Introduction: Power is the Central Concept of the Social Sciences

Introduction

The concept of power is absolutely central to any understanding of society. The ubiquity of the concept can be seen by a comparative Google search. The score for ‘social power’ is 376 million hits, for ‘political power’ 194 million which compares with 334 million for ‘society’, 253 million for ‘politics’, 52 million for ‘sociology’, ‘social class’ at 280 million and ‘political class’ at 111 million. Of course, such measures are crude but the fact that the combined 470 million social and political power hits outstrip any of the other categories, including the combined hits for ‘social’ and ‘political class’, indicates the absolute centrality of the concept. However, despite this ubiquity it is arguably one of the most difficult concepts to make sense of within the social sciences. Nonetheless, it has been a core concept for as long as there has been speculation about the nature of social order (Wolin 1960).

The Ancient Athenians distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate power in terms of a contrast between power that accorded to the dictates of law (*nomos*) and power which exalted the glorification of a specific individual (*hubris*). In the work of Aristotle, arguably the world’s first empirical political scientist, this became refined in terms of a six-fold classification of governments according to whose interests are served. Monarchy is the government of the many in the interests of all, Aristocracy by the few in the interests of all, Constitutional government is by the majority in the interests of all, while the corrupt illegitimate versions of this are Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, in which the one, the few or the majority each govern in their own interests, disregarding the interests of the whole.

In Machiavelli’s *The Prince* we find images of power as domination and control, which work in subtle ways; the successful Prince manages society through the manipulation
of flows and movements of power. The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power becomes subsumed under the dominant discourse of practical success and failure. Power is exercised over others and society constituted through the domination of the weak by the strong. If Niccolò Machiavelli offers one influential modern template for thinking about power, Thomas Hobbes offers another.

In Hobbes (1968), power flows from society to the individual. The political actor creates society as an architectonic product, which gives individuals a capacity for action. The ultimate backing for power is violence and coercion over which the Sovereign holds a monopoly. As represented in the frontispiece of the *Leviathan*, society is the sum of individuals who carry and constitute power. If Hobbes’ discourse was closely tied to the legitimacy of sovereign power as a presupposition of a commonwealth, by the late nineteenth century the terms of power’s address were changing radically.

For Nietzsche (1968), power is a capacity to define reality. If you can define the real and the moral, you create the conditions of legitimacy. The terms of trade of legitimacy have changed markedly: what is at issue now, of course, is not normative legitimacy, as in Aristotle, but legitimacy as a sociological fact of domination and, as it had been in Machiavelli, the fate of mankind. What sometimes may appear as an escape from power and domination is really the replacement of cruder forms of domination by more sophisticated and thus less visible forms. In Weber (1978) the English term ‘power’ covers both *Herrschaft* and *Macht*, which correspond to authority and coercion respectively; thus, power can either be legitimate or based upon the threat of violence.

The intricacies of legitimate versus illegitimate power; of coercion versus authority; of collective systemic versus individual agent specific power; of constitutive power versus power from which there is escape, and of power as autonomy versus constraint, are all aspects
of power’s many faces which have shaped contemporary perceptions of power in the social sciences. Tangled up with these central perceptions of power’s empirical character are a great many normative issues, often encoded in different forms of address of the same topic. For instance, political philosophy or political theory were both more inclined to engage with power in normative terms, with what should be done, while political science and political sociology were more inclined to engage with power in empirical terms, looking at what is done rather than what should be done. Yet, for all this institutional separation, there has been a tendency for normative issues to intrude, except for the most self-consciously ascetically empiricist of practitioners. This is especially the case in more recent debates in which the threads of genealogy, that we have briefly sketched, have tended to wend their way into empirical analysis.

After World War II, the consensual view of power, as a capacity for action, as ‘power to’, came to the fore through the work of Hannah Arendt (1970), Talcott Parsons (1964), and Barry Barnes (1988). For these thinkers, power constitutes the opposite of coercion and violence, and is thus a prerequisite for agency. The Hobbesian view of power, as domination exercised by individuals, is reformulated by many including by Robert Dahl (1957; 1961; 2006), Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970), and Steven Lukes (1974; 1977; 1986; 2005). Foucault (1977) emerges as the prime rejuvenator of the Machiavellian and Nietzschean view of power as a systemic phenomenon which is constitutive of social reality. Following this, Stewart Clegg (1989), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), and Mitchell Dean (1999) constitute contemporary refiners of these positions. The attempt to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate power has been central for many political theorists both in continental theory, such as Habermas (1984) and in the analytic traditions associated with British theorists such as Peter Morris (1987; 2002) and Brian Barry (1989). The link between power and interests as a criterion distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate power,
as in Aristotle, remains central for Lukes’ analysis (1974; 2005). In addition, there are a number of attempts at synthesis such as rational choice theory, where Keith Dowding (1996) has merged the idea of power as agency-based and systemic phenomenon, as have Giddens (1984) and Haugaard (1997; 2002) in their respective accounts.

While the plethora of accounts of power is complex the complexity is one of requisite variety. What emerges is that ‘power’ is not a single entity. It represents a cluster of concepts. Power as domination, which is linked to (the capacity for) violent agency, is the dominant perception of power in everyday speech and, quite likely, would represent the majority of the combined 470 million Google hits for ‘social’ and ‘political power’, if we were to examine them. However, if we look to the academic social science literature, increasingly the conception of power as essentially grounded in coercion represents a minority view. One of the characteristics of the development of the literature over the last thirty years has been a move away from this ‘common sense’ view to more systemic, less agent specific, perceptions of power that see it as more generally constitutive of reality. Such a move is coupled with a more inclusive perception of the concept, whereby the idea that there is a single thing-in-the-world corresponding to power, as some kind of essence, has fallen out of favour.

The fact that few claim that their view of power constitutes ‘The Concept of Power’ is a healthy development, which heralds the abandonment of the search for the holy grail of the essence of power. At the height of the Seventies power debate, when a singular perception of power was de rigueur, Lukes (1974) shifted the debate by arguing that power is an ‘essentially contested’ concept. Essential contestation refers to matters that cannot be settled empirically. In Lukes, for instance, liberal, reformist and radical accounts of power are differentiated. Each differs precisely in what their value-commitments will admit as evidence and data, as a result of definitional inclusion and exclusion. Concepts become essentially
contested because normative evaluations are smuggled into what appear to be empirical statements. For instance, if we term a set of political institutions as ‘legitimate’, the latter is ‘an essentially contested’ concept because this is not simply an empirical statement. It is an implicitly normatively evaluative statement, endorsing certain political arrangements. Thus, while the concept of legitimacy is doing ostensibly empirical work – identifying institutions acceded to be legitimate – it is simultaneously endorsing evaluative presuppositions. With regard to power, this works in reverse, whereby power constitutes ‘domination’, which we normatively condemn. Thus, from this perspective, whether or not any interaction is deemed as entailing power implies a tacit negative normative evaluation. However, as our brief account of power’s genealogy implies, not all evaluations of power are implicitly normatively negative in this way. Thus, while the idea of power as ‘an essentially contested’ concept captures some aspects of the power debate, it does not describe them all.

While to speak of power as essentially contested captures a part of the debate, where different theorists seem to be wilfully not grasping the points that other theorists make, because of their more or less implicit normative assumptions, perhaps a more accurate model would come from the application of Wittgenstein’s description of ‘family resemblance’ concepts (Wittgenstein 1967). Family resemblance concepts do not share a single essence. Rather, they embody a cluster of concepts with overlapping characteristics. Just as in an extended family, there may be similarities which make each member recognizable as a member, yet there is not a single set of characteristics which all the family have in common – John resembles his father through his complexion and his mother by his posture, while Mary resembles great Aunt Beth, etc. Wittgenstein used as an example of family resemblance concepts the word ‘game’. If we examine cards, football and chess, it might appear that the essence of the word ‘game’ lies in winning and losing. However, if we observe a solitary child playing a game of ball, there is no winning or losing (Wittgenstein 1967: 32). Solitaire
is a game but there are no competitors. Thus, applying these views, when we examine power in the writings of Lukes and Dahl, it may appear that domination defines the essence of power, while if we read Arendt and Parsons, it would appear to be legitimacy, and so on.

For Wittgenstein, concepts premised on family resemblances are not considered particularly problematic with regard to usage; they are not so much muddled concepts as much as they simply defy singular essentialist definitions. As a family resemblance concept, ‘power’ covers a cluster of social phenomena central to the constitution of social order. As with most family resemblance concepts meaning is defined by localised language games, which are a set of relations between different concepts. These family relations will be exhibited in the practice of both lay and professional theorists. In lay terms, in certain empirical settings, certain actors will think of and do power in ways that are more or less coherent. What is considered as coherent, will of course, already be an effect of the domination of certain empirically modulated ways of doing things. Think of the US policy of extraordinary rendition, which allows the exercise of certain powers of violence and torture on the body of ‘suspects’ that would not be normatively appropriate in other countries. The policy trades off the different ways of thinking about and doing power in countries such as Poland and Egypt from the US. Theoretically, the same differentiation in practices also occurs. Some language games that have developed around power as a theoretical practice will cohere around certain dominant ordering conceptions. For instance, if a given theorist, such as Arendt (1958 and 1970), is primarily interested in clusters of concepts, such as ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘citizenship’, which she defines in opposition to ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘violence’, then her concept of ‘power’ is defined relative to these other concepts. Just as within large-scale languages, such as English and Spanish, words are defined relative to each other through difference and similarity. Just as there can never be exact translation between languages, so too, a local language game creates differences of usage which are not exact
equivalents of each other. Thus, the concept of ‘power’ in the anthropological/sociological literature on the different types of capital outlined by Jenkins in (Chapter 8) is different from Cerny’s international relations usage in chapter 21 or Dean’s genealogical account in chapter 10. Some usages will be closer than others, for instance Dean and Clegg, are relatively close, while both are far from that used by Dowding in his rational choice language game.

No one of these usages is right or wrong. These concepts are conceptual tools, each of which enables the author in question to make sense of certain aspects of social life, presumably those aspects that most interests them and which they think most important, most powerful. If their usage brings clarity to the perspective the ‘conceptual tool’ is being used well; if the contrary, then their usage is poorly developed. Of course, it can be argued that when local usage is so singular as to make a specific usage appear ‘forced’, relative to everyday usage, this is less than desirable. That point accepted it is still better to think of power as plural, as shaped by local context, as a tool which enables us to make sense of the social world rather than embodying a singular essence. And it is always a translational tool – not only between different academic language games but between these and the world of mundane practises. Different concepts will articulate different practices; some will reveal more of some practices; others more or less of these and, perhaps, other practices.

The articles in this Handbook represent paradigmatic perceptions of power within theoretically conceived ‘local language games’. The articles are not intended as summaries of particular debates, rather they provide exemplars of ‘cutting edge’, ‘state of the art’ work, drawing on various social science perspectives. Power is not the property of any one social science discipline. Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, Political Theory, Organization Studies, Geography, and different perspectives within and transcending each of these, such as Feminism, all make a contribution. All use the concept of power as a central and defining
concept. Within each of these broad disciplinary divisions, there are local power debates, each of which encapsulates a vision of its own, defined by a perspective.

In commissioning for the Handbook, the editors have sought to provide exemplars of best practice within fields. In explaining the nature of paradigms, Thomas Kuhn argued that when one has understood an exemplar of a piece of work within a paradigm one should, within that paradigm, be able extrapolate from that work to problem-solving in general,. If, as a competent member of a scientific community, one properly understands Newton’s account of the gravitational forces acting upon falling objects, one should be able to apply this to pendulums without ever having been shown how to do so (Kuhn 1962). The social sciences do not have the predictive consistency of the natural sciences, nor, in terms of their being sciences of culture rather than of nature, should they necessarily ascribe to this as a holy grail. Nonetheless, it is still the case that specific well chosen exemplars of a debate or perspective within sub-disciplines, should give the less initiated reader, or the power specialist reading outside their paradigm, a way into the terrain of core power debates. Simultaneously, to the specialist, each of these contributions is intended as an original contribution which pushes a particular paradigm further.

**Framing the field**

In the first chapter Gerhard Goehler introduces the distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, a debate that has its roots in Aristotle’s distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power. The point of departure for the chapter is the theorization of power as it appeared after Lukes’ (1974) summary of the field. In that summary, power, it was argued, was a concept with an essence that was highly contested; liberal, reformist and radical approaches to the concept had been identified. The 1980s complicated the picture; the idea that there might be a single essence at the back of diverse conceptions became harder to hold. For Goehler, as for a number of other scholars, the distinctions of ordinary language are a possible way out of
conceptual confusion. The salient difference between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ is a
distinction that Goehler finds inconsistent with ordinary language usage therefore he seeks to
replace it with the concepts of ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ power. Using this opposition he
develops a fourfold typology of power that is used to explore a rapprochement between the
theory of two of power’s major contributors: Max Weber and Hannah Arendt.

In Chapter 2, Keith Dowding, integrates agency and situational advantage as a systemic
quality, within rational choice theory, thus using the concept of power to overcome the
accusation that rational choice theory is a purely agent-centred perspective. He starts from the
auspices of neo-classical economic theory where, as he notes, power has little or no purchase
as a concept. Power has been implicitly analysed away by contrasting preferences held by an
actor at different times without taking account of different contextual circumstances.
Retaining the rationality of the active choosing agent, choices occur in what sociologists are
wont to call differential ‘situated actions’. Where there are multiple actors involved in these
choice situations, Dowding suggests, rational choice methods allow us to analyse power in
the relative bargaining strengths of different actors, represented by the sets of resources they
command. A paradigmatically clear case for his argument is provided in the literature on
voting, from which discussions the idea of constructing a power index has emerged. The
discussion of voting is coupled with the distinction that Morriss (2002) makes between
‘ability’ and ‘ableness’ Ability makes actors more or less capable of doing something given
the resources that they have at their disposal. Ableness refers to the position in which
someone finds themselves; for instance, in the voting case, the preferences of all voters would
need to be addressed. Developing this essentially agent-centred distinction, Dowding moves
the analysis forward by examining the power structure of societies, which shape the types of
power available to actors.
In Chapter 3, the analytic tradition in political theory that Dowding draws on is developed further by its prime representative, Peter Morriss, who demonstrates how an analytically clear understanding of power is central to making sense of legitimacy within the liberal tradition. Traditionally liberal theorists have placed exclusive emphasis upon freedom without taking account of power, which is an imbalance that Morriss seeks to address. A society can fail to live up to the normative criteria of liberal legitimacy in two ways: it can prevent its members from having the freedom to choose the way that want to live and/or it can be unsupportive, doing nothing to foster the prospects of its inhabitants, so that they having nothing to choose between. A society can either be tyranny in which power is exercised *over* people so that they have no freedom or because its members have limited power to do any of things that they might wish to.

If one accepts the inevitable fact that all societies, including liberal ones, have to limit freedom to some extent and that they cannot be expected to give its members infinite powers, this raises the obvious question determining criteria of acceptability. What kinds of limits of freedom and absence of capacity for action should liberal concern themselves with? In answer to this Morriss examines a number of liberal perspectives, including the currently dominant view, which holds that human agency is a crucial criterion determining relevance. Rejecting these, Morriss argues that the one of the defining criteria of a liberal society has to be that its institutions to do not insult or humiliate its members. Thus, constraint upon freedom and deprivation of power which either insults or humiliates is normatively unacceptable.

It is interesting to reflect that in instances when societies deliberately insult the status of some of their member’s one can see the complex interrelationship between freedom and power. In those societies that discriminate what their citizens are free to do, who they can have sexual relations with, and where they can live, be educated or work, on the basis of ethnic
classifications (for instance, the Apartheid regime of South Africa, the Bhumiputra regime of Malaysia, the caste system of India (or Japan), or the Aboriginal Protectorate Agencies of Australia) lack of freedom to do something which one cannot currently do may be sufficient to dissuade one from acquiring the required ability.

In Chapter 4, using the methods of comparative political sociology, Charles Tilly shows us how power indices can be used to make sense of levels of democraticness and political stability. (As he notes at the outset, female suffrage is often take as an index of democracy and cites Finland as the first to admit female suffrage. This is not strictly true, as Finland’s advent in 1906 was preceded by Australia’s in 1902 and New Zealand’s in 1893.) The number of democracies advanced from zero in 1900, on the criteria he adopts from Freedom House, to 192 by the end of the twentieth century. Of course, it is not a Whiggish history of progress so much as one of set-backs and stalling as much as a forward march. Democracy depends on a specific type of power relations. A distinctive and historically unusual form of power is involved. Its essence is the subordination of authority to collective power expressed in voting in elections. Central to democracy are power relations between central authorities and the populations nominally subordinate to them. Once again, we find Tilly using the ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ distinction to advance his argument. All definitions of democracy hinge on different methodologies for the exercise of democratic power which assure that citizens exercise collective control over some central executive. At the core of this measure must be a focus on practices rather than principles; it is not so much what actors are constitutionally represented as doing so much as what they actually do that is significant. The key practices, suggests Tilly, are how wide are the range of citizens’ actually expressed demands; how demands are translated into state behaviour; the extent to which expressed demands receive state political protection, and the extent to which the process of their translation into practice commits both citizens and state. On this basis, regime democracy entails
political relations between state and citizenry that feature broad, equal, protected, mutually binding consultation. But there is one other thing: states must have a capacity to enforce their political decisions and, as Tilly explains, these capacities can vary greatly. What explains the variance, he proposes, is the extent and character of trust networks or ramified interpersonal connections, the extent of inequality between citizens construed in terms of various membership categories, such as race, ethnicity and gender, which, typically, tend to be intersectional, and the extent and detachment of autonomous power centres from formal public politics, especially where they control autonomous coercive means. A large plurality of trust networks well integrated into the polity, a low degree of discriminatory membership categorization devices, and a high number of politically participating autonomous power centres with relatively equal access to political resources and with little or no recourse to autonomous power resources favours democratization. Hence, power relations are at the core of democracy in ways that are far more elaborated than the merely ceremonial aspects of democratic participation in acts of voting.

Rob Stones, in Chapter 5, both introduces and develops further our understanding of power within structuration theory, as a paradigm concerned to link power to agency and structure. Structuration theory, developed and popularized by Anthony Giddens, has been a major contributor to power debates in the past (see Clegg 1989; Haugaard 1997). Giddens developed structuration theory in the 70s and early 80s, and it has undergone a subsequent process of conjecture and refutation, largely, but not entirely, conducted in terms of social theory rather than applied research. (Interestingly, in Giddens’ own more policy-oriented writings on modernity and Third Way politics it is sometimes difficult to see the writing as an exemplification of structuration theory. Stone notes that the later work seems underpinned by a ‘non-reductionist pluralism’ geared to macro analysis rather than by structuration theory.) The version of structuration theory that Stone deploys shares Giddens’ emphasis on
hermeneutics, situated practices and the ‘duality of structure’ at its core but is more empirically oriented. Stone analyzes the strengths and core principles of structuration theory and the role of power within the theory. To do this he engages with the debates that have centred on Steven Lukes’ (1974; 2005) substantial contributions to the analysis of power, especially the third ‘dimension’ of power, centring on different ways of conceiving what the’ interests’ of subjects might be, such that we can maintain that the actors’ conceptions of their interests prevent the manifest emergence of ‘real’ grievances. At issue is the analytical sense one should make of the proposition that one might ‘have’ an interest that is externally imputed to one, on the basis of a structural analysis of the situations one might be in, even if one is ignorant of, or resists, that imputation? As Stone notes, most of what is significant in recent debates about power hinge on how one addresses these issues, relating power, structure and agency. For instance, how one resolves issues centred on gender and ethnic relations, for instance, hinge on how one construes ‘real interests’ in the face of professions to the contrary by knowledgeable social subjects. Ultimately, of course, theoretical debates and arguments about ontological principles only go so far, intriguing as they may be for the theorist; how the theoretical positions elaborated can contribute to empirical studies of power is what is significant, as Stone concludes.

In Chapter 6, Jacob Torfing explains how power functions in discourse theory through the constitution of meaning and reality (Machiavelli and Nietzsche). The debates that he draws on, from poststructuralist discourse theory, provide an increasingly fashionable approach to the study of social identity and political power. Abandoned are the prime movers of historical materialism or the rational calculating homunculus of neo-classical and analytical theory. Instead, he sees power as those constitutive acts that shape and reshape structures and agencies constituting the conditions for how we make sense of the world, the categorical inclusions and exclusions made, and the action that flows from these differently embedded
ways of seeing. The empirical field on which he projects his analysis of power is that of the welfare state. What is constituted as welfare reform depends on the relative influence of social and political actors as well as on path-dependencies produced by political and institutional legacies in different countries. Increasingly, however, political agendas and vocabularies are being shaped by a discourse of globalization that forms a relatively coherent whole. Power is a crisscrossing field of forces and strategies that constructs particular subjectivities and particular institutional structures. Poststructuralist theories demonstrate how discourses are constructed through political conflicts and power struggles, and how they structure the identity, perceptions and actions of the social and political actors thus constituted.

With clear Machiavellian antecedents, in Chapter 7, Rolland Munro shows how networks constitute fabrics of power, which provide conditions of possibility for social action which actors use, more or less effectively. These networks comprise agents – of various kinds: there is no privileging of the human subject in actor-network theory. Agency is restored to things other than people. One consequence of this way of seeing agency is to lessen the centrality of intention: if agents can be non-intentional and still have effects how can they be held to be responsible actors? Lukes (1974) established that questions of responsibility were inseparable from those of power but, in a technology-saturated world, where stock markets behave erratically because of decisions triggered by computer chips, and where data bases profile people as intentionally typified, irrespective of their real intentions, it seems somewhat arcane to preserve matters of agency for human beings or overly reductionist to insist on the human ghost in the machine. Hence, actor network theorists prefer to focus not on intentions, will or consciousness, but focus instead on effects.
Using an anthropological backdrop, Richard Jenkins explores the complex ways in which agents create power resources for themselves through networks of capital in Chapter 8. The chapter adopts Max Weber’s discussion of legitimacy and domination (1978: 53-4, 212-54) as one point of departure. The other embarkation point is a significant and influential debate that flourished in anthropology during the 1960s between formalists and substantivists (Firth 1967; Sahlins 1974). Formalists argued that the models and assumptions of conventional economics – most specifically, maximising ‘economic man’, ‘the market’, and ‘scarcity’ – can, and should, be applied to all human groups and ways of life. Thus, they aligned themselves with those for whom context is immaterial except in so far as essential and universal actions unfold differently in differently resourced contexts. Substantivists opposed this view: for them, taking terms that were deeply embedded within the emergence of neo-classical economic orthodoxy and assuming that had a universal applicability demonstrated a deep cultural imperialism – assuming that the master narratives of a master discourse of the most dominant societies had universal applicability, separate from the times and places in which they were coined. That is one should be doubly blind: blind to the specificities of the societies under study and equally as blind to the specificities of the tools with which one studies them. The priority of local meanings (encoded as ‘culture’) and relevancies was the crucial thing – not the imposition of essentially alien categories. Hence, when we come to apply categories such as authority to explain how power operates in specific contexts we need to acknowledge the limitations of general categories and should be sure to ground them in local ‘folk’ models. We cannot understand the sense of a situated action unless we grasp how the constitutive sense of the phenomenon is embedded in concrete members’ practices. To achieve this intensive fieldwork is required.
Certain doubts about the usefulness of grand narrative categories, such as power, are raised by the line of argument that Jenkins follows. Concepts such as ‘power’ may not be very useful analytical categories because they abstract too far from everyday life. It may be better, suggests Jenkins, to focus on those resources – such as beer, money, women or pigs – that are valued in specific contexts and focus on the relations that surround their deployment, use and exchange – what he terms their ‘efficacy’. Such things may represent local capital – in the sense of the term that stresses it as a process and social relation on which value and values are pivoted, around which value can be maximised, husbanded, invested, increased or decreased. To do all these things requires some socially organized social networks that offer access to resources and, as such, can be considered a resource in their own right. It is in these networks of social capital that, anthropologically speaking, Jenkins wishes to locate power. People, whether as hunter-gatherers or trans-national masters of business, adopt problem-solving approaches to their lives, and draw on resources, such as a hunting party or an organization, that are often institutionalised ‘power containers’ as and when appropriate to do so.

Coming from Economic Geography as a disciplinary approach, but appropriating a considerable element of post-Foucauldian theory, John Allen considers “Powerful Geographies: Spatial Shifts in the Architecture of Globalization” in Chapter 9. In this chapter he contributes a notion of a topological world which disrupts our sense of what is near and what is far and loosens defined times and distances, calling into question the idea that power may be simply distributed or extended over a given territory, or that it can be regarded as something which flows through extensive networks. It is a landscape in which settled administrative entities that have territorial definition and location fuse with more fluid, networked activities of economic
corporations and social movements. The risk with this approach is in assuming a
given global backdrop largely composed of territorial fixity and networked flows.
Against this idea Allen proposes that power is more spatially ambiguous than is often
recognized. A new geography of power is emerging in which the global is both
instantiated in the national and the national in the global which moves beyond simply
mapping global distributions of domination and authority in a ‘cartography of power’.
The two authors who do most to overcome this way of thinking, Allen suggests, are
Ulrich Beck (2002) and Saskia Sassen (2002), whose work he goes on to consider.

Beck introduces the notion of a meta-power game whose rules of engagement
between national and international system of states are being radically changed and
re-written. Globally networked, digitally connected corporations use the leverage of
being able, in principle, to exit and invest elsewhere against states that do not provide
what they want. However, it must be said that this leverage is perhaps more remarked
on than engaged in practice. Many organizations are so deeply embedded in the life of
specific places that they root there. Moreover, they often have to engage with equally
global and digitally connected social movements and NGOs. States, NGOs, social
movements and corporations can ally on occasions as potential forces for integration
and enablement at the global scale rather than being merely antagonistic.

Saskia Sassen alerts us to an overlapping mix of spaces and times as the hallmark of
the global. National spaces and times are increasingly interpenetrated with global
conceptions. Elements of older public management, institutional authority, legal rights
and territorial infrastructure are recomposing into private and public/private social
relations that are neither national nor global and represent an unstable power
formation in the making. Global banks, media and construction – one channelling
capital, one representing power to the people while the other channels state power into infrastructure and mega-projects – are exemplary cases of these newly emergent relations. They lace together the boardrooms and state rooms of global cities across the planet. Allen concentrates on the role of private equity arrangements – although these might be seen as a symptom of their times rather than a constitutive characteristic. Nonetheless, as Allen puts it, states are both confronted by and are part of a new geography of power that does *not* have territorial exclusivity as its defining characteristic. Global cities are the containers of power for the new ordering of inter/national affairs. In these cities financial and corporate business tangle stretched with proximate social relations and circuitous with more immediate styles of power; in turn tangled up with these are civil society, NGO, and social movement relations that often latch on to emblematic sites or representations as icons to oppose, such as Nike or McDonald’s.

**Power and Related Analytic Concepts**

In Chapter 10, using Sir Isaiah Berlin’s (2003) distinction between positive and negative liberty as a backdrop, Mitchell Dean considers them within the competing traditions of liberal and Foucauldian social thought. The chapter begins by taking a concrete and controversial policy innovation: the direct intervention by the Australian state into the conduct of people in remote aboriginal communities which severely circumscribed the liberties of these people. Such interventions are seen as a denial of the politics of neo-liberalism, based on consumer sovereignty and free choice, to select groups of citizens. Instead, a new paternalism can be seen to be in play. Liberalism, in its variants, makes a normative claim that power should best operate by the shaping of liberty and through the exercise of choice. In the new paternalism,
however, these assumptions are dropped in favour of a view of the exercise of power that seeks to shape a specific form of freedom by means of close supervision and detailed administration of the individual. The connection with classical debates on power is evident: new paternalists claim to know the interests of subjects better than these subjects do themselves. Indeed, it is the inability of certain classes of subjects – the feckless, indigenous, poor etc – to know what their real interests should be that necessitates the state having to intervene in order that they might better realize them rather than the deviant interests which have so undermined their capacity for personal responsibility such people cannot make appropriate choices for themselves even if they know what such a choice would be.

The discussion then shifts to classical and central conceptions of liberty: for Berlin, as much as for Mill or Hobbes, one is free to the extent that one is not prevented in realising one’s will, i.e., there is no interference in the area in which one wishes to act. When one agency has a causal effect on another in a significant manner by interfering in the area in which the other would act, then there is an exercise of power which entails the subtraction of liberty of from the party or agency so constrained. Hence, in this classical conception, power and liberty are mutually opposed. As Dean (p xxx) puts it, ‘To be free is to be free from power. To exercise power is to limit the area of freedom of others; thus, there is a quantitative and inverse conception of the relation between power and liberty’. Dean observes that the legitimacy of sovereignty rests on the members of a political community voluntarily acceding to being ruled. If this is the case, then the forms of intervention with which he began the chapter are deeply problematic in liberal terms, as is the assumption that there is an inverse, quantitative relationship between power and liberty.
In contrast to the classically liberal accounts of liberty Dean considers Foucault’s notion of governmentality. At the core of this, rather than an inverse relation between power and liberty, there is an assumption that, in principle, all subjects of power are at liberty to act in one way or another; hence power relations become a series of strategic games between liberties and the rationalities – the more or less systematic ways of thinking about problems to be addressed, the means by which they can be solved, the actors and identities involved, and the goals sought in so doing – that support them. From this perspective, neo-liberal programs try to shape the conditions under which these liberties are expressed as choices while neo-paternalism seeks to rectify what is defined as previously irresponsible use of liberty by close surveillance and supervision of future actions. While they share similar vocabularies their means of shaping the conduct of conduct clearly differ markedly.

In the classical liberal tradition the subject is posited as either conforming or resisting acts of power, which are conceptualized as something that is external to the will of the subject whose choices are pre-formed – they either want to do something or they do not. In governmental approaches practices try to shape the conditions under which choice is made by seeking to produce different kinds of identity and freedom among specified individuals and populations. Dean argues that these governmental practices are not merely a re-specification of Lukes’ third dimension of power; for one thing, they do not seek to shape consciousness but rationally thought out conduct; they are not insidious and subtle mechanism but overt and explicit analytics of governance.

Dean’s conception of the self on whom practices work is clearly ‘thin’; it is a tabula rasa written on by diverse governmental practices. Drawing on the anthropological cannon, in Chapter 11 Nigel Rapport, reaches the conclusion that the
central questions in power relations relate to how we constitute the meaning of the self: what is the relationship between a humanism that stresses the generic human rationality and the biological unity of mankind and evident structural variation in languages, cultures, and social arrangements in which this humanism is constituted? The enduring nature of power relations is that they are inscribed on human beings who, in principle are free in consciousness and individuality, but for whom this freedom can only ever be expressed socially, which means that the freedom will always be culturally and collectively structured: no agency without structure and no structure without agency, in other words, with power relations inscribing their articulation substantively around different conceptions of what constitutes the available identities that actual men and women may readily assume or resist. Hence, discourses that privilege humanism or other claims, though widespread in some versions of modernity, are by no means guaranteed, because they are historically contingent. Nonetheless, we should not simply say that all discourses are relative: some make claims whose substantive commitments are more laudable than others, and humanism, despite its evident blindness’s and shortcomings, offers a better basis for a rights and equity project of humanity than the competition. It enables us to escape the essentialism of structural and given identity determination. For Rapport, power is important because understanding it enables us to address the politics of identity. Identity emerges from a sociocultural realm that is not conceived so much as a distinct ontological domain but rather as a phenomenological space that is, as he says, continuously affected and effected by the diversity of individual interpretation and intention. Identity is not just something formed by the great structural prime movers of history and sociology; it is something that is formed both politically or institutionally and existentially or personally as a manifestation of power. Thus,
power relations shape and are articulated in the everyday sensemaking that people engage in, using the discursive and other resources that are available to them. For Rapport, we must begin analysis with the individual situation, albeit with an emphasis on the relational nature of identity. He conceives of social science as the study of the effects, intended and unintended, direct and tangential, which human beings have upon one another as energetic things-in-the-world. These effects are clearly power-effects. The most primitive, or first power-effect, is that of the subject over self, matters realized in the working out of issues of identity as an answer to the question ‘who am I?’ As he puts it, ‘Only as a self, active in the world towards an ongoing accruing of meaning and identity, does an individual construe otherness and relate, consciously and intentionally, to other things-in-the-world’ (Rapport xxx). Power is first of all exercised over the self before it is exercised over others.

In the world at large power is closely coupled with identity; it occurs through a capacity to create our selves as the kinds of being that can and do exist in the very different systems of symbolic classifications of identity which we continue creating – and resisting. It is in the interplay of collective cultures and individual identities that we create and recreate the worlds in which we live, through the classification devices we find contingently conventional to use – or which we resist using. Finally, while Mitchell Dean began the previous chapter with Sir Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between negative and positive freedoms, Rapport concludes with discussion of this distinction, in order to state, once again, what he sees as the primacy of existential power over and against structural power and of an extensive conception of identity over and against a conception of it as essential.
Fredrick Engelstad shows, in Chapter 12, how an actor’s interpretative horizons shape and influence relations of power and domination, taking his cue from Michael Mann’s influential work, especially his concept of ideological power, which is here rendered in terms of a concept of ‘culture’ conceived in terms of generalized patterns of communication and interpretation. Within this cultural frame Engelstad follows Foucault in seeing power in terms of actions that work upon other actions; within a cultural perspective power is seen to operate by acting on social actors’ interpretational modes and thereby influencing their social behavior. Thus, power is seen to work on, in and through actors’ beliefs about the worlds they imagine and in which they operate. Hence it works on the ways in which they conceive of their self, relationally.

Various mechanisms are envisaged that collect and focus power: aggregation, networks, organization, and institutionalization. These are not to be confused with the more usual rational mechanisms of the mainstream accounts of power that dominated most of twentieth century analysis until the 1970s, in which culture played little or no role. One way in which the role of culture is most evident is in the ways that legitimacy is constituted, often through origin myths, or through appeals to procedural legitimacy, or through the delineation of specific spaces in which specific rights are recognized and others not.

All culture is based on the communication of meanings that entail mechanisms of selection, framing, valorization, and ascriptions of causality. These are used to try to connect, in various ways, with those who positioned in, by and through relation to these meanings. Sometimes the clarity of a meaning will be its chief feature; other times its ambiguity may be the key feature. One effective way in which power and
culture interconnect is through the institutionalization of ritual that participants see as mirroring values that they hold to, or which they defer to or resist. Often, the accoutrements of ritual – the spectacle, the sense of occasion, the costumes, music, and dance – in a word the ‘ritual’ – are what one responds to: the hymns that move the spirit; the vows that one defers to; the music that stirs the heart.

At the core of all culture and all acts of power is the self that presents itself as the self it is signified to be, and seeks to be signified as, to others as it seeks to shape their and its social appearance. The ways that power adorns the self seeking to exhibit its will always be contextually contingent, and a great deal of the skill in wielding power will be choosing the appropriate and contextually attuned significations. One recalls, for instance, the put down of Michael Heseltine when he sought to lead the conservative party in the UK in the 1990s, by party grandees, that he was a man who had bought his own furniture – rather than inherited it.

Power does not always occur in the public sphere – indeed, one of the most successful elements in political life is to maintain certain issues and agendas as outside the public sphere. However, insofar as it does, then the forms of its representation in various media may be decisive for how the politics of situations or events are interpreted. Institutionally, the Western public sphere has always been framed by the construction of spaces, by the state, religion and commerce, designed to awe, control and subdue. From the nineteenth century, the public space was increasingly filled by more centralized media that also discursively framed a shifting range of normaley’s and deviancies as major instruments of cultural power, along with the various disciplines that emerged to organize civic, public and academic life.
These public spaces, on the whole, are not characterized by the hegemonic projects that many Marxists imagine. On the contrary, large-scale modern societies are more characterized by continuous struggles over values and norms, which, in the Weberian sense, often have unintended effects. Some of these unintended effects are the result of what Engelstad refers to as aggregation. For instance, individual advertisers seek to sell the commodities they are promoting as effectively as possible. In doing so they will use whatever means are legitimate and available to persuade the public to consume. Sometimes this involves appealing to instances of irrationality in the public, thus, perhaps inadvertently, creating a commercial culture with strong elements of irrationality in it.

All communication may be thought of as a system of distinctions that form members’ categorization devices for constructing and interpreting the worlds in which they live and relate to. These distinctions and categories will be riven through by the cleavages and fissures that mark the social in all its complexity of gender, age, ethnicity, status groups, classes and so. Many of these fissiparous deployments will be occasions for struggles over values and norms in which the battle for ascendancy may be thought of in terms of a struggle for cultural hegemony, whereby the categories become fixed and immutable, with the their implicit interests attached.

At the heart of Engelstad’s formulations, just as with Rapport, is the self. Various subject positions – the alienated, conformist, protesting, empowered, reflective, condescending, and aggrandized self – are rehearsed. Who knows what new and enticing senses of the self will emerge from the Internet generation, with Facebook and YouTube, ruminations with which Engelstad concludes
Mark Haugaard explores how the Gramscian perception of power, as based upon the creation of consent, recurs in much of the contemporary sociological and political science literature in Chapter 13. Thus, there are evident continuities with the previous chapter by Engelstad. At the core of such conceptions of power is a view that power is less about the coercive imposition of will on others and more to do with producing qualified levels of consent to the will of the relatively powerful on the part of the relatively powerless. Gramsci’s work on hegemony began to shape research thinking on power from the 1970s, when it first appeared in English. Prior to this time, the debates about power had largely been about pluralism versus elitism, an argument about both methodologies and ideologies, and about issues and non-issues, a debate largely about epistemologies. By the time that Lukes (1974) entered debate in the mid-1970s, the matters at issue were both epistemological and ideological, and he sought to demonstrate alliances between explicit methodologies, epistemologies and ideologies, usually dubbed, for shorthand, the liberal, reformist and radical views of power. At the same time, these were not just relativist and equivalent constructions: Lukes wanted to be able to say that there was greater explanatory purchase in the radical view of power, where power was seen, in terms framed by hegemony, as acting against an agent’s ‘real interests’. The key to identifying ‘real interests’ is not simply some objective truth but the existence in the agents of an alternative worldview, which typically manifests itself in moments of radical rupture. When the veil of normalcy is ripped apart a deeper and more appropriate understanding of the situation may occur, suggests Lukes. Lukes (2005) maintained these views, at greater length, in the second edition of his book. He argues that radical, or three-dimensional, power entails domination, which renders social agents less free ‘to live as their nature and judgment dictate’ (Lukes 2005: 114 – italics orig.).
The crucial problematic for Lukes’ radical view of power, as for Gramsci’s (1971) account of hegemony, is why subordinated agents frequently appear to consent to their own domination? Indeed, if any question may be said to have been the central issue in power over the past thirty years or so, it is this question. Theorists have typically addressed the issue by claiming that in some way they can better know the interest of the subordinate agents than the subordinate agents can themselves, largely because the conditions of existence of their subordination do not allow these agents to know their real interests. Feminists and Marxists have been adept at deploying these arguments.

While Lukes’ account is certainly representative of a central tradition in power analysis, with roots that delve as deep as Hobbes (Clegg 1989), Haugaard reminds us that there is a tradition exemplified in modern times by Hannah Arendt, which stresses that power is the ‘capacity to act in concert’ (1970: 44). Such a view, with its stress on positive power and undistorted communication, is precisely the opposite of what Lukes dubs the deepest form of power. Power in Arendt becomes a civic virtue, an essential element in phronesis, rather than its antithesis. There are resonances with Parsons’ conceptions of power. Parsons sees power as a system attribute of the polity in which the unequal distribution of power may be the key to its effective creation, as a non-zero sum and positive phenomena. He imagines that power is derived from consensus on system goals. The assumption of consensus hardly begins to describe many contemporary organizational and societal situations which are far more likely to be characterised by value conflicts than value consensus.

There is a dualism in the conceptualization of power that Haugaard finds also reflected in theories of hegemony, where it is conceived as both a source of
domination (bourgeois hegemony) and as founded on consent, where it constitutes a form of collective will (subordinated proletarian consciousness). The special enemy of dualism in recent times has been Anthony Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, which, as Haugaard observes, provides a conceptual bridge between the consensual and conflictual power traditions.

Giddens views power both as ‘power to’ and as ‘power over’ (Giddens 1981:50; 1976: 111-2). Agents derive the power to do things, in Giddens’ formulation, from what social structures enable them to do. For some agents, social structures enable them to exercise power over some other agents. When routinized and regularized this equates with domination; thus, ‘power over’ is a subset of ‘power to’. Domination is not a total and asymmetrical zero-sum phenomenon but implies a social relation. Giddens sees the consensual basis of conformance with power to reside in general, tacit, social knowledge lodged in practical consciousness. Under given circumstances and situations agents are smart enough to know that while it may not be in their ideal interests to go along with things as they are there is little point is putting themselves on the line only to endure defeat. In more sophisticated conceptions of practical consciousness, which Haugaard associates with Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of *habitus*, practical consciousness is itself an effect of power – what Foucault called power/knowledge. Foucault’s advantage is that he does not constitute the dynamics of these power/knowledge relations in terms of classical figures, such as labour and capital, as do Gramsci and Bourdieu. Hence, Foucault never gets hung up on the differentiation of true from false consciousness – which is why he opposed the notion of ideology, because as a notion signifying falsehood, it demanded that its other be ‘truth’. For Foucault, truth was historically contingent rather than a transcendent category and plays a key role in the dynamics of power, by reifying regimes of
power/knowledge, fixing them, one might say, as hegemonic. Certain regimes are more likely to be more effective under certain conjunctures than other regimes. Centralized, coercive sovereign power, where the masses were unimportant and only occasionally dealt with, has lost its efficacy in modern neo-liberal orders, where the masses must be trained to be docile in all the institutional areas for the expression of their selfhood, such as sexuality, schooling, work, family life etc, areas in which power will be far more constitutive, producing subjects with desires to become certain sorts of agents, agents that are simultaneously free subjects as they are objects of domination. Subject to surveillance, socialization and systemic pressures, the spaces for resistance are whittled down, if never entirely eliminated. What they are not is pre-ordained by the prime movers of history: the sources of resistance may be classes or genders but not necessarily so. In this respect, theorists such as Foucault, suggests Haugaard, provide a more profound knowledge of the modern system of domination than was available to Gramsci and his Marxian analysis. Theorists who have built on these post-Foucauldian foundations include Clegg (1989; Clegg et al 2006) and Haugaard (1997, 2003 and 2006), as well as Flyvbjerg (1997 and 2001). For Flyvbjerg, to conceptualize truth as something divorced from power is the characteristic deception legitimating modern forms of domination, which allows the rationalization of power to flourish as reason, a theme taken up by Gordon in the next chapter.

Gordon (Chapter 14) fuses Foucauldian and organizational perspectives to re-examine the classic Weberian account of the relationship between power and authority. The point of departure is Weber’s account of rationalization. Within this account, Weber sketches a role for power that is as well known as any in the literature. There is some continuity with the Marxist stress on power flowing from the control of the means of
production which is supplemented by the importance of differential skills in the means of production, with class being cross-cut by status ascriptions of various kinds. Gordon situates power in Weber’s frame of bureaucracy in the context of the modern conception of organizations. All organizational members have access to varying degrees of power, which they may use to further either conformance or resistance to authoritative structures of dominancy. Interestingly, the influence of Parsons’ functionalist translation of Weber meant that it was the legitimate, authoritative rather than the resistant use of power that was stressed. Weber did not see that the legitimacy of rationality is always to be taken for granted; it has a contextual, historical and value laden dimension. Substantively, power should always be seen within the context of structures of dominancy. In mainstream accounts of organizations this has rarely been the case because such structures have invariably been seen, *a priori*, as legitimate. Hence, analysis becomes morally skewed: right always resides with the legitimate and opposition to it, resistance, can only ever be illegitimate. Authority, because of it’s taken for granted legitimacy, is viewed as something different to power; power is reserved for action that is not sanctioned by authority, hence resistance is always an act of power while authority is not.

In accounts of power, Gordon suggests, more critical accounts of power emerged out of the Community Power Debate, when Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1970) began to look at the ways in which legitimate agendas were framed to exclude what became non-issues for the elites and how it was the resistance of the excluded that reframed these non-issues as legitimate matters for exclusion, and transformed the politics of decision making in the process. On the back of these interventions Lukes (1974) was to develop his celebrated radical view of power, hinging on the extent to which subjects were capable of comprehending what their ‘real interests’ were and the extent
to which analysts were able to formulate what these interests were when the subjects
did not know themselves. The thorniness of these issues was best spelled out by
Benton (1981) in his discussion of ‘the paradox of emancipation’: if people were
deluded about their real interests, then having these specified for them by some
external agency could never be emancipatory: it could ever be another imposition on
their consciousness. Contrasted with the functionalist and moral agendas hitherto
discussed, Gordon turns his focus to a pragmatic account of power, originating with
Machiavelli and Nietzsche and shaped by Foucault in his various approaches of the
archaeology of knowledge, the genealogical perspective and the concern with care for
the self.

Finally, Gordon reviews current work on power and legitimacy, including
Courpasson (2006), and Gordon et al (2008). Much of this work points to the
importance of the “legitimisation of legitimacy” – the process by which members of a
social system legitimise certain forms of legitimacy and exclude others. Gordon
clearly favours the pragmatic approach to analysis of power.

Weber was one of a number of theorist at pains to differentiate power from violence;
violence, however, especially as it is lodged in state capacities, has rarely been
separate from the practice of many states, as Siniša Malešević explores in Chapter 15,
seeing the intrinsic structural relation between power and violence, almost exclusively
monopolized by the state apparatuses, as characterizing modernity. In fact, in his
account, modernity is covered in the gore of violence in a way that the Enlightenment
thinkers failed to anticipate. Indeed, it was only the German militaristic tradition of
social thought that emerged with the German nation-building project in the nineteenth
century, which saw systematic violence as a necessary step towards modernity. For reasons that are all too apparent, after the Second World War, this bellicose and specifically German tradition of social thought was discredited. Moreover, in the immediate post-War era, the stress was on a consensus mode of thinking that stressed shared central values, normative order, and regulation with the threat of violence removed to the margins of mutually assured destruction in the case of this order being threatened in its heartland in Western Europe and the United States by other states. In the margins, in Latin America or Asia, then the absence of shared values acted as a prompt for violent intervention.

From the 1980s onwards, historical and comparative sociologists increasingly began to focus on both actual violence and the possibilities of it occurring between states. Almost all did so within a more or less explicitly Weberian frame of analysis; the exception may be Michael Mann (1986; 1993), who places social power and state expansion at the centre of societal change. Social change occurs as a result of four networks of power organized politically, economically, militarily and ideologically. Military power, as the ‘social organization of concentrated lethal violence’ (Mann 2006:351), is clearly the basis of state power but, in most instances, not its limit. Other recent writers, such as Poggi (2004) and Collins (1975; 1986; 1999), also draw on the militaristic tradition of thought.

For Malešević there is one key question: ‘Why modern self-reflexive beings, socialized in the environment that abhors the sacrifice of human life, nonetheless tolerate and often tacitly support murder on a massive scale?’ To answer this question properly, he suggests, one needs to take ideological power much more seriously than contemporary historical sociologists have done. Violence as state power always has
ideological underpinnings, he suggests. Religions have had a key role to play in providing these in the past, and still do, as events in the Balkans, Middle East, Africa and Chechnya demonstrate; however, modern ideologies are also often underpinned by the authority of science, humanist, and other secular ethics. Nonetheless, even modern states can be deeply theological as well as scientific, humanist etc: although Israel may be the best example there are arguments that would suggest that under the sway of the ‘evangelicals’ in the Republican party in the US, this would not be an entirely inappropriate characterization. Perhaps the power of religious ideologies is too diminished by Malešević and the reason of contemporary ideologies too emphasized?

Power and Substantive Issues

One of the chief battlegrounds in both theory and practice has been the arena of gender relations. With few exceptions, Amy Allen suggests, in Chapter 16, that power has rarely been explicitly theorized by feminists in their discussions of the intersection of gender, race, class and sexuality. With respect to these exceptions, a wide variety of often incompatible theoretical strategies and conceptions of power have been deployed, with little agreement about the meaning of power, the key term. Allen uses feminist perspectives to explore the relationship between ‘power to’, ‘power over’ and ‘power with’, which allows her to fuse power as ‘domination’ with power as ‘emancipation’, as she tries to clarify what she refers to as a ‘muddy terrain’.

In surveying the field she observes that while poststructuralist approaches integrate power-over and power-to, they neglect power-with. She begins with Beauvoir, and her account of the ‘othering’ of women. Women are self-conscious human beings and capable of transcendence but compelled into immanence by patriarchal cultural, social
and political conditions that deny them that transcendence. Although one of her main
points of reference is Marxism it is the phenomenological elements in her thought that
proved more productive. Marxist thinking did have an impact on late twentieth
century feminism, through dual systems theory and segmented labour market analysis,
but there was always a clash of essentialisms at work in its frame in Marxist-feminist
analyses. Other approaches that flourished at this time were psychoanalytic accounts,
in which the psychological impact of a social ordering arranged as a system of
gender-based subordination was explored. What all these approaches had in common
was the equation of power with domination. Other approaches produced different
conceptions through a fusion of analysis of power with biology: out of the womb may
spring not only life but a care for the other that is uniquely nurturing and empowering
rather than dominating. From such perspectives then power conceived principally as
power over others is far too restricted and masculinist, although Allen thinks that
restricting power to this nurturing conception may be mistaken: how useful is it, she
asks, to redefine power in such a way that gender, race, class, and sexual
subordination can no longer be seen as relations of power at all?

Judith Butler (1990) is the most recognized poststructuralist contributor to feminism
and follows Foucault in seeing power as subjecting, as forming the subject. She
recognizes that from this perspective, therefore, none of us can be outside of power
relations as we are all subjects. Consequently, any attempts to maintain that there are
pure analytical starting points unaffected by power relations can only be a mistake
made from within a particular analytic of power, her take on Foucault’s
power/knowledge relations. There are affinities, Allen suggests, between
poststructuralism and ethnomethodology in their accounting of gender.
The key text for ethnomethodology is Candace West and Don Zimmerman (2002), which analyses the social accomplishment of gendered performance as an engagement in everyday behaviour which will always be the subject of close scrutiny as to how it is being accomplished. From this perspective, it is the everyday categories through which gender is accomplished that are important; how ordinary people do gender in everyday life. Both poststructuralist and ethnomethodological approaches emphasize neither women as victims nor the possessors of a unique empowerment but as agents who play an active and creative role the maintenance, reproduction and questioning of subordinating social norms. Allen clearly favours the micro-focus of approaches such as ethnomethodology, which seek to find the structuring of social order in the grain of everyday life, while being alert to the criticism that they have been neglectful of relations of dominance and subordination embedded in macrostructural and institutional dimensions of power, as well as collective power, and the intersectional cross-cutting of gender, race, class, and sexual relations.

Themes of agency and structure and their calibration form a backdrop to a number of the contributions that we have discussed thus far, as well for Stewart Clegg’s Chapter 17, which explores how organization theory can build upon Machiavellian, Nietzschean and Foucauldian perspectives to give us an account of power. The central focus is on managing as an action, considered historically, in terms of the emergence of the categories of the manager and the employee, the one specialist in authority and the other a specialist in obedience. The worker is constituted as a basic labour power (energy to work) while the manager is defined by knowledge, which grants the authority to conduct (others’) behaviours. Together, they comprise the essential unity between power-knowledge as the base of modernity.
The first definitive codification of this power-knowledge occurred when Frederick Winslow Taylor produced the first modern technology of power, one oriented to constituting a utilitarian political economy of the body. Management emerges as a pragmatic science that works in a positive ways by shaping the dispositions that define what employees take, normally, to be true. Management seeks to constitute central aspects of identity through relations of power over both ones’ self, qua manager, and other people and things. Managing means making things happen through the exercise of initiative and agency, which entails power. Modern managers, after Taylor, confront modern employees who do not exist merely as creatures of habit, tradition or craft but become *objects* of scientific knowledge and *subjects* produced by the application of that knowledge; they become utilitarian subjects in an elaborately reformist and timed ethnography of work. However, increasingly the project of reform could not be contained within work itself; it spilled out into the broader social ordering with the Ford Sociological Department, as Clegg demonstrates, before shifting into the management of abstractions such as social capital and knowledge. Taken in their totality these forms of managing are attempts to manage power/knowledge, as Foucault suggests. Finally, there is an irony in the ways that management and organization theory have theorized power; largely, the way in which the chapter has treated the concept is not how the discourse normally attends to it. In Clegg’s theorization power is embedded in practices that, very largely, do not theorize it as such.

Closely related, but dwelling on relations of resistance, David Courpasson and Françoise Dany, in Chapter 18, discuss the processes through which a taken for granted phenomenon (for instance, managerial hegemony) is more or less suddenly unveiled by certain social actors and made questionable and thinkable by the same
social actors, using changes in the form of power to open up its relations. The chapter demonstrates, as did Gordon, that power and resistance are not necessarily illegitimate activities; indeed the thrust of the chapter is to demonstrate the ways in which power organized as resistance, rather than being merely antithetical and illegitimate, can also transform the nature of legitimate power relations by being the trigger that generates new organizational forms. The focus is on the emergence of processes by which power structures and relationships are modified, altered and relations of power changed.

Courpasson and Dany write against the grain of many recent studies of resistance. Rather than focusing on resistance through subjective distanciation and escape attempts they see resistance through the creative capacities it entails and enhances. What is striking and interesting about resistance is its creative power. Contemporary managerial ‘soft domination’ (Courpasson 2006) facilitates the emergence of productive and creative forms of resistance that are capable of changing managerial imperatives and directives through a ‘culture of empowerment’.

In Chapter 19, Kevin Ryan explores how power relations are constituted not only through the positioning of the powerful but also through constitution of a social world in which certain categories of person become synonymous with powerlessness, with exclusion. H begins the chapter with a discussion of two types of power – biopower and disciplinary power that we know well from Foucault, using examples of eugenics and psychology to demonstrate how power, knowledge and empire were bundled up together. What connected them were issues of government; indeed, Ryan suggests that to be governed is to be free to articulate a certain type of discourse by thinking,
speaking and acting within a distinct order of possibilities and limitations represented in what he terms, after Foucault, a regime of truth.

The chapter begins, in a classical manner, with regimes of truth that predate modernity: those that constituted the ‘three estates’ in pre-revolutionary France and the disciplinary society that held these estates together, largely in terms of functions that policed the society for the state. There were two ways of doing this, which combined disciplinary and pastoral powers, seeking to ensure the strength and security of the state and secure the happiness and prosperity of the population. In other words, to pattern the combination of negative interventionary and positive organizational power in such a way as to govern, as relatively easily and economically as possible, the relation between what Ryan terms ‘each and all’. For Ryan, the various adumbrations of the Poor Law and its attempted reform through the nineteenth century were the space in which these dynamics can be seen in their workings. At the heart of these Laws and their reform were shifting categorizations of what constituted indigence, citizenship and responsibility centred on notions of the vagabond and the indigent, defining illiberal subjects who had to be regulated. Positive power, defining the liberal subject, and exclusionary power, reforming the illiberal subject, operates not only through law but also through norms, especially those established in terms of the distribution of characteristics in a population. Increasingly, in the prison, the workhouse, the factory, the asylum, the hospital, the school and the family a new normative order of the normal and its deviancies began to be established. Thus was modernity defined and constructed.

In the final part of the chapter Ryan turns his attention to the order of advanced liberal modernity that characterizes our times. He dwells on the panoply of devices used for
delineating degrees of social inclusion and exclusion, such as various mechanisms of social audit, regulation, and, in short, governmentality. Together the actuarial logic of performance, the organisational power of partnership, and the regulatory power of auditing and accounting prove to be techniques of control that secure order.

Chapter 20 constitutes a strategic-relational perspective on the state-power nexus in which Bob Jessop explains that the state should not be conceived as a unitary subject or as a thing that is capable of acting but should instead be conceptualized as a set of relations constituted through power. What is at issue is how it is possible for a state to act as if it were a unified subject and what could constitute its unity as a 'thing' and how is it that social actors come to act as if the state were a real subject or a simple instrument? In short, how is it possible that such everyday reification is possible?

Approaches are considered and discarded. The state cannot be defined by those institutions it constitutes and governs, for instance, as Weber remarked, there is no activity that states always perform and none that they have never performed (1948: 77-78). Nor can we determine the limits of the state through its top management team when so much state activity is contracted out or conducted at arms length by agencies such as national media, employers associations or trades unions. The legitimate monopoly of the means of violence may be necessary but it is hardly sufficient as a defining feature for it is too minimalist and hardly addresses the normal everyday body of state business which does not entail the troops, police or riot squad. Nor does territorial definition help greatly when we have states that are members of super-state entities such as the EU and simultaneously, such as France and Italy, have elected representatives from overseas territories over which they may, or may not, have sovereignty. (One of the editors lives in a neighbourhood in Sydney, Australia, that
elects a deputy to the Italian parliament.) As such examples suggests states are embedded in wider political systems, articulate their relations with other institutional orders, and are linked, in different ways, to different forms of civil society.

The state is both one institution amongst many but also that which polices all aspects of the functioning of the society in which it is embedded. It is continually called upon to resolve society's problems just as much as it is held responsible for having created many of these problems in the first place. Against this background Jessop has defined the state, minimally, as a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’. It is a minimalist definition, however, and Jessop quickly moves to qualify it in a number of ways. Bundled up in the definitional a question is the matter of state power; again, ever the minimalist, Jessop defines it as the capacity of a given force (the state) to produce an event that would not otherwise occur. Essentially, he sees the state as a system of political domination, variations in the capacities of which, their organization, and exercise, has effects on states' capacities to project their power into social realms well beyond whatever institutional boundaries may be taken to define the state in question. How these are constituted are themselves subject to evolutionary processes of selection, retention and variation. On the basis of the discussion that we have just summarized, Jessop arrives at a definition of the state as an effect of those strategies that traverse it, which are contested and constituted within its arenas; thus state power is an institutionally-mediated condensation of the changing balance of political forces. And these forces are expressed in changing strategies that will be more or less explicitly formalized as such, to which the analyst can attend; to wit, Thatcherism, neo-liberalism and so on. Such strategies may emerge as techniques for
governing the economy, the labour-capital relation and so on but they are also equally likely to be emergent with respect to the intersection of an infinite number of possible identities that do not necessarily privilege those of relations of production.

In Chapter 21 Phil Cerny begins by noting that, from a neo-realist perspective, in order to explain what happens in world politics in politics between states it is necessary to focus on the power-seeking actions of states as well as “state actors” in terms of the structured, ongoing relations of power that occur between and among states. Such relations at their most basic are between those who are members and those who are not, those who are insiders and those who are outsiders, or between us and them, where they are ‘foreigners’.

In the contemporary conditions of a globalizing world the relations among global states have become far more complicated, with cross-cutting forms of power evident from the emergence of new institutions and actors within the changing structure of the global economy and social relations among states and other global actors and institutions. Power in international relations is typically defined power in terms of the relative power of states vis-à-vis each other, where states are seen as relatively homogenous actors capable of collective and unitary action. Typically, states acted on states. Today, however, economic, political and social relationships that cut across state borders undercut these clear categories. Revived, emerging and hegemonic cross-cutting linkages and loyalties are increasingly seen as intruding on state politics. Modes of “transnational” action create webs of collective action far more subtle and sophisticated than power politics. The chapter discusses some of these new forms in detail, forms such as international institutions, regimes and “global governance”, non-state and transgovernmental actors, the changing structure of the global economy,
evolving transnational social and cultural bonds, the loosening of frontiers and
borders, the emergence of transnational pluralism, the restructuring of the state, and
the growing “civilianization” of power in a world of complex interdependence. The
overarching and global window on power that is provided by Cerny seems to be an
appropriate ending to this journey through the family of power.

Conclusion

In the conclusion the editors reflect, in conversation, on the diversity of power
perspectives and their relevance to power research. Overall, they acknowledge that
the Handbook is premised upon the idea that there is no single correct interpretation
of power; thus, they do not seek to impose one. Power is a conceptual tool not a single
essence that is eternally contested. A screwdriver can double as a chisel but it is not
as fit for the purpose as a specifically designed and appropriate tool. So it is with
power. Just as both a screwdriver and a chisel may generically belong to a category of
metal-bladed hand tools, so power may collect different devices under its category.
Just as a specific tool may be fit for one purpose but not so good at another, so it is
with different conceptual tools of power. Different tools arise from overlapping
perceptions of power each of which is shaped by particular local language games,
which function much as if they were paradigms, shaping certain problems and
questions surrounding the concept. In bringing together this Handbook we have
brought together exemplars of each tradition, which can serve either as a point of
entry for those who are new to or exploring power fields while, for the expert, the
chapters constitute exciting new developments within specialist areas of research.
References


