Examining the development of public space in foreshore Sydney: Barangaroo case study

Kane Pham

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Faculty of Design, Architecture and Building

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Abstract

Urban development in Sydney since the 1970s has attempted to satisfy the needs of both a global audience and local citizens. Urban development and planning strategies have formed distinct and opposite development directions that fortify the mandate of the NSW Government and federal government to attract global capital, while the nested hierarchy of government has reduced the strength of local government to deliver equitable commons that provide open public spaces for their citizens. The thesis conducts a case study analysis of the Barangaroo precinct development tracing changes in the provision of public space through a review of the design competition documents, concept plans, modifications and associated media, to uncover and understand the implication of the Barangaroo precinct development on the quantitative and qualitative public space outcomes.

The development of Sydney, Australia's Global City, has favoured the imperative to provide an economic framework to enhance its position relative to other state capital cities and in a global context. This has stymied the development of public spaces where public space as an object of exchange and extraction is more highly valued than its social utility and outcomes are poor in the delivery of large urban developments.

The thesis draws on a range of theoretical tools recognising cities as transdisciplinary spaces. An assemblage framework is applied to integrate more explicitly the often tacit sociospatial inputs within the economic discourse that dominates the urban entrepreneurial agenda. The methodology of conducting a parallel analysis of the quantitate and qualitative changes in the Barangaroo precinct development was used due to the complexity of the development and also due to the range of available data that was not easily comparable.

The key findings from the thesis reveal an erosion of both the quality and quantity of public space in relation to the private gain from development. The Modifications made to the original Concept Plan over the course of the development have been the key points of reference revealing these often misleading and disparate pieces of information. By disassembling and reassembling these relationships, a greater understanding of the urban regeneration discourse is exposed through the Barangaroo case study.

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

This thesis is the result of a research candidature in pursuit of a Masters by Research degree. I certify that the work in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree.

I also certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

Signature:

Student: Kane Pham

Date:

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Publications

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis offers a theoretical and practical examination of the Barangaroo precinct foreshore revitalisation development in Sydney. Since the inception of the Barangaroo precinct development in 2005, the design and development of Barangaroo has become a key site of the city that materialises the conflicts that are centred on the prioritisation of private over public interests.

This thesis examines the contestation of the development of public space in Sydney through the Barangaroo precinct development. This precinct was designed through an international urban design competition, the East Darling Harbour International Design Competition, that saw 137 entries submitted from around the world. The importance of Barangaroo, formerly East Darling Harbour, the last undeveloped waterfront site in the City of Sydney, was recognised by the NSW Government which took control of the project under planning instruments that classify the project as a 'major project'. The conditions that surround this development evoke memories of the adjacent Darling Harbour development in the 1980s that is currently being redeveloped to address regional competition from Melbourne and Brisbane. Considering Sydney as both a city and agglomerative region, the development is significant in the maintenance of Sydney's position as the pre-eminent Australian city and there are valid concerns that the development benefits both the public and the private.

The following timeline lists the key dates needed to understand the context of contemporary development around the Darling Harbour cove, as well as the key dates of the Barangaroo precinct development.

Date	Event
1971	Earliest signs to consider redeveloping Darling Harbour into a mixed-use precinct to transform Sydney into a globalising city
1984	Announcement of the Darling Harbour redevelopment to designed as a landmark project to celebrate Australia's Bicentenary
1984	A special purpose development vehicle, the Darling Harbour Authority Act was drawn to prevent opposition to development allowing construction to proceed relatively unencumbered towards the 1988 deadline

1988	Completion of the Darling Harbour redevelopment
1993	Announcement of the Star City casino development
1995 (1997)	Completion of the temporary casino with the permanent casino opening in 1997
2005 March	Call for entries by the NSW Government launching the East Darling Harbour International Design Competition (Barangaroo)
2005 July	137 entries received from an international field
2005 August	6 finalists announced to proceed to the second stage
2005 December	Second stage of the competition began
2006 March	Hill Thalis, Bierkemeier & Irwin (HTBI) announced as the winners of the competition
2006 July	The Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (SHFA) were assisted by the winners HTBI to prepare a concept plan to be submitted for planning approval
2007 February	Approval was given by the NSW Department of Planning. The project was divided into three precincts, Barangaroo South as the commercial precinct, Barangaroo Central as the mixed-use precinct, and Barangaroo Reserve as the headland park
2008 November	The NSW Government had created a special purpose delivery vehicle the Barangaroo Delivery Authority and announced that they would assume the responsibilities of managing the project from SHFA
2009	A controversial unsolicited proposal was presented to the NSW Government for a casino to be developed on the Barangaroo site with the details held secret as commercial-in-confidence
2010	Construction of Barangaroo South began
2010 December	First significant modification of the concept plan (Modification 4) was approved. This was also the first stage of detailed planning of the development becoming public with vocal public opposition of the development critiquing both lack of transparency through the process and impact on the public outcome
2016 June	Modification 8 of the concept plan was approved. Most significantly, approval was granted for a 270 meter hotel and integrated casino resort on the foreshore edge

Figure 1. Location of Darling Harbour and Barangaroo.
Source: The author.

Barangaroo is a 22-hectare parcel of land that has been developed and used for a variety of productive port facilities over the last 150 years. Its most recent use has been as a container terminal that has seen activity slowly decline after a new port was built in Port Botany in 1979 and the quantity of containers decreased. By the 1990s container ships no longer stopped in Sydney harbour. This scene of an industrial heritage on the waterfront that is no longer active is all too familiar in port cities that have shifted industrial activity to the peripheries of the city and converted their urban environments to generators of advanced capital and services. As the piecemeal adaptation of industrial sites on the waters edge have been converted to more urbanised uses, Barangaroo was to be the final piece of land to be developed and connecting these foreshore precincts.

This thesis begins with a literature review of the academic literature, non-academic references and key reports and documentation. A theoretical toolkit is gathered to support the understanding of the proliferation of global waterfront developments allowing an international perspective to be applied to Barangaroo. As the conditions of global waterfront developments are introduced, the thesis then establishes the theoretical framework to examine this development. First, the thesis studies the politics of city construction through questioning the democratic processes that are taken for granted. The thesis is then grounded through Lefebvre's 'right to the city' and the contemporary extensions developed by Brenner and Elden[1] and Iveson.[2] This follows with a review of conflict in public space through Harvey,[3] Mitchell and Staeheli,[4] and the aestheticisation of public space through Sennett.[5] The thesis then considers the hegemony of actors that have a dominant impact on the construction of the urban, situating these processes in the shift in models of planning. This examination then segues into a theorisation of the structure of urban form. Jane Jacobs has long recognised that well-functioning urban space is the basis for a successful street and neighbourhood, vehemently opposing the pro-development agenda of Robert Moses.[6] Although the development of public space and the urban condition is both contextually and temporally specific, the same principles sounded out in New York City in the 1960s of citizen participation and sensitivity in the development of urban form are still relevant in Sydney in 2016. This introduction closes with more contemporary readings from Ali Madanipour and Kim Dovey on current conflicts that impact on public space and theories of assemblage on urban morphology.[7]

Chapter 1 lays the foundation for examining contemporary waterfront developments in Sydney beginning with the impacts of an open market system that aims to draw business headquarters and service centres to Sydney during the slow economic growth period of the 1970s and 1980s. The post-World War II reconstruction was also winding down with

[1] Brenner, N. and Elden, S., 2009. Henri Lefebvre on state, space, territory. *International Political Sociology*, *3*(4), pp. 353-377.
[2] Iveson, K., 2011. *Publics and the city* (Vol. 80). John Wiley & Sons, London.
[3] Harvey, D., 2006. The political economy of public space. *The politics of public space*, pp. 17-34.
[4] Staeheli, L., and Mitchell, D., 2008. *The People's Property? Power, Politics and the Public.* Routledge, New York and London.
[5] Sennett, R., 1992. *The fall of public man*. WW Norton, New York.
[6] Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs had polarizing positions on city development with the former intending to implement planning for automobiles carving the city with multi-lane roads through existing neighborhoods and the later recognising the importance of street level relationships that contribute to self-sustaining communities.
[7] Although this thesis utilises the ideas of several different scholars, the overarching theoretical framework relies on an adapted assemblage theory to form a scaffold grounding the sometimes divergent ideas that take place when conducting urban studies research.

Melbourne and Sydney becoming increasingly important in a national context. The second part of the chapter situates the local impacts of global competition in Sydney but also through regional competition with Melbourne. Several threads are drawn out including the spatial impacts of a condensed monocultural Central Business District (CBD) that skews towards international businesses, redevelopment to cater for tourist uses and the impact of planning provisions and floor space ratio bonuses that attempt to alleviate problems of supply only to introduce additional problems of poor design quality and insular public spaces through privatised public spaces. The chapter concludes with a review of contemporary waterfront developments surrounding the Barangaroo site including the Darling Harbour renewal in the 1980s and Pyrmont Casino in the 1990s and introducing East Darling Harbour.

Chapter 2 is the first of the Barangaroo specific chapters. This chapter puts the design competition at the centre, exploring the competition and the conditions that surround it from the criteria to the jury panel and politics. The chapter then examines the shortlist and their submissions with an analysis of the competition comments and a lack of elaboration from the jury, and a critique of the masterplans delivered. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the conflicts that unfold in major projects run by the NSW Government and its impacts on the local.

Chapter 3 tracks the development of the Barangaroo precinct and the political drivers that steer the decision-making processes leading to conflicts between the NSW Government, City of Sydney Council, professional organisations and citizen groups. The principal contribution of the chapter details the interventions and implications for the planning process, expanding on the modifications submitted by the proponent in seeking more space that inequitably favours the construction of additional commercial and residential uses without offering complementary public amenities. The chapter concludes with a summary of events, highlighting relationships to the similarities of development processes that occurred with the Darling Harbour development in the 1980s.

Chapter 4 addresses the social impacts of the development and the condition of the urban fabric critiquing the precinct in its current state in 2016. Moving between loci of the interior and exterior, this chapter situates the precinct as functioning both as a global attractor of businesses and tourism and testing its mandate to deliver 50 per cent of the

foreshore as public space, the quantitative measurements by gross floor area and morphological analysis of the qualitative lived space that it should provide. Taking a snapshot of Barangaroo from the conflicts, built form, approved proposals and the changes in the surrounding areas, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the events and determinations that have occurred and situates the state of the public realm that has seen the erosion of material space, rights of use and securitisation of space impacting on the public experience.

The thesis concludes by reviewing the Barangaroo precinct development in relation to previous developments and its impacts on the condition of public space in Sydney. After summarising the findings, directions for future research are offered to address the business as usual approach to the development of megaprojects. The ingrained issues of urban development in Sydney mirror the general state of development both nationally and globally, and planning processes require a serious overhaul to adequately steer progress in the right direction to meet public objectives.

A review of the literature

Construction of Barangaroo began in 2010 and is expected to be complete by 2021. As the construction of Barangaroo is half way through its expected timeline, an emerging collection of literature that documents and interrogates the precinct through its organisational management and spatial impact is starting to develop. These conflicts mirror previous developments such as Darling Harbour in the 1980s. This repetition of events indicate a need for critical examination and its contextual relevance is suggested by the abundance of news articles and opinion pieces in the daily newspapers. This public interest in the development, the processes and its outcome has shifted the spotlight onto the project questioning the legitimacy of the decisions made and even bringing decisions made by the NSW Department of Planning to court.[8] This section reviews literature firstly on Barangaroo, Barangaroo as part of a wider study, and then waterfront developments globally where examination can offer a perspective on development in Sydney.

[8] See Australians for Sustainable Development Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] *NSWLEC 33* https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/54a6344b3004de94513d8402

Academic literature

Judy Johnston and Stewart Clegg[9] have produced the most significant academic article that addresses Barangaroo in the context of Sydney as a globalising city. Through an organisational management lens they highlight the contestation that surrounds the development. They address the circuits of power that are exercised in large developments that are important to the goals of the NSW Government and raise the issue of circumvention of rules that political actors routinely act on: "Rather than observing the formal rules, political actors deliberately find ways to be disobedient because of issues of power."[10] Also drawing attention to the significance of Barangaroo as a project that follows the Public Private Partnership approach, they also address the collusive relationship between state and private partnership in the delivery of megaprojects like this noting "In a project such as Barangaroo, in which the state contracts jointly with market actors, the involvement of these market actors can lead government to act in ways that are in direct contradiction with the rationally derived obligatory passage points of normal public management".[11] These issues were recently raised by Elizabeth Farrelly[12] critiquing the disciplinary function of planners, displacing their traditional remit of planning for the public good, now merely facilitating developments to occur.

Moving to contract relations, they also highlight two aspects of the design competition. The importance of the site has been reiterated by both the NSW Government as the competition organisers and by the press that the development of a site such as this will likely not happen again.[13] The authors critique the exhibition period of just two weeks that was available to the public, and the NSW Minister for Planning Frank Sartor who was also previously Lord Mayor of the City of Sydney handing the development over to runners up Lend Lease in 2007.[14] Together these issues raise the question of the legitimacy of a megaproject that situate the conflict between local and state government, collusion between governments and private firms, and the effectiveness of public private

[9] Johnston, J. and Clegg, S., 2012. Legitimate sovereignty and contested authority in public management organization and disorganization: Barangaroo and the grand strategic vision for Sydney as a globalizing city. *Journal of Change Management*, *12*(3), pp. 279-299.
[10] Ibid. p. 283.
[11] Johnston, J. and Clegg, S., 2012, p. 284.
[12] See Farrelly, E. 2016. Sydney will be unrecognisable now that the planners have gone. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 25 May 2016.
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/sydney-will-be-unrecognisable-now-that-the-planners-have-gone-20160525-gp3cwb.html
[13] The rhetoric referred to was a one in one hundred year opportunity.
[14] Johnston, J. and Clegg, S., 2012, p. 286.

partnership coalitions in developing precinct scale transformations that also address the public interest.

Published in the same year, landscape architect Jillian Walliss addressed the politics of aesthetics of the construction of the headland park at the north of the site.[15] She begins by backing the decision by the jurors in selecting the Hill Thalis, Berkemeier & Irwin (HTBI) scheme as the winner and quickly moves to highlight the conflict that emerged following the close of the competition where the lead architect of the runners up, Lord Richard Rogers, became the lead designer of the precinct. Walliss also mentions the influence and importance of former Prime Minister Paul Keating in the ideation and formation of the headland park.[16] From the one in one hundred year opportunity mentioned in the competition brief, she identifies the increased gravity of a "once in 200 years opportunity to create a new naturalistic park…"[17] lauded by the Labor Premier at the time Kristina Keneally. This rhetoric proclaiming the importance appears to sit just on the surface while all oversight and transparency in decision-making seems to evade the view of the public. This position is reflected in her expanding on Paul Keating's role in the design of the 'naturalistic' headland with even Peter Walker[18] affirming that it was Paul Keating's vision that he provided with technical support. Ultimately this article is a critique of the contradictory application of an authority's vision, taking charge and forcing an implementation of their imagined ideology invoking their position as a public intellectual and a skilled amateur. Peppered through the text is evidence of professionals acting as implementers and providing the technical services to a former public servant whose cries are paid more attention because of the gravity of his former office.

As a landscape architect Walliss rightly also draws attention to the public realm, questioning the authenticity of the developed design in comparison to the qualities of the winning entry by HTBI. By comparing it to exemplary examples both locally (Ballast Point) and globally (Nordbahnhof Park in Berlin) she projects her perspective but also highlights the programming sensitivity of the cited works. It is clearly evident that the design intended to clear away all memory of the foreshore as a former industrial working

[15] Walliss, J., 2012. The politics of aesthetics: expanding the critique of Headland Park, Sydney. *Journal of Landscape Architecture*, *7*(2), pp. 6-13.
[16] Walliss, J., 2012, pp. 8-9.
[17] Walliss, J., 2012, p. 8.
[18] Peter Walker is the lead designer and founder of the firm Peter Walker and Partners, the firm selected to design the Barangaroo Headland Park.

port, and the forced vision of a naturalistic headland hindered the public program that was offered from the competition winning entry. The elements of the international design competition and world-class site were missing one last ingredient, a world famous architect. Pritzker Prize winner Richard Rogers as the principal architect and Peter Walker, the designer of the 9/11 Memorial in New York City, as the lead architect of the headland park support the view that there is a "prioritization of international 'star' designers over local experience."[19]

The most recent of a limited set of academic references on Barangaroo as a primary subject is my paper presented at the State of Australian Cities Conference 2015 that considers the impact of the development on the urban public space in the precinct.[20] The paper considers Sydney within the network of Global Cities and Barangaroo as a megaproject that functions to retain and attract economic and tourist flows. The paper begins to examine the changes in the major modifications that have been submitted to the NSW Department of Planning and how the changes have curtailed the quantitative and qualitative benefits to the public. A shadow diagram analysis is provided addressing the impact of the planned casino resort and residential towers on an already compromised public park.[21] This gradual decay of the public realm raises questions of the legitimacy and efficacy of our democratic institutions to perform their role in providing for the public good.

There are also a number of articles that consider Barangaroo in minor aspects, but there is one book chapter that situates Barangaroo within a larger scoping of case studies. Prominent urban researcher Glen Searle examines the discourse and habitus of waterfront redevelopments in Sydney.[22] The focus of the chapter is on the influences of planning outcomes on waterfront spaces in Sydney through Bourdieu's 'habitus' as a theoretical framework examining how users experience public spaces, questioning the decision-making capacity of professional urban planners. After describing the history of the competition stages of the Barangaroo development, Searle then lays out the critical examination through a global city discourse and the politics surrounding the processes

[19] Walliss, J., 2012, p. 13.
[20] Pham, K., 2015. Vanity unfair – Examining the Impact of development authorities on the designation and development of public space: Barangaroo Case Study. In *State of Australian Cities Conference,* Gold Coast, December.
[21] Pham, K. 2015,, pp. 10-11.
[22] Searle, G., 2013. Discourse, doctrine and habitus: Redevelopment contestation on Sydney¹s harbour-edge. In *The Ashgate research companion to planning and culture*, pp. 135-152.

and outcomes. He rightly observes that the project functions as a positioning tool to align economic interests with the development outcome also critical of the selection of 'starchitect' Richard Rogers.[23] The chapter functions as a positioning piece that collates some of the issues and contextual underpinnings for future studies that is also explicitly stated towards the close. Part of the conclusion details the hegemony of political actors and their agency and influence in 'getting things done', and Paul Keating again is noted for his dominant involvement.

Non-academic literature

This review of sources, rather than thematically developing the narrative, is instead organised by authors and respective special issues. The authorial tone is an important thread that runs through the development process that mirrors the dominant actors present through the progression of the Barangaroo precinct development.

Elizabeth Farrelly

The contested nature of the Barangaroo development in Sydney has generated numerous opinion pieces and publications in news outlets and national disciplinary journals.[24] One of the most publicly outspoken critics of the development has been Elizabeth Farrelly. An architect and completing her PhD in architecture in 1997 addressing development controls in central Sydney CBD from 1900 to 1960 at the University of Sydney, she is uniquely qualified as a columnist to comment on the conflicts and issues facing urban change in Sydney.

Her regular articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald*[25] generate interest not only from a public audience, but also at recent events such as a keynote presentation at the 2016 Festival of Urbanism at the University of Sydney by Pat Fensham of SGS Economics and Planning. Fensham's presentation title "Putting the public interest back into planning" responds to

[23] Searle, 2013, p. 146.
[24] There has been much reporting in particular through the *Sydney Morning Herald* and The Conversation, an independent online news source that publishes predominantly from academic authors. Industry specific sources include Architecture Australia and Landscape Architecture Australia.
[25] Farelly has written numerous articles covering Barangaroo. Some of the more significant articles include "For a living harbor, you can't beat a grubby port", 29 March 2006; "Camping out in glitz city", 21 July 2007; "What's it to be: a flair mile or plunder down under?", 16 October 2008; "Bad dreams of a front lawn for a 50-story office park", 5 February 2009; "Now for the hard part: public spaces of quality not quantity", 27 February 2010; "Bring on drama and boldness", 2 October 2010; "We are taken for idiots as others take a gamble on greatness at Barangaroo", 11 May 2013.

Farrelly's article "Sydney will be unrecognisable now that the planners have gone"[26] and addresses the issues in contemporary city governance and planning, entrepreneurial governance and the mandate of the recently formed Greater Sydney Commission, a quasigovernmental agency that has the responsibility to construct a new planning framework for metropolitan local councils in Sydney. The conversational banter of Farrelly's prose makes for easy digestion and introduction of critical urban issues.

From the start of the East Darling Harbour Urban Design Competition there have been problems of poor guidance and direction from the competition organisers, the NSW Government and their successive leaders. Farrelly questions the lack of specificity of the competition brief, poor planning considerations and lack of certainty surrounding the precinct to be developed.[27] At the heart she suggests that the root of the problem is government abnegation and coalition of leadership that lacks ability to lay the grounds for progressive development. As the Barangaroo Delivery Authority[28] was created, the leader of the heavily criticised Melbourne Docklands development, John Tabart, was made head of the authority.[29] Given all the successes of Melbourne's public spaces, Docklands has generally been recognised as a failure of public infrastructure. Many of the issues lie in the lack of public input in the development process and a focus on quantitative development over quality.

Farrelly makes comparison to the judging of the Sydney Opera House competition which was by an architect led jury.[30] Taken as the grounds for the built development, Farrelly critiques the Unsolicited Proposals Process replacing Part 3A[31] which allowed the Crown casino resort to make its way through the planning process uninhibited by public purview or contestation, and also critiques the intertwining of government as

[26] Farrelly, E., 2016. Sydney will be unrecognisable now that the planners have gone. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 25 May 2016. Accessed 26 August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/comment/sydney-will-be-unrecognisable-now-that-the-planners-have-gone-20160525-gp3cwb.html
[27] Farrelly, E., 2006. For a living harbour, you can't beat a grubby port. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 March 2006. Accessed 24 August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/for-a-living-harbour-you-cant-beat-a-grubby-port/2006/03/28/1143441144871.html
[28] The Barangaroo Delivery Authority was created in 2009 due to issues of lack of transparency and perceptions of poor legitimacy through the early stages of development.
[29] Farrelly, E., 2010a. Now for the hard part: public spaces of quality not quantity. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 27 February 2010. Accessed 26 August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/now-for-the-hard-part-public-spaces-of-quality-not-quantity-20100226-p95n.html
[30] Farrelly, E., 2013. We are taken for idiots as others take a gamble on greatness at Barangaroo. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 10 May 2013. Accessed 26 August 26 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/comment/we-are-taken-for-idiots-as-others-take-a-gamble-on-greatness-at-barangaroo-20130510-2jdbu.html
[31] Part 3A allows the Minister for Planning to declare a project of State significance bypassing usual checks such as Environmental Impact Statements without public consultation.

decision maker and beneficiary of these decisions. The reliance of labels on the development and buildings as 'iconic' through natural inspirations justifying the out of place height of buildings that also do not conform to planning guidelines.

Philip Thalis

Philip Thalis has the unique position of being on the competition winning team and being equally vocal in critique and disdain of the processes that have led to the current outcomes.[32] Part of his critique stems from the decision of the NSW Government to appoint a different project lead but the detail and quality of his interrogations of the events that have occurred and the decisions made offer a qualified account and examination of the conflict[33] that includes the competition jury report and his team's submission on the changes in the Modification 2 revisions, Modification 4 revisions, and the Sussex Penn Report in 2011.[34] The documentation is both diverse and detailed ranging from a critique of the predicated knowledge of the proponents; the history of the shoreline selected for example, to the dissemination of documentation and response to submissions from the public and organisations such as the City of Sydney Council. The document written by Thalis addressing the Modification 4 proposal, identifies a range of issues with the submission. A selection of these, taken from the document include (1.1) mismanagement by public authorities, (1.2) obfuscation of process, (1.3) private profiteering over public benefit, (1.7) secretive contracts and deals for a public land, (1.11) alienation of the public foreshore, (1.14) distortion of the city's form and (1.19) exclusionary social impacts. The issues raised in this document question the structures of governance used to deliver such a significant project that disproportionately favours private benefit in lieu of public gain. Thalis has also noted that there has been a marked change in urban form from the winning proposal through to Modification 4 with not only increases in building floorplates and heights, but also the effects on the public domain and distortion of the form of the precinct integrating back into the city grid.

These successive changes have also intruded on foreshore access and habitation, dividing the precinct into clearly demarcated blocks and shifting the public domain into positions

[32] Earlier in the development, Philip Thalis with members of the HTBI team penned an opinion piece for *The Sydney Morning Herald* "A rare chance to get the city's waterfront right", 5 August 2008. More recently he has responded to the development in The Conversation with "Sydney risks becoming a dumb, disposable city for the rich", 2 March 2015.
[33] For the collated documentation by HTBI, see https://www.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/HILLS_THALIS_BarangarooReviewAppendix_110620.pdf
[34] The Sussex Penn Report was the first major review of the Barangaroo development.

of lower precedence. The collective developments give little confidence to the public for the functions of governance and planning to deliver genuine public good in lieu of private influence.

Architecture Australia Special Issue – May/June 2010

Architecture Australia journal produced a special issue[35] that featured collected dialogues on the Barangaroo development from a number of different lens, foci and sides from Brian Zulaika, the then President of the NSW Chapter of the Australian Institute of Architects, to Todd Murphy, the Development Director of the Barangaroo Delivery Authority. It is a commentary from different voices that together make a three key points. The first point is the difficulty of genuine critique of the project due to the procurement processes and commercial-in-confidence aspects of the project. The second point is the necessity to prioritise public space, both through comparison of the competition winning program with the current [in 2010] offering from Lend Lease and through direct comparison to the failure of Darling Harbour to activate a successful public space. The third point is the politics and political processes surrounding the development. Part of the critique lies in the deviation from the winning masterplan that would have seen the precinct divided and parcelled to several developers instead of the monopoly of development that has taken place. The detail of fine-grained master planning and public space provision is predicated on cities being built gradually, over time and that "Great cities have no single author".[36] This also premises the participatory process of planning that should take input from a greater range and diverse gathering of interlocutors to deliver an outcome of a city made by the public.

In the same issue, Lee Stickells provides an outline of the events and conflicts that had occurred until 2010.[37] Stickells takes three points of concern: Paul Keating's selective heritage of the site, a comparative critique of the winning HTBI and runner-up Rogers masterplans, and a critique of the competition process. The most important point however is the recognition of the project falling under Part 3A of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*.[38] This categorisation allows the development to move

[35] Zulaikha, B., Randles, B., Candalepas, A., Allchin, C., Harding, L., Murphy, T., Trimble, M., Simpson, R. and Burton, C., 2010. The debate continues...[Views on the Barangaroo development in Sydney.]. *Architecture Australia*, *99*(3).
[36] Ibid, p. 53.
[37] Stickells, L., 2010. Barangaroo: Instant urbanism – just add water. *Architecture Australia*, *99*(3), pp. 47-51.
[38] Ibid, p. 49.

streamlined past the view of citizen participation, allowing the NSW Minister for Planning to authorise changes and approve all decisions on the project.

The Conversation Special Series – November 2012

Two years later in 2012, The Conversation online website recognised the increasing importance of the Barangaroo development and arranged a series of five articles on different parts of the project. The first article by Gerard Reinmuth circles his argument around the issue of trust, or lack of trust.[39] The critique falls not just on Lend Lease and the Barangaroo Delivery Authority, but also on successive NSW Governments that allowed these developments to take place, and to take place behind closed doors. The second article by Mark Rolfe discusses the historical linkages of politics and pounds, and how easily and embedded it is for politicians and lobbyists to collude and get their own way.[40] The third article by Deborah Edwards and Tony Griffin comment on the proposed casino and its claim for a privileged position on the foreshore.[41] In the fourth article, Helen Westerman and Sunanda Creagh interview Philip Thalis, lead architect of the competition winning entry.[42] Thalis repeatedly calls the project in its current incarnation an abject failure on just about every account, from the kitsch historicism of the parklands to the commercial precinct that overtly benefits Lend Lease as the sole developers. Thalis also blames successive NSW Governments for failing this project by intensifying and privatising the land that their competition entry reserved for the public, calling this the "compound failures of government agencies".

Mike Harris – Megaprojects

As part of the Festival of Urbanism 2014 hosted by the University of Sydney, Mike Harris produced a review of megaprojects that encompassed a global assortment of case studies and some locally significant examples including Barangaroo and Darling Harbour

[39] Reinmuth, G., 2012. Barangaroo: the loss of trust? *The Conversation*. Accessed 24 August 2016 from https://theconversation.com/barangaroo-the-loss-of-trust-10676
[40] Rolfe, M., 2012. Barangaroo: politics, property and players – it's business as usual. *The Conversation*. Accessed 24 August 2016 from https://theconversation.com/barangaroo-politics-property-and-players-its-business-as-usual-10722
[41] Edwards, D. and Griffin, T., 2012. Will a casino be a boon or a bane for Barangaroo? *The Conversarion.* Accessed 24 August 2016 from https://theconversation.com/will-a-casino-be-a-boon-or-a-bane-for-barangaroo-10355
[42] Westerman, W. and Creagh, S., 2012. Barangaroo: Development interests counter the public interest. *The Conversation*. Accessed 24 August 2016 from https://theconversation.com/barangaroo-development-interests-counter-the-public-interest-10837

in Sydney. The paper cites concerns that are common among megaprojects in general identifying five criticisms:[43]

- introverted governance lacking democratic participation and accountability
- global economic positioning at the sake of local issues
- physically and socially disconnected from the context of host city
- similar formal outcome regardless of the host city
- lack of public benefit and social outcomes.

The first criticism is the inclusion of Barangaroo under the Part 3A planning instrument that limits the participatory planning process. The paper also notes the poor transport planning for a site constrained with no existing public transport which will have 22,000 workers travelling during peak periods[44] and makes comparison to similar precincts of Hudson Yards in New York and HafenCity in Hamburg where transport commitments were planned and constructed prior to commercial development.

The second point refers to the branding exercise of positioning the precinct on a global level boasting, "Barangaroo will raise Sydney's international acclaim and be a globally celebrated destination".[45] This rhetoric has been echoed in numerous articles, official publications and documentation submitted to NSW Department of Planning for approval. This outward looking position explicitly limits the scope of development for the local population and links to the third point of disconnecting from the host city. The only communicable agenda of the precinct is to function as a centre for the exchange and production of capital. This also relates to the fifth point of a lack of public and social benefit in the built form of the precinct. Harris cites both a comparative requirement of residential floor space for key-worker housing, with Hudson Yards requiring 25 per cent and Stratford City in London requiring 35 per cent[46], and a growth in total floor area approved and applied for from the competition brief of 330,000 square metres to the current Modification 8 total of 598,733 square metres, an 81 per cent increase from the competition brief. This all comes with no additional public benefit; a common trait in global megaprojects.

[43] Harris, M., 2014. *Megaprojects: A global review and the Australian context.*
[44] Ibid, p. 11.
[45] Barangaroo Delivery Authority, 2016. Overview. Accessed 24 August 2016 from http://www.barangaroo.com/discover-barangaroo/overview.aspx
[46] Harris, M., 2014. *Megaprojects: A global review and the Australian context.* pp. 17-18.

These procedural issues drove Lord Mayor Clover Moore of the City of Sydney Council to resign from her role in the Barangaroo Delivery Authority and international urban consultant Jan Gehl to withdraw support for the project[47], asking for his name to be removed from all publications and press involved with the project.[48]

Supporting documentation

Meredith Sussex and Shelley Penn Report – City of Sydney submissions

In 2011, NSW Minister for Planning, Brad Hazzard, asked government officer Meredith Sussex and architect Shelley Penn to conduct a review[49] (explicitly not an audit[50]) of the Barangaroo development from the competition stages to the current modification. A call for submissions was made and the review received 230 submissions, held 51 meetings and produced a report by 1 August 2011.[51] This is the first and only major review of information commissioned by the NSW Department of Planning and functions as a point of reference of events up to Modification 4. The report explores a range of significant issues raised by both individual submissions, councils and organisations but only those relevant to this thesis are highlighted here.

The first point of contention raised is the overemphasis of bureaucrats and key government stakeholders over professionals with urban design, planning and architecture credentials[52], observing that "best practice for a *design* competition would typically require the majority of jurors to have had professional design quality expertise".[53] The shift from design proposal followed chronologically by concept plan saw the detail in the design fall away, with the schema being assessed for development envelopes but building proposals that made it unclear as to the outcomes being made in the modifications.[54] One of the most significant changes to the competition winning plan (including suggested changes by the competition jury) introduced in Modification 4 was the ideation of reclaiming part of the shore and siting a hotel over the water[55], a grand gesture that threatens the public

[47] Ibid, p. 19.
[48] Hasham, N., 2013. Designer's Barangaroo bombshell. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 October 2013, Accessed August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/designers-barangaroo-bombshell-20131004-2uzri.html
[49] Sussex, M. and Penn, S., 2011. Barangaroo Review.
[50] Ibid, p. 87. The report commissioned expressly asked for a review as indicated in the appendices "The Review was not an audit, and did not 'discover' material".
[51] Ibid, p. 87.
[52] Ibid, p. 13.
[53] Ibid, p. 13.
[54] Ibid, p. 17.
[55] Ibid, p. 25.

access to the foreshore and is also a jarring visual accompaniment to the precinct that also affects the buildings and open space of the western side of Darling Harbour by overshadowing.

As the gross floor area increased in size, the resultant community allocation remained the same. By Modification 4, the total development area increased from 388,300 square metres to 549,465 square metres while the community uses remained static at 2,000 square metres.[56] Already an insignificant proportion of the site at the start, the community use begins to be whittled away while the pedestrian intensity increases with commercial and residential uses having the most significant increases in space. While the review argues on the side of the proponent that this is merely part of the iterative process of design development, the monopoly of benefit to the developer in lieu of public benefit cannot be ignored.

The next point of concern is perhaps the most controversial with the NSW Minister for Planning exercising Executive Order to approve the casino over the water, a decision that contravenes the existing *State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Development)* because the development fell under Part 3A. This decision was made three days after the Independent Commission Against Corruption delivered a report on exercising discretion of Part 3A. This decision gave the developer successive rights to build a hotel within the site and with provisional approval to build it on reclaimed land in the harbour. This decision has been recognised as noticeably worsening the public perception of transparency and legitimacy of the governing bodies.

Clarity from the competition organisers and the Barangaroo Delivery Authority has been consistently lacking at all stages so it is not surprising that there is much public confusion on the design development from competition winning entry, suggested plan and subsequent modifications. The review finds issue with the competition process, and the jury process,[57] perhaps an embedded political issue, as even successive changes in NSW Governments do not change this issue.

The review touches on the issue of building heights in the commercial area and justifies the heights through comparison to taller buildings in Sydney, Melbourne and the Gold

[56] Ibid, p. 30.
[57] Ibid, p. 39.

Coast.[58] Although the other buildings may be taller, they do not share the same site condition; the towers in Sydney that were referenced are not built on the waterfront where there are planning controls to step down towards the water. This was also raised by the City of Sydney in the review.[59] The listed buildings in Melbourne either fall under the same site conditions as the Sydney examples or are situated close to the waterfront but do not have the overshadowing issues and on the Gold Coast the coastline is dotted with tall buildings on the waterfront.

The review also lightly considers the necessity of design excellence and the functioning of the Design Excellence Review Panel reinforcing that the Design Excellence processes need to be "clearly articulated, and rigorously, transparently applied"[60] and highlighting the importance of the design process as not just a cosmetic apparatus but a fundamental aspect of creating contiguity in the connection to the existing city fabric and through a whole of precinct approach to create enduring spaces for habitation.

Overall the review's remit limits the extent of the forensic analysis that could have taken place, reviewing the literature and examining input from a call for submissions, which may be why the report was fairly neutral compared to the other available literature.

City of Sydney submission on Modification 8

Modification 8 is the most recent proposed change to the Barangaroo precinct and is of concern due to the design and siting of a casino resort by Crown Resorts which is at the centre of the City of Sydney's submission on this modification. As prior NSW Governments have approved the casino, there is no avenue to repeal the decision. The submission by the City of Sydney criticises the lack of public interest, community engagement and public benefit of the casino, noting that it also reduces the integrity of the current scheme.[61] The changes in this stage of the concept plan also muddle the clarity of the public domain and alignment of Globe Street affecting view corridors and follows a consistent loss of public foreshore promenade.[62]

[58] Ibid, p. 48.
[59] Ibid, p. 51.
[60] Ibid, p. 54.
[61] City of Sydney, 2015. *City of Sydney Submission to NSW Planning and Environment Barangaroo Concept Plan MOD 8 and SEPP Amendments Environmental Assessment*., p. 10.
[62] Ibid, p. 15.

One final matter of concern is the quantification of public space. Previous modifications and submissions have separated the calculation of roads and laneways in the quantum of public open space but Modification 8 counted these values in the target of 50 per cent minimum public space.[63] The quality of public space is also compromised with a large public park sited away from the foreshore and surrounded by the casino resort and three large residential towers. Instead of valuing the primacy of the public domain for the public, it has now fallen prey to the economics of private development.

Theoretical tools

Cities are transdisciplinary spaces. Public spaces in cities are sites of conflict that make visible these issues and become a space where they can be mediated. The literature on public spaces encompasses the built form, their meaning and virtues, spaces of interaction and the social necessity of space, the politics that surrounds it and the intersection of global and local hegemony and issues. This section develops ideas and frames of reference to situate the Barangaroo development that may be better placed to form relational comparisons with global cases and develop further the local context. It begins with waterfront developments that situate the Barangaroo development within this international literature, and their impacts that then lead to iconicity of major developments and the *tourist gaze*.[64] The following section introduces the topic of government intervention, the hierarchy of actors in these scripted developments and the impacts of international design competitions. The final section covers global developments and the local impacts, and the social implication of urban developments. Developments like Barangaroo that are situated within overlapping jurisdictional boundaries are inherently complex requiring acknowledgement of the context of regional and global competition, perspectives from different users and stakeholders, and shifting strategies that prioritise the discourse towards a global imperative.

Prior to the Industrial Age, waterfronts served as strategic access points for trade and diplomatic relations. They were the first point of call and were the identity on show for foreign partners. Waterfronts still serve these purposes but in different ways in a global

[63] Ibid, p. 21.
[64] The *tourist gaze* first introduced by John Urry recognises the importance of tourism, moreover their view of cities and its effects of urban development.

trend of spatial restructuring,[65] as the government is often the owner of the land that undergoes redevelopment and renewal, and also writes the policy that shapes the development. Waterfronts are undeniably sites of politics and power, and sites that shape the public.

Some of the physical characteristics of globalised cities are the shifting of sea freight out of the city,[66] relocated to the periphery, and then moved back to the city by land networks such as heavy rail links. Malone also notes the intertwining of international economic frameworks and waterfronts through the example of Canary Wharf in London.[67] He also confirms that waterfronts are sites of 'cultural capital', places where tourism and leisure developments may be embedded and exercised supporting the financial and other sectors of economic growth. As a way to attach themselves to the renewal of these spaces, politicians might want to take a greater role in the direction of precinct development and dictate less popular details as NSW Premier Neville Wran did with the monorail in Darling Harbour in 1984.[68] Malone concludes that waterfronts act as 'shop-fronts'[69], projecting the 'new' image of the city with symbolic attachment through cultural icons.

This kind of intervention is also recognised by Sandercock and Dovey as "the tensions of global capital and local place identity are mediated by the state".[70] The public interest is one of the overarching principles of urban planning but has been seen to recede in more recent times.[71] The seduction and manipulation of the image has been welcomed by these authorities as a way to market and sell the attraction of cities. These qualities are also tools to combat regional competitors much like Darling Harbour in Sydney and Southgate in Melbourne,[72] both new developments in the 1980s, both sited on waterfronts. Sandercock and Dovey also recognise the impacts of corporate city branding through the power of Crown Casino in Melbourne that was able to broker a

[65] Oakley, S. and Johnson, L., 2012. Place-taking and place-making in waterfront renewal, Australia. *Urban Studies*, *50*(2), pp. 341-355.
[66] Malone, P., 1996. Introduction. In *City, capital and water*. Routledge, London. pp. 1-14.
[67] Ibid, pp. 3-4.
[68] Ibid, p. 8.
[69] Malone, P., 1996. Conclusions. In *City, capital and water*. Routledge, London. pp. 261-268.
[70] Sandercock, L. and Dovey, K., 2002. Pleasure, politics, and the "public interest": Melbourne's riverscape revitalization. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *68*(2), pp. 151-164.
[71] Ibid, p. 152.
[72] Ibid, p. 153.

tender in total secret[73] through commercial-in-confidence arrangements, much like the Crown casino resort at Barangaroo. They close with a focus on the processes of these revitalisation projects and the relationship between planning and democracy.[74] This critique on the processes of secrecy and lack of transparency in these public projects is pertinent in the Barangaroo development as, since the competition phase, there have been unanswered questions on these issues.

In his analysis of a recent urban design competition in Toronto, White[75] examines the relationship between design experts and lay people during the competition and concludes with some clear principles that would have benefitted the process of choosing a plan for Barangaroo. Counter to the conditions of the Barangaroo competition and brief, the competition to revitalise Toronto's waterfront maintained the following three principles. The first principle is establishing a clear competition brief that clarifies the intent of the competition and constraints that can become muddled during the process. The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation had conducted due background research to limit the risks that could occur in dealing with both a complex site and a diverse range of stakeholders. The second principle is appointing an appropriate jury to form a more balanced representation of design professionals and administrators to legitimise the process and results of the jury. The jury appointed in the Toronto waterfront competition featured six design experts from a variety of disciplines, chaired by an architect and including a filmmaker, graphic artist and urban designer. The public was engaged for their opinions and by process gave their support which leads to the third principle of integrating opportunities for public feedback. The introduction of a level of citizen participation into the selection process (although citizens might not have had a vote in the selection) helped to sustain interest in the competition and help push the delays in funding. Although the Barangaroo development did not suffer from this limitation, it has been openly understood that a genuine level of engagement would encourage much greater trust from the community.

[73] Ibid, p. 158.
[74] Ibid, p. 162.
[75] White, J.T., 2014. Design by competition and the potential for public participation: Assessing an urban design competition on Toronto's waterfront. *Journal of Urban Design*, *19*(4), pp. 541-564.

Lynne Sagalyn[76] has also written about the politics of design competitions noting that they "are commissioned for many reasons, almost none of which have to do with design and all of which have to do with *political motivations*".[77] Of the many reasons for potential conflict, one of the biggest spatial impacts is precedent on the site positioned in a working city. There is no *tabula rasa* or blank slate. The site is never blank. As is apparent in the Barangaroo scheme, even though it is a masterplan with small parcels and districts, it is still embedded in a larger city and in the case of Sydney, a region. One of Sagalyn's case studies is The High Line disused rail corridor[78], once a blight on the western side of Manhattan. Through citizen leadership and work of community non-profit 'Friends of The High Line', New York now has a prototypical elevated park that is copied the world over. The High Line over 20 blocks is not just a highly functional public asset, but has increased the value of surrounding property that has allowed the Hudson Yards development and the seven-line subway extension to take place. As the argument for the scarcity of space is made in Sydney, the condition is at least in higher demand in New York City yet incumbent mayors are able to justify provisions for public space to occur.

The Barangaroo Delivery Authority repeatedly justifies the grand gestures of the Barangaroo development and reshaping Sydney's skyline as necessary to maintain relevance within a global marketplace, proving that, more than ever, the image and dissemination of the image is of utmost importance to cities and city marketing. Iconic architecture is the postmodern relic that serves this function. A revival of Rand's[79] protagonist, architecture is imagined without context, only to be viewed from serial articles not from the ground. Maria Kaika[80] has addressed these monuments as "autistic architecture", just as spectacular and non-responsive to their environments in which they are sited. She draws connections both to the technological advancement and relationship to the period, a list of named buildings in Manhattan, and its ineffable relation to capital that props up the commercial buildings. These named buildings are brands that connect their own networks in headquarter cities: Rockefeller and Seagram in New York, Lloyds and Swiss Re in London. Advancing past these houses of commerce there are now hotel

[76] Sagalyn, L.B. 2006. The political fabric of design competitions. In C. Malmberg (ed.) *Politics of design: Competitions for public projects*. The Policy Research Institute for the Region, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 29-52.
[77] Ibid, p. 29, my emphasis.
[78] Ibid, p. 43.
[79] Rand, A., 1947. *The fountainhead.* Cassell, London.
[80] Kaika, M., 2011. Autistic architecture: the fall of the icon and the rise of the serial object of architecture. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *29*(6), pp. 968-992.

brands of Trump and Crown and brands of culture, such as Guggenheim. She argues that beyond this dominant association with ideology, power and symbolism is a concern with collective identity portrayed through these urban totems.[81] Conflating these issues she argues that they perform a double role, that of "signifiers of power, but also that of constituting a new language, of symbols and myths for a new configuration of power",[82] no less it is necessary to have a starchitect to take the lead in these projects to imbue the name value of the monument.[83] She closes by becoming even more specific, defining contemporary corporate commissions as "self-referential monosemantic *autistic objects*"[84] with no recourse to interact with the social context of their cities, which if architecture still has a role to play it must revive the radical imaginary stimulating the ephemeral.

Charles Jencks has suggested that the iconic building has replaced the monument.[85] Just as Western society is becoming more secular, we are turning away from temples of prayer to churches of commerce and consumption. This transference of ideology is all too passive so that a response, like towards the Eiffel Tower "isn't *hated* enough"[86] so it will continue to be a subject of conversation and not pushed any further. Jencks argues that although the function of iconic buidlings are transferred from religious iconography, they must not be visibly associated, finding new typologies of vertical and abstract, "missile, screw, bullet, penis, finger, pine cone, cigar – and also somewhat farfetched – brain and Russian Doll",[87] a comment on the skyscrapers of London.

Following Jencks, Sklair and Gherardi[88] argue that prior to the global age, iconic architectural monuments were driven by state-run and religious institutions but now corporate organisations control the transfer of wealth. Although these buildings do not respond to context, they require a context which they do not to respond to. If they were among a sea of similar buildings they would likely no longer be iconic. But most importantly, they find that the narrative of the architect is as important as their architecture: "the architectural icon must be accompanied by a famous author, whose

[81] Ibid, p. 972.
[82] Ibid, p. 973.
[83] As is the case of Barangaroo with Richard Rogers.
[84] Ibid, p. 988.
[85] Jencks, C., 2006. The iconic building is here to stay. *City*, *10*(1), pp. 3-20.
[86] Ibid, p. 12.
[87] Ibid, p. 13.
[88] Sklair, L. and Gherardi, L., 2012. Iconic architecture as a hegemonic project of the transnational capitalist class. *City*, *16*(1-2), pp. 57-73.

own story is interwoven with that of the building".[89] This narrative is built into their metaphorical dialogue or implied imagery where the form translates through an image, petals of a flower in the case of Barangaroo. This then gets subsumed into city identity, caught in the whirlpool of media kits and promotional videos.

The strategic extraction of capital through an iconic building finds a modern precedent in the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. Beatriz Plaza[90] quantifies this impact of an iconic building through examining the increase in overnight stays and visitation to the Guggenheim before and after the opening of the museum. It is a cultural project that revitalises the waterfront, a spectacle that successfully fulfills its mandate to generate a noticeable increase in tourism with a 54 per cent growth due to the Guggenheim.[91] It is noted that the success is predicated on drawing on an existing brand[92] that then strengthens that partnership.

The impact of this perfect storm of global brand, brand-name architect and iconic architecture then leads the charge to capitalise on this schema and "designing for the *[tourist] gaze*".[93] Urry and Larsen extend Urry's seminal text *The Tourist Gaze* navigating the staging we give to our temporary visitors. Urry takes his cue from Venturi[94] and positions these modern designed environments of consumption as "consumerist postmodernism".[95] The space-time compression of globalisation has accelerated the flow of travellers and tourists where the distinct characteristics of the physical and the digital has dissolved. This liquidity has also increased the power and reach of global brands[96] like McDonalds, Nike and Crown. They expand on the dominating aspect of contemporary architecture "theming and malls".[97] The imposition of these spaces that act primarily on our sight have become all encompassing experiences that control and dominate our actions. Spaces are increasingly privatised and commodified where overstimulation forces us into submission. The result of these is due in part to government policy determining the physical makeup of our cities.

[89] Ibid, p. 70.
[90] Plaza, B., 2000. Evaluating the influence of a large cultural artifact in the attraction of tourism: the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao case. *Urban Affairs Review*, *36*(2), pp. 264-274.
[91] Ibid, p. 268.
[92] Ibid, p. 272.
[93] Urry, J. and Larsen, J., 2011. *The tourist gaze 3.0*. Sage, London, p. 120. My italics.
[94] Venturi, R., Brown, D.S. and Izenour, S., 1972. *Learning from Las Vegas* (Vol. 102). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[95] Urry and Larsen, 2011, p. 120.
[96] Ibid, p. 28.
[97] Ibid, p. 125.

Procurement and provision of public infrastructure has quickly transitioned from a state-led model to private partnerships in response to budget deficiencies and market-led growth of information services. This more recent proliferation of private contributions to the delivery of public amenities, in concert with the strength and influence of the private sector, acts both as a boon and bane for the procurement and delivery of these developments. Johnston and Gudergan[98] raise the issue of ethics of public private partnership by the contractual nature of the relationship. The importance of this is compounded by state planning instruments that allow for unsolicited proposals[99] that bypass the competitive tender process. Chew argues that although such procedures may drive innovation, the opaqueness of the process can undermine the integrity of the contract.[100] One might wonder how the development of a waterfront casino may be a unique or innovative opportunity to prop up the image of a city, and rightly so considering there is already an existing casino fulfilling that duty, as Star Casino sits across Darling Harbour in direct line of sight of the casino at Barangaroo.

Conflicts of this kind that occur in important sites, primarily in high growth areas, prompt questions on the system that has allowed such significant projects to proceed with lack of vision. Ruming and Davies[101]examine the recent changes in planning reform in New South Wales from 2004 to 2013 finding that little has changed but the compounding of rhetoric exaggerating the progress of planning reform. In conflict with the initial stated goals of handing back power to local governments,[102] these reforms have given more power to planning panels.[103] MacDonald[104] also examines these reforms and has come to similar conclusions that the reform process has exacerbated the problem by narrowly defining the definition of sustainable development as a primarily economic goal[105] and also failing to reform an already cumbersome process. These collective changes that limit citizen participation, standardise zoning and local planning

[98] Johnston, J. and Gudergan, S., 2009. 15. Ethical leadership in public-private partnerships: learning from an Australian 'great controversy'?. *Public sector leadership: International challenges and perspectives*, p. 276.
[99] The application for the Crown casino resort was made under such clause where the proponents argued for the competitive advantage such a development might provide for NSW. See Chew, 2015 for an elaboration of the state of these developments in an Australian context.
[100] Chew, A., 2015. Use of unsolicited proposals for new projects – the approaches in Australia. *European Procurement and Public Private Partnership Law Review*, *10*, p. 29.
[101] Ruming, K.J. and Davies, P.J., 2014. To what extent 'an entirely new approach to how planning is done'? Tracing planning system reform in New South Wales. *Australian Planner*, *51*(2), pp. 122-131.
[102] Ibid, p. 122.
[103] Ibid, p. 128.
[104] MacDonald, H., 2015. 'Fantasies of Consensus': Planning reform in Sydney, 2005–2013. *Planning Practice and Research*, *30*(2), pp. 115-138.
[105] Ibid. p. 133.

frameworks, and prioritise economic development give developers the dominant hand in areas of state importance.

Glen Searle[106] traces these efforts of urban consolidation back to Sydney's first strategic plan, the County of Cumberland Plan (1948)[107] with an examination of development controls on urban design in Sydney by Punter.[108] Most significant to this thesis is Searle's analysis of the Darling Harbour and Bicentenary projects of 1988 that see a revival in the importance of design quality and the impacts of a global gaze affecting urban development. Faced with a four year deadline for completion of an entire city precinct that included rehabilitation of the entire Darling Harbour waterfront and design and construction of a new international convention centre by 1988, some tight controls had to be put in place,[109] the Darling Harbour Authority was formed and a NSW Government-appointed board put in to run and essentially 'fast-track' development.[110] The global imperative was so strong that even the local council was dismissed with NSW Government-appointed commissioners presiding over city governance for two years. Although judged reasonably successful, the urban form is still not integrated with the existing city grid and seems more like a World Fair.[111]

Daly and Malone[112] also recognise the global imperative of the Darling Harbour development that culminated in a series of events that opened up Sydney in the 1970s and 1980s leading to a growth of financial capital and tourism.[113] Like Barangaroo, this project faced resistance from industry groups such as the Planning Institute of Australia (formerly Royal Australian Planning Institute) criticising the transport planning at the site.[114] These concurrent processes of local development and global outlook are termed 'glocalisation' by Swyngedouw.[115] He suggests that these processes advantage economic development and institutional arrangements while marginalising socioeconomic and

[106] Searle, G., 2007. *Sydney's urban consolidation experience: power, politics and community* (Vol. 12). Urban Research Program, Griffith University, Brisbane.
[107] Ibid, p. 1.
[108] Punter, J., 2005. Urban design in central Sydney 1945–2002: laissez-faire and discretionary traditions in the accidental city. *Progress in Planning*, *63*(1), pp. 11-160.
[109] Ibid, p. 68.
[110] Ibid, p. 71.
[111] Ibid, p. 72.
[112] Daly, M. and Malone, P., 1996. Sydney: the economic and political roots of Darling Harbour. *City, capital and water*. Routledge, London, pp. 90-108.
[113] Ibid, pp. 94-95.
[114] Ibid, p. 100.
[115] Swyngedouw, E., 2004. Globalisation or 'glocalisation'? Networks, territories and rescaling. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *17*(1), pp. 25-48.

cultural currency in the reconfiguration of spatial scale and shifts in the flows and networks of territorial governance. The argument also emphasises the importance of "specific and historically created forms of territorial and socio-institutional organization"[116] in maintaining the importance of local characteristics of cities and regions instead of an outwards facing locus.

More recently, Baker and Ruming[117] speak more specifically about the Sydney context problematising the porous nature of the city and that the city is "everywhere and everything".[118] They affirm the 'Global Sydney' label was a push to facilitate economic growth in lieu of other declining industries.[119] This expanded rhetoric is entrenched in policy literature and strategic plans such as *Sydney 2030*. This alignment towards a global aspiration is both a political project and object of governance[120] and is at odds with the equivalent strategies for London in *The London Plan*[121] with performance measured at the metropolitan and national levels.

This outward looking strategy has a direct relation to the type of urban form being sought after in the photogenic tourist precincts examined in this thesis. In an attempt to build consensus for the *Sydney 2030* plan, McNeill finds that the City of Sydney had enlisted well-known urban designer Jan Gehl[122] to conduct a public life study and to help drive future public domain improvements. Gehl was also employed to consult for the Barangaroo development but fell out and became critical of the development,[123] ultimately withdrawing his name from all associated documentation.

This review of literature reveals the conflicted nature of urban development on significant sites in Sydney's waterfront. The role of government to deliver public infrastructure projects has waned over the course of the last 50 years with significant grounds being made by the private sector determining the spatial quality of public spaces. Planning policies have not shifted far allowing transactions and deals to take place

116 Ibid, pp. 37-38.
117 Baker, T. and Ruming, K., 2015. Making 'Global Sydney': spatial imaginaries, worlding and strategic plans. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *39*(1), pp. 62-78.
118 Amin and Thrift, 2002 in Baker and Ruming, 2015, p. 63.
119 Ibid, p. 66.
120 Ibid, p. 68.
121 Ibid, p. 72.
122 McNeill, D., 2011. Fine grain, global city: Jan Gehl, public space and commercial culture in central Sydney. *Journal of Urban Design*, *16*(2), pp. 161-178.
123 Ibid, p. 170.

behind closed doors even when the development is occurring on public land and where the state or local government is required to deliver benefits to the public, not simply abstract economic gains that disproportionately return to corporate interests. The extended review reveals systemic issues that are common across the world but there are specificities to urban development in Sydney in particular that are worth examining further. Greater understanding of these issues may reveal some insights that will expand the knowledge of these critical urban issues and contribute to a global understanding by way of policy transfer.

The public

The review of literature has demonstrated the dissonance of development that clouds the accountability and transparency of the actors influencing the decision-making of developments. Such conflicts have a burdened history in the urban development of Sydney especially since the post-World War II boom ending in the 1960s to 1970s. The oft referred 'the public' is central to discussion of cities and urban environments. The emancipatory potential of architecture and urban development attracts discussions and input from a broad range of fields. As the definition of 'the public' is perpetually rewritten it is necessary to situate the dialectical relationship between private and public, and understand the problematisation of this discourse within the 'right to the city'. The transdisciplinary nature of this discourse borrows the theory and perspective developed from philosophers (Habermas, Lefebvre, Benhabib), political theorists (Arendt), geographers (Purcell, Harvey, Mitchell, Staeheli), urban theorists (Brenner), urban designers (Madanipour), architects (Dovey), sociologists (Sennett) and activists (Jacobs). This is necessary to parse the complex struggle framing the Barangaroo development.

The public sphere

Contemporary observation and theoretical development of the conflicted 'public' has been revived through Habermas' seminal text *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.*[124] Habermas writes in relation to the bourgeois public sphere and defines it as when "the sphere of private people come together as a public".[125] This limitation is framed through references of moving from their bourgeois private spaces into salons,

[124] Habermas, J., 1991 [1962]. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. MIT Press, Cambridge.
[125] Ibid, p. 27.

more-or-less quasi-private spaces demarcated from the proletariat. Habermas makes the important point that "The public sphere of civil society stood or fell with the principle of universal access",[126] drawing relation to the context of our contemporary commons and public spaces, where the atrophy of access is mirroring the depoliticisation and privatisation of the public sphere. Habermas also relates the idea of public opinion with the (bourgeois) public sphere through Bentham[127] and Kant.[128] As the salon expands and gives access to an audience beyond the bourgeois, this begins to introduce and problematise the idea of the public good and interrelatedly, public opinion.

Like Habermas' text, Arendt makes important contributions to theory and understanding of the public and private realm,[129] and she also underscores the importance of the public with the word signifying the world itself.[130] The notion of power is related to potentiality,[131] the tension of the public realm held together by power relations. This relation between tension and potential also corresponds to the condition of plurality[132] such that power requires the public to legitimise its influence but unfortunately the conflation of power and capital works to exercise this domination of the public reviving the bourgeois and elite public over the polity.[133]

Benhabib[134], a student of Habermas, presents a more contemporary interpretation of the democratic public sphere. Interpreting Arendt, she suggests that "totalitarianism has no spatial topology: it is like an iron band, compressing people increasingly together until they are formed into one".[135] The 'competitive' space of the public sphere is a space of both possibility and futility where there is a potential for agonism post liberalism that allow for public participation to occur. Although developing the liberal-democratic view of society from Arendt, Benhabib returns to the discursive model of public space of Habermas, although with some modifications to adapt to contemporary pluralistic society.[136] She argues that public space is not understood agonistically but "viewed

126 Ibid, p. 85.
127 Ibid, p. 99.
128 Ibid, p. 102.
129 Arendt, H., 1998 [1958]. *The human condition*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
130 Ibid, p. 52.
131 Ibid, p. 200.
132 Ibid, p. 201.
133 Calhoun, C., 1992. *Introduction: Habermas and the public sphere* (pp. 1-50). MIT Press, p. 16.
134 Benhabib, S., 1992. *Models of public space: Hannah Arendt, the liberal tradition, and Jürgen Habermas*. MIT Press, Cambridge.
135 Ibid, p. 77.
136 Ibid, p. 103.

democratically as the creation of procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and by collective political decision can have a say in their formulation, stipulation and adoption"[137] so the determination of the public is made through deliberative democratic decision-making. The optimal scenario of this model requires trust in the system and does not yet foresee the impact of the privatisation of space.

Purcell[138] joins together theories of deliberative democracy and Lefebvre's 'right to the city' and argues "ongoing neoliberalization of urban political economies makes more urgent the existing critiques of communicative planning".[139] Over the past 50 years neoliberalisation has asserted itself as the dominant doctrine of hegemonic global power. This distinction from Keynesian economics shifts the balance of power through reduced state intervention to an open market system that allows the market to self-regulate unhindered by state borders and policies. This laissez-faire capitalism has markedly increased the speed of a growing uneven development[140] and subsequently increased inequality from near and from afar, by extracting tribute from foreign investments.[141] Over the past 15 years there has been much written about neoliberalisation and its discontents but through all the critiques there are few solutions and alternatives that feasibly reposition the current state of global affairs. Purcell, through Laclau and Mouffe, suggests a counter-hegemonic struggle,[142] a disciplinary approach through planning, mobilising the political class to revive the democratic imperative.

The right to the city

Lefebvre's 'right to the city'[143] has influenced a great deal of work in both the urban and social fields. Lefebvre writes that cities are made from a series of binary processes, that of "industrialization and urbanization, growth and development, economic production and social life",[144] cities are inductively produced and work by consumption, integrating their surrounding environment. They are also sites of use value (the city and urban life) and exchange value (spaces bought and sold)[145] such that the city is both a site of

[137] Ibid, p. 105.
[138] Purcell, M., 2009. Resisting neoliberalization: communicative planning or counter-hegemonic movements?. *Planning Theory*, *8*(2), pp. 140-165.
[139] Ibid, p. 141.
[140] Harvey, D., 2007. *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press, USA.
[141] Ibid, p. 30.
[142] Purcell, M., 2009, p. 158.
[143] Lefebvre, H., 1996 [1967]. The right to the city. *Writings on cities*, pp. 63-181.
[144] Ibid, p. 70.
[145] Ibid, p 86.

habitation and speculation. This speculative quality enhances the quantitative importance of the city in a world of global cities but still must balance the production *of* the city and the social relations *in* the city.[146] As we shift into a dominant neoliberal regime, there are questions on the provision of social infrastructure and the responsibility of private enterprise on their supply, and as cities become more and more sites of speculation, there must be an equitable way to balance quantitative and qualitative measurements and equivalences.

In the fifth of Lefebvre's theses on the city, the urban and planning, Lefebvre suggests the "realization of urban society calls for a planning oriented towards social needs, those of urban society. It necessitates a science of the city (of relations and correlations in urban life). Although necessary, these conditions are not sufficient. A social and political force capable of putting these means into *oeuvres* is equally indispensable."[147] This urgent call for a greater emphasis on the social in the urban has attracted responses to the 'right to the city', with Purcell suggesting the idea of the 'right to the city' as a response to neoliberal urbanisation.[148] As governments are shifting to governance and public private partnerships are proliferating,[149] there is a genuine fear that these new institutions and arrangements will monopolise power and control the shape of the city leaving inhabitants disenfranchised and eventually taking away their right to the city. There is an argument to restructure the power relations in the city to place greater priority on lived space rather than speculate on its value. The connectivity of large corporates whose global networks are both extensive and expansive have influence on scalar-politics[150]. The example used was Boeing in Seattle: if they were to shift headquarters the impact would be significant on the region, giving them power to influence policy and planning decisions on a metropolitan level. This impact on sub-national level politics is of concern to urban studies and these power relations are important to the understanding of critical urban theory.

[146] Ibid, p. 101.
[147] Ibid, p. 178.
[148] Purcell, M., 2002. Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the inhabitant. *GeoJournal, 58*(2-3), pp. 99-108.
[149] Ibid, p. 101.
[150] Ibid, p. 104.

Brenner[151] argues that critical urban theory is a critique of ideology and "emphasizes the politically and ideologically mediated, socially contested and therefore malleable character of urban space – that is, its continual (re)construction as a site, medium and outcome of historically specific relations of social power",[152] and therefore a necessary tool to analyse contemporary urban sociospatial interfaces. The reflexive qualities are necessary to question the existing ideology, contextualise the theory, and apply it in practice.[153] Space cannot be seen strictly as an interior relation, but also relations of exteriority. Brenner and Elden expand Lefebvre's theorisation of space to include the problematic of state.[154] The inherent politics grounded in the public, or 'abstract space'[155] introduce a different problematic due to the expansive nature of city territories and their influence. Through Lefebvre, they argue that "abstract space is inherently violent and geographically expansive" and that it provides a framework for interlinking several different frameworks at "not only at the scale of every State, but also at the international and worldwide scale, the scale of the planetary state system".[156] This geographically expansive influence of the State problematises interrelations of local and global forms of development but can also lay the framework to understand the spatial and political imaginary. The importance of these urban spaces also promotes the maintenance and growth of capitalist production allowing their spatial influence to proliferate in cities.[157] This relationship between State and capital and the shift from government to governance has reduced the transparency of its function leading to a loss of trust in the political class.

Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer[158], writing immediately after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, also identify that under capitalism, the sites of renewal are increasingly put under pressure to be intensively commodified,[159] and there needs to be a restructuring of the urban to find alternatives to capitalist development. This first requires an understanding of "contemporary patterns of urban restructuring, and then, on that basis, analysing their implications for action".[160] They give hints at possible avenues to counter this dominant

151 Brenner, N., 2009. What is critical urban theory?. *City*, *13*(2-3), pp. 198-207.
152 Ibid, p. 198.
153 Ibid, p. 204.
154 Brenner, N. and Elden, S., 2009. Henri Lefebvre on state, space, territory. *International Political Sociology*, *3*(4), pp. 353-377.
155 Ibid, p. 358.
156 Ibid, p. 359.
157 Ibid, p. 369.
158 Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. and Mayer, M., 2009. Cities for people, not for profit. *City*, *13*(2-3), pp. 176-184.
159 Ibid, p. 178.
160 Ibid, p. 177.

framework by identifying the transformative potential of social movements,[161] but also identify the constraints of market fundamentalism.[162] In a climate of austerity such as post-Global Financial Crisis, dispossession is overshadowed by recession clouding the relations of capital and State. These events compound the intensity of the struggles in cities, but Low and Iveson[163] suggest that "the provision of more just public space can be achieved through processes that seek to *redistribute* resources, *recognize* difference, foster *encounter/interaction*, establish an ethic of *care* and ensure *procedural fairness*".[164]

Harvey also signifies the importance of the public sphere as something critical to the proper functioning of democratic governance.[165] Conflict can be softened to experiences between strangers that are typical of the porosity of public spaces. These interactions that give life to social spaces contribute to the contextuality of cities and their development in contrast to the cleavage of capital with spectacle that disguises class relations.[166] Like Haussmann's oppression in nineteenth century France, we are experiencing another period of urban revolution, albeit at a more subtle, insidious pace. With the transformation of the city through image and spectacle, the experience of space will shift from active interaction to passive observation. Harvey states that is it the "relational connectivity among public, quasipublic, and private spaces that counts when it comes to politics in the public sphere"[167] and as such when these relationships are weakened, so too is the political consciousness of public spaces.

Mitchell[168] and with Lyn Staeheli[169] consider conflicts that occur in public spaces. Through case studies in North America they examine how public spaces become carved up challenge the idea of publicness through a combination of physical characteristics,[170] rules and regulations[171] and the delegitimisation of classes of people through legal

[161] Ibid, p. 180.
[162] Ibid, p. 181.
[163] Low, S. and Iveson, K., 2016. Propositions for more just urban public spaces. *City*, *20*(1), pp. 10-31.
[164] Ibid, p. 12.
[165] Harvey, 2006.
[166] Ibid, p. 23.
[167] Ibid, p. 31.
[168] Mitchell, D., 1995. The end of public space? People's Park, definitions of the public, and democracy. *Annals of the association of american geographers*, *85*(1), pp.108-133.
[169] Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008.
[170] Mitchell, 1995, p. 109; Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008, p. 118.
[171] Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008, pp, 115-116.

exclusion.[172] Their explorations problematise the commodification of public spaces challenging the professionalisation of classifying and stratifying space that maintain existing hegemonic relationships.[173] These acts of violence against minorities are predicated by the homogenous notion of an urban public that is founded within democratic societies.[174] Indeed the quality of a public space is established by the relationship between the quality of the space and the relationships between property and the people that use, or habit the space.[175]

Sennett claims that public spaces within modern cities have always been hybrids of politics and commerce.[176] The commodification of space lays together with the professionalisation of creating public spaces resulting in the growth of 'dead public spaces' that are characteristic of many corporate public plazas typical of commercial forecourts.[177] These dead spaces that front insular buildings dominated by walls of glass give enough room to see the building, or view of a spectacle, but beyond the aestheticisation of space, does little to encourage participation. The commodification and privatisation of space not only facilitates capital flows but also the unencumbered movement of people.[178] Fundamentally the removal of resistance also removes the opportunity for participation, interaction and therefore seeks to homogenise space. Like Mitchell and Staeheli, these active, violent acts of exclusion and division produces a sanitised form of space that Sennett calls this freedom an empty volume.[179]

Read in tandem, the politics of public spaces are inherently tied to both conceptions of the public sphere and the right to the city. Public spaces are sites of conflict, deliberation and experience and need to negotiate their position and relationship to global linkages. As the contemporary commons have been mined and extracted placing more importance on their exchange rather than use value, there is a powerful trend reducing their qualitative, lived and experiential qualities displaced by capital generation and image

[172] Mitchell, D., 1997. The annihilation of space by law: the roots and implications of anti-homeless laws in the United States. *Antipode*, *29*(3), pp.303-335.
[173] Mitchell, 1995, p. 120.
[174] Ibid, p. 116.
[175] Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008, p. 116.
[176] Sennett, 1992.
[177] Ibid, p. 12.
[178] Sennett, R., 1994. *Flesh and stone: The body and the city in Western civilization*. WW Norton & Company, New York.
[179] Ibid, p. 310.

agglomerations for global transfer. There needs to be a revival of Lefebvre's theses on the city calling for greater development of social urban spaces.

City form

The form of the city is dependent on both socioeconomic changes and technological advancements. City form is also contingent on competitive and political motives, and under the urban transformation of cities there is a trend to look upwards constructing taller buildings addressing constraints to expand horizontally. Jane Jacobs has long espoused for communities to sustain the convivial life within cities closing her seminal book *Death and Life of Great American Cities* with the statement "Dull, inert cities, it is true, do contain the seeds of their own destruction and little else. But lively, diverse, intense cities contain the seeds of their own regeneration, with energy enough to carry over for problems and needs outside themselves."[180] Jacobs suggests that cities, when looking introspectively contain all the ingredients to sustain themselves, but also when they are unresponsive, and where their locus of development is primarily external from themselves, they hold all the grounds for their demise. Cities constantly face this impasse, more so now considering the pace of urban development, global expansion and mobilities. Cities are also contingent on their citizens and should not be planned for finality. Oversimplifying city planning can lead to "unbuilding"[181] where city development is taken over by administrators and professional planners and built environment specialists are taken out of the decision-making loop. Madanipour has also considered the multi-dimensional essences of urban design and the challenges it faces in the twenty-first century.[182]

Following Nietzsche, Madanipour suggests that a multi-dimensional framework is required to understand the "role of urban design in the process of urban change".[183] This requires gathering the knowledge of regulators, producers and users, changing political, economic and cultural roles of stakeholders, and their interrelationships. The perspective of the producers have changed significantly due to market liberalisation where a greater portion of public infrastructure and amenities are delivered by the private sector, and governments act more as facilitators and intermediaries rather than providers. This

[180] Jacobs, J., 1961. *The death and life of great American cities*. Vintage, New York, p. 448.
[181] Ibid, p. 408.
[182] Madanipour, A., 2006. Roles and challenges of urban design. *Journal of Urban Design*, *11*(2), pp. 173-193.
[183] Ibid, p. 174.

change has also caused a shift in power where coalitions now sit in place of government. By shifting the view of urban design from a tool to beautify the city to a discipline that works to shape cities, there can be a broader public appeal to professionalise the process.[184]

Madanipour identifies four roles of the regulator: "making the city more competitive, helping shape the future of the city, managing change, and helping develop better governance arrangements".[185] Increasing city competitiveness works well with increased economic liberalisation where the private sector has taken a leading role. This is a reversal of governments that have shifted from providers to enablers and now support private development to provide these spaces. Managing change has also been difficult to manage where governments have been "under pressure from two fronts. From the economic side… and from the social side".[186] This has been difficult to achieve with fragmented forms of governance and leadership with a visible hegemony through the outcomes of urban design projects. Due to processes that may or may not be visible, the perspective of the user can be wildly differentiated and the fragmentation has been seen to increase social segregation rather than integration.[187] But these projects, due to their high visibility, may be pet projects of politicians. For example, Paul Keating took a keen interest in the development of Barangaroo Headland Park. Ultimately it is the responsibility of government to balance the provision of space so that there is an even tension between use and exchange value.[188] Achievement of such balance can work to reduce the likelihood of sociospatial segregation.

Through DeLanda, Dovey[189] introduces theories of assemblages, seen as a 'state of affairs' and "whose properties emerge from the interactions between parts".[190] This unordered system describes the chaotic nature of cities, an aggregate collection of such discrete objects such as buildings, trees, cars, footpaths, goods and people. But more than the objects, it is their relations and "the interconnections between public to private space".[191] Most importantly, assemblages are critical, avoiding essentialism and are

[184] Ibid, p. 178.
[185] Ibid, p. 180.
[186] Ibid, p. 183.
[187] Ibid, p. 186.
[188] Ibid, p. 190.
[189] Dovey, K., 2009. *Becoming places: urbanism/architecture/identity/power.* Routledge, London.
[190] Ibid, p. 16.
[191] Ibid, p. 16.

contextually determined. Assemblages also move past the interactions and connectivities between objects and also depend on the relations to space, the spatial experience of phenomenology. Spaces exhibit territory and exert direct control on its inhabitants. Although architects and urban designers lack the gravitas in the supply of capital, they have the ability to mediate these experiences through specification of materials and products, and the programmatic form of space contributing to the "deep complicities of place with power".[192]

Dovey suggests that there are four forms of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic, with symbolic the most problematic to define.[193] Through Bourdieu, "the production of symbolic capital is a kind of 'alchemy' through which social class divisions become naturalised."[194] Symbolic capital often depends on an arbiter that generates distinction from other forms of cultural production, but moreover depends on context and distinction and that "if everyone gets 'good' architecture, no one wins the symbolic capital".[195] As a discipline of image production, architects are complicit in the production of symbolic capital and are embedded in these circuits of power, and architecture "always mediates spatial practices in a semi-coercive manner, it enables and constrains; the question is not whether but how it does so and in whose interests".[196] This inherent disciplinary responsibility imbues an architecture of potentiality and a potency to contribute to a critical urban future.

In this post-modern age of increasing mobilities where cities are sold on image production, the hegemony of corporate governance continues to place emphasis on the construction of cosmetic precincts for cosmopolitan audiences. As global cities become entangled in competition with one another, the developmental agenda of the city for its citizens and residents becomes discarded and displaced by the seduction of a dominant neoliberal discourse. Post-industrial development of Sydney's foreshore has historically favoured corporate interests leading to a commoditised and homogenised environment. This consolidation of power calls for a renewed urgency to undertake research on the construction of these developments so that there may be viable alternatives to business as usual development practices.

[192] Ibid, p. 33.
[193] Ibid, pp.33-35.
[194] Ibid, p. 35.
[195] Ibid, p. 35.
[196] Ibid, p. 45.

This introduction has reviewed literature relevant to the Barangaroo project. The emergent nature of the Barangaroo project has necessitated a literature review situating the development both within Australia and in a global context. The literature has been critical of Barangaroo and megaprojects in general. The outcomes of such developments are often mono-focused, emphasising the economic imperative over the social outcomes that are delivered. This literature is grounded in a theoretical framework that takes its foundation from Habermas' conception of the public sphere. This idea is developed through more contemporary theorists and practitioners updating the theory and applied to the twenty-first century. Also of prominence are the relations and imbalances of power that favour private interests. The neoliberal context of development prioritises the requirements of the business elite that have displaced government formations allowing these organisations to directly shape the spaces of the city and steer policy to their benefit. Finally this introduction elaborated on the network structure of cities, offering theories of assemblages as a way to view the complex relations of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital.

CHAPTER 1. EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE FORESHORE: IN ANTICIPATION OF BARANGAROO

Foreshore development has long been important to the growth of port cities with Sydney no exception. Contemporary waterfront development in Sydney began with another international design competition in 1956 for the iconic cultural space of the Sydney Opera House won by Jorn Utzon. The Sydney Opera House was completed in 1973. The 1970s were also a time of a strategic reconfiguration of the economic outlook and structure, with Australia opening up its economic borders, calling for international investment, recognising Asia as of key importance to maintain growth and establishing its standing on the global stage. This chapter begins with a brief overview of key moments in the political economy of Sydney's development in the period post 1970, then examines the impacts of globalisation on the development of policy and the spatial changes occurring in the city. The chapter concludes with contemporary waterfront developments in the areas surrounding the Barangaroo development.

Political economy of the city

As Australia emerged from the post-World War II reconstruction in the 1940s and 1950s, the internalisation of its labour market and Keynesian economic system could no longer sustain the growth trajectories of an increasingly internationalised global order. By the late 1970s manufacturing had shifted from a Fordist to post-Fordist mode of production.[1] Sydney's development as an 'accidental city'[2] required significant structural change to align with the requirements of becoming a global city.

The shift from to a post-Fordist mode of production must be seen in light of the County of Cumberland Plan (1948) that promoted the development of suburban town centres as a response to the excessive congestion of the central Sydney area.[3] Although this plan prevented suburban expansion into greenfield areas by establishing a greenbelt, the lack of urban consolidation and low-density suburban expansion continued without effective

[1] Searle, G. and Cardew, R., 2000. Planning, economic development and the spatial outcomes of market liberalisation. *Urban Policy and Research*, *18*(3), pp. 355-376.
[2] Ashton, P., 1993. *Accidental city: planning Sydney since 1788*. Hale & Iremonger, Sydney
[3] Searle, G., 2002. The demise of place equity in Sydney's economic development planning. *Australian Geographer*, *33*(3), pp. 317-336.

employment centres in these suburbs.[4] This was also a process of decentralisation shifting the geographical centre of Sydney west towards the new manufacturing centres at the city's edges during the long boom from the 1950s to 1970s. This mix of heavy and light industry was clustered around growth areas and aligned to main roads[5] that linked to major distribution centres, and rail and port connections.

The 'long boom'[6] of consistent and significant levels of growth was a product of the period following the signing of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 that sought to undo the economic malaise of the interwar period, introducing stability, suburban development and slum clearance of the city suburbs such as Woolloomooloo. Spatially, urban growth expanded to the south-west and western suburbs from Liverpool to Blacktown[7] and new industrial estates grew in these outer suburban zones.[8] Although liberalisation began to weaken the insulation from global linkages, protectionism of inefficient manufacturing kept subsidies at a significant level until the 1970s and 1980s[9] under John McEwen, the federal Minister for Trade and Industry. Eventually the lack of investment capital to pour into burgeoning industrial expansion required access to a pool of foreign direct investment.[10]

A growing trend to expand the spatial links and internationalise Australian industries caused an intensification of regional competition, with Melbourne and Sydney, the two largest Australian capitals in direct competition. Sydney did not have a clear lead in the title for largest manufacturing sector as Melbourne had at times displaced Sydney during the 'long boom' years.[11] The geographic dispersal of the manufacturing sector proved difficult to optimise as tariff and protections began to be wound back in the 1980s[12] and the sector required significant restructuring to become competitive in a global market.

[4] Ibid, p. 320.
[5] Fagan, R., 2000. Industrial change in the global city: Sydney's new spaces of production, in *Sydney: The emergence of a world city*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pp. 144-166.
[6] Gleeson, B.J. and Low, N., 2000. *Australian urban planning: New challenges, new agendas*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp. 24-25.
[7] Freestone, R., 2000. Planning Sydney: historical trajectories and contemporary debates. *Sydney: The emergence of a world city*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, p. 126.
[8] Fagan, R., 2000, p. 147.
[9] Capling, A., Crozier, M. and Considine, M., 1998. *Australian politics in the global era*. Addison Wesley Longman, pp. 29-30. Incentives were also given for industry to relocate to areas outside Sydney, see Searle,, 2002, p. 320.
[10] Ibid, p. 30.
[11] Fagan, R., 2000, p. 145.
[12] Fagan, R. and Webber, M.J., 1999. *Global restructuring: the Australian experience*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pp. 121-122.

The financial and information services sector, lacking the spatial dispersion and protectionist intervention, had less trouble integrating in an era of globalisation.[13] These structural changes caused heavy losses of employment in the manufacturing sector with nearly 178,000 jobs lost in Sydney between 1970 and 1985,[14] and the majority of manufacturing employment located in the middle zones of Auburn, Parramatta, and Bankstown.[15] The recession of 1982, the worst in 50 years, pushed the NSW Government led by Premier Neville Wran to attract jobs and investment to the state with the Darling Harbour development to be delivered in the bicentenary in 1988 as the centrepiece of that strategy. [16]

In 1996 the conservative Australian Government under Prime Minister John Howard[17] reorganised federal policy winding back further the protections of industry, as even the motor vehicle industry was not immune to these changes.[18] Reduced protections and increasing deregulation in the 1990s led to an increasingly market-led determination of economic and social life.[19] This, in turn with the growing competitiveness of rapidly industrialising Asia-Pacific nations and Japan, pushed for the policy for integration of production, trade and finance to address these global changes impacting Australian trade. Along with the declining base of manufacturing employment and a trend towards internationalisation of the capital cities and growth of the financial and information service industries, Sydney became the Australian base for regional headquarters in the Asia-Pacific region.[20] This spatial reorientation led to the centralisation of capital to be more heavily concentrated in the city.

The first real push to revitalise the city came with the Darling Harbour development run by the NSW Government from 1984 to 1988. This decade saw the waning of planning by the city council and the NSW Government[21] increasing control, with the spatial bounds of the city occupying potential sites to capitalise on developing Sydney's global credentials. This was also a period of financial reform deregulating the markets from

[13] Ibid, p. 126.
[14] Fagan, R., 2000, p. 149.
[15] Ibid, p. 152.
[16] Searle, G., 2002, p. 322.
[17] John Howard was the 25th Prime Minister of Australia serving from 1996-2007.
[18] Fagan, R. and Webber, M.J., 1999, pp. 147-148.
[19] Ibid, p. 150.
[20] Daly, M. and Pritchard, B., 2000. Sydney: Australia's financial and corporate capital. *Sydney: the emergence of a world city*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pp. 167-188.
[21] Punter, J., 2005. Urban design in central Sydney 1945–2002: laissez-faire and discretionary traditions in the accidental city. *Progress in Planning*, *63*(1), pp. 11-160, see p. 68.

1983 to 1985 during Paul Keating's tenure as federal Treasurer.[22] The reforms included floating the dollar, removing capital controls and allowing the entry of foreign banks. This consolidated Sydney's position as the financial capital of Australia and laid the foundations for a 24/7 city. By 1998, these changes gave Sydney (and by extension Australia) a competitive position in the Asia-Pacific region competing with Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan.[23]

Advances in technology, shifts towards producer services and increasing mobility and tourist flows have shaped the spatial configuration of Sydney prioritising these uses and their development. Hu, Blakely and Zhou suggest that "urban competitiveness takes its roots in the competitiveness of industries and firms", later adding "urban or regional competitiveness is essentially about economic competitiveness, and is measured by economic success".[24] This functional overlap of firms and industries, and economic competitiveness emphasises the importance of economic development in the makeup of the city and its influences. With this dominant hegemony of private firms and industries influencing and often overpowering governments, they have greater power to dictate the spatial outcomes in cities.

The neoliberal policies promoted since the 1980s have integrated Sydney into the global network of cities competing both regionally and globally. The influences of international development have shaped the spatial condition by developing manufacturing centres in a suburban belt followed by a contraction as these industries failed to integrate by lack of competitiveness and consolidation. Just as the industries moved from the edges of Sydney CBD to the outer metropolitan region, residential trends faced the oppositie direction with slum clearance in the inner city attracting high-income workers and tourists to the central city. This push-pull effect of globalisation of the spatial configuration and political economy of Sydney has been consistently uneven in that it has consolidated affluence in the inner ring and poverty on the outskirts suffering from a heritage of poor planning, the ailments of urban sprawl and poor public transport and infrastructure. The design and implementation of successive regional plans have had mixed results in an attempt to push economic advancement and aim for full employment

[22] Daly, M. and Pritchard, B., 2000, p. 174.
[23] Ibid, p. 176.
[24] Hu, R., Blakely, E.J. and Zhou, Y., 2013. Benchmarking the competitiveness of Australian global cities: Sydney and Melbourne in the global context. *Urban Policy and Research*, *31*(4), pp. 435-452.

but Sydney's endowments, both geographical and strategic, have allowed it to become a headquarter city attracting a mix of financial and information services firms and also to become a tourist destination through a series of successful, though controversial developments.

Global competition: Local impacts

Sydney in the twenty-first century, viewed from nearly any measure, is an international, global city. Its geographical isolation required self-sufficient economies that suited a predominately agricultural society in the nineteenth century. With the impacts of the two World Wars and the Depression between, it is inevitable that global influences affected the urban development of Australian cities.

Since the end of World War II, the post-war reconstruction followed global dictates with the Bretton Woods agreement to establish a common denomination for global trade.[25] Australia, a former convict settlement, historically relied on immigration to support its population. The post-war period saw an increasingly multicultural diaspora with the gradual dismantling of the 'White Australia' policy in 1973[26] partly due to not being able to fulfil an immigration quota through traditionally white English, North American and Western European nations. This increase in diversity of cultural backgrounds was also spatially apparent in the formation of communities such as the Vietnamese in Cabramatta and a consolidation of the pre-war establishments of an Italian community in Leichhardt.[27] These communities were augmented by chain migrations by allowing family members to join those who had already immigrated to Australia or by allowing those with specialist skills to also immigrate.[28] New migrants took a large proportion of blue-collar factory and manufacturing jobs and they were impacted through restructuring processes and deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s.

Along with the cultural changes on the surface in the 1970s and 1980s, the structural changes of globalisation were more acute due to the exogenous nature of the process and relations. With the impacts of globalisation becoming more pronounced, a polarisation

[25] Stilwell, F., 2011. *Political economy: The contest of economic ideas*. OUP Catalogue, London. p. XI.
[26] Burnley, I.H., 2000. Diversity and difference: Immigration and the multicultural city. *Sydney: the emergence of a world city*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pp. 244-272.
[27] Ibid, p. 254.
[28] Ibid, p. 245.

between the cities and suburbs pushed the issues of urban development back to a federal level with the Labor federal government creating a new Department of Urban and Regional Development following the 1972 election.[29]

During the late 1960s and 1970s a series of global events prompted the call for a major economic restructuring. A lack of Western technological innovation pushed down profits and wages, the advancement of Japanese production provided competition and the impact of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries greatly increased the cost of crude oil.[30] The growth of transnational corporations had also emerged during this time as well as the supporting technological infrastructure to support this. With the possibilities of global expansion firms were open to strategies to reduce costs including shifting production to low-wage markets of South America and South East Asia or adopting technological advancements that led to greater efficiencies although conversely a deskilling of employment by replacing unskilled workers.[31]

The economic restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s also had significant spatial impacts. As manufacturing employment consistently shed jobs, development was now focused on cities to enable a receptive environment to attract newly contingent transnational firms and a location for their regional headquarters. Aging industrial precincts in the Sydney CBD and city fringe that were no longer productive were ripe for redevelopment and concurrent gentrification. Inner city suburbs like Darlinghurst were already developing a convivial environment through sociocultural renewal, and the creative and gay communities that had moved in due to low rents were now part of the gentrification process.[32]

Functionally urban transformation through the creative class is quite different from the top-down process of business-oriented development. The former is a generative process that is adaptive and considers historical development. The latter is a strategic opportunistic endeavour that seeks to dominate the contextual condition and assert control on a macroscopic level influencing the politics, policy and spatial fabric of the city. Each transformative process is fundamentally a response to a market system but

[29] Forster, C., 1999. *Australian cities: continuity and change*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, p. 27.
[30] Ibid, p. 28.
[31] Ibid, p. 30.
[32] See Florida, R., 2005. *Cities and the creative class*. Routledge, London.

each from a different level, one responding at a local level and the other at a global. The market-based system that is inherently global consolidates existing inequalities and displaces the hierarchy of government where governance structures support these market-driven developments.

In Sydney the 1980s was a time of significant economic and social change that led to "both expansion and concentration in the City Centre".[33] The global imperative saw the revitalisation of Sydney's aging industrial waterfronts and a pro-development agenda dominated the urban restructuring. The end of the 'long boom' also saw a shifting spatial concentration of services firms clustering in Sydney,[34] displacing Melbourne as the financial capital of Australia. These changes were linked to the mining boom with Sydney also increasing its links to the Asia-Pacific region. The 1980s were also a time of significant political power struggles in Sydney with the Labor NSW Government dismissing the Labor City Council because of their opposition to development in the Central Business District.[35] Mired in controversy, the NSW Government asserted its authority and pushed through a series of developments to launch Sydney as a global city.

The Darling Harbour development from 1984 to 1988 reflects the global imperative of city development and the need to attract the *tourist gaze*. Proposed as a project to celebrate Australia's Bicentenary in 1988, the project was remarkably optimistic transforming 54 hectares of industrial waterfront into mixed-use tourist, entertainment, convention and exhibition facilities. The imperative of the development saw the creation of the Darling Harbour Authority, an agency appointed by the NSW Government to oversee and authorise the development. The use of the project to generate iconic status for the precinct proceeded without due consideration of the social context.[36] This was an exercise in the efficiency and power of the NSW Government to deliver a heavily conflicted public project, delivered through a Public Private Partnership.

The 1980s was also a time of shifting the focus of economic generation. Although there was an increase in exports, the outward flow of capital greatly exceeded its importation with the Australian current account deficit rising from A$5.5 billion to $A22.3 billion in

[33] Hu, R., 2012. Shaping a global Sydney: the City of Sydney's planning transformation in the 1980s and 1990s. *Planning Perspectives*, *27*(3), pp. 347-368.
[34] Fagan, R., 2000, p. 158.
[35] Punter, J., 2005, p. 67.
[36] Daly, M. and Malone, P., 1996, pp. 96-97.

the 1980s[37] and there was a desperate need to find new avenues of revenue generation. The development reflected the ambition of the NSW Government and also its hubris. A casino was also planned but ultimately the selected Hooker-Harrah consortium was revealed to have had underworld links to the United States delaying the eventual construction of the casino.[38] The resolution of the Darling Harbour development was mostly agreeable but the process that was undertaken removed a great deal of public confidence, with the development lacking due process and consultation and with heavily opaque procedural processes.

One of the most contentious pieces of the development is the now removed monorail line (that was removed in 2013) that sought to connect the development with the rest of the city and "symbolized the government's arrogance and the tendency to put political advantage and private economic ambitions before essential development and the public interest"[39] with the physical tangibility of the monorail development the reason for its significant public opposition.[40] Although the development of State-endorsed iconic developments have became more prominent later in the twentieth century, significant effects of State intervention in the post-war construction can be traced to floor space ratio bonuses in the early 1970s designed to increase the density of city development.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Sydney was a moderate metropolis with regulation restricting building heights to 150 feet.[41] In context, these controls suited the neoclassical buildings and sandstone terraces of the previous century but faced conflict with the inevitable necessity of the requirement for modern office buildings. The controls of 1912 were overturned with the *Heights of Buildings Amendment Act 1957*[42] giving the Minister powers to approve buildings that breached the 150 feet limit under an expert committee, the Height of Buildings Advisory Committee. Although the increase certainly allowed for increased density, the allowance for taller buildings resulted in new building typologies with block consolidations having a negative impact and "further erosion of the city's fine grain of building frontages".[43] The early stages of redevelopment were dominated by

[37] Ibid, p. 95.
[38] Ibid, p. 102.
[39] Ibid, p. 101.
[40] Turnbull, L.H., 1999. *Sydney: Biography of a city*. Random House, Sydney, p. 317.
[41] Punter, J., 2005, p. 20.
[42] Ibid, p. 26.
[43] Ibid, p. 38.

Australian and foreign firms and British insurance companies.[44] There was a slow start in the construction of taller buildings but by 1966 several buildings greater than 20 floors had been built with Harry Seidler's Australia Square reaching 183 metres and finished in 1967.[45]

The speculative development of high-rise buildings was a worldwide phenomenon. The founder of Lend Lease, Jozef Dusseldorp, had the foresight to limit his investment before office development reached its peak, announcing that Lend Lease will be moving into "shopping centres and other avenues".[46] The continued supply and development of office space was unrelenting with 1.3 million square metres supplied between 1960 and 1973, an additional 577,000 square metres from 1973 to 1975 and a further 195,000 square metres already certain beyond 1975.[47] By 1973, landowners were already offering discounts of up to 20 per cent and other inducements like one year free rent to attract tenants in an oversupplied market.

The floor space ratio bonus system was a scheme that was also designed to encourage developers to deliver public amenities such as public space improvements that the city council could not pay for.[48] This was a thoroughly ineffective system that often gave developers unbridled freedom to push the bounds of the floor space ratio limits to secure approval for significantly greater limits. For instance, the AMP building by PTW Architects had an agreed floor space ratio of 15.5:1 but the final ratio stretched to 18.7:1.[49] This locus of development was clearly geared towards economic advantage and attracting global firms. Consequently the development of the public realm was ignored with very little public gain during this period of unchecked development. A 1971 Strategic Plan was formulated seeking to action a series of controls and "positively to prescribe the space about buildings… the height, floor space, use, design, external appearance or character of buildings".[50] This plan was not adopted by the NSW Government and remained non-statutory even after 1988.

[44] Daly, M.T., 1982. *Sydney boom, Sydney bust*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p. 43.
[45] Punter, J., 2005, p. 36.
[46] Daly, M.T., 1982, p. 60.
[47] Ibid, p. 62.
[48] Punter, J., 2005, p. 45.
[49] Ibid, p. 33.
[50] City of Sydney, in Ibid, p. 49.

The next phase of development was in the period of the 1980s with the landmark Darling Harbour development aligned with the 1988 Bicentenary. The Darling Harbour development was more than a revitalisation project for Sydney and the Sydney region because, as the gateway to the Asia-Pacific and other global destinations, Sydney was also a gateway to the rest of Australia.[51]

The central location of Darling Harbour to Sydney allowed it to serve as a working port most prominently prior to World War II. Changes in global shipping standards and a shift to larger ships requiring deeper piers meant ships were no longer able to berth at Darling Harbour. After the establishment of Port Botany in the 1960s, the shipping facilities at Darling Harbour began to wind down, and by the 1970s the precinct became derelict. The former port also supported complementary industrial developments including the CSR sugar refinery and the adjacent power station.[52] Sydney, already with a sufficient supply of offices for its transnational corporations to work in, now needed somewhere for them to play. The development was hindered by lack of consensus in the 1970s with the NSW Government refused funding from the federal government to support the development.[53] However, this changed with the intention of making the development form part of the 1988 Bicentenary celebrations. Darling Harbour formed part of a larger set of cultural facilities including the Art Gallery of New South Wales and the Australian Museum.

With one of the primary goals of the development to maximise financial gains to the government[54] it was not surprising that a casino was part of the development. Although the casino development was delayed by nearly a decade, the conditions of its development captured just as much attention for the conflicting circumstances that surrounded the process. Prompted by the NSW Government's $A450 million investment in Darling Harbour, estimates provided by the NSW Treasury suggested that up to $A100 million revenue could be captured by the new casino.[55] Facing objection from citizens, residents and the City of Sydney Council, the NSW Government eventually settled on situating the casino at the former Pyrmont Power Station. Pyrmont was a

[51] Daly, M. and Pritchard, B., 2000, p. 180.
[52] Searle, G., 2013. Case study window-discourse, doctrine and habitus: redevelopment contestation on Sydney's harbor-edge. In *The Ashgate research companion to planning and culture*, pp. 135-152.
[53] Daly, M. and Malone, P., 1996, p. 98.
[54] Ibid, p. 98.
[55] Ibid, p. 102.

working class residential neighbourhood whose character would be completely dominated not just by the spatial characteristics of the casino, but also the traffic impacts and clientele that the casino would attract. The benefits for the NSW Government were irresistible with the winning tender paying the government a total of $A376 million for the casino licence, 12 years payment on the 99-year lease and associated taxes generated from operating revenue.[56]

Like the Darling Harbour development, the NSW Government took control of the casino development. Although contravening state planning policy (State Regional Environmental Plan No. 26), and the government's statutory urban development plan for the area, the NSW Government gazetted *State Environmental Planning Policy 41* allowing the casino resort on site, and giving the NSW Minister for Planning rights to approve the development.[57] Unsurprisingly given the opaqueness of this process and lack of consultation with the residents, there was little consensus on the casino development, but it still went ahead and was completed in 1997. The success of the casino development reveals the structural shift of development signifying the importance of entertainment and recreational facilities in a growing tourist market. Nevertheless there are critiques of the Disneyfication of the precinct with urbanist Jan Gehl referring to Darling Harbour as "too much of a theme park"[58] and impersonal and homogenous.

In late 2016, Barangaroo is the last piece of the harbour to be developed but a series of redevelopments have also been undertaken to increase Sydney's competitive standing with the other Australian state capital cities, especially on the eastern seaboard. The convention centre in Darling Harbour, less than 20 years old, has been demolished and rebuilt to once again meet international standards and the IMAX theatre has been approved to be redeveloped into a mixed-use building with retail, cinema, serviced apartments and hotel rising 24 stories and 94 metres between the inbound and outbound lanes of the Western Distributor.

Economic and competitive interests have heavily driven development in Sydney in the late twentieth century. Spatial transformation of the city centre has been business friendly

[56] Searle, G. and Bounds, M., 1999. State powers, state land and competition for global entertainment: the case of Sydney. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *23*(1), pp. 165-172.
[57] Ibid, p. 169.
[58] Edwards, D., Griffin, T. and Hayllar, B., 2010. Darling Harbour: Looking back and moving forward. *City spaces–Tourist places*. Butterworth-Heinemann, London, p. 288.

attracting transnational corporations and displacing Melbourne as Australia's most global city, with Sydney becoming the preferred choice of global and regional headquarters at the expense of public space development and social cohesion at street level. Developments have also shifted from smaller lots to block-scale developments eroding the fine-grain development frontages of previous decades. The NSW Government has also increasingly intervened in important developments using its power to approve developments that contravene existing policies, augmenting their approval through the gazetting of more agreeable policy. Collectively these developments have created urban environments that function to attract tourism and fiscal stability, while neglecting the social agenda of city development. The following section outlines a genealogy of waterfront developments that helps situate the Barangaroo development.

Waterfront developments surrounding Barangaroo

For thousands of years, an indigenous Aboriginal population were the caretakers of the land. The traditional owners of the Sydney City region are the Gadigal people[59] of the Eora group, and they encountered Captain Cook in 1770 at Botany Bay and the First Fleet in 1788.[60] One of the first to make contact with the English was Bennelong, a senior member of the tribe[61] whom Bennelong Point was named after. Along with Bennelong, Colbee, another senior male member, and Barangaroo, a wife of Bennelong, were prominent in early documentation interacting with the English. Barangaroo was recognised as a strong willed and attractive woman[62] and appeared to hold sway with Bennelong. The Aboriginal relation to country was a cultural and land rights issue not understood by the English. It is important to note that Barangaroo was from the Cameragal group that habited the Lower North Shore area north of the harbour[63] and not Gadigal land on the south of the harbour where the Barangaroo precinct is named. This relationship contributes to the conflict in naming the precinct.

In the early days Darling Harbour was a difficult place to develop due to its rocky outcrops and steep terrain. Sydney Cove, now Circular Quay to the east, functioned as the primary port for the settlement and by the turn of the nineteenth century,

[59] Austral Archaeology, 2010. *Barangaroo Archaeological Assessment & Management Plan Final Report*, p. 11.
[60] Turnbull, L.H., 1999, p. 23.
[61] Ibid, p. 24.
[62] Austral Archaeology, 2010, p. 14.
[63] Karskens, G., 2014. Barangaroo and the Eora fisherwomen. *Dictionary of Sydney*.

development slowly swept down to the west with Walsh Bay receiving a scattering of buildings[64]. An eventual meandering towards Darling Harbour was visible in Meehan's *Plan of the Town of Sydney* in 1807. The early settlers also brought with them diseases that the Aborigines had no immunity to and the Gadigal clan was reduced from fifty to three members in 1791.[65]

Although Cockle Bay was opened in 1811, it was renamed Darling Harbour in 1826 after Governor Darling.[66] The naturally deep waters from Darling Harbour to Walsh Bay suited its maritime use prompting the construction of wharves allowing coastal trade to begin in the 1840s.[67] Originally reaching deeper inland, land reclamation of the foreshore began in the 1830s and continued through to the 1850s with the construction of public ports and private jetties accommodating the booming coastal trade.[68]

By the 1850s the Industrial Revolution was underway with the developments in Europe and Britain reaching Australia.[69] By 1865 Sydney had experienced another stage of growth partly fuelled by incoming capital from Britain and the gold rush centred in Melbourne. This period was also a time of great transformation of the city fuelled by growth in industry and export markets.[70] Ports expanded into Woolloomooloo and the existing Walsh Bay and Darling Harbour continued to develop supplementing Sydney Cove. This intensification consolidated Sydney's waterfront development requiring significant warehousing and stores close to the harbour. This rapid increase in productive uses required the construction of housing in nearby Millers Point and Pyrmont for workers.[71] By the 1880s it was becoming apparent that the existing ports were no longer sufficient to keep up with the increasing activity on the waterfront and land reclamation continued, enabling a goods railway yard to be constructed with the rail-sea interchange[72] shifting goods inland through what was known as the Goods Line.[73] By 1886 the

[64] Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2006. *East Darling Harbour History*. Unpublished document, p. 4.
[65] Turnbull, L.H., 1999, p. 33.
[66] Fitzgerald, S. and Keating, C.J., 1991. *Millers Point: the urban village*. Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, p. 11.
[67] Proudfoot, P.R., 1996. *Seaport Sydney: the making of the city landscape*. University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, p. 20.
[68] Ibid, pp. 30-31.
[69] Ibid, p. 34.
[70] Ibid, p. 58.
[71] Turnbull, L.H., 1999, p. 313.
[72] Ibid, p. 314.
[73] The Goods Line was a significant rail corridor connecting Darling Harbour with the Western Suburbs. The last train ran in 1984 and it has recently undergone renewal into an urban park and pedestrian corridor.

wharves had been upgraded to handle larger ships and cargo. This shift in development to cater to the industry at the time had an effect on the existing cottage industry present at Millers Point, clearing these small-scale enterprises in favour of large warehouses.[74]

During this time, Millers Point was an area of mixed demographics serving both wharf workers and reforming gentlemen. It unfortunately also contained shanties that lacked suitable sewerage and sanitation facilities and the areas around the wharves succumbed to an outbreak of the Bubonic Plague in 1900 spread by the rats onboard incoming ships.[75] This outbreak prompted a reorganisation of administration of the port's operations, finally overcoming the laissez-faire attitude harboured through decades-long domination of a business-oriented council.

The establishment of the Sydney Harbour Trust in 1900 sought to bring the port into line with international standards of port administration[76] and also to consolidate a mosaic of mostly private wharves into an industry that could be more effectively governed and managed.[77] Although Millers Point was not so badly affected by the plagues, this central administrative body was able to better effectively manage and refurbish the entire shoreline and transferring these properties into public ownership simplified the agenda to construct a bridge across the harbour to connect to the North Shore.[78]

During the early twentieth century, the collective impacts of World War I, The Depression and World War II stood in the way of any significant urban transformations. The growth in vessel size also meant that fewer vessels were needed to transport the same amount of tonnage, reducing the frequency of ships arriving and increasing the precarious nature of dock work.[79] The increase in vessel size also requiring reconfiguring the ports with the small wharves replaced by 1925 with longer and wider piers.[80] This also overlapped with the construction of the Sydney Harbour Bridge beginning in 1923 and completed in 1932.

[74] Fitzgerald, S. and Keating, C.J., 1991, p. 47.
[75] Ibid, p. 63.
[76] Ibid, p. 71.
[77] Proudfoot, P.R., 1996, p. 63.
[78] Fitzgerald, S. and Keating, C.J., 1991, p. 73.
[79] Ibid, p. 85.
[80] Proudfoot, P.R., 1996, p. 171.

Little changed at the docks until the 1950s, and the late 1950s and early 1960s saw the impacts of the post-war boom. Rising wages, construction of highways, and growth in suburban development encouraged a life in the suburbs on larger blocks. As there was a residential shift towards the inner ring of suburbs, a collective relaxing of building height restrictions and a bid to capture transnational corporation headquarters, there was a boom in construction in Sydney city.[81] Once again, global trends in shipping technologies standardising containerisation and roll on roll off cargo handling required upgrades to the piers, widening of the berths and an expansion to Port Botany to keep up with demand.[82] As the Port Botany facility opened in the 1960s, the majority of container trade shifted there due to inadequate connections to railways, noise and congestion in residential areas and poor roadways in Sydney.

Darling Harbour was first considered in 1971 for redevelopment into a mixed-use precinct that would contain open space, markets and residential development.[83] It was not until 1984 that the public first interacted with a most contested development as Premier Wran announced the project would be completed for the Bicentenary in 1988. Collectively, the Darling Harbour development and Pyrmont casino preceed the pattern of development to the Barangaroo development. They are responses to develop unproductive post-industrial waterfronts through Public Private Partnerships delivering a mixed-use precinct that is both business-friendly and functions to either position or reinforce Sydney as a global city.

Darling Harbour has remarkable resemblance to the conditions surrounding the Barangaroo development. In both cases the NSW Government took particular care in drafting its own acts to manage the project, with the *Darling Harbour Authority Act* and the *Barangaroo Delivery Authority Act*. These authorities are both run with NSW Government appointed administrators while they are both the landowner and decision maker for the development. These two developments are also at odds with not only the public but also professional organisations such as the Australian Institute of Architects and the Planning Institute of Australia. The concerns raised cover not just the domain of architecture, urban design and urban planning, but also the democratic procedures and due process, governance, trust and legitimacy of the organisation in charge.

[81] Fitzgerald, S. and Keating, C.J., 1991, p. 104.
[82] Proudfoot, P.R., 1996, pp. 80-81.
[83] Turnbull, L.H., 1999, p. 316.

The Pyrmont casino development, a result of accumulated government debt, was delayed because none of the proponents were able to pass their probity checks.[84] This development sits within a residential neighbourhood and to ensure that the development could proceed without delay the site was rezoned for redevelopment, the NSW Minister for Planning was the consent authority and a State Environmental Planning Policy was gazetted to approve the development.[85] Once again the economic imperative completely overshadowed the sociospatial implications of the development. Place identity and heritage seem to matter little in the context of finance and debt.

Most recently, the residential heritage of Millers Point is again being sold to raise revenue for the NSW Government.[86] The irresistible temptation for capitalisation abounds in Millers Point.[87] In line with the branding for revitalising the precinct, the NSW Government has launched an accompanying website to promote its world class credentials.[88] This development is highly controversial not just for the potential loss of heritage, but also because of the relocation of social housing residents, many of them residents for over 80 years.

The urban restructuring of Sydney has exhibited many of the characteristics of other global waterfront cities. The emergence from World War II was a time of unbridled connectivity drawing heavily from international relations. It is arguable that Sydney has always been global. Facilitated by its colonial past, reliance on international trade and impacts by global events, Sydney has developed its own particular characteristics through internal restructuring, government intervention and protectionist policies. The discordant development policies that promoted the development of traditional industries were unable to compete with global markets once these protections were released. The terms of open markets have also prompted an urban restructuring to capitalise on these demands, surpassing Melbourne as the economic powerhouse of Australia.

[84] Ibid, p. 318.
[85] Searle, G. and Byrne, J., 2002. Selective memories, sanitised futures: constructing visions of future place in Sydney. *Urban Policy and Research*, *20*(1), pp. 7-25.
[86] Pham, K., 2016. Clearing stock of the invisible: The impact of cosmopolitan power on the supply of affordable housing. In Day, K (ed.) *AMPS Conference Publication Series 7. Future Housing: Global Cities and regional Problems.* Swinburne University, Melbourne, 09 – 10 June (2016), pp. 83-92.
[87] The estimate for the sale of 290 properties is $500 million, accessed 30 November 2016 from https://www.property.nsw.gov.au/millers-point-0
[88] See https://rediscovermillerspoint.com.au/

Sydney has successfully navigated the change from a manufacturing heavy economy to a service centre attracting the majority of transnational corporations' regional and global headquarters predominately to the CBD through provision of office space, and through the natural endowment of its landmarks. Although the city has catered for an international audience, development control is overwhelmingly geared towards the developer. The economic imperative has also seized governance issues, approving controversial developments over the social impact like the casino development in Pyrmont. These decisions are repeatedly facilitated raising the public's distrust of government *and* governance.

This chapter has collated a brief history of urban development in Sydney, in the Australian context. Facing globalisation, the city of Sydney has grown in importance to capture the attention of international markets. This has also cleaved the terrain of the city marking spatial distinction through landmark projects intended for a global audience. Considering the waterfront developments in Sydney over the last 30 years there is a clear emphasis to engage the *tourist gaze* while also attracting business interests. Equity in the public domain in a concern that is rightfully held by its citizens questioning the legitimacy of the political class. The following chapters detail the elements of the Barangaroo precinct development and evaluate the processes, urban form and implications of megaprojects in waterfront cities in the twenty-first century.

CHAPTER 2. BARANGAROO – THE COMPETITION

Barangaroo, a landmark megaproject and urban regeneration proposal, began in 2005 as an international design competition calling for ideas to transform an unused dock into a mixed-use precinct worthy of world city status. The politics and lack of transparency surrounding the process has generated conflict from the community and professional organisations. The iterative development over the past 50 years has seen the waterfront gradually transform from a working class harbour into a cosmopolitan urban landscape with the Barangaroo development completing the foreshore. This chapter begins with a documentation of the competition detailing the organisation of the competition, the shortlist and judging panel, and the competition criteria. A detailed examination follows, expanding on the jury comments and drawing relations to the competition design panels and the resultant scheme. The final section details the politics surrounding the development situating it within a local context and against the imperative of sustaining the global status of Sydney.

Call for entries

The working harbour of the previous century is no longer functional with an increasingly mobile citizenry. The transformation of Sydney's Darling Harbour and Millers Point has also progressively shifted from a traditional working harbour moving physical goods to the transference of the immaterial following the flows of information and capital. These collective changes provided opportunities for the continued remediation and revitalisation of East Darling Harbour cohesively connecting Darling Harbour and Millers Point to form a "cultural ribbon"[1] along the entire foreshore from Pyrmont east to Woolloomooloo.

As the bulk of shipping and container traffic and use had shifted to Port Botany and Port Kembla, the conditions were suitable for remediation and redevelopment. The NSW Government officially launched a competition as the East Darling Harbour International Urban Design Competition with a call for entries in May 2005.[2] This open, international

[1] Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners (RSH+P), 2014. *Master Plan*, p. 25.
[2] NSW Government, 2005. *East Darling Harbour Sydney Urban Design Competition* 2005.

competition was promoted as a one in one-hundred year opportunity[3] and attracted 137 entries in the first stage closing two months later on 20 July 2005. The competition brief was both wide and open in its aspirations mandating a built environment that aims to be forward looking, positioning Sydney as a competitive node in global attractiveness to business and tourism. These grand aspirations also allowed for a great degree of interpretation with limited structured deliverables anchored by comments like "Proposals that differ from this will be considered by the Jury, subject to the urban design merits of the proposal".[4] This 'openness' of the competition by itself was not a problem had the competition proceeded in a transparent mode of delivery but the implied importance of the site and its position on the harbour as the last open foreshore site in Sydney allowed the NSW Government to take control over the local council. This is a narrative that has been repeated through nearly all waterfront developments in Sydney in the last 50 years, from the finger wharves at Woolloomooloo, the renewal of Darling Harbour and the transformation of Pyrmont precinct from a low income residential neighbourhood to a casino-centric development. The neighbouring suburb of Millers Point is currently undergoing a similar change with a selloff of public housing that forms part of a wider NSW Government-led transformation of foreshore land and property.[5]

The site itself was contested space sited in the City of Sydney Council but falling under the remit of the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, a statutory authority that acts between the local government where the land is sited and the NSW Government. The importance and potential of the site meant that the East Darling Harbour Competition was managed and run by the NSW Government. Premier Bob Carr officiated at the launch on 23 May 2005[6] making particular mention of the following requirements:

- Provide a *minimum* of 50 per cent new foreshore parkland for the people of Sydney
- Enhance the growth and positioning of Sydney as the premier business, cultural and living centre of the Asia-Pacific region
- Activate the site with a combination of working and recreational uses
- Be self funding

[3] NSW Government, 2005, p. 1.
[4] NSW Government, 2005, p. 18.
[5] Pham, K., 2016. Clearing stock of the invisible: The impact of cosmopolitan power on the supply of affordable housing. In Day, K (ed.) *AMPS Conference Publication Series 7. Future Housing: Global Cities and regional Problems.* Swinburne University, Melbourne, 09 – 10 June (2016), pp. 83-92.
[6] NSW Government, 2005, p. 1.

- Incorporate the Government's Foreshore Walkway – a vital new cornerstone in creating a 14 kilometre foreshore walk which will be the envy of harbour cities worldwide.

The first criteria requiring at least 50 per cent of the foreshore as parkland is perhaps the most straightforward requirement of the competition brief, although terminating the point with "for the people of Sydney" begins to both draw conflict with the conception of public space and form a binary objective separation of those that do not fit that criteria. The second criteria requires more interpretation but through mention of comparison to the Asia-Pacific region suggests external rather than internal benchmarks to be achieved that overshadow the direction of the competition brief implying that it is less of an appendage of the existing city, instead acting as part of an assemblage of a larger global network. The third criteria is a judgement on the design and programming of the site that should be able to be parsed through the masterplan and supporting documentation. The fourth criteria, like the second, is the most difficult to confirm or test. The site is both of unprecedented value and development potential, and being cleared of its existing use functions. Infrastructure provision is a part of the development that is not constrained to the site. Add to that the likely toxic remediation of the land and transport connectivity that needs to be considered. At this stage of ideation it is unlikely to be addressed or justified. The fifth criteria can be both straightforward in connecting two points, Darling Harbour and Walsh Bay, or answering the brief in full to create a foreshore walk of above world standard. Given the position of the development, the implication of the latter interpretation is what would be expected of the design entries.

These requirements heavily skew the positioning of this new precinct as a "global" centre connecting the city through the foreshore. This language continues through the competition brief placing importance on attracting international companies and maintaining and growing Sydney's position as a global city.[7]

At the close of competition, 137 entries were received. The jury for Stage 1 included a range of disciplinary leaders; one academic, one architect, an ethics chair and a heavy dose of seven senior administrators of government departments. The jury was:

[7] NSW Government, 2005, p. 7.

- Chris Johnson, Chair and NSW Government Architect
- Dr Deborah Dearing, President of the NSW Chapter, Royal Australian Institute of Architects
- Jack Mundey AO, former Chair of Historic Houses Trust
- Philippe Robert, Principal of Riechen et Robert, Paris
- Professor Edward Blakely, Chair of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Sydney
- Neil Bird, Deputy Chair of Landcom
- Dr Tim Entwisle, Director of the Botanic Gardens
- Michael Coutts-Trotter, Director General of the Department of Commerce
- Peter Joseph, St Vincents Hospital and St James Ethics Centre Chair
- Gary Pratley, Deputy Director, Major Projects, NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources.

Although the panel members were leaders in their fields, two significant jurors had significantly greater impact on the development and on the competition. The jury chair, Chris Johnson, was a NSW Government Architect from 1995 to 2005 and is currently CEO of Urban Taskforce,[8] a property developer lobbying group. He has presided over many large urban projects including the Circular Quay and Central Station redevelopment and is known for restructuring the Government Architect's Office to run on a more commercialised basis.[9] Jack Mundey, formerly chair of the Historic Houses Trust, was famous for acting as the face of the 'green bans' in the 1970s that worked to preserve the heritage of The Rocks precinct.[10] A stoic environmentalist, Mundey continues to campaign for heritage sites in Sydney and in 2011 as the President of Australians for Sustainable Development led a court case against the NSW Minister for Planning for using Part 3A laws to allow the Barangaroo development to proceed.

After two weeks of deliberation, new Minister for Planning Frank Sartor announced the finalists on 5 August 2005 timed with a public exhibition of all entries at the Museum of Sydney. The five shortlisted finalists of local and international firms were given permission to continue to the second stage. The five shortlisted firms were:

[8] Urban Taskforce, 2016. *Media Contact*.
[9] NSW Government Architect's Office, nd. *History: Johnson, Chris.*
[10] Darcy, M. and Rogers, D., 2015. Place, political culture and post-Green Ban resistance: Public housing in Millers Point, Sydney. *Cities*, pp. 47-54.

- PTW Architects, EDAW, Advanced Environmental Concepts
- Project Architecture, Hargreaves Associates, Thom Mayne
- Hill Thalis Architecture + Urban Projects, Paul Berkemeier Architects, Jane Irwin Landscape Architecture (HTBI)
- Lippman Associates, Richard Rogers Partnership, Martha Schwartz Partners, Lend Lease Developments Pty Ltd
- Lend Lease Design Group.

The first team anchored by Australian firm PTW represents an international entry with EDAW (now absorbed into international conglomerate AECOM) and Advanced Environmental Concepts, specialists delivering Ecologically Sustainable Development services. PTW and EDAW are both globally networked firms often tackling precinct based developments and masterplans for high profile sites. The second team was formed of the Australian studio Project Architecture, with Hargreaves Associates and Thom Mayne of Morphosis. This design was spearheaded by Thom Mayne who often generates experimental, digitally informed design that explores urban patterning and has also published this competition entry in a recent book.[11] Team three was a wholly Australian entry representing a group of urban professionals with expertise in the Australian context. Headed by lead architect Philip Thalis, they are known for delivering contextually sensitive designs that respond to the social fabric and its surrounds. Team four was Lippmann Associates partnered with Richard Rogers Partnership, Martha Schwartz Partners and Lend Lease Developments. All four party members often take part in high-value masterplanning and urban projects. Richard Rogers Partnership is perhaps most notable as the Pritzker Prize winner 2007 and co-designer of the Pompidou Centre in Paris with Renzo Piano and also consequently vocal in his position through the development post competition. The fifth team comes from the design arm of Lend Lease. This team drew on the expertise of other parts of the Lend Lease conglomerate and other consultants such as JBA Urban Planning (who are the current urban planning consultants for the development) and The People for Places and Spaces, a placemaking consultant.

[11] Mayne, T. and Allen, S., 2011. *Combinatory urbanism: The complex behavior of collection form*. Stray Dog Café, Chapter 8.

The second stage of the competition commenced on 4 December 2005 with a revised jury of:

- Chris Johnson, Chair and NSW Government Architect
- The Hon. Paul Keating, former Prime Minister of Australia
- Dr Deborah Dearing, President of the NSW Chapter, Royal Australian Institute of Architects
- Jack Mundey AO, former Chair of Historic Houses Trust
- Philippe Robert, Principal of Riechen et Robert, Paris
- Professor Edward Blakely, Chair of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Sydney
- Neil Bird, Deputy Chairman of Landcom
- Dr Tim Entwisle, Director of the Botanic Gardens
- Helen Lochhead, Director of Sustainability, Sydney Olympic Park Authority.

Most noticeable on this revised jury is Paul Keating, former Labor Prime Minister from 1991 to 1996 who has an ongoing impact on the design and development of the competition.[12] Absent from the first jury were Peter Joseph and Gary Pratley, replaced by former Prime Minister Paul Keating and Helen Lochhead, also more suitable as the Director of Sustainability at the Sydney Olympic Park Authority. The second stage was assessed between 18 to 22 March 2006 with technical assessment on the basis of engineering, cost planning, heritage, traffic and transport, and commercial office planning.

It is difficult to know whether it was at all possible to adequately respond to the points of engineering and cost planning given the condition of the site. East Darling Harbour was also the site of the former Australian Gas Light Works from 1841[13] to 1921 that, through the extraction of gas, produced a noxious cocktail of hazardous substances including cyanide associated with gas works waste, petroleum hydrocarbons and polycyclic hydrocarbons.[14] Had this environmental survey and rehabilitation been conducted prior to the competition and included in the competition brief at least some of the risk in

[12] see Design Quarter Talk, Powerhouse Museum, 23 May 2007. Available at www.dhub.org/articles/932.
[13] Environment Protection Agency, 2006. *East Darling Harbour Geotechnical and Environmental Investigation Summary of Findings 2006*, p. 5. Available at http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/resources/barangaroo/BRRP02.pdf
[14] Ibid. p. 7.

knowing the site conditions, and rehabilitation of the site would have been mitigated. The precarious uncertainty of engineering and cost planning this difficult site would have benefitted from this inquiry that would form the basis of the resulting design development. The remediation costs are unknown with (2010) estimates around $100 million.[15] The issue of traffic and transport planning would also be significantly difficult considering the time constraints, the complexity of the site, and the infrastructure requirements. There were no public transport options available in 2005 and these have recently been negotiated with relevant transport authorities such as Transport for NSW and Roads and Maritime Services. While the review might be expected to have extensive comments for all finalists matching the implied importance of the site and opportunity, the only public document from the jury report is a limited dot point summary of each scheme. There is no expansion or explication on any of these five technical assessment categories to get an insight to the approach that better sheds light on the jury process.

Further criteria agreed on by the panel prior to assessment, with no particular weighting to any individual criteria, were:

- Vision
    - Transforming a unique and historic peninsula
    - Inspiring a twenty-first century future
- Contextual response
    - Linking city to harbour
    - Enhancing the fabric of the city
    - Balancing the local and global
- Functionality
    - Creating a productive and efficient precinct
    - Creating a safe and vibrant waterfront
    - Promoting a new sustainability
- Deliverability
    - Balancing poetics with pragmatics
    - Staging the transformation
    - Allowing for iteration.

[15] Aston, H., 2015. Taxpayers to foot $100m Barangaroo clean-up bill. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 July 2010. Accessed from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/taxpayers-to-foot-100m-barangaroo-cleanup-bill-20100703-zuz0.html

Unanimously, on 22 March 2006, the jury selected the HTBI team as the winners of the East Darling Harbour Urban Design Competition highlighting the scheme for "completing the western edge of the city"[16] with the competition panel members highlighting the following details:

- a new civic boulevard connecting East Darling Harbour to Walsh Bay and King Street Wharf
- a grand harbourside park along the entire length of the waterfront
- a vibrant new commercial quarter integrated with the CBD.

While acknowledging these merits, the jury made the following recommendations to be integrated in the next phase of the project:

- a natural headland form which touches the water at the northern end of the site
- a large northern cove located directly behind the headland to further define the headland
- a larger intervention of the southern cove, located north of Napoleon Street.

The jury also highly commended the entry by Richard Rogers Partnership, Lippmann Associates, Martha Schwartz Partners and Lend Lease Development Pty Ltd with the following report:

> This scheme alters the linear edge of the waterfront by taking new water bodies into the site. The Jury was impressed by the vision of three precincts defined by water in different ways: the commercial precinct adjacent to a new passenger port, the central island park offering a variety of leisure experiences and the headland park including a new city beach.[17]

The documentation for the competition highlights the apparent conflicts and shortcoming of both the requirements of the competition and the process of determining the winning entry. The uniqueness of an open site to be developed into the twenty-first century requiring a balance of economic development, tourist attraction and social cohesion is evidently a difficult proposition, nigh impossible.[18] The impact of former Prime Minister Paul Keating in the process has been difficult to verify but from

[16] NSW Government, 2006a. *East Darling Harbour Urban Design Competition Stage 2 Jury Report*, p. 6.
[17] NSW Government, 2006a, p. 7.
[18] Farrelly, E., 2013. We are taken for idiots as others take a gamble on greatness at Barangaroo. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 10 May 2013. Accessed 26 August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/comment/we-are-taken-for-idiots-as-others-take-a-gamble-on-greatness-at-barangaroo-20130510-2jdbu.html

both his perspective and others it appears that many significant decisions have been because of his gravitas.[19]

The selection of the winning entry was not without compromise. Although unanimously selected, the recommendations made were essentially elements of the highly commended masterplan. It seems that Paul Keating's wish of a naturalistic headland park was coming closer to fruition although his influence has been of major concern in the legitimation of the competition.[20] Jury member Jack Mundey also decried the disconnection of the winning team from the development of the final design. The following section details the shortlist and the associated jury comments drawing relation with the competition design panels.

The shortlist

Although the results have already been revealed, the trajectory towards the outcome of the development makes room for analysis of the entries. This section begins with the jury report details and then compares the five distinct plans making reference to noteworthy elements of individual entries that led to the resulting major project facing planning assessment.

[19] Stickells, L., 2010. Barangaroo: Instant urbanism – just add water. *Architecture Australia*, *99*(3), pp. 47-51. See also Munro, K., 2010. Bringing Barangaroo's headland to life. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 December 2010. Accessed August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/bringing-life-back-to-barangaroo-20101210-18swx.html

[20] Moore, M., 2009a. Row over Keating's influence on Barangaroo plan. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 September 2009. Accessed 14 September 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/national/row-over-keatings-influence-on-barangaroo-plan-20090928-g99a.html



Figure 1. PTW Team Scheme

Entry No 70012

PTW, EDAW, Advanced Environmental Concepts

As shown in Figure 1, the major intervention on the site is a division by water of the built form along the shore and parkland framed by the new canal and Hickson Road. There is a footbridge that connects Millers Point to the new cruise terminal and gradates the built form from wide to narrow from south to north and inversely with the open space.

Strengths of the scheme

- The clarity of the overall diagram of a built peninsula counterpointed with a landscape peninsula, allowing for the parkland to be clearly def ined
- The development of the parklands allowing for the interplay of the grand and the intimate, the abstract and the semi-natural
- The generosity of parkland space, allowing for a variety of programming options
- The dramatic incision of water which reinforced the strength of the park and exaggerated its experiential qualities
- The variety of spatial experiences in the public domain, including the canal, walkways, laneways and pier gardens
- The development of the 'pier gardens' concept as memory spaces evoking the finger wharves with distinct uses and character structuring the public domain
- The porosity and permeability of east-west connections through the site
- The overall cascading built form strategy which allowed for an appropriate relationship with its urban context, view sharing and clustering of activity
- The built form system as a reinterpretation of working harbour systems
- The strong framework of environmental sustainability that underpinned the submission including the investigation of centralised plant concepts, the modular framework for the built wedge and water management strategies

Weaknesses of the scheme

- Greater flexibility of form and massing in the built wedge
- Investigation of increased density in the southern section of the built wedge
- Further investigation of the potential of Hickson Road as a grand active boulevard
- The reassessment of the location of the cruise ship terminal to allow for synergies between commercial and public uses
- Greater emphasis on the refinement of the pier gardens concept as the defining element of the public domain framework

Figure 2. Project Architecture Team

Entry No 70112

Project Architecture, Hargreaves Associates, Thom Mayne

Figure 2 shows the emphasis is on maximising the public domain with 93 per cent of the site given to the park. There is a raised park connecting to High Street and Millers Point and a channel of water that runs for half the length of the western foreshore with higher density buildings occupying the southern site.

Strengths of the scheme

- The clarity of the overall concept of open space as the basis for redefining the 21st century waterfront city
- The extent of public open space, particularly landscaped open space in a variety of forms
- The development of the park into three definable places – a peninsula park at the northern point, a plinth park connecting High Street and the harbour, and a city park between Hickson Road and the harbour
- The resolution of the city park as a grand opening to the harbour defined by a range of active and passive uses
- The resolution of the potential public/private conflicts in the High Street plinth park
- The investigation of the programmatic aspects of the parklands, ranging from civic scale to neighbourhood use
- The strategic intervention of water on the site, allowing for animation of the public domain experience and connection with the harbour
- The resolution of the residential buildings as 21st century interpretations of the historic finger wharves
- The development of environmentally sustainable water management strategies that also provide character to the site

Weaknesses of the scheme

- Investigation of strategies to address the perception that the residential component and High Street park would need to be designed by the one hand
- The reassessment of the location of the cruise ship terminal to allow for synergies between commercial and public uses
- Further testing of landscaped open space areas to ensure their usability and amenity
- Refinement of the commercial component to address the need to develop an identifiable and vibrant precinct connecting to the CBD
- Reconsideration of the use of land bridge to High Street
- Refinement of some built form relationships, including the location and massing of the hotel
- Strategies to activate foreshore areas, particularly the cruise ship terminal precinct

Figure 3. HTBI Team Scheme

Entry No 70178

HTBI

Figure 3 shows the HTBI design allowed for parklands to line the entire foreshore with gradation increasing towards the northern edge. Public spaces are provided at a variety of scales with multiple connection points to High Street and the existing city grid. The design is focused on creating a legacy which retains the parklands for perpetuity.

Strengths of the scheme

- The conceptual approach of a democratic plan encapsulating a multitude of projects, enabling richness through elaboration by many hands
- The compelling understanding of Sydney's built and natural form underpinning the strategy
- The development of the landscape component as a grand harbourside park along the entire 1.2 kilometre length of the waterfront, unlocking the drama of the site's location
- The resolution of the parkland as a variety of spaces and experiences including a headland park as a civic place in contact with the life of the harbour, a broad landscape of community and city parkland and an urban waterfront park anchoring the new urban quarter
- The proposal for a great new street for Sydney bounded by park and a mixture of commercial and public buildings – as the western complement to Macquarie Street
- The development of Hickson Road as a grand, strongly defined boulevard
- The development of a rich and diverse public domain including streets, squares, and laneways as intimate counterpoints to Globe Street, Hickson Road and the foreshore promenade
- The investigation of greater density and critical mass in the commercial component of the scheme
- The flexibility of the built form subdivision pattern

Weaknesses of the scheme

- Refinement of the functionality and character of Globe Street, particularly in its relationship to Hickson Road
- Refinement of the southern urban quarter to address the need to develop an identifiable and vibrant precinct connecting to the CBD
- Investigating the potential for a natural headland form which touches the water at the northern end of the site
- Investigating the potential for a large northern cove located directly behind the headland to further define the headland
- Investigating the potential for a larger intervention of the southern cove, located north of Napoleon Street

Figure 4. Lippman Team Scheme

Entry No 70184

Lippman Associates, Richard Rogers Partnership, Martha Schwartz Partners, Lend Lease Developments Pty Ltd

Figure 4 shows the Lippman Associates and Richard Rogers masterplan aimed to break down the site into smaller parcels of land creating distinct precincts. These precincts would be intersected by new harbours cut into the existing concrete apron with a commercial precinct at the south, island precinct then a beach precinct at the north.

Strengths of the scheme

- The overall conceptual approach of the scheme as three precincts defined by their relationship to water
- The resolution of the business district component which creates an identifiable and vibrant urban quarter, building on its proximity to Wynyard and bringing the CBD to the water 's edge
- The resolution of functional aspects of the cruise ship terminal in relation to 24 hour foreshore access
- The development of a working harbour component, allowing for the potential of harbour activities to engage with the site
- The investigation of the functional and programmatic aspects of the iconic beach proposal
- The strong framework of environmental sustainability that underpinned the submission including the investigation of innovative water management strategies, services infrastructure, and sustainable communities strategy

Weaknesses of the scheme

- Reassessment of the nature and character of the beach and island precincts as places distinct from existing activities in Darling Harbour
- Greater development and communication of the public domain framework and landscape strategy for the site, particularly the island component
- Investigation of the potential to reduce conflicts from the siting of intense recreational activities in close proximity to residential uses
- Strategies to overcome the perception of the island park as a private domain as a result of it being bounded on Hickson Road by private development

Figure 5. Lend Lease Design Team Scheme

Entry No 70292

Lend Lease Design Group

Figure 5 shows the Lend Lease Design Group design statement was communicated through allegory attempting to draw attention to the possibilities of celebrating twenty-first century Australian strengths, qualities and lifestyle. The masterplan invited water throughout the site creating a series of horizontal divisions breaking up the competition site into themed areas.

Strengths of the scheme

- The overall conceptual approach of defining the site through bold water and landscape moves
- The strength of the overall landscape strategy which deliberately exploits the access to water
- The development of the commercial component as a new urban gateway to Sydney
- The resolution of functional aspects of the cruise ship terminal in relation to 24 hour foreshore access
- The strong framework of sustainability that underpinned the submission at the environmental, economic and social level which attempts to elevate the notion of sustainability to iconic status, defining the entire site

Weaknesses of the scheme

- Greater coherency in the character and programmatic aspects of the public domain
- Reassessment of the nature and character of the beach precinct as a place distinct from existing activities in Darling Harbour
- Investigation of strategies to address the perception that the scheme relies on the implementation of a number of megaprojects
- Reassessment of the positioning of the hotel on the northern headland, resulting in a perception of a privatised foreshore domain
- Greater refinement of landscaped roof areas and functional areas below to allow for deep soil planting

Figure 6. Winning Scheme of HTBI (Left) and Highly Commended Scheme of Lippmann and partners (Right)

Figure 6 shows the winning scheme and the highly recommended scheme. Elements from the winning scheme to move forward are:

- a new civic boulevard
- a grand harbourside park
- a new commercial quarter.

Recommendations made include:

- a natural headland form which touches the water
- a large northern cove directly behind the headland and larger intervention of the southern cove.

The PTW scheme (Figure 1) features a bold delineation of built form and parkland, and attempts to maintain the heritage of the finger wharves. The scheme makes a series of grand gestures to divide the precinct in distinctive wedges. Parkland is inserted between Hickson Road and the coastline, introducing a canal as a 'water cut' that unmistakably separates the built form from the parkland. The built form flanks the existing foreshore and is designed as a series of smaller blocks that gradually step down to the northern edge. With the move to introduce a canal of water, the PTW scheme proposed to double the length of the waterfront with the inlet of water used for recreational purposes. The scheme intends to maintain the historical context of a working port connecting public infrastructure with transport modes of cruise and ferry terminals. The major parkland emphasises the dynamic topography with a meandering path from the shore to the sandstone cut at Hickson Road. There is also intent to connect to Millers Point through implementation of pedestrian bridges.

The Project Architecture team attempts to radically compress all of the built form to less than 8 per cent of the site area (Figure 2). Like the PTW scheme, this design introduces a canal in the middle section dividing the built form and a series of smaller fields by the foreshore with a wide public boardwalk along the existing foreshore and east of the canal Between the mixed-use precinct and the commercial core there are spaces indicated for organised sports distinct from the open space along the middle foreshore and the northern edge. The concentration of the commercial centre into three large towers allows for primacy given to the public realm and a compact series of residential ribbons with connection to High Street that substitutes the existing access from Hickson Road. The

canal separates the ferry terminal from the rest of the site, and within the mixed-use precinct submerges the logistics of the site hiding utilities and parking underground raising the datum and reserving more open space for public use.

The winning HTBI scheme (Figure 3) moves away from cutting the site and introducing a canal, instead the plan divides the site into wedges of built form and public space; the public space expanding towards the north on the foreshore and the built form reversed expanding to the south on the eastern edge. The scheme concentrates the commercial buildings to the southern precinct with mixed-use and residential blocks stepping down towards the north. The street plan integrates into the existing city blocks leading towards the public domain of the site. The public domain features a series of program from larger to the small scale. This fine-grain approach to the design of the precinct also manages to accept the heritage of the site into the program maintaining some of the heritage structures into public buildings with community programs. The parkland at the north continues this sensitive approach allowing both program and infrastructure to coalesce with small bodies of water penetrating the parkland.

The Lippman and Rogers scheme (Figure 4) divides the site into three distinct precincts: the beach precinct at the north, the island precinct and the commercial precinct at the southern end with a cove dividing each precinct. The commercial precinct is dense and compressed and also contains the cruise terminal. There are generous pockets of water bodies spread through the built up area, an imagined underground link to Wynyard Railway Station and a hotel that links the commercial precinct to the island precinct fronted by a cove. The island precinct features a series of smaller scale residential buildings lining Hickson Road with pedestrian bridges linking to High Street. The foreshore walk meanders through parkland in the island precinct connecting to the beach precinct at the north enclosing another body of water for the urban beach. Along with the larger beach a series of smaller water bodies are dispersed through the precinct heated by ejected cooling water.

The defining features of the Lend Lease scheme (Figure 5) are breaking the hard edge of the existing foreshore through a series of soft curves layered with the new foreshore, landscaped edges, slices of water and beaches. This is contrasted with hard straight pathways that link Hickson Road with the foreshore terminating with ferry terminals and

other public buildings. A series of building 'fingers' run from Hickson Road towards the foreshore in the middle of the site before retreating back and allowing a small quay for public maritime vessels. This links to the commercial precinct with a cruise terminal at the west, moving east to the commercial towers and a landmark hotel that fronts to Hickson Road. The site north retains part of the existing dock as a foreshore extension but also makes room for a tidal pool.

These five schemes offer distinctive and innovative interventions addressing the redevelopment and rehabilitation of the aging East Darling Harbour docklands. Looking back to the jury's comments on the winning proposal and their recommendations, we begin to see a coalescence of HTBI's winning scheme and the highly recommended scheme of the Rogers team. These initial steps are the clearest representation of transparency in the entire development timeline that runs until the present.

Materialising the masterplan

In July 2006, the winning team assisted the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority in the preparation of a concept plan for planning approval. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating and competition chair Chris Johnson took a large part in the realisation of the plan, with Keating opposed to retention of any link to the industrial heritage of the site, seeking to return the foreshore to some kind of 'naturalised' coastline for the public.[21] This concept plan, shown in Figure 7, was approved by the NSW Department of Planning on 9 February 2007[22] and on 20 July 2007 the project was listed as a State Significant site under the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*. The highly controversial and now repealed Part 3A laws that this development was approved under streamlined the approval process leaving the NSW Minister for Planning sole arbiter of decisions. These powers superseded all policy frameworks and guidelines bypassing even heritage and environmental controls that may stall progress. Although Part 3A was repealed in 2011, modifications to Part 3A approved projects can still be made through submissions to NSW Department of Planning.

[21] Hill Thalis Architecture + Urban Projects, 2010. *Barangaroo (formerly East Darling Harbour) Timeline 2010*, p. 3.
[22] NSW Government, 2007. *NSW Major Development Monitor 2006-07*, p. 36.

As planning approval began the transformation from ideation of concept to the start of concrete plans to transform the now empty dock, we begin to see the politics in the course of the project. Paul Keating took on the role of the stalwart of the development, driving the vision of a 'naturalistic' headland park and used a public presentation[23] at the Powerhouse Museum on 23 May 2007 to give the public his view of development in Sydney specifically around the waterfronts surrounding the CBD from Balmain and Ballast Point to Woolloomooloo, denouncing the position of the 'heritage industry' and the HTBI competition entry.[24]

[23] Keating, P., 2007. Design Quarter Talk, Powerhouse Museum, 23 May 2007. Available at www.dhub.org/articles/932.
[24] Hill Thalis Architecture + Urban Projects, 2010, p. 4.

Figure 10.0 – Indicative layout

Plan showing indicative built form, public domain and landscape.

Figure 7. Approved Concept Plan 9 February 2007
A hybrid drawing taking elements from both HTBI and Lippmann schemes.

As the process of development had moved on from the competition and concept development phase, on 7 November 2008 the NSW Government announced that the Barangaroo Delivery Authority would assume the responsibilities of the management of this urban renewal project from Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority.[25] Shortly after, the NSW Government announced that the board would be:

- Michael Collins, Chair
- John Tabart, CEO
- Richard Timbs, appointed representative of the Secretary of the Treasury
- Clover Moore MP, appointed nominee of the City of Sydney Council
- Peter Holmes a Court
- Brendan Crotty
- Gabrielle Trainor.

The inaugural chair Michael Collins had previously held the same position at Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, and his background contributed to the urban renewal of both Darling Harbour and Sydney Olympic Park. He also cited Potzdamer Platz in Berlin and Southbank in London as precedents for Barangaroo.[26] Both examples cited are heavily privatised spaces that through the design of prescriptive and passively seductive environments prescribe certain controls on their users.[27] Other relevant board members are John Tabart and Clover Moore. John Tabart, formerly of Lend Lease and leading the Docklands development in Melbourne, was scrutinised due to the failure of the Docklands project to integrate into the existing city grid.[28] Although delivering an unsuccessful public interface, Tabart delivered a return to government. His experience in other markets like London and Dubai were expected to benefit the development of Barangaroo. Clover Moore, the Lord Mayor of the City of Sydney, has suggested that her position on the board was an attempt to steer the development in a more equitable and transparent direction.[29] As a vocal proponent of citizen interests her involvement with the board was misdiagnosed by some of her constituency but the direction of the

[25] Although the responsibilities had been transferred, the key members of Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority remained involved in the project.
[26] Farrelly, E., 2008. What's it to be: a flair mile or plunder down under? *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 October 2008. Accessed 14 August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/elizabeth-farrelly/whats-it-to-be-a-flair-mile-or-plunder-down-under/2008/10/15/1223750125260.html
[27] Allen, J., 2006. Ambient power: Berlin's Potsdamer Platz and the seductive logic of public spaces. *Urban Studies*, *43*(2), pp. 441-455.
[28] Chong, F., 2009. Barangaroo winner must find $3bn over decade. *The Australian,* 2 April 2009, p. 29.
[29] Farrelly, E., 2010b. Bring on drama and boldness. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 2 October 2010, p. 6.

development and instruments of power were too embedded for change. Moore eventually resigned in September 2010 citing the removal of financial information from Barangaroo contracts, poor community consultation and lack of transparency.[30] Although the authority was formed in 2008, it is thoroughly surprising that board minutes were not kept until December 2011 and is a serious insight into the lack of transparency of such a significant public development.

Following this change in management, we see again the official involvement of Paul Keating in this development through NSW Minister for Planning Kristina Keneally establishing the Barangaroo Design Excellence Review Panel[31] consisting of:

- Paul Keating, Chair
- Chris Johnson, Deputy Chair
- Angelo Candalepas, Architect
- Bridget Smyth, Architect and Urban Designer
- Oi Choong, Landscape Architect
- Professor James Weirick, Landscape Architect
- Leo Schofield, Cultural Advisor.

It raises questions when the chair of a design panel is a (former) professional politician of the highest order. Even if architecture and urbanism are some of his interests, it is best practice for the chair to be a member of a professional organisation or discipline they have dedicated their professional life to. Projects like the Toronto waterfront revitalisation follow a more transparent and consultative mode of delivery but also appoint professionals when requiring professional advice.[32]

The concept plan that was approved on 9 February 2007 in Figure 7 integrated a majority of the HTBI plan. The foreshore in the south began an intertwining of the HTBI and Lippmann schemes, but as the foreshore continues, the influences of the sculpted foreshore and naturalistic headland of the Lippmann scheme become more apparent.

[30] Moore, M., 2010. Moore quits Barangaroo team. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 September 2010. Accessed 13 August 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/moore-quits-over-barangaroo-railroading-20100921-15ldg.html

[31] Barangaroo Delivery Authority, 2009. Leading experts to overview designs for Barangaroo, Media release 5 June 2009.

[32] White, J.T., 2014. Design by competition and the potential for public participation: Assessing an urban design competition on Toronto's waterfront. *Journal of Urban Design*, *19*(4), pp. 541-564.

The erosion of masterplanning principles formed the seed for further shifts and modifications to take place, including the large cove positioned between the headland and the tapered edge of built form.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a review of the competition, the shortlisted masterplans, and the actors that have had a significant impact on the Barangaroo precinct development. Conflicts materialised through the poorly prescribed competition brief and the events that followed to deliver the concept plan. Aspirations to develop a world class and 'iconic' precinct find caveats and conflict against the role and function of government, especially between the City of Sydney and its residents placing more importance in place-based development than the NSW Government that is more focused on developing and promoting Sydney as a global city. This background to the competition provides an indication of the demonstrably public concerns on the Barangaroo development. Significantly there are major conflicts of interest for the NSW Government (through the Barangaroo Delivery Authority) as both landowner and project approval office. These conflicts continue, as explained in Chapters 3 and 4.

CHAPTER 3. BARANGAROO – PRECINCT DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DRIVERS

The previous chapter detailed the competition phase of the development and introduced some of the key players that have impacted and continue to impact on this emerging precinct. As the development comes closer to construction there is a continuation of the conflict between the NSW Government and developer on one side, and planning and architecture professionals and citizens on the other. The development becomes a vehicle to trace the spatial conflicts of development with a site stretched between multi-level governance structures and the hegemony of global over local. This chapter details the modifications that have been submitted to the NSW Department of Planning tracking the increasing floor space of development that has been biased towards productive purposes and a qualitative analysis of the changes between modifications. Analysing these changes form the crux of the argument dialogically revealing the quantitative changes in gross floor area giving primacy to commercial and productive uses, and through analysis of changing morphology that has eroded the built form principles of the competition winning scheme, reducing the quality of public space and prioritising the location and development of private development. This chapter concludes with comparison to previous developments and a reminder that there have been few significant changes in the process in comparison to historical developments on the adjacent foreshore.

Interventions and implications

In 2005 when the East Darling Harbour Urban Design Competition was issued, there were few firm requirements and direction of how to program the site or the limitations of the brief. Although planning objectives were included in the competition brief[1] it has been proven through historical developments and the timeline of the Barangaroo development thus far that these frameworks are fluid in their restrictions and malleable in their commitments. This section details the programming changes as Barangaroo has been developed through successive masterplans. These changes have allowed for the built form to nearly double over the course of design development and the spirit of the

[1] NSW Government, 2005, p. 22.

competition winning entry to erode reducing the public benefit relative to commercial opportunity. The insidious changes must be inspected through a comparative and co-evolving tracking of the changes that have impacted the outcomes of public amenity. A parallel analysis of changes of gross floor area composition are provided and qualitative analysis is conducted through tracking the changes in morphology and the subsequent impact on the public domain linked to the approval of the Crown casino resort.

The competition brief – 330,000 square metres – Announced May 2005

In 2005 when the competition brief was issued, the requirements for the built form were noticeably vague in what should be built: built footprint limited to 33 per cent of the site, gross floor area of approximately 330,000 square metres, built form ranging from 5 to 14 stories, a mix of use but limiting residential uses to 25 per cent of gross floor area, commercial floor plates of greater than 1,500 square metres and the possibility of a 3 or 5 star hotel.[2] Besides this rough guide, the competition teams had significant freedom to masterplan the site and as detailed in Chapter 2 there were a wide range of outcomes developed as possible solutions in the brief.

The competition winner – 389,511 square metres – Announced March 2006

Unanimously selected on March 2006, the HTBI scheme offered three different scenarios: a complying scheme meeting the 330,000 square metre competition brief, a detailed option that was selected, and a stretch option that *if* linked to increased public benefits, a built form exceeding 500,000 square metres could be developed.[3] The selected scenario limited built form to just over one quarter of the total site and with the built form broken into the following proportions in Table 1.

Table 1. Gross floor area in square metres

Commercial	Residential	Retail & Mixed Use	Hotels	Public Buildings
233,170 m²	61,957 m²	46,690 m²	34,560 m²	13,135 m²
(59.86%)	(15.91%)	(12.98%)	(8.87%)	(3.37%)

As the plan was at the competition stage, details such as building heights and floorplates were not yet furnished but were expected to follow in the submissions to the NSW Department of Planning.

[2] Ibid, p. 18.
[3] Hill Thalis Berkemeier & Irwin, 2006. *East Darling Harbour Report*, p. 27.

The approved concept plan – 388,300 square metres – Approved 9 February 2007

Shortly after winning the competition, the HTBI team were enlisted to help Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority prepare material to be included in the concept plan that would be submitted to the NSW Department of Planning. In addition to the competition winning team, Paul Keating and Chris Johnson were heavily involved in the development of the concept plan, modifying the winning design and incorporating the suggested changes by the competition jury. The HTBI team have documented the insistent efforts of Paul Keating in his opposition to retain any link to the industrial heritage of the site[4] and after unamenable conflicts prevented a resolution between the members involved, Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority engaged JBA Planning to compile the concept plan. HTBI concluded their involvement in the project from September 2006.

On 9 February 2007, the NSW Department of Planning approved a concept plan that involved many of the suggested changes from the competition jury with some detail beginning to be applied to the development blocks and height limits to them. The modifications from the winning entry also led to a significant reduction in detail indicated in the approved development plan in Table 2.[5]

Table 2. Gross floor area in square metres, approved concept plan, 2007

Commercial	Residential	Tourist Uses	Retail Uses	Community Uses
237,300 m² max, 200,225 m² mix	97,075 m² max, 60,000 m² min	50,000 m² max	39,000 m² max	2,000 m² min

The development blocks are detailed in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Development block details for the concept plan approved in 2007

	GFA	Residential GFA (Max)	Height (Max)	Height above existing ground level
Block 1	11,800 m²	-	RL 62	60
Block 2	180,000 m²	20,000 m²	RL 180	178
Block 3	56,000 m²	9,575 m²	RL 112	110
Block 4	74,500 m²	25,000 m²	RL 100	98
Block 5	29,200 m²	15,000 m²	RL 34	32
Block 6	3,000 m²	-	RL 29	27
Block 7	28,000 m²	27,500 m²	RL 35	33
Block 8	5,800 m²	-	RL 32	30

[4] Hill Thalis Architecture + Urban Projects, 2010. *Barangaroo Timeline – 24.02.10*, p. 3.
[5] The information in Tables 2 and 3 was extracted from Minister for Planning, 2007. *Determination of the Barangaroo Concept Plan (MPA No. 06_0162)*, p. 5.



Figure 1. East Darling Harbour Concept Plan Development Blocks, 2006
Source: NSW Government, 2006b. *East Darling Harbour State Significant Site Proposal, Concept Plan & Environmental Assessment*, Overlay of Figure 11.26 (p. 101) and Figure 12.1 (p. 107).

As seen in Figure 1, the approved concept plan amalgamates elements of both the competition winning scheme and the runner up. The built form is concentrated on the eastern edge both tapering to the north and also with the building heights stepping down towards the parkland at the north. The major morphological interventions are the

beginning of a delineation of the hard edge of the existing pier with a small water body at the south of the site and a larger intervention bridging the parkland to the mixed-use zone. The development is broken down into eight development blocks; Blocks 1 to 4 allocated for the commercial precinct, Blocks 5 to 7 for the mixed-use precinct, and Block 8 for the parkland. The introduced water bodies are not completely compensated for with the passenger terminal within the commercial precinct effectively reducing the amount of land for development. The arrangement of the development blocks structures the majority of the development within the southern zone allowing for built form up to 180 metres gradually tapering to around 30 metres at the northern end. Residential development is roughly evenly spread between Blocks 2 to 5 and 7 allowing for variation through the site but increasing in proportion towards the north. There is also allocated community uses within Blocks 6 and 7, and Block 8 houses supporting facilities to service the parkland.



Figure 13.4 – Accessible roof valley

Figure 13.5 – Tapering height of built form

Figure 2. East Darling Harbour Concept Plan Built Form Principles, 2006
Source: NSW Government, 2006. *East Darling Harbour State Significant Site Proposal, Concept Plan & Environmental Assessment*, Figure 13.4 and 13.5 (p. 113).

The morphology of the approved concept plan was designed with dedication of the foreshore to public land with the built form lining Hickson Road. As seen in Figure 2 the buildings taper towards the north and the larger blocks are punctuated with open space and lower building heights in their centre. This also reduces the perceived bulk of the compressed built form contributing to the appearance of a more open space at the intersection of the greenspace. Water bodies begin to punctuate the site delineating the foreshore into three distinct precincts designating commercial, mixed use and parkland. These water bodies both reduce the amount of land within the site boundary and reciprocally increase the proportion of water. A ferry terminal at the south of the site

takes back some of the lost land changing the State Environmental Planning Policy maps to allow for these changes.

Modification 2 – 508,300 square metres – Approved 16 February 2009

Approved just over two years later on 16 February 2009 under a different Labor Minister for Planning, Modification 2 sees a significant ballooning of the development gross floor area from the initial concept plan. The approved gross floor areas are in Table 4.[6]

Table 4. Gross floor area in square metres, approved Modification 2 plan, 2009

Commercial GFA	Residential GFA	Tourist Uses	Retail Uses	Community Uses
359,055 m² max, 320,225 m² min	97,075 m² max, 58,245 m² min	50,000 m² max	39,000 m² max	2,000 m² min

With a minimal decrease in the minimum residential gross floor area, the only increase has been the commercial floor space with a 120,000 square metre allowable increase. This increase has fallen entirely within the previously approved building heights generated by the consolidation of commercial buildings into buildings of greater floorplates. The changes in the development blocks are detailed in Table 5 below.

Table 5. Development block details comparing the concept plan and Modification 2 plans approved in 2009

	GFA		Residential GFA (Max)		Height (Max)		Height above existing ground level	
	CP	MOD 2	CP	MOD2	CP	MOD2	CP	MOD2
Block 1	11,800 m²	11,800 m²	-	-	RL 62	RL 62	60	60
Block 2	180,000 m²	211,907 m²	20,000 m²	20,000 m²	RL 180	RL 180	178	178
Block 3	56,000 m²	85,568 m²	9,575 m²	9,575 m²	RL 112	RL 112	110	110
Block 4	74,500 m²	121,000 m²	25,000 m²	25,000 m²	RL 100	RL 100	98	98
Block 5	29,200 m²	41,225 m²	15,000 m²	15,000 m²	RL 34	RL 34	32	32
Block 6	3,000 m²	3,000 m²	-	-	RL 29	RL 29	27	27
Block 7	28,000 m²	28,000 m²	27,500 m²	27,500 m²	RL 35	RL 35	33	33
Block 8	5,800 m²	5,800 m²	-	-	RL 32	RL 32	30	30
TOTAL	**388,300** m²	**508,300** m²	**93,075** m²	**93,075** m²				

[6] The information from Tables 4 and 5 was extracted from Minister for Planning, 2009a. *Modification of Major Project Approval (MP06_0162 MOD 2),* p. 2.



Figure 3. Modification 2 Barangaroo Development Blocks, 2008
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2008. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2008*, p. 20.



Figure 4. Modification 2 Built Form Principles, 2008
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2008. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2008*, p. 56.



Figure 5. Modification 2 Tapering Built Form, 2008
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2008. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2008*, p. 57.



Figure 6. Modification 2 Revised Public Domain Framework, 2008
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2008. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2008*, p. 66.

As these building footprints are part of the commercial core it would seem acceptable to generate an increase that predominately favours the commercial gross floor area. What has not been taken into account has been the public gain necessary to offset the

commercial gain and the increase in pedestrian foot traffic that will coincide with this increase.[7] Already designed as an isolated appendage to the city, the commercial core is further isolated from an imagined cohesive whole. The extent of the social impact analysis is limited to an economic potentiality allowing for employment growth and also justifying the increase in employment as a driver to improve public transport viability. Once again as an isolated development without coordinated strategy to deliver public transport solutions this iteration functions as an empty proposal predicated on future uplift presumptively supported by a volatile NSW Government. With the approval of this modification the beginning of a compounding erosion of the public interest has become realised in the private gain without public amenity or infrastructure.

The morphology of the site has also become more dense, with individual buildings within development blocks coalescing into fewer buildings of larger footprint. Referring to Figure 12 in comparison to the Figure 5 of the concept plan, we see this in the bulkier forms of the commercial precinct. This view also sees the impact of the larger built form on the southern cove dominating that public space. Examining Figure 6 we can see the loss of habitable land removed from the Local Environment Plan map and given to an expanded water body.

Because this development was assessed under Part 3A of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act*, there is a significantly less rigorous process undertaken to determine compliance of the development. Had it been assessed against the Local Environment Plan planning controls it is unlikely that the consent authority would have approved such major increases in proposed gross floor area. Such piecemeal plans would have also been caught in a more rigorous assessment process if the City of Sydney Council were the consent authority as their mandate more holistically evaluates developments in their catchment. In December 2009, Lend Lease was awarded the tender for Barangaroo South to develop the commercial precinct with a non-conforming bid proposing a new pier whose footprint would accommodate a landmark hotel. Lend Lease subsequently entered into contractual agreement with the Barangaroo Delivery Authority on 5 March 2010.

[7] The Director General's Report also details these two criteria as a key issue of consideration. See Department of Planning, 2008. *Application to Modify the Minister's Approval for the Barangaroo Concept Plan Major Project 02_0162 (MOD 2)*, pp. 28-31.

Modification 3 – 489,500 square metres – Approved 11 November 2009

Modification 3 was relatively minor in changing gross floor area, actually reducing the gross floor area of the development by 18,800 square metres and removing Block 8. The approved gross floor areas are shown in Table 6.[8]

Table 6. Gross floor area in square metres, approved Modification 3 plan, 2009

Commercial GFA	Residential GFA	Tourist Uses	Retail Uses	Community Uses
340,255 m^2 max, 301,425 m^2 min	97,075 m^2 max, 58,245 m^2 min	50,000 m^2 max	39,000 m^2 max	2,000 m^2 min

The changes from the existing gross floor area involved a reduction in Block 7 from 28,000 to 15,000 square metres and deletion of Block 8. The residential gross floor area in Block 7 was also reduced from 27,500 to 14,000 square metres. The changes in the development blocks are detailed in Table 7 below.

Table 7. Development block details comparing Modification 2 and Modification 3 plans approved in 2009

	GFA		Residential GFA (Max)		Height (Max)		Height above existing ground level	
	MOD2	**MOD3**	**MOD2**	**MOD3**	**MOD2**	**MOD3**	**MOD2**	**MOD3**
Block 1	11,800 m^2	11,800 m^2	-	-	RL 62	RL 62	60	60
Block 2	211,907 m^2	211,907 m^2	20,000 m^2	20,000 m^2	RL 180	RL 180	178	178
Block 3	85,568 m^2	85,568 m^2	9,575 m^2	9,575 m^2	RL 112	RL 112	110	110
Block 4	121,000 m^2	121,000 m^2	25,000 m^2	25,000 m^2	RL 100	RL 100	98	98
Block 5	41,225 m^2	41,225 m^2	15,000 m^2	15,000 m^2	RL 34	RL 34	32	32
Block 6	3,000 m^2	3,000 m^2	-	-	RL 29	RL 29	27	27
Block 7	28,000 m^2	28,000 m^2	27,500 m^2	14,000 m^2	RL 35	RL 35	33	33
Block 8	5,800 m^2	*Removed*	-	*Removed*	RL 32	*Removed*	30	*Removed*
TOTAL	**508,300** m^2	**489,500** m^2	**97,075** m^2	**83,575** m^2				

[8] The information in Tables 6 and 7 was extracted from Minister for Planning, 2009b. *Modification of Major Project Approval (MP06_0162 MOD 3),* pp. 3-4.



Figure 7. Modification 3 Barangaroo Development Blocks, 2009
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2009. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2009*, p. 27.



Figure 8. Modification 3 Governing Principles for Public Domain, 2009
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2009. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2009*, p. 42.

Figure 9. Comparative Modification 2 and Modification 3 Development Blocks, 2009
Source: Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, 2009. *Part 3A Modification Report, 2009*, pp. 16 and 21.

The move to expand the headland cove has reduced the developable area within Block 7 with flow on effects realised in the redesign of the headland park removing Block 8 from developable gross floor area. The expanded northern cove also removes existing public space from general occupation. This also more clearly separates Headland Park from the rest of the site. The compression of developable area sets the ground to increase density within the remaining area of the site. In addition to the gross floor area changes, there have been approvals to begin shaping the headland into the naturalistic headland recommended by the jury. Approval has also been given for a car park to be provided within the headland.

Modification 4 – 563,965 square metres – Approved 16 December 2010

The approval of Modification 4 was the beginning of detailed planning becoming public. This modification also seeks another significant increase in gross floor area throughout the site. The approved gross floor area is in Table 8.[9]

Table 8. Gross floor area in square metres, approved Modification 4 plan, 2010

Commercial GFA	Residential GFA	Tourist Uses	Retail Uses	Public Recreation	Community Uses
373,870 m² max, 329,702 m² min	128,763 m² max, 84,595 m² min	50,000 m² max	39,000 m² max	4,500 m² max (3,000 m² within Barangaroo South)	12,000 m² min (10,000 m² within Barangaroo South)

Modification 4 was the stage where the most significant changes were starting to be seen and approved. This was also the last modification approved before minutes were taken at Barangaroo Delivery Authority board meetings.[10] The addition of Block Y allowing for a landmark hotel sited on the foreshore set the precedent for continuing iterations and modifications that have been compromises of unfortunate circumstances. Figure 10 indicates the position of the proposed hotel, an unprecedented approval in Sydney's history of controversial development. The approval in the week before Christmas holidays was also well timed to avoid criticism and exposure of the decision.

The introduction of development Block X is approved for a mostly residential use gross floor area. This fronts the commercial towers on Blocks 2 and 3 softening the impact of the commercial towers and providing a buffer to the foreshore. This addition begins to

[9] The information in Tables 8 and 9 was extracted from Department of Planning, 2010. *Modification of Minister's Approval Major Project Number MP06_0162 (MOD 4)*, pp. 2-3.
[10] Meeting minutes were first taken in December 2011.

eat into the site that was initially reserved for public domain. Block Y continues this erosion of public provision and houses the landmark hotel on a newly built pier. Block 4 has been subdivided into three separate blocks with a range of different RL. The blocks with significant changes are Block 1 increasing from RL 62 to RL 80, Block 3 from RL 112 to RL 209, nearly doubling in height. Block 4 was approved for RL 100 but has now got approval for RL 41.5, RL 175 and RL 160 correlating to development Block 4A, 4B and 4C. The hotel on the pier is also a significant gain of built form that has been approved with an RL of 170, unprecedented for a waterfront building in Sydney. The discrepancy from the total gross floor area approved and the total in the table below is attributed to the gross floor area for active uses in the Public Recreation zone and the gross floor area for community uses. The changes in the development blocks are detailed in Table 9.

Table 9. Development block details comparing Modification 3 and Modification 4 plans approved in 2010

	GFA (sqm)		**Residential GFA (Max) (sqm)**		**Height (Max AHD)**		**Height above existing ground level**	
	MOD3	**MOD4**	**MOD3**	**MOD4**	**MOD3**	**MOD4**	**MOD3**	**MOD4**
Block 1	11,800 m²	9,400 m²	-	9,000 m²	RL 62	RL 80	60	78
Block 2	211,907 m²	209,213 m²	20,000 m²	-	RL 180	RL 180	178	178
Block 3	85,568 m²	142,669 m²	9,575 m²	-	RL 112	RL 209	110	207
Block 4A	121,000 m²	8,150 m²	25,000 m²	6,900 m²	RL 100	RL 41.5	98	39.5
Block 4B	*Total for*	29,900 m²	*Total for*	28,900 m²		RL 175		173
Block 4C	*Block 4*	39,000 m²	*Block 4*	38,500 m²		RL 160		158
Block X	-	18,908 m²	-	16,463 m²	-	RL 41.5	-	39.5
Block Y	-	33,000 m²	-	-	-	RL 170	-	168
Block 5	41,225 m²	41,225 m²	15,000 m²	15,000 m²	RL 34	RL 34	32	32
Block 6	3,000 m²	3,000 m²	-	-	RL 29	RL 29	27	27
Block 7	28,000 m²	15,000 m²	14,000 m²	14,000 m²	RL 35	RL 35	33	33
TOTAL	**489,500** m²	**549,465** m²	**83,575** m²	**128,763** m²				



Figure 10. Modification 4 Barangaroo Development Blocks, 2010
Source: Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners, 2010. *Modification 4 Appendix F_Major Development SEPP Amendment*, p. 26.

Figure 11. Modification 4, Barangaroo South. Urban Structure
Source: Barangaroo Design Advisory Panel Report, 2015. *Section 75W Modification Application To The Barangaroo Concept Plan: MP06_0162 Mod 8, 2015*, p. 11.

The impact of a landmark hotel flanking the foreshore is unprecedented in Sydney's urban development history. The justification of an iconic structure also fails to consider the influence in context of an enclosed, private structure that was signalled to be for the use of the public. The floorplates of the commercial buildings have also grown commensurably supporting the growth of Sydney's requirement to capture the growth of transnational companies that have also demanded this from the market. The drive for consolidation of the site has transferred into the built form removing the fine-grain vision of and between buildings that was supported in the competition winning entry.



Figure 12. Comparison between Modification 2 and Modification 4 Skyline Impact
Source: NSW Government, 2010. *Director-General's Assessment Report*, p. 46.

In addition to the impact of the hotel on a newly built pier, the character of the skyline has also pushed the built form apex further north, both in its RL and its position in the precinct. The concentration of building bulk and built form is no longer held in the south and commercial district, but shifts the image from a bookend to a bell shaped form. Collectively, these changes provide a basis for a reconfiguration of the commercial precinct with the hotel forming the centre with its influence radiating outwards. The approval for the tallest commercial building now fits neatly into the background of the hotel.



Figure 13. Modification 4 Barangaroo South Proposed Development Blocks, 2010
Source: JBA Planning, 2010. *Environmental Assessment Report*, p. 43.

The approved plan radically alters the built form principles with the proposed pier jutting out of the existing foreshore edge. The proposed development blocks are also misleading with the cove northeast of the newly sited pier blocked under the public domain zoning. This is deceptive in the provision of public space. In comparison to the existing Modification 3 approved concept plan, the Modification 4 plan allows for expansion of the built form encroaching onto the foreshore that has set a precedent for a landmark building to occupy this prime land and switch the priorities of the built form principles to that of private use.



Figure 14. Barangaroo Land Zoning Plan. Concept Plan and Modification 4
Source: NSW Government, 2009. *Map Identification Number SEPP_MD_BAR_LZN_001_20091208*; NSW Government 2010. *Map Identification Number SEPP_MD_BAR_LZN_001_20101129*.

From a high-level zoning perspective that frames the bounds of built form, land that was previously zoned RE1 public recreation has taken a markedly different appearance. With a more dynamic shifting of boundaries that appears to allocate more land, and especially the foreshore area in the southern precinct, towards built form zoned B4 for mixed-use. The reciprocal trade for more land zoned RE1 in the north of the site is tokenistic considering that this area has yet to be planned or designed.



Figure 15. Modification 4 Shadow Diagram, 2010
Source: NSW Government, 2010. *MP06_0162 Modification 4 Appendix B* Shadow Analysis part 0001 *& MP06_0162 Modification 4 Appendix B Shadow Analysis part 0002.*

The shadow diagrams in Figure 15 provide evidence for the overshadowing impact becoming greatest during the winter solstice covering a significant amount of the public domain from 1 to 3 pm due principally to the approved hotel on the pier. The impacts are not sufficiently addressed in the project documentation nor is the justification for siting the hotel on a newly built public pier.

Collectively the changes approved in Modification 4 have allowed for the priority of private development to further encroach onto what was allocated for public purposes. The outcomes of these changes have seen the built form expand west to the foreshore, north pushing the built form further into the precinct and upwards increasing the building height. The floorplates that have been consolidated and building forms that have grown larger have also eroded the condition of fine-grain edges on street level. The design principles developed from the competition winning entry have now become far removed from the outcomes of the precinct's development.

Modification 5 – Withdrawn – Late 2012
The application for Modification 5 was withdrawn with no detail provided.

Modification 6 – 563,965 square metres – Approved 25 March 2014
Although there were no changes in the requested gross floor area in Modification 6, there were surreptitious attempts to reduce the amount of space allocated for community uses. Approved in Modification 4 was a *minimum* of 12,000 square metres for this use, but in Modification 6 the proponent intended on a *maximum* of 12,000 square metres for this program. The Planning Assessment Commission subsequently declined this request on 25 March 2014.

Modification 7 – Not assessed against the Concept Plan – Approved 26 November 2015
The developments requested in Modification 7 were related to bulk excavation of development Blocks 1 to 3 associated with basement car parking. No issues were raised during submissions.

Modification 8 – 594,354 square metres – Approved 28 June 2016
The most recent Modification 8 approved on 28 June 2016 grants a series of significant changes from the Modification 6 plan, essentially the Modification 4 plan approved in

2010. The most high profile impact is the approval and relocation of the Crown casino resort located on the foreshore. This structure has impeded so much on the foreshore it requires a 'clip-on' section of foreshore promenade. The bulk of the casino podium that has occupied the foreshore reducing the public domain has required this additional foreshore to maintain a 30 metre continuous promenade along the length of the urban precinct. It should be noted that there is a significant uplift in residential and tourist gross floor area and moderate reduction in retail gross floor area. The changes in the approved plan requiring more clearance to Hickson Park has further compressed the site for built form to be developed in Barangaroo Central. The implication of this change will likely require more dense form for this precinct further aggravating the impact on public domain developments in future applications. The changes to the approved gross floor area are detailed in Table 10.[11]

Table 10. Gross floor area in square metres, approved Modification 8 plan, 2016

Commercial GFA	**Residential GFA**	**Tourist Uses**	**Retail Uses**	**Public Recreation**	**Community Uses**
313,354 m^2 max, 284,323 m^2 min	183,031 m^2 max, 154,000 m^2 max within Barangaroo South	76,000 m^2 max, 59,000 m^2 max within Barangaroo South	34,000 m^2 max, 30,000 m^2 max within Barangaroo South	5,000 m^2 max, 3,500 m^2 max within Barangaroo South	12,000 m^2 min

There are several significant changes that have been accepted in this series of modifications. Block 1 has a significant reduction from RL 80 to RL 25 metres also shrinking the gross floor area from 9,400 to 1,927 square metres. Block 2 has a reduced gross floor area from 209,213 to 197,280 square metres and Block 3 has a reduction from 142,669 to 129,934 square metres while also allocating a max residential gross floor area of 10,515 square metres. The most significant changes occur in Block 4A, Block 4B and Block Y. There has been a reallocation of floor space in Block 4 with the loss of Block 4C. Block 4A has increased from 8,150 to 86,979 square metres gross floor area, also with an increase of RL from 41.5 to 250 metres. Block 4B has decreased from 29,900 to 19,158 square metres and RL reduced from 175 to 107 metres. Overall the net increase for the gross floor area in Block 4 is 29,087 square metres. The hotel resort on Block Y has also seen its gross floor area grow from 33,000 to 77,500 square metres and RL increase from 170 to 275 metres. Also contravening existing policy is the inclusion of residential gross floor area within the hotel envelope, which was previously forbidden.

[11] The information in Tables 10 and 11 was extracted from Department of Planning, 2016. *Modification of Minister's Approval Major Project Number MP06_0162 (MOD 8)*, pp. 5-8.

Block Y with approval for RL 275 metres also occupies the apex of the precinct as seen in Figure 18. Block 5 sits adjacent on the southern end of Barangaroo Central and is currently suggested to be primarily residential gross floor area decreasing from 41,225 to 29,688 square metres. This reduction should reduce the shadow impact on Hickson Park that will be bordered by the Crown casino building, the residential buildings on Blocks 4A and 4B, and Block 5.

There are a series of less visible but notable changes. Wintergardens are not to be counted in gross floor area calculation with provisions of up to 15 per cent of the gross floor area of the apartment space. With a conservative estimate of 20 per cent circulation and public space within a residential apartment building, there could potentially be a 12 per cent uplift of space that will not be recognised in gross floor area calculations and subsequent bulk in the building envelope.

Provision of key worker housing has also been a matter of significant contention. The Sussex-Penn Review in 2011 expressed that however high value the site was, the provision of community housing was a very low provision by global standards. There are two points to clarify from the approved modifications. Firstly, the increased provision should be commended, however minimal it was in Modification 8. In terms of approval Part B11, there are modifications that allow 2.3 per cent residential gross floor area on site for key worker housing *and* an additional 0.7 per cent offsite within 5 kilometres of site or within the City of Sydney local government area. In conflict with these requirements, within Schedule 3 – Statement of Commitments, Condition 34 allows Lend Lease to shift all of the community housing offsite under the following provisions:

- 2.3 per cent of the total 3 per cent may be located in Barangaroo South, or at another location outside Barangaroo South and within the City of Sydney local government area. Selection of any location outside Barangaroo South is to be at the discretion of the Community Housing Provider, with Lend Lease agreement, to which the commitment has been allocated to own and manage.
- Should the existing 2.3 per cent key worker housing provision be located at a location outside of Barangaroo South, Lend Lease will transfer a monetary contribution to the Community Housing Provider equivalent to the difference of the independently verified value offered by the Provider, and the independently verified cost of providing the required floor space for key worker housing at

Barangaroo South, at a time to coincide with practical completion of 75 per cent of Barangaroo South residential floor space.

The lack of overarching public housing strategy across NSW and federal policy certainly limits what can be achieved within the Barangaroo development. The changes in the development blocks are detailed in Table 11 below.

Table 11. Development block details comparing Modification 4 and Modification 8 plans approved in 2016

	GFA		**Residential GFA (Max)**		**Height (Max AHD)**		**Height above existing ground level**	
	MOD4	**MOD8**	**MOD4**	**MOD8**	**MOD4**	**MOD8**	**MOD4**	**MOD8**
Block 1	9,400 m²	1,927 m²	9,000 m²	-	RL 80	RL 25	78	23
Block 2	209,213 m²	197,280 m²	-	-	RL 180	RL 180	178	178
Block 3	142,669 m²	129,934 m²	-	10,515 m²	RL 209	RL 209	207	207
Block 4A	8,150 m²	86,979	6,900 m²	86,166	RL 41.5	RL 250	39.5	248
Block 4B	29,900 m²	19,158 m²	28,900 m²	18,287 m²	RL 175	RL 107	173	105
Block 4C	39,000 m²	*Removed*	38,500 m²	*Removed*	RL 160	*Removed*	158	*Removed*
Block X	18,908 m²	18,908 m²	16,463 m²	16,463 m²	RL 41.5	RL 41.5	39.5	39.5
Block Y	33,000 m²	77,500 m²	-	22,600 m²	RL 170	RL 275	168	273
Block 5	41,225 m²	29,688 m²	15,000 m²	15,000 m²	RL 34	RL 34	32	32
Block 6	3,000 m²	3,000 m²	-	-	RL 29	RL 29	27	27
Block 7	15,000 m²	15,000 m²	14,000 m²	14,000 m²	RL 35	RL 35	33	33
TOTAL	**549,465** m²	**579,354** m²	**128,763** m²	**183,031** m²				



Figure 16. Modification 8, Barangaroo South. Urban Structure
Source: Barangaroo Design Advisory Panel Report, 2015. *Section 75W Modification Application To The Barangaroo Concept Plan: MP06_0162 Mod 8, 2015*, p. 13.

Although the Crown casino resort occupies a less prominent position on the foreshore pier, the impact of its size, form and position still commands attention and remains the focal point of the precinct. The public pier that was now allocated a community centre remains without design or program at this late stage of design development within Barangaroo South. The commercial buildings have been tweaked and the principal focus of development changes is now with the residential development primarily occupying Blocks 4A and 4B.



Figure 17 Barangaroo Land Zoning Plan. Concept Plan, Modification 4, Modification 8. Source: NSW Government, 2009. *Map Identification Number SEPP_MD_BAR_LZN_001_20091208*; NSW Government, 2010. *Map Identification Number SEPP_MD_BAR_LZN_001_20101129*; NSW Government, 2016. *Map Identification Number SEPP_SSP_BAR_LZN_001_20160601*.

Tracking the changes in the land zoning plan from the concept plan through to Modification 8, the erosion of public space has suffered through the primacy of commercial development. In the southern precinct all that remains is a sliver of foreshore that tracks the urban development. The proponent has met the minimum requirements to provide a minimum of 30 metres along the foreshore but awarding the Crown casino resort prime position. Hickson Park surrounded by the casino and residential towers in Blocks 4A and 4B functionally acts as a compromised public space visually connected to these buildings from the ground. These outcomes fall not only on the resilience of the proponent to submit these plans but also the approval authority, the

NSW Government. With Barangaroo acting as a Darling Harbour redux, more thorough scrutiny of the development practices of megaprojects is required in future developments.



Figure 18. Variance in building profile: Modification 2, Modification 4 and Modification 8, 2016
Source: NSW Government, 2016. *MP06_0162 Modification 8 PAC Determination Report*, p. 14. Individual drawings rescaled for direct comparison to be made.

Table 12. Comparative gross floor area connected to building morphologies in Figure X

	MOD2	**MOD4**	**MOD8**
GFA	508,300 m²	563,965 m²	594,354 m²
Year Approved	2009	2010	2016

Examining Figure 18 there is little remaining of the design principles lauded from the early stages of development. From the compression of taller buildings to the south of the precinct, moving to a ballooned form in Modification 4, the casino resort now bookends the northern end of the commercial precinct. As a corollary to the development of the

commercial precinct, and all of the additional gross floor area gain that has been approved, the Central precinct has become compressed before even a single design sketch has been exhibited. Rhetoric centred on the proposed iconicity of the casino resort forming a new distinctive skyline acting for Sydney's global image lies not on the quality of design but is instead anchored on the branding of the casino as a tourism draw through its function as a high-end gambling establishment.



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

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

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

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

Figure 19. Modification 8 Shadow Diagram, 2016
Source: NSW Government, 2016. *MP06_0162 Modification 8 Appendix J Shadow Studies*, pp. 46-55.

The solar impact of the casino impedes on use of the public cove fronting the casino during the winter lunch period. Another troubling residual effect of previous approved modifications is the approved building design shadows. The urban morphology has been completed changed, especially in the area of impact around the hotel and residential towers surrounding Hickson Park. The buildings casting the shadows are not even indicated in the shadow studies.

Figure 20. Modification 8 Masterplan Application
Source: Rogers Stirk Harbour +Partners, 2015. *Barangaroo South Masterplan*, p. 26.

Figure 21. Modification 8 Approved Concept Plan
Source: NSW Government, 2016. *MP06_0162 Modification 8 PAC Determination Report*, p. 6.

There are two reasonable changes answering the negative impacts on the public domain made from the initial Modification 8 application in 2015 through to what has been adjusted for approval in 2016. Firstly, widening of access from the foreshore public domain towards Hickson Park is welcome considering the height of buildings flanking the park. This clearance of access makes provision for potential solar loss through the undefined built form that will be developed as part of Barangaroo Central. Secondly the widening of the foreshore appears as a reluctant addition to appease the Planning Assessment Commission to meet the requirement to maintain a consistent 30-metre foreshore promenade. Apparent also between these two plans is the loss of detail on the community building on the pier. From this information it is not clear whether this is a consequence of the changing shape of the foreshore and the status of its provision.

These collective modifications from the concept plan through to Modification 8 have shifted the development considerably over the last ten years and the impact on the skyline has changed from a scheme that stepped down towards the edge of the city, to one that is bookended by a landmark hotel resort.[12] The secretive processes that plagued

[12] Planning Assessment Commission, 2016. *Determination Report (MP06_0162 MOD 8)*, p. 14.

the first five years of the development had lasting impact on future iterative development of the site.

Tracking the incremental gross floor area allocation, there is an inequitable spatial distribution through the site. With the inclusion of water bodies as public space dissolving the 'publicly' habitable space and the additional space allocated for commercial and private residential development, not to mention the casino uses and likely shifting of key worker housing offsite, it is questionable whether these approved changes will be for the public good. The erosion of these public benefits has seen responses by both citizen groups and professional organisations. The Better Planning Network, a not-for-profit organisation that challenges the heritage, environmental and social outcomes of the NSW planning system, was particularly critical of the Part 3A laws that the Barangaroo development was approved under. The Australian Institute of Architects has also been critical of the development, with members including Brian Zulaikha and Gerard Reinmuth also contributing individual responses. Some of the particular critiques include the planning process that the development and successive modifications have been approved under, the increases in gross floor area without adequate qualification and the impact on the public domain.[13]

The obvious spatial implications of these successive changes are the erosion of public space and the quality of these spaces that inhibit and prevent the public from inhabiting them. More than a spatial issue, there is a structural problem that allows such unbridled development to take place. Seen individually, many of the changes made within each modification hide the complexities of the development. But as successive changes build upon previous modifications to the concept plan, an increasingly complex spatial assemblage is built over time and space that work to silence discourse and erode the amount and quality of space that would be expected of landmark developments, especially on public land. These insular planning and development processes often, and as seen in this case study, have hindered the possibility of public discourse from contributing to the wider discussion of how public and civic spaces should be designed, developed and delivered. The following section contextualises the Barangaroo development with previous waterfront developments that have evolved under similar circumstances.

[13] Australian Institute of Architects, 2011. *Barangaroo Review Submission to the Department of Premier and Cabinet.*

Spatial legacies

The impact of globalisation and the iterative effects on Sydney's post-industrial landscape have shaped the foreshore, eroding much of its heritage as a working harbour. Successive redevelopment projects have worked to reposition Sydney as an attractive place to do business, subsequently generating a successful tourist economy. Much of these successes are underwritten by unequal social impacts through the development process and the outcomes in these precincts.

Darling Harbour was the first of these contemporary redevelopment strategies, with spatially similar circumstances to Barangaroo. The 1980s were a time of restructuring the economic landscape and redefining the image of the city. Although the reasons for development were different, a landmark project celebrating 200 years of European colonisation, the strict development timeline and dominating hand of the NSW Government followed the same brief. Initiated by the then NSW Premier Neville Wran, the *Darling Harbour Authority Act* was drawn up in 1984[14] to prevent opposition to the development. Much like the derelict East Darling Harbour ports in 2005, there was little reason to resist developing the aging Darling Harbour ports of 1984 allowing construction to proceed rapidly towards the 1988 deadline.

The ambitions of the NSW Government overwhelmed any deviation that would prevent the development from being delivered on time. Concerned with the pace of development and monocultural spatial legacy of the impending development, the City of Sydney Council was opposed to several of the hotel developments to be constructed around the waterfront which led to the council's dismissal by the NSW Government. Even City of Sydney Lord Mayor Clover Moore's position on the Barangaroo Delivery Authority board had little influence on the outcomes of the development. The NSW Government's decisions to advance the policy agenda of market liberalisation and urban consolidation leading to the outcome of the Darling Harbour development appear routine with these conflicts between local and state governments continuing through to the development of the Sydney casino development.

[14] Daly, M., and Malone, P., 1996, p. 97.

The use of special purpose urban authorities and specific planning instruments continued with the casino development at Pyrmont. By the establishment of State Environmental Planning Policy 41 the NSW Minister for Planning was the approval authority for the development,[15] also allowing development that contravened regional planning policy. Once again the dominance of a significant State development (casino) on aging industrial land (Pyrmont Power Station) drawing the ire of residents and design professionals[16] advanced a controversial urban redevelopment project that, through a 'blank slate' approach, ignored the social and built heritage of the site to enforce its own dominant program of a casino precinct.

Searle suggests "a doctrine of neo-liberalism had taken root from the late 1980s… and the promotion of increased opportunities for investment".[17] The dominant ideology of neoliberalism and urban consolidation established in the 1980s has set the scene for unbridled urban development and the coalition of government and private developers in achieving outcomes that would not have been possible in a pre-global era. Spatial consolidation also reveals the power struggles between the state and local governments. Even the changing leadership from a Labor to Liberal-National NSW Government resulted in little change to the outcome of urban redevelopment strategies. The doctrine of neoliberal governance is a fundamental globalising strategy that has reinforced the dominance of the capitalist class. Indeed the outcomes in Sydney align with the global approach to generating iconic exemplars but falling into the 'generic city' that Koolhaas had foretold by embracing innovation and to "abandon what doesn't work".[18] This model exemplifies the urban development strategy employed in Sydney sanitising the foreshore, rejecting heritage and advancing its credentials as a global city.

Although these foreshore developments do revitalise non-productive industrial land and successfully open new avenues for economic development the outcomes and ensuing benefits have an unequal distribution in these grand urban projects. While these development projects open up what was essentially publicly inaccessible space, the possibilities of refining these developments to promote social cohesion could have been more successfully advanced. With the locus of development moving offshore there are

[15] Searle, G. and Bounds, M., 1999. State powers, state land and competition for global entertainment: the case of Sydney. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *23*(1), p. 169.
[16] Searle, G. and Cardew, R., 2000, p. 369.
[17] Searle, G., 2013, p. 141.
[18] Koolhaas, R. and Mau, B., 1998. *S,M,L,XL*.Monacelli Press, New York, p. 1252.

bound to be casualties and oversight that affect local development with such strategic positioning. With the removal of any signs of a working foreshore at Barangaroo, the only reminder of its maritime heritage is the National Maritime Museum on West Darling Harbour that was linked to the Bicentenary developments. In Barangaroo the artistic hand that dominated the design of the precinct was that of former Prime Minister Paul Keating discarding his working class roots in favour of leaving his legacy of the Headland Park.

The legitimation by the government for taking control of these major projects is nominally stated to be in the 'public interest'. Dominance by private developers in the outcomes of mixed-use projects on public land needs greater oversight to avoid the sanitised urban landscapes that are becoming common. Designing for the tourist gaze has also become a significant determinant in the design of contemporary urban precincts. Examined from the exterior, current urban developments on Sydney's waterfronts provide both the infrastructure for commercial and tourist development and disseminate images of cosmopolitan landscapes that become the new postcards to draw in a global audience. Internally however the politics, process and outcome are less than ideal, extenuating issues of the conflicts of multi-level governance and materialising their results by compromising the quality of public infrastructure and space. As these developments are assessed under their own specific development authority vehicle, they are approved under lower thresholds of assessment than would normally have been allowed for a similar development assessed under local government panels. The dominance of the NSW Government over local government that allows the creation of these authorities contributes to the continued erosion of the resultant built form that is approved.

Since the 1970s, the pervasive ideology of city building has been unashamedly outward looking as the cyclical instability of changes in leadership, city boundaries and policy provision drives development. The internationalisation of Sydney's urban form has seen progress and advancement dominate over issues of heritage and preservation, and as Sydney continues to strive for world city status, so too has the governance mindset shifted towards that agenda.[19] Contemporary urban developments have tracked towards development for a global audience responding to a combination of inefficient local

[19] McGuirk, P.M., 2004. State, strategy, and scale in the competitive city: a neo-Gramscian analysis of the governance of 'global Sydney'. *Environment and Planning A*, *36*(6), pp. 1019-1043.

industries and the weakening of territorial boundaries. The transnational class has become increasingly mobile and to attract this affluent audience, as well as the tourist class, cosmopolitan urban precincts are increasingly required to be developed and delivered albeit at the cost of heritage and history.

This structural adjustment of Sydney's urban development agenda to welcome the *tourist gaze* is intertwined with the proliferation of privately developed public spaces. The impacts that are unfolding in the Barangaroo development have engineered the public to acquiesce by inculcation passively driven through non-provision. The scripted spaces that benefit the tourist or non-resident disqualify non-commodified uses of these public spaces such as the foreshore and Headland Park. The last stage of privatising the foreshore through the Crown casino resort clearly prioritises a monocultural outcome as an appendage to attract a global audience in lieu of its citadins nor the historicism of city development.

The relatively recent phenomenon of urban iconic architectural production that has emerged since the 1990s to the present has become intertwined with the 'starchitect' and 'starchitecture'. These structures are designed to be outstanding in their position, and wildly contextual by not responding to their context.[20] The second requirement from the design competition documentation to "enhance the growth and positioning of Sydney as the premier business, cultural and living centre of the Asia-Pacific region"[21] explicitly asks for this kind of functional precinct to both maintain and improve Sydney's global position.

Conclusion

This chapter has conducted a close analysis of the developing masterplans from the initial concept plan through the most recent Modification 8. The iterative cycle of modification has successively written more detail into the masterplans, but with each successive modification, more and more of the development has been given towards commercial uses. The concept plan formed a masterplan by combining the HTBI and

[20] The prototypical example is Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain. The building enveloped in a voluptuous titanium skin is a strikingly loud structure on the aging industrial waterfront. For an extended examination see Plaza, B., 2000.
[21] NSW Government, 2005, p. 1.

Rogers schemes totalling 388,300 square metres with built form clustered to the south and tapering the building heights towards the north. Modification 2 increased the gross floor area to 508,300 square metres increasing the block sizes to deliver large floorplates for prospective global clients. Modification 3 increased the size of the northern cove, slightly reducing the gross floor area to 489,500 square metres. Modification 4, perhaps the most important change in the masterplan, increased the gross floor area to 563,965 square metres. The most significant change in this iteration is the inclusion of Block Y for the hotel on the pier. The approval for the hotel has set the precedent for the current condition in Modification 8 siting the Crown casino resort on the foreshore. Modification 4 also shifted the bulk of built form from the south towards the middle of the southern precinct. This bulge shifts further north in Modification 8 with the apex at the north of Barangaroo South, a 'bookend' to the site, following the rhetoric of the proponents. At this point, Modification 8 reaches a gross floor area of 594,354 square metres, but greater than this quantitative peak is the spatial impact of the casino. Sited abutting the foreshore, this institution is a polarising icon within the development.

The collective impacts of special purpose delivery authorities and purpose built state legislation in tandem with the influence of private developers, and the hubris and ambition of the NSW Government have shaped the foreshore of Sydney in a very particular way. It is unsurprising that these conditions have led to a commodified and increasingly privatised waterfront that has had influence on surrounding areas like Millers Point that is in the process of renewal and eviction of social housing residents. Chapter 4 looks more closely at the morphology of the Barangaroo development examining the social impact of the proposed and built form and determining the success of its relation and alignment with the city and the foreshore.

CHAPTER 4. BARANGAROO – SOCIAL IMPACTS AND THE URBAN FABRIC

As the spatial form of Barangaroo is materialising with construction underway, it is now possible to deliver a critique of the outcomes of the development. Chapter 2 detailed the competition stage and the interconnected politics of that stage of pre-development. Chapter 3 elaborated on the successive modifications approved by the NSW Department of Planning and the uneven distribution of benefits between the private and public gross floor area that was problematised by the outcomes of public assets developed by the private sector. This chapter begins with a discussion of local and global development perspectives within the Barangaroo development, examining key documentation that describes the development. The Barangaroo precinct is then situated within the assemblage of Sydney as a city, undertaking a qualitative analysis of how the precinct adapts into the existing city, and the success of the precinct in fulfilling its mandate to provide foreshore parkland for the city, enhance the position of Sydney as a business and cultural centre and connect the foreshore. This is followed by a historical comparison to developments on Sydney's foreshore, concluding with a reflection on the spatial quality of new urban developments and the impact of securitisation and privatisation of the public realm.

Multiple loci – The exterior and the interior

Following Kim Dovey, "As the corporate towers have replaced our public symbols on the skyline, so the meaning and the life have been drained from public space. The degradation of public space encourages its replacement by pseudopublic space (public access but private control) as part of a slow expropriation of the city."[1] Even though the competition was won by a local team, for such a high profile development it would seem pertinent to select a firm of equal standing. Richard Rogers was cautious of approaching such a unique context saying "I have to be careful because I don't know it well".[2] Peter Walker also required a local liaison partner to deliver the headland park. The value of a

[1] Dovey in Sklair, L., 2010. Iconic architecture and the culture-ideology of consumerism. *Theory, Culture & Society*, *27*(5), p. 148.
[2] Withnell, K., 2011. Debate in East Darling Harbour. *Monument.* Accessed 10 August 2016 from http://issuu.com/katherinewithnell/docs/debate_in_east_darling_harbour_-_barangaroo/1

globally known architect must be viewed against the knowledge of a local practitioner to produce a more contextually sensitive outcome. Barangaroo has been subdivided into three precincts with the responsibility of masterplanning each precinct as follows: Headland Park – Peter Walker & Partners and Johnson Pilton Walker; Barangaroo Central – Skidmore, Owings & Merrill; and Barangaroo South – Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners.

The Headland Park is currently the only complete section of Barangaroo with the maturity of the trees and shrubs, and the programming of the underground cultural space. Vetted by Paul Keating and publicly announced by then NSW Premier Kristina Keneally, the Headland Park follows the virtues of Paul Keating's vision reinstating a natural headland circa 1836[3] while neglecting the heritage of the working harbour. The resolution is now so bold and dynamic that over the 60,000 square metre intervention, there is no space for active recreation. The sculptural design of the Headland Park is intended to be viewed from afar and placed on postcards and marketing material. The fields and reserves are shaped in convex or sloping surfaces rejecting active uses, but with the long list of restrictions limiting the use of the public space this should not be an issue.[4] With public real estate in such demand, the Barangaroo Delivery Authority has charged admission for access during the New Year celebrations. The space is not just limited to peak periods such as New Year celebrations but can also be hired for private events.

These critiques are not just about the design of the headland but also about the governance and management of the space. Based on the resolution of its design recognition and impact it is arguably a successful project. The headland won the 2015 Australian Institute of Landscape Architects' NSW President's choice award and has featured heavily in tourist publications. Peter Walker has successfully delivered high profile projects including the 9/11 Memorial in New York, and so his pedigree was more than enough to take charge in this politically enthused urban landscape project. Also of contention, especially among the architectural and planning professions, is the lack of programming of the prospective cultural facility beneath the headland.

[3] Walliss, J., 2012, p. 11.
[4] Needham, K., 2015. Barangaroo bans kites, balls, barbecues but welcomes private parties for a fee. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 October 2015. Accessed 15 September 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/barangaroo-bans-kites-balls-barbecues-but-welcomes-private-parties--for-a-fee-20151031-gknl6l.html

The difficulty of a project like the Barangaroo Headland Park that is contingent on private funding of public facilities is that there is a functional dominance of structural and infrastructure concerns before public facilities can be addressed. The cost overruns of the technical details of the project have left a shortfall for the cultural facility to continue to develop. The development of an unprogrammed void has drawn the ire of a collection of noted Australian architects including Richard Leplastrier, Peter Stutchbury and Philip Cox,[5] with growing discontent in the face of the approved casino development.

Barangaroo Central is currently at the tender stage with construction expected to begin in 2017. The precinct is expected to form a spatial transition between the headland and commercial core with development on the Hickson Road edge and greenspace along the foreshore.

Barangaroo South began construction in 2010 and has undergone staged opening since mid-2015 and is expected to continue until 2021. This core commercial precinct has seen successive changes to the planning of its built form with a gradual increase in bulk through successive modifications and is now in a near complete state with three commercial towers fronted by medium density mixed-use buildings set against the foreshore walk. Intended as Sydney's next financial district, the bulk of the commercial towers are already leased by banking firms Westpac and HSBC, auditors PwC and KPMG, law firm Gilbert + Tobin and insurance broker Marsh & McLennan. The developer of the Barangaroo project Lend Lease is a prominent founding tenant anchoring the commercial precinct.

Judging the construction that has been completed, the identity of the commercial precinct is wholly in line with its function as a business and financial hub. Although the bulk and scale of the commercial towers are contextually large situated on the cusp of the foreshore, the most arguable point of contention is the attachment of James Packer's Crown casino resort that will feature a landmark building and is argued to be the icon that Sydney requires to sustain its position as a world city. The casino was surreptitiously floated in 2009 under the unsolicited proposals process successfully arguing the

[5] Moore, M., 2011. Barangaroo bunker baffles architects. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 September 2011. Accessed 15 September 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/stage/culture-to-bloom-in-barangaroo-bunker-20110909-1k1sw.html

uniqueness of the development warranted direct dealings with the NSW Government.[6] The merit of such a proposal is certainly surprising given that Sydney already has a high profile casino operating just less than 1000 metres southwest across Darling Harbour. The commitment of a $100 million fee for the casino license was a significant lever to allow the project to proceed through to the development of a detailed proposal.[7] The development was approved by the then NSW Premier Barry O'Farrell at the end of 2013, and the casino was only recently approved on 28 June 2016[8] against a critical assessment from the Planning Assessment Commission.

At the time of solicitation and development of documentation to support the casino, the global exemplar examples cited to encourage the development were the highly successful casinos of Singapore and Macau.[9] The extremely volatile nature of these casino precincts however proved to be exposed to the corrupt practices of China's moneyed class with a reverse trend observed in the years following a sustained crackdown by the Chinese government on these practices.[10] For a government and development sector that is looking to reduce the risk of their investments it has ignored the historically poor performance of the casino-tourist model that has been repeatedly proven in Australia's casino developments across the country.[11] The proposed programming of the casino with table games adopting a $20 minimum-hand limits the attraction of lower-income visitors already building an exclusionary fence around the estate. These collective actions will likely inhibit the public from using the public space around the casino resort once it is complete, instead it will act as a front yard for the casino guests.

Viewed collectively, the Barangaroo development pays little attention to either the planning policy that should provide the framework to determine the outcome of the built form nor the historical background of its former use as a working harbour. Cities are

[6] Chew, A., 2015. Use of unsolicited proposals for new projects-the approaches in Australia. *European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review*, *10*, pp. 29-34.
[7] Ibid, p. 30.
[8] Saulwick, J., 2016. Final nod for Packer tower despite criticisms in report. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 June 2016. Accessed 16 September 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/james-packers-barangaroo-tower-receives-final-approval-despite-critical-pac-report-20160628-gptd7d.html
[9] Allen Consulting Group, 2012. *Crown Sydney Proposal An Economic Benefit Assessment*. Accessed 26 April 2016 from http://www.crownresorts.com.au/CrownResorts/files/1d/1db9d9a2-3de5-4072-9a4a-486bb427cf8c.pdf
[10] Chow, D.C., 2015. How China's crackdown on corruption has led to less transparency in its enforcement of its anti-bribery laws. *University of California Davis Law Review*. Accessed 26 April 2016 from http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/49/2/Symposium/49-2_Chow.pdf
[11] Pham, K., 2016. Ready or not: The inevitability of another casino in Sydney. In *Urban Affairs Conference*, San Diego.

social entities[12] and the construction of successful cities is determined from that historical development and the relation between city and citizen. Images of contemporary cities are now disseminated through the agglomeration of iconicity in contest with other global cities in attracting the *tourist gaze* towards it. Developments like the Crown casino resort appear as coalitions of private companies and governments without even needing a tender offer. The determination of these developments will already have restricted the occupation of the surrounding space not just along the foreshore to the west, but also overshadowing Hickson Park to the east.[13]

The development of taller buildings in Sydney experienced a slow start in the mid twentieth century after the rescinding of the 150-foot building height restriction. Since the mid 1960s they have appeared with an enthusiastic flourish to capture the audience of a global market, but the development industry finds excitement in trend setting precedents such as these policy-defying tall buildings being built in Barangaroo. The City of Sydney has already adopted these developments into a strategic planning document[14] prescribing even taller building height developments to encourage balanced growth prioritising the provision of commercial space over residential space.

The result of urban development approvals at Barangaroo is an indictment of the governance structure of local government under the control of the NSW Government. Acting under 'the public interest' the social fabric of cities has become overwhelmed and overcome by the economic imperative of creating a global city. At Barangaroo Headland Park the development outcomes have dictated an extroverted parkland that operates under the guise of veiled privatisation, and at Barangaroo South there is no mistake at all about who this space was intended for. The loci of development are based on exteriority for which the myriad regimes of privatisation have little effect on over a collective general public. The shift from the development of open spaces to a 'scripted space'[15] is becoming clearer in the changing ideology from public to privatised spaces.

[12] Rossi, A. and Eisenman, P., 1982. *The architecture of the city*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, p. 9.
[13] Pham, K., 2015, p. 10.
[14] City of Sydney, 2016a. *Central Sydney Planning Strategy 2016-2036*, p. 20.
[15] Klein, N.M., 2004. *The Vatican to Vegas: a history of special effects*. New Press, New York, p. 10.

Is it still a cultural ribbon? Connecting Sydney's foreshore

The foreshore of Darling Harbour has historically seen its boundaries shift as land reclamation has reduced the intrusion of water bodies into the land. These staged transformations principally occurred because of industrialisation and the related industries of production and transport in response to trends of advancement in the global order. The relative youth of Sydney as a city has limited the cycles of change that have transformed the foreshore. Although young, the identity of the foreshore is emblematic of the dominant hegemony of development from industrial production of the nineteenth century to post-industrial services in the late twentieth century. The function of cities as epicentres of development has also required both dynamic, adaptive cities able to quickly respond to changes regionally and globally, and porous cities that are communicative between city precincts and their users.

Urbanisation as a sociospatial process needs to consider the outcomes of its spatial strategies and the impacts on its users. As the waterfront has quickly accommodated the needs of business interests and transnational citizens many blind spots become exposed that quickly develop into a crisis of spatial equity and citizenship. The built form surrounding the Darling Harbour foreshore from Pyrmont to Barangaroo is experiencing either development or redevelopment as a response to a larger regional or global imperative. Although there are city and regional planning strategies and state-level frameworks that seek to position Sydney as an economic, ecological, sustainable and cultural centre, the actioning of such strategies is most often limited by accumulated debt and lack of capital flow.

Definition of the cultural ribbon

The ambition to develop Sydney's foreshore into a 'cultural ribbon' dates from 2008[16] and it was included in the NSW Government's strategy for Sydney in 2014.[17] The cultural ribbon sought to capitalise on the development of several new projects along the foreshore including Barangaroo and connect with existing iconic cultural infrastructure like the Sydney Opera House. As of 2016, the current list of ongoing and planned major developments and cultural upgrades includes (from west to east):

[16] City of Sydney, 2016b. *The Cultural Ribbon Draft Strategy*, p. 11.
[17] NSW Government, 2014. *A plan for growing Sydney*, p. 6.

- The Bays Precinct (currently planned as a mixed-use precinct anchored by high-tech industries and start-ups)
- The Star Casino (casino renewal and hotel development and rebranding under Ritz-Carlton)
- Darling Harbour (convention centre and public realm upgrades, and IMAX theatre redevelopment)
- Barangaroo
- Walsh Bay (cultural development on Pier 2/3 and Wharf 4/5)
- Circular Quay (public domain and precinct renewal)
- Sydney Opera House (infrastructure and interior upgrades addressing major acoustic issues caused by the piecemeal adoption of Jorn Utzon's initial design)
- Art Gallery of NSW (Sydney Modern Project extension).

This impressive list features projects that are predominately redevelopments. With recently completed projects like The Goods Line[18] and forthcoming developments such as the CBD and South East Light Rail, it draws pedestrian interconnectivities further inland.[19] Structurally, and as a regional framework, the ambition to deliver a cohesive outcome of public infrastructure and cultural facilities aligns with the best practice strategies of waterfront cities globally. These cultural and public improvements however are grounded in the discourse of a dominant economic framework. Kornberger and Clegg note the shift *to* (as distinct from *in*) strategic thinking within the framework of New Public Management in the context of rising neoliberalism has shifted the dependence of strategic guidance to reliance on the private sector.[20] In the City of Sydney's *Sydney 2030* framework,[21] the 'cultural ribbon' was promulgated as a strategic package to develop Sydney's brand as a global tourist destination,[22] and although an

[18] The Goods Line is a piece of pedestrian infrastructure modelled after the High Line in New York City. Its path follows a disused freight rail system, hence its borrowed name.
[19] Infrastructure projects such as the light rail system seek to address NSW Government strategy linking pedestrian and cultural precincts interlacing Sydney's urban fabric with a mix of pedestrian and public transport options.
[20] Kornberger, M. and Clegg, S., 2011. Strategy as performative practice: The case of Sydney 2030. *Strategic Organization*, *9*(2), pp. 138-139.
[21] City of Sydney, 2014. *Sustainable Sydney 2030 Community Strategic Plan.*
[22] Kornberger, M. and Clegg, S., 2011, p. 146.

initiative of the City of Sydney Council, the outcome is contingent on the myriad stakeholders (predominately private) that are developing the foreshore.[23]

Question 1: Why move the Powerhouse Museum?

Among all the conflict surrounding the development of the waterfront, it is important to note the consensus between the NSW and local governments on a shared vision in the development of this cultural ribbon. The outcome of this initiative however is still contested with the NSW Government deciding to sell the Powerhouse Museum site in Ultimo and relocate the collection to Parramatta.[24] This decision, in contradiction to the development of a growing cultural strategy, highlights the limit to the Global Sydney imperative. The strategy for the foreshore may be a cultural ribbon, but the relocation of the Powerhouse Museum out of Ultimo reveals the constraints and economic agenda of second-tier development that is removed from the *tourist gaze*. This control exhibited by the NSW Government draws an implicit barrier that cuts and divides citizenship at the city and water's edge.

City development within the assemblage of a dominant NSW Government clearly inhibits the agenda of Global Sydney that has historically prioritised economic development. The drivers of cultural development are still restrained by a need to be examined by and provide a case for economic legitimation that often limits the type of cultural development that could be supported. The secondary nature of cultural development is observed within Barangaroo in the lack of priority and planning given to the space beneath the Headland Park that has been argued to be of such highly flexible design it could be used for a range of programs.[25]

Question 2: Why remove the industrial heritage?

The selective retention of heritage that was prioritised by Paul Keating during the early stages of the Barangaroo masterplan development is also representative of the strategy of the NSW Government determining the future of Global Sydney's image. Explicitly erasing the working-class past of the foreshore imposes a 'blank slate' style development

[23] Although the regional strategy and development is driven by the NSW Government and to a lesser extent local government, they are dependent on multinational developers and global market conditions.
[24] Taylor, A., 2016. Powerhouse move to Parramatta could cost up to $1 billion. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 5 September 2016. Accessed 18 September 2016 from http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/art-and-design/powerhouse-move-to-parramatta-could-cost-up-to-1-billion-20160905-gr92oc.html
[25] City of Sydney, 2016b, p. 4.

while also implicitly restricting the range of social heritage that can be called upon in future development. This fait accompli that operates without needing approval or specialist oversight in its construction contributes to the global proliferation of waterfront developments that no longer identify with the specificity of the historicism of city development.[26]

This selective retention of culture and heritage is accelerating the exodus of collective symbolic capital whose attachment is linked (and subsequently lost) with the people that have actually lived and/or worked on the foreshore as an industrial working harbour. The post-colonial heritage also must be negotiated into the balance of cultural capital that should have representation within the cosmopolitan developments taking place. 'The Cutaway' under the headland at Barangaroo has been earmarked for a National Centre of Indigenous Arts and Culture although the conflict and contradiction of the naming of the Barangaroo precinct as discussed in Chapter 3 may hinder the overall aims for a space to share the arts, culture and history of the Aboriginal people. If the content delivered at the Aboriginal cultural tours run by the Barangaroo Delivery Authority at Barangaroo are an indication of the programming of the cultural centre, then we should expect a certain artistic editing to take place that limits the politicisation of the siting of the centre and the cultural history on show.

Question 3: Do casino precincts in the CBD align with inclusive environments?

The complexity of the myriad cultural, historical and economic layers of development are inherently difficult to manage while creating a cohesive foreshore that equitably responds to and caters for these diverse groups of stakeholders. Still as a development on public land the principal interest should be that of the public. The definition of 'the public' has become problematised within an increasingly mobile citizenry and globalising framework. The complexities of territorial borders should submit to a larger field, supporting citadins (visitors as well as residents) of the global agora, and instead of a line divided by economic potential, the embrace of globalisation should be felt at the local level recognising the heterogeneity of diverse social groupings.

Taking stock of what exists and is being built, there can be a projected social polarisation of this 'cultural ribbon' with Darling Harbour becoming a casino-precinct cum financial

[26] Harvey, D., 2001. *Spaces of capital: Towards a critical geography*. Routledge, London, p. 406.

district, and Circular Quay bordered by the Museum of Contemporary Art and the Sydney Opera House closer to embodying the cultural ribbon. Just as the rhetoric of 'the public good' is loosely defined, so too is the definition of culture.

This dichotomy between principle and outcome highlights the functional difference between more dominant spatial planning frameworks over the qualities of good urban design. More than a functional critique of the strategy, policies that have allowed monocultural development such as casino-precincts ignores one of the principal tenets of urban design, which is quality of place. Coordinating a strategy that requires navigating the complex property rights of fragmented ownership of the foreshore presents a challenge[27] with the City of Sydney the approval authority for just a small section of Hickson Road at Walsh Bay. This fragmentation belies the importance of coordinated development of the foreshore, that also requires communication between organisations and development authorities, and also consultation with the public where a transparent mode of delivery and the accountability of these institutions can be observed and legitimated; a strategy and outcome that has not been exhibited through the development of the Barangaroo precinct.

Conclusion: Economic drivers over common good

Could Sydney's waterfront still become a 'cultural ribbon'? Let us make a judgement based of the lack of inter-institutional development seen thus far. Based on the principles of a highly inclusive public realm that exhibits a public program of spatial infrastructure and cultural development that allows for a mix of spaces for consumption and passive and active recreation, the waterfront has not achieved the ideals of a cultural ribbon. But comparing the current spatial condition to the foreshore circa 2005, there is much to praise in the public access to the foreshore and the future linkage between Darling Harbour and Woolloomooloo. Unfortunately with their dominance over the determination of the foreshore, the NSW Government has a record of delivering development driven by an external locus that seeks to enhance the competitive position of Sydney within regional and global networks. The supremacy of economic drivers above all other social and cultural development inherently limits the individual institutions and spaces that can be provided and it will continue to deliver a fragmented mosaic of foreshore development.

[27] City of Sydney, 2016b, p. 30.

The value of the public domain should be recognised as an asset that must be provided before a liberal economic agenda can displace the outcomes of successful public spaces. Until the universal value of public space can be recognised the realisation of a genuinely cohesive and connected foreshore will not be achieved. Although this is a fairly critical view of the spatial condition of Sydney's foreshore and the expected outcomes as interpreted through strategic documentation, there are avenues and trajectories to shift these values that can offer a framework of development that values the heritage and historicism of city development, integrating it into future plans and overcoming the seductive goals of iconic status and symbolic capital that are representative of a narrowly defined ideal.

Inclusive atmospheres or the end of the public

In light of structuring the city to respond to a strategic global positioning and the increasing shortage of space for development within the city, the NSW Government's intent to "return the foreshore to the public"[28] is a seemingly generous proposal that gives due consideration to the public. As noted in the previous section, 'the public' is a problematised categorisation due to conflicting values. This idealistic scenario of public foreshore access must be negotiated within a complex assemblage of land ownership, jurisdictional authority and shifting governance strategies that must balance local development and global competitiveness.

The evolution of this Barangaroo case study through Chapters 2 and 3 has revealed the performative and dynamic unfolding of this development through both a structured organisation of the initial competition and jury, through the development of the initial masterplan with the prominent involvement of Paul Keating and the subsequent modifications approved over the last eight years. Since the initial approved development plan in 2007, the total gross floor area has grown considerably from 388,300 square metres to the current Modification 8 approval of 594,354 square metres. Collectively the approved modifications have disproportionately increased the private gross floor area while leaving the equivalent public provisions nearly static. It is also telling that with nearly all the built form within Barangaroo that has been accounted for (save for Barangaroo Central), none of the built form indicated for public use has been designed

[28] City of Sydney, 2016b, p. 10.

or completely allocated. Notwithstanding the allocation and development of the public domain and infrastructure, the programming of the commercial and private uses (and their subsequent gross floor area gain) will likely have a disproportionate impact on the future use and place equity on the public domain.

Within the Barangaroo development there are three distinct and overlapping themes that have a negative impact on place equity: the Crown casino resort, together with The Star, which begins to carve out a dominant program within Darling Harbour; the sale of public housing at Millers Point and the lack of and potential rejection of affordable housing within Barangaroo; and the cleavage of public space within the Barangaroo precinct.

The recent approval of the Crown casino resort within Modification 8 in June 2016 was inevitable given the provisional approval given by previous NSW Governments. There was an understanding of the possibility of a second casino since the development of Darling Harbour for the Bicentenary in the 1980s as casino developments started to become commonplace in Australia in the minor state capitals.[29] However the rapid pace of globalisation that is prioritising the development and consolidation of transnational brands and corporations is giving greater impetus and influence to these casino developments. The introduction of casinos and slot machines in Australia has divided communities as the casinos have been both successful generators of capital while deepening socioeconomic divisions where they are situated. Casinos also generate government revenue through the taxes applied to these earnings. Australians are amongst the biggest gamblers in the world, with an average loss of $1,242 per capita in 2014–15 and an average loss of $1,518 per capita in NSW.[30] Although Crown has committed to restricting the extent of gambling to table games, historical evidence has suggested that Australian casinos can neither rely on a roving tourist population nor only table games to fulfil their expected earnings.[31]

The influence of homogenising spatial planning frameworks has given priority of the waterfront to casino-centric developments, and the branding of these transnational

[29] Pham, K. and Grant, B., 2017. Home, James, and don't spare the horses: the inevitability of a second Sydney casino. *Australian Planner* 54(2): 80-92.
[30] Queensland Government, 2016. *Australian Gambling Statistics 32nd Edition.*
[31] Pham, K., 2016a.

corporations contributes to the city's image being determined by a collection of corporate logos. But if the landmark hotel is to be given iconic status due to its design quality, it would not be necessary to so prominently brand the façade with its logo. Indeed the spatial extent and impact on the waterfront when approached with a dominant coalition of corporate and consumptive brands have surreptitiously applied their influence through the development stages, and consequently this has been spatially realised in the totality of the built form and its surroundings.

Equity of housing tenure is also a concern when evaluating the inclusivity of the foreshore. The provision of public and affordable housing in Millers Point and Darling Harbour shares a history that is tied to the industrial uses of the foreshore. The provision of public housing on the foreshore was linked to these historical uses. But with the transformation of the remaining foreshore towards post-industrial services linkages with the tenants that used to live in this area are gradually weakening and becoming lost. Selective memories of the waterfront have become constructed through the reproduction of power through redevelopment of ex-industrial land that is by no means a unique process. The emphasis on employment, technology and sustainability is dominant in the transformation of these highly valuable sites marginalising both the existing character and tenants, and also future habitation and constructions of place. Historicism and historical analysis is predicated on the interpretation of a complete sociocultural and political economic outlook of place that when selectively constructed by dominant actors begins to reductively erode the authenticity of the domain. Once again the ideology of economic rationalism dictates the extent of spatial policy and development guidelines.

Inclusivity has also been threatened by vocal actors in the public domain. Paul Keating's dominating leadership has found critique and scorn from the architectural profession with Paul Keating claiming authorship, "I am fundamentally the founder of the scheme", and in his usual mode of insult, rebuking architect Brian Zulaikha calling him a "little toady",[32] as Zulaikha was addressing some of the issues with the development process and his critique of current documentation.[33] There were also internal conflicts with Clover Moore disagreeing with Keating's hubris with both her exit on 22 September

[32] Moore, M., 2009b. Storming the Headland. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 19 September 2009. Accessed from http://www.smh.com.au/national/storming-the-headland-20090918-fvc8.html
[33] Zulaikha, B., 2010. *The Public Interest.* Accessed from http://architectureau.com/articles/the-public-interest/

2010[34] from the Barangaroo Delivery Authority board and Keating's eventual resignation on 6 May 2011[35] from the Design Excellence Review Panel. Moore's resignation was because of the lack of transparency, consultation and commercial-in-confidence leniency given to the development.[36]

These conflicts extend further with Stage 2 juror Jack Mundey, CEO of Australians for Sustainable Development, submitting a case on 31 January 2011 against the NSW Minister for Planning Tony Kelly.[37] This case was resolved rather unconventionally with the Minister for Planning amending State Environmental Planning Policy 55, the law that were cited. This act was remarkable in the brazen commitment to fight the case, making the claim against Australians for Sustainable Development void, and the Minister's office having to pay all costs to the applicant.[38]

Paul Keating's continued role in the development and shaping of Barangaroo around his vision is well reported and self promoted.[39] From the beginning of his official involvement on the second jury panel and as chair of the Design Excellence Review Panel from 2009 to 2011, he continued this role through informal connections with developer James Packer, who, recognising his influence asked for his expertise to select a design for Packer's Crown casino resort.[40] As the development continues along the same trajectory with more of the development being constructed, the precinct increasingly becomes a tool for the capitalist class generating building programs for maximal profit that is progressed to address the NSW budget deficiencies.

Although the development of consumptive spaces like casinos and the loss of subsidised housing continue to undermine the diversity of tenants drawn to the expanded precinct of Darling Harbour, the constitution of users within the public domain also continues to become ostracised through the lack of priority given to public space development. As the

[34] Keneally, K., 2010. News release, 22 September 2010, Statement by Premier Kristina Keneally on Barangaroo Delivery Authority Board. Accessed from http://www.barangaroo.com/media/13481/100922%20premier%20bda%20board.pdf
[35] Keating, P., 6 May 2011. Letter of resignation. Accessed from http://images.smh.com.au/file/2011/05/06/2348269/keatingtohazzard.pdf
[36] Moore, C., n.d. Hands off our Harbour – Not this at Barangaroo Rally Speech. Accessed from http://www.clovermoore.com.au/hands_off_our_harbour_not_this_at_barangaroo_rally_speech
[37] Australians for Sustainable Development Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] *NSWLEC 33* https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/54a6344b3004de94513d8402
[38] Ibid. para 298-309.
[39] See Moore, M., 2009b.
[40] Ruehl, M., 2013. Keating's knockout. *Australian Financial Review,* 14 December 2013, p. 18.

decision-making authority continues to be taken away from architecture, design and planning professionals, the impact of this loss of specialised knowledge will have a continued impact on the development and delivery of public space outcomes. In examining the state of the foreshore in its current form together with the current documentation, it appears there are extensive public domain facilities on the foreshore. However, these surface level details hide the more contextual issues that become apparent on closer inspection.

Divided into three distinct precincts, Barangaroo from the outset has been planned as a paradise for the global citizen, an abstraction in a digital age that extols bold interventions over sensitive balance of public domain and built form. The Headland Park limits the contagious freedom associated with an open parkland. Instead the heavily curated landscape both dictates and censors the activities that can be conducted within the site. From the limits of active recreation permitted within the Headland Park (no ball games, no professional photography) to the commodification of public space (charging for entry during New Year celebrations), this prescriptive design heavily orchestrates control over the user. As a path, the foreshore walk functions well to connect the edges from Walsh Bay towards Darling Harbour but approaching Barangaroo Central, the scale and impact of the Crown casino resort enforces the image of a privatised public space.

The heavily curated Headland Park acts as a Trojan horse for the casino resort assisting the reading of the precinct as distinct interventions tied together by the foreshore walk. However, the Barangaroo precinct cannot be disentangled from the complex political economy of the city and must be realised as an assemblage of parts, both in relation to the city and internally within Barangaroo. The outcome follows the discourse of branding the city for cosmopolitan development. This corporate model of development is predicated on the model of an agile organisation without attachment to a fixed location. The flexible corporate branding model buttresses both historical development and encourages credibility and legitimacy through a unilateral approach to prescribe meaning.[41] The model of city development in Sydney is embedded in a different structure altogether, hegemonically organised and disregarding the historical development of the city. The city as a fixed entity is an illiquid asset that does not have the flexibility of

[41] Kornberger, M., 2010. *Brand society: How brands transform management and lifestyle.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 26.

corporate organisations and requires a different strategic approach towards allocating resources for a diverse population.

The placement of the casino resort on the foreshore also compromises the surrounding open space through denial of solar access and the spatial domination of the landscape. Prioritising the casino resort on the water's edge means Hickson Park falls prey to a commercially skewed spatial organisation. The public domain suffers from the accumulation of decision-making that has been unresponsive to responses and submissions from councils, professional organisations and the public, instead allowing the proponent unbridled freedom to shift maximum value towards the commercial interests of the development. The prioritisation of the casino resort on the foreshore is symbolic of these collective actions that relegate public benefit on public land behind the requirements of commercial gain.

Viewing the Barangaroo development in light of the recent transformative efforts to gentrify and redevelop the historic Millers Point neighbourhood,[42] the exercise of image control and place marketing dictate spatial planning within Millers Point and the Darling Harbour foreshore. These strategies work to forcefully remove heritage and heritage controls in Millers Point by transferring public housing stock to the fringes of Sydney's metropolitan region. This removal of residents from these historically working class neighbourhoods homogenises and dilutes the diversified historical production of the city that creates enclaves of high net wealth households.

The opportunity to transform the last large parcel of land on Sydney's foreshore began with the mandate to give back the foreshore to the public. However, this was highly unlikely to ever be adequately realised given the historical process of cosmopolitan development on the foreshore since the 1980s. The city more than ever is structured as a signifier of commodified excess where the spatial extent of development must reflect the greater global imperative of government strategy. The conflicting hegemony between the dominant NSW Government over local government has seen repetition of the processes used to ensure the greater state-level agenda determines the outcomes of spatial planning and development of City of Sydney. The failure of the NSW Government to respond to spatial inequity in the face of economic liberalism since the 1980s has constructed a

[42] See https://rediscovermillerspoint.com.au/

sanitised foreshore of commodified spaces that are synonymous with global cities. The mirroring of corporate strategy generates a homogenised cityscape that inherently increases risk in the future potential of city transformation. This developmental bias is the result of assimilation into a global network of cities at the expense of sociocultural development and the construction of cohesive and equitable places.

Future implementations – An autistic city

City development in Sydney since the 1980s has become increasingly polarised as development has had a distinctly outward facing locus prescribing the spatial construction of the city. This dominant influence of the global that has accompanied the shift from an industrial to post-industrial economy as well as an agenda of economic liberalism has benefited from the loosening restrictions and controls on trade, making increasingly volatile speculative developments commonplace. The neoliberal turn has also led to economic restructuring that has had a distinctly spatial impact. Prioritising space from a consumptive to productive asset has seen the commodification of public space that is also increasingly being developed by the private sector leading to a city that lacks cohesion of the social or the spatial.

The attraction of the foreshore in post-industrial port cities as an asset has been readily adopted by the private sector, and governments want to consume the foreshore to redevelop as the inherited debt accumulated by successive governments has shifted the power to construct the city to private developers. This cyclical co-dependency has gradually transformed cities like Sydney from those defined by their historical development to homogenised cities appealing to the appetite of a global audience.

The development of identifiable markers of iconic architecture and precincts are inherently biased towards a more easily communicable image of the development over the more difficult to convey place-making outcomes of strategic urban design that balances an investment in the local while passively attracting the global eye. The contemporary iconic development as an urban renewal strategy continues to maintain dominance through both regressive planning policy and private developers embedded within government decision-making processes. If these policies were not so skewed, how else could the development of a second casino in Sydney be considered as a unique

offering to the city? Would it be conceivable to approve a program of privatised development on prime public land while compromising the outcomes of adjacent public developments? With consideration to the complex assemblage of property rights, integration of development authority and developer, the decision-making process for development on public land needs to be conducted with greater transparency and with consideration of the responses from the public and professional organisations. The lack of professional organisations in the decision-making process clearly deviates from best practice and limits the potential for achieving greater outcomes over the current processes of special purpose delivery authorities.

The unrestrained mandate of special purpose delivery authorities like the Barangaroo Delivery Authority has allowed serialised architecture to proliferate contributing to the decontextualised waterfronts that have been built. This decontextualisation aligns waterfront developments into the network of global cities that they both are compared to and compete with, and it isolates them from the best practice strategies of community and sustainable development. The unfortunate result of such exogenous developmental strategies is being dislocated from spatially localised integration and become appendages of the existing city instead of integrating to the existing grid. Barangaroo is following this framework, satisfied with becoming an autonomous part of the city conveying its iconic status through markers that signify its public offerings such as the Headland Park, its commercial competence such as the commercial core, and its cosmopolitan consumption such as the Crown casino resort.

When viewing the precinct in isolation it becomes apparent that it is made up of a combination of layering of brands that have exhibited control from an early stage and ongoing through current developments. The Headland Park was masterplanned by PWP who share their expertise and exposure from having designed the 9/11 Memorial in New York. But under the directives of the jury, particularly Paul Keating, PWP are relegated to facilitators engineering Keating's idea of a naturalistic foreshore into a feasible outcome. The limits of this vision polarise the outcome by cleaving the heritage and history of the site and reducing the headland to the desires of an expert amateur. The rhetoric of returning the headland and foreshore to the public is made correct by superficial rhetoric sacrificing a holistic approach to the design of the headland, integrating into the precinct and by extension to the city.

The masterplan of Barangaroo South by Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners anchors the commercial precinct under equivalent global name-brand architects. The Crown casino resort is sheltered within the commercial precinct, with even Richard Rogers defending the initial position on a constructed pier on the foreshore, suggesting it as a metaphor for an exclamation mark. Richard Rogers has certainly championed bold design statements such as the Pompidou Centre in Paris with Renzo Piano and is no stranger to controversy. These approved developments set a precedent, leading the way for similar and more inflated projects to be approved, compromising public access to the foreshore and the outcome of public domain projects. The masterplan of Barangaroo Central is yet to be determined but the plans being drawn by Skidmore Owings and Merrill are requesting additional developmental gross floor area for the mixed-use built form justified by the planned metro stop at Barangaroo. If the state of the precinct's evolution is an indicator of what to expect from this last undetermined part of the project, it is likely that the proponent will continue to push the limits of what can be built on site, allowing commercial interest to dictate the density to be delivered while offering no equivalent increase in public amenity.

These recursive shifts in development consent push the limits of what can be achieved on public land on the last remaining foreshore development in Sydney. The prioritisation of 'blank slate' approaches signifies the demise of historical sensitivity and memory, erasing any physical anchor to the heritage of previous uses of the foreshore. This hegemonic development strategy lays the foundation for future development to pass through unhindered. If there is no longer any link to the heritage of the past, it will no longer be necessary to justify the design intent to further encroach on civil liberties as there will be nothing left to defend.

Collectively the impact of special delivery authorities prioritising commercial development on the public domain is the gradual erosion of the interface between public and private. Historically the Barangaroo development fits into a line of foreshore development that successively depoliticises development and dissolves the participatory input of professional organisations, local government and citizens alike. The impact on the public domain is a proliferation of 'autistic' iconic buildings and equivalent urban landscapes that limit social organisation, active recreation and habitation of public spaces without commodification.

The arrangement and organisation of power structures determining development in Sydney actively imparts on the public domain the corporatised character of city development. This motive that is driven by an external locus of development dictates the qualities required to maintain competitiveness but also works to dismantle the historical characteristics of city development. What is left is a mosaic of isolated sites and buildings that both passively and actively securitise spaces by limits on use and restriction of habitation and surveillance that rather than ensuring the safety of users, instead reminds them of the intrusion on personal liberties that is endemic in our urban environments.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed local and global development perspectives within the Barangaroo development and also situating the Barangaroo precinct development within the urban assemblage of Sydney as a global city. The NSW Government strategy to form a 'cultural ribbon' on the foreshore is heavily reliant on private developers to deliver public outcomes that are first filtered through commercial imperatives. The Barangaroo foreshore park is a heavily scripted space that fits within the discourse of a globalising Sydney. It cohesively fits within the precinct to deliver a cosmopolitan development attached to the Crown casino resort, skewing large portions of the site to a pay-per-use outcome. Relying on exterior relations the outcome of the precinct development is committed to an inequitable program that favours the productive value of prime waterfront land. It must not be forgotten that this is indeed a private development on public land.

Reflecting on the Barangaroo precinct development highlights the hegemonic determination and delivery of large-scale urban projects that have become common in high profile urban renewal projects. The power structures that have prioritised commercial development over social outcomes continue the impact on the foreshore. From a state of abandonment, having public access to the foreshore at Barangaroo is an improvement over an unused, contaminated pier. However, the outcome neither signifies the openness that the proponents were endorsing nor does it exhibit inclusiveness. The outcomes of this development continue the banality of global cosmopolitan precincts contributing to Sydney becoming another 'generic city'.[43] For city precincts to stray away

[43] Koolhaas, R. and Mau, B., 1998, p, 1252.

from a march towards monocultural development there needs to be structural change in the determination of large-scale urban developments. The city needs to be viewed as a functional assemblage where the precinct under development must be integrated into the existing city. This can only be achieved with the partnership and involvement of disciplinary professionals, with the endorsement of professional organisations like the Australian Institute of Architects and Planning Institute of Australia, and with the participation of the city's residents.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary development in Sydney has successfully followed the trends dictated by leading global cities. This has required the intervention of the NSW Government as the performance of industries has been traditionally inward looking, and due to a historically protectionist framework that has promoted the inefficient development of these industries. This thesis examined the impacts on the design and delivery of public space in Sydney through the Barangaroo precinct development while considering the meta-narrative associated with development in a global city. The outcome of the Barangaroo development has traced the outcomes of previous waterfront developments in Sydney that have been run under special purpose authorities. This conclusion reviews the Barangaroo case study with contextualisation to global demands and inputs, and reference to a changing structure of urban governance in the greater Sydney region. It begins with a summary of findings, discusses the proliferation of special purpose development authorities, and concludes with the contribution of the research and directions for future research.

Variations on a theme

The Barangaroo development is similar to previous developments like Darling Harbour in the 1980s. Both are urban redevelopments on Sydney's foreshore where the evolution of successful developments can be compared and tracked under the performance categories of economic, social, ecological and spatial criteria. These outcomes however are guarded by recurring political and ideological frameworks that are justified through regional and global competition, construction and control of image, and the commercial imperative of a single developer to push (and breach) the limits of planning controls at the expense of providing public infrastructure.

As the Barangaroo process began in 2006, the framework of the East Darling Harbour International Urban Design Competition was ill defined and unstructured to allow for the unhindered development of the intended 'ideas competition'. The rhetoric pointed to the rehabilitation of the disused dock that lined East Darling Harbour, intending to reopen and provide universal access to the foreshore. However, this relied on the

commercial outcomes and delivery model supplementing the existing CBD and providing an ideal climate for global headquarters to be situated promoting Sydney's position as a global city.

Although there is a need to structure the development of a city to capture the opportunities of an international audience from both a commercial and tourism perspective, cities have not developed from these external drivers. Instead, cities have been historically constructed through layerings of social development determining the sociocultural and political economic framework that has laid the foundations for successfully distinct and identifiable cities. A greater functional complementarity could be achieved through acknowledging that a range of different actors occupy public space and more effort needs to be given to foster these encounters and interactions.[1] The speed and intensity of city redevelopment has structured its future form by the development of identified exemplars selected by their impact within a global scale. These selections however lack the contextual specificity to reincorporate into the distinct topology, climate or sociocultural individuality of Sydney.

From the selection of the HTBI team as winners of the design competition, it was clear that the design conflicts that were developing would continue as the project progressed. As White examined in his case study to develop Toronto's waterfront[2] it was found that establishing transparent principles from having a clear competition brief, appointing an appropriate jury and integrating opportunities for public feedback could have been used to better incorporate a wider perspective in the design and development of Barangaroo from the start. This, however was not the case with the Barangaroo Delivery Authority established in 2008 to oversee the development. In conjunction with the Design Excellence Review Panel, a coordinated governance and design management structure was set up to guide the development, though under prescriptive terms.

The use and proliferation of special purpose delivery authorities has continued with establishment of quasi-government agencies responsible to the NSW Government. The recently formed Greater Sydney Commission has a mandate to interface between local and metropolitan level planning and manage growth. This extra layer of governance

[1] Low, S. and Iveson, K., 2016. Propositions for more just urban public spaces. *City*, *20*(1), pp. 10-31.
[2] White, J.T., 2014. Design by competition and the potential for public participation: Assessing an urban design competition on Toronto's waterfront. *Journal of Urban Design*, *19*(4), pp. 541-564.

directing local government strategies towards an integrated framework that aligns towards major structural reform offers opportunities to guide growth of the greater Sydney region. The argument against this multi-tiered governance model is that it is an extra obstacle for local development that must be justified to what is another vehicle of approval by the NSW Government.

Rhetoric

One of the key descriptors driving the Barangaroo development has been innovation. Functioning as a keyword, innovation has been used to describe the precinct's sustainability, technological and design performance. The emphasis on these marketable factors of the development appeals to a global audience where it is easily comparable through metrics of sustainability, and the imagery of technological and design advancements. What is missing however is the advancement of a social agenda that realises the value of social equity and cohesion within the site and the city. Once again in common with previous waterfront developments in Sydney, Barangaroo extols this ocular bias[3] supporting the instant persuasion grounded in the image. Frederic Jameson laments the depthlessness of contemporary cultural production[4] that is irresistible to the cosmopolitan transformation of precincts such as Barangaroo. The sedation of development for the visual is easy to understand in a digital age of image dissemination. The ease of maintaining the status quo of such cosmetic development will require a systematic overhaul to move past the business-as-usual approach that questions the sustainability of such world-class development.

Coalitions and organisations

Of more structural concern are the subjugation of professional and citizen groups, the rejection of local councils and an extended coalition with private interests. The influence of economic liberalism since the 1980s has had a distinctly spatial impact on the public domain with the economic imperative of commodifying the waterfront leading to an iterative process of urban renewal and social exclusion. The Darling Harbour Bicentenary project was accelerated under the imperative of meeting the strict deadline of 1988, building controversial infrastructure such as the monorail line and sacking the local council because their interventions would have hindered development and progress.

[3] Pallasmaa, J., 2012. *The eyes of the skin: architecture and the senses.* John Wiley & Sons, London, p. 33.
[4] In Harvey, D., 1989. *The condition of postmodernity* (Vol. 14). Blackwell, London, p. 58.

The Sydney Casino project in the 1990s followed a structurally similar framework under the auspices of NSW Government leadership introducing new policy instruments to allow the development to proceed unhindered to address a perennially mounting debt. Now the entirety of Darling Harbour has faced growing pains with Barangaroo under the same control of the NSW Government which instituted the Barangaroo Delivery Authority to oversee the development.

This lineage of development has become cyclical in nature and can be seen to lack innovation in the process and outcomes when evaluating the projects under a social lens. This requires a multi-dimensional framework to understand the "role of urban design in the process of urban change".[5] The relationship between development authority and developer, and levels of governance also come under question with the Chief Commissioner of the Greater Sydney Commission Lucy Turnbull also the wife of current Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. These embedded power structures have become so refined that this control of power has raised few questions about the potential conflicts of interest that could occur.

Economic liberalism over historicism

There is also correlation among these waterfront developments through the prioritisation of an external developmental locus over the grounding of heritage and historical development. Urban space undergoes continuous change and it is where we can see the historical reconstruction of a site and where relations of power are mediated in public.[6]

Cycles of crisis, particularly induced through an assemblage of global, interconnected events often reinforce power relations, encourage market fundamentalism and highlight the relations of capital and state.[7] The urban restructuring of Sydney since the post-World War II reconstruction has required major reconfiguration of the social, political and spatial agenda of the city-region to identify itself as an economic powerhouse of not just Australia but also the Asia-Pacific region. This has required an adoption of international standards that is read as an eviction of the historical developments of the city that enables the city to discard its colonial heritage and attempt to introduce a unique identifier, although copying an international framework of foreshore regeneration

[5] Madanipour, A., 2006. Roles and challenges of urban design. *Journal of Urban Design*, *11*(2), pp. 173-193.
[6] Brenner, N., 2009. What is critical urban theory?. *City*, *13*(2-3), pp. 198-207.
[7] Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. and Mayer, M., 2009. Cities for people, not for profit. *City*, *13*(2-3), pp. 176-184.

projects that intend to draw upon global flows of capital and tourism. This establishment of Sydney as the global capital of Australia allows the city near autonomy but this primacy also requires oversight by the NSW Government to manage the spatial and economic growth of the city and the agenda of its image.

Lack of transparency and questions of legitimacy

Since the competition stage, much of the process of development at Barangaroo was shrouded in secrecy without internal reporting until 2009. As the changes from the concept plan have shown significant departures through the modifications, each successive iteration has justified the commercial gains through arguments of international competition and economic-centric development. These concerns have been flagged in news articles and documents produced by professional organisations like the Australian Institute of Architects. For a development that promoted the potential to give back the foreshore to the public that is also sited on public land, the outcomes of what is being delivered have diverged from what was promised.

Qualitative and quantitative shifts in the design and development of public space

The central finding of this thesis is the successive erosion of public space through changes in both gross floor area and morphology. It was imperative to conduct a parallel analysis to qualify the findings as the changes uncovered through the documentation were complex without a consistent baseline for comparison. Through this analysis it was clear that the increases in commercial gross floor area were instead of public benefit. But the quality of public space is more than just the quantum of public space. Instead of separating the component parts and considering quantitative and qualitative components separately, better consideration of the interactions between objects, people and (public) space should be made whereby their collective properties will emerge from interaction of these parts.[8]

The provision of public space has become increasingly quantified and therefore becoming an object of productive capital. The dissemination of architectural production and visual representation of public spaces are increasingly tied to its aestheticisation and therefore the circulation of its image. Unfortunately, an increased emphasis on the

[8] Dovey, K., 2009. *Becoming places: urbanism/architecture/identity/power.* Routledge, London.

spectacle of architecture and space does little to encourage participation and use.[9] The approval of the Crown casino resort and its location on the foreshore promenade signifies valuing an iconic development over public amenity outcomes. The approval not only relegates the position of public open space to a symbolic role satisfying quantitative values, but also creates the spatial impact of the casino resort and the extension of its licensed areas around the podium of the building that implicitly segregates casino guests from public users on the foreshore.

The repetition of similar development delivery models from Darling Harbour and Sydney Casino to Barangaroo suggests that there has not been a reflection on past problems to counteract the dominant advancement of hegemonic relations and strategies. This repetition also suggests the inability of government-managed delivery models to deliver social equity over successive developments. There is a renewed urgency to reintegrate the needs of all stakeholders and users to realise a genuinely equitable framework to plan and deliver significant major projects that can adequately respond to the needs of all users that use these public spaces.

Through examination of the Barangaroo precinct development, this thesis has found there is a distinct development bias that favours the outward facing image of a global Sydney. The structural framework that binds local government under the hegemony of the NSW Government providing agreeable conditions for commercial development may not necessarily provide the best solution for inclusive public spaces. The dearth of detail in the early stages of the Barangaroo precinct development has provided a poor base for public scrutiny, and for legitimising the development and modification process. The literature has shown that more rather than less transparency leads to public support for significant state projects, allowing the project to progress and succeed even if there is not a sufficient commercial basis. The development and approval of successive masterplans for Barangaroo reveal a clear spatial bias in the provision and impact of the development. As the complexity of cities and their development continues to increase, applying an assemblage framework to the understanding, application and theoretical approach to the planning, development and delivery of large urban precincts such as Barangaroo may contribute to more equitable outcomes that more holistically consider the ecology of cities within the global city discourse.

[9] Sennett, R., 1992. *The fall of public man*. WW Norton, New York.

Barangaroo and the State of Australian Cities

Integrating into global networks has accelerated the pace of development, especially within post-industrial precincts on city foreshores. Developments in Sydney since the 1980s have become lenses reflecting the progress of these transformations and signifying the bias of economic development which sacrifices social cohesion in both spatial form and the impact on its users. The growth of Sydney as a global city has formed agglomerations with the extended Sydney metropolitan region with expansions of the foreshore and the development of business and 'global' corridors overcoming the limits to consolidation within the city. As the city expands it becomes more difficult to see the details of place-making and place-centric development under the auspices of economic development.

Competition

Examination of the Barangaroo design competition and development as a priority of the revitalisation of Sydney has allowed observation and critique of the interlacing of public and private interests, commercial and government relations, the hegemony of the NSW Government over local government and the pragmatic outcomes expected of the completed development. Within the agenda of maintaining Sydney's global standing and competition with regional capitals, there is also a necessity to provide some sort of differentiation that promotes Sydney as the more preferred place to both visit and do business. However, this should not overshadow the overarching requirement to balance innovative development with social sustainability outcomes.

The outcome is a development that has kept to the usual trajectory of prioritising business interests and leaving the public provision to be determined when there is available funding. This prioritisation of development is not the only model possible, with Brooklyn Bridge Park in New York developing a public program before commercial and residential development were built. As Sydney continues to increase in density, foreshore development should show initiative to test a more inclusive delivery model beginning with the public space allocation then fitting in the commercial interests.

Actors

A recently released discussion paper[10] from the NSW Government Architect's Office to develop a design led approach for policy development recognises the primacy of the public realm and has potential to integrate architecture, design and planning into a unified framework. However, this is in the early stages of discussion and must be considered together with the remit of the Greater Sydney Commission and the long-term plans of both the NSW Government and the City of Sydney Council.

Impacts of development

Future development of the public realm requires transparency and consensus because of the integral function and scarcity of the urban commons. As argued through this thesis, there is potential and function for design competitions to generate proposals for future urban developments but there must be clarity from the organising body and certainty regarding the outcome. Through both the competition and project development, a greater separation between private developer and government agency is required to help guarantee legitimacy and confirm that the development on public land is of public interest.

Findings from this thesis suggest several avenues for further research. The relationships between government and development actors require a larger field of case studies to draw relational conclusions on their shared role in the construction of cities, and also on their influence that leads to a crisis of legitimacy of the process and outcomes. This issue leads to the NSW Government whose role of land owner and development authority signals a clear conflict of interest towards the outcome of prioritising global over local. There is also opportunity to undertake a more explicitly ethnographic inquiry and assessment to develop a finer grain understanding of lived-experience of the Barangaroo development when it is completed. There are opportunities to explore more deeply these structural issues that reoccur through successive developments. An exploration into policy that allows such conditions to occur may reveal greater insight into these iterative failings.

As the spatial agglomeration of Sydney as a global city extends to the metropolitan region, the expansion of policy frameworks to capture these opportunities has the

[10] NSW Government Architect's Office, 2016b. Better Placed, *Discussion paper.*

opportunity to open the agenda to recognise the imperative for public open space. However, this is reliant on shifting the lens of city development to interpret the operational remit of the global city imperative to recognise urban ecologies that are as sensitive and responsive to changes in inputs as natural ecologies are to human intervention.

Although former Prime Minister Paul Keating was a vocal actor in the narrative, the issues that are of concern are the processes that allowed this to happen. The interjection in the design process allowed the development of a 'naturalistic' headland but at a cost to the design and development of the rest of the precinct. The scarcity of foreshore land for redevelopment requires best practice processes that allow architecture and design professionals to develop what can be world-class projects within the constraints and principles of their training. Only then can the demands and rigour of a complex development processes with myriad inputs negotiate spatial constraints to develop a mixed-use precinct that balances public and private agendas while considering the project within the critical assemblage of the design of the city.

Within cities, the provision and design of public spaces have become scarce and difficult in their development and delivery. Although the historical development of Sydney's foreshore has been contested and under conflict, it is not enough to simply be satisfied with provision. The qualitative outcomes with the greater assemblage of the city-region are also a concern. Outcomes such as the Crown casino resort on the foreshore fronting Hickson Park are not inevitable. As private developers are relied on more often to deliver public space outcomes, there needs to be greater stewardship and cooperation between the NSW Government and local government to best mediate the results. Although recent examples of large urban developments such as Barangaroo have succumbed to a business-as-usual approach to provide open public space, these increasingly complex sets of conditions may also be the impetus towards innovative solutions to recast development.

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