Clairvoyance: Cross-contract Static Analysis for Detecting Practical Reentrancy Vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts

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ABSTRACT
Reentrancy bugs in smart contracts caused a devastating financial loss in 2016, considered as one of the most severe vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Most of the existing general-purpose security tools for smart contracts have claimed to be able to detect reentrancy bugs. In this paper, we present Clairvoyance, a cross-function and cross-contract static analysis by identifying infeasible paths to detect reentrancy vulnerabilities in smart contracts. To reduce FPs, we have summarized five major path protective techniques (PPTs) to support fast yet precise path feasibility checking. We have implemented our approach and compared Clairvoyance with three state-of-the-art tools on 17770 real-worlds contracts. The results show that Clairvoyance yields the best detection accuracy among all the tools.

KEYWORDS
reentrancy detection, path feasibility analysis, cross contract analysis, smart contract security

ACM Reference Format:

1 INTRODUCTION
Smart contract applications, built upon the block-chain platform Ethereum [1], belong to the most security-critical and data-sensitive application category. These contracts are mainly written by a turing-complete language Solidity. The majority of concerns on smart contracts security begins in 2016 since a devastating financial loss because of the DAO attack [3].

The principal reason of this attack is due to the fallback mechanism. Users often misconceive that smart contracts provide secure transactions and easy-to-use interfaces, by assuming that the other side in the transaction is trustworthy. Unfortunately, this assumption does not always hold. We find that attackers can write a function call in fallback function and form an end-to-end call chain, and execute functions in the chain without paying to the seller. We further find that, this attack often utilizes cross-contract calls, which are not considered by the state-of-arts. To understand the functionality of state-of-the-art tools (e.g., Oyente [4], Securify [6] and Slither [5]), we revisit the state-of-art available tools and find that they have limited capability in identifying the cross-contract reentrancy vulnerabilities. Besides, they usually focus on generic categories of vulnerabilities, not specific to the reentrancy. Even when this fatal vulnerability has been reported for years, it still appears unknown why the weakness in these tools is not patched. Overall, the existing work cannot represent the leading comprehension of this vulnerability, and the state-of-arts are ineffective in identifying cross-contract reentrancy bug.

To study the essential property and various evolutions of reentrancy and help to ensure the smart contract security, in this paper, we propose a more-sound cross-contract and cross-function static analyzer. We further propose a light-weighted symbolic analysis to help to precisely detect bugs. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:

• We present a large-scale empirical study to evaluate the effectiveness of three recent general-purpose static tools using 11714 real-world contracts from Etherscan[2].
• We present a new static reentrancy detection approach to enable (1) more sound analysis by modeling cross-function cross-contract behaviors, and (2) more precise analysis by applying a light-weight symbolic analysis based on PPTs.
• Our tool, named CLAIRVOYANCE has significantly better accuracy than all the other tools.

2 APPROACH
To identify cross-contract reentrancy effectively, we construct the cross-contract call graph and CFG (named XCFG) among the input smart contracts. Next, we identify the suspicious objects or addresses, and track how they are used and propagated along the call chain from XCFG. In this step, a path matches our criterions will be added to the candidate pool. Meanwhile, in order to mitigate
To evaluate the effectiveness of Clairvoyance, we conduct extensive experiments. Specifically, we attempt to answer the research questions: How effective are the summarized PPTs? Compared with the three available static tools, how is the precision of Clairvoyance?

The experiments are performed on 17770 new contracts obtained from Google Big Query open dataset. Tools employed in this experiment are all in their latest version. Further, Clairvoyance is implemented in Python using 5000 lines of code, processing and accepting SlithIR. During the evaluation, all the experiments and tools are conducted on a machine running on Ubuntu 18.04.

For the numbers of detection results of the four static tools, Slither reports 162 vulnerabilities in total, of which 3 reports are true positives (TPs), while the other 159 reports are false positives (FPs). Oyente has least 28 reports, of which 4 reports are TPs, while the rest 24 reports are FPs. Securify reports 3 TPs, but it has 605 FPs. Comparatively, Clairvoyance has outstanding precision in this experiment, for 124 true positives in total 168 reports.

Securify, Oyente, Slither reports more bugs, but most of their result are false positives. Comparatively, Clairvoyance has the highest true positives. The reason behind the FPs reported by three tools is due to the inconsideration of PPTs. In our observation:

1. Securify fails to consider permission controls, hard-coded addresses and self-defined modifiers. It also falsely reports the write operations after calling built-in functions send() and transfer() as vulnerable, causing FPs since it does not consider PPT5.
2. Oyente basically ignores the protections in self-defined modifiers and has many FPs mostly because it ignores PPT3.
3. Among all the FPs of Slither, it generally has a good support for PPT3 by considering the code of security check in modifiers. Considering a relatively small number of cases in using execution lock (PPT4), Slither totally ignores the protection by execution lock(s).
4. The 44 of FPs of Clairvoyance are due to the complicated path conditions, which cannot be easily handled by our lightweight symbolic analyzer.

5 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we present a reentrancy detection approach based on two steps, first applying the cross-contract static taint analysis to find reentrancy candidates, then integrating the PPTs to refine the results. On the publicly collected 17770 contracts, Clairvoyance significantly outperforms the three static tools in terms of precision. In future, we will extend our approach for other types of bugs and also combine with dynamic approaches.

REFERENCES