A Review of Third Sector Research in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand: 1990-2016

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PART ONE: THE SHAPE OF THE THIRD SECTOR

While non-profit organisations and informal mobilisation of citizens has existed since early colonial days, these topics have only become an object of scholarly interest since the early 1990’s with the formation of the Australian New Zealand Third Sector Research Association (ANZTSR), and its journal, Third Sector Research. Long before European settlement, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia and the Maori in New Zealand had their own forms of social organisations, both within the family and tribal structures, but also more loosely for the purposes of mutual assistance (eg “women’s business” to assist in matters of birth). While these forms of social organisation remain important today, they largely form a separate sphere of enquiry, though we do include in the scope of the present review more formal indigenous organisations.

The over-riding feature of the third sector in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), is its emergent nature. While formal organisations and programs exist and have been documented, new forms of organisation continue to emerge, with or without legal structure, old organisations evolve or disappear, and the boundaries between categories of citizens’ action become increasingly blurred. This review will attempt to identify some of the more formal categories of action, but also explore the implications of the growing complexity of the field.

Defining the Third Sector

Third sector organisations are variously called nonprofits, not-for-profits, voluntary organisations, community organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), charities,
clubs or civil society organizations. Each term carries slightly different connotations. For example, NGOs is the common term among international development organisations and in Aotearoa New Zealand among health organisations but less consistently elsewhere. In sport and recreation clubs is the most frequent term. Community organisations usually refer to small local organisations, while charities usually imply special taxation benefits. The term “third sector” was adopted more recently by researchers and some in the sector in the 1990s to conform with international attempts to locate a common reference. Nonetheless there is no single agreed term that fully describes the sector, their application overlaps and often the terms tend to be used interchangeably, with debates on their use often bubbling up in the literature (for example, Robinson, 1993 and CVSWP, 2001:202-203). In both countries researchers have noted that while there are many organisations that fit a definition of a non-profit organisation, there is little widespread recognition of a non-profit sector (Lyons, 1998:1, & Tennant, et. al., 2006:2-3).

While terminology and definitions vary, the ‘structural-operational’ framework developed by the Johns Hopkins Centre for Civil Society Studies has been highly influential. It was implemented in over forty-five national studies as a part of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), including in both Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand. It has also largely been adopted by the United Nations (UN) Statistics Division as the framework for the UN Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts - first drafted in 2000-01 and subsequently used by most national statistical agencies, including the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2002, 2009 & 2014) and Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) (2007a & 2016). The structural-operational definition uses five qualifying criteria: organised, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing and non-compulsory (all of which must apply to be considered a nonprofit entity) (Salamon & Anheier, 1997).

While appearing clear-cut these criteria can be applied with varying degrees of flexibility. In Aotearoa New Zealand, for example, one particular debate was how the 'non-compulsory' criterion applied to kin-based or other traditional indigenous organisations - where participants might feel a high degree of moral or cultural obligation. Ultimately it was decided to include such organisations in the scope, and only exclude organisations where membership might be a legal requirement or a condition of citizenship (Tennant, 2006:40). In Australia, the non-profit distributing criterion has been contested, for example, by Lyons (2001:7-8), who argues for the inclusion of mutuals and cooperatives in our understanding of the sector. Thus, he suggests instead of expecting no distribution of profits, where any material benefit is gained by a member, it is proportional to their use of the organisation. However, he also proposes an additional criterion of ‘democratic control’, which would exclude many other organisations – for example the Aotearoa New Zealand ‘self-perpetuating’ trust model where there is no requirement for a membership to whom they could be accountable.
A more recent subject of research interest is the ill-defined ‘social enterprise’, which may apply to a non-profit organisational form that aims to mainly operate through market forces, or to a business structure that aims to achieve social change above maximising its financial returns to its owners or investors, or some other overlapping combination. See section in this monograph which further discusses this category. In Aotearoa New Zealand much of the interest have been driven or at least supported by government - see, for example, DIA 2012). A further impetus for this attention in Aotearoa New Zealand has been the growth of tribal enterprises with mixed social and financial objectives, as a result of Treaty settlements.

While all third sector organisations have much in common, a further important distinction has recently been made by Horton Smith (2017). That is between what he terms Voluntary Associations on the one hand and Nonprofit Agencies on the other. Voluntary Associations are likely to be local (though not all are), managed and operated democratically by volunteers with few if any paid staff. They are frequently unincorporated. They are characterized by their mission, their close personal ties and their capacity to mobilize local and sometimes wider commitment for social change. They are important network contributors to social capital at the community level. Nonprofit Agencies on the other hand are highly professionalized, with substantial financial and physical resources, professional staff, and formal bureaucratic structures and governance mechanisms. They are normally incorporated (registered) and often provide services as agents of the state. As such they are more likely to have a significant impact on the national economy as measured by GDP figures.

Lyons (1996) had earlier proposed a similar distinction from an Australasian perspective, between what he calls the “non-profit sector” and “civil society”. The former broadly equates with Horton Smith’s “nonprofit agency”, which Lyons argues is essentially a modern (post 1960’s) legal/economic paradigm born in the USA, conceptualising these organisations as a special class of economic ‘firm’. The “civil society” paradigm, which roughly equates with Horton Smith’s “voluntary associations”, he argues has a much older tradition, drawing from sociology and political science, and is stronger in European scholarship.

These two, potentially competing, paradigms lead to very different understandings of the sector, and especially of how to evaluate its contribution. The highly influential CNP structural-operational definition is clearly within the “non-profit agency/sector” paradigm – and thus has been associated with a focus on measuring the sector’s employment size, level of expenditure, and contribution to gross domestic product. In contrast, the “civil society/voluntary association” paradigm is more interested in the sector’s capacity to encourage active citizen participation, build stronger communities and grow social capital. One approach emphasises what can be acquired or extracted from communities, and is focussed on return-on-investment for both volunteering and philanthropy (“once volunteers are no cheaper than paid staff, why use them?”). While the other approach is more
interested in the value of membership and engagement as worthwhile outcomes in themselves, as an investment in “better” communities (Nowland-Foreman, 1998:112).

While the CNP framework is clearly located within the “non-profit agency/sector” paradigm, it does give some recognition to the wider roles of non-profit organisations beyond the provision of tangible services, by adopting two broad summary categories:

- service functions, which involve the delivery of direct services, such as education, health, social services, housing, and the like, and
- expressive functions, which provide avenues for expression of cultural, political, civic, religious, and professional interests, and the like (Sanders, et. al, 2008:7).

It is recognised that this convenience allocation is crude and simplistic, and is likely to under-estimate the expressive role, as it assumes that organisations providing services have no expressive functions. Nevertheless, it does provide a useful reminder of the different roles of non-profits, and the distinction does have clear echoes of the paradigms of “non-profit agency/sector” and of “civil society/voluntary association”. It also offers opportunities for assessing the relative strengths of the two approaches in a country. When Sanders, et. al. (2008:14-15) applies this categorisation, they find service/expressive ratios of the non-profit workforce (paid employees and volunteers as full-time equivalents) in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand of 61%:37% and 50%:49%, respectively.

The Scope and Scale of Third Sector Organisations

Official measures of the size and economic value of third sector organisations in both countries is relatively recent, having been conducted three times in Australia, for 2000, 2007 & 2013 (ABS, 2002, 2009 & 2015), and twice in Aotearoa New Zealand, for 2004 & 2013 (SNZ, 2007a & 2016).

The Aotearoa New Zealand contribution to the Johns Hopkins University international comparative study of the non-profit sector, acted as an important stimulus to research on the sector in that country. A multi-sectoral Committee for the Study of the New Zealand Non-profit Sector was established in 2004, comprising representatives of government, the sector (services, associations and philanthropy), and researchers. It included Maori and Pasifika researchers and community members, and unusually in the Aotearoa New Zealand context was jointly resourced by government, philanthropy and academia. In itself this was an interesting and useful piece of collaboration. It also produced important sector-wide, quantitative and qualitative research on defining the sector (Tennant, Sanders, O’Brien & Castle, 2006), on its history (Tennant, O’Brien & Sanders, 2008), in international comparative perspective (Sanders, Tenant, O’Brien, Salamon & Sokolowski, 2008), and on the policy relationship with government (O’Brien, Sanders & Tennant, 2009). It collated a 293-item bibliography of research on the sector in Aotearoa New Zealand, based on its four-year programme of work (Sanders, O’Brien & Tennant, 2008), and provided a stimulus for,
as well as advising on, the first Non-Profit Satellite Account for the country – measuring the sector’s size, scale and economic impact (Statistics New Zealand, 2007).

The development of research in Australia has been much more dispersed. Early developed mainly emanated from the two research centers specializing in non-profit research, those in University of Technology Sydney (UTS) now discontinued, and Queensland University of Technology (QUT). Mark Lyons was instrumental in the very early development, and produced an early paper for the John Hopkins project. However most of the statistical analysis of the sector has occurred from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) which began to produce Satellite Accounts of the sector from 2000.

For comparison between the two countries it is worth noting that Australia is much larger and more economically prosperous than Aotearoa New Zealand – for example, in 2013 it had about five times the population and eight times the gross domestic product of its neighbour. The average exchange rate in 2013 was Australian 85 cents for one New Zealand dollar.

Table 1: Size and value of the third sector in Australia and NZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Aotearoa NZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of Nonprofits</td>
<td>520,000 600,000 600,000</td>
<td>97,000 114,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Nonprofits</td>
<td>59,000 56,894</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% All Volunteer</td>
<td>89.8% 89.5% 90%</td>
<td>90% 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of employees</td>
<td>604,000 890,000 1,081,900</td>
<td>105,340 136,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of volunteers</td>
<td>4,400,000 4,600,000 3,882,300</td>
<td>1,011,600 1,229,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer hrs</td>
<td>704 mill 730 mill 520 mill 270 mill</td>
<td>157 mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP (w/out vols)</td>
<td>3.3% 4.1% 3.8% 2.5% 2.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP (with vols)</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sales income*</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Govt income*</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Donation income</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sales of Goods & Services here has been adjusted to excluding Government purchase-of-service contracts, which in turn has been added to Government Grants to include all income from Government (regardless of whether it is classified as a contract or a grant).


According to the 2012-13 Non-profit Institutions satellite account, there were 56,894 NPI organisations in Australia registered with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) at June 2013 and that are therefore counted in the National Accounts. These constitute the bulk of Nonprofit Agencies in Smith’s terms. However it is estimated that there are in total about 600,000 NPIs in Australia, with the bulk of them small, non-employing organisations that rely on volunteers (McGregor-Lowndes, 2014). These constitute the bulk of voluntary Associations. As of July 2014 there were 60,755 charities and non-profits registered with the new National Australian Charities and Not-for-profit Commission (ACNC), an increase of 10% since 2011. By all measures, the number of non-profits in Australia is significant and growing. According to the ACNC, of those registered charities, 34% are in NSW, 24% in Victoria, 18% in Queensland, 10% in Western Australia, 8% in south Australia, 3% in Tasmania and 1% in the Northern Territory.

As is the case in most countries, the Aotearoa New Zealand sector is pyramid-shaped, with a small number of very large organisations and a large number of very small organisations.

Sixty-one per cent of the 97,000 NPIs counted by Statistics New Zealand (2007b) were unincorporated, 22 per cent were incorporated societies, 15 per cent were charitable trusts. The remaining two per cent were charitable or non-profit companies, or incorporated under their own legislation.

Regardless of their legal status, 26,372 of these organisations were registered as a “Charity” in 2013. A rich databank is readily available to researchers and the public about this smaller sub-set of organisations on the Charities Register (https://charities.govt.nz/view-data), including historical data since it was first established as a searchable database. Unfortunately registered charities comprise little more than a quarter of the full sector, and
is likely to under-represent smaller and all-volunteer organisations, and certain types of membership associations that are not eligible for registration.

**Economic contribution**

In order to measure the economic contribution of the sector, the ABS and Statistics New Zealand adopt the measure of GVA or gross value added, which is the estimated value of goods and services produced minus the cost of goods and services used in the process of production. In practice, as most NPIs do not try to recover costs through the prices paid for goods and services there is no ready measure of the ‘value’ of the goods and services. So a surrogate for the value-added is calculated by summing compensation of employees, taxes on production, consumption of fixed capital and net operating surplus. A further, fuller picture of the value-added is obtained when a financial valuation of volunteering is also imputed.

In Aotearoa New Zealand in 2013, the Non-profit Institutions Satellite Account identified 114,110 NPIs, (up 17.6 per cent on 2004), employing 136,750 paid staff (up 30 per cent). However, 90 per cent of NPIs employed no paid staff (that is, all-volunteer organisations). This was unchanged on 2004. The number of people volunteering also rose, up 22 per cent to 1,229,054. However the amount of hours volunteered in NPIs dropped dramatically, down 42% to 157 million in 2013. This is an unusual and unexpected exception to the general trend to significant growth in the sector. As a result the proportionate contribution of the sector to gross domestic product fell from 4.9 to 4.4 per cent when a notional value for volunteering is included (though in nominal dollar terms this contribution grew from NZ$6.9 billion to NZ$9.4 billion). Excluding volunteers, the sector’s contribution to gross domestic product grew from 2.4 to 2.7 per cent.

The 136,750 paid jobs in New Zealand NPIs compares with employment in other high profile industries, such as Manufacturing (170,000 jobs), Tourism (168,000 jobs), Construction (100,000 jobs), Agriculture (40,000 jobs) and Forestry & Mining (40,000). If, even the reduced number of, volunteer hours are converted to full-time equivalent positions, the NPI total workforce increases to 215,300 – swamping all other industry groups.

NPIs had an income of NZ$13,280 million in 2013, compared with NZ$8,036 in 2004 (an impressive growth of 65 per cent). Over the same time, expenditure grew just a little more by 68 per cent to NZ$12,034 – resulting in a gentle squeeze on the overall operating surplus (McLeod & Nowland-Foreman, 2016).

The Satellite Account classifies income by type of transaction as well as source, thus government purchase-of-service contracts are included within Sale of Goods & Services, while government grants are considered transfer income, like donations. Given distinctions between government grants and government contracts are often contested and ambiguous, it is useful to pull out and combine all types of government income, to compare with other...
Sales of Goods & Services and other Donations & Grants. The reduced category of other Sales of Goods & Services remains the largest source of income (42.5 per cent), followed by total income from government (30.9 per cent), and Donations & Grants (20.1 per cent). Other income is primarily Interest and Dividends.

All main sources of income have increased in absolute dollar terms since 2004. Comparing the relative shares of NPI income from 2004 to 2013, it appears that income from government has grown at the expense of a drop in relative shares of Donations & Grants, and, to a lesser extent, of Sales of Goods & Services. While not effecting the overall income figure, a not insignificant part of the shift in relative shares is likely to be due to misclassification of 2004 data under-estimating government income and over-estimating Sales of Good & Services - as a result of unreliable data from the Ministry of Health. That also suggests, however, that (some large part of) the drop in share of income from Donations & Grants (down from 23.7 to 20.1 per cent) may be real, and not just an artefact of classification errors.

As well as the structural-operational definition, the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project was also influential in setting the most commonly used way of classifying non-profit organisations, having been adopted as the United Nations International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO). This was largely adopted by Statistics New Zealand (2007:12-13) as the New Zealand Standard Classification of Non-profit Organisations (NZSCNPO). There are twelve major activity groups, with additional sub-groups. After much discussion an additional category of ‘tangata whenua governance’ was created for use in Aotearoa New Zealand. It does not include indigenous organisations that would fit into other categories, for example a marae-based health centre is counted under Health, and a kapahaka group is counted under Culture & Recreation. This additional category makes visible the specific set of indigenous organisations whose primary activity is the mandated governance of Maori affairs (outside of government), for example iwi (tribal) and hapu (sub-tribal) organisations, marae committees, and organisations established to receive and administer Treaty of Waitangi settlements. This category shows a similar level of detail as the other twelve main activity groups, in recognition of the significance of these organisations, even though they are treated as a sub-group of Development & Housing for purposes of international comparison (SNZ, 2007: 13).

Table 2: NZ nonprofit subsectors-types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations %</th>
<th>GDP contribution %</th>
<th>Paid employees%</th>
<th>Vol hrs%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>% Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Recreation (including sport)</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, research</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, animals</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development, Housing</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangata Whenua govt</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, Advocacy, politics</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, Unions Professional Ass.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SNZ, 2004 & 2016

The Culture & Recreation group has by far the largest number of NPIs (50,380 in 2013, up from 43,220 in 2004), including 17,990 in the sub-group Sport in 2013 (up from 14,910 in 2004). Over that time, while share of NPI paid employment has remained fairly steady, the group’s economic contribution to gross domestic product has increased significantly, moving from fifth to second largest-contributor – overtaking Grantmaking, Fundraising & Volunteerism Promotion (which dropped the most in its share of the sector’s economic contribution), along with Education & Research, and Health (which while growing did not increase its share as fast as Culture & Recreation).

The Health group is of similar size to Culture & Recreation with respect to paid employment and economic contribution, but vastly smaller in terms of its share of organisations and volunteering.

While slipping to third place in economic contribution and maintaining its place as second largest employer, Education & Research is significantly smaller in its use of volunteer hours, and in the number of organisations it represents.

The second largest category by number, Social Services, increased from 11,280 NPIs in 2004 to 14,810 in 2013, and easily maintained its position as making by far the largest economic

9
contribution of all groups, and by far the largest employer (in both cases over 50 per cent higher than the next highest group).

The Development & Housing category increased significantly (from 7,580 NPIs in 2004 to 9,680 in 2013, and NZ$104 million economic contribution in 2004 to NZ$390 million in 2013), largely due to improved data allowing better classification of Tangata Whenua Governance NPIs into this group (up from 1,180 in 2004 to 3,190 in 2013).

While Religion is another significant activity group, it was one of only two groups (along with Professional Associations & Unions) to have fewer absolute numbers of NPIs – down from 9,890 in 2004 to 9,440 in 2013 - though some other categories lost relative share, as others grew faster. Religion

In 2013, the highest values of Sales of Goods & Services were for Culture & Recreation, Health, and Social Services, totalling NZ$4,717 million (57 per cent of total Sales) – though it is important to understand that a significant proportion of Sales, especially for Health and Social Services, represents government purchase-of-service contracts. Unsurprisingly, the highest share of Interest and Dividends were for Grantmaking, Fundraising & Voluntarism Promotion (NZ$196 million), followed by Development & Housing (NZ$155 million). The Religion, and Culture & Recreation groups received the most Donations (45 per cent of all donations).

The Economic contribution Australia

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), in 2012-13 NPIs contributed an estimated A$55 billion to the Australian economy, representing 3.8% of GDP (ABS, 2014), an increase of 42% over 2006-07 estimates. A report by Knight & Gilchrist (2014) suggests that the actual contribution may be significantly more than ABS estimates. When the imputed value of volunteer contributions is included, ABS estimates rise to some $A79 billion. Even at the base GVA rate, this contribution represents twice the entire contribution of the State of Tasmania, and larger than many national industries including the information, media and telecommunication and media industries.

The National Accounts analyses contribution by sector within NPIs. A summary breakdown for subsectors is provided in table xxx for years 2000 and 2007. According to this analysis, the largest contributors to GVA were education and research NPIs. For the year 2013, a similar picture occurred, with Education and research at 30.9% followed by social service NPIs at 19.5%. Culture and recreation at approximately 15% and health (excluding hospitals) at 12.5%

In 2013, the sector employed approximately 1,081,900 people, or 9.3% of the Australian workforce. Of these 413,100 were full-time. As indicated in table 04 below, and again in 2013, Social services and Education are the strongest employing subsector. Approximately 33% of the population also volunteer, creating a large additional volunteer workforce, with
a notional wage equivalent value of $A15 billion for 521 million hours in 2012-13 (ABS, 2015). The sport and physical recreation subsector represented the highest level of volunteering.

Total ABS measured NPI sector income was $A107,840 million in 2012-13, double that in 2000. Income was derived from fees and services 51%, government funding (33%) and philanthropy (11%). However there were important differences between subsectors: community (social) services and health services were dependent on government funding for up to 60% of income, while fees and other self-generated income accounts for 75% of income for culture and recreation services.

Table 3: NPO subsectors types and statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>No of Orgs 2007</th>
<th>Volunteer No. 2007 (000s)</th>
<th>2000 % sector employed</th>
<th>2007 % sector employed</th>
<th>2000 % sector</th>
<th>2007 % sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture and recreation</td>
<td>11,510</td>
<td>2,072</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and research</td>
<td>6,621</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>7,811</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, development, housing</td>
<td>11,972</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations (unions, prof. Business.)</td>
<td>3224</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a number of different legal forms that nonprofits may take, with some variations between states. The Productivity Commission estimated the following breakdown (Productivity commission, 2010):

Companies limited by guarantee: 11,700

Incorporated Associations: 136,000

Cooperatives: 1,850
Incorporated by other means, eg act of parliament: 9,000

Unincorporated entities: 440,000

Legislation governing Incorporated Associations is state based as are Cooperatives. Companies limited by guarantee are national. With the introduction of the ACNC, registration under this form together with reporting requirements has been moved from ASIC, and streamlined to suit nonprofits. In recent years many organisations formerly registered as Associations or Cooperatives have now moved to become companies, registered with the ACNC.

While the formal data now indicates a significant and growing contribution of Nonprofit Agencies to the Australian economy, this provides only part of the picture. By far the greatest number of third sector organisations are Voluntary Agencies as indicated by the enormous number of volunteers and by the large number of unincorporated organisations. While these organisations are usually not counted in the National Accounts, the real work of Voluntary Associations lies in their production of social capital. That is, every community maintains a network of small and medium organisations that serve specific needs for that community in the areas of sport, art, health, emergency services, community service, social support, childcare, youth services, aged care, etc. and which together serve to knit the community into a cohesive whole. Without these services, communities would be far less friendly and resilient places.

For example, the Productivity commission (2010) noted

Not-for-profit activities may generate benefits that go beyond the recipients of services and the direct impacts of their outcomes. For example, involving families and the local community in the delivery of disability services can generate broader community benefits (spillovers) such as greater understanding and acceptance of all people with disabilities thereby enhancing social inclusion. Smaller community-based bodies can play an especially important role in generating community connections and strengthening civil society.

(Productivity commission, 2010, p. xxix)

We have to date no reliable way of estimating either their combined indirect contribution to the economy, or to the maintenance of a healthy society.

Third Sector Infrastructure

Until recently there was no national office for nonprofits in Australia. Various states had their own funding regimes and alternative forms of legal incorporation for nonprofits, but none of this was co-ordinated across the country. Individual organisations were required to report to a variety of different regulatory bodies, some of which were designed for commercial ventures and not suitable for nonprofits.

This changed with the establishment of the national regulator, the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission, or ACNC. This office was intended to be a single destination for
regulation and reporting, ultimately replacing all individual state jurisdictions. The newly formed ACNC had three objectives:

- to enhance public trust and confidence in the sector
- to support the sector’s independence and innovation;
- to reduce unnecessary regulatory obligations (ACNC, 2013: 14)

Despite some initial volatility (discussed below in relations with government), this organisation is proving a powerful and important point of reference for nonprofits across Australia. It has enabled cooperation across states on such matters as incorporation, duplicative record filing, streamlined contracting and fundraising reform, as well as a formal means of dealing with abusive charity behaviour (McGregor-Lowndes, 2017). Also, as noted by McGregor-Lowndes, the ACNC website provides “...a number of well-considered legal precedents and guides. This includes model constitutions for unincorporated associations, companies limited by guarantee, model charitable purposes as well as templates for common legal documents such as annual meetings...” (P40)

With the formation of the ACNC came the national Charities Act of 2013. The Charities Act moved beyond case law to establish a unified Australian definition of charities to specify that the intent or purpose of the organisation was more significant than the means of obtaining funds (eg through social enterprise). There was recognition of indigenous issues, and political advocacy within the broad terms of the charitable organisation (McGregor-Lowndes, 2017).

In 2005 an independent Charities Commission was established to regulate the roughly 23% of non-profits that are registered charities in Aotearoa New Zealand. It was subsequently downgraded and transferred to be a section of within the Department of Internal Affairs. Its website now provides ‘live’ statistics on the 27,800 charities by region and by sub-sector, over time (since 2012).

In New Zealand, the Tangata Whenua Community and Voluntary Sector Research Centre was established by leaders in the sector in 2008, to promote better access to research for indigenous community organisations and non-profits. It now includes a family of three websites (www.communityresearch.org.nz, www.whanauoraresearch.org.nz and www.whatworks.org.nz), a community research newsletter, social media posts and a regular programme of research webinars. By the end of 2016, over 206,00 unique visitors have used the websites, and in the two years since the research webinars were instituted, they have attracted a total live audience of 2,600 registrations, with a further 12,100 views on their Youtube channel. Almost 3,700 researchers and people working in the sector now receive regular resources from Community Research. (Personal communications with J Hind, Manager, Tangata Whenua, Community and Voluntary Sector Research Centre, March 2017.)
At an academic level, an organisation, the Australian New Zealand Third Sector Research organisation was established, first as an Association, and later as a non-profit company limited by guarantee. This was established at the first ever National conference for third sector research, held in 1992 at UTS (University Technology Sydney), with Professor Mark Lyons as the initial Chair. The organisation has held a biennial conference since that time, on a rotating basis with two conferences in Australia followed by the third in New Zealand. The organisation and its conferences has served to promote third sector scholarship across the region.

At the same time, Australian and NZ scholars were actively involved in developing the international third sector organisations, notably International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR). Mark Lyons was on the founding international board of ISTR, and an Australian researcher has been on the Board on all successive sessions. Approximately 15 - 20 Australians and New Zealanders have attended every ISTR conference, and many have contributed to ARNOVA conferences in the U.S. as well. From the beginning, members of ANZTSR have been active in the international third sector research scene. In particular, ANZTSR members were very active in supporting and organizing biennial regional conferences of ISTR in various Asian countries, including Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, India, China, and South Korea.

Initially there were only two non-profit teaching/ research centres at Universities, they being UTS (University Technology Sydney) and QUT (Queensland University Technology). There are however a number of other teaching centres across the two countries which offered courses relevant to the third sector. Nonprofit management education programs are offered in seven major Australian universities and two New Zealand tertiary education institutions. Most of the Australian programs have grown within university business schools, and two have received international accreditation from the US based Nonprofit Academic Centers Council (NACC). The main NZ program arose from a social practice/community development school within an institute of technology, with a postgraduate program developed soon after in a university business school. The main post graduate courses in non-profit management as listed in Malcolm et al (2015) include:

• University of Technology Sydney (UTS): Masters, Graduate Certificate or Graduate Diploma that comprise its first or first two part-time years
• Queensland University of Technology (QUT): Masters, Graduate Certificate of Business (Philanthropy and nonprofit studies)
• Swinburne University of Technology: Asia-Pacific Centre for Philanthropy and Social Investment; Centre for Social Impact (Grad Cert offered in partnership with Melbourne Business Schools (MBS) at The University of New South Wales (UNSW).
• Centre for Social Impact, UNSW
• La Trobe University, Graduate School of Management; Graduate Certificate /Graduate Diploma, Masters of Corporate Responsibility

• Unitec NZ, Auckland: Graduate Diploma in Not for Profit Management, Graduate Certificate in Pacific NGO Leadership

• Waikato University, Hamilton, NZ: Postgraduate Certificate, Diploma and Masters in Social Enterprise

This history has recently been documented in detail (Malcolm, Onyx, Dalton, & Penetito, 2015)

Of particular significance was the establishment by the ANZTSR of the peer reviewed Journal Third Sector Review which was launched in 1995, with Jenny Onyx as founding editor. An overview of the contents of that journal provides a glimpse of the research issues of concern to the third sector in the region, both for researchers and for practitioners. That first issue contained the keynote address by Margaret Harris of London School of Economics, given at the second ANZTSR conference held in Brisbane (QUT). She explored the challenges of researching the sector. Other articles explored organisational survival and change (Melville), debt management (Buckmaster), feminist third sector theory (Nyland), consumer rights in TSOs (McDonald and Crane). This issue anticipated the diversity of research issues that would be covered in succeeding volumes of the journal.

Initially Third Sector Review produced a single issue per volume each year. This was expanded to two issues per volume in 1995 as more quality articles were submitted. Initially all peer reviewed articles were written by Australian academics. However, gradually some New Zealand articles appeared, particularly after a couple of the biennial ANZTSR conferences had been held in New Zealand. By 2016 there was a strong New Zealand presence in the Journal, including scholars taking editorial roles.

ANZTSR held a third sector research conference every two years, on the basis of two successive conferences at an Australian University followed by one in New Zealand. Those presenting papers were encouraged to develop their conference papers further for submission to the Journal. For each conference, one issue in the following year was at least partly reserved for those peer reviewed conference papers. Submissions were encouraged from academics and practitioners alike; many issues included a “from the field” section of more direct relevance to practitioners. These were also peer reviewed but within a policy of peer support and development.

A summary of content topics over the twenty year period from 1995-2016 is provided in table 4 below. This table includes a total of 192 peer reviewed articles, 23 of which were coded twice as they covered two content topics. Indeed many other articles similarly covered a range of topic issues making them difficult to classify. The table does not include those articles published in the 10 special issues of the journal; these are discussed.
separately below. However the summary table does give an indication of the extent and
diversity of research topics published during this period.

**Table 4: Peer reviewed articles in TSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic area</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory of sector (research agenda)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal backroom: accounting, finance, accountability measures</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal governance: planning, Board governance, stakeholder</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal: workforce</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations with government, advocacy</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social enterprise, relations with the corporate sector</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots participation: Clients, community engagement, activism</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital, social impact</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering, philanthropy</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific demographic disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>217</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the table indicates some of the diversity of topic issues covered, it also highlights
some interesting preoccupations and neglected areas. The sector in Australia and New
Zealand appears to have been preoccupied with relations with government, which is not
surprising given the dependence of most organisations on government funding, and the
political upheavals and consequent changes in government policy during this period (see
section below). Of related concern was the internal governance of Third sector
organisations, as various articles explored both the governance demands of the state but
also the need for strategic planning within governance structures more appropriate to the
third sector. Much if not all of this preoccupation concerned formal (incorporated)
Nonprofit Agencies in Smith’s terms (Smith, 2017) rather than with the many
unincorporated community organisations. However, throughout the period there was a
continuing interest in exploring theory of the sector as a whole.
More recently articles began to emerge that explored relations with the corporate sector, and the possibility of creating hybrid forms of third sector organisations, particularly social enterprises which may be at least partly self-funding through the sale of goods and services, while maintaining a broader social mission.

Some surprising gaps also exist. While there was a moderate and continuing interest in the internal backroom tasks of accounting and finance, there was relatively little interest in exploring the conditions of employment of the workforce, despite the fact that these were known to be inadequate with a preponderance of highly qualified but relatively low paid, casual employment, and high turnover of staff in some areas. There was similarly relatively little interest in the issue of philanthropy, or indeed in volunteering (see discussion below). Finally, there was relatively little interest in grassroots community engagement or activism beyond an interest in broader social capital and social impact of the organisation on the community in question. The impression is one of research and theory devoted to developing an effective third sector system of service provision within the prevailing broader state hegemony.

Special issues

Throughout the 20 years since the Journal was established, there have been ten special issues, roughly one every two years. These special issues are a useful indicator of key areas of concern for third sector research in Australasia, either to highlight major hubs of current interest, or, more frequently, to stimulate interest in an under-researched area. Indeed the first special issue, in 1998, was the report of a research symposium organised by Mark Lyons and held in Melbourne, designed to stimulate Australian interest in third sector research. This symposium brought to Australia some key international scholars together with senior Australian researchers. As published in the special issue, each international paper was accompanied by a reply from a senior Australian scholar. These included the history of philanthropy and nonprofits by Kathleen McCarthy, with reply from Mark Lyons, a paper on non-profit economics by Richard Steinberg, with reply from Myles McGregor-Lowndes, an analysis of the development of voluntary sector studies in the UK by Diana Leat, with reply from Peter Booth, an analysis of government and the non-profit sector in the US by Steven Smith, with reply from Michael Muetzelfeldt, and discussion of the non-profit sector, volunteering and civil society in Western Europe by Paul Dekker, with reply from Jenny Onyx.

This research symposium was followed up in a second special issue in 2003, this time reflecting on third sector research in Australia. A number of senior Australian researchers reflected on aspects of current research including among others volunteering (Melanie Oppenheimer), the role of peaks (Rose Melville), Feminist research (Rosemary Leonard), collaborative, practitioner based research (Wendy Earles), and mapping the sector (Sue Kenny)
Other special issues explored areas of third sector research that had to date been silent or under represented within a distinctive third sector space. These included areas where significant research may have occurred but were not widely recognized as third sector. For instance, in 2006, Russell Hoye edited a special issue on sport and the third sector. Similarly, in 2012, Miriam Pepper edited a special issue on Australian third sector environmentalism. In other cases, specialist areas within the third sector were explored, such as Charity Law (edited by McGregor-Lowndes), Communication (edited by Roumen Dimitrov), Cooperatives and the social economy (edited by Judy Johnston). Finally, some special issues were devoted to important current issues and debates, such as third sector as voice for civil society (edited by Jenny Onyx), social enterprise (edited by Jo Barraket and Suzanne Grant) and volunteerism (edited by Kirsten Holmes and Melanie Oppenheimer).

Volunteerism was considered such an important and central issue for the third sector that the Australian Centre for Volunteering under the direction of Annette Maher, and with the support of ANZTSR, established an independent Australian journal on Volunteering. That Journal ran from 1996 till 2009, when Commonwealth funding ceased. The Journal included a mixture of peer reviewed research reports as well as non-reviewed but nonetheless informative reflections from practitioners. In 2016 a national Australian Volunteering conference was again held (http://2016nationalvolunteeringconference.com.au/) with conference papers submitted to a special edition of Third Sector Review for publication in 2017.

Conclusion PART ONE

While the statistical documentation of the non-profit sectors in both countries has been sometimes sketchy and remains incomplete, nonetheless the evidence is overwhelming. The sector in both countries is large and growing, both in size and in recognized importance. Academic understanding of the sector is still in its infancy, partly due to the paucity of research centres. Nonetheless there is a growing body of knowledge emanating particularly from the ANZTSR and its Journal as well as the activities of many researchers and practitioners working across disciplines and in collaboration with international organisations and researchers. The fruits of this collaboration and research programs will become clearer in the following parts of this anthology.

PART TWO: RELATIONS WITH THE STATE

Australia became a series of British colonies from 1789, but gained independence as a single Nation with the Constitution in 1901: Australia is essentially a federation of semi-autonomous States (Queensland, NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia). It has three levels of Government. At the National level is the Commonwealth Government with control over defense and foreign affairs, but also increasingly an
involvement in most other sectors including health, education and community services. At the local level, local government manages local matters such as waste collection, but also is increasingly involved in various community services. Local government is not recognized within the constitution and therefore remains under the control of its respective State Government. Before the 1980’s, most governments in Australia adopted a form of benevolent neglect of the third sector, but with a relatively open, supportive governance role for the provision of social services. However according to Lyons (2001), the growth of the community services sector in Australia really took hold in the 1970s and early 1980s. The development of a "community services industry" was the result of the effective advocacy of a key group of nonprofit organisations, their clients and other activists. Lyons writes, "It was advocacy work by a few provider organisations and, later, feminists and other community activists, along with organisations of disadvantaged people themselves, 'consumers' in today's terminology, that prompted the Commonwealth government to begin funding accommodation and then services for older people, people with disabilities, children, the homeless and so on to create the complex fabric of community services we have today." (2001:37)

In 1840, with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand became a British colony, at first part of the colony of New South Wales but soon as a colony in its own right. After an unsuccessful attempt in 1846 at establishing two Provinces, for 23 years from 1853 there were initially six provincial governments, with some additional outlying districts successfully separating in subsequent years. Much of the territory of North Island provinces was not under their control but of Maori – who have had more influence over the development of society in Aotearoa New Zealand than Australian Aboriginals have since colonization. Since the abolition of Provincial governments in 1876, Aotearoa New Zealand has essentially been a unitary state, with local councils created by the authority of the central government, and like Australia with limited roles but some variable involvement in community services.

Tennant et al (2008:3) note an internationally distinctive role of Maori in Aotearoa New Zealand society:

“Maori kin-based associational forms have remained significant, and showed renewed potency over the later twentieth century. Maori have also participated in the organisation of mainstream society, bringing cultural perspectives to them, while borrowing from some of their structural forms. Although apparent in some periods of the country’s history more than others, this interface has been highly significant. It has resulted in distinctive forms of organization which do not readily fit internationally recognized non-profit sector categories.”
At the same time, “Aotearoa New Zealand was relatively late addition to the Anglo-British world, and certain civil society formations were at a particular stage of development in the United Kingdom during the mid-nineteenth century... The patriotic, and charitable societies, lodges, clubs and sporting groups which had undergone vast expansion in Britain since the late eighteenth century provided models of associational life for the first colonists.” (Tennant et al., 2008:3).

As in Australia, the sector benefited from English ‘common law’ largely providing an enabling rather than a constraining environment. With the added advantage of a unitary state and a more activist government, it also benefited from early supportive legislation (since the 1856 Religious, Charitable and Educational Trusts Act, and the 1908 Incorporated Societies Act which still operates as the most common means of incorporation for non-profit organisations today) and early tax relief. It was a period of relatively light-handed and benign government involvement – though in a small country, formal and informal partnerships were important. This was especially so in the post-World War II growth of the welfare state, and burgeoning church social services.

There was another burst of associational activity in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, not only outside of state initiatives, but often anti-government in focus. This included a wide range of social and environmental protest organisations, most famously the Save Manapouri campaign and the (then) Native Forests Action Council. Not only were new associations formed but old organisations, like the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society, founded in 1923, were invigorated. The Vietnam War and apartheid policies in South Africa provided a particular focus, along with women’s liberation groups, and most especially Maori activism. As Maori urbanisation increased (75 per cent by the 1970s compared to just over eleven per cent in 1936), new organisations often operating on a pan-tribal basis, became:

“...the key to successful adjustment of the Maori to urban life... These included Maori sections of the orthodox churches, the Maori protest churches of Ringatu and Ratana, culture clubs, sports clubs, family and tribal organisations, benevolent societies, Maori committees, Maori wardens, Maori Women’s Welfare League, and Te Ropu Whakawhanaunga I Nga Hahi (Maori Ecumenical Council of Churches) (Walker, 1992:503).

Protest groups were formed around Maori language and land rights, and association life blossomed around a range of human rights, including the Disabled Persons Assembly (1983), Halt All Racist Tours (1969) and the Dorian Society (1962), with its legal sub-committee/Wolfenden Association (soon to become the Homosexual Law Reform Society).
Australian Relations with Government

According to the Productivity Commission set up by the Commonwealth government to assess the contribution of the non-profit sector in Australia (2010), the decades before 2010 saw a marked expansion in the extent to which non-profits were being funded by government to deliver human services on behalf of government (Productivity commission, 2010, p300). Total funding for the sector rose from $A10.1 billion in 1999-2000 to $A 25.5 billion in 2006-07. In nearly half of all relevant public service agencies, non-profits accounted for at least 75% of the value of government-funded services. According to government agencies at the time, non-profits were often seen as the most cost-effective way of delivering services to the community.

The huge investment in the non-profit sector by the Australian government, particularly since the mid 1990’s coincided with a strong ideological shift by all major parties to a neoliberal economic agenda. There was a concerted effort to bring non-profits under the control of centralist government policy, and, under State government policies in particular (Butcher & Dalton 2014). Funding became increasingly constrained by contract for specific services within a competition policy.

The policies of neo-liberalism in Australasia, as elsewhere, turned attention from the state to the market. Governments (of both left and right) championed privatisation and deregulation drawing on the free play of market forces. Through public policy, the state adopted the mechanisms and principles of the market. The basic assumptions were that individual citizens- now constructed as consumers or clients- should exercise their free choice in accessing goods and services according to their capacity to pay; the providers of such goods and services will continue to provide them as long as demand is strong enough and the quality of their services are sufficiently attractive. Quality is ensured through competition between providers. All agents are motivated by rational self-interest. The philosophical position that justifies all this is a form of neo-liberalism which rests on the core value of individual choice and autonomy (Lyons & Dalton 2011).

In fact, and of course, in most cases the disadvantaged citizen/ consumer was not in a position to pay (thus creating a failure of the market), and so the state became the purchaser of services on behalf of the consumer. The basic tenets of neo-liberalism were translated into bureaucratic regulations that emphasised standards of efficiency, performance, and accountability to the state (Deakin, 1996). Governments began to
privatise public social services and make use of market mechanisms, with the greater use of contracts in which the governments act as purchaser of services. Most importantly was the application of competition policy to third sector organisations thus pitting one non-profit against another in which any sharing of information between them was considered borderline illegal and a conflict of interest. Along with this policy came a greater emphasis on formal, principle/agent accountability and evaluation (usually in cost benefit terms).

Increasingly, governments of both right and left are seeking to apply a competitive tendering model. This entails direct control by the funder/purchaser. Typically, government determines the types, levels and location of services through its own planning/political mechanisms, usually without consultation with service providers, and awards contracts for the provision of services according to a competitive tendering process. Strictly speaking, the tendering agency should be free to set its own price and to determine its own procedures within the terms of the contract. In practice, governments prefer to fix the unit cost for service provision, and to maintain managerialist control over financial reporting by the contracted agency (Lyons, 1995). Government may then use the contract in an adversarial sense as a form of threat or control, and as a means of forcing competition between providers. Funded organisations are then expected to operate as efficient businesses, with a focus on achieving the contracted service outputs at minimum cost.

The purchaser is thus in a better control position, it is assumed to ensure maximum return for money expended, quality control of services, and equity of provision (Blundell and Murdock,1997).

In accounting terms, the business objectives of government are thus achieved through agency relationships, in which the state attempts to maximize control of the output while minimizing its own transaction costs. At the same time, because the government funding body has monopsony power as sole purchaser, it is in a position to force competitive tendering below the cost of service provision. Non-profits (but not for-profits) are then expected to provide the difference from their own (fundraising or voluntary) resources.

The Australian Productivity Commission (2010, p307) noted the potential of these moves by funding agencies to erode the comparative advantage of non-profits to the extent that they lead to:

- Non-profits moving away from their core purpose (‘mission drift’)
- Non-profits taking on the characteristics and behaviors of the government agencies (‘isomorphism’)
- Weaker connection with their communities
• The diminution of advocacy roles of non-profits

• A perception that non-profits were simply agents of the state, unable to respond flexibly

There followed several further developments. First, particularly since the recent elections (2014) in which conservative parties won in all states as well as federally, there has been a consistent reduction in funding for most community services, particularly in the field of accommodation and homelessness, but also women's services, aboriginal services and refugee support services. This is happening in the interest of "returning the budget to surplus" and "fixing the economy", while rhetoric in support of the defunded service areas remains strong (as in domestic violence for example).

A specific example of how this process has played out is evidenced in the following example of a recent "reform" process in NSW. In June 2014 the NSW Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) announced the successful tenders for the reformed crisis housing system, to be delivered by 'a total of 149 new specialist homelessness services across NSW that build on current good practice and innovation at the local level' (FaCS, Specialist Homeless Services Tender Outcomes, 2014). The initial discussion paper was released in June 2010 and despite a two month "consultation process", the Going Home Staying Home Reforms were driven by a small reference group of Housing NSW staff and some peak organisation representatives who were bound by confidentiality clauses (McManus, 2013). In order to tender, Non-government organisations had to demonstrate their capacity to deliver early intervention and support services across a broad spectrum of clients (young people, women and men) through a 'prequalification' process. Those NGOs deemed 'capable' by FaCS where then invited to tender for the 'contract' to provide services. Analysis of the tender outcomes by Homelessness NSW (Homelessness NSW, 2014) indicates: service contracts for the provision of housing services declined from 370 to 149; NGOs involved in housing dropped from 250 to 180; 70 new multi-organisation consortiums were created; state-wide organisations increased their proportion of all services from 31% to 39%; there was a decline in small local organisational services and specialist services, most severe in women's housing and Aboriginal housing. It is estimated that 400 people would lose their jobs and potentially leave the housing sector. Some feminist crisis services were handed to large faith-based charities.

The second effect, illustrated in the above example from NSW was the growth of "big charity". A recent analysis, found that income is heavily concentrated within a small proportion of charities: 80 percent of $A99 billion total sales income was contributed by 5 percent of the charities while approximately 90 percent (23,800) of charities contributed 10 percent of charity sales (Knight and Gilchrist 2014:9-10). Ironically, rather than creating a true market with many services from which the consumer can chose, there has followed a
dramatic reduction in the number and diversity of services that were funded, while a handful of big charities grew very large indeed.

Competition favours the more efficient over the less efficient. Larger organisations gain efficiencies of scale, and from the funding bodies’ point of view are seen as more reliable, with firm business risk management protocols in place. Organisations are thus driven to grow or amalgamate to survive. Engaging with a few larger providers is also thought to reduce transaction costs to government. Official estimates, subsequently feeding into contract specifications, are that the same service can be delivered at 20% less cost through the non-profit sector as opposed to the government sector. (Dalton and Butcher 2014)

In response many NGOs have merged to become larger entities in order to win government contracts. As Nicholson of Brotherhood of St Lawrence suggests:

“If the trajectory of agglomeration and amalgamation of organisations is allowed to run its course over the next two decades, I fear we will see a welfare arms race in which the lion’s share of government funding will go to super-sized welfare business, some of which will be for-profit in nature, and the smaller, community-based and faith-based organisations will be marginalized or left completely undone”. (Nicholson, 2014)

A third consistent and related side-effect of a contracting culture has concerned an increased discrepancy in working conditions. The 20% cost saving is generally achieved by NGOs paying lower wages to front-line workers. In the UK, but also in Australia senior managers of both purchasing and providing organisations (but particularly purchasers) receive increased remuneration, expanded role and career progression (Deakin, 1996). At the other end there is a consistent tendency for reductions in costs to be made at the expense of a deregulated labour market with front line workers experiencing declining pay and conditions, and often depending on the actual caring being performed on a voluntary basis.

Despite the rhetoric that accompanies the introduction of economic rationalist policies concerning the greater choice and empowerment of the customer/ consumer, there is no evidence of increased consumer power actually occurring, largely because there remain a very limited number of off the shelf services available within prevailing resource constraints. Nor are consumers consulted in the planning or delivery of services. As Deakin concluded in the UK:
“But none of these developments appears to have benefited service users directly, at least in the short term. There appears to be some awareness of this deficiency and [a consultant has been appointed] …to devise ‘a methodology for consulting users and their carers’. But one may be pardoned for wondering whether such a strategy that leaves the key objective of policy to be addressed in this way can command much confidence (Deakin, 1996:36).

Similarly, in Australia’s employment and training programmes, Considine, O’Sullivan and Nguyen (2014) found that while various aggressive incentives and systems implemented by the Government ‘purchaser’ to encourage a more ‘business-like’ approach among service-providers were indeed successful in achieving pressure not just on managers but also for front-line staff to indeed become more business-like, part of the tradeoff appears to have been some evidence of ‘mission drift’, but no evidence of any better outcomes for the clients or communities served.

Another recent policy development in Australia has attempted to address this inconsistency. The much-touted NDIS (National Disability Insurance Scheme) is breaking new ground by placing income directly in the hands of the consumer, following an individual assessment of need. The disabled consumer is then able to purchase the service of his or her choice from among the available services. A similar model is being developed for aged care services. Services themselves have their funding from government reduced or eliminated; they must survive on the competitive advantage of the service being offered. It is not yet known how well this scheme will work. It is designed to give real choice to the consumer. It may however have the effect of further reducing the number and range of services offered, if service providers have little means of ensuring sustainability of their infrastructure. It certainly transfers risk from government funders to the service providers, apparently without any risk premium in the payments.

Since 2005, government policy moved even further in the direction of marketization, with an increased emphasis on encouraging social enterprise in which ultimately organisations can make sufficient profit to sustain themselves within the market (Paredo and Mclean (2006). While the emphasis is on business practices and profitability, some community organisations were able to develop hybrid programs using social enterprise as part of a larger community development program, particularly where some alternative funding was also available (Kenny et al., 2015, ch 11).

New Zealand Relations with Government
In Aotearoa New Zealand, a very similar process was underway, with major shifts in policy-driven funding process, as outlined by Smith (1996):

"The resulting changes which have had an impact upon the funding of voluntary sector organisations are a heightened interest in various forms of contracting; the pervasive expectation that explicit agreements for performance of agreed objectives at specified standards of quantity, quality, and cost will underpin all funding relationships; the disaggregation of government departments into autonomous businesses, including those with explicit purchaser roles; efforts to make all businesses, including voluntary sector ones, more responsive to their consumers, and the introduction of the financial management system for government departments with its emphasis on output and outcome reporting leading to increased transparency of the effects of funding decisions". (Smith, 1996:8)

Nowland-Foreman (1997:6) describes how after similar rapid and uncoordinated growth in government funding, public policy in Aotearoa New Zealand produced numerous official reviews and calls for reform in a relatively short period: Department of Social Welfare (1984), Social Advisory Council (1986), New Zealand Planning Council (1986), Ministerial Taskforce on Social Welfare Services (1987), and Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare (Poau-Te-Atu-Tu, 1988). The major shortcomings identified in these reports were: an ad hoc approach (confused and inconsistent different funding approaches); provider capture (by a small number of established, large voluntary agencies); means- rather than ends-focused (as a result of distorting incentives in funding mainly ‘inputs’); monocultural (inadequate resourcing of Maori and other culturally appropriate services); centralised decision-making (reinforcing the disadvantaged position of new, local initiatives); and, inequitable distribution of funds (as a result of over-reliance on a submission-driven approach).

Purchase-of-Service-Contracting (POSC) was also part of the neo-liberal take-over of public policy. Although Aotearoa New Zealand may have taken the New Public Management, as it was called, further, harder and faster than most other jurisdictions (Schick, 2001), it was still part of the same international public policy trend. Contracting, undergirded by Agency Theory, is the principle tool at the centre of the neo-liberal strategy of deregulation, privatization and corporatization. The promise was POSC would lead to: more secure funding; greater flexibility for non-profit organisations; and a better partnership (DSW, 1989, quoted in Nowland-Foreman, 1997:19); while Nowland-Foreman (2016:54-55) concludes that it resulted in almost the diametrically opposite:

“Within a year or two of its introduction, the cracks were already beginning to appear, not only in a litany of complaints, from voluntary organisations bearing the brunt of these
changes, but also in independent evaluations, and even in the relevant department’s (self-doubting) post-election briefing for the incoming government.”

Following the widespread discontent and a change of government, two successive, collaborative government-sector reviews were established, which both produced hard-hitting reports severely critical of the government-sector relationship (Community & Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001, and Community-Government Relationship Steering Group, 2002). The new Prime Minister signed a Statement of Government Intentions for Improved Community-Government Relationships (2001), there were a number of new approaches piloted and some blunting of the excesses of contracting, but the fundamental POSC approach remained largely intact, only to be reinforced and (most recently) even more aggressively implemented with a focus on purchasing Outcomes by a subsequent government (Nowland-Foreman, 2016:55-61).

The current New Zealand Government has shown interest in financing innovations, such as Social Bonds and Social Enterprises that may reduce government funding for non-profit organisations, especially those involved in social services broadly defined. The government began a trial of Social Bonds in the Health sector, from which all of the participants have subsequently withdrawn with the expenditure of NZ$29 million and the delivery of no services as yet, after three years (http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/308026/government’s-first-social-bond-collapses). The government has provided indirect support for the growth of social enterprises, and there is some evidence to indicate growth in this area, but with no reduction as yet in demand for funding of traditional voluntary social services. Social enterprise is discussed further below in Part five.

Ironically, at the same time, the government has been significantly increasing its funding for the sector’s involvement in social housing (a current public policy priority area) (http://www.socialhousing.govt.nz and http://communityhousing.org.nz/new-zealand/social-housing-reform-programme/funding-social-and-affordable-housing). Capping increasing demands for government funding for social services appears to be coming from the traditional approach of tighter rationing – focusing under a rubric of ‘social investment’ in services for a more narrowly defined set of services for a smaller group of ‘highest risk’ clients.

The ‘purchasing’ metaphor has been surprisingly powerful, not only in shaping how governments dealt with voluntary organisations, but also how it conceived them, and ultimately threatens to remake voluntary organisations into their image. The overall policy push, including the most recent emphasis on ‘funding for outcomes’ adds up to even less acknowledgement of the wider role of the sector in contributing to community cohesion.
and social capital, with a tighter focus on procurement of services to meet government requirements. The impact of the POSC approach has clearly been demonstrated to include an increase in transaction and overhead costs, a shift in initiative and power to the funder, and a shift in risk, and higher expectation and competitiveness for the non-profit organisations delivering government-funded services (Nowland-Foreman, 1997: 9). Constraints on collaboration (Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001, and Milbourne, 2009), community development (Aimers & Walker, 2015) and advocacy (Elliott & Haigh, 2012) have been observed. It has also been suggested that this may undermine volunteering (Woods, 1996 and Milbourne, 2009), and the viability and capacity of the sector, especially as a result of hollowing out of infrastructure/‘back room’ costs (Ernst & Young, 1996). In short this can have the perverse effect of undermining the very features that made the sector attractive for government to work with in the first case.

The risks of emphasising ‘funding for outcomes’ also includes:

- managing for the predetermined outcome rather than a holistic and responsive approach;
- reducing the time horizon to a short-term, reporting-cycle focus;
- unintended and perverse incentives for cutting corners;
- underinvestment in quality and service infrastructure;
- ‘cherry picking’ easier-to-serve participants; and
- diverting funds to higher monitoring reporting and transaction costs. (The Treasury, 2013; Nowland-Foreman, 2016b).

When government purchasers implement ‘funding for outcomes’, they tend to focus on narrowly-defined, readily quantifiable services they are ‘purchasing’ (Nowland-Foreman, 1998:121 and Neilson, et. al., 2015:45). Recent research was commissioned by the New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services to help identify and better understand how non-profit organisations make a difference above and beyond the funded outcomes. It identified eight key attributes that collectively represent the added ‘community value’ enabling non-profit organisations to: build connections among people (social and cultural capital); contribute to social inclusion and cohesion; contribute to the empowerment of individuals and communities; and, assist with the development of stronger communities (community development):

When a government ignores or undermines the special characteristics, strengths and infrastructure of the community and voluntary sector it is likely to generate a service
provision system that is highly individualized, disjointed from real needs, and is unable to build the overall strength of the community. This does not serve either government or taxpayer well, but more importantly for New Zealanders it will mean the community and voluntary sector will be unable to operate to its full potential (Neilson, et. al., 2015:809, 31-36).

The four wider ‘community value’ attributes identified by Neilson, et. al. (2015) show a remarkable similarity to Nowland-Foreman’s (1998:116) four civil society ‘golden eggs’ (encouraging active citizen participation, mobilizing internal and external resources, promoting and developing leadership, and enhancing cooperation and trust) or Collis’ et. al. (2003:55) four defining impact functions for the sector (resourcing, service provision, voice/advocacy, and membership and representation). However labeled, these are some of the very factors that attracted governments to work with non-profits in the first place, but are most at risk of being ‘crowded out’ under current government funding arrangements.

The development of an independent regulator of the Australian non-profit sector

Given the size and diversity of the sector, there have been many calls over the years for some sort of independent regulator of the non-profit sector, one that is not directly controlled by any single branch of government, nor of any particular section of the non-profit sector itself. This would be an advantage to the sector itself, which continues to struggle to present a strong coherent identity. It would also be an advantage to state and federal governments if it could simplify existing complex and often inconsistent regulations. Indeed, during the last 19 years, four government inquiries, the latest being the Productivity commission of 2010, have recommended that a single, independent, national regulator be established. However governments of all persuasions remain highly ambivalent about granting such strong recognition of the non-profit sector.

In 2012, for the first time, the Labor Federal government enacted legislation to create a new national regulator, the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission (ACNC). This office was intended to be a single destination for regulation and reporting, ultimately replacing all individual state jurisdictions. The newly formed ACNC had three objectives:

- to enhance public trust and confidence in the sector
- to support the sector’s independence and innovation;
- to reduce unnecessary regulatory obligations (ACNC, 2013: 14)
The intent was for organisations that were registered with the ACNC to provide corporate and financial information only once a year, without the necessity of repeating this with each new government contract.

Perhaps more importantly, the ACNC was able to begin immediately to collect and disseminate data pertaining to the Australian non-profit sector, much of this data never before available. Within its first two years operation, it rapidly gained the trust and support of the majority of non-profit organisations, although a few large church based charities continued to object.

However despite this success, or perhaps because of it, the new conservative government in Canberra in 2014 moved to abolish the ACNC, calling it an unnecessary new bureaucracy. Regulatory powers were to return to the Australian Taxation Office against the advice of that organisation.

Some States objected to handing over their own reporting requirements to the national body. Some large charities and powerful for-profit trustee companies also objected to the powers of this new regulatory body, preferring to remain in an essentially unregulated, and largely unaccountable position (Cham, 2014). This is particularly the case for private philanthropic foundations, of which there are a large but unknown number providing a putative estimate of $A billion annually to the Australian community. Foundations are largely managed by one of a few very large public for-profit trust companies. The only accountability requirement is an annual tax audit, with all information remaining “private and confidential”. It is ironic that while neoliberal regimes are bent on ever tighter financial and operational control over all forms of non-profits, they are reluctant to assert even the most minimal level of control over these private philanthropic foundations, despite the fact that the foundations are based on funds derived with heavy tax concessions (at the tax payers expense) and are supposedly devoted to the public good.

As of 2017, the ACNC has continued to function and with increased general support (without coverage of the private philanthropic foundations). The commonwealth Government has not made any further moves to disband it, and it does appear that this independent regulator will continue to play a major role within the Australian non-profit sector. Many organisations are now choosing to alter their legal status from Incorporated Association (under individual State law) to that of Company ltd by guarantee. New regulations have made this national form of incorporation much simpler and more appropriate to the non-profit sector, with streamlined annual reporting requirements. There is thus not only a reduction in reporting requirements, but also national consistency and transportability across State boundaries.

**Community Development and the State**
The relationship between grassroots action on the one hand and response by the state on the other is complex and shifts with time. The evidence suggests that community development driven social change, may be highly productive within a supportive governance environment, but that the underlying rules and principles of community development are non-commensurate with a neo-liberal driven bureaucratic regime of the state. Grassroots demand for participation in the development of social policy is a cumulative process, which takes time and persistence, and which may score a success in the right governance context, within a supportive political climate, and a reforming government in power. Such was indeed the case during the 1970’s and 80’s but became increasingly submerged, under-funded and co-opted to the state agenda from the 1990’s (Onyx, 2017).

Community development as a concept is somewhat contested in Australia, mainly because its nature is viewed quite differently whether from the perspective of the citizen/practitioner on the ground, or from the perspective of government policy.

Viewed from the perspective of the citizen, the principles and practice of community development (McArdle, 1989, Kenny, 1994) can be articulated as:

* Decision making by those most affected by outcomes of the decision: the subsidiarity principle,

* Personal empowerment and control by individual citizens over their own life: the empowerment principle,

* The development of ongoing structures and processes by which groups can meet their own needs: the structural principle.

Community development is therefore about shifting power to confront and challenge inequality and disempowerment (Rawsthorne & Howard, 2011). Community development seeks to give people power over: personal choices and life chances; need definition; ideas; institutions; resources; economic activity; and reproduction (Ife, 2001).

The values of community development from this perspective involve working in ways that create an environment and processes for fairness to be enacted. The values are those of respect, human rights, voice, inclusion of people at the margins as much as those at the centre. The processes are those of shared information, participation, negotiation and collaboration by those affected by the decision. Perhaps the best example of a major community development funded program was that of the Area Assistance Scheme in NSW, which ran from 1978 to 2008. Local Government was heavily involved in this with State Government support. But the initiative remained with local communities (Onyx, 2017; Bamforth et al,2016).

From the perspective of government, community development can look quite different. As Kenny (1994) notes, community development itself is open to manipulation in the hands of
powerful elites, and is susceptible to redefinition by state funding bodies. From the perspective of government, it is not about devolution of control of the planning or policy environment, but about devolution of responsibility for its enactment (Herbert-Cheshire,2000). Framed within a neo-liberal political position, community development is about personal responsibility, self-help and competition. Both community and state perspectives emphasize the development of local level capacity, skills and initiative, but in the case of government this capacity building is aimed at self-sufficiency and reduced reliance on government resources. While the rhetoric of empowerment remains, there is in fact no intention on the part of government to relinquish power. Rather the emphasis shifts to one of governance, an indirect form of control in the Foucauldian sense, (Foucault, 1980) in which state power is exercised not through coercive force, but by governing through community (Herbert-Cheshire, 2000). Individuals and groups are encouraged to become entrepreneurial to achieve their needs, but all within the context of enacting existing government policy.

However the reality on the ground is not likely to reflect either perspective in pure terms. Given a scarcity of resources, there is inevitably an ongoing contestation for desired outcomes, both between various interests within the community itself, but also between the collective community voice on the one hand and government policy on the other. The final outcome is never assured. Such contestation is not necessarily destructive. However, particularly since the recent conservative controlled governments came into office, the real capacity for community participation of any sort has been severely curtailed in Australia. Nonetheless local community initiatives continue to emerge, usually on a voluntary, unfunded basis, and often in response either to a lack of services to meet a perceived need or in opposition to prevailing government policy. A good example of the latter is the rise of climate action groups across Australia as documented in Third Sector Review (Power, 2012)

Conclusion PART TWO

Neoliberalism has certainly provided a hostile environment for community development both in Australia and in Aotearoa New Zealand. However perhaps its practice can survive with small islands of support, and liberated from too close a reliance on government funding (and hence, frequently, government control) (Aimers & Walker, 2015; Nowland-Foreman, forthcoming).
PART THREE: VOLUNTEERING AND PHILANTHROPY

Volunteers and Volunteering

Volunteering is very much alive and well in Australia and New Zealand, though perhaps it is taking a different shape. Over the last 20 years there has been some debate concerning the definition of volunteering. Most official accounts concern formal volunteering, that is unpaid work given freely to an organisation. However, following the analysis of Rochester (2006), it is possible to consider three different ways of seeing and understanding volunteering:

- The Unpaid Worker: which complements (or even substitutes for) paid work in a formal, often service-providing organisation, and is managed under a ‘workplace’ model. This is formal volunteering.
- The Activist: which is primarily a force for social change, usually as a part of civil society, and is engaged under an ‘active citizen’ or ‘mobilization’ model.
- The Hobbyist: which is a pleasurable, albeit ‘serious’, leisure activity requiring commitment, but primarily for entertainment, and is marketed under a ‘recreational’ model.

In fact, of course these different paradigms can overlap, and we can hold more than one perspective at the same time. However, it is useful to consider the range of possible volunteering paradigms, especially as the Unpaid Worker is generally the dominant paradigm, and the Activist and Hobbyist are often invisible or only tangentially considered in both the literature (Smith & Cordery, 2010) and public policy (MSD 2002 & 2003, OCVS 2008, Volunteering NZ, 2015). Of particular interest is the level of informal volunteering, that is helping people outside the family but not within a formal organisation. This may be particularly important for those of non-English speaking background who may exhibit high levels of community support but not necessarily within formal organisations. This kind of informal support is not usually counted in formal surveys, however the recent 2015 Australian General Social Survey did attempt to assess this, and found that informal volunteering is higher, at close to 50%. Nearly everyone (95%) felt able to get support from outside the household in times of crisis, suggesting strong overall social capital networks (see Part four for discussion of the relationship between volunteering and social capital).

Definitions of volunteering commonly describe it as work that is undertaken of one’s own free-will, unpaid, often through an organisation, and for wider community benefit. When Cnaan, Handy & Wadsworth (1996, cited in Smith & Cordery, 2010:5) take these elements...
and propose instead a continuum of each, they help to make more visible some of the hidden diversity and contested dimensions of volunteering (Figure 01).

**Figure 1: Dimensions of Volunteering**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free choice</td>
<td>Free will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration</td>
<td>None at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Strangers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Smith & Cordery, 2010: 5 (after Cnaan et al., 1996: 371).

Dominant ideas of conventional volunteering cluster to the left-hand side of Figure 01; while the further an activity ranges to the right-hand side, the more controversial it may be to describe it as ‘volunteering’. This can be uneven over different dimensions. For example, the likely consensus on remuneration (reimbursement of expenses, as evidenced in ‘good practice’ publications, such as Woods, 1998 or ‘what works’ reviews such as Smith & Cordery, 2010) is closer to the middle of the continuum than the extreme left.

The continuums are also a useful reminder how European-centric are the usual definitions of volunteering (towards the left-hand side of the continuum). Wilson (2001) and Suggate (1995) note how this does not fit well with Maori, Pacific and some other ethnic groups’ world views – which may be less likely to identify the focus of their help as ‘other’ or stranger, more likely to be well-connected with a wider community (so less likely to require a formal organisation to act as a channel for helping), and emphasise ‘cultural obligations’,
common interest, and kin-connections. Specifically, the lack of a direct equivalent term in te Reo means that Maori often do not see their contributions as volunteering (Te Korowai Aroha Aoteara, et al., 1999), and one piece of research which consulted widely among a range of Maori propose instead coining a new term - ‘mahi aroha’ (Office for the Community & Voluntary Sector, 2007). The Maori concept of mahi aroha: “Volunteering for Maori is based significantly upon the notion of whanaungatanga (kinship) and the benefits, both for the individuals and the wider community, derived from contributing to the common good.” “Many ethnic people think of volunteering as the fulfilling of family and social obligations and responsibilities... helping, sharing and giving, first to their own family... their extended families... ethnic communities and finally to the wider community.” (New Zealand Federation of Ethnic Councils, 2004:11)

The motivation to volunteer is complex and varied. From an economic rationalist perspective volunteering would appear to be an irrational activity, as there is no immediate personal gain, except perhaps for those seeking to expand a career opportunity or to gain new skills. Other reasons given in the Giving Australia survey were for personal satisfaction, to maintain a connection to the community, to have a meaningful activity after retirement, for mental health, and as a family tradition. Generally volunteering is a mixture of altruistic intentions (to give back to the community, to help others) and personal satisfaction (Kenny et al, 2015). We know for instance, that older people who volunteer are healthier and live longer (Onyx and Warburton, 2003). We also know that volunteers have the highest levels of social capital including higher levels of trust, community participation and informal networks (Onyx and Bullen, 2001). They are active citizens.

A major ARC (Australian Research Council) funded research project conducted between 2003-2005 (Leonard et al, 2004; Onyx et al, 2003) examined the role of service volunteers in suburban and rural regions of NSW. The analysis identified four categories of service volunteering roles: developing services, bonding, mediating, and bridging. The first two categories provide the type of connection that might be expected. Volunteers as active citizens worked together to identify, create, fund and govern new services to meet identified needs in the community. Virtually all services in all communities seemed to start like this. Generally it was the collective act of volunteers that established new services, including the establishment of branch services of old organisations in new areas. As these services became established, then government funding may be sought and obtained. Some services, such as parent support and senior citizens outings may never receive funding, and they continued to be provided on a volunteer basis. Some organisations continued to generate considerable fund-raising for themselves and required little if any government funding. Indeed some of the auxiliary associations actually subsidised government services. Other services did receive funding and over time became professionalised. The volunteers that established the service then took on a governance role, as members of the management committee or board. Eventually, such a role became less attractive or necessary, and the service passed into professional hands, often within a large organisation.
Some volunteers continued to play a token or marginalised role, but their tasks became deskilled and their vision limited.

At all stages of this continuum, considerable bonding social capital was generated within the community by the volunteers, who provided support and connections to clients and members of the organisation, created wider friendship networks among the community of volunteers, and more broadly created a web of caring relationships in the wider community. This was the second major service volunteering role identified.

The third role of service volunteering was a potential mediating role. As discussed by Onyx et al. (2003):

Many services were managed by highly qualified and specialized professionals. Citizens are expected to place their trust in these expert systems (Giddens, 1990). But in the shift from the traditional trust of known acquaintances to the trust in the expert, something is lost, and there may be some distrust, as citizens become more aware of the contested nature of much expert ‘knowledge’ (Beck, 1999). There is also pressure for professionals to produce more, for more people, more quickly, at lower cost. Time is limited. Fear of litigation requires caution in not appearing too personally attached to individual clients. There is no time or opportunity anymore for the house visit, for the relaxed conversation, for the affectionate enquiry into people’s welfare. The expert may well provide a technically excellent service, but they are much less likely to provide the warmth of the human connection. Their technical knowledge also may provide a communication barrier. Such people may well adopt a technical language that is beyond the easy grasp of the lay-person. Intimidated, the client fears to ask for the information they need in a readily accessible language. This gap was often filled by volunteers. The volunteers may be former professionals, or else they have gained considerable training and experience such that they may play a para-professional role. But they had more time. They were able and willing to visit the house-bound. They had time to talk. They could provide the information requested, or at least they knew where to find the required information. Above all they expressed acceptance and respect for the person regardless of who that person was. In terms of Giddens’s levels of trust, volunteers may combine the two levels of traditional and expert trust. For this reason, other members of the community frequently turned to them in preference to the professional, and disclosed more private information. The volunteer then became a crucial node in the communication networks, connecting the client/community with the world of expert systems.

As volunteering has become better recognized and understood, the structures in which community service volunteering occurs has become increasingly well supported but also more controlled within the bureaucratic structure of large charitable organisations. Volunteers are more carefully selected, trained, supported, but also managed within strict
ethical guidelines. However, this can lead to a situation where the very essence of the caring volunteer/client relationship can be put at jeopardy (Onyx, 2013). Indeed the best volunteers may be those who “break the rules” and occasionally cross the boundary between a professional caring role and friendship. Much depends on the volunteers’ capacity to form real person to person connections separate from the formal and detached professional care which is provided by paid professional workers.

The fourth role of service volunteering is most problematic. Bridging social capital may mean several things. It may mean accessing external resources of expertise or finance or opportunity. It may mean bridging between different organisations within the community. It often means acceptance of difference, and a bridging across demographic divides. It may mean breaking down traditional hierarchies of discourse and privilege. Volunteers especially in rural towns played a key gatekeeping role. In many cases they did play a positive bridging role, bringing disparate groups together. However on occasion they also served to block access by disapproved, marginal groups within the community.

**Types of formal volunteering**

The most obvious and numerous volunteer activity is service volunteering, requiring ongoing regular commitment of volunteers within a service organisation. However much of the recent research on volunteering has identified new and different ways in which formal volunteering may now occur. While the traditional volunteering in community services such as mentioned above continues, there are many very different forms of volunteering emerging. One such is the growing interest by volunteers in short-term episodic volunteering (Leonard, Onyx, and Maher, 2006). Many volunteers sought greater flexibility in the hours they volunteer; short term options; once-off volunteering opportunities; family volunteering and virtual volunteering opportunities not necessarily within a service context. For example, of increasing interest is the potential volunteering role of Grey Nomads. Grey Nomads are defined as people aged over 50 years, who adopt an extended period of travel independently within their own country. Many grey nomads spend considerable time exploring the inland of Australia and visit many outback towns. Many small outback towns are experiencing decline especially those that remain dependent on resource industries. They experience reduced government and private services and the loss of employment opportunities. The evidence suggests that Grey Nomads make a substantial economic contribution to rural communities. Grey Nomads have a wide range of skilled trades of use to people in isolated rural communities on a volunteer basis. About half those interviewed identified voluntary activities as part of their future plans (Onyx and Leonard, 2010).

There are many other specific forms of volunteering. One of these is International volunteering, in which usually trained and skilled volunteers from Australia and New Zealand spend several months in a developing country working with and directed by a local organisation to assist in capacity development (Hawkes, 2014).
However there is another category of volunteer that is rarely discussed or even identified, yet which may be even more important, not only to the development of social capital but to the capacity of civil society to produce social change. These are the activists identified in Figure 1 above. They are citizens who act voluntarily to form new networks and organisations to deal with urgent social or environmental problems. They take the initiative, come together, identify paths of action, perhaps protest, perhaps construct alternative or new projects or services. They arguably form the highest form of active citizenship. They are volunteers but seldom identified as such.

One such example concerns Climate Action Groups (CAGs), which have emerged all over Australia in response to urgent concerns about the need for a response to climate change and its dangers (Kent, 2012). These grass roots groups are strongly associated with place. They are not managed by any national formal organisation, but rather generate their own action, developing alternative practices towards a low-carbon society. They do however network with other similar CAGs to share ideas and potential collaborations. They are generally driven by their members’ passion for change, and operate within their own resources. See part four for further discussion of this category.

Other examples of citizens coming together to create new community projects on a voluntary basis have been documented in small rural communities in Australia, Peru, and Sweden (Onyx and Edwards, 2010). Whole communities are able to come together, to “reinvent themselves” to generate new forms of enterprise and services to meet urgent social and economic needs. They are entrepreneurs, and they may ultimately generate economic wealth and jobs for the community. But they are also volunteers (see part five below).

A particularly strong example of voluntary citizen action occurs in response to a disaster. Immediately following a disaster normal community infrastructure is likely to be immobilized or destroyed. Government action will be mobilized, but that takes time. The immediate need for help must come from the affected community itself. Citizens come together, provide material and social support to those in greatest need, pool the available resources, self-organize. Examples of how this happened were explored at the ANZTSR conference in Christchurch in relation to the Christchurch earthquakes that destroyed much of the city. It became clear through that discussion that much more needs to be understood, especially by government bureaucracies in their coordination with existing community infrastructure and grassroots networks. The special issue of Third Sector Review in 2014 documented some aspects of third sector response to the earthquakes, as did the panel of key-note speakers at the conference. The point to be made, however, is that these are active citizens working voluntarily within their community to assist fellow citizens in need and to rebuild or adapt local organisational capacity. Similar stories could be found following major Australian bush fires. Some of these citizens may be paid for their efforts, but
hundreds of others are not. They are simply volunteer activists who care about their community and their fellow citizens.

A volunteering infrastructure

Of particular importance to the growth of volunteering in Australia, and to our greater knowledge of the dynamics of volunteering was the development of Volunteering Australia at the National level as well as offices in each state. Particularly important was the creation of a new journal, *Australian Journal on Volunteering* by Volunteering Australia. The Journal included a mixture of peer reviewed research reports as well as non-reviewed but nonetheless informative reflections from practitioners. ANZTSR and the *Third Sector Review* were supportive of this process. The Australian Journal of Volunteering published a commemorative edition in 2001, the International Year of Volunteers. It noted in part that some 32% of the civilian population over 18 years were volunteers at that time, a growth of 8% over the 1995 estimate, with the growth in all age groups and both sexes (*Australian Journal of Volunteering*, 2001:5). More recently Volunteering Australia has modified its definition of volunteering to include some forms of informal helping. This increased interest in volunteering has led over the past two decades, to a much more sophisticated understanding of the importance of volunteering and of its changing nature. It was therefore very unfortunate that Volunteering Australia (up til now located in Melbourne) lost much of its Federal funding and the journal ceased publishing on a regular basis. In 2013 an Australian National Volunteering Conference was hosted by two state level organisations: Volunteering South Australian and Volunteering Northern Territory. At this conference a research stream was once again incorporated in the general conference, and a research round table discussed the need to strengthen relationships between academia, government and the sector and to develop ways to bring academic research into wider applicability for the field. The new CEO of Volunteering Australia, now located in Canberra, lacked the resources to significantly pursue this agenda. Nonetheless four papers from this conference were subsequently published as a special feature in *Third Sector Review*, 2014.

In 2016 a national Australian Volunteering Conference was again held (http://2016nationalvolunteeringconference.com.au/) with conference papers submitted for publication to a special edition of *Third Sector Review* for publication in 2017.

An overview of volunteering: Australia

Data on volunteering in Australia has mainly originated from various ABS surveys. These were first compiled in a major review of giving and volunteering by McGregor-Lowndes et al (2014) and subsequently by a number of Fact Sheets from the Giving Australia survey 2016 (QUT and Swinburne Universities).

The 2015 ABS General Social Survey results for 2014 suggest that formal volunteering, that is unpaid work given freely to an organisation, increased continually from 1995 to reach a peak of involving 36% of the adult population in 2010, (with higher rates of 41% outside
capital cities), but then declined to 31% in 2014, with the recent drop occurring for both males and females. Still, it appears that roughly one third of Australian adults continue to volunteer. However the national census data may be seriously under representing the actual level of volunteering in Australia. More recent data provided by the Giving Australia 2016 survey (conducted by QUT and Swinburne Universities) found an estimated 43.7% of adult Australians volunteered with an average 2.5 hours a week over the past year. Women had a slightly higher rate of volunteering, at 46.9%. Those aged between 35 and 44 were most likely to volunteer (at 50.7%) but those over 65 years volunteered more hours. Most of those who volunteered also donated money (87%).

The giving Australia survey also indicated that people volunteered over a wide range of areas. Most popular were Primary and secondary education (21%) and sports (20%), but considerable numbers also volunteered for religion (18%), health services (17%), social services (16%) and emergency services (11%).

**An overview of volunteering: New Zealand**

The NZ volunteering data were collected by Statistics New Zealand as a part of the Time Use Survey (1999 & 2010), and adjusted for use as part of the Nonprofit Institutions Satellite Account (2004 & 2013). Participation in volunteering has also been collected as part of the New Zealand General Social Survey since 2008. Both formal volunteering through organisations and informal volunteering during the previous four weeks was collected in 2008 (32.2 and 64.2 percent respectively), in 2010 (32.6 and 65.1 percent), and falling back a little in 2012 (30.6 and 62.2 percent) (New Zealand General Social Survey, 2012). Unfortunately this question was omitted in 2014 and 2016, as this survey allows more capacity to better disaggregate different dimensions of volunteering, such as groups more likely to engage in voluntary activities.

The most popular source of volunteering was for Culture and Recreation (38%) followed by Religion (15%) and Social Services (13%). Higher than average formal volunteering rates was noted for the following categories:

- older people (65 years plus) and middle-aged people (45-64 years);
- unemployed people;
- those with higher levels of education
- those with higher income levels
- couples with children

Pacific peoples

The most commonly reported challenge from managers of volunteers (operating primarily under the ‘unpaid work’ model) is recruiting of volunteers, (followed by not having enough time to achieve goals, not having enough money to achieve goals, and matching and
41 per cent report they ‘squeeze their volunteer management work around everything else’ (Smith, Cordery, & Dutton, 2010: 24 & 29).

Although most managers of volunteers report they feel well supported by their organisation (Smith, Cordery, & Dutton, 2010: 30-31), 42 per cent have no volunteer programme budget or they do not know their budget, and a further 18 per cent have a budget of less than $5,000 per annum. This is all the more remarkable given 11 percent of these worked in organisations with 200 or more volunteers – representing half of these ‘big volunteer’ organisations surveyed (Smith, Cordery, & Dutton, 2010: 11). Volunteers are not free, and Cordery & Tan (2010) found that costs can be a barrier to the availability of volunteers; out-of-pocket expenses have caused one in five volunteers to reduce or change their volunteering, or consider doing so.

The prime benefits of volunteers are much more likely to be considered by managers of volunteers as being ‘essential to achieving [the] organisation’s goals’ (78 per cent), than as ‘an effective way of engaging the community’ (27 percent) – compared to Global Volunteer Management Survey scores of 85% and 70% respectively (Smith, Cordery, & Dutton, 2010:12). This suggests the sector may still be largely operating within a narrow Unpaid Worker paradigm, from an organization-centric perspective.

Conventional ideas about volunteering are frequently associated with what Wilson, Hendricks & Smithies (2001:128) refer to as the Lady Bountiful stereotype of the ‘middle-class, middle-aged, do-gooder’ working in respectable charities. They note there is some support for this notion in practice, but it is more in the segmentation of volunteering as outlined by Zwart & Perez (1999 cited in Wilson, Hendricks, & Smithies, 2001:128): people from lower socio-economic groups, ethnic minority groups, younger people are no less likely to volunteer, just more likely to volunteer outside the structures of traditional formal and organizational volunteering.

It is widely discussed that the 21st Century volunteer seeks more flexible roles and more enriching experiences; they want their expertise acknowledged and are more committed to a cause than an organization; to a time limited project than an open-ended commitment (for example, Finlay & Murray, 2005, Gaskin, 2003, and Merrill, 2006, cited in Smith & Cordery, 2010; 11-12). Emergent forms of volunteering in response to these changing expectations include: episodic and micro volunteering; virtual, online or cyber-volunteering; corporate, workplace or employee volunteering; family and intergenerational volunteering; and, ‘voluntourism’ (volunteer tourism) (Wilson, Hendricks & Smithies 2001, npSynergy, 2005, Carter 2008, and Smith & Cordery 2010). These models are also likely to help volunteering move beyond the Unpaid Worker to Activist and Hobbyist paradigms as well.

Philanthropy in Australia

As indicated in Part One, it is estimated that less than 11% of income for third sector organisations in Australia is derived from philanthropic sources. This is a much lower
proportion than the US but only slightly less than in Canada or UK. Nonetheless, philanthropy remains an important issue for the third sector and especially for those with charitable and tax-exempt status.

The Australian Centre for Philanthropy at QUT (2014) used ABS 2012-13 data to estimate the total giving for the year at $A8,614 million. Table 06 indicates the various sources of these donations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philanthropic sources</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private donations, bequests and legacies</td>
<td>$A 3,993 million*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations from businesses</td>
<td>$A 863 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations from trusts and foundations</td>
<td>$A 474 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsorships</td>
<td>$A 1,381 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fundraising</td>
<td>$A 1,903 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- A 20% decrease from 2006-07

The amount of private donations may be estimated from gift deductions claimed by Australian tax payers. The amount claimed increased consistently each year until 2006-7 to approximately $A1300 million (Productivity commission, 2010) after which it declined. This estimated total represented only 26% of total giving (Australian Centre for Philanthropy, 2010) and excluded eligible gifts that were not claimed and philanthropic gifts to non-deductible charities.

According to Giving Australia report, (2016) in an independent survey, an estimated 14.9 million individual Australian adults (80.8%) gave in total $A12.5 billion to charities and nonprofit organisations (NPOs) over 12 months in 2015-16. The average donation was $764.08 and median donation $200. It is clear that there is no definitive source of accurate philanthropic data: The sparse available data provides variable estimates. It is also likely that the total amount of giving may be subject to variations over time, for example a decline following the Global Financial Crisis in 2008.

Tax exemption is important for third sector organisations as it reduces costs considerably. Furthermore tax exempt organisations are far more likely to attract private donations as such donations are more likely to be tax deductible for the donor. The main types of Not-for-profit Organisations which gain tax exemption are Public benefit institutions (PBIs) and Charitable institutions of which 40% were endorsed as deductible gift recipients (DGR). However many third sector organisations including PBIs and Charities do not attract tax deductible status but nonetheless receive considerable donations. The regulations within the Australian Taxation office regarding tax exemption and DGR endorsement are highly
complex and somewhat inconsistent, with calls by the productivity commission for simplification and greater consistency (Productivity commission, 2010)

According to the 2016 Giving Australia report, in 2015–16, businesses gave $A17.5 billion during their last financial year. This was also far greater than that estimated from ABS data and comprised:

- $7.7 billion in community partnerships (80 per cent of which came from large business
- $6.2 billion in donations, and
- $3.6 billion in (non-commercial) sponsorships.

Workplace giving has become an important component of giving by large business. Of those businesses that reported giving in their last financial year:

- 85% facilitated payroll giving, whereby employees make regular donations from their pre-tax pay
- 56% provided payroll matching programs, where an employer will match the giving of their employees, and
- 46% had a formal workplace volunteering program.

Foundations and Trusts in Australia

Within Australia there are an estimated 5,000 philanthropic trusts and foundations (Cham, 2015). However the real number is unknown because there is no regulatory requirement for public reporting of these entities beyond confidential returns to the ATO. There are a number of different forms of Philanthropic trusts/foundations as indicated in table 07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporate trusts and foundations</td>
<td>Corporations use various structures (eg internal funds, private foundations) for corporate philanthropy. While separate entities, decisions normally remain with company executives</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community trusts and foundations</td>
<td>Community foundations receive donations from many individuals and businesses within a geographic boundary, and provide an umbrella management structure for multiple funds. They are publically accountable bodies with broad based trustee boards</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Ancillary funds (PAFs)</td>
<td>These private family foundations allow wealthy individuals and families to donate wealth for</td>
<td>1002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
philanthropic purposes and grow the capital during their lifetime. An unknown number of these are administered by trustee companies.

| Privately Endowed Philanthropic Foundations | These foundations are established as a legacy through a will or trust document. They form a perpetual entity with permanent endowment. Trustees are initially appointed in the trust deed, and self-appointed thereafter. In most cases a trustee company is co or sole trustee. There is no legal or regulatory requirement for public accountability beyond annual tax returns. |
| Independent Family Trusts and foundations | Similar to above but remaining independent. Board is self-selected but foundation managed by family trustees, solicitors, accountants or formally constituted governance structure. |
| Others | These include government initiated foundations (eg Australian Sports Foundation), international trusts and specific purpose foundations (eg Heart Foundation). |

Source: Taken from Cham, 2015, with permission.

Of particular concern are those privately endowed perpetual trusts and foundations which are largely or solely managed by Trustee companies. Trustee companies are the largest administrators of charitable monies in Australia with $A3.3 billion of capital in 2,000 private trusts and foundations. In 2014, only six publicly listed (ASX) companies managed these foundations as legal sole-trustee or co-trustee (Cham, 2015). The dealings of these trustee companies and the foundations which they manage, remain commercial in confidence. As private trusts, there is no public accountability (the same applies to PAFs). There is some evidence that as trustee companies take over sole trusteeship (even when the initial will stipulated several independent trustees) then the initial purpose of the endowment is lost or ignored. As the primary accountability of publicly listed trustee companies is to their shareholders and not to the donor or the public, emphasis appears to be capital growth rather than philanthropic distribution of funds. In the case of PAFs, it appears that while philanthropic distribution is made, the amount of tax savings to the donor exceeds that distributed in total. There is no public disclosure as to how the philanthropic funds are distributed, or who the recipients are. There is no opportunity for third sector organisations in general to obtain information concerning the foundations policies or to make application for funds. Thus, while there are documented cases of valuable and generous grants made by private philanthropic foundations, the overall picture remains largely unknown. There is an argument that private philanthropic money gained through substantial public tax
concessions, and used for public purposes, should also have some degree of public accountability or at least some publicly available information (Cham, 2015). Such a position is severely disputed by the funds management. Even the now established ACNC has no means of providing even basic records of these funds (Cham, 2014).

**Philanthropy in New Zealand**

Grants, donations and membership fees from households, philanthropic institutions, and other private sources increased 40 percent between 2004 and 2013 to reach $NZ2,663 million in Aotearoa New Zealand, and now represents 20 percent of the sector’s total income of $NZ13,280 million. It compares with $NZ1,440 million in government grants and $NZ2,662 million in government contracts (Statistics New Zealand, 2016: 14).

This is a relatively large share, internationally, in part because of the somewhat unique feature of Aotearoa New Zealand philanthropy – the assets from privatised community banks and commercialised energy supply authorities, along with a range of other philanthropic trusts described below. In addition, this remains an important source of leverage and often unrestricted funds (or at least, less restricted than government funding) for non-profits.

**Table 7: Sources of Philanthropic funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of income</th>
<th>2004 $’000</th>
<th>2004 %</th>
<th>2013 $’000</th>
<th>2013 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>215,985</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>245,332</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profits/philanthropy</td>
<td>542,653</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>556,495</td>
<td>20.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>1,146,758</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>1,861,061</td>
<td>69.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total transfer income</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,905,396</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,662,888</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2016: 20

a) Business and Economic Research Ltd (BERL) (2015: 2) estimates of overall philanthropy broadly defined are very similar ($NZ2,788 million in 2014) – however its make-up is quite different, attributing only $NZ77.2 million from business, $1,530 million personal giving and $1,180 million from trusts and foundations. It is no clear what the reason is for the discrepancies in how philanthropic income is composed. The BERL study, which is commissioned by Philanthropy New Zealand report also identifies that the top three activities supported by giving during 2014 were:

- Culture and education,
- Education, and
- Social services.
Twelve community trusts were created in 1988 when the government restructured and privatised the Trustee Savings Banks. The assets of the banks were held in trust for each region’s community benefit. Similarly 25 energy trusts were created with the assets from the commercialisation of the former regional energy supply authorities. Not all make charitable donations. Some distribute surplus as a cash dividend to local residents or customers, and some do a combination. There are also 19 Licensing Trusts – non-profit bodies that have the exclusive right to sell liquor in a defined geographic district – usually these were historically voted by local residents as ‘dry’ areas. The trusts are permitted to distribute profits to the area it serves for charitable purposes. There are also gaming machine societies which distributes a minimum of 37.12 percent of the net profits from gaming machines it owns for authorized (mainly charitable) purposes.

Other sources of philanthropy include 20 percent of sales from the Lotteries Commission, distributed through the Lottery Grants Board to three statutory bodies (Creative New Zealand, Sport & Recreation New Zealand, and Film New Zealand), with the remaining funds distributed for ‘community and charitable purposes’. There are also family and university foundations; individual donations and bequests (and the Non Profit Institutions Satellite Account also includes membership fees paid to non-profits here); and, corporate donations and sponsorship.

Jeffs (2005) has argued that philanthropy has flexibility that government funding does not have, and could make greater use of loans and loan guarantees to social enterprises as a part of its overall funding portfolio; they could also have the financial clout to research the feasibility of creating social banking consortia.

Conclusion PART THREE:

Both volunteering and Philanthropy (Giving) are flourishing in Australasia. In both countries, volunteering has remained fairly constant over time, although issues of measurement make estimation difficult. Nonetheless, roughly 35% to 40% of the population volunteers on a formal basis within organisations. Many more volunteer on an informal basis, particularly those within migrant communities and Maoris. There is evidence, though not well documented that there are many forms of volunteering, including a growth in new types of volunteering, especially short term, episodic and virtual forms of volunteering.

There is also evidence of relatively high levels of giving, both from households and from philanthropic trusts. The infrastructure for philanthropic giving is different in New Zealand relative to Australia, and probably more advantageous to nonprofits. In Australia, new policy attempts to increase private philanthropic trusts has lead to a dramatic increase in number of these, but these private trusts resist close scrutiny and so little is known about their contribution.
Nonetheless, we can conclude that Australians and New Zealanders are generally very involved in supporting civil society, third sector organisations both volunteering and providing funding. As a part of the Gallup World Poll, people in over 140 countries are asked if they have done any of the following three activities in the past month: helped a stranger, or someone you didn’t know who needed help; donated money to a charity; and, volunteered time to an organisation. In the most recent survey (CAF 2015), both Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia continue to rank highly by international comparison (respectively third and fifth overall in the World Giving Index). The proportion of respondents saying they helped a stranger was 65 and 66 per cent respectively; donating money was 73 and 72 per cent; and volunteering was 45 and 40 per cent. Apart from an overall dip in all three activities in 2011 and a subsequent recovery, countries on average have remained relatively steady with small overall increases in the participation rates over the five years the data have been collected.

PART FOUR: THE WORLD OF CITIZEN ACTION—SOCIAL CAPITAL, ADVOCACY, AND PROTEST

Apart from the world of formal volunteering within non-profit organisations that provide services, there are thousands of unfunded, (often) unregistered organisations that together form dynamic networks within local communities. These consist of citizens who voluntarily commit time and effort in creating a better world for their community. Local sport clubs are a case in point. Some more formal efforts are the result of community development initiatives. The key to active citizenship and community development generally may well be the creation of social capital in communities.

There has been considerable interest within the third sector research community in Australasia concerning social capital, its nature and effects, and its relationship to community development

Social Capital and the link between capitals.

During the 1990s several major research initiatives occurred in relation to the development of social capital theory in Australia. The concept of social capital, recently popularized internationally by Putnam et al (1993) was introduced to an Australian audience by Eva Cox in her ABC Boyer Lectures (1995). Following this was an extended research project at UTS to explore the nature of social capital, and culminating in the publication of one of the early empirical analyses of social capital by Onyx and Bullen (2000). The research was followed by a major roundtable held in Canberra, involving academics and policy makers within government. The papers from this roundtable lead to a publication edited by Ian Winter,

It quickly became clear that social capital is an essential ingredient in community cohesion and well-being. Studies in Australia and internationally indicated that regions and groups measuring high in social capital also have a variety of positive outcomes, beyond economic advantage, such as improved health and well-being, reduced levels of crime and better educational outcomes (Putnam, 2000; Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Baum and Palmer, 2002; Stone and Hughes, 2002; Halpern, 2005; Edwards and Onyx, 2007). In Aotearoa New Zealand there also was a particular interest in social capital’s links with Maori collectivist culture and way of working, for example, Williams & Robinson (2002).

At the same time that Cox was promoting civil society and collective action as crucial to social capital in Australia, across the Tasman in Aotearoa New Zealand a neo-liberal big business think-tank, the Business Roundtable commissioned “From Welfare State to Civil Society: Towards Welfare that Works in New Zealand” from a visiting UK champion of friendly societies and increased voluntary activity at the expense of a much smaller role for the state (Green 1996). While this sparked considerable public and political debate, there was very little content or analysis actually from Aotearoa New Zealand. Lyons & Nowland-Foreman (2009) describe how this led, in part, to a group of activists and researchers bringing out Robert Putnam to Aotearoa New Zealand in 1996 to promote his concept of social capital, in the hope of influencing public policy still dominated by narrow neo-liberal prescriptions:

The intention of at least some is summed up in the title of a paper presented to an Institute of Policy Studies follow-up seminar – ‘Bringing Back Balance: The role of social capital in public policy.’ The balance referred to in that paper included recognition of the importance of social as well as economic goals, of community as well as individual interests, and of the important place of ‘church, voluntary and other civic bodies’ in society (Riddell, 1997:13). Putnam spoke in private and public sessions with senior politicians, bureaucrats, and non-profit leaders. With the direct interest and support of (then) Prime Minister Bolger, high level policy work in a wide range of [government] agencies... The Institute of Policy Studies sponsored workshops on social capital in 1997, 1998 and 2000 (Robinson, 1997, 1999 & 2002), high level work on applying the concept was undertaken by a wide range of Ministries... This surge of policy interest, however, was short-lived, as Bolger was replaced as Prime Minister in December 1997 by his own party.

Social capital was defined by Putnam (1993: 167) as “those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. For him, and others following this approach, social capital is a basic
resource that is used to maintain and enhance community cohesion and collective action in promoting community wide civic health. In other words it focuses on the productive aspect of social capital when people are able to work cooperatively and collaboratively.

Bourdieu on the other hand defined the social capital as “the sum of the resources actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p119). For Bourdieu, social capital was a core strategy in the struggle for dominance within a social field. His focus was not on collaborative action but on the struggle for power and wealth, and in particular the strategies adopted by elite groups to maintain their relative advantage.

Other scholars have adopted a middle ground, that is acknowledging the capacity of social capital to be both a productive resource, but also a strategy used by marginal groups in their struggle for economic survival and human rights (Woolcock and Narayan, 2001; Halpern, 2005; Onyx, Edwards and Bullen, 2007).

Much academic debate in Australia as elsewhere focussed on the silence in social capital theory relating to social inequalities and power. The original conceptualization of social capital was more interested in the collaborative capacity of people to generate social capital, rather than its potential to magnify existing power differences. The exception to this is Boudieu who argued that social capital, in the form of “old boys networks” simply reinforces existing class relations. It was argued that social capital should not be presented as a kind of “spray on” solution to economic, environmental or social problems (Bryson and Mowbray, 2005). A political economy must be included in any analysis (Fine, 2001). We knew for instance that social capital is most likely to work effectively among equals; inequality, exploitation, and power tactics are highly destructive of working social capital. Some subsequent work in Australia and elsewhere attempted to examine the political economy of social capital with an analysis of the intersection of social capital and power (Onyx et al, 2007). Social capital can be and is used to advantage those in power (Dale and Onyx, 2005). At a more sinister level, social capital can be and is used in the discourse of consensus which supports the status quo (Bryson and Mowbray, 2005). For this reason, many mainstream sociologists refused to use the concept. Nonetheless, social capital is the one resource that is widely available to all communities, regardless of levels of wealth. It can therefore be seen as a resource for the social activist, and is well explicated in such social movements as the Social Forum for example, and within Australia in the “lock the gate ” campaign against coal seam gas extraction in agricultural land (see next section).

Despite these different approaches, there is a growing consensus among researchers, that social capital must be defined in terms of networks that are durable and mutual with norms and sanctions to enforce their interactions. There is also agreement that social capital is a complex multilayered concept with several components, though scholars disagree as to which other elements are core and which peripheral to its definition. In particular one point
of discussion concerns the centrality of trust. For some it is critical (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; Schneider, 2009), for others simply a fortunate side effect (Portes 1998; Woolcock 2001; Schuller 2001). It is interesting to compare indicators of trust between the two countries. In 2006, 54 per cent of Australians surveyed felt “most people could be trusted”, and this was much the same across different population groups and regions (ABS, 2007). While in the same year, 76 per cent of those survey in Aotearoa New Zealand said they believed people can be trusted (18% ‘almost always’ and 58% ‘usually’ (MSD, 2008).

Other scholars have emphasized different core elements of social capital, elements such as reciprocity (Putnam 1993) and social agency (Leonard and Onyx, 2004). Agency in particular appears to be important in establishing the capacity for grassroots initiative, to be proactive. Evidence points to the significance of agency or a ‘can do’ attitude within the social network and within community organisations in particular (Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Leonard, 2005; Johannisson and Olaison, 2007; Williams and Guerra, 2011). Human interaction is marked by intentionality. It is not enough simply to maintain networks of mutual support. As Sampson notes, ‘networks have to be activated to be ultimately meaningful’ (Sampson, 2006, p 153). Hence Portes and Sensenbrenner (1998) define social capital in terms of ‘expectations for action within a collectivity’. What is required is that networks mobilise into action, that is, that they take the initiative in their own development. Communities that assume control over their own destiny are better able to deal with crises and natural disasters, as well as their own disadvantage. Sampson (2006) concludes that collective efficacy signifies an emphasis on shared beliefs in a collective capacity for action combined with a sense of engagement on the part of citizens. He found evidence that neighbourhoods with this combined sense of social cohesion and social control, in other words with high levels of collective efficacy, had lower levels of violence, controlling for other variables such as effects of poverty and ethnicity.

Most discussions of social capital distinguish between “bonding”, and “bridging” social capital (Woolcock and Narayan, 2001; Putnam, 2000). Bonding social capital is usually characterised as having dense, multi-functional ties and strong but localised trust. It is essential for a sense of personal identity, support and belonging. However, to the extent that it creates narrow, intolerant communities, it can be oppressive even to those who otherwise benefit (Portes, 1998). Bridging is more complex. Bridging, as the name implies, is about reaching beyond these immediate networks of family and friends. Bridging is important for personal and community development (Woolcott and Narayan, 2001). Bridging can be used in at least three different ways; to cross demographic divides, notably ethnic divides, to bridge structural holes between networks, and to access information and resources outside the community in question. However as Schneider (2009) and others (Leonard and Onyx, 2004) have argued, bridging is not simply a matter of weak or transient ties, but of more formal ties which also require the development of trust over time. Evidence is increasingly making clear that both bonding and bridging are essential resources
for individual and collective wellbeing (Putnam, 2000; Leonard and Onyx, 2004; Edwards and Onyx, 2007; Schneider, 2009)

The interaction of the capitals

One of the most significant contributions of Bourdieu was his broader sociological analysis of the role of capital. He argues that there are a number of different capitals, all of which are linked and under some circumstances can be converted into other forms of capital. For example he argues

Capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights: as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications, and as social capital made up of social obligations (connections) which is convertible in certain conditions, into economic capital... (Bourdieu, 1986: p242)

Bourdieu later adds the concept of “symbolic capital” which alludes to the power of prestige or reputation when economic or cultural capital is recognized and acknowledged by others. He also defines cultural capital as having several subspecies, notably embodied cultural capital, objectified cultural capital and institutionalized cultural capital. Embodied cultural capital refers to long-lasting personal dispositions such as ethnicity, religion, family background, linguistic codes. Objectified cultural capital refers to the value and power of cultural products. Institutional cultural capital refers mainly to educational qualifications as formally recognized (Bourdieu, 1986).

The importance of cultural capital in the creation of social impact has been highlighted within another discipline, that of social psychology, by Latane and colleagues. He defines culture as “the entire set of socially transmitted beliefs, values and practices that characterize a given society at a given time” (Latane, 1996:13). He proposes a dynamic theory of social impact to account for how coherent cultural patterns emerge out of a self-organizing complex system of individual networks.

Bourdieu in his analysis privileges economic capital as the primary source of wealth and power; other capitals are primarily useful in so far as they may be ultimately convertible into economic capital. However other scholars are more interested in the interdependencies between capitals for their own sake. Of particular relevance here is the link between social capital and human capital. Human capital resembles Bourdieu’s institutional cultural capital and is defined by the OECD for example as encompassing skills, competences and qualifications (Schuller, 2007). Schuller argues that the value of social capital depends in large measure on its linkage to other capitals, especially human capital, just as human capital requires access to social capital in order to actualize its potential. Both are important ends in themselves but each is enhanced by the presence of the other capital.
The individual vs the organisation

Putman sees social capital as a collective resource, located in the social networks, which are potentially open to all. Bourdieu was concerned with the advantages individuals gain from social capital resources, but he nonetheless recognized that social capital was generated within durable social networks. More recently, some economists have attempted to identify social capital as an individual possession, to be accumulated and used like any other form of capital, regardless of what other people may do (Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002). However, by definition, social capital adheres to the connections between people and is a quality of the social rather than the individual. Nonetheless, as Putnam (2000) and others have noted, the individual may access the resources available in the collective, and may do so to their personal advantage. For example, individuals in organisations are able to use their networks to gain new employment opportunities. But, to the extent that the individual continues to draw from the collective social capital resource without contributing to it, that resource will ultimately be drained of its dynamic renewal. This raises the problem of the “free rider”.

As Ostrom explains:

Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-ride, the collective benefit will not be produced. (1990: 6)

If social capital resides in the social connections between people, then logically, the best measure of it also requires measures of the collective. In fact most attempts to measure social capital make use of individual, survey type instruments (eg Onyx and Bullen, 2000) in which individual scores are aggregated to provide a picture of the larger collective.

As a consequence of this approach, there has been little effort to apply social capital to the organisation as a whole, that is, to the organisation separate from the individuals who make it up. Schneider (2009) on the other hand defines organisational social capital as “established, trust based networks among organisations or communities supporting a particular non-profit, that an organisation can use to further its goals” (Schneider, 2009: 644). She provides considerable evidence of the role of organisational social capital which is independent of the people involved and which is based on that organisation’s history and reputation. So, even as key individuals move on, the organisation can continue to draw on its organisational networks as important resources. Just as with individual networks, the organisational network ties are reciprocal, enforceable and durable. Schneider further makes use of Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital to explain how subcultural differences within and between organisations help to define social capital networks. Thus, organisations are likely to form social capital networks with those other organisations within the same field that have one or more core values or cultural attributes in common. Resources are more likely to be shared and collaborative action developed between alliances within this organisational network.
The generation of social capital is therefore seen as an ongoing process within the communities in question, one dependent on complex sets of relationships, both within formal third sector organisations but also within informal networks within the wider community. That is, we are not examining an extant ‘stock’ of capital, but an ongoing process of generation.

**Advocacy**

Advocacy, and in particular systemic advocacy, is a clear indicator, and outcome, of active citizenship. This has been a major preoccupation of third sector research in Australasia over the past 20 years, though most of the publications have been located within political science or public social issues journals, rather than Third Sector Review.

The term ‘Advocacy’ is defined as active interventions by organizations on behalf of the collective interests they represent (often referred to as ‘systemic advocacy’), that have the explicit goal of influencing public policy or the decisions of any institutional elite (Onyx et al, 2008, Casey and Dalton 2006; Salamon 2002). Two aspects of advocacy are important: first, the emphasis on any institutional elite, including Business, as well as governmental, institutions as the objects of advocacy activity and second, the focus on ‘collective interest’, that is benefits that in Berry’s terms, “may be shared by all people, independent of their membership or support of a given group”, rather than private benefits, as the principal goal of advocacy activity (Berry 1977, p. 8).

Advocacy is important to democracy in two ways. First, advocacy provides an opportunity for those who participate to learn about political issues and be politically active, to “cultivate the habits of collective action, thus producing an active, self-sufficient, and vigilant citizenry” (Warren 2001, p. 6). Second, advocacy ensures that the views and voices of other, marginalized interests are represented in the policy process (Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998; Berry 1999; Sawer 2002).

However, the distinctions between private benefits and ‘collective interest’, and who and what constitutes ‘civil society’ are unclear in neo-liberal governance and discourse concerning democratic processes and entitlements. In the public choice paradigm, which underpins neo-liberalist policies, marginalised constituencies who depend on advocates for access to public debate and decision making are perceived as exclusive, and therefore private, self-interest groups (Andrew 2006). Public organisations are rendered private. Marginalised groups are no longer amenable to special pleading, thus curtailing their opportunities for engagement in a variety of civic and democratic processes.

Consequently there has been a trend within various neo-liberal governments at both state and federal levels in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand, for governments to curtail or control advocacy activities, partly by defunding those who are overtly critical of government policy, particularly where advocacy makes use of government funding. This has lead to an avoidance of advocacy by those, particularly small service delivery organisations most
dependent on government funding. Some researchers have documented the restriction on community organisations and the repercussions they fear may be incurred by speaking out (Melville 2001; Maddison, and Denniss 2005), if they dare to ‘bite the hand that feeds’.

However, that did not mean the end of advocacy in Australia. Rather, neo-liberal government policy appears to have generated a shift in strategy. A major study (Onyx, Armitage, Dalton, Melville, Casey, and Banks, 2010) identified a number of quite sophisticated strategies adopted by third sector organisations. First, organizations were much more likely to undertake institutional than radical advocacy action. Many organizations stated that they never take part in direct election related activities, though a minority do so often. They are unlikely to directly organize demonstrations or direct protest action. On the other hand, almost all organizations participated in government sponsored consultations or advisory processes, prepared submissions for government enquiries, worked directly with government departments and advisors in support of a particular issue, and advocated on behalf of specific clients (individual advocacy which may have systemic implications). Interestingly, almost all organizations sometimes or often contributed to research that supported a particular issue.

Second, a number of organizations had developed new strategies involving forms of sector co-ordination. They attended and resourced conferences and workshops with other third sector organizations, joined advocacy campaigns often under the leadership of peak organizations, and encouraged their membership to take various forms of participatory action. Sharing information and resources in order to build strong networks within the sector was important as was the value of organizing united media responses to government policy. Smaller organizations in particular were likely to join advocacy campaigns of larger organizations. Some organizations saw that engaging and strengthening their own constituencies was a valuable way of doing effective advocacy work. Rather than traditional lobbying within a ‘top down’ approach, mobilizing user groups to advocate on their own behalf was important work. This approach requires consultation with constituents as well as providing training for them, for example, public speaking and media training. There was a similar shift in Aotearoa New Zealand

A positive consequence of a more coordinated response to advocacy was the development of formal networks, often around peak organisations. This can be seen as a counter measure to the individualised competitive required by government. Perhaps the most significant of these new networks was the Sydney Alliance. According to the Alliance homepage:

The Sydney Alliance brings together diverse community organisations, unions and religious organisations to advance the common good and achieve a fair, just and sustainable city. We do this by providing opportunities for people to have a say in decisions that affect them, their families and everyone working and living in Sydney. The Sydney Alliance is a non-party political organisation. (http://www.sydneyalliance.org.au, 2017)
Currently the Alliance supports campaigns for affordable housing, more accessible transport and the needs of asylum seekers. More importantly it provides a framework in which individual organisations can find supportive allies, share information and resources and obtain training in community organizing.

Protest Actions

However there has remained within both Australia and New Zealand a strong tradition of direct citizen protest action. As Hutton (2012) noted, bureaucratised and professionalised advocacy involving endless consultations, submissions and backroom discussions with ministers (so called “soft advocacy”) can work well for some issues, small contained campaigns that operate within safe policy boundaries. But when dealing with big issues against entrenched powerful interests, then as Hutton (2012) notes, “trapping ourselves in the formal processes of submissions, environmental impact assessments, petitions, letters to local politicians and the like will largely be a waste of time” (Hutton, 2012, p17). Under these circumstances the only solution is one of nonviolent protest and citizen disobedience, within a wider social movement. These actions have nearly always represented a coordinated campaign involving many third sector organisations, and an alliance of diverse formal and informal networks.

By way of example, one such successful campaign in NSW involved “Lock the gate” to prevent coal seam gas mining exploration within core agricultural areas of Northern NSW. Although the Alliance was first developed in Queensland, it has had greatest success to date in NSW. As noted in Wikipedia:

The Lock the Gate Alliance is an incorporated Australian community action group which was formed in 2010 in response to the expansion of the coal mining and coal seam gas industries: [1] which were encroaching on agricultural land, rural communities and environmentally sensitive areas. The organisation has initially focused on responding to developments in the states of Queensland and New South Wales, through peaceful protest and noncooperation. Lock the Gate Alliance’s stated mission is “to protect Australia’s natural, environmental, cultural and agricultural resources from inappropriate mining and to educate and empower all Australians to demand sustainable solutions to food and energy production.” The Alliance claims to have over 40,000 members and 250 local groups constitute the alliance including farmers, traditional custodians, conservationists and urban residents. [2] The organisation was incorporated in 2011 in New South Wales and became a registered company, limited by guarantee on 6 March 2012. The inaugural AGM was held in Murwillumbah [3] on 11 June 2011

The strategies of the Lock the gate campaign involved a great deal of grassroots organisation, in transforming individualised frustrations and anger into a coordinated community action. This involved visiting and listening to individual farmers, bringing normally antagonistic “greenies’ and farmers to a mutually respectful dialogue. It also
involved the creation of a common “script” or discourse around the cultural, environmental and economic value of rural life, a coherent argument “as a dynamic series of rhetorical responses to an intensely politicised situation” (Mcmanus and Connor, 2013). It also involved creating local public spaces for a collective voice to emerge, one that included citizens of all ages and positions in the community. It required institutional support from local businesses and local government. It involved public displays of non-cooperation and physical action. According to law, mining companies with exploration licences were entitled to enter private properties. They were prevented from doing so, first with “lock the gate” notices on the locked entrances to properties, but also with trucks and other appliances creating roadblocks for advancing heavy mining machinery, together with a strong physical community presence of many local citizens. All of this created considerable media interest. The NSW neoliberal government finally agreed to a moratorium on all coal seam gas mining in the northern rivers agricultural region of NSW. The struggle is not over, but the social movement to protect precious agricultural land and rural resources is growing in strength at least across the eastern states of Australia.

Colonisation in Aotearoa New Zealand brought dramatic challenges for Maori, who were soon marginalised and effectively stripped of 90 per cent of their assets either through forceful confiscations or arranged land sales, within a couple of decades of signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. In response to rapid European population growth and increasing pressure to sell their land, various tribes from across the country came together to discuss the idea of appointing a single king, with the coronation of the first king, Potatau Te Wherowhero, in 1858. His son, Tawhiao, who became king in 1860 led the Kingitangi movement during the Waikato Land Wars of 1863-64 and the land confiscations that followed, leading his people into exile into the area now known as King Country to keep the movement together when it was treated as a direct threat to the authority of the colonial powers.

When succeeded by his son in 1894, there was a shift in tactics. Mahuta became a member of the Legislative Council and the Executive Council (Cabinet). From 1912, his son, Te Rata, continued the work of his father negotiating with the Colonial authorities, and seeking redress for grievances. But progress was slow and limited.

In 1918, the charismatic Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana experienced visions that led him to establish the Ratana church. Its leaders sought economic development and modernisation, and demanded the ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1920s Ratana formed a political wing, and the movement attracted popular support. In the mid-1930s it entered into an alliance with the Labour Party; Labour nominated Ratana leaders as its candidates in the Maori electorates, and by 1943, Ratana Labour candidates had won all four Maori seats, gaining a much stronger voice in governing circles, until Labour lost power in 1949. This was perhaps reflected in the 1945 Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act, which set up tribal and district committees that had the chance to enhance Maori development and
provide a framework for tino rangatiratanga (Maori self-determination). These committees had a list of responsibilities, which referenced self-dependence, the promotion of a range of well-beings, cultural maintenance, and ‘full rights, privileges and responsibilities of citizenship’. However the strict control of funding by the Department of Maori Affairs did not allow tribal committees the resources to undertake developmental programmes except those approved by government schemes.

Maori anger over loss of sovereignty, land, culture and recognition by Pakeha-dominated institutions also reached a critical juncture in the 1970s. The decade saw the rise of Nga Tamatoa (The Warriors) - a Māori activist group, inspired by international liberation movements, that operated throughout the 1970s to promote Māori rights, fight racial discrimination, and confront injustices perpetrated by the Government, particularly violations of the Treaty of Waitangi. This was also the era of the iconic land rights hikoi (march) led by Dame Whina Cooper, and the Bastion Point occupation.

Around the same time, and not unrelated, Halt All Racist Tours rose to prominence opposing the 1981 Springbok (White South African) Rugby Tour, when more than 150,000 people took part in over 200 demonstrations in 28 centres and 1,500 were charged with offences relating to the protests. One outcome was an increased awareness by many Pakeha (European New Zealanders) engaged in these protests, of the continuing discrimination and disadvantage experienced by Maori in their own country.

As another strategy, locally-based Te Kohanga Reo (whanau—or family-based, early childhood, total emersion language nests) were initiated in 1981 through the Department of Maori Affairs to support the aspiration for the survival and revival of te reo Maori (the Maori language). They represented the growth of a new parallel service system, not only culturally appropriate but also directly controlled by Maori. The first Kohanga Reo, Pukeatua in Wainuiomata, was opened in 1982, and such was the excitement that one hundred were established by the end of the year. Today, there are over 460 Te Kohanga Reo established around the country, all self-managed, catering for over 9000 mokopuna (representing five per cent of all children in early childhood education) (www.kohanga.ac.nz/history).

Protest movements and citizen action for social change in Aotearoa New Zealand were not restricted to Maori. The peace movement provides interesting demonstrations of the range of tactics and complex interplay of various forms of organising in changing public policy.

Peace Movement: “New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy came into being over a few tense days at the end of January 1985. US officials were enraged; they had not believed that David Lange’s government would agree to the policy. New Zealand’s foreign affairs and military establishment were angry and were taken by surprise as well.” Leadbeater (2013:7). Aotearoa New Zealand’s foreign policy had been changed by a campaign of ordinary people, in the face of substantial opposition from powerful national and international elites. And the policy has now become so ingrained in the country’s national identity that 30 years later,
despite several changes of government, none have gone on to drop the nuclear-free policy. Within a period of less than 10 years, the peace movement went from small and marginal to a central position on the political stage:

The strategies and tactics ranged from tried and true – petitions, letters and submissions – to provocative demonstrations involving full nudity. Many actions involved risky confrontations as activists on surfboards and kayaks launched themselves at French and US warships or climbed on bulldozers clearing the way for a new base. However, violence was off the agenda and property destruction was rare. The level of confrontation between activists and police lessened as the movement became larger, but some confrontation was inevitable when activists chose to carry out acts of civil disobedience... (Leadbeater 2013: 13).

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) included Christian pacifists and may have been central, but there soon developed a web of organisations it would work with – the trade union-based, Communist-sympathising New Zealand Peace Council, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, United Nations Association of New Zealand, the Progressive Youth Movement with its more dramatic and disruptive tactics (sit-ins, flag burning, noise attacks), and the Campaign Against Foreign Military Activities in New Zealand. “Vigorous campaigns against warship visits [in 1968 there were 20 visits], US military facilities and French nuclear testing during the 1960s and early 1970s laid the groundwork for the high-profile campaigns that followed in the next decade” (Leadbeater, 2013:15).

A teacher at St Johns Theological College (recently returned from the U.S., inspired by the Quaker peace activists who had taken to sea in small boats to stop shipment of arms to Pakistan) formed the first Peace Squadron to picket Aotearoa New Zealand harbours against nuclear warships. The New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies worked to gain public trust and political support using education and research. Trade unions went on strike, the National Council of Churches provided its support, and a Nuclear Free Zone movement enabled local activism. The media and visiting experts were used by both sides of the issue. Campaign Half Million did not achieve its ambitious target but did get 333,000 signatures in a few short months, making it one of the largest petitions ever presented to the New Zealand Parliament (the equivalent of one in 7 of the population over the age of 14 years).

A separate coalition of the Environmental Defence Society, Ecology Action and Friends of the Earth came together to oppose nuclear-generated power, but supported each other’s campaign objectives. Anti-nuclear professional and interest group associations formed, such as Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, and Engineers for Social Responsibility, and made knowledgeable and passionate submissions to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Nuclear Power.
It was a slow and relentless process to maintain pressure and gradually bring around public opinion. Prior to the current on-line revolution in organising, building a movement in the 1970s meant groups, such as Auckland CND, had a (landline) telephone tree for mobilising supporters at short notice (reasonably efficient until a key person in the chain moved house without telling their coordinator), and a newsletter run off on a simple, hand-wound Gestetner printing machine was mailed out six times a year. Committee meetings happened at a regular place and time, and social evenings were quite frequent (Leadbeater, 2013:48).

**Conclusion**

**PART FOUR**

While government policy has clearly had a major effect on the form and development of third sector organisations in Australasia, that is only a small part of the picture. To balance the image of an obedient, reactive civil society we have only to examine the many thousands of informal, local organisations working to maintain social cohesion and social capital within the community. Organisations constantly find new ways to maintain the important role of advocacy, even in the face of government threats and hostility. Even more important is the recurring evidence of social protest, organised and persistent protest creating major social movements to resist a wrong, to create a better society. We have given only three examples here, but there are many more equally profound in their effects. Such is the basis of a healthy democracy, supported by a strong civil society and the third sector organisations that are involved in its operations.

**PART FIVE: NEW FORMS OF ORGANZING**

**Social enterprise**

The third sector in Australia and New Zealand is extremely dynamic, shifting and developing in new ways. This shift is partly in response to government policy and particularly the neo-liberal funding policies for formal service delivery, as discussed above. To meet the challenges imposed by shifting priorities of government and the economy, new organisational forms are emerging. One of these is the emergence of social entrepreneurship and the rise of social enterprises, both as a form in themselves, but also as part of a hybrid formation with existing forms.

Social enterprise has received enormous and enthusiastic attention in Australia, partly because it rests on the principles of business and capitalism, and therefore is an excellent fit with neo-liberal ideals. The promise is that with good business planning, the organisation can meet the needs of civil society through good business practice, while also delivering a profit to investors and reduced reliance on government funding. The market prevails! However, despite many heroic stories of social entrepreneurs creating magic, there is in fact little evidence as to the actual effectiveness of the model.

Social enterprise, and social entrepreneurship are usually taken as synonymous, social entrepreneurship being the process by which social enterprise is formed. Both have
contested definitions. However, in broad terms most agree that at a minimum, social enterprise/social entrepreneurship consists of the following basic criteria (Dees, 1998; Dart, 2004; Paredo and McLean, 2006):

- Adopting a mission to create and sustain social value, rather than private value.
- Recognising and pursuing new opportunities to serve that mission, normally by identifying a need and articulating a new way of meeting that need.
- Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation and learning.
- Refusing to be constrained by a lack of existing resources.
- Operating with a heightened sense of accountability to and embeddedness within the constituencies involved.

Key research in Australia has followed similar discussions. Barraket et al (2010), following an empirical process of exploring emergent debates, defines social enterprises as “organisations that existed to fulfil a mission consistent with public or community benefit, that trade to fulfil their mission, and that reinvest a substantial proportion of their profit or surplus in the fulfilment of that mission” (Barraket et al. 2010).

The debates around definition concern the centrality of resource generation or profit making. The five central criteria listed above do not focus on income generation or the requirement of distribution of profit to individuals. This is sometimes referred to as a soft version of social enterprise. However, the “hard” version does make specific requirement that the enterprise achieves its mission through an explicitly business focus, including the requirement for making a profit. Several reviews of the concept therefore have developed some kind of typology to account for some of these differences in emphasis (Neck, Brush and Allen, 2009; Paredo and McLean, 2006; Casey, 2013). For example, Neck et al, (2009) identify four quadrants including (1) social purpose: those with a predominantly social mission but an economic market orientation; (2) traditional: those with a traditional market mission and an economic market orientation but who nonetheless produce some social benefit; (3) social consequence: those with an economic mission but a predominant social market orientation often identified as corporate social responsibility; and (4) enterprising third sector organisations: those with both a social mission and social market orientation, with little regard to economic generation of income, beyond basic survival. Paredo and McLean (2006) further explore the range of hybrid cases in which social goals may be more or less central and commercial exchange can variously be out of the question, used directly for social benefit, or involve more or less profit making for the entrepreneur or investors.

For example, at the more social end of the spectrum is Yunus’ definition of social enterprise as “a non-loss, non-dividend company designed to address a social objective” (Yunus, 2010). This approach specifically limits the distribution of profit. However, in other cases, this is not so.
Regardless of the subtleties of social and economic mission, all versions of social enterprise tend towards a taken for granted acceptance of the language and techniques of business. As noted in Kenny et al. (2015, p188):

Dart (2004) explores this trend from the perspective of institutional theory and the centrality of moral legitimacy. As business has become centre stage in neo-liberal thought, government bureaucracies and nonprofit organisations are seen as non-productive and burdensome. It follows that even social sector organisations can gain legitimacy by adopting the language, goals and structures of business. As Dart notes “Thus moral legitimacy of social enterprise can be understood because of the consonance between social enterprise and the pro-business ideology that has become dominant in the wider social environment” (Dart, 2004, p419). Dart goes on to argue that once social enterprise has gained this ideological legitimacy it becomes somewhat immune to rational independent evaluation. Indeed the U.S. literature on social enterprise is full of stories of heroic acts of achievement, but very little in the way of hard evidence of outcome. One such preliminary assessment of outcome by Casey (2013), involved a follow-up of four high profile media cases. After some two and a half years following the initial media portrayal of these four “heroes”, all four enterprises had disappointing outcomes. This of course is not to say that all social enterprises are doomed to fail, only that there has been little critical analysis of outcomes.

As a direct result of this concern, there is a growing demand for objective measures of social impact of all projects, including social enterprise, of which the dominant example in UK and Australia is Social Return on Investment (SROI). This is basically a cost benefit analysis in which an attempt is made to identify the monetary value of actual outcomes. It is a relatively sophisticated and expensive tool (http://whatworks.org.nz/frameworks-approaches/social-return-on-investment/).

While SROI has not yet had as big an impact in Aotearoa New Zealand, Social Value Aotearoa Network was launched in June 2015, as the official national member of Social Value International, to promote SROI in that country.

There has also been a small core group, especially of social enterprises, such as Trade Aid Importers since 2000, which have chosen the Social Accounting and Auditing to ensure a balance between financial and social reporting. Although simpler, it is still time-expensive, especially of the organisation’s leadership, as each organisation needs to design their own systems (Nowland-Foreman, 2000)

Social enterprises may take various legal forms, but basically they use business tools to meet a social mission. They may include cooperatives, and community interest companies. The preferred business model is one in which the organisation may make a profit, both in order to meet its social objectives but also to make a financial return to investors. The arguments in favour of this strong business-centred approach have been recently demonstrated in a series of opinion pieces printed in The Harvard Business Review and widely disseminated.
within the business world. For example, Rottenberg and Morris (2013) argue that while social enterprises face the dual task of creating financial value for their investors and social value for those they seek to serve, their advice is to always prioritize financial goals over social ones to maximize the long term sustainability of the business. Their own case analysis of some 50 social businesses around the world demonstrated that those who did prioritize financial goals over social goals were much more likely to experience high rates of growth and have greater social impact.

Similarly Pallotta (2013) argues that what he terms “the humanitarian sector” has put itself at an enormous disadvantage by ignoring some basic rules of for-profit enterprises, including maximizing salaries of CEOs, using professional paid advertising, building long term plans for return on investment allowing for risk of failure, and raising massive capital in the stock market by offering investment returns. These rules he argues are just as effective for third sector organisations or rather for social enterprises that are allowed to create profits.

The same phenomenon is becoming evident in Australasian qualifications for third sector managers seeking MBA qualification and large charities employing senior managers from the Business sector, often having little or no experience of the third sector. Many non-profit teaching programmes have long been small parts of much bigger business schools.

The problem with this approach, as acknowledged for example by Rottenburg and Morris (2013) and Menasce and Dalsace (2011) is the inherent conflict of interest between profit generation and social good. While most nonprofits would acknowledge the importance of financial viability, many operational decisions made by the organisation find that the two objectives, that is meeting social needs and financial needs, are non-commensurate. This can have dire consequences for the organisation’s operation, including its human resource management (Green, 2012). It is also likely that as economic goals and the achievement of profit become paramount, and as the organisation adopts the language of business, then those intangible goals of social cohesion, trust and social justice, become ever more invisible.

These issues continue to be apparent within Australian social enterprises. A recent review by Barraket (2016) notes that the number of social enterprises appears to be increasing rapidly. Indeed a second wave national survey, Finding Australia’s Social Enterprise Survey (FASES) (Barraket et al. 2016), indicated many new entrants with 38% of the social enterprises being younger than five years old. However she expressed a similar concern, noting:

As the hegemony of neoliberal market logic has been so routinized as to be rendered almost invisible, analyses of power and its effects – both repressive and generative – seem to have been largely sidelined. These discussions tend to render insignificant forms of civic and collective action that do not engage with the mainstream market, or are explicitly concerned with contesting market power. Another troubling effect of this discourse is a
dominant tendency to cast the doing of business as an expert domain and the creation of social value as a generic domain into which anyone with an MBA and a sentiment to ‘do good’ can launch themselves. The corporatisation of the third sector that accompanies the rise of social enterprise is definitely cause for concern. So, too, is the concomitant devaluing of diverse knowledges needed to tackle social problems at their source. (Barraket, 2016, p75, 76).

The course of new social enterprise forms and outcomes in Australia remains uncertain. Certainly social enterprise as a creative new approach to a myriad of social problems appears to be gaining momentum and support. Whether they can indeed achieve their promise and avoid the dilemmas/ imperative of profitable business remains to be seen.

Social enterprise is similarly a recent and growing focus of interest in Aotearoa New Zealand, especially in government policy – though it is perhaps more recent and has probably not yet had as large an impact as in Australia. In 2006 Jeffs had concluded that Aotearoa New Zealand offered a hostile business and social environment for social enterprise, and was particularly critical of public policy indifference at the time, and of what he saw as an excessive emphasis on a distorted view of individualistic, ‘hero’ social entrepreneurs, which could actually undermine a strong social economy.

The Department of Internal Affairs (DIA 2013a) undertook a survey of social enterprise in Aotearoa New Zealand, using many of the same questions as the 2010 FASES survey, which was in turn was based on similar mapping exercise in UK, continental Europe and Canada. This enabled comparisons, particularly with Australia – highlighting many similarities and some differences. While still a relatively small sample (421), 76 per cent of Aotearoa New Zealand social enterprises were operating for more than 10 years, and only 12 per cent for 5 years or less. So it may be a small but more mature sub-sector than the recent policy interest suggests. Even more broadly, ‘earned’ income has long been a major source of finance for the overall non-profit sector (between 40 and 50 per cent in both Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand). When revenue from government contracts are included, ‘earned’ income increases to an average 60 per cent and more. Another report (DIA 2013b) examined current and desirable legal structures. Jennings (2014) adds depth to the mapping by interviews with 97 social enterprise and community economic development practitioners, with an emphasis on ‘localism’ and civic participation, and finding a strong correlation with Maori tikanga (protocols and ways of doing things).

By 2014 the NZ Government released its “Position Statement on Social Enterprise” committing it to identify policy barriers and work collaboratively to promote a supportive environment for social enterprise. This was followed up by a cross-sectoral Strategic Group on Social Enterprise and Finance (SiGSEF) report in 2016, which recommended further specific priorities for government action. It is interesting that so much focus on promoting the growth of social enterprise has revolved around what government (and to a lesser extent philanthropy) can do, given the approach is often promoted on the basis of being less
reliant on government funding. Christchurch is the venue for the 2017 Social Enterprise World Forum, which is likely to give further impetus to this form of organising in Aotearoa New Zealand.

A particular area of attention in Aotearoa New Zealand is the relevance of social enterprise concepts for Maori, not only as a result of substantial settlements available to Iwi (Maori tribes) in response to historic breaches of Te Tiriti O Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi), and the growing ‘Maori economy’. As of 31 March 2016, financial redress of $2.47 billion was transferred to various Iwi under 61 Treaty settlements, with a further 55 still in progress. Furthermore, the Charities Act was amended so that, from April 2003, an organisation administering a marae on a Maori reservation may qualify for income tax exemption as a charity. However, Dey and Grant (2014) argue that traditional Maori community activity and tikanga are consistent with the aspirations and intent of social enterprise. They propose another, communitarian way of conceptualising social enterprise, in contrast to the dominant neo-liberal, competitive, individual-focused culture - influenced instead by concepts of whakapapa (genealogy, including attitudes to land), whanaunatanga (family, kinship and reciprocal relationships) and marae (community space and meeting place). Tedmanson (2014) similarly explores how, building on collective and kinship strengths, social enterprise can contribute to community resilience in remote indigenous communities and homelands in central Australia.

A different paradigm is emerging: Working on-line

While the neo-liberal driven business model of funding for non-profit services still prevails in Australia and New Zealand, there is a growing movement of resentment and a determination to find alternative ways of coming together in a collaborative, mutually supportive form. This is leading to a greater diversity of largely unfunded networks and organisations, some of which have been documented, many of which have not.

One new direction is being led by young people using mainly on-line action outside normal channels of public scrutiny. Many of “generation x” (Those born roughly between 1963-1980) and especially “generation Y” (Those born between 1981 and 1994) wish to avoid the formal world of organisations all together (Yerbury, 2009). Relations are informal and personal, leading to a construction of unique individual and tribal identity. Communication and connectedness are maintained and nurtured as much on-line as face-to-face (Onyx et al, 2005; Yerbury, 2010). One obvious outcome of this cultural shift is the very rapid development of such social media as Facebook and Twitter, both of which have now been co-opted by the formal world of organisations, such as Universities, as a means of reaching this demographic group.

These online networks are at best embryonic third sector organisations. But they do have a loose membership, a set of informal norms of operation, and they can lead to collective
action. This collective action may often be of the relatively private form of meeting for some form of entertainment. But it can also lead to broader action in the community, such as organising a charity run, seeking sponsorship for a charity purpose, or organising a public protest, and eventually to the formation of a third sector organisation.

Indeed, online collective action has led to some recognizable organisations. One such is Vibewire. The website of Vibewire proclaims:

Vibewire was born on the streets of urban, inner city Sydney in 2000 as a dynamic connection point between young people and the arts, culture, business and ideas. A youth-led not for profit, we capture stories from within our urban communities transforming them into opportunities for young people to connect, create, innovate and grow. We ensure young people are included and can participate in conversations that matter. A team of energetic Vibewire volunteers drive our art, digital media, live performance and workspace projects (http://vibewire.org, 2014).

The actions of vibewire have been documented in a recent publication (Kenny et al, 2015, p196):

Vibewire operates explicitly on the belief that “young people should create the future, not just inherit it. Vibewire is a Launchpad for young change makers” (http://vibewires.org, 2014). Its aim is to engage young people in active citizenship through their involvement in local arts, culture, politics, current affairs, fiction, ideas. While it is very much an online organization, it also organizes regular face to face events in real time within the Sydney area, and has developed a physical hub, known as vibewire hub, which acts as a business incubator for young social entrepreneurs to develop new startup ventures. This model is also being rolled out in other states within Australia. As one member put it “It’s really important to have the online networks, but it’s actually also really important to have those offline physical networks” (interview, co-ordinator, 2008). Within the Sydney region, Vibewire is part of a strong and integrated network of emergent organizations, all focused on youth, art, encouraging young entrepreneurs in a myriad of new projects. All are struggling with minimal resources, but gain strength from collaborating, sharing physical and online resources, and creating joint projects. As one of many examples, Vibewire hosted a creative Sydney networking night, which brought a range of creative people and organisations together and generated new opportunities and ideas: “we provide residency for all these groups and organizations and young social entrepreneurs and the idea is that we come together, we all share resources, and we strengthen each other’s networks and collaborations can grow out of that” (Kenny et al, 2015, p196)

Amidst a depressing picture of the destructive impact on third sector organisations of 25 years of purchase-of-service contracting in Aotearoa New Zealand, Nowland-Foreman (2016: 64-65) catalogues as ‘signs of hope’, the spontaneous emergence of grassroots groups, often informal at least in the first instance, along with the remarkable reinvigoration
of many long established organisations discovering a new relevance in response to the 2010-11 Christchurch earthquakes. One of these stories is that of the Student Volunteer Army (SVA), which began as a Facebook page and a shout-out to friends, and is today a charitable trust, which has shared its lessons and learnt from others internationally. Dabner (2015) highlights the important role of technology, mobile telephone apps and social media in scaling up and so quickly engaging and successfully deploying so many short-term volunteers. The mass offers of help worried officials from Civil Defence and the City Council, putting obstacles in the way of those who wanted to help. Fortunately one of the key organisers didn’t follow official advice and ‘leave it to the experts’. At its peak this informal, spontaneous group was coordinating the deployment, welfare and catering for 1,800 volunteers a day. They also wisely recognised they were not just shovelling silt or providing a service:

We needed to ensure students not only volunteered for one day, but sufficiently enjoyed the experience to want to bring their friends along for a second day. The Facebook page enabled us to survey the volunteers on their enjoyment of the day before, and helped to maintain enthusiasm. It provided a familiar place for volunteers to interact with one another and tell stories from their experiences. And that team cohesion fed out through the work to the community. While the initial workload involved cosmetic clean-up, the impact on community mental health and wellbeing was phenomenal. The physical volunteering helped the grieving process, and allowed individuals to feel that they were contributing to the recovery of the city. Each day, volunteers were encouraged not only to focus on manual labour, but to spend time listening and talking to residents, strengthening intergenerational connection, and supporting virtual and physical communities (Johnson 2012: 21).

These emergent organizations appear to represent the purist form of social entrepreneurship. However, they show little regard for profit or formal business tools. They are not competitive, but explicitly collaborative in their operations. They largely avoid government funding beyond occasional local government assistance, and they are highly democratic in their mode of operation, again with little regard to bureaucratic requirements.

As discussed earlier, many direct action protest groups also form new third sector organisations with an agenda of change and direct social action, and operate on very different governance principles. Almost all operate democratically, through network communication and collaborative action. One example of this is the Lock the Gate organisation discussed with reference to protest. It has an apparent company Ltd by Guarantee structure that is applied quite differently from conventional business companies. Another example with Australia is Getup, with a very loose governance structure. Like other emergent organisations it is driven by passion and not money, but by making astute use of the social media and crowd funding is able to operate with adequate though minimal financial resources. Getup may be taken as an exemplar emergent organisation that
operates successfully entirely away from the realm of neoliberal ideology and state bureaucratic control. It may stand as an exemplar counter organisation to the prevailing hegemonic control of civil society.

As documented in a recent publication (Kenny et al, 2015, p198)

“GetUp is an independent, grass-roots community advocacy organisation which aims to build a more progressive Australia by giving everyday Australians the opportunity to get involved and hold politicians accountable on important issues.” (https://getup.org.au)

Using a variety of media and other actions, GetUp members take targeted, coordinated and strategic action to effect real change. Get-Up does not support any particular political party and does not accept government or political funding. It is based on broad progressive values of economic fairness, social justice and environmental sustainability and relies on small donations to fund its work and in-kind donations from the Australian public. (Http://GetUp, 2013)

The organisation began with a small number of young entrepreneurs. GetUp was founded in 2005 by two young Australian graduates of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government who have worked at the intersection of technology, new media and politics in the United States. The two founders went on to co-found Avaaz.org, a new global online political community inspired by the success of GetUp. GetUp is operated by a small group of workers, interns and volunteers out of a Sydney office. It has a Board of local activists. While it has no formal membership, members are those who sign up, make donations and sign petitions or otherwise engage with Getup activities. There are an unknown number, but estimated at more than 500,000 such members across Australia. Interestingly, while the organising energy is driven by young people, Getup is mainly supported, both financially and in actions like signing petitions, by a growing band of older, professional people.

GetUp has been involved in many campaigns over time. The most spectacular was their involvement during the 2013 Federal election in Australia. Prior to the election, GetUp campaigned heavily to have young people enrol to vote, and saw enrolment shoot up by over 30%. They engaged in TV and newspaper ads (with crowd funding) to highlight key social/ environmental issues. When these ads were blocked by the Murdoch press, they pursued a highly successful online headline-making campaign to call the Murdoch press to account. During election-day, an estimated 6,000 volunteers of all ages and demographic, in bright orange tee-shirts handed voters some 2.4 million independent party scorecards. These scorecards rated the major political parties on each of 14 issues relating to the environment, social justice, a fair economy, and human rights, scores being based on survey responses of the parties themselves. (Kenny et al, 2015, p198).
Inspired by GetUp and similar organisations in other countries, ActionStation emerged in 2014 to operate in similar ways in Aotearoa New Zealand, and has grown remarkably in a short period, engaging more than a quarter of a million people by 2016, enabling more than 10,000 individual submissions to Parliamentary Select Committees, and prompting 30,000 phone calls or other personal contacts with MPs (http://actionstation.strikingly.com/blog/who-is-behind-actionstation). An important characteristic of GetUp and ActionStation is their strong international connections. They collectively network with sister organisations in 14 countries, sharing information, funding and other resources across the globe as the Online Progressive Engagement Network (OPEN), who describe themselves a sharing “eight common ways of working, a common DNA that allows them to work as a coherent and productive network”: progressive, people-powered, member-led, multi-issue, nimble, full-spectrum campaigning, independent, and digital (http://www.the-open.net/network).

The Anthropocene

Organisations like Vibewire and Getup, ActionStation and Lock the Gate are all activist organisations driven by passion and not “good business sense”. However they do not touch mainstream social service delivery or community organisation governance, all of which being dependent on some form of government funding are forced to accept neo-liberal business models of operation. There is an increasing awareness, as expressed at the most recent ANZTSR conference in Sydney, that business as usual cannot continue, that indeed it is becoming a part of the problem and not part of the solution to our social/ political/ environmental crisis.

We quote here from a recent paper arising from that conference (Onyx, McLeod, Ramzan, Suhood, 2016) and from a new think-tank “the Anthropocene Transition Project “ (www.ageoftransition.org/our-project, 2016)

The “Anthropocene” is a term used in the physical sciences to indicate a new era in the planet’s history, “the age of humans”. While the beginning of this era can be traced back to the widespread establishment of agriculture, most attention in now paid to what is termed “the Great Acceleration” dating from 1950 onwards (Oldfield, Barnosky, Dearing, Fischer-Kowalski, McNeill, Steffen and Zalasiewicz , 2014). As understanding of the interconnectedness of human, social and ecological systems increases, the term has quite rapidly come to be used as a kind of shorthand for the rupture in the Earth System that our species has caused. It is about what we do together, collectively, to reframe our most fundamental relationship –our place in the Earth’s web of life.

The Anthropocene has huge implications for and about civil society, and the third sector. It raises questions about how our current system of neo-liberal governance has been impacting the rate of disruption to our economic and social fabric. It raises broader questions about what we need to do to adapt and hopefully reverse some of the most
deadly effects of human disruption. Ultimately our collective future will depend on our ability to creatively transform our human systems, starting with a rethink of our core cultural values, to identify those that support human systems and those that disrupt them.

As many practitioners have articulated in frustration:

- We have limited capacity to collaborate
- We operate in silos with little or limited connection with each other
- We have increasingly become an arm of government
- We have become corporatized and competitive
- Services have become transactional and commodified
- We are required to work with individuals - rather than engage communities draw from their strengths, support each other and build resilience
- Everything must be measured, preferably in money terms or it isn’t funded
- Many small organisations have had to close.
- Our mindset has limited what we believe is possible
- In our isolation we struggle to tackle the systemic change that is sorely needed

It is perhaps no coincidence that new ways of organising like GetUp and ActionStation are as much globally networked, as locally active, operate outside of government influence and work collaboratively.

Theory building is also a crucial aspect of third sector research, and there is nothing as practical as a good theory. We need much better metaphors and conceptual models to work with. One such is complexity theory (Chia, 1998; Cilliers, 2005; Goldstein & Hazy, 2006; Onyx and Leonard, 2011). This is a kind of meta-methodological approach which leads to very different lines of inquiry. The fundamental tenant of complexity theory is that all things and actions are connected and constantly emergent in time. Causality is not linear but emergent over time. Causality is about the combination and interaction of the elements present co-creating what is happening. We are dealing with the phenomenon of emergence, the constant creation of the new out of the interaction of all the present elements. That includes people. Agency is never an individual act but an intersubjective process, a collective process of interaction with others (present and imagined). The outcome can never be fully predicted or knowable. But it has shape. It is meaningful. It is self-organizing. We humans collectively self-organize ourselves into new networks, new actions, new organizations. We are constantly co-creating ourselves, forming new understandings, determining new paths of actions for ourselves to solve the problems we understand. This is best done in open
ended collaborative inquiry groups, not within a bureaucratic, hierarchical structure of command and control. Even within the most highly controlled structure, the real action is nonetheless outside the control and knowledge of any individual authority.

These concepts of complexity, emergence, uncertainty and co-creation, are new and difficult concepts. They require a different concept of causality, collective and transdisciplinary enquiry. No single discipline has the capacity to understand what is happening, but all can contribute.

Finally, the Anthropocene transition requires new or renewed forms of practical action. Above all, for third sector researchers and practitioners alike, it must mean listening to the voices of the people as we together co-create our future. It means focussing on collaborative action, not individualistic, competitive self-interest. It means regarding people not as clients but as citizens and co-creators.

We need to measure, support, and create local and trans-local networks and alliances.

We need to talk about new ways of thinking and acting, including new models of public funding that enhances not diminishes the capacity of the third sector.

In conclusion, we acknowledge that current neo-liberal business-as-usual is not sustainable, and indeed major social change and a shift in cultural values must occur if we are to move into a better future. But there are potential solutions. These solutions at least in part must begin with the actions of civil society, and therefore the actions of researchers and practitioners in the third sector.

A final word

This monograph has attempted to outline the many threads of third sector research in Australia and New Zealand from 1990 to 2016. We have explored the basic shape and structure of the sector, its contribution to the economy and more importantly to society. We have explored some of the extensive forms of volunteering and of philanthropy in the sector, and the more elusive, but in some ways more important forms of citizen action through advocacy, protest and the many informal networks which together continually recreate the stock of social capital within the local community. Finally we have examined some of the new forms of organizing emerging within the sector and the major challenges facing the future of the Anthropocene. In doing so, we have necessarily moved across multi disciplines: management, political studies, psychology, sociology, economics, law to name a few. Third sector research gains its strength from this multi-disciplinary perspective. As in other parts of the world, that also makes this field very vulnerable. Many of our key research and teaching programmes have been discontinued as they fall from favour in the academic scramble for disciplinary funding. This essentially leaves the Australasia without any effective academic centres or research programmes specialising in the not for profit sector. Major ‘infrastructure’ initiatives are left to the sector itself to take a leading role.
Increasingly individual, often isolated scholars continue third sector research located within a wide variety of disciplines. It is therefore of even greater importance for research associations like ANZTSR, ISTR, etc and their associated conferences and journals to continue to bring these disparate scholars together.

What happens in Australia and New Zealand is often interconnected or parallel in the development of third sector research. In some ways Australia has lead the way, for example in the development of a research infrastructure. In other ways New Zealand has lead the way, for example in its respectful inclusion of separate but parallel Maori third sector structures and actions. We have not yet met this challenge in Australian third sector research.

But both Australia and New Zealand third sector research and researchers are heavily shaped by and engaged with the global world of voluntaristics (Smith, 2013, 2016; Anheier, Toepler, and List, eds., 2010). From the beginning, third sector researchers in Australia took a central role in the establishment of ISTR, and have continued to be active participants in the Asia Pacific regional conferences of ISTR as well as attending ARNOVA conferences. We have all contributed regularly, not only to our own Journal Third Sector Review, but also to all the major international Journals in the sector, as identified in Horton Smith’s compilation. We have regularly collaborated with colleagues in many parts of the globe, as witnessed by recent publications coming out of experiences with ISTR conferences. One of these is an anthology of global feminist civil society organisations, which came directly out of a project initiated by the women’s special interest group at ISTR, with Editors from UK, Germany, Australia and Japan, and contributions from some 15 countries (Schwabenland, Lange, Onyx and Nakagawa, 2016). That was a critical assessment of women’s organisations capacity for emancipation of women throughout the globe. There are many other examples of contributions made by Australian and New Zealand authors to international collaborations. We have both contributed and in turn learned from this experience, and found ways of translating that knowledge to the uniquely Australasian context.

Like our colleagues from around the world, we feel passionately that the growth of this inter-, trans-disciplinary field of voluntaristics is essential if we as a society are to survive and indeed thrive in the challenging future of global civil society and the only planet we have.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


