Doing power work

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Introduction

In this chapter I will introduce the notion of the researcher, especially as a Doctoral student, as someone who is expected to think for a living. Thinking for a living, it will be suggested, means following ideas – even if they take us out of what we define as our intellectual paddock and lead us to stray into neighbouring or even distant terrain.

For organizations scholars, however, thinking for a living is not sufficient. We have to relate how our thinking for a living relates to the way that others are working for a living in relation to those organizations that employ them, that they relate to and work with. Thus, the second movement is to consider the relation between thinking for a living and working for a living.

Researchers work. They do researching for a living. Hence, the third movement of the chapter is to address how we can connect that thinking that we do with the worlds of organizations and work on which we work – doing researching for a living. In essence this kind of work entails making sense of others working for a living and the organizations within which they do this working and which they relate to in the process. There are many ways that one might make these connections. If one is studying power relations then one of the best ways is to focus on the discursive moves that actors make in context. Practically, this means gaining access to key decision-making and issue-
addressing meetings in which people’s managing largely consists of talking through, round and about issues. Theoretically, there are a number of ways of addressing such talk; the one that I shall focus on derives from the notion that people are engaged in complex language games in everyday organizational life.

Of course, for researchers, the ideas they develop in one project should feed and nurture subsequent ones, subsequent significations one might say, and so for the fourth movement of the chapter I consider how the earlier conjunction of empirical experience and theoretical insight led to subsequent theoretical signification.

All research takes place in space and time as the abstract coordinates of its construction. Typically, researchers focus more on one axis than the other: most survey researchers take a small, often static slice of time, and bring reports from a large number of discrete spaces at more or less one moment. If they do this more than once then they may be said to bring back snapshots that form an elapsed sequence, often referred to as a panel study. Case study researchers vary enormously in the amount of time that they spend in the field. Because I understand that this book is meant to be a useful tool for practising researchers I have decided to discuss an exemplary case study, one that records a detailed length of time in the field, measured in terms of quite a number of years. I am well aware that such a level of detail may be out of reach of many hard-pressed research students and apprentice researchers, but Flyvbjerg’s (1998) work sets a benchmark of which all case study researchers should be aware.
Finally, in the last movement, there are a few words summing up the themes that have been scored into this account, and the lessons that it might teach.

**Thinking for a living**

Becoming a researcher means getting a PhD. I chose to do my research on ‘power in organizations’. The first thing that one does as a researcher is to try and define the parameters for a literature search. At the time that I started the research there did not appear to be a great deal of literature to search. Max Weber (1968) had written about power; David Hickson and his colleagues (1971) had done a masterful job of pulling together much of the more recent thinking into a ‘strategic contingencies theory of intraorganizational power’, which accommodated major contributions such as those of Crozier (1963; also see the later development by Crozier and Friedberg 1980). In passing they had referenced a definition of power by the American political scientist, Robert A. Dahl (1957). Following this up entailed reading some of the political science literature, in which I found debates that were entirely pertinent to organization theory and almost entirely absent.

Two main debates had preoccupied the American political science literature concerned with power. One was a debate that Dahl (1958; 1971) had had with C. Wright Mills (1957), the author of the famous study of *The Power Elite*. Mills provided an institutional history of the construction of the military industrial complex that many commentators, including President Eisenhower, saw as dominating the Cold War United States in the 1950s. Dahl countered that Mills had not clearly determined that this elite existed; for him to do so, he said, one had to establish that its preferences routinely prevailed in
decision-making in specific arenas of power. Having a reputation for being powerful was insufficient, he said. We have to be able to say that we have observed someone doing power which would consist of making someone do something with respect to a decision that was different from what they would have done had the other not interceded. ‘My intuitive idea of power’, Dahl (1957: 203) said, occurs when someone whom he nominates as an A, can do something to someone else, whom he nominates as a B: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to so something B would not otherwise do’.

Such a definition has immediate organizational application; as Dahl (1957: 203) says an ‘A’ could be any kind of agency – a person, group, roles, office, government, nation-state or other human aggregate’. The agency expressed in power will depend on mobilizing some resources; these will be expressed through means or instruments of power, and, empirically, be rendered as a probability that A’s power will prevail over a specific scope of B’s behaviour. For instance, an organization, such as the Greater London Council may be able to mobilize resources, such as cameras, parking patrol officers, and legislation, to dissuade drivers from entering central London, unless they are prepared to pay a congestion charge. The power of the council would be rendered in terms of the probability that a certain percentage of drivers will obey the new rules and a certain percentage will break them.

However, the astute reader will have already picked up the reference to rules. As the rules change, behaviour changes in response to their enforcement. Somehow, it seems to be the rules that represent the changed power. Looked at this way the opportunities for analysis become more promising. We might for instance, compare different cities and ask why
and when congestion charging was, or was not, introduced. In the city of Sydney, where I am writing at this moment, there is no congestion charge even though the roads are highly congested and traffic circulation and movement is widely acknowledged as a problem. Why is it the case that the city of London was able to introduce this change of rules while many other cities that are equally afflicted with the same problems have not? Once we start to enquire into these questions we probably have to relax the focus on decision making. For one thing, the key issue may be that there has been no decision making; that, for whatever reasons, the issue of congestion charging has not arisen. In exploring these reasons we would need to expand our reading somewhat and catch up with a second major set of debates that were occurring in political science.

Dahl’s (1961) empirical work rapidly attracted criticism of the assumptions on which it was based. The chief protagonists were Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 948) who question whether a ‘sound concept of power’ can be ‘totally embodied and fully reflected in “concrete decisions” or in activity bearing directly upon their making?’ Is there not such a phenomenon as ‘non-decision-making’, they suggest? One can capture this concept, they suggest, by investigating how an ‘A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 948). In the case in point, this could take us into quite diverse territory. We might want to compare the organizational structure and scope of operations of city councils: are they weak and fragmented because small and premised on historical neighbourhoods or are they large and unified as a result of amalgamation? What role do developers and road lobbies play in constructing a climate of opinion? What
is the state of public transport? What are the boundaries of the city and how do these map on to the patterns of wealth and social demography of the citizens? Answers to all these questions might indicate forms of bias that may be mobilized in the existing structure of things (Schattschneider 1960: 71) and shape action about the issue – or non-issue – at hand.

What constitutes an issue cannot simply be read off, observationally, from what happens. What does not happen also needs to be considered. The ‘dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favour the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 950) need to be considered. These constitute the rules of the game and it is through these rules that power possibilities will be shaped and framed.

Three major ways of non-decision-making present themselves: first, the powerful may choose not to hear issues articulated by the less powerful and in this way they never make it on to the formal agenda of decision-making; second, their may be a ‘rule of anticipated reaction’ (Freidrich 1937) in play. The relatively weak might anticipate the likely reaction to an issue and choose not to raise it, anticipating the likely outcome, so the issue remains unacknowledged publicly; third, non-decision-making may occur through the mobilization of bias evident in ‘those situations where dominant interests may exert such a degree of control over the way in which a political system operates, and over the values, beliefs and opinions of less powerful groups within it, that they can effectively determine not only whether certain demands come to be expressed and needed, but also whether such demands will even cross people’s minds’ (Saunders 1979: 30).
Debates in a field are often quite hermetically sealed; researchers read specific journals in the field that they define themselves as working and do not, on the whole, read journals from other fields, even if they are cognate to their field of interest. It was certainly the case that when I began to read widely in the power literature I discovered debates there that had not, at the time, made any impact in organization theory. What was important next was to work out how these could be translated into data collection and interpretation. About the answer to this question I was less confident than in my ability to have tracked down interesting ideas in the literature.

One thing was for sure: I did not feel that after moving into these more subtle accounts of power and the rules of the game that the standard questionnaire approach which generated data on a number of predetermined response sets would furnish the quality of data that was required to address these issues. For one thing, any such approach would have to have incorporated quite a large sample across a wide number of organizations to be statistically valid; meeting this requirement would have meant a considerable degree of abstractness and lack of context in any questions that could be asked, if only because, as a researcher I could not possibly know in advance what the contextual issues and non-issues would be across a wide range of organizations. Of necessity, it seemed that a case study approach would be necessary.

That case studies should be preferred was not the conclusion that early organization theory studies of power, such as Hickson et al (1971; Hinings et al 1974), came to. The power of numbers overwhelmed the power of context, even when the numbers were fairly meaningless because they referred to hypothetical rather than real situations. The
preference for numbers runs deep in organization theory, in a somewhat intellectually stunted way. No better instance of this can be found than the continuing fascination of organization theorists for measuring things that do not happen other than as an artefact of the questions that are asked in a survey by way of responses to hypothetical questions. The numbers are generated by individual responses to particular Likert-scale type questions. The answers of all the individuals are then aggregated and a mean score for ‘organizational politics’ derived from these, which is taken, somewhat bizarrely, to represent the organization that the individuals are situated in. Of course, the data represents no such thing: it is merely an artefact of the questions, the scales and the individuals coming into collusion to generate data which, when averaged, is meaningless as a measure of anything other than of the ‘average sense’ that a number of discrete individuals make of a set of hypothetical questions such as ‘rewards come only to those who work hard in this organization’. Using such data a POPS or Perception of Organization Politics score can be generated. Quite what the value of such data is escapes me entirely. For one, it breaches Durkheim’s (1964) *Rules of Sociological Method*. The average of aggregate individual data about non-contextually specific and hypothetical questions that generate replies from any number of individuals, which tap into their delusions, disconnects or ability to parrot corporate lines means nothing real. Second, if it has any merit, it is as a kind of ritual incantation that will keep simple-minded positivist supervisors happy and ensure that you never have to speak to managers about how they use, view and are abused by organizational politics in their own terms. Instead, all that the respondents might think has already been curtailed by the thinking that goes into the questions that collect the data. It is lazy research; the researcher does hardly any
translational work and just leaves it to trust that the respondents are capable of doing it without any reality checks on their ability to do so. If this kind of research interests you and is what you wish to do, I suggest you give up reading this chapter now and go and read something such as Vigoda (2003) and Ferris et al (2002; 2005). It will be far more to your taste even though I believe it to be a complete waste of time other than as an object lesson in how not to research power and politics in organizations.

**Working for a living**

Perhaps typically of most research students, my experience of the world of work was fairly limited. While many of my contemporaries were gaining business and organizational experience I was reading obscure debates about power in libraries of journals and books. That was the nature of my work at that time. As a research apprentice it was what one is expected to do. However, I had worked at other things in the past. One of these things was as a seasonal worker on a construction site, working as a labourer for a group of joiners or carpenters as they are sometimes called. As I worked away in the library or at my desk at home my thoughts often turned back to this work experience wondering how I could translate the terms of debate that I was grappling with into an understanding of something concrete.

Looking back on that experience of my early induction at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy, I did what the joiners told me to do, whether it was applying fish oil to shuttering – a particularly unpleasant job – brewing up the tea, fetching the fish and chips at lunch time, going to the bookie’s office to put bets on, hammering nails – and screws – into formwork, or downing tools. Downing tools – when I would carry nail
boxes and other equipment back to the joiners hut – normally occurred at the end of the
day, or at a lunch break – ‘snap time’ – but on one occasion it occurred more irregularly.

The ‘lads’ with whom I worked were skilled labourers and good sorts. Jokes and
observations on the young women passing by the site were one currency of work time
relations. Doubtless, we were a bastion of working class masculinity and sexism, but at a
time when hardly any of us thought much about the latter and rarely connected it to the
former. The other main currency of conversation concerned pay rates. These were very
complex, and consisted of several allowances, such as a journey to work allowance and a
shower and clean up allowance, as well as conditions that had been won for the joiners as
a part of a collective industrial relations award. There was an hourly rate, and a piece-rate
system that delivered a productivity bonus if the joiners exceeded the norms that were
established for the metres of shuttering that were constructed as form work in a given
time period. Additionally, there were contractual agreements about when joiners could
work. One of these was that ‘joiners shall not work in inclement weather’.

A recurrent theme of conversation among the joiners was the inadequacies of the project
and project manager. One day we were on the site and it started to flake with snow, the
temperature dropped, and our hands became blue with cold. The ganger, the leader of the
work team, called us all off the job, saying 'Eh up, 'appen weather's turned inclement',
and we trooped back to our hut, where I brewed the tea, and the lads studied the racing
form, the page three girls, and the rest of the paper. After we had been there about thirty
minutes the foreman came down and said ‘What’s up wi’ you lot then? Get thee sen back
on site.' The ganger replied, 'No, no, joiners don’t work in inclement weather.' The foreman looked hostile and left. Ten minutes later the project manager came down to the hut and said 'Why aren’t you out there working?' 'What do you think we’re paying you for?'

Now, with mention of pay it appeared as if we were getting somewhere: the issue turned out not to be about the weather at all; it was really about pay, which the project manager had raised as an issue. Sure enough, the joiners did have a collective agreement that they should not work in inclement weather but there was no operational definition of what constituted inclemency. The weather wasn’t that bad – unpleasant but not so severe that you couldn’t work. 'Well, point is', came the reply, 'it’s not worth it, for what thee’s paying us in shutterage, there’s nought in it for us.' And that was the nub: the site was badly managed; the project manager was not doing his job well.

It was widely known that his wife had left him because of his ‘fancy woman’, his ‘bit on the side’, and that he was having trouble looking after his children, getting them to school, and picked up, and himself to work. The job was ill managed; this manifested itself mainly from the joiners’ point of view in a lack of coordination in the flow of materials aligned with the flow of work on the site. Hence, they were making very little or no bonus – not because of their laziness but because, as they saw it, of the project manager’s incompetence – or at least distraction. They had little to do because of the lack of effective coordination. Raising the inclemency rule was merely a way of putting
pressure on the project manager; instantiating a legitimate rule to establish a legitimate grievance without establishing a formal dispute.

Some time later I realized that I had learnt a lot from this incident. Things didn’t get done and buildings weren’t accomplished without a great deal of coordination, communication, consent and control – the four ‘C’s’ of management. Looking back on this experience some time after it had happened I thought that if understanding power in organizations required detailed contextual understanding, the conclusion I had come to, then why not go back to construction sites to study it? At least I knew something about them as an insider.

**Researching for a living**

*Making sense of working for a living*

I re-entered the world of construction sites, this time as a non-participant observer. I was not working on the site, other than to connect what I knew from the library with what I could grasp on site. I spent all my time on the site, wandering around, sitting in on meetings, and tape-recording conversations. As well as reading Max Weber (1968), Georg Simmel (1971), Michel Crozier (1963) and David Hickson (1971) on power, in addition to the contributions to the Community Power Debate by Dahl (1961) and Bachrach and Baratz (1970), I had also been reading in the areas of methodology and philosophy of enquiry. I read Garfinkel (1967) on ethnomethodology, and I read Wittgenstein (1972a) on language games. Wittgenstein fascinated me. I had first met him in an undergraduate philosophy subject. I knew about the *Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1994) and I knew of his renunciation of its problematic and the adoption of the language game approach of the Philosophical Investigations. And I had read about the builders who made an appearance early on in the Blue and Brown Books (1972b). They were quite impoverished, linguistically, seeming to respond best to gestures and short, sharp imperative commands. I knew that Wittgenstein – an engineer by training – had built a family home in his native Vienna for his sister and could only conclude that his wealthy background meant that he took only a very patrician interest in how it was built. Certainly, the language games that we had played on site were much richer, much more multi-faceted, and much more tangential to the task of construction.

Still, together with my interest in ethnomethodology, this interest in Wittgensteinian language games shaped a research method in my mind. I would go back on site; I would lurk in the corners and shadows, I would blend in, and I would capture the naturally occurring conversations I chanced upon. I would do so using some new technology – that of a portable cassette player. But there were some problems. Construction sites are very noisy; conversation is shouted and snatched by the wind, covered by the sound of machinery, and fragmented by motion around the site. Thus, I retreated to the project office, where at least it was warm, where I had a table in the corner, strewn with technical drawings that I could hide behind, read philosophy, and where conversation could be captured.

Each day I might capture anything up to six hours taped material. So much talk, heated arguments, conspiratorial planning and plotting, multiple issues and agendas, different
points of view, irreconcilable interests, sexual flirtation, everyday dramas: all human life was there. And I had much of it on my cassette tapes. I sat up till late at night transcribing it, slept a few hours, and then was back on the site to collect more. I did this for three months – not everyday but about three or four days a week on average. From the point of view of the builders I was studying how managers actually managed – hence the tape recordings. And, in a way, I was, because my ways of making sense of these materials was increasingly being steered by my ways of making sense of Wittgenstein. My earlier thoughts of using conversational analysis methods that had developed out of Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology increasingly seemed inadequate to my research question of how power, non-decision-making and the rules of the game were constituted and accomplished in organizations. Turn-taking didn’t seem to be the trick (Sachs et al 1974). To answer my needs I turned to ideas that I had encountered in Wittgenstein.

Language games and power in construction

Wittgenstein’s analysis of language games in his scattered texts, notably the *Philosophical Investigations* (1972a), was thin. Central key concepts for thinking about language were introduced, including the notions of ‘form of life’ and ‘language game’, but were analytically underdeveloped. That this should be the case was hardly surprising given that the texts come from notes that his students took in his lectures, and were only constituted as books subsequent to his death in 1951. It was part of what made them so useful – that they were underdeveloped provided ample room for subsequent theorists to be creative (see for instance Pitkin 1972).
Taking a cue from ethnomethodology but not using its conversation analysis approach, I was probably one of the earliest researchers to realize that the world of organizations is a world that is essentially rich in discourse; whatever else managers may do a large part of their work consists of the interpretation of key texts and the articulation and rationalization of different accounts of these (Clegg 1975).

Power came into the analysis in a way that blended Wittgenstein (1972a) with Garfinkel (1967). One of the key concepts of the latter was the notion of ‘indexicality’, a term that originated from linguistics, where an indexical term would be defined as one that could only be understood in context. Classically indexical terms would be ‘it’ and ‘this’. For instance, in the following sentence one cannot know what either mean without an appropriate context being supplied: ‘It is this, then’. It could be an interrogative or a factual statement referring to the relation of two terms – but without a context being provided then the meaning of the terms is utterly inscrutable. One could as easily imagine the sentence to be one spoken by an explorer, a lover, or a politician, or, indeed, almost any identity.

What relates indexicality to power is context. In the context of construction sites the contract and its associated documents are the central framework shaping managerial discourse. The contract in question was of the kind that is referred to in the construction industry as a hard money contract – where the construction being undertaken was bid for on the basis of the specifications in the contract, for a definite price, and where the most competitive tender wins the contract. What this does is to set up a constitutive framework
in which the *meaning* of the contract plays an essential role. Despite recommendations in the procedural handbooks of the industry the contracts are never unindexical: that is, they cannot be read simply as a precise and unequivocal set of instructions for building a building. There are at least two reasons for this, I argue (Clegg 1975). Both are questions of context – one immanently material to the conditions in which the specific contract is enacted and the other transcendentally constitutive of all contracts.

The immanent reasons are simple. Contractual specifications, typically, are large and complex bodies of documentation: Not only are there the documents on which the work is bid but there is also an associated ‘bill of works’ – comprising detailed consultants reports and associated documents. In an ideal world these would exist in an absolute and seamless correspondence of all detail from one document to another such that no document ever contradicted another or was in conflict with it. Given the vast amount of paper – comprising detailed specifications, reports, and projections – associated with relatively complex construction projects, that there actually is such correspondence is a large assumption to make. Many hands, at many times, using many distinct skills, produce the papers. More often than not there will be points of ambiguity or even disagreement between them. The precise meaning of them is not stipulated in the documents themselves – in Wittgenstein’s (1972a) terms there is no meta-rule that provides the rules for how the meaning embedded in the documents should be interpreted. It is this that provides the immanent grounds for indexicality and substantial opportunity for extensive language games to be conducted between project managers and
other significant actors on construction sites, in which the precise meaning of what is often imprecise documentation, is translated into contested action.

One distinction is central to Wittgenstein’s thought – that between the ‘surface’ and the ‘deep’ structure. The classic case of the difference between surface and deep structure is one that Wittgenstein uses on several occasions and it involves the relation between any given instances of speech and the idea of grammar. Speech is on the surface – it is what one hears or reads in a written form. Underlying it, however, are the rules of grammar.

Wittgenstein thought of the deep structure in terms of grammar. I argued that the texts that I recovered through audio-taping from the construction site had a social grammar underlying them – one that was embedded in their ‘form of life’, another Wittgensteinian concept. Quite what Wittgenstein meant by form of life is not entirely clear. On some occasions of use it seems to mean no more than a mode of life; on other occasions the meaning is more inscrutable, possibly even genetically constitutive. The form of life, I argued, was transcendentally constitutive and with this move brought together the surface structure and the deep structure. On the surface was what people said; underlying this was a deep structure of rules in the use of which players were more or less skilled game-players, using a social grammar as a generative device for making sense of what it was that was being said and what it was that could – and should – be said. Skill is the crucial issue in this regard – and the skills were basically a mastery of rhetoric, of being able to make something out of the opportunities presented by the contractual documents. Deeper still was a transcendental frame, the form of life, which made what was constituted by the
grammar, the deep structure, sensible and rational, by stipulating the need for the organization to be as profitable an enterprise as it could be.

The action played out in specific arenas. Project meetings were the main arenas. These meetings were held to discuss issues. Sometimes they had fairly formal agendas, other times they were impromptu. Many of these were taped over a three-month period of intensive fieldwork. The issues invariably related some actions, or absence of actions, to the contractual documents contained in the bill of works. Thus, much of what was said in these meetings was said in relation to some putative but contested state of affairs in terms of the alignment of that state of affairs with the state that should have pertained in terms of the contractual specifications. The gap between these states was the matter at issue. Hence, the discourses involved attributions of responsibility for variance. What got to be said was spoken from different positions of material interest in the contract; for the head contractor the main issue was to find indexical particulars in the contract that could be exploited in order to win some contribution to the profitability of the site through processing variation orders for which additional payments could be demanded. The architect and client team sought to see that what they thought they had designed and were paying for was actually constructed for the price contracted. That is the point of hard money contacts – they are supposed to provide for a ‘what you contracted for is what you get at the price agreed’ outcome – at least in theory. In practice industry people know that skilled and shrewd project managers will find ways of creating significant – and costly – variance.
It can be seen that the rules underlying the surface production of text were quite clear –
the Project Manager and his team sought systematically to exploit any indexicality in the
contract in order to maximize profitability while the Architect and the client team sought
to resist this at every turn. In turn, that these were the rules of the game only made sense
in terms of a form of life of capitalism – one in which the creation of profit was the
fundamental aim.

To make it more concrete, the matter under discussion in a project meeting might be
something apparently simple such as the meaning of clay. But while the meaning of clay
may appear simple it soon becomes apparent that, from a perspective that sees the talk as
exhibiting a surface structure, deep structure, and form of life, that in fact the meaning is,
precisely, a matter of power. The actually recorded material – what people said in
situated action – provides the surface structure of the text. The contested matter was the
depth of clay that should have been excavated to prepare the site for foundation pillars
that were to be constructed out of poured concrete. The issue was simple. The Consultant
Engineers’ drawings instructed excavation to a minimum of 600 mm. into ‘sandy, stony
clay’. They did not specify the depth at which such clay could be found. Accompanying
the drawings were a series of reports from drilled test bore holes done as a site survey of
the ground that had to be built on. These recommended excavation to a depth of two
meters into clay. The Project Manager argued that there were different qualities of clay
across the site, running at variable depths. There was ‘puddle clay’ and ‘sandy, stony
clay’. He defined ‘normal clay’ as ‘sandy, stony clay’. The resulting depth of the
excavations done became the subject of an acrimonious letter from the Clients’ Architect
to the Construction Company. The points at issue resulted from investigation of the claimed excavation levels, which, as the letter put it, revealed little or no consistency. The counter claim from the Project Manager was that the normal clay sub-strata varied in level across the site – hence the need for additional – and unauthorized – excavation. It was a complicated dispute (Clegg 1975, Appendix 2 and 4).

The analytical importance of the case is that it demonstrates that in everyday organizational life language games can be inherently political. First, the contestation that occurs – the discourse of the site meetings – is not random. Second, contestation is patterned by the skilful use of the underlying rules for constituting issues – searching for indexicality in the meaning of the documents – by the participants in the arena. These comprise a mode of rationality – a way of acting that is, within the situated action context, rational. Third, this patterning only makes sense where the ultimate aim is the maximization of profit. The analysis can be represented in the following terms:

<table>
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<th>Concept</th>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Structural level</th>
<th>Ethnographic questions</th>
<th>Primacy of analytic focus</th>
<th>Focus</th>
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<td>Rules</td>
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<td>Domination</td>
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Subsequent significations

The stress on situated and plural rationalities that developed out of my interest and appreciation of Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology and Schutz’s (1967) phenomenology was subsequently to be fed by the work of the French historian of ideas, Michel Foucault. Foucault (1977: 27-28) says ‘power produces knowledge . . . power and knowledge directly imply one another . . . there is no power relation without the creative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.’ In such a view rationalities and powers are fused. Rationalities are always situational. And because they are always contextually situational they are always implicated with power. No context stands outside power. If that were the case, then power would exist nowhere, outside of understanding, outside of possibility, outside of sense. Different power actors operate in and through different rationalities, which have different rules for producing sense and, at the more formal outer limits, for producing truth. In fact, sense and truth cannot be separated from the ensemble of rules that constitute them—and their obverse—as such.

To adopt a discursive analysis of rationality is to see what people say as the means whereby rationality and power become interwoven. People may be in a position to say anything, given the infinity of discourse, but they rarely surprise the well-grounded analyst with their discursive moves. Language games are not predictable but they are
explicable. We can understand and constitute the senses that are being made as well as the conditions of existence and underlying tacit assumptions that make such sense possible. And in this way we can begin to understand the different forms of agency that find expression in organizational contexts, where the players make sense of rules that they actively construct and deconstruct in the context of their action.

I have used the idea of circuits of power to represent the ways in which power may flow through different modalities (Clegg 1989). Relatively simple is transitive power, where one agency seeks to get another to do what they would not otherwise do. Power in this sense usually involves fairly straightforward episodic power, oriented towards securing outcomes. The two defining elements of episodic power circuits are agencies and events of interest to these agencies. Agencies are constituted within social relations; in these social relations they are analogous to practical experimentalists who seek to configure these relations in such a way that they present stable standing conditions for them to assert their agency in securing preferred outcomes. Hence, relations constitute agents that agents seek to configure and reconfigure; agencies seek to assert agency and do so through configuring relations in such a way that their agency can be transmitted through various generalized media of communication, in order to secure preferential outcomes. All this is quite straightforward and familiar from what Lukes (1974; 2005) termed one-dimensional accounts of power.

Episodes are always interrelated in complex and evolving ways. No 'win' or 'loss' is ever complete in itself nor is the meaning of victory or defeat definitely fixed as such at the
time of its registration, recognition or reception; such matters of judgment are always contingent on the temporalities of the here-and-now, the reconstitutions of the there-and-then, on the reflective and prospective glances of everyday life (Schutz 1967). If power relations are the stabilization of warfare in peaceful times then any battle is only ever a part of an overall campaign. What is important from the point of view of the infinity of power episodes stretching into a future that has no limits are the feedback loops from distinct episodic outcomes and the impact that they have on overall social and system integration. The important question is whether episodic outcomes tend rather more to reproduce or to transform the existing architectonics—the architecture, geometry and design—of power relations? How they might do so is accommodated in the model through the circuit of social integration episodic outcomes serve to either more or less transform or reproduce the rules fixing extant relations of meaning and membership in organizational fields; as these are reproduced or transformed they fix or re-fix those obligatory passage points, the channels, conduits, circuitry of extant power relations. In this way dispositional matters of identity will be more or less transformed or reproduced, effecting the stability of the extant social relations that had sought to stabilize their powers in the previous episodes of power. As identities are transformed then so will be the social relations in which they are manifested and engaged (see Figure 1).

System integration also needs to be considered. Changes in the rules fixing relations of meaning and membership can facilitate or restrict innovations in the techniques of disciplinary and productive power, which, in turn, will more or less empower or disempower extant social relation that seek to stabilize the episodic field, recreating
existing obligatory passage points or creating new ones, as the case might be. (Clegg [1989, chapter eight] discusses the model in detail; in chapter nine of the same text the model is applied to matters of state formation.)
Figure 1: Representing circuits of power
**Bringing time in to play**

The study that I have earlier discussed, which was published as Clegg (1975), was not concerned with a large slice of temporality, and this was a real weakness in terms of providing an account of how power was constituted across time. The later formal model of circuits of power was intended to be a way of making sense not just of events that were ‘here-and-now’ but of how the present was constituted. Fortunately, there is an exemplary and detailed case study of planning in Aalborg conducted by Bent Flyvbjerg (1998), which is easily interpretable in terms of the later circuits’ model, even though it does not use it explicitly. Clegg (1989) and Flyvbjerg (1998) were both influenced by Foucault, albeit that both use the resources that he provides creatively. Clegg, especially, recognized that there is no fundamental power that should not be seen as constitutive of nearly anything and everything. Power should not be seen as ubiquitous. It flows through different circuits of social relations, with different effects.

High-level city officials initiated the Aalborg Project in October 1977, as a plan intended to limit the use of cars in the city centre. Soon after its initiation, several agencies, trade unions, police, local and national consultants, the business community, private corporations, the media, and interested citizens became involved in order to decide on issues such as redirecting traffic by creating a rational local and national bus traffic system. A task force was established to formulate a three-year plan. The first conflict arose between architects and the bus company over the location and size of a bus terminal. Originally just a minor disagreement, the discussion turned into embittered conflict and division among the main players. There was a public hearing and the
production of a counter-plan by the Aalborg Chamber of Industry and Commerce, which produced a revised plan that was approved in 1980.

Small business people with retail outlets in the planning precinct grew increasingly dissatisfied with the original urban renewal plan. Without a constant stream of cars coming in to the city centre they feared they would lose business. They succeeded in halving the original plan to construct the bus terminal. The Environmental Protection Agency then began to question the environmental hazards and impact of the proposed bus terminal, while another source of local conflict concerned a sub-plan designed to try and maintain the authentic charms of the old shopping streets. The Town Council forbade all non-retail businesses (banks, insurance companies, and offices) from occupying ground floor premises, to try and preserve the street’s character. However, non-retail business leaders were also present in the local Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and they agitated against this plan. In its first four years the Aalborg Plan underwent six rounds of reconstruction and modification. Although the overall plan was never actually rejected, specific projects became more and more minute, as well as more problematic in content and scope, generating further subordinate and specific episodes of power between local factions, such as cyclists and planners; planners and small business people; motorists and public transport, and so on.

Unexpected and unanticipated environmental contingencies had an impact on the project, such as the Mayor and several high-level local officials being jailed on bribery charges, thus challenging the overall legitimacy of the urban renewal plan. By this time the
original plan had undergone its eleventh revision. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce reversed its original stand and began arguing that redirecting traffic would hurt businesses by causing falling revenues. However, the city council survey rejected this fear by revealing that retail profits were increasing. Meanwhile, new Social Democratic politicians came on the scene, deciding to bolster the urban renewal project by emphasizing positive aspects of the original plan adopted a decade earlier, which led the Aalborg Project into a total impasse.

The outcomes were not what any factions wanted. Instead of reducing car traffic, it increased by 8 percent; instead of creating an integrated system of bicycle paths, unconnected stretches were built; instead of reducing traffic accidents, the number of fatalities and injuries among cyclists increased 40 percent; instead of reducing noise the levels substantially exceeded Danish and international norms, with increasing air pollution the result.

Flyvbjerg's (1998) main theme is that power shapes rationality. At various stages in the project the various political actors sought to steer the project through their preferences, they sought to structure what the circuits of power model terms obligatory passage points. Different claims were made for participation in different committees; differential participation produced different outcomes at different times, favoring different preferences. Small battles were fought over who, and what, could be introduced in which arenas and meetings. In this way the relations of meaning and membership in the various locales were contested, reproduced or transformed. As these changed then the obligatory
passage points shifted; as these shifted the relations of power that had prevailed shifted also, most dramatically when the Mayor and officials were indicted and imprisoned. Thus, small wins in specific episodes of power had the capacity to shift the configuration of the overall circuitry through which power relations flowed. The actors engaged in the plans were constantly seeking to fix and re-fix specific schemes, and although the play of power was very fluid, the underlying social integration of the small business people with each other, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and the editorial views of the local newspaper, seemed to mean that the small business people were the prevailing winners in the many struggles. The attempts to re-specify the system integration of the traffic plan in Aalborg consistently foundered on the reef of social integration. How Aalborg was planned, designed and looked, as well as how it was not planned, not designed and did not look, was an effect of power relations.

Flyvbjerg (1998) alerts us to one very important fact of power relations and rationalities. When power and knowledge are entwined then the greater the power the less the need for rationality, in the sense of rational means-end justifications. The relation between rationality and power was an uneven relation. Power clearly dominated rationality. That is, those who presently configured power sought to continue doing so and were quite ready to define the reality of the project in any way that seemed to them to further their preferences, using whatever strategies and tactics were available to them. In this sense, what was defined as rationality and reality was an effect of power, as it defined and created ‘concrete physical, economic, ecological, and social realities’ (Flyvbjerg 1998: 227). What was advanced and argued as rationality depended wholly on power relations;
the more disadvantaged in these the agents were, the more they were liable to have recourse to conceptions of rationality that downplayed power, and sought to position themselves through factual, objective, reasoned knowledge. The most powerful rationalities took the form of rationalizations rather than authoritatively grounded accounts. Often these were public performance of rationality which other agents who were witness to the rationalizations felt compelled not to reveal it because they lacked the powers to do so; they anticipated and feared the reaction that their actions would in all probability produce, should they move, dangers lurked in open conflict and identification of differences.

The greater the facility with which agencies could have recourse to power relations the less concerned they were with reason, and the less they were held accountable to it. Access to more power produced less reason. In other words, the more that they were able to seduce, manipulate, dominate, induce, and rationalize, the less likely that they would be amenable to the authority of reasoned argument. The Enlightenment project of a rational public sphere is a strategy of the weak and opposed by the strong, according to Flyvbjerg’s analysis. Power relations were, on the whole more marked by the gentle arts of power—persuasion, inducements, seduction, etc—than by antagonistic strategies. The antagonisms were the most visible and publicly reported aspects of power, but they were hardly the most typical. They rarely are. The necessity to throw ones weight around usually signals a position of relative weakness rather than strength, such that if one needs to use force one is demonstrating that one is weak. Establishing agreements between
agents creates the power of ongoing action, a much stronger relation of power than specific episodes enacted in response to conditions of crisis.

In Aalborg, what was most typical was the constant attention to the small things of power relations that continually reproduced the status quo; rather than attempts at transformation, it was largely reproduction that prevailed, and the most skilled strategists of power were those for whom reproduction was their preferred strategy, in the case of Aalborg, this was the small business community, whose institutionalized voice was much more actively represented to governmental rationality than that of the various citizen groups, including the cyclists, greens and so on. In turn, these relations were embedded in deeply held local loyalties and relations defined by the forms of symbolic and cultural capital that Bourdieu analyses. When, in openly antagonistic settings, these relations came up against contra-points of view that were well researched and represented in rational terms, power-to-power relations dominated over those defined in terms of knowledge or rationality against power. Mostly, power relations were both stable and inequitable, characterized by consensus and negotiations, such that rationality could gain a greater toehold. The more power relations became antagonistic the easier it was to deploy arguments and strategies that elided rationality but relied on other strategies, such as personal connections. Thus, if rationality is to influence existing circuits of power it must try to keep the power circuitry intact. To challenge the rationality of the circuit within which one’s actions are being co-constructed is often to play a losing hand, if one does not have recourse to some external circuit-breakers, such as kith, kin, or community connections that provide relations for extra-circuitry mobilization.
Circuits of power in practice

The theorization of circuits of power has been used in a number of other studies\(^1\), but the one that we shall discuss here is a recent study of ‘Circuits of power in practice: strategic ambiguity as delegation of authority’ by Sally Davenport and Shirley Leitch (2005). It is a study of positive power enacted through the facilitative circuit, which is the reason that we have chosen to discuss this particular application. It pulls together an analysis of power with an analysis of strategic ambiguity to empower stakeholders. Strategic ambiguity (Eisenberg 1984) involves deliberate use of ambiguity to create a ‘space’ in which multiple interpretations and responses by stakeholders are enabled and possible (Davenport and Leitch 2005) The case study analyzes the attempt by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, a public sector research-funding body in New Zealand, to transform the national science system. Given that unclear goals, restive and sometimes resistant stakeholders, and a process of creative engagement between the organization and its stakeholders marked the attempt, the use of strategic ambiguity was highly appropriate.

In 1999 New Zealand research funding changed from being a very explicit rules-based funding model in which power relations were highly episodic, with strong non-collaborative competition between grant getters. What changed the situation was the

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\(^1\) See, amongst others, the following: Cerny (1994); Hallsworth and Taylor (1996); Hallsworth, Taylor, Jones and Muncaster (1997); Coopey, Keegan and Emler (1997); Orssatto and Clegg (1999); Orssatto, den Hond and Clegg (2002); Lycett and Paul (1999); Lagendijk and Cornford (2000); Taylor and Hallsworth (2000); Lucio (2000); Tantoush, Clegg and Wilson (2001); Prasad and Eylon (2001); May (2001); Bathelt and Taylor (2002); Bathelt (2002); Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley and Marosszék (2002); Clegg and Ray (2003); Leiser and Backhouse (2003); Rodrigues and Child (2003); Johnston (2004); Muir (2004); Latimer (2004); Marshall and Rollinson (2004); Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari and Santti (2005).
fashion for a ‘knowledge economy’ that had blown across the Pacific and into New Zealand. In the new knowledge economy the idea was to create facilitative knowledge sharing and building capacities rather than encourage zero-sum games between researchers in a very small country (less than four million people). Policy statements were issued; things were going to change and things had to change. What was changing was that the foundation was moving from funding research to investing in innovation. Where previously there had been disciplinally defined fiefdoms there was now to be one investment operation in an innovation strategy accompanied by ‘disinvestment’ in existing areas of research that failed to show promise for future wealth creation.

The focus of the research is on the third circuit of power, the positive facilitative circuit, which comes into play when the existing rules of practice characterizing a power arena are changed or destabilized in some way, either by authorities or others internal to the circuits of power, or by some exogenous contingency that has an impact on these circuits. When the existing rules of practice fixing relations of meaning and membership change, then relations of power in the circuit may be either empowering or disempowering of members, stakeholders and others. Here the focus is on stakeholders who are particularly susceptible to what Clegg defines as the central paradox of power: ‘the power of an agency is increased in principle by that agency delegating authority; the delegation of authority can only proceed by rules; rules necessarily entail discretion and discretion potentially empowers delegates’ (1989: 201). The use of strategic ambiguity is one way of achieving ‘high discretionary strategic agency’ through enabling creativity in sensemaking about what changing meanings mean. Strategic ambiguity introduces
purposeful discretion into the space between organization and delegates. Contested sensemaking shifts the circuits of power in unanticipated but partially creative ways. For anyone familiar with university research circles the immediate results were predictable: confusion, resentment and resistance; however, researchers who were involved in research institutes that already had a private sector funding orientation saw it quite differently and much more positively. The Foundation sought to engage research providers and end users of research in a creative dialogue into which that institutes jumped with alacrity while the universities were far more hesitant about what the changed conditions meant. Previously they never had to negotiate; they just submitted research applications and were either funded or not, according to the recommendations of expert panels in a very small national system. Now the priorities were being set by the Foundation in terms of investment criteria which were opaque to the community of researchers until they entered negotiation with the Foundation. The researchers speculated that perhaps, as the rules became more fixed, as meanings settled down and settled in with the new system of funding, the system of relations might shift back into a more episodic mode of circuitry. In which case, one might expect periodic bouts of reformed purpose and renewed use of new sources of strategic ambiguity.

Conclusion

Researching power and politics in organizations is best done through case study. Only case study can provide the fine-grained contextual detail necessary to begin to appreciate the finer points of theoretical arguments that have developed since the early days of organization and political science accounts of power. Moreover, it is only through the
contribution of liberal doses of theory that one can overcome the spatial limitations of any case study research: that it tells us about a very limited piece of space, even when it is studied in depth and over time. What can connect the specificities of a case to the generalities of a field is the work of theory. The case must be theorized; it must be read through theory, it must help build theory, otherwise it becomes just another, hopefully interesting, story. Local stories are important; they are how we learn who we are and what we relate to in terms of stocks of knowledge, but in modernity stories in themselves are regarded as insufficient if they do not connect to those larger stories that are illuminated in theory. My introduction to stories about power began with simple mechanics, where an A got a B to do something that B would not otherwise have done. Through this contribution I hope to have been able to persuade the reader of the value of both more complex stories and of more complex theories for rendering the complexity of these stories more manageable and comprehensible².

References


Cerny (1994);

² For further elaboration, the reader could consult Clegg (1975; 1989; Clegg et al 2006).


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