
Neoliberal Migration Regime, Escape from ‘Hell Joseon’ and the Pursuit of Cosmopolitan Aspiration: An Overview of Temporary Migration from South Korea to Australia *

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Transnational temporal migration is becoming increasingly prominent. Neo-liberalised governance has pushed more governments to develop temporal migration programs to relieve skill and labour shortages and, more broadly, to boost economic growth and development. Young people regard short-term migration programs as a valuable chance to obtain global experience, to the extent that temporal migration has become a rite of passage. This paper offers an overview of temporary migration from South Korea to Australia and identifies the structural factors affecting this temporary transnational mobility, namely regulatory regimes, policies and relevant programs. The data sources in this paper are entirely secondary, consisting of published and unpublished research papers, newspaper articles, statistical data and various government and non-government organisation information and policy documents. Through a historical review of changing migration policies and discourses, the paper explores the ways in which temporal migration has been constructed by the state, in both South Korea and Australia. The paper sheds light into both structural and personal factors that motivate young Koreans to come to Australia on a temporary visa. The paper proposes future directions for research on temporary migration.

Keywords: temporary migration, transnational mobility, youth migration, working holiday visa makers, immigration policy in Australia and Korea

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Introduction

In South Korea, a growing number of people, particularly young people, wish to leave the country to explore opportunities for a better life, including English education, foreign university degrees, employment and overseas work or travel. In particular, South Korea's worsening quality of life, often dubbed 'hell-Joseon', (describing a society of competitive education and employment, soaring education costs, low employment rates, unaffordable housing, clashing values between generations, air pollution, and political conflict) have pushed many (typically young) Koreans to explore ways to live and work overseas, whether temporarily or for good. Global mobility is often seen as a panacea to all 'hell-Joseon' issues (Cho 2017) by both the South Korean government and South Korean youth.

Since the 1990s, the South Korean government initiated strong globalization-driven policies, where a handful of elite groups served as the frontiers of globalisation, characterized by incessant transnational exchange of goods/products, info/ideas, culture, and people. The effects of this trend have trickled down to nearly all South Korean citizens, even those occupying a marginal status in Korea, such as people of lower Social Economic Status (SES). Various temporary migration schemes such as the working holiday visa has enabled those with low economic capital to pursue transnational mobility.

Australia has been one of the preferred destination countries for young Koreans who pursue this trajectory. These Koreans come to Australia under various temporary visa schemes as international students, temporary graduate workers and working holiday visa holders. In particular, the working holiday visa has been popular with job-seeking South Korean youths because it offers the prospect of working in a developed country without having to go through a complicated visa application process. Of 20 host countries, Australia has been the most popular because it does not have a quota on the number of South Koreans it receives through the program. Over 30,000 Korean students under the working holiday visa have come to Australia since 2008, comprising more than 70 percent of all South Korean nationals traveling abroad under the visa.

Based on a historical review of changing migration policies and discourses in both Australia and Korea, the paper explores the ways in which temporal migration has been framed by the state, in both South Korea and in Australia. The paper looks into both the structural factors and personal factors leading young Koreans to come to Australia on a temporary visa.

First, to gain an understanding of the meaning of temporary/transnational mobility among Korean youth, relevant existing research on cosmopolitan aspiration is discussed. Second, a historical overview of changing Australian migration policies and temporal migration programs is offered. Third, the current state of Korean temporal migrants in Australia is investigated in detail. The paper then explores structural factors driving young Koreans towards temporary migration to Australia and offers a brief overview of their experience in Australia. The paper concludes with suggestions for future directions on the research relating to temporary migration.

The Young, Temporary/ Transnational Mobility and Cosmopolitan Aspiration

Young people are crossing borders more frequently for education, work, travel and combinations thereof. Their mobilities are not permanent, rather ‘temporary, flexible and circular’ (Stevens 2019, p.296) and are characterised as ‘temporariness, transitoriness, impermanence, ephemerality, mutability and volatility’ (Stevens 2018 p.296). As types of temporary mobility have become more diversified, the motivations behind transnational move become more varied. The temporary transnational moves among the young are increasingly seen as almost ‘rites of passage’, playing a critical part in youth transitions. Transnational mobility is also understood as the pathway to upward social mobility and increased cultural capital. Self-discovery and self-actualisation or the search for a meaningful life is often cited as reasons for transnational ‘wandering’ (Cho 2017, Yoon 2014). For example, some Korean youth leave for another country because of existential longing as well as economic motivation (Cho 2017). In the similar vein, recently ‘Living a foreign country for a month’ has been very popular among the youth in Korea. Yoon’s research on Korean working holiday visa makers in

Canada found that the pursuit of an individualised or true self by means escaping from their family was one of the driving forces towards transnational/temporal migration. (2014). LGBTQI youth choose a temporal or permanent migration to escape pressure from family and homophobic society.

Cosmopolitan aspiration has frequently been used to explain the motivations behind transnational mobility (Jung et al. 2018, Dalton & Jung 2018). Robertson et al explained by proposing the introduction of a new term, 'mobile aspiration', which includes "how youth aspire to be mobile, yet also how they construct and create other aspirations for their futures (around education, work, marriage, family or lifestyle) through desires of mobility" (Robertson et al. 2018, p.615). It is anticipated that transnational mobility offers better life chances, competitive skills and global networks, so that today's youth become tomorrow's most cosmopolitan and agile workforce.

Transnational mobility may be not possible for all, but rather only for some privileged groups (Chun & Han 2015, Jung et al. 2018). Young people with backgrounds differing in factors such as SES, gender, sexuality, and ethnicity engage in different forms of mobility or immobility and experience transnational mobility in a different way. Transnational mobility could strengthen the existing structure of social division or offer differential advantages by way of greater social and cultural capital. Chun and Han succinctly pointed transnational mobility out as a force which "exacerbates and reinscribes hierarchies" (2015, p.575). The consequences of transnational mobility are varied across different social groups and contexts. Empirical research is required to explore this in further detail.

Some research has indicated that aspirations need to be understood as "more than individual plans and desires" but as "collective, cultural and embedded within political, discursive and institutional frameworks at a local, national and regional level" (Robertson et al. 2018, p. 616). Global and cosmopolitan aspirations are pursued not only by individuals but by national and local governments and communities, encouraging transnational mobility through related policies and programs and anticipating benefits for national and local communities through remittances, skills transfer, and increased social networks.

The cost of pursuing these cosmopolitan aspirations through transnational mobility is often underestimated. A liminal status often means uncertain legal status, and few or no rights and entitlements. Temporary migrants frequently experience exploitation, discrimination,

unfair treatment, insecurity and anxiety over their protracted migration process, and may be occupationally and financially disadvantaged by their uncertain and precarious legal status (Robertson & Runganaikaloo, 2014). In the following section, we will examine how temporal migration has been developed in Australia and how this migration has been framed in the Australian context.

Shifting from Permanent Settlement to Temporal Migration: An Overview of Australian Immigration Policy

Australia is considered one of the world's major immigration nations. The overseas-born population in Australia has gradually increased both numerically and proportionally. In 2017, there were over 7.1 million overseas-born residents in Australia, estimated to be 29.0% of the Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). In contrast, there were approximately 4.3 million overseas-born people in 1997, accounting for 23.3% of the whole population. In September 2018, there were 2,206,039 people who resided in Australia lawfully but were neither Australian citizens nor permanent residents (Department of Home Affairs, 2019b).

Australia has experienced a significant increase in temporary population. Over a five-year period between 2013 to 2018, there was a 26.5 per cent increase in those holding some type of temporary visa. A breakdown of the population by visa category presents a detailed overview. Temporary migration takes the form of seasonal or periodic migration for work, for survival, or as a life-cycle process. Temporary migrants are put into diverse categories. The Australian government has provided statistics on temporary migrants under nine different visa sub-categories: Bridging, Crew and Transit, Other Temporary, Special Category (New Zealand), Student, Temporary Resident (Skilled), Temporary Resident (Other), and Visitor (Department of Home Affairs, 2019b).

Main visa categories by population size are Special Category (New Zealand) (30.9%), Student (26.1%), and Visitor which includes tourists (14.8%). Excluding visitors, scholars have reclassified temporary migrants into four broad categories: working holiday makers, international students, skilled workers, and New Zealanders (Hugo, 2006; Mares, 2011). Working holiday visas are valid for 12 months and open to travellers aged 18-30 from countries that Australia has a reciprocal

agreement with. Working holiday makers stay in Australia under either the Working Holiday visa (subclass 417) or Work and Holiday visa (subclass 462), which has more restrictive visa requirements. The number of individuals taking up the working holiday scheme grew steadily up until 2014-15, and has been declining since. Whilst the scheme was introduced as a cultural program, facilitating the travel of young people to and from Australia for the purposes of cultural exchange, it has been increasingly instrumentalised by the government to address labour supply shortages in certain industries with a demand for a temporary labour force (Mares, 2011). For example, working holiday makers are now eligible for a second 12-month visa, extending their visa for another year, after undertaking at least three months of specified work in eligible regional areas.

Table 1. Temporary entrants visa holders

Visa Category	30/09/2013		30/09/2018		Difference	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Bridging	111,979	6.4	197,798	9.0	85,819	76.6
Crew and Transit	12,471	0.7	15,828	0.7	3,357	26.9
Other Temporary	2,585	0.1	4,928	0.2	2,343	90.6
Special Category (New Zealand)	648,200	37.2	682,440	30.9	34,240	5.3
Student	346,962	19.9	575,337	26.1	228,375	65.8
Temporary Resident (Other)	59,671	3.4	114,566	5.2	54,895	92.0
Temporary Resident (Skilled)	196,446	11.3	152,946	6.9	-43,500	-22.1
Visitor	199,848	11.5	325,729	14.8	125,881	63.0
Working Holiday Maker	166,258	9.5	136,467	6.2	-29,791	-17.9
Total	1,744,420	100.0	2,206,039	100.0	461,619	26.5

The population of international students, the second largest group of long-term temporary residents in Australia, increased a great deal over the past five years. However, the stock of international students has fluctuated. A number of domestic and international factors have contributed to the rise and fall of the population of international students, including the exchange rate of Australian dollar, global economic situations, and changes in policy which influence the relationship between study in Australia and permanent residency. Study has been used as a pathway to a longer-term stay, and a considerable number of applications for permanent residence have been made by former international students

who have graduated from Australian universities and colleges (Mares, 2011).

The third category of long-term, but not permanent residents is identified as temporary migrant workers, who are skilled workers on the Temporary Business Entry scheme. Known as 457 visa holders, these temporary skilled migrants are sponsored by an employer in Australia and can remain in the country to work for up to four years. The introduction in 1996 of the temporary business migrant category produced a parametric increase in the number of temporary residents particularly in the labour market in Australia (Hugo, 2006). Temporary Resident (Skilled) visas have been in decline after peaking at a population over 200,000 in 2014. Now known as the Temporary Skills Shortage visa, introduced in 2018 in replacement of the 457 visa, is estimated that there will be a significant impact on the number of applications due to the more stringent requirements of the new visa.

The fourth category of non-permanent residents in Australia is New Zealanders, who have accounted for one of the largest temporary migrant groups. As part of the Trans-Tasman agreement between Australian and New Zealand governments, New Zealanders have the right to stay for as long as they choose with no need to renew their visas. However, New Zealanders have a higher return rate than any other birthplace groups (Hugo, 2006). The change in New Zealand citizens in Australia is in relatively narrow ranges, having increased by about five per cent over the five years.

Apart from the above main visa categories, there are notable trends in temporary migration in Australia. In 2011, the Australian government introduced the Temporary Graduate visa (subclass 485), which changed the visa pathways for international students who seek longer stays in Australia. This category has unrestricted work rights over a two-year period for people who have graduated with a bachelor's degree or higher in Australia. This change increased the population of people staying on after their education up to over 55,000 in 2017. Combined with the increase in the number of international students, temporary graduates are likely to continue to grow in the near future (Sherrell, 2018).

Another noteworthy visa category is the Bridging visa. The Bridging visa is not a standard visa but a transitory visa permitting the applicant to remain in Australia for a certain period of time. Generally, bridging visas follow the expiration of the current substantive visa such as a student visa, and are granted for the period in which an application for another substantive visa (such as a permanent visa) is being processed.

In 2018, about 200,000 people held a bridging visa, which is the highest on record (Sherrell, 2018). Strong growth in bridging visas indicates increased demand for longer-term visas and longer visa processing time. This may be the result of changes in Australian migration policy, which will be discussed further in the next section.

Neo-liberal Policy Changes towards Temporary Migration in Australia.

The number of migrants entering Australia has fluctuated according to the policy priorities and economic and political considerations of the Australian government. The Australian Government's immigration policy focus has changed markedly since 1945, when attracting general migrants primarily from the UK was the priority, to focusing on attracting economic migrants and temporary (predominantly skilled) migrants. From the post-war era until the mid-1990s, permanent settlement dominated Australian immigration processes. The majority of migrants were granted permanent residency upon selection or arrival, and progression to full citizenship through naturalisation was positioned as the desirable and desired norm (Ongley & Pearson, 1995). One of the most significant developments in Australian migration policy has been 'a permanent shift to temporary migration' (Mares, 2016, p. 36). From the mid-1990s, there were a range of visa categories introduced whereby persons could enter the country on a temporary basis (Hugo, 2006). The policy shift in immigration policy was guided by the Inquiry into the Temporary Entry of Business People and Highly Skilled Specialists 1994. This paper pointed out that there had been a lack of recognition of the rise in temporary migration, and an overwhelming amount of emphasis placed on permanent settlements (Committee of Inquiry into Temporary Entry of Business People and Highly Skilled Specialists, 1994). Since then, Australia has made policy arrangements to manage and regulate temporary foreign workers as part of a neo-liberal restructuring of the labour market and post-Fordist accumulation (Walsh, 2014). The net migration gain from long-term temporary movement exceeded that of permanent movement in 1999-2000 (Janet Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2017). In 2011, 10% of the Australian workforce had a temporary migrant status, and in the 20 to 24 year old age group, temporary migrants comprised 20% of the workforce (Mares, 2011). In the 2016-17 financial year, 207,245 permanent places were granted, along with more than 8.4

million temporary visas. Of the latter category, 63.6 per cent were Visitor visas, followed by 22.8 per cent comprising of New Zealand citizens granted a Special Category visa (Department of Home Affairs, 2018a). When visitors were excluded, temporary migrants were over 3 million, which is a figure 15 times greater than permanent residents.

Growth in temporary migration is not an experience unique to Australia but is common in other countries. The nature of migration is changing on a global dimension. Migration is becoming more circular and more temporary (Castles, 2002). Rather than models of one-way mobility, settlement and integration, transnationality and temporal fluidity of diverse kinds of migrant subjects have featured in the contemporary migration landscape (Robertson, 2014). In 2006, there were about 2.5 million entries of temporary labour migrants in OECD countries, about three times the number of entries of permanent labour migrants. Seasonal workers are the largest single category, and working holiday makers are also growing in number (OECD, 2008).

Whilst the growth of temporary migration has been driven by dominant worldwide tendencies such as the globalisation process, internationalisation of labour markets, and the rise of transnationalism, it has also been facilitated by state policies that embrace neo-liberal views of migration as threats to the welfare state, national security, and national identity. Many countries including Australia have devised policy regimes to ease the flow and settlement of prioritised migrant groups, while limiting the incorporation of those viewed as undeserving of citizenship. Initially promoted as short-term solutions to labour shortages, temporary migration schemes have become entrenched in Australia (Walsh, 2014). With the shift in demand for employer-driven schemes, the Australian government has undertaken administrative functions of determination of skill shortages, foreign worker recruitment and selection, and establishment of flexible labour market practices (Wright, 2011).

The impact of the expansion of temporary migration programs is not limited to the increase in the numerical size of non-permanent migrants. Temporary migration programs have intensified restrictions on entitlements and pathways to longer-term or permanent residency. For example, on top of the pre-existing Working Holiday visa (subclass 417), a new type of visa named Work and Holiday visa (subclass 462) was introduced in 2005. The Work and Holiday visa was a part of a restrictive immigration initiative established by the conservative Howard government. Under the Work and Holiday visa, additional countries including China, the USA, South American countries, and some South-

East Asian countries formed working holiday agreements with Australia (Mares, 2016). While there are no restrictions on the number of Working Holiday visas issued, Work and Holiday visa arrangements generally have limits on the number of visas granted annually, with the exception of the USA. Also, the Work and Holiday visa has additional eligibility requirements such as functional English, successful completion of 2 years of university, and a letter of support from the Working Holiday Maker's home government (Phillips, 2016).

Introduced in 1996, the 457 visa was initially intended to be a transitional measure to fill temporary skill gaps in the Australian labour market until the domestic education and training system could meet the demand for labour. Since its introduction, 457 visa holders have increased dramatically in number. The 457 visa has been used extensively as a pathway to permanent residency in Australia. However, from March 2018, the Australian Government introduced a new work visa replacing the 457 visa – the Subclass 482 Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa. Unlike the 457 visa, the 482 visa has subdivided streams: the Short Term, Medium Term and Labour Agreement streams. Whilst the TSS serves as pathways to apply for permanent residency, applicants are required meet stricter requirements to be eligible for the permanent residency (Department of Home Affairs, 2019a).

Unlike other temporary visas, international student visas are not for the purpose of providing employment or long-term residency. However, Australia's overseas student program has evolved relative to the migration programs. Australian governments have been keen to take advantage of the significant economic and non-economic benefits provided by the international education sector (Adams, Banks, & Olsen, 2011; Evans & Bowen, 2011), and thus sought to attract overseas students through immigration policy measures. The decade in the 2000s saw a rapid growth in international student enrolment in Australia, which was partly because study in Australia provided a pathway to permanent residency through the skilled stream of the migration program (Spinks, 2016). Recently there has been a policy shift to introduce a temporary visa mechanism. Whilst student visa numbers increased over the last few years, in 2016–17, the number of permanent visas granted to former international students fell by 6.3 per cent relative to 2015–16. Conversely, a record 41,387 Temporary Graduate visas were granted in 2016–17, up 27.6 per cent on the previous year (Department of Home Affairs, 2018a). The Temporary Graduate visa (subclass 485) has two different streams (Graduate Work stream and Post-Study Work stream), which allow

graduate students to stay from 18 months to 4 years depending on their level of degree. Since the introduction of Temporary Graduate visa, Australia is experiencing another round of growth in the number of overseas students, reaching 800,000 students in 2017 (Department of Education and Training, 2018b).

As has been the case, it is anticipated that there will be a continued increase in non-permanent residents (Mares, 2016). Also, the proportion of temporary migrants out of the total migration flow is expected to grow. This is because the level of temporary migration to Australia is not limited or subject to a quota or caps set by the government, but is demand-driven (Janet Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2017). The development of a series of temporal migration programs has helped to facilitate labour shortages to the effect that 10% of the total workforce consist of temporal migrants. They are on average much younger than the general population. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship reported that working holiday makers, skilled workers on 457 visas and international students now make up around one-fifth of the total labour force aged between 20 and 24 (Mare 2011). Neo-liberal drive of migration policy towards temporal migration has made it possible for the youth to make a transnational move.

A Brief Overview of Korean Migration to Australia

Korean migrants' settlement history in Australia can be traced back to around a half-century ago. There is a record that a Korean entered Australia with a migrant status for the first time in 1968 (Yang, 2008). However, human exchanges between Korea and Australia started much earlier than that. The first Korean entrants according to historical documents were those who were accompanied by Australian Protestant missionaries during the 1920 and 1930s. They were conceived to be either Korean-born children of these missionaries or those invited to Australia for the purpose of English study (Yang, 2008).

The Korean War (1950-53) saw the first wave of Korean immigration to Australia. Australian troops were dispatched to serve in Korea. The presence of Australian troops in Korea led to a number of Australian soldiers establishing permanent relationships with Korean women, many of whom later immigrated to Australia as war brides (Coughlan, 1997). In the aftermath of the Korean War, a number of Korean War orphans were adopted into Australian families, and the adoption of Korean orphans continued for the following half century

(Heaser, 2016; Walton, 2019).

From the post war period to the late 1960s and the 1970s, most of the Koreans settling in Australia were granted entry into Australia as students and visitors. The two biggest historical moments that triggered Koreans' arrival in Australia were the Colombo Plan, established in 1950 by a Commonwealth Conference of Foreign Ministers to provide a framework for international cooperation to raise the standards of people in the Asia Pacific region. Another one was the establishment of an official diplomatic relationship between Korea and Australia in 1961 (Meadows, 2011). Thanks to the development, dozens of Koreans, mostly government officials or students sponsored by the Korean government, entered to Australia. With Australia's demand for skilled labour force, some Korean skilled professionals including helicopter pilots, geologists, and Taekwondo instructors (Lee, 2009) entered Australia during this period. In addition, hundreds of Koreans hired by the Coalition Forces in Vietnamese War were allowed to come to Australia on tourist visas at the end of the War. The formal abolition of the 'White Australia' policy in 1973 and subsequent policy changes including amnesty arrangements enabled a number of Koreans on temporary or illegal visas to change their immigration status to become permanent or legal residents of Australia.

From the 1980s to the 1990s, the deregulation of international movement by the Korean government led to more Koreans immigrating to Australia. For instance, investment emigration was allowed since 1986 and the liberalisation of studying overseas in 1993 expanded routes for emigration, facilitating Korean emigration to Australia.


Korean temporary migrants in Australia

Since the 1990s, there was also a rapid increase in Korean tourists in Australia, and a great number of young Koreans entered Australia for the purposes of English study, study in tertiary education, and working holiday. International movement of Koreans to Australia temporarily decreased due to the Korean financial crisis in 1997, but otherwise, the number of Koreans in Australia has continued to increase overall (Lee, 2009). The characteristics of Korean entrants during this period were in contrast with those in the previous times, as many of them were skilled and independent migrants and business migrants who arrived with the desire for a better quality of life (Ng, 2011).

In 2016-17, there are 114,500 Korean-born people in total in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). They account for 0.47% of the total population, and 1.6% of the total overseas-born population.

According to statistics by the Korean government, of the Koreans living in Australia, permanent residents accounted for the highest proportion (44.3%), followed by Australian citizens (27.5%), other residents (18.3%), and then international students (9.9%) (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). This indicates that most Koreans in Australia were long-term residents (71.8%), with less than three in ten (28.2%) being temporary residents.

Figure 1. Composition of Korean temporary entrants (% , 2017)



It should be noted here that migration is conventionally measured in terms of stocks and flows. The former are the total numbers of migrants in a particular destination or from a particular origin at one point in time, whilst the latter are the numbers moving from an origin to a destination over a specified time period (Hugo, 2006). In flow terms, 21,717 Koreans entered Australia on temporary visas in 2017. There was a temporary reduction in the number of Korean temporary entrants from 220,876 in 2013 to 203,157 in 2014, but since then Korean temporary arrivals are on a gradual uptrend¹.

The breakdown of Korean temporary entrants by visa category (Department of Home Affairs, 2019b) show that international students accounted for the largest percentage (32.6%), followed by working


¹ A murder incident of a Korean working holiday visa maker, Ban Eun Ji occurred in November 2013 and this might have affected the reputation of Australia as a destination country among working holiday visa makers.

holiday makers (29.1%), and then visitors (16.5%). A noteworthy observation was that a considerable proportion (8.3%) of Koreans was on a transitional visa. An alarming fact was that the number of Koreans on the Bridging visa was on the sharp rise from less than 13,000 in 2015 to over 18,000 in 2017. As the Bridging visa usually does not allow visa holders to work or travel except for those under certain permitted circumstances, many Koreans appeared to be in unsettled or unstable residence situations.

International students

Drawing from enrolment data of Korean students (Department of Education and Training, 2018a), there are broadly five different visa subclasses for overseas students in Australia: Higher Education, Vocational Education and Training (VET), Schools, ELICOS, and Non-award. Higher Education refers to university-level education including undergraduate and postgraduate courses, and Schools category is for primary and secondary students. VET category is for those who study on a vocation or training course typically for a Certificate or Diploma. ELICOS stands for English Language Intensive Courses for Overseas Students, a visa that allows international students to study English in Australia at an approved Australian English school. Non-award visas are designed for international students who want to study a foundation studies course or other full-time course that does not lead to an Australian degree or certificate.

Figure 2. Korean student enrolments in Australia



In 2018, there were 28,831 Korean international students enrolled at Australian educational institutions. Out of the total, students in VET courses accounted for the overwhelming majority (57.8%), followed by ELICOS (18.5%) and Higher Education (17.6%). The profile of Korean students was quite different from that of the total international student enrolment in Australia, where Higher Education (46.6%) accounted for the largest percentage and VET enrolments were just 27.6 per cent.

Overall, the number of Korean students in Australia was on the rise from 17,954 in 2002 to 28,831 in 2018 (Department of Education and Training, 2018a). However, a noticeable variation was identified in terms of the longitudinal trends by visa sub-category. The VET was the only category in a growth trend, while all the other main categories were in decline after reaching the peak around the turn of 2010. The reduction in the ELICOS was the most striking, as this category was the largest before the reversion of the trend. The strong growth in VET led the overall increase in the number of Korean students in Australia. The reason for this should be examined in detail.

Recent decline in the number of Korean international students in Australia, except for the VET sector, has resulted in the reduction of the proportion of Koreans out of all international students in Australia from 6.8% in 2002 to 3.9% in 2017 (Larkins, 2017). Consequently, South Korea was degraded from the third top source of Australian international education in 2002 to the seventh in 2017. Diverse factors were associated with the reduction of Korean international students. They included changes in student visa regulation, such as a stringent financial requirement and restricted opportunities to transition into long term residents. The rise in the value of Australian currency, and reputational damage as a safe destination for studying abroad caused by publicised attacks on international students, also precipitated the decline.


Working holiday makers

Korean working holiday makers are the second largest Korean temporary migrant group in Australia. Historically, Australia is the first country that formed a working holiday agreement with Korea, tracing back to 1995. Australia is the most popular destination for working holiday participation among Koreans. Australia accounts for more than 50% of all working holiday departures in Korea. Since 2008, over 30,000 Korean students under the visa have come to Australia. In 2018, there are 16,073 Korean working holiday makers in Australia, which is 13.6% of all working holiday participants in Australia (Department of Home Affairs,

2018c). Korean working holiday makers hold the third largest number in Australia, and are one of the largest population groups from non-English speaking countries.

Young Koreans have chosen this program for a variety of purposes such as an opportunity to learn Australian society and culture, career development, and a pathway for overseas study and permanent settlement. This Australian special visa has been the most popular, especially with job-seeking South Korean youths, because it offers the prospect of working in Australia with a very simple application process. The program authorizes students to stay in Australia for travelling, studying and working purposes, with some restrictions.


Figure 3. Korean participation in Australian Working Holiday program



Recently, Korean participation in the Australian working holiday program has been on the decline. At the start of the Australian working holiday program, Australia accounted for 83.9% of the total Korean outgoings for working holiday participation, which has reduced to 53.7% in 2017 (Working Holiday Info Centre, 2019). The decline could be explained by diversification of working holiday destinations in Korea, the deteriorating image of the Australian working holiday program, the allegedly unfavourable policy measures for temporary migrant workers, and reduced opportunity to convert it to a long-term residency (Jung & Lee, 2017). Young Koreans living under this visa in Australia are understood as being of distinct demographics, those who are not of an elite group of privileged social and economic status in Korea, commonly found in South Korean young immigrants in the North America and the

Europe. Those who often lack the economic, social and cultural capital to pursue their global aspirations select these working holiday programs (Cho 2017). This needs to be further corroborated by large scale-empirical research.

Figure 4. Korean temporary skilled migrants



The last temporary migrant group to be discussed is those on the Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visa. As this visa is an uncapped, demand-driven program designed to enable approved employers to address short-term skill shortages, applications and grants often fluctuate according to the state of the economy and the labour market. There are 4,265 Korean temporary skilled migrants, accounting for 2.7% of the total (Department of Home Affairs, 2019b). Koreans have actively used this program as means to transition into permanent residents, as this program allowed those in employment for 2 years to be eligible to apply for the Employer Nomination Scheme, which was a permanent residency visa. However, it is expected that recent changes into the Temporary Skill Shortage (TSS) visa will see a rapid reduction in the number of Koreans on this visa. In fact, Koreans who were granted this visa decreased by 28.6% between 2016 and 2017 (Department of Home Affairs, 2018b).

Policy contexts of Koreans' temporary emigration to Australia

International migration has been affected by the economic and political situations of both origin and host countries. As was discussed, Australia's pro-migrant immigration programs have resulted in the increase in

Korean immigrants, whereas recent restrictive policy changes led to the reduction in the number of Korean entrants. Emigration patterns of Koreans are largely associated with the domestic economic situations at the time. Whilst international migration is ultimately a personal decision, the Korean government has utilised its administrative power to encourage or restrict emigration.


Korean international emigration has a long history. Korean emigration has developed from invitation-based private interchanges into permanent settlement driven policy. During the Korean War and the establishment of the South Korean government, the state was actively involved in sending its people to other countries with diverse drives. Incapable of taking care of war orphans, many children were sent overseas for international adoption. In a bid to develop human capital, public servants and students were sent out for overseas education and training.. For instance, a large-scale international move of the skilled labour force such as nurses and miners sent to West Germany was implemented for the purpose of foreign earnings in the 1960s. Another large scale international labour move was temporary emigration to the Middle East at the construction boom in the 1970-1980s (Lee, 2010).

From 1960s to up until the late 1980s, Korea was an emigration county with emigration outnumbering immigration to Korea. Both temporary labour emigration and permanent emigration reached its peak around the mid-1980s, with 200,000 involved in overseas employment. From the late 1980s, growth of Korean outgoings started to slow down, but immigration started to outgrow from the other end. The Influx of those migrating to Korea, including foreign workers employed to meet the domestic labour shortage, Korean-Chinese, and marriage migrants turned the tide. Since then, Korea has transitioned into an immigration country, where the number of outflows outnumbers the inflows (Lee, 2010).

Changes in domestic and international economic situations affected the policy environment for international labour force movement. Korea's economic growth and the subsequent increase in domestic employment opportunities and the decline of construction business in the Middle East, a major driving force for Korean emigration of skilled migrants, led to the suspension of labour force export programs organised by the Korean government. However, Korea's financial crisis in 1997 was a turning point for the resumption of public sector-driven overseas employment measures. Economic restructuring and the mass unemployment that accompanied it forced the Korean government to turn its eyes to the international job market as a resort to address its now

largely redundant labour force. ‘Plans to activate overseas employment’ was launched in 1998, and the responsible government portfolios, including Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and Human Resources Development Service of Korea (HRD Korea), provided support for applicants, such as information services, consultation, placement, and exploration of job opportunities.

Figure 5. Youth unemployment in Korea



Focus on Youth/Temporary Migration as counter unemployment measures

Overseas employment policy was redirected to focus on young applicants, as youth unemployment emerged as the greatest issue. After the economic crisis, economic growth without the generation of new jobs was embedded in the Korean labour market, and particularly affected young job seekers. Labour force demand for less skilled young people significantly decreased, and youth unemployment has been aggravated. The unemployment rate of Koreans aged between 15 and 29 is three times greater than the overall working age population (OECD, 2019; Statistics Korea, 2019). Creation of job opportunities for young people was a national priority, but the labour supply exceeded the domestic labour market capacity. In 2006, the Korean government launched “Overseas Employment Promotion Measures” and was rebranded as a “Global Youth Leader Training Program” in 2009, an ambitious 5-year project named ‘Making 100,000 Global Youth Leaders’ in 2009. This project aimed to promote 50,000 overseas employments, 30,000 overseas interns,

and 20,000 overseas volunteers.

With the extension of this project, a successive overseas employment project for youth was launched under a new brand, 'K-Move', in 2013 (Lee, 2017; Park, 2015). This project has undertaken reorganisation of the existing infrastructure and provision of customised trainings. Specifically, the K-Move website was established (www.worldjob.or.kr) as an online information hub, and specialised training programs were provided by the K-Move School. K-Move Centres were established in 10 countries as a local job agency for Korean young people, and incentives were provided to those who participated in the K-Move training program and were successful in securing overseas employment (HRD Korea, 2019).

Through the contributions of the K-Move Centres, a strategic action plan titled 'Short and long-term policies for overseas employment' was published. This report identified promising countries with high potential for Koreans to find overseas job opportunities. According to the indexation of the report, Australia was ranked at 10th out of 100 in terms of the level of labour market appeal and accessibility to the job market. Australia was deemed appealing because of its low unemployment rate, relatively higher reliance on a foreign skilled labour force, availability of long-term residence, growth in Korean corporations in Australia, and an established Korean community (Seo, 2015). As of 2015, ten government bodies operated 24 affiliated programs, with a yearly budget of 1.8 trillion KRW. The large budget size and ongoing efforts to expand the overseas employments program for youth speak to the seriousness of youth unemployment in Korea. This program appeared to achieve its intended outcomes with a fast increase in the number of those involved in foreign labour market from 1,607 in 2013 to 5,118 in 2017. Australia accounted for 7.5% of Korean overseas employment, which was a fourth-largest proportion following Japan (27.9%), the USA (21.1%), and Singapore (9.9%) (Open Data Portal, 2018). These government-run programs have also received criticism for poor outcomes and exploitative treatment. The youth are often employed in the hospitality, caring, and agricultural sector, often paid less than the minimum wage standard.

Korean emigration cannot be explained by the Korean government's commitment to overseas employment only. Negative outlook on future prospects for domestic employment among young Koreans has been reported to be the underlying drive for transnational move. Anxiety about the future fueled the desire to 'escape' and find opportunities outside of Korea (Iem, 2018; Jung, 2016). The period

required for entry into the labour market lengthened increasingly, and young workers are more likely to be engaged in precarious, low income positions than ever (Ahn, 2016). Motivated by the inequitable distribution of opportunities in the labour market, young people in Korea have experienced social exclusion on diverse dimensions. This also intensifies inter-generational transmission of wealth or poverty.

Efforts to break through the exclusion has necessarily accompanied heightened competition, but the existence of structural barriers has only precipitated frustration among young people. Many young people positioned themselves as abandoning traditionally recognised life values such as love, marriage, childbirth, home ownership, human relationships, personal dreams and hope. This discouraging social atmosphere has been expressed by the satirical expression such as ‘Hell Joseon’. This self-deprecating term connotes a contemporary Korean society with growing inequality like the Joseon Dynasty, the last dynasty of Korea, where Confucian hierarchies were entrenched in the feudal class system (Jung, 2016). In contemporary terms of class, ‘spoon’ is widely used to categorise people into three groups by their status: golden, silver and dirt. A golden spoon refers to those born to a rich family, a silver spoon to those born to a relatively well-off or middle-class family, and lastly a dirt spoon to those born to a low-income family. Golden or silver spoons have a head start by inheriting their family’s prosperity whilst dirt spoons struggle making a living on their own, attempting to break the cycle of inherited poverty.

Layered vulnerability amongst Korean young people has been reflected on the NEET rate, the share of youth which are neither in employment nor in education or training in the youth population. The Korean NEET rate was 18.0%, which was higher than the OECD average (14.6%) (OECD, 2016). In a bid to exit from this sense of relative deprivation, some people choose to or are forced to find alternative pathways outside Korea. This generation is often dubbed the ‘G’ generation, G for global (Cho, 2015). If a breakthrough is not found within Korea, transnational mobility can be a logical solution to respond to domestic vulnerability.

However, transnational mobility is not purely a pathway for young Koreans to find an escape from structural disadvantages, and are not necessarily employment-driven. Motivations for Korean emigration are diverse, and many Koreans are internationally engaged with positive expectations such as cultural exchange, experience of foreign societies, and development of personal human capital (Dalton & Jung, 2018; Jung,

2017; Jung, Dalton, & Willis, 2017). For example, a survey with Korean working holiday makers in Australia (Jung & Lee, 2017) revealed that improving foreign language skills (45.6%) and exploration of foreign society and culture (38.1%) were the main reasons for participation. Motivations driven by a pessimistic outlook such as the 'desire to escape from Korea' (20.8%) and economic purposes such as greater employment opportunity (16.0%) were lowly ranked reasons. Other research has also indicated that non-economic motivations such as the search for the individualised self (Yoon, 2014), escape from discrimination as North Korean defectors (Jung, 2017), and pursuit of cosmopolitan aspirations (Dalton & Jung, 2018) are often cited as the reasons why they came to Australia.

Future Directions for Empirical Research on Temporary Migration.

Three out of ten Koreans living in Australia are temporal migrants. Australia's neo-liberal migration policy, which is focused on market-driven temporal migration rather than permanent settler migration, has served as an institutional foundation for Korean temporal migrant arrivals. The Australian government has promoted temporary migration to fill the labour shortage gap without the burden of social cost to support these migrants through a range of visa programs discussed in the paper. The Australian Government constructs the temporary migrants as sojourners rather than workers or settlers as part of "neo-liberalisation of immigration regimes" (Walsh, 2011) and as a desirable labour workforce without any state sponsored social benefits. These temporary migrants, students/workers and tourists/workers have made another economic contribution to Australia not only as cheap/flexible/casual labour participants but also via their spending on education, tour expenses, entertainment and consumer goods. The Korean government has also actively encouraged the youth to participate in temporary migration programs to allow young people to gain 'global experience' and, more importantly, to use these programs as a solution to easing high youth unemployment. The Korean government constructed these programs as global leadership programs and global experience, which are required for survival in the competitive global market.

The most outstanding of the pulling factors of Koreans to come to Australia as temporal migrants is the considerable easiness in obtaining a visa (Jung, 2017). For example, for the working holiday makers program,

unlike some other countries, Australia does not have a quota system and applicants do not have to queue for a visa. Getting a job is relatively easy, due to Australia's constant labour demands, in regional Australia particularly, combined with large established large Korean communities in big cities. Pushing factors of temporal migration of Korean are, first, high youth unemployment rates, the worsening quality of life, and an extremely competitive environment. For many young Koreans nowadays, living overseas temporarily or for good has become a rite of passage required to become a 'global talent', equipped with language skills, cultural capital, and cosmopolitan mannerisms. The existing empirical research, although very limited, indicates that there is a huge discrepancy between the rhetoric both governments has promised through their temporal migration programs, and the lived experiences of Korean temporal migrants in Australia and elsewhere. Unlike their expectations to work as transnational knowledge workers, they are often employed as precarious/unskilled labour in the grey economy. The working conditions are often exploitative (suffering underpayment, discrimination and unfair treatment) and are often subject to co-ethnic exploitation. Their Australian dream to be a cosmopolitan with fluent language skills rich in cultural capital is hardly achieved due to long working hours, few resources to study, and social isolation (few chances to mingle with diverse Australian) (Jung 2017; Jung & Lee, 2017). Empirical research on various categories of temporary migrants should be further investigated based on a range different data sources including in-depth interviews and Internet data (Youtube and Facebook) through the suggestions as below.

Transnational experiences of non-elites and disadvantaged low SES groups: No doubt, a handful of elite groups have served as the frontiers of the globalisation drive. The effects of this trend have trickled down through to almost all citizens, even those occupying a marginal status in Korea, such as people of lower SES, North Korean defectors (Jung et al. 2018) and sex workers working underground or pushed to look for work overseas after the 2004 passage of South Korea anti-prostitution legislation (Dalton & Jung, 2019). International students choose Australia rather than North America or Europe as their destination for its cheaper tuition fees and low living expenses and also, more importantly, its greater access to student work permits, compared to other English-speaking countries. Temporary migrants often lack economic, social and cultural capital to pursue their global aspirations. Therefore, the need for empirical research demonstrates how differences in social and economic status will

affect transnational mobility differently, an area not fully explored in current transnational migration studies.

Intersectional approach to transnational experience: The consequences of transnational mobility might differ according to social and economic status, gender/sexuality, ethnicity, age, dis/ability and background (in the case of North Korean refugees). Research is required to transcend a dominant view in the existing studies that treat transnational migration experiences as homogenous and without consideration to differences in gender, class, age and background. Some research has implied that migration trajectories, motivations and lived experiences are varied according to class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity (Shanthi et al. 2018; Jun and Han 2015). For example, gender is critical to understanding the motivations and the lived experience of transnational temporal migrants. A little empirical research has pay attention the gendered experience of temporary migrants Dalton& Jung 2019). Future research is needed to delve into the gendered experience of this transnational mobility in the context of family, work, daily lifestyle and social interactions, among other categories that affect the construction of their life as temporal migrants.

Nuanced understanding of transnational mobility: Existing research tends to focus on the positive impacts of moving and living overseas, despite their liminal existence (retaining Korean citizenship, identity and values while living overseas whilst pursuing the host nation's citizenship, learning new values, broadening their identity, and embracing cosmopolitan identity) that renders their overseas living experiences quite challenging. They are often subject to criminal activities, are not entitled to legal protection by either Australia or Korea, and are confused by different legal frameworks and regulatory migration regimes. We suggest that further research will explore the unexpected experiences and consequences of transnational mobility, such as domestic, sexual and/or other violence, and involvement in criminal activities.

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