"JAZZ FOR GOETHE" ON "POLITICS' THIRD STAGE" ("DRITTE BÜHNE DER POLITIK") WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED JAZZ TOURS DURING THE 1960S: REVISITING "OUTDATED IMAGINATIONS OF WEST GERMANY" OR PARTICIPATING IN WESTERN "CULTURAL PENETRATION"?
ANDREW HURLEY

Introduction

In early 1964, Albert Mangelsdorff's West German modern jazz quintet set out on a lengthy tour of Asia. It gave 50 concerts in 65 days from Iran to Japan (Berends, *Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.)). The tour was financed by the West German language and cultural institute, the Goethe Institut, and was reported as being the first tour by a group of West German jazz musicians to be supported in this way with public funds ("Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika" 277). The Goethe Institut apparently took some convincing that this was an appropriate use for its funds, however by the mid-late 1960s it was regularly sending West German jazz musicians overseas as part of its cultural policy (Berends, *Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.); Berends, *Ein Fenster aus Jazz* 227 – 8). As a representative of the Institut reported in 1968, it had by then financed 26 tours to all continents but Australia. At this stage almost one fifth of its annual music budget of approximately one million DM was devoted to jazz tours ("Jazz aus Deutschland" 277).

Being novel, the early (1964 – 68) tours were regularly reported on in the West German jazz press. This article will examine a range of sources, including the *Jahrbücher* (yearly reports) of the Goethe Institut and the reports of these early tours given in the West German jazz press. It will argue that the Goethe Institut jazz tours fulfilled an important purpose: they provided an opportunity to West German jazz musicians and critics (and ultimately to the FRG itself) to advance a modern, liberal and tolerant image of West Germany to overseas and domestic audiences. The desire to do this exhibited itself in a number of ways. Broad mission statements of the Goethe Institut outlined the thrust of its cultural policy. At a more concrete level, sometimes the jazz tourists expressly prided themselves on having presented an "updated" image of a modern West Germany (Johanns 94). At other times they expressed their respect for other musical cultures ("Now Jazz Ramwong – Asiatische Themen aber Jazz a la Mangelsdorff" 192). Sometimes they concluded that they had performed *Bildungshilfe* ("educational aid work") (Johanns 95) or made a "valuable contribution to global understanding" ("wertvoller Beitrag zur Völkerverständigung"; Berends, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140). These positions coincided with the cultural policy of the Institut and allowed those musicians and critics to...
emphasise a causus which they (perhaps unconsciously) wished to draw between postwar West Germany and the inaural cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist past.

However this article will also suggest that at least some of the recipients (or intended recipients) of these jazz tours had a more critical attitude towards jazz and to activities which introduced western popular culture into their countries. Whilst there is a paucity of Indonesian primary sources, the mid-1960s attitude of the Indonesian President Sukarno and his allies in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) towards western popular culture (including jazz) will be explored here by way of example.

Finally, the article will examine the points of intersection between these two differing attitudes to jazz. It concludes that West German jazzers may have been unreactive to the sorts of arguments advanced by Sukarno and other like-minded Asians for two reasons. Firstly, these arguments resonated with anti-jazz arguments which had been advanced in the past by the East German communist regime. Secondly, they were infused with cultural nationalism, which from the postwar West German liberal habitus embraced by champions of jazz such as Berendt, was highly suspect.

**Jazz and postwar West German liberalism**

In his recent book *Beyond the Swastika*, Peter O'Brien has described what he calls a postwar West German liberal *Weltanschauung* ("world view"), according to which postwar West German history is seen as a protracted struggle between the "Manichaean opposites" (12) of German nationalism (illiberalism) and western liberalism (1-2). O'Brien argues that this *Weltanschauung* was based on an anxiety caused by the memory of the Weimar Republic's failure: as postwar West German intellectuals were only too aware, Hitler had come to power democratically. Seeking to explain this phenomenon, some West German intellectuals argued that Germans were "philosophically predisposed" to welcome a dictator promising a "utopian community" (24). In the 1950s and 1960s, various writers posited a German *Sonderweg* ("special path") to modernity which involved a "modernized society without a modernized (that is liberal) citizenry" (30 – 31). According to O'Brien, this postwar liberal *Weltanschauung* involved a concern that German nationalism/illiberalism was a "dormant virus capable of revival" (40). O'Brien argues that the result was a strong investment in technocratic liberalism on the part of postwar West German liberal intellectuals as well as a compulsion on their part to "keep vigilant watch for the slightest traces of nationalist revival" (3).

The watchdog stance of postwar West German intellectuals was interpreted. Although jazz had Socialist ideologues, some postwar West German jazz was considered "protofascist. According to one anonymous interpretation increasingly ceded to that of the Germanamerican writer of jazz concerts succumbed to the fascists of tomorrow (Korscheneutzer). This interpretation was advanced by means of catchy aphorisms such as "the jazz does not exist" ("Jazz in Germany [111]"), by opponents to "artistic sense," ("Kunstgestalt des Diktators"; Der just abated towards the end of the 1950s, such as for West Germany. Even the arch-conservative CSL 1958 (Berendt, "Was halten Sie vom Jazz Herr V

The liberal interpretation of jazz was quite prodigious: one could demonstrate one's liberal credentials an anti-jazzfinische rifle ("jazz-inimical") National Socialist: The liberal interpretation of jazz was quite prodigious: one could demonstrate one's liberal credentials as anti-jazzfinische rifle ("jazz-inimical") National Socialist: – from the illiberalism of the East German communism

During the early 1960s, when West German jazz called "Third World," this reigning liberal ironies which O'Brien describes as being part of the postwar West Germans in the way in which those critics and they encountered.
The watchdog stance of postwar West German intellectuals had implications for the way in which jazz was interpreted. Although jazz had been officially disapproved of by National Socialist ideologues, some postwar conservatives took the view that jazz was dangerously (and inherently) protofascist. According to one such view, jazz enthusiasts who got carried away with themselves at jazz concerts succumbed to a herd mentality and, by implication, were the fascists of tomorrow (Kotschenreuther 198 – 210). By the end of the 1950s, this anxious interpretation increasingly crossed to that of liberal conservatives, who saw youthful jazz enthusiasm as being more a harmless (and even desirable) consumer behaviour (Poiger 6 – 7).

Joachim Ernst Berendt did not share the anxieties about jazz which West German conservatives had expressed in the early 1950s. Since the late 1940s, he had championed jazz vigorously. For Berendt, jazz had a distinct programmatic value. According to his interpretation, it was very much on the side of liberalism rather than illiberal nationalism. As he admitted in his recent autobiography, Berendt saw his championing of jazz in postwar Germany as being partly about helping to overcome past chauvinism and building tolerance (Das Leben Ein Klang 314). On numerous occasions during the 1950s he advanced jazz’s liberal credentials. Accordingly, it was expressed to embody a democratic tolerance of opposing viewpoints, and to be fundamentally anti-fascist, anti-ideological and antinationalist (Der Jazz Eine zeitkritische Studie 32; “Jazz als Ideologie”). This interpretation was advanced by Berendt in various articles and essays by means of catchy aphorisms such as “jazz does not go for nations. It is international par excellence” (“Jazz in Germany [#1]”) and by opposing jazz to what he dubbed the “dictator’s artistic sense” (“Kunstgefühl des Diktators”; Der Jazz 32). As conservative anxieties about jazz abated towards the end of the 1950s, such a liberal interpretation increasingly held sway in West Germany. Even the arch-conservative CSU politician Franz Josef Strauss adopted it in 1958 (Berendt, “Was halten Sie vom Jazz Herr Verteidigungsminister?”).

The liberal interpretation of jazz was quite productive too. By displaying an interest in jazz, one could demonstrate one’s liberal credentials and distance oneself from the illiberalism of the fascist National Socialist past and/or – as in Franz Josef Strauss’s case – from the illiberalism of the East German communist regime (Berendt, “Was halten Sie”).

During the early 1960s, when West German jazz critics and musicians began moving the so-called “Third World,” this reigning liberal interpretation of jazz and the “watchdog” stance, which O’Brien describes as being part of the postwar West German liberal habitus, manifested themselves in the way in which those critics and musicians commented on other cultures that they encountered.
Berndt and Asian (musical) nationalism

In 1962, a little under two years before Mangelodorff's inaugural Goethe Institut tour of Asia, Berndt spent three months traveling through the region. This trip produced a stream of articles for West German and international newspapers and magazines such as Downbeat, even and Die Welt. These articles sang the praises of non-European musical cultures. However, they also demonstrated the opposition drawn by Berndt between jazz as the epitome of tolerance and liberalism and illiberal nationalism. When nationalist considerations intersected with jazz, Berndt argued that they interfered with the quality of the jazz produced. He asserted for example that the standard of the Thai King Bhumipol's Royal Jazz Sextet was marred by its All-Thai make up. King Bhumipol's jazz band was restricted in this way for what Berndt called "patriotic and national reasons" ("patriotischen und nationalen Gründen"); [EB]s Asienreise [Teil 2] 25. If only, Berndt lamented, the band contained some of the excellent Phillipino musicians resident in Bangkok, it would be truly "regal" ("königlich"; Asienreise Teil 2" 25).

Javanese cultural nationalism in President Sukarno's Indoneisa was also singled out for criticism. According to Berndt, President Sukarno was seeking to instate Javanese culture as the homogenous culture throughout the Indonesian archipelago: Berndt wrote that Sukarno had the "Javanisation" ("Javanisierung"); "Asienreise Teil 1" 23) of Bali well and truly in his sights. In this respect, Berndt took the side of the Balinese. According to him, this cultural minority had managed to keep its culture "pure, without becoming ill-willed towards or rejecting the foreign -- as other peoples had had to do in order to keep their culture pure" ("rein, ohne abweisend und böse gegenüber dem Fremden zu werden -- wie andere Völker das mussten, um ihre Kultur rein erhalten zu können"; "Asienreise Teil 1" 23). The Balinese might have been isolated and have conformed themselves, but in his view they were not chauvinist or exclusionary; they were "receptive and open, when it comes to something appropriate to them" ("aufnahmefähig und zugänglich, wenn es um etwas ihnen gemäßes geht"; "Asienreise Teil 1" 23).

Berndt's siding with the minority Balinese (and also with the minority ethnic Chinese; "Asienreise Teil 2" 23-4) against the homogenising Javanese cultural nationalism of President Sukarno is important for several reasons. As with his other, later comments in relation to cultural nationalism elsewhere in the Third World (Festser 276), Berndt demonstrated a heightened sensitivity towards "exotic" nationalism. This sensitivity to foreign nationalism was a further manifestation of the postwar West German liberal habitus, which, on O'Brien's interpretation, was primarily concerned with domestic nationalism.

Siding with the Balinese and the Indonesian Chir the postwar German context. The Balinese and Berndt as being cultural minorities suffering unposition was analogous with that of the Jews and expressly made a link between the Chinese in Indonesia often told [in Indonesia] that 'the Chinese with us you [in Germany] [...] 'No-one likes them but the bel uns so etwa, was die Juden bei Euch waren' we sie machen die große Geschäfte"; 'Jazz in Djakarta'.

Supporting the cause of the ethnic Chinese consistent with postwar West German philosopher The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, the philos antisememism (and indeed reversing it) and thereby Stern shows that, in the postwar era, and particular it the Jewish people and their suffering) was in Germany's political integration into the West. I d or even conscious strategy, however I suggest that by Berndt towards the ethnic Chinese and Bali the oppressed 'Jews' of Indonesia demonstrated d National Socialist past. As noted above, Berndt's clear attack on those peoples (and he clearly had cultural purity had become 'ill-willed' towards to be interpreted as both a rejection of the past and not to fall back into the nationalist ways of that p.

Jazz for Goethe?

With the Goethe Institut jazz tours, West Germany (ultimately the FRG itself) had a new avenue thro From 1964 these tours presented a viable, practical Germany was a modern and open country. Before representation took, it is worth passing for a mc Institut and its shifting cultural policies during th
Siding with the Balinese and the Indonesian Chinese also had another special significance in the postwar German context. The Balinese and the Indonesian Chinese were described by Berendt as being cultural minorities suffering under the yoke of a nationalist dictator. This position was analogous with that of the Jews under Hitler: indeed, in a 1967 article Berendt expressly made a link between the Chinese in Indonesia and the Jews in Germany: "One is often told [in Indonesia] that the Chinese with you [in Indonesia] are rather like the Jews with you [in Germany] [...] ‘No-one likes them but they do the big business’ (‘Die Chinesen sind bei uns so etwa, was die Juden bei Euch waren’ wird einem oft gesagt, ‘nienand mag sie, aber sie machen die große Geschäfte’, ‘Jazz in Djakarta (Indonesien)’)."

Supporting the cause of the ethnic Chinese or the Balinese in Indonesia was, I argue, consistent with postwar West German philosemitism. As Frank Stern has demonstrated in The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, the philosemitic gesture involved publicly disavowing antsemitism (and indeed reversing it) and thereby seeking to make amends for the Holocaust. Stern shows that, in the postwar era, and particularly in the 1950s, philosemitism (and with it the Jewish people and their suffering) was instrumentalised as a way of assisting West Germany’s political integration into the West. I do not wish to imply that it was a calculating or even conscious strategy, however I suggest that a philosemitic-like attitude was expressed by Berendt towards the ethnic Chinese and Balinese in Indonesia. Put bluntly, siding with the oppressed “Jews” of Indonesia demonstrated distance from the cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist past. As noted above, Berendt’s writing about the Balinese also contained a clear attack on those peoples (and he clearly had Germany in mind) who, in order to maintain cultural purity had become “ill-willed” towards foreign cultures. This ‘watchdog’ remark can be interpreted as both a rejection of the past and an admonition to his West German readers not to fall back into the nationalist ways of that past.

Jazz for Goethe?

With the Goethe Institut jazz tours, West German jazz critics (and now musicians, and ultimately the FRG itself) had a new avenue through which to demonstrate their liberalism. From 1964 these tours presented a viable, practical forum to show to the world that West Germany was a modern and open country. Before examining the precise forms that this self-representation took, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the nature of the Goethe Institut and its shifting cultural policies during the 1960s.
The Goethe Institut (now the Goethe Institut-Inter Nationes) is a counterpart to the British Council and the Alliance Française. It was founded by the FRG in 1952 and was initially charged with the responsibility of conducting German language courses in West Germany for foreigners (particularly from the so-called underdeveloped countries) who had been granted scholarships to study at West German universities (Ross 7). In 1960, the federal Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt) gave the Institut the additional task of founding and administrating so-called "cultural institutes" (Kulturinstitute) abroad (Ross 8). These Kulturinstitute were soon established in a wide range of locations throughout the "First" and "Third World." They carried on language courses and also presented cultural events (musical concerts, theatre exhibitions and lectures).

From the outset, the Kulturinstitute had a specific cultural-political (kulturpolitische) brief. At a basic level, this involved representing West German culture to the world at large. Karl-Ernest Hüldepohl, the head of the Institut’s programming division, outlined the task in 1968: According to him, it involved: providing factual information about West Germany; garnering sympathy for West Germany by means of both cultural representation and the provision of services; collaboration on joint projects; as a result of this, cultural exchange (or what he called the "reciprocal endeavours towards the understanding of the self- and otherness of the other" ("wechselseitigen Bemühren um das Verständnis des So- und Anderenessens des Anderen"; 19)) and ultimately the "deliberate collaboration on the growing together, the reciprocal penetrations and the self-complementation of the cultures" ("bewußte Mitarbeit am Zusammenwachsen, an der gegenseitigen Durchdringung und am Sich-Ergänzen der Kulturen"; 19).

The question of representation of (West) German culture was a vexed one in the context of postwar Germany. On the one hand, it was felt that after National Socialism it was necessary to rehabilitate or redeem Germany's international reputation. However, given that the cultural politics of the National Socialists and those of the Goethe Institut could be seen, in their way, to be both celebrations of "German" culture, it was necessary for the Goethe Institut to distinguish strongly between the two. These two dimensions of postwar West German self-representation are evident in the early Jahrbücher of the Institut.

According to the President of the Institut, Peter H. Pfeiffer's introductory remarks in the 1965 Jahrbuch, Germany needed to win back "that reputation [...] which she possessed in her great days and which she forfeited through the madness of self-overestimation" ("jenes Aussehen [...] das sie in ihren großen Tagen besessen und durch den Wahn der Selbstüberschätzung eingebüßt haben"; 1965 Jahrbuch Geleitwort). However, it was important to distance the notion of representing West Germany abroad which according to Werner Ross (also writing in his book "of overtake and of ill repulse" ("politisch überholt ode the Institut from the idea of aggressive cultural] [culture] on a man by violence" ("mit aller Gewalt Jahrbuch Geleitwort)). Instead, he stipulated that "as a working-wit and an encouragement, as an and Anregung, als Muster oder Möglichkeit"; 11 reveal that in the mid-1960s, the Goethe Institut German past.

The presentation and celebration of German culture being placed in an expressly liberal, non-national, or even universal, the representation of West Germany properly to be understood as part of a broader understanding aimed at the project of "an uncon vergablosen Öffnung zum Welt"; Ross is seen as part of an international "world culture" ("the Institut's cultural work was aimed at securing of peoples" ("einen würdigen Platz im Konzert der Welt") in culture in postwar Germany.

This left open the question of what sort of German culture actually finance. In the early 1960s, its cultural ev and conservative concept of culture. Berendt at "Mozart, Beethoven, Goethe etc" (Now Jazz is degree of domestic criticism. As Werner Ross pc hurried to discern in this this baroque music by carte FRG" ("ließe Journalisten bezeelten sich auch in restaurativen Grundzugs der Bundesrepublik zu e

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which according to Werner Ross (also writing in the inaugural 1965 Jahrbuch) was "politically
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Institut from the idea of aggressive cultural politics or what he called "looting German
[culture] on a man by violence" (”mit aller Gewalt Deutches an den Mann zu bringen”; 1968
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as a working-with and an encouragement, as an example or a possibility” (”als Mit-Wirkung
und Anregung, als Muster oder Möglichkeit”; 1968 Jahrbuch Geleitwort). These comments
reveal that in the mid-1960s, the Goethe Institut still had one eye firmly fixed on the recent
German past.

The presentation and celebration of German culture abroad was also rendered benign by
being placed in an expressly liberal, non-national, cosmopolitan context. According to Pfeiffer,
Ross and Hildepohl, the representation of West German culture by the Goethe Institut
was properly to be understood as part of a broader notion of cultural exchange and intercultural
understanding aimed at the project of “an unconditional opening up to One World” (”einer
vorbereitenden Öffnung zur Einen Welt”; ROSS 15). Germany’s culture was therefore to be
seen as part of an international "world culture" ("Weltkultur"; ROSS 15). In Pfeiffer’s words,
the Institut’s cultural work was aimed at securing West Germany’s "worthy place in the concert
of peoples” (”einen würdigen Platz im Konzert der Völker”; 1966 Jahrbuch Geleitwort).

This left open the question of what sort of German cultural offerings the Goethe Institut
should actually finance. In the early 1960s, its cultural events abroad tended to be pegged to
a narrow and conservative concept of culture. Berendt summed up this tradition-oriented policy
as "Mozart, Beethoven, Goethe etc" (Now Jazz Ramwong (re)). This policy in turn led to a
degree of domestic criticism. As Werner Ross pointed out as early as 1965, "busy journalists
hurried to discern in this ‘baroque music by candlelight’ the restorative characteristic of the
FRG" ("Feißeige Journalisten beilten sich auch in dieser ‘Barockmusik bei Kerzenzachein’ den
restaurativen Grundzug der Bundesrepublik zu entdecken"; 8).

Around the time of Mangelsdorff’s 1964 Asian tour, the Institut was entering into a phase
of pensiveness, of new structuring, of planning” ("der Nachdenklichkeit, der Neuordnung,
der Planung") which involved a fundamental re-examination of the notion of "culture" (ROSS
13). According to Ross, the Institut was seeking to distance itself from the idea of culture
as a "repertoire to be represented and presented" ("Bastellendes und vorzustellendes
Repertoire") and instead was seeking to translate it into "life, function, mediation, exchange"
("Leben, Funktion, Vermittlung, Austausch"; 15). In other words, the Goethe Institut was beginning to view culture less as a handied-down and passively received thing and more as processual. As the 1960s progressed, the Goethe Institut continued to express this desire to liberate itself "from the traditional, too noble and narrow concept of culture" ("von dem überkommenen, zu edlen und engen Kulturbegriff"; Pfeiffer 1968 Jahrbuch Geleitwort), a desire which appears to have been expressed with more urgency in the years after the unrest of the 1968 student protests. It was also advanced again in 1970, after the Ausswärtiges Amt reformulated its Kulturpolitik (von Herwarth 1970 Jahrbuch Geleitwort; Goethe Institut, "Zur Geschichte des Goethe Institutes").

Jazz concerts provided one concrete opportunity for the Goethe Institut to reflect a broadened, more up-to-date notion of culture. However, the Institut's programming of jazz was not uncontested. Throughout the 1960s, jazz continued to be regarded by some critical voices as not being "German" and therefore, in the context of representing German culture abroad, as being "cheating/wrong playing" ("Falschspiele"); reported in 1968 Jahrbuch 60; Mangeldorff, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159).

By the late 1960s, detractors of the Institut were also suggesting that its programming of jazz was simply an "Alibi" for conservative, business-as-usual programming (reported in 1969 Jahrbuch 115).

These domestic concerns with the notion of (German) "culture" did not exist in isolation however. At a foreign policy level, the Goethe Institut's change of focus served a distinct purpose too. Its new policy of jazz programming was partly motivated by a desire to broaden the foreign appeal of its overseas cultural events. By the mid 1960s, the Institut had identified that its concerts tended to attract a rather small, elite, "society" crowd. As such, there was an unfortunate "guilt" ("Kulfr") between those who attended the Institut's language courses and those who attended its concerts (Ross 14).

The desire to close the gap and broaden the appeal of the Goethe Institut cultural events, however, only went so far. On the whole, the Institut exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards what it called the "mass public" ("Massenpublikum"; Homburger 41). It was clearly proud of the larger, youthful audiences which its jazz concerts attracted. The Institut was also excited by the possibilities of telecasts of its jazz concerts reaching very large audiences. This increased coverage must have satisfied those in the Ausswärtiges Amt who held the purse strings. However, the Institut noticeably shied away from programming popular music. As a 1968 report in Jazz Podium reveals, the Institut indicated that it was not interested in programming "inferior popular functional music" ("minderwertige populäre Gebrauchsmusik") in order to attract the masses" ("die Massen anzulocken"); this ambivalence towards popular music was ali for the association between commercial reçoal opposed to Unterrichtung ("education"), the recordings of its jazz tourists "Deutscher Jazz domestic viability of its cultural work abroad Munich; Doldinger, The Ambassador; 1968 Jahn). The "masses" were by no means the primary at Werner Ross indicated in 1965 that it was par events foreign intellectuals, as or he termed the and society" ("zwischen der Massen und der" those who attended the language courses). Internals thus: "They can learn from us, we learn, wir können von ihnen lernen" (14).

This reorientation in the Goethe Institut's cult of the artistic merit of jazz in West Germany it was increasingly seen as having legitimate a Unterhaltungsmusik ("entertainment-music"). Initially somewhat tentative, however. In respect to the extent of his country's achievements in j "little, but perhaps nevertheless one or two th do das eine oder andere Vorzeigbare" 15). Berendt and others in the late 1950s and early Goethe Institut to countenance financing jazz to Albert Mangeldorff quitter's 1964 Asian tour. The expectations placed on the audience, also to represent West Germany considerables - indeed the future funding of a...
In other words, the Goethe Institut was and passively received thing and more as a "Institut continued to express this desire for a broader concept of culture" ("von dem derzeitigen"; Pfeiffer 1968 Jahrbuch Geleitworten), a more urgency in the years after the unification in 1970, after the Auswärtiges Amt Jahrbuch Geleitwort; Goethe Institut, "Zur

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"attract the masses" ("die Massen anzulocken"; "Jazz aus Deutschland für Südeuropa" 277). This ambivalence towards popular music was also evident elsewhere: Despite a stated distaste for the association between commercial recordings and Unterhaltung ("entertainment") (as opposed to Unterrichtung ("education")), the Goethe Institut used commercially released recordings of its jazz tours "Deutscher Jazz 68" and Klaus Doldinger to promote the domestic visibility of its cultural work abroad (The German Allstars, Live at the Domicile Munich; Doldinger, The Ambassador; 1968 Jahrbuch 89; 1969 Jahrbuch 116).

The "masses" were by no means the primary audience that the Goethe Institut was targeting. Werner Ross indicated in 1965 that it was particularly interested in attracting to its cultural events foreign intellectuals, or as he termed them, the class which exists "between the 'masses' and society" ("zwischen der 'Massen' und der 'Gesellschaft'"; 14). In short, he had in mind those who attended the language courses. Ross boldly formulated the appeal of foreign intellectuals thus: "They can learn from us, we can learn from them" ("Sie können von uns lernen, wir können von ihnen lernen"; 14).

This reorientation in the Goethe Institut's cultural policy coincided with a growing acceptance of the artistic merit of jazz in West Germany. By the early 1960s, jazz - or at least some of it - was increasingly seen as having legitimate artistic value, as being distanced from popular Unterhaltungsmusik ("entertainment-music"). The embrace of jazz by the Goethe Institut was initially somewhat tentative, however. In response to his own 1965 rhetorical question as to the extent of his country's achievements in jazz, Werner Ross argued that it had achieved "little, but perhaps nevertheless one or two things worth showing" ("we"gen, aber vielleicht doch das eine oder andere Vorzeigbare" 15). It took considerable persuasion on the part of Berendt and others in the late 1950s and early 1960s for the Auswärtiges Amt and then the Goethe Institut to countenance financing jazz tours. The culmination of these efforts was the Albert Mangelsdorff quintet's 1964 Asian tour (Berendt: "Jazz für den fernen Osten"). The Goethe Institut made it clear that this trip was to be a one-off experiment (Berendt: Now Jazz Ramsweig (rec.)). The expectations placed on the group (not only to attract a larger, younger audience, but also to represent West Germany in an appropriate way) must have been considerable - indeed the future funding of other such tours was effectively riding on it.

The Goethe Institut Jazz Tours: liberal tolerance and respect in action

West German jazz musicians and critics connected with the guiding liberal philosophy of the Goethe Institut's cultural policies in a number of ways. Their reports in the press reveal that
they understood themselves to be representing West Germany as a modern and open country. This was done variously: by making explicit verbal representations from the bandstand; simply by the act of playing modern jazz; by building a respectful bridge to the audience by means of a jazz adaptation of a local tune; or by participating in what they interpreted as cultural exchange or collaboration.

Joachim Ernst Berendt used his announcements at Mangelsdorff's concerts during the 1964 Asian tour to make representations about modern West Germany. One of these assertions was that West Germany was now a "peace loving country" which had left its militaristic past behind it (New Jazz Ramwong). Some of the jazz tourists understood that simply by playing modern jazz, they were representing West Germany as a modern country, distanced from its tainted past. There is a paucity of primary evidence to indicate how such representations were actually received in the countries that these early jazz tourists visited. However, we do have a number of the jazz tourists' own accounts. Some of these tourists interpreted that their musical representations of a modern West Germany were not falling on deaf ears. This was a cause for some pride.

The jazz singer Willi Johanss, who traveled to North Africa in late 1965 and early 1966 with the Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra, offers one example. Johanss took delight when he interpreted that the Orchestra's music had caused North African audiences to rethink their understanding of West Germany. From the German perspective, what postwar North African audiences thought of Germany was not simply a matter of intellectual curiosity: North Africa had been, a little over twenty years earlier, a significant arena of German military aggression during the Second World War. Johanss proudly noted that his North African audiences had been surprised "that such a lively and contemporary music could come from the land of Wagner and the Nibelungen" ("daß aus dem Laute Wagners und der Nibelungen eine solch lebendige und zeitnahe Musik zu hören war"); 94). He did not need to remind his West German jazz readership of the link between National Socialist ideology and Wagner's antisemitism and music. As a final gloss, Johanss enthusiastically claimed that the Edelhagen jazz tour ensured that "outdated imaginations of Germany and its current cultural life were revised" ("überholte Vorstellung von Deutschland und seinen heutigen Kulturleben wurden damit revidiert"); 94).

At the level of cultural practice too, these jazz tours offered West German musicians and critics an opportunity to demonstrate their respect for and interest in other cultures, which had previously been marginalized or denigrated from a European perspective. Some of the individual Kulturtante paid their respects to these musical cultures by inviting local musicians performing in traditional (as well as those Kulturtante (1965 Jahrbuch 42; 1970) is one context for interpreting the praise lavish as Berendt and musicians such as Mangelsdorff. German jazz tourists like Mangelsdorff to play at

When in Thailand, for example, the Mangelsdorff Thai King Bhumipol (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten") having been conceived as "special musical greets in countries visited ("Jazz für den fernen Osten") Podium concurred when it viewed New Jazz Ram the admired musical culture of Asia" ("dies er Musik kultur Asiens"; "New Jazz Ramwong - As Asian audience. King Bhumipol does not appear his composition: indeed after Mangelsdorff's give them to jam with his own "Royal Jazz Sextet" (E were impressed with Mangelsdorff's efforts: the that the Mangelsdorff quintet had done a "man Djay Ramwong") (qtd in Berendt, New Jazz Ram Jack Lesmana and Bubi Chen interpreted Mange Burungkaka Tua as a musical greeting to them Lesmana and Chen subsequently repaid the "mu a version of a German jazz composition on their Bali. Even a jazz such as the Japanese trumpets point of view, interpreted jazz adaptations of western jazz musicians to be "a bit gratuitous, an actual song itself and just appreciate the music

West German jazz musicians and commentators fleeting) musical collaboration or exchange between World" musicians occurred. This usually occurs
musicians performing in traditional (as well as modern) styles of music to give concerts at those Kulturinstitute (1965 Jahrbuch 42; 1970 Jahrbuch 74). The desire to "show respect" is one context for interpreting the praise lavished on non-European musics by writers such as Berendt and musicians such as Mangelsdorff. It also contextualises the attempts by West German jazz tourists like Mangelsdorff to play adaptations of local songs whilst on tour.

When in Thailand, for example, the Mangelsdorff group performed a composition by the Thai King Bhumipol (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 138). Mangelsdorff viewed such adaptations as a way of building a bridge to local audiences who might otherwise have had little exposure to jazz (Now Jazz Ramwong). When Mangelsdorff made a recording of these versions on his return to Germany (Now Jazz Ramwong), they were billed by Berendt as having been conceived as "special musical greetings" ("spezielle musikalische Grüße") to the countries visited ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 138). The West German jazz periodical Jazz Podium concurred when it viewed Now Jazz Ramwong as involving a "respectful bow towards the admired musical culture of Asia" ("ehrlich und bewundernden Musikkultur Asiens"; "Now Jazz Ramwong – Asiatische Themen" 192).

This interest in and respect for other musics was clearly appreciated by some of Mangelsdorff's Asian audience. King Bhumipol does not appear to have been put off by the adaptation of his composition: indeed after Mangelsdorff's group had performed at his court, he invited them to jam with his own "Royal Jazz Sextet" (Berendt, Now Jazz Ramwong). Other locals were impressed with Mangelsdorff's efforts: the reviewer from the Bangkok Post considered that the Mangelsdorff quintet had done a "marvelous job transforming the folktrne["Nau Djay Ramwong"]" (qtd in Berendt, Now Jazz Ramwong). The two Indonesian jazz musicians Jack Lesmana and Bubi Chen interpreted Mangelsdorff's version of the Indonesian folk song Barungkaka Tua as a musical greeting to them and their cohort (Berendt, Djangari Bali). Lesmana and Chen subsequently repaid the "musical greeting" by performing and recording a version of a German jazz composition on their 1967 European tour and recording Djangari Bali. Even a jazzier such as the Japanese trumpeter Terumasa Hino, who, from the musican's point of view, interpreted jazz adaptations of Japanese folk songs performed by visiting western jazz musicians to be "a bit gratuitous, not very interesting" was able to "name out the actual song itself and just appreciate the musicianship of the performers" (Hino).

West German jazz musicians and commentators also delighted in instances where (often fleeting) musical collaboration or exchange between West German jazz musicians and "Third World" musicians occurred. This usually occurred in the form of a jam session (Hömberg 50).
or where local musicians were spontaneously invited to perform on stage with the Germans (1966 *Jahrbuch* 81). Such instances were lauded as forms of "intellectual exchange" ("geistigen Austausch"); Johanna 95) or "genuine encounters and lively cultural exchange" ("echten Begegnungen und lebendigen Kulturaustausch"); "Doldinger füllt Titelseiten" 175). However the "close collaboration between the German artists and their Latin American, African and Asian colleagues" to which Berendt referred in 1980 (*New Jazz Ramswong (re.)*) was not yet a reality when Mangeladoff's group traveled to Asia in 1964. As Mangeladoff observed at the time, the band was simply too busy rehearsing, traveling and performing to have a great deal of leisure time in which to "really get to know the land[s] and [their] people" ("Land und Leute wirklich kennenzulernen"); "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 158). The extent of the collaboration which occurred on that tour amounted to an occasional jam session, and a short visit, for example, to Ravi Shankar's music school in Bombay (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" and *New Jazz Ramswong*). Longer term Goethe Institut-funded collaborations would come later — for example when the German-based Dave Pike Set traveled to Bahia (Brazil) in 1972 and resided there with the Brazilian group *Grupo Bahia* for two weeks. This collaboration resulted in performances and a joint recording (Schreiner). It possibly also reflected a 1970 change in Goethe Institut policy which increasingly focused on "dialogic and partnership-based cultural work" ("dialogische und partnerschaftliche Kulturarbeit"); Goethe Institut).

Berendt for one did not shy away from making the boldest claims for these early Goethe Institut jazz tours. On the return of Mangeladoff's group in 1964, he published an article on the tour in which he expressed the conviction that jazz (and by extension the Goethe Institut jazz tours) stood to make a "valuable contribution to global understanding" ("wertvoller Beitrag zur Völkerverständigung"); "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140). In Berendt's view, the jazz tours and the intercultural communication which they invoked were a bridge to a future conviviality of countries.

Some of the West German jazz musicians involved with these tours understood themselves to be making a significant contribution to the recipients of their tours: Albert Mangeladoff connected with the idea of musical *Bildungshilfe* when he reported that "the more rewarding part of [his trip] was that we were allowed to feel that we had given the others something" ("das beglückendste dieser Reise [war], daß wir spüren durften, anderen etwas gegeben zu haben"); "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). Willi Johanna also pondered whether these activities might not be considered musical *Bildungshilfe* (95). This was a notion which the Goethe Institut itself also advanced at various times during the mid to late 1960s (Hömburger 9; Hüdepohl 19 – 20; 1967 *Jahrbuch* 91; Pfeiffer 1968 *Jahrbuch Gebietswelt*; Pfeiffer 1970 *Jahrbuch Gebietswelt*).

As a final gloss in his article for *Jazz Podium*, Berendt to be "ambassadors of the lively musical events lebendigen Musikgeschehens der westlichen Weltern to eastern Lands" ("in die östlichen Länders beneficent stance — as well as the notion of music with the guiding liberal philosophy of the Institute argue, a desire on the part of some West German cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist era: redemption for that chauvinism.

However, this is only part of the story. There was such as the Goethe Institut jazz tours and the notion focus is turned to Indonesia in the early 1960s. M the country in 1964 because of the "political conf (Berendt, *Djanger Bali*; Ticoalu, Telephone inter possibly have met with an interpretation of jazz not see jazz as a medium towards a conviviality or jazz adaptation of the Indonesian folk song *Buru* than "special musical greetings.

**Reconstructing President Sukarno's Attitude**

In early 1964, when Mangeladoff's band was in Indonesia was engaged in a volatile confrontation 203 – 246). Since September 1963, the federal leaders (including the Indonesian communist par President Sukarno). Malaysia was seen by these British sponsors. Related to the Malaysia issue military (Mortimer 226). Part of that milita popular culture, particularly film (Mortimer 244).

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ried to perform on stage with the Germans as forms of ‘intellectual exchange’ (‘geistigen ers and lively cultural exchange’ (‘echten Doldinger füllt Titelseiten’ 175). However, observed in the occasional jazz session, and a short visit, for a Piko Set traveled to Bahia (Brazil) in 1972 Baiafo for two weeks. This collaboration ichreiner). It possibly also reflected a 1970 focused on ‘dialogic and partnership-based Kulturarbeit’; Goethe Institut).

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As a final gloss in his article for Jazz Podium, Berendt considered groups such as Mangelsdorff’s to be “ambassadors of the lively musical events in the Western world” (“Botschafter des lebendigen Musikgeschichtens der westlichen Welt”) and that they should continue to be sent “to eastern Lands” (“in die östlichen Länder” “Jazz für den fernen Osten” 140). This beneficent stance – as well as the notion of musical Bildungshilfe – was thoroughly in accord with the guiding liberal philosophy of the Institut’s cultural work. It also represents, I would argue, a desire on the part of some West German critics and musicans to reverse the harmful cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist era and perhaps to make an unconscious bid for redemption for that chauvinism.

However, this is only part of the story. There was an alternative way of interpreting activities such as the Goethe Institut jazz tours and the notion of Bildungshilfe. This can be seen if the focus is turned to Indonesia in the early 1960s. Mangelsdorff’s group had been unable to enter the country in 1964 because of the “political confrontation” between Indonesia and Malaysia (Berendt, Djangg Balli; Ticoalu, Telephone interview). Had they been able to, they would possibly have met with an interpretation of jazz on the part of some Indonesians which did not see jazz as a medium towards a conviviality of countries and which may have held their jazz adaptation of the Indonesian folk song Barungjaka Tuas to be something more harmful than “special musical greetings.”

Reconstructing President Sukarno’s attitude to jazz

In early 1964, when Mangelsdorff’s band was waiting in Singapore to gain entry to Indonesia, Indonesia was engaged in a volatile confrontation with the Malaysian federation (Mortimer 203 – 246). Since September 1963, the federation had been a burning issue for Indonesia’s leaders (including the Indonesian communist party (PKI), which increasingly had the ear of President Sukarno). Malaysia was seen by these leaders to be an imperialist creation of its British sponsors. Related to the Malaysia issue was an upsurge in general anti-imperialist militancy (Mortimer 226). Part of that militancy was specifically directed at American popular culture, particularly film (Mortimer 244).

Though there is a paucity of historical Indonesian primary sources relating to jazz in the 1960s, based on Berendt’s account as well as on the supporting comments of a number of Indonesian jazz musicians and writers, jazz apparently did not escape Sukarno’s and other Indonesian leaders’ criticism at this time. Berendt first wrote about Sukarno’s opposition to
jazz after his 1962 Asian trip ("Asienreise Teil 2"). He also discussed it when the Indonesian Allstars performed in Europe in 1967, that is, after Sukarno's and the PKI's fall. According to Berendt, this opposition to jazz manifested itself in several ways: firstly, jazz recordings were hard to come by (Berliner Jazztage 1967 program notes 4). Further, in 1961 the American jazz musician Tony Scott (who had been residing in Indonesia in the early 1960s and participating in his own jazz proselytizing) was ordered to leave the country (Berliner Jazztage notes 4). Finally, the Indonesian guitarist Jack Lesmana (who occasionally performed in President Sukarno's presence and who had a penchant for jazz improvisation) was requested by Sukarno to desist from improvising. A recording by Lesmana's ensemble dating from 1965 which expressly received the imprimatur of President Sukarno — it even bore a song penned by him — gives a hint as to what sort of music was ideologically acceptable to the President. The album contains, for example, a straight, Indonesian "Lensu" version of the folk song Bursungkaka Tua. It is quite different from the jazz version recorded by Lesmana and his jazz colleagues only two years later for their album Djanger Bali.

Berendt's explanation for what he clearly interpreted as President Sukarno's opposition to jazz was to rely on the "Dictators don't swing" aphorism, which had, thanks partly to his own efforts, gained currency in postwar West Germany. According to Berendt, jazz was "political music everywhere in the world and during the Sukarno era, it was blacklisted the same as under most other dictatorships, whether of leftist or rightist persuasions" (Djanger Bali). Earlier, in the 1950s, he had expressed the cause of the dictator's constitutional aversion for jazz: a dictator was unable to cope with the rhythm in jazz, which embodied the idea of listening to those with opposing viewpoints (Der Jazz 3). And as Berendt had pointed out in 1962, Sukarno was "a regular dictator" ("ein ordentlicher Diktator"; "Asienreise Teil 2") 23). This lumped him together with the National Socialists (as well as with the East German communist regime, which as will be shown, had also campaigned against jazz from time to time). Recourse to the "Dictators don't swing" aphorism reflected favourably on West German jazz enthusiasts: since jazz [imoculated] against all totalitarianism ("[impf] gegen jeden Totalitarismus"); Berendt "Für und wider den Jazz" 890), a jazz enthusiast could not be protofascist. Nevertheless, the aphorism did little to explore or explain Sukarno's opposition to jazz. It also could not account for the fact that Sukarno's successor (the equally dictatorial President Suharto) was, by Berendt's own account, quite well disposed to jazz (Berliner Jazztage notes; Djanger Bali).

It is not straightforward to plumb the reasons for Sukarno's ideological opposition to jazz, given the paucity of Indonesian primary sources on jazz from the era. However, on the basis of Berendt's and others' observations, a number of points can be made. On the one hand, I suggest that Sukarno's antijazz opposition to jazz which could be observed from communist countries including East Germany. The term "anti-US cultural penetration" on the other hand, refers to the hallmarks of a strong cultural nationalism as postcolonial country. This dimension of anti-jazz cultural nationalism. These two dimensions were:

Jazz and US "cultural penetration"

In order to appreciate the "anti-US cultural penetration" to jazz, it is worthwhile pausing for a moment to consider the concept of Cold War. During the 1950s, jazz was not merely a form of music played by black American musicians, but also a cultural symbol of political power used by the United States to promote its ideology around the world. In Latin America, for example, the United States supported the military coup in 1954 in Guatemala, which overthrew the socialist government of Jacobo Árbenz and installed a pro-American regime. The new government then banned all forms of "subversive" music, including jazz. In Europe, the U.S. government supported the "Marshall Plan" to help rebuild war-torn economies, including the music industry. The U.S. government also supported the "Jazz Festival" in the United States, which showcased American jazz musicians to the world. This "cultural penetration" was not without controversy. Some argue that it was a form of cultural imperialism, while others argue that it was a form of cultural exchange. The debate continues to this day.

The current "Boogie-Woogie" is a channel that penetrates and threatens to anesthetize the image of the United States as a major world power. It is important to remember that the idea of the U.S. as a world power is still very much alive, despite the challenges it faces in the post-Cold War era. The United States continues to be a major player in world affairs, and its influence is felt in many different ways. The current "Boogie-Woogie" is a channel that penetrates and threatens to anesthetize the image of the United States as a major world power. It is important to remember that the idea of the U.S. as a world power is still very much alive, despite the challenges it faces in the post-Cold War era.
of Berendt’s and others’ observations, a number of tentative speculations can be advanced. On the one hand, I suggest that Sukarno’s attitude towards jazz resembles the ideological opposition to jazz which could be observed from time to time in several Eastern European communist countries including East Germany. This dimension of anti-jazz sentiment might be termed “anti-US cultural penetration.” On the other hand, Sukarno’s opposition also has the hallmarks of a strong cultural nationalism grounded in postwar Indonesia’s status as a postcolonial country. This dimension of anti-jazz sentiment might be termed “Indonesian cultural nationalism.” These two dimensions were interrelated and are not easily separated.

Jazz and US “cultural penetration”

In order to appreciate the “anti-US cultural penetration” dimension to Sukarno’s opposition to jazz, it is worthwhile pausing for a moment to consider the way in which jazz had been promoted by the USA and received in the communist and non-aligned world during the Cold War. During the 1950s, jazz was not merely a neutral cultural form. Eastern European communist regimes, such as East Germany, periodically denigrated jazz as an agent of US cultural imperialism (Nöglik, “Hürdenlauf zum freien Spiel”). These attacks were often covered in the West German jazz media. In the 1950s, for example, Berendt reported a passage from the East German paper Musik und Gesellschaft which eloquently expressed this ideological opposition to jazz:

“The current ‘Boogie-Woogie’ is a channel through which the poison of Americanisation penetrates and threatens to anaesthetize the brains of working people. This threat is just as dangerous as a military attack with poison gas... It is wrong to mistake the dangerous role of American music in the preparation for war. (Der heutige ‘Boogie-Woogie’ ist ein Kanal, durch den das Gift des Amerikanismus eindringt und die Gehirne der Arbeiterkränke zu betäuben droht. Diese Bedrohung ist ebenso gefährlich wie ein militärischer Angriff mit Gifftgasen... Es ist falsch, die gefährlichen Rolle der amerikanischen Musik bei der Kriegsvorbereitung zu verkennen; ’Jazz in Germany [2]’).”

Even before anxieties such as these were being expressed in the Eastern bloc, the West was also aware of the possibilities of jazz in winning over Eastern European “hearts and minds.” Field Marshal Montgomery had notably commented for example that “[i]f we are unable to conquer the communist east with the weapon, then [we] will be able to do so with the jazz trumpet” (quod in Nöglik “Osteuropäischer Jazz im Imbruch der Verhältnisse” 148 – 9). Nor was this empty rhetoric. From the mid-1950s, the US State Department was engaged in
sending so-called "Jazz Ambassadors" on tours of the communist and unaligned world: In 1956 Dixey Gillespie's Big Band traveled through Asia. Benny Goodman did likewise in 1956-7. In 1961 Goodman traveled to South America and in 1962 to the USSR. Dave Brubeck and Duke Ellington undertook tours of Asia in 1958 and 1964 respectively. Herbie Mann traveled to Africa in 1959 (Pfeiferer 57). Referring to such activities, Frank Kofsky (writing in 1970) polemically labeled jazz a "Cold War secret weapon" (qtd in Pfeiferer 57).

Given President Sukarno's increasing ideological alliance with the PKI (Indonesian communist party) during the early-mid 1960s, it is possible that his opposition to jazz was partly akin to the opposition to jazz displayed (from time to time) in communist countries such as East Germany. According to this approach, jazz was probably seen as simply another agent of what the PKI referred to in 1963 as US "cultural penetration" (qtd in Mortimer 244). It should be pointed out that, during this era, the USA was not the only country being accused of imperialism in Indonesia, rather, that accusation was also being leveled by Indonesian PKI leaders at other western countries, including Great Britain and West Germany (Mortimer 210). If the USA was being accused of "cultural penetration," then there was no logical reason why other countries accused of imperialism could not also be accused of "cultural penetration." On this approach, the Goethe Institut jazz tours might well have been thought to be "Cold War secret weapons."

One can make out certain continuities between the Goethe Institut jazz tours and the US "Jazz Ambassador" tours. In many ways, the West Germans were literally following in the footsteps of the American jazz ambassadors - Mangelsdorff reported, for example, that they often played concerts hot on the heels of Duke Ellington and Benny Goodman ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). The West German jazz tourists were also referred to as ambassadors at the time. As noted above, Berendt argued in 1964 (to his West German audience) that (German) jazzers should be sent as "ambassadors of the lively musical happenings in the Western world" ("Botschafter des lebendigen Musikgeschichtens der westlichen Welt"; "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140, my emphasis). Regular Goethe Institut jazz tourst Klaus Doldinger named his 1970 Institut co-funded record "The Ambassador." The West Germans were perceived by some westerners to be continuing or even taking over the jazz proselytising work of the Americans. West German pianist Wolfgang Dauner expressed the view that the American "Jazz Ambassador" tours had tailed off in the late 1960s. Dauner, who traveled with an Allstar West German band through South America in late 1968, lamented that the United States was not doing nearly enough to spread the jazz message through the world ("Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#2]"). Other observers, including Berendt, also saw the Goethe Institut tours as exemplary for the USA ("Jazz: representative of the United States Information Goethe Institut's jazz work, which in his view mac (reported in Berendt, "Jazz für Goethe - nega perceive a significant difference between the We US "Jazz Ambassador" tours.

Based on their reports in the West German jazz do not appear to have paid much heed to Tied US (or western) "cultural penetration." Yet as were confronted with these types of objections, their downplaying of this interpretation. Firstly, expressly avoid aggressive cultural imperialism. All too familiar from East German jazz discou attitudes to jazz had been ridiculed in the past. Finally, the idea that jazz could be an agent of also inconsistent with the image of jazz which themselves. Put bluntly, if jazz was fundamendal could it be an agent of western cultural penetra encountered Anti-Americanism in Burma, which youth" (jugendverderbend"), he dismissed this that in the play of politics, some of the most asto is actually obvious, namely [jazz] music's truly is overlooked or denied" ("Man sieht, im politis Feststellungen und das eigentlich Naheliegen völkerverbindinge Charakter der Musik, wird til fernen Osten" 159).

West German jazz tourists also possibly did not to jazz for an aesthetic-based reason: being Germ expressly affected by that Anti-Americanism. confronted with local attitudes which made aes American jazz. Berendt and Mangelsdorff pointe audiences had not tarred their music with the tan den fernen Osten"; Mangelsdorff, "Jazz für den / that his Burmese audience had distinguished be
In the communist and unaligned world: In Asia, Benny Goodman did likewise in America and in 1962 to the USSR. Dave Brubeck was also a frequent visitor. Referring to such activities, Frank Kofsky wrote a secret security report (quoted in Pfeiffer 57).

In line with the PKI (Indonesian communist government), his opposition to jazz was partly skin deep in countries such as East Germany and in the US (as East Germany). The government also used the PDI (People's Democratic Institute) to ban jazz for cultural penetration. It should be noted that the only country being accused of being an agent of cultural penetration was also being leveled by Indonesia at the United Nations. Therefore, it was not only the only country that was being accused of cultural penetration; it was also accused of being an agent of cultural penetration.

The Goethe Institute tours as exemplary for the USA ("Jazz für den fernen Osten"). In the 1970s, a representative of the United States Information Service expressed similar admiration for the Goethe Institute's jazz work, which in his view made the USA's efforts seem pale by comparison (reported in Berendt, "Jazz für Goethe – negativ"). These commentators at least did not perceive a significant difference between the West German Goethe Institute jazz tours and the US "Jazz Ambassador" tours.

Based on their reports in the West German jazz press, the early Goethe Institute jazz tourists did not appear to have paid much heed to Third World objections that jazz was an agent of US (or western) "cultural penetration." Yet as will be shown, at least some of the tourists were confronted with these types of objections. I wish to posit several possible reasons for their downplaying of this interpretation. Firstly, the guiding philosophy of the Institute was to expressly avoid aggressive cultural imperialism. Secondly, these objections were presumably not too familiar from East German jazz discourse. As I have shown above, East German attitudes to jazz had been ridiculed in the past by influential commentators like Berendt. Finally, the idea that jazz could be an agent of western "cultural penetration" was also inconsistent with the image of jazz which postwar West Germans had fashioned for themselves. Put bluntly, if jazz was fundamentally international and anti-ideological, how could it be an agent of western cultural penetration? When, in 1964, Albert Mangeloff encountered Anti-Americanism in Burma, which denigrated American jazz as "corrupting of youth" ("jugendverderbend"), he dismissed this attitude in the following terms: "One can see that in the play of politics, some of the most astonishing claims are made and that that which is actually obvious, namely jazz music's truly international and nation-bonding character, is overlooked or denied" ("Man sieht, in politischen Spiel kommt es zu den erstaunlichsten Feststellungen und das eigentlich Naheliegende, nämlich der wahrhaft internationale, volksverbindende Charakter der Musik, wird übersehen – oder verschwiegen"); "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159).

West German jazz tourists also possibly did not pay heed to Asian Anti-American opposition to jazz for aesthetic-based reasons: being German jazz musicians, they were not necessarily exposed to this Anti-Americanism. These musicians were not infrequently confronted with local attitudes which made aesthetic distinctions between their music and American jazz. Berendt and Mangeloff pointed out, for example, that Anti-American Asian audiences had not tarred their music with the same brush as American jazz (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten"); Mangeloff, "Jazz für den fernen Osten"). Mangeloff also reported that his Burmese audience had distinguished between acceptable "academic" German jazz and
"youth-corrupting" American jazz ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). According to the Asian reviews, which were quoted on the cover of the Now Jazz Rambong album, several Asian jazz connoisseurs did perceive an aesthetic distinction between jazz as played by Mangelsdorff's group and American jazz. Mangelsdorff posited that these reviews must have been gratifying to the Goethe Institut, which might otherwise have been accused of spending their money on presenting "American" rather than "German" culture ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). Though Mangelsdorff demonstrated both modesty and a distaste for the notion of "national" varieties of jazz ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159), it is likely that he also found such reviews personally gratifying. They suggested that he might have succeeded in "emancipating" himself from the postwar West German pattern of slavishly copying American jazz innovators.

Indonesian cultural nationalism and jazz

As noted above, I suggest that Sukarno's apparent opposition to jazz also had an "Indonesian cultural nationalism" dimension. From this perspective, any fine aesthetic distinction between "academic" or "emancipated" West German jazz and American jazz may have been a little beside the point. Well before Sukarno's informal alliance with the PKI in the early 1960s, nationalism was an important element in his politics. In fact it was one of the Panja Sila (five fundamental principles) formulated by President Sukarno in 1945 by which the Indonesian Republic was to exist (Wertheim 228). This nationalism was in turn partly a consequence of Indonesia's postcolonial status. In that context, nationalism played a distinct role. Writing in 1959, the Dutch scholar W.F. Wertheim noted that the cultural nationalism advanced by Sukarno was a "source of the spiritual strength needed to build a new Indonesian society" (331). Wertheim argued that whilst nationalist phenomena "may sometimes smell of chauvinism" they were "only too understandable reactions to a colonial past and at the same time conditions to free themselves from an inferiority feeling" (332). Sukarno's nationalist ideology had little room for "Western music and dance," which as early as the 1950s he had considered an affront to youths' "Indonesian Identity" (Mortimer 244). The exact source of affront to this (imagined) Indonesian identity (be it West German jazz tourists, American "Jazz Ambassadors," the ethnic Chinese or the Balinese minority) was perhaps not always relevant.

Had President Sukarno been aware -- and we have no evidence that he was -- that some West German jazz musicians and critics regarded the early Goethe Institut jazz tours as Bildungshilfe, he may well have taken a dim view of this. Such a position (as well-intentioned as it might have been) could be interpreted as inimical to the goal of instilling Indonesian cultural pride, since the notion of Bildungshilfe recipients of that Hilfe was underdeveloped.

As demonstrated earlier, Asian attitudes four likely to endear themselves to postwar West trajectory of German nationalism and anxious this perspective Sukarno's nationalist program criticism. This postwar West German liberal had cultural nationalism such as that displayed by : understandable reaction in the postcolonial cono

Conclusion

Writings about Goethe Institut jazz tours in the : musicians and critics as well as the Goethe Institut's tolerant, liberal credentials and to place distance be of the National Socialist past. The West German itself in a desire to 'pay respect' to other musical : European perspective. However this respect only and critics often reacted strongly to instances of ct postcolonial countries such as Indonesia. Come affinities between these nationalist ideologies and and, as a result, were unwilling to entertain the idea in a postcolonial context. This sensitivity to样式 postwar West German liberal habitus describes domestic German nationalism to be a 'dormant vir and the concomitant interpretation of jazz as inmilitate against commentators like Mangelsdorff (American) jazz on the basis that it was an agent of Asian youth. In the context of Cold War Germ close to the anti-jazz rhetoric advanced in the past seriously contemplated by many in the West Gem
ern Osten' 159). According to the Asian jazz Ramayong album, several Asian jazz musicians played by Mangeldarof's hat these reviews must have been gratifying. We have been accused of spending their money on culture ('Jazz für den fernen Osten' 159). It is likely that he also found such reviews to have succeeded in 'emancipating' himself by copying American jazz innovators.

opposition to jazz also had an 'Indonesian respective, any fine aesthetic distinction in jazz and American jazz may have been informal alliance with the PKI in the early 1960s politics. In fact it was one of the Pansja President Sukarno in 1945 by which the 8). This nationalism was in turn partly 1. In that context, nationalism played a role. W.F. Wertheim noted that the cultural anxiety of the spiritual strength needed to build a nation that whilst nationalist phenomena "may oo understandable reactions to a colonial nation from an inferiority feeling" (332). "Western music and dance," which as early as the "Indonesian Identity" (Mortimer 244), is an identity (be it West German jazz and Chinese or the Balinese minority) was

sve no evidence that he was— that some of the early Goethe Institut jazz tours as this. Such a position (as well-intentioned nical to the goal of instilling Indonesian cultural pride, since the notion of Bildungshilfe implicitly suggested that the culture of the recipients of that Hilfe was underdeveloped.

As demonstrated earlier, Asian attitudes founded in cultural nationalism were hardly likely to entail themselves to postwar West German liberals mindful of the historical trajectory of German nationalism and anxious about its potential to be revived. From this perspective Sukarno's nationalist program was reprehensible and worthy of vehement criticism. This postwar West German liberal habitus was unwilling to entertain the idea that cultural nationalism such as that displayed by Sukarno might, following Wertheim, be an understandable reaction in the postcolonial context.

Conclusion

Writings about Goethe Institut jazz tours in the mid to late 1960s exhibit West German jazz musicians' and critics' as well as the Goethe Institut's desire to demonstrate their (and their country's) tolerant, liberal credentials and to place distance between themselves and the cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist past. The West German jazzers' liberal habitus sometimes manifested itself in a desire to 'play respect' to other musical cultures which had been marginalized from a European perspective. However this respect only went so far— West German jazz musicians and critics often reacted strongly to instances of cultural nationalism which they encountered in postcolonial countries such as Indonesia. Commentators like Joachim Ernst Berendt identified affinities between these nationalist ideologies and the National Socialist ideologies of the past and, as a result, were unwilling to entertain the idea that such sympathies might be understandable in a postcolonial context. This sensitivity to 'exotic' nationalism was, I suggest, an extension of the postwar West German liberal habitus described by Peter O'Brien, which regarded forms of domestic German nationalism to be a "dormant virus capable of revival" (40). The liberal habitus and the concomitant interpretation of jazz as inherently international and anti-ideological also militated against commentators like Mangeldarof from giving credence to Asian objections to (American) jazz on the basis that it was an agent of US 'cultural penetration' or that it 'corrupted' Asian youth. In the context of Cold War Germany, such an interpretation was probably too close to the anti-jazz rhetoric advanced in the past by the East German communist regime to be seriously contemplated by many in the West German jazz scene.
Endnotes

1 Unlike earlier, privately-initiated jazz tours such as a 1957 trip by two German jazz groups to the Polish Zopot Jazz Festival, the Goethe Institut jazz tours were funded by the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office). For a short history of the Goethe Institut and the way in which its brief has changed over the years, see Goethe Institut "Zur Geschichte des Goethe Instituts." See also Ros.

2 A survey of West Germany's leading jazz periodical of the day, Jazz Publikum, gives an overview of these tours. The Goethe Institut "Jahrtauscher" also indicate the extent of these fully- and partly-funded tours. Klaus Doldinger's group toured South America between March and June 1965 ("Das Klaus Doldinger Quartet in Südamerika"; "Doldinger flügt Titelseiten"; Hinterberg 59). The Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra toured North Africa in late 1965 and early 1966 (Johannes 94-9; Hinterberg 51). In January and February 1966, the Gunter Hampel Quintet toured Italy and Tunisia (1966 Jahrbuch 103). Mangelsdorff's group toured Spain, Portugal and North Africa in February and March 1966 (Untitled Article [#1]; Untitled Article [#2]; 1966 Jahrbuch 104). They were in Budapest in April (1966 Jahrbuch 104). In October 1966, the Schoof Quintet were in Prague (1966 Jahrbuch 104). The Spree City Stompers toured Africa in late 1966 (1966 Jahrbuch 105). Mangelsdorff's Quintet were in Italy and Tunisia in January and February 1967 (1967 Jahrbuch 140) and in the USA and Canada in February and March of that year (1967 Jahrbuch 139). In October and November they were in Great Britain (1967 Jahrbuch 140). Doldinger's Quartet was in France in February and March 1967 (1967 Jahrbuch 139). In April 1967, the Joe Haldner ensemble traveled to Ireland (1967 Jahrbuch 140). In July 1967, the Kölnse Quartet was in the USA (1967 Jahrbuch 140). Manfred Schoof's Quintet traveled to Czechoslovakia in March 1967 and then to Poland in October 1967 (1967 Jahrbuch 141). A West German Allstar band toured South America in 1968 ("Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika"); Dusen, "Mit Jazz in Südamerika (#1); Dusen, "Mit Jazz in Südamerika (#2); 1968 Jahrbuch 107). Such tours continued in the following years.

3 See for example Kater for an in-depth treatment of jazz under National Socialism.

4 Korschnerberger's argument is explicitly influenced by Theodor Adorno's negative interpretation of jazz "enthusiasm." For a succinct outline of Adorno's attitude towards jazz, see Schud.

5 The equation of jazz with antisemitism was commonly adhered to in postwar West Germany. See for example Hoffmann 97, where he quotes the German jazz musician Volker Kriegel in support of this assertion.

6 See for example the reports in the following Jahrbucher in which the Institute reported on the popular success of its jazz concerts: 1965 Jahrbuch 50 (reporting on Klaus Doldinger's success in South America); 1965 Jahrbuch 51 (the Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra in North Africa); 1966 Jahrbuch Plate caption (the Spree City Stompers in Africa); 1969 Jahrbuch 86 (an Allstar Big Band in South America); 1969 Jahrbuch 66 (Klaus Doldinger in Asia).

7 See for example 1965 Jahrbuch 43 (reporting on the telecast of the Edelhagen Orchestra in Cairo, which reportedly reached an audience of 5 million). Similar claims were later made in relation to the telecast of the "Deutscher Jazz 1968" Allstar band in South America (1969 Jahrbuch Plate caption).

8 Berendt notes that the Thai King Bhumibol even requested of the German Government in the early 1960s that it send a German jazz group on tour to Asia ("Jazz für den fernen Osten").

9 Germany's military aggression in North Africa during World War II was well aware. In 1967 he made a point of referring to it by Romanell's Africa Keeping during the early 1940s (Nien in '). On the link between Wagner's anti-semitism and National Socialist political thought, in particular his chapter, "Wagner, Hitler and the German Racial Problem in the nature of Wagner's oeuvre in the postwar years.

10 Klaus Doldinger, who traveled under the auspices of the Goethe Institut, performing with his Quartet in Südamerika."11. The_Ramwong (also spelled Rambong or Ram weeg) is a folk (Pileiderer 272).

12 However, as early as 1965 there had been calls for West Germany to renounce such cultural exchange activities under the guise of "cultural relations" (Hönb erg 49).

13 The Indonesian writer Alfred D. Ticovala, who has researched Scott and the Indonesian Allstars was unable to locate any information about the band's position in relation to jazz at this time. He had conducted with associates of Sukarno, whatever the music might have been (and the evidence suggests that such was the case), he was, as a personal level, an ardent admirer of the Indonesian jazz concert organizer and writer jazz gigs in Indonesia at this time and that this had not been simple or "party" to avoid unwelcome attention from the ative).

14 R. Rumin and Alfred D. Ticovala both esteemed to me that not have been entirely relaxed to his being a jazz musician, but reasons (Sudibyo; Ticovala, Telephone interview).

15 Alfred D. Ticovala, who interviewed the late Jack Leesman, nor denied Berendt's anecdote. Ticovala did note, however, that he did tell him: that it was not straightforward at this time for me to interview. R. Rumin confirmed this (Sudibyo).

16 Berangka Ria was recorded by the Orchesta Irama (under the leadership of Leesman). It showcases music to accompany the "Lento", at Molucca. According to Alfred D. Ticovala, Sukarno adopted the "Jazz for Indonesia.

17 This passage derives originally from a 1952 book by the Pan Zeitgeschichte. (ged in Noglik: "Hüllenlauf um freien Spieß"

18 The Japanese trumpet player Terumasa Hino attended the Man identified the music as being European. He recalls being "ver
Germany's military aggression in North Africa during World War II was a matter of which Berendt, for once, was well aware. In 1967 he made a point of referring to Tussi's brief period when it was 'conquered by Rennart's Afrika Korps during the early 1940s (Noos in Tunisia).

On the link between Wagner's anti-Semitism and National Socialist ideology, see for example Perris. See in particular his chapter, "Wagner, Hitler and the German Race." See also Mann for a discussion of the problematic nature of Wagner's oeuvre in the post-war years.

Klaus Doldinger, who traveled under the auspices of the Goethe Institute to South America in 1965 adopted a similar approach to that of Mangelsdorff, performing adaptations of local songs ("Das Klaus Doldinger Quartet in Südamerika" 112).

The Ramwong (also spelled Rambonong or Ram vong) is a form of dance practiced in South East Asia (Phuket 272).

However, as early as 1965 there had been calls for West German musicians to stay in one location for a longer period (rather than simply to travel through and perform a single concert). It was interpreted that only under such circumstances could more effective cultural exchanges between the Germans and the locals take place (Hömburg 49).

The Indonesian writer Alfred D. Tiscalu, who has researched the 1967 Djanger Rod recording by Tony Scott and the Indonesian Alatara was unable to locate any Indonesian newspaper articles referring to the official Indonesian or PKI position in relation to jazz at this time. He did indicate that, based on interviews he had conducted with advocates of Sukarno, whatever the President's ideological objections to western music might have been (and the evidence suggests that there was an ideological opposition to western music in general), he was, at a personal level, an ardent admirer of western classical music (Tiscalu, Telephone interview). The Indonesian jazz concert organizer and writer P.R. Sudibyo told me that he had organized jazz gigs in Indonesia at this time and that this had not been impossible, however he had had to bill the gigs simply as "parties" to avoid unwelcome attention from the authorities (Sudibyo).

P.R. Sudibyo and Alfred D. Tiscalu both insisted to me that Scott's being advised to leave Indonesia may not have been entirely related to his being a jazz musician, but rather that it may have been for more personal reasons (Sudibyo, Tiscalu, Telephone interview).

Alfred D. Tiscalu, who interviewed the late Jack Leemana, indicated that Leemana had neither confirmed nor denied Berendt's anecdote. Tiscalu did note, however, that other jazz musicians such as Nick Mahamid had told him that it was not straightforward at this time for Indonesians to play jazz (Tiscalu, Telephone interview). P.R. Sudibyo confirmed this (Sudibyo).

Bersaka Rus was recorded by the Orkestra Drama (under the leadership of Jack Leemana) in 1965 (Leemana). It showcases music to accompany the "Lenso", a traditional form of dance from Celebes and Moluccas. According to Alfred D. Tiscalu, Sukarno "adopted the Lenso as Indonesia's national dance" during the 1960s (Tiscalu, "Re Jazz in Indonesia").

This passage derives originally from a 1952 book by the East German Ernst H. Meyer titled Musik im Zeitalter (translated in English as "The Age of Music" 208).

The Japanese trumpeter Terumasa Hino attended the Mangelsdorff quintet's concert in Tokyo. He too identified the music as being European. He recalls being "very stimulated by what he calls "European jazz."
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RECONTEXTUALISING GERMAN: EMIN KATE ROY

"Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of..." [...] The basic error of the translator is that he p happen to be instead of allowing his language to (Rudolf Pannwitz qtd. in Benjamin 80).

Why write in a language that is not your own? The possibilities of making that language resonate with illuminate the works of Emine Sevgi Özdamar, begin with a short biography to set the scene. She has lived in Germany for more than thirty years. She has been described as (Kübler). Born in Malaya, Eastern Anatolia, Germany took place when she was nineteen, w worker. On her return to Turkey in 1987 she was detained for three years. She was arrested and de... this decided her return to Germany. Her early y where she worked with Benno Besson (the firm works, a former assistant of Brecht who began and later worked for Deutsches Theater and the travelled to France. On returning to Germany, Bochum, where she began to write, while continue career as a freelance writer progressed with stay most recently taken her to Frankfurt, where she for Bergen-Enkheim.

Özdamar has authored two plays, "Blackeye i "Baldhead in Germany" ("Keloğlan in Alamania has two doors I came in through one and went out through the two doors aus einer kann ich rein und der au be referred to as Cannovuunerei - and the second, som Gouden Horn), two collections of short st