

# **Framing the Carbon Tax in Australia: An investigation of frame sponsorship and organisational influence behind media agendas**

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requirements for the award of the degree

**Doctor of Philosophy**

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## CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

I, Darryl Nelson, declare that the work in this thesis document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution or any other degree.

This thesis is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

This research is supported by the Australian Government Research Training Program.

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Until then, this thesis is dedicated lastly (but by no means least) to all those who currently work and strive to redress the widespread detrimental effects of corporate greed and unethical consumerism. Your efforts are vital, in the face of unequal power relations, and together constitute what RFK described as tiny ripples of hope, whereby "crossing each other from a million different centres of energy and daring, those ripples build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance."

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## i. Abstract

Framing has been extensively studied in relation to media and public discourse. However, this dissertation examines a dimension of framing theory that has long been acknowledged but not adequately explored – the influences of sources on media news stories and the concept of framing sponsorship.

Frames and framing have typically been identified as media artefacts and practices, with suggestions that editors and journalists unilaterally frame issues of debate in the public sphere. Comparatively little attention has been paid to examining how frames are created externally to the newsroom, to influence the emphasis or content of media stories, other than some studies of public relations (PR) that have mostly been undertaken for functional purposes (e.g. to identify the effectiveness of PR). However, research reported here shows that the influence of sources on the newsroom process is increasingly sophisticated and pervasive.

Using triangulated data from media content and textual analyses, source interviews and a public opinion survey, this study examines how the Carbon Tax was framed in its first three months as a policy direction in Australia. First introduced in February 2011 by the Gillard government, considerable effort was mobilised by supporters and opponents of the policy in attempts to influence the public debate in relation to the tax. As a result, media agendas and frames were set more by key organisations with vested interests in the success or failure of the tax than by media editors or journalists reporting on the issue.

This study shows that, while the debate was characterised by both pro and anti-Carbon Tax voices, opponents such as BHP Billiton and other industry and minerals sector organisations were able to dominate the discourse compared with policy supporters such as the Climate Institute. By examining the framing process by which that was achieved, these findings reveal the activities and significance of what this thesis calls *frame sponsors* – the often hidden and largely ignored sources of influence behind media frames, public opinion and policy.

In summary, this thesis indicates how framing theory needs to pay further conceptual and empirical attention to the forces that influence the presence of

frames in the news. By considering the framing relationship between agenda-setting by media and agenda-building by external sponsors, this study contributes to framing theory by revealing how the latter are able to strongly influence the former, when their vested interests are at stake. Together, the findings of this study offer three contributions to theory in relation to media, the public sphere and framing in particular. First, this analysis shows that the primacy given to newsroom actors in framing must be questioned and not taken-for-granted. For too long, such a default position has helped obfuscate the potential relevance of other key frame influencers.

Second, this research provides examples of how framing sponsorship occurs and the strategic methods and level(s) of proactive influence that are evident in those sponsor processes. Through well-honed strategies and communication practices, competing organisations central to the Carbon Tax debate gained considerable input, both directly and indirectly, into how the policy issue was framed in media narratives. In the current global wave of falling trust in western democratic political systems, the need for greater clarity on how frames carry what Entman has called the 'imprints of power' cannot be overstated.

Finally, by confirming and further defining a specific type of frame – sponsored frames – a new analytical direction is suggested. More recently, framing theory has started to examine how meaning is formed not by a static, standalone frame but by the complex interplay of frames within the relevant wider culture. The recognition that there are various frame types helps build on these ideas, to further suggest that future research might establish a more nuanced understanding of frame types – perhaps a taxonomy of frames. In a media context at least, narrative frames start somewhere; but not all frames are created equally, since some are a lot more successful at gaining salience than others.

## ii. Introduction

Framing theory is now widely recognised and used as the primary discipline for understanding how salience may emanate from textual content, in all its forms. Across the social sciences of psychology, sociology, political sciences and media and communication studies, framing informs evaluations of how texts convey ideas and issues. Over the past two decades or so, framing in a media context has moved such enquiry beyond the disciplines of agenda-setting, agenda priming and agenda building, though it still owes much to those earlier theoretical directions.

Not least of all, framing studies regarding media news are primarily concerned with how frames provide specific parameters for any given topic or issue, guiding the meaning(s) of the textual content in which they appear. Frames suggest certain meanings are relevant to an issue, which in turn can lead how the reader makes sense of that issue. Frames also help exclude various other sense-making parameters. By doing so, frames help focus potential meanings and restrict the polysemy of an issue. In this regard, media framing studies are also increasingly concerned with how frames carry “imprints of power” (Entman 1993), or the interests and agendas of vested actors.

In order to better evaluate the effectiveness or success of a frame within public discourse, media frames and framing practices are best approached not as siloed, isolated events, but as situated within the context of ongoing, multilayered contested narratives. Such a view allows for greater emphasis on cultural connections and power relationships. As Reese (2010) has characterised it:

I regard frames as embedded in a web of culture, an image that naturally draws attention to the surrounding cultural context and the threads that connect them...[and] I see frames as expressions and outcomes of power, unequally distributed with public opinion dominated and enlisted accordingly. (pp. 18-19)

In essence, the public context is full of *competing* frames, all jostling for salience and prominence. Such a view requires research which considers how at least some of those frames do not just conjure themselves, but rather are increasingly sponsored, created and propagated, at least to some degree, to serve vested interests. As Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) have noted, while ‘framing research...assumes that media frames might help set the terms of debate among

citizens as part of a frame contest', and that a key 'potential influence on frame building comes from elites, including...corporate actors', research on the link between such actors and how issues are framed 'is inconsistent at best' (pp. 22-3).

### **Climate change, Australian politics and the Carbon Tax debate**

Over the past decade, climate change policy has remained one of the most contentious areas of political in-fighting in Australia. In 2007, Kevin Rudd was elected Prime Minister with a large parliamentary majority, with a campaign promise to address climate change as "the most urgent moral challenge of our generation". Ever since, this issue (at least in part) has seen the downfall of two sitting PMs and one opposition leader (Crabb 2018). At the end of 2018, Australia still awaited any sign of political consensus regarding how to reduce carbon emissions, despite the latest scientific evidence showing world temperatures had already increased 1 degree Celsius due to human activity (Crowe 2018).

The most recent of the three ministers to fall was Prime Minister Julia Gillard, deposed in a leadership spill in June 2013. Prior to that, Gillard had formed a minority government (Australia's first in 70 years) after a hung election in August 2010, which had required the support of Greens and independent MPs in return for policy concessions. Those concessions included an agreement with the Greens to put a price on carbon (Liddy 2010), after Gillard had promised during the election campaign there would be "no carbon tax under a government I lead". As history would show, those words would haunt her term as leader, when on February 12, 2011, *The Weekend Australian* reported the Prime Minister Julia Gillard and her Labor government would introduce Australia's first price on carbon, in the form of a tax on emissions (Maher & Shanahan 2011). This major event in recent Australian politics was selected as the topic for this study for a number of reasons. The event took place at the start of the candidature period for this thesis and relates to a major ongoing political and public issue in this country – climate change and how to address it. Establishing a topic which could be examined some years after it occurred was also important to provide the strongest possibility of securing high-level participant interviews. Often, issues such as this can only be studied retrospectively, due to commercial confidentialities and political sensitivities that exist at the time.

Most importantly, this policy announcement mobilised concerted efforts among political and organisational supporters and opponents of the proposal, with the respective aims of ensuring the legislation was enacted or defeated. This made the Carbon Tax debate a fertile issue for research concerned with how particular frames emerge to dominate the discourse within a contested narrative, the roles organisations take behind such frames and the potential for those frames and sponsor activities to influence public policy.

As this thesis explores, central to those organisational efforts was the debate carried by Australian newspaper media, with pro and anti-Carbon Tax voices jostling for primacy. From early February 2011, immediately following the PM's announcement, vested interests – frame sponsors – on both sides vied to influence how the tax was defined or, to put another way, by what terms the tax itself and its implications would be understood. By the end of the first three months, in mid-May 2011, this media debate had largely settled into a framing contest over whether the policy represented a sensible economic direction or a looming economic disaster.

However, identification of these media content frames does not in itself reveal and confirm sponsorship efforts, strategic success or framing influence. Within the body of work that has already contributed to the theoretical understanding of media framing, such a focus on the frames themselves has often been accompanied by much less attention on the origins of those frames. More pertinently, from the early work of agenda-setting through to the richly textured landscape framing has become, the framing agenda or source influence has mostly been evaluated in terms of newsroom cultures.

Media frames, it has been widely argued, are the result of journalistic selections and the editorial imperatives of any given news team or mass media channel. As Kitzinger surmised: 'Journalists are consummate "framers" of reality' (2007, p. 137). This narrow starting point is no longer enough, for while sources – even sometimes referred to as sponsors – have for too long received little more than a passing mention, considerable professional work and acumen is now marshalled by sponsors in the processes of media framing.

Interestingly, there has been long-standing acknowledgment that external influences are typically myriad, as illustrated by McCombs and Reynolds who stated:

As evidence accumulated about the agenda-setting influence of the mass media on the public, scholars in the early 1980s began to ask who set the media's agenda. In this new line of inquiry, researchers began to explore the various factors that shape the media agenda...These include politicians, public officials, public relations practitioners, and any individual, like the president of the United States, who influences media content. (2009, p. 11)

However, to date little research has explored how a frame may have originated from and been maintained from *outside* the newsroom. That is, how *sponsored* perspectives and narratives are created and dispersed by actors other than journalists or other newsroom practitioners.

With this aim, this study also looks beyond the disciplinary field of media studies – the traditional media-centric locus of framing enquiry – to take a more interdisciplinary view. By returning framing to its broader sociological and political perspectives, it becomes possible to see beyond the traditional media studies' view of the public sphere, as typically defined by Habermas, where a narrow range of political actors (i.e. politicians and journalists) have continued to enjoy their 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Century pre-eminence in media agendas.

An alternative view argued here, is that newsroom-centricity in both media agendas and news framing must be set aside, as the default starting point. Instead, media framing studies must explore the possibility that a whole host of (typically acknowledged yet often unrecognised) actors have at least as much, if not more, influence over not only what is said but *how* it is said. As such, any continued notions that a journalist's work begins with the gathering of 'raw materials' becomes at best questionable and at worst untenable.

Major power elites, more often than not now found in multinational organisational actors rather than individuals, as well as grassroots activists, online communities, citizen journalists, trolls and other countless micro-bloggers, all encroach on the declining centrality of the traditional journalist and politician to lead public conversations. While this has obvious implications for continued notions of a 'mediated-centre' (Couldry 2006), successful framing sponsorship in this context also raises clear implications regarding 'how resources from the host culture are being appropriated by a variety of actors and sponsors' (Reese 2007, p. 153).

Framing sponsorship and the roles sponsors play as a source of issue frames are the focus of this study, to assess their effectiveness at seeding *their* preferred frames in media narratives. This research explores this in the context of the climate change debate in Australia, by evaluating media framing of the Gillard government's Carbon Tax in its first three months as a concrete policy issue. In so doing, this dissertation seeks to offer clear evidence of how organisational frame sponsorship works, how public agendas are shaped by the needs of business, and ultimately how government policy is *influenced*.

### **Structure of this dissertation**

This thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the existing literature, to evaluate how a theory of framing has emerged from across social science domains. In particular, the media studies focus for framing has evolved from key ideas of agenda-setting and priming. This section concludes with the specific theoretical gaps identified by this study, and the research questions used to guide the enquiry.

Chapter 2 then explains the methodology used to address those research questions. Within a constructionist paradigm, a mixed quantitative/qualitative methodology was used to develop two comparative case studies, examining the Climate Institute and BHP Billiton. In an iterative process, content/textual analyses (Stage 1) enabled the study to identify not only key frames but their correspondence with prominent organisations involved in the Carbon Tax debate. The study focuses on newspaper print news, as opposed to TV or radio or online channels. The main reason for this is how the four major daily print newspapers continued to enjoy high modality and trust as news channels during the study period, ahead of commercial TV and radio news and online channels.

Stage 1 provided the evidence on which to base the second step, namely which organisations should be followed-up with interviews (Stage 2) to complete the case studies. Furthermore, a secondary quantitative data set (the annual Lowy Poll in Australia) provides the analysis with public context and *inferred* audience effects. As such, this research integrates three key components of issue framing in media: (1) Sources, (2) Messages and (3) Audience effects. Together, these three data

sets enable a triangulated-analysis of organisational strategies and sponsored frames.

Chapters 3 and 4 then consider the substantive research results, key findings and conclusions for this thesis. These findings help to confirm and support theoretical understanding of frame sponsorship, by offering new evidence of source influence. The power to frame, in effect to 'sponsor' the establishment of discursive centres around any given 'topic', clearly has important implications for the establishment of public policy. It also has implications for notions of newsroom-centricity, and the traditional view that journalists alone enjoy ultimate 'authorship' over story directions and frames. Furthermore, the conclusions offered here also indicate new directions for understanding how some frames come to dominate over others, and how this recognition highlights the need for defining frame types.

Lastly, Chapter 5 considers the limitations of this study and some potential directions for future research.

# Chapter 1: Frames, Framing and Media: The literature of framing theory

Framing theory has emerged from a number of different disciplines, particularly psychology, sociology and media studies. Van Gorp (2007), for example, explains framing as a theory which 'does not belong exclusively to the tool set of the communication scholar' (p. 60), with its development to be found in cognitive psychology and anthropology and key contributions from sociology, linguistics and communication and other fields. For Van Gorp, highlighting a theoretical shortcoming, this multi-disciplinary history has led to a situation where 'multiple meanings of the words "frame" and "framing" – that is, the frame as a "framework" and framing in the sense of "shaping" – are largely to blame for the vagueness that persists and the absence of an unequivocal conceptualization' (2007, pp. 60-1).

Notwithstanding this history, framing enquiries across the social sciences have usually remained guided by the traditions of media studies, which has understandably focused its attentions on the key actors in that sector: the mass media entity, the journalist and the newsroom. A key early shortcoming of this focus has been to think of the act of framing as a unilateral process, ascribed to a single, omnipotent author – typically, the journalist, the news organisation or the politician, depending on the line of enquiry. In other words, the power to frame, or set the agenda, has long been accepted or analysed in terms of a single key actor, and this approach has enabled power relations behind the frame(s) to remain unexplored.

A key beginning of the newsroom focus was agenda-setting theory, which has important associations with media framing theories. Both ideas are largely about how messages in media texts can influence the presentation of information and, therefore, potentially the thinking of audiences. However, their theoretical differences can be seen in the now famous dictum of Bernard Cohen (1963), who noted 'the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about' (p. 13).

If framing enquiry has moved anywhere beyond agenda-setting, it is in this distinction, towards a model which addresses the first half of Cohen's sentence –

one which can 'reveal' how media narratives do in fact tell us what to think. Accordingly, a review of framing theories must begin with agenda-setting.

## 1.1: From Setting Agendas to Setting Frames

The conceptualisation of *agenda-setting* theory, which posits mass media as the arbiter of agendas that become public agendas, is largely attributed to the work of Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw. They introduced this idea from their now seminal Chapel Hill study, in which they stated:

In short, the political world is reproduced imperfectly by the individual news media. Yet the evidence in this study that voters tend to share the media's *composite* definition of what is important strongly suggests an agenda-setting function of the mass media. (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 184)

Antecedents of this idea trace back to Walter Lippmann's prescient book *Public Opinion*, published in 1922. McCombs described Lippmann as the 'intellectual father' of agenda-setting, since it was his thesis that 'the news media, our windows to the vast world beyond direct experience, determine our cognitive maps of that world' (McCombs 2004, p. 3).

The contribution of agenda-setting research to media and communication studies is now well documented (e.g. McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991; McCombs 2004). Countless studies – in different countries through different media and around different issues – have established a causal link between media coverage and public perceptions of the salience of issues (Dearing & Rogers 1996). An outcome of this tradition was to elevate the perceived importance of the newsroom in shaping media reporting. Again, McCombs' work was central to this early focus, which argued:

The behaviour of individual journalists and the behaviour of news organizations do significantly influence the final shape of the daily news report. But it is important to remember that these individual and organizational influences are expressed through the genre of writing that we know as journalism... Only when we understand this inner core of the onion will we fully understand the role played by journalism in the creation of public opinion. (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, pp. 30-1)

Nevertheless, the idea that *media set the public agenda* established the vital starting point that there is in fact measurable media influence. After all, the 'entire study of mass communication is based on the premise that there are effects from the media' (McQuail 1987, p. 251). Agenda-setting theory was the first to establish credible evidence for that premise, without which later notions of framing might have had little basis.

### **Frame origins – Cognitive psychology and “the pictures in our heads”**

Advances in cognitive behavioural analyses of how we process information and 'perceive' have strongly influenced thinking across all strands of social science, not least of all media studies. An early important text in the psycho-cognitive vein came from the work of anthropologist and social scientist Gregory Bateson (1972), titled *A Theory of Play and Fantasy*. In his psychotherapy-based analysis of communication both between animals and between humans, Bateson saw a clear delineation between more natural “mood-signs” and more culturally imbued signals, whereby:

If we speculate about the evolution of communication, it is evident that a very important stage in this evolution occurs when the organism gradually ceases to respond quite 'automatically' to the mood-signs of another and becomes able to recognise the sign as a signal (1972, p. 121).

Bateson even couched this psychotherapy-based analysis in the idea of humans using *frames* to determine signals from mood-signs, in the sense that framing applied to a communication instance provides the reader with all the necessary clues to allow the signal to be decoded. As Bateson described it: 'Any message which either explicitly or implicitly defines a frame ipso facto gives the receiver instructions or aids in his attempt to understand the message included within the frame' (1972, p. 128).

Another oft cited text is the work of Fiske and Taylor (1991), who explained how social psychologists used the term “cognitive misers” to describe the way most people often use the least effort in their day-to-day thinking (e.g. by typically using heuristics), rather than apply elaboration (deep critical thinking). Fiske and Taylor further explained how social cognition research identified a set of cognitive processes which came to be known as *social categories and schemas*, which 'allow

us the comforting sense that we understand our world, and often they are accurate enough, although sometimes they are sadly mistaken' (p. 97). The importance of heuristics in information processing and meaning-making has come to be accepted, contributing not least of all to contemporary thinking such as behavioural economics. For example, Fiske and Taylor said:

For these reasons – time constraints, complexity and/or volume of relevant information, and uncertainty about the evidence itself – it is unrealistic for the social perceiver to use exhaustive strategies for making judgements. Thus, the social perceiver must be, under most circumstances, a 'satisficer' who makes adequate inferences and decisions. (1991, p. 381)

This heuristic process has perhaps been most strongly demonstrated by the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1984). In a social psychology experiment highly referenced in framing texts, they showed how question framing elicits very different responses from people, resulting in diverse options chosen when a situation was described in terms of deaths or lives saved (pp. 341-50). In this psycho-cognitive sense, it now seems as though Lippmann was perhaps even more prescient than realised at the time, and that his idea of media contributing to the "pictures in our heads" was more an early framing theory than an agenda-setting one. At least one agenda-setting scholar has also remarked on this (Ghanem 1997, p. 5).

Fiske and Taylor acknowledged that this type of processing within the psychological field has not been without debate, particularly in terms of understanding which certain schemas are more or less likely to be used by a person in any given context. Nevertheless, it is easy to see in this cognitive reasoning how early notions of agenda-setting would come to be unsatisfactory, particularly in the sense of any transformative media influence.

### **Agenda-setting – Second order effects and priming**

We can see this trajectory beyond agenda-setting in a key study by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), undertaken as part of their widely-cited research into television and the formation of opinions among the American public. This introduced the notion of *priming* as distinct from agenda-setting, describing it as 'a manifestation of

television power that is more insidious and perhaps more consequential than agenda-setting' (p. 4).

Following in the vein of Lippmann, their arguments also highlighted the importance of "accessible information", in terms of people making sense of issues. At the time of their studies, TV news was assumed to be the most accessible, at least in US homes, which led them to conclude 'that television news powerfully influences which problems viewers regard as the nation's most serious' (Iyengar & Kinder 1987, p. 4). For Iyengar and Kinder, any given issue becomes a high priority for the public only if it first becomes a high priority news item. While this 'chicken and egg' argument has been refuted by some (e.g. Kosicki 1993), there is the clear influence of psycho-cognitive theories in shaping Iyengar and Kinder's arguments, as they themselves acknowledge (1987, p. 63). This increasing understanding (e.g. of heuristics) provided the foundation for Iyengar and Kinder to identify what they termed priming, which:

Presumes that when evaluating complex political objects ... citizens do not take into account all that they know ... What they do consider is what comes to mind, those bits and pieces of political memory that are accessible. And television news, we argue, is a most powerful force determining what springs to the citizen's mind and what does not. (1987, p. 4)

Media priming studies, according to Willnat, have typically been the domain of political communication researchers and 'have linked the agenda-setting hypothesis and cognitive priming theory' (1997, p. 52), to find strong evidence for the priming effects of television news. While Willnat also pointed out that making this link has not been without disagreement, the point here is to highlight how the journey from agenda-setting to framing has unfolded. Iyengar and Kinder's priming can be seen as an early shift in thinking towards a type of "framing" effect – that is, not only what to think about, but how to think about it. In effect, 'priming requires a second step' (Kinder & Iyengar 1987, p. 95). Although the theory distinguishes between involved and uninvolved audiences, in terms of how well priming works, it is in regards to this second step that an early basis for a framing effect can be located. As Iyengar and Kinder described it, in this second (cognitive) step of their TV news consumption, people may be more likely to see the "connections" between the news problem and the president (p. 96). While back then they did not specifically refer to those news

stories as carrying frames, it is now possible to see how 'frames' within the TV news content were/are most likely responsible for creating such a connection.

Before turning attention to framing theory more fully, it is important to finally look at how more recent analyses of agenda-setting, ideas of *salience* and second order attributes, have underwritten attempts in reconciling the theory with growing academic attention on framing. Essentially, agenda-setting theorists had to take note that something more was going on than simply setting agendas. An overview of the status of agenda-setting theory in the early 1990s, for example, highlighted the growing realisation that there was a need to explain "opinion change" more convincingly within media contexts. Agenda-setting was now at pains to describe how 'different people can interpret the same information in different ways' (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, p. 18). Again, social cognition processes were central in the new questions being asked about media influence. Most importantly, as McCombs et al. explained, the forces being brought to bear on media messages could no longer be ignored:

It is likely that increased salience of an issue will result in more public knowledge and stronger public opinion, but it is less certain what direction that opinion will take. Direction of opinion depends not only on what past beliefs and values each person brings to media messages, but also on how issues are presented by the media in terms of group interests and values, as well as perspectives that are developed through discussion with other persons. (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, p. 19)

Agenda-setting scholars such as Ghanem further offered a revised second level of influence, while still arguing that the 'shift in emphasis does not negate the basic agenda-setting hypothesis, but rather builds on what already exists' (1997, p. 3). However, at the second level, agenda-setting moves from object salience (the re-scribed first level) to *attribute salience*, and the influence of framing ideas is apparent. As Ghanem explained:

The attributes of an object are the set of perspectives or frames that journalists and the public employ to think about each object. How news frames impact on the public agenda is the emerging second level of Agenda-setting. (1997, p. 5)

Ghanem insisted that it became possible to see, from a renewed vantage point, how many early agenda-setting studies did in fact 'explore this second level of agenda-setting even before explicit theorising had begun' (1997, p. 5). However, as

she also pointed out (Ghanem 1997, pp. 6-7), such arguments and refinements arose as a direct response to ongoing discussions about frames, including those of Iyengar and Simon (1993), Entman (1993), Hackett (1984), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Mendelsohn (1993), Tiffen (1989) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1990).

### **The growing primacy of a framing theory**

Framing has arguably supplanted agenda-setting theory, although some key questions are starting to be asked of framing theory itself, not least of all regarding whether studies focus adequately on power relations among those who would do the framing. Sociologist Erving Goffman's 1974 *Frame Analysis, An Essay on the Organization of Experience* is widely recognised as the first fully-formed attempt to characterise a theory of framing. Drawing on a range of previous philosophical and psychological ideas regarding the separation of a person's perceived reality from actual reality – including Bateson's *A Theory of Play and Phantasy* (first published in 1955) – Goffman's focus, as he readily pointed out himself, was in bringing them together (1974, p. 8). As he stated:

My aim is to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject ... frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. (Goffman 1974, pp. 10-11)

Certainly, Goffman's original premise of what a frame and its organising capacity consists of has stood the test of time. Similarly, another key contribution was Entman's *Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm* (1993), now seen as a seminal work in the development of framing as a media discipline. In particular, he was one of the first to attempt to synthesise – from across the social sciences – a coherent definition of framing in a communication context.

Entman argued that, despite enjoying a position of omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, framing theory lacked any clear explanation of 'exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking' (1993, p. 51). For Entman, the discipline of

communication was best placed to offer this analytical synthesis of framing because, despite its disparate uses in various fields, those uses by necessity all involve communication. His description of framing as an act which involves “selection and salience” is now well known:

Frames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience. The word *salience* itself needs to be defined: It means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. (1993, p. 109)

This study takes some of Entman’s key arguments regarding the importance of reaching a more unified understanding of framing as a basis for this enquiry. He highlighted three aspects of framing that “direct our attention” and which are most relevant here: Firstly, that ‘salience is a product of the interaction of texts and receivers’ (1993, p. 53), which further compels an examination of any extant *competition* between frames in that interaction. Secondly, that ‘the concept of framing directs our attention to the details of just how a communicated text exerts its power’ (Entman 1993, pp. 55-6), which further compels an examination of any extant evidence of influence or power in that competition and whose *power* is being exerted? Thirdly, he surmised that ‘journalists frequently allow the most skilful media manipulators to impose their dominant frames on the news’ (Entman 1993, p. 56-7), which further compels an examination of just how that happens. By what process(es) are the frames of some “skilful media manipulators” more successful than others in making their way into media?

Entman, like many other media and communication scholars, was concerned with the political implications of power embedded within frames, since ‘the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text’ (1993, p. 55). However, while there has been considerable research to *name* the power vested in frames, especially within key fields of cultural studies (e.g. gender, race, sexuality), by exploring and uncovering signs of the dominant voice in cultural texts, there have arguably been some major shortcomings of this work. Critically, there has been little examination of the origin(s) of a frame and the process or processes disseminating that frame and, just as importantly, there has been little acknowledgment that any given frame must compete with other frames for salience, which in turn demands examination of how some frames are more successful than others.

## **Sociology and political studies – Key contributions to framing theory**

Two social sciences which have drawn heavily on the importance of framing to thinking and acting are sociology and political studies. Over recent decades, it is in these areas where the theoretical impetus of what can be termed ‘agenda-mobilising’ has gathered pace, which in turn suggests wider frame influences. This can be seen in the work of Snow and Benford (1986), who introduced the notion of *frame alignment* as a key condition of social mobilization. For them, different framing efforts, which address different stages of the mobilisation process, must align to produce “frame resonance” in the target social group.

By providing descriptions of four frame alignment processes – frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation – Snow and Benford had drawn on social psychological understandings of frames and framing, not least of all from Goffman. Their aim was to explain the necessary conditions for improving support and participation in social movements by relevant organisations:

By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. So conceptualized, it follows that frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation. (1986, p. 464)

Here, frame alignment refers to congruence and coherence between the orientations of the social-movement organisation and the public it wishes to mobilise. It is with these outcomes in mind – congruence and mobilisation – that much of the socio-political communication framing approach is couched within. More recently, Snow and Benford have come to refer to “collective action frames”, which are ‘action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns’ (cited in Gamson 1992, p. 67).

Another key contributor in this sense, Gamson, draws heavily on framing theory and has also explored why it is that some social movements are more successful than others in gaining and mobilising popular support. In *Talking Politics* (1992), Gamson sought to debunk the typical (at that time) American social science view of mass publics as full of “passive and dumb” individuals. Instead, he settled on the notion that social movements require the right circumstances of political

consciousness in order to flourish. From his research, Gamson (1992) identified one factor of “political consciousness” as a collective sense of injustice, what might be termed an injustice frame, which has to be evident at three levels: in personal experience, popular wisdom and media discourse. This early suggestion of a *type* of frame and how its salience is formed in the interplay between three loci of sense-making is instructive, and further discussion of these ideas forms part of the conclusions of this study.

These adopters of cognitive framing insights outlined here were key contributors to an understanding that has shifted media studies away from agenda-setting and more firmly into framing. Through the lens of socio-political objectives, regarding perceptions and behaviours, understanding of the media effect of agenda-setting, at least at the original first-order level, had clearly come to be inadequate.

### **Newsroom centrality and agenda-setting**

Throughout the literature of both agenda-setting and framing, the primacy of the newsroom has remained largely intact. Agenda-setting theory in particular has long asserted that the dissemination of issues is primarily under the control of news media factors; namely journalists, editors and newsroom principles.

This key departure point has tended to be taken as given, primarily because most agenda-setting studies have started from identifying issues that are already in the news, and then looked for correlative evidence of the same issues in public audiences. While external actors have also long been acknowledged, these influence factors have typically been ignored in favour of the filtering control of the newsroom agents. This media studies’ inclination tells us:

Through their day-to-day selection and display of the news, editors and news directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues of the day. This ability to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda has come to be called the agenda-setting role of the news media. (McCombs 2004, p. 1)

Such a preponderance on newsroom centrality is evident throughout key texts in the agenda-setting tradition (e.g. McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991). In the early 1980s, scholars began to develop the agenda-setting theory further, by asking ‘who

sets the agenda for the media?’ (Gandy 1982; Weaver & Elliot 1985). In their *Journalism Quarterly* article, Weaver and Elliot contended that:

Even if there is a correlation between what the press emphasizes and what many people are most concerned about, it is not quite accurate to speak of the press *setting* the agendas if it is mainly passing on the priorities set by other actors and institutions in the society. (1985, p. 87)

Yet, at least in their early study, Weaver and Elliot found that local newspaper coverage of the Bloomington City Council, Indiana, either ‘played more of an active filter role’ or ‘played more of a neutral transmitter role’, in terms of passing on the City Council’s agenda (1985, p. 91). Again, there appeared to be *more* support from this study for the idea of journalistic control, not less, as noted in the following comment:

With regard to media agenda-building, then, this limited study of news source and media agendas suggests that a prominent news source can have a major influence on the subsequent media agenda, but the selective processes and news judgement of journalists also play a significant part in shaping this agenda. (Weaver & Elliot 1985, p. 94)

*Media gatekeeping* (Shoemaker 1996; Shoemaker & Vos 2009) is another approach to understanding agenda-setting which placed the newsroom at the centre. As Shoemaker and others (Salwen & Stacks 1996) have examined, stories don’t just appear in the news, but rather have to go through a process of selection – a series of media gates which define newsworthiness. McCombs and Bell, for example, point to the intermedia news leads given by elite news organisations and the propensity for “pack journalism” (1996, p. 104).

This journalistic focus owes a great deal to media and mass communication studies, which firmly established the newsroom at the centre. As Takeshita highlighted: ‘The question of how the media mediate between the external objective reality and our social reality (our belief of what the world is like) has been one of the most fundamental themes in mass communication research’ (1997, p. 15). Takeshita explained that during the 1970s, led by a “new generation” of scholars from the schools of journalism and mass communication established during the preceding decade, there was a paradigm shift within the field of mass communication research from a persuasion-al paradigm to a journalistic one. As he

succinctly surmised: 'No one would argue that the agenda-setting perspective does not embody the journalistic paradigm' (1997, p. 19).

Kosicki (1993) also acknowledged this key departure point, whereby the literature originally encompassed the work of scholars in journalism and mass communication, but he also provides a clue as to why this newsroom focus has persisted. In describing the characteristics of the agenda-setting model which "set it off from others", Kosicki explained:

Agenda-setting is one of the few media effects models to explicitly prescribe a particular way of dealing with media content. Basically, it says that the amount of space or time devoted to particular issues should be measured, and that this measurement should relate to either the amount of attention people pay to issues or to their judgements of the issues' importance. This connection is an important strength that has sustained Agenda-setting over the years. (1993, p. 105)

Such an approach must firmly hold the newsroom as key organising actor, determining as it does the amount of "space or time" given to any specific issue or set of issues. We can also see in this concept a very useful scientific approach that is easily replicated and hence attractive to retain. Certainly, Kosicki saw this unquestioning approach to news work – that is, whether journalists act as neutral observers *reflecting the news*, or actively focus social attention by *shaping the news* – as a "key failing" of public agenda-setting studies (1993, p. 110).

This myopia within agenda-setting studies also had further implications for the important process of linking up agenda-setting with policy settings. As Kosicki continued:

Ultimately, it is useful to know something about the origins of the ideas being communicated, since this bears directly on the extent to which Agenda-setting is a media effect or a reality effect in which media are mere channels between policy makers and public. (1993, p. 110)

### **Newsroom centrality and framing**

While the media-content measurement of a newsroom-centric approach may have been relevant for early analyses of the agenda-setting function, it is surely inadequate for studies of framing. Reese (2001), for example, said of his more

politically considered approach, that 'frames are connected to asymmetric interests', and that:

Critiques of the public relations industry, for example, are full of these success stories, which help explain why certain sources are so successful at convincing journalists that their frame is the most useful way of organising an issue. (p. 18)

Reese further contended: 'This notion of framing contestation draws attention to how journalists organize information as the outcome of their interaction with their sources' (2001, p. 18).

Nevertheless, the dominant assumption of journalist-centric news shaping remained in the early framing-based challenges that emerged from cultural studies. These challenges have, among other things, centred on notions of discourse and narrative. As Bird and Dardenne (1988) highlighted, cultural studies revealed how many journalists held dear the notions of objectivity, impartiality and balanced reflection of reality while, in other disciplines, 'the study of narrative and story is becoming increasingly important, as emphasis focuses on texts as cultural constructions' (pp. 67-8).

While this type of challenge has been critical in calling attention to the artifice of objectivity, which again has been an important contribution in the shift from notions of agenda-setting to framing, the journalist remained the key author for the most part. As Bird and Dardenne also observed: 'Journalists find themselves poised uneasily between what they see as two impossible ideals – the demands of "reality", which they see as reachable through objective strategies, and the demands of narrativity' (1988, p. 78). Yet, again, we also see acknowledgement that perhaps that was not the whole story: "Perhaps most significant, the consideration of the narrative qualities of news enables us to look more critically at whose values are encoded in news – whose stories are being told?' (Bird & Dardenne 1988, p. 79).

More recently, Van Gorp (2007) has drawn on the cultural work of the likes of Stuart Hall and argued that it is more useful to define frames in the context of the production and consumption of news, along the lines of shared culture. This is because 'culture is seen as a primary base to constitute knowledge, meaning and comprehension of the world outside' (p. 61). Van Gorp's analysis led him to the recommendation of thinking about a "frame package", which links framing devices,

latent reasoning devices and implicit cultural phenomena (2007, p. 73). This is an important and useful re-thinking of the framing model, as it highlights how the theory suffers from inconsistent definitions of different types of frames, and therefore struggles to uncover the different layers of effects in the frame interplay.

However, Van Gorp also confirmed how the journo-centric approach often remains core to thinking, when considering newsroom or source influences, by saying:

I suppose, however, that the main focus should be on framing by the media, mainly because I feel that even representing a statement made during an interview, whoever the interviewee may be, implies choices made by the medium in question, so that it is part of the framing process. (2007, p. 69)

Similarly, Scheufele and Tewskbury (2007) offer a good summary of the three main theories typically informing media effects studies: agenda-setting, priming and framing. For them, these three areas represented the paradigm trajectory in political-communication research, starting with agenda-setting research in the 1970s, followed by the emerging approaches of priming and framing in the 1980s and 1990s with new ideas that 'mass media had potentially strong attitudinal effects' (p. 11). Yet, again, in their brief exploration they also appeared to confirm the newsroom centrality that typically informs all three theories, even when considering frame building and agenda building (for more on these adjunct theories, see Section 1.3). For example, Scheufele and Tewskbury continued: 'A number of different theoretical approaches – sociological, economic, critical, and psychological ... have been applied to this effort, focusing on a variety of steps in news production' (2007, p. 12). Examining the nature and variety of such "steps in news production" forms a key starting point of this study.

### **Newsroom centrality and notions of *raw* stories**

That the newsroom came to dominate both agenda-setting and framing thinking is unsurprising, given early origins were closely linked to questioning the 'objectivity' of journalism and the 'impartiality' of news media. These ideas were a particular foundation of *mirror theory*, which asserted that journalism and news media simply reflected reality (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, pp. 25-49).

Central to this early focus were notions of news stories emanating from *raw* ideas or facts, which journalists then “shaped” into news copy. This assumption is evident in discussions regarding the influences of news traditions on journalism, where ‘the structural biases that arise from the very nature of journalistic reporting and writing...shape the configuration of facts reported in the news’ (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, p. 30). Similarly, in a framing sense, Kosicki asserted:

How issues emerge and evolve over time is a matter of considerable importance, and at present we have only a fragmentary account of the process. However, starting from the point of view that journalists do not merely mirror reality but rather...actively construct news out of the available *raw materials*, we can begin to understand how issues are framed.’ (1993, pp. 111-12) [emphasis added]

Notions of “raw” have also been used in relation to audiences. For example, the language and imagery used by media in the making of a political candidate’s “image” have been described as providing “important raw material” (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, p. 82). Or, in terms of how the mass media exert a powerful influence on public opinion and “the social construction of reality”, Johnson-Cartee surmised that ‘newsgathering processes affect how issues are named and defined by reporters, thus shaping the *raw materials* from which people inevitably draw to form their own versions of reality’ (2005, p. 3) [emphasis added].

The point here is not to question the relevance of such content artefacts to the processes of news production and sense-making under discussion. Rather, it is important to recognise that we must be careful about any ongoing assumptions of ‘rawness’. Just how *raw* is “raw”, in the context of news story materials? Surely the past four or five decades of agenda-setting and framing enquiry – regarding not just newsroom production but also source agendas and wider socio-cultural imperatives – have shown that notions of media news starting from raw materials are at best circumspect? Indeed, the contradiction in such thinking has been there at least since the early 1990s, as apparent in this statement:

An increasingly important influence of the media agenda, and thus indirectly on the public agenda, is the work of various interest groups – not only to raise the salience of certain issues, but also to gain attention in the media for facts that support their side of an issue controversy (McCombs, Einsiedel & Weaver 1991, p. 98).

In the realms of business and organisational agendas, news media-relations work 'is almost as old as modernity itself', with formalised corporate public relations systems incepted at least as early as 1928 (Manning 2001, p. 160). It was then that Pilkingtons, the UK glass manufacturer, established one of the first internal public relations departments, and, as discussed later in this Chapter, public relations scholarship has probably done most to evaluate such source strategies.

Today, some 90 years since Pilkingtons, the highly sophisticated media-relations approaches of "various interest groups" surely requires media and framing scholarship now recognise that many of the *facts* provided to news media have, to some degree, been 'cooked', packaged and presented with specific intentions in mind. Or, in other words, carefully selected and framed for the desired effect. What is more, we should probably stop thinking about external influence on the public agenda through media as being "indirect".

## **1.2: Framing Theory Today – The break from agenda-setting**

The relationship between the mass media and significant sources of news – politicians, lobbyists, corporate leaders, public relations professionals – has always been acknowledged in both the agenda-setting and framing paradigms, and indeed within multiple studies of public relations (PR) (Macnamara 2012, 2014; Reese 2001). That media channels are predisposed to carry the voices of a select few has, of course, been a primary motivation. Framing theory now appears to offer a better framework for examining this relationship, and many scholars have started to call for a theoretical separation from agenda-setting. Carragee and Roefs (2004), for example, argued that agenda-setting and framing theories have diverse origins and focus, stating:

Agenda-setting research scholarship represents a continuation of media effects research, and its prominence as a tradition reflects a disaffection with the limited effects model. In contrast, framing research originates from the sociological research of Goffman (1974) and the media sociology of Tuchman and Gitlin. (2004, p. 218)

Carragee and Roefs stressed the need to move beyond problems such as how researchers define frames, particularly the conflation of story topics with frames emanating from the agenda-setting tradition. In response to research done by Miller, Andsager and Riechert from 1998, which identified “frames” including crime, welfare and the economy, they argued:

These are story topics, not frames, because they categorize news stories by their subject. In contrast, frames construct particular meanings concerning issues by their patterns of emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion. The conflation of frames with story topics... can be viewed more appropriately as a continuation of scholarship on the influence of press releases on news content. (Carragee & Roefs 2004, p. 217).

Importantly, however, Carragee and Roefs emphasise that work studying the influences of media (press) releases and studies on framing can be merged, ‘but only if an application of framing to the former approach employs a meaningful definition of frames’ (2004, p. 217).

Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) also follow other scholars (e.g. Price & Tewksbury 1997; Scheufele 2000), to challenge McCombs’ assertion that framing is a continuation of agenda-setting, despite the fact that ‘the concept of second-level agenda-setting is not without merit’ (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007, p. 15). Reese perhaps best refutes the agenda-setting parallel with framing:

It has been particularly interesting to see the attempts made to subsume framing under the agenda-setting umbrella. This turf battle is ironic, because I would view framing as in part a reaction against the theoretical limitations of its neighbour. (2007, p. 151)

Over recent decades, a major theoretical improvement from framing scholars has been to introduce notions of frames emanating not from some hygienic clean slate but rather within the full history and ongoing context of multiple media frames and other cultural codes (e.g. Gamson 1989; Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Iorio & Huxman 1996). In other words, sense-making through an interplay of factors has steadily gained theoretical primacy. Framing research has done more to consider the importance of the cultural context surrounding media content, demonstrating how ‘frames are negotiated and contested in people’s discussions, and that their “frames” also come from sources other than media, i.e. popular wisdom and experiential knowledge’ (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen 2011, p. 105)

Research conducted by Iorio and Huxman, which studied 191 adults who lived in or near Wichita Kansas prior to the 1992 presidential primary elections in the USA, investigated how individuals 'attach meaning to their concerns by framing information and personal experience within their social worlds' (1996, p. 98). They found patterns emerged not so much as groups of concerns but among the methods people used to express those concerns. For them, the study showed that: 'Through commonalities in the response patterns, we identified three processes – *linking*, *collapsing*, and *colourising* – as part of the overall action involved in framing personal concerns' (p. 104). Like Gamson, Ioria and Huxman argued that people do use media as an important source of information, but that this is routinely interspersed and integrated with their own ongoing "personal frames of reference", to result in the totality of their perceptions and the meanings of their concerns.

What this work illustrates more than anything else is the manifest difficulty in pinning down and attributing clear causal effects of media frames on people's opinions, attitudes or actions. As Iorio and Huxman further asserted:

Because our findings show that the public actively engages mediated communication by associating disparate topics, streamlining information, and responding emotionally to issues, attempts at aligning media and personal frames by shifting media presentations may never be entirely successful. (1996, p. 111)

### **Media frames vs personal frames of reference**

Locating the significance of cultural and cognitive contexts and the resulting separation of media frames from personal frames has been an important development within framing. It also represents another key area where theories of framing have offered a richer landscape for mass communication effects theory, beyond simple agenda-setting, opening up spaces for audience negotiation and contested meaning(s).

To date, the separation of frames as content (e.g. words/images within media texts), versus frames as cognition ("meaning" ascribed to that content by the reader, through personal frames of reference), has gone by many names. Kinder and Sanders (1990, cited in Scheufele 1999, p. 106), for example, described the two frame types respectively as "devices embedded in political discourse" and

“internal structures of the mind”. Similarly, Entman (1991, cited in Scheufele 1999, p. 106) described the distinction as “attributes of the news itself” versus “information-processing schemata”.

The term *frame devices* comes from the important work of William Gamson and colleagues (with Kathryn Lasch 1983, and Andre Modigliani 1987 and 1989). In their study of media discourse on nuclear power, Gamson and Modigliani highlighted how “media packages” are distinct from cognitive processes of individual sense-making (1989, p. 2). Media packages, being essentially content, are described as carrying ‘a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue’ (p. 3). Framing devices form part of that set and direct how to think about the issue. For the authors, there were five such devices, comprising metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, p. 3). From this work, Van Gorp argues media packages are best thought of as “frame packages”, to move beyond notions of media production towards more cultural and social productions of the frame. He further crystallises that frame devices should be considered the ‘manifest elements in a text that function as demonstrable indicators of the frame’ (Van Gorp 2010, p. 91).

Also using these ideas, a study regarding climate change specifically called this distinction the difference between frame devices (e.g. a slogan) and frames (the underlying interpretive meaning). Nisbet explained how this could impact research:

For example, [studies] might track in news coverage or test in an experiment a slogan such as Al Gore's "climate crisis", but never carefully consider the underlying interpretive meaning ("runaway impending disaster"), of which the slogan is just one among many possible triggers. (2010, p. 49)

Nisbet provided a few examples of this distinction, from the USA (2010, p. 50), whereby Democrats have used the framing device “gun safety” to conjure the frame meaning of *public health*, as a shift away from the Right's framing device of “gun control” which emphasises more the frame meaning of *civil liberties*. Similarly, he explained how Greenpeace has used the framing device “Frankenfood” to conjure *unknown risks and consequences*, as a response to genetically modified crops and the food bio-tech industry's preferred frame meaning of *addressing the world's food needs*.

In another related vein, Vliegenthart and van Zoonen (2011), building on the work of others (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007), highlight the theoretical confusion that has arisen from confluences of “frame” and “framing”, particularly as a result of the contrasting approaches taken within the sociology paradigm and the communication studies paradigm. Here, the issue is seen as scholars not doing enough to separate the building of frames (‘how does a frame come about?') from framing effects (‘what consequences does the frame have?'). The former constitutes the ‘content features’ and the latter is seen as either the ‘process or contextual features’ (of framing) or the resulting “receiving” of meaning (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen 2011, p.102).

These distinctions, between *the content* of a frame device (e.g. the words "climate crisis") and the underlying conjured *frame* of meaning (e.g. the notion or theme of *runaway impending disaster*), have been vital, towards understanding the power to frame. That is, such distinction is necessary to reveal how certain frame devices are more powerful than others to "conjure" the frame of meaning, and how certain "underlying" frames of meaning are more powerful than others to underwrite a cognitive consensus (however fleeting) critical enough to mobilise and/or motivate certain reactions.

What is more, these distinctions have necessarily raised questions about how various frames may compete with each other for salience, an area of research Chong and Druckman described as “largely unexplored” (2007a, p. 101). Not least of all, such a view has shifted framing enquiries more strongly towards real-world conditions. As Chong and Druckman continued, ‘politics is typically competitive, fought between parties or ideological factions, and issues that are debated are framed in opposing terms’ (2007a, p. 102).

### **The call to examine “imprints of power”**

The acknowledgement that frames exist and operate in different forms and on different levels to generate meaning, typically in competition, has also rightly demanded greater attention to how those negotiated and contested meanings may be fought over. Reese’s offering of framing theory as a “bridging model” for synthesising the disparate nature of the communication field as a whole, offers two

key reasons why the “framing project” has come to dominate. Firstly, as we have seen already, a framing approach is better placed to examine the dynamic and contextual nature of message-meaning(s) (Reese 2007, p. 150-152). Secondly, it is better equipped to consider “precisely” how certain attributes come to be associated with certain issues. As Reese continued: ‘The framing project opens up more room for interpretation, captures a more dynamic process of negotiating meanings, and highlights the relationships within discourse’ (2007, p. 152).

Such a focus on “relationships within discourse” necessarily introduces the need to look at immanent influences and the various forces of power shaping the discourse. A key text to crystallise such a call – to examine the nature of power relations in this context – came from Carragee and Roefs (2004). They argued that framing research had suffered from a neglect of power, owing to a number of factors, including: ‘conceptual problems in the definition of frames, the inattention to frames sponsorship, the failure to examine framing contests within wider political and social contexts, and the reduction of framing to a form of media effects’ (p. 214).

For Carragee and Roefs, the importance of sociology was paramount, as a way of bringing framing theory back from its media-centric trajectory. By integrating the “media hegemony thesis” into framing research, framing processes can be better ‘examined within the contexts of the distribution of political and social power’ (2004, p. 214). As they explained:

In recent years, there has been an increasing tendency to isolate frames as a characteristic of news texts in an effort to trace their influence on audiences. Within this approach, framing research becomes part of the wider tradition of media effects scholarship ... This tendency represents a considerable narrowing of the framing process by ignoring why certain frames dominate news texts and others do not. (2004, p. 220)

Their argument is also important for the call to place greater emphasis on “sponsors”; a critique which highlights how the main body of framing research to date, while constantly acknowledging the presence and importance of source influence, has done little to look further behind the newsroom. Too often, framing studies have failed to consider the framing process in its entirety and (to echo Vliegthart and van Zoonen) just how does a frame come about? Not only does this critique raise the important consideration of *sponsorship* and just how ‘power’ enables frames to be successful, it also elevates consideration of framing as a

*contextual contest*. In this regard, work in the hegemony, cultural discourse and media power traditions, including Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault, have much to offer.

In this sense, Carragee and Roefs raise an interesting assertion. By drawing on the hegemony focus of the sociological work of Snow and Benford and Gamson, among others, they are also led to conclude that 'because asymmetries in power influence the framing process, social movements experience considerable difficulty in shaping news coverage' (2004, p. 226). Here, the interaction of social-movement organisations with mainstream media reveals what Gamson and Wolfsfeld have termed a "struggle over framing" (1993, cited in Carragee & Roefs 2004, p 225). But do they experience considerable difficulty? If so, how so? As contended here, a research study more focused on the activities of competing sponsors in a frame building conflict can begin to confirm or refute this assertion. As Carragee and Roefs have called for:

The challenge of framing research is to study the complex ways power informs frame sponsorship, the articulation of frames within news stories, and the interpretation of these frames by audience members. (Carragee & Roefs 2004, pp. 228-9)

Such calls to improve the attention paid to any manifest power relations has not gone unnoticed. Vliegthart and van Zoonen (2011) also recently made the case for sociology to be brought "back to frame analysis", in a plea to make full considerations of power central to framing theory. Vliegthart and van Zoonen highlight that the mass-media studies dominance of framing research has, to its deficit, largely ignored 'more sociologically informed research about framing' (2011, p. 111), including the valuable insights offered by cultural studies, such as from Stuart Hall, and socio-political studies, such as from Gamson, Snow and Benford, Iorio and Huxman. Accordingly, it has also largely ignored discussions of the complex processes media messages go through, firstly to become a frame and secondly to generate meaning:

The relation between news frames and audience frames is based on collective processes of negotiation over meaning, rather than on individual exposure to news frames. Such a perspective does not preclude a social psychological approach to frames and framing, but does necessitate that such studies incorporate a theory of

power and use methods that are sensitive to the contexts of production and reception of news. (Vliegthart & van Zoonen 2011, p. 111-12)

This study seeks to build on this timely call; a call to use sociological perspectives to move media research studies beyond contemplations of media frames *in situ*, to look more closely at the how and why some frames are more readily able to appear there in the first place.

### **Framing and public relations – “Frame strategists, issue managers”**

As has been highlighted throughout this literature review, while external influences have always been acknowledged, their activities have largely taken a back-seat to the newsroom. One area where source strategies and newsroom relationships have been explored more comprehensively is within public relations (PR) scholarship. In Australia, Macnamara points to a number of studies conducted between 1992 and 2010 which, at various times, showed strong correlations between newspaper stories and PR activity (2012, pp. 37-8). This included a study from 2010 by the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism at the University of Technology, Sydney, which indicated ‘PR influence on content ranged from 42 per cent in the *Sydney Morning Herald* over a five-day working week to 70 percent in *The Daily Telegraph*’ (Macnamara 2012, p. 38).

Another key work in this regard was the influential study of Oscar Gandy (1982), which examined how the relationship between media relations professional and journalist had become a very effective and cosy value-exchange. For him:

Sources enter into an exchange of value with journalists which (1) they reduce the costs of news work to increase their control over news content; (2) they reduce the costs of scientific research to increase their control over scientific and technical information; and (3) they even reduce the costs of writing and producing television fiction to increase their control over the cultural back-ground against which social policy questions are generally framed. (Gandy 1982, p. 16)

As Gandy implored more than three decades ago, the professional reality of these *information subsidies* demands we ‘go beyond agenda-setting to determine who sets the media agenda, how and for what purpose it is set, and with what impact on the distribution of power and values in society’ (1982, p. 266). However, this level of

source enquiry (e.g. Miller, Andsager & Riechert 1998, cited in Carragee & Roefs 2004, p. 217) has typically departed from the object of press or media release. As such, it has also done little to examine the process by which those releases have come to be developed and disseminated, particularly in terms of carrying a sponsored frame.

Similarly, Manning's analysis of news and news sources struggles to examine factors beyond the long-established interaction of key players (political and corporate elites and marginalised 'activist' organisations) and *the newsroom*. As he explained: 'Although this book aims to provide a comprehensive account of the news production process and the broad constraints that impinge upon the work of journalists, a central preoccupation is with the issue of *access* to the news media' (2001, p. 137).

It must be stressed that this is not to downplay or refute the importance of access to news media as a key area for understanding social power relationships. Yet access alone does not fully explain *influence*. That PR practitioners are increasingly adopting a framing approach on behalf of their clients, underlines how a deeper insight of frame development beyond the newsroom is imperative. The take-up of key theoretical ideas regarding cognition within PR clearly demonstrates how frame management – to influence and direct public agendas and thinking – is becoming a central mainstream practice within the media strategies of sources. As Botan and Hazelton highlighted in their key text for PR students:

Heuristic message processing is, in all likelihood, the dominant processing mode for most public relations content...Where heuristic processing dominates, determining what shortcuts are more likely to be employed by specific receiver groups in what circumstances would inform public relations practices. (2006, p. 114)

Indeed, some of the most useful efforts to synthesise the competing theoretical interests of framing and agenda-setting – at least in a practical sense – are found among PR scholars. Hallahan (1999) has perhaps done most to make sense of this fractured paradigm. In a broad review and summary of the existing literature at the time, Hallahan identified what he felt were seven distinct framing scenarios, or contexts, applicable to public relations professionals. The following table outlines Hallahan's seven types (1999, pp. 209-23) and some of the theoretical bases also cited in this study from which they were drawn.

**Table 1.1.** Summary of Hallahan’s typology of seven framing models applicable to Public Relations

| <b>What is Framed</b>   | <b>Key Academic Sources (also cited in this Thesis)</b> |
|---|---|
| <b>Situations</b> (relationships between individuals, structuring communication interactions)           | Bateson, Goffman  |
| <b>Attributes</b> (characteristics of objects or people which are accentuated)                          | Ghanem and McCombs                                      |
| <b>Choices</b> (alternative decisions posed as either negative (a loss) or positive (a gain))           | Kahneman & Tversky                                      |
| <b>Actions</b> (driving a desired behaviour goal by stating alternatives in positive or negative terms) |   |
| <b>Issues</b> (defining social problems for a preferred definition or solution)                         | Gamson & Modigliani, Snow & Benford                     |
| <b>Responsibility</b> (attribution of credit or blame for cause and/or remediation)                     | Iyengar & Kinder  |
| <b>News</b> (media stories conveying culturally resonating themes and/or preferred source views)        | Gamson  |

It is the last of these areas that most concerns this study. Hallahan himself noted how the framing of news ‘can incorporate many of the notions of framing discussed in the previous sections’ (1999, p. 221), regarding the other six models considered relevant to PR. In terms of framing’s overall importance to the public relations professional, Hallahan asserted that “contextualization” is the central idea linking all seven of the models, such that framing works to provide “clues” and establish “frames of reference”. The PR objective here was also laid bare, since ‘the message must be imbued with sufficient clues so that people can make sense of the message and for it to be *persuasive*’ (1999, p. 224). [emphasis added]. Hallahan also made it very clear that framing is not to be considered “merely useful” but as “essential” to the PR professional:

In developing programs, public relations professionals fundamentally operate as *frame strategists*, who strive to determine how situations, attributes, choices, actions, issues, and responsibility should be posed to achieve favourable outcomes

for clients. Framing decisions are perhaps the most important strategic choices made in a public relations effort. (1999, p. 224)

A similar practical synthesis of communication theories is offered by Zoch and Molleda. Combining theories of framing, information subsidies and agenda-building, they developed a theoretical model of media relations for students and practitioners of PR. For them, understanding these rich theoretical tools ensures public relations practitioners can provide information to effect very favourable client outcomes:

[PR] practitioners wise in the ways of the media, and aware of the needs of policy actors to obtain “objective” information about a particular issue, can make every effort to influence decision making for the benefit of their organizations. We also contend that when media outlets are provided a carefully framed message, perhaps even arranged into an organized media package to help facilitate their newsgathering, the benefits to a practitioner’s organization increase geometrically. (Zoch & Molleda 2006, p. 287)

Assertions like these from a PR industry standpoint, again, highlight the growing urgency to closely examine “imprints of power” within third-party agendas and their framing in news media. As Hallahan also pointed out, ‘framing is clearly a valuable concept for issue managers’:

The ultimate objective of most issue management initiatives is to seek resolution of disputes...However, if that is not possible, effective issues management involves controlling the prominence the issue attains in the media or the public policy agenda. **Defining issues through the process of framing thus becomes a pivotal concern.** (1999, p. 227) [emphasis added]

### **1.3: Agenda-building, Agenda-cutting, Frame ‘Sponsorship’**

Recently, more work has been done to focus on external influences on media coverage. Interestingly, ideas more closely linked to agenda-setting than framing are providing useful analysis tools – in particular, agenda-building. What is more, it is within business contexts that a number of media studies have recently returned to this idea.

## **Key directions in understanding source strategies and sponsorship**

The term “agenda-building” is not new. As Hallahan explained nearly 20 years ago: ‘Agenda-building involves pushing issues from the arenas of public discussion, onto the media agenda and ultimately to the public policy agenda’ (1999, p. 218). The origins of this idea, which closely followed the development of agenda-setting, have been credited to Cobb & Elder’s 1972 look at the way agendas are ‘dynamically’ built between the press and other societal actors, Lang & Lang’s 1981 examination of Watergate, and Gandy’s 1982 work on how institutional sources build agendas through information subsidies (Macnamara 2014, pp. 137-9).

Agenda-building is distinct from agenda-setting, in so much as ‘it is more concerned with how issues originate, or how subjects of news coverage *become* issues, than with the media-audience relationship studied so often by agenda-setting’ (Weaver & Elliot 1985, p. 88) [emphasis added]. Agenda-building focuses on the internal and external forces *influencing* what mainstream media covers (Colistra 2012) and, in most cases, specifically on the interactions between journalists and sources (Ragas 2013). For Ragas, these interactions are again based primarily on the symbiotic relationship highlighted by Gandy, particularly in the context of business PR:

While the relationship between the news media and business is strained at times, they both have what the other wants. Corporations have a stockpile of a commodity (newsworthy information) that the media often needs, while these same firms often seek the reach and legitimization that earned media coverage can provide. (Ragas 2013, p. 158)

As a key basis for the analysis of what Lippmann called the “transfer of interest” (1922, p. 193), agenda-building and also agenda-cutting provide some important latest thinking by more concretely moving enquiry beyond the newsroom. Similarly, ideas around frame “sponsorship” are particularly useful for examining corporate agenda-building and frame-building strategies. Again, the acknowledgement of external sponsors is not new. Gamson and Modigliani’s work was among the early pioneering in this regard, calling out the forces behind at least some of the interpretative packages making it into media stories. As they explained:

Packages frequently have sponsors, interested in promoting their careers... These sponsors are usually organizations, employing professional specialists whose daily jobs bring them into contact with journalists. (1989, p. 6)

Those assertions were based on their empirical study of how sponsorship had impacted on media debates regarding the US government policy of Affirmative Action (Gamson & Modigliani 1987). They found that, over time, arguments against affirmative action through an interpretive package/frame of “reverse discrimination” gained dominance, not least of all due to this package being actively promoted (i.e. sponsored) by a “neoconservative network” of voices. Ideas since then have expanded this further. In talking about influences on media agendas, McCombs, Einsiedel and Weaver (1991) noted how ‘to get their information to the public, interest groups sponsor research’ (p. 99). Tewskbury et al. (2000) undertook one of the first such studies in a policy setting, looking at ‘how different news story perspectives can serve as vehicles for the advocacy activities of policy actors’ (p. 805). For them, these source media activities constituted “advocate frames”.

Pan and Kosicki (2001), in discussion about the relationship between framing and public deliberations, remarked that ‘the rise and fall in the prevalence of a frame, and consequently a particular policy option, clearly invoke debates among people who sponsor or align with different frames’ (cited in Johnson-Cartee 2005, p. 25). While Reese (2001), in discussing how framing theory provides the tools to examine “knowledge structures”, added that this ‘must in turn be carefully tied to frame sources and sponsors, social practices, and interests’ (p. 9). These notions of sponsorship and sponsor influence have more recently gathered a renewed emphasis, with calls to make vested interests more central to framing analysis (Carragee & Roefs 2004; Van Gorp 2007). The ubiquity of this activity in the real world is further suggested by Macnamara:

Frames are advanced and promoted by official sponsors, such as governments, political leaders, institutions and representative organisations. In addition, frames are advanced by a range of unofficial sponsors ranging from ‘think tanks’ and activist groups to private business interests and individuals. (2014, p. 136)

Van Gorp especially has argued how the recognition of sponsorship changes the nature of framing enquiry, away from newsroom-centricity. It is a recognition that ‘forces external to news organizations partly shape the degree of journalistic autonomy’ (2007, p. 68), at the very least. In particular, sponsorship demands greater attention on framing as a *process*:

The impact of frame sponsors brings me to an important distinction...between framing *by* the media and framing *through* the media. In the former case, the

journalists arrive at a particular frame in their representation of an event, whereas in the latter, framing is concerned with frames that have been processed in communication by utterances by frame sponsors and other actors. (Van Gorp 2007, pp. 68-9)

### **Corporate PR: Framing and agenda management in the business context**

Over the past decade, a growing volume of research on corporate agenda-building has clearly shown that business media strategies, in general, have some meaningful impact on the media coverage associated with them. Ragas (2013) explains, for example, how research by LaReau in 2010 showed US motor company Ford capitalised on its decision not to take Federal Government bail-out funds during the height of the Global Financial Crisis. Standing in contrast to its rivals General Motors and Chrysler, both of which requested and received financial assistance, Ford ramped up its media relations campaigns to emphasize frames of “accountability” and “shared sacrifice”. The resulting media coverage of Ford’s determination to ‘stand on its own two feet’ (Ragas 2013, p. 154) helped propel the organisation’s Reputation Quotient (a leading annual measure of corporate reputation in the US) up the ladder. In 2009, Ford’s RQ score made the largest gain ever seen at that time, and rocketed up to rank #37, compared with GM at rank #54 and Chrysler at rank #55.

More recently, Colistra (2012) has examined how television news content in the US is influenced by extra-media sources, among other key forces. By drawing on interviews with journalists, she maps relationships between the various key influences on content, which hitherto have typically been researched separately. Instead, Colistra’s study identifies three major loci for these forces: *extramedia* (advertisers, public relations, political representatives), *organisational* (economic, owner/executive leadership, staffing levels etc) and *within-media* (newsroom culture, journalistic norms etc.).

Colistra’s findings are not without issue, and it is notable that she readily acknowledges they are a measure of “perceived influence” from a journalistic perspective and not of actual influence. What is more, the modelling used in the study struggled to find a direct correlation between external forces and the newsroom (i.e. within-media), instead indicating that ‘influences from the

extramedia level are first mediated by forces at the organizational level and then passed on to managers within the news organization itself' (2012, p. 121).

Notwithstanding these points, the study was one of the first attempts to take a more concrete 'step back to consider who or what is influencing the media's decisions', in response to the research call 'that more knowledge is needed about how and by whom the media agenda is set' (Colistra 2012, p. 117). As such, her findings and conclusions are particularly relevant and instructive here. Colistra argues, for example, that her modelling – based in part on the 1996 work of Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model of influences, as well as examples from agenda-building and framing theory literature – measures the *interplay* of forces from a panoramic perspective. It found a strong, linear link between journalists' perceptions of outside pressures creating organisational pressures and, based on existing literature and logical reasoning, this supports the view those pressures must flow-on as greater influences within the newsroom (Colistra 2012, p. 125).

It is the potential link between external forces (extramedia) and Colistra's final content consequences – of agenda-building, frame-building and agenda-cutting – that is of particular interest. As discussed, frame-building is the process by which 'internal and external forces tell the media *how* to think (and write) about an issue, story, or topic' (Colistra 2012, pp. 98-102). Agenda-cutting, on the other hand, is where those same forces are focused on keeping an issue *off* media agendas, an idea which has hitherto been 'largely ignored in scholarly research' (p. 100). As Colistra exhorts:

Examining agenda cutting from a media-effects perspective is also an important area to consider for future researchers. If an item is not covered or is placed low on the news agenda, the public may be unaware of important societal issues. In turn, this cutting function may affect how people view and participate in their social structures (2012, p. 129).

The concept of agenda-cutting can be traced to the work of McCombs and Shaw, and Wober and Gunter in the 1980s (Colistra 2012; Macnamara 2014). Essentially, agenda-cutting is a process 'whereby problems or issues have attention directed away from them by receiving little or no media coverage (Wober & Gunter 1988, cited in Macnamara 2014, pp. 138-9). More pointedly, an agenda is "cut" or ignored when internal and/or external influences conspire to: (1) place an item low on the

news agenda; (2) remove it from the agenda once it is there; or (3) completely ignore it by ensuring it is never on the agenda in the first place (Colistra 2012, p. 100). From these ideas, it becomes possible to further ask: to what extent do external forces *effect* frame-building and frame-cutting in media, through agenda-building strategies? In a corporate or organisational context in particular, how are agenda-building and framing strategies put into practice to achieve such outcomes? That business organisations do this is no great secret. Nor is *why* they do it a great mystery either. As Ragas succinctly puts it:

Corporations invest tens of millions of dollars each year producing and disseminating information subsidies as part of media strategies designed to earn coverage, and in turn, influence public opinion. (2013, p. 158)

What this thesis contends, then, is the need for functioning democracies to better understand and counteract this growing corporate influence. Dinan and Miller (2007) offer a somewhat extreme yet nonetheless disturbing analysis of how, in many respects, big business has already won. For them, the functioning of public relations has always sought to 'thwart and subvert democratic decision making' (p. 11). In recent decades, in its most modern, globalised form, corporate PR has 'provided the cutting edge of the neoliberal revolution', which has firmly 'put the market in the driving seat' (p. 14). As an industry based on "manipulation and deceit", Dinan and Miler raise a number of moral and social "charges" that can be made against the practice of public relations (2007, p. 12):

1. It is overwhelmingly carried out for powerful vested interests, mainly corporations
2. It is not open and transparent about its means or even its clients
3. It characteristically involves deception and manipulation
4. It does not engage in democratic debate, but rather seeks to subvert it in the interests of its clients
5. Corporate social responsibility and other 'ethical' activities are all subordinated to corporate strategy

6. PR has played a crucial role at the cutting edge of corporate power in the neoliberal revolution.

It is this last point that the authors feel is the most serious charge. Across advanced industrialised nations from around the mid-1970s, largely in response to the growing influence of “social democracy”, PR professionals and lobbyists were in the vanguard of an economic counter-revolution. Principally funded by the interests of big business, corporate interests finally seized power in the UK and USA with the elections of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980. For Dinan and Miller:

[T]he neoliberal victory was not put in place by abstract forces but had to be won by argument and action...by means of vastly increased investment in the machinery of information management (2007, p. 15)

Whether or not corporate agendas are quite so nefarious is a moot point. For example, from Dinan and Miller’s scathing perspective, there is ‘no such thing as aligning private and public interests’ (2007, p. 17), and only by deceit can they be made to appear so. Yet, recent business ideas such as *Creation of Shared Value* (e.g. Pirson 2012) are at least starting to think about how to “reinvent capitalism” (Porter & Kramer 2011). However, Dinan and Miller do highlight two very interesting points about the nature of this corporate information management (2007, pp. 14-18). Firstly, the authors note that a key vehicle for the business agenda has been – and continues to be – pro-business think tanks and peak bodies, including global organisations like the International Chamber of Commerce. Secondly, they identify a PR-industry tactic known as the “third-party” technique, whereby corporate views and agendas side-step the tarnish of being a vested-interest opinion. Basically, they theorise, the general public are often rightly sceptical about any claims made by a person or organisation that clearly benefits themselves. As such, PR often works to ‘disguise the source of the message by inducing others to spread it’ (Dinan & Miller 2007, p. 18), lest they be tainted by calls of *they would say that, wouldn’t they*.

Again, such assertions enable this enquiry to be further refined, to ask: to what extent do corporate or organisational forces *effect* frame-building and frame-cutting in media, through agenda-building and framing strategies which are direct and/or which recruit or co-opt third-party voices, such as peak bodies?

## 1.4: Agenda-setting Today – The struggle with framing theory continues

Attempts to reconcile agenda-setting with the disruption of framing ideas have continued, not least of all from the former's principal scholars, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver. A brief review of these latest ideas serves to illustrate just how much framing has forced a re-think of agenda-setting.

As discussed in Section 1.1, the first evolution of agenda-setting was to separate out first-level effects (essentially, the salience of "objects" or subjects in the text), from second-level (the salience of object "attributes"). Latest ideas now include a third-level, described as *network agenda setting*, a concept of *need for orientation*, and a new facet described as *agendamelding* (McCombs, Shaw & Weaver 2014, p. 782). In these three reworked ideas of agenda-setting, the framing insistence of textual *openness* and reader negotiation have especially been addressed. In the facets of network agenda-setting and need-for-orientation (NFO), there appears a clear response to the socio-cognitive influences on framing ideas. While it is stressed that NFO was an early consideration of how agenda-setting functions, in which 'the relevant social and personal characteristics that mediate such an effect' must be accounted for, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver reprise need-for-orientation to encompass an interplay between issue relevance and levels of issue uncertainty for the reader (2014, p. 784-7). Similarly, network agenda-setting is an insistence that agenda salience occurs in the relationships between how 'audiences map out objects and attributes as network-like pictures' in our heads (a la Lippmann), and how the news media map out such combined networks or "sets" of these elements (2014, p. 792).

Finally, the new concept of *agendamelding* appears to address how all of this works as audience negotiation, as the authors explained:

Agendamelding is the social process by which we meld agendas from various sources, including other people, to create pictures of the world that fit our experiences and preferences. (McCombs, Shaw & Weaver 2014, p. 794)

Despite the sometimes-parallel, sometimes-divergent evolutions of both agenda-setting and framing theories, they do have at least two things in common. They

clearly demonstrate the huge difficulty there is in defining and pinning-down the vagaries of human cognition and communication reception. For example, an important study by Edy and Meirick (2007) considered the relative media effects of repetition (in an agenda-setting sense) and resonance (in a framing sense). While their results suggested that framing effects resonated more than agenda-setting, they were also compelled to admit this did not reveal the whole phenomenon:

Taken as a whole, our analysis suggests the complexity of the framing phenomenon. Respondents seem not to have simply adopted the frames presented in the media. Confronted with competing frames, they appear to have cobbled them together to build stories of their own. (Edy & Meirick 2007, p. 135)

More importantly, both theories exist because of the very real and evident link between what goes on in our media channels, no matter how centralised and monolithic *or* fragmented and diffuse, and what becomes *salient* in our social communities. One topic that has consistently generated media struggles over defining salience is the environment, not least of all owing to its typical reliance on scientific explanations. As a competing frames issue, work done in this area has consistently highlighted ongoing contestation over meaning and offers considerable insight regarding that contest.

## **1.5: Framing Science and the Environment**

Science reporting in general has always been a type of journalism heavily reliant on framing, particularly through using metaphors as a way of turning complex science jargon into simple lay ideas. As Nelkin observed:

Metaphors are a prevalent and important vehicle of public communication in all areas, but they are especially important in communication about science. Explaining and popularizing unfamiliar, complex, and frequently technical material can often be done most effectively through analogy and imagery. (Nelkin 1987, p. 10)

It is a well-researched fact that science, technology and environmental reporting have grown in both volume and importance since the 1960s (Anderson 1997; Boyce & Lewis 2009; Cox 2013; Lacy & Coulson 2000; Nelkin 1987). In her assessment of science reporting by mainstream media in the USA, Nelkin argued

this was mainly due to, on the one hand, the 'growing policy importance of science-related issues' and, on the other, some particularly high-profile disasters arising from science and technology-related events during the 1980s. These included the disasters of Bhopal and Chernobyl, the Challenger space shuttle and the rise of AIDS (1987, pp. 1-2). A key shift in this growing media focus was how 'the frame changed in the late 1960s and the 1970s, as wonder about the marvels of science and technology gave way to concern about environmental and social risks' (Nelkin 1987, p. 10). Furthermore, Anderson has shown how much of the work done to examine the relationship between media, culture and the environment during the 1980s and 1990s highlighted major changes in perceptions and representations of "nature". In particular, there had been 'a growing recognition of the need to 'manage' public opinion concerning the environment' (Anderson 1997, p. 111).

Although Nelkin and Anderson both saw control of science-related reporting as a struggle between journalist and scientist, the media studies tradition of newsroom-centricity is again evident in both assessments of how science issues typically came to be framed in media. For example, Nelkin surmised that 'in esoteric areas of science and technology where readers have little direct information...the press, as the major source of information, in effect defines the reality of the situation for them' (1987, p. 77). Similarly, Anderson (1997, p. 117-35), drawing on some of the key media-studies theories of the time, including Galtung and Ruge and Gamson and Mogdigliani, argued that environmental news reporting was selective according to key news values.

This early work highlighted four key aspects were intrinsic to media stories regarding science and the environment: Coverage is typically "event-driven", particularly by disasters such as oil spills and nuclear accidents; Stories are accompanied by strong visual components, which are "extremely important" for television; Lengthy drawn-out environmental issues in the real world are typically truncated to fit 24-hour daily news cycles (Anderson 1997, p. 121-3); and, both science and environment are often framed competitively, not least of all as a race for "breakthroughs" (Nelkin 1987, p. 7), and in terms of "risks" (Anderson 1997, p. 115; Nelkin 1987, p. 3). These arguments reveal three key developments in the understanding of science and environment news narratives:

1. Firstly, that *science* and *the environment* have shifted from domains where the scientist (expert) voice once held sway, to ones which are now

contested by myriad voices – including government, industry, environmental groups and NGOs, consumers and scientists (Lacy & Coulson 2000);

2. Secondly, science and environmental stories are typically couched within frames of conflict and attendant “risks”, for example humanity vs nature, good science (technological advancement) vs bad science (misleading discoveries/disastrous side-effects), or disaster vs social order/safety; and
3. Thirdly, the resulting contestation of those risks (e.g. the nuclear power industry vs green groups) has led to “science wars” being played out in media coverage, waged by vested interests. As Anderson explained (citing Cutter 1993), the resulting ‘institutionalization of divisions in scientific opinion has had one of the most significant impacts. Conflicts of opinion have become more difficult to keep within the scientific community, and media publicity provides further fuel for the declining public confidence in the “expert”.’ (Anderson 1997, p. 115)

Such arguments over scientific validity, usually played out behind closed science-lab doors until consensus and *proof* are reached, have instead become a feature of environmental news reporting in general. Accordingly, Anderson’s and Nelkin’s assessments further raise the importance of understanding frame influences in the mainstream media, especially in relation to science-related issues. As Nelkin has explained:

Metaphors in science journalism cluster and reinforce one another, creating consistent, coherent, and therefore more powerful images which often have strategic policy implications. (1987, p. 81)

The competitive struggle over the environmental narrative provides a consummate example of how multiple actors increasingly battle for primacy over the terms of the public debate. The plethora of these “voices” includes what can easily be described as the full range of possible vested interests in *any* given issue, encompassing citizens and community groups, environmental groups, scientists, corporations and lobbyists, anti-environmentalist and climate change critics, news media and environmental journalists, and public officials (Cox 2013, p. 26). What is more, this particular struggle also lays bare why such a battle is of paramount importance to those actors, since the prize is effectively to “speak” on behalf of a silent nature. As

Cox informs us, the 'public sphere is filled with competing visions, agendas and modes of speaking' (2013, p. 2), all with a single objective:

Although in a sense, nature is silent, others – politicians, business leaders, environmentalists, the media – claim the right to speak for nature or for their own interests in the use of natural resources. Hence, here's the dilemma: If nature cannot speak...who has the right speak on nature's behalf? Who should define the interests of society in relation to the natural world? (Cox 2013, p. 4)

Much of the recent work on sources and their influence on media coverage of environmental issues illustrates how this coverage has become dominated by voices other than "the experts". For example, a comparative case study (Lacy & Coulson 2000) examined the use of sources on the newspaper environmental "beat" (i.e. editorial desk), to analyse coverage in the US of motor vehicle emissions regulations during 1995. The analysis found environmental beats were just as reliant as more traditional news beats on governmental and business sources, and were used 'four and a half times more often' (Lacy & Coulson 2000, p. 18), than consumers, environmentalists, scientists and others combined:

Because this topic involved federal regulation, it might be expected that many sources would be from government. However, this does not explain the emphasis on business sources at the expense of consumer and environmental sources. One could easily argue that regulation of air quality is just as important for consumers and environmental groups as for business. (Lacy & Coulson 2000, p. 22)

As acknowledged by the authors, the study does not reveal why certain groups were excluded, nor does it say anything about the relevant influence of each source. Still, it can be surmised that, for non-governmental or business actors, 'their limited access to the news pages likely diminished their contribution to the public dialogue on this issue' (Lacy & Coulson 2000, p. 22). However, such over-reliance on business sources does indicate how environmental reporting in general, but climate change in particular, has become routinely conflated with economic issues. For Boyce and Lewis, mainstream media's relationship with climate change – both in terms of business-as-usual and as a story topic – is constrained/framed by 'our most dominant economic and cultural system', namely the norms of consumer capitalism (2009, p. 5).

Analysis of US press coverage of climate change between 2000-2008 by Zehr (2009) illustrated at least one development of this, and what he calls an Environmentalist/Economic Hybrid frame. Prior to the mid-1980s, US press coverage of environmentalism in general and economic issues were typically quite separate and distinct, and indeed usually in opposition to each other. From the late 1980s, however, these two topics increasingly converged:

Eventually, some environmental problems became perceived as economic inefficiency problems and environmental solutions as economic opportunities. Such was the case with climate change...A close connection between economic development and climate change formed a key frame in press accounts. (Zehr 2009, p. 85)

## 1.6: Framing and Climate Change Discourse

The reporting of climate change, as with media treatment of most things scientific and environmental, is no less of a highly-contested terrain, usually requiring 'contestable' events to peg news stories on and often requiring scientific explanation. Existing environmental scholarship (e.g. Alexander 2009; Anderson 1997; Boykoff 2011; Cox 2013; Lester 2010) points to how this topic has come to be the media issue *par excellence* in terms of framing, contestation and political management. As such, climate change is an issue where the acknowledgement of sponsored agendas has also been prominent. Anderson, for example, asserted: 'Although concerns about environmental issues may have objective roots, they are shaped both by the promotional activities of *issue sponsors*, and through culture representations' (1997, p. 110) [emphasis added].

Not surprisingly, the escalating social/public attention on climate change has attracted considerable social science attention over the last decade or so, especially in the field of environmental media and communication. A meta-analysis of such studies, for example, encompassed 133 original empirical analyses of media representations of climate change across multiple countries (Schafer & Schlichting 2014). Also unsurprisingly, this focus has generated considerable knowledge 'about media representations and public perceptions of climate change',

in distinct areas of ‘the production, content and reception of media discourse’ (Olausson & Berglez 2014, p. 250).

The relationship between frames and discourse in media studies and effects analysis is now well established, not only in environmental studies. Reese described this relationship as one focused on the “what” of frames; a perspective that ‘involves the dissection of the content of the frame, specifically the network of concepts and the unique narrative and myths that make it work’ (Reese 2010, p. 19). This discursive consideration of frames, Reese argued, is important for understandings of cultural relevance:

In all, an analysis of the what of frames emphasizes the special configuration of discourse elements that articulate culture. If the what of frames are explored, it encourages an analysis that delves into the contextualization of topics – social, historically, culturally – and urges the framing researcher to look closely at the particular features of the frame. (2010, p. 20)

### **The distinction between frames and discourse**

While many of the notions of frame characteristics are shared with notions of discourse, such as how they “organise and structure” (Reese 2010, p. 18), they are distinct. Gitlin, for example, suggested as much about media frames specifically, as long ago as 1980, saying:

Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. (Gitlin 1980, p. 7)

In the context of environmental frames and discourse, Cox claims that the concept of discourse ‘reminds us that rhetorical resources are broader than any single metaphor, frame or utterance’ (2013, p. 68). Similarly, Reese continued that a cultural approach to framing effects research considers ‘how social actors participate in the creation and maintenance of certain frames, the ongoing construction of the discursive environment, and the interests that are served in the process’ (2010, p. 22). In this sense, frames contribute to and are seen as part of the discourse, and such discursive meanings ‘often influence our understanding of how the world works or should work’ (Cox 2013, p. 68). But frames do not *constitute*

the discourse – and this is an important distinction. As Lester has warned, when it comes to analysing news texts, confusion ‘over terms such as “frame” or “discourse” or “content” analysis can unnecessarily hinder those seeking to understand how news texts work’ (2010, p. 66).

An example of the relationships between frames and discourse is provided by Reese’s work on the George W. Bush administration’s “War on Terror” frame in the US. For him, this provided an example of how a discourse reveals what is “taken for granted” in our societies:

This sense that “we all know what we mean” when we say the War on Terror, that it means what we want it to mean, speaks to the embedded quality of the frame, that it has passed into the realm of being regarded as common sense and is taken for granted. (Reese 2010, p. 36)

### **Foucault, Derrida and discursive ‘centres’**

The textual implications of *discourse*, founded primarily from the work of Foucault and Derrida, are now well established (further discussion of how discourse underwrites the analysis for this study is provided in Section 2.1).

For a working definition of discourse, Torfing (1999) provides a suitable starting point, having synthesised the key theorists of Derrida and Foucault, among others. In a conceptualisation that captures the “openness” argued by Derrida, Torfing describes discourse as ‘a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated’ (1999, p. 85).

However, echoing Reese’s reasoning, Cox offers that when discourse gains a ‘broad or taken-for-granted status in a culture (for example, growth is good for the economy) or when its meanings help to legitimise certain practices, it can be said to be a dominant discourse’ (2013, p. 68). In relation to climate change specifically, discourse has similarly been described as a ‘struggle to give meaning to a particular aspect of the world, or to stake out a specific territory in the debate’ (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 11). In this way, discourse is ‘not limited to simply “talk” but is also viewed as a socially constitutive phenomenon that influences and structures social conduct and social perceptions’ (Fairclough 1992, cited in Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 11).

It is this configuration of discourse, as being a little *less* open to negotiation, that this study starts from. To return to Reese, this view of discourse demands greater attention to how the “ongoing construction of the discursive environment” serves particular interests. As he argued about the War on Terror frame:

Here was a case where the country was immediately caught up in a particularly compelling macrolevel organizing principle, and the discourse that followed took place within those boundaries. (Reese 2010, p. 37)

### **Climate change ‘frames’ and discourse: Key findings and ideas from the literature**

As the subject of climate change ‘has increasingly dominated the contemporary science and policy landscapes’, Boykoff has argued, ‘it has also more visibly inhabited public discourse’ (2011, p. 1). In the history of media representations of climate change, Boykoff found ‘convergences of competing knowledge, framing climate change for policy, politics and the public’ (2011, p. 3). Drawing on Foucault, he further argued that power-relations are central to those convergences:

Examining interactions between discourses and material lives...facilitates our consideration of questions regarding how power flows through the capillaries of our shared social, cultural and political body. (Boykoff 2011, p. 4)

In other words, as Lester (2010) offers, ‘news is a mediated version of reality but with significant and “real” consequences’ (p. 63). As such, analyses of news as discourse become questions of how knowledge but also power are embedded within news (p. 64), and how “meaning making” is a complex, contested site (p. 65). In this vein, the findings of Lester, Matthew C. Nisbet and Richard J. Alexander regarding climate change specifically are particularly useful and enlightening. Nisbet, for example, argued that: ‘Scholars often overlook that in each policy sector, there is likely to exist a generalizable typology of latent meanings that are directly applicable to understanding a specific issue or major event’ (2010, p. 46). From a linguistics perspective, Alexander undertook a critical discourse-based dissection of environmental issue texts and powerful voices, to ‘highlight certain aspects of discourse in order to discover what the producers of the discourse are really getting at’ (2009, p. 7).

Alexander emphasised, again, how contemporary science and the economy-based reporting of such, in relation to ecological issues, may now be more ‘an intrinsic part of the problem’ than part of the solution – not least of all due to ‘its linguistic manifestations [and] propensity to construe reality’ (2009, p. 5). For him, analysis of powerful responses to ecological concerns reveals how ‘environmental discourse and ecological thinking are severely constrained within the frame of economic discourse and thinking’ (2009, p. 27). As part of his dissection, Alexander’s critical linguistic reading of a 1997 speech by then BP chief executive John Browne, regarding the issue of climate change and given to a “friendly audience” at Stanford University (2009, p. 42), identified this common theme. Essentially, the speech carried a strong stress on “market-based” solutions, to which science was routinely enlisted, both to position climate change as beset by “a scientific conundrum” (Alexander 2009, p. 51) and BP as ‘a major player in the scientific research and technology required to solve the problem’ (p. 46).

To return to Nisbet, he explained that a *typology of latent meanings* can be gleaned from debates over nuclear energy and biotechnology issues and used ‘to explain the specific communication dynamics of what many experts consider to be the most pressing problem of our generation’ (2010, p. 46): climate change. Nisbet offers a framework for understanding communication dynamics through a typology developed from existing science and environmental literature (2010, pp. 49-58). For him – echoing Lakoff (2005, p. 17) – such an informed approach is required to address what he calls the decades-old “deficit model paradigm”, which ‘assumes that when debates over science occur, ignorance is at the root of conflict or public inaction’, and all that is required is for the public to understand the facts (pp. 50-1). Table 1.2 shows this typology (Nisbet 2010, p. 52). Each frame indicates a latent *frame of meaning*, with Nisbet’s interpretations of each frame’s implied meaning (e.g. “social progress” is a latent meaning which implies “improving quality of life”).

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider either the completeness or the viability of Alexander’s linguistic interpretations or Nisbet’s typology, both analyses of how such frames are applicable to climate change provide support for this study and the search for evidence of sponsored frames.

**Table 1.2:** Frames (latent meanings) that consistently appear across science-policy debates

| <i>Frame</i>   | <i>Defines Science-Related Issue As...</i>  |
|--|---|
| Social progress                                      | ...improving quality of life, or solution to problems. Alternative interpretation as harmony with nature instead of mastery, "sustainability."  |
| Economic development/competitiveness                 | ...economic investment, market benefits or risks; local, national, or global competitiveness.   |
| Morality/ethics                                      | ...in terms of right or wrong; respecting or crossing limits, thresholds, or boundaries.  |
| Scientific/technical uncertainty                     | ...a matter of expert understanding; what is known versus unknown; either invokes or undermines expert consensus, calls on the authority of "sound science", falsifiability, or peer-review.            |
| Pandora's box/Frankenstein's monster/runaway science | ...calls for precaution in the face of possible impacts or catastrophe. Out-of-control, a Frankenstein's monster, or as fatalism, i.e. action is futile, path is chosen, no turning back.               |
| Public accountability/governance                     | ...research in the public good or serving private interests; a matter of ownership, control, and/or patenting of research, or responsible use or abuse of science in decision-making, 'politicization.' |
| Middle way/alternative path                          | ...around finding a possible compromise position, or a third way between conflicting/polarized views or options.  |
| Conflict/strategy                                    | ...as a game among elites; who's ahead or behind in winning debate; battle of personalities; or groups; (usually journalist-driven interpretation.)   |

To summarise, Alexander argued his analysis highlights how powerful voices – ‘business corporations, in particular, but also their acolytes in politics and the media’ (2009, p. 27) – are able to command the routine framing of the environment and climate change, through various lexical devices. As such, ‘the discourse of market economics colonises and serves to narrowly frame critical and oppositional discourse on the environment and ecology’ (p. 41). Nisbet, furthermore, summarised the prevailing issue for climate change framing as one where “ideologically-friendly” frames provide the “perceptual cues” for public

understanding, rather than the evidence of scientific reality. This state of affairs, he explained, was by no means organic or accidental:

Several conservative think tanks, political leaders, and commentators continue to hew closely to their decade-old playbook for downplaying the urgency of climate change, which includes questioning that human activities are driving climate change while also arguing that any action will lead to dire economic consequences. (Nisbet 2010, p. 53)

### **Climate change and the conservative “playbook”**

For both Alexander and Nisbet, a chief “acolyte” for the corporate sector has been Republican pollster and consultant in the US, Frank Luntz, who helped develop the ‘climate skeptic playbook’ (Nisbet 2010, p. 53) in the 1990s. Most pointedly, Luntz was instrumental in getting the phrase global warming re-framed as *climate change*, as this was “less frightening” to the American people (Alexander 2009, p. 209). Lutz also recommended the issue be framed as scientifically uncertain and emphasise how the US economy would face an “unfair burden” if it were to mitigate climate change while countries such as China and India did not (Nisbet 2010, pp. 53-4).

One US study confirmed this struggle over the science, at least back in 2007 (Bailey, Giangola & Boykoff 2014). Analysis of 152 newspaper articles in the US, discussing WGI reports of climate science from the IPCC concluded that: ‘US climate news continued to employ mitigating language with such frequency, despite ever-strengthening scientific understanding of and consensus around climate change’ (p. 212). Interestingly, in an Australia and New Zealand context, one discourse-analysis study from 2007 found that the ‘overwhelming majority of articles reflected the scientific consensus and did not make any reference to any controversy surrounding it’ (Howard-Williams 2009, p. 34). Instead, the majority of articles ‘made at least a passing reference to a solution’ (p. 36), and this introduced a new level of uncertainty around climate change (pp. 36-9) – that is, not whether it’s real or not, but how should we deal with it? Again, this “solutions” focus was heavily led by market-based considerations and ‘concentrated on schemes promoted or controlled by government or business’ (Howard-Williams 2009, p. 36). This led Howard-Williams to conclude:

The heavy reliance on government or industry sources, who are better resourced and more able to get their message into the media, gives these groups an advantage in setting the news media agenda and controlling the terms of the debate. (2009, p. 39)

A further example of this comes from a study of news articles in the national daily *The Australian*, from May 2006 and February 2007 (McGaurr & Lester 2009). This looked at stories about climate change and nuclear power, raised by then PM John Howard as a possible solution. The study highlighted not only the (political) “conflict” and (environmental) “risk” frames this type of story always seems to rely on, but also the typical myriad competing voices struggling for primacy:

Competing concerns that keep Australian public opinion about nuclear energy divided include environmental risks, export regulation, Indigenous royalties and land rights, and land degradation. (McGaurr & Lester 2009, p. 175)

For the authors, this study revealed how the “competing risks” frame between the two issues (climate change and nuclear power) demonstrated the central, contributing role media play in creating public ‘contestation’ around environmental risk, and how ‘media framing of one problem can clearly serve to disguise the risks of another’ (McGaurr & Lester 2009, pp. 183-5).

### **Climate change and global discourses**

Finally, an important recent work by Anshelm and Hultman assesses the discourses of global climate change, within the context of the December 2009 UN climate conference in Copenhagen (the COP15 Summit). Through an extensive look at some 3,500 newspaper and magazine articles published in Sweden between 2006 and 2009, and subsequent correlations with previous global research and comparative study findings, the authors consider a glaring contradiction that is no less relevant in Australia: ‘How can an apocalyptic framing of climate change dominate at the same time that politics is ruled by conservative business-as-usual strategies?’ (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 1)

Globally, climate change debate leading up to Copenhagen was characterised by four core climate discourses. These are termed as Industrial Fatalism, Green Keynesianism, Eco-socialism and Climate Scepticism, which represent the ‘regular

and consistent patterns' (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 11) of discourse that arose, in response to the "apocalyptic" urgency that climate change gained in 2006. As Anshelm and Hultman explain:

The year 2006 will forever be remembered as the year when the greenhouse effect was recognized all around the globe as a major crisis in human history. It all began with the collapse of the New Orleans infrastructure and the human – as well as non-human – catastrophes that resulted from hurricane Katrina... This newfound focus on climate change was reflected in news reporting all over the world in the first months of 2007, when the consequences of climate change for people and cultures became a recurring theme... Common to all of these stories was the apocalyptic tone that pervaded them. (2015, pp. 4-5)

The response to this heightened public and political concern to address global warming, as it unfolded in the public realm through media, followed a common pattern. While there was broad agreement on the need for urgent action to reduce carbon emissions, the four discourses embodied very different ideas about a solution. These discourses developed 'along politically divergent paths' and were based on a fundamental question of 'what kind of relationship between nature and industrial society should be the basis for the design of climate action...?' (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 6).

The four discursive "solutions" are characterised as:

1. Emissions management through existing capitalist economic and technical structures, with only marginal changes to the industrial society (**Industrial Fatalism**)
2. Strong market regulation by governments, to rectify the carbon-based ills of the industrial world's economic system (**Green Keynesianism**)
3. A complete rethinking of the existing industrial-capitalist structure, to undo the carbon-drenched ideology of economic growth (**Eco-socialism**)
4. Do nothing, since Climate Change has nothing to do with anthropogenic emissions (**Climate Scepticism**)

Of these four, Industrial Fatalism was found to be the most dominant, followed by Green Keynesianism. With strong relevance to *organisational* priorities, it is these two competing discourses that are also most relevant to this thesis. In terms of chief proponents of each discourse, Industrial Fatalism was most associated with the Liberal-Conservative government in Sweden, as well as businesses such as Volvo (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 25). Green Keynesianism, conversely, was mostly associated with opposition political parties (e.g. the Green Party, Social Democrats) and environmental organisations, including Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund and Friends of the Earth (pp. 51-73).

“Industrial Fatalism” (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, pp. 19-45) was first termed by German sociologist Ulrich Beck in 1995. In this discourse, the issue of climate change is addressed by technological determinism, with answers rooted firmly in ‘the logic of linear modernisation’. Key arguments have included new technological developments (e.g. nuclear power), new market opportunities and the need for a globally co-ordinated response, coupled with changes in the consumption behaviours of individual citizens. At its heart, the Industrial Fatalism discourse holds unerring faith in technological, market-based solutions to resolve the emissions crisis caused by the very same technological, market-based system:

The core of the argument was that self-inflicted environmental risks caused by grand-scale technology had to be managed with the help of improvements in that same grand-scale technology. Every new unintended consequence was conceived of as a business opportunity or a temporary deviation that could be handled with the help of minor corrections of the industrial socio-technical system. (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 25)

Green Keynesianism (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, pp. 51-76), on the other hand, has raised more pressing questions about society’s technical and economic foundations, and demanded more politically-driven answers. Key arguments have included rejecting nuclear power as an option, calls for “climate justice” (whereby rich, first world countries owe an ecological debt to poor countries), and new business opportunities (primarily through renewable-energy technologies). However, it is most opposed to the Industrial Fatalism discourse in terms of its emphasis on government regulation to achieve the desired emissions reductions. As such, it strongly rejects any notion of a business-as-usual solution:

Given the extensive demands for rapid, large-scale and effective action to cut global emissions of greenhouse gases, the Green Keynesian discourse required ambitious climate politics and effective changes in the regulations. To trust only in future technological changes, market mechanisms or changes in individual consumption choices was both uncertain and insufficient. Again and again it was mentioned that it was time for politicians to shoulder their responsibilities. (Anshelm & Hultman 2015, p. 68)

To summarise, these preceding discussions all raise key considerations here: can we see evidence of these types of science, environmental and climate change frame devices (content) railed against the Carbon Tax? If we can, what are the implications of that for our understanding of frames, meanings and power relations within the media-policy nexus in Australia? Furthermore, can we uncover at least something about *how* key industry sources – who undoubtedly are “better resourced” – enjoy a media advantage when it comes to influencing the frame devices of the debate?

For, as we have seen in this section, climate change is indeed a contested narrative, with ample evidence of competing voices to make it so. It then follows that myriad frame devices *must* have made it into news media, regardless of available resources. Accordingly, as the likes of Boyce and Lewis have begun to examine, how do some frame devices *work* so much better than others at gaining dominance in a political and/or psycho-cognitive sense? How do some frame devices/frame meanings become the basis not only for thought but for action, such as electoral support for a climate-denying Tony Abbott in 2013? In other words, as will be more closely evaluated here, how do some frame devices/frame meanings come to dominate the discursive landscape ahead of other competing frame devices/meanings?

## **1.7: Framing and the Public Sphere**

Underlining the tradition of newsroom-centricity, Paul Manning provides a comprehensive review of how the expansion of communication and media studies courses had brought with it "dozens" of books describing the work of journalists and how news is made. However, it was an expansion that included "rather fewer"

offering more than a passing view of where those journalists got their information from. Yet, as he rightly pointed out:

[T]he study of news sources and their relationships with news organisations is absolutely central to the discussion of the 'big questions' that should be at the heart of any consideration of news journalism... Do all news sources enjoy the same degree of access and the same ability to communicate their perspectives, or encode their preferred agendas?' (Manning 2001, p. 1)

Manning further provided a useful explanation of the importance of "access" to news media by a variety of groups with diverse interpretations, to a healthy, functioning capitalist democracy, and how Habermas' 1962 formulation of the Public Sphere has guided much of this thinking. For Habermas, the emergence of capitalism in Europe in the 17th and 18th Centuries opened up a new sphere or "space" for the exchange of ideas, beyond the hitherto control of feudal church and state (Manning 2001, p. 4-5). This new space was characterised as bringing with it a wider, more democratic access to the flow of rational ideas and public communication. However, by the 19th Century Habermas' new public sphere was itself usurped by those same capitalist market energies, which were weakening democracy through a process he termed "re-feudalisation". As Manning explained, we can also see in this formulation the idea of sponsored communication emerging:

The re-feudalisation of the public sphere describes the process whereby communication and the exchange of ideas grow increasingly dependent upon a new group of sponsors and patrons, and upon new structures of authority which pose an increasing threat... In other words, capitalism replaces monarchs, church and feudal lords, with advertising, public relations and the commercial **sponsorship** of mass communication. (2001, p. 5) [emphasis added]

The concept of the public sphere as well as ideas of "rational communication" have seen plenty of critique and revision since, not least by Habermas himself (Manning 2001, pp. 6-9). However, as Manning concluded, Habermas' concept retains "enormous value" for media scholars, as a guiding framework for the "really central issues", not least of all in terms of *access* to public communication. In this sense, Manning also provided a useful (if somewhat understated) summary of why such access is important to groups or organisations beyond government:

For organisations enjoying a realistic expectation that government ministers will take their policy agendas seriously, the news media can sometimes serve as a

useful alternative channel to the conventional lobbying routes... for other organisations a more generalised appeal to 'public opinion' via the news media may assist in attempts to secure the attention of government for the first time. (2001, p. 137)

This highlights the critical importance of public opinion to issues of social policy, at least in western democracies. Bob Franklin explored this in relation to the media's approach and treatment of social policy in the UK, arguing that 'since politicians are responsive to public anxieties about policy issues and pressures for policy change – and because politicians no less than ordinary viewers and readers take note of media accounts – misleading media representations of social policy may ultimately influence the policy process' (Franklin 1999, p. 12).

In this context of media coverage of social policy in the UK, David Brindle's *A journalist's perspective* is also instructive, and clearly highlights how some journalistic influence must be acknowledged. As the specialist social policy correspondent at the *Guardian* (a left-leaning, UK national newspaper), his musings on where news comes from – and what makes a good story – are probably a somewhat depressing read for those working in the social services sector. As he put it: 'It seems to be to the eternal bafflement of social policy professionals that good practice does not win headlines... Culpability is very much top of the media agenda' (Brindle 1999, pp. 43-4). Brindle's account highlights that some journalistic control over the selection and framing of stories cannot be denied, and it is not the intention here to do so. Brindle explained how 'by and large... journalists take on-the-run decisions about what to cover, and what not to' (p. 40), and shows with one example how (at least in the UK) journalists often 'massage' a story in a direction they consider more media friendly.

However, a second point is more pertinent for this study. As a specialist correspondent, Brindle typically proposed stories to the news desk on a daily basis, with the likelihood he would be asked to write one or two of those ideas as news. In this regard, his relationship with sources was key:

I rely heavily, indeed too heavily, for story ideas on institutional sources... Pressure not to miss a government announcement is an enormous incentive to do the job from your desk, and a corresponding disincentive to take time out to see social policy in practice. (Brindle 1999, p. 42)

This assertion of reliance on "institutional sources" strongly implies organisational media relations activities enjoy a privileged level of access with news journalists. However, what it does not do is explain or indicate how proactive those sources are, or indeed reveal anything about what strategies were employed during or before those source-journalist interactions. It is this gap in the relationship chain of *source-newsroom-published media story* of past media research enquiry that this study looks at, to further ask: just how original are those "story ideas", if at all, when supplied or filled by organisational sources? What are the public-sphere implications for that whole 'source-newsroom-published story' reality, the more *contrived* or sponsored those story ideas are found to be?

What is at issue here is further highlighted in Gaye Tuchman's concise review and assessment of the production of news (Tuchman 2002, pp. 78-90). In an informative summary of the media studies tradition of examining news production practices, Tuchman explained how three distinctive yet related approaches emerged in response to the early functionalist models during the 1950s, which 'described media as components of a larger social system in which media organizations and their audiences were equal and parallel entities' (p. 79). Challenges to this type of model began in the late 1960s and continued through the 1970s, with what can be described as the beginnings of a sociology of the media. These new positions started to look at how 'news is made, not found' (Tuchman 2002, p. 80), and to explore the relationship between journalist and wider social and organisational contexts as determinants of what becomes news. This new emphasis on the "production" of news naturally lent itself to considerations of *agency* and control, and reactions to the early functionalist thinking gave media studies research three distinct "traditions" (Tuchman 2002, p. 81), differentiated by examining news production as:

1. Political economy (grounded in classic Marxism, examining media control embedded in class and power struggles)
2. Phenomenology and ethnomethodology (examining "the role of media in constituting and disseminating meaning" and "the social construction of reality")

3. Textual studies (examining news as 'narratives' and shifting focus more to the 'output' of news production and "the media-audience nexus")

Again, however, in both Tuchman's introduction and summary of her assessment of what these three traditions meant for developments happening in news media, newsroom-centricity remained apparent:

A key point of later studies has been that journalists and other newswriters do not merely select and combine information; rather they can be seen to literally 'produce' the news in the context of organizational and other social frameworks. (Tuchman 2002, p. 78)

As we have seen, this emphasis on what "journalists and other newswriters" do and such notions of newsroom primacy need to be reassessed. In her conclusion, Tuchman revealed both the issue of this newsroom-centric 'definition' of news production, but also how media research must more critically examine the relationship between journalists and sources:

One important issue for further studies is the relationship between 'pull' and 'push' in the news market - between journalists pulling together information from various sources, and sources pushing their agendas and frames of understanding into the media. 'Push' activities are increasingly important, as planned media coverage has become integral to the conduct of both business and politics. (Tuchman 2002, p. 89)

A key implication of push activities is to reconsider a core issue of newsroom-centric approaches noted earlier. Namely, the assumption, sometimes directly stated but often implied in media studies, that journalists and newsrooms work with raw materials, in the gathering of news information. Tuchman's appraisal, while characterising sources and news media as 'interconnected organizations' and 'key elements of the push-pull nexus' (p. 89), again reveals this core assumption, even applied to Gandy's information subsidies:

At the juncture between sources and reporters, 'source media' (press releases, government reports, telephone interviews, etc.) provide the important and still under-researched *raw material* for what ends up as news texts. (Tuchman 2002, p. 89) [emphasis added]

This study seeks to investigate that "still-under-researched" area, to look at that juncture between reporters and the news media activities of vested interests, when it comes to the "push". In other words, just how much are the materials provided to

journalists cooked and re-cooked, utilising not only proprietary resources but also ancillary 'third-party' resources as useful and possible? Under what conditions are some of those push efforts more successful than others?

### **Push-framing through central media**

A second key point of this research study is to highlight what push-framing by vested interests means for the media-social policy nexus (to use Tuchman's phrasing). This brings us back to considerations of the public sphere and how this study contributes to our theoretical understanding of the 'imprints of power' that inhabit that space between organisational sources, news media content and government policy.

As discussed earlier, Manning's considerations of access to media are central to media and communication research studies where ideas of a public sphere are pertinent. This formulation of 'power', as a characteristic that provides uneven organisational access to media, further provides the basis for the analysis here. That is, to explore through case studies how particular organisational media strategies and narratives enable the power to push 'their agendas and frames of understanding into the media' (Tuchman 2002, p. 89) more successfully than others. Again, Manning's important critique of news and news sources, and the reality of a rapidly changing landscape for contemporary mass media, underlines the urgency of this type of enquiry. As part of this, debates have started regarding the democratising force of the Internet, and whether a new "electronic commonwealth" is unfolding or not (Manning 2001, p. 13). While such debates are ongoing, the fragmentation of both media channels and academic considerations of textual/audience meanings during the past two decades has certainly challenged notions of a centralised, mass-media dominated public sphere.

In this sense, Couldry (2006) has contended that a "myopia" within media studies means it has become guilty of remaining wedded to 'the myth of the mediated centre' (p. 177). For Couldry, as with Tuchman, the starting points of media studies from perspectives of political economy and textual analysis have for too long assumed a monolithic centralised media focus, which must be 'decentred' in contemporary work:

[W]ithout the assumed central focus, the research questions for social science inquiry into media...are necessarily decentered, and more complex: how and on what terms do certain media, rather than others, contribute to the knowledge and agency of individuals and groups in a particular social environment?" (Couldry 2006, p. 191)

For him, the 'myth' has sustained a narrow adherence to ideas of a "centralised media", which 'block from view other regions of media production' (Couldry 2006, p. 177). Moving beyond a centralised media – essentially large, institutionalised mass media outlets such as print, radio and TV – continues the recent theoretical shift away from functionalism and into pluralism. For Couldry, the 'myth' further pointed to the 1940s-50s tradition of sociology's erroneous claims that 'there are such totalities as "societies" and "cultures" that "function" as working systems' (2006, p. 179). These assertions of why such a media studies myopia is problematic, with its "social construction" of a mediated centre, certainly remain instructive:

A research agenda focused almost exclusively on the production, circulation and reception of mainstream media risks forfeiting media studies' critical edge. Its underlying assumptions miss crucial dimensions of media change... Built into this [social] construction, I will argue, are outmoded, indeed conservative, theoretical biases that no longer explain what we need to explain, and which we must move beyond. (2006, p. 178)

Accordingly, it must be acknowledged that conceptions of what constitutes both *media* and its functioning are by no means agreed and remain problematic. The focus of study here then is only a small, representative (though by no means complete) collection of "central mass-media", comprising national and state-based newspapers in Australia.

Nevertheless, the preceding arguments confirm two important theoretical positions. Firstly, the idea that mainstream media are a cogent force in the functioning of public domains has a long history. The central concern with just whose interests are being served by that force remains, rightly so, a critical locus of enquiry. Secondly, the definition of 'power' and a formulation of influence also remains critical to this study, as with any concerned with (any particular type of) media influence in (any particular type of) society. To put this another way, it is not unreasonable to categorise the history and body of academic enquiry in this space as a struggle between locating power at the centre (what might be called functionalist, politico-

economic structures with the power to encode, represent and define) and diffuse audience power at the margins (pluralist, textual 'readings' with the power to *decode*, negotiate and re-define).

Manning describes this struggle as the debate over "primary definition", which has followed the shortcomings of Habermas' original ideas, since they 'underplayed the issue of the relationship between power, structures of dominance and access to the public sphere' (2001, p. 14). He uses the position first offered by Stuart Hall et al. in 1978's *Policing the Crisis* as an example of this debate, which was subsequently critiqued by Philip Schlesinger among others (Manning 2001, pp. 14-17). Hall famously argued that 'the powerful have a built-in advantage in the scramble to set the news agendas or define news issues in particular ways... because they are positioned at the top of a hierarchy of credibility' (Manning 2001, pp. 14-15). For Hall and his colleagues, the powerful were 'the primary definers of topics' (Hall et al. 1978, p. 58).

However, for Schlesinger, Hall's position was guilty of underestimating the 'potential openness' of distinct media sites. Hall's shortcomings included an over-simplification of the cohesiveness of "primary defining institutions" and did not adequately define the "precise boundaries" between primary and secondary definers. Nor did he make allowance for possibilities of shifts in the distribution of capacities to primarily define. Lastly but perhaps most relevant to the notion of power at the edges, Hall's argument was based on 'the assumption that the flow of influence travels in one direction only' (Manning, 2001, p. 14-17).

While such re-formulations of media influence are clearly important, the traditional, central mass-media's position within Australian public consciousness has been shown to hold considerable salience, at least recently (Jakubowicz & Palmer 2002; Jakubowicz & Jacka 2005). In their assessment of media activity around the time of the second invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Coalition of the Willing, which included Australia, Jakubowicz and Jacka concluded that, through the mainstream media: 'The Australian government was clearly able to mobilize a complex of pre-existing fears and rising apprehensions to swing popular support behind its commitment' (2005, p. 117) to the invasion.

What is more, as Lester, a former Australian journalist covering the environment, has pointed out in her assessment of 'the dynamics and practices behind news

media coverage of environmental issues' (2010, p. 2), traditional Australian news media remain 'a key site for information, analysis and debate' in the public domain:

Other spaces exist; within media in the form of websites, blogs, listservs, television forums, radio talkback; and outside media in the form of, for example, public meetings, community forums, art exhibitions, theatrical performances. However, news privileges a form and style of information content and distribution that has ensured it remains central to contemporary society. (Lester 2010, p. 3)

To return to Couldry, arguments of diffuse media and diffuse public, social and individual relationships with media, by no means insist that the mass media are no longer relevant at all. Certainly, for Couldry, their importance to considerations of media power and influence was not the problem per se, but rather the *assumption* that they have that power:

To orientate ourselves, let's be clear where we start from. First, empirical research must start out from a question, not an assumption, regarding the existence of anything like a mediated centre. We need to know much more about the *relative* importance in people's lives of 1) mainstream media institutions, 2) other media productions, and 3) *non-media influences*, and to understand better the range of variation here among individuals and sociological types. (2006, pp. 186-7)

### **Framing theory and mainstream practices**

The call to understand external influence on media frames, and the urgency for examining potential links between such sponsored framing and public policy, is strongly sounded by the mainstream adoption of framing strategies. As the body of academic work already done in regard to environmental and climate change frames shows (see Sections 1.5 and 1.6), there is ample evidence of media frames embodying or carrying the corporate agenda. The fact that framing strategies are now being adopted in mainstream practices is further illustrated by The FrameWorks Institute in the US and the work on US political communication by George Lakoff.

The FrameWorks Institute was founded in 1999 and describes itself as 'an interdisciplinary team of social scientists and communications practitioners who work with advocates, policymakers, educators, and funders from around the country

and abroad to reframe social and scientific issues' (The FrameWorks Institute, n.d.). Originally focused on strategic frame analysis, its work was based on the observation that 'non-profit organizations and foundations lacked access to the latest approaches in the social and cognitive sciences' (The FrameWorks Institute, n.d.). By 2004, the Institute had moved beyond simply analysing existing frames and started experimenting with managing or contributing to fully developed communications campaigns. As this research-based and consultative work has grown, the socio-cognitive and communication framing theories underpinning its work have been increasingly introduced to mainstream progressive organisations and practices:

This work sparked a new kind of campaign practice — one in which framing research drives the development of creative communications campaigns and collateral. This process invited new and broader coalitions of partners to champion issues... Looking ahead, FrameWorks is more committed than ever to its mission to conduct research and innovate new research methods that support more effective non-profit communications and that have the empirical power to change the public discourse on social issues. (The FrameWorks Institute, n.d.)

In an environmental campaign context, Boykoff even names the Institute directly, for having 'examined public discussions of climate change', to help understand the influences of language on public engagement with the issue (2014, p. 147).

That such framing strategies are increasingly central to political communications and policy debates is further supported by the work and views of George Lakoff, who has worked with the FrameWorks Institute as part of an advisory board. As the opening sentence of his *Little Blue Book* exhorts: 'This is a handbook for Democrats, intended for immediate use in the current political moment' (Lakoff & Wehling 2012, p. 1). This urgency for the Democrat movement in the US is based on the mounting evidence that the conservative-side of politics is winning on almost every front. For Lakoff and Wehling, this is due in no small part to conservatives being very "good at" framing issues and policies in line with their moral values and agendas:

Extreme conservatives make their moves while Democrats sleep. They frame public debate in their own language over the whole range of issues. And once they get the public thinking their way, they can control the media, elect their candidates, pass their legislation... Meanwhile the Democrats have failed to frame the full range of

issues in terms of what American democracy has always been about. (Lakoff & Wehling 2012, pp. 61-2).

This final brief consideration of the literature in regards to the public sphere serves to underline why researchers need to do more to examine and unpack the specific conditions by which some frames, agendas and sponsors are so much more successful than others. Framing, as a specific communication act with a specific intention, is now widely practiced and strategised. The influence of frames on public debate, the flow of ideas and the success or not of policy developments, is now widely recognised yet remains under-researched.

## **1.8: Literature Review Summary**

The preceding discussion of existing concepts forms the theoretical framework for this study. The literature highlights how the theory of framing clearly owes a significant debt to the earlier ideas and research insights of agenda-setting. However, a framing discipline has provided a more fruitful way forward, in efforts to examine media influence and has continued to mature through theoretical refinements. These refinements have included contributions from across the social sciences and psycho-cognitive sciences, not least of all through multiple applications of framing ideas to research projects in varied settings and disciplines. More recently, the body of work has begun to explore some key issues and weaknesses in framing ideas.

Importantly, the theoretical separation (e.g. Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen 2011) of frames as a device (content) from interpretive meanings (underlying/active sense making) – or “manifest” content from the “organizing principles” of frames in that content (Reese 2001) – has been a vital step to allow more considered approaches to locating frame influences by not conflating the two. This separation has enabled considerations of power to be located *between* the frame device and resulting meanings, as per Snow and Benford’s (1986) socio-cognitive based analysis of “frame alignment” through “frame resonance”.

In the vein of Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, Van Gorp (2007) further tells us: 'In a way, frames seem to be everywhere, but no one knows where exactly they begin and where they end' (p. 62). More work needs to be done, then, to identify types of frames, which in turn allows an examination of where specific types of frame begin and end. In this sense, Reese (2007) also identifies another historical problem with the approach to framing theory, namely that the research has always suffered from taking its starting point as the *coding* of frames by the researcher: 'On the quantitative side, students often have a unit-of-analysis problem, finding the most appropriate textual elements to count and sort' (p. 151). By using a study approach which seeks to allow the sponsor(s) to confirm the frame agenda, we can anticipate this methodological shortcoming can be overcome.

There is also growing realisation that examination of vested interests, or power relationships, associated with certain frames must become more central to framing enquiries, and not just acknowledged but then left aside. In the case of sponsored frames, for example, it may be possible to identify the genesis of a frame from sponsor agenda or objective, to PR professional treatment to journalistic adoption. If so, does such a chain of framing (in a verb sense), or frame-building, reveal something about the wider *salience* of the cultural frame or frames (in a noun sense)? Or to put this another way, how influential are sponsors in the interplay between frames and discourse?

To clarify, this study is not about examining audience effects per se, taking that aspect of framing theory as something of a given. Instead, frames are examined here 'to the extent that they form broader patterns, but what supports those patterns?' (Reese 2007, pp. 150-1). Nevertheless, the analysis of sponsor framing of the Carbon Tax in its notional 'genesis' as a media narrative about impending policy, is informed by the social reality of a policy that was subsequently introduced and then repealed after the Federal election of 2013. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to accept that media framing *did* have some effect in getting people to think about the issue in a certain way. Or, to use Cohen's words: "how to think" and not just "what to think about".

In summary, this study looks at two organisational processes and strategies, taken towards frame development and dissemination. In particular, this strives towards greater clarification and further evidence that "sponsored frames" exist, but also to evaluate how the power-to-frame becomes possible in the case of this frame type.

Together, this will contribute to an understanding that sponsored frame devices often (if not always) exist within contested narratives. In turn, it is hoped these findings will also contribute new stimulus and a greater urgency for the need to reveal how some media content frames are so much more successful than others at gaining salience and influence. In a policy sense, as the recent history of Australia's Carbon Tax has confirmed, this urgency cannot be overstated.

## 1.9: Research Questions

The development of specific research questions for this thesis, in many respects, owes much to Scheufele's conceptualization of framing as "a theory of media effects". As part of the early efforts to sort through and address framing theory's fractured paradigm, Scheufele developed and offered a process for framing research, to address the "deficits" and "inconsistencies" of the field. He approached this by asking rhetorically:

In other words, how can framing be used to broaden our understanding of media effects? Is it possible to categorize framing research by key inputs, processes, or outcomes? Finally, what are the theoretical and methodological implications for future studies on framing effects? (1999, p. 104)

The contemporary relevance of Scheufele's "theoretical and methodological implications" is based on three main assertions he made nearly two decades ago. Firstly, he recognised the importance of developing an approach that was embedded within what McQuail (1994) had described at the time as the fourth and current stage of media effects research: characterized by "social constructivism" (cited in Scheufele 1999, p. 105). As we have seen in the preceding literature review, framing forced media effects thinking to acknowledge the social constructivism of audience sense-making, whereby textual meanings can be negotiated and contested. As Scheufele had argued then, the relevance of this social reality to media effects research and its applicability to *political* texts are no less pertinent today.

Scheufele's typology further included the separation of media content frames from individual cognitive frames, based on the rationale that: 'Because frames have to be

considered schemes for both presenting and comprehending news, two concepts of framing can be specified: media frames and individual frames' (1999, p. 106). As reviewed in Section 1.2, such a conceptualisation of frames is now critical to evaluations of what is being said, on the one hand, and what is being heard on the other. For, if we are to understand how one leads to the other, then 'framing must take into account both kinds of frames and link them consistently' (Scheufele 1999, p. 106).

Finally, in discussing applications of his typology regarding media frames, Scheufele noted that:

Although many researchers have examined extrinsic and intrinsic factors influencing the production and selection of news...no evidence has yet been systematically collected about how various factors impact the structural qualities of news in terms of framing. (1999, p. 109)

While such studies have started to emerge, particularly in terms of agenda/frame-building, this remains a key gap in the literature, especially in relation to "extrinsic" factors. These three main aspects of Scheufele's conceptualisation remain both theoretically pertinent and methodologically useful for framing research. In terms of this study, the separation of frames ensures the research focus will be firmly on frames as *media content*. The following methodology chapter will look at how a social constructivist approach provides the interpretive and cultural considerations necessary, both to analyse and embed the Carbon Tax media frames within wider socio-political contexts.

In terms of specific research questions, one further aspect of Scheufele's guidance is useful. The second part of his typology called for research to evaluate media or individual frames as either a dependent or an independent variable. In the case of the former, Scheufele found existing studies of frames as dependent variables had tended to examine 'the role of various factors in influencing the creation or modification of frames' (1999, p. 107). Conversely, studies of frames as independent variables had tended to be more concerned with 'the effects of framing'. Essentially, studying frames as dependent variables allows research to consider how a frame has come to exist – what specific and influential factors can be traced in a frame's genesis or "creation"? On the other hand, studies of frames as independent variables allow research to look at what any particular frame

“means” to its audience; how does a frame effect a *cognitive* response? What “truth” does it carry?

Using this overall typology here, the framework is instructive: to study media frames, or frame devices, as dependent variables, to evaluate how organisational influence may have contributed to the creation of media frames surrounding the Carbon Tax. Drawing on Scheufele’s question guidance (1999, p. 108), this study set out to investigate the following research questions:

**RQ1:** What types of media frames were prominent in news media coverage regarding the Carbon Tax in the period February-May 2011?

**RQ2:** To what extent were organisational voices related to those prominent frame devices?

**RQ3:** In terms of organisations that were prominent (to whatever extent) in the narratives, what communication strategies (e.g. information subsidies) or efforts were behind the creation and dissemination of respective organisational frames and how were these implemented?

Together, the findings in relation to these three questions provide new insights into the important issue of framing and contribute to a theory of frame sponsorship. As Vliegenthart and van Zoonen have pointed out, studies that have considered ‘higher level influences on the news than those of individual journalists’ constitute “rare research” (2011, p. 107).

To summarise, the focus identifies (and confirms) the existence of frame sponsors and the key factors that enable frame sponsorship by vested interests to be successful, in so much as they are able to embed frame devices in media stories to support their agenda. Any actual cognitive effect, then, is not a focus here, not least of all because the frame devices under examination occurred more than six years ago and trying to measure any such audience effects so long after the fact would have been impossible.

However, Scheufele offers another point of research guidance, which suggests these findings might have further implications for a wider understanding of such framing effects. When researching media frames (albeit as *independent variables*), he indicated we should ask: ‘What kinds of media frames influence the audience’s

perception of certain issues, and how does this process work?' (1999, p. 108). Using this guidance, evidence that sponsored frame devices did *influence* the Carbon Tax narrative further provides an analysis of "what kinds of frames" might sway perceptions of issues. For, if we can assume there was indeed some correlated influence on public opinion (as suggested by the secondary data of the Lowy Poll, discussed in Section 2.5 and 4.2), then these findings reveal some insights of how frame sponsorship manifestly carries imprints of power.

These research questions enable a more sociological-based study of the kind called for by framing scholars (e.g. Carragee & Roefs 2004; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen 2011). Most importantly, the objective is to move beyond the short-comings of the media-centric tradition, to examine a key gap. As Vliegenthart and van Zoonen say:

While evidence from frame and framing research of the key relevance of the political, social and economic power of news sources for building the news agenda is significant... the inevitable question of whether and how this power translates into a news frame that is favourable to the interests of the powers-that-be, has been less prominently posed. (2011, p. 108)


What is more, as has been argued strongly by Lester, environmental news offers a highly suitable context for such a focus, where 'media roles in shaping and influencing crucial public debates and environmental decision making remain poorly understood' (2010, p. 7).

## Chapter 2: Methodology

Just as Scheufele provided specific guidance for the research questions, the analytical focus owes much to Stephen Reese. As one of the early scholars to consider the relevance of the organising principles provided by frames to social power relations, his guidance from nearly two decades ago resonates strongly with the aims and intentions of this study. As Reese (2001) explained:

A focus on the organizing principle should caution us that what is seen in media texts is often the result of many inter-related, competing principles from contending sources and media professionals...Thus we may ask, whose principle was dominant in producing the observed coverage? ...These questions require looking behind the scenes and making inferences from the symbolic patterns in news texts. (p. 13)

**Figure 2.1.** Political communication effects research: A basic diagram of levels of enquiry.



In Figure 2.1, the main body of historical media studies enquiry, related to political communication, is represented above the dotted line. This study will address those aspects below the line – the activities by organisations that can be thought of as frame sponsors. Through professional strategies, information subsidies and the work of lobbyists and spokespeople, sponsors actively contribute to the successful propagation of their own vested frame devices in news media.

## **Approach**

This research was undertaken within a naturalistic/interpretivist approach. More specifically, the social constructionist paradigm guides the interpretive inquiry, starting from the view that there are “multiple realities”, socially constructed ‘between and among people’ (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, pp. 19-20). For constructionism, ‘people live in, believe, and accept the constructed reality that is linked to but distinct from physical reality’ (Neuman 2003, p. 64). For this study then, social reality is something people actively construct for themselves on a daily basis, and media frames are an important part of the materials used to do that.

In terms of analytical framework, this further allows for an interpretative analysis informed by the discourse theories of a critical approach, which ultimately ‘holds that knowledge is power’ (Neuman 2003, p. 86). The reasoning for a framing study based on the synergies between the constructionist and the critical – and the value of their applicability to this study – is summarised by Reese, who reflected:

My own interests span the constructionist and critical: critical in the sense that I see frames as expressions and outcomes of power, unequally distributed with public opinion dominated and enlisted accordingly; and constructionist in the sense that I grant participants, such as journalists, some professional autonomy and take them seriously, using frames as “interpretive packages” in creating understandings of the social world. (2010, p. 19)

As required by an interpretivist approach, the research was primarily qualitative (Brennen 2013; Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000). However, as a number of research scholars note, there are important benefits from applying a mixed methodology involving both qualitative and quantitative methods (Altheide 2013; Krippendorf 2004; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Hansen et al. 1998). As such, the research

applied a mixed methodology to build a selection of case studies, which are well suited to using mixed methods (Yin 2012, pp. 10-19).

The following sections of this chapter explain the rationale and methods used in this research. Firstly, Section 2.1 briefly considers the theoretical rationale for not only how this study was completed but why, including constructionist synergies between framing and key cultural studies theories of discourse and the public sphere.

Section 2.2 then outlines the mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology used to examine the case studies, to highlight how these worked together and the key benefits gained from the two-stage approach. Further, this section explains how the mixed research provided credibility, confirmability and reliability, towards the overall trustworthiness of the data analysis and findings, as required of qualitative studies (Altheide 2013; Brennen 2013; Denzin & Lincoln 2013; Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000; Neuman 2003).

Sections 2.3 and 2.4 explain each of the research stages respectively, including data sampling and data gathering methods used, as well as how the key evidence to emerge from Stage 1 informed the development of Stage 2. To summarise briefly, quantitative and qualitative research was undertaken to examine the case studies in an iterative two-stage approach, as follows:

**Stage 1:** A mixed content analysis (quantitative) and textual analysis (qualitative) of news articles comprising the media sample (message pool);

**Stage 2:** Depth interviews (qualitative) with representatives from key organisations identified from Stage 1, as well as review of relevant documentation (e.g. media releases).

These methods are both primary data-gathering tools for the naturalistic researcher, as pointed out by Frey, Botan and Kreps (2000, p. 262). Findings from Stage 1 directly informed the development of Stage 2, including which organisations to invite for interview and which frame content to focus on.

Finally, Section 2.5 explains more fully how the secondary data from the Lowy Institute's annual polling in Australia provides evidence of the wider public opinion context, as well as potential media effects, for this study.

## 2.1: Research Design and Analysis Rationale

As highlighted in Chapter 1, this study takes an interdisciplinary perspective (Lawrence 2010), drawing on framing theories and frameworks across several disciplines, including media studies, cultural studies, and elements of public relations/public affairs theory. Across these fields, notions of discourse are a common theme.

The synergy between constructionist approaches and theories of discourse and their relevance to studies of media framing, is now well documented (Brennen 2013; Denzin & Lincoln 2013; Johnson-Cartee 2005; Neuman 2003). In essence, both constructionism and discourse theory place communication artefacts at the centre of socially constructed realities, which necessarily raises the importance of political considerations. As Johnson-Cartee explained:

In recent years, the emphasis has been placed not on social interactions but on mediated interactions in an individual's construction of his or her social reality...[because] For most people, political knowledge is constructed through the mass media...the mass media provide us with the mosaics from which we build our own personal reality. (2005, p. 4)

For constructionism (Lincoln & Guba 2013, pp. 43-82), sense-making is based on the creation of a coherent, articulated, pattern or web of constructs. Once articulated and shared, those constructs become stabilized and are quickly reified as part of the socio-cultural milieu. Most importantly, in relation to notions of discourse, such reified constructions then become a powerful force in support of maintaining the status quo. Similarly, the usefulness of discourse theory to a constructionist-textual study has been well argued by Denzin and Lincoln (2013), among others. Hansen, for example, sees this as a must for environmental-media research:

If we accept the constructionist argument that environmental problems – and social problems generally – do not ‘objectively’ announce themselves, but only become recognised as such through the process of public claims-making, then it is also immediately clear that media, communication and discourse have a central role and should be a central focus for study. (2010, p. 18)

These paradigms enable communication research to move beyond the frustrations of a more traditional, quantitative-based positivism, in order to 'understand communication as a social and cultural practice' (Brennen 2013, p. 6). As such, media studies scholarship has turned to the many theoretical positions that have come to be known collectively as *Critical Theories* (Brennen 2013, pp. 8-9), such as Neo-Marxism, Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism.

The following summaries of constructionist-discourse ideas further explain the philosophical underpinnings and rationale for this thesis. Key perspectives of discourse include Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. However, a third set of key theoretical ideas from the same trajectory have further informed the analysis of what this all means: neo-Marxist notions of the public realm and media relationships with the workings of that particular social reality.

### **Why worry about framing sponsorship?**

The purpose of this study is to contribute towards a better understanding of the power to frame, as part of a growing urgency across the social sciences regarding political influence. In a sense, it is an urgency that asks: how do we reconcile/address what can be described as the postmodern drift away from concerns about who's doing the talking towards examinations of who hears what?

Central to this concern is the relationship between media frames, discourse and how, 'as individuals, we are dependent on the news media to bring us the political happenings of our day' (Johnson-Cartee 2005, p. 42). Most importantly, a more holistic evaluation of political influence within media studies now demands we move beyond a traditional newsroom-centric perspective. However, to echo Manning, 'why worry about the sources of news?' (2001, p. 1).

To understand the 'power' of frame sponsorship, the critical theories of Derrida and Foucault in particular, underwrite the productive reading of the media narratives and attendant organisational strategies offered here. Much has been said about the importance of Derrida's and Foucault's re-thinking of Saussure's signification theory to post-structuralist and postmodernist paradigms (Torfing 1999, pp. 39-90). In particular, Jacques Derrida's seminal ideas offered a recognition of the play of meanings and decentred structures:

According to Derrida...the always unfulfilled desire for a centre gives rise to the endless displacements and substitutions of the centre...Henceforth, we must begin thinking about the absence of a centre. The centre is not a fixed locus, but rather a non-locus in which an infinite number of substitutions come into play...Derrida's definition of discourse...emphasises the moment of unfixity in the construction of meaning. (Torfing 1999, p. 40)

Derrida's final dashing of notions of "totalising structures" against the rocks of deconstruction has provided the foundation on which questions could be raised about how, in a socially-constructed reality sense, we keep ending up with such 'fixed' ideas and seemingly closed structures of 'truth' and certainty? For the development of discourse theory, and not least of all for neo-Marxism, this theoretical principle provides the intellectual opening for a new and more productive evaluation of ideology, political struggle and power relations (Torfing 1999, pp. 155-65). Namely, by what processes is it that one or more of an "infinite" number of possible centres comes to be substituted as *the* centre at any given time?

To answer such questions, the work of Foucault was important for locating power relations within a theory of discourse. In 1969, Foucault introduced the notion that discourses should not be thought of as groups of signs, but rather constitute 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (2002, p. 54). In so doing, Foucault reconceptualised the traditional notions of power from something "repressive" to something "productive". As Torfing explained:

Power often involves the proliferation of discourse and the constitution, multiplication and transformation of identity. As such, power is ultimately related to knowledge...However, power is not a wholly positive force as the constitution of identity and the production of knowledge are always conditional upon acts of exclusion. (1999, p. 162)

Here, it becomes possible to locate answers to the questions posed by Derrida's opening-up of a deconstructed, bogus centre, to find that "temporary order" (Torfing 1999, p. 86) *can* result from the productive force of discursive knowledge. What is more, far from being an open field of play, power relations are both central to and manifested through that knowledge. In other words, the discursive struggle itself forms the productive force *powering* the establishment of some centres over others, in any given moment, as much by acts of "exclusion" as acts of creation. Through

Foucault, power becomes immanent not just to discourse theory, but to notions of constructionism as a whole. As Torfing further explained:

For Foucault, power is first and foremost the way in which certain actions modify other actions by means of shaping the identities of the acting subjectivities...Power thus accounts for how human beings are made subjects...Identities are constructed, and as part of this construction they are placed in specific relations of control and dependence. (1999, p. 164)

It is this conceptualisation of *discourse* which broadly informs this study: as a productive force central to the social construction of reality, yet one which is struggled over, never ultimately fixed, but very good at assuming the position of 'totalising centre' when conditions allow. In essence, sponsored media frames exist within contested narratives, which may eventually become reified and either create or contribute to discourse.

### **Theoretical synergies: Neo-Marxism and the reality of the public realm**

Finally, then, it is important for this study to locate the findings within the nexus between media frames, discursive constructions of the public realm, and the very tangible reality of government policy. For it is here that the effects of the power relations which inhabit that space are laid bare. However, it is acknowledged that such a reading does not automatically follow from taking a discursive, constructivist position. Accordingly, a neo-Marxist perspective is confirmed as the final piece of the theoretical framework which underwrites this thesis. In particular, a neo-Marxist position provides the basis for being concerned at all about the discursive power of media frames to create a totalising centre (no matter how illusory or fleeting), but also to consider such power in terms of unequal social relations.

For James Curran (2006), the development of media and cultural theory in Britain since the 1970s was strongly influenced by the victory of capitalism. As a theoretical impetus, the "fading light of Marxism" led the British academic left to turn to Habermas and Gramsci, which in turn led to 'two different but overlapping groups - one centred in cultural studies (Gramsci) and the other in media studies (Habermas)' (Curran 2006, pp. 132-4).

From this new starting point, neo-Marxist thinking became somewhat 'seduced' by postmodernism and the ideas of globalised cultural populism, particularly by the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Paul Willis and John Fiske (Curran 2006, pp. 135-9). For Curran, this thinking has now moved too far away from the early economic essentialism. The problem is that while many of the new affirmative views of individual freedoms and cultural appropriation – in and through the marketplace – have validity, such views are not enough in the face of very clear and growing social inequalities. As Curran lamented:

An unwillingness to confront market issues also accounts for the one-sided understanding of globalisation that dominates media and cultural research. The prevailing orthodoxy adopts a broad, anthropological understanding of 'culture' as a way of life. Yet, it seldom gives more than a passing consideration to the inequitable nature of the global market, even though this profoundly affects peoples' lives. (2006, p. 140)

### **Summary: The political worry about news framing**

While media and cultural studies have certainly done much to re-orientate understandings of power-relations away from the elite centre and out to the fragmented periphery, such theoretical insights surely must do more to help address the growing social dominance of elite centres "out there". For, while the past four decades or so have seen the genesis and development of those ideas, those decades have also seen the extraordinarily rapid concentration of wealth, and all its attendant socio-political power, in the hands of relatively very few.

This has now reached such a critical (and absurd) point, that in 2017, 82% of global wealth created went to the richest 1% of the world's population (Oxfam Australia, n.d.). To look at inequality another way, the wealthiest eight individuals living on planet earth controlled more wealth than the poorest half, or approximately 3.5 billion people (Oxfam Australia 2017). The situation is no less dire in Australia itself, where the top 1% have more wealth than the bottom 70% of people (Oxfam Australia 2017).

If framing theory was born of the twin media and cultural studies strands within communication theory, then this brief overview of those theoretical directions

highlights how an understanding of *the power to frame* has been somewhat lost in the trajectory. As Curran surmised:

In brief, media and cultural studies has been seduced by the discourse of market liberalism into bracketing out class. It has colluded in the perpetuation of myths that mask *inherited* privilege and legitimate inequality. It has also been distracted from investigating adequately the part played by the media in the growth of inequality in market liberal societies. (2006, p. 143)

Accordingly, the aims of this research focus, as well as this researcher's own inherent philosophical starting point that our social realities are indeed socially determined, have largely dictated an interpretivist approach. An analysis of framing sponsorship, contested narratives and the power of discursive frames, necessarily demands research not wedded to notions of a single truth or an objective reality. As explored in this section, there are strong synergies between a naturalistic-constructionist paradigm and discourse theory. Together, these perspectives allow an evaluation of how, in a world full of complex, multiple narrative *realities*, certain specific narratives are still able to gain dominance and become, however momentary, reified "truths".

## **2.2: A Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Methodology**

This study utilises quantitative and qualitative methods, to build two comparative case studies of how pro- and anti-Carbon Tax organisations framed their respective agendas through news media. As expected of naturalistic, constructionist-interpretive paradigms, qualitative research methods have been primarily used to answer the research questions (Brennen 2013; Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000). A qualitative study was most appropriate for this research, since the aims required a textual reading of media frame devices and subsequent in-depth interviews. This allowed findings from each of these data sets to be analysed for complementary and correlated patterns, matching key media frames with relevant organisational processes and objectives.

What is more, since the research required gathering evidence from senior organisational representatives, in-depth interviews were the only realistic and appropriate tool for achieving this. This is because such professional individuals are

typically time-poor and not well disposed towards completing quantitative surveys. Furthermore, only a small number of organisations were identified during the study as relevant for possible follow-up, which would have provided a very inadequate sample for undertaking a quantitative study.

However, in order to provide the research and subsequent analysis with greater rigour and reliability, additional quantitative elements were employed. These include a content-analysis count of the key frame devices identified and of organisational mentions in news stories, in relation to the Carbon Tax. This allowed for the aforementioned correlated patterns to be further analysed in terms of volume, matching the key media frames with organisational 'presence' within the news stories.

The use of both quantitative and qualitative data for this media study is in line with the growing assertion that communication studies can and should adopt integrated methodologies, as possible and necessary (Altheide & Schneider 2013; Berger 2014; Hansen & Machin 2013; Neuendorf 2002). The separation of quantitative and qualitative tools is arguably now seen as a methodological weakness, particularly in terms of content analyses and especially in relation to mass communication research (Berger 2014, pp. 29-30).

Accordingly, the data analysis includes both a quantitative count of key news story references, as well as a deeper qualitative textual analysis of the relevant newspaper articles. In this way, the dominance of any particular frame(s) over other 'contesting' frames is evaluated in terms of both volume *and* interpretation of the discourse carried by that repetition.

Utilising integrated, mixed methods, helped this research avoid being overly inferential (Neuendorf 2002). Importantly, the use of follow-up interviews ensured analysis of the media frames and organisational influence did not rely solely on the derived data obtained from the content/textual analyses (Yin 2012, p. 5). It also prevented the research from being quantitatively too narrow, by focusing only on what is available to count, or being qualitatively too subjective, by inferring textual meanings or effects which, at best, are hard to defend (Berger 2014, p. 26-7).

Instead, a more reliable and valid approach integrates *available* studies of media sources, messages, audiences, and media effects on audiences (Neuendorf 2002, pp. 56-61). This was achieved by integrating quantitative and qualitative measures

of frames used in relation to the Carbon tax (messages), with a qualitative evaluation of organisational agendas and processes behind those frames (sources), and an analysis underwritten not only by the fact that the Carbon Tax legislation was eventually repealed but also by secondary quantitative data regarding public perceptions of the policy at that time (media effects on audiences).

### **Two-stage case studies to triangulate the data**


The overarching methodology has been to undertake comparative analysis of two case studies, utilising mixed methods. Design of the case studies was achieved through an iterative, two-stage process. This is because the critical first requirement of defining the cases themselves (Yin 2012, p. 6), only became possible after conducting the content/textual analyses of media frames.

While initial immersion in the topic and a pilot study of Carbon Tax news stories had revealed 10 key organisations to focus on for the content-analysis of media mentions, dominant organisations could only be identified once this was completed. What is more, the selection of the Climate Institute (CI) and BHP Billiton (BHP) as the final two cases was wholly dependent on their eventual acceptance to participate. For, while the content/textual analyses had confirmed these organisations as two of the most prominent voices, they were also the only two that subsequently made representatives available for follow-up interviews.

With final organisations identified for the study, the full case study framework was then developed. Typically, Yin tells us, case studies are either single case or multiple case, holistic (single unit of analysis) or embedded (multiple units of analysis) (2012, p. 6). Drawing on this guidance, the design for this research is multiple-case embedded, with two organisations providing comparative cases, using the content/textual analyses data and interview data as the embedded units of analysis.

The following diagram in Figure 2.2 illustrates this design.

**Figure 2.2:** Comparative case study design framework, adapted from Yin (2012, p. 8)




Case studies, Yin advises (2012, p. 4-6), are especially useful when the research needs to answer a *descriptive* question (e.g. What happened?), or an *explanatory* question (e.g. How or why did something happen?). Here, this design has been used for both a description of how the Carbon Tax was framed in the news media during February-May 2011 and an explanation of how particular frames came about and what that all means in the media-policy nexus (however, as discussed in Chapter 5, the limitation of two case studies means we must be cautious about the external validity of the findings, beyond these organisations).

The case study approach then, has provided a very workable framework for mixed-methods research. Most importantly, however, the design taken also enabled a triangulation of data, to help validate the final analysis by 'establishing converging lines of evidence – which will make findings as robust as possible' (Yin 2012, p. 13). Using this triangulated data, the findings and final conclusions have been reached through an overall qualitative textual analysis, which correlated and matched key 'patterns and relationships' (Neuman 2003, p. 440) between the media frames and organisational strategies.

The following Figure 2.3 helps illustrate this triangulation, as relevant here.

**Figure 2.3:** Data ‘triangulation’ analysis framework



In terms of the media frames, the use of narrative analysis ‘to focus on major themes and stories contained in the texts’ (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, p. 237), and one also focused on ‘ideological analysis’ (Brennen 2013, p. 201) was especially suitable for this project. Not least of all, “narrative framing” (Cox 2013) has been found to be highly pertinent within environmental reporting, where media frames about the environment play a specific role ‘in providing a narrative or coherent story line about the world’ (p. 164).

In terms of the organisational strategies, the Climate Institute and BHP interview transcripts have provided the analysis with both ‘genuine experiences’ (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, p. 257) and insights towards understanding ‘the relationship between media and society’ (Brennen 2013, p. 37). That is, the transcripts were used to determine what Frey et al. describe as “first-order explanations”, or what the

participants themselves say about their experiences, and “second-order” analysis, provided by the researcher’s interpretations of the first-order (2000, p. 280-1).

For this study, the second-order was not as relevant as the first, as the interviews were undertaken to gather data related to media campaign processes. Accordingly, first-order data has largely been taken at face value, with little attempt to examine any underlying emotions or hidden meanings, or indeed falsehoods, which are more pertinent to ethnographic studies (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, p. 257). Nevertheless, second-order interpretation has been done to evaluate the relevant strengths and weaknesses of each organisation’s strategy, based on the respondent’s recount of what went on. Most importantly, the full case study analyses combined both the data sets from Stage 1 and Stage 2, by looking for ‘patterns, classifications, themes, and categories in this material’ (Berger 2014, p. 170). In this way, the results have been correlated to verify, validate and confirm the findings and conclusions reached.

To confirm, while drawing on some quantitative data, the content/textual and interview analyses here have largely been typical of a qualitative approach. Both the focus of the research and the analysis of findings have evolved by forming and refining concepts ‘grounded in the data’, resulting in data organised into categories ‘on the basis of themes, concepts, or similar features’ (Neuman 2003, p. 441). The analysis overall was backgrounded by the Lowy Poll results and the hindsight of knowing the Carbon Tax policy was eventually repealed, which provided the contextual boundaries that guide and permit such readings (Brennen 2013; Krippendorff 2004).

Before looking at the chosen methods more fully in the rest of this Chapter, it is important to briefly explain the rationale of this last part of the data triangle, adopted to inform the analysis of the primary fieldwork. That secondary data comes from the high-profile, annual Lowy Poll published in Australia, and its significance to this study is to provide both context but also a proxy for the potential media effects of the framing contest examined here. Furthermore, a justification is offered for a study focus limited to newspaper media. Certainly, frames regarding the Carbon Tax would have emanated from a range of other mass media channels, as well as discussions in social media and smaller communication outlets (e.g. organisational websites, activist campaigns etc).

## **The importance of social context and the high-modality of newspapers**

As part of an integrated methodology and a proxy for audience effects, the highly respected annual Lowy Poll offers a facet considered important to a naturalistic/interpretive approach: the social context. Typically, this refers more to the ethnographic origins of qualitative research and related to location-based fieldwork, which ‘involves studying phenomena *in situ*, that is, in context’ (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, p. 262). Similarly, Neuman (2003) has said that the ‘interpretive theorist attempts to discover the meaning of an event or practice by placing it within a specific social context... Meaning comes from the context of a cultural symbol system’ (p. 61).

Notwithstanding that ethnographic applicability, the wider social context offered by the Lowy Poll provides concrete guidance for both the reading of frames in the textual analysis phase, and the analysis of framing success for each of the case studies. Not least of all, the poll is clear evidence that concerns among Australian residents regarding climate change diminished rather than increased around the time of the Carbon Tax, but also of public rejection of the tax itself (these data results are provided in full in Sections 2.5 and 4.2). This reality allows a productive reading of the news articles in this study and analysis of the organisational processes and strategies, towards understanding how that came about, at least in part, as a result of contested news story frames. This version of social context and its relevance to media studies is perhaps best explained by Brennen:

Qualitative research aims to understand the myriad meanings that people make. However, it is not enough for qualitative researchers to describe their observations, experiences and/or textual readings. Context is a central part of the interpretive process, and researchers must place their interpretations within the relevant historical, cultural, political and/or economic contexts. (2013, p. 22)

Lastly, a focus on the *newspaper* and *news* contexts of the media frames under study is due to the continuing authority this media had in Australia in 2011, as ‘a key site for information, analysis and debate’ in the public domain (Lester 2010, p. 3). Work in the area of genre analysis has shown how genres such as news and documentary enjoy “high modality” because they are widely seen as strongly connected to reality (Brennen 2013, pp. 204-5). In many respects then, through the formal features and protocols constituting “news” in the mainstream media, it is a

genre which 'still tends to present itself to audiences in a few standard formats that can be taken as evidence of professionalism in general and *objectivity* in particular' (Tuchman 2002, p. 87) [emphasis added].

This potential for considerable influence on public debates is confirmed by research at the time regarding the use and trust placed in newspapers, especially for the two broadsheets, compared with other media types (conducted by respected media research organisations Essential Media and Roy Morgan in July 2011). In terms of reach and relevance for the four newspaper print titles, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, the *Australian* and *Daily Telegraph* all enjoyed circa 90% readership of their news sections, while the *Herald Sun* enjoyed 80% (Roy Morgan Research 2011). What is more, 74% of *SMH* readers had trust in that newspaper, as did 69% of *Australian* readers, 54% of *Herald Sun* readers and 52% of *Daily Telegraph* readers (Essential Media Report 2014).

This compared with lower levels of trust in commercial TV news (48%) and radio news (46%), but similar levels of trust in the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (the public broadcaster) – 71% trust for TV news and 67% for radio news. Interestingly, trust for online channels was very low, with only 41% trusting news and opinion websites and 20% trusting blogs (Essential Media Report 2014).

## Summary

Multiple data sets give this study greater reliability since the analysis is 'not limited to a single source of data' (Yin 2012, p. 10), allows for an 'in-depth focus of the case(s)' and, as such, 'goes beyond the study of isolated variables' by drawing on multiple sources of evidence (p. 4). Using two comparative cases to build this evidence triangulation, the objective has been to show how frame sponsorship has important implications for three main areas of existing knowledge.

First, as discussed in Chapter 1, the newsroom has all too often been taken as the starting point for examining the power to frame. Yet, as has also been widely acknowledged but little explored, there are powerful forces outside the newsroom that are now very sophisticated and increasingly so, allowing sponsored agendas to be very successful. Their framing *processes*, it is argued here, underwrite such influence in mainstream media.

Second, frames are all too often examined in isolation or on an equal footing, but this is not how they exist in the real world; frames exist as part of contested narratives – some support each other, some contradict and conflict. This research aimed to describe how this unfolded for the Carbon Tax, to examine how some frames were more successful than others at gaining salience, even if only fleetingly.

Third, an understanding of frame sponsorship provides a more critical examination of the power-relations at the heart of the media-policy nexus, and what that means for existing notions of a democratic public domain. Through explaining how organisational framing contributed to the eventual demise of Australia's first policy to price carbon, the case studies further offer an evaluation of how sponsored frames – as a contributing narrative to discursive centres – can so strongly influence the directions of public policy.

### **2.3: Stage 1 Content/Textual Analyses**

In order to analyse correspondence between organisational voices/mentions and media frames, a dualist approach combining content and textual analyses was most appropriate. An important benefit of using both quantitative and qualitative tools was to avoid what has been described as 'the problematic distinction' between manifest and latent content (Hansen & Machin 2013, pp. 88-9), typically arising from a quantitative content analysis alone. Accordingly, while a quantitative count of organisational mentions was suitable to quantify those voices and their presence within the articles, it was not considered adequate for the analysis of media frames. Instead, a textual analysis has ensured the study categorised frame devices not only as manifest content but also analysed them in terms of potential latent meanings, recognising that 'texts are produced and read by others and are expected to be significant to them' (Krippendorff 2004, p. 22). This section explains the iterative steps taken with this dualist method.

#### **Sampling method for the final message pool**

The first appropriate step for this study was to become immersed in relevant materials related to the research (Brennen 2013, p. 21). In order to do so, however,

it was necessary to establish the best time-period of focus, around the initial news story that the Gillard government would introduce a tax on carbon. This date was identified using Google searches, which revealed that the story was reported as 'breaking news' on 12 February 2011 (Maher & Shanahan 2011). A subsequent search on Factiva showed that the first mention a Carbon Tax was about to be announced by the government actually came in the *Canberra Times* on Friday February 11. This was followed by an "exclusive" in *The Weekend Australian* on February 12 from Maher and Shanahan, stating 'Julia Gillard plans to introduce a carbon price from July 1 next year.' This established 12 February 2011 as the key starting date of the 'story' for the study, selected due to the *Australian* newspaper being a more prominent title than the *Canberra Times*. In turn, this determined the scoping should consider the months preceding and following this announcement of the tax.

The next step was to select a representative number of major newspaper titles. This became necessary after initial searches in newspaper databases indicated there would be more than 700 articles to contend with if the research scope included all major state and national newspaper titles in Australia. Initial searches also eliminated the relevance of weekend/Sunday papers (apart from *The Australian's* version), as these typically carried very little coverage of the study topic.

**Table 2.3:** Media sampling framework for the Content/Textual Analyses

| <b>Title:</b>            | <b>The Australian/<br/>The Weekend<br/>Australian</b> | <b>The SMH</b>  | <b>Herald Sun</b> | <b>Daily<br/>Telegraph</b> |
|--------------------------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Format/Style</b>      | Broadsheet  | "Broadsheet" (in style, though in reality has become tabloid in size) | Tabloid           | Tabloid                    |
| <b>Target readership</b> | Professional  | Professional  | Working class     | Working class              |
| <b>Coverage</b>          | National  | Sydney  | Melbourne         | Sydney                     |
| <b>Publisher</b>         | News Ltd  | Fairfax   | News Ltd          | News Ltd                   |

Accordingly, the scope was pared to include four weekly newspapers: *The Australian* (including the Saturday edition, *The Weekend Australian*), *The Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH), the *Herald Sun* and the *Daily Telegraph*. As shown in Table 2.3, this mix provided a good cross section of major newspaper types available in Australia, not only in terms of readership but also in terms of the dominance of publishing company News Ltd in this country.

The third sampling step was to narrow the time period around the first story date of 12 February 2011. At first, the study considered periods both preceding and following that date. Factiva searches showed that between 14 September 2010, when the Gillard minority government was sworn in, up to the day after the Carbon Tax was announced in the *Weekend Australian* (i.e. Sunday 13/02/11), those four newspapers carried 120 "carbon tax" stories related to climate change. This compared to 271 stories in the three months after February 13, 327 in the next three months (May-August) and 110 during the final three months of 2011 (August-November), thus excluding December, which is normally a quiet period for serious news reporting in Australia (often referred to colloquially as 'the silly season').

Searches were conducted using the free text parameter of "carbon tax" as well as the Factiva subject code of *climate change*. Table 2.4 shows the breakdown of consecutive periods scanned in Factiva.

**Table 2.4:** Total counts of Carbon Tax news articles in Factiva across key time periods

| <b>Time period</b>   | <b>Total articles (excluding identical duplicates)</b> |
|--|--|
| <b>14/09/10 (date of Gillard minority government sworn in) to 13/02/11 (Sunday after the carbon tax story appeared in <i>The Weekend Australian</i>)</b> | 120  |
| <b>14/02/11 to 13/05/11</b>  | 271  |
| <b>14/05/11 to 13/08/11</b>  | 327  |
| <b>14/08/11 to 13/11/11</b>  | 110  |

While the May-August period returned the greatest number of relevant articles, it was further expected that in many respects the media frames related to the Carbon Tax would have been mostly established in the February-May period. Also, as the study focus was to examine signs of organisational activity in the struggle to establish dominant frames for the story, it was considered most applicable to look at media stories after the tax was officially announced. This is not to dismiss the fact that various political and business parties had long been debating climate change leading up to this point, and the 120 articles found between 14 September 2010 and 13 February 2011 highlight how the words “carbon tax” were certainly part of those debates. However, it was not until the news story of February 12 that this nomenclature became the official policy response. This was later confirmed in Stage 2 by the Climate Institute representative, who had been privy to some of the behind-the-scenes activity leading up to the policy’s introduction, since the fact that it would be announced as a “carbon tax” came as a complete surprise and shock (see section 3.3). Only after this political reality was established is it possible to view the organisational media and framing activity as a direct response to a policy called the *Carbon Tax*. As such, the content/textual analyses have focused on the key three-month period (from Monday 14/02/11 to Sunday 13/05/11) following the official announcement, and the final article sample units per newspaper title are shown in Table 2.5.

**Table 2.5:** Final article counts (sample units) per media sample title

| <b>Newspaper articles citing "carbon tax" published in three-month period between 14/02/11 (first weekday after the story was reported nationally) to 13/05/11, comprising the final study sample units (message pool)</b> | <b>Total articles</b><br>(excluding identical duplicates) |
|--|---|
| The Australian/Weekend Australian (National)   | 168   |
| The Sydney Morning Herald  | 63  |
| Herald-Sun (Melbourne, Australia)  | 21  |
| The Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia)  | 19  |
| <b>Total:</b>  | <b>271</b>  |

To fully explain how the Factiva database searches were conducted:

1. The searches were conducted across the four newspaper titles only and did not encompass their respective websites. This is because Factiva does not include any website content from the study period for these four titles, with curated articles available only from various dates after December 2011. Accordingly, it was not possible to include online news stories with any certainty of complete coverage.
2. News stories between 14 February and 13 May 2011 were searched using "carbon tax" as a free text criterion, as well as *climate change* as the Factiva subject code.

This returned the overall pool of 271 stories in total. This final selection of news articles constituted the entire message pool and each separate article constituted a unit of analysis.

### **Pilot study to identify key organisations *a priori***

Prior to starting full coding, further immersion in the Carbon Tax stories was then undertaken to scan for organisations cited in the articles. Since the content/textual data were also to be analysed quantitatively, an *a priori* design was required (Neuendorf 2002, p. 11). In terms of identifying organisations, this was completed before proceeding to the first open coding of the message sample units.

Conversely, for the coding of media frames, it was decided this was better left for the first full open coding pass, so that key frame devices could be evaluated *a priori* more comprehensively.

The initial pilot study scanned a selected sub-set of the 271 articles in the message pool. These 29 articles were randomly chosen using selective random sampling (Neuendorf 2002, p. 84), by taking every ninth article, in date order, from each of the four newspaper titles (i.e. 18 from the *Australian*, 7 from the *SMH*, and 2 each from the *Daily Telegraph* and *Herald Sun*). Along with business counts of organisations in the selected Factiva articles, the pilot scan identified key organisations to focus on, in terms of news citations and vested interests in the

debate. Perhaps predictably, business organisations linked to resources mining and energy were especially prominent. These included BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, BlueScope Steel, Peabody Energy Corporation and Origin Energy. Peak industry bodies were also prominent, including the Business Council of Australia (BCA) and the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA).

Of these, BHP, BlueScope Steel, Rio Tinto, Origin Energy and the BCA were selected for the coding analysis. This provided corporate representation across resources mining, energy and industry bodies. In order to balance the corporate side of the debate, key non-profit and environmental agencies were also selected for the full open pass. Again, early immersion and the pilot scan revealed the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Climate Institute (CI) were most relevant in Australia. Greenpeace, as a well-known global environment ‘brand’, was also selected.

Lastly, the Clean Energy Council (CEC) was selected, to provide a view related to both a corporate and an environmental perspective; as the representative body for green-tech developers in Australia, the CEC was considered uniquely positioned with both corporate and non-carbon vested interests (in the end, however, this organisation featured very little in the debate).

**Table 2.6:** Key organisations selected for the study focus

| <b>Corporates</b>     | <b>Non-Profits</b>                       | <b>Industry Bodies</b>              |
|-----------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| BHP Billiton (BHP)    | Climate Institute (CI)                   | Business Council of Australia (BCA) |
| BlueScope Steel (BSS) | Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) | Clean Energy Council (CEC)          |
| Rio Tinto (RT)        | World Wildlife Fund (WWF)                |                                     |
| Origin Energy         | Greenpeace (GP)                          |                                     |

These selected key organisations were then used to guide the first full open coding pass through the data. As indicated, this approach also satisfied the quantitative

requirement of establishing categories *a priori*. Table 2.6 outlines the 10 organisations across corporate and non-profit sectors.

### **Coding method for the content/textual analyses**

To undertake the human coding of content, the following three-step, iterative approach was used (Neuman 2003, pp. 442-5):

1. **Open Coding** – the ‘first pass’ through the data, designed to identify initial categories and which ‘brings themes to the surface from deep inside the data’. It is both a flexible and low-level pass, based on the researcher’s early understanding or stimulated as immersion unfolds.
2. **Axial Coding** – the ‘second pass’, to focus mainly on the data now organised into the themes and concepts arising from the first pass. In this data review, Neuman stresses that “additional codes” or new ideas may further emerge; however, the primary focus is to consider “causes and consequences”, to ‘look for categories or concepts that cluster together’, and stimulate analysis regarding ‘linkages between concepts or themes’. Again, this stage may raise new questions, but should identify ideas which demand further examination, and begin to reinforce ‘the connections between evidence and concepts’.
3. **Selective Coding** – the third ‘pass’ through the media data, to enable the researcher to finally *select* data which directly supports the major themes and concepts identified during the first two coding stages of analysis. This final coding is used specifically to build ‘cases that illustrate themes’.

Human coding and analyses of media texts by the researcher were conducted in NVivo. Although predominantly used as a qualitative software program, its tools also enable quantitative counts to be made. This enabled a flexible yet systematic interrogation of the data by setting up NVivo with the newspaper source articles, loaded per title and per month. Each of the 271 articles were then scanned for mentions and quotes of the 10 organisations, which were coded into four nodes per organisation:

1. Organisation citation (i.e. ACF, BlueScope, BCA etc. is named in the story, either in full or using an abbreviation/acronym)
2. Direct quote of organisation representative(s) (e.g. CEO, General Manager, 'company spokesperson', etc.)
3. Indirect citation of organisation representative(s)
4. Full article in which any of the above three citations existed.

Direct quotes consisted of instances where the representative was quoted verbatim, usually at length and usually with "quote marks". Indirect citations, on the other hand, were instances where the author/journalist referred to something the representative had said in the past.

It should be noted that all instances of the above were coded as separate citations, regardless of whether they appeared in the same article (unit of analysis). This quantitative coding was taken to allow subsequent analyses to measure how much 'voice' – or weight of opinion and thought leadership – the stories carried of any key organisation or spokesperson. Simply counting whole articles as a single instance was not felt to be adequate, as a measure of repetition and influence.

### **Textual analysis: A reading of *latent frames in media frame devices***

This coding approach allowed ongoing, flexible revision of coded content throughout the research, as well as a strong method for finding patterns in the data. The coding method was especially useful for the textual analysis, as it enabled an iterative exploration for narrative patterns and relationships, where such analysis could begin early in the project (Neuman 2003, p. 440).

This analytical method has also been used in relation to climate change specifically, where an extensive analysis of global discourses was conducted 'to reveal regular and consistent patterns' in the texts (Anshelm and Hultman 2015, p. 11). Arising from the work of Shanahan and McComas in the 1990s around *cultivation analysis*, which 'focuses on the general, long-term and consistent trends and messages of media content' (Hansen 2010, p. 174), the idea of narrative framing (Cox 2013, p.

164) is useful for underlining how frames are not only limited to single words (e.g. Nisbet's "climate crisis") or well-established slogans (e.g. Reese's "War on Terror"). Instead, latent frames – that is, certain meanings – can also emerge from within much longer narrative terrains, where the framing 'can organise the "facts" of a news story in ways that provide a narrative structure – what is the problem, who is responsible, what is the solution, and so on' (Cox 2013, p. 164). Drawing on Barthes, such audience readings can also be substantiated by pointing to contextual conditions and evidence of 'anchorage', or various textual techniques that underwrite the chosen reading. To paraphrase Barthes (1977): 'How does meaning get into the [text]? Where does it end? And if it ends, what is there *beyond*?' (p. 32)

### **Operational definition of frames**

Within the fractured paradigm of framing theory, there is a growing concern with how a frame is defined, particularly in terms of what sort of content constitutes a frame. For example, Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) have contended that news stories about political issues contain both information and frames, but that a question remains for researchers regarding 'how they distinguish between these two story elements' (p. 19). More recently, scholars have pointed to how "loose definitions" are impacting on the validity of media effects research. As Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar assert of framing in the communication discipline: 'there seems to be little consistency across studies in the types of content (or "framing") categories identified' (2016, p. 14). It is acknowledged that such difficulty is no less relevant here. Nevertheless, the study requires a definition of how frames have been determined and the following explains this researcher's approach.

The reading of frames offered here is predicated on looking for *patterns of narrative framing* and inferences of *textual anchorage*. That is, of particular themes and discourses, which this researcher's reading 'seeks' both within and beyond the manifest content, to find more meaningfully productive latent areas, vis-a-vis the various organisational interests present in the news texts. As Reese has said of 'the narratives' of frames:

The ultimate frame may not be plainly visible from a simple inspection of the manifest content and terminology that it invokes. Rather, it must be interpreted in its latent message. (2010, p. 24)

Operationally, frames in this study have been analysed using Van Gorp's description of frame packages (see section 1.2), in which frame devices manifest in the text (i.e. actual words present in the stories) function as indicators of the frame. What is more, the reading is focused on identifying another of Van Gorp's distinctions, namely how those manifest words of the organisational actors can be seen as framing *through* the media, rather than as framing by the media. In this way, quotes and news items related to the organisations and their representatives have been analysed as manifest instances *indicating* a key latent frame.

To explain further, since the content/textual analyses were more concerned with identifying sponsorship activity than with analysing the frames more specifically, there has been no attempt to decipher or categorise the various elements that may constitute frame devices in the text, or how these may differ from mere information, for example. In other words, while a full understanding of the frame package might consider the prevalence of metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases etc (as per Gamson and Modigliani's conceptualisation), such elements have been considered here in their manifest totality. Accordingly, within the full narrative terrains of each news article, relevant comments, arguments and other manifest story items have all been taken as equal frame device elements, in so much as they express the researcher's defined latent frames under analysis.

Lastly then, in terms of identifying/interpreting the latent frames, the narrative content was analysed for macro themes which were seen to explain or characterise the Carbon Tax, either as a policy in its own right or as the policy of the Gillard Labor government. To use Entman's parlance, frames were identified as instances of promoting 'a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (1993, p. 52). Or, as Gamson and Modigliani said, a frame is 'a central organising idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events... The frame suggests... the essence of the issue' (1987, p. 143).

### **Coding reliability**

While the coding approach was human coding, testing for intercoder reliability was considered not necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, the open and axial phases for organisational mentions were based entirely on precise word matching for each of the 10 organisations or their representatives (e.g. names of the organisation or spokespersons related to that entity). For the coding of latent frames during the axial phase, coding was based on direct reference to terms or synonyms specific to the identified frames, such as aligning the tax to economic benefits or economic pitfalls, or discussing the tax as either good or bad government policy. Furthermore, the coding of the media content was undertaken primarily to identify which organisations could be considered dominant frame sponsors, as the basis for further investigation during the second stage of research.

As indicated, both the quantitative content analysis and textual analysis components of Stage 1 were carried out from the first full open coding phase onwards. Full details regarding how these methods were implemented are provided in section 3.1. This also provides a coherent view of how the dualist methods and data sets worked in tandem.

## **2.4: Stage 2: Organisational Interviews**

High-level depth interviews for this study were conducted with the Climate Institute and BHP Billiton. These were significant discussions conducted with very senior executives. Both representatives had been closely involved with their organisation's campaign team at the time of the Carbon Tax study period. These teams had been responsible for deciding and implementing strategies which directly sought to influence the Federal government's policy development, once the tax was officially announced in February 2011.

As this section explains further, these final two selected cases were based on evidence of the most prominent voices, as analysed in Stage 1. This ensured the selection of cases for the study was not simply 'a matter of finding the most convenient or accessible case' (Yin 2012, p. 33).

### **Purposive sampling method for depth interviews**

The results from the content/textual analyses were used to screen potential candidates for Stage 2. Stage 1 data identified which of the 10 selected organisations were evidently most prevalent in the framing of the Carbon Tax and, accordingly, were most relevant and vital for the follow-up interviews. In order to provide the best opportunity for securing both pro and anti-Carbon Tax perspectives, it was decided to invite the most dominant two organisations from each side of the debate.

This purposive sampling (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, p. 274; Neuendorf 2002, p. 88) for the case studies found two organisations from each side were correlated most with the key media frames: BlueScope Steel and BHP Billiton on the anti-Carbon Tax side; and the Climate Institute and Australian Conservation Foundation on the pro side (full Stage 1 details and results are provided in Chapter 3). Invitations were then sent to these organisations, to targeted representatives where possible or generic email contact addresses where not, requesting interviews. Table 2.7 outlines these details and responses.

**Table 2.7:** Key organisations invited for the interview phase and their responses

| <b>Organisation</b>                             | <b>Contact approach</b>         | <b>Response</b> |
|---|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| <b>BHP Billiton</b>                             | Targeted representative emailed | Accepted        |
| <b>BlueScope Steel</b>                          | Generic address emailed         | No reply        |
| <b>Climate Institute</b>                        | Targeted representative emailed | Accepted        |
| <b>Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF)</b> | Targeted representative emailed | Declined        |

Despite repeated attempts to contact BlueScope Steel, via emails to the company contact address and phone calls to head office switchboard, identifying a suitable person to take part in the interviews were unsuccessful. This made it impossible to

send a targeted invite, which made securing participation very difficult. A representative for the ACF, on the other hand, was identified and contacted directly. However, owing to professional commitments and personal reasons, the invite for an interview was declined.

### **Interview details**

The participants were sent a brief outline of the main discussion points prior to the interview taking place. Given the time period under discussion was more than five years ago, this provided advanced time for each of them to recall campaign details as much as possible, as well as conduct any internal review if required.

They were also asked to provide any relevant supporting documents if possible. Both representatives indicated that all their publicly-available records were archived on their websites, such as media releases, speeches and research evidence. As such, any relevant artefacts from the study period were accessed and reviewed prior to each discussion. In addition, BHP provided some archived media resources related to the Carbon Tax campaign. However, much of it was from outside the study timeframe, and subsequently has only been used here when pertinent to the positions taken during February-May 2011.

**The Climate Institute interview** took place at their Sydney office in September 2016 and was conducted face-to-face with one of their executive leadership team. The representative had been part of the organisation during the time-period of this study and was central to all parts of their media strategy at that time.

**The BHP interview** took place by telephone in January 2017 and was conducted with a senior member of the corporate communications team, based in their Melbourne head office. The representative had also been part of the organisation during the 2011 time-period of this study. Although not directly involved with the government team focused on climate change communications at the time, the representative was privy to that part of their media strategy and had been in the same office throughout the daily goings-on. (To note: it was not possible to speak with anyone who had been more directly involved, as none still worked for BHP).

## **Semi-structured interview method**

The depth interviews were the most suitable method to 'go beyond' the isolated media variables (Berger 2014, p. 159), by examining the media strategy/narrative campaign of each organisation (as much as possible) at the time. A semi-structured approach was adopted, utilising a formal list of pre-determined base-line questions but sufficiently open enough for a "conversational" and flexible discussion, allowing for follow-up questions and new ideas to emerge during the interview (Berger 2014; Brennen 2013).

This enabled the discussion to focus specifically on the organisation's media response to the Carbon Tax's announcement in early 2011, and to probe for particular aspects of that strategy. However, it also allowed the order and direction of the base-line questions to unfold organically during the interview, based on the interviewee's responses and lead. Most importantly, a semi-structured interview meant each of the case discussions evolved as relevant to each organisation *and* as pertinent and meaningful to each of the interviewees.

Each interview was digitally recorded with permission from the participant. These were later fully transcribed and used for an interpretive/textual analysis. As well as this, brief researcher notes were taken during the interviews, to record key points as they emerged and also enable specific events and issues to be revisited as needed. Pertinent documents and/or findings from the Stage 1 data were also introduced during the interviews, so that the strategy behind specific media content (i.e. identified frames, media releases, third-party resources etc) could be interrogated, as much as possible.

It must be noted that, in terms of some events and issues, two key challenges arose. Firstly, a few questions were declined as being too commercially sensitive or confidential, for example regarding the campaign budget for BHP. Secondly, some questions related to issues where the participant's memory had become vague, or indeed constituted things they weren't involved with or experiences that could not be recalled at all. In such cases, these responses were accepted at face value and no attempt was made to insist on or draw-out a possibly false recollection.

## **Textual analysis of interviews for final case studies**

Just as with the textual analysis of media frames (see Section 2.3), the interview analysis looked for any consistent patterns in the transcript data, especially in terms of important insights and information, key concepts, patterns and themes, as well as interesting experiences (Brennen 2013, p. 38). Specifically, the transcript data was interrogated to assess the *processes* used by the organisations in their Carbon Tax campaign strategies (e.g. messaging focus, media relations tactics, resources marshalled). In particular, this evidence has been used to determine if those processes were similar or differed demonstrably between pro and anti-Carbon Tax (i.e. non-profit and corporate) organisations.

Furthermore, the Stage 2 textual analysis of interview data was based on and synthesised with the Stage 1 findings. As outlined earlier (see Section 2.2), the final case study analyses triangulated the multiple data sets, and has sought to understand *how* each strategy contributed to a successful campaign, or not. This evaluation was based on the strategies identified in the interviews, coupled with the evidence of dominant frames identified in the content/textual analyses.

## **Ethics**

This research received Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approval from the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) in July 2013, valid for 5 years:

UTS HREC Ref no. 2013000184.

Accordingly, ethics approval was granted prior to interview fieldwork starting, in line with the requirements of the host institution (UTS). In accordance with that ethics clearance, each participant was invited to take part voluntarily and provided with an information sheet detailing the purpose of the study, what their participation would entail, as well as their rights to anonymity and to withdraw at any time. Each respondent also signed a consent form prior to the commencement of the interviews and were given the lead to set a time and place convenient for them.


Of greatest concern to this study was the potential for professional harm, in terms of confidential commercial information being shared or revealed by this thesis. Details related to the respective Carbon Tax campaigns of each organisation could be

politically or commercially damaging, to the organisations and/or the careers of the individual participants. To address these concerns, de-identification was offered to both participants and the interviews were conducted with sensitivity and respect for any issues or events either participant felt had to be treated with care or declined to answer. Furthermore, great care has been taken not to disclose or suggest the identities of the interviewees, by masking not only each respondent's name but also their specific title and also their gender.

## 2.5: Secondary Fieldwork: The Lowy Poll and public *context* in Australia

The Lowy Poll provides a proxy for locating this research in context. As a highly respected annual survey in Australia and one which included questions directly related to this study, the Lowy Poll was considered the most appropriate secondary data for this purpose. As an indicator of the broader social attitudes that surrounded the lead up to and introduction of the Carbon Tax, this secondary data further helps validate the findings, by placing the conclusions and interpretations 'within the relevant historical, cultural, political and/or economic contexts', as a 'central part of the interpretive process' (Brennen 2013, p. 22).

**Figure 2.4:** Lowy Institute polling, 2007-2011 (The Lowy Institute 2012)



Public support for action on climate change in general dropped significantly in public polls by the Lowy Institute, between 2007 and 2011, as shown in Figure 2.4. This period spans the years from Kevin Rudd's election in 2007, with a clear promise to tackle climate change, to his Government's decision to scrap its proposed emissions trading scheme in April 2010 (known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, or CPRS), through to his replacement by Julia Gillard as PM later that year and her announcement of a tax on carbon in February 2011.

As Figure 2.4 shows, only 46% of Australian residents felt tackling climate change was "very important" in early 2011 (polling took place during March-April). This was down from the 75% highpoint in 2007, when the Labor Party came to power under Kevin Rudd (a fall of 29%). This Lowy Poll trend confirms how Australia was no less immune to a declining public engagement with climate change in countries like Sweden and around the world, post Copenhagen 2009 (Anshelm & Hultman 2015).

After the failures of the COP15 Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, there can be little doubt that public appetite and enthusiasm for "tackling climate change" – as the Lowy question asks – faded dramatically. In Australia, such a paucity of public concern and interest in addressing 'the greatest environmental challenge of our time' (Olausson & Berglez 2014, p. 139), provides a background to the Carbon Tax which, at the very least, can be seen to have offered fertile ground for the naysayers. These results are offered here to acknowledge how, in this context, it is possible that journalists were more pre-disposed to negative views than positive ones, regarding the tax. However, while this could be seen as affecting the volume of contested frames in the coverage – and as we shall see, anti-tax content was much more prevalent than pro-tax content – it does not impact the central focus of this thesis, which is concerned with identifying the processes used by organisations towards successful dissemination of frames.

As well as context, further results from the 2012 Lowy Poll, coming soon after the research period of this study, are also provided later in the conclusions section (Chapter 4). As an indicator of how the media framing specifically of the Carbon Tax potentially impacted on public perceptions, the 2012 results are offered as supporting evidence for the analysis and conclusions reached.

# Chapter 3: Findings

## **Sponsorship strategies and processes that framed the Carbon Tax**

The major findings of this study are presented in the following sections of this Chapter. Results from the open and axial coding are discussed (Section 3.1), to highlight how the content/textual analyses of organisational mentions and manifest frame devices produced correspondences between key latent frames and organisational voices. Section 3.2 then examines more closely the evidence of sponsored frames within the media narratives, arising from the final selective coding phase. These content findings, regarding dominant manifest and latent frames, are then integrated with findings from the interviews with the Climate Institute and BHP Billiton, to evaluate how specific sponsor objectives and strategic initiatives were directly or indirectly associated with narrative outcomes and media frames related to the Carbon Tax. Lastly, section 3.4 provides summaries of the two comparative case studies, to explain how the strategies were similar and how they differed, especially in terms of campaign success factors.

### **3.1: Correspondence between Carbon Tax Frames and Organisational ‘Presence’**

Systematic analyses of the media content during Stage 1 revealed that negative corporate voices dominated the Carbon Tax reporting throughout the period studied, particularly those of BlueScope Steel and BHP Billiton. The Climate Institute, conversely, was virtually alone as the voice arguing in favour of the tax. Within those contested narratives, key frame patterns (both manifest and latent) revealed four main themes in the Carbon Tax debate: the economy, the government and its policy, the environment, and the wider social reactions.

## Open coding of media reporting

As indicated in Section 2.3, initial immersions in the message pool (sample units) identified 10 organisations on which to focus because they were prominent in the news stories – five corporations and five non-profit organisations. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the total number of mentions per month for each of these 10, identified during the initial content analysis. Article mentions were all coded as separate citations, regardless of whether they appeared in the same article or not.

**Table 3.8:** Total mentions of corporate organisations across all 271 articles

| <b>Publication Month</b> | <b>February<br/>2011</b> | <b>March<br/>2011</b> | <b>April<br/>2011</b> | <b>May<br/>2011</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| <b>Corporates</b>        |                          |                       |                       |                     |              |
| <b>BCA</b>               | 2                        | 2                     | 16                    | 1                   | <b>21</b>    |
| <b>BHP</b>               | 4                        | 7                     | 26                    | 8                   | <b>45</b>    |
| <b>BlueScope</b>         | 9                        | 28                    | 32                    | 4                   | <b>73</b>    |
| <b>Origin</b>            | 1                        | 0                     | 5                     | 1                   | <b>7</b>     |
| <b>Rio Tinto</b>         | 1                        | 15                    | 16                    | 3                   | <b>35</b>    |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>17</b>                | <b>52</b>             | <b>95</b>             | <b>17</b>           | <b>181</b>   |

**Table 3.9:** Total mentions of non-profit organisations across all 271 articles

| <b>Publication Month</b>    | <b>February<br/>2011</b> | <b>March<br/>2011</b> | <b>April<br/>2011</b> | <b>May<br/>2011</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| <b>Non-Profits</b>          |                          |                       |                       |                     |              |
| <b>ACF</b>                  | 1                        | 8                     | 2                     | 1                   | <b>12</b>    |
| <b>Clean Energy Council</b> | 0                        | 0                     | 3                     | 3                   | <b>6</b>     |
| <b>Climate Inst.</b>        | 4                        | 11                    | 14                    | 2                   | <b>31</b>    |
| <b>Greenpeace</b>           | 0                        | 1                     | 0                     | 1                   | <b>2</b>     |
| <b>WWF</b>                  | 2                        | 2                     | 0                     | 0                   | <b>4</b>     |
| <b>Total</b>                | <b>7</b>                 | <b>22</b>             | <b>19</b>             | <b>7</b>            | <b>55</b>    |

This initial data provided some interesting first glimpses of how the debate had unfolded in the four newspapers under study. Firstly, it was notable that corporate voices apparently enjoyed much more coverage than non-profit voices, with 181 total citations compared to only 55. Secondly, it was noticeable that BHP Billiton and BlueScope Steel were highly dominant voices on the corporate side (45 and 73 total citations respectively), as were the Australian Conservation Foundation (12 citations) and the Climate Institute (31 citations) on the non-profit side.

### Four macro contested frame themes

During the concurrent textual analysis of the first open coding, four *latent* framing themes also became most evident in the articles, as supportive and oppositional sides of the debate (i.e. the four main contested issues, prevalent as story content). On the one hand, the manifest comments of pro-advocates tended to focus on whether the tax was of environmental or economic benefit, and/or whether it was evidence of good government or good government policy, and/or if it enjoyed widespread support. Conversely, opposing advocates tended to offer the obverse of those arguments.

Again, this first textual step in the open coding satisfied the quantitative requirement of establishing categories 'a priori', before measuring these frames in the message pool (Neuendorf 2002, p. 11). Table 3.10 illustrates these binary latent frame pairs.

**Table 3.10:** Macro pro and anti-Carbon Tax frame themes identified in the open coding

| Pro-Carbon Tax Frames           | Anti-Carbon Tax Frames         |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| "Environmental benefit"         | "No environmental benefit"     |
| "Economic benefit"              | "Economic vandalism"           |
| "Good Government and/or Policy" | "Bad Government and/or Policy" |
| "Widespread support for tax"    | "Widespread opposition to tax" |

It should be noted that, since the objective was to examine specifically how the various organisations were implicated in the dissemination of opposition and/or

support for the tax, only pro or anti frames were coded for analysis. In other words, another study may have also identified ‘neutral’ frames, for example, had such a perspective been important.

Before proceeding to the axial coding, a keyword scan was undertaken for an initial glimpse of frame dominance and correspondence. While the open coding had identified four, binary pro/anti frame themes, it appeared that the debate was mostly between economic and environmental issues. As such, it was useful to see if there were any correspondences between either of those two macro frames and the wider issue of climate change, and how those three themes were associated with the Carbon Tax specifically. Using a broad-context keyword search in NVivo, the full 271 articles were scanned separately for four keywords:

1. carbon tax
2. climate change
3. environment or environmental
4. economy or economic

**Table 3.11:** NVivo keyword test 1: Environment/Economic correspondence with Climate Change

| <b>Keyword</b> | <b>A: Economy or Economic</b> | <b>B: Environment or Environmental</b> |
|----------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Climate change | 61 references                 | 25 references                          |

**NVivo query details:**

1. Conducted matrix query which compares 'overlaps' in articles based on 'broad context' search between "climate change" and 2 other keyword frames
2. References between rows and columns were compared using "AND" search criteria, to show article texts where BOTH keywords existed (i.e. concurrence in the textual frame)
3. The results highlighted how the frame of "climate change" is more often related to "economy/economic" (61 refs) than "environment/al" (25 refs), within the full article set

These four keyword nodes were then queried (using matrix coding) to see how often “climate change” was correlated with either “environment/environmental” or “economy/economic” in each story. A second query was used to then correlate

those three themes with “carbon tax”. As Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show, both of these tests provided the first signs that ‘economic’ framing held story dominance, which subsequently informed the axial coding for frame devices and latent meanings.

**Table 3.12:** NVivo keyword test 2: Climate Change/Environment/Economic correspondence with Carbon Tax

| <b>Keyword</b> | <b>A: Climate Change</b> | <b>B: Environment or Environmental</b> | <b>C: Economy or Economic</b> |
|----------------|--------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Carbon Tax     | 121 references           | 28 references                          | 62 references                 |

**NVivo query details:**

1. Conducted matrix query which compares 'overlaps' in articles based on 'broad context' search between "carbon tax" and 3 other keyword frames
2. References between rows and columns were compared using "AND" search criteria, to show article texts where BOTH keywords existed (i.e. concurrence in the textual frame)
3. The results highlighted how the frame of "carbon tax" is more often related to "climate change" (121 common references) and "economy/economic" (62 refs) than "environment/al" (28 refs), in the full article set

### **Axial coding of media reporting**

The axial coding was designed to explore more deeply the key frames in the media reporting, to identify sponsorship linkages and/or message patterns in the narratives. To do this, the full text of articles related to all organisations studied (i.e. articles in which any of the 10 organisations had been cited/quoted) were aggregated. This new node consisted of the total organisational-relevant articles, which numbered 76 out of the initial 271 articles in the message pool. This article subset refined the units of analysis for the axial coding focused on framing analysis and was selected for two main reasons:

1. The objective of the textual analysis was specifically to examine any correspondence between organisations and frames; and

2. The analysis of frames was specifically focused on pro and anti-Carbon Tax sides of the debate, in order to evaluate how each argument was able or unable to gain dominance.

Accordingly, it made sense to focus on the frames evident in those articles where the organisations were cited. Not only did this enable a focus on frames which were specifically ‘organisation relevant’ – i.e. potentially or directly influenced by the organisation and/or its representatives, or by other supporting actors – but also because this was where the various vested interests or agendas of those organisations could be most seen to overlap and/or compete.

Table 3.13 shows each newspaper’s share of the final 76 articles used for the axial phase. From this data, one key point is notable: in terms of organisational voices, *The Australian* was a very dominant media channel, carrying more than half (43) of the articles where the key organisations were cited. This compared to just 18 articles for *The Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH) and less than 10 for each of the tabloid papers. (NOTE: All references to articles in *The Australian* also includes any articles from the Saturday edition, *The Weekend Australian*)

**Table 3.13:** Newspaper share of final 76 organisational-relevant articles

| Publication Month<br>Newspaper | February<br>2011 | March<br>2011 | April<br>2011 | May<br>2011 | Total     |
|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|
| <b>The Australian</b>          | 4                | 17            | 15            | 7           | <b>43</b> |
| <b>Daily Telegraph</b>         | 2                | 5             | 0             | 1           | <b>8</b>  |
| <b>Herald Sun</b>              | 3                | 3             | 1             | 0           | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>The SMH</b>                 | 1                | 5             | 10            | 2           | <b>18</b> |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>10</b>        | <b>30</b>     | <b>26</b>     | <b>10</b>   | <b>76</b> |

The axial review of the 76 organisational-relevant newspaper articles was conducted using the eight broad macro frame codes indicated earlier in Table 3.10 (four binary pro- and anti-Carbon Tax latent frames). Each article was examined for one or more of those frames, both as express comments (manifest) or key themes

(latent) evident within the text. The coded sections (e.g. a sentence, or paragraph) typically fitted neatly into a single coding node. However, some were occasionally more ambiguous or were seen to carry multiple frames; in those instances, the content was coded at two or more relevant nodes (see Table 3.15 for counts of single or multiple coded frames). Headlines for each of these articles were also coded either pro or anti, when relevant – though in the end these nodes were not used in the analysis. As part of this second phase, evidence of *co-opted support* for either pro or anti positions was also coded as a new separate node.

The following Table 3.14 shows total counts for all the key frames for both pro- and anti-Carbon Tax positions.

**Table 3.14:** Total counts of pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames identified in the axial coding

| <b>Pro-Carbon Tax frames</b>     | <b>Total mentions in the 76 organisational-relevant articles:</b> |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Pro-Carbon Tax headlines         | 15  |
| Economic benefit                 | 20  |
| Good government or policy        | 18  |
| Environmental benefit            | 7   |
| Widespread support               | 7   |
| Co-opted support for pro-frames  | 33  |
| <b>Anti-Carbon Tax frames</b>    |   |
| Anti-Carbon Tax headlines        | 41  |
| Economic vandalism               | 74  |
| Bad government or policy         | 50  |
| No environmental benefit         | 5   |
| Widespread opposition            | 18  |
| Co-opted support for anti-frames | 61  |

**Table 3.15:** Reference coding for pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames – single and multiple counts

| <b>Pro-Carbon Tax frames</b>   | Economic benefit   | Good govt or policy | Environmental benefit    | Widespread 'social' support  | Co-opted support for pro orgs  |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Economic benefit               | 20                 | 2                   | 1                        | 0                            | 4                              |
| Good govt or policy            | 2                  | 18                  | 2                        | 0                            | 2                              |
| Environmental benefit          | 1                  | 2                   | 7                        | 1                            | 0                              |
| Widespread 'social' support    | 0                  | 0                   | 1                        | 7                            | 0                              |
| Co-opted support for pro orgs  | 4                  | 2                   | 0                        | 0                            | 33                             |
| <b>Anti-Carbon Tax frames</b>  | Economic vandalism | Bad govt or policy  | No environmental benefit | Widespread social opposition | Co-opted support for anti orgs |
| Economic vandalism             | 74                 | 4                   | 2                        | 0                            | 4                              |
| Bad govt or policy             | 4                  | 50                  | 1                        | 0                            | 3                              |
| No environmental benefit       | 2                  | 1                   | 5                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| Widespread social opposition   | 0                  | 0                   | 0                        | 18                           | 2                              |
| Co-opted support for anti orgs | 4                  | 3                   | 0                        | 2                            | 61                             |

Co-opted support mostly included economic details (such as costs and earnings), or industry sector figures (e.g. total employment details), or research statistics (e.g. public opinion polls). Support was identified as coming from a third-party, including

instances which were not directly attributable to any of the 10 key organisations under study, or which appeared to have been recruited by the organisation (e.g. commissioned research, joint announcements with politicians or experts, etcetera). While this new node was not established initially, its relevance and importance became apparent as part of the ongoing refinements that were made during the course of the research (Altheide & Schneider 2013; Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000). Since the new category was also established before the axial pass began, its inclusion still conformed to an *a priori* design.

Again, as with the open coding, this second review of the data also indicated that the debate was heavily skewed towards the anti-Carbon Tax side of the story. In particular, this axial data appeared to confirm that the debate centred on economic and government policy frames, at the expense of environmental frames. However, as mentioned previously, some of these frames were coded more than once, due to ambiguity or clear multiple frames in the same content.

Table 3.15 shows how the vast majority of the reference counts (highlighted) were coded as distinct single frames, while some were coded as one or more other frames or co-opted support. For example, of the 20 'economic benefit' frame references, only two of them were also coded as 'good govt or policy' and one instance was also coded as 'environmental benefit'. Similarly, four of the economic benefit frames were found to coincide with content showing 'co-opted support' for pro-Carbon Tax positions.

Examples to illustrate the key macro frames identified in Table 3.14 – narratives with economic, government, popular sentiment or environmental themes – are provided below. These are outlined as binary pro and anti-Carbon Tax sets. (NOTE: in all of the following quotes, capitalisation of the first word indicates the opening sentence of that particular news story. Also, **bold emphasis** has been added to highlight the relevant textual frames, identified as manifest frame devices carrying the latent frame meanings)

### **Economic frames: Latent meanings of “Vandalism” or “Benefit”**

Economic frames coalesced around two key themes: whether or not the tax represented an economic threat or opportunity in Australia. In particular, the Carbon

Tax was likened to a wrecking ball that would smash Australia's economy and disadvantage our largest industries against overseas competition:

AUSTRALIA'S biggest energy **companies would be put out of business** if they had to pay the world price for carbon emissions under a carbon tax. (*The Australian*, February 2011)

AUSTRALIA'S powerful business lobby has attacked the lack of detail in the Gillard Government's carbon tax plan, while **warning it threatens jobs and will fuel uncertainty**. (*Herald Sun*, February 2011)

Meanwhile, Andrew Reitzer, the chief executive of Metcash, said he was unsure of the wisdom of pricing carbon. "We have a two-speed economy with the resources going hell for leather and everyone else finding it tough, and **this is just going to make industries like ourselves worse**." (*The SMH*, March 2011)

POLITICIANS and big business have been outspoken about the Gillard government's plans to introduce a carbon price amid conjecture that **it may drive up energy costs and kill off some enterprises**. Now small-business owners want to be heard. (*The Australian*, March 2011)

This economic concern wasn't entirely limited to corporate voices:

Australian Workers Union national secretary Paul Howes has already **warned the government that the union will withdraw support if "one job" is lost** as a result of the carbon tax. (*The Australian*, May 2011)

Another negative economic angle was the tax's potential to blow out the cost of living, shifting the negative effects away from business and on to households:

Australian National University climate change economics expert Dr Frank Jotzo said **the Gillard Government must quickly establish compensation schemes for households, or the scheme will be doomed**...The Government conceded bills would rise but pledged to pump revenue from the carbon tax into household compensation and industry assistance.

National Seniors chief executive Michael O'Neill said **older Australians were already struggling with basic living costs**.

“We fear that by introducing a carbon price we open Pandora's box,” he said.  
(*Herald Sun*, February 2011)

STRUGGLING families will be compensated with cash for rising energy costs when the Federal Government imposes a carbon tax on Australians from July 1 next year. But **most households won't be able to escape Prime Minister Julia Gillard's new emissions trading scheme, with forecasts that it will push power bills higher** by between \$300 and \$500 a year. (*Daily Telegraph*, February 2011)

On the pro-Carbon Tax side, economic frames typically presented the new regulation as a business opportunity, whether in terms of new markets, new jobs or new investment gains:

And a report by the Climate Institute predicts **Victoria could gain 6800 clean-energy power sector jobs** under a carbon price. (*Herald Sun*, February 2011)

With the government planning to introduce a carbon tax from July 1 next year, **there is a real opportunity for proactive ICT companies to be first to market** with solutions capable of monitoring and reporting carbon usage to ease the load for business. (*The Australian*, March 2011)

In a report released in February, Mercer says technology designed to achieve a low-carbon transformation is **creating a big investment opportunity for super funds**. As much as \$5 trillion could be invested in such technology worldwide by 2030.

The technology includes energy efficiency, renewable energy, biofuels, nuclear and carbon capture and storage. (*The SMH*, April 2011)

Another pro-angle was the potential economic costs of ‘inaction’ on climate change:

But the cost of action must always be referenced against the cost of inaction. If you accept **the findings of the vast majority of climate scientists, climate change will impose increasing direct costs** from rising sea levels and more droughts and catastrophic weather events. (*The SMH*, May 2011)

## **Government/Policy frames: Latent meanings of “Bad” or “Good” government and/or policy**

Government and Policy frames also coalesced around two key themes: whether or not the tax represented good or bad policy, and by extension whether the Gillard Government was a good or bad administration.

On the anti-Carbon Tax side, these frames tended to emphasise how the new tax was either unworkable or would do nothing to achieve its carbon abatement goals. Another associated frame focused on how Australia’s response was ‘out of step’ with overseas actions, and again this would do nothing to stop emissions on a global scale. In many respects, there was some overlap in these frames with the ‘economic’ frames; however, what made these frames different was the pointed responsibility attached to either Julia Gillard, the government and/or policy advisors.

**JULIA Gillard faces months of opposition and lobby group attacks as her government works on details of its carbon strategy**, with its effects on petrol prices yesterday sparking a public row over her closed-door negotiations with the Greens and independents. (*The Australian*, February 2011)

The production of coal -- and **subsequent emissions -- would just be shifted elsewhere. Which nevertheless captures precisely the sheer pointlessness** of what the government is proposing. (*Herald Sun*, March 2011)

CLIMATE change **adviser Ross Garnaut is under attack from both business and environmentalists over his latest paper**, which recommends a carbon tax start from July 1 next year at a fixed price of between \$20 and \$30. (*The Australian*, March 2011)

Mr Bradley wrote to Ms Gillard last week, saying it was “disappointing” that the government was already determining the allocation of revenues it expected to generate from a carbon price **without first resolving critical design details**. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

On the pro side, good government/policy frames presented the tax as necessary to address climate change, and the right decision ‘in principle’:

Mining giant BHP and **big energy players welcomed the move**. (*Daily Telegraph*, February 2011)

To be clear, the Productivity Commission endorses Labor's rationalist rhetoric that **putting a price on carbon emissions -- through a tax or an ETS -- is the least costly way to reduce them**. It will not back the Coalition's "direct action" alternative. (*The Australian*, March 2011)

Mr King said **both sides of politics were saying Australia should reduce carbon emissions**, so the issue was not whether to do something, but how to do it. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

THE Coalition is struggling to win business support for its climate plan, after **no company chiefs signed up to spruik it as a better way to cut carbon dioxide emissions than a carbon tax**. (*The SMH*, April 2011)

Large enterprises including Qantas, BHP Billiton and other mining and energy companies **have backed a carbon price as the best way to cut emissions**, though many have expressed concern about the scheme's design. (*The SMH*, April 2011)

### **Popular sentiment frames: Latent meanings of "Widespread opposition" or "Widespread support"**

These macro frames argued whether or not the Carbon Tax enjoyed widespread support or opposition, whether by the general community, business leaders, politicians or any other vested interest. On the anti-Carbon Tax side, these frames tended to emphasise how support was low, falling or non-existent, OR that opposition was high and/or rising. In particular, this was associated with opposition to the PM Julia Gillard and/or the government, more than the tax itself.

**Ms Gillard is facing opposition** to her plans for a price on carbon. **Polls show that only a third of people support it**. (*Daily Telegraph*, March 2011)

**The Gillard government faces rising opposition** to its carbon-pricing strategy, as industries and unions lobby hard for more exclusions, higher levels of compensation and stronger links to international action on climate change than under the dumped carbon pollution reduction scheme. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

The omens are now unmistakable -- **the government's effort to price carbon is a policy that is losing support in the community, within industry, inside the trade union movement and silently within the Labor Party.** (*The Australian*, April 2011)

Yesterday, **amid a growing backlash from unions and the business community over the carbon tax**, senior federal ministers, including Infrastructure Minister Anthony Albanese, played down the latest opinion poll, which put Labor's standing at its lowest in 15 years. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

Another angle also framed this opposition as based on a falling concern with “what used to be called global warming”:

But it's clear the broader community and business scepticism about Canberra's logic is far greater than it was in 2009 and even than when Kevin Rudd (partly at Gillard's urging) walked away from his plan for a carbon pollution reduction scheme last year.

A combination of the lack of any international agreement and the return of floods, as opposed to drought, **have weakened general support for the notion that Australia needs to take immediate action** to avoid what used to be called global warming. (*The Australian*, March 2011)

On the pro-Carbon Tax side, frames were mostly focused on Australians wanting the government to “get on with it”:

**Australians apparently expect the government to fix the problem** without any change to the way they live - both an irrational and an impossible demand. To those holding this irrational position, though, Tony Abbott's equally irrational policy on climate change may well appear to make sense. (*The SMH*, March 2011)

WHAT'S startling about the carbon price debate is how **a big group of industrial and even mining companies want Australia to get on with it** and start putting a price on carbon emissions. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

### **Environmental frames: Latent meanings of “No effect” or “Effective” environmental benefit**

These macro frames argued whether or not the Carbon Tax would actually achieve carbon abatement and, in turn, whether or not there would be some effective

benefit or no benefit to the environment. On the anti-Carbon Tax side, the frames mostly coalesced around the argument that Australia going it alone was “not in Australia’s interests” and would ultimately have no impact whatsoever on global greenhouse emissions:

Steel makers have also signalled they will be asking for more, with a BlueScope Steel spokesman highlighting the competitive threat of low-cost Asian producers. **“It is not in Australia's interests - economic or environmental - to force domestic industries to shut down or curtail production, only to see that production replaced by higher-emission overseas production,”** the spokesman said. (*The SMH*, February 2011)

Bradley came close, very close, to actually stating that **the proposed 5 per cent cut in emissions would be utterly pointless in “environmental terms”**. It would lead to a cut in global emissions of all of 0.075 per cent, over a period when China alone would increase global emissions by hundreds of times that if not thousands of times. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

On the pro-Carbon Tax side, the frames tended to reassert the link between climate change and greenhouse emissions, but also to assert that Australia was a major contributor to the problem:

AUSTRALIA is the **fastest-growing emitter of greenhouse gases in the world**, according to a submission from the Climate Institute to the Federal Government's climate change committee.

The amount of carbon equivalent pollution produced by every Australian is now more than 20 times that of a person in India or China. (*Daily Telegraph*, March 2011)

The sustainability manager at Linfox, David McInnes, said **the company accepted that carbon emissions cause global warming and climate change.**

“We have accepted establishing a price on carbon is an important long-term reform that will improve our energy efficiency and drive low-carbon innovation, benefiting the economy and the environment.” (*The SMH*, April 2011)

Mr du Plessis said Rio believed **there was enough scientific evidence to draw a “very clear link” between carbon emissions and global warming.** He said Ms Gillard was making a brave stand trying to tackling the issue after the failure of the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen. (*The Australian*, April 2011)

## Axial coding analysis: Correspondence between frames and organisations

For the second part of the axial phase, these frame positions were then examined for correspondence with organisational citations and quotes.

**Table 3.16:** Total correspondences between corporate mentions and anti-Carbon Tax frames

| <b>Anti-Carbon Tax frames</b>    | Economic vandalism | Bad govt or policy | No environmental benefit | Widespread social opposition | Co-opted support for anti orgs |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Corporates</b>                |                    |                    |                          |                              |                                |
| <b>1: BHP</b>                    | 8                  | 3                  | 0                        | 3                            | 4                              |
| BHP people direct quotes         | 2                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| BHP people indirect citations    | 5                  | 2                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| <b>2: BCA</b>                    | 2                  | 2                  | 0                        | 1                            | 2                              |
| BCA people direct quotes         | 2                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| BCA people indirect citations    | 5                  | 4                  | 1                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| <b>3: BlueScope Steel (BSS)</b>  | 16                 | 12                 | 1                        | 1                            | 9                              |
| BSS people direct quotes         | 4                  | 5                  | 0                        | 0                            | 2                              |
| BSS people indirect citations    | 10                 | 5                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| <b>4: Rio Tinto (RT)</b>         | 5                  | 2                  | 0                        | 2                            | 6                              |
| RT people direct quotes          | 3                  | 2                  | 0                        | 0                            | 1                              |
| RT people indirect citations     | 1                  | 2                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| <b>5: Origin</b>                 | 0                  | 1                  | 0                        | 0                            | 1                              |
| Origin people direct quotes      | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |
| Origin people indirect citations | 0                  | 1                  | 0                        | 0                            | 0                              |

**Table 3.17:** Total correspondences between non-profit mentions and anti-Carbon Tax frames

| <b>Anti-Carbon Tax frames</b>        | Economic vandalism | Bad govt or policy | No environmental benefit | Widespread 'social' opposition | Co-opted support for anti orgs |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Non-Profits</b>                   |                    |                    |                          |                                |                                |
| <b>1: ACF</b>                        | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| ACF people direct quotes             | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| ACF people indirect citations        | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| <b>2: Clean Energy Council (CEC)</b> | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| CEC people direct quotes             | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| CEC people indirect citations        | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| <b>3: Climate Institute (CI)</b>     | 0                  | 1                  | 0                        | 0                              | 1                              |
| CI people direct quotes              | 0                  | 1                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| CI people indirect citations         | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| <b>4: Greenpeace (GP)</b>            | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| GP people direct quotes              | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| GP people indirect citations         | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| <b>5: WWF</b>                        | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| WWF people direct quotes             | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |
| WWF people indirect citations        | 0                  | 0                  | 0                        | 0                              | 0                              |

**Table 3.18:** Total correspondences between corporate mentions and pro-Carbon Tax frames

| <b>Pro-Carbon Tax frames</b>     | <b>Economic benefit</b> | <b>Good govt or policy</b> | <b>Environmental benefit</b> | <b>Widespread 'social' support</b> | <b>Co-opted support for pro orgs</b> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Corporates</b>                |                         |                            |                              |                                    |                                      |
| <b>1: BHP</b>                    | 0                       | 3                          | 0                            | 1                                  | 1                                    |
| BHP people direct quotes         | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| BHP people indirect citations    | 1                       | 2                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| <b>2: BCA</b>                    | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| BCA people direct quotes         | 1                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 1                                    |
| BCA people indirect citations    | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| <b>3: BlueScope Steel</b>        | 0                       | 2                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 3                                    |
| BSS people direct quotes         | 0                       | 1                          | 1                            | 1                                  | 1                                    |
| BSS people indirect citations    | 1                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 3                                    |
| <b>4: Rio Tinto</b>              | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| RT people direct quotes          | 0                       | 0                          | 1                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| RT people indirect citations     | 0                       | 0                          | 1                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| <b>5: Origin</b>                 | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| Origin people direct quotes      | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| Origin people indirect citations | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |

**Table 3.19:** Total correspondences between non-profit mentions and pro-Carbon Tax frames

| <b>Pro-Carbon Tax frames</b>   | <b>Economic benefit</b> | <b>Good govt or policy</b> | <b>Environmental benefit</b> | <b>Widespread 'social' support</b> | <b>Co-opted support for pro orgs</b> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Non-Profits</b>             |                         |                            |                              |                                    |                                      |
| <b>1: ACF</b>                  | 1                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 1                                    |
| ACF people direct quotes       | 1                       | 0                          | 1                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| ACF people indirect citations  | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| <b>2: Clean Energy Council</b> | 2                       | 0                          | 0                            | 1                                  | 0                                    |
| CEC people direct quotes       | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| CEC people indirect citations  | 1                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| <b>3: Climate Institute</b>    | 4                       | 1                          | 1                            | 2                                  | 6                                    |
| CI people direct quotes        | 3                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 3                                    |
| CI people indirect citations   | 1                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 1                                    |
| <b>4: Greenpeace</b>           | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 1                                    |
| GP people direct quotes        | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| GP people indirect citations   | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| <b>5: WWF</b>                  | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| WWF people direct quotes       | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |
| WWF people indirect citations  | 0                       | 0                          | 0                            | 0                                  | 0                                    |

Tables 3.16 to 3.19 show these common reference counts, between organisational citations and quotes and the binary pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames. This revealed

how the various pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames and ancillary support correlated with each of the main organisations. This provided a first analytical view into the relationship between organisational presence across the 76 contested story articles and the macro latent frames within those stories.

While these tables contain many low frequency results, they are presented here in full to illustrate how the corporate anti-tax voices were so much more prolific than any of the other possible binary positions (e.g. corporate pro-tax correspondences or non-profit pro-tax correspondences).

In terms of theme clusters of three or more citations (highlighted), then, these matrix queries in NVivo clearly highlighted how the Carbon Tax story was largely dominated by anti-frames, which largely corresponded with corporate presence in the stories. Economic vandalism and bad government/policy frames were heavily related to mentions of and from BlueScope Steel, BHP, the BCA and Rio Tinto (Table 3.16).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in contrast to the widespread corporate correspondence with anti-frames, Table 3.17 starkly indicates how non-profit organisations were virtually silent in this regard. Conversely, as Table 3.18 highlights, when it came to pro-Carbon Tax frames, the correspondences with corporate activity were sparse and in contrast to the greater activity of non-profit organisations (see Table 3.19).

This second axial analysis strongly confirmed that the debate had been dominated by corporate voices, but also linked those voices to predominantly anti-Carbon Tax frames, primarily in terms of “economic vandalism” and “bad government/policy” themes. In contrast, non-profit organisations were more correlated with pro-Carbon Tax frames espousing “economic benefit”. In Table 3.20, these key contested storylines and the aggregated narrative ‘presence’ of key organisational actors (i.e. total mentions) are cross-tabulated and compared. Again, larger citation clusters are highlighted (blue for corporates, green for non-profits).

In terms of sheer volume alone, the axial data indicated two important points about how the Carbon Tax narrative emanated from organisations between February-May 2011. Firstly, the contested debate very quickly settled into “economic” and “policy” frames and, concurrently, that by and large those frames were heavily dominated by corporate voices.

However, a third point is equally salient about this early narrative debate; the fact that the *environment* was almost completely left off the agenda. As the data show (Table 3.20), while 79 of the correspondences refer to story frames around the economy (63 references for ‘economic vandalism’ and 16 ‘economic benefit’), and 54 refer to story frames around government policy (43 references ‘bad policy’ and 11 references ‘good policy’), only 7 refer to environmental frames (2 ‘no benefit’ and 5 ‘of benefit’).


**Table 3.20: Contested Narratives:** Total reference correspondences between organisations and key pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames

| <b>Key Carbon Tax frames</b>                      | Economic vandalism | Economic benefit | Bad govt or policy | Good govt or policy | No environmental benefit | Environmental benefit |
|---|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Organisations (total frame correspondence)</b> |                    |                  |                    |                     |                          |                       |
| <b>BHP</b>  | 15                 | 1                | 5                  | 6                   | 0                        | 0                     |
| <i>ACF</i>  | 0                  | 2                | 0                  | 0                   | 0                        | 1                     |
| <b>BCA</b>  | 9                  | 1                | 6                  | 0                   | 1                        | 0                     |
| <i>CEC</i>  | 0                  | 3                | 0                  | 0                   | 0                        | 0                     |
| <b>BlueScope Steel</b>                            | 30                 | 1                | 22                 | 3                   | 1                        | 1                     |
| <i>Climate Institute</i>                          | 0                  | 8                | 2                  | 1                   | 0                        | 1                     |
| <b>Rio Tinto</b>                                  | 9                  | 0                | 6                  | 1                   | 0                        | 2                     |
| <i>Greenpeace</i>                                 | 0                  | 0                | 0                  | 0                   | 0                        | 0                     |
| <b>Origin</b>                                     | 0                  | 0                | 2                  | 0                   | 0                        | 0                     |
| <i>WWF</i>  | 0                  | 0                | 0                  | 0                   | 0                        | 0                     |
| <b>Total</b>                                      | <b>63</b>          | <b>16</b>        | <b>43</b>          | <b>11</b>           | <b>2</b>                 | <b>5</b>              |

Before moving to the third and final selective coding phase in the content/textual analyses, some final quantitative views of the data help illustrate these

correspondences. Since a key aim of this study is to examine how the framing of the Carbon Tax had evolved as a contested narrative, a chronological view of the data was taken. Figures 3.5 to 3.8 show how the frame and organisational coded nodes in NVivo were cross-referenced with the full 271-article sample pool, split up by publishing month.

**Figure 3.5: Narrative Frames:** Total counts for pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames per month




These graphs illustrate how the key macro frames and organisational presence within the stories mapped-out across the study months of early 2011. Once again, Figure 3.5 clearly illustrates how the debate was dominated by both *economic vandalism* and *bad government or policy* frames. Together, these two macro narrative frames accounted for more than half of the coded media commentary

during the three months (mid-February to mid-May). On the pro-Carbon Tax side, *good government or policy* and *economic benefit* frames were the most prevalent, but struggled to compete with their obverse negative arguments, at least in terms of media volume.


It is also evident that much of the activity took place during the months of March and April 2011 (although this also has to do with February and May being short months in the study period).

In terms of the 10 organisations included for the study, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 further illustrate how the debate was dominated by corporate voices and viewpoints. This is particularly so for BHP and BlueScope Steel, who together accounted for more than half of the coded media commentary related to corporate positions. Conversely, the pro-Carbon Tax non-profit organisations clearly struggled to compete with their corporate counterparts for presence, again at least in terms of media volume.


**Figure 3.6: Corporate Presence:** Total mentions for corporate organisations per month (including direct and indirect citations)



**Figure 3.7: Non-Profit Presence:** Total mentions for non-profit organisations per month (including direct and indirect citations)



**Figure 3.8: Contested Narratives:** Total correspondences between key organisations and key pro and anti-Carbon Tax frames



Finally, when coded references for the two most prevalent corporate and non-profit organisations are compared with the four binary ‘economic’ and ‘government/policy’ frames (see Figure 3.8), the potential for a direct relationship to exist between organisational voices and Carbon Tax framing becomes even clearer. A spike in media citations for both BHP and BlueScope Steel during March and April is matched by media articles carrying more ‘economic vandalism’ and ‘bad government/policy’ frames. Similarly, an increase in media citations for ACF and especially the Climate Institute also correlate to higher incidences of the ‘economic benefit’ and ‘good government/policy’ frames in media articles.

Together, all these organisational and frame correspondences analysed during the axial coding strongly indicated that the two key themes of ‘economic’ and ‘government policy’ most warranted further examination in the third and final selective coding pass, and also in the follow-up depth interviews. Accordingly, the final coding pass through the data was used to not only represent the key frame themes indicated by the axial coding, but also to undertake a renewed textual analysis of those frames. Through this final selective coding phase, the analysis draws on both the quantitative and qualitative data to ensure frequency is not unduly equated with significance (Berger 2014; Hansen & Machin 2013), to show how those frames best served corporate agendas.

### **Selective coding of media reporting**

Before completing the third selective coding phase, any multiple-referenced text was assigned to an appropriate single frame (see Table 3.15 for counts of duplicate frame references). If making this choice wasn’t possible, such references were not used in the final analysis. Occasionally, a selected text was also reassigned. This either-or selective approach was done to ensure the final and ultimate analysis of correspondences between frames and organisations didn’t suffer unnecessarily from ambiguity. For example, some quotes that were coded as both economic vandalism and bad policy were assigned to just one of those frames, while some quotes that were previously coded as one frame were reassigned to another frame, when deemed more appropriate. However, it is acknowledged that another

researcher may have reassigned such duplicate frame content differently (as indeed they may have done with any of the frames).

This final phase provides examples of organisational presence within the stories, such as direct and indirect citations. It also includes instances coded as co-opted support (see Tables 3.16 to 3.19), whereby third-party findings, expertise or solidarity were utilised to support pro or anti-Carbon Tax arguments (e.g. co-opted support variously supported 'economic vandalism' frames, or 'economic benefit' frames, or 'widespread opposition' frames etcetera).

However, most importantly, key references were mostly selected here (i.e. taken from references cited in Table 3.20 and illustrated in Figure 3.8) to show the associations between key frames and organisational voices, and how those debates evolved as a narrative contest. This higher-level, selective coding analysis is provided in the following summary (section 3.2) of key findings from the Stage 1 content/textual analyses.

### **3.2: Contesting the Carbon Tax, Part 1: Key frames in organisational media narratives**

As the data throughout this chapter have so far shown, media narratives regarding the Carbon Tax pitted corporate voices against non-profit voices. In the main, those narratives were dominated by 'economic' themes, from both supportive and oppositional perspectives. The following analysis considers this framing contest and how it unfolded chronologically. This provides a more comprehensive view of the narrative patterns which emanated from organisations supporting and opposing the Carbon Tax, before a more concise and succinct examination of sponsorship activity is provided in the second half of this section. The purpose of this substantive consideration of media quotes, from the selective analysis, is to highlight how the debate unfolded as a contested narrative and also how the key macro latent frames emerged within broader story contexts. In this way, the research avoids focusing on narrow, single keyword examples of frame devices, to illustrate instead how latent frame meanings emerge within overlapping and competing cultural narrative terrains.

To confirm, as a final further analysis of the data, key quotes from organisation actors have been selected to illustrate both the pro and anti-Carbon Tax sides of the debate, and how particular key frames correlate with key organisational voices. In line with the methods and purposes of this research, these final quotes support the objective here (Frey, Botan & Kreps 2000, p. 229), which is to examine how some media frames were influenced and/or propagated by external, source organisations or, in other words, by sponsors.

### **Selective coding analysis: A chronological walk through organisational narratives as they developed**

#### **14-28 February 2011:**

After the Carbon Tax story first appeared over 11-12 February 2011, the first notable organisational responses appeared in *The Australian* on February 14. The story was authored by Dennis Shanahan, who had co-written the *Weekend Australian* exclusive on February 12 and was a prominent 'anti-Carbon Tax' journalist. The first *Sydney Morning Herald* article to include relevant organisational voices then appeared on February 19.

These first two articles have been cited here largely in full, for three main reasons. First, the dominant *economic* macro frame was clearly established early in the media narrative, and both articles serve to illustrate how that central point of the debate was largely based on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) model that had gone before.

Second, both articles establish key manifest themes that will underpin the dominant latent frames as the debate unfolds – business fears, unworkable policy and growing public concerns about rising costs. Third, while *The Australian* article was mostly concerned with highlighting business fears only, the *SMH* article tried more to explain why transition assistance was unjustified, at least in some industry sectors. These dichotic positions largely established the two opposing media sides for the debate, with News Corp mostly aligned to the anti-Carbon Tax position and Fairfax Ltd the pro-Carbon Tax position.

Under the headline "Local Industry Fears Doubled Carbon Price", Shanahan's news story established very early the ideas of 'business fears' and the Gillard

government's incompetence and 'duplicity'. It also introduced very early in the debate how organisational perspectives were critical to the discussion. This, in turn, would very quickly lead to the government losing control over the specific details of the tax:

BUSINESS and industry fear that the Gillard government's starting price for carbon tax of \$20-\$30 a tonne from July 1 next year will lead to a doubling in the cost of carbon when an emissions trading scheme begins in 2015-16.

Despite the early start to a carbon tax, members of the government privately concede Australia cannot meet its target of 5 per cent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.

The concession came as the Australian Greens refused to be drawn on revelations in *The Weekend Australian* that Julia Gillard intended to ignore their demands to wind back the compensation for the electricity and mining industries when she introduces an interim carbon tax from July 1 next year...

While industry is expecting an initial carbon tax of about \$20 to \$25 for every tonne of carbon emissions, cabinet has not yet decided on the final price but is considering options up to \$30 a tonne.

Some industry leaders said yesterday they were surprised by the news, while others felt the government had deceived them at the beginning of negotiations. (*Australian*, Feb 14)

Interestingly, the story also set up the tax as a policy related to the Rudd government's failed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). This, in turn, led much of the opposition to focus on concerns about "rising costs" as a starting point:

Opposition environment spokesman Greg Hunt dubbed the government's preferred option "ETS mark II", saying it had changed little from the previous model and would cause a hike in electricity prices. "This is going to cause massive tension between the government and the Greens over any compensation."

He said business was becoming concerned with the government's direction on climate change.

But Labor is preparing to counter opposition attacks, and is sensitive to escalating community anger about rising costs, particularly electricity prices...

Kevin Rudd's dumped Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme offered electricity generators compensation of \$7.3bn over 10 years -- \$1.5bn for the coal industry and \$1.3bn in extra assistance for emissions-intensive sectors exposed to international trade such as cement and aluminium.

Industry compensation remains a sticking point with the Greens, who voted down the CPRS, arguing it gave too much compensation to the coal and power industries and the emissions targets were too low. (*Australian*, Feb 14)

As mentioned, this opening story in the debate was also important for quickly establishing organisational voices as relevant, particularly in terms of corporate perspectives carrying a "matter of urgency":

Australian Industry Group chief executive Heather Ridout said business would be seeking more consultation with the government as a "matter of urgency".

Ms Ridout said she had concerns the business community had been left to discover the plan by reading of it in the newspaper. "If the government has a timetable on it, we would like to know about it," she said...

Climate Institute chief executive John Connor said he was assured by Mr Combet at Friday's meeting the government was a long way from reaching a decision on a carbon tax plan, let alone presenting it to the multi-party committee. "There is still a lot of water under the bridge in terms of negotiations," he said.

The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union's Tony Maher, who is president of the union's mining and energy division, was also at Friday's conference. He said the government's preferred option was "just speculation". (*Australian*, Feb 14)

However, what is also very interesting is how the story indicated there was business support for pricing carbon, as an appropriate mechanism to reduce emissions:

In his weekly economic note, the Treasurer said yesterday the government had highlighted the need for "early action" with business and industry groups during the conference. "The meeting discussed the economic benefits of a carbon price over other forms of government action, and how a carbon price allows the market to select the lowest-cost methods to reduce pollution," Mr Swan wrote.

He said Mr Combet had "led a discussion on the design options for a carbon price and the need for early action. I was heartened to see the positive reaction from

business leaders, and their strong message that they want to roll up their sleeves and get involved in implementing this reform". (*Australian*, Feb 14)

This first article was followed by a story in *The Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH) on February 19, titled 'Business Going up in Smoke'. Again, key economic themes were evident: business fears, comparisons with the CPRS and the prevalence of corporate views on the matter, most notably BlueScope Steel, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. However, this story also appeared to confirm that industry was, in fact, in favour of the tax, at least in principle:

WHEN heads of industry met federal ministers at Sydney's Hilton Hotel earlier this month, the corporate chiefs didn't mince their words.

Executives from BHP Billiton, Woolworths and Qantas - just a few of the household names represented on the government's business roundtable on climate change - agreed a carbon price was needed. But with the pleasantries behind them, they were quick to direct the conversation to a more pressing concern: the impact on their bottom lines.

In no uncertain terms, the executives asked for yet more meetings with government to make sure there were no "unintended consequences" of putting an economy-wide price on carbon.

The Climate Change Minister, Greg Combet - a veteran negotiator from his union days - is said to have worked hard to reassure the corporate chiefs. The Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, has also promised not to ignore the "good work" of the carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS), blocked by the Greens for its generosity to business.

However, the soothing words have not calmed business nerves over Labor's plan to legislate for a carbon price this year. (*SMH*, Feb 19)

The story also continued the themes of the policy representing "another ugly fight with corporate Australia", particularly over transition assistance, and the Coalition's opposition to the "big new tax", with "more pain to come":

In Canberra, the impact of a carbon price on high-emission or trade-exposed industries is also shaping up as a key hurdle for Labor's plans to cut carbon pollution. With the Opposition opposed to the so-called "big new tax", the government needs to strike a delicate balance between a policy that is ambitious enough for the Greens without inflicting too much pain on industry.

No one thinks this will be easy. On one hand, business groups are warning of another ugly fight with corporate Australia if they are ignored. On the other, economists say too much compensation for industry simply passes the burden to consumers - who are already facing surging power bills with more pain to come.

...According to a Grattan Institute report, Rudd's CPRS promised compensation worth \$22 billion for emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries. Most of the assistance was targeted at aluminium, steel, cement, liquefied natural gas, and coal industries.

This time, emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries are again calling for assistance to help with transition. But while the CPRS debate took place against the backdrop of the financial crisis, much has changed in the past few years. (*SMH*, Feb 19)

Most importantly, the corporate voices in this second article again established economic considerations as the key starting point in this debate, not least of all to prevent "industry heading overseas":

Now, many of the companies pushing for compensation are also benefiting from a once-in-a-century resources bonanza.

The liquefied natural gas industry - promised \$3.6 billion in free emissions permits under Rudd's scheme - is a case in point. The chief executive of the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, Belinda Robinson, says the CPRS didn't go far enough in recognising LNG's "green" role as a replacement for coal overseas.

"Putting a price on carbon simply serves to make the economics of getting these projects to financial investment decision a little bit harder," she says. "Shouldn't we be looking at how we can encourage the growth of that sector, not winding it back?"

...Less contentious is the aluminium sector - one of the most intensive users of electricity.

Under the CPRS the industry was to receive more than \$8 billion worth of free permits, and the executive director of the Australian Aluminium Council, Miles Prosser, says he will now push for a similarly "workable" arrangement to prevent the industry heading overseas.

"If we did close down smelters in Australia, they would be replaced by the investment in China," Prosser says. "I would be surprised if the Labor government

was happy to see industry move offshore and jobs move offshore to a country which doesn't have a carbon cost."

Steel makers have also signalled they will be asking for more, with a BlueScope Steel spokesman highlighting the competitive threat of low-cost Asian producers.

"It is not in Australia's interests - economic or environmental - to force domestic industries to shut down or curtail production, only to see that production replaced by higher-emission overseas production," the spokesman said.

...Rio Tinto - which owns half the country's smelters - was reminded of the looming battle on this front last week after posting a record \$US14 billion profit. The leader of the Greens, Bob Brown, accused the mining giant of trying to "gouge" public money in lobbying for compensation. He also promised to drive a harder bargain this time around, saying Rio would have pocketed \$565 million a year in taxpayer support under the CPRS.

The most controversy, however, is reserved for the electricity industry. Power stations are responsible for about half the country's carbon emissions, and Labor's own climate change adviser, Professor Ross Garnaut, has argued there is no justification for giving them support. In contrast, the CPRS promised \$7.3 billion in free permits.

The chief executive of the Energy Supply Association of Australia, Brad Page, says removing this assistance would "strand" billions of dollars worth of power station assets and threaten the sector's ability to raise capital.

Assistance is needed to help encourage investment in new plant, he says, and shut the highest-polluting power stations without punishing investors and creditors.

...Heather Ridout, chief executive of the Australian Industry Group, also said a "standout weakness" of the CPRS was its failure to assist moderately-emitting trade-exposed industries, such as food processing, paper and chemicals. Ridout - a member of the business roundtable on climate change - said her lobby would push for more help for these industries. (*SMH*, Feb 19)

One other point is worth noting here, related to the opposing Carbon Tax positions. When the rest of the *SMH* article is considered, it becomes clear how, right from the outset, trying to explain the tax was a complex task. The policy details – its workings and its implications – would bedevil supporters' messaging efforts to campaign on potential benefits:

...The Grattan Institute report found Rudd's carbon price was "highly unlikely" to influence investment decisions. When the oil price was \$US80 a barrel (today it's \$US100), the report said the LNG projects' returns on equity would be well above 12 per cent - and carbon was a small fraction of the capital and labour costs.

Moreover, the institute's chief executive, John Daley, says Robinson's argument that LNG is replacing coal overseas does not mean the industry should have no incentive to emit less. "LNG is a potential replacement for coal, but [eventually] other technologies are going to replace LNG. So LNG should pay its carbon price just like everyone else," he says.

The coal industry - which stood to receive more than \$1 billion in compensation under the CPRS - has also enjoyed a profit boom since the last round of negotiations. Meanwhile, global coal prices have risen between 30 per cent and 60 per cent in the last year alone, and Australian mines are among the least costly in the world.

...Most people, including the Greens, agree these emission-intensive, trade-exposed sectors such as aluminium and steel should receive some assistance. But whether they need as much as Rudd promised is hotly debated.

...But since cutting carbon has been on the agenda for the past two decades, won't it create a moral hazard if investors in the most carbon-heavy power stations are bailed out? No, says Page, who argues the public should help the investors because the community has been the real winner from unpriced carbon.

"You've got to look at who the beneficiary has been of this, and it isn't simply the power generators. Frankly the community is a massive beneficiary out of this, so there is a responsibility there for some reasonable funding for a transition."

FOR consumers, however, all these business pleas for special treatment may be hard to stomach. At a time when electricity costs are soaring, every handout to industry comes at a price to the rest of the economy.

The executive director of the Australia Institute, Dr Richard Denniss, explains there's no "free lunch" when trying to reduce carbon - it requires a change in behaviour across the economy. "The more compensation you provide to the polluters, the duller the price signal and the less money left over to invest in alternatives," he says.

Compensation can make sense on equity grounds or if it is politically necessary to get what you want, Denniss says. But otherwise, the economic case for handouts is difficult to make.

The Grattan Institute's Daley adds that the CPRS arrangements were also excessive when it came to saving jobs. His research found protecting the aluminium sector amounted to an annual subsidy of \$161,000 per worker.

"The most important thing is to get a carbon price in. It would be good policy to have much less compensation than was offered last time around," he says. "If we're doing this to protect jobs it's not obvious that we need to do anything like what was suggested last time."

However, these calls for restraint are unlikely to quell the demands of the many smaller businesses who are joining the rush for assistance.

The key independent Rob Oakeshott this week said small business had not been heard in the carbon debate, in a sign he could push for wider compensation for this sector.

His remarks were pounced on by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry chief Peter Anderson, who is calling for small and medium companies also to be reimbursed for higher energy costs. (*SMH*, Feb 19)

Lastly, in terms of the debate being established early on mainly economic grounds, the author Clancy Yeates was incredibly prescient:

...**Whatever happens in the carbon debate**, it appears the big companies will face plenty of competition as they demand similar compensation to last time. In part, this is because the terms of the debate have changed. **Rather than being the "greatest moral challenge of our time", pricing carbon has become yet another economic debate.** (*SMH*, Feb 19) [emphasis added]

The rest of the chronological analysis focuses more directly on the key macro latent frames and their correspondence with organisational positions. (NOTE: Each individual article is presented as reported at the time, including as paragraphed. Ellipses (...) indicate any selective coding breaks between such paragraphs in the article. In all of the following quotes, capitalisation of the first word indicates the opening sentence of that particular news story. **Bold emphasis** has also been added throughout, to highlight the macro frames and correspondences identified by the researcher).

As we will see, an early and ongoing part of the corporate position was to 'agree' that climate change was an issue and that something needed to be done to reduce carbon emissions. Throughout the study period, these positions formed part of the good government/policy frames. However, within corporate voices, this was always accompanied by doubts and dismissals that *this particular* solution was in no way an effective policy response. As such, their conditional agreement was more strongly framed by messages of bad government/policy and pending economic vandalism. What is more, as these themes of economic vandalism and bad government/policy continued, the number of co-opted voices expressing these corporate fears expanded, especially within the News Corp newspapers:

PROVIDING decent compensation for **households hit by higher bills** could make or break the Federal Government's carbon tax plans.

**Consumer groups and climate economics experts yesterday warned** the ultimate goal of a cap-and-trade system was doomed unless poor and middle-income Australians were adequately looked after.

...**The electricity generation industry fears the value of its assets will plummet**, prompting **Business Council of Australia acting chief Maria Tarrant** to call for a "smooth transition" for that sector **to maintain viability and reliable supply**.

**Minerals Council of Australia chief Mitchell Hooke** said investment in the proposed low-carbon economy **must not jeopardise the viability of exports**.  
(*Herald Sun*, Feb 25)

**AUSTRALIA'S powerful business lobby has attacked** the lack of detail in the Gillard Government's carbon tax plan, while **warning it threatens jobs and will fuel uncertainty**.

**While the proposal to introduce a carbon price next year drew a mixed response from companies yesterday**, uncertainty over **the transition to an emissions trading system continues to plague business** leaders.

**Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry chief Peter Anderson slammed the plan**, labelling it "a blow for the competitiveness of Australian business, especially small and medium-sized enterprises".

“The extra lead in the saddlebags of Australian business **will not reduce overall global emissions, nor will it help save the jobs** that will be exported offshore to countries without a carbon scheme,” he said.

**Australian Industry Group chief Heather Ridout** said the proposal would “live or die on the detail”, declaring “the sharp end of the debate is yet to come”.

“These missing details **will impact on key questions such as the continuity of electricity supply and preventing the erosion of competitiveness for large and small businesses**,” she said.

**Mining giant BHP and big energy players welcomed the move to carbon pricing**, but one of **Australia's biggest manufacturers, BlueScope Steel, was scathing**.

“I'm very concerned that **the Government is proposing to `offshore emissions'**, by taxing and **potentially killing manufacturing** in Australia,” said chief executive Paul O'Malley.

**Business Council of Australia acting chief executive Maria Tarrant** said **business would lack the certainty needed for future investment** until details such as the scale of the carbon price and the transition arrangements were known. (*Herald Sun*, Feb 25)

**STRUGGLING families** will be compensated with cash **for rising energy costs** when the Federal Government **imposes a carbon tax** on Australians from July 1 next year.

But **most households won't be able to escape Prime Minister Julia Gillard's new emissions trading scheme, with forecasts that it will push power bills higher** by between \$300 and \$500 a year...

**Mining giant BHP and big energy players welcomed the move** but one of Australia's biggest manufacturers **BlueScope Steel, was scathing** saying it was “**potentially killing manufacturing** in Australia”. (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 25)

Against this growing corporate position of dire economic consequences, pro-Carbon Tax organisations began to offer counter arguments of new economic opportunities. As February ended, these positions formed part of the good government/policy frames and also introduced economic benefit frames:

JULIA Gillard says she did not want to have a carbon tax but, faced with the choice of a compromise or doing nothing, **she had to tackle climate change**.

Fighting back against attacks, including the claim she broke her election promise not to have a tax, the PM said circumstances had changed.

...Ms Gillard said her plan -- to start in July, 2012 -- would have a fixed price, ``effectively a tax" for three to five years before becoming the trading scheme she wanted.

...The PM promised ``households would come first" when compensation was handed out and it would be ``generous" for low-income earners, pensioners and people on fixed incomes.

And **a report by the Climate Institute** predicts **Victoria could gain 6800 clean-energy power sector jobs** under a carbon price. (*Herald Sun*, Feb 28)

Today, **the Climate Institute** and independent Tony Windsor **launch research showing close to 7000 NSW power sector jobs could be created** by 2030 through pricing carbon.

``Australia stands at the doorway to **a clean energy transition** that can **drive tens of billions of dollars of investment** in the electricity sector creating a net **increase of close to 34,000 new jobs** in regional Australia," **Climate Institute chief executive John Connor** said. (*Daily Telegraph*, Feb 28)

### **March 2011:**

As the debate heated up, including a growing stoush between the Gillard government and the Abbott-led opposition, early March continued to see acknowledgement of "in-principle support" from at least some businesses. Most notable here was Australia's largest multinational, BHP Billiton.

Nevertheless, the stories featuring key organisational voices continued to be dominated by the macro arguments of economic vandalism and bad government/policy frames versus economic benefit and good government/policy frames. Alongside these frames, the stories also began to include frames pitting 'widespread opposition' against 'widespread support':

**SO much for business certainty on carbon pricing.** Or for encouraging much-needed investment in new base power generation.

Tony Abbott's declaration yesterday that a Liberal government would rescind the carbon tax is just the latest example of the **conflicting messages for business** about what will happen over the next few years.

But despite Julia Gillard's determination to blame this on the Liberals -- describing Abbott's statement as grossly irresponsible -- it's **the government's plan that remains the primary reason for the confusion.**

Gillard's new agenda includes the idea of a relatively modest tax in place by July 2012, which will supposedly prove to the public and the business community safely ahead of the 2013 election that this is not **crippling to anyone's budget or to the economy.**

**She does have some in-principle support from business -- including many in the gas industry, but also ranging from influential corporates such as Westpac and BHP** -- arguing a national scheme is the most efficient option to reduce emissions. **But it's clear the broader community and business scepticism about Canberra's logic is far greater than it was in 2009** and even than when Kevin Rudd (partly at Gillard's urging) walked away from his plan for a carbon pollution reduction scheme last year. (*The Australian*, March 1)

Four days after announcing **a tax that will finish off what is left of manufacturing** in Australia, the PM goes to the very heart of the iconic industry that is teetering on the cliff edge.

...Both Holden and the Government were rejoicing in the new Cruze, the only locally made small car.

Enjoy it while you can. For **as BlueScope's Paul O'Malley has succinctly, bleakly and all-too accurately pointed, manufacturing cannot survive our unilateral carbon tax.**

Manufacturing will simply switch to those countries where they don't have to pay it. That's almost, literally, everywhere else in the world except Europe...

Gillard's visit to **the soon-to-be-extinct Holden production line, if she gets her way**, captured the almost **sublime stupidity of her policy.** As O'Malley has pointed out, we already faced the prospect of becoming more and more a quarry.

The carbon tax will accelerate that process, as it **hollows out not just manufacturing but all the service industries** as well. (*Herald Sun*, March 1)

Again, pro-Carbon Tax organisations countered the economic vandalism frame by trying to explain the sense of the policy, mostly using economic benefit frames:

TAXPAYERS spend about 12 times more encouraging the use of fossil fuels than on climate change programs - and the sum is growing.

**Fossil fuel incentives and subsidies will cost about \$12.2 billion this financial year, compared with \$1.1 billion spent on programs designed to cut greenhouse gas emissions** and boost clean energy research.

An **Australian Conservation Foundation analysis** found the cost of the incentives has increased by \$1.6 billion since 2007-08, the final year of the Howard government, **while spending on climate programs had risen just \$500 million**. The biggest fossil fuel incentives were in unclaimed revenue, including about \$5 billion in fuel tax rebates for greenhouse-intensive industries.

**Don Henry, executive director of the Australian Conservation Foundation**, said the government must cut fossil fuel incentives at the May budget if it was to convince people it was **serious about tackling climate change**. Keeping them would undermine the value of a carbon tax, he said. "Funding these is **bad for the climate and it is bad economics**."

...**Mr Henry said the tax concession for company cars was a "virtual pollution factory"** that emitted as much as a medium-sized coal-fired plant each year. (*The SMH*, March 1)

As the corporate attack on the tax continued, it became apparent that one particular organisation was leading the charge: BlueScope Steel. Many of its senior leadership team were increasingly quoted directly and indirectly. Again, in-principle agreement, economic vandalism and bad government/policy were the macro frame themes:

THE **BlueScope Steel managing director, Paul O'Malley**, has written to the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, proposing a carbon price which would target the electricity sector but **exempt manufacturing and other trade-exposed industries**.

**Mr O'Malley** backed the call of the Opposition Leader, Tony Abbott, **to repeal the tax if it unfairly treated sectors of the economy and failed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions**.

On a tour of BlueScope's Port Kembla steelworks, **Mr O'Malley** said the government should **price carbon but not target the manufacturing sector**, which was "at the bottom end of the cycle".

It had suffered from a rising Australian dollar, lower domestic demand, and high prices for steel-making ingredients such iron ore and coking coal. **"It is when you are down and you get kicked in the guts that you really say this doesn't make sense," Mr O'Malley said.**

**Mr O'Malley**, who is part of the government's business round table on climate change, **said he believed that a carbon price was needed to** spark the transition from coal-fired power to gas.

"A price on carbon that is charged on the electricity bill and a rebate given to low-income households and those that face import competition is a very simple, cost effective way to get the right price signal for the electricity sector," he said.

**"For emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries there should be no cost** until our competitors face a cost and there certainly shouldn't be a free ride for imports that sees **manufacturers have to move their operations offshore and hide carbon in someone else's backyard."**

...Asked if he would support Mr Abbott's proposal to repeal the tax if the Liberals won government, **Mr O'Malley replied: "If there is bad policy, bad policy should be repealed, absolutely."** (*The SMH*, March 3)

In response, efforts to try and explain the policy were inevitably mired in the complexity of its workings:

In a magical world we could put the rumble over climate science and politics on hold but an important question would still need to be answered. **If you have to put a price on carbon, is Julia Gillard's proposal the right way of doing it?**

The lazy answer is to say anything is better than nothing. But that doesn't give enough respect to the people waiting in hospital queues and soup kitchens around the country. The real test for this policy must be a simple one: is this the best way to leverage public money to foster new energy technologies?

Economists will bite your ear off for hours about whether a tax or trading scheme is a better way to jump-start the low carbon economy. I tend to agree that a carbon tax is the cleanest and most direct approach to transforming the energy infrastructure but it's not clear that this proposal commits to the task wholeheartedly. The reason a

carbon tax is initially superior to an emissions trading scheme is it gives more certainty to investors in early-stage technologies. You set the tax over the long run and give power to an independent regulator to make sure capital investment is flowing to new ideas. The principle behind a carbon tax is that you cannot solve the environmental problem until you have solved the technological problem. **A tax allows the economy to focus on new technologies first, and on achieving environmental parameters second. This is the right approach** early on if we are to respect the freedom of people to live the life they have reason to value.

**A trading scheme, by contrast, operates by the opposite logic. It puts environmental standards front and centre** and lets the price bounce around like a volleyball. **This is hardly a recipe for long-term investment stability. Marius Kloppers, the chief executive of BHP Billiton, said as much in a speech** at a business lunch in Sydney last year. We should give Kloppers some credit on this point. His company is disadvantaged by a carbon price whether it's a tax or an emissions trading scheme. His only interest in this whole endeavour is to know what the damage will be. (*The SMH*, March 4)

As the debate continued, BlueScope Steel's position was increasingly joined by other big resources companies:

**MINING giant Rio Tinto has put Julia Gillard on notice that business will demand her carbon pricing plan offers more generous compensation and industry protection** than Kevin Rudd's 2009 scheme because of the international community's failure to reach a global deal on carbon prices.

In his first major entry into the climate change debate since the Prime Minister last month unveiled plans to price carbon from July 1 next year, **Rio's Australian managing director, David Peever, says** the changed global outlook means the government should acknowledge that **Mr Rudd's carbon pollution reduction scheme ``is not an appropriate starting point for discussions in 2011"**.

In an article published today in *The Australian*, **Mr Peever calls for ``real world" modelling of industry transition** being forced by the carbon price.

He warns that **a carbon price will ``inevitably be disastrous" in a downturn for businesses** unable to pass on the extra costs to their customers.

And, in a thinly veiled shot at the Greens, **he describes as ``bizarre" the logic surrounding the debate about maintaining Australia's international competitiveness.**

Mr Peever -- a member of the federal government's business roundtable on climate change...says that for three decades economic reform has focused on increasing Australia's productivity and competitiveness.

“Remarkably, however, **when it comes to the issue of carbon, trade-exposed Australian firms that insist on maintaining a level playing field with the international competitors are liable to be dismissed as self-interested rent-seekers,**” he writes.

**Rio's export operations would have faced an additional \$3 billion cost over 10 years from the final design of the CPRS,** which offered almost \$50bn in compensation to industry and mining in its first decade...

**According to figures provided by Rio to the Climate Change Department, the company's annual carbon tax bill would be about \$154 million** if the tax was set at \$20 a tonne for every tonne of carbon pollution.

**Mr Peever dismisses** as “more rhetoric than fact” **suggestions that Australia lags the rest of the world in emissions reduction** action and warns “care also needs to be taken to avoid overstating Australia's influence in the global debate”.

**Australian industry, particularly the steelmaking sector, is becoming increasingly vocal about the potential impact** of Ms Gillard's carbon pricing plan, which imposes a tax from July 1 next year before morphing into an emissions trading scheme in three to five years.

Yesterday, **oil and gas giant Woodside Petroleum called for the company's trade-exposed exports to be exempt from any price on carbon,** given the absence of an international agreement on pricing greenhouse gas emissions. “**Woodside's position on exemption for its trade-exposed exports** recognises the important role liquefied natural gas plays in helping lower global greenhouse gas emissions,” the company said.

**Woodside, which could be forced to pay about \$168m** if the price of carbon was set at \$20 a tonne, said the government's framework needed to acknowledge that LNG was regarded internationally as a cleaner transition fuel towards an alternative energy future. (*The Australian*, March 7)

The above article highlights another aspect to the debate which began to emerge throughout March. Just as potential costs of the tax to Rio Tinto and Woodside were reported, “according to figures provided”, expert opinion, research and modelling evidence were increasingly added to pro and anti-arguments (these

citations were largely coded as co-opted support). For example, the article below illustrates how an opinion survey published by the Climate Institute helped 'support' a frame of widespread social support:

IF Julia Gillard is finding the going tough selling her carbon tax, she might glance at the new survey by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to understand why. The OECD has surveyed 10 member nations for their attitudes to, and relevant behaviour towards, the environment...

The survey found Australians are the least likely of those surveyed to consider energy costs when buying a house;

**...Yet the survey found that we are at the same time among the most worried about pollution and climate change...**

The logical disconnection in the results explains too why the wheels on Julia Gillard's carbon tax bandwagon are spinning fast without it making much progress. **Australians can be quite convinced that climate change is a problem, and that governments should do something about it - as has been repeatedly shown in opinion surveys such as the one published by the Climate Institute last August** - yet reject the notion of a price on carbon, and be susceptible to the intellectually dishonest scare campaigns about a carbon tax run by some politicians and media personalities. (*The SMH*, March 11)

Similarly, corporate representatives were also able to muster support for their frames:

**According to carbon emission figures provided to the Climate Change Department**, several of **the nation's biggest power generators could face additional costs of more than \$1 billion** a year if the carbon price was set at \$60-\$70 a tonne.

At \$70 a tonne, NSW Hunter Valley power station operator Macquarie Generation would face an annual bill of \$1.64bn based on emissions of 23.4 million tonnes a year. **BlueScope Steel**, which emits 10.8 million tonnes a year, would face a bill of about \$750m. (*The Australian*, March 12)

With authoritative opinion and evidence rolled out more and more, the central economic and policy frames continued to dominate as "the debate rages":

THE Federal Government's **chief climate change adviser** recommended a carbon price of between \$20 and \$30 a tonne, which would add about \$250 to the average household bill or \$5 a week.

But Ross Garnaut said lower and middle income-earners would be better off under a carbon price.

...Professor Garnaut, releasing the latest update of his landmark 2008 climate change report, said half of the revenue generated by the tax on polluters should be redirected to household welfare programs.

Ms Gillard is facing opposition to her plans for a price on carbon. Polls show that only a third of people support it.

Her own MPs have criticised the way the Government handled the announcement, with little detail provided on how it would work and how families would be compensated.

...**The Climate Institute warned** that without additional regulations and higher pollution prices, faster price increases would be needed to ensure Australia maximised the use of its world-leading clean energy sources.

**“Professor Garnaut's proposals for pollution pricing to unlock clean energy investment in Australia are practical and politically pragmatic,” Climate Institute CEO John Connor said.**

**“The initial pollution pricing proposed would start to reduce our economic dependence on pollution.”** (*Daily Telegraph*, March 18)

**Modelling conducted for the Minerals Council of Australia** by the Centre for International Economics shows the huge amounts of revenue at stake in the compensation debate.

**According to the modelling**, at a carbon price of \$26 a tonne, **the 2012-13 liability for steelmaker Bluescope Steel would be \$317.61m** without compensation. **Mining giants Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton would face bills of \$451.18m and \$181.23m** respectively in the first year of the carbon tax. (*The Australian*, March 22)

The debate rages as Mr Combet and Energy Minister Martin Ferguson prepare to begin negotiations on the shape of the compensation package with some of the nation's most powerful company executives tomorrow. They include: **Paul O'Malley from BlueScope Steel; Don Voelte from Woodside; David Peever from Rio Tinto; Anne Pickard from Shell; and Hubie Van Dalsen from BHP Billiton.**

**A forum in Canberra today organised by the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network and the Business Council of Australia will be told that the reliability of Australia's energy system could be under threat** over the period to 2020, as coal-fired power stations close before enough replacements are built and maintenance work is reduced or even stopped.

Even a carbon price of \$20 a tonne of emissions was **likely to lead to some coal power stations defaulting on their debts** and handing the assets over to their financiers. **AIGN chief executive Michael Hitchens said** that if some investors in power stations made big losses they would not invest in new capacity and new investors would invest only if there were higher returns.

**"This would lead to even higher electricity prices** than are needed," Mr Hitchens said.

**The findings** will put pressure on the Prime Minister to stare down the Greens, who are opposed to compensating electricity generators for putting a price on carbon. (*The Australian*, March 23)

JULIA Gillard has branded Tony Abbott a climate change denier as she seeks to capitalise on **a bounce in the polls** and deflect questions about the government's yet to be worked out household compensation package.

...The parliamentary stoush came as **research by the Climate Institute, with assistance by AGL Energy, estimated the impact of a carbon tax** on an average household electricity bill, if the price was set at \$20 per tonne of carbon, would be about \$150 a week.

**According to Climate Institute deputy chief executive Erwin Jackson,** producing a megawatt hour of electricity creates about one tonne of carbon pollution.

Given the average household in Sydney uses about 7.5 megawatts of electricity a year, the impact of a carbon tax on an average household electricity bill would be

about \$150 a year out of a total bill of about \$1500, **the research finds.** (*The Australian*, March 23)

AT LAST a major business figure has come out with a blistering attack on the insane stupidity of Julia Gillard's carbon tax.

**Graham Kraehe will of course be labelled and libelled as speaking for one of the 'big polluters' -- he chairs BlueScope Steel.**

And obviously on one level, he is 'speaking his book.' But that's also in part precisely why his critique is so meaningful. He is right at the, if you'll excuse the term, coalface of the impact of the proposed tax.

**Kraehe knows that the government's policy will decimate manufacturing here.** And in particular, mean the death of our steel industry.

...And hurt Australia, **secondly, to absolutely no point in its stated intention of cutting so-called 'carbon pollution.'** It will simply send those emissions -- and the jobs -- offshore.

Indeed, the tax will almost certainly increase CO2 emissions as the production shifts to countries less efficient than Australia.

**The great weight of Kraehe's speech to the National Press Club, was in his merging of the carbon tax and its devastating impact with our China-driven resources boom.**

**He started with a cheeky but powerful observation. If the government wanted to make a big contribution to reducing the world's generation of carbon dioxide, it could ban the export of our coal.**

...**Of course it wouldn't do that, Kraehe noted. It would be economic and political suicide.** It also wouldn't actually achieve what Kraehe suggested. The production of coal -- and subsequent emissions -- would just be shifted elsewhere. Which nevertheless captures precisely the sheer pointlessness of what the government is proposing.

...He was both subtle and damning in highlighting the two-speed economy. **Manufacturing, which employed around one million directly and supported another two million jobs in the services sector, was already under siege**

because of the boom and the rise in the Aussie dollar. And would now be whacked with the tax.

The impact would be devastating for Australian manufacturing across the value chain.

**For Bluescope, a tax on carbon (dioxide) produced in steelmaking was fine as long as the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Indians, Russians, Brazilians, and others had a similar tax, he said.**

...Going where no other mainstream business figure has gone -- and exposing them and shaming them in the process -- Kraehe clinically dismantled the government's utterly dishonest claims. Especially about China.

Australian steelmaker emissions of CO2 totalled 17 million tonnes year. China's increased steelmaking was producing an additional one billion tonnes of CO2 emissions.

And then there was China's power industry. **It was ``disingenuous and misleading (for the government) to focus on the closure of a few excessively (really) dirty power stations," he said.** Translated: PM Gillard, you are deliberately lying to mislead Australians. (*Herald Sun*, March 23)

Bob Brown's Greens remain opposed to nuclear energy, as they are to another source of clean power, hydro-electricity, because they don't like dams.

**... If carbon dioxide emissions are as lethal as they claim, then surely the risks of nuclear power will pale by comparison.**

As the only form of baseload energy with virtually zero carbon emissions, nuclear is the only solution for those, like the Prime Minister, who claim a ``low-carbon" world is necessary to prevent climate catastrophe. (Well, there is one other solution, which **BlueScope Steel chairman Graham Kraehe suggested sarcastically this week** while criticising Gillard's carbon tax at the National Press Club. We could stop exporting coal and **wreck our economy.**) (*Daily Telegraph*, March 24)

Not everyone is so pleased with the shift to a carbon price, with **the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry arguing it could hurt manufacturers** in areas such as food processing, plastics, chemicals and equipment and metal production.

**ACCI policy director Greg Evans says** small and medium enterprises, in particular, run the **risk of being internationally exposed to export or import competition.**

“They aren't necessarily able to pass on **the cost impact of rising energy prices** because their competitors won't be facing the same impost,” he says. “So if they lift their prices they could well have declining revenue.”

...**The ACCI's criticism follows calls from a group of more than 20 leading Australian companies, including Wesfarmers, Leighton Holdings and BlueScope Steel, for the government to delay implementation of the carbon price** and lift compensation for industry over and above levels flagged in former prime minister Kevin Rudd's 2009 climate change plan.

**Retailer Gerry Harvey also has entered the debate,** claiming **the carbon tax row is contributing to a fall in household confidence.** The Harvey Norman co-founder's comments **reflect the findings of a Westpac-Melbourne Institute consumer confidence survey** showing households are especially negative on the outlook for family finances during the next 12 months, with pessimists outnumbering optimists for the first time since March 2009. (*The Australian*, March 25)

As the month ended, non-profit pro-Carbon Tax voices also tried to remind everyone that this was all about reducing carbon emissions, and that Australia had a key part to play:

**AUSTRALIA is the fastest-growing emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, according to a submission from the Climate Institute** to the Federal Government's climate change committee.

The amount of carbon equivalent pollution produced by every Australian is now more than 20 times that of a person in India or China.

The submission to the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee recommends a faster transition from a carbon tax to an emissions trading scheme, claiming Australia was now the highest per capita emitter of carbon.

But it also calls for the burden not to rest with families **and says the Government should not buckle to the demands of large mining companies such as BHP,** which has said that it should be exempt from a carbon tax.

The **submission cites a World Resources Institute report** putting Australia at the top of per capita carbon emissions with 27.1 tonnes per person, followed by

Canada, the US and Venezuela, Brazil, Russia and Germany. (*Daily Telegraph*, March 31)

**April 2011:**

As shown in Figure 3.8, organisational correspondence with the key macro frames peaked in April. While the core macro frame themes continued to dominate the debate, this month saw two very important 'shifts' in the narrative. Firstly, while the corporate anti-Carbon Tax position was joined by yet more voices, most notably the Business Council of Australia (BCA), the non-profit voices remained relatively scarce and isolated – mostly carried by the Climate Institute. Secondly, there emerged a growing emphasis in stories that the corporate opposition was now firmly entrenched and universal, and even their 'in-principle agreement' had gone.

The following quotes also provide an example of how the debate often included narrative exchanges, as various points and counter-points were raised. For example, the *SMH* on April 9 mentioned how Climate Change Minister Greg Combet was defending the proposed compensation scheme for industry, ahead of a meeting with businesses in the government's consultation group. The *Australian* (April 14) and the *Herald Sun* (April 15) then reported criticisms of Combet from BlueScope Steel and the Australian Aluminium Council:

This is a unique time in history. The introduction of a carbon tax will create pressure across the community for people to lower their energy consumption in order to reduce their costs.

...Opponents of the tax fear it will negatively impact Australia's manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors, driving costs up and sending jobs offshore. However, **environmental analysts say a carbon tax is essential** to fund the development of alternative energy solutions and drive changes in behaviour. **The Climate Institute claims its research shows that about 31,000 jobs could be created** in regional Australia by shifting focus towards our largely untapped energy resources in geothermal, large-scale solar, bioenergy, hydro, wind and natural gas.

**The institute's chief executive, John Connor, said** by 2030 clean energy could be used to generate up to 43 per cent of Australia's energy needs, up from 12 per cent today, with **significant economic benefits**.

**“All the models show** that even with significant reductions in pollution, virtually all sectors of the community will continue to grow,” he said. (*The Australian*, April 5)

**THE POWERFUL lobby group for the mining industry has effectively ruled out support for the Labor carbon tax plan** before a meeting between the government and key industry representatives tomorrow.

In a sign of another protracted battle between the mining industry and the government, the **chief executive of the Minerals Council of Australia, Mitch Hooke, said he was increasingly concerned** industry compensation for Labor's proposed carbon tax would be based on the package of the dumped emissions trading scheme. **But the Climate Change Minister, Greg Combet, hit back** at suggestions from Mr Hooke yesterday that European trade-exposed industries would be better protected under its trading scheme than Australian companies, adding the government would not walk away from the "good work" it had done on industry compensation under the now dumped trading scheme.

...**The Minerals Council represents mining giants BHP and Rio**, among others. Mr Combet will come face-to-face with representatives of BHP and Rio tomorrow at a meeting with the government's business consultation group on carbon pricing.

**"The Rudd government's carbon pollution reduction scheme did not adequately protect Australia's export sectors** and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme," **Mr Hooke said** in a statement yesterday. **"The Minerals Council of Australia will not support a carbon pricing system** that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia's export industries."

**The council also released an analysis it commissioned from SFS Economics** finding compensation for heavy industry under the European Union's emissions trading scheme covered more industrial sectors than Australia's plans. (*The SMH*, April 7)

**THERE is furious agreement all around: BlueScope Steel will need to be compensated** for the effect of a carbon tax, until rival steelmakers in competing countries face a comparable penalty.

**Nobody wants to see a decline in manufacturing or a hollowing-out of Australia's economy**, increasing our dependence on the resources industry. Everybody wants a steel industry in Australia.

So why is **the anti-carbon tax rhetoric of BlueScope's chairman, Grahame Kraehe, and his chief executive, Paul O'Malley**, so extreme?

**In his National Press Club address in February, Kraehe spoke of a manufacturing industry "under siege"** and described proposals to compensate emissions-intensive trade exposed industries (EITEs) such as steelmaking as a "Band-Aid on a bullet wound".

On the ABC's Inside Business, **O'Malley attacked the carbon tax proposal as "economic vandalism"**.

O'Malley stopped short of saying the former emissions trading scheme would have shut down the steel industry, but he went close, repeatedly warning that a carbon price which wasn't imposed on imports would simply see our emissions shifted, "hidden" offshore.

**O'Malley "absolutely" saw the need for Australia to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.** "I've got four young kids," he told the ABC. "My wife and kids want me as a CEO of a manufacturing company to reduce our carbon emissions.

**"But to make steel - you cannot make steel through the blast furnace technology without emitting carbon, whether it's made in Australia, whether it's made in Korea, Taiwan, China or Japan.** Those producers send steel to Australia and compete with us. They are emitting carbon, and on average we're more efficient in producing steel with less carbon than those companies. **So if you shut us down**, you don't actually reduce the amount of carbon because steel will still come into Australia. That's the bit that doesn't make sense." (*The SMH*, April 9)

**An independent analysis** of the compensation arrangements under the old emissions trading scheme - which the government is using as a starting point for negotiations this time around - **was carried out last year by the Grattan Institute.** The **institute found that in some EITE sectors such as coal mining or LNG, compensation was completely unwarranted** as the industries remained extremely profitable despite a carbon price. In some industries, such as aluminium smelting or oil refining, much Australian plant was dirtier than offshore competitors and should be either cleaned up or shut down.

**But the institute recognised the steel industry had a case for compensation,** based on its relative emissions intensity and international competitiveness.

...There is **no doubt BlueScope will be hurt by the carbon tax: broker analysis regularly shows it is the Top 200 ASX-listed company likely to suffer the biggest hit to earnings**, depending on carbon price assumptions and the expected level of compensation. (*The SMH*, April 9)

**BlueScope chief executive Paul O'Malley** recently told the ABC **his company had spent more than \$500m in the past 10 years improving its environmental performance**, but was concerned that "if you take the policy being pushed by the Greens today, **there is no compensation for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries and that would have a minimum cost on us of \$300m a year**". (*The Australian*, April 12)

BlueScope is Australia's biggest steel producer and is therefore the biggest single emitter of so-called carbon dioxide equivalents. And **the way Kraehe was talking back in March**, carbon tax loomed as a "tipping point" for Australia's steel industry.

"So why are we in Australia contemplating a simplistic green agenda, **to sacrifice the livelihood of the thousands of hard working Australians** in manufacturing and related industries," Kraehe stated darkly.

..."We are at a loss to explain how Minister Combet has calculated a year-one carbon cost of \$2.60 per tonne of steel," **BlueScope's Paul O'Malley said** yesterday.

"**We believe this is a very selective use of the data and does not reflect the full impact of a carbon price** on Australian steelmakers.

"Data provided by the Minister's department shows an estimated year-one cost of the order of \$37 million. That comes after the company has just made a \$55m loss for the first half FY2011.

...**As Kraehe said in his remarkably gladiatorial speech: "The truth is a first-year tax burden would be almost three times the Garnaut estimate"**.

...**BlueScope estimates that it will stump up with something more than \$1bn in carbon tax** over the first 10 years of the scheme. And its problem is that it, like other trade-exposed manufacturers, simply will not be able to pass the cost of that tax through to its customers...

...As **Kraehe said**: "A tax on carbon produced in steelmaking is fine, as long as the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Indian, Russians, Americans, Brazilians and others have a similar tax. If this is not the case, Australia will simply transfer the carbon generation to countries without a carbon tax and **accelerate the hollowing out of the Australia economy.**" (*The Australian*, April 14)

**Australian Aluminium Council executive director Miles Prosser** rejected Mr Combet's suggestion that the impact of a carbon price on the industry would be minor. He said Mr Combet was comparing the carbon cost with revenue rather than profit. "The analysis is misleading and designed to **trivialise reasonable industry concern,**" he said.

**BlueScope Steel chief executive Paul O'Malley** was "at a loss to explain how Minister Combet has calculated a year one carbon cost of \$2.60 per tonne of steel".

"We believe this is a very selective use of the data and **does not reflect the full impact** of a carbon price on Australian steelmakers."

**He said BlueScope's costs would be more than \$8 a tonne of steel**, rising to more than five times Mr Combet's figures if carbon costs passed through from suppliers were included. (*The Australian*, April 14)

A **COALITION of clean energy groups and big companies will today urge the government** to establish an extensive energy saving program alongside a carbon tax to help lower power bills.

The group, which includes **energy giant AGL and the Clean Energy Council**, said Labor should accept the findings of a government advisory group which last year recommended a national scheme be set up requiring electricity retailers to ensure their industry and household customers use less energy.

The scheme could **save households between \$50 and \$243 a year on their power bills** and would be complementary to a carbon tax, the business coalition said. Medium-scale industry could save between \$10,608 and \$23,712 a year under the scheme.

...**The task group's report also recommended setting a target of cutting energy intensity** - the amount of energy used per dollar of gross domestic product - by 30 per cent over the next decade, requiring an average cut in power use of 16 per cent for every Australian.

**A spokeswoman for AGL said the company "has long been an advocate of the establishment of a national energy efficiency scheme** which amalgamates the various state-based schemes currently in operation".

"We support the government in implementing this, as a complementary policy to a carbon price, as soon as possible."

The **chief executive of Clean Energy Council, Matthew Warren, said** a national energy efficiency scheme needed to be complementary to the implementation of a carbon price.

"It's the most effective way to help households and businesses save money on their power bills. As Minister Combet said in his address to the National Press Club yesterday, any additional savings that households can make from energy efficiency will be extra money in the bank after compensation is allocated."

The energy efficiency push comes as **a group of 21 companies, including AGL, BP, IKEA GE, Linfox and Arup came out in support of a carbon price** yesterday, following a week of complaints from the mining and manufacturing sectors about Labor's carbon tax plans.

**In a joint statement the companies said: "As the costs of action are outweighed by the costs of delay** the carbon price should be implemented as soon as possible."

The **chief executive of GE Australia, Steve Sargent, said the political debate on a carbon tax was too negative and there were significant business opportunities in carbon pricing.**

The **sustainability manager at Linfox, David McInnes, said the company accepted that carbon emissions cause global warming and climate change.**

"We have accepted establishing **a price on carbon is an important long-term reform that will improve our energy efficiency and drive low-carbon innovation, benefiting the economy and the environment.**" (*The SMH*, April 14)

FURTHER light has been shed on how far apart the federal climate change minister is with his own department over critical advice provided to an Australian steelmaker.

**Figures seen by BusinessDaily support claims that Bluescope Steel made** after Greg Combet outlined the government's climate change policy on Wednesday.

In his speech, Mr Combet said that a tonne of steel would be taxed at \$2.60 based on a carbon price of \$20 a tonne. **Yesterday, BusinessDaily was shown the figures the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency gave to Bluescope late last month.**

Those numbers confirm that the tax would be equal to \$8.23 a tonne using a carbon price of \$26.10 a tonne -- \$6.10 above the figure Mr Combet projected in his speech to the National Press Club on Wednesday.

**Bluescope calculates that at \$8.23 a tonne it will have to pay the government more than \$38 million next year.** In the first half of this year Bluescope racked up a \$55 million loss.

**Company officials also say** that Mr Combet failed to explain in his speech that the 94.5 per cent of emissions assistance to be made available to steelmakers under the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme will apply only at the hot rolled stage of steel production. (*Herald Sun*, April 15)

At this stage, two interesting articles appeared in the *SMH*, in the face of this corporate momentum. The first, written by Jessica Irvine with the headline "Sweetener Can't Negate Need for Sacrifice", is notable as one of the few articles caught up in this economic debate to actually mention the looming environmental disaster indicated by the "findings of the vast majority of climate scientists":

...This will be the tax that tickles, rather than cripples, the government argued, seeking to counter scare-mongering about how a great big new tax will push up the cost of everything from mangoes to mandolins.

...The government is in dangerous territory here, trying to sell its carbon pricing scheme on the basis that it won't hurt. Putting a price on carbon means, at least in the short term, shifting to a way of doing things that is by definition more expensive than the way we do them now.

But the cost of action must always be referenced against the cost of inaction. **If you accept the findings of the vast majority of climate scientists, climate change will impose increasing direct costs from rising sea levels and more droughts and catastrophic weather events.**

...Pricing carbon involves sacrifice now to avoid even greater sacrifice in the future. (*The SMH*, April 16)

The second article, titled “Business Carbon Tax: Belligerence, Bluffs and Poker Faces”, written by Clancy Yeates and Mathew Murphy with Gareth Hutchens, attempted to bring some considered balance back into the debate. However, as a kind of ‘ledger’ in the narrative thus far, it was notable as a detailed look at positions regarding the macro economic frame, which clearly illustrates how corporate voices enjoyed much more representation in this regard than non-profit organisations. To examine this point in the narrative, again the article is included here almost in full:

**Only months ago, business leaders seemed happy to sit on the sidelines of the carbon price debate.** They quietly warned senior ministers things would get nasty if business views were ignored but public criticism of the plan was limited.

**Now, however, the gloves are coming off. Gripes about inadequate consultation have morphed into outright opposition** among several blue-chip companies **including BlueScope Steel, Woodside** and other manufacturers. **The latest attack came from Woodside's chief executive, Don Voelte, who joined big miners and steelmakers in demanding effective exemptions** from the scheme until other countries follow suit.

But how accurately do these critics represent the business community? In an attempt to gauge where corporate Australia stands on the carbon debate, this week Weekend Business surveyed the biggest 50 companies on the ASX.

**The survey revealed relatively few who were as openly hostile as Voelte**, with only three companies opposing the tax. **But it also showed support was heavily qualified** with a growing list of demands for compensation.

**A substantial number of companies also remained undecided** - or unwilling - to reveal their hand, as negotiations over compensation heat up. Sensing a possible cave-in after Julia Gillard's government's capitulation to the mining industry, companies are playing their cards carefully, **with a growing list demanding to be shielded from a carbon price.**

This pressure sets the scene for a furious debate about industry compensation, to be played out in coming weeks. So what exactly is business demanding from the carbon plan? And just how seriously should the threats be taken?

The government has sharpened its message this time around, having failed under the former prime minister Kevin Rudd to adequately explain the emissions trading scheme.

Gone is the rhetoric about climate change being "the great moral challenge of our generation" and about protecting the environment from rising sea levels and one-in-1000-year weather events. Now, the government is spruiking that pricing carbon is about "creating the jobs of the future" and making the big emitters pay for their contribution to the problem.

At the National Press Club on Wednesday, the Climate Change Minister, Greg Combet, was less about sending a price signal through the whole economy so that everyone from big companies right down to households could reduce energy use and more about giving the impression that the problem could almost be quarantined to big business.

...How this plays out with households is yet to be seen. However, the Herald's survey of the ASX 50 suggests there is a fair degree of ambivalence on pricing carbon - or at least a reluctance to discuss it publicly.

**Twelve of the 50 backed Canberra's plan to** introduce a carbon price, including some of the country's biggest emitters. However, **this support is heavily qualified with calls for compensation for trade-exposed, emissions-intensive industries** that would be disadvantaged relative to overseas rivals.

**Three firms flatly opposed the move - Woodside, BlueScope and Coca-Cola Amatil** said Australia shouldn't move before rivals overseas and pricing carbon threatened already-struggling sectors.

**Eight of the top 50 were uncommitted**, while the remaining 27 companies did not respond to the survey. This group included firms with a clear interest in such a major economic change, including the Commonwealth Bank, Rio Tinto and Leighton.

**Qantas, BHP Billiton, Newcrest Mining, AGL Energy and Incitec Pivot all supported a carbon price, on the proviso that trade-exposed businesses were compensated for loss of competitiveness to overseas rivals.** Qantas, for example, now faces a carbon price in Europe, New Zealand, and Australia - and the company said it was discussing a "range of options" for assistance.

**Newcrest claimed Australia's probable transitional assistance was "out of step"** with the approach taken in Europe, where trade-exposed businesses receive more protection, it argued.

"Closer alignment by Australia with the only other major international scheme **would limit the potential disadvantage to Australian exporters and importers** and provide a broader platform for global action in future," the company said.

**LNG companies** - exporters, but which still will face greater costs under the previous scheme - put a similar argument and **want to be effectively excluded from the scheme** until overseas rivals introduce a carbon price.

**In September, BHP's chief executive, Marius Kloppers, supported a model of pricing carbon since adopted by the government and this is seen as a turning point in the debate.** The speech put climate change back on the front page and gave the government momentum to change its "no tax" stance and propose a broad framework in line with the views of Australia's biggest company. **But BHP was coy this week on declaring its full support** for the government's plan until more policy detail is released.

Energy companies AGL and Origin, having long pushed for a carbon price, stand to profit handsomely from the extra demand for gas-generated power. But **Origin is planning a \$35 billion LNG project in Queensland and pushing for more exemptions for LNG**, and did not respond to the survey.

**Even among supportive businesses** that should be able to pass a carbon price to customers with ease - such as Woolworths and property giant GPT - **support comes with conditions.** Woolworths backed compensation for low- and middle-income households, as promised by the government this week.

**Westpac and Suncorp broadly backed the government's approach but were the only banks to do so.** The Westpac chief executive, Gail Kelly, is on record as backing a price on carbon. Given that lenders stand to profit handsomely from the creation of a new carbon market, both banks would prefer an emissions trading scheme to a tax.

**The insurance company IAG also tempered its support** by arguing that adjusting the impact of climate change should also be a top priority for government. "This will involve investing in appropriate infrastructure, strengthening building standards, encouraging self-responsibility via insurance, education and other measures," an IAG spokesman said.

**In short, even businesses that support a carbon price are asking for a range of conditions** to protect shareholder profits.

On the other side of the fence are a smaller group of firms such as Woodside that have openly opposed the tax. **BlueScope Steel's boss, Paul O'Malley, is the most vocal in the "no" camp and says a carbon tax will push up the price of Australian-made products and exports but do nothing to reduce emissions** from Australia's steel sector.

"A better way [to reduce Australia's emissions] would be to adopt a sector-by-sector approach to carbon pricing that doesn't disadvantage local manufacturers as compared to importers," BlueScope said. "This combined with tax incentives to promote R&D investment in carbon effective technologies."

**Coca-Cola Amatil would not support introducing a carbon price next year.** It said Australia's efforts to reduce emissions should centre on research and development tax breaks, incentives for adopting clean energy strategies and allowing accelerated depreciation on energy inefficient equipment to be upgraded.

"Australian food and beverage manufacturers, as well as many farmers and fruit and vegetable growers, are **already under significant pressure from cheap packaged imports** due to the high Australian dollar and yet another tax will only exacerbate this pressure," the company said.

Its **chief executive, Terry Davis, said there had also been insufficient detail** on how manufacturers would be affected by moves to price carbon.

**Voelte this week said a carbon price - alongside tax changes and soaring labour costs - could endanger the benefits flowing from the resources boom.** "There's a point where this whole good news story for this country could either be delayed, or at least postponed, until more certainty is given," he said.

**Many companies, however, aim to keep their powder dry** until the government provides details on a carbon price and transitional assistance. **"It hardly makes sense for us to state a position publicly until we see the details," one spokesman said.** "It would be like showing your cards in the final round of a high-stakes poker game."

**Top executives also say business leaders sense an opportunity to demand more compensation** because the government has caved in once to mining company demands. To avoid another damaging fight with big business, some businesses think, the government will capitulate again.

Beyond corporate gamesmanship, **however, some of the doomsday scenarios described by chief executives are meeting growing scepticism, not just from**

**green groups.** The investment community is also raising doubts - **broker research suggests the impact will be nowhere near as great as** some chief executives have warned.

**Citi, assuming the same level of compensation as under the previous scheme, found a fairly moderate impact,** with the value of most companies affected by between 0.5 per cent and 4 per cent.

**"The numbers as we've crunched them look relatively small," Elaine Prior, a Citi analyst, said.** "We think that the impact on individual companies won't be nearly as big as is sometimes being suggested, and we know that some of the media debate has been on the basis that there would no compensation for industries."

It also appears the prediction by BlueScope's chairman, Graeme Kraehe, that carbon pricing would "sacrifice" the steel industry may have overstepped the mark. A Deutsche Bank analyst, Tim Jordan, concluded that impacts of a carbon price would be "modest," predicting a 5.2 per cent hit to earnings for BlueScope and 2.3 per cent for OneSteel.

**Some of the loudest opponents of a carbon price have also found themselves under attack over their transparency** on carbon. **Woodside was one of four Australian companies targeted last year by the Climate Advocacy Fund, a joint initiative between the Climate Institute and Ethical Investor,** which proposed shareholder resolutions calling for greater disclosure on the portion of shareholder value that could be impacted by a carbon price.

The push for openness and transparency on carbon positions and disclosure is also starting to drive a wedge between longstanding allies.

**In a rare show of defiance, the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors,** the country's largest shareholder voting adviser, **revealed yesterday that it would defy Woodside's recommendation to reject the Climate Advocacy Fund resolution** at next week's annual meeting. **The Climate Institute's Julian Poulter said investors** deserved to know **how companies were managing risk.**

"Woodside CEO Don Voelte has talked about project risk and carbon regulation," he said, "but in the next breath Woodside wants investors to provide billions of dollars of capital based on some vague hope that global growth in carbon regulation slows down. It's not going to."

Andrew Gray, Goldman Sachs's head of environmental, social and governance research, said companies were entitled not to have a position.

"That includes things like having committees and even board members responsible for the company's approach to carbon," he said. "Answers to these questions tell us how considered and well-formulated their view might be so we then know how the company is managing the risk."

Business leaders also question some of their peers' doomsday scenarios.

In a frank assessment of business's campaign against the carbon price, **GE Capital's regional chief executive, Steve Sargent, warned against accepting the argument that "the world will end"** on face value.

**"This is a movie we have all seen before," he said.** "When George Bush snr was in the White House he introduced the Clean Air Act which companies in the US, including GE, were outraged. We screamed. We said, 'This is going to shut down our business, we will never be able to comply, we will have to put off jobs.'

**"We put out all the arguments that you are hearing now and guess what? It didn't happen.** But today we sell a locomotive that has 90 per cent less emissions than it did back then. There are sectors that will need support as well as some low-income households but that shouldn't stop Australia moving on this issue."

**GE was joined by a handful of big businesses including AGL, BP, Ikea, Linfox and Pacific Hydro in calling for the federal government to introduce a carbon price "as soon as possible".**

"We really need to stop thinking that this will mean acting ahead of the world. **We actually have a long way to catch up.** Germany has broken the nexus between strong economic growth, strong trade growth and increasing greenhouse gas emissions," **Sargent said.** **"With Australia, we have gotten worse. We have grown our economy but we are No. 6 in terms of the worst-performing greenhouse gas emitters** per capita behind countries like Bahrain, Brunei and Qatar."

In their defence, business groups fiercely deny they are only seeking corporate welfare.

The **deputy chief executive of the Business Council of Australia, Maria Tarrant, rejected critics' suggestions** businesses were seeking more compensation out of corporate greed. Instead, **she said companies are trying to tell the government that the global environment had changed substantially since 2008** when the carbon pollution reduction scheme was developed.

"Three years down the track [there are] a whole lot of regional and individual country approaches. It's very clear that it's unrealistic to expect that most of our competitors will have explicit carbon prices on their products - **we don't think we are heading towards a level playing field internationally,**" she said.

Although the public debate homes in on the carbon question, **Tarrant said many companies were also under growing pressure from the strong dollar, labour constraints and the impact of rising commodity prices.** Businesses that faced higher energy costs but did not qualify for compensation also **fear they will struggle** to pass the full cost onto more frugal households, she said.

"The impact of carbon pricing, particularly for those that are not in the [emissions-intensive trade-exposed] group but are exporting, is much greater today. **That price impost comes on top of a lot of other things.**"

The dilemma, however, is that prolonging the debate about compensation only adds to market uncertainty.

**And after years spent debating these issues, AMP Capital Investors analyst Ian Woods said more uncertainty is not conducive to shareholder value.** There's a valid argument for transitional assistance, he says, but the longer we wait, the more expensive it becomes to cut carbon.

"It would not be correct to say that somehow we are going it alone or leading. The longer we wait, the more change is needed to reach the 2020 target." (*The SMH*, April 16)

Throughout the rest of April, strident corporate voices clearly 'rejecting' or 'defying' the Carbon Tax gathered both unity and urgency, despite the occasional confirmation of ongoing or tacit agreement that carbon emissions *should* be reduced. In particular, the 'economic vandalism' and 'economic benefit' frames continued to compete for salience, bolstered by 'bad or good government or policy' frames and 'widespread opposition or support' frames:

Leaders of major coal companies -- including **BHP, Rio Tinto, Xstrata, Anglo American Coal, Centennial Coal and Peabody Energy** -- will be in Canberra today for talks on **"special circumstances" facing the industry.**

Resources Minister Martin Ferguson is due to brief business leaders on negotiations with the steel, liquefied natural gas and coal industries on transitional assistance in the wake of their calls for exemptions.

**The Australian has obtained documents circulated to the industry** transitional working group that compare emissions regimes in Europe and New Zealand with Kevin Rudd's 2009 carbon pollution reduction scheme.

The committee, which includes **representatives of Woodside Petroleum, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Xstrata Coal, BlueScope Steel, OneSteel, Shell and Origin Energy**, has been provided with details of a speech by Productivity Commission chairman Gary Banks, which outlined its approach to comparing international carbon prices.

... **As the carbon debate raged** in Canberra, **BHP Billiton flagged the expansion of its Pilbara region iron ore mines, ports and railways** that could triple the company's production over the next decade if Chinese growth continued to support demand.

The staged project, known as the Port Hedland outer harbour development, would rival the West Australian LNG operations Gorgon and the North West Shelf **as the nation's biggest resources projects**.

It would also **boost the nation's annual commodities revenue by \$US22bn a year** based on analysts' long-term estimates for iron ore prices.

...As well as BHP's plans, **Rio Tinto has ambitions to grow its Australian iron ore capacity** from about 225 million tonnes to 433 million tonnes.

**Andrew Forrest's Fortescue Metals Group plans to grow** from about 50 million tonnes a year to 350 million tonnes, which is why analysts expect prices to drop.

...Yesterday, **amid a growing backlash from unions and the business community over the carbon tax**, senior federal ministers, including Infrastructure Minister Anthony Albanese, played down **the latest opinion poll, which put Labor's standing at its lowest in 15 years**. (*The Australian*, April 19)

**THE nation's six biggest coal companies say the only way to cut emissions from the sector by 2020 is to close mines**.

As Julia Gillard yesterday moved to stare down **the growing business backlash** over the carbon tax, the **coal chief executives of BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Xstrata, Anglo American Coal, Centennial Coal and Peabody Energy flatly rejected** the government's proposed carbon tax compensation plan, **warning of billions of dollars in lost investment**.

The Prime Minister restated her commitment to a carbon price, hitting back at **Business Council of Australia president Graham Bradley**.

**Mr Bradley** wrote to Ms Gillard last week, **saying it was "disappointing" that the government** was already determining the allocation of revenues it expected to generate from a carbon price **without first resolving critical design details**.

... **The letter emerged** following an intense day of negotiations between the government and senior business figures in Canberra that **failed to resolve the carbon pricing deadlock**.

...Speaking after the meeting between the coal executives and Climate Change Minister Greg Combet, **Australian Coal Association chief executive Ralph Hillman said** Australia was the **only country in the world contemplating including fugitive emissions** -- gasses that escape during the mining process -- in a carbon price, and they **should be exempted** from the scheme.

**He said the industry had told the government to "go back to the drawing board"** after Mr Combet indicated it would develop the carbon pricing policy within the framework of Kevin Rudd's carbon pollution reduction scheme, which was dumped before last year's election.

**Mr Hillman said the CPRS approach represented a major risk to the competitiveness of Australian coalmining.**

The ACA now plans to meet directly with MPs in coal electorates and is yet to rule out an advertising campaign against a carbon pricing plan. "If we don't get this right, **investment will move offshore** to other countries such as South Africa, Colombia, Indonesia and Mongolia, who would take Australia's place in supplying Asian markets," **Mr Hillman told The Australian**.

...The **paper recycling industry said yesterday it was also under threat** from the carbon tax, with cardboard packaging giant Visy **warning it could be penalised** for diverting waste away from methane-producing landfill. (*The Australian*, April 20)

It is premature to say that a perfect storm has emerged against Julia Gillard's pledge to legislate a carbon price. But Gillard's policy is in jeopardy.

...This change towards "bottom-up" national agendas weakens Australia's momentum for a carbon price. **The growing alarm of the Business Council of Australia was displayed in the April 15 letter from BCA chief Graham Bradley**

to Gillard saying that **Australia accounted for only 1.5 per cent of global emissions and it ``must act in tandem with international action not ahead of it''**. This is Abbott's future script, namely, that **it is irresponsible to price carbon when the US and China do not**.

...The **BCA says industry compensation under Rudd's scheme is insufficient ``to offset the impact of a carbon price''** in future years. Given the absence of carbon prices in competing nations and ``current pressures" on Australia's economy, **the BCA deems it ``essential" that Gillard now ``fully offsets" any carbon price imposed on such industries**. It says failure to act **threatens manufacturing, agricultural and resource-based businesses and puts jobs at risk**. But this is a demand that Gillard cannot meet at face value.

To reinforce this momentum **nearly 40 senior industry executives and heads of six industry associations (including mining, food, plastics and small business) wrote to the PM**, again on April 15, wanting measures that ``fully preserve" Australia's international competitiveness. Again, this is a demand that Gillard cannot meet at face value.

**Such orchestration from wide sections of business and industry, along with union alarm, constitute the most serious turn of sentiment against carbon pricing** since the BCA's historic change of policy in late 2006 that encouraged the Howard government to its ETS. The politics of climate change hover on the edge of going into reverse.

...The third obstacle is **the power sector**. It is staying silent for the moment. But **it calculates that under Rudd's scheme it faced a \$10 billion loss in asset value** in the coal sector with the risk that brown coal generators would breach their debt covenants. (*The Australian*, April 20)

**WOODSIDE Petroleum chairman Michael Chaney has joined the business backlash** over the Gillard government's plans for a carbon tax, **arguing that the move could lead to customers rejecting Australia** as a supplier of liquefied natural gas or **turning to dirtier energy sources** such as coal.

Ignoring calls by Climate Change Minister Greg Combet for business chiefs to express their concerns about the tax behind closed doors, **Mr Chaney told hundreds of Woodside shareholders yesterday** that it was ``extremely important" that **LNG be recognised as a clean fuel that could help reduce global emissions**.

His comments came as **Climate Institute chief executive John Conner hit out at the industry campaign** against the costs of putting a price on carbon, **releasing research showing that electricity price rises** were primarily being driven by the cost of network upgrades and **not the decision to price carbon**.

**Mr Chaney is one of the nation's most senior corporate leaders**. He is also chairman of **National Australia Bank** and a former president of the **Business Council of Australia**.

**“Woodside does not support the application of a carbon price to our trade-exposed exports at a time our competitors do not face such costs,”** Mr Chaney told Woodside's annual general meeting in Perth.

**“Placing a carbon price on Australian LNG risks two outcomes: customers either look past Australia for cheaper supplies of LNG produced by countries which do not have a carbon price, or they continue to use higher-emitting energy sources such as coal.”**

**Mr Chaney's comments** echo those made by other LNG producers, who want the sector to receive full compensation for any **extra costs imposed by a carbon price**.

**The Climate Institute research** shows a carbon price of \$25 a tonne would add about \$3.86 a week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012-13, while rising network costs -- which have nothing to do with **a pollution price** and would happen regardless -- would add \$7.88 a week to the bill.

The 20 per cent renewable energy target backed by both the ALP and the Coalition accounted for \$1.25 a week for the average Sydney household.

**“For around the cost of one sausage sandwich a week, putting a price on pollution will help change the investment and power generation decisions necessary to help put Australia on the path to a low-pollution, clean-energy future,”** Mr Connor said.

**The research also shows Australia's power sector ranks among the world's top 10 most polluting**, along with countries such as Botswana, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mongolia and Estonia. (*The Australian*, April 21)

**With the carbon tax debate reaching fever pitch, the Climate Institute will today release its own research** that shows a \$25 carbon price will add about

\$3.86 a week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012-13. "This is slightly higher than the amount estimated by Treasury but **a third less than suggested by the Coalition and some business groups,**" **the institute's chief executive, John Connor, said.** This **impost** would be reduced to \$2.45 a week due to other energy efficiency policies. **"This is about the cost of a sausage sandwich."**

By comparison, rising electricity network costs, which have nothing to do with a carbon price and will happen regardless, will add \$7.88 a week to the same power bills.

The Treasurer, Wayne Swan, accused vested interests of "hysterical scaremongering" yesterday while the war of words between the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and **the Business Council of Australia**, continued apace.

On Sunday, **the council's chief executive, Graham Bradley**, wrote to Ms Gillard **saying her policy would hurt business and industry and have no meaningful impact on global emissions.**

...**Mr Bradley said yesterday that the BCA acknowledged the target**, believed in a market-based mechanism **but will only support policies where the "environmental benefit is clear" and "the competitiveness of Australia's exporters is not diminished"**. (*The SMH*, April 21)

As the month drew to a close, some interesting narrative contradictions in the debate were raised by journalists. Firstly, *The Australian's* Terry McCrann slammed the BCA president for an apparent 'back down' in its criticism of the Gillard government:

THE exchanges between **BCA president Graham Bradley** and the Prime Minister last week were instructive, revealing and ultimately depressing. And also humiliating. For Bradley.

They were initiated by a letter to the PM from Bradley. It was tough, even aggressive. But it was substantive, very detailed, and sensible. It laid out precisely **the very large number of major concerns with the government's unilateral move to impose a carbon tax.** In sum, it **demonstrated why the proposal made no sense -- even in its own environmental and business and economic terms.** It led to only one possible conclusion. There was **no way the BCA could support this carbon tax** or any conceivable modified version of it.

...The response from Bradley was at best embarrassing. **He and his fellow BCA members folded like a pack of cards. They effectively stated that their initial missive with its powerful, substantive points, was "no longer operative".**

What made it all so much worse was that Bradley closed his letter with a snivelling, mealy-mouthed restatement of the issues that rendered the proposed carbon tax so pointless and yet so destructive.

**Bradley's initial -- "no longer operative" -- letter had stated with great clarity exactly why the proposed carbon tax would be a disaster not just for business and the economy but the country.** It deserved, it demanded an answer that actually engaged with its substance. That at core, any carbon policy had to maintain economic growth, international competitiveness and a viable electricity sector. What then should be self-evident: Australia should act in tandem with international action, not ahead of it.

Specifically and further, policy should ensure that the advantages arising from our relatively cost-competitive energy industry were not diminished without commensurate environmental benefits.

In that context, only significant and ongoing reductions by major emitting nations would over time materially reduce the risks of environmental damage to Australia, his letter had stated.

**Bradley came close, very close, to actually stating that the proposed 5 per cent cut in emissions would be utterly pointless in "environmental terms".** It would lead to a cut in global emissions of all of 0.075 per cent, over a period when China alone would increase global emissions by hundreds of times that if not thousands of times.

**But it would still wreak havoc across Australian industry.** In particular, **Bradley put on the table the potential damage to future investment** in electricity generation. The end product of which would be **prices higher than they otherwise needed to be -- and a "major setback to Australia's efforts to improve productivity across all sectors of the economy"**. Bradley stated the BCA position clearly and unequivocally. BCA would support policies to reduce Australia's greenhouse gas emissions where the environmental benefit was clear; the competitiveness of Australia's exporters was not diminished; and the transition to less emissions-intensive electricity followed a planned approach that did not prematurely close plants without adequate compensation, and the risk of generators breaching their debt covenants was removed.

Yes, this was tough. But it raised matters that are basic and have to be addressed by any government purportedly aiming for good policy outcomes in the national interest. All he got from Gillard was empty motherhood statements about carbon pollution (sic) and acting on climate change; and a thinly veiled threat to wedge Bradley and the BCA. (*The Australian*, April 23)

Then, the *SMH's* Phillip Coorey took to task the key arguments of those "vehemently against" the tax, explaining how much of it was "disingenuous":

SUCCESS in politics often assumes people are pretty stupid, have short memories, didn't pay attention in the first place, don't care, or several of the above. **Take the current debate about the government's plans to price carbon** which, if it eventuates, will start as a de facto carbon tax for three to five years before morphing into an emissions trading scheme.

**While there has been plenty of criticism thrown at the Gillard government's handling of the process** - ranging from the broken "no carbon tax" promise, to the decision to announce the bones of the scheme without any detail - the other side of the argument is far from pure itself but receives little scrutiny.

Many of those arguing vehemently against the government's plans were content enough with the compromised scheme that was nussed out two years ago between the Rudd government and the opposition led by Malcolm Turnbull. **Now, the most common refrain is that "things have changed".**

From what we have been able to glean so far, the substance of the proposed new scheme, especially the transitional assistance that is being developed for export-exposed industries, is pretty much the same as last time. The industry assistance from the old scheme has been the starting point for negotiations for this scheme. **Big industry has stipulated the assistance be at least that good this time** and the government has given the same assurance.

...One of the most common complaints today from those which the Greens call "rent seekers" is that the old scheme was devised before the global financial crisis struck and made business conditions worse.

The incoming president of the **Business Council of Australia, Jennifer Westacott, told the ABC** last week, on behalf of her group's powerful members, that "things have changed".

"Firstly, we've had a global financial crisis and **many sectors of the Australian economy are still soft.**"

What she failed to mention, however, was that when the last scheme was negotiated the global financial crisis was well advanced and, consequently, a "GFC buffer" was added to the compensation. The 90 per cent free permits for heavy emitters was increased to 94.5 per cent and the 60 per cent for the lesser emitters went to 66 per cent. Should these same levels be offered now the impact of the financial crisis is already factored in.

**Another common refrain, and one which was very influential last time, is that Australia will put its industries at risk** because other countries, in which their competitors operate, are not taking any action on climate change.

Again, thanks largely to Turnbull who remodelled the scheme to reflect that which John Howard promised at the 2007 election, the old scheme was designed to enable Australian industry to remain competitive until, or when, there was a global price on carbon.

Last week, even Ian Macfarlane, who was Turnbull's chief emissions trading scheme negotiator, argued "the whole context has changed" because "Australia is going this alone". This was the polar opposite of his stated views two years ago. (People in the government readily admit Turnbull's absence from the debate this time is making their task far more difficult.)

**Another argument put forward by the opposition is simply disingenuous** when contrasted against its own actions and that **is that the carbon scheme will have no meaningful impact in reducing global emissions.**

"Whatever your views are, there is one absolute fact that this tax is going to do nothing to the climate," the Nationals senator Barnaby Joyce said last week.

Well may this be the case but if so, why is the opposition promising to blow billions from the budget on direct action measures to achieve the exact same reductions in emissions that the government's carbon tax will aim to achieve?

...If the Coalition were honest, it would do nothing and be proud of it. Instead, it's having a very expensive bet each way just in case. (*The SMH*, April 25)

Third, *The Australian's* Michael Sainsbury reported that Marius Kloppers, BHP CEO, had effectively 'shifted' away from the tax, despite his continued "support for action to cut carbon emissions". This new 'position' would also be highlighted by subsequent stories:

**JULIA Gillard is under mounting pressure** to give exporters a special deal under her proposed carbon tax after **BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers yesterday became the latest business leader to warn** that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a **``dead weight" on high-polluting industries**.

**Mr Kloppers**, the head of the world's biggest mining company **who last year championed putting a price on carbon**, yesterday reinforced the company's support for action to cut carbon emissions but told **The Australian the government's climate change measures should adopt a ``sector-specific" or ``mosaic" approach**.

**Any carbon tax had to be designed to cut emissions -- not simply raise revenue -- and had to be trade-friendly**, he said in Beijing, hours after appearing side-by-side with the Prime Minister at a function marking BHP's contribution to fund five scholarships bolstering Australian studies at the Beijing University.

**Mr Kloppers said that ``in the absence of a global scheme, any carbon taxes you impose on an exported product basically is just dead weight"**.

**He said that from the start** of the carbon tax debate **the global giant had raised concerns about penalising Australian manufacturers** relative to their international peers, particularly **given their struggles** with high operating costs exacerbated by the soaring Australian dollar.

A broad-based **carbon tax**, he said, **would affect BHP's business** if there were **``no rebating for trade-exposed industries"**.

A **BHP spokesman confirmed that Mr Kloppers believed there should be ``some form of treatment" to recognise export sector industries** under the carbon tax, **echoing growing calls for special deals** across the economy, including from the steel industry, cement manufacturers, food and groceries, oil, gas and aluminium.

**Mr Kloppers' comments**, which come on the first anniversary of then prime minister Kevin Rudd's decision to abandon the carbon pollution reduction scheme, **will be interpreted as a shift. Just weeks after last year's federal election, Mr Kloppers became the first chief executive of a major company to support a price on carbon**, urging Australia to act before any international agreement in order to protect the nation's long-term economic interests. **But yesterday he said Australia ``should not penalise your trade-exposed industries"** by imposing a carbon tax ahead of international competitors.

Citing liquefied natural gas and alumina -- an industry where BHP does have Australian operations -- **he said ``anything that you do something different from your trade partners in a trading industry is just a dead-weight cost''**. (*The Australian*, April 28)

INDEPENDENT Tony Windsor has challenged the world's biggest miner, BHP Billiton, to declare where it stands on the carbon tax and has publicly thrown down the gauntlet to industry critics to offer up an alternative plan to cut emissions.

The call by the crossbencher, whose support is crucial to Julia Gillard's minority government, for industry to ``put up or shut up" on the carbon tax **comes after BHP chief executive Marius Kloppers warned that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a ``dead weight"** on high-polluting exporters.

...The Gillard **government faces rising opposition** to its carbon-pricing strategy, as **industries and unions lobby hard for more exclusions**, higher levels of compensation and stronger links to international action on climate change than under the dumped carbon pollution reduction scheme.

...**Large polluting industries in Australia that compete internationally, including the mining and manufacturing sectors, have warned** that Mr Combet's plan to legislate this year to introduce a carbon tax from July next year could **price them out of the market** if their offshore rivals were not penalised for their emissions.

...A **BHP Billiton spokeswoman** confirmed the carbon tax was on the agenda at yesterday's meeting with Mr Windsor and said the talks formed part of the company's regular briefings with MPs from all sides of politics on major issues.

**She said the company's support for Australia's adoption of a carbon price had not changed** since it was enunciated last year.

``The position they put to Mr Windsor was **BHP's longstanding position that they expect the trade-exposed sectors to be protected so that carbon emissions and jobs aren't exported,**" the spokeswoman said.

After the federal election, **Mr Kloppers became the first chief executive of a major company to support a price on carbon.**

...In China this week, **he said Australia should not penalise its trade-exposed industries** by imposing a carbon tax ahead of international competitors. (*The Australian*, April 29)

**MINING giant Rio Tinto has added its weight** to calls for Julia Gillard to reassure big polluting industries that **her carbon tax plans will not damage Australia's international competitiveness, warning it is unwise to act** before China and the US.

**In an exclusive interview with The Weekend Australian, Rio Tinto chairman Jan du Plessis urged the Gillard government to rethink its carbon pricing policy** and timing, saying it **threatened the Australian economy** when other leading economies appeared to be stalling on climate change action. "The question is, how and when does Australia move in the light of the disappointment of the Copenhagen conference and in light of the fact there are very few signs the big gorillas -- the US and China -- really are going to be moving," the London-based Mr du Plessis said in Sydney.

Rio, which earned about 70 per cent of its 2010 profit from Australia, is the world's third-biggest miner and is a leading supplier of coal to Asia.

**Mr du Plessis has spoken out as criticism grows** about the government's interim carbon tax, which is due to begin from July next year.

**This week, BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers warned the Prime Minister that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a "dead weight"** on heavy polluting industries, and the nation should not penalise its "trade-exposed industries" by moving ahead of its international competitors.

...**Mr du Plessis said his concerns were from an Australian business perspective**, rather than a mining one, and centred around how an initial price would be determined and the **impact on businesses** that have global competitors.

"If the Australian government, with all the best intentions in the world, is going to move too fast and eventually **simply damage energy-intensive, trade-exposed business at a cost to Australia as a country**, whilst China and America don't move, I am not sure that is smart," he said. "The time has come from the **government side to give reassurances that while the government is passionate about dealing with climate change -- which I admire -- it is not going to do it in a way that damages Australian businesses** at a time when the rest of the world doesn't appear ready to move."

Rio, which is listed on the London and Australian stock exchanges, has put its views to the government through its **Australian unit's managing director, David Peever**, who sits on the climate change business roundtable.

**Mr du Plessis said Rio believed there was enough scientific evidence to draw a "very clear link" between carbon emissions and global warming.** He said Ms Gillard was making a brave stand trying to tackling the issue after the failure of the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 to reach consensus and the abandonment last year of the Rudd government's carbon pollution reduction scheme.

**"I think the Prime Minister was courageous to sort of say to Australians, 'Let's have this debate again', because I think the debate should be had, and I admire her for that,"** he said.

**But he questioned whether now was the right time to implement the type of policy being suggested.** He thought the government was listening to industry and he expected its next move would be to give business confidence that trade-exposed business would be suitably protected.

The **government has faced rising dissent among businesses and unions**, including from Australian Workers Union national secretary Paul Howes, since it announced it would legislate this year for a carbon tax without releasing details of its starting price, operation, or compensation scheme. (*The Australian*, April 30)

### **1-13 May 2011:**

During the first weeks of May, the final period of this study, the main economic arguments continued. Opponent positions stressed the "growing resistance" to an economy-wrecking policy, while supportive positions still tried to explain the value of a "decarbonised economy". However, after three months of the debate, this period is most notable for two key pieces of co-opted support, which emerged for both campaigns. On the anti-Carbon Tax side, the latest research was published showing very low public support for the tax. Conversely, on the pro-Carbon Tax side, a group of prominent climate-change action supporters announced a national campaign to "rescue Julia Gillard's carbon tax".

AN INDEPENDENT carbon bank, similar to the Reserve Bank, should be set up to oversee a carbon price and **investment in clean technology, the peak renewable energy lobby says.**

**The Clean Energy Council will today release a discussion paper** proposing the carbon bank, which it says could be allowed to borrow money to invest in renewable energy projects against the future revenue of Labor's proposed carbon tax and emissions trading scheme.

Like the Reserve Bank, a carbon bank would have the advantage of distancing efforts to tackle climate change from daily political pressures, the council says.

"Like interest rates, **managing short-term political pressures may not always be consistent with the long-term goal of the lowest cost transition to a decarbonised economy," the paper says.**

"Independent institutions may be better placed to make these difficult decisions that inevitably will arise in the future."

The **chief executive of the Clean Energy Council, Matthew Warren, told the Herald** the job would be so big that several independent bodies could be needed, instead of one central agency...

**Mr Warren said the independent carbon bank could also consolidate and better direct more than \$6 billion on offer for renewable energy,** energy efficiency and carbon capture and storage projects through government programs, funds and grants.

The Gillard government's chief climate change adviser, **Professor Ross Garnaut, proposed an independent body to oversee an emissions trading scheme** in both his landmark 2008 report and this year's updated report.

**The Clean Energy Council says** its proposal is similar to those of bodies overseas, including Britain's Committee on Climate Change, which advises the government on how to best achieve its emissions reduction targets. In 2012-13 Britain will also set up a green investment bank which has been given £3 billion (\$4.6 billion) to help fund low-carbon infrastructure. However, the bank will not be allowed to borrow money until 2015-16, which has angered environmental groups.

**In the discussion paper, prepared with the help of the Boston Consulting Group, the Clean Energy Council says** creating a bank that responds quickly to problems in carbon markets and **clean energy investment "will provide stability**

**and clarity for business**, along with fairness and efficiency in the allocation of revenues collected (from a carbon price)". (*The SMH*, May 2)

BUSINESS leaders have been summoned tomorrow night for a dinner with Julia Gillard on the carbon tax as the Prime Minister launches a behind-closed-doors charm offensive to quell rising anger over her climate change policy.

...**The Australian understands the guest list includes members of the energy sector**, among them key players in Origin Energy and the explosives maker Orica.

It is one of several Ms Gillard has scheduled to win support for the carbon tax.

**The government faces growing resistance to the tax** from the trade-exposed sector, including the steel industry, which is also battling the impact of a high dollar, ahead of an expected tough budget next Tuesday.

...**The Australian understands** the government has put the same compensation measures it negotiated with former opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull over the failed carbon pollution reduction scheme on the table in its current discussions with emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries.

... **Australian Workers Union national secretary Paul Howes has already warned** the government that the union **will withdraw support if "one job" is lost** as a result of the carbon tax.

**BlueScope Steel's chief executive Paul O'Malley yesterday attacked Mr Swan** for playing down **the impact a carbon tax would have** on the steel industry.

"We are concerned at the timing and purpose of the Treasurer's comments, and equally concerned that **the government continues to get it wrong on carbon**," **Mr O'Malley said.**

**BlueScope's chairman Graham Kraehe**, who also sits on the Reserve Bank of Australia board, **said: "I am extremely disappointed that the government refuses to acknowledge the severe impact** its proposed carbon tax will have on the steel industry." (*The Australian*, May 3)

FORGET Tony Abbott's alleged four-letter assessment of climate change for a moment, Prime Minister. It is the 48-point paradox in **yesterday's Newspaper findings** that should really trouble you. **It found that 78 per cent of voters believe**

**in climate change and most attribute it to human activity. But Ms Gillard's policy response, a carbon tax, is supported by just 30 per cent.** The 48 per cent discrepancy is a measure of the credibility gap Ms Gillard has to bridge between now and the next election. Make no mistake; voters have a sound understanding of what is at stake. They do not want the government to jeopardise their prosperity by going out on a limb. But the fact that the science of climate change is so well accepted indicates most would support climate action.

Voters are clearly angry with the government for its plan to introduce the tax on July 1 next year after Julia Gillard pledged not to do so during last year's election campaign. Voters appear to appreciate what the government's adviser on climate change, **Ross Garnaut, said in 2008 -- that Australia, which produces 1.5 per cent of the world's greenhouse emissions, must not get too far ahead of the rest of the world.**

The Australian favours a market mechanism as an efficient strategy to alter energy consumption patterns and cut emissions, but there is no compunction for Australia to launch such a strategy before the world's biggest economies and our major trading partners commit to similar action. **The Gillard government would be prudent to review the timing of its scheme following the warnings of mining giants BHP and Rio Tinto.** Both companies point out that acting before China and the US, the world's largest polluters, **would damage Australia's international competitiveness by saddling heavy trade-exposed industries with a "dead weight"**, which industry groups and trade unions agree **will cost jobs and limit prosperity.** (*The Australian*, May 5)

As Julia Gillard, speaking after Wednesday night's dinner with corporate leaders, promised to continue consulting, **Rio Tinto chairman Jan du Plessis said the government was listening** to miners' concerns.

**But he reiterated his warning that Australia should not act** while major emitters, including the US and China, were stalling on the issue. (*The Australian*, May 6)

A WIDE-RANGING coalition of supporters of action on climate change is planning a massive **campaign to rescue Julia Gillard's carbon tax in the face of growing industry opposition.**

**The Weekend Australian understands** Oscar-award winning actress Cate Blanchett has been approached to be part of a national advertising campaign.

But sources said it would be wrong to suggest the actress would be the spearhead of the campaign, which will also include a raft of "ordinary Australians".

The Weekend Australian understands the planned print, radio and TV **campaign is supported by groups including Get Up!, Greenpeace, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Southern Cross Climate Coalition, an alliance including the ACF, the Climate Institute and the Australian Council of Trade Unions.**

But a separate part of the campaign will be launched in Melbourne today when the Southern Cross Climate Coalition makes a major announcement backing **action on climate change.**

The move is aimed to counter **growing opposition** to the carbon tax from emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries and a collapse in public support for the plan. **A Newspann** published this week showed **support for the government's carbon tax stood at only 30 per cent while 60 per cent of voters opposed it.** (*The Australian*, May 7)

**BHP Billiton chairman Jacques Nasser has turned up the pressure on Julia Gillard to abandon plans for a carbon tax, calling for a "go-slow" approach to tackling climate change and warning that the rest of the world is unlikely to follow Australia's lead.**

Speaking in Melbourne yesterday, **the chairman of Australia's biggest company and the world's biggest miner added to recent calls by his chief executive, Marius Kloppers,** for a sector-specific approach to dealing with carbon pollution that did not hurt businesses that had global competitors.

**...Mr Nasser yesterday told a Melbourne Mining Club lunch that BHP Billiton still supported Australia moving early on climate change,** but **questioned the government's plans and stressed the nation needed to remain competitive with other countries.**

"In terms of a carbon tax, **most countries around the world have decided to go in some other direction," the BHP chairman said.**

"Particularly in the larger economies, there's been a trend towards regulation, rather than changing behaviour through taxation or policy changes.

“We've got to be careful we don't get into the trap of really believing our behaviour is going to influence other countries; I don't think that will be the case.”

**The comments will be seen as a shift in the mining giant's stance** from when Mr Kloppers late last year called on Australia to act before any international agreement to protect the nation's long-term economic interests. At the time, Mr Kloppers called for a combination of a carbon tax, land use actions and limited trading system.

Yesterday, **Mr Nasser said** different sectors of the economy could require different solutions.

“**We favour a go-slow approach (to emissions reduction):** in other words, take a sector, work on that, take another sector, work on that and the solutions to each sector may be completely different,” he said. (*The Australian*, May 10)

But the nation's other steelmaker, **BlueScope, has been a whole lot more forthcoming on the dismal potential of a carbon tax.**

**According to data published last week, BlueScope reckons its liability** under the carbon tax, as it is so far understood, would be between \$34m and \$43m in the first year, and it would **cost in the order of \$450m** over the first eight years of the scheme.

It is important to put that cost into some sort of context. Last year, BlueScope reported EBIT of \$240m and in February it reported interim EBIT of \$127m and indicated that its 2011 fiscal year results would probably match 2010 fiscal year outcomes. Time will tell whether BlueScope has been hit by the same price-based delivery deferrals that have prompted OneSteel's revised guidance. But either way, given no sudden change in business settings (that is, the dollar continues to trade well above trend on the back of the unprecedented prices being paid for steel's raw materials), **the way BlueScope sees it, the carbon tax looms as a very material matter for its bottom line.** (*The Australian*, May 11)

**Superannuation funds that do not respond adequately to the challenges of climate change, risk making less money** for their members.

**Investment consultancy Mercer estimates the typical fund would need to direct up to 40 per cent of its portfolio towards investments that would benefit**

**from climate change.** These include investments in clean technology and "green" commercial property. It's estimated 30 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions come from property and most big super funds have high exposure to commercial property.

**In a report released in February, Mercer says technology designed to achieve a low-carbon transformation is creating a big investment opportunity** for super funds. As much as \$5 trillion could be invested in such technology worldwide by 2030.

The technology includes energy efficiency, renewable energy, biofuels, nuclear and carbon capture and storage....

It's not just about investing sustainably but also about the way super funds reduce their carbon footprints. For example, the survey found nearly three-quarters of super-fund members, or 6 million people, still receive printed communication from their funds rather than electronic communication.

**The business director at the Climate Institute, Julian Poulter, says super funds need to hedge or protect their portfolios against long-term climate-change risk** in the same way they protect their investment portfolios against rising inflation or interest rates. (*The SMH*, May 11)

### **Selective pass analysis: *Textual* correspondences between frames and organisations**

Having looked at the key organisational frames chronologically and, where relevant, within a more complete news article context, the following groups of latent frame patterns provide a starker view of this narrative contest. Once again, these are analysed chronologically, to retain the trajectory of the framing. Each of the key latent macro frames are illustrated by the selected quotes, as carried or underwritten by organisational voices. Where relevant, the citation type refers to the coding reference from the axial phase (see Tables 3.16 to 3.19).

(NOTE: The article number indicates if the quotes are from the same article or not, when the newspaper title and date are identical (e.g. when title and date are the same, 'Article 1' will refer to all quotes in the same article, as separate from 'Article 2' etc.). In each instance, the **bold** again indicates the exact phrasing taken as constituting the particular latent frame).

## Economic Vandalism: February

| Quotes: February 14-28, 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <p><i>Steel makers have also signalled they will be asking for more, with a BlueScope Steel spokesman highlighting <b>the competitive threat</b> of low-cost Asian producers.</i></p> <p><i>"It is not in Australia's interests - economic or environmental - <b>to force domestic industries to shut down or curtail production</b>, only to see that production replaced by higher-emission overseas production," the spokesman said.</i></p> | BSS, direct quote              | SMH, Feb 19              | 1           |
| <p><i>The chief executive of the Energy Supply Association of Australia, Brad Page, says removing this assistance would <b>"strand billions of dollars' worth of power station assets and threaten the sector's ability to raise capital.</b></i></p>   | Co-opted support               | SMH, Feb 19              | 1           |
| <p><i>The electricity generation industry <b>fears the value of its assets will plummet</b>, prompting Business Council of Australia acting chief Maria Tarrant <b>to call for a "smooth transition" for that sector to maintain viability and reliable supply.</b></i></p>   | BCA, indirect quote            | Herald Sun, Feb 25       | 1           |
| <p><i>Minerals Council of Australia chief Mitchell Hooke said investment in the proposed low-carbon economy <b>must not jeopardise the viability of exports.</b></i></p>  | Co-opted support               | Herald Sun, Feb 25       | 1           |
| <p><i><b>one of Australia's biggest manufacturers, BlueScope Steel, was scathing.</b></i></p> <p><i>"I'm very concerned that the Government is proposing to 'offshore emissions', by taxing and potentially <b>killing manufacturing in Australia,</b>" said chief executive Paul O'Malley.</i></p>   | BSS, direct quote              | Herald Sun, Feb 25       | 2           |
| <p><i>one of Australia's biggest manufacturers BlueScope Steel, was scathing saying it was <b>"potentially killing manufacturing in Australia"</b>.</i></p>   | BSS, indirect quote            | Daily Tele, Feb 25       |             |

## Economic Vandalism: March

| Quotes: March 2011   | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>For as BlueScope's Paul O'Malley has succinctly, bleakly and all-too accurately pointed out, <b>manufacturing cannot survive our unilateral carbon tax.</b></i>   | BSS, indirect quote            | Herald Sun, Mar 1        |             |
| <i>In an article published today in The Australian, Mr Peever calls for "real world" modelling of <b>industry transition being forced by the carbon price.</b></i>   | Rio Tinto, indirect quote      | Australian, Mar 7        | 1           |
| <i>He warns that a <b>carbon price will "inevitably be disastrous" in a downturn for businesses</b> unable to pass on the extra costs to their customers.</i>  |                                |                          |             |
| <i>Rio's export operations would have faced an <b>additional \$3 billion cost</b> over 10 years from the final design of the CPRS</i>  | Rio Tinto, company named       | Australian, Mar 7        | 1           |
| <i>According to figures provided by Rio to the Climate Change Department, <b>the company's annual carbon tax bill would be about \$154 million</b> if the tax was set at \$20 a tonne for every tonne of carbon pollution.</i>   | Rio Tinto, indirect quote      | Australian, Mar 7        | 1           |
| <i><b>According to carbon emission figures provided to the Climate Change Department, several of the nation's biggest power generators could face additional costs of more than \$1 billion a year</b> if the carbon price was set at \$60-\$70 a tonne.</i>                     | Co-opted support               | Australian, Mar 12       |             |
| <i>At \$70 a tonne, NSW Hunter Valley power station operator Macquarie Generation would face an annual bill of \$1.64bn based on emissions of 23.4 million tonnes a year. <b>BlueScope Steel, which emits 10.8 million tonnes a year, would face a bill of about \$750m.</b></i> |                                |                          |             |
| <i><b>Modelling conducted for the Minerals Council of Australia by the Centre for International Economics shows the huge amounts of revenue at stake in the compensation debate.</b></i>   | Co-opted support               | Australian, Mar 22       |             |

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According to the modelling, at a carbon price of \$26 a tonne, the 2012-13 **liability for steelmaker Bluescope Steel** would be \$317.61m without compensation. **Mining giants Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton would face bills of \$451.18m and \$181.23m respectively in the first year of the carbon tax.**

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| <p>A forum in Canberra today organised by the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network and the Business Council of Australia will be told that <b>the reliability of Australia's energy system could be under threat over the period to 2020</b>, as coal-fired power stations close before enough replacements are built and maintenance work is reduced or even stopped.</p> | <p>BCA, indirect quote</p> | <p>Australian, Mar 23</p> | <p>1</p> |
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| <p><b>Even a carbon price of \$20 a tonne of emissions was likely to lead to some coal power stations defaulting on their debts and handing the assets over to their financiers.</b> AIGN chief executive Michael Hitchens said that <b>if some investors in power stations made big losses they would not invest in new capacity and new investors would invest only if there were higher returns.</b></p> <p><b>“This would lead to even higher electricity prices than are needed,” Mr Hitchens said.</b></p> | <p>Co-opted support</p> | <p>Australian, Mar 23</p> | <p>1</p> |
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| <p>[BlueScope Steel chairman] Kraehe knows that <b>the government's policy will decimate manufacturing here. And in particular, mean the death of our steel industry.</b></p> <p>...He was both subtle and damning in highlighting the two-speed economy. <b>Manufacturing, which employed around one million directly and supported another two million jobs in the services sector, was already under siege</b></p> | <p>BSS, indirect quote</p> | <p>Herald Sun, Mar 23</p> |  |
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| <p>(Well, there is one other solution, which BlueScope Steel chairman Graham Kraehe suggested sarcastically this week while criticising Gillard's carbon tax at the National Press Club. <b>We could stop exporting coal and wreck our economy.</b>)</p> | <p>BSS, indirect quote</p> | <p>Daily Telegraph, Mar 24</p> |  |
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| <p>Not everyone is so pleased with the shift to a carbon price, with <b>the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry arguing it could hurt manufacturers</b> in areas such as food processing, plastics, chemicals and equipment and metal production.</p> <p>ACCI policy director Greg Evans says small and medium enterprises, in particular, run the risk of being internationally exposed to export or import competition.</p> <p>“They aren't necessarily able to pass on the cost impact of rising energy prices because <b>their competitors won't be facing the same impost,</b>” he says.</p> | Co-opted support | Australian,<br>Mar 25 |
|---|------------------|-----------------------|

## Economic Vandalism: April

| Quotes: April 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <p><b>There is no doubt BlueScope will be hurt by the carbon tax: broker analysis regularly shows it is the Top 200 ASX-listed company likely to suffer the biggest hit to earnings</b></p>   | Co-opted support               | SMH, Apr 9               | 1           |
| <p>In his National Press Club address in February, <b>Kraehe spoke of a manufacturing industry "under siege"</b> and described proposals to compensate emissions-intensive trade exposed industries (EITEs) such as steelmaking as a "Band-Aid on a bullet wound".</p> <p>On the ABC's Inside Business, <b>O'Malley attacked the carbon tax proposal as "economic vandalism"</b>.</p> | BSS, indirect quote            | SMH, Apr 9               | 2           |
| <p>“So why are we in Australia contemplating a simplistic green agenda, <b>to sacrifice the livelihood of the thousands of hard working Australians in manufacturing and related industries,</b>” [BlueScope Steel's chairman] Kraehe stated darkly.</p>  | BSS, direct quote              | Australian,<br>Apr 14    | 1           |
| <p>The steelmakers, mind you, reckon that <b>Combet, Garnaut and Team Deutsche have all got it wrong. As Kraehe said in his remarkably</b></p>  | BSS, direct quote              | Australian,<br>Apr 14    | 1           |

gladiatorial speech: **“The truth is a first-year tax burden would be almost three times the Garnaut estimate”.**

**BlueScope estimates that it will stump up with something more than \$1bn in carbon tax over the first 10 years of the scheme.**

|   |                     |                       |   |
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| <p>As Kraehe said: <b>“A tax on carbon produced in steelmaking is fine, as long as the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Indian, Russians, Americans, Brazilians and others have a similar tax. If this is not the case, Australia will simply transfer the carbon generation to countries without a carbon tax and accelerate the hollowing out of the Australia economy.”</b></p>   | BSS, direct quote   | Australian,<br>Apr 14 | 1 |
| <p>Mr Hillman said the CPRS approach represented <b>a major risk to the competitiveness of Australian coalmining.</b></p> <p>The ACA now plans to meet directly with MPs in coal electorates and is yet to rule out an advertising campaign against a carbon pricing plan. <b>“If we don't get this right, investment will move offshore</b> to other countries such as South Africa, Colombia, Indonesia and Mongolia, who would take Australia's place in supplying Asian markets,” Mr Hillman told The Australian.</p> | Co-opted support    | Australian,<br>Apr 20 | 1 |
| <p>The BCA says industry compensation under Rudd's scheme is insufficient <b>“to offset the impact of a carbon price”</b> in future years. Given the absence of carbon prices in competing nations and <b>“current pressures”</b> on Australia's economy, <b>the BCA deems it “essential” that Gillard now “fully offsets” any carbon price imposed</b> on such industries. It says failure to <b>act threatens manufacturing, agricultural and resource-based businesses and puts jobs at risk.</b></p>                  | BCA, indirect quote | Australian,<br>Apr 20 | 2 |
| <p>JULIA Gillard is under mounting pressure to give exporters a special deal under her proposed carbon tax after <b>BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers yesterday became the latest business leader to warn that Australia's go-it-alone approach would</b></p>  | BHP, direct quote   | Australian,<br>Apr 28 |   |

be a **“dead weight”** on high-polluting industries.

Mr Kloppers said that “in the absence of a global scheme, **any carbon taxes you impose on an exported product basically is just dead weight”**.”

The call by the crossbencher, whose support is crucial to Julia Gillard's minority government, for industry to “put up or shut up” on the carbon tax comes after BHP chief executive Marius Kloppers **warned that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a “dead weight”** on high-polluting exporters.

BHP, indirect quote

Australian, Apr 29

In an exclusive interview with *The Weekend Australian*, Rio Tinto chairman Jan du Plessis urged the Gillard government to rethink its carbon pricing policy and timing, saying **it threatened the Australian economy**

Rio Tinto, direct quote

Australian, Apr 30

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“If the Australian government, with all the best intentions in the world, is going to move too fast **and eventually simply damage energy-intensive, trade-exposed business at a cost to Australia as a country**, whilst China and America don't move, I am not sure that is smart,” he said.

This week, BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers **warned the Prime Minister that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a “dead weight”** on heavy polluting industries, **and the nation should not penalise its “trade-exposed industries”** by moving ahead of its international competitors.

BHP, indirect quote

Australian, Apr 30

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## Economic Vandalism: May

| Quotes: May 1-13, 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>The Gillard government would be prudent to review the timing of its scheme following <b>the warnings of mining giants BHP and Rio Tinto. Both companies point out that acting before China and the US, the world's largest polluters, would damage Australia's</b></i> | BHP, indirect quote            | Australian, May 5        |             |

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**international competitiveness by saddling heavy trade-exposed industries with a "dead weight"**

*But the nation's other steelmaker, BlueScope, has been a whole lot more forthcoming on the dismal potential of a carbon tax.*

BSS, indirect quote

Australian, May 11

*According to data published last week, **BlueScope reckons its liability under the carbon tax**, as it is so far understood, would be between \$34m and \$43m in the first year, and it **would cost in the order of \$450m** over the first eight years of the scheme.*

*... the way BlueScope sees it, **the carbon tax looms as a very material matter for its bottom line.***

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**Economic Benefit: February**

| <b>Quotes: February 14-28, 2011</b>   | <b>Key organisation citation type</b> | <b>Newspaper title and date</b> | <b>Article no.</b> |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| <i>And a report by the Climate Institute predicts <b>Victoria could gain 6800 clean-energy power sector jobs under a carbon price.</b></i>  | CI, indirect quote                    | Herald Sun, Feb 28              |                    |
| <i>Today, the Climate Institute and independent Tony Windsor <b>launch research showing close to 7000 NSW power sector jobs could be created by 2030 through pricing carbon.</b></i>  | Co-opted support                      | Daily Tele, Feb 28              | 1                  |
| <i>"Australia stands at the doorway to a <b>clean energy transition that can drive tens of billions of dollars of investment in the electricity sector creating a net increase of close to 34,000 new jobs in regional Australia,</b>" Climate Institute chief executive John Connor said</i> | CI, direct quote                      | Daily Tele, Feb 28              | 1                  |

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## Economic Benefit: March

| Quotes: March, 2011   | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>An Australian Conservation Foundation analysis found the cost of the incentives has increased by \$1.6 billion since 2007-08, the final year of the Howard government, while spending on climate programs had risen just \$500 million. The biggest fossil fuel incentives were in unclaimed revenue, including about \$5 billion in fuel tax rebates for greenhouse-intensive industries.</i>                                     | ACF, indirect quote            | SMH, Mar 1               |             |
| <i>...The parliamentary stoush came as research by the Climate Institute, with assistance by AGL Energy, estimated <b>the impact of a carbon tax on an average household electricity bill, if the price was set at \$20 per tonne of carbon, would be about \$150 a week [sic].</b></i>   | Co-opted support               | Australian, March 23     | 1           |
| <i>According to Climate Institute deputy chief executive Erwin Jackson, producing a megawatt hour of electricity creates about one tonne of carbon pollution.</i><br><br><i>Given the average household in Sydney uses about 7.5 megawatts of electricity a year, <b>the impact of a carbon tax on an average household electricity bill would be about \$150 a year out of a total bill of about \$1500, the research finds.</b></i> | CI, indirect quote             | Australian, March 23     | 1           |

## Economic Benefit: April

| Quotes: April, 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>... environmental analysts say a carbon tax is essential to fund the development of alternative energy solutions and drive changes in behaviour. <b>The Climate Institute claims its research shows that about 31,000 jobs could be created in regional Australia</b></i> | Co-opted support               | Australian, April 5      | 1           |

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| <i>The institute's chief executive, John Connor, said <b>by 2030 clean energy could be used to generate up to 43 per cent of Australia's energy needs, up from 12 per cent today, with significant economic benefits.</b></i>  | CI, direct quote | Australian, April 5  | 1 |
| <i>``All the models show that even with significant reductions in pollution, <b>virtually all sectors of the community will continue to grow,</b>'' he said.</i>   |                  |                      |   |
| <i>``<b>For around the cost of one sausage sandwich a week, putting a price on pollution will help change the investment and power generation decisions necessary to help put Australia on the path to a low-pollution, clean-energy future,</b>'' Mr Connor said.</i> | CI, direct quote | Australian, April 21 |   |

#### Economic Benefit: May

| Quotes: May 1-13, 2011   | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>In the discussion paper, prepared with the help of the Boston Consulting Group, the Clean Energy Council says creating a bank that responds quickly to problems in carbon markets and <b>clean energy investment "will provide stability and clarity for business, along with fairness and efficiency in the allocation of revenues collected (from a carbon price)".</b></i> | CEC, indirect quote            | SMH, May 2               |             |
| <i>Superannuation funds that do not respond adequately to the challenges of climate change, risk making less money for their members.</i>  | Co-opted support               | SMH, May 11              | 1           |
| <i><b>In a report released in February, Mercer says technology designed to achieve a low-carbon transformation is creating a big investment opportunity for super funds. As much as \$5 trillion could be invested in such technology worldwide by 2030.</b></i>   |                                |                          |             |
| <i>The business director at the Climate Institute, Julian Poulter, says <b>super funds need to hedge or protect their portfolios against</b></i>   | CI, indirect quote             | SMH, May 11              | 1           |

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*long-term climate-change risk in the same way they protect their investment portfolios against rising inflation or interest rates.*

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### Bad Government/Policy: February

| Quotes: February 14-28, 2011   | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>The chief executive of the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, Belinda Robinson, says the CPRS didn't go far enough in recognising LNG's "green" role as a replacement for coal overseas.</i>  | Co-opted support               | SMH, Feb 19              |             |
| <b>"Putting a price on carbon simply serves to make the economics of getting these projects to financial investment decision a little bit harder," she says. "Shouldn't we be looking at how we can encourage the growth of that sector, not winding it back?"</b> |                                |                          |             |
| <i>Business Council of Australia acting chief executive Maria Tarrant said <b>business would lack the certainty needed for future investment</b> until details such as the scale of the carbon price and the transition arrangements were known.</i>               | BCA, indirect quote            | Herald Sun, Feb 25       |             |

### Bad Government/Policy: March

| Quotes: March, 2011   | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Mr O'Malley backed the call of the Opposition Leader, Tony Abbott, to <b>repeal the tax if it unfairly treated sectors of the economy and failed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.</b></i>   | BSS, direct quote              | SMH, Mar 3               | 1           |
| <i>It [BSS] had suffered from a rising Australian dollar, lower domestic demand, and high prices for steel-making ingredients such iron ore and coking coal. <b>"It is when you are down and you get kicked in the guts that you really say this doesn't make sense,"</b> Mr O'Malley said.</i> |                                |                          |             |

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| <p><i>[Mr O'Malley, who is part of the government's business round table on climate change, said he believed that a carbon price was needed to spark the transition from coal-fired power to gas.]</i></p> <p><i>"For emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries <b>there should be no cost until our competitors face a cost and there certainly shouldn't be a free ride for imports that sees manufacturers have to move their operations offshore and hide carbon in someone else's backyard.</b>"</i></p> | BSS, direct quote         | SMH, Mar 3         | 1 |
| <p><i>Asked if he would support Mr Abbott's proposal to repeal the tax if the Liberals won government, Mr O'Malley replied: "<b>If there is bad policy, bad policy should be repealed, absolutely.</b>"</i></p>  | BSS, direct quote         | SMH, Mar 3         | 1 |
| <p><i>MINING giant Rio Tinto has put Julia Gillard on notice that business will demand her carbon pricing plan offer more generous compensation and industry protection than Kevin Rudd's 2009 scheme</i></p> <p><i>Rio's Australian managing director, David Peever, says the changed global outlook means the government should acknowledge that <b>Mr Rudd's carbon pollution reduction scheme ``is not an appropriate starting point for discussions in 2011''.</b></i></p>                                  | Rio Tinto, direct quote   | Australian, Mar 7  | 1 |
| <p><i>[He warns that a carbon price will ``inevitably be disastrous" in a downturn for businesses unable to pass on the extra costs to their customers.]</i></p> <p><i>Mr Peever <b>dismisses as ``more rhetoric than fact" suggestions that Australia lags the rest of the world in emissions reduction action and warns ``care also needs to be taken to avoid overstating Australia's influence in the global debate".</b></i></p>  | Rio Tinto, indirect quote | Australian, Mar 7  | 1 |
| <p><i>[Kraehe knows that the government's policy will decimate manufacturing here. And in particular, mean the death of our steel industry.] ...</i></p> <p><i>The great weight of Kraehe's speech to the National Press Club, was in <b>his merging of</b></i></p>  | BSS, indirect quote       | Herald Sun, Mar 23 | 1 |

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**the carbon tax and its devastating impact with our China-driven resources boom.**

He started with a cheeky but powerful observation. **If the government wanted to make a big contribution to reducing the world's generation of carbon dioxide, it could ban the export of our coal.**

...Of course it wouldn't do that, **Kraehe noted. It would be economic and political suicide.**

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**Kraehe clinically dismantled the government's utterly dishonest claims. Especially about China.**

BSS, direct quote

Herald Sun,  
Mar 23

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*Australian steelmaker emissions of CO2 totalled 17 million tonnes year. China's increased steelmaking was producing an additional one billion tonnes of CO2 emissions.*

*And then there was China's power industry. It was "disingenuous and misleading (for the government) to focus on the closure of a few excessively (really) dirty power stations," he said.*

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## Bad Government/Policy: April

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**Quotes: April, 2011**

**Key organisation  
citation type**

**Newspaper  
title and date**

**Article  
no.**

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*In a sign of another protracted battle between the mining industry and the government, **the chief executive of the Minerals Council of Australia, Mitch Hooke, said he was increasingly concerned industry compensation for Labor's proposed carbon tax would be based on the package of the dumped emissions trading scheme...***

Co-opted support

SMH, Apr 7

1

*The Minerals Council represents mining giants BHP and Rio, among others.*

*"The **Rudd government's carbon pollution reduction scheme did not adequately protect Australia's export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme,**" Mr Hooke said in a statement yesterday. **"The Minerals Council of***

|  |                   |                    |   |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|---|
| <p><b>Australia will not support a carbon pricing system that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia's export industries."</b></p>   | Co-opted support  | SMH, Apr 7         | 1 |
| <p><i>The [Minerals] council also released an analysis it commissioned from SFS Economics finding compensation for heavy industry under the European Union's emissions trading scheme covered more industrial sectors than Australia's plans</i></p>   | Co-opted support  | SMH, Apr 9         | 1 |
| <p><i>An independent analysis of the compensation arrangements under the old emissions trading scheme - which the government is using as a starting point for negotiations this time around - was carried out last year by the Grattan Institute.</i></p> <p><b>...But the institute recognised the steel industry had a case for compensation, based on its relative emissions intensity and international competitiveness.</b></p>   | BSS, direct quote | SMH, Apr 9         | 2 |
| <p><i>[O'Malley "absolutely" saw the need for Australia to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. "I've got four young kids," he told the ABC. "My wife and kids want me as a CEO of a manufacturing company to reduce our carbon emissions.]</i></p> <p><i>"But to make steel - you cannot make steel through the blast furnace technology without emitting carbon, whether it's made in Australia, whether it's made in Korea, Taiwan, China or Japan. Those producers send steel to Australia and compete with us. They are emitting carbon, and on average we're more efficient in producing steel with less carbon than those companies. <b>So if you shut us down, you don't actually reduce the amount of carbon because steel will still come into Australia. That's the bit that doesn't make sense.</b>"</i></p> | BSS, direct quote | Australian, Apr 14 | 1 |
| <p><i>``We are at a loss to explain how Minister Combet has calculated a year-one carbon cost of \$2.60 per tonne of steel," BlueScope's Paul O'Malley said yesterday.</i></p> <p><b>``We believe this is a very selective use of the data and does not reflect the full impact</b></p>  |                   |                    |   |

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**of a carbon price on Australian steelmakers.**

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|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| <p><b>Australian Aluminium Council executive director Miles Prosser rejected Mr Combet's suggestion that the impact of a carbon price on the industry would be minor. He said Mr Combet was comparing the carbon cost with revenue rather than profit. "The analysis is misleading and designed to trivialise reasonable industry concern," he said.</b></p> | <p>Co-opted support</p> | <p>Australian, Apr 14</p> | <p>2</p> |
|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------|

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|--|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| <p><b>BlueScope Steel chief executive Paul O'Malley was "at a loss to explain how Minister Combet has calculated a year one carbon cost of \$2.60 per tonne of steel".</b></p> | <p>BSS, direct quote</p> | <p>Australian, Apr 14</p> | <p>2</p> |
|--|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------|

**"We believe this is a very selective use of the data and does not reflect the full impact of a carbon price on Australian steelmakers."**

*He said BlueScope's costs would be more than \$8 a tonne of steel, rising to more than five times Mr Combet's figures*

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|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| <p><b>Figures seen by BusinessDaily support claims that Bluescope Steel made after Greg Combet outlined the government's climate change policy on Wednesday.</b></p> | <p>Co-opted support</p> | <p>Herald Sun, Apr 15</p> |  |
|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|--|

*In his speech, Mr Combet said that a tonne of steel would be taxed at \$2.60 based on a carbon price of \$20 a tonne. Yesterday, BusinessDaily was shown the figures the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency gave to Bluescope late last month.*

**Those numbers confirm that the tax would be equal to \$8.23 a tonne using a carbon price of \$26.10 a tonne -- \$6.10 above the figure Mr Combet projected**

**Bluescope calculates that at \$8.23 a tonne it will have to pay the government more than \$38 million next year.**

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|--|----------------------------|--------------------|----------|
| <p><i>In September, BHP's chief executive, Marius Kloppers, supported a model of pricing carbon since adopted by the government and this is seen as a turning point in the debate. The</i></p> | <p>BHP, indirect quote</p> | <p>SMH, Apr 16</p> | <p>1</p> |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------|----------|

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speech put climate change back on the front page and gave the government momentum to change its "no tax" stance] and propose a broad framework in line with the views of Australia's biggest company. **But BHP was coy this week on declaring its full support for the government's plan until more policy detail is released.**

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On the other side of the fence are a smaller group of firms such as Woodside that have openly opposed the tax. **BlueScope Steel's boss, Paul O'Malley, is the most vocal in the "no" camp and says a carbon tax will push up the price of Australian-made products and exports but do nothing to reduce emissions from Australia's steel sector.**

BSS, direct quote

SMH, Apr 16

1

"A better way [to reduce Australia's emissions] would be to adopt a sector-by-sector approach to **carbon pricing that doesn't disadvantage local manufacturers as compared to importers,**" BlueScope said.

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Combet fired the latest salvo in this battle this week by trying to quantify the cost of a carbon price of \$20 per tonne of pollution relative to the market value of steel and aluminium. Such a carbon price would impose a cost of \$2.60 a tonne compared to the market price of steel of about \$800 a tonne, or "one-third of 1 per cent of the value of a tonne of steel", Combet said.

BSS, indirect quote

SMH, Apr 16

2

**Australia's biggest steel producer, BlueScope Steel, hit back, saying it would be more like \$8 (1 per cent), or perhaps as high as \$14 (1.75 per cent), more than five times the government's estimate.**

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The deputy chief executive of the Business Council of Australia, Maria Tarrant, rejected critics' suggestions ...

BCA, direct quote

SMH, Apr 16

2

"Three years down the track (there are) a whole lot of regional and individual country approaches. **It's very clear that it's unrealistic to expect that most of our competitors will have explicit carbon prices on their products - we don't think we are heading towards a level playing field internationally,**" she said.

|  |                            |                           |          |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| <p>Mr Bradley wrote to Ms Gillard last week, saying it was "disappointing" that the government was already determining the allocation of revenues it expected to generate from a <b>carbon price without first resolving critical design details.</b></p>  | <p>BCA, indirect quote</p> | <p>Australian, Apr 20</p> | <p>1</p> |
| <p>Speaking after the meeting between the coal executives and Climate Change Minister Greg Combet, <b>Australian Coal Association chief executive Ralph Hillman said Australia was the only country in the world contemplating including fugitive emissions</b> -- gasses that escape during the mining process -- in a carbon price, and they should be exempted from the scheme.</p> | <p>Co-opted support</p>    | <p>Australian, Apr 20</p> | <p>1</p> |
| <p>He said <b>the industry had told the government to "go back to the drawing board"</b></p>   |                            |                           |          |
| <p>The growing alarm of the Business Council of Australia was displayed in the April 15 letter from BCA chief Graham Bradley to Gillard saying that <b>Australia accounted for only 1.5 per cent of global emissions and it "must act in tandem with international action not ahead of it"</b></p>   | <p>BCA, indirect quote</p> | <p>Australian, Apr 20</p> | <p>2</p> |
| <p>On Sunday, the council's chief executive, Graham Bradley, wrote to Ms Gillard saying <b>her policy would hurt business and industry and have no meaningful impact on global emissions.</b></p>  | <p>BCA, indirect quote</p> | <p>SMH, Apr 21</p>        |          |
| <p>Mr Bradley said yesterday that the BCA acknowledged the target, believed in a market-based mechanism but <b>will only support policies where the "environmental benefit is clear" and "the competitiveness of Australia's exporters is not diminished".</b></p>   |                            |                           |          |
| <p>They were initiated by a letter to the PM from Bradley... In sum, it demonstrated why the proposal made no sense -- even in its own environmental and business and economic terms. It led to only one possible conclusion. <b>There was no way the BCA could support this carbon tax or any conceivable modified version of it.</b></p>   | <p>BCA, indirect quote</p> | <p>Australian, Apr 23</p> |          |

|   |                         |                    |   |
|---|-------------------------|--------------------|---|
| <p>The incoming president of the Business Council of Australia, Jennifer Westacott, told the ABC last week, on behalf of her group's powerful members, that <b>"things have changed"</b>.</p> <p><b>"Firstly, we've had a global financial crisis and many sectors of the Australian economy are still soft."</b></p>   | BCA, direct quote       | SMH, Apr 25        |   |
| <p>[Mr Kloppers said that ``in the absence of a global scheme, any carbon taxes you impose on an exported product basically is just dead weight"].</p> <p>He said that <b>from the start of the carbon tax debate the global giant had raised concerns about penalising Australian manufacturers relative to their international peers</b>, particularly given their struggles with high operating costs exacerbated by the soaring Australian dollar.</p>  | BHP, indirect quote     | Australian, Apr 28 | 1 |
| <p>Mr Kloppers' comments, which come on the first anniversary of then prime minister Kevin Rudd's decision to abandon the carbon pollution reduction scheme, will be interpreted as a shift. [ Just weeks after last year's federal election, Mr Kloppers became the first chief executive of a major company to support a price on carbon, urging Australia to act before any international agreement in order to protect the nation's long-term economic interests.] But yesterday he said <b>Australia ``should not penalise your trade-exposed industries" by imposing a carbon tax ahead of international competitors.</b></p> | BHP, indirect quote     | Australian, Apr 28 | 1 |
| <p>[Mr du Plessis said his concerns were from an Australian business perspective, rather than a mining one, and centred around how an initial price would be determined and the impact on businesses that have global competitors.</p> <p>``If the Australian government, with all the best intentions in the world, is going to move too fast and eventually simply damage energy-intensive, trade-exposed business at a cost to Australia as a country], whilst China and America don't move, I am not sure that is smart," he said. <b>``The time has come from</b></p>  | Rio Tinto, direct quote | Australian, Apr 30 |   |

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***the government side to give reassurances that while the government is passionate about dealing with climate change -- which I admire -- it is not going to do it in a way that damages Australian businesses at a time when the rest of the world doesn't appear ready to move.***

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## **Bad Government/Policy: May**

| <b>Quotes: 1-13 May, 2011</b>   | <b>Key organisation citation type</b> | <b>Newspaper title and date</b> | <b>Article no.</b> |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| <i>BlueScope Steel's chief executive Paul O'Malley yesterday attacked Mr Swan for playing down the impact a carbon tax would have on the steel industry.</i>  | BSS, direct quote                     | Australian, May 3               | 1                  |
| <i>``We are concerned at the timing and purpose of the Treasurer's comments, and equally <b>concerned that the government continues to get it wrong on carbon,</b>'' Mr O'Malley said.</i>  |                                       |                                 |                    |
| <i>BlueScope's chairman Graham Kraehe, who also sits on the Reserve Bank of Australia board, said: ``I am extremely disappointed that <b>the government refuses to acknowledge the severe impact its proposed carbon tax will have on the steel industry.</b>''</i>   | BSS, direct quote                     | Australian, May 3               | 1                  |
| <i>As Julia Gillard, speaking after Wednesday night's dinner with corporate leaders, promised to continue consulting, Rio Tinto chairman Jan du Plessis said the government was listening to miners' concerns. But <b>he reiterated his warning that Australia should not act while major emitters, including the US and China, were stalling on the issue.</b></i> | Rio Tinto, indirect quote             | Australian, May 6               |                    |
| <i>[Mr Nasser yesterday told a Melbourne Mining Club lunch that BHP Billiton still supported Australia moving early on climate change], but <b>questioned the government's plans and stressed the nation needed to remain competitive with other countries.</b></i>   | BHP, direct quote                     | Australian, May 10              |                    |
| <i>``In terms of a carbon tax, most countries around the world have decided to go in</i>  |                                       |                                 |                    |

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*some other direction," the BHP chairman said*

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## Good Government/Policy: February

| Quotes: 14-28 February, 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Executives from BHP Billiton, Woolworths and Qantas - just a few of the household names represented on the government's business roundtable on climate change - <b>agreed a carbon price was needed.</b> [But with the pleasantries behind them, they were quick to direct the conversation to a more pressing concern: the impact on their bottom lines.]</i> | BHP, company named             | SMH, Feb 19              |             |
| <i><b>Mining giant BHP and big energy players welcomed the move to carbon pricing</b> [but one of Australia's biggest manufacturers BlueScope Steel, was scathing saying it was "potentially killing manufacturing in Australia"].</i>  | BHP, indirect quote            | Herald Sun, Feb 25       |             |
| <i><b>Mining giant BHP and big energy players welcomed the move to carbon pricing</b> [but one of Australia's biggest manufacturers BlueScope Steel, was scathing.]</i>   | BHP, indirect quote            | Daily Tele, Feb 25       |             |

## Good Government/Policy: March

| Quotes: March, 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Mr O'Malley, who is part of the government's business round table on climate change, <b>said he believed that a carbon price was needed</b> to spark the transition from coal-fired power to gas.</i>   | BSS, direct quote              | SMH, Mar 3               |             |
| <i><b>"A price on carbon that is charged on the electricity bill and a rebate given to low-income households and those that face import competition is a very simple, cost effective way to get the right price signal for the electricity sector," he said.</b></i> |                                |                          |             |

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*["For emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries there should be no cost until our competitors face a cost and there certainly shouldn't be a free ride for imports that sees manufacturers have to move their operations offshore and hide carbon in someone else's backyard."]*

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***But Ross Garnaut said lower and middle income-earners would be better off under a carbon price.***

Co-opted support

Daily Tele,  
Mar 18

1

***Professor Garnaut, releasing the latest update of his landmark 2008 climate change report, said half of the revenue generated by the tax on polluters should be redirected to household welfare programs.***

***Professor Garnaut said the way an emissions trading scheme was structured would ensure there were incentives for consumers to use less power.***

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***The Climate Institute warned that without additional regulations and higher pollution prices, faster price increases would be needed to ensure Australia maximised the use of its world-leading clean energy sources.***

CI, direct quote

Daily Tele,  
Mar 18

1

***“Professor Garnaut's proposals for pollution pricing to unlock clean energy investment in Australia are practical and politically pragmatic,” Climate Institute CEO John Connor said.***

***“The initial pollution pricing proposed would start to reduce our economic dependence on pollution.”***

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***The [Climate Institute] submission to the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee recommends a faster transition from a carbon tax to an emissions trading scheme, claiming Australia was now the highest per capita emitter of carbon.***

CI, indirect quote

Daily Tele,  
Mar 31

***But it also calls for the burden not to rest with families and says the Government should not buckle to the demands of large mining companies such as BHP, which has***

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said that it should be exempt from a carbon tax.

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## Good Government/Policy: April

| Quotes: April, 2011   | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <p><b>O'Malley "absolutely" saw the need for Australia to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.</b> "I've got four young kids," he told the ABC. "My wife and kids want me as a CEO of a manufacturing company to reduce our carbon emissions.</p> <p><i>["But to make steel - you cannot make steel through the blast furnace technology without emitting carbon, whether it's made in Australia, whether it's made in Korea, Taiwan, China or Japan. Those producers send steel to Australia and compete with us. They are emitting carbon, and on average we're more efficient in producing steel with less carbon than those companies. So if you shut us down, you don't actually reduce the amount of carbon because steel will still come into Australia. That's the bit that doesn't make sense."]</i></p> | BSS, direct quote              | SMH, Apr 9               |             |
| <p><i>In September, BHP's chief executive, Marius Kloppers, supported a model of pricing carbon since adopted by the government and this is seen as a turning point in the debate. The speech put climate change back on the front page and gave the government momentum to change its "no tax" stance and propose a broad framework in line with the views of Australia's biggest company. [But BHP was coy this week on declaring its full support for the government's plan until more policy detail is released.]</i></p>   | BHP, indirect quote            | SMH, Apr 16              | 1           |
| <p><i>It also appears the prediction by BlueScope's chairman, Graeme Kraehe, that carbon pricing would "sacrifice" the steel industry may have overstepped the mark. A Deutsche Bank analyst, Tim Jordan, concluded that impacts of a carbon price would be "modest," predicting a 5.2 per cent hit to</i></p>  | Co-opted support               | SMH, Apr 16              | 1           |

|   |                     |                       |   |
|---|---------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <hr/>   |                     |                       |   |
| <i>earnings for BlueScope and 2.3 per cent for OneSteel.</i>  |                     |                       |   |
| <i>His comments came as <b>Climate Institute chief executive John Conner hit out at the industry campaign against the costs of putting a price on carbon</b>, releasing research showing that electricity price rises were primarily being driven by the cost of network upgrades and not the decision to price carbon.</i>                                   | CI, indirect quote  | Australian,<br>Apr 21 | 1 |
| <i><b>The Climate Institute research shows a carbon price of \$25 a tonne would add about \$3.86 a week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012-13, while rising network costs -- which have nothing to do with a pollution price and would happen regardless -- would add \$7.88 a week to the bill.</b></i>                                   | Co-opted support    | Australian,<br>Apr 21 | 1 |
| <i>With the carbon tax debate reaching fever pitch, the <b>Climate Institute will today release its own research that shows a \$25 carbon price will add about \$3.86 a week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012-13.</b></i>  | Co-opted support    | SMH, Apr 21           | 1 |
| <i>"This is slightly higher than the amount estimated by Treasury but <b>a third less than suggested by the Coalition and some business groups</b>," the [Climate] institute's chief executive, John Connor, said. This impost would be reduced to \$2.45 a week due to other energy efficiency policies. "This is about the cost of a sausage sandwich."</i> | CI, direct quote    | SMH, Apr 21           | 1 |
| <i>A BHP Billiton spokeswoman confirmed the carbon tax was on the agenda at yesterday's meeting with Mr Windsor and said the talks formed part of the company's regular briefings with MPs from all sides of politics on major issues.</i>  | BHP, indirect quote | Australian,<br>Apr 29 |   |
| <i><b>She said the company's support for Australia's adoption of a carbon price had not changed since it was enunciated last year.</b></i>  |                     |                       |   |
| <hr/>   |                     |                       |   |

## Widespread Opposition or Support: February-May

| Quotes: 1 March-13 May, 2011  | Key organisation citation type | Newspaper title and date | Article no. |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Widespread Opposition</b>  |                                |                          |             |
| <i>Ms Gillard is facing opposition to her plans for a price on carbon. <b>Polls show that only a third of people support it.</b></i>  | Co-opted support               | Daily Tele,<br>Mar 18    |             |
| <i>The <b>ACCI's criticism follows calls from a group of more than 20 leading Australian companies, including Wesfarmers, Leighton Holdings and BlueScope Steel, for the government to delay implementation of the carbon price and lift compensation for industry</b> over and above levels flagged in former prime minister Kevin Rudd's 2009 climate change plan.</i>  | Co-opted support               | Australian,<br>Mar 25    |             |
| <i>Retailer Gerry Harvey also has entered the debate, claiming <b>the carbon tax row is contributing to a fall in household confidence.</b></i>   |                                |                          |             |
| <i>Yesterday, amid a <b>growing backlash from unions and the business community over the carbon tax</b>, senior federal ministers, including Infrastructure Minister Anthony Albanese, played down <b>the latest opinion poll, which put Labor's standing at its lowest in 15 years.</b></i>  | Co-opted support               | Australian,<br>Apr 19    |             |
| <i>Julia Gillard's delightfully unequivocal line last August ``There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead'' has done more damage to Labor's re-election hopes than the planned tax itself, although it's a close call. <b>The last time I checked, the following entities or individuals opposed the tax or had severe reservations: Rio Tinto, Alcoa, dairy farmers, barley growers, insurance companies, councils, NSW and Victorian governments, chief financial officers, food and grocery producers, miners, union members, Gerry Harvey and BHP.</b></i> | Rio Tinto, BHP company named   | Daily Tele,<br>May 2     |             |
| <i><b>yesterday's Newspoll findings... found that 78 per cent of voters believe in climate change and most attribute it to human activity. But Ms</b></i>   | Co-opted support               | Australian,<br>May 5     |             |

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***Gillard's policy response, a carbon tax, is supported by just 30 per cent.***

***The move is aimed to counter growing opposition to the carbon tax from emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries and a collapse in public support for the plan. A Newspan poll published this week showed support for the government's carbon tax stood at only 30 per cent while 60 per cent of voters opposed it.***

Co-opted support

Australian,  
May 7

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**Quotes: 1 March-13 May, 2011**

**Widespread Support**

**Key organisation  
citation type**

**Newspaper  
title and date**

**Article  
no.**

***The OECD has surveyed 10 member nations for their attitudes to, and relevant behaviour towards, the environment.***

Co-opted support

SMH, Mar 11

1

***...the survey found that we are at the same time among the most worried about pollution and climate change.***

***Australians can be quite convinced that climate change is a problem, and that governments should do something about it - as has been repeatedly shown in opinion surveys such as the one published by the Climate Institute last August***

Co-opted support

SMH, Mar 11

1

***The Weekend Australian understands the planned print, radio and TV campaign is supported by groups including Get Up!, Greenpeace, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Southern Cross Climate Coalition, an alliance including the ACF, the Climate Institute and the Australian Council of Trade Unions.***

ACF, CI company  
named

Australian,  
May 7

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**Environmental Benefit or No Environmental Benefit: February-May**

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**Quotes: 1 March-13 May, 2011**

**No Environmental Benefit**

**Key organisation  
citation type**

**Newspaper  
title and date**

**Article  
no.**

|  |                           |                       |                |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| <i>O'Malley stopped short of saying the former emissions trading scheme would have shut down the steel industry, but he went close, repeatedly <b>warning that a carbon price which wasn't imposed on imports would simply see our emissions shifted, "hidden" offshore.</b></i> | BSS, indirect quote       | SMH, April 9          |                |
| <i><b>Bradley came close, very close, to actually stating that the proposed 5 per cent cut in emissions would be utterly pointless in "environmental terms".</b></i>   | BCA, indirect quote       | Australian, Apr 23    |                |
| <hr/>  |                           |                       |                |
| <b>Quotes: 1 March-13 May, 2011</b>  | <b>Key organisation</b>   | <b>Newspaper</b>      | <b>Article</b> |
| <b>Environmental Benefit</b>   | <b>citation type</b>      | <b>title and date</b> | <b>no.</b>     |
| <i><b>AUSTRALIA is the fastest-growing emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, according to a submission from the Climate Institute to the Federal Government's climate change committee.</b></i>  | CI, indirect quote        | Daily Tele, Mar 31    | 1              |
| <i>The amount of carbon equivalent pollution produced by every Australian is now more than 20 times that of a person in India or China.</i>  |                           |                       |                |
| <i>The [Climate Institute] submission cites a <b>World Resources Institute report putting Australia at the top of per capita carbon emissions with 27.1 tonnes per person, followed by Canada, the US and Venezuela, Brazil, Russia and Germany.</b></i>                         | Co-opted support          | Daily Tele, Mar 31    | 1              |
| <i><b>The Climate Institute research... also shows Australia's power sector ranks among the world's top 10 most polluting, along with countries such as Botswana, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mongolia and Estonia.</b></i>  | Co-opted support          | Australian, Apr 21    |                |
| <i>Mr du Plessis said Rio <b>believed there was enough scientific evidence to draw a "very clear link" between carbon emissions and global warming.</b></i>  | Rio Tinto, indirect quote | Australian, Apr 30    |                |

## Summary

This section has addressed the first two research questions of this study:

**RQ1:** What types of media frames were prominent in news media coverage regarding the Carbon Tax, in the period February-May 2011?

**RQ2:** To what extent were organisational voices enabling those prominent frame devices?

As the selected quotes of this final pass strongly illustrate, corporate voices were front and centre in a Carbon Tax narrative mostly focused on frames of 'economic vandalism' and 'bad government/policy'. In particular, BlueScope Steel carried these arguments more than most, predominantly through *The Australian*. The period of study is also striking for the sheer volume of negative comment aimed at the Carbon Tax by business voices. Against this, non-profit voices struggled to prosecute antithetical arguments, that the tax represented 'economic benefits' and 'good government/policy'. Here, the Climate Institute almost single-handedly carried those frames, but more evenly spread across newspaper titles. Perhaps most significantly, any environmental narrative was essentially cut from the agenda, beyond a few scant and minimalised frame devices.

Yet, what this data does not reveal is just how much 'influence' can be attributed to each of the organisations, both in terms of their presence in the media stories and in generating those frames. As we have seen from a traditional media-studies perspective, such framing outcomes may indeed have been exercised far more by the newsroom. As such, this content/textual analyses phase raised important questions to follow-up in the interviews phase:

1. Just how proactive were these organisations in securing their media coverage? Was their participation in the narrative strongly driven by them, or were they mostly invited to comment by journalists?
2. Just how orchestrated were those particular frame devices, in terms of each organisation's contribution to the narrative? Did they form part of a wider media strategy or, if not, should we instead assume they were more likely created in the newsroom, through editorial focus and selection?

These questions formed the core focus of the next stage of the organisational case studies, which consisted of primary interviews in regards to the third research question.

### **3.3: Contesting the Carbon Tax, Part 2: Key organisational strategies behind the media frames**

Senior representatives of the Climate Institute and BHP Billiton were interviewed in Stage 2 of this research. The discussions used a semi-structured approach based on the following three discussion points. These points were also used to structure the interview analysis and findings in this section.

***Discussion point 1.*** Organisation background and response at time of the Carbon Tax

1. When did the organization first become aware of the carbon tax becoming a reality? What was the initial response from a corporate communications viewpoint?
2. After the Gillard announcement and the carbon tax became 'official' in early February 2011, what was the organisation's media approach, as it unfolded?

***Discussion point 2.*** Campaign tactics: February-May 2011

1. Key details of how the campaign was run – what were the tactics adopted to get the organisation's viewpoint out and into the media, specifically regarding mainstream newspaper titles/journalists? e.g. were any other supporting docs/spokespeople/evidence etc provided to support your campaign?
2. Was there a particular message in your campaign? How were messages developed?

3. Were there any key partnerships formed with other organisations as part of the campaign?

***Discussion point 3.*** Campaign success

1. Finally, can you please explain how successful the campaign was at the time, from the organisation's viewpoint? i.e. how many media releases/campaign messages were picked up by the journalists?
2. How did your coverage compare with 'opposing' voices/points of view?

(Note: for the full discussion guide, see Appendix 1)

## **Interview findings**

The following quotes have been selected to provide the interview details most pertinent to this study. As much as possible, the quotes are provided verbatim. However, in some instances small corrections have been made to ensure the quote is clear and makes sense. In these instances, changed or added words are indicated in square brackets [thus]. It should also be noted that the quotes have been selected as pertinent to each of the broad discussion points and are not necessarily provided in a linear progression through the interview. As the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, key responses emerged at various moments in the discussion. Comments that are not linear are represented by ellipses [...] immediately prior to the start of a new paragraph (i.e. dots indicate this sentence did not follow the previous one during the discussion).

### **The Climate Institute; Senior representative from executive leadership team:**

***Discussion point 1.*** Organisation background and response to the Carbon Tax

An important background to the debate was the Rudd Government's earlier failed carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS). This was a key starting point for both the policy development and the debate narrative.

**Respondent:** We've now had ten years of the Climate Institute and coming up to eleven. And have been very much involved in the national climate policy agenda. We were significantly involved in the carbon pollution reduction scheme, particularly when the Greens and much of the environment movement took quite a significant reaction to that scheme, and basically vacated the field. ...So I think it's not as if we came fresh to that, nor did BHP or BlueScope of course. ...so we we're quite involved with the CPRS and then its downfall. And then actually did some work, discussing with other colleagues and NGOs and other stakeholders about what would be necessary if we got a second chance.

...But importantly in the immediate aftermath of the election in 2010, we were very close in with the independents [in parliament] and actually briefing them and brought together both [Professor Ross] Garnaut and Lord Nick Stern with the independents. And so they put climate on the agenda.

For the Climate Institute and other pro-organisations, another key part of the "Carbon Tax" background, or context, was the Gillard government's early labelling of the policy with that exact term.

**Respondent:** Perhaps the biggest shock of February '11 was that wording of the carbon tax itself, because I understand that Julia Gillard even had a brief not to say the word "carbon tax", but that's sort of a bit like don't mention the elephant. She actually then came out with that, because it was a very unhelpful framing and one which we always tried to avoid from a communications perspective. I mean ... the carbon pricing mechanism [that] it was to evolve into isn't a tax in a normal sense.

**Respondent:** So I guess that moment came and ... we'd already been through the bruising period of the carbon pollution reduction scheme and its collapse. And were quite involved in what I like to describe [as] a miraculous triangulation of forces, with the minority government.

...So that's why the carbon tax – in inverted commas – never had a chance to rise in the first place. So ...that was that and the biggest shock was actually that Julia Gillard did say the words "carbon tax" and then of course that quickly descended into the "Ju-liar" etc. etc...

So that, I mean there was ... it took a massive hit.

**Interviewer:** Right from day one.

**Respondent:** Just from day one.

**Discussion point 2.** Campaign tactics: February-May 2011

As well as the CPRS background, the Climate Institute discussion also confirmed just how complex trying to explain the tax had been. What is more, this had been an ongoing problem in relation to carbon policy in general, since the days of the CPRS.

**Interviewer:** Do you know what [the carbon tax] was originally meant to be called?

**Respondent:** Well it's sort of a carbon pricing mechanism. The whole communication point is really more about the big emitters paying for their pollution. So there was quite a focus in language on 'price on pollution'. Subsequent research and some of the research we were doing at the time showed that was a little bit confusing.

So I mean this is the – I guess – a broader communications learning out of that whole episode was that, in a sense, they [the government] led with a glass jaw [of] the most complex element, which they then actually made even more brittle by calling it a carbon tax. But even the concepts of carbon pricing, price on pollution, those elements are complex concepts to communicate to the community.

**Interviewer:** So when you say you were doing research, that was..?

**Respondent:** We've been doing polling and research on attitudes to climate change since 2007.

From a campaign perspective then, the Climate Institute faced a number of obstacles – the perceived negativity of a "tax" frame, the fragility of a minority government and the backlash against a Prime Minister branded a "liar".

**Interviewer:** So perhaps that's a good starting point then to talk about ... what was the media strategy from that point given that you saw yourself already up against it?

**Respondent:** Well, one of the things which we were trying to do ... And remembering of course this is an ALP minority government, and part of what happened with the original CPRS was that there was a lot of in-fighting.

...And so we'd actually [done] a lot of work with other community organisations ... as well as unions and environment groups. And so actually to talk about [the

CPRS] ... to demonstrate that there was a broader base of support for that, because what happened was that the CPRS became very unfriendly, had very few friends.

And so there was actually – I guess if you like a communication strategy – to show that the clean energy future action, however you call it, had a number of friends. And so that was the purpose of the pollution and climate initiative, or what we [later] came to call “Say Yes”. So that was a broad part of that.

We were also keen to continue our work that we’ve done previously, [which] is to highlight that this is good policy. So we did the evidence-based work in terms of modelling of the outcomes, including price and other [things].

...And then we realised that the cost of living concerns were serious, so we’d already begun to sort of try and put that in context, with the fact that household incomes could grow considerably; the fact that you did actually have a revenue stream which was supporting lower income households.

And so there was a broad range [and] we then ...subsequently got a grant from the Government to actually run a bigger cost of living and communications exercise.

Which we got a fair bit of media [from] when we launched that. But that was sort of a vein of work that [was] ongoing ... working with St. Vincent’s, the Council of Social Services and others, and those welfare groups. [To show] the whole other fact that the policy was actually well designed, in that [it] supported them for that impact.

**Interviewer:** Alright okay so who – when you say the modelling, who did you do that with?

**Respondent:** Well we commissioned the modelling... we also did some broader economic monitoring [with] Monash University and the like so. ... I mean basically we are an independent research organisation think tank, if you like. And so ... [for] our communication we sort of need to have an evidence base.

**Interviewer:** So what you identified – that sort of cost of living concern there – was that something that came out of the social research you were doing with communities?

**Respondent:** Oh no, it was pretty clear that was where the opposition was going as well, in terms of the great big tax on everything. So that framing came up very quickly, so you didn’t need to be a rocket scientist to realise that we needed account of those things.

While such a negative background had required the Climate Institute to be very reactive with its media strategy, there was also a lot of effort to be proactive, to get on the front foot and establish more positive frames around the Carbon Tax.

**Interviewer:** So was there a communication position that the Institute adopted from the start, based on the position you wanted to take, or did you feel you were having to respond to that, that sort of opposition [great big tax] frame?

**Respondent:** Well then, we had to be reactive but we were certainly making it [apparent] that it was making the polluters take action. We also had ... we did do some advertising – the life of the dinos and stuff.

**Interviewer:** The dinos?

**Respondent:** Yeah we had a whole dinosaurs campaign. ...which [was] all about basically trying to establish ... these are polluting industries but also that they're old industries – so trying to get that sense of the clean energy future.

**Respondent:** And so I guess we were almost trying to highlight the fact that this is making polluters pay for their pollution – 'take responsibility for it' I think was actually better wording for it. The fact that people hadn't had responsibility, that this is actually putting a limit on pollution, that previously the pollution was unlimited.

...[and] trying to bring to life as much as possible the kind of jobs, and trying to make concrete rather than abstract the kind of clean energy jobs.

**Respondent:** We did something I think...which Tony Winsor launched. But so, [we focused on] those things of economic opportunities, that polluters need to take responsibility and that this policy was one which actually looked after the sort of less well-off and vulnerable, in terms of there was a supporting package for those price impacts.

**Interviewer:** So did you feel that sort of communication angle was evolving through ... that first three months?

**Respondent:** No, ... we were just highlighting those polluter responsibility [and] clean energy options.

The following Table 3.21 provides notable examples of the Climate Institute's proactive approach and direct influence on the narrative. The table shows a comparison of passages from two media releases during February and March 2011

and quotes from newspaper articles (note, the bold emphasis has been added to highlight correspondences).

**Table 3.21:** Correspondence 1 between Climate Institute media releases and news story quotes

| Climate Institute media releases, 2011   | Media quotes   | Newspaper title and date                                  | Latent frame  |
|--|--|---|---|
| <p><b>28 February:</b></p> <p>Ground-breaking research launched today by Independent MHR Tony Windsor demonstrates not only potential regional clean energy resources available from carbon pollution pricing and clean energy policies, but outlines pathways for regions to maximise employment and investment opportunities.</p> <p>...said John Connor, CEO of The Climate Institute. "The Climate Institute has commissioned leading energy and industry specialists* to model the opportunities and to talk to regional business and community leaders to not only see what extra opportunities exist, but to see what else is necessary to turn opportunity into reality."</p> <p>... <b>"Australia stands at the doorway to a clean energy transition that can drive tens of billions of dollars of investment in the electricity sector creating a net increase of close to 34,000 new jobs in regional Australia,"</b> said Mr Connor.</p> <p>...State employment opportunities out to 2030 include:</p> | <p><i>And a report by the Climate Institute predicts <b>Victoria could gain 6800 clean-energy power sector jobs under a carbon price.</b></i></p> <hr/> <p><i>Today, the Climate Institute and independent Tony Windsor launch research showing <b>close to 7000 NSW power sector jobs could be created by 2030 through pricing carbon.</b></i></p> <hr/> <p><i><b>"Australia stands at the doorway to a clean energy transition that can drive tens of billions of dollars of investment in the electricity sector creating a net increase of close to 34,000 new jobs in regional Australia,"</b> Climate Institute chief executive John Connor said</i></p> | <p>Herald Sun, Feb 28</p> <hr/> <p>Daily Tele, Feb 28</p> | <p>Economic benefit</p> <hr/> <p>Economic benefit</p> |

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• **NSW: Close to 7,000 new power sector jobs**

• Queensland: Close to 6,300 new power sector jobs

• **Victoria: Over 6,800 new power sector jobs**

• South Australia: Close to 2,700 new power sector jobs

• Western Australia: Over 3,500 new power sector jobs

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**18 March:**

The Climate Institute said Professor Garnaut had shown shrewd pragmatism in his proposed approach to pollution pricing released today.

However, **The Climate Institute warned that without additional regulations higher pollution prices would be needed to ensure Australia maximises the use of its world leading clean energy sources.**

**"Professor Garnaut's proposals for pollution pricing to unlock clean energy investment in Australia are practical and politically pragmatic,"** The Climate Institute's CEO John Connor said.

**"The initial pollution pricing proposed would start to reduce our economic dependence on pollution** but without faster price escalators it would be insufficient to peak pollution levels or maximise the Australian investment in our abundant clean energy resources."

***The Climate Institute warned that without additional regulations and higher pollution prices, faster price increases would be needed to ensure Australia maximised the use of its world-leading clean energy sources.***

***"Professor Garnaut's proposals for pollution pricing to unlock clean energy investment in Australia are practical and politically pragmatic," Climate Institute CEO John Connor said.***

***"The initial pollution pricing proposed would start to reduce our economic dependence on pollution."***

Daily Tele,  
Mar 18

Good  
policy

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Note: for the full media releases, see Appendix 2

As part of this proactive approach, one of the key campaigns to emerge from the pro-side was the “Say Yes” campaign, fronted by Australian actor Kate Blanchett. While this media activity actually launched later in 2011, much of the planning and work for it had taken place before and during the study period. Again, much of this early strategy was guided by lessons from the CPRS days:

**Respondent:** ... over that summer [after the CPRS collapsed], there was some work establishing where [we were], [and] we originally had a working title of ‘Pollution and Climate Change 2011’. But [this] then grew up into the “Say Yes” communications exercise. Now that’s a mixture and not of just paid advertising but social media and other things, which we weren’t necessarily headlining ourselves as the Climate Institute. But [we were] loosely involved with and there [were] various lessons out of all of that.

One of the notable findings in the textual analysis had been the lack of environmental messaging/framing throughout the news stories. For the Climate Institute, this was part of a deliberate focus on economic and policy framing and, apparently, part of wider pro-Carbon Tax alliance strategy.

**Interviewer:** What’s really interesting is, from both an anti and a pro [carbon tax] perspective, the environment never really got a mention. It just fell off the table as a discussion point.

**Respondent:** Yeah and I guess ...this was saying that, this was actually about good economic planning... So as the Climate Institute we weren’t trying to say “oh you need this to save the reef” or anything like that. We were focusing on the fact that this was actually about economic opportunities, economic prosperity and so it’s been a big part of our broader positioning. And “no environmental benefit” and those sorts of things like that [said by opponents] are actually more about Australia’s small part of the global greenhouse pollution.

**Interviewer:** Can you recall any particular reason or decision that was made, around deciding that the environment narrative would be sort of left alone? Was that a conscious decision as well?

**Respondent:** Oh no. Well I mean ... it wasn’t our work ... we had ACF. I mean... the ACF and others were doing some of that work. So actual environment groups [were doing the environmental messaging]. We don’t consider ourselves a straight-out environment organisation.

I mean it's part of our brief, but then we've always tried to get the communications close to home as well. ...So it probably - it was like a double whammy in a sense [that] a lot of the environmental aspects aren't actually directly related to people – remembering of course the millennium drought had broken. We were still fighting off the back of this... [and] still fighting off the back of some of the Climate Gate and other things which were around Copenhagen. There was still uncertainty around climate science, which is really, really important in communicating in this area. Again, a really interesting thing – we've seen the steady growth in the trust of the science [since 2012]. it's come back.

...it was something like 46 or 49% in 2012 ... and it's up around 60% now.

**Respondent:** But so ...there was a background of ambivalence [and] still some question marks around the climate science and all those sorts of things, [based] on the fact there was no longer a big drought and ...the actual climate impacts weren't as strong as they had been in the last couple of years, for example.

**Interviewer:** The sharing of different narrative focus points – was that part of the strategy, so choosing ACF to do environment, you guys do economy?

**Respondent:** It probably sort of fell out that way, but yeah it's like 'so let's work with the unions to have a message about job opportunities', and with the welfare organisations, who were trying to talk about cost of living and those things. So the broad Say Yes coalition were certainly saying 'you should do X or Y'.

As well as examining the media approach in terms of messaging, the interview also sought to clarify how the Climate Institute had worked with the various media outlets. What strategies, if any, had been employed to generate news coverage?

**Interviewer:** Okay so if we could talk a bit more about specific media strategy details... How do you build relationships with journalists in this instance? What was done to get the Institutes' word into the news coverage that was going on?

**Respondent:** Well ... with most players we had pre-existing relationships. And so, the press galleries are a pretty small sort of mob really.

So, it's about having, I guess, trusted relationships - and we have strategies around the launch of materials and the like. But we didn't really have to go out and find fresh new media people, to engage with, in the sense they were the people who we'd been meeting with and dealing with already, during the ups and downs of the carbon roller coaster.

**Interviewer:** Did you target specific journalists or was it a blanket approach or that kind of thing?

**Respondent:** Oh I think ... well it's sort of the more mainstream national policy ones. So, certainly we realised the impact that *The Australian* could have. We certainly tried, at times, to do what we could with the tabloid press, which blew up particularly later. But the key national ones really, which wasn't any sort of a dramatically different strategy ...but [we targeted] the ones that were forming the debate.

**Interviewer:** And were there specific tactics taken with them, in order to generate the frame you were looking for? Was it just - was it sort of left to media releases or were there other things you did?

**Respondent:** Oh no – we did releases, we did briefings. I mean, the strategy was certainly to keep driving those messages home and to combat where we could those [negative messages], which is why we subsequently did extra modelling in terms of the pricing packs. And [we] actually generated a host of information in that regard. So that was reactive, that certainly was in the first three months.

**Interviewer:** So just to talk again more specifically about that research you were doing at that time. Did that - was that used at all to contribute to the focus of the communication strategy?

**Respondent:** Absolutely. Every bit of research we do is well designed to have impact. And so, we don't just do research for research sake, because we are a policy and advocacy organisation. You've got to have that integrity with that.

To highlight a key instance of media picking up Climate Institute research and messaging, the following again compares a media release at the time and the subsequent newspaper coverage (see Table 3.22). The extent to which both *The Australian* and the *SHM* reproduced the CI's information subsidy is a clear example of how, at least in this case, the Institute was successful in driving its positioning agenda into the news media, as confirmed by the representative:

**Interviewer:** One of the great quotes I've picked up was... the impact being the price of a sausage sandwich.

**Respondent:** Oh yes... We actually had a barbeque out on the Domain [in Sydney] ...We got a bit of a run [in the media].

...So, we were trying to highlight that this wasn't the end of the world, as we were already starting to see with some of the big grandiose claims coming out from Tony Abbott, Barnaby Joyce, etc.

**Table 3.22:** Correspondence 2 between Climate Institute media releases and news story quotes

| <b>Climate Institute media release:<br/>21 April, 2011</b>  | <b>Media quotes</b>   | <b>Newspaper<br/>title and date</b> | <b>Latent<br/>frame</b>     |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <p><b>The Climate Institute has today hit out at the campaign of misinformation being driven by vested business</b> and political interests and is urging the issue of pollution costs be put in perspective.</p> <p>“It’s high time we had some honest and balanced debate not just about the costs associated with putting a price on carbon pollution, but also the opportunities this important policy initiative will deliver for Australians,” said The Climate Institute’s CEO John Connor.</p> <p><b>...Research released by The Climate Institute today details how electricity price rises are primarily being driven by the cost of network upgrades, and not the decision to put a price in pollution.</b></p> <p><b>The research also reveals Australia’s power sector ranks amongst the ten most polluting power sectors on the planet, alongside Botswana, Cambodia and Estonia, emphasising the need for Australia to get serious about transforming its economic base. This comes on top of figures released on Tuesday by</b></p> | <p><i>...Mr Chaney told hundreds of Woodside shareholders yesterday that it was “extremely important” that LNG be recognised as a clean fuel that could help reduce global emissions.</i></p> <p><i>His comments came as <b>Climate Institute chief executive John Conner hit out at the industry campaign against the costs of putting a price on carbon, releasing research showing that electricity price rises were primarily being driven by the cost of network upgrades and not the decision to price carbon.</b></i></p> <p><i>...The Climate Institute research shows a carbon price of \$25 a tonne would add about \$3.86 a week to the average Sydney household’s energy bill in 2012-13, while rising network costs -- which have nothing to do with a pollution price and would happen regardless -- would add \$7.88 a week to the bill.</i></p> <p><i><b>The 20 per cent renewable energy target backed by both the ALP and the Coalition accounted for \$1.25 a week</b></i></p> | <p>Australian,<br/>April 21</p>     | <p>Economic<br/>Benefit</p> |

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the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency that reveal Australia's annual carbon pollution levels continued to increase in 2010.

**“For around the cost of one sausage sandwich per week putting a price on pollution will help change the investment and power generation decisions necessary to help put Australia on the path to a low pollution, clean energy future,”** he said.

...The Climate Institute's factsheet, Infographic and policy brief show that when compared to other factors a pollution price will have a relatively small impact of household energy bills.

**A pollution price of \$25/tonne will add around \$3.86 per week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012/13. This is slightly higher than the amount estimated by Treasury, but a third less than suggested by the Coalition and some business groups.**

**Rising network costs – which have nothing to do with a pollution price and will happen regardless – will have greater impacts at \$7.88 per week.**

**Energy efficiency policies can further reduce the impact of pollution prices by at least \$1.41 per week, reducing the difference to \$2.45 per week. This is about the cost of a sausage sandwich at a local community fundraiser, or a fifth of the value of food wasted by the average household each week.**

**for the average Sydney household.**

**“For around the cost of one sausage sandwich a week, putting a price on pollution will help change the investment and power generation decisions necessary to help put Australia on the path to a low-pollution, clean-energy future,”** Mr Connor said.

**The research also shows Australia's power sector ranks among the world's top 10 most polluting, along with countries such as Botswana, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mongolia and Estonia.**

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*With the carbon tax debate reaching fever pitch, the Climate Institute will today release its own research that shows a \$25 carbon price will add about \$3.86 a week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012-13. "This is slightly higher than the amount estimated by Treasury but a third less than suggested by the Coalition and some business groups," the institute's chief executive, John Connor, said. This impost would be reduced to \$2.45 a week due to other energy efficiency policies. "This is about the cost of a sausage sandwich."*

*By comparison, rising electricity network costs, which have nothing to do with a carbon price and will happen regardless, will add \$7.88 a week to the same power bills.*

SMH, April 21

Good Policy

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Other key facts on electricity prices:

- **Australia’s power sector ranks amongst the world’s top ten most polluting, along with countries such as Botswana, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mongolia and Estonia.**
- **The 20 per cent Renewable Energy Target (RET) backed by both the ALP and the Liberal and National Parties accounts for a relatively small fraction of weekly energy bills – around \$1.25 a week for the average Sydney household.**

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Note: for the full media release, see Appendix 2

### ***Discussion point 3. Campaign success***

The final key area the interview explored was whether the organisation felt their media strategy had been successful or not, and the reasons why or why not. For the Climate Institute, the campaign to prosecute supporting arguments for the Carbon Tax had been “very challenging”. This was due to a number of factors, including the political context, the opposing narratives and an “old trick” in economic modelling.

**Respondent:** Part of the problem [for our messaging] was that this was all announced and then you had this sort of political vacuum, in terms of the actual clarity of the [carbon tax] concepts. Which is one of the criticisms of the Say Yes movement – we were out there doing “Say Yes” when it wasn’t quite clear what we were saying yes to.

**Interviewer:** [But] it became quite clear what the opposition was doing right up front?

**Respondent:** And not just the ... political party [but] the opposition of those [outside government] that were opposing.

**Interviewer:** Yes so, obviously Abbott was front and centre in that. That was pretty clear. But can you tell me what, from your perspective at that time, what could you see corporates were doing or were you aware of any particular corporate strategies going on – oppositional strategies?

**Respondent:** Oh certainly. One you mentioned, BlueScope Steel, they observed the demise of the carbon pollution reduction scheme and the mining tax. And because it was the mining industry and the Minerals Council in particular, who were very aggressive in the carbon pollution reduction scheme – [and] a lot of people talk about the minerals tax and how the Minerals Council bought their way out of that, basically.

I do sort of quip that we basically got them up to ‘fighting speed’. So they put out research and advertising campaigns – there wasn’t a great deal of evidence in there – and they distorted numbers in terms of job impacts and all sorts of things and economic impacts and various reports along the way, [regarding] the carbon pollution reduction scheme, which they then applied at an even larger scale in the mineral resource rent tax debate.

And then there were some companies – and BlueScope Steel was preeminent in that list – that basically applied those tactics and went very hard and very early in their campaign, claiming all sorts of impacts... and threats from an early stage. So they were notable, them and the steel mob, in addition to the miners and obviously the Coal Association, as it was at the time.

**Respondent:** And this is the general problem... The future beneficiaries aren’t that well organised whereas we were tackling a status quo and an inertia that was fighting pretty hard... And they could see that a weakened government, in this case a Labour government, were fair game in a sense for those sorts of exemptions and the like.

So companies and industry associations played very hard ball through that time, to push the envelope and then to be able to come back somewhat in terms of what they got. And the steel industry in particular played very hard into some of the unions, the Australian Workers Union in particular, to try and split them away. As I mentioned earlier we’d actually got the ACTU supporting the broader reforms. But there were targeted sub-campaigns in that regard.

**Interviewer:** And when you say sub-campaigns, was that sort of more behind closed doors?

**Respondent:** Oh, well some of it was very high level but there were certainly sub-campaigns. There was a lot of pressure put on the unions. The CFMEU stayed broadly in the tent [but] the AWU were sort of wavering a bit. And they had all sorts of [internal] politics, which obviously reverberate right through to a national Labour government. And so players like the steel industry in particular, were playing that for all it was worth. And it was probably part of a broader concept, because you had the rise of Paul Howes and people like that at the AWU, he was quite a national figure at the time.

...So if I was the enemy, the opposition if you like, then you'd see there was a key wedge opportunity there.

**Interviewer:** So just to clarify, when you say 'pressure was brought to bear' on some of those players. What do you mean exactly, how was that done?

**Respondent:** Oh, so the employers were having worksite meetings and telling them that 'your bloody union reps are trying to kill your future, by supporting this carbon tax'.

**Interviewer:** They're going direct to the workforces?

**Respondent:** Oh yeah, so they were definitely. They were on sites running campaigns and in local papers and all sorts of things. So that was - they were definitely attempting to destabilise the whole thing... in an effort to extract greater concessions.

**Interviewer:** Do you think that was the main focus of the corporate communication strategy - job loss?

**Respondent:** Well I mean ...there's an old trick, in terms of economic modelling, and particularly through the CPRS [period] I'm sure a few of them used it a couple of times... But where the modelling is a process whereby you have economic growth projecting at its current trends. And then you actually apply a policy shock to it, so there's always some sort of drop... But in all of the modelling [for the carbon tax], it's like this minor sort of drop. But if you put it out for another decade or so, then that drop becomes a [much larger] juicy number... so they then say that the economy is hit by this much.

They neglect to tell you that the economy is also, at that stage, still growing this much as well. So that sort of economic growth attack, [where] they're claiming that it was going to be a slug to the economy etc. etc, was standard fair out there.

**Respondent:** It was later when the actual [carbon] price itself got determined.... And [then] there was another message around “world’s highest price”, which we had to counter.

...[So] I guess the scare campaign was effective, certainly effective, and that only grew all the way until June 2012.

From a pro-Carbon Tax perspective, the opportunity to influence the narrative positively was ham-strung from the start, not least of all due to the apparent ‘about-face’ it represented for the PM, Julia Gillard.

**Respondent:** So there were just these extraordinary things ...But I mean the biggest problem – and it was one that we just couldn’t combat – from early on was the “Ju-liar”. The fact that she said she wouldn’t have a carbon tax ... Particularly in that early three months, it was devastating... And so they could use her own words and they did so to devastating effect.

**Interviewer:** So all of that work that was done to get those messages out, to counter some of the scaremongering that was going on. From your perspective, did you feel that was easy to do for the Climate Institute or was it difficult to do?

**Respondent:** No, it was very challenging.

...[With] those themes I talked about, we were certainly trying to portray a broader level of support. And so I guess we had worked in that broader coalition... to show and demonstrate a broader support. And – I didn’t agree with the frame but there was a collective decision around “Say Yes” – but that actually was part of a strategy, if you like, to actually show that there was a broad-based support for this, which was missing in the first CPRS.

So that was certainly a part of our communication strategy.

**Interviewer:** Okay. But, from your perspective what was challenging about it?

**Respondent:** Well, as I said ... the biggest problem was the lie. Without a question of a doubt. So that was our realm of politics – it was virtually impossible for us to impact. And then the challenge, particularly in that period, was that there were scare campaigns against [the carbon tax], [but] there was no substance with which we could counter some of those scare campaigns, because they’re actually negotiating the legislative package .... So that was a massive challenge for us. So we were just - we were having to communicate in the broad concepts, still in the

aftermath of Climate Gate and still in the aftermath of the disappointments of Copenhagen, for example.

**Interviewer:** So that's kind of the narrative barriers that we're going on. Anything logistical you would point to, or sort of the mechanics of making the campaign happen?

**Respondent:** Yeah well, I think [our] resources were still well under-powered [compared with] those industries and businesses. [And] there was sort of editorial support for [carbon tax opposition] – I mean you only had to look at the front pages of the *Telegraph* and others and how keen they were to bring this down, as much as bring Julia Gillard down and those sorts of things. So you knew you were taking big risks if you went into various mast heads.

**Interviewer:** Did you find *The Australian* [newspaper] particularly hostile for example?

**Respondent:** Oh look, we got a reasonable run now and again with *The Australian*. And we've not been knocked too bad, partly because I think we're more a mainstream organisation with *The Australian* and have some established relationships there. It was just more that they ran stories of the opposition, and they used to run them more front page. And they were running still with anti-science and all those sorts of elements.

...So we had reasonable access to *The Australian*. I used to joke we were kind of their 'carbon offset', because partly they gave us a bit of a run to give them an appearance of covering both sides. Some of which was genuine. I mean, to his credit there was a couple of times where I communicated with Chris Mitchell and just said "that's bullshit, you've got to give me a chance to rip that up", and I think he'd 'Op Eds' or something [with our response].

Finally, for the Climate Institute, the campaign also struggled due to the well-organised – and *well-rehearsed* – campaign of the opposing corporate sector, and the "sheer weight of numerical numbers":

**Respondent:** The thing I'd stress with you is that these were corporate communicators and industry associations well-schooled through the CPRS and the mining minerals and resource rent tax. So these guys knew exactly how to go.

...We were ready on a few fronts, but we just couldn't [compete]... I mean, I'd imagine BlueScope's probably got more lobbyists than the whole [pro-] movement combined, basically. So it was just a sort of sheer weight of numerical numbers.

**BHP Billiton. Senior representative from corporate communications team:**

***Discussion point 1.*** Organisation background and response to the Carbon Tax

Unlike with the Climate Institute interviewee, the BHP representative had not been directly involved with their Carbon Tax communication response at the time of the study period. As such, gaining specific details going back that far was not possible:

***Respondent:*** So my role was working in the media team, reporting through to the vice president of media, so I wasn't assigned to working on the carbon tax issue. In terms of how the media team's structured, we're assigned to different projects. It just so happens I seem to be one of the ones who were around at that time and I can understand how it's been difficult trying to find people to talk about this issue. Because if I look at our government team, the guys that were in our government team at the time are no longer there.

Nevertheless, a number of important details regarding the strategic approach at that time were forthcoming, as well as the sharing of some campaign documents from then. Notably, BHP had already established a formal position on climate change, through an earlier speech by then CEO, Marius Kloppers:

***Interviewer:*** So let's just go back to what you do recall from that time in early 2011. Anything else you can sort of add regarding BHP's position?

***Respondent:*** In terms of BHP being proactive on our position on carbon, it was Marius's first speech, at the ABCC I think it was, but that was really articulating BHP's position on carbon and climate change. [So] because I think that we were building up to that in the political environment as well, that was our first position.

And then, in terms of how we responded to media enquiries, we would always be referring back to that speech. And when Gillard announced the carbon tax, we had a response to that.

***Respondent:*** It was just, that's how we really did media [then] – we had our major speeches and we used those as our platform for media coverage. I don't think there was any particular reason, it was just that Marius had made that initial speech and we just leveraged that speech and then, as I said, the carbon tax was announced and we had a reactive statement.

**Discussion point 2.** Campaign tactics: February-May 2011

The most notable point about BHP's strategic approach was its adherence to an established formula and, in particular, the central involvement of a broad coalition with other resource sector organisations.

**Respondent:** If I take the carbon tax [and] also the MRT [Mineral Resource Tax] as an example, when we're faced with big national policy issues that are going to affect our business and our company, it's usually the industry body such as the MCA [Minerals Council of Australia] or the CME [Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia], that will represent the mining companies on our behalf.

And they do that through a consolidated approach, so they will commission all their research, they will lead an advertising campaign. They will lead all the interviews and the media responses and then, if we feel like there's a specific targeted messaging that BHP had, we will have our own holding statement.

So I think you'll see with the carbon tax that [it was] led by the MCA, or the [Australian] Coal Association, and then there were specific holding statements related to 'what's the impact', what's the financial impact on our business?

So we would have a holding statement to address that. That's why there's not been a huge amount of holding statements, because you'll see there's probably only three or four I think. We had one when the carbon tax was announced and then we put in a submission for when the carbon tax was repealed, but as I said it [was] mainly led by the MCA.

**Interviewer:** Just one thing I want to clarify there, holding statements – what exactly does that refer to?

**Respondent:** It's an internal word we use for a statement, the company position, company statement. The difference between a holding statement or a company statement versus a press release is, a press release will go on our website, whereas a holding statement or a company statement is given reactively. So, if someone rings and says 'what's your position on the carbon tax?', well we'd say, here, this is our position. It's more of a reactive statement rather than a proactive statement.

As well as BHP, the MCA members include other miners such as Rio Tinto, Glencore, Newcrest and Whitehaven Coal. Similarly, the CME members include

many of the major mining and energy companies, such as Rio Tinto, Alcoa, Chevron and Shell. (Interestingly, CME is itself an associate member of the MCA).

The MCA promotes itself as “Representing Australia’s Exploration, Mining and Minerals Processing Industry”:

*The MCA is the peak industry body representing companies that produce more than 85 per cent of Australia’s minerals output and generate export earnings worth more than \$150 billion a year. The MCA has a reputation for uncompromising advocacy on the issues that matter most to Australia’s mining sector and related industries.*  
(Minerals Council of Australia n.d.)

The CME promotes itself as “The Voice of the Western Australia Resources Sector”:

*The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia (CME) is the peak resources sector representative body in Western Australia. Representing our members across mining, oil and gas and resources sector services, we support an innovative and competitive Western Australian resources sector, which delivers value to the community and investors while underpinning Australia’s economy.* (The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia n.d.)

However, in terms of the Carbon Tax campaign, it appears the MCA was prominent:

**Interviewer:** [So] the ACA is more of a sort of a junior partner, or what’s the relationship there?

**Respondent:** I’m not super familiar with the ACA but ... they were just one of the parties that were [involved].

**Interviewer:** Are there any other partnerships, any other organisations?

**Respondent:** We’re a member of the CME in Western Australia – that’s the Chamber of Minerals and Energy.

**Interviewer:** So they’re sort of more relevant to WA are they?

**Respondent:** Yeah, that’s correct. But for your particular issue it would be the MCA.

They would have had the consolidated national [carbon tax campaign], but the Coal Association would put out their press releases and it would have just been sent to us as an 'FYI' [i.e. shared as 'for your information'].

This revelation regarding the MCA was a very critical insight, as it explained why searches of BHP's media release archive (<https://www.bhp.com/media-and-insights>) for the 2011 study period found nothing of note regarding the Carbon Tax. Surely, as this researcher had expected post-content analysis phase, BHP's regular coverage in related news stories had been based on at least some media release activity? However, this appeared (pre-interview) to be a mistaken assumption, at least in terms of what was archived. For example, consider the comparison in Table 3.23 of some selected BHP quotes and the headlines of their business-as-usual media releases during the same period.

**Table 3.23:** Correspondences between BHP media releases and news story quotes

| <b>BHP media release headlines, Feb-May 2011</b>   | <b>Media quotes</b>  | <b>Newspaper title and date</b> | <b>Citation type</b> |
|--|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| <b>BHP Billiton Announces Acquisition of Chesapeake Energy Corporation's Fayetteville USA, Shale Assets</b> (22/02/11) | <i>...But Opposition Leader Tony Abbott accused Ms Gillard of the ultimate act of ``betrayal". ``The price of this betrayal will be paid every day by every Australian," he said.</i>                                      | Daily Tele, Feb 25              | Company named        |
| <b>Fatality at Manganese - Hotazel Manganese Mines - Wessels Mine</b> (24/02/11)                                       | <b><i>Mining giant BHP and big energy players welcomed the move but one of Australia's biggest manufacturers</i></b>   |                                 |                      |
| <b>Notice of Dividend Currency Exchange Rates - 2011 Interim Dividend</b> (14/03/11)                                   | <i>BlueScope Steel, was scathing saying it was ``potentially killing manufacturing in Australia".</i>  |                                 |                      |
| <b>BHP Billiton Donates US\$1 Million To Japanese Disaster Relief</b> (15/03/11)                                       | <i>Gillard's new agenda ... does have some in-principle support from business -- including many in the gas industry, but also ranging from <b>influential corporates such as Westpac and BHP -- arguing a national</b></i> | Australian, Mar 01              | Company named        |
| <b>BHP Billiton Board Changes</b> (24/03/11)   |  |                                 |                      |

|   |   |                    |                |
|---|---|--------------------|----------------|
| <b>Bowen Basin Metallurgical Coal Expansions</b> (25/03/11)   | <b><i>scheme is the most efficient option to reduce emissions.</i></b>  |                    |                |
| <b>Expansion of Hunter Valley Energy Coal</b> (25/03/11)  | <b><i>In September, BHP's chief executive, Marius Kloppers, supported a model of pricing carbon...</i></b>  | SMH, Apr 16        | Indirect quote |
| <b>Further Growth at Western Australia Iron Ore</b> (25/03/11)  | <b><i>But BHP was coy this week on declaring its full support for the government's plan until more policy detail is released.</i></b>   |                    |                |
| <b>BHP Billiton Advances The Olympic Dam Project</b> (30/03/11)   |   |                    |                |
| <b>BHP Billiton Approves USD554 Million Investment at Escondida</b> (30/03/11)  | <b><i>As Julia Gillard yesterday moved to stare down the growing business backlash over the carbon tax, the coal chief executives of BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Xstrata, Anglo American Coal, Centennial Coal and Peabody Energy flatly rejected the government's proposed carbon tax compensation plan, warning of billions of dollars in lost investment.</i></b> | Australian, Apr 20 | Company named  |
| <b>BHP Billiton Joins Marine Well Containment Company</b> (02/04/11)  |   |                    |                |
| <b>Market Price For The Off-Market Buy-Back of BHP Billiton Limited Shares</b> (08/04/11)   |   |                    |                |
| <b>BHP Billiton Successfully Completes A\$6.0 Billion (US\$6.3 Billion) Off-Market Buy-Back of BHP Billiton Limited Shares</b> (11/04/11) | <b><i>A BHP Billiton spokeswoman ... said the company's support for Australia's adoption of a carbon price had not changed since it was enunciated last year.</i></b>   | Australian, Apr 29 | Direct quote   |
| <b>Release Of Draft Environmental Documents For The Proposed Port Hedland Outer Harbour Development, Western Australia</b> (18/04/11)     | <b><i>``The position they put to Mr Windsor was BHP's longstanding position that they expect the trade-exposed sectors to be protected so that carbon emissions and jobs aren't exported," the spokeswoman said.</i></b>  |                    |                |
| <b>BHP Billiton Sponsors New Chair of Australian Studies at Peking University in China</b> (27/04/11)                                     |   |                    |                |
| <b>BHP Billiton Approves Samarco Expansion</b> (29/04/11)   |   |                    |                |
| <b>First Gas From The Angostura Gas Project</b> (12/05/11)  | <b><i>Mr Nasser yesterday told a Melbourne Mining Club lunch that BHP Billiton still supported Australia moving early on climate change, but questioned the government's plans and stressed the nation</i></b>  | Australian, May 10 | Direct quote   |
| <b>Olympic Dam Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement</b> (13/05/11)  |   |                    |                |

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*needed to remain competitive with other countries.*

*“In terms of a carbon tax, most countries around the world have decided to go in some other direction,” the BHP chairman said*

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Media releases source: (BHP n.d.)

The *lack* of any apparent correlation is stark. On face value then, it had appeared the various newsrooms had indeed exercised considerable control over the narrative, through *inviting* the comments of BHP unbidden. However, the MCA’s central involvement now offered another explanation. Perhaps, through the MCA’s media-relations lead, BHP’s position had been proactively and directly relayed to journalists? Additionally, the opportunity to secure interviews with senior BHP executives could’ve easily been offered-up as part of that strategy.

Yet, with such a broad membership base comprising diverse agendas and direct competitors at the MCA, a key follow-up question was to understand how such a coalition worked in a campaign sense? For example, one of the news stories in *The Australian* (22/03/11) mentioned economic impact modelling conducted by the Centre for International Economics for the MCA. How did this modelling come to be commissioned and what steps were taken to release it? How was the campaign managed as a whole?

**Interviewer:** So the MCA would have commissioned that [impact modelling] directly themselves?

**Respondent:** Yes.

**Interviewer:** And would they have collaborated or contacted all of the industry members before putting the campaign together or do they just run with it?

**Respondent:** No, no, we work in collaboration together, so they will consult with the companies.

So we’re a member, we pay membership fees for the MCA, so they would coordinate with all the members – BHP, Rio and some of the more junior ones. Because they’re effectively representing our view, we would have to be comfortable

with what they're saying. And usually when we're doing joint campaigns, the MCA will lead with the responses and then they'll ensure that BHP and Rio [etc], that we're all aligned. They're always done in ...

**Interviewer:** Collaboration.

**Respondent:** Yeah.

**Interviewer:** And do you know whether extra budget would be allocated for this sort of thing or would the MCA be funding that?

**Respondent:** Look, I can't answer that with certainty. I don't know how that budgeting works, but as I said we do pay membership fees every year [but] I don't know how the MCA would fund those things.

As well as the overall campaign strategy being well marshalled by the MCA, it appears the campaign's overarching position, or messaging, was also well coordinated, enabling the miners to "all be aligned" on the media approach:

**Interviewer:** In regards to the MCA, just getting back to their involvement, would you say that a particular position was developed for the industry as a whole prior to them going out to the media, or did it sort of unfold organically?

**Respondent:** I think it's correct to say that a position would have been formed prior to going to media, [and] the parties with BHP or Rio would all be aligned on what the media approach would be.

**Interviewer:** And [the MCA] would have kept you informed throughout the campaign? All the members would have been kept informed?

**Respondent:** Yes.

An important aspect of this coordinated strategy was how, through the MCA, a unified and "consolidated industry view" could be articulated. Any specific details behind that 'macro' mining position were then addressed by the individual member companies, such as BHP and Rio Tinto. Interestingly, from BHP's perspective, this was not *always* solely about the industry's agenda, but sometimes in response to a newspaper's agenda.

**Interviewer:** Okay, fantastic. And anything else you could add?

**Respondent:** No. I mean, just to reiterate that, with the big national policy campaigns, most often they're led through our industry bodies, who represent the

consolidated industry view. And they're developed in collaboration with the mining companies. And that certainly was the case with the carbon tax...

And then we [at BHP] have specific messaging to particular business questions, such as, 'what would be the cost impact', or those types of things.

**Interviewer:** Yes, there was a lot of focus on 'the economic' in the news media. Again, was that sort of a deliberate strategy would you know?

**Respondent:** No, I think that's more driven by media, by the editorial of what they're looking for in the stories. They want to be able to say 'the carbon tax will cost BHP Billiton X billion dollars a year'. And we never gave them those figures, but that's what they wanted to do. So, I mean a lot of that's also driven by the media agendas.

**Interviewer:** I imagine a lot of the inquiries were inbound as well, to an organisation like BHP?

**Respondent:** Yeah, absolutely, absolutely. [But] certainly for their paper they wanted to be able to prove what the financial impact would be from the carbon tax... because we were saying "this is going to impact our businesses" and they wanted to be able to put a number on it as well.

**Interviewer:** But you say you never gave them any?

**Respondent:** No, no, we never gave them financial stats. I mean, it's in our full year results... but it would have been difficult to work out the financial impact because they'd have to really break it down.

**Interviewer:** Because that Centre for Economics report puts a figure on the impact on BHP, but is that something the MCA would have modelled?

**Respondent:** Yes. I'm sure the MCA commissioned that report, if they're putting their name on it. I know we didn't give any numbers out.

...[So], the MCA would have put out the broad "this is our position on it" and then the media would come to us for the detail behind that and then wanting to know what the direct impact would be on our businesses. And that's why you would see those more tailored holding statements.

**Interviewer:** One thing I would be interested to understand, from a holding statement position, would each of the miners have selected a different position? Would you have organised that?

**Respondent:** No, I don't think so. It would really be the MCA working in collaboration with the different mining companies to get to this position. And then it would be "we're putting out this position" and Rio would say, "okay, good, we're going to be doing this".

[But] we wouldn't collaborate with Rio, and I'm talking generally here. We would say, 'we've been asked these specific questions', [so] we're going to talk about what the direct impact is to our business and why that affects our business. And it's also for our shareholders as well because our shareholders want to know what's going to happen to our business, because of these policy changes.

So Rio would talk about their specific business and we would talk about our specific business. But those big, motherhood, "why this is damaging for the industry" statements would come from the MCA.

Armed with these insights, the case study then required renewed research (post-interview), to examine if there was any evidence of direct influence from the MCA. As indicated in section 3.2, the original content analysis had identified there was at least co-opted support from them, through the commissioned economic modelling and various comments as the Industry Body. A subsequent search of the MCA's online media releases and published documents archive found there were indeed instances of the mining industry's agenda being clearly reported.

The following instances (Table 3.24) of the media picking up key MCA messages, through comparison of a media release at the time and the subsequent newspaper coverage illustrate this point (bold emphasis has again been added to highlight direct correspondence).

**Table 3.24:** Correspondence 1 between MCA media releases and news story quotes

| <b>MCA media release:</b>  | <b>Media quotes</b>   | <b>Newspaper title and date</b> | <b>Latent frame</b> |
|--|---|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>6 April, 2011</b>   |   |                                 |                     |
| <b>The Minerals Council of Australia will not support a carbon pricing system that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia's export industries.</b> | <i>Minerals Council of Australia chief executive Mitch Hooke said the Garnaut paper had made the incorrect claim that the carbon pollution reduction scheme's emissions-intensive, trade-exposed assistance</i> | Australian, March 18            | Bad policy          |

**The Rudd Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) did not adequately protect Australia's export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme.**

A new economic analysis shows that a CPRS style approach to the treatment of internationally trade exposed firms under a carbon pricing scheme will expose the vast majority of Australian exporters to the full brunt of the world's highest carbon costs ahead of their international competitors.

The analysis follows increasing concern that the Gillard Government's approach to transitional arrangements for trade exposed sectors will be based on the flawed CPRS model. This is the wrong approach.

We agree that it is necessary for Australia to make a measured transition to a low emissions economy, but we do not accept that we need to unilaterally sacrifice the competitiveness of Australia's trade sector in the process.

Where carbon pricing schemes are being implemented or planned internationally, governments are adopting a phased approach to the introduction of a carbon price in order to protect the international competitiveness of their export and import competing industries. The European Union (EU) is principal among them.

The EU scheme recognises the importance of a firm's trade

*model was "more generous" than the EU's scheme, citing a higher rate of decay in aid given to qualified firms.*

**"It overlooks the fact the EU scheme covers 164 sectors accounting for 77 per cent [sic] of EU goods exports, while the CPRS ETIE scheme covers 35 [sic] "activities" accounting for just 13 per cent [sic] of Australian goods exports," he said.**

*With a population of 500 million and an economy 16 times larger than Australia's, the EU has been able to create a functioning carbon market with a tiny fraction of the tax burden.*

*The EU is the world's largest exporter. After 2013, when the EU begins to sell (that is, tax) some permits, **firms that produce 73 per cent of European merchandise exports will be granted up to 100 per cent of their permit liability free because they are "at risk of carbon leakage".***

**By contrast, just 16 per cent to 19 per cent of Australian goods exports come from sectors that are classified as "emissions intensive and trade exposed" under the CPRS model.**

*In a sign of another protracted battle between the mining industry and the government, the chief executive of the Minerals Council of Australia, Mitch Hooke, said he was increasingly concerned industry compensation for Labor's proposed carbon tax would be based on the package of the*

Australian,  
April 04

Bad  
policy

SMH, April 07

Bad  
policy

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exposure when assessing eligibility for measures to ensure continued competitiveness, recognising that export and import competing firms operating in fiercely competitive global markets cannot pass on the additional costs to their customers.

The CPRS model failed to do this, focusing instead only on a firm's emissions intensity.

**The EU scheme gives the same weight to a firm's trade exposure as its emissions intensity.** The upshot is that more than 70% of EU sectors (117 of the 164 European industry sectors) will qualify under the EU's trade intensity test, and be allocated permits for up to 100% of their direct emissions. EU trade exposed firms will also be eligible for assistance from EU member states for higher electricity costs.

In contrast, under the CPRS model, more than 80% of Australia's merchandise exports will face the full brunt of carbon costs from the outset of the scheme.

Under the CPRS EITE framework, sectors accounting for 90 per cent of total manufacturing employment in Australia will receive no transitional assistance to preserve their competitiveness...

A TALE OF TWO APPROACHES TO TRADE COMPETITIVENESS\*

**Coverage of industry sectors.**

*dumped emissions trading scheme.*

*... The Minerals Council represents mining giants BHP and Rio, among others. Mr Combet will come face-to-face with representatives of BHP and Rio tomorrow at a meeting with the government's business consultation group on carbon pricing.*

***"The Rudd government's carbon pollution reduction scheme did not adequately protect Australia's export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme," Mr Hooke said in a statement yesterday. "The Minerals Council of Australia will not support a carbon pricing system that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia's export industries."***

***The council also released an analysis it commissioned from SFS Economics finding compensation for heavy industry under the European Union's emissions trading scheme covered more industrial sectors than Australia's plans.***

*Under the now abandoned Australian emissions trading scheme, an industry receives compensation based on the amount of greenhouse gases emitted to revenue generated. Mr Hooke said the European scheme also assessed an industry's trade exposure to countries with no carbon price in place.*

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European Union ETS **164 sectors**. Australia CPRS EITE **33 'activities'**.

Share of exports covered by trade competitiveness provisions:

**[EU] 73 per cent. [Aus] 16-19 per cent.**

Coverage of manufacturing value-added:

**[EU] 48 per cent. [Aus] 20 per cent.**

Coverage of manufacturing employment:

**[EU] 42-52 per cent [Aus] 8 per cent**

Share of GDP:

**[EU] 8 per cent [Aus] 2 per cent**

*Source: SFS Economics \*As at March 2011*

***The SFS report says the difference in criteria meant the EU's compensation covered more than 164 industry sectors as opposed to the 31 [sic] industrial activities covered by Australia's compensation plans.***

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Note: for the full media release, see Appendix 2

The above article quote from *The Australian* on March 18 is notable as a key example of the MCA's proactive work and direct influence. Interestingly, the article cites MCA figures of the EU scheme covering "164 sectors accounting for 77 per cent of EU goods exports", while the Australian scheme "covers 35 'activities' accounting for just 13 per cent of Australian goods exports". Although some of the exact details are different then, this same modelling is clearly provided at the end of the media release (these discrepancies are taken to be literal errors).

However, what is most interesting is how this article was published some three weeks prior to the media release being posted in the MCA archive (dated April 6), with the commissioned SFS Economics figures either updated or corrected. It would appear then, that the MCA must have chosen to share this modelling with the newspaper, prior to it actually being released publicly or indeed being finalised.

Furthermore, the article cited from *The Australian* on April 4 indicates, in particular, that the MCA was very successful in exerting it's influence with key media outlets. Under the headline "Follow the EU and US on a carbon price or we will just export

jobs”, the feature article heavily carried the economic vandalism frame (because the tax will destroy jobs) and the bad government/policy frame (because the tax does not follow other trade-friendly approaches overseas). The author was Seamus French, who at the time was chief executive of Anglo American Metallurgical Coal *and* chairman of the Minerals Council of Australia climate change committee. Again, a comparison of details from a follow-up MCA media release (dated April 7) and further quotes taken from the Seamus French article further illustrate how the MCA’s work provided centralised, co-opted support to an anti-Carbon Tax mining position:

**Table 3.25:** Correspondence 2 between MCA media releases and news story quotes

| <b>MCA media release:</b>  | <b>Media quotes</b>  | <b>Newspaper title and date</b> | <b>Latent frame</b>                                |
|--|--|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>7 April, 2011</b>   |  |                                 |  |
| <p>Climate Change Minister Greg Combet yesterday claimed that the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) – the template for the Government’s new carbon pricing plan – provides more safeguards for Australia’s trade exposed firms than the European Emissions Trading Scheme. This is incorrect.</p> <p>Analysis of the two schemes demonstrates that the trade competitiveness safeguards in the CPRS are vastly inferior to those developed for their European Union competitors under the EU ETS...</p> <p>□ Tax burden: Since its inception in 2005 the EU scheme has established a functioning carbon market without a tax spree. <b>The CPRS would have raised more tax in its first three months than the EU scheme has generated since 2005.</b></p> | <p><i><b>THERE is one simple fact that highlights the minerals sector’s concerns with an Australian carbon pricing scheme based, as widely expected, on the carbon pollution reduction scheme.</b></i></p> <p><i><b>A new carbon tax, if set at \$25 a tonne, will raise more tax from liable Australian companies in its first three months than the European Union’s emissions trading scheme has generated since its launch more than six years ago.</b></i></p> <p><i><b>Think about that. The proposed carbon pricing scheme in the country that accounts for 1.4 per cent of global emissions is going to generate more tax revenue in three months than the scheme in the European trading bloc that accounts for 14 per cent of global emissions</b></i></p> | <p>Australian, April 04</p>     | <p>Bad policy</p> <p>...and Economic vandalism</p> |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>□ Coverage of export sectors: The EU scheme's trade exposed provisions apply to 164 sectors that account for 73 per cent of EU merchandise exports. The so-called Emissions Intensive Trade Exposed provisions of the CPRS will cover just 40 'activities' – 80 per cent of Australia's goods exports and 90 per cent of minerals exports will receive no safeguard assistance.</p> | <p><i>has generated in more than six years.</i></p>   |
| <p>□ Safeguards for employment in manufacturing/mining: The EU trade exposure provisions cover sectors that account for 50 per cent of employment in manufacturing and mining. Under the CPRS, sectors accounting for 90 per cent of total manufacturing employment in Australia will receive no transitional assistance to safeguard their competitiveness.</p>                       | <p><i>... The impact on jobs will be severe. Let me use an example from my company, Anglo American. We have planned investments of \$4 billion to grow our business in Australia. Based on our conservative modelling, a carbon pricing scheme as envisaged by the government would halve the value of these investments. In a global company such as Anglo American, Australian projects would become less attractive, putting at risk more than 3000 jobs in regional Queensland and NSW.</i></p> |

Note: for the full media release, see Appendix 2

Most importantly, there is also clear evidence in articles during the study period that those ideas and positions were shared and *endorsed* by key MCA members, notably Rio Tinto and BHP. This is shown in the following Table 3.26.

**Table 3.26:** Correspondence 3 between MCA media releases and news story quotes

| MCA media release:  | Media quotes  | Newspaper title and date  | Latent frame      |
|---|---|---------------------------|-------------------|
| 6 April, 2011   |   |                           |                   |
| <p><b>The Minerals Council of Australia will not support a carbon pricing system that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia's export industries.</b></p> | <p><i>Rio's Australian managing director, David Peever, says the changed global outlook means the government should acknowledge that <b>Mr Rudd's carbon pollution reduction scheme ``is not an</b></i></p> | <p>Australian, Mar 07</p> | <p>Bad Policy</p> |

|  |   |                                 |                               |
|--|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <p>The Rudd Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) did not adequately protect Australia's export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme.</p>  | <p><i>appropriate starting point for discussions in 2011".</i></p>  | <p>Australian,<br/>April 28</p> | <p>Bad Policy</p>             |
| <p>A new economic analysis shows that a CPRS style approach to the treatment of internationally trade exposed firms under a carbon pricing scheme will expose the vast majority of Australian exporters to the full brunt of the world's highest carbon costs ahead of their international competitors.</p>                    | <p><i>In an exclusive interview with The Weekend Australian, Rio Tinto chairman Jan du Plessis urged the Gillard government to rethink its carbon pricing policy and timing, saying it threatened the Australian economy</i></p>  | <p>Australian,<br/>April 30</p> | <p>Economic<br/>Vandalism</p> |
| <p>...We agree that it is necessary for Australia to make a measured transition to a low emissions economy, but <b>we do not accept that we need to unilaterally sacrifice the competitiveness of Australia's trade sector in the process.</b></p>   | <p><i>"If the Australian government, with all the best intentions in the world, is going to move too fast and eventually <b>simply damage energy-intensive, trade-exposed business at a cost to Australia as a country,</b> whilst China and America don't move, I am not sure that is smart," he said.</i></p> |                                 |                               |
| <p>Where carbon pricing schemes are being implemented or planned internationally, governments are adopting a phased approach to the introduction of a carbon price in order to protect the international competitiveness of their export and import competing industries. The European Union (EU) is principal among them.</p> | <p><i>Mr Nasser yesterday told a Melbourne Mining Club lunch that BHP Billiton ...questioned the government's plans and <b>stressed the nation needed to remain competitive with other countries.</b></i></p>   | <p>Australian,<br/>May 10</p>   | <p>Bad Policy</p>             |
| <p>The EU scheme recognises the importance of a firm's trade exposure when assessing eligibility for measures to ensure continued <b>competitiveness</b>, recognising that export and import competing firms operating in fiercely competitive global markets cannot</p>   | <p><i>"In terms of a carbon tax, <b>most countries around the world have decided to go in some other direction,</b>" the BHP chairman said</i></p>  |                                 |                               |

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pass on the additional costs to their customers.

The CPRS model failed to do this, focusing instead only on a firm's emissions intensity.

**The EU scheme gives the same weight to a firm's trade exposure as its emissions intensity.** The upshot is that more than 70% of EU sectors (117 of the 164 European industry sectors) will qualify under the EU's trade intensity test, and be allocated permits for up to 100% of their direct emissions. EU trade exposed firms will also be eligible for assistance from EU member states for higher electricity costs.

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Note: for the full media release, see Appendix 2

Before concluding, the BHP case study revealed one final aspect of their media coverage. Notwithstanding this centralised campaign coordination, the content analysis had identified how BHP often appeared at odds with other mineral and energy organisations. A key part of this was the afore-mentioned speech by CEO Marius Kloppers, in September 2010, to the Australian British Chamber of Commerce (ABCC). Table 3.27 highlights key passages taken from this speech, and respective media quotes referencing its content or positions, identified during the content analysis phase (again, bold emphasis is added).

**Table 3.27:** Correspondences between BHP CEO speech and news story quotes

| <b>Marius Kloppers' speech to ABCC: 15 September, 2010 (Selected extracts)</b>  | <b>Media quotes</b>   | <b>Newspaper title and date</b> | <b>Latent frame</b> |
|---|---|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| ... a century on from the Chamber's foundation, economic transformation continues to take place. The rise of the BRIC | <i>Executives from BHP Billiton, Woolworths and Qantas - just a few of the household names represented on the</i> | SMH, Feb 19                     | Good Policy         |

|  |   |                       |                              |
|--|---|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| economies is once again changing the balance of economic power, creating new opportunities and challenges.   | <i>government's business roundtable on climate change - <b>agreed a carbon price was needed.</b></i>  |                       |                              |
| <b>...There is, however, another issue that has seen considerable debate – and in my opinion will continue to generate public discussion. Australians are clearly concerned about the potential impacts of climate change - and so are we as a company.</b>  | <i>Mining giant BHP and big energy players <b>welcomed the move to carbon pricing</b></i>   | Herald Sun,<br>Feb 25 | Good Policy                  |
| <b>BHP Billiton acknowledges that the mainstream science is correct, and that we need to stabilise (and eventually reduce) the carbon concentration in the atmosphere.</b> We are, therefore, committed to working with governments on the design of effective policies to help reduce greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. BHP Billiton is a globally significant producer, exporter and consumer of energy and we want to make a thoughtful and considered contribution to the debate. | <i>Mining giant BHP and big energy players <b>welcomed the move to carbon pricing</b></i>   | Daily Tele,<br>Feb 25 | Good Policy                  |
| <b>Historically we have expressed that our preferred solution is the introduction of an international climate framework,</b> which includes binding commitments by all developed and major developing economies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  | <i><b>In September, BHP's chief executive, Marius Kloppers, supported a model of pricing carbon since adopted by the government and this is seen as a turning point in the debate. The speech put climate change back on the front page and gave the government momentum to change its "no tax" stance and propose a broad framework in line with the views of Australia's biggest company. But BHP was coy this week on declaring its full support for the government's plan until more policy detail is released.</b></i> | SMH, Apr<br>16        | Good Policy<br>...Bad Policy |
| Observing the debates around the world in recent years, we believe local actions that are eventually harmonised into unified global action is a more   | <i><b>JULIA Gillard is under mounting pressure to give exporters a special deal under her proposed carbon tax after BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers yesterday became the latest business leader to warn that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a "dead weight" on high-polluting industries.</b></i>   | Australian,<br>Apr 28 | Economic<br>vandalism        |
|  | <i>Mr Kloppers said that "in the absence of a global scheme, any carbon taxes you impose</i>  |                       |                              |

|   |   |                       |                                  |
|---|---|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| likely outcome than an immediate broadly supported global initiative.   | <i>on an exported product basically is just dead weight".</i>   |                       |                                  |
| <b>We also believe that such a global initiative will eventually come, and when it does Australia will need to have acted ahead of it to maintain its competitiveness.</b>  | <b><i>Mr Kloppers' comments, which come on the first anniversary of then prime minister Kevin Rudd's decision to abandon the carbon pollution reduction scheme, will be interpreted as a shift. Just weeks after last year's federal election, Mr Kloppers became the first chief executive of a major company to support a price on carbon, urging Australia to act before any international agreement in order to protect the nation's long-term economic interests. But yesterday he said Australia "should not penalise your trade-exposed industries" by imposing a carbon tax ahead of international competitors.</i></b> | Australian,<br>Apr 28 | Good Policy<br><br>...Bad Policy |
| Presently, Australia has a high carbon economy; we are the eighth largest emitter of carbon, and the largest on a per capita basis in the Kyoto Annex 1 countries according to 2008 figures.  |   |                       |                                  |
| <b>...My main point is a simple one – we need to anticipate a global price for carbon when taking decisions with long dated impact. The decisions we take now on power production will still be with us long after a global price for carbon is finally in place.</b> |   |                       |                                  |
| <b>...As I said before we do take climate change seriously and I have studied it in detail. BHP Billiton now has a clearly articulated set of policy statements on this issue...</b>  | <i>The call by the crossbencher... comes after BHP chief executive Marius Kloppers warned that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a "dead weight" on high-polluting exporters.</i>   | Australian,<br>Apr 29 | Economic<br>vandalism            |
| It should come as no surprise that the main points we believe any national system must adhere to reflect closely the topics I have spoken about today:  | <i>A BHP Billiton spokeswoman ... said the company's support for Australia's adoption of a carbon price had not changed since it was enunciated last year.</i>  | Australian,<br>Apr 29 | Good Policy                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <b>The need for a clear price signal</b> – ensuring that the carbon price signal reaches consumers such that consumption is reduced, and investment choices are made that favour low carbon alternatives                                     | <i>This week, BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers warned the Prime Minister that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a "dead weight" on heavy polluting industries, and the nation should not penalise its "trade-exposed industries"</i>  | Australian,<br>Apr 30 | Economic<br>vandalism            |

|   |  |                               |                                  |
|---|--|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <p>□ <b>The need for revenue neutrality</b> – returning aggregate revenues raised to individuals and businesses impacted by the carbon price...</p>   | <p><b>by moving ahead of its international competitors.</b></p>  |                               |                                  |
| <p>□ <b>The need for a system that is trade friendly</b> – rebating emissions costs for trade exposed products during the transition to a global system prevents emissions simply being transplanted to other countries where emissions prices are lower.</p> | <p><i>The last time I checked, the following entities or individuals opposed the tax or had severe reservations: Rio Tinto, Alcoa, dairy farmers, barley growers, insurance companies, councils, NSW and Victorian governments, chief financial officers, food and grocery producers, miners, union members, Gerry Harvey and BHP.</i></p> | <p>Daily Tele,<br/>May 2</p>  | <p>Widespread<br/>opposition</p> |
| <p>□ <b>The need for a broad-based system...</b></p>  | <p><i>Mr Nasser yesterday told a Melbourne Mining Club lunch that BHP Billiton still supported Australia moving early on climate change</i></p>  | <p>Australian,<br/>May 10</p> | <p>Good Policy</p>               |
| <p>□ <b>The need for a predictable and gradual transition...</b></p>  |  |                               |                                  |
| <p>□ <b>And finally, the need for a simple and effective system – a combination of a carbon tax, land use actions and limited trading system...</b></p>   |  |                               |                                  |

Note: for the full speech transcript, see Appendix 3

It is notable how, in the early coverage, BHP was clearly seen as a major supporter of a price on carbon, largely based on the (albeit qualified) support for it that Kloppers had expressed in the speech. However, on April 16, the *Sydney Morning Herald* article remarked how “BHP was coy this week on declaring its full support for the government's plan until more policy detail is released”.

This was the first indication that BHP’s position had changed since the September speech, and was quickly followed by articles noting “BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers yesterday became the latest business leader to warn that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a ‘dead weight’...” (*The Australian*, April 28), and how “Mr Kloppers' comments... will be interpreted as a shift” (*The Australian*, April 28). But was it such a shift? Subsequent articles then indicated that “a BHP Billiton spokeswoman ...said the company's support for Australia's adoption of a carbon price had not changed” (*The Australian*, April 29), and how “BHP Billiton still supported Australia moving early on climate change” (*The Australian*, May 10).

Certainly, his original speech did mention two key qualifications in BHP's support for a carbon price:

- 'The need for revenue neutrality – returning aggregate revenues raised to individuals and businesses impacted by the carbon price...'
- 'The need for a system that is trade friendly – rebating emissions costs for trade exposed products during the transition to a global system prevents emissions simply being transplanted to other countries where emissions prices are lower'

For BHP, however, this reported shift was a case of journalistic error:

**Interviewer:** Now, one key question I've got – and this is from that content analysis that I've already done of the news stories – it's basically reported about April timeframe that Marius changes his position from supporting a price on carbon to not supporting it.

**Respondent:** Okay, yeah, I think I do recall that being an issue actually and I'll have to go back and have a look through what happened there.

**Interviewer:** That's what I'm keen to understand – what sort of prompted that shift?

**Respondent:** I think from memory something was misinterpreted, because it's not like him to change his position. But let me find out, I'll have to come back to you on that one. But I do recall that being an issue at the time and I do remember a lot of people trying to do some work on that.

The following explanation was later provided via email:

**Respondent:** There was never a shift in position. I remember now that Marius' comments were misinterpreted:

Some media reports suggested we previously supported the carbon tax. That's not right. What we did say, was that we agreed with the concept of climate change and taking action, but that in doing so we had to ensure we didn't disadvantage trade exposed Australian industries (like resources).

We said that pricing carbon was one of the measures that could be used, and that we supported six principles that we believed should underpin any climate change policies. These six principles were first outlined by Marius Kloppers before the carbon tax was introduced at a speech in 2010 at the Australian British Chamber of Commerce.

The same points have been repeated since then, in our annual sustainability reports – page 24/5 of this year's report (2017) – and call for measures that: give a clear price signal, are revenue neutral, trade friendly, broad based, predictable and gradual and simple and effective. We have consistently reinforced that this was our position since first outlining them.

As per our submission, our view is that the carbon pricing system that eventuated did not deliver against these objectives.

However, it is possible to identify one key 'change' of position from the September 2010 speech, and this concerns Kloppers' view regarding *when* Australia should act, as well the competitive reasoning for acting or not:

"We also believe that such a global initiative will eventually come, and when it does **Australia will need to have acted ahead of it to maintain its competitiveness**" (ABCC speech, September 2010)

"Just weeks after last year's federal election, Mr Kloppers became the first chief executive of a major company to support a price on carbon, urging Australia to act before any international agreement in order to protect the nation's long-term economic interests. **But yesterday he said Australia ``should not penalise your trade-exposed industries'' by imposing a carbon tax ahead of international competitors.**" (*The Australian*, April 28)

### ***Discussion point 3. Campaign success measures***

Owing to the BHP representative not being directly involved with the Carbon Tax media team at the time, few details or recollections were available regarding how the campaign would've been budgeted, or how the strategic effectiveness had been measured or evaluated. Nevertheless, in one key regard, hindsight provided a very strong indicator of just how successful the BHP/MCA communication strategy had proven to be:

**Interviewer:** Do you have any sense of whether the media team at the time felt that they handled the carbon tax issue well? Do you sort of feel like it was a successful engagement from the media perspective?

**Respondent:** I think with the repeal of the carbon tax – yeah, look, from a media perspective, I do think it's a successful campaign.

## Summary

This section has addressed the third research question:

**RQ3:** In terms of organisations that were prominent (to whatever extent) in the narratives, what communication strategies (e.g. information subsidies) or efforts were behind the creation and dissemination of respective organisational frames and how were these implemented?

In tandem with the preceding findings (Section 3.2), the case studies provide important research conclusions. In the following section, a comparison of the two cases explains how the campaigns and levels of influence were similar and how they differed. This offers new insights regarding source strategies through a concept of sponsorship and framing influence from beyond the newsroom.

## 3.4: Case Study Summaries: Corporate (BHP) vs non-profit (CI) influence on Carbon Tax frames

In this section the two case studies are compared, to consider how the two campaigns were similar and how they differed, both in terms of strategies deployed and the resulting media outcomes. Further analysis of what this all means for a theoretical understanding of framing sponsorship is then provided in Chapter 4.

The first thing apparent from the evidence is how both the Climate Institute (CI) and BHP Billiton (BHP) were able to exert influence on the news media narratives surrounding the Carbon Tax. While the CI mostly achieved this under its own name, BHP was ably assisted by its main industry body, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA). Information subsidies from the CI and the MCA were directly quoted in parts

of the media coverage. Both the CI and BHP representatives were also heavily quoted throughout the study period. To facilitate this framing success, there were many similarities about their respective media strategies:

1. Organisational experience was brought to bear from previous climate-change related campaigns, most notably regarding the CPRS.
2. Messaging was well prepared to carry specific, targeted frame devices and coherent positions – e.g. BHP’s holding statements regarding the tax’s impact on trade and the CI’s focus on demonstrating the carbon tax “had friends” and would ultimately benefit the economy.
3. Both campaigns were formed and implemented as part of broader alliances.
4. Both campaigns made extensive use of co-opted support, through research evidence, economic modelling and expert or ‘lofty’ (e.g. senior executive) opinion.

However, there were also key differences. Most notably, the corporate coalition was unified, involving many voices, while the non-profit coalition, on the other hand, was fragmented. While the Climate Institute was charged with campaigning on the economic front, others such as the Australian Conservation Foundation and the World Wildlife Fund were apparently tasked with the environmental front. However, as we have seen, environmental frames around the Carbon Tax were very few and far between during the study period. Conversely, BHP’s corporate campaign was centrally coordinated through the MCA, which marshalled and unified the mining industry around a very clear, simple message:

The Minerals Council of Australia will not support a carbon pricing system that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia’s export industries.

The Rudd Government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) did not adequately protect Australia’s export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme. (Hooke 2011)

This had a critical effect on the debate, resulting in the Climate Institute’s voice mostly standing alone, against multiple corporate voices united around latent frames of economic vandalism and bad government and/or bad policy. Prominent

corporates in the campaign were clearly BlueScope Steel, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and two of their most high-profile industry bodies, the Business Council of Australia and the Minerals Council of Australia. Yet, there were many others during the study period – with a vested interest in the economic status quo – who added their unity to the key oppositional frames. For example, the Australian Industry Group, Visy and Coca-Cola, among “rising opposition”:

Australian Industry Group chief Heather Ridout **said the proposal would “live or die on the detail”, declaring “the sharp end of the debate is yet to come”.**

**“These missing details will impact on key questions such as the continuity of electricity supply and preventing the erosion of competitiveness for large and small businesses,” she said. (Herald Sun, Feb 25)**

Coca-Cola Amatil would not support introducing a carbon price **next year.**

**“Australian food and beverage manufacturers, as well as many farmers and fruit and vegetable growers, are already under significant pressure from cheap packaged imports due to the high Australian dollar and yet another tax will only exacerbate this pressure,” the company said. (SMH, Apr 16)**

The paper recycling industry **said yesterday it was also** under threat from the carbon tax, **with cardboard packaging giant Visy warning it could be penalised.** (*The Australian*, Apr 20)

**The Gillard government faces rising opposition to its carbon-pricing strategy, as industries and unions lobby hard for more exclusions**, higher levels of compensation and stronger links to international action on climate change **than under the dumped carbon pollution reduction scheme.** (*The Australian*, Apr 29)

**The government has faced rising dissent among businesses and unions**, including from Australian Workers Union national secretary Paul Howes, **since it announced it would legislate this year for a carbon tax without releasing details of its starting price, operation, or compensation scheme.** (*Australian*, Apr 30)

In the last two quotes above, we can also see evidence of how the anti-Carbon Tax coalition was able to recruit union voices to its 'economic vandalism/bad policy' frames, as indicated by the Climate Institute's representative during the interview:

**Interviewer:** So just to clarify, when you say 'pressure was brought to bear' on some of those players [unions]. What do you mean exactly, how was that done?

**Respondent:** Oh, so the employers were having worksite meetings and telling them that 'your bloody union reps are trying to kill your future, by supporting this carbon tax'.

**Interviewer:** They're going direct to the workforces?

**Respondent:** Oh yeah, so they were definitely. They were on sites running campaigns and in local papers and all sorts of things. So that was - they were definitely attempting to destabilise the whole thing... in an effort to extract greater concessions.

While it is only possible to speculate that wider, co-opted support beyond the unions and MCA members was part of an organised corporate strategy, at least one piece of the editorial narrative provides such a clue:

To reinforce this momentum nearly 40 senior industry executives and heads of six industry associations (including mining, food, plastics and small business) wrote to the PM, again on April 15, wanting measures that "fully preserve" Australia's international competitiveness.

**Such orchestration from wide sections of business and industry**, along with union alarm, constitute the most serious turn of sentiment against carbon pricing. (*The Australian*, April 20)

However, there is further evidence provided by the news coverage which suggests the corporate agenda was kept on track. Again, the following story lines, as indicated earlier, highlight narrative contradictions. First, BCA president Graham Bradley is accused of being "mealy-mouthed" in his handling of the PM's responses to BCA demands regarding the new tax policy, by *The Australian*. As we have seen, this newspaper title was the main conduit of anti-Carbon Tax sentiments. As it then transpired, the new incoming BCA president Jennifer Westacott announces, on behalf of the BCA's "powerful members", that "things have changed", while finally, as the research has also revealed, BHP CEO Marius Kloppers (an early and vocal

corporate supporter of a price on carbon) reportedly shifts into the anti-Carbon Tax position. While the BHP representative explained this was a reporting error, Kloppers clearly did “shift” in at least one respect. Where he had previously felt that Australia should not wait to act in order to *preserve* its competitive position, he now expressed the view that Australia should in fact wait, and not act “ahead of international competition”. Arguably, these narrative shifts illustrate how corporate representatives were brought back into the fold, so to speak, to maintain a unified opposition:

THE exchanges between **BCA president Graham Bradley** and the Prime Minister last week were instructive, revealing and ultimately depressing. And also humiliating. For Bradley.

...The response from Bradley was at best embarrassing. **He and his fellow BCA members folded like a pack of cards. They effectively stated that their initial missive with its powerful, substantive points, was “no longer operative”.**

What made it all so much worse was that Bradley closed his letter with a snivelling, mealy-mouthed restatement of the issues that rendered the proposed carbon tax so pointless and yet so destructive. (*The Australian*, April 23)

SUCCESS in politics often assumes people are pretty stupid, have short memories, didn't pay attention in the first place, don't care, or several of the above. **Take the current debate about the government's plans to price carbon** which, if it eventuates, will start as a de facto carbon tax for three to five years before morphing into an emissions trading scheme.

...The **incoming president of the Business Council of Australia, Jennifer Westacott**, told the ABC last week, **on behalf of her group's powerful members, that “things have changed”.**

“Firstly, we've had a global financial crisis and **many sectors of the Australian economy are still soft.**” (*SMH*, April 25)

**JULIA Gillard is under mounting pressure** to give exporters a special deal under her proposed carbon tax after **BHP Billiton chief executive Marius Kloppers yesterday became the latest business leader to warn** that Australia's go-it-alone approach would be a “**dead weight**” on high-polluting industries.

**...Mr Kloppers' comments**, which come on the first anniversary of then prime minister Kevin Rudd's decision to abandon the carbon pollution reduction scheme, **will be interpreted as a shift. Just weeks after last year's federal election, Mr Kloppers became the first chief executive of a major company to support a price on carbon**, urging Australia to act before any international agreement in order to protect the nation's long-term economic interests. **But yesterday he said Australia ``should not penalise your trade-exposed industries" by imposing a carbon tax ahead of international competitors.** (*The Australian*, April 28)

It is not unreasonable to see these shifting corporate positions as the result of discussions behind closed doors, particularly among the BCA leadership and its powerful members, BHP among them. Given the evidence of the coordinated strategy between at least the MCA mining members, it is highly possible wider pressure was brought to bear on corporate representatives not toeing the anti-Carbon Tax line.

To summarise, organisational influence on the early Carbon Tax debate in Australia was both well-organised and successful. Relationships, resources and alliances were marshalled in well-tested ways, and efforts to contribute views consistently resulted in media coverage on both sides of the debate. Most importantly, comments from senior representative and related information subsidies were prepared, well-rehearsed and framed to carry very specific agendas. The frame devices and agendas carried by those information subsidies were often adopted comprehensively by the media outlets.

Notwithstanding the campaign successes for both the CI and BHP, corporate influence on the narrative was especially concerted and coordinated. The tax policy was overwhelmingly framed as both economically irresponsible and as the product of a poor government. In terms of the corporate agenda and from a pro-carbon abatement standpoint, that influence can also be described as pernicious. As history has proven, the oppositional campaign was clearly most successful, since it eventually helped create the necessary political context for an incoming Abbott Government to repeal the Carbon Tax legislation in July 2014. At the start of 2019, Australia remains the only country in the world to reverse such policy.

# Chapter 4: Conclusions: How (in a framing sense) the Carbon Tax came and went

## Introduction

In a frame building sense, it is a *process* of framing (verb) that this study has primarily focused on, to understand sponsor strategies towards frame device propagation in the news media and the conditions underwriting that success. The fact that such activity occurs has been known for more than a decade now, as indicated by Van Gorp (2007):

Certain sponsors of a particular frame – interest groups, spin doctors, advertisers, and so forth – may strategically try to convince the media to cover a situation in accordance with “their” frame, that is, by prior strategic decision making (p. 68).

Viewed from a process perspective, then, several insights are forthcoming, regarding how corporate framing of the Carbon Tax was more successful than the strategies and counter frames offered by non-profit organisations. These points are outlined in the rest of this section, as final interpretive conclusions for this thesis.

## 4.1: Organisational Influence as a Media Framing Process

Two narrative patterns are striking in the corporate voices. First, broad agreement was expressed that addressing climate change and reducing carbon were important and necessary. This view was expressed early in the news coverage, including by BHP and BlueScope Steel, despite the latter being the most “scathing” of the tax. Examples of this include the following:

**Executives from BHP Billiton, Woolworths and Qantas** - just a few of the household names represented on the government's business roundtable on climate change - **agreed a carbon price was needed.** (*SMH*, Feb 19)

**Mining giant BHP and big energy players welcomed the move to carbon pricing,** but one of Australia's biggest manufacturers BlueScope Steel, was scathing saying it was ``potentially killing manufacturing in Australia". (*Herald Sun*, Feb 25)

**[BlueScope Steel CEO] Mr O'Malley, who is part of the government's business round table on climate change,** said he believed that a carbon price was needed (*SMH*, Mar 3)

Second, this corporate agreement that something should be done was qualified by immediate insistence of "but not this". Instead, the Carbon Tax policy was usually framed with responses of economic doom and/or risking international competitiveness.

These twin narratives provided two very important positions for the corporate view. On the one hand, the agreement response ensured corporate voices could not be dismissed as denying climate change or as attacking carbon abatement per se. On the other hand, the attacks on this particular policy set up an early conflicting and contradictory context for the Carbon Tax. This led to, and enabled, the tax and everything related to it to be labelled as "uncertain" and/or "irresponsible". Yet this 'uncertainty' was created precisely by the corporate reaction. Crucially, this wasn't uncertainty in the science, but dismissal of the Gillard government's intended solution. Lessons learned from the earlier Rudd government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) were critical in this strategy. Time and again, corporate voices tied the new tax to this former (failed) policy framework:

**Under the CPRS the industry was to receive more than \$8 billion worth of free permits,** and the **executive director of the Australian Aluminium Council, Miles Prosser, says he will now push for a similarly "workable" arrangement** to prevent the industry heading overseas.

"If we did close down smelters in Australia, they would be replaced by the investment in China," Prosser says. **"I would be surprised if the Labor government was happy to see industry move offshore and jobs move offshore to a country which doesn't have a carbon cost."** (*SMH*, Feb 19)

Heather Ridout, chief executive of the Australian Industry Group, also said a **"standout weakness" of the CPRS was its failure to assist moderately-emitting trade-exposed industries.** (*SMH*, Feb 19)

In a sign of another protracted battle between the mining industry and the government, the **chief executive of the Minerals Council of Australia, Mitch Hooke, said he was increasingly concerned industry compensation for Labor's proposed carbon tax would be based on the package of the dumped emissions trading scheme...** "The Rudd government's carbon pollution reduction scheme did not adequately protect Australia's export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme," Mr Hooke said in a statement yesterday. (*SMH*, Apr 7)

This narrative strategy provided fertile ground for the opposition, as it embedded the Carbon Tax within a context in which they had battle-hardened experience and know-how. As the Climate Institute representative explained, the CPRS policy and related media campaigns had essentially brought BlueScope Steel and other opponents 'up to fighting speed', and that one of the overriding lessons learned from that period was that the CPRS had 'very few friends' (see Section 3.3). Of course, the same lessons had obviously been learned by the Climate Institute and its Carbon Tax allies. But equally clear is the fact that, for them, the lesson was about what *did not* work in a campaign sense. This required the development of new strategies and narratives, unlike the tried and trusted lessons the tax's opponents could call on. Furthermore, as we have also seen, trying to explain the benefits of a previously rejected policy and frame this in a new light was much more complex than simply saying it was a "failure":

The **executive director of the Australia Institute, Dr Richard Denniss, explains there's no "free lunch" when trying to reduce carbon - it requires a change in behaviour across the economy.** "The more compensation you provide to the polluters, the duller the price signal and the less money left over to invest in alternatives," he says.

**Compensation can make sense on equity grounds or if it is politically necessary to get what you want, Denniss says.** But otherwise, the economic case for handouts is difficult to make. (*SMH*, Feb 19)

Finally, this tactic also aligns with the well-established finding of the “competing risks” frame found by many studies of environmental framing. This is usually between two environmental-based issues (e.g. climate change and nuclear power). However, in this case the risks of ‘economic vandalism’ have worked to relegate any considered risks of climate change itself as of only passing interest. We can see here agenda-cutting, or how ‘media framing of one problem can clearly serve to disguise the risks of another’ (McGaurr & Lester 2009, pp. 183-5).

Another set of past lessons learned in this space also appears to have been adopted by the corporate opponents. As discussed previously (Chapter 1.6), during the 1990s, US Republican pollster and consultant Frank Luntz helped develop what has come to be termed the “climate skeptic playbook” (Nisbet 2010, p. 53). As part of this, Luntz recommended sceptics emphasise how the US economy would face an “unfair burden” if it were to mitigate climate change, while countries such as China and India did not (Nisbet 2010, pp. 53-4). Two decades later, the early Carbon Tax narrative in Australia showed the corporate response following similar frames, both in terms of the tax being a burden on the economy *and* a burden on Australian businesses competing within “trade-exposed industries”.

However, it is acknowledged that it is not certain from the evidence whether or not this was adopted from the Luntz playbook, as a deliberate framing tactic. If it was, this suggests a learned/shared ‘expertise’ within political/commercial professionals, and it is not unreasonable to assume that such communication lessons have indeed been gained across corporate landscapes. Alternatively, if this framing device was not a deliberate part of the corporate strategy, then its clear presence within the corporate narrative suggests something else was going on. This other potential explanation is explored in the final conclusions of this analysis (Section 4.3).

### **Avoiding the taint of ‘vested interest’**

One of the main differences in the approaches of the two opposing organisations was how they used strategic alliances. While both the Climate Institute and BHP campaigned within broader coalitions, the CI’s supporters were essentially a loose alliance of fragmented agendas. Conversely, the opponents to the Carbon Tax employed a unified, coherent agenda. A key result of this was for the Climate

Institute to find itself virtually alone in the contested debate, since the environmental framing agendas of allies such as the Australian Conservation Foundation, World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace were essentially 'cut out' from the conversation. While this meant the corporate voices dominated by sheer weight of numbers, there is another aspect of this coalition structure that appears to have enabled a very coherent oppositional campaign.

Through the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), representing the mining industry as a whole, the individual mining companies were able to avoid the direct tarnish of being a "vested interest". From the MCA's work, a macro position was established, which each of the miners then supported with specific 'micro' details, creating a hidden, arms-length influence for the major mining companies. This is a very powerful framing process, as it sets up a synergy between macro and micro positions, giving a strong sense of universality and 'common' experience, but without the baggage of *they would say that, wouldn't they*. Essentially, the MCA carried that vested interest burden, but which allowed the individual mining representatives to explain, flesh-out and support that position without the same taint. Since the MCA's role was effectively to enable the mining industry's agenda, this structure was highly successful indeed.

### **The struggle of an uneven playing field**

As the literature has argued extensively, successful source influence in a media-agenda or framing sense is often about resources – which the powerful usually have in abundance, while the less powerful typically struggle on limited budgets. These resource inequalities are typically seen to affect access to media channels (see Section 1.7). The case studies presented here further confirm this view. As the interviews revealed, another key area of difference between the two campaigns was each organisation's evaluation of success, in terms of their communication strategies. Here, the relative uphill struggle experienced by the Climate Institute is telling. In one key regard, the Climate Institute indicated how antagonists such as BlueScope Steel simply enjoyed an overwhelming advantage. As the CI representative put it:

We were ready on a few fronts, but we just couldn't [compete]... I mean, I'd imagine BlueScope's probably got more lobbyists than the whole [pro-] movement combined, basically. So it was just a sort of sheer weight of numerical numbers.

Again, it is not unreasonable to assume that BHP also commanded this sort of numerical weight. We know, for example, they at least enjoyed the support of the MCA's media team, working in collaboration with their own.

It is also very likely that this uneven playing field had a lot to do with funding. The Climate Institute representative indicated that, in 2011 they had an annual media budget of around \$150,000. Against this, we can only speculate what BHP's annual media budget was, since their representative wasn't able to share those details. However, it would almost certainly have dwarfed the CI budget. According to BHP's annual statement for the year ended 30 June 2011, the multinational BHP Group had profits after tax of just under US\$24bn. Most significantly, while BHP's annual profit after tax for the year ended June 2017 had fallen to just under US\$6bn, the CI closed in the same month, due to a lack of funds.

There are other, non-resource-based areas where the tax's supporters were also at a disadvantage. In a framing process sense, this included the communication struggle with what was essentially a policy vacuum. With the Carbon Tax announced before any actual policy details had been finalised, which was one of the main reasons the CPRS policy version quickly became relevant, the Climate Institute and its allies were forced to try and frame something that had little concrete substance. As the CI representative intimated, the 'Say Yes' alliance and broader pro-Carbon Tax campaigners were severely hamstrung by the fact "it wasn't clear what we were saying yes to".

As a contested narrative, the corporate campaign was advantaged by being based on very established realities. As multinationals and large businesses, their importance to Australia's economic success was without question. BlueScope Steel, BHP, Rio Tinto etcetera, all number among the top 100 organisations in Australia in terms of revenues and are among the largest employers. As such, their frame of impending economic disaster had a very concrete basis behind it, making the threat of that frame much more tangible, authoritative and salient.

### **The successful propagation of information subsidies**

Another widespread assumption across the literature over the past few decades is that the newsroom is almost always the ultimate control filter for media frames (discussed in Chapter 1). Now, we must become more circumspect about notions of 'raw' story materials and journalistic freedom. The consistency with which corporate voices ensured the Carbon Tax was framed as an economic issue and *not* an environmental one, and how that framing focused on negatives of economic vandalism and bad government policy, speaks volumes about the leverage those anti-Carbon Tax sponsors enjoyed across mainstream newspapers, especially within the News Ltd press.

This is not to suggest that traditional news gathering can be dismissed entirely, and examples of strong investigative journalism still appear in the mainstream media. Certainly, as explained by the BHP representative, proactive efforts by journalists to gather and write about the costs of the Carbon Tax also took place in this instance. However, the research has also provided several examples of media releases and sponsor frames being adopted in the stories (see section 3.3).

One of the main industrial effects of the online media (r)evolution has been to undercut the hitherto advertising power of mass media outlets, not least of all newspapers. This has resulted in the loss of many journalist jobs across Australian newsrooms. When coupled with the pressures of the 24-hour news cycle that digital media has also introduced, these two developments alone must have placed incredible reliance on information subsidies, as they were made available. As Lester, a former Australian Journalist, has noted, there are now more public relations professionals writing news-ready copy, 'which journalists fail to check' (2010, p. 4).

## **4.2: An Effects Proxy – Public attitudes towards the Carbon Tax**

Before concluding the analytical interpretations, the Lowy Poll provides final evidence indicating how successful the anti-Carbon Tax strategy and framing

approach had been. Specifically, the Lowy Institute's 2012 poll directly asked people about their views on the Gillard Government's new tax on carbon.

From these survey results, the correspondences between public opinion about the Carbon Tax and related issues and the frames and agendas of the corporate campaign offer strong evidence of that campaign's success. Notably, 63 percent of people were against the Carbon Tax policy, which had been legislated by the Gillard government. Among those opposed to the policy, the vast majority said the main reason was a concern "it would lead to job losses". This scenario was a key frame device in the corporate sponsors' criticisms of the tax and strongly associated to the latent frame of economic vandalism.

Furthermore, 57 percent of people were in favour of the Coalition removing the Gillard policy if they won the next election (a promise the Abbott-led opposition had campaigned hard on ever since the tax was announced). Again, this echoes the corporate position that the tax was bad policy coming from a poor government.

Those specific Lowy Poll results (The Lowy Institute 2012) are presented here (shading highlight emphasis added):

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>Q: Thinking now about the legislation the Gillard Labor government passed last year introducing a fixed price on carbon that will then lead to an Emissions Trading Scheme. Are you personally in favour or against this legislation? Is that strongly or somewhat?</b> |            |
| Strongly in favour   | 18%        |
| Somewhat in favour   | 17%        |
| <b>Total in favour</b>   | <b>35%</b> |
| Don't know   | 4%         |
| Somewhat against   | 18%        |
| Strongly against   | 45%        |
| <b>Total against</b>   | <b>63%</b> |

Q: (Asked only of those strongly or somewhat against in Q above)

**You said you were against the legislation. For each one of the following please say whether you agree or disagree it is a reason why you personally are against the legislation:** (Reported as a % of the total sample)

|  | Agree | Don't know | Disagree |
|--|-------|------------|----------|
| It will result in job losses   | 52%   | 2%         | 9%       |
| It is not necessary to act before other countries                                | 38%   | 1%         | 22%      |
| The measures are not strict enough to result in substantial emissions reductions | 33%   | 2%         | 27%      |

**Q: And if a Liberal Nationals Coalition government is elected at the next Federal election, would you personally be in favour or against that Coalition government removing the Emissions Trading Scheme set up by the Gillard Labor Government? Is that strongly or somewhat?**

|                        |            |
|------------------------|------------|
| Strongly in favour     | 38%        |
| Somewhat in favour     | 19%        |
| <b>Total in favour</b> | <b>57%</b> |
| Don't know             | 4%         |
| Somewhat against       | 13%        |
| Strongly against       | 26%        |
| <b>Total against</b>   | <b>39%</b> |

Finally, in 2008 – the year immediately after Rudd’s election with a strong commitment to tackle climate change – 60 percent of Australia’s population had considered global warming as a “serious and pressing problem” which we should take steps to address “now”, regardless of costs. However, as the results below indicate, by 2012 this view had fallen to 36 percent, with the majority (45%) now agreeing that the problem could be dealt with “gradually” and by taking steps which were “low in cost”. This ‘gradual steps’ opinion had grown from 40 percent in 2011. Again, this reflects a key argument against the tax offered by opponents in the study period, that Australia should not act in haste ahead of other countries.

**Q: Now about global warming. There is a controversy over what the countries of the world, including Australia, should do about the problem of global warming. I'm going to read you three statements. Please tell me which statement comes closest to your own point of view.**

|  | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2006 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs   | 36%  | 41%  | 46%  | 48%  | 60%  | 68%  |
| The problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost | 45%  | 40%  | 40%  | 39%  | 32%  | 24%  |
| Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs   | 18%  | 19%  | 13%  | 13%  | 8%   | 7%   |
| Don't know/Refused   | 1%   | 1%   | 1%   | 1%   | 0%   | 1%   |

2012 Lowy Poll results: survey conducted 02-19/04/12 (Source: The Lowy Institute 2012)

Although this poll was conducted approximately a year after the study period, it is highly likely the media narrative continued along similar lines for many months afterwards and up to this poll being taken in April 2012. Indeed, a key reason for the early framing focus here was precisely an assumption that this period would *establish* the key debate frames moving forward. As the Climate Institute representative interviewed for this study also observed of the corporate campaign:

**Respondent:** I guess the scare campaign was effective, certainly effective. And that only grew all the way until June 2012.

These results provide not only a proxy for audience effects of the Carbon Tax framing considered here, but also the broader climate change policy context that enabled the new Coalition Government to "axe the tax" shortly after coming to power in late 2013. As an indicator of the broader social and potential cognitive effects of the Carbon Tax's framing, these results support the conclusion that corporate sponsorship and their frames prevailed in the narrative contest.

In other words, while it is not possible to link direct cognitive effects between the framing of the Carbon Tax and the Lowy Poll's clear indication of public opposition to it, it is reasonable to see that corporate influence on the media narrative played at least some part influencing that outcome. Accordingly, these results also offer further evidence of why locating power and influence at the centre of framing analysis is both so urgent and so important. Here, at the media-policy nexus, the corporate agenda has been well served, through a concerted, well-organised and widely prosecuted sponsorship of media frames against the Carbon Tax.

### **4.3: Frames, Discourse and Influence as an *Anchored* Process**

The research and arguments here have focused on framing as a sponsored, organisational process, yet such approaches may provide further implications for theoretical understandings of "framing effects", as suggested by Scheufele (see Section 1.9). To recap, when researching media frames, Scheufele implored us to ask: 'What kinds of media frames influence the audience's perception of certain issues, and how does this process work?' (1999, p. 108). As such, when coupled

with existing theories about how frames work in a constructionist-discourse sense, the insights of this study regarding the success of corporate sponsorship in a framing process make it possible to extend the work beyond manifest frame devices. In this section, this extended analysis is offered to suggest potential directions for framing theory, arising from the evidence.

Since corporate frames were able to dominate a contested narrative so effectively as a process, that success offers several new ideas regarding how frames work – not only as a narrative vehicle for latent meaning(s), but also as a bedrock underwriting how that narrative can unfold in the first place. Again, several patterns emerge in relation to the corporate frames, when considered from the perspective of latent effectiveness. These patterns provide a final set of interpretative implications from this study, before ending with what this potentially means for framing theory and notions of discourse as a whole.

### **The importance of existing frames**

One of the key disadvantages for the pro-Carbon Tax sponsors was the lack of specific policy details for the Carbon Tax, on which the communication strategy could build and underwrite narrative frames. In a sense, this meant the tax was announced not only within a policy vacuum but also within a frame vacuum: its policy *settings* were ill-defined and as such, so were its narrative *meanings*. In other words, the meaning of the frame device “Carbon Tax” was up for grabs, and it was a vacuum the anti-Carbon Tax sponsors quickly filled with well-established economic frames.

As we have seen, an important vehicle for these economic frames was Australia's first attempt to price carbon, the CPRS. This narrative context provided fertile frame associations for the tax's opponents, as it embedded the Carbon Tax within the context of all of the previous negative frames associated with the CPRS. These included frames of economic irresponsibility and vandalism now attached to the new tax, but also frames of 'rent-seeking' and 'ineffective emissions targets' that *supporters* of a price on carbon had criticised the CPRS for (i.e. the Greens Party). Perhaps most importantly, the CPRS context conjured frame associations with the policy 'failure' of Rudd's signature election promise of 2007, as well as all the

recriminations and lost faith post-Copenhagen 2009. In arguing against rent-seeking compensation, for example, even supporters of the new tax were drawn into narratives which framed the policy details as failure and “excessive”:

The Grattan Institute's Daley adds that **the CPRS arrangements were also excessive when it came to saving jobs**. His research found protecting the aluminium sector amounted to an annual subsidy of \$161,000 per worker.

**"The most important thing is to get a carbon price in. It would be good policy to have much less compensation than was offered last time around,"** he says. "If we're doing this to protect jobs it's not obvious that we need to do anything like what was suggested last time." (*SMH*, Feb 19)

However, not all of the frames that helped fill the vacuum were sponsored or even economic per se, and here we see the importance of existing and overlapping frames that may emanate from other contexts, or how meaning is generated in the full web or interplay of frames (Reese 2010). Two particular examples stand out, most importantly because they were identified by the Climate Institute as especially damaging to the pro-campaign. Perhaps most damaging, the price on carbon suffered in a latent sense by being labelled a “tax”. While it is beyond the scope here to look more fully at studies of what this device means cognitively, its negativity as a frame is laid bare simply by considering the usual metaphors and expressions associated with the term (at least in the author's anecdotal experience):

“Tax haven”;

“Tax relief”;

“A less taxing way”; and

“Tax burden”.

Tax, as a manifest term and latent frame idea, is a burden and something to be “avoided”, “minimised” or escaped (i.e. within a ‘haven’). Furthermore, in an explanation that reveals the ideas of Lakoff and just how much framing theory is now a part of mainstream professional thinking, the Climate Institute interview confirmed how this label was a communication and policy disaster:

**Respondent:** Perhaps the biggest shock of February '11 was that wording of the carbon tax itself, because I understand that Julia Gillard even had a brief not to say the word "carbon tax". But that's sort of a bit like 'don't mention the elephant'... Because it was a very unhelpful framing and one which we always tried to avoid from a communication perspective. I mean... the carbon pricing mechanism it was to evolve to isn't a tax in a normal sense.

**Interviewer:** Do you know what it was originally meant to be called?

**Respondent:** Well it's sort of a carbon pricing mechanism. The whole communication point [was] really more about the big emitters paying for their pollution.

Beyond economic frames, the vacuum was also filled by the "Ju-Liar" frame device. Clearly, in a classic ad hominem argument, this ensured the policy was firmly embedded within the associated frame context of Julia Gillard's "lies", and interplayed with the latent meanings of "untrustworthy", "false" and "manipulating", for example. In the words of the Climate Institute representative, the pro-Carbon Tax campaign "took a massive hit" and was up against it "from day one", due to these other narrative frame associations being attached to the policy.

As discussed earlier (section 4.1), the corporate framing can arguably be seen as adhering to a 'tried & trusted' conservative playbook, which seeks to position climate change discourse within frames of "uncertainty" and economic peril. As this study and many others in relation to the environment have shown, it is a strategy that has been very successful. Again, we can only speculate here whether this was deliberate (i.e. through a learned/shared neoliberalism 'expertise' across professionals). However, that such a rehearsed position *was* in fact adopted is suggested by one quote from the CEO of BlueScope Steel, the most strident of corporate voices against the tax:

On the ABC's Inside Business, O'Malley attacked the carbon tax proposal as "**economic vandalism**". (SMH, Apr 9) [emphasis added]

This is a clear instance of a manifest frame device explicitly worded using what was first identified in this research as the dominant *latent* frame, and aligning to the framing recommended by Republican strategist Luntz.

But what if it was not a learned or shared outcome? What if something else was 'going-on' to privilege and prioritise the dictates of economic frames over others? Is

it possible that, instead of a frame idea being directly shared, its insistence is actually entirely naturalised or socialised, in the sense of being culturally ordained and reified? In other words, while economic frames dominated the narrative, were the CI and BHP media strategies the only influence behind that? Or indeed, where they even the most important factors?

Sponsored frames strongly contributed to the contested narratives which informed the early Carbon Tax debate. But so too did other frames relevant to the context at the time – e.g. the former CPRS policy, the efforts of environmental groups such as the ACF to place *the environment* on the agenda (albeit with limited success), the ‘climate gate’ and policy failures of Copenhagen in 2009, the end of the prolonged Millennium Drought in Australia in 2010, and even the fact of the Gillard government being in a fragile minority alliance from 2010-2013.

Framing, whether as a sponsored process or not, never takes place in ‘clean air’, and it is the combination of these factors that adds to the success or not of a frame’s resonance. Yet, despite the potential for contesting frames to push or pull the narrative in other directions, economic considerations still held sway. The end of the drought, for example, could just as easily have led the conversation towards frames of “never again”, with debates about what sort of price on carbon could best ensure Australia was doing all it could to avert drought in the future.

It is this idea that something else was, is, going-on – besides organisational influence and corporate agendas – to hold the economic discourse above others, that is provided as a final interpretive implication. Before doing so, it is strongly acknowledged that this is not a fully-fledged theoretical position, but rather is offered as potential for a re-thinking of the framing project’s *materia*, namely frames themselves, the relationship(s) between frames and discourse, and how these might constitute new avenues for further research. Not least of all, it is a re-thinking that may offer a way forward which simultaneously ‘brings culture back in’ but also helps manage how underlying power-relations can be more coherently addressed in framing analyses.

### **Frames, the public sphere and *anchored* discursive ‘centres’**

If one pattern emerged within this study above all others, it is within the theme of the ‘economic’. As a central focus of both the Climate Institute and the BHP communication strategies, and as a dominant feature of the media narrative (both as a manifest frame device and a latent frame), the Carbon Tax was essentially discussed as an ‘economic’ issue alone. What is more, in a nod to newsroom control that cannot be dismissed entirely, concerns about the economic effects of the tax appear to have also been a central journalistic focus (as explained by the BHP representative).

Across the environment-media literature, there are numerous cases of where environmental issues have been relegated by or reduced to economic concerns and the interests of business (see Section 1.6). In their seminal constructionist examination of nuclear power discourse, for example, Gamson and Modigliani identified how latent frames of “progress” included framing devices such as ‘Nuclear power is necessary for maintaining economic growth and our way of life’ (1989, p.11). Fast-forward to 2015, and global discourses in relation to climate change are heavily dominated by “Industrial Fatalism” frames, in which the routine answer to a crisis directly created by industrial modernization is ‘more industrial modernization’ (Anselm & Hultman 2015, p. 29). For the authors of this far-reaching study, it is a discourse which has been based on ‘the notion that there was no alternative to intensified technological innovation and economic growth; even questioning the notion was depicted as harmful’ (pp. 29-30).

What is more, the second-most dominant discourse (“Green Keynesianism”) was found to share ‘many of the assumptions’ of the Industrial Fatalism view, despite being in many respects a direct critique of it. Not least of all, this alternative narrative was also based on ‘a strong belief that a market mechanism...could deal with all the problems and crises, both economic and ecological’ (Anselm & Hultman 2015, p. 74).

The evidence of a dominant ‘Industrial-fatalist’ discourse that contributed to the failure of COP15, demonstrates just how much the *economic* discursive contest around climate change has influenced policy, and the *lack* of policy, on a global scale. As Boyce and Lewis lamented a decade ago, it is essentially a discourse

underwritten by the ‘environmentally damaging – and disingenuous – norms of consumer capitalism’:

We are, as a culture, so deeply committed to a consumerist infrastructure that the temptation is strong to take solace in the soothing messages it repeatedly provides. (2009, p. 14)

This economic hegemony over the environment, in both a media narrative and government policy sense, has best been summarised by Boykoff:

Historically entrenched cultural preoccupations with free markets and economic growth in capitalist societies – along with the concomitant politics of interest groups – have resulted in a naturalized consideration of market-led approaches to policy action...Commitments to economic growth, and deeply entrenched technological optimism, have been significant forces influencing the wider cultural politics of climate change. (2011, p. 5)

Such dominant, economic concerns have been no less evident in relation to the Carbon Tax. Similar manifest and latent frames privileging economic growth (i.e. that the tax must not be allowed to question or harm this imperative) and presenting the new policy as an economic benefit (i.e. an opportunity for clean-energy investment), dominated both the media debate and the media strategies of the two respective case study organisations. Both the Climate Institute and BHP addressed the issue firmly within the existing market-based system, just as countless others have done so before them in other environmental-media debates. Is the centrality of this economic dictate simply a dominant theme or sponsored agenda? Or does this economic adherence signal a kind of discursive anchoring?

In other words, is the *economic* far more than a topic or thematic category, and in fact a kind of cultural anchor frame, which underwrites and validates the legitimacy and relevance of all other frames and discussion around the issue? Is it possible that the framing of the Carbon Tax as an economic issue above all else was due in part to something beyond the efforts of the sponsors and newsroom actors? That is, could this have been due to the underlying dictates of a shared/universal neoliberal discourse, anchored by the hegemony of an *economical* frame – in both a socio-cultural sense and a psycho-cognitive sense? The acknowledgement of this possibility is not exactly new. For example, as Boykoff continued in his reflection on economic hegemony over the environment:

In this context, it is often the case that those deemed as permissible discourses have remained encased in the logic of neoliberal late capitalism. (2011, p. 5)

Similarly, the roots of this conceptual foundation can be seen all the way back in the seminal 'polysemy' ideas of Roland Barthes (1977). Although Barthes initially related the ideas of polysemy and 'anchorage' to the meanings of images specifically, they are no less applicable to any text. For Barthes, the potential for multiple interpretations of an image (in print) required the publication to use "linguistic messages" to anchor the meaning:

[All] images are polysemous; they imply, underlying their signifiers, a 'floating chain' of signifieds, the reader able to choose some and ignore others... Hence in every society various techniques are developed intended to *fix* the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs. (Barthes 1977, pp. 38-9)

However, what is argued here is that such assertions of how certain "techniques" work to "fix" meanings should inform framing enquiries more holistically. Using this as the starting point, framing can more thoroughly examine the conditions that make it possible for discourse to remain routinely encased in economic terms, for example, and how the interplay of frames ensures readers "choose" particular meanings and ignore others. What this interpretation suggests foremost – and certainly as a first step towards developing these ideas further – is that framing theory requires a greater understanding of the various types of frames that may exist. When does a content device cease to be a topic or theme and become a frame? If sponsored frames exist, what other sorts of frames are there? Organic? Contextual? When does one type of frame end and another start, or do they overlap?

This is the final implication offered here: that we need to be working towards a taxonomy of frames, to enable such questions to be examined and tested in relation to various settings and agendas. Again, this not a new idea without precedent, but has been alluded to and suggested by many framing studies to date, and some of these origins offer useful starting points.

The power to frame, as so many previous arguments have begun to unravel, is so much more about the *relationships* between frames than it is about any single frame or the actions of any particular framing actors. To put this another way, it has

recently been acknowledged that the salience of any given frame is perhaps best understood as a product of the interplay, or web, of the frame's relationships with both competing and complementary "meanings" in the cognitive moment (e.g. Reese 2010; Van Gorp 2007). But what constitutes these other meanings? Are they borne by simple non-framed content (if such a thing exists), as much as other fully-formed frames? Or are they only carried by frames which have become discursive?

A starting point that recognises the possibility of multiple frame types necessarily begs the question, are all such various contributing frames of an equal nature? We know, for example, that frames do not begin with an equal value in terms of their potential for influence on the resulting salience. As the framing project has sought to demonstrate perhaps more than anything else, some frames are more predisposed than others to gain priority and to resonate with the reader. What is suggested here, is that unravelling how and why *resonance* happens requires a categorisation of frame types, towards greater understanding of the relationship between frames and discourse, or even if such a distinction is valid.

### **Discourse and frame types: The need for a taxonomy of frames**

Ideas of multiple frame types have existed for some time. Similarly, the relationships between frames and dominant socio-cultural meanings are the bedrock of constructionist analyses across the literature. However, what is also evident is just how varied, nebulous and interchangeable notions of frames and discourse are across those same discussions. It is possible even to see how the need for a taxonomy began to emerge with agenda-setting theory. In discussing how the media agenda becomes more critical and therefore more influential when people have a strong "need for orientation", McCombs (2004, pp. 53-67) offered the idea that media salience was strongest around "unobtrusive issues". This related to when individuals had little or no direct experience of an issue and thus relied more on media to fill the "cognitive vacuum", unlike obtrusive issues where personal experience was more at hand. Accordingly, this would suggest that media content could be categorised around obtrusive and unobtrusive agendas, for example.

In terms of framing theory, a few examples illustrate the point, particularly in terms of identifying *latent* frame types. As is well known, Snow and Benford identified

“collective action frames”, which are ‘action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns’ (cited in Gamson 1992, p. 67). However, they also referred to “domain-specific interpretative frames” and “global interpretative frames”, as the bases for a sort of micro and macro cognitive negotiation process (Snow et al. 1986, p. 474). Zhou and May have explained how ‘framing research has differentiated between issue-specific frames...and generic frames’ (2007, p. 84). Various frame types have also been referred to as “cultural frames” or “strategic frames” (Reese 2001, p. 12), or “culturally embedded frames” (Van Gorp 2010, p. 87), or “value frames” (Borah 2011, p. 253). Such markers undoubtedly reveal the ongoing problem of conceptualizing frames (Carragee & Roefs 2004, p. 217), and in part reveal how framing theory remains a “fractured paradigm” (Borah 2011, p. 257). More recently, this ambiguity has led to a situation where scholars now feel that ‘despite the attention paid to the concept, framing is arguably less clear now than at any point in its history’ (Cacciatore, Iyengar & Scheufele 2016, p. 8).

Nevertheless, in a useful appraisal of this early taxonomical work, Van Gorp (2010,) argued that culturally embedded frames have greater power than issue-specific or generic frames, because ‘they possess an outspoken defining capacity’ and ‘resonate with cultural themes’. For him, this success is due to their ‘appeal to ideas the receiver is already familiar with’:

[T]heir use appears to be natural to those who are members of a particular culture or society. Such “cultural resonance” makes the association between a frame and the issue seem transparent and obvious. (p. 87)

Such ideas of how frame-culture relationships work to impart meaning have also long imbued framing and discourse analyses. These too have gone by various names or explanations and have included “cultural templates” or cultural “givens” (Ericson et al., cited in Anderson 1997, p. 124), or “interpretive packages” (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, p. 3), which Hansen has recycled as “cultural packages” (2010, p. 107). The constructionist ideas of Gamson and Modigliani (1989), perhaps more than any other, have provided the most fruitful (and oft-cited) origins for a taxonomical understanding. As noted in Chapter 1, their work identified five framing devices (which suggest *how to think about* an issue) but also three reasoning devices (which suggest and justify *what should be done about* the issue). This modelling constituted a “signature matrix” of any given interpretive package:

A package can be summarized in a signature matrix that states the frame, the range of positions, and the eight different types of signature elements that suggest this core in a condensed manner. (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, pp. 3-4)

Most notably here, Gamson and Modigliani place these interpretative packages in the “cultural level”, where meaning is constructed out of the interplay between media discourse and the cognitive “predispositions” of individuals. Crucially, these packages are neither static nor absolute, for, ‘if they are to remain viable, have the task of constructing meaning over time, incorporating new events into their interpretive frames’ (1989, p. 4). It is less clear whether their *interpretive* formulation refers specifically to manifest frame devices or latent frames, and/or cognitive frames, or a combination of all three. Nevertheless, this early beginning of a taxonomical approach *did* argue that in all this complex, hard-to-decipher sense-making, some part of the symbolic order takes precedence over others, which they termed “cultural resonances”:

Not all symbols are equally potent. Certain packages have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with the larger cultural themes. Resonances increase the appeal of a package; they make it appear natural and familiar. (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, p. 5)

In the post-modern drift to find cultural resistance and cognitive freedoms, this assertion has been lost, unfortunately pushed aside too easily. Some frames simply do enjoy a more privileged or more ‘natural’ position within narratives, and this is anchored by a certain class of frame – an *anchor* frame. For, while negotiation and resistance are certainly valid factors of sense-making, we must not lose sight of other factors which underwrite power in our socio-cultural realities, simply because it is possible theoretically to do so. In another description of the interplay between frames and culture, Hertog and McLeod have described how frames are ‘structures of meanings made up of a number of concepts and the relations among those concepts’ (cited in Reese 2010, p. 24). Building on this description, Reese also offers a further important consideration that suggests *negotiation* of those concepts, in a frame reading sense, may not be such a totally free cognitive exercise:

Master narratives are among the devices that structure these concepts, providing rules for processing new content, which is organized on the basis of the more central network of concepts. (2010, p. 24)

Like Gamson et al., Reese also contends this is why frames are not static, since this functioning of frames is what gives them their 'dynamic quality as they operate over time to assimilate and reconstitute new facts and concepts' (2010, p. 24). Perhaps it is in this sense of "master narratives" that anchor frames work – "providing the rules" for any negotiation that may take place. So, while other frame types may evolve dynamically, interacting with and responding to the cultural and content imperatives of *context*, anchor frames ensure their reconstitution and assimilation never takes place too far away from the "central network of concepts" of their day. This is not to suggest that anchor frames are entirely fixed in any way either. Rather, they should be thought of as a class of frame which evolves more slowly, perhaps at glacial pace. An anchor frame underwrites other frames, to ensure they function precisely as 'persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation', in order to 'routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual' (Gitlin 1980, p. 7).

An example of a possible anchor frame can be found in Gamson's (1992) "injustice frame", which he identified as a collective sense of injustice, or what we might call a sense-making thread, evident at three levels: personal experience, popular wisdom and media discourse. Is it possible this kind of anchoring thread forms the core of Gamson and Modigliani's interpretative packages? Or, in Van Gorp's (2007) reworking as a "frame package", is an anchor frame the thread which links framing devices (e.g. media discourse), latent reasoning devices (e.g. personal experience) and implicit cultural phenomena (e.g. popular culture)? Does an anchor frame, then, constitute the binding thread that holds a frame interplay together, ensuring that while such an interplay is flexible and negotiable, it is never chaotic.

To be clear about what is meant by frame types, the following explanation helps illustrate how this conceptualisation is offered here only as the starting point for a new direction. Much more work needs to be done to firstly confirm there are different types of frames, and secondly what their characteristics may be. To paraphrase Scheufele, perhaps a taxonomy will finally allow framing theory to 'take into account *all* kinds of frames and link them consistently' (1999, p. 106). In the media effects vein, these sorts of concerns are now considered urgent. As Cacciatore et al. (2016) indicate: 'Using the framing label to describe virtually any issue-related content category has muddled the concept to the point where it is indistinguishable from other effects models' (p. 14). While their concerns relate

more specifically to the reception of frames by audiences, it is equally valid for studies such as this, focused on the production end of news frames.

Notwithstanding these theoretical issues, the history of framing ideas does offer pathways forward. Drawing on the ideas of “Gamson and colleagues”, Nelson and Kinder described how their work in defining the ‘assortment of frames’ in relation to ‘prominent public controversies’, including affirmative action, welfare and nuclear power, documented ‘a taxonomy of frames for each issue’ (1996, p. 1058). In the nuclear power example, this taxonomy comprised seven key packages: *progress*, *energy independence*, *devil’s bargain*, *runaway*, *soft paths*, *public accountability* and *not cost effective* (discussed in Hansen 2010, p. 109). These are best thought of as latent frames. For example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 4) explained how the *progress* package (i.e. a latent frame) was evident in relation to narratives around nuclear power for electricity generation (e.g. the various manifest frame devices that invoked ideas of “progress”). This sense of the packages as latent frames is also evident within Nelson and Kinder’s discussion, whereby the nuclear power study showed how coverage ‘shifted from a largely favourable “technological progress” frame to an alarming “runaway technology” frame’ (1996, p. 1058).

This taxonomy, however, is one that relates specifically to the issue of nuclear power. As such (and without doing further analysis on this point), it is probable the seven frame types are all various examples of latent *issue-specific* frames. Within this issue-specific frame type, then, we may find that *progress* and *energy independence* were frames heavily sponsored by an electricity industry promoting the technology, while environmental groups sponsored the *soft paths* frame (as suggested by Hansen). In this taxonomical sense, issue-specific frames are one type, of which sponsored frames are one version. So, in this example, what might be the anchor frame? Hansen offers a possibility, albeit in relation to the progress frame only:

The progress package thus benefits from its resonance with deeper American values, in many respects overlapping with the protestant ethic... [and] a broader utilitarian enlightenment perspective emphasising efficiency, technological innovation, a frugal, rational and logical approach. (2010, p. 108)

A sense of “progress” is anchored by what that *progress* means in a utilitarian, protestant work ethic paradigm/discourse, so that it is very difficult for any other

alternative reading of “progress” to arise. The unspoken, natural, cultural resonance of this anchoring privileges *this* particular idea of such progress to emanate. Perhaps this anchoring may also underwrite the *devil’s bargain* frame, and its similar religion-based “Faustian” ideas (Hansen 2010, p. 109).

Other frame types may also be evident in this example. A *public accountability* frame, for example, rests on shared notions of a public realm and the accountability of all of us in that realm. This frame, perhaps, is a type of “generic” or organic frame. Generic because of its universal applicability, across multiple narrative contexts, and organic because it has evolved over a very long time, in which it has developed as a frame widely taken-for-granted, in Reese’s parlance. Or is it? Does the shared cultural resonance of the *public realm* actually constitute an anchor frame? Similarly, is the *protestant work ethic* an anchor frame or more a generic one? How would we decide? What are the characteristics of each type in this taxonomy?

As a first, tentative suggestion, perhaps anchor frames are defined most by being something of an uber frame – a master narrative – by which they are virtually beyond contestation or question. For example, protestant ethics may hold dominance in many western cultures where this indeed would make it an anchor frame. However, in other cultures the uber frame would come from the foundations of other religious ethics. Notions of the public realm, on the other hand, are in direct contrast to the private realm and, in any given narrative context, one or the other may provide the most appropriate *generic* resonance. Accordingly, frames of *public* or *private* could acquire quite different meanings when interplayed with diverse anchor frames.

The neoliberal, capitalist economic model has practically no alternative narrative to contend with, especially as a western system but increasingly as a global one. The ‘economic’ anchors precisely because it is above question. Our free-market social systems, while varied in terms of just how ‘free’ that actually is, are the bedrock of how our democracies function. As such, the *economic* is also the bedrock of our thinking; a discursive fabric guiding understanding, debate and sense-making. One key characteristic of anchor frames, for example, may be how they seamlessly enable the framing device of metaphor. Perhaps this class of frame makes it so easy to ‘know’ the meaning of a t-shirt slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid”, or for

other well-known metaphorical phrases to slip off the tongue, such as “the bottom line”, “the public purse”, “taxpayers’ money”, “cost-benefit”, “the cost of living”.

Finally, to apply this possible taxonomy to the Carbon Tax debate, it is possible that the sponsored, issue-specific frames of the corporate agenda were more successful not only due to the processes identified in this study, but also because of the greater cultural and discursive resonance their arguments enjoyed. A cultural resonance underwritten by the master narrative frame of the *economic*, which anchored the debate in these terms, but also supported by the negative associations of generic/organic frames such as *tax*, *lies* and *vandalism*, and the negative contexts of other issue-specific frames around the *CPRS* and the failures of *Copenhagen*.

### **Summary: Locating power and influence at the centre of framing analysis**

Organisational influence on the news coverage of the Carbon Tax in Australia was instrumental in certain frames dominating that coverage. Through information subsidies and coordinated media strategies, that influence strongly determined both the terms of the early debate between February-May 2011 and the discursive course of the narrative. What is more, such framing sponsorship was a direct strategic objective among organisations on each side of that debate, with the Climate Institute largely leading the non-profit, pro-Carbon Tax arguments and BHP Billiton a key voice among a group of strident corporate, anti-Carbon Tax arguments. Yet, with the use of third-party data from the Lowy Institute and the benefit of hindsight, there is also strong (inferred) effects evidence that the corporate sponsorship was far more successful than the non-profit campaign. Clearly, public opinion turned against the Carbon Tax as the debate wore on, eventually leading to the sitting Labor government losing the 2013 election to a very anti-Carbon Tax Tony Abbott and the Coalition party. Not long after, in July 2014, the regulation was successfully repealed.

Interestingly, both the 2012 Lowy Poll and the Climate Institute interview indicated that, despite the concerted anti-campaign and climate change-denying voices “since the climate change debate began in Australia” (as asked by the polling question), public concern about climate change itself had started to return.

Research undertaken by the Climate Institute apparently showed this trend, as explained by the CI representative during the interview. This reversal in public opinion constituted a “bitter irony”:

**Respondent:** What I think is fascinating is that all of our polling – and other polling showed this as well – is that concern about climate change... did continually drop until June 2012, until the moment the pricing mechanism started and the scare campaigns were seen not to be what they were. Then there was a notable recovery.

...This is one of the bitter ironies, that we actually went through the valley of death and got the thing up, [and] we were getting the wind of community support for the whole carbon tax, only for it to be slashed away because Abbott got elected.

The 2012 Lowy polling confirms this point below (The Lowy Institute 2012). At the time, results showed the vast majority of Australia’s population either had the same level of concern (55%) or were now more concerned (38%), than in 2011 (when most people (81%) agreed that climate change was a problem – see Section 4.2).

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**Q: Since the climate change debate began in Australia, have you personally become more concerned or less concerned about climate change than you were when the debate began in Australia, or, have you not changed your mind at all?**

|                  |     |
|------------------|-----|
| More concerned   | 38% |
| Have not changed | 55% |
| Less concerned   | 7%  |
| Don't know       | 0%  |

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[Shading highlight added]

What are the social and theoretical implications of this outcome, whereby *unelected* vested interests can successfully sponsor a particular media narrative, to propagate a corporate framing agenda within the public realm? What are the lessons, in a discourse and framing sense, from a sponsorship that was also able to turn public opinion against a specific policy solution so effectively? A public opinion that helped political vested interests firstly to win government and then to reverse a key policy and set of regulations in line with that corporate agenda. For, as many would argue, reversal of the Carbon Tax and its intended carbon abatement effects was without

doubt *against* the public interest. This all supports a renewed view of frames and framing, along three key lines of understanding:

1. Framing (verb) activities and frame (noun) messages are never conjured nor received in isolation, but take place in contested, historical, iniquitous contexts – understanding how some frames come to dominate the discourse over others requires consideration of all these attendant factors, rather than a simple textual analysis of the frame itself.
2. Notions of journalists working with ‘raw’ story materials, and the apparent narrative control of newsrooms, must not be assumed but rather questioned from the outset.
3. Not all frames are equal – to understand more fully what constitutes ‘the power to frame’, we need a ‘taxonomy’ of frame types; e.g. anchor, organic or generic and issue-specific, such as sponsored frames. While teasing out the respective effects of various frames in the content-cognitive interplay clearly remains complex and problematic, the framing project would do well to at least start from a more informed position regarding the varied, constituent *materia* of this frame interplay.

It is hoped that future research on framing in the nexus between media and policy will continue the ideas offered here, to explore these questions and address imprints of power. Not least of all, it is a central hope of this thesis that framing research can begin to claw back some space and primacy for public agendas beyond the dominant neoliberal free-market discourse, to break-free from that particular, near-omnipotent socio-political anchor.

## Chapter 5: Limitations and Future Research

Media content/textual analyses in this study were conducted on a sample of media reporting on climate change (n = 271), not on the full population of articles published on this topic leading up to and during the period of study.

As shown in Table 5.28, a Factiva search identified 767 articles were published nationwide in Australia during the eight-month period between the date of election of the Gillard federal government and three months after the tax's announcement. However, the full sample included all national and capital city daily newspapers.

**Table 5.28:** Total Carbon Tax articles published nationwide, Sept 2010-May 2011

| <b>Newspaper stories citing "carbon tax" published in 8-month period between 14/09/10 (date of Gillard minority government sworn in) to 13/05/11 (3 months after the tax was 'announced')</b> | <b>Total articles (excluding identical duplicates)</b> |
|---|--|
| The Australian/Weekend Australian (National)  | 228  |
| The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)  | 99   |
| The Age (Melbourne)   | 91   |
| The Australian Financial Review (National)  | 100  |
| Canberra Times  | 44   |
| Courier Mail (Brisbane)   | 39   |
| The Advertiser (Adelaide)   | 38   |
| The Daily Telegraph (Sydney)  | 33   |
| Herald-Sun (Melbourne)  | 32   |
| The West Australian   | 31   |
| Hobart Mercury  | 22   |

From this, a sample of articles was selected as explained in section 2.3 and shown in Table 2.5, to focus on a representative selection of newspapers and the earliest

period of the Carbon Tax debate, following the first reporting of the policy on February 11-12, 2011. Study of TV and radio news and commentary would have provided further perspectives. However, media research indicated that TV and radio news across commercial networks were trusted far less than the two broadsheet newspapers and also less than the two tabloids – although similar trust levels were held regarding the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)* – see section 2.2 for full details. Accordingly, and because retrieval of broadcast media content is very expensive, TV and radio content were deemed less important and beyond the scope of this study.

The political sensitivity of this study topic necessitated that considerable time had lapsed between the events and the research taking place. Due to factors of both commercial confidentiality and professional caution, it was recognised that interviews could only be realistically secured after the passage of some years. However, this fact also made it difficult to identify and locate suitable persons for the interviews. Not least of all, many of the employees relevant to the Carbon Tax campaigns had left prior to the study commencing, and organisations were reluctant to share contact details or information about past employees. For example, requests for the contact details of former relevant employees were rejected by both the Climate Institute and BHP. The author also attempted to interview executives from BlueScope Steel, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Minerals Council of Australia, however this was not possible. ACF declined, while repeated enquiries with BlueScope were unanswered and there were no executives at the MCA who were on staff during the study period and still working there.

### **Internal and external validity**

The limited number of case studies means caution must be taken regarding the external validity of the study. The findings offered here are pertinent to two specific organisations in relation to a very specific media and policy issue, and generalising beyond this context is not really possible. Nevertheless, it is the researcher's opinion and experience that many professionals and organisations operate in similar ways, hence why such communication positions and roles are transferrable, and as such these insights provide a solid foundation on which to test sponsorship influence in other settings.

However, the evidence provided suggests less threat to the internal validity of the study, due to the strong correlations shown between organisational strategies and media releases (independent variables) and the presence of narrative devices and latent frames in media news stories (dependent variables). While the influence of journalistic priorities on stories cannot be dismissed entirely, the findings indicate how this main extraneous variable had limited (if not less) effect on media frames, due to the sponsorship activities during the study period.

Despite these limitations, this research is important as one of the first to focus specifically on how frames are motivated and produced by actors beyond the newsroom – in effect, how framing takes place *through* the media rather than by the media. By examining the activities of two prominent organisations towards influencing how newspapers covered the Carbon Tax policy, this study provides evidence which links the presence of media frames with the aims and strategies of sources, to help confirm how frame sponsorship is both real and effective. Finally, these findings contribute to a theoretical understanding of ‘the power to frame’, and how vested organisational interests are able to influence public debate through media news, and in turn influence public policy.

### **Potential directions for future research**

Further studies of media framing sponsorship in different settings will help locate how the agendas and messages of organisations contribute to the establishment of dominant frame(s). Such work will contribute wider evidence and understanding of sponsoring activities. In particular, further studies are needed to evaluate the framing process taken by vested source interests, rather than speculate on or leave aside such considerations.

The limitations of this study suggest some key areas for further enquiries. Firstly, studies in relation to all media types, including broadcast media and social media, would provide new perspectives. For example, are the processes and extent of sponsor influence differentiated by varied media channels?

Secondly, is sponsor influence differentiated by varied issues or news topics? This study has focused on a political issue with relevance to corporations and environmental groups, but how does influence change within other contested

contexts? Further studies might look at corporations or community groups competing with each other, or competing with government, for example, or issues less related to policy establishment (e.g. enforcement of existing legislation, or social issues more concerned with ethics than regulation).

Thirdly, further research in areas such as those suggested here can help confirm and develop a taxonomy of frames, to identify varied frame types and their discursive relationships. A nuanced understanding will enable stronger investigations of the interplay between various levels of cognitive and media frames, to help locate where power lies within frames.

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## **Appendix 1: Full interview discussion guide – semi-structured**

### **1. Intro – 10mins**

What was your position/title in early 2011? (Feb-May time period)

Tell me a little about your role then; what were you responsible for? What type of communications did you organize?

### **2. Org background at time of carbon tax – 10mins**

Thinking back to the last 2-3 months of 2010, what was the organisation's position on climate change in general?

When did the organization first become aware of the carbon tax becoming a reality? What was the initial response from a corporate comms viewpoint? (e.g. what did they think/do leading-up to the official Gillard announcement?)

### **3. Org strategy response to the carbon tax – 20mins**

After the Gillard announcement and the carbon tax became 'official' in early February 2011, can you walk me through the organisation's media strategy, as it unfolded?

Probe:

- Was a decision made that a media campaign was needed? What were the reasons?
- What steps were taken to set a campaign in motion?
- Was the organisation's position on the carbon tax established and fixed from the start, or did it evolve throughout the campaign period?
- What was the overall position adopted? (pro or anti – and why?)
- What was the campaign budget?

### **4. Org tactics during the campaign – 25mins**

Can we discuss a bit more in detail how the campaign was run – what were the key tactics adopted to get the organisation's viewpoint out and into the media?

Probe:

- Were particular newspaper titles/journalists targeted? What were the reasons?
- What resources were marshalled for the campaign? (e.g. internal/external, company spokespeople, third-party support, research etc?)
- How did you develop particular story angles? What was the process for deciding on specific media release 'frames'?
- What was the 'opposition' doing? – Was it apparent who they were and what their campaign was focused on?
- 

#### **5. Campaign success measures – 25mins**

Finally, can you please outline how successful the campaign was, from the organisation's viewpoint?

Probe:

- How responsive were different media outlets/journalists to your campaign/media releases?
- Did you have to work hard to gain media attention, or was it easy/invited?
- Were some tactics more successful than others? Which ones? What were the reasons?
- Were you successful in getting any particular organizational viewpoints directly into the media? Which ones?
- (Ask to highlight any specific media releases/engagement actions/resources which were picked up by the key newspapers verbatim or near verbatim)

#### **6. Is there anything else you would add?**

*Thank and close*

## Appendix 2: Media releases

### Climate Institute:

#### **Pricing pollution & clean energy policies unlock door for regional clean energy jobs** Media Release

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Feb 28, 2011 - 11:00pm

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Ground-breaking research launched today by Independent MHR Tony Windsor demonstrates not only potential regional clean energy resources available from carbon pollution pricing and clean energy policies, but outlines pathways for regions to maximise employment and investment opportunities.

“This research shows pollution pricing and clean energy support policies unlock the door to significant regional employment and investment opportunities, but also highlights the skills and industry development policies necessary to realise them,” said John Connor, CEO of The Climate Institute.

“The Climate Institute has commissioned leading energy and industry specialists\* to model the opportunities and to talk to regional business and community leaders to not only see what extra opportunities exist, but to see what else is necessary to turn opportunity into reality.”

Independent MHR Tony Windsor launched The Climate Institute’s series of policy briefs, state and regional snapshots and roadmaps and launched an interactive Clean Energy Jobs in Regional Australia website. The reports and website present and summarise research from Australia’s leading energy consultants SKM-MMA and industry experts at Ernst and Young.

“This ground breaking research shows not only the great clean energy resources that exist in regional Australia, but also some of the national and regional policies needed for regions like New England to realise the full employment and investment opportunities that can come from action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and grow cleaner industries,” said Mr Windsor.

“I am delighted to be able to launch not only this research but also the online tools that will allow everyone to examine, challenge and learn from this research.”

“Australia stands at the doorway to a clean energy transition that can drive tens of billions of dollars of investment in the electricity sector creating a net increase of close to 34,000 new jobs in regional Australia,” said Mr Connor

“Realising these opportunities for Australia, and regional Australia, will require our politicians to make companies, like power generators, responsible for the pollution they create, policies to grow clean energy such as the Renewable Energy Target, plus skills and industry development policies .”

Australia has largely untapped energy resources in geothermal, large scale solar, bio-energy, hydro, wind and natural gas. Modelling from SKM-MMA shows that by 2030 close to 43 per cent of

Australia's electricity could be produced from clean energy, up from around 12 per cent today. Regional analysis shows that greater proportions of renewable electricity are attainable with extra policies and focus.

State employment opportunities out to 2030 include:

*[please refer to state snapshots for updated job estimates]*

- NSW: Close to 7,000 new power sector jobs
- Queensland: Close to 6,300 new power sector jobs
- Victoria: Over 6,800 new power sector jobs
- South Australia: Close to 2,700 new power sector jobs
- Western Australia: Over 3,500 new power sector jobs

The Climate Institute was awarded a grant from the NSW Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water to assess the employment opportunities in six NSW renewable energy precincts. As part of the project it commissioned Ernst and Young to develop roadmaps detailing opportunities and challenges for each precinct.

“Importantly, these clean energy opportunities also offer a strong economic foundation for Australia's regions, providing much needed investment and jobs to ensure a strong population base for regional communities, and their associated services infrastructure.

“In 2010 global clean energy investments hit record levels at \$243 billion and this is expected to accelerate in coming years. Australia lags in current investments and will fall further behind without action on pollution to stimulate clean energy uptake.”

“Delays and half measures to tackle pollution and climate change will risk these new job and investment opportunities for Australia's states and regions.”

“These clean energy jobs are just the beginning as we put in place stronger policies and as Australian industry invests more in those industries which represent real growth areas for our economy now and into the future,” said Mr Connor.

*\*All case studies, roadmaps, methodologies and reports are available on [project page](#) and interactive online map at [cleanenergyjobs.climateinstitute.org.au](http://cleanenergyjobs.climateinstitute.org.au) Navigate to the state or region you wish to access and click on the View/Download Report tabs on the left of the map.*

## **Garnaut shows shrewd pragmatism in approach to pollution pricing**

### **Media Release**

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**Mar 18, 2011 - 1:00am**

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The Climate Institute said Professor Garnaut had shown shrewd pragmatism in his proposed approach to pollution pricing released today.

However, The Climate Institute warned that without additional regulations higher pollution prices

would be needed to ensure Australia maximises the use of its world leading clean energy sources.

"Professor Garnaut's proposals for pollution pricing to unlock clean energy investment in Australia are practical and politically pragmatic," The Climate Institute's CEO John Connor said.

"The initial pollution pricing proposed would start to reduce our economic dependence on pollution but without faster price escalators it would be insufficient to peak pollution levels or maximise the Australian investment in our abundant clean energy resources."

"Making business responsible for the pollution they cause is central to ensuring Australia joins other nations who are gaining first mover economic benefits from developing new clean energy industries.

"However, pollution prices of only \$20-30/tonne that increase slowly would need to be backed up with strong regulatory measures to encourage more efficient use of energy in the homes, industries, transport choices and to ensure we don't lock in investments in highly polluting traditional coal fired power stations."

**Time to put things into perspective**  
**Media Release**

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Apr 21, 2011 - 10:30pm

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**TIME TO PUT THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE:**

**For around the cost of a sausage sandwich per week we can help Australia out of the world's biggest polluters club**

The Climate Institute has today hit out at the campaign of misinformation being driven by vested business and political interests and is urging the issue of pollution costs be put in perspective.

"It's high time we had some honest and balanced debate not just about the costs associated with putting a price on carbon pollution, but also the opportunities this important policy initiative will deliver for Australians," said The Climate Institute's CEO John Connor.

"No one denies there will be costs associated with transforming the Australian economy from one reliant on highly polluting industries to one based on cleaner energy and clean industries, but there are misleading claims being made," he said.

"Whilst it's understandable that a handful of vested interests might choose to put company profits or their own personal gain ahead of the interests of Australians, it's disappointing the extent to which some have been willing to peddle misinformation to the community," he said.

"Of particular concern is the fact pollution and clean energy policies have dishonestly been made the scapegoat for household electricity price rises, when in fact these rises are mainly the result of rising infrastructure costs," he said.

Research released by The Climate Institute today details how electricity price rises are primarily being driven by the cost of network upgrades, and not the decision to put a price on pollution.

The research also reveals Australia's power sector ranks amongst the ten most polluting power sectors on the planet, alongside Botswana, Cambodia and Estonia, emphasising the need for Australia to get serious about transforming its economic base. This comes on top of figures released on Tuesday by the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency that reveal Australia's annual carbon pollution levels continued to increase in 2010.

"For around the cost of one sausage sandwich per week putting a price on pollution will help change the investment and power generation decisions necessary to help put Australia on the path to a low pollution, clean energy future," he said.

"Most of us buy a sausage sandwich regularly to support important local community causes – this is no different. It's about what relatively small amount of money we are willing to pay to reduce pollution for the benefit of our environment."

"And the Federal Government has made clear there will be assistance provided to those lower income families who may struggle to pay the additional costs that result from making polluters finally start to pay for their pollution."

"Let's get real about this and put it in perspective. Unlike the other factors that are affecting electricity price rises, a pollution price will work to generate revenue from big polluters which can then be used to support energy efficiency, clean energy development and help low income communities manage the transition to cleaner energy in Australia."

"Most importantly, making dirty power generators pay for their carbon pollution for the first time will then help drive investment in, and greater generation from, cleaner energy sources."

The Climate Institute's factsheet, Infographic and policy brief show that when compared to other factors a pollution price will have a relatively small impact of household energy bills.

A pollution price of \$25/tonne will add around \$3.86 per week to the average Sydney household's energy bill in 2012/13. This is slightly higher than the amount estimated by Treasury, but a third less than suggested by the Coalition and some business groups.

Rising network costs – which have nothing to do with a pollution price and will happen regardless – will have greater impacts at \$7.88 per week.

Energy efficiency policies can further reduce the impact of pollution prices by at least \$1.41 per week, reducing the difference to \$2.45 per week. This is about the cost of a sausage sandwich at a local community fundraiser, or a fifth of the value of food wasted by the average household each week.

Other key facts on electricity prices:

- Australia's power sector ranks amongst the world's top ten most polluting, along with countries such as Botswana, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mongolia and Estonia.

- Uncertainty in climate policy will cause electricity prices to rise by as much as 13 per cent by 2020 – that’s a \$2 billion hit to the economy for nothing in return.
- Failure to provide a more certain policy environment for investors will itself add an estimated \$1.30 to the average household’s energy bill by 2020.
- The 20 per cent Renewable Energy Target (RET) backed by both the ALP and the Liberal and National Parties accounts for a relatively small fraction of weekly energy bills – around \$1.25 a week for the average Sydney household.
- “There is no doubt there are challenging electricity price increases in the system, but the potential impacts and outcomes of pollution and clean energy policies needs to be put in perspective.”

“Pollution and clean energy policies can make a real difference to Australia’s pollution dependent economy and can help spark investment in our abundant clean energy resources,” said Mr Connor.

## **Minerals Council of Australia:**

MEDIA RELEASE MINERALS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA

### **EUROPE’S CARBON PRICING SCHEME PROTECTS EXPORTS, AUSTRALIA’S CPRS DOES NOT**

Statement from Mitch Hooke, Chief Executive Officer, Minerals Council of Australia

The Minerals Council of Australia will not support a carbon pricing system that fails to maintain the international competitiveness of Australia’s export industries.

The Rudd Government’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) did not adequately protect Australia’s export sectors and should not be the template for the new carbon pricing scheme.

A new economic analysis shows that a CPRS style approach to the treatment of internationally trade exposed firms under a carbon pricing scheme will expose the vast majority of Australian exporters to the full brunt of the world’s highest carbon costs ahead of their international competitors.

The analysis follows increasing concern that the Gillard Government’s approach to transitional arrangements for trade exposed sectors will be based on the flawed CPRS model. This is the wrong approach.

We agree that it is necessary for Australia to make a measured transition to a low emissions economy, but we do not accept that we need to unilaterally sacrifice the competitiveness of Australia’s trade sector in the process.

Where carbon pricing schemes are being implemented or planned internationally, governments are adopting a phased approach to the introduction of a carbon price in order to protect the international competitiveness of their export and import competing industries. The European Union (EU) is principal among them.

The EU scheme recognises the importance of a firm’s trade exposure when assessing eligibility for measures to ensure continued competitiveness, recognising that export and import competing firms

operating in fiercely competitive global markets cannot pass on the additional costs to their customers.

The CPRS model failed to do this, focusing instead only on a firm's emissions intensity.

The EU scheme gives the same weight to a firm's trade exposure as its emissions intensity. The upshot is that more than 70% of EU sectors (117 of the 164 European industry sectors) will qualify under the EU's trade intensity test, and

be allocated permits for up to 100% of their direct emissions. EU trade exposed firms will also be eligible for assistance from EU member states for higher electricity costs.

In contrast, under the CPRS model, more than 80% of Australia's merchandise exports will face the full brunt of carbon costs from the outset of the scheme.

Under the CPRS EITE framework, sectors accounting for 90 per cent of total manufacturing employment in Australia will receive no transitional assistance to preserve their competitiveness.

The EU also applies a non-discriminatory and practical approach to the treatment of all its trade exposed sectors. The EU has taken a more pragmatic approach where fugitive emissions from coal production are excluded from the EU

ETS until uncertainties about the accuracy of the measurement of fugitive emissions are resolved.

In contrast, emissions from coal mining (including fugitive emissions) under the CPRS were arbitrarily excluded from eligibility for assistance despite qualifying under the scheme criteria.

Minerals Council Contact:

Ben Mitchell – Director, Public Affairs W: [www.minerals.org.au](http://www.minerals.org.au) D: 6 April 2011

MEDIA RELEASE MINERALS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA

### **GOVERNMENT WRONG ON EUROPEAN CARBON SCHEME**

Statement from Mitch Hooke, Chief Executive Officer, Minerals Council of Australia

Climate Change Minister Greg Combet yesterday claimed that the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) – the template for the Government's new carbon pricing plan – provides more safeguards for Australia's trade exposed firms than the European

Emissions Trading Scheme. This is incorrect.

Analysis of the two schemes demonstrates that the trade competitiveness safeguards in the CPRS are vastly inferior to those developed for their European Union competitors under the EU ETS.

- Compensation for electricity costs: Contrary to the Minister's assertions, European trade exposed firms will be compensated for both direct emissions costs and higher electricity charges. Yesterday, the Minister for Climate Change claimed that the EU ETS scheme will not (after 2013) compensate

trade exposed firms for the impact of higher electricity costs. The Minister has been wrongly advised. Paragraph 31 of the relevant EU Directive states as follows:

o “Sectors or sub-sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage may be compensated for costs related to greenhouse gas emissions passed on in electricity prices by financial measures adopted in Member States in accordance with state aid rules applicable and to be adopted by the Commission in this area.”

- Limits on support: The Minister claims that the EU will limit support to a cap of 29 per cent of permits. This cap applies to direct emissions only, and there is no proposed limit on additional compensation for electricity price increases. Under the CPRS EITE model, support for Australian firms (for both direct and indirect emissions) is estimated at 25 to 28 per cent. The Greens propose a cap of 20 per cent.
- Treatment of coal mining The EU scheme exempts fugitive emissions from coal mining as there is no technology available to capture these emissions. Fugitive emissions are included in the CPRS. This will cost the Australian coal mining industry \$14 to \$20 billion (in current dollars) by 2020. The EU coal mining sector – which produces 45 percent more emissions than the Australian sector – will face no such costs.
- Tax burden: Since its inception in 2005 the EU scheme has established a functioning carbon market without a tax spree. The CPRS would have raised more tax in its first three months than the EU scheme has generated since 2005.
- Coverage of export sectors: The EU scheme’s trade exposed provisions apply to 164 sectors that account for 73 per cent of EU merchandise exports. The so-called Emissions Intensive Trade Exposed provisions of the CPRS will cover just 40 ‘activities’ – 80 per cent of Australia’s goods exports and 90 per cent of minerals exports will receive no safeguard assistance.
- Safeguards for employment in manufacturing/mining: The EU trade exposure provisions cover sectors that account for 50 per cent of employment in manufacturing and mining. Under the CPRS, sectors accounting for 90 per cent of total manufacturing employment in Australia will receive no transitional assistance to safeguard their competitiveness.

Minister Combet has previously lauded the European emissions scheme, citing it as a model for Australia. On 28 February on Sky News, Mr Combet was asked which scheme “would you hold up as the model you would most like to follow, that has done the best when it comes to pricing carbon?”

He replied: “Well I think the phasing in of the European Union emissions trading scheme has had some teething problems, but is getting underway effectively.”

Minerals Council Contact:

Ben Mitchell – Director, Public Affairs W: [www.minerals.org.au](http://www.minerals.org.au) D: 7 April 2011

## **Appendix 3: BHP CEO Marius Kloppers' speech to ABCC**

### **Australian British Chamber of Commerce**

15 September 2010 (25 Minutes)

[PowerPoint SLIDE 1]

#### **Introduction:**

Thank you for your kind introduction. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I join you here today to mark the centenary of the founding of the Australian British Chamber of Commerce.

[SLIDE 2]

When this Chamber was established early last century, international commerce was being transformed by the emergence of new economic powers.

One hundred years ago BHP and Billiton existed, but were separate companies that looked very different to the globally diversified resources group that BHP Billiton is today. BHP this year celebrates its 125th anniversary and Billiton its 150th anniversary. Today, our company is the world's largest diversified resources company with 40,000 employees and operations in more than 25 countries. As an Australian and British listed company, and critically dependent on international trade, both the Australian British Chamber of Commerce and the ideals that it was founded upon are particularly important to us.

And now, a century on from the Chamber's foundation, economic transformation continues to take place. The rise of the BRIC economies is once again changing the balance of economic power, creating new opportunities and challenges. I want to talk to you about some of these opportunities as they relate to Australia, before turning to climate change – an issue that will profoundly affect all aspects of business and trade in the coming decades.

#### **China and other emerging economies:**

[SLIDE 3]

Clearly China's continued growth underpins BHP Billiton expectations of the future demand for our products, and it is also critical to expectations of future growth in the global economy. Additionally, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia and a host of other emerging economies have the potential to follow the same trajectory, creating huge opportunities for business and prompting significant changes to the balance of both political and economic power.

Some of the most obvious and pressing challenges will lie in managing the environmental consequences of rapidly rising living standards. New ways of addressing the world's problems and resolving its conflicts will also need to emerge, because the redistribution of wealth around the world will inevitably mean a redistribution of power and influence.

Business and government alike will have to get used to this environment and quickly learn how to work in new ways with different and more powerful partners. All of us will need to develop ways of

working together in relations that reflect new realities of power, in order to address challenges like climate change. And we need to this whilst ensuring that relations remain peaceful and harmonious.

The need for such a rethink was evident in Copenhagen last December, which provided us with a stark reminder of how difficult it is to negotiate multilateral environmental agreements.

#### **Resources and the Australian economy:**

[SLIDE 4]

Future success for Australia and BHP Billiton will depend on our ability to seize the opportunities offered by these dramatic economic changes. Today, the mining sector accounts for roughly half of the nation's export revenue.

In this regard I'm sure this audience would have noted our Company's recent results. While there was understandable focus on our profits, there was not as much focus on what the company returned to Australia. For every \$1 of Australian profit, BHP Billiton put \$1.30 back into Australia. We did this by committing A\$8 billion in capital investment, paying \$5.5 billion in taxes and royalties and returning A\$1.9 billion in dividends to Australian shareholders.

And, at the same time, we employed more than 40,000 staff and contractors in Australia. BHP Billiton is proud of our strong performance. We are just as proud of the contribution we are making to this nation and its people.

While Australia has the mineral and energy resources and geographic location to prosper, success is not guaranteed. Over the last decade, Australia's share of production of most commodities has stagnated or declined. To capture the full economic benefit of the higher demand for commodities, the nation requires continued investment in mines and infrastructure and extra sources of skilled labour. This cannot be funded without capital from overseas and it is vital that the investment climate remains internationally competitive.

Obviously the above comments immediately bring us to immigration, infrastructure and tax policies. I will not talk about these issues today – other than to note that they were critical points of debate in the recent election campaigns and will continue to be so into the future.

#### **Climate Change:**

[SLIDE 5]

There is, however, another issue that has seen considerable debate – and in my opinion will continue to generate public discussion. Australians are clearly concerned about the potential impacts of climate change - and so are we as a company.

- BHP Billiton acknowledges that the mainstream science is correct, and that we need to stabilise (and eventually reduce) the carbon concentration in the atmosphere. We are, therefore, committed to working with governments on the design of effective policies to help reduce greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. BHP Billiton is a globally significant producer, exporter and consumer of energy and we want to make a thoughtful and considered contribution to the debate.

- Historically we have expressed that our preferred solution is the introduction of an international climate framework, which includes binding commitments by all developed and major developing economies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
- Observing the debates around the world in recent years, we believe local actions that are eventually harmonised into unified global action is a more likely outcome than an immediate broadly supported global initiative.
- We also believe that such a global initiative will eventually come, and when it does Australia will need to have acted ahead of it to maintain its competitiveness.

[SLIDE 6]

Presently, Australia has a high carbon economy; we are the eighth largest emitter of carbon, and the largest on a per capita basis in the Kyoto Annex 1 countries according to 2008 figures. To remain competitive in a future carbon-constrained world, Australia will need turn into a lower carbon economy.

**A single “silver bullet” does not exist:**

[SLIDE 7]

Transitioning to a lower carbon economy carries a number of special considerations that make it different from the typical problems that countries face:

☐ Firstly – it is a long-dated problem and the nature of long-dated problems normally means that a single silver bullet does not exist to cure the ills – there are many moving parts – technology being only one of them that will change over time. Instead, governments will need to take incremental steps that build upon each other to create a mosaic of initiatives that collectively achieve the desired result.

☐ Secondly – many participants with varied characteristics make it a complex problem to deal with:

- In the first place, real capital constraints exist; for example a household that does not have the savings to put a solar heating system in place, even though in the long-run from an overall pay-back perspective it is a sensible thing to do.
- And different players have different cost of capital (for instance, research shows that the behavioural changes of consumers indicate a much higher discount rate than for businesses).

The combination of a long-dated problem that can only be tackled with many initiatives, and the different capital constraints and discount rates show clearly that a single encompassing trading system and the academically elegant economics surrounding it is not the solution.

We need to instead reconcile ourselves to a multifaceted solution, involving a combination of regulations, initiatives and market-based measures.

[SLIDE 8]

I want to highlight two points that are crucial for Australia as it searches for the path forward.

The first point is really more of an observation – our relative competitive advantages have given us an economy that has traditionally and increasingly produced products for the export market that

are materially carbon intensive. Simply put, economies like ours, with a growing population, face an intrinsically harder target with a fixed percentage reduction in carbon, than for example an economy with a shrinking population that is de-industrialising.

We should never forget that we have an economy that produces things for others and that in such economies reductions are more difficult to achieve. (China incidentally as the “workshop to the world” has a similar problem – which possibly explains its reticence to sign up to absolute targets, preferring intensity based targets instead).

The second point is that some choices have a long-dated impact. This is nowhere truer than in the stationary production of electricity (generation infrastructure). Each year, investment decisions are made that inherently lock-in carbon emissions for the coming 30 to 50 years. So, it is critical that we get this right.

[SLIDE 9]

Let me focus on the electricity sector. While Australia’s emissions are generated across the economy, just over half comes from stationary energy (51%) followed by the agriculture (16%) and transport (14%).

[SLIDE 10]

Australia’s energy supply is particularly carbon intensive. In 2007 there were only 5 countries in the world with a more emissions-intensive energy supply – Bosnia Herzegovina, North Korea, Estonia, Mongolia and Poland. The emissions intensity of our electricity - that is, tons of carbon emitted per unit of energy - is the highest amongst OECD countries.

The decisions that we are taking now on power production and building infrastructure will still be with us by the time we expect a global price for carbon to be in place.

With about 90% of the carbon emissions from our electricity sector coming from coal fired power stations, Australia will need to look beyond just coal towards the full spectrum of available energy solutions. Failure to do so will place us at a competitive disadvantage in a future where carbon is priced globally.

My main point is a simple one – we need to anticipate a global price for carbon when taking decisions with long dated impact. The decisions we take now on power production will still be with us long after a global price for carbon is finally in place.

**Some difficult political considerations:**

Electricity generation is just one dimension of the carbon emissions problem. Let’s not forget that tackling carbon emissions is really an energy consumption problem and many factors drive consumption, from transportation to manufacturing to household behaviours.

Reducing Australia’s carbon emissions footprint will require substantial changes in consumer (business and individual) behaviour. In short – carbon emissions need to have a cost impact in order to cause the consumer to change behaviour and favour low carbon alternatives.

We all recognise this is a politically charged subject. No government relishes telling consumers that things need to cost more through higher and more expensive standards - for example double and

triple glazing of windows - and through higher fuel and energy costs. But in this case there is really no easy answer – all of us who care about this issue need to also recognise that making a difference comes at a price.

**What else do large companies think about?:**

[SLIDE 11]

Beyond the points that I have already made, large companies like ours think about two further issues as countries contemplate their policy response to climate change:

- what happens to the money raised by pricing carbon?
- and how international trade is affected when countries act individually?

So let me try to explain these two concerns as clearly as I can:

*Revenue Neutrality*

Firstly, we must acknowledge that a price carbon does have an overall cost impact on the economy and that in most cases; the money raised through pricing carbon is collected by the government. Importantly, the government must avoid using those funds for general spend or to back “winning” technologies – the outcome of which will likely be disappointing emissions reduction and slower growth.

Conversely, instead of treating this income as windfall revenue, the government must find mechanisms to return this revenue to the economy – individuals and businesses – and let the markets work. I think that a price on carbon can only be effective if it is operated in a revenue neutral manner by a government.

*Trade friendly*

Secondly, I would like to note that in the absence of a global solution on carbon emissions reduction, the application of domestic measures could be unsuccessful if not implemented carefully.

Notably, in the absence of a global system, trade exposed products impacted by a price on carbon end up being disadvantaged in comparison with those originating from countries that do not yet price carbon. As a result, private companies will tend to choose to transplant their facilities to more competitive locations where a carbon price doesn't hinder their margins.

Under these circumstances, the world will not be better off, as the emissions will only be relocated to a different country and the Australian economy negatively impacted.

In order to avoid such negative impact on trade exposed products, emissions costs for trade exposed industries must be rebated until a global emissions reduction system is in place.

**A summary of BHP Billiton policy statements:**

[SLIDE 12]

As I said before we do take climate change seriously and I have studied it in detail. BHP Billiton now has a clearly articulated set of policy statements on this issue that are incorporated in our Summary Sustainability report for FY2010 which will be available on our website and in hard copy shortly.

It should come as no surprise that the main points we believe any national system must adhere to reflect closely the topics I have spoken about today:

- The need for a clear price signal – ensuring that the carbon price signal reaches consumers such that consumption is reduced, and investment choices are made that favour low carbon alternatives
- The need for revenue neutrality – returning aggregate revenues raised to individuals and businesses impacted by the carbon price [for example, by a cut in taxes and individual lump sum grants] maximally offsets the impact of increased carbon costs
- The need for a system that is trade friendly – rebating emissions costs for trade exposed products during the transition to a global system prevents emissions simply being transplanted to other countries where emissions prices are lower
- The need for a broad based system – covering the broadest possible range of both carbon emission activities and low carbon energy options in any plan ensures the largest base for emissions reduction
- The need for a predictable and gradual transition – ensuring that future carbon costs are predictable facilitates investments that reduce emissions; a gradual change in price gives the economy time to adjust
- And finally, the need for a simple and effective system – a combination of a carbon tax, land use actions and limited trading system [for example for stationary electricity production only], is both easy to implement and effective

**Closing:**

[SLIDE 13]

Let me conclude by saying a little about the future. BHP Billiton is a company focused on long-term value creation through the development of natural resources. We have a clear, unchanged strategy that guides us in pursuing that objective. Sustainability is a key underpin of that strategy, and we are committed to respecting the environment and having a positive impact in the locations where we operate.

We are the world's leading resources company and we are proud to provide the world with those resources that are essential to sustain and improve the standards of life of hundreds of millions of people. The world is going through a process of rapid change, and it is only by anticipating and responding to this change, rather than resisting, that Australian businesses and the country as a whole can succeed. That is what BHP Billiton is doing.

I hope the ideas I shared with you today encourage you and others to enter the climate change conversation so we can reach the consensus needed to make effective action possible.

Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to be here with you today. And, finally, let me wish the Australian British Chamber of Commerce another one hundred years of success.