Climate Risk and Climate Security: A Comparison of Norm Emergence under the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC, 2001–2019

Christo Idowu Odeyemi

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Professor James Goodman
(Principal Supervisor)

Dr Lai-Ha Chan
(Alternate Supervisor)

University of Technology Sydney

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

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Certificate of Original Authorship

I, Christo Idowu Odeyemi declare that this thesis, is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Communication / Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Technology Sydney.

This thesis is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

This document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

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Publications Based on This Thesis

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Climate change and armed conflict: The cases of Darfur and Syria. Paper presented at the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) Annual Conference. Hosted by Monash University, Melbourn. 25-27 September 2017. https://tinyurl.com/y2yxgt27.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
Candidate Norm	Emerging Climate Security Norm
CLICO	Climate Change, Hydro-Conflicts and Human Security
COP	Conference of the Parties
EU	European Union
FCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

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Abstract

This thesis documents and analyses an intensifying dialogue between the changing discourses of global security and climate change governance. It presents a comparative assessment of the extent to which policy statements and debates on climate risk and climate security within three interstate institutions – the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the European Union, and the United Nations Security Council – might indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and thus how these institutions have understood, conceptualised and recognised climate security. Drawing from the literature on epistemic communities, riskification, and securitisation, the thesis conceptualises the three analytical themes as a set of tools relevant for analysing the nuances of climate and security discourses. It applies these themes within the domain of interstate climate security, attending to key differences between the themes while acknowledging conceptual overlaps and interchange between them. In doing so, the thesis demonstrates and extends understanding of how these themes can be deployed.

Using discourse-historical analysis, supplemented by scoping interviews with leading climate security experts, it scrutinises transcripts of relevant meetings held within the three institutions between 2001 and 2019. It offers an in-depth analysis of the extent to which an 'epistemic community on climate security' has emerged within these institutions, along with associated commitments that signal a process of 'climate-riskification' and 'climate securitisation.' The data reveals that the epistemic community on climate security has made riskifying and securitising moves, which have created institutional locations that have allowed the development of climate security in the first stage of the norm life cycle. Serious contestation has persisted but, from all indications, climate security discourse seems unstoppable. The thesis draws out the unfolding but distinct conceptualisations of climate security within the three institutions, including the wider significance of this phenomenon. Despite limits on the policy mandates assigned to the institutions, the thesis finds clear indications of an emerging discourse on climate security and thus a distinctive understanding of security. The findings offer a clear evidence-based guiding tool for scholars and policymakers who aim to identify priority elements for climate security action.

CHAPTER 1 RESEARCH FOCUS AND BACKGROUND OF THE THESIS

1.1 Introduction

This thesis presents a comparative case study assessment of the extent to which policy statements and debates on climate risk and climate security by three interstate institutions might indicate an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. These institutions – case studies – are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Despite the availability of research on these cases, there is no study that compares the unfolding but distinct conceptualisations of climate security by these institutions. Although the policy mandates originally assigned to these institutions require no such conceptualisation, the wider significance of the unfolding phenomenon is missing in the literature. Focussing on the emergence of a dominant discourse on climate security, the thesis subscribes to climate security discourse as a constitutive element of normative approaches to studying climate-related security risks. It seeks to overcome a current disconnection between the changing discourses of global security and climate governance. It discusses how three specialist institutions have understood, conceptualised and phrased climate security. It addresses an important question:

> To what extent might policy statements and discussions by the UNSC, the FCCC and the EU indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and therefore the recognition of the concept itself?

Answering this question will facilitate a deeper understanding of some important conceptualisations of climate security. It will also respond to the calls for comparative analysis. For example, given the established climate-security link (Diez et al. 2016) which remains contentious, discursively and practically, research needs to "evaluate the various climate security discourses in terms of their policy consequences and to strengthen the empirically based comparative agenda" (von Lucke 2014: 876). The findings of this study will help fill this missing coverage by providing insights into the progress of climate

security; the case studies will help clarify the mystery surrounding the normative trajectory thereof.

For this study to achieve the stated goal, five objectives were defined and undertaken: 1) definition of key concepts, 2) the conceptualisation of climate security discourses in terms of distinct analytical themes, 3) scoping interviews with climate security policy experts, 4) application of the analytical themes to each case study to capture phrasings of climate security, and 5) comparison and interpretation of findings uncovered during case analyses. The conceptualisation of discourses is key to constructing analytical themes at the same level of abstraction. These themes will enable clear interpretations of the phrasings being promoted by specific policy statements on climate risk and climate securit*y* (henceforth statements or statements on climate security or climate security statements). In other words, the themes will contribute to the understanding of the complexity of the climate security debate and the potential policy responses. The conceptualisation of discourses will also enhance our understanding of what we are being told by these discourses and the ways in which they have evolved over time.

Informing this thesis is a simple research approach that will be fully discussed in Chapter 2. Uncovering evidence for statements that present climate change based on the logics of security risk (riskification) or security threat (securitisation) requires the basics of a systematic literature review involving problem definition, data sources, and identification of inclusion and exclusion criteria. Following this format, the approach adopts a comparative case method, supplemented with ten expert informants' perceptions of how the institutions have engaged with climate security as well as the successes and failures thereof.

In doing so, this study broadly contributes to scholarly discussions on climate security, securitisation, riskification, security studies, epistemic communities, norms in international society, norms in international society and global climate governance. The study defines global climate governance as the sum of institutionalised values, principles and norms tackling the climate challenge comprising various actors (Asselt 2014) and defines institutions as collective entities operating at the international level. Within the global governance framework, climate governance acknowledges why deficits in risk

governance may be technical and political (Deere-Birkbeck 2009) and seeks to operate collectively through institutional arrangements.

The rest of this chapter discusses the foundation for this thesis. The next section discusses key facts of norms in international society, as relevant in this thesis. Next, the chapter presents the significance of this thesis, including empirical and theoretical contributions, and highlights the relevance of the three case studies. Next, the chapter presents the three analytical themes that will be applied in the case study chapters. It then presents the central argument to further establish the relevance of these themes. Next, it defines key concepts relevant for answering the research question. Next, it outlines the thesis scope. The chapter closes with an outline of the remaining chapters.

1.2 Norms in International Society

This section clarifies two important details: climate security norm and the relevant facts of norms in international society. First, climate security norm (or candidate norm) is defined as follows: considering UNSC's acknowledgement of climate change as a threat multiplier, a phrase often cited by advocates of climate security at various international climate negotiations, at a debate held in January 2019, that acknowledgement may culminate as a real-world effect on potential climate security norm and in a symbolic effect on norm evolution. This thesis therefore draws upon the literature that sees risk, threat and security as socially constructed concepts within the processes of riskification and securitisation.

Second, international norms generally emerge amidst contestation (Wiener 2008). Set against this perspective and the definition in the paragraph above, climate security discourse (and in effect climate security norm) emerges amidst ongoing controversy over whether climate change can be directly held responsible for security risks and threats. This development has made climate security norm more visible in the international arena as actors and scholars continue to drag the norm in various directions. Contestation of this sort is foundational for giving more substance to candidate norms. Each of these opposite ends of the debate is vital for establishing the relevance of climate security as a budding, candidate norm. Norm scholars have responded to this continuum in an attempt to meet

deep-seated challenges and opportunities. Deep contestation may not be essential but often unavoidable and the question of whether it strengthens or weakens norm emergence remains a current and key area of research (Hofmann & Zimmermann 2019). Norm contestation enables an ontological debate about the dynamic or static nature of norms (Lantis 2017). Wiener's (2014) explanation on theory of contestation is an interesting narration of possibilities that can enable or discourage what may occur in the practice of controversy. Certainly, it will be interesting to see how analysis of the case studies will reveal that climate security norm is not static – a situation often arising in the absence of robust institutional debates. In this respect, revelation will be made regarding the dynamic and contested nature of climate security norm, especially in the UNSC case.

1.3 Why This Thesis is Crucial for Understanding Climate Security

No single study has developed the concepts of the epistemic community on climate security, climate-riskification and climate securitisation and then applied these analytical themes to the case studies. In the case study chapters (chapters 4 – 6), this study offers a unique comparative assessment of the extent to which statements by the UNSC, the FCCC and the EU might indicate an emerging climate security discourse. The analytical themes are central to climate security as an increasingly important scholarly and political matter related to the issues of risk and threat. Several scholars of climate security have focused on this context. This study complements the contributions of these scholars through four major fronts.

Firstly, this thesis explores the emergence of a climate security discourse within the UNSC, the FCCC and the EU. Drawing from both existing scholarly contributions and policy statements by the three institutions, the thesis offers a redefinition and elaboration of how riskification and securitisation play out under climate change. On the theoretical level, the thesis envisages that the combination of riskification/securitisation theory with a normative/epistemic community approach has the potential to significantly contribute to climate security discourses. With respect to riskification and securitisation, it mentions norms in international society (where necessary; and mainly in relation to the first stage of the norm life cycle). Such attention (as will be shown in Chapter 7) enables the thesis to discuss key challenges when it comes to establishing new norms in international

society; this is particularly so with regards to the emerging climate security norm. In the foreseeable future, this thesis, normatively speaking, expects UNSC members to adopt a substantive resolution focusing on climate security in the hope that such development should encourage the collective to search for better and timelier responses to climate change. Moreover, the "emerging" nature suggests the discursively constrained context even though climate security is a real issue, judging by the increasing attention (both scholarly and policy wise) given to it since 2007. Scholars, advocates and practitioners can fine-tune their strategies for progressing climate security based on the analysis of empirical data in the thesis. More succinctly, the thesis makes several contributions to climate security research as follows. Based on case study approach, it presents an inclusive definition for climate security. It offers a systematic conceptualisation of climate security literature. It presents the first comparative analysis of statements that invoke climate security (in relation to the case studies). It also presents a comparative analysis supplemented by evidence sourced from interviews with climate security experts.

Secondly, the overall goal in this study contextualises a broad argument by several scholars: given that norm entrepreneurs and critics of climate security often phrase competing perspectives of both the sources of risk/threat and the most appropriate provider of security for the referent object, the occurrence of transnational experts and actors who form part of an epistemic community raises the need for a comparative assessment of climate security in terms of riskification and securitisation (McDonald 2013; Floyd 2015; Diez et al. 2016; Pettenger 2017). In the field of International Relations (IR), norm entrepreneurs typically present a referent object (such as ideal, system, human beings or natural environment) as being threatened or under potential attack and requires protection. Norm entrepreneurs are agents (such as international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), countries and political figures) who identify or direct attention to an issue by using security phrasings that may lead to normative recognition. The target audience of such political issue are norm addresses – the agents who make decision about the merits of the issue identified by norm entrepreneurs.

Thirdly, this study is empirically innovative in its choice of case studies and analytical themes focussing on the relationship between security risk/threat and climate security

governance. The analytical themes signpost the emerging dominant discourse on climate security and, to a certain extent, the normative trajectory of climate security. They also signpost the empirical gravitation towards climate-related security policy in the current literature. Research in this area is yet to offer solid empirical evidence showing the role of phrasing in the context of climate-related security risks. The study therefore addresses an issue of considerable significance. Notable in this respect is the explicit identification of statements that either succeeded or failed in invoking security. The application of climate-riskification as an analytical theme is of particular significance due to a scarcity of research that clearly conceptualises climate-riskification. The ability of the riskification framework to further enhance our understanding on the normative progress of climate security has hitherto been underdeveloped.

More concretely, there is room for empirical and original contributions with this thesis research question: to what extent might policy statements and discussions by the UNSC, the FCCC and the EU indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and therefore the recognition of the concept itself? This is a question of the phrasing of climate security in the policy sphere in part due to the competing discourses of climate security. There is a need to advance a universal definition of climate security by an authoritative source to fill "the definitional lacuna of climate security" (Floyd 2015: 140). The main mandate of the FCCC's Task-Force on Displacement, for instance, is to help develop "a definition" for "climate-related persons" (Serdeczny 2017: 2) and climate security (Youngs 2015). Due to the demand for deeper engagement with the conceptualisation and definition of climate security, the thesis aims to make empirical contributions to the literature on this.

Fourthly, this thesis should be useful to scholars of international norms, especially those interested in norm evolution – mainly the first stage of the norm life cycle. In this regard, the thesis operationalises and applies riskification and securitisation on the topic of climate change, starting with (in the UNSC case for instance) the first-ever UNSC debate on possible dynamics between global security and climate-related security risks. Since that debate, there has been a growing interest in climate security norm in the UNSC (Scott 2017), in the EU (Zwolski & Kaunert 2011; Bremberg et al. 2019; Floyd 2019); and on climate security in both the EU (Stang & Dimsdale 2017; de las Heras 2020) and the

UNSC (Smith et al. 2019a; Day & Caus 2020). Based on broad empirical research findings, all current UNSC member countries acknowledge the climate-security nexus in complex, changing and partly country-dependent ways (Hardt & Viehoff 2020). However, in terms of the three analytical themes, no research has compared the normative endeavour in the UNSC to/with similar developments in the FCCC and the EU.

This discursively normative context helps to conceptualise an analytical framework (climate-riskification, climate securitisation and the epistemic community on climate security) and to uncover the intended and unintended impacts of issue phrasing, decisions, actions and inactions related to climate security (in the case study chapters). Since an analytical framework typically entails conceptual and theoretical considerations, the literature review chapter will offer in-depth discussion in this regard. Notably, examining the pathways by which the phrasing of an issue is linked to global governance outcomes is a sure way to contribute, especially when scholars "employ comparative designs" (Allan & Hadden 2017: 616). By performing similar examination, this thesis is able to discuss how statements might indicate the extent of an emerging climate security discourse.. This is crucial for climate security researchers as they as seek to enable policy intervention. Moreover, there is little research that empirically analyses the dynamics of policy settings in which competing interests characterise different problems with conflicting problem definitions and/or solutions (Boscarino 2016). However, phrasing an issue is challenging in international climate negotiations because it is one of the processes by which decision-making acquire different meanings from various perspectives (Dewulf 2013). It also helps the thesis to uncover new perspectives, to anticipate the discursively normative dimensions of climate securitisation, climate-riskification and the epistemic community on climate security, and to more clearly understand the case studies (Table 1).

As Table 1 shows, there is an important attribute of the institutional case studies. Nobody has hitherto systematically compared transcripts of FCCC, EU and UNSC meetings. The thesis fills this gap. Considerable attention has been given to these cases in which the focus has been on either the EU or the UNSC – and rightly so – but less so on comparative analysis of the UNSC and the EU.

Table 1. Sample of research on climate security and institutional case studies in the 2007–2019 timeframe

Literature	Institutions	Key contexts	Key words
Sindico/2007	UNSC	Climate change at the UNSC	Climate and security
Evans/2008	IPCC, UNSC, EU	Renewed prominence of climate change	Statements by these actors
Detraz & Betsill/2009	UNSC	2007 UNSC debate	Security dimensions of climate change
Conway/2010	UNSC	UNSC's role	Climate and security
Zwolski & Kaunert/2011	EU	Epistemic community	Climate security agenda
Cross/2013a			Security integration
Depledge & Feakin/2012	UN, NATO, EU	International security managers	Climate challenges, politicisation; resources/capacity
Kurtz/2012	UN	Securitisation	Climate change
Cousins/2013	UNSC	UNSC's role	
Sonnsjö & Bremberg/2016	EU	Policy making	Climate and security
Hardt/2018	Institutional actors	Need for more analysis	Environmental security
Dellmuth et al./2017	e.g. UNSC, NATO, EU	Review of research on interstate institutions	Climate security
Dellmuth et al./2017	UNSC, NATO, EU	Most evidence points to these cases	Trends of climate security discourse
Bremberg/2018	OSCE, NATO, EU	Actors with a security mandate	Climate-related security risk
Dellmuth et al./2018	UNSC, NATO, EU, UN agencies	Empirical evidence comes mostly from these cases	Climate security research community
Biedenkopf & Petri/2019	EU	Climate diplomacy	International actor
Bremberg et al./2019		Theory-practice gap	Climate security policy
Dupont/2019		Collective securitisation	Climate security
Chin-Yee/2019	FCCC	Heart of global climate governance	Setting of rules/standards
Calliari et al./2019		Politics of loss/damage mechanism	Loss/damage
Baldwin et al./2019		Institutionalised climate-human mobility relationship	Emerging research agenda
Conca/2019	UNSC	UNSC's role	Climate security

Even where such comparison has been made with respect to climate security statements, it rarely considers the FCCC's contributions, as part of efforts to progress the climate security debate, despite being the legitimate platform for airing and progressing the climate and security issue. The diversity of topics is remarkable. The attention to

epistemic communities, international security managers, policymaking, the need for more analysis on the theory-practice gap and collective securitisation seemingly indicates that discursive claims would soon reach a decisive consensus on the emerging climate security discourse. Accordingly, the thesis acknowledges the literature on norms in international society and the securitisation scholarship as having important similarities; for instance, both phrase certain risks and threats of climate change in dramatic ways (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Diez et al. 2016; Scott 2017). A key takeaway from Table 1 is that the case studies are relevant for comparing statements while the main phrasing of climate security emphasises climate-related security risk.

There is another important attribute of the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC. These current cases are influential in setting rules governing global climate change. They have acknowledged climate change as a significant factor in propelling conflict and security dynamics. For example, the EU and the UNSC have made this acknowledgement in relation to the West Africa and the Sahel region (Kalkavan 2019) while a review of the research agenda on interstate institutions and climate security suggests how to meaningfully link this agenda to broader lines of theory on institutional change and effectiveness (Dellmuth et al. 2018). Scholars investigating related topics are usually unmotivated by shared conceptualisations even when such scholars offer in-depth knowledge on cases of individual interstate institutions in specific policy areas (Dellmuth et al. 2017). This state of the literature reflects the fragmented nature of global climate governance, one in which the challenges of climate security typically fit uncomfortably within interstate institutions' mandates.

This thesis agrees with Dellmuth et al. that a better understanding of the challenges should enable the creation of more effective global solutions. Perhaps more importantly, the climate security research community should, methodologically, think conditionally about advancing existing "inductive case study research with theory-driven comparative research" in terms of institutional change (Dellmuth et al. 2018: 9). Additionally, there is a need for this community to include more systematic comparative analysis of effectiveness within and between organs of interstate institutions (Dellmuth et al. 2017; Hardt 2018). Future research might usefully explore the relative power of such factors in explaining effective interstate institution responses to challenges of climate security and

also contribute to both the emerging fields and the broader literatures on climate security (Dellmuth et al. 2018). In this respect, the performance of interstate institutions may be best assessed through comparisons of accomplishments within and across institutions (Tallberg et al. 2016). The legitimacy of an interstate institution is consequential for its effectiveness in promoting climate security (Dellmuth 2019). We need more research on both the legitimacy – that is, the beliefs among the subjects of a political institution that the institution's authority is appropriately exercised – of interstate institutions addressing climate risks (Dellmuth 2019) and how performance influences interstate institutions' legitimacy (Tallberg et al. 2016).

1.4 Analytical Themes

The practices of riskification and securitisation influence the politics of climate security. To begin, the process of riskification is a precautionary and sustainable risk-management technique while securitisation seeks to reduce or alleviate security threats by demanding for urgent exceptional measures. Given that both riskifying and securitising moves target the governance of security risks and threats, this study utilises three analytical themes to examine the cases. These themes will be conceptualised in the literature review chapter. The themes are the epistemic community on climate security, climate-riskification, and climate securitisation. Each of these themes has specific meanings and perform different functions in the climate security debate. In order to operate them in the study, the themes are defined in the following paragraph and further substantiated by way of fuller explanation in the consequent three paragraphs. They are also explained with respect to how they will be used in the analysis and interpretation of relevant policies or programmes adopted by the interstate institutions (case studies).

Securitisation may be defined either as a sequence of events involving a securitising actor, a securitising move, audience and policy action or the outcome of a shared "threat" perception within a specified population. It may (or may not) lead to appropriate and substantive policy response. Riskification is different. It is clearly not a situation of securitisation but a process of envisaging or phrasing a "risk" event or phenomenon in relation to the future. In the case studies chapters, although the two logics may operate side by side or coexist but capture two or more different dynamics and contexts,

securitisation requires riskification. In other words, as opposed to threat-based security that centres on direct causes of harm, risk-based security is oriented towards the conditions of possibility or constitutive causes of harm (Corry 2012). Many scholars have warned that the successful securitisation of climate change could become a harbinger of drastic, undemocratic and extraordinary measures in high-politics settings. Of course, both logics have their own advantages and disadvantages. In climate-riskification terms, an epistemic community, a network of specialised experts who assist political figures on difficult policy issues, plays a crucial role by presenting the risks of climate change as a policy issue that is best pursued as a sustainable development agenda. With this knowledge, applying the themes to analysis of institutional responses on climate security should clarify the mystery surrounding the exact responses and actions undertaken at the interstate level.

In this study, the epistemic community on climate security is a norm entrepreneur, comprising various international organisations, a dedicated Group of Friends on Climate and Security informed by committed knowledge experts, and a diversity of political and climate actors. It is a passionate advocate of coalition building at international forums, especially in the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC. Members of the epistemic community on climate security are located across the globe, but they have managed to collaborate on the climate security debate. Climate security literature has tended to focus on the EU epistemic community on climate security at the expense of other influential actors whose voices should not be discounted in the debate. This thesis seeks to correct the omission.

In this study, climate-riskification occurs in the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC whenever the epistemic community on climate security presents the same (or closely related) statements for discussion. When there is no (or near absence of) serious contestation, climate-riskification becomes self-evident when the target audience agree that such statements merit further open discussion under the rubric of a security agenda. Ascertaining the extent of riskification or how far a riskification move has progressed is dependent on the type and level of institutional setting in which it is being discussed. For instance, the topic of climate and security was discussed at various meetings held by the FCCC's Adaptation Committee and Task-Force on Displacement. Before a riskification-related decision taken at these meetings can be fully acknowledged as a riskification move

in terms of international climate policies, the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement are required to notify the Conference of Parties (COP) about the decision, which the COP would then approve. In instances of rejection, specific decisions will be send back to the Adaptation Committee or the Task-Force on Displacement (as the case may be) for further discussion. The point being conveyed here is that a riskification move can be considered successful only when it has been approved by the COP, whose institutional power carries far more authortity than that of the Adaptation Committee and Task-Force on Displacement. Broadly speaking, the process of riskification is interested in side effects, reflexifivity, possibilities, and influencing the way we operate; for instance, in a situation of imminent risk, people may enthusiastically embrace habits aimed at emissions reduction – while governments would increase budgetary allocations.

In this study, climate securitisation occurs in the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC whenever specific statements or a successful securitising move is adopted as a policy strategy. Within the process of climate securitisation, the epistemic community on climate security seeks to convince the target audience about the need for and validity of specific riskifying and/or securitising moves. In this regard, specific statements (or a riskifying/securitising move) is successful when the audience approves such statements. Success invariably leads to a planned programme to protect a referent object from a specified threat. "Of particular interest with respect to the process of securitization" are questions of how securitising moves turn into securitisation(s) and how securitisations are linked to extraordinary measures" (Stengel 2019: 296). This particular process can be broadly categorised into three aspects: securitising actors, securitising moves (statements) and policy setting (Balzacq 2011). "These three categories are well suited for structuring an analysis of the specific case of climate change" (Paglia 2018: 99) and that of climate security. Against a background like this, securitisation theory is noted here as a combination of constructivism and realism. Combining core concepts of realist and constructivist interpretation thereby "renders securitization an innovative and enticing analytical concept" (Broecker & Westermeier 2019: 84).

Generally speaking, a securitisation process is interested in causes, impacts, symptoms, imposition of order at the international level and security policies at the domestic level –

notably the 'protect yourselves' variants, such as strengthened border fortification to keep climate migrants out. Relatedly, of discursive and practical significance here is the Task-Force on Displacement's main mandate – to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address climate-related displacement. As such, this study is interested in statements made at high-level policy settings – the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC – where a securitised issue denotes the acceptance of a security phrase, raising the issue from normal politics to high politics through explicit reference to extraordinary measures.

Based on this section's discussion, it is worth noting that the epistemic community on climate security is a precondition for riskification and securitisation processes (or moves). That is, the epistemic community can perform the role of riskifiers or securitisers one it makes its intention about climate security known to the audience. This distinction is important because the study will refer to different but key definitions of riskification and securitisation that can be found in both the secondary literature and policy statements by institutional and climate actors. In the next chapters, this new understanding compels the study to refer to somewhat different criteria (as necessary) for how to identify riskification and securitisation moves that may be perceived as successful. The understanding helps to move beyond the existing literature as well as to better answer the research question of the thesis.

That said, it is worth reemphasising the major differences between riskification and securitisation. In research on riskification and securitisation research, context matters because it is one of the key tussles between riskification researchers and securitisation scholars. Table 2 presents the main distinctions between riskification and securitisation in order to concisely articulate the tussle. The distinctions highlight the main advantages and, by extension, the disadvantages of riskification and securitisation. The distinctions explain why both securitisation scholars focus on the logic of threat narrative and riskification researchers prefer the logic of risk narrative. The distinctions thus become a representation of the dichotomy between riskification and securitisation. In recent years, scholars have been hunting for illocution-based speech-acts which are required for explaining a successful shift from one socio-political context to another (Vuori 2008) largely because the types of words and phrases used in characterising a context would

affect how it is regarded, understood and responded to (Vuori 2011). Accordingly, the significance of the political context within which securitising moves occur has been emphasised in recent scholarship (Léonard & Kaunert 2020) though little attention has been given to the contexts that matters and how they matter (Kaunert & Yakubov 2017). As such the effects of contextual variation on conceptual implications in security theory have not been fully mapped out (Ciută 2009), suggesting that a key methodological impediment is how to shift from one socio-political context to another, without stretching securitisation theory (Vuori 2011).

Table 2. Distinctions between securitisation and riskification (Adapted from Corry 2012; Buzan et al. 1998)

Security Grammar	Securitisation	Riskification
Threat-management techniques (monitoring, screening, profiling and detaining); triggers extraordinary policy measures that can bypass normal democratic process; politics of emergency and exceptionality	X	
Risk-management technique (governance); do not trigger extraordinary measure nor militarisation against existential threats; politics of permanence and long-termism		X
Threat is ungovernable; can be defended against or eliminated; logically articulated as *external* by the securitising actor; focus on both existential threat to a valued referent object and the performative effects of security discourse	X	
The safety of a referent object is mainly a function of attributes of that referent and its vulnerability to danger; tendency to lead to an internal locus of control being proposed; focus on social process of constructing something politically in terms of risks		X
Precautionary principle into security issues; the doctrine of preventive war	X	
Constantly reflects on catastrophic scenarios; inductive exploration of what function security performs		X
Focus on speech-acts, frames or discourses, including institutions and practices	X	
Focus on institutions and practices		X
Security entails a set of discursive rules, which are dependent on the variant of securitisation theory	X	
Diverse security discourse; can change without ceding entirely to contextualism		X
Pre-emptive security; uncover direct causes of harm; devises a plan of action to confront the existential threat (for instance, global war on terror)	X	
Focus on background structures and factors (material or discursive) that make certain actions or events possible; uncover both the constitutive causes of harm and existence of conditions of possibility (for instance, the adverse effects of climate change		X

1.5 Central Argument

This thesis argues that climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies. This argument will be supported via the analysis of primary documents that empirically reveal that climate security is implied whenever the epistemic community on climate security presents statements in the context of climate-related security risks and threats. The case study chapters aim to capture and contextualise the relationship between the normative dimension and the epistemic community on climate security. Being a type of an epistemic community, the epistemic community on climate security provides expert advice to the target audience. Expertise entails the phrasing of issues as needing management through extraordinary measures. In this regard, "the specific fields in which epistemic communities operate are structured around struggles for the symbolic capital of that which constitutes valid knowledge" and therefore epistemic communities are not just passive sources of expertise; they proactively intervene "to influence policymakers' decisions on what constitutes a problem in the security sphere" (Jerdén 2017: 503-4) and why exactly the problem is a candidate for securitisation.

Since any policy strategy aimed at taking extraordinary measures closely operates alongside securitisation, the connection between the epistemic community on climate security and securitisation further signifies the relevance of these two concepts for both analytical themes and normative consideration. The consideration of this connection will help the thesis in its analysis. This context raises the widely cited Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) conception of norm life cycle. Based on the conception, specific norms of global environmental governance attain maturity through a three-staged process: norm emergence, cascade and internalisation. Successful graduation from one gradational stage to the next is contingent upon how climate security has been conceptualised, phrased and presented in each stage. Finnemore and Sikkink acknowledge the complementarity between norm discourses and securitisation scholarship, but without explicit articulation, in any depth, of this complementarity. The thesis will contribute in this regard in the conclusion chapter.

The central argument reflects the core of research on interstate institutions and climate security as an unfolding agenda. It also compliments key mainstream perspectives. For example, arguments about climate securitisation (Peters 2018) at the international level (Warner & Boas 2019) are yet to be completely convincing (Mason 2013), despite a flourishing discursive securitisation of climate change (Warner & Boas 2017). These perspectives could explain gradational securitisation which is attributable to uncertainties in addressing climate risks. They appeared to be the motivation for scholars like Shirley Scott (2012) who explores what successful securitisation may look like in international politics. In their comparative analysis of climate security discourses in four countries, Diez et al. (2016) present empirical evidence of successful securitisation. Over and above all this is the point of how apparent securitisations should be analysed (Hofmann & Staeger 2019). This thesis therefore refrains from making speculative judgements aiming for more robust explanations about climate security statements as *an* unfolding agenda. This is so for policymaking because uneven consequences and policy responses at the global level parallel uneven spread of climate risks globally. This assertion relates back to the explanation above about capturing and contextualising the interactive dynamics between the normative dimensions, the epistemic community on climate security and securitisation.

1.6 Definitions of Key Concepts

This thesis acknowledges a relationship between the academic and policy spheres: the perceived linkage between climate and security is an inseparable part of a conceptual and policy challenge. Conceptual and definitional challenges should be addressed early in a thesis seeking to analyse and interpret statements made in the arena of high politics. Doing so will prevent the presumption that the reader is already familiar with key concepts that have already taken root in climate security discourses. In the next six paragraphs, the key concepts that were defined include security, threat, risk, climate risk, climate security, the climate security debate, climate insecurity, climate-related security risks, slow-onset events, and climate-related displacement.

This thesis acknowledges that much of current discussion in climate security research has acknowledged the importance of the knowledge production process, especially when the

core disagreement is about the best forms of policy intervention aimed at protecting and prioritising resposes to climate change. In corollary, the concept of security remains a contested concept, creating challenges for security studies scholars who have devoted much attention to the threat and risk aspects of climate change. The term security is a self-referential practice because it is in this practice that an issue becomes a security dilemma, not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the unique nature of the discursive construct enables and validates both the threat-referent linkage and the use of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998). Given the different intersecting discourses on climate security, it is worth noting a tension between considering security as a self-referential practice and any attempt to discuss climate security as an emerging norm.

The logic of crafting something as an immediate security threat is clearly different from the politics of constructing something as a risk – anticipated in the future (Corry 2012). The notion of risk is useful for enabling nuanced analysis of cases where there is "no immediate security threat or security outcome" (McConnon 2019: 11). Alongside the creation of various global principles and norms, the reimagination of societal stability leads to the promulgation of world risk society (Beck & Levy 2013), which implies dangers are produced by civilisation in ways that cannot be socially delimited in either time or space (Beck 1996). During crisis times in a risk society, a world engaged with focused risk-management techniques (Beck 1992) in which we are given the opportunity to study complex cases with a focus on policy issues such as the relationship between security and development. Therefore, the popular phrasings of climate change mostly seek to respond to confront the climate issue and respond to risks and threats in order to assure the public about timely collective commitment to climate action.

In retrospect, climate risk is what is: a risk is a future-based event that may be disastrous for humans and the natural environment if it happens. Climate change is a perfect exemplar of this definition. When evaluating or even pondering risks related to climate change, what is immediately obvious are questions about the degree of seriousness and thus how urgent the responses should be.

Each phrasing of climate change subscribes to both the logic of risk and threat. Simultaneous adherence to these two logics is advisable if climate security is to be defined

in a constitutive way. Prominent among existing definitions is the EU's construct: "climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict."[3] Phrased in this way, this construct specifies the threats without specific referent objects. In contrast, the UN generally perceives climate security as a minimiser of climate risks to human security; and specifies both the threat and the referent object. Other definitions exist. Climate security refers to either the absence of climate threats to human and international security or the condition where these referent objects can manage stressors and prevent climate risks (Mobjörk et al. 2016; Thomas 2017; Dellmuth et al. 2017).

These definitions prompt this thesis' more inclusive version: climate security acknowledges several ways in which the epistemic community on climate security presents human security, international security and conflict prevention programmes as key referent objects of climate-related security threats and risks such as slow-onset events and climate-related displacement. This definition is narrow enough for retrieval and interpretation of statements invoking security phrasings. In policy settings, this is vital for deciphering the extent to which climate change has been phrased as a security problem. Closely connected, in the thesis, the climate security debate refers to high-level political deliberations on climate and security. And also refers to how scholars have discussed possible relationships between the negative impacts of climate change and international security, including human security.

Flowing from these perspectives, climate insecurity denotes a condition in which the effects of climate variability and/or change are presented as threatening to a group of affected actors (Mason 2014). This thesis notes three concepts: climate-related security risks, slow-onset events (and the associated loss and damage idea) and climate-related displacement. Climate-related security risks basically comprise food security, water security, coastal degradation, sea level rise, extreme weather-related disasters, civil conflict and climate-related migration/displacement (Mobjörk et al. 2016). The FCCC defines slow-onset events as comprising climate-related security risks such as sea-level rise.[4] Climate-related displacement entails human mobility as a response to climate-related security risks (Wilkinson et al. 2016). Importantly, the discourse on loss and

[3] Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe – A global strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy, June 2016, https://tinyurl.com/y9jtlvso.
[4] FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011.

damage is a context-enhancer for climate securitisation, but it comes with drawbacks. In my reading of the empirical work and scientific conceptualisations on loss and damage, which have focused mainly on human impacts (Wrathall et al. 2015), more research has been conducted about this topic from rapid-onset disasters – like floods and cyclones – than from slow-onset processes such as drought, ocean acidification, and sea level rise (van der Geest et al. 2019). More pointedly, in the inherently politicised field of migration governance, policy guidance and support focussing on loss and damage could enable risky types of political interference such as restriction of migrants to the Global South (Mayer 2017).

Furthermore, the common academic and highly political debates about climate security (Methmann et al. 2013; Baldwin et al. 2014; Trombetta 2014; Thomas 2014; Huntjens et al. 2018) can be presented as a thematic discussion (Table 3). The debates emerged as a forum for heated political discussions due to their focus on not only concerns that have global significance (Bettini 2014; Klepp & Herbeck 2016) but also the missing policies at the national level (Gerstetter et al. 2012), despite the availability of national and international policies on climate and security (Kloos et al. 2013). The concerns however seem more regional-focused policy-oriented solutions, and a political stalemate regarding legally binding treaties on a global level (McNamara 2007; Zetter 2011; Thomas 2014; Klepp 2017; McInerney-Lankford 2017). There is a parallel debate about whether the linking of climate and security should be pursued through assessment of how a climatisation of security and migration policy could motivate enhanced coordination and timely responses on climate-related security risks (Oels 2013). These arguments point to why climate-related migration and displacement is falling between the policy gaps (Wilkinson et al. 2016). They also offer an approach for examining vulnerability to climate risks (Busby et al. 2013).

In Table 3, each row defines a concept, although the analysis is obviously not exhaustive. The intention here is not to ascertain whether the definitions are irrefutable, or the underlying assumptions are justifiable. The definitions simply showcase key phrasings, help the retrieval of the three analytical themes used in this thesis and signify the need to conceptualise these themes from existing literature. The overarching phrasing contextualises climate security as a response to key climate problems.

Table 3. Definitions of key concepts (CC = Climate Change)

Literature	Concepts	Definitions	Phrasings	References
Thesis author/ 2021	Security	The ability of people to thrive in an environment free from climate threats	Freedom to choose and act	Human well-being
IPCC/2014[5]	Human security	Condition that protects human lives		
O'Brien & Barnett/2013		Focuses on individual, group, environment	Freedom to choose and act	CC/ Complex challenges
Buzan et al./1998; Balzacq/2011; Bo/2016; Floyd/2019, 2019a	Securiti sation	Shifting from normal politics to emergency politics	Securitising actors, referent objects, audience	Extraordinary measure
Stritzel/2007	Security	A single security speech at a point in time	Securitisation	Referent objects
Harris/2019		Social commitment with a clear communicative intention (e.g. treaties, constitutive norms)	Epistemic community	Climate security
Corry/2012; McDonald/2013; Krampe & Mobjörk/2018	Climate-related security risk	Potentials of CC to undermine the security of named entity	Climate-riskification	Referent objects
Vivekananda et al./2014	Environ mental security	Risk/threat-free habitable environment	Climate fragility/ conflict	Human well-being

Guiding the selection of phrases are papers that parallel this thesis' approach to climate security. To uncover the analytical themes, a literature review of peer-reviewed definitions was collected. The chosen definition for each concept is underpinned by the most cited phrases, whether based on a qualitative or quantitative paper. In this regard, it is possible to posit a major step forward in measurable conceptualisations of performance in addressing climate security issues (Dellmuth et al. 2018) in terms of the analytical themes. A striking feature of this observation – and by extension the rhetorical struggle of what gets included and excluded – is what could strip away the power of a phrase. For instance, climate securitisation can imply what scientists say, or refer to a consensus among decision-makers, as what may be deemed as frameable (climate science-based findings) as opposed to what is actually phrased (consensus).

[5] *AR5 climate change 2014: mitigation of climate change*, https://tinyurl.com/zj4ttao.

1.7 Thesis Scope

Given the wide-ranging debate over climate change in terms of space and scope, it is important to specify some of the key topics that this thesis covers. The thesis does not focus on topics such as countries' capacity to produce climate science for decision-making (Skelton et al. 2019), climate justice and quantitative scenario-based simulation. Instead, the thesis considers three theoretical frames: the epistemic communities framework, the riskification framework and securitisation theory. It focuses on the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory instead of other variants that emerged from this theory. Likewise, it centres on the riskification framework as conceptualised by Corry (2012) instead of similar approaches such as climatisation and crisification. It pays attention to the first stage of the norm life cycle in relation to norm emergence, which, according to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998), has three stages that perform specific and different functions.

The interest here is in the security dimension of climate change. This dimension has been made possible by different institutional phrasings, but have received little attention when it comes to comparative analysis of case studies. As such the thesis, drawing from the attempted construction of discursive and practical threats related to phrase contestation and collective securitisation (Hofmann & Staeger 2019), considers how a gradual but growing acknowledgement of climate risks and threats emerges among policymakers alongside doubts about the climate-security linkage (Lundgren & Monheim 2007). Reflecting this, Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015), for instance, uncover dominant phrasings by policy actors with a particular focus on how these are constructed through abstraction, reasoning, language and metaphor. Hofmann and Staeger build their argument on statements drawn from policy proposals and reports by the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament, including public interviews with political figures and EU officials. The research design enabled Hofmann and Staeger to analyse statements related to concrete institutional changes. To build on this, the thesis seeks to go beyond analytical confinement to existing discourses by analysing transcripts of FCCC, EU and UNSC meetings, supplemented by expert interviews.

1.8 Thesis Structure

Chapter 2 justifies the case study approach and outlines why the chosen cases are seen as reliable sources of data for comparative analysis. It also discusses the chosen method for data collection and analysis. Chapter 3 performs a critical review of the literature and conceptualises three analytical themes from the exercise. Based on the analytical themes, Chapter 4 (UNSC case), Chapter 5 (FCCC case), and Chapter 6 (EU case) separately offers empirical analysis of climate security statements. These chapters present the contributions of these institutions to the climate security debate as well as facilitate answers to the research question regarding the extent to which statements might indicate an emerging climate security discourse, and thus how far climate change has altered the conception of security by institutional actors. The rationale behind the analytical order is simple. The UNSC is the ultimate manager of international peace and security and the first to be examined, followed by the FCCC case being the manager of global climate change. The EU comes next because it is both a regional and international organisation. A key finding from the analysis is that climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies. Chapter 7 details the comparative analysis, interpretations and findings from the case study chapters. It adopts a normative approach to the analysis and pinpoint the signs of an emerging dominant discourse on climate security in each of the case studies in order to contribute to the climate security debate. Chapter 8 ties together all the chapters and brings the thesis to conclusion; it recaps the key findings from previous chapters, highlights the major contribution of the thesis to climate security research.

CHAPTER 2 JUSTIFICATION OF CASE STUDY ANALYSIS, SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES AND RESEARCH METHOD

2.1 Introduction

This chapter justifies the relevance of case study approach for climate security research and contributes by discussing four common limitations or criticisms of this approach. This contribution is vital because scholars, policymakers and political figures do pay attention to studies on case study analysis. The ideas of case and case study are regularly consulted and criticised in research on climate security. What is the meaning of these social science research tools? Numerous definitions can be found in the literature because the case study approach has proved relevant across research disciplines and research paradigms (VanWynsberghe & Khan 2007). For example, healthcare researchers use case studies to bridge paradigms because they can uncover experience, relationships and meaning (Luck et al. 2006; Napier et al. 2017; Teti & van Wyk 2020). Case study is not exclusively about the case revealing itself as it is about the analytical unit being constructed or discovered (VanWynsberghe & Khan 2007). According to VanWynsberghe and Khan, this vital detail implies that the analytical unit should become clearer as a study progresses, rather than situations where the analytical unit is identified at the outset of a study. Case study approach is useful for examining modern phenomena within their real-life contexts, especially when the boundaries between context and phenomenon are unclear (Crossley 2016). It is also useful when focused and deeper investigation of multifaceted issues are required for credible decision and policymaking (Feagin et al. 1991). Due in part to these credible claims, researchers continue to undertake systematic examination of historical cases in order to collect high quality data for understanding and interpreting the dynamics of complex phenomena (Kalyvas & Fedorowycz 2016).

Specific justifications of the case study approach involve discussion of common limitations or criticisms of case study approach such as the lack of ontological alignment to a well-established theory, weak case selection, inability to generalise to a population, and lack of objectivity. This chapter aims to justify the relevance of the three institutional case studies, the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC. Case study approach have been criticised

for being susceptible to selection of convenient cases (Patton 1990) not ontologically tied to a well-established theory (Rosenberg & Yates 2007), and therefore with weakened relevance for generalisation (Yin 2009)

To justify the relevance of case study approach and highlight the limitations, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section justifies the appropriateness of case study analysis. To do this, general limitations of the case study approach and why these limitations are invalid in a systematic research such as this thesis will be discussed. The second section justifies why the selected cases are reliable sources of data for answering the research question and discusses why comparative analysis of the institutional cases is significant for reliable answers. The third section discusses the research method that informs this thesis.

2.2 Lack of Ontological Alignment to a Well-Established Theory

Case study approach may not be based on any well-established theory where the goal is to establish an emergent theory from case analysis. This thesis refrains from committing to any well-established theory though the three analytical themes (that will be conceptualised in the literature review chapter and applied in the case study chapters) and, as a compensation for non-subscription to a well-established theory, the conceptualisation of the analytical themes will help in-depth description of the dominant factors of each case study. If the case study is to be advanced as a key qualitative tool, useful for maintaining the novelty and adaptability that is valued in case analysis, and for enhancing qualitative inquiry, questions of methodological credibility covering clear explanations of methods and theoretical positions must be explored so that research findings are not undermined (Hyett et al. 2014).

The lack of attachment to a well-established theory is advantageous because case study approach can then adapt to accommodate a range of established theories and confront the complexity of the research problem being studied (Rosenberg & Yates 2007; Harrison et al. 2017). Lessons may include what happened, where it happened, what is typically perceived as having political clout, a foundational understanding of how climate disasters unravel, and the integral dynamics driving the general trends (Franta et al. 2020). Scholars

also argue that a case study constitutes the empirical foundation for documenting socio-environmental interactions and thus general social inferences used in policy formulation.

2.2.1 Inability to Generalise to a Population

Insufficient grounds for replicability tohether with lack of scientific rigour is one of the limitations of case study approach (Yin 2009). Yet some of the limitations, if not all, can be effectually mitigated with a carefully thought-out research design and well-chosen phrases for description of propositions and/or midrange theory, taken from empirical evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Although these perspectives do not completely eliminate ambiguity inherent in case study analysis, case selection should be based on the assumption that they are typical, and not based on committed interest in the uniqueness of each case (Mills et al. 2010). Mills et al. also argue that socio-political events and phenomena occur only within unique contexts and cases. They make a relevant clarification: the relationship between the generalising spirit of qualitative research and the uniqueness of cases carries theoretical pretensions, especially when the researcher seeks to understand and interpret the outlier case – the very unique event, group, organisation, group, and so on. Credible research findings therefore require several cases and even at that a specific finding may only be applicable to specific cases, making case analysis a bit suboptimal for the purpose of replicability.

Eric Tsang (2014) argues that case study approach has been criticised for generating results that are less replicable than those of large-N, quantitative method. Yet this does not apply in situations where researchers have little to no control of the issue being studied, such as questions of why and how institutional actors have presented possible solutions for identified issues. Case study approach considers an array of events in which the overall goal is to dig deep and present a contextually rich explanation of the issue being investigated (Farquhar 2012). As such comparative case analysis is perhaps the best approach to interpret a continuously morphing agenda like the climate security debate, meaning a purposive emphasis on replicable findings is not compulsory in this thesis.

Case study is also presented with the limitation of the inability to generalise the results obtained from conclusions specific to the cases studied (Silva & Mercês 2018). For

findings to be credible, multiple cases are required. Even at that, this approach could be suboptimal if certain findings are only applicable to specific cases. There are four useful ways to address this limitation. First, case study approach can facilitate access to a contentious phenomenon to be studied, especially when researchers acknowledge both the absence of consensus and competing voices (Mills et al. 2010). Second, as case study approach provides robust interpretations and rich understandings of real-world contexts, analysis in the case study chapters can aim to determine the possibilities for normative development of climate security. Third, the analytical power of an emergent theory can be enhanced through integration of new empirical findings with existing theoretical insights, even where research findings turn out to be non-generalisable beyond specific cases. And fourth, the selection of case studies may be based on the criterion that such cases must be replicable. To avoid some of these issues, this thesis uses embedded case study strategy.

2.2.2 Lack of Objectivity

Another limitation of case study approach centres on the concern that it cannot satisfy the criterion of objectivity. When based on the realist perspective of maintaining objectivity, this approach often aligns with a post-positivist approach (Yin 2014). Alongside post-positivist researchers who seek to understand the nature of reality (Harrison et al., 2017), case analysts can shift focus from the positivist belief that there is just one objective reality that can be studied and understood to a constructivist perspective in which several realities can be socially constructed and interpreted. Whether in traditional realism, which can be used to assess interventions synthesising textual configurations of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes (Carr et al. 2017), or constructivism, what is perceived as a limitation differs across disciplinary methodologies. Realism sits between positivism and constructivism (Harre 1980) and responds to the limitations of empirical science in interpreting outcomes (Cooper, Lhussier & Carr 2020), which results from causal mechanisms and the contexts in which they occur (Pawson & Tilley 1997) rather than a direct result of an intervention. It is within these contexts that realist research situates its criterion of objectivity, to which case analysts strive to address.

Concern about objectivity is common in field research, as is one of the most contested topics (Öksuzoglu-Guven, 2017). Öksuzoglu-Guven suggests subjectivity can enrich research in settings where the researcher has nativity to the group being studied, and highlights little need for subjectivity where the goal is to understand the dynamics of individuals and societies, because the nature of humanity is based on social constructs. For this reason, it becomes important for researchers to show how they can substantiate their findings. Look at it in this way: the case study approach privileges precision over scope with a focus of few variables in relation to the climate security question.

2.2.3 Weak Case Selection

Case study approach has been associated with the limitation of weak or convenient case selection. It is true that preferential selection would limit the credibility and strength of research findings (1990). However, the institutional cases in this thesis are not preferentially selected. Moreover, case selection is based on theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007), with articulation of clear research question, guided by the ability of chosen cases to address such question. Without this, case selection would be erroneous. Where the issue under scrutiny is current and remains open for further deliberation, researchers should problematise and theorise it in order to address key challenges. In other words, due to the ongoing nature of the climate security debate, this thesis problematises and theorises this debate in order to confront the challenge of interpreting the extent to which statements might indicate an emerging climate security discourse. One complication might be that the case-based scholarship has focused disproportionately on a skewed subset of relevant cases and places (Conca 2019). Without giving one source unfair advantage over the other, the cases are selected based on their ability to the answer the research question as well as yield reliable, replicable data.

The case studies are not convenient choices. They are selected because the institutions remain actively involved in the climate security debate. Critics might still raise an opportunist contention when cases are characterised by their influence in international climate negotiations. Although it is true that the institutional cases wield enormous political influence because their actions often have far-reaching effects on international climate negotiations, the selection strategy duly considered the fact that extant discourses

have neither comprehensively nor systematically compared these cases. Taking the differences exhibited by the cases as balancers of similarities, this thesis gives more weight to the question of interstate institutions that have effectively demonstrated the ability to make formal recommendations on climate security.

2.3 Selection of Case Studies

The previous section grounded the usefulness of case study approach by explaining four general limitations that could hinder the credibility of this approach. The present section discusses case selection strategy. To begin, this thesis is attentive to key critiques of case study analysis and notes that although the unfolding nature of the climate security debate made data collection difficult in certain instances, the selection of multiple cases guaranteed retrieval of empirical data necessary for a robust analysis of statements, trends and patterns within the specified analytical timeframe. Examining multiple cases allows an exploratory study of specific statements on climate security where the evidence derives from in-depth and interpretive narration of how the three institutional have handled the topic of climate security. To be certain, as process-tracing seeks to compile events that occurred within certain periods (Ulriksen & Dadalauri 2016), co-variational evaluation needs several cases to test the causal relationship between an identified variable and the specific events or outcomes being investigated (Blatter & Haverland 2012). Furthermore, focussing on the testing of competing arguments and theories, congruence assessment enables researchers to use multiple cases to argue empirical evidence for the explanatory significance of competing theoretical approaches (Blatter & Haverland 2012).

This thesis does not analyse the three institutions as a whole but focuses on certain subcases. It acknowledges that the subcases differ in their nature (for instance, programmes, subunits and so on) and may not concretely represent the whole institution. Considering this may lead to biased findings, the thesis employs discourse-historical analysis to avoid erroneous findings. This thesis utilises several embedded subcases (or case-within-a-case study). The three institutional cases can be well-understood only by gaining insight into key facets of embedded cases, which provide vital information about the phenomenon of interest – the emerging climate security discourse. These are important not only because the researcher encountered different perspectives of inquiry

during data collection stage but also for clearer and more reliable data. For the thesis, case sampling strategy involved consideration of problem framing, scenario consideration, theoretical constructs and interrelationships. If these elements were duly considered during sampling selection (Scholz & Tietje 2001), it is possible to examining the peculiarities of each parent case and reliably replicate embedded case study research (Yin 2009 2012; Cohen et al. 2018; Budiyanto et al. 2019).

Due to the sheer size of each institutional case, this thesis divides each into two subcases. Therefore, in the UNSC case, it confines the analytical units to informal (Arria-Formula) and formal meetings; to the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement in the FCCC case; and to the Copernicus Climate Change Security Programme and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace in the EU case. These subcases were then used to identify and compare similarities and differences, within and acros all cases.... The embedded subcases can be accessed only if the entire study and the research question focus on the original case study in its entirety (Yin 2012). It is important to clearly ascertain the original case and the boundaries of what will (and will not) be studied before one can successfully operate an embedded case study, very useful for acquiring the foundation for theoretical generalisations that are difficult to determine when using a single case (Yin 2012; Mills et al. 2010). The embedded–like the original cases–to be compared should be selected based on satisfying some pertinent theoretical criteria (Mills et al. 2010).

2.4 Justification of the Selected Case Studies

This section justifies the chosen case studies, and enhances our knowledge of these cases by assessing their level of significance. This thesis examines the selected cases as they have a specialist focus on climate change, security and conflict prevention. Due to active involvement in the ongoing climate security debate, the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC are perhaps the best-case studies. These institutions are enormously influential when it comes to where this debate may be heading next or, to be more precise, its normative trajectory thereof. In general terms, the UNSC elitist nature opens the way for the FCCC's universal appeal, whereas the EU must be considered for its regional-based supranational character. These cases constitute empirical research sites, offering useful information on the climate

security debate – the pillar of an emerging dominant discourse on the interstate responsibility to protect global populations from the adverse symptoms of climate change.

The case studies are significant. But at issue are opinion and methodology. What now counts is that there is truly a difference of opinion. For instance, the UNSC's role in dealing with climate change is both unclear and an area where more work is certainly needed (Sindico 2017). Such action may be difficult to envision in the current political moment largely because it may perturb the work of the FCCC (Conca 2019). The FCCC is centrally important in climate governance and offers an illustrative case of institutional accountability (Kuyper et al. 2017). At the same time the FCCC is expected to foster productive networks within the field of climate governance, which implies nurturing collaborative understanding with the UNSC. If this scenario unfolds, the FCCC's role as coordinator will be limited – constantly trying to fix problems rather than build a productive path (Kuyper et al. 2018; Skelton et al. 2019). The UNSC may take a stronger role, or can bring authoritative voice in preserving peace and security (Davies & Riddell 2017), most notably when we acknowledge that the EU should not be left alone to championing the climate security question.

In real-time, the relevance of the cases has been growing since 2007 considering the increasing attention given to them by climate security scholars. In his speech on conflict potential in a world of climate change, Gareth Evans (2008: para. 3) highlighted how climate change research has developed remarkably since the early 2000s: "the past year – with its big debates at the UN Security Council and in statements from EU and G8 states, all following on from the ground-breaking reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – has underscored the central position that climate change now occupies in international policy and strategic thinking."

A lot has happened since Evans delievered his speech. Scholars have examined how the climate security debate is unfolding as a political issue in the UNSC and the EU (Herbeck & Flitner 2010; Trombetta 2014; Bardazzi et al. 2016). More research is needed considering the triple mobility crisis – climate change, urbanisation, and intensified violence – inadvertently contributes to the reification of a troubling political category (Baldwin et al. 2019). Within the contexts of sluggish UN climate change negotiations

managed by the FCCC, and the persistent calls for the UNSC to play a more decisive role in global climate governance, the UNSC could legitimately take active steps to counter climate-related security threats (Scott & Andrade 2012; Cousins 2013). If it fails to do so, the UNSC may find itself responding by default, compelled to engage with crises that may not in the first instance appear as climate-related events (Scott 2015).

Furthermore, based on statements made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the EU and the UNSC in 2007, there is "unquestionably a general causal connection" between conflict and climate change in the sense that the latter is a "threat multiplier" (Evans 2008: para 6). Given the "ongoing academic debate about the causal linkages from climate change to conflict," Dellmuth et al. pinpoint the EU, the UNSC and UN agencies as well as and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the interstate institutions with the clearest mandate on humanitarian and environmental affairs (Dellmuth et al. 2018: 1). Most of the evidence with respect to trends and patterns of interstate institution discourse on climate security points to institutions "dealing with state security" – such as the EU, the NATO and the UNSC (Dellmuth et al. 2017: 2). To achieve effective risk-management approaches, governments have increasingly relied on interstate institutions such as the EU and UN agencies (Dellmuth 2019). In addition to the need to analyse how climatic impacts could affect the functions and functioning of the UNSC, these institutions have started to focus on climate security discourses because of the threat posed by ecological imbalances and the associated unforeseeable consequences for planetary security (Scott 2015). We also need more systematic comparative analysis of effectiveness within and between organs of interstate institutions (Dellmuth et al. 2017) before the practical context of "environmental security" can be meaningfully strengthened (Hardt 2018: 270).

It is useful to remember that the FCCC is the legitimate manager of global climate change – and, by extension, climate security – and is more representative of the global states system than either the NATO or the EU. Reflecting this, Depledge and Feakin systematically compare the NATO, the EU and the UN, and make an important policy-relevant argument: "these institutions" manage "international security on behalf of their members at a time when national and international security requires strong partnerships with other countries" (Depledge & Feakin 2012: 73). Interstate institutions can also take

actions independently of member countries and fundamentally influence climate action (Dellmuth 2019). These observations serve as a warning to be alert to statements that may be implicitly self-directed but explicitly make an emancipatory case for populations facing adverse effects of climate change.

It is therefore unsurprising that Boston et al. (2009) recount why an edited collection challenged scholars to investigate the relationship between climatic instability as well as policy responses to these consequences. The authors of a special issue of the *International Journal of Global Warming* (van der Geest & Warner 2015) have in/directly responded to that challenge. The authors presented a collection of papers from a conference held in February 2013 at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security. Whereas the conference focused on decision-making on loss and damage, other scholars adopted a slightly different approach by considering the extent to which there is an academic discourse aimed at analysing the relationship between climate change and maritime security (Germond & Mazaris 2019; Germond & Wa Ha 2019). Baldwin et al. (2019) responded to the abovementioned challenge. In their role as editors of the July 2019 *Mobilities* journal's special issue, Baldwin et al. label policy responses to climate consequences as an unfolding research agenda that requires rigorous investigation. Without alluding to climate security or climate securitisation, Baldwin et al. contend that the unfolding agenda challenges certain assumptions underpinning the growing institutionalised response within the FCCC. Fuelled by speculative threats to international security from climate-related displacement, the agenda centres on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the "institutionalised dialogue" on climate-related displacement (Baldwin et al. 2019: 2).

2.5 Justification of Comparison of Institutional Case Studies

The previous section introduced the case studies to progress climate security research in this thesis. The present section solidifies the basis for believing the case studies as appropriate for answering the research question. Given there is no single overriding factor for examining statements by these cases, it may be insufficient to claim that these cases are relevant solely because they remain active in the climate security debate. We must therefore think about justification of the comparative approach in this thesis. Climate

security discourses remain one context if we agree that scholarly evaluations have contributed to expanding discourses on UNSC discussion on climate security (Sawas & Krampe 2017; Scott 2017; Sindico 2017; Scott & Ku 2018, 2018a) and key challenges of climate security (Peters & Vivekananda 2014; Rüttinger et al. 2015; Bodanac et al. 2016; Mobjörk et al. 2016; Rigaud et al. 2018). Furthermore, several assessments are partly based on interviews with diplomats (cf Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016; Mueller 2017; Bremberg 2018). This thesis complements this research strand by comparing the institutional case studies. It is particularly contributory in relation to the December 2017 Arria-Formula debate and the recent debates in the UNSC, notably the July 2018 and January 2019 debates. The opportunity to contrast these subcases offers a credible means of studying statements on climate security, as it will enable access to an intellectual site where climate security discourses could further germinate and become more concrete.

Other subtle justifications of the institutional cases are possible (albeit indirect). For instance, the failure of existing studies to situate climate-conflict correlations into a broader context has been perceived as not just an inadequate consideration of contextual specificity (Peters & Vivekananda 2014), but also a constraint to the explanatory power of findings, thereby eroding the accuracy of credible comparisons across cases (Harris et al. 2013). As the broader context implies the institutional postures of each case, addressing the varied dimensions of climate security concurrently requires an appropriate entry point for doing this. The peer-reviewed literature will benefit from more detailed explanatory cases which might encourage effective strategies for mitigating climate-related conflict (Peters & Vivekananda 2014). Such mitigation, as Peters and Vivekananda argue, requires inductive or case study investigation of specific settings and locations like trans-boundary areas or interstate collaborative sites. These sites obviously include the institutional cases as distinct avenues for progressing climate action.

2.6 Research Method

This section is divided into data collection and analytic method. These are underpinned by the research argument and question over where to search for data on speech acts on climate security. The thesis is located within broader climate security discourses. To study how people have engaged the climate security debate, is to examine speech acts by key

institutions and actors who have sought to influence the debate in one way or the other. The written and oral statements regarding the security context of climate change is crucial in this respect. Speech acts define policy statements as doing something in terms of shifting how the climate security debate is understood.

2.6.1 Data Collection

There was no serious challenge with data collection for the 2001–2019 research timeframe. Data was sourced from publicly available documents that include formal and informal decisions, policy reports, and the discourses of countries participating in climate security discussions. Contributions from the UN General Assembly, the IPCC, humanitarian organisations, national legislations, and conference papers were also considered. To achieve a detailed survey of these sources, search words relevant to the research question were used to retrieve documents focussing on climate security. I also checked for previous instances where researchers may have examined closely related questions. Key words included climate security discourse, climate change securitisation, threat-multiplier, epistemic community, climate security debate, climate-riskification, climate actions, speech act, global and international security, human security, loss and damage, slow-onset events, climate-related displacement and migration, environmental degradation, climate vulnerability, environmental security, norm evolution and emergence, norm entrepreneurs, UNFCCC, EU, UNSC, Security Council, IPCC, violent, armed and civil conflict, global warming, temperature rise, and drought. Combining concepts such as climate security, risk, and climate-related conflict as well as environmental protection and vulnerable populations proved useful in retrieving papers that focus on the intersections between these concepts. Various authors understandably utilised certain terms interchangeably as these fit each author's purpose. Because this could be disadvantageous if inappropriately interchanged, such terms were categorised into either high or low priority to make them more amenable, coherent and useful for the search strategy.

Some commentators might argue the 2001–2019 research timeframe as inappropriate because discussions of climate change as a foreign policy issue and national security concern trickle through the 1970s and early 1980s (Campbell & Parthemore 2008).

Dellmuth et al. (2018) however see things differently. In their paper on how to advance the research agenda on interstate institutions and climate security, Dellmuth et al. identify 2004–2016 as the appropriate analytical timeframe because systematic research on climate security challenges gained momentum only after the Pentagon commissioned Schwartz and Randall to conduct a research on climate change and United States (US) national security. This was published as a seminal policy paper in 2003. With a focus on the climate-security relationship, the report implies the significance of the 2003–2019 timeframe because a systematic academic research on climate security emerged during this timeframe. With this thesis being limited to a four-year duration, the evidence that will be presented may be constrained by a lack of long-term monitoring and evaluation processes.

Guided by the research question, this thesis traces climate security phrasings between 2001 and 2019. This was underpinned by the selection and examination of primary documents sourced from the reports of FCCC, EU and UNSC meetings (and statements) held within this timeframe. The empirical documents include concept notes submitted by invited international organisations and NGOs, summaries of meetings, technical reports on meetings, formal reports to the COP, and key decisions made by Parties at the annual COP. All this should indicate political attempts to address climate security as well as potential policy directions. To exclude records unimportant to this thesis' goal, deliberations in which climate security is the key topic were prioritised. Boundary delimitations such as the forum in each case study where data was accessed helped to capture crucial data and the selective strategy undertaken. Focussing on primary data archives, this strategy considered proceedings of institutional debates, associated policy documents, insider insights or accounts into the climate security issue, media releases, and public reports.

Secondary sources of data included textbooks, peer-reviewed articles, legislation, government documents and institutional archives focusing on climate security. The abstracts and conclusions of each document were read. Those that failed to sufficiently address the climate security debate were excluded from further consideration. Because the ability to pinpoint the main ideas and underlying interpretations of phrases and texts in each document required scrutiny, each document determined as useful for further

consideration was read several times to understand the key messages. The key problems and findings in each document were tabulated. In situations where authors cited additional materials clearly relevant to this study, the bibliography (when given) of each document was further explored, without forgetting potential and real biases by these authors.

2.6.1.1 Skype-Based Interviews

To examine statements, this thesis relies to a certain extent on data retrieved from Skype-based interviews with ten climate security professionals that were arranged through email communication between 2018 and 2020. The author spoke with the informants on separate days and the total duration of all interviews is 5 hours. The informants were experts in their areas of research and possess first-hand knowledge on the climate security topic. Several of them have conducted policy focused research for either the UNSC or the EU. The informants preferred anonymity with three exceptions: the head of Netherlands-based Clingendael International Sustainability Centre, a senior policy advisor from Britain-based Third Generation Environmentalism's climate diplomacy team, and a senior fellow from German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The author sought to interview diplomats and experts who are directly affiliated with either the FCCC, the EU or the UNSC to better understand the subtleties of the climate security issue and articulate a more nuanced contexts, but only succeeded in interviewing a senior expert from an international organisation dealing with cross border displacement. The expert chose to remain anonymous because the parent organisation is a member of the Task-Force on Displacement.

The informal interviews were mainly used to supplement contextual background of analysis. Interview questions focused on climate actions that were undertaken, how the selected cases might deepen their involvement, and why people are talking about the climate security. The questions probed the case studies regarding evolving problems and prospects in advance of a new direction for climate security. They also offered deeper reflections on key terms of the climate-security relationship, what is being undertaken in the policy sphere and what should or could be undertaken about it, especially in terms of reaching international consensus on climate security.

2.6.2 Data Analysis

Noting that a comprehensive interpretation of what have happened is the overall goal, this thesis offfers a preliminary assessment of the extent to which policy statements might indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and thereby the recognition of the concept itself. Discourse analysis presented itself as the obvious approach given the requirement of an in-depth assessment. As an important aspect of the research process, discourse analysis is an appropriate interpretive technique for the growing tendency to securitise climate change (Detraz 2011) because it enables not only a focus on how actors have phrased security contexts in their statements but also the synthesis of both the detected security phrasings in statements and the associated intentions. Mills et al. (2010) argue that actors can either subconsciously or strategically make choices about how an issue is expressed or heard. A useful example is the case of responses to the challenges of climate change. It is notable that the term discourse and its adjective, discursive, are less helpful research terms unless modified by additional descriptors (Mills et al. 2010). One of such descriptors is an adjectival qualifier: critical. Discourse analysis is useful for thick descriptions of contexts and capturing grammar and intentions (Rapley 2007: Holzscheiter 2014), and often performs beautifully when analysing discursive articulations, but could fall apart either when it uncritically accepts discursive assumption or where critical assessment of policy statements regarding climate security is the overall goal.

The requirement of criticality separates critical discourse analysis from other variants of discourse analysis (Spratt 2017). This may well imply an analytically normative commitment in which texts are analysed in terms of values such as how wrongs might be righted or mitigated from a particular normative standpoint (Fairclough 2013; 2013a). Specifically, this thesis differs from other studies on climate security as it does not use extensive coding of documentary data. This tactic to some extent influenced the findings herein, and it might invite criticism from scholars who hunt for objectivity, reliability and validity in a research report. However, the introduction chapter clarified that the research question is exploratory in nature, permitting preliminary study and indication of new possibilities and realities. More specifically, it is permissible to rely on the idea of the human-as-instrument in which the researcher is the only instrument which is flexible

enough to capture the complexity, subtlety and constantly changing situation which is the human experience (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Alongside human experiences and situations being the key subjects of qualitative research, together with the knowledge that what people do in any given situation can never be fully predicted, human-as-instrument simply implies that the researcher together with relevant background, experience, skills, biases and knowledge constitute the primary and maybe the exclusive source of data analysis (Maykut & Morehouse 1994).

The analytical approach here complements Tamsin Paige's (2019) methodological subscription to discourse-historical analysis, a subset of critical discourse analysis (Wodak & Meyer 2009). The origins of discourse-historical analysis can be traced to the work of Habermas and Foucault regarding the constituents of discourse (Reisigl & Wodak 2009). Discourse-historical analysis may appear to be the same as critical discourse analysis, but there are important distinctions to be made in spite of the appreciable overlap between them. With most types of critical discourse analysis relying on field-work, participant observations, in-depth interviews and other forms of ethnography, discourse-historical analysis relies on primary documents (Wodak & Meyer 2009; Paige 2019). Proponents of discourse-historical analysis are politically engaged and often application-oriented as they both discursively criticise the misuse of power and make epistemic-based practical claims of emancipation and enlightenment (Reisigl 2017).

Based on discourse-historical analysis, this thesis presents a preliminary determination of both an emerging climate security discourse and the recognition of the concept itself. It provides insights into riskifying and securitising moves and the extent of these moves – that is, how the phrasings of statements by the epistemic community on climate security invoke the need to protect referent objects from risks or threats and whether such invocation is successful or not. A clear indication of the success or failure of securitisation and riskification is whether climate security-relevant policies have been formally proposed or adopted. With all this being a vital indicator for the utility of discourse-historical analysis which will enable pieces of data that were seemingly unrelated to be empirically woven together into coherent knowledge about how the case studies have understood and conceptualised climate security, the analysis helps determine whether the language and phrasings qualify as part of a broader global climate security agenda,

whether these can be fruitfully interpreted as a critical sign of what could materialise on the horizon in the foreseeable future and, perhaps more important, whether the phrasings can be credibly presented as invocation of either climate securitisation or climate-riskification.

Discourse-historical analysis has received considerable attention since its inception. At the same time, concepts and analytical categories have been improved and clarified; for instance, "the famous 'discursive strategies'" (Lupprich 2014: 1). Martin Reisigl (2017) describes four important discursive strategies. These comprise the nominative strategy: for discursive construction of how objects, actors, phenomena, processes and actions were referred to linguistically in the text. The predicative strategy: for discursive characterisation of the qualities (whether positive or negative) that were attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, processes and actions mentioned in the text. The argumentative strategy seeks to interpret textual arguments that were employed to persuade audiences of claims of truth and normative validity. The perspectivisation strategy seeks to locate the actor's or speaker's statement and interpret involvement or distance with respect to the perspective from which these nominations, attributions are arguments expressed. But why advocate a perspectival view when readers often perceive an objectivist view as almost synonymous with good research? (Maykut & Morehouse 1994). Defining words (according to Maykut and Morehouse) is a political activity in which specific grammars – even grammars that are not intended – can be slippery. Owning in part to this observation, this thesis subscribes to a perspectival rather than an objectivist posture. This is because to be objective is to be cold and distant; but to be perspectival is to focus on subjective agency and the speech patterns and behaviour of actors or agents, especially the specific contexts in which these behaviours occur (Maykut & Morehouse 1994).

Discourse-historical analysis together with the mentioned discursive strategies helps guide the interpretation of data. A characteristic feature here is the inductive approach to analysis of discourse. Guided by the research question, the collected data was not predetermined. Nor was data analysis grouped according to predetermined categories. The data analysed here emerges from the data itself, thus using emergent coding and an inductive reasoning to identify categories (Maykut & Morehouse 1994). What is more,

this thesis embraces coding as a discovery phase where the emergent coding can be placed between an emergent and a priori continuum. This is necessary due to the lack of absolute hard-and-fast rules of coding (Faherty 2010). Although it might be feasible to simply tabulate the results of coding, a serious limitation is bias in analysis which skews the results and interpretations (Paige 2019). For these reasons the literature review chapter will offer a preliminary sense of the phrasings of riskification and securitisation.

Discourse-historical analysis helps this thesis to make a modest contribution to case study research through the separation of key words, phrases, sentences and ultimately phrasings from those that are not relevant for ascertaining the extent of threat-based (securitisation) and risk-based (riskification) phrasings. This delineation helps the analysis of institutional cases. Case analysis is vital as it helps in the separation of phrasings into grammatical parts. It also helps syntactic location of these parts to each other, including their intertextual and interdiscursive salience (Reisigl & Wodak 2009; Flowerdew 2013). These types of phrasings often create an iterative body of work for synthesis (Paige 2019), which typically enables an inductive examination of patterns and themes for the refinement of new interpretations and translations of isolated findings to meaningfully inform theory and practice (Leary & Walker 2018). Researchers have fruitfully considered the progress of inductive case study research and institutional change (Peters & Vivekananda 2014; Dellmuth et al. 2018) within the broad context of discource-historical analysis. Inductive content analysis is appropriate for cases where there are no previous studies dealing with the phenomenon in question or when the phenomenon is either fragmented (Elo & Kyngäs 2008) or highly differentiated (Dorsch & Flachsland 2017). In cases where the phenomenon in question is highly differentiated (Dorsch & Flachsland 2017), inductive content analysis is appropriate especially when the phenomenon is missing in previous studies or fragmented in real-time (Elo & Kyngäs 2008).

In the case study chapters, discourse-historical analysis will help unpack how climate change has been phrased as a security problem. This task could however become counterproductive for the whole discursive enterprise only if the issue of power struggle is ignored as a source of concern. Differences are negotiated within the purview of discourses as a site of struggle for power where and when different ideologies compete

for primacy (Wodak & Meyer 2009; Lupprich 2014), which in the mainstream discourse is dominated by opinions addressing social hierarchy within a community or an institution (Alasuutari 2018). To better present this perspective, the consideration of power translates into the question of which actors have power and authority. According to Pertti Alasuutari (2018), one can expand the meaning of authority to interpret the influence that actors have in that others seriously consider their statements when deciding about their views or behaviour. Alasuutari points out that when considering contemporary debates, speakers recurrently utilise respect for a statement, actor or group especially when any of these presents a credible picture of reality as a means to strengthen their argument. Competition for influence and primacy tends to be ruled outside the discussion as it is assumed that the contest has been settled; the actors who are outside such a power structure risk being ignored, or their fight for supremacy is not discussed in terms of power.

For discourse-historical analysis, language is not powerful on its own because it is a way to gain and maintain power by the use powerful people make of it. Pertti Alasuutari (2018) clearly argues this opinion, noting that a better articulation of power should contextualise the broader meaning of authority in a way that succinctly presents the main role of language and signification in the social world and its power games, as enumerated in discourse theories. In this respect and given the circumstance that a broad effort to conceptually come to terms with the power in securitisation processes is absent so far (Langeohl & Kreide 2019), another explanation for power struggle and the expansion beyond political practice to political discourse of power and the associated discourse-historical analysis is the nature of the road from language to generating grammar, which is not always linear. In this way, this thesis opens an avenue to discuss the ways of conceptualising power dynamics in statements by the institutional case studies in relation to securitisation and riskification processes.

Understood in this context, discourse-historical analysis is a site and tool for contesting the concepts of authority and power. Based in part on factors like political power and authority, the epistemic community on climate security simultaneously presents an issue as a security dilemma and suggests potential solutions. With the climate security debate, it becomes important to ask whether there is any difference between these two concepts. Authority and power are not the same but can perform similar functions in certain

situations. Authority is attributed to a specific actor based on the ability to perform certain functions or act in certain roles; it is a source of power allowing the actor to mandate orders and enforce compliance though enforcement is not always easy (Porter et al. 2018). In colloquial application, actors are seen as people who make appearances. But authority ought to be seen as more of an attribute about the interchange between actors, who may be represented by organisations or similar entities. Authority then becomes an acknowledgement that actors are endowed with a proven ability to manifest a desired and legitimate outcome in political settings.

2.6.2.1 Limitations of Research Method

General limitations of case study analysis turned up as envisaged. Key among these is the familiar difficulties in interpreting complicated and uncertain causation link and in harmonising the researcher's own perspectives and beliefs. Another clear limitation can be traced to competing interpretations of risk and threat. Although threat is generally associated with securitising moves while risk is often aligned with riskifying moves, these terminologies serve different conceptual meanings and purposes in the scholarly and policy spheres where people have been known to interchangeably use the terminologies. Acknowledging these limitations, this thesis is designed as a scoping study that should contribute to the building of a basis upon which more rigorous studies could be undertaken (Warner et al. 2009). The research process has been designed in a way to better acknowledge and understood these limitations in terms of the research question. The limitations are resolved further with meticulous analysis by way of providing concise and direct evidence from primary source – whenever possible. Furthermore, extra caution remains acutely vital where social paradigms (such as norms in international society and securitisation theory) complement each other. Reisigl and Wodak (2009) advise people using discourse-historical analysis in interdisciplinary research to avoid the combination of theoretically incompatible scientific sources and resources. This is a sound advice. It is neither a constrained nor reductionist way of seeking knowledge. All well-established theories do face their own share of limitations especially if even some of the fundamental tenets of specific theories are inconsistent with other theories (and within a specified theory).

CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUALISING THE LITERATURE

3.1 Introduction

This thesis argues that climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the FCCC, the EU, and the UNSC. This argument is a reflection of three important developments. First, how these institutions have sought to address climate change as a dominant narrative in international climate politics. Second, the governance of climate security as an emerging but growing narrative in academic and policy circles. The third development relates to the convergence between these two narratives: the epistemic community on climate security, which entails a community of actors with advocacy experience on climate-riskification and climate securitisation. Given much excellent work in these areas, this literature review chapter's overall objective is to concisely summarise the relevant discourses by conceptualising three analytical themes from theoretical advancements. The analytical themes are: 1) the epistemic community on climate security, 2) climate-riskification, and 3) climate securitisation. As the concept of an analytical theme entails the latent, subjective meaning and cultural-contextual message of data (Vaismoradi & Snelgrove 2019), these analytical themes will be applied to the institutional cases in the case study chapters. The research overall aims to answer a question regarding the extent to which policy statements by the three interstate institutions might indicate an emerging climate security discourse.

This chapter also overviews the role of security actors, contextualises useful opinions on security policy, and attempts to identify gaps in the literature on global climate security studies across a wide range of literature, taking into account the fundamental shifts in the global security research. The chapter is divided into three broad sections. Section 3.2 conceptualises the epistemic community on climate security from the framework of epistemic communities, a useful analytical unit for developing insightful discursive premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice (Adler & Haas 1992). An epistemic community is an alliance of experts that holds a common belief in generating truth (Holzner & Marx 1979) and seeks to institutionalise its influence, knowledge, and views into the broader international politics to the extent to which it can consolidate bureaucratic power (Haas 1992). The common belief ultimately provides this

alliance with an episteme, a shared worldview that derives from their mutual socialisation and shared knowledge (Cross 2013: 147). This section reviews key conceptualisations of important features of the epistemic communities framework. In the knowledge that innovative conceptualisations are bound to happen where epistemic communities thrive in specific policy settings, the chapter believes that the conceptualisation of epistemic community on climate security should complement the general criteria for identifying an epistemic community, as well as contribute to the broader field of climate security governance. This claim, by itself, is a mere assumption unless there is empirical evidence that moves from the conceptualisation to empirical illustration – and this is attempted in the case study chapters. Therefore, as part of reviewing research on the epistemic communities framework, the chapter highlights why the epistemic community on climate security is more than just a group of stakeholders with a desire to influence policymaking on climate security, but a key player in the unfolding climate security discources (Floyd 2020).

Section 3.3 conceptualises climate-riskification from the riskification framework. Based on a distinction between risk (a focus on the conditions of possibility of harm) and a security threat (a focus on direct causes of harm), Olaf Corry (2012) conceptualises the riskification framework from securitisation theory whereby climate securitisation is connected to the relationship between security politics and securitisation in environmental politics. Whilst security is different from riskification (Lis 2018), there has been minimal curiosity about the riskification framework in the security literature. Yet, this framework makes it easy to understand some of the security risks elemental to climate change. The dominant discourse of risk may be perceived as an incidental risk even though this does not necessarily imply an empirical connection. Applying climate-riskification to policy statements from the selected case study institutions allows analysis of the empirical claims of a connection between climate risks and statements on climate security.

Section 3.4 conceptualises climate securitisation from securitisation theory. In Chapter 1, climate securitisation was defined as a process in which specific statements or a successful securitising move successfully convince the target audience about the vulnerability of specified referent objects – and then become adopted as a policy strategy, thereby influencing the politics of climate security. This section tries to identify the

achievements of the climate securitisation concept and conceptualisation process, outlining climate securitisation as an appropriate analytical theme for interpreting the emerging dominant discourse on climate security and associated recognition of the concept. Again, the concept is developed as an analytical theme for investigating climate security in practice, through the case studies.

Why conceptualise climate securitisation? In order to better understand different understandings of climate security, this chapter reviews various discussions of climate security with respect to climate security as defined in Chapter 1. The definition may vary in different areas of the world, depending upon how the challenges caused by climate change are viewed. In such situations, a key aspect of the diverse definitions is discursive while the other is practice oriented. When humans face challenges that seem insurmountable or unclear due to inherent uncertainties, people often – it is hoped – think analytically about what is it that is important to survive such challenges. People scrutinise the aspects of everyday livelihood that may have been taken for granted and reconsult, including genuine reconsideration of decision-makers' pursuit of alleviating or reducing exposure to challenges. In so doing, decision-makers at the national and international levels are often compelled to revisit past actions and inactions to see which of these needs to be jettisoned, honoured or fine-tuned. As will be shown in the case study chapters, the underpinnings of common securitisation efforts are insecure. At the same time, these efforts nurture a reflective process to establish the credibility of discursive constructions.

Securitisation is always a political choice (Buzan et al.1998). While this might be so at the empirical level of analysis where a successful securitisation process is an opportunity to consolidate political power and increase regulatory oversight (Neo 2019), one of the key tasks in this thesis is to clearly discuss if climate securitisation is normatively relevant at the empirical level. That is, discussion of the ways in which the emerging climate security discourse may progress the case of the candidate norm. Although securitisation theory is clearly relevant from discourse perspective, it remains to be seen whether this is the case with respect to the vision of a climate security norm. It is thus necessary to look and see what the mainstream research is saying about climate security, whether it is inspiring and insightful and whether climate security helps answer this thesis' research question. This question draws attention to debates at the interstate level of analysis and

therefore is a curiously age-old issue of the relationship between securitising actors and securitisation process. This relationship can be examined more clearly through specific phrasings, which will be analysed in the case study chapters to judge how institutional actors have promoted and refuted climate change as a security threat. This is vital for climate security research because institutional actors have generally premised their statements on events that can be evidenced and have generally advocated their case in the public interest.

3.2 Conceptualising the Epistemic Community on Climate Security

This section conceptualises the epistemic community on climate security from the literature on epistemic communities. Focussing on this literature, it outlines the main conditions for identifying an epistemic community and its relevance to climate security debate, as well as highlights instances of coordination among the members of the epistemic community on climate security.

The epistemic communities framework has been used to examine policy making in the EU (Radaelli 1997; Verdun 1998) and more broadly in world affairs. Dunlop (2010), drawing upon in-depth interviews with scientists and European Union officials, empirically examines the role of two epistemic communities that advised the European Commission. Dunlop (2017) similarly utilises primary interviews to explore how an epistemic community of scientists advising the European Commission reacted to the politicisation of learning surrounding the use of hormones in meat production. Conducting interviews with elites remains the gold standard for uncovering usable data about epistemic communities (Haas 2019). But identifying, locating, and gaining access to epistemic community members may frustrate efforts to engage with the epistemic community as an analytical lens (Dunlop 2013). While it may not be so easy to identify epistemic community members because they are part of the social collective (Haas 2019), ten experts on climate security policy provided scoping information for the current thesis. The experts are high-ranking officials in think-tanks and academic institutes. Some of the experts have held climate security-focused meetings or conducted interviews with diplomats while one of them regularly attended the annual COP and is currently involved

with the global mobility and displacement debate. Some of the details provided by the informants helped focus the key conceptual tasks in this chapter.

As noted above, the framework of epistemic communities has been employed as analytical tool for making sense of global affairs. Due to its potential, the seminal papers by Haas (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992) introduce epistemic communities as a useful analytical unit for the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice in international politics. The seminal papers have since established the relevance of technical expertise in political issues such as climate change, as well as complement a broad set of influential contributions that established the relevance of technical knowledge in matters perceived as requiring state action. These contributions include the influence of non-state actors on national interests (Russell 1973; Wooster 1973), the agenda-setting function of epistemic-like communities in the inter-state decision-making process (King 1973), how scientific communities approach the genesis and development of a scientific fact (Polanyi 1962; Fleck 1979) and the broader sociological structure of scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1970). These contributions helped establish the importance of a constellation of beliefs governing not only a subject matter but also a group of expert practitioners. The contributions also informed the epistemic communities research programme, which would not be where it is today without these foundational contributions.

Haas (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992) prominently promote four key conditions for identifying epistemic communities, namely: innovative phrasing of an issue area, dissemination of consensus-based innovation to decision-makers, acceptance by decision-makers, and endurance of innovation in policy settings. Zwolski and Kaunert (2011) draw from these conditions to examine whether a small group of EU officials and member countries can be considered a European climate security epistemic community. Taken together, the four conditions represent another way of defining an epistemic community and imply a stricter posture than the definition offered by, for instance, Holzner and Marx (1979) who defined an epistemic community as an alliance with a common belief in the knowledge system as a way of generating truth. An epistemic community does not imply absolute conformity of opinion but allows for difference of opinion on climate action (Gough 2001), so does the conditions for identifying epistemic

communities. What is more important is bonding among the members of an epistemic community. Compared with the definition by Holzner and Marx that somewhat relegated this aspect, the definition offered by Adler and Haas stressed the bond among members of an epistemic community as the common belief in the truthfulness and the applicability of knowledge in policy settings. Having a common belief is helpful for consensus where members have different perceptions and interpretations of the issue under question. Moreover, there is always a sense of belonging when and where there is a bond among actors. This raises a whole new way to applying epistemic communities as an analytical theme.

Claudio Radaelli (1997: 169) cautions against the four key conditions for identifying an epistemic community because the tendency to define knowledge in relation to certain actors (like academics, consultants, experts, consultants and/or even the normal social sciences discourse, in the Kuhnian sense) is implicit in these conditions. The actual identification of epistemic communities using the key conditions that define them remains rare (Dunlop 2013) even though it is possible in certain situations. Radaelli argues such conditions should be resisted because knowledge production is less about specific actors than with the overall structure in which actors perform (Radaelli 1997). Furthermore, while scientific consensus is often suspect because the experts themselves cannot be detached from a broader cultural discourse, scientific outcomes may reflect not only the bias of sponsors but more deeply the broader culture of the society from which they emerge and about which they may be insufficiently aware (Haas 2004). It has also been argued that scientific consensus does not always indicate shared knowledge because an agreement among the members of a consensus community is a contingent fact, and members may reach a consensus for various reasons such as sharing a common bias or resisting a common foe (Miller 2013).

This chapter accepts these criticisms but favours the model, drawing on Haas's own reassertion (2016) of his four key conditions for identifying an epistemic community. The reassertion benefitted from Haas' devotion to the epistemic communities framework since its inception in 1992, as well as attests to the conditions' discursive utility and practicality over time. Scholarly interest in systematising and progressing the four-part framework has been strong and continuous since Adler and Haas introduced it. Peter Haas was

awarded a Distinguished Scholar Award by the Environmental Studies Panel at the 2014 International Studies Association Convention. Following the momentous occasion, Haas (2019) reflects on the progress of the epistemic communities framework, noting that a robust worldwide acceptance of the framework cannot be accidental. In part this is due to scholars' responses to questions and critiques of the knowledge-based approach to governance, arising from the International Relations (IR) field and beyond (Haas 2019). The model had also been demonstrated in practice, for instance through analysis of strategic coalition-building and bargaining tactics in Brussels (Bergmann 2018), and the process of developing EU climate security policy (Tallberg 2006; Dunlop 2016). The conflictual character of epistemic communities – of interest-based disputes within a defined consensus – is key to understanding why practitioners may not always agree on how best to conceptualise and assess a concept like climate security (Bremberg et al. 2019), and is also key to understanding how actors innovate and generate new perspectives on the shared problems, including in the case of climate change.

For these reasons the four conditions will play a key role in discourse analysis of policy statements on climate security – as will be shown in the case study chapters. In the context of the conditions, the epistemic community on climate security is engaged in institutional practices such as those found in the UNSC, the EU, and the FCCC. This epistemic community is likely to be successful if it satisfies some of the many prerequisites for success. Key among these is 1) the degree of reputation and expert knowledge, supported by reputable textual sources, will determine a community's degree of access to policy settings (Zito 2018: 2) the stage in the policy process – an epistemic community would be more persuasive when defining, phrasing, and proposing an original idea; 3) the extent of internal cohesion and professionalism within the community, and its capacity to innovate in addressing defined problems; and 4) the nature of the policy dilemma – an epistemic community would succeed when the issue can be defined as technocratic, as opposed to politicised (Cross 2013; Loblová 2018).

An effective assessment of the epistemic community on climate security must highlight politicisation, which is an important aspect of problem definition and knowledge contribution – two key tasks for most epistemic communities. Politicisation occurs when an issue becomes part of public policy, requiring government involvement and, very

rarely, some other form of shared governance (Buzan et al. 1998). This type of governance often creates a need for epistemic contributions in institutional decision-making. A politicisation agenda may be neutralised with consistent metaphorical phrases when there exists an established overall phrasing (Natorski 2020), backed by technical definitions and knowledge-based common beliefs provided by knowledge experts. But most investigation of the beliefs which epistemic communities embody rarely make "the community itself" the centre of analytical attention, losing out to interest groups and institutions (Dunlop 2013: 233). This thesis heeds this warning by paying special attention to important features of the epistemic community on climate security. Such attention is vital for in-depth discourse analysis of how climate change has been debated as a security issue at international meetings on climate and security. Climate change poses a real risk or threat to human livelihoods. The crisis perceptions and dimensions of this issue have been variously defined, conceptualised, and recommended to decision-makers as signposts for possible solutions. Such phrasings may appear as simple discursive devices for calling for more attention to the issue, but they represent another interpretation of politicisation, an effective but, nonetheless, contentious strategy through which actors and experts from the epistemic community on climate security often speak with one voice whenever they are advocating for (or presenting) tailor-made propositions or recommendations for addressing the crisis phrasing of climate risks and threats.

There is ample evidence that epistemic communities can shape decision-making in institutional settings through for instance, recommendations regarding (non)responses in international climate governance (Benzie & Persson 2019; Mabon et al. 2019; Maliniak et al. 2020). In this context, Zwolski and Kaunert (2011) were the first authors to explicitly make a case for the EU epistemic community on climate security, which has coordinated with the FCCC, while noting that climate security literature has mainly devoted attention to the UNSC. Indeed, norm entrepreneurship on climate security (Green 2018) is growing in interstate institution settings (Haas 2019; Chasek 2019) and benefitted from epistemic communities' advocacy in both the UN (Dellmuth et al. 2018) and the EU (Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016; Bremberg et al. 2019).

However, one may be on less sure footing when others (such as Meyer & Molyneux-Hodgson 2010; Cross 2013; Meyer 2015; Loblová 2018) criticise the original model for

epistemic communities as not evolving much beyond Adler and Haas' (1992) original conceptualisation. For Dunlop (2009), the original version exaggerated the ability of experts to influence the agendas of decision-makers. In relation to the EU response to climate security and the inability to reach policy coherence on climate security, much work is indeed being devoted to "in-house activism" where EU experts involved with climate-related conflict prevention strategy at the European External Action Service engage in a culture of "getting on with it" in the rest of the organisation, where the focus on creating projects overshadows the upstream analysis and strategic thinking through the conflict prevention unit (Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016: 19). Not only might this kind of internal activism be counterproductive, but also could prevent the input from externally-sourced expertise such as much needed Indigenous knowledge as outsiders are prevented from accessing the policymaking process

The case study chapters will shed more light on this these competing views without overlooking Rita Floyd's (2020) timely observation: that commentators seeking to unpack normative processes have good reason to acknowledge the idea of functional actors in the policy process. Floyd distils functional actors into several specific roles, with epistemic communities assigned more generative roles for instance in relation to institutional, gatekeepers. Floyd (2020) examines the neglected category of functional actors in securitisation, and contextualises functional actors as a useful analytical category, especially if actors are neither securitising actors nor referent objects of securitisation, but may contest a securitisation move and are functionally distinct from other actors. This chapter envisages a set of potential roles for functional actors in terms of riskification and securitisation moves, as will be discovered in the case study chapters with respect to how an epistemic community is more than just a group of stakeholders or policy community, but has a more proactive role as specific alliance of stakeholders working to promote a consensus-based technical definition of the climate security agenda. This aspect is important to separate epistemic communities from bureaucratic coalitions, social movements, and interest groups for instance (Zwolski & Kaunert 2011). The distinction is also important because it foregrounds social dynamics not normally captured by the epistemic communities framework (Bremberg et al. 2019), and can take account of communities opposing decision-making initiatives whose efforts have not

really given them concrete influence on the solutions that are adopted (Akrich 2010; Wagner et al. 2019).

3.2.1 Epistemic Community on Climate Security as an Analytical Theme

Analysing representation in an epistemic community requires paying attention to the institution where a participant is employed because it plays a crucial part in the researcher's research focus and scientific socialisation (Corbera et al. 2016; Biermann & Möller 2019). This is particularly vital. Regular and frequent meetings solidify a body of shared professional beliefs relating to the protocol, procedure and standards of consensus-building within an epistemic community (Cross 2013). Regular attendance at meetings and identifying the members of an epistemic community can be figured out when recurrent names are sighted in attendance lists for international climate negotiations over time and sighted in secondary literature (especially by journalists), interview transcripts and related snowball techniques (Haas 2016). Following these suggestions, I consulted the attendance lists for climate meetings and negotiations. The names of participants are often identified together with affiliated organisations or research institutions. The attendance lists are publicly available on the websites of the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC, making it possible to verify the existence of the epistemic community at the institutional level.

We cannot and should not relegate the epistemic community on climate security's thematic viability. As Zwolski and Kaunert (2011: 21) make clear: the EU "epistemic community on climate security" has been effective at diffusing the climate security agenda within the EU and globally. The reality is that although all EU countries agree on considering the climate security agenda, implying that these countries are equally interested in the agenda, some of the new EU countries are rather sceptical (Zwolski & Kaunert 2011: 38). In any case, the EU epistemic community on climate security exists as part of wider epistemic communities on climate security centred on policy making in interstate institutions such as the United Nations (UN) (Bremberg et al. 2019; Dellmuth et al. 2018). To exemplify this emerging context, Dellmuth et al. systematically reviewed and drew together research from several strands of literature, covering International

Relations, political science and socio-environmental science, on interstate institutions' responses to climate security challenges. In so doing, they highlighted the importance of institutionalisation, as part of global climate security governance. As Bremberg et al. (2019: 626) assert:

> While epistemic community captures central aspects of what a community of practice is, it fails to acknowledge that the social effects of practices do not necessarily rely only on scientific knowledge or truth claims, but instead on the establishment of ways of saying and doing things that appear self-evident to practitioners in certain settings.

Institutional mandates and responsibilities are central. Sonnsjö and Bremberg (2016: 17) find that information sourced from staff and seasoned diplomats at the European External Action Service shows that although there is a mismatch between the analysis of climate security risks and the political efforts to avoid these risks, "the interviews confirmed much of the literature on the EU response to climate change, e.g. that there is a strong 'epistemic community' within the EU, i.e. a thorough understanding of how climate change could impact on a wide range of EU responsibilities." Cross (2018) highlighted how the EU's climate diplomacy hasd underperformed in the past, showing that Brussels resolved the problem in the lead up to the 2015 COP mainly because decision-makers engaged in a process of political learning, and also had broadened the epistemic community of climate diplomats since the 2009 Copenhagen Summit. Indeed, epistemic communities have become somewhat institutionalised in international environmental organisations, and many interstate institutions have recruited members of the relevant ecological epistemic communities as consultants and staff members (even though this is guarantee that scientific knowledge has been successfully conveyed to or used by decision-makers) (Chasek 2019: 18).

3.2.2 Summary of the Epistemic Communities Framework

This chapter uncovered key conceptions of epistemic communities as part of the conceptualisation of the epistemic community on climate security. The epistemic communities concept began its evolution as a tool for interpreting global governance.

Based on this concept, applying the epistemic community on climate security theme to institutional case studies is essential for clarifying its epistemic influence. Climate change poses serious risks to sovereignty and populations. Drawing on the epistemic logic, one response in this regard is the creation of the FCCC. Given the need for FCCC members to access different types of expert knowledge, there are a range of ways in which climate policy epistemic communities have emerged. In each of the three case studies the four conditions for the emergence of the epistemic community are analysed to arrive at an understanding of the extent to which climate security phrasings are being incorporated into the policy process. One measure of this influence is the extent to which the institutions have embraced climate-riskification.

3.3 Conceptualising Climate-Riskification

This section conceptualises climate-riskification and shows how it has unfolded with regard to the climate security debate. The genealogy of climate-riskification is perhaps best related to Corry's (2012) seminal paper on climate politics and the riskification framework, in which he explains the socio-political construction of risks and riskification as distinct from the construction of threats and securitisation. He also enumerates how exceptional measures are introduced to confront hypothetical dangers and posits the contours of the riskification framework as a separate kind of speech act based on distinguishing risks from threats.

For Corry there are three phases in riskification. First, the identification of an issue as a security problem, followed by the phase which is typically characterised by competing views and and unavoidable contestation about the identified problem. These two phases will not progress to the third phase unless those who identified and introduced the issue as security as a security problem are able to convince the relevant audience about its risky nature. In the third phase, phrasing the problem as an irreversible risk should nullify lingering doubts about the problem and catapult it to the high politics of climate-riskification, involving abstract or discursive transposition of risk to threat and defining the identified security risk as a candidate for policy consideration or action.

There are particular aspects to these phases in the context of climate security. One approach deserving careful attention in this regard is the need to replace climate uncertainty with climate risk (Mabey et al. 2011). If such replacement, it will substantially help the epistemic community to gain more support in its climate security advocacy. But the moral and political judgement involved in labelling specific uncertainties an irreversible risk comes with challenges (Petersen 2012). The risk politics involved in labelling a problem an irreversible risk does not transform the problem into an imminent threat. Understanding the precise language used to define the problem during the first phase, and whether the relevant audience accept the language and definition, then becomes important – as will be analysed in the case study chapters.

The riskification framework is a derivate of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. In part because scholars have developed variants of the riskification framework from securitisation theory, it would be disadvantageous to discuss this framework without mentioning this theory. Some have argued that climate is transforming security, signalling a climatisation of the security field (Oels 2012) which translates the climate threat into a a governable risk (Oels 2013). As demonstrated by Maertens and Baillat (2017), it is possible to use the climatisation phrasing to not only provide new empirical examples of climate security discourses as unpacked by several scholars, but also articulate how climatisation recasts issues such as migration, livelihood security, and military conflict, and creates new ways in which they interact, contradict or reinforce each other. Climatisation therefore holds that new practices from the field of climate policy can be applied and introduced into the security field, producing forms of climate risk management.

The climate-riskifcation approach draws from the riskification framework to understand the management of climate change. As argued by Trombetta (2014): Corry mobilises precautionary- or risk-related approaches to the logic of security to understand theoretical and practical securitisation of certain elements of climate change. Other concepts have been developed to complement this effort, allowing a multilayered risks approach. For instance, crisisification – similar to climatisation – is proposed by Paglia (2018) to complement the analysis of securitisation processes in which crisis is constructed as a prominent signifier of threat. This suggests climate crisis serves as a primary discursive

device employed by prominent advocates of urgent action (Paglia 2018). According to Paglia, crisisification may be applied more generally to cases whose crisis status is still emerging and therefore are politically contested. Angela Oels highlights this process, suggesting the security phrasing of climate change has enabled routine measures of enhancing resilience to disruptions that may result from secondary climate change impacts, strategies for managing these anticipated impacts, which may include "mass displacement" for instance, have been emerging as forms of conflict prevention since 2003 (Oels 2013: 21).

In corollary, the climate-riskification approach and the riskification framework, including its variants, can be anchored in climate security literature. Corry's acknowledgement of policy statements on climate risks as a securitising move (Dupont 2019) aligns with Trombetta's (2014) assertion that securitisation leads to the governance of an issue in a way that reinforces the image of a threat. In the literature, the alarming claims of climate-related population displacement since the 1980s have for instance prompted more investigations suggesting that forecasts of massive displacement rushing to the Global North were exaggerated (Trombetta 2014).

Risk governance and risk management have become central to the governance of the impacts of climate change, and, as will be outlined, are in strong evidence across all three case studies. This climate-riskification approach helps reveal how climate security is constituted as an object of knowledge. Political and public concerns about the need to curtail the present dangers of climate change have undergone a remarkable shift. Even if the progress is not always matched by substantive policy outputs, the construction of climate risks progresses as climate actors have become more outspoken and politically active; some of their collaborative contributions (including climate science and advocacy) have cumulatively helped to advance institutional innovations such as through the FCCC's Task-Force on Displacement. There are clear and deliberate phrasing dimensions to this, that cater to particular assumed audiences: the exceptional or extraordinary politics of climate phrasing is expressed in what Corry (2012) labels societal engineering, that is the purposive guidance of the public towards a particular way of thinking and acting.

It is contentious whether climate change may be articulated in risk terms rather than in terms of security (von Lucke et al. 2014) just as the presence of the different logics of riskification and securitisation raise questions about whether institutions can reconcile them into a common understanding of threats as a way of legitimising specific policy goals (Judge & Maltby 2017). A clear and important demarcation between the logics of risk and threat must be made here. These two logics are central to the riskification framework, which fundamentally paints a risky future (or future risk) scenarios in relation to the security risks of climate change. In her consideration of the logics of risk (focusing on climate-riskification) and threat (focusing on climate securitisation), one must ponder whether climate scenarios have compelled climate-related security risks to the top of things to do by the three institutions. Of more importance, this is to say that riskification move is a precondition for securitisation move even though this does not mean it is the "norm" in policy settings. That said, the introduction of new issues for risk-management is not an unchallenged process: clearly riskification serves certain interests over others. While the riskification framework itself has not been seriously challenged in any depth, a lively controversy revolves around the definition of risk. The logic of risk is a variation of security rather than a category separate from it because risk is normally subsumed under security articulations (Diez et al. 2016). There is a strong and established climate-security nexus in distinct contexts; the security-risk debate revolves around the difficult climate-security nexus and whether it helps or hinders climate policy.

Perhaps more important, none of the abovementioned variants of the riskification framework articulate riskification in terms of statements by the institutional case studies while a key commonality among them is riskification of climate-related issues such as risk governance and management. This commonality signifies the first unmistakable point where climate-riskification emerged and can be reinserted. The vitality of climate-riskification emanated from its focus on comparative assessment of statements by the case studies. This thus reassures that the analytical prowess of climate-riskification as an analytical can produce new insights rather than merely replicating what have been produced or explained by crisification and climatisation.

The climate-riskification approach is a reenergised call for further clarification of climate security, calling for more information about how the phrasing of climate security is

constituted as an object of knowledge and about why certain actors assumed shared meaning of the security risks of climate change. Political and public concerns regarding the need to curtail the present dangers climate change pose to human security have undergone a remarkable progress. Even if the progress is not always matched by substantive policy outputs, the construction of climate risks progresses as climate actors have become more outspoken and politically active; some of their collaborative contributions (including climate science and advocacy) cumulatively helped the creation of the FCCC's Task-Force on Displacement. Set against this development, and in concert with the climate-riskification approach, climate-related displacement is a phrasing of risk in which exceptional or extraordinary politics is not just supplanted by a governmental logic but underpinned by what Corry (2012) labels societal engineering – the purposive guidance of the public towards a particular way of thinking and acting. But linking displacement to riskification requires acknowledgement of an important policy argument.

The application of climate-riskification to the case studies in this thesis contributes to this critical field of policy debate and research. Evidence showing today's drivers of displacement will intensify into the future (Arnall et al. 2019) implies that planned climate-related relocations will become more common (Piggott-McKellar et al. 2019). Yet there is a lack of research on slow-onset events, especially in developing countries (Matias 2017; Geest et al. 2019). Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2017) assert that the distinction between slow-and sudden-onset may bear on activities and the allocation of functional responsibilities but does not itself determine institutional competence. Interviews conducted by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2017) illuminated why there may be cases where the drivers of displacement are slower-onset in nature without a triggering disaster. This suggests operational and normative ramifications and challenges, and that institutions like the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) might better focus on protection needs rather than why or how people move. One issue is the distance that people must migrate before they can be categorised as people displaced by climate change; another is the difficulty of attributing relocation solely to climate change because people have a multitude of reasons for moving, even when significantly affected by the impacts of climate change (Kelman 2019). For instance, Pacific Islanders developed their own strategies for migration and resettlement despite the creation of formal resettlement schemes (Connell 2016). Yet while planned, short distance and

village resettlements occurred in Fiji's Yadua Island, partial movement occurred in Denimanu due to sudden-onset impacts, whereas full relocation occurred in Vunidogoloa due to slow-onset impacts (Piggott-McKellar et al. 2019).

These perspectives substantiate climate-riskification approach in the determination of the extent to which risk is represented as knowable and assessable (Oels, 2013: 20). Aleksandra Lis (2018: 94) addresses the question of how "riskification is communicated" and what types of political knowledge are produced when a socio-technical field is politicised and riskified, and also when it is de-riskified and depoliticised. Broadly mirroring Lis' approach, Heinrich and Szulecki (2018) propose a securitisation and desecuritisation pendulum which can move from de-politicisation, through politicisation to securitisation. It is noteworthy that compared with technical experts in energy who are most active in de-securitisation, politicians are more prone to use and accept security jargon (Szulecki & Kusznir 2018). This can lead to a conversation about security threats that does not lead to concrete measures (Lis 2018; Heinrich & Szulecki 2018). Herrmann (2017) offers an interesting point in this regard: he finds that the space for and use of Arctic security discourses at the 2015 COP are not matched with climate commitments, meaning the ensuing global policy agenda to encourage adaptation and mitigation in the North does not adequately support the security of current cultural practices and heritage in the Arctic.

Furthermore, security jargon sometimes seemed inadmissible in terms of certain interstate institutions. Institutions like the EU have explicitly described climate change as a security threat. Such statements underpinned the contention that climate change has been successfully represented as a security concern to such an extent that it is firmly established on the political agenda regardless whether the implementation of concrete policies is disputed (von Lucke et al. 2014). But besides underpinning different political moves around energy production and securitisation, a key aspect of energy politics comprised knowledge production that was utilised by political actors to prevent riskification of the energy issue from been undertaken at the EU level (Lis 2018). It appeared security jargon is admissible after all. Broadly mirroring Lis' approach, Heinrich and Szulecki (2018) expand the idea of a security statement. They focus on securitised discourses (rather than individual utterances) because the expansion enabled

the delineation of securitisation proper from the similar notion of riskification. The expansion also enabled the articulation of a securitisation and desecuritisation pendulum.

To close this section, the extant literature did not really pinpoint what is perhaps the biggest dilemma in Corry's (2012) paper: the question of what determines who can make a security move and who can speak about it. Identification of riskifying actors, while not insignificant, is nowhere to be found in Corry's paper. The best Corry (2012) offers is as follows: the would-be riskifying actor would need to point convincingly to possible harmful events. Clearly, riskifying actors are an unavoidable part of riskification, and epistemic communities play a key role in constituting their influence. Since constructivist minded writers acknowledged riskifying actors as an unavoidable part and language in today's risk security writing, it will be useful to replace the would-be riskifying actor by the epistemic community on climate security – as conceptualised in this thesis. That said, there is more to the riskification framework as enumerated below.

Climate-Riskification and the Riskification Framework

By complementing existing climate security discourses, the climate-riskification approach complements existing approaches seeking to set a foundation for future research. This section therefore engages with the broader security field by discussing the general security literature relating to climate change and the riskification framework. There are broadly three assumptions that may underpin the extent of an emerging dominant discourse on climate security: that climate-riskification is happening or has happened; that institutional actors have the capacity to enact this riskification; and that climate-riskification reflects an increase in the perceived security threat posed by climate change. These assumptions can be read as a phrasing of climate-riskification and a summary of the riskification framework.

Security study writers who have framed climate change as a security threat have typically based their arguments on accepted concepts in the field of security. Corry (2012) finds it strange that an apparent shift to risk was missing in this field. He tackles this question by identifying the distinct logic of statements that turn issues into questions of risk politics,

suggesting a model for what rules or grammars they follow and what the political implications are. What resulted is the risk-based approach to security threats, the main difference between securitisation theory and the riskification framework. For Corry, grammar, political imperative, and performative effects constitute three elements of the language game of the riskification framework.

The lively controversy over the riskification framework revolved around the definition of risk. Therefore, a conceptually sound climate-riskification approach is contingent on understanding what risk really is, and how it has been framed. Risk can be uncovered in many forms. Humans perceive risk very differently and they are exposed to risk daily – be it heatwaves, polluted air, unpredictable weather, and so on. One meaningful way researchers have sought to understand and progress the climate risk debate is by defining, phrasing, and conceptualising risk. The risk terminology has found its way into climate security discourses and thus its application to climate security (Aradau & van Munster 2011; Corry 2012; von Lucke 2014). But of all the consequences of climate change, security risk may be the hardest to assess (King et al. 2015: 120) partly because risk is more diffuse, uncertain and less imminent (von Lucke 2014).

Risk assessment should strive to understand interactions between policies and actions (Aven 2018; Adger et al. 2018; 2018a). Yet most definitions are rather puzzling by not explicitly conceptualising risk in climate security terms. Notable exceptions include risk security writers (such as Corry 2012; von Lucke et al. 2014; Diez et al. 2016). To that end, this thesis acknowledges an incomplete agreement – in specificities – between climate security and risk, which is defined here in a manner to make it more useful for scholars. In its simplest form, risk is the product of probability and consequence (Hultman et al. 2010). Risk is best articulated as a focus on understanding what the worst that could happen, followed by precise identification of how likely that might be (King et al. 2015) and its implications for policy. Often described by detailed mathematical models to assist decision-making, the science of risk is essentially experimental (Petersen 2012; IIER 2019). Indeed, researchers have long discovered that one can only forecast the plausibility and possibility of a risk manifesting under certain conditions.

Within the institutional case studies, work is clearly being undertaken to riskify certain aspects of climate change. It is crucial to this thesis that the climate-riskification approach may neither foreground scenario construction nor foreclose the possibility of overstatement. To ensure that findings in the case study chapters reflect the intent of statements, climate-riskification is best construed when the referent objects are explicitly clarified alongside consideration of uncertainties in possible scenarios. Doing so should inform future policy responses while familiarity with the terminology of uncertainties becomes an important step in eastablishing climate-riskification as a mode of governance. How well an unknown future can be configured on a scenario basis underpins whether the climate-riskification approach can properly outline uncertainties, or radically under- or over-estimate them.

3.3.1 Climate-Riskification as an Analytical Theme

This section confirms the validity of climate-riskification as an analytical theme. If we are to better concretise the discursive shift from denial of climate change to further integration of risks in climate policies, it is vital to define specific aspects of the climate-riskification approach. Climate-riskification is a type of skill and knowledge-based practice, centred on 'high' politics. An effective way to determine the degree of riskification is by looking at key institutions that have engaged in the practice, and at the players in the discourse, their area of expertise as riskifying institutional actors. One must also consider how they gained expert status, their impact on the policy process in terms of an emerging climate security discourse, and more widely the ways in which climate change is shifting how institutional actors conceptualise security.

At the national level, various countries have formally acknowledged the security implications of climate change. Due to climate politicisation at the international level, collective inter-state climate action has unravelled across multiple streams – from consequences of climate action and action, through to conceptualisation of climate security and climate-riskification. At the international level there is intense inter-institutional shifting: a case in point is China's assertion at the UNSC debate in April 2007 that "climate change may have certain security implications, but generally speaking it is in essence an issue of sustainable development", and therefore should be tackled by

the FCCC, and not the UNSC.[6] The contest continued in July 2018 when the UNSC held an open debate on climate-related security risk. At that debate, Amina Mohammed (UN Deputy Secretary-General) recounted the role of the climate-conflict relationship in the Lake Chad region and emphasised the importance of building a culture of prevention and peace preservation for climate actions. Russia argued against Mohammed's statement, stating it implied a climate-security connection without scientifically sound evidence.[7] Debates such as these, played-out within and between institutions, are highly revealing of the standing, or otherwise, of climate security discourse. This political polarisation over climate-riskification a key issue for the case study chapters, which explore how this issue becomes a stake in inter-state diplomatic rivalry.

The political polarisation over climate-riskification is suggested as the referent object here; it is damaging to the UNSC's positive public image. However, it is neither overblown nor implausible to accept Russia's statement as being based on empirical literature on the issue in contention. The institutional case studies have been criticised for not doing enough about curbing climate risks. Because such a complaint may well turn out as a hasty judgement, it is prudent to exercise caution until we see what the case study chapters can reveal about climate-riskification. This is clearly the case with the issue of how climate change has altered the perception and conception of security by institutional actors. With this knowledge, it should not be difficult to make a preliminary determination of the case studies' postures on climate security especially if we are interested in judging the extent or level of climate-riskification in statements. To acquire knowledge in any field of inquiry, one must accept certain concepts or ideas. This is what really defines knowledge, including the climate-riskification approach. While the latter is a tool for determining the degree of riskification, climate security discourse can follow either a threat-based or risk-based logic, or even both.

3.3.2 Summary of Climate-Riskification

The two sections above have drawn on existing academic discussions to understand and conceptualise climate-riskification. The discussion shows how climate-riskification is a

[6] S/PV.5663, 17 April 2007, p. 12.
[7] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018, p. 15.

valuable analytical theme for interpreting statements on climate security. The process of identifying an anticipated risk, defining it and developing policy to address it, is at the centre of 'riskification', and is central to climate policy-making. We can identify a process of climate security riskification, which can for instance can involve a range of preventative measures to minimise these security risks. This riskifying process is distinct from the process of securitisation, which responds to existing threat.

The riskification framework remains limited in its capacity to inform the research question in this thesis. One must look further afield to consult the IPCC's precautionary principle – within which the climate-riskification approach emerged as a force to reckon with. In relation to climate consequences, applying the precautionary principle rests on centring security risks within climate-riskification. The principle may become operational if statements regularly quote it and explicitly use the idea of irreversible risk. As will be shown in the case study chapters, such risk politics is an empirical judgement, laden with normative implications. Based on the discussion (in the above two sections), the differences among various types of risks may be so subtle they could be inseparable. While such risks can be aligned with this thesis' central argument that climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies, the following section conceptualises climate securitisation.

3.4 Conceptualising Climate Securitisation

An interesting angle to focus this section's discussion is the question of why climate change is a different and challenging issue area for securitisation. Conceptions of climate securitisation in security studies have been analysed in two main ways: national and international or interstate levels. The term international is a concept regularly used for analysing or describing global politics or affairs, although often therein lies an assumed centrality for inter-state diplomatic relations (Hatsuse 2009). Terms such as institutionalism, transnationalism and global governance seem to have replaced the focus on inter-national relations, reflecting a shift away from geo-political inter-state models, sometimes with an underlying normative intent of promoting wider forms of global cooperation. In national and international settings, the impacts of climate change have been often presented as a grave threat to global security, destabilising countries and

causing a myriad of negative consequences (Warner & Boas 2019), and requiring global cooperation. This section explores how climate securitisation reflects these contexts, and builds on securitisation theory combined with the phrasing of climate change (Watson 2012; Stengel 2019).

Researchers who are interested in the construction of security in today's international politics raise serious questions about possible implication and the capacity of securitisation theory to explain the mobilising power of security or the dynamics of its construction in international security (McDonald 2008, 2010, 2012). Amid recent contestation over global climate policy, traditional security narratives have reappeared in a process theorised through the dynamic of climate securitisation and the governmentalisation of security (Trombetta 2012). The key dynamic of the transformation of security can be effectively outlined by adopting a broader understanding of securitisation beyond the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, as the contest is to some degree about the theory's relationship with climate securitisation or vice-versa. Because environmental securitisation is an uncertain domain for securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998; Trombetta 2008) just as the burden of proof to legitimise climate securitisation is particularly tricky (Warner & Boas 2019), securitising moves by inter-state institutions can shed light on this enduring contest and hopefully supplant the fuzziness of the climate securitisation process. Such clarification of course does not imply bringing the contest to an end, but it should shed light on it.

Stefano Guzzini (2011) recounts that when the Copenhagen School introduced the term securitisation, it offered a pathway in the ongoing debate about how best to study security. It simultaneously implied a conceptual move, an analytical framework, and an empirical and political theory of security. In this thesis securitisation is used as the analytical approach for studying constructions of climate security. Securitisation theory opens up valid research avenues partly because while the theory left a subjectivist security concept behind (where security can mean anything), it went beyond conceptualising security in objectivist terms (as a tautology, where securitising actors are securitising actors; security means security). Scrutinising the political reality is all that is needed, argues Guzzini, who claims that the theory can unpack how the exact meaning of security is socially produced. Securitisation theory can thus be seen as an analytical framework (Buzan et al. 1998),

which defines several conditions that must be identified if one is to specify the occurrence of securitisation process as well as the factors on which the effects of securitisation depend (Guzzini 2011). Regarding the claim that securitisation is part of a political theory of security, the interest on this point centres on the political world where the threat can take the form of a shift to high-level political dilemma such as a secessionist agenda within a sovereign state (Buzan et al. 1998; Floyd 2020) , or alternatively it may remain a low-level issue, such as when German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier criticised the US Presdient Trump as creating a politics of fear (Floyd 2020).

Recent studies on securitisation theory have sought to resolve unresolved internal contradictions inherent in the theory by conceptualising securitisation as a phrasing (Smith et al. 2019b). Many political figures (at different decision-making levels) and analysts (working in various contexts) worry about securitisation attempts, particularly when such efforts seek to address climate challenges at the international level. Others consider that this effort is desirable, at several levels and in various contexts. But attempts that seek to phrase climate securitisation have not galvanised action to tame the purported threat (Warner & Boas 2019) partly because the purported nature of the threat in question has remained unresolved. There thus lies an inherent concern about climate securitisation, although proponents generally believe that securitisation will further foreground climate discourse in academic and policy debates. While these divergent opinions and their influence as determinants of whether a securitising move will be successful is reflected in the phases of securitisation process at the interstate level, which have intensified in recent years. Over the coming years the focus on discursive and practical consequences (in both medium- and long-term terms) of attempts at climate securitisation, as it informs discourse and practice, will be therefore likely to intensify.

Credible criticisms of securitisation multiply with the growing apprehension that climate crises is bringing bring dire consequences for human livelihood. According to van Schaik et al. (2020), the phrasing of climate change as a security issue and the consequent strategic use of climate securitisation, has been criticised by some academics as a proxy which serves other political or military agendas (Boas 2015). One of the most important criticisms centres on the criterion for the success of securitisation (Floyd 2016). Many opponents of climate securitisation stress this problem. Furthermore, for readers who may

be hunting for evidence regarding how phrasing an issue as a security threat remains an assumption, Stengel (2019) notes that securitisation theory has failed to connect security logic and extraordinary measures, highlighting Watson's (2012) systematic compilation of the commonalities between securitisation and the framing discourse. This is a conceptual issue. As noted above, the success of a securitisation move undertaken by the collective can be ascertained from the policy measure that is adopted (von Lucke et al. 2014; von Lucke 2015; Dupont 2019). The transformation in security governance as regards patterned, stakeholder and regulatory interactions, depend on the particular contexts of each cases. This further complicates assessment of a securitising actor's success as an agent of securitisation (Lucarelli 2019). This is particularly so, as securitisation depends on threat identification, and, with climate change being the obvious example, threats are increasingly systemic in impact and origin (Sperling & Webber 2019).

Yet contestation is a reliable gateway to new knowledge. A framework stressing why some governments fail to take climate change seriously (or even accept its existence) has been proposed for explaining different securitising moves (Stengel 2019). Since growing concerns about the environment truly challenge the state-based approach of traditional political sciences just as human security proponents have been doing (Zwierlein 2018), this thesis extends research beyond Stengel's state-based approach (2019) and those holding assumptions about the state character of the securitisation-phrasing nexus.

The theoretical relevance and depth of securitisation theory is sound judging by sustained and ongoing engagement with the theory. Climate securitisation has emerged as a concept amid contestation and criticisms in the academic and policy sphere. Owing to the problematic nature of climate securitisation (Trombetta 2014), using the language of security in climate affairs in certain domestic settings is sometimes handled as normal politics (or low politics), thereby enabling the legitimation of governmental actions (Trombetta 2019). From an interstate institution perspective, an intensified focus on discursive and practical consequences of climate change should benefit from the normative critiques about how a threat is conceived, prioritised and administered with the language of security, bringing implications for the wider international relations and

security frameworks. Thus, new policy propositions and enhanced approaches for managing international security may emerge.

Securitisation and Discourse

Given that the case study chapters scrutinise securitisation in three high-politics settings, it is useful to ponder how discourse analysis may enhance our understanding of climate policy process and how the conceptual merit of securitisation theory broadly speaks for the theory's analytical fitness. Discourse analytical approaches differ from most frameworks in operating on the fundamental assumption that the relationships between humans and the world are mediated by means of collectively-created symbolic meaning systems or orders of knowledge, which, in turn. This suggests that the purpose of an analyst is best served by treating the social objects, subjects and interchanges they study as contingent and co-constituted through discursive practices that render some objects knowable and governable and others not so much (Leipold et al. 2019).

Securitisation may be welcomed as an appropriate analytical framework for ascertaining the truth effect of presenting climate change as a security issue. It allows the analysis of discourse in specific traditions insofar as the phrasings given by securitising actors are accepted an accurate representation of their perspectives. The empirical merit of securitisation as an analytical framework can be traced to similar logics. Knowing different security discourses and analysing how a problem is presented within each enables the analyst to see possible policy fault-lines and securitisation processes. This, in turn, makes it possible to claim that a security issue arises when such discourses simultaneously begin securitising the problem (Guzzini 2011). In this light, the tracing of discourses in historical context is perhaps the best source for studying the circulation and origin of discursive elements when one is seeking to understand multiple and sometimes competing phrasings (Leipold et al. 2019). This approach is also a good way to unpack the phrasings of authority and power whereby competing phrasings would not reduce the importance of policy statements as sources for analysing discourse. In this way, looking at phrasings offers opportunities to analyse policy statements in terms of not only securitisation, but also riskification and the epistemic community on climate security.

The idea of climate security is a response to climate change. In this context, nearly all the papers that were examined acknowledged that what really occurred at the 2007 UNSC debate was the presentation of climate change as a security risk. The emerging climate security context has been analysed in a variety of ways. How this has developed is outlined Table 4, which offers a selected narrative: this is not wholly representative as it does not cover all possible interpretations, but does point the reader towards the extent of climate securitisation in practice (as then demonstrated in the case study chapters).

Table 4. Sample of the discursive debate on climate and security in the 2007–2019 timeframe

Literature	Discursive Dimensions	At What Points	Achieved / To Be Achieved By
Stritzel/2007	Reflections on new security theories	Discursive, critical stance	New security theorists
Schmidt/2008	Newest "new institutionalism"	Structures/constructs internal to agents with ideational abilities	Conceptualisation/explanation of institutional change/persistence
Boston et al./2009	Climate risk management and responses	Discursive level and climate action	Scholars
Kurtz/2012	Practical example	UN debates on climate/security	Rhetorical entrapment / forum-switching in securitisation
Oels/2014	Requires a new analytical direction	Climate conceptualisation	Scholars/Political Elites
van Buuren & Warner/2014	Phrasing of climate threats/opportunities	Responses rest on conceptualisation	Norm addressers
Diez et al./2016	Concept of entrepreneurs	Shaping of climate security discourses	Various ways to phrase climate-security
Scott/2017	Enhanced securitising norm	Securitisation/ norm dynamics	Acceptance or rejection of climate security
Warner & Boas/2017	Discrepancies in securitisation processes	Security language may not increase the urgency of climate action	Audience is not easily persuaded.
Sindico/2017	Securitisation of discourse	Definition of climate refugees	Scholars
Dellmuth et al./2018	Contentions arise when institutions advance agendas other than climate security challenges	Literature privileged two forms of interstate institution responses	Discursive and governance approaches
Deitelhoff & Zimmermann/ 2019	Judging a norm that is discursively strong but regularly ignored	Normative institutionalisation	Requires several dimensions of norm compliance allowing a broader interpretation of trends
Stengel/2019	Embedment of securitising statements in dynamics of change	Threat/referent object identified	Differential arrangement of discursive elements in a discourse
Wagner et al./2019	Epistemic communities	Discursive actions generated by epistemic communities	Perhaps best studied from a relational approach
Baldwin et al./2019	Climate risks and mobility	Policy responses	Scholars

As such, climate change could be said to have been variously phrased and informed by either the worldviews of analysts or filtered by the intuitive worldviews of the audience (Hulme 2009) in which securitisation can be ad hoc or already institutionalised (Buzan et al. 1998), intentional or non-intentional, and discursive or non-discursive (Balzacq 2011). The papers examined neither accept full securitisation of climate change nor flatly reject the significance of the UNSC debate in 2007 as an important departure-point in the debate about the securitisation of climate change, although the popular phrasings can imply different types of security (Table 5). To be sure, Balzacq's (2011) observation informed the construction of Table 4, in terms of highlighting different perspectives on or interpretations of climate security. The 'discursive dimension' and 'at what point' columns reflect these different perspectives as a process toward climate securitisation – which is best reflected in the 'achieved/to be achieved' column. Despite the differences, a unifying element is discernible: the characteristic argument rather than intuition behind what may be described as an emerging climate security discourse.

Table 5. Illustration of popular phrasings in climate security discourses in the 2008–2019 timeframe

Literature	Key Phrasings
Trombetta/2008	Environmental security
Dalby/2013, 2013a	Biopolitics
Boas/2015; Boas & Rothe/2016; Ferguson 2019	Resilience
Mayer/2014, 2017; McNamara/2014; Simonelli/2016; Hall 2016, 2016a; Bettini/2017; Warner/2018; Nash/2018, 2018a, 2019; Kelman et al./2019; Ebrahimi & Ossewaarde/2019	Climate-related migration
Rosenow-Williams & Gemenne/2016	Interstate institutions and their approaches to mobility
Morrisser/2019	How effective climate actions and climate resilience can be productively advanced via a securitisation discourse
Abel et al./2019; Baldwin et al./2014; Baldwin/2014; Bettini/2013, 2014, 2017, 2019; Nishimura/2015, 2017; Bettini et al./2017; Bettini & Gioli/2016; Baldwin & Bettini/2017; Baldwin/2017; Born/2017; Mayer/2013, 2014, 2016, 2016a; Abrahams/2019; Middendorp & Bergema/2019	Discourses surrounding the above contexts, although not necessarily restricted to the FCCC while this, of course, plays a role in many of the analyses
Detraz & Betsill/2009; Oels/2013; McDonald/2013; von Lucke et al./2014	Power dynamics in climate security discourses
Barkdull & Harris/2014	Climate catastrophe, transformationalism
DiMento & Doughman/2014	Apocalyptical phrasing of climate security
Chaturvedi & Doyle/2016	Negative phrasing of climate security as a tool of a neoliberal globalised world
Telford/2018	Role of racial logics in climate security discourses
van Bavel et al./2019	Potential relationship between climate change and conflict onset

The papers examined neither accept full securitisation of climate change nor flatly reject the possibility of the debate in 2007, which turned out as the departure point for full securitisation of climate change even though the popular phrasings can imply different types of securitisations (Table 5). To be sure, Balzacq's (2011) observation helped the construction of Table 4 that shows different interpretations of climate security. The 'discursive dimension' and 'at what points' columns display different perspectives about climate securitisation – this is clearly reflected in the 'achieved/to be achieved' column. Despite the differences, a unifying element is discernible: the characteristic reasoning (or argument), rather than the intuition, behind what may be described as an emerging climate security discourse.

The contents and contexts of Tables 4 and 5 illustrate how climate securitisation has emerged as an analytical theme. A comparative approach can contribute to a more grounded normative assessment of how the concept has developed (von Lucke et al. 2014); to achieve this, the case study chapters bring out the salience of the dominant securitisation discourses and *new* climate security discourses (Wellmann 2016: 6) as well as analyse the emerging phrasings that should help to pinpoint the extent to which statements might indicate an emerging climate security discourse. The literature in the 2007–2019 period assists to broadly categorise the popular phrasings of climate change as a security risk (Tables 4 and 5). The tables show engagement with the idea that climate change has influenced perceptions on and conceptions of both security and climate security. The missing value in the tables is not whether climate change is changing how institutional actors perceive and conceive climate security, but the nature and extent of the change. The case study chapters aim to provide answers to this question.

3.4.1 Climate Securitisation as an Analytical Theme

Based on the expansive research on securitisation, this section confirms the utility of climate securitisation as an analytical theme and highlights the 2007 UNSC debate on climate and security as the departure point. In 2007 little did UNSC members know that they had established a new direction for climate security discourses. Given the almost instantaneous multiplicity of climate security papers since that year this section presents a short but concise account of popular phrasings from the papers. As the scholarly debate

has also taken up the climate-security nexus (von Lucke 2015), not mentioning these phrasings would signal an important omission here because many of these constitute the core features of climate security and broadly reflect securitisation theory (Table 5). A range of researchers (Trombetta 2008, 2008a; McDonald 2018; Corry 2012; Methmann & Rothe 2012; Bremberg 2018; Abel et al. 2019; Amalia 2019) have examined the academic and political debates about climate challenges from a securitisation approach with a focus on how representations of climate change as a security issue can modify the debate in both low and high politics settings. However, public and policy discourse on climate security has barely altered (Selby & Hoffmann 2014). The discourse analysis can answer a range of *how* questions, telling us why certain definitions do or do not catch on at specific place and time, and also can reveal the mechanisms by which a policy does or does not materialise within particular institutional settings (Hajer & Versteeg 2005).

But how has climate securitisation been discussed in the literature? An important question for researchers is not whether discourse 'does' things but the conditions under which the context, social content and meaning of security produces threats (Balzacq 2010). This is because the idea of security has a particular discursive and political force as it is a performative concept (for instance, to securitise) rather than an objective (or subjective) condition (Buzan & Hansen 2009). That is, something acquires a security status as a result of an intersubjective process involving a securitising actor and an audience whereby a securitising move is rooted in the basic premise that successful securitisation should support the management of a perceived security threat that do not have to depend upon purely material or objective conditions (Balzacq & Guzzini 2015). In this respect decision-makers are then dutybound to undertake whatever policies they deem appropriate to halt a threat once a perception of the need for securitisation has been firmly established.

Securitising statements have been made at pivotal geopolitical points in conformity with the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. However, a key consideration is important due to non-compliance with securitisation theory. As will be shown in the FCCC case, the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement did not include key statements (made at various meetings) in their separate reporting to the COP. As a testament to a major tenet of securitisation theory, that non-transmission of vital

statements may be seen as an unsatisfactory performative posture. To perform satisfactorily in a performative role, securitising actors (the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement) are required to convincingly convey a statement's credibility to a significant audience (the COP) whereby the urgency of the conviction should compel the target audience to agree with securitisers about the need for protection of a named referent object.

Another way to exploit securitisation is through the emergent nature of the climate securitisation process and how it is talked into reality. Its emergence is characterised by four main phases. These include the securitising move that is conceptualised as an isolated speech act, its transformation into a successful securitisation through acceptance by a relevant audience, and the translation of a successful securitisation into specific policies through the application of emergency measures (Stengel 2019). Basically, securitisation theory suggests that a mundane issue can be converted into a security topic if a political community agrees to do so: in this manner, the theory shifts the focus from the truth of a statement to its truth effect (Trombetta 2019). Thereafter, decision-makers can immediately undertake policy-backed actions commensurable with the threat that has been identified and successfully securitised. That is, when a securitising actor convincingly conveys a securitising move's credibility to a significant audience whose crucial role is acknowledged by the securitising actor's effort to convince, the urgency of the conviction might compel the audience to agree with the actor about a need for the protection of specific referent objects and thus the activation of extraordinary measures or emergency policies.

The thesis has a particular focus on the crucial departure point for (or the first phase of) a securitising move, where it is vital that a securitising move is well-intentioned, credibly phrased and appropriately contextualised with the ultimate aim to set-off a securitisation process in the pursuit of emergency climate or policy actions. At the outset a securitising move rests on a securitising actor's ability to speak security (Buzan et al. 1998), but it is not always defined by speaking the word security; instead, how specific referent objects are aligned with threats or security problems is more important. In these contexts, actors are given information which becomes critical by virtue of its attributed significance. Climate securitisation researchers should pay attention to how the voices of these public

source influence securitising actors. One reason could be that few studies, if any, have considered the influence of these voices in their conceptualisation of climate securitisation, and in terms of the role of institutional actors. In particular, existing research has not provided sufficient insight into the process of such influence. More particularly, there is lack of fresh insights into whether it is conceivable that a securitising move has been influenced by the mass public's understandings of climate securitisation.

A securitising move rests on a securitising actor's ability to speak security (Buzan et al. 1998), but it is not always defined by speaking the word security; instead, how specific referent objects are aligned with threats or security problems is more important. In these contexts, actors are given information. Thereafter, such information becomes crucial, as it cannot be completely lost on them. If nothing else, the convincing power of a securitising move could be considerably enhanced if actors are presented with the opportunity to reflect on a piece of previously unknown information, suggesting that the role of the mass public and news media in climate discussion cannot be denied as contributory sources of information. This means that climate securitisation research can be permissibly notarised as truncated in important respects. Key among these is the extent to which the voices of these public sources do influence securitising actors.

Current debates are yet to satisfactorily answer the questions of who can do or speak security successfully, on what issue, under what conditions, and with what effects. These questions were explored by Buzan et al. (1998). Considering that radical constructivism requires practitioners to be responsible for defining a successful securitisation, a basic understanding of the conditions for success is that they are set by scholars and this translates to a challenge of and/or for securitisation theory; that is, who defines success (Floyd 2016). Although some policy-makers may be unaware about the intricacies of academic debates – a site where the possibility of crossover between definitions is common especially in relation to "distinct meanings of climate security" (Floyd 2015: 140) – success is not decided by the securitiser but by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998).

There thus arises the inherent issues of who has the right to intervene and who defines the nature of intervention (Piggott-McKellar et al. 2020) even though climate securitisation has occurred in some policy circles when understood to mean rephrasing the

environmental and developmental effects of climate change in terms of security (Peters & Mayhew 2016). These arguments (and those in the above paragraph) rely heavily on the language of security and securitisation in the context of climate change. Yet the language games of securitisation and desecuritisation are dissimilar when it comes to protecting different types of referent objects (Donnelly 2017). Climate security practitioners have tended to reinterpret differences of opinion according to their established routines, leading to practices and storylines that are more diverse and messier than is mentioned in the conceptual literature (Boas & Rothe 2016). In this reasoning, one may be tempted to agree with Abrahams' (2020) conclusion that the discourse that presents climate change as a threat multiplier hinders conceptualisations of interventions in climate-related violent conflicts, for instance. This conclusion is important for scholarly analysis of climate securitisation that focuses on policy models, but has neither moved beyond the narrative realm nor examined the implication of climate securitisation on programming priorities (Peters & Mayhew 2016) or compared securitising moves of institutional cases – as will be done in the case study chapters.

3.4.2 Summary of Climate Securitisation

The two sections above have conceptualised climate securitisation, uncovered relevant findings, and sought to extend mainstream thinking about this concept. This is useful for analysing and interpreting the extent to which statements might indicate an emerging climate security discourse. The sections raised awareness about how climate securitisation was moulded from securitisation theory through critical reflection on key intersections between these two concepts, thereby leading to discursive engagement and confrontation, progressing the overall climate security debate. Since 2007 when the UNSC debated the climate and security topic, there have been numerous phrasings of climate change as a security risk (Tables 4 and 5). The year 2007 was a turning point in the climate security debate. It was also the year that climate securitisation, alongside being brought to the forefront in global security research, coud be said to have begun influencing perceptions on and conceptions of security – more broadly defined. What is missing in the comparative analysis and thus climate security discourses is the exact extent to which climate securitisation has altered how institutional actors perceive and conceive climate security and vice versa. The thesis aims to fill this gap in climate

securitisation research. As outlined in the case study chapters a key issue is whether statements on climate security lend credibility to climate securitisation.

3.5 Justification of the Analytical Themes Arrangement

This chapter has conceptualised the three analytical themes. In Chapter 4 (UNSC case), Chapter 5 (FCCC case), and Chapter 6 (EU case), the themes will be applied and analysed in the following order respectively: the epistemic community on climate security, climate-riskification, and climate securitisation. It is useful to offer a clearer reasoning as to the order in which the three main themes will be applied to the three cases. The epistemic community will be examined first in order to shape the analysis of riskification and securitisation processes. Another reason for the format is that the epistemic community on climate security is the one who initiated the debate on climate change, climate-riskification, and climate securitisation within and among all of the three institutions.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided a review of the literature on the three thematic themes the thesis will use for the analysis of the case studies: UNSC, FCCC, and EU. Based on the outcome of the chapter, a comparative analysis of these cases will be conducted in the next case study chapters. The analysis will offer more clarity on how riskifying and securitising moves have been put to work by the epistemic community. It will shed light on how institutional actors have addressed climate security, and how this may develop into the future. In so doing, this thesis will able to progress how riskifying and securitising moves have been put forward and been influenced by the epistemic community.

CHAPTER 4 THE UNSC'S STATEMENTS ON CLIMATE SECURITY

4.1 Introduction

Advances in climate security scholarship present this concept as a normative and scholarly challenge. This chapter contributes to this scholarship by systematising the UNSC's Arria-Formula and formal contributions to the climate security debate. It uses three analytical themes (climate-riskification, climate securitisation and the epistemic community on climate security) to explore the research question: to what extent might policy statements and discussions by the UNSC indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and therefore the recognition of the concept itself? This question is laden with important implications, as similar questions have led other scholars to examine the inner workings of the UNSC. Foregrounding two relevant constructs are vital are important to answer the research question.

First, the epistemic community on climate security strives to uncover ill-understood spaces within the boundaries of an existing discourse, which are ripe for mining and thereafter refinement into a new and dynamic context. "In the first phase of the Council's norm consumption, epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs research new applications for a broadly-stated existing norm" and thereafter target the UNSC in view of norm-related resolutions or binding decisions (True-Frost 2007: 121). It then becomes important that the climate change movement and/or doctrine, with its main concepts rapidly outgrowing the confines of the epistemic communities they had emerged from (Billi et al. 2019), has decidedly gone off course in recent years (Swyngedouw 2013). As the doctrine becomes progressively institutionalised in the name of designing security protection for environmental health, so do the epistemic communities' desire to nurture the epistemic community on climate security within international epistemic networks. Indeed, to preserve the security and risk logic, epistemic networks do emphasise why security communities should engage this logic to progress "their own role in climate change governance (including in the UNSC)" (Jayaram 2020: 8). At the same time, ardent proponents of "riskification" insist that the rationale embraced in the climate-security linkage is that of security and/or "securitization" owing to the claims that efforts at

securitising moves have not led to the adoption of extraordinary polices at the international level (Jayaram 2020: 6). For Jayaram, securitisation and riskification in this respect parallel the climatisation of security actors as they also complement precautionary climatising moves that could then act as securitisation multipliers. As noted in Chapter 2, a growing sense of climate ambiguities in governance expanded the scope of intervention to climate-riskification.

Second, this chapter draws mainly on publicly available documents. Transcripts of UNSC meetings regarding climate and security provide empirical data on compelling evidence about the UNSC's overall posture on climate security, as competing statements in the reports enable the chapter to tie all the pieces together into a coherent whole. To further progress the discourse on climate security, and perhaps help develop an alternative and/or a parallel to the discourse on securitisation, in tandem with riskification and securitisation (Jayaram 2020), the chapter extends the work undertaken by researchers mentioned so far in it (including similar work discussed in previous chapters). Doing so enables the chapter to indicate what may happen to the climate security debate in terms of international security.

To achieve these tasks, this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section justifies the two subcases. Next, the chapter examines Arria-Formula meetings on the security implications of climate change, followed by the section on UNSC formal debates on this topic in 2007 and 2011. Next, it devotes a separate section to the December 2017 Arria-Formula meeting, followed by separate sections on the July 2018 and January 2019 formal debates. Altogether, these sections will present answers to the research question. The chapter then turns to examination of the epistemic community on climate security analytical theme, followed by an analysis of climate-riskification and climate securitisation in separate sections. The chapter then concludes with the key findings, attesting to a line of thought implying that how the epistemic community on climate security has understood climate security is an undeniable indication of the extent to which the UNSC has conceptualised, indicated and invoked climate security.

Justification of the Subcases

This chapter centres its analysis on two subcases: formal and Arria-Formula debates or meetings. So many things really do start to become obvious when someone scan policy statements made at various meetings. Notably, conceptual development is ongoing when it comes to both the threat multiplier context of climate change and the possibility of civil conflict due to indirect effects of climate change. Most notably, when policy statements meant to convey various agendas are broadly divided into formal and informal debates, one can make informed judgement about how and why UNSC members considered the conflict aspect of climate change.

The subcases are resourceful for uncovering how the relationship between climate and security has been promoted at debates in the UNSC. At the conclusion of several formal debates, various presidential statements released by the UNSC have progressively characterised climate change as a security issue (Camprubí 2016; Estève 2020). Depending on the degree of support or absence thereof, the prospects of an emerging climate security discourse, within and beyond the UNSC, can be ascertained from outcomes of formal debates because major consensus reached at such debates has good chances of maturing into a legally-backed resolution. The formal debates appeared to have strengthened the possibility of a climate-security relationship because this new approach, according to Alejandra Camprubí, parallels the articulation of the international security and climate change discourse is being undertaken in parallel to the mainstream international climate negotiations. Yet researchers have not compared the UNSC's contributions in terms of the Arria-Formula debate in December 2017 (in New York) and the formal debates in July 2018 and January 2019. As we will see from the statements on climate security, a focus on the three analytical themes provides a deeper understanding about how and why the UNSC become involved in the climate security debate.

Arria-Formula meetings have served as fora for advocating the significance of a new international environmental agreement on climate security – a topic that is ineliminable from UNSC agenda at least in the view of the epistemic community on climate security. Since it was first convened in 1992, an Arria-Formula meeting (sometimes confidential)

is usually organised by UNSC members and is different from formal debate in important respects. Due to its informal nature, it is not covered by the UN Charter's provisional rules of procedure.[8] This suggests that such meetings may or may not qualify as an activity of the UNSC. Although there is typically no official (or formal) outcomes, some meetings have been cited in UNSC documents, which may lead to initial contextual work on climate security. Unless specifically invited, attendance by UN secretariat members is not required. When attendance by UNSC members is required, the convenor(s) of an Arria-Formula meeting issues a written invitation or concept paper, indicating the topic to be debated and the names of key briefers to be heard. In this manner, an Arria-Formula meeting provides attendees, including invited topic experts and high-level diplomats, an opportunity to deliberate on international issues which are often critical to the UNSC mandate to preserve international security. The epistemic community on climate security, like epistemic communities in general, has been most effectual Arria-Formula meetings. Generally speaking, epistemic communities use Arria-Formula meetings to sustain specific discussions among UNSC members and to hold them accountable for innovations (True-Frost 2007).

4.2 Analytical Summary of Arria-Formula Meetings

Portugal (UNSC President) initiated the first Arria-Formula meeting on the crime-pandemics-climate change nexus in November 2011.[10] Portugal initiated the meeting partly because of the discussion among the epistemic community. According to the concept note for the meeting,[11] the UNSC has recently focused on new challenges to international peace and security such as the proliferation of small arms and transborder organised crime,[12] HIV/AIDS,[13] drug and human trafficking in West Africa[14] as well as the impact of climate change.[15] The focus shifted from the crime-pandemics-climate change nexus to a desire for better understanding of the nexus' climate-related security element, at the meeting in February 2013. This notable shift may well be due to the

[8] UNSC, https://tinyurl.com/y9qevmah.
[10] UNSC, SC/10457, 23 November 2011.
[11] UNSC S/2011/698, 9 November 2011.
[12] SC/10036, 23 September 2010.
[13] SC/10272, 7 June 2011.
[14] SC/10295, 24 June 2011.
[15] SC/10332, 20 July 2011.

UNSC's inability to reach a concrete conclusion on the climate security issue at the closure of its formal debate in July 2011 (as discussed in the next section). Pakistan's co-host role is also notable (Table 6).

Table 6. Summary of Arria-Formula Meetings

Year	Topics	Key Statement	Convenor(s)
Nov 2011; Arria-Format Briefing at UNSC formal debate	Crime-pandemics-climate change nexus.	Climate change: threat multiplier.	Portugal
Feb 2013	Security dimensions of climate change.	Enhanced knowledge on climate risks.	UK, Pakistan
June 2015	Climate change as a threat multiplier.	To ensure adequate continuity of the climate security debate.	Spain, Malaysia
July 2015; Arria-Format Briefing at UNSC formal debate	Security challenges.	Threat of climate change to international security.	New Zealand
April 2016	Water, peace/security.	First-ever discussion of the water-peace/security link.	Senegal
May 2016; Arria-Format Briefing at UNSC formal debate	Peace/security in the the West Africa and the Sahel region.	Climate-security link in the West Africa and the Sahel region.	Egypt, Spain
Nov 2016; Arria-Format Briefing at UNSC formal debate	Water, peace/security.	Climate-water scarcity link.	Senegal
April 2017; Arria-Format Briefing at UNSC formal debate	Security risks of climate change: Sea level rise.	Climate security challenges: Small Island Developing States.	Ukraine, Germany
October 2018	Water, peace and security.	Exploring how the UNSC can be provided with assessment of climate change and water stress.	Netherlands, Italy, Bolivia, Cote d'Ivoire, Belgium, Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia
November 2018	Environment protection in relation to armed conflict.	Environmental impact of armed conflict.	Germany, Kuwait
December 2019; Arria meeting			Kuwait, Germany, Estonia, Peru

Table 6 shows that the climate security issue has been debated as an Arria-Formula topic on eleven occasions. The December 2017 Arria-Formula meeting in New York is discussed separately in the next section. With a focus on how to ensure the climate security debate's consistency on the UNSC agenda, the Arria meeting in June 2015 exemplified the true essence of Arria-Formula – to nurture UNSC members' interest. As shown in Table 6, the success of the meeting first became apparent one month later when UNSC members focused on Small Island Developing States, followed by water security

nine months later, the West Africa and the Sahel region ten months later, water security again fifteen months later, sea level rise twenty months later, and water security in October 2018.

During the UNSC debate in 2007, Pakistan found the UNSC's encroachment on the mandates and functions of other UN organs very disturbing.[19] This position had changed as demonstrated by Pakistan's co-host role in 2013. While Pakistan's shifting position may be read as a distinctive change in its understandings and interpretations of climate security, it could be directly linked with the Arria-Formula meeting on the crime-pandemics-climate change nexus. The strategic repositioning is unsurprising because Pakistan is vulnerable to climate-related risks and extreme events. Based on analysis of data covering the 1996–2015 period, the *Global Climate Risk Index 2017* showed that Pakistan is ranked the seventh most vulnerable country to climate-related risks.[20] Pakistan's Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Climate Change, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), responded with a policy paper in October 2017. They developed a climate change financing framework, outlining public financial management processes and reforms.[21] That policy response may well explain Pakistan's keen interest in the 2017 COP, especially in discussions on climate finance and adaptation measures.

Within the 2011–2017 period, the Arria meetings formed the basis for strengthening climate security advocacy, necessary for potential international policy. This does not mean that a policy will certainly emerge in the future. Instead, it means that specific Arria meetings have been known to deepen voluntary compliance, which at the minimum motivates UNSC members' involvement in these meetings. Between November 2011 and May 2016, one can interpret the distinct progressive momentum on climate-related security element of the crime-pandemics-climate change nexus as acknowledgement of this element's transnationally and exponentially evolving set of risks for human security. It is not clear why the focus shifted to water in 2016 although there are clear climate security dimensions to the risk of water crisis. The sudden shift in focus to water security

[19] S/PV.6587, 20 July 2011.
[20] Germanwatch, Global Climate Risk Index 2017, https://tinyurl.com/ybfxkxro.
[21] Government of Pakistan, Climate change financing framework, October 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yc8clbfz.

in April 2016 was followed by similar focus in November 2016, April 2017 and October 2018 (Table 6). Arria-Formula meetings have been useful in sustaining international discussions on climate security at the UNSC level, though these meetings lack the capacity to fully respond in ways commensurate with the risks of climate change. Most of existing climate security discourses highlight incomplete knowledge about the conditions under which institutional organisations focus on climate security risks, including when such focus is effective. Consequentially it becomes important to consider how the UNSC has formally debated the climate security topic.

4.3 Analytical Summary of UNSC Debates

This section contributes to existing explanations about the climate and security debates between 2007 and 2019. The following discussion presents key details from the debates in 2007 and 2011. This is followed by the December 2017 Arria-Formula meeting in New York (henceforth Arria-Formula Meeting in New York), an important debate held as part of preparations for security implications of rising temperatures. The July 2018 formal debate was followd by the latest formal debate in January 2019; these two debates are crucial because statements by key countries at these forums could be taken as their current positions, which may well indicate the UNSC's overall posture on climate security. In particular, the July 2018 debate on climate-related security risks provided important insights about the progress and future of the climate security debate.

The 2007 and 2011 UNSC Formal Debates

To begin with, a highlight of the debates in 2007 and 2011 suffices here because exisiting studies have robustly analysed these debates from various perspectives. However, important takeaways can be found in statements by key countries (Table 7). The climate security debate's political prominence emerged in April 2007 when Margaret Beckett introduced it to international politics and peaked again in July 2011 when Germany championed the same topic. These two debates left the UK (2007 sponsor) and Germany (2011 sponsor) with little to no satisfaction other than contentment that UNSC members, at least, had become better acquainted with the climate security issue.

Table 7. Overall pattern of countries' postures on the climate and security debate in the UNSC

Key elements of the debate	April 2007 Debate	July 2011 Debate	December 2017 Arria-Formula	July 2018 Debate	January 2019 Debate
UNSC is suitable for the climate security debate	UK, US, EU countries, Peru, Japan, Congo, Papua New Guinea	UK, US, EU countries	No comment	UK, US, EU countries, Nauru	Broadly like the debate in 2018
UNSC is unsuitable for the climate security debate	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), Costa Rica, Philippines, Indonesia, Sudan, Cuba, Pakistan	BRICS, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Portugal, Costa Rica, Iran, South Korea, Singapore, Fiji, Cuba, Lebanon, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chile, Ecuador, Pakistan, Egypt, Argentina, Turkey, Barbados		Russia, Trinidad & Tobago, Maldives	Russia, India. China: UN agencies must not overstretch their mandates. Indonesia: UNSC must respond to climate risks, but not climate change itself
Climate change can aggravate tension and existing civil conflict	UK, EU countries, Congo, South Africa, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Mexico, Costa Rica	UN Secretary-General, US, UK, EU countries, Nauru, Japan, Bolivia, Sudan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Lebanon	UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, France, Germany, Morocco, Japan, Peru, Maldives	UK, Nauru, Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Kazakhstan, Curaçao, Peru, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia	Broadly like the debates in 2007, 2011, 2017 and 2018
Creating an institutional home for climate and security	No comment	UN Secretary-General, Nauru	UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, France, Germany, Morocco, Japan, Peru, Maldives	UK, Sweden, Nauru, Kazakhstan	Broadly like the 2017 debate
Special remark:			Responsibility to Prepare Agenda		
Climate change is a national security issue	UK, Belgium, China, Japan, South Korea, Costa Rica	Kazakhstan, Kenya, Germany, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Peru	No comment	US, Côte d'Ivoire	Broadly like previous debates

At the day-long debate in 2011, which ended without a clear and substantive outcome that may be beneficial to people suffering from effects of climate change, Germany and the US found the UNSC's inability to reach consensus on a substantive presidential statement very regretful.[24] Peter Wittig finally read the first-ever presidential statement

[24] UNSC/10332, 20 July 2011.

on climate change that failed to directly acknowledge climate security as a distinct concept, but somehow camouflaged with the necessary phrases in places as follows.[25]

> The Security Council notes that in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security under its consideration, conflict analysis and contextual information on, inter alia, possible security implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace.

The 2017 Arria-Formula Meeting in New York

This section is important because some of the extant explanations (such as Peters 2018), surprisingly, did not draw on the December 2017 Arria-Formula meeting held in New York. It is also important because the concept note for the 2017 meeting asked how the assignments deriving from the July 2011 presidential statement could be consolidated within and promoted beyond the UN system and how the UNSC can efficiently and consistently assess climate-related security risks so as to better prepare for risks such as civil conflict.[26] Keynote speakers duly addressed the empirical nature of questions which compelled the UNSC to do more, rather than simple compliance with the international security mandate, just as the questions aimed to discover the extent to which the UNSC has raised climate security.

The Arria-Formula Meeting in New York kicked off with an opening speech attesting that the security of millions of people was threatened in 2017 due to weather-related extreme events and further emphasising the urgent need to create an institutional home for climate security (Cardi 2017). The meeting stand out as it was co-hosted by the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, France, Germany, Morocco, Peru, Japan and Maldives. Besides the unusual number of co-hosts, 13 members of the UNSC also graced the meeting. This is a crucial for two key reasons.

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[25] S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011, p. 2.

[26] *What's in Blue*, Climate change: Arria-Formula meeting, 14 December 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y8yhqyrh; Arria-Formula, Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures, 15 December 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y8wjzzdl.

First, the impressive composition of co-hosts evidently resonated with the support – by these countries – for climate security at the formal debates in 2007 and 2011. The composition was instrumental to these formal debates though there are exceptions. For instance, Morocco was absent from the debates. Japan's neutral position underpinned its proposition in 2007 that the UN General Assembly should instruct the Secretary-General to present recommendations on how the UN system could best address climate risks. At the 2011 debate, Japan and Peru unequivocally supported the FCCC as the main forum for discussing climate security. Maldives was absent from the 2011 debate but its neutral position in 2007 still supported the Group of 77+China's insistence that although the UNSC may play a pivotal role to in climate security, the legitimacy of the FCCC and the UN General Assembly must not be overlooked. Second, the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York is special because some influential members of the UNSC insisted that the UNSC is primed for debating climate security, despite the usual and sustained opposition against airing it in the UNSC. China and Russia championed opposition to this insistence.

Second, the UK, Italy and Netherlands presented climate security as a distinct concept at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York. Due to the focus on creating an institutional home for climate security, the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York performed better perhaps because climate security is no longer new to UNSC members.[27] The meeting is also characterised by a strong correlation between this focus and the belief that climate change can aggravate existing tensions and civil conflicts. This correlation was enabled by the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York's informal nature (similar to Arria-styled Planetary Security Initiative Conference), meaning the decisions reached at these meetings neither obligate UNSC members nor any member of the international community to act on such decisions although these actors may embrace such decisions voluntarily.

At the same 2017 meeting the incidents of climate-related disasters and conflict-based displacement were compelling enough for the UNSC to remain focused on conflict prevention and resolution; such a focus may be easy because the UNSC has remained committed to confronting extreme weather-related issues since 2007 (Field 2017). It is worth noting that these sorts of risks formed the basis of discussion at FCCC meetings.

[27] UK, Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, France, Germany, Morocco, Peru, Japan and Maldives.

World leaders should therefore promote climate security through concerted actions because individual actions can miss opportunities or produce unintended consequences (Field 2017). Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi (former Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN) alluded to the launching of One Planet Summit in France[28] which took place three days before the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York. The Ambassador implicitly restated the UNSC as the preferred choice of venue for progressing the climate security debate, at least for Italy and EU countries, urging the UN system to recognise the tools devoted to governing feedback loops in the climate-security nexus because failure to do so would mean the UNSC has failed in its obligation to protect human and international security.

Truth be told, the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York was not the only high-level event making waves in 2017. The choice of words by Halbe Zijlstra (former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs) echoed those of Field and Cardi. Zijlstra succinctly captured a climate and security phrasing that has eluded many people until the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York. She acknowledged the Planetary Security Initiative's efforts on climate security advocacy, although decisions reached at these Arria fora does not create any rights or obligations under international law. Attended by nearly 300 government officials and NGOs representatives from 48 countries, the 2016 Planetary Security Initiative Conference called for planetary security to be put on the UNSC agenda.[29] At the close of the 2017 Planetary Security Initiative Conference, held three days before the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York, a set of high-level institutional decision-makers agreed on a six-point agenda as practical requirement for progressing the climate security debate.

The 2018 UNSC Formal Debate

Seven years after UNSC members had formally debated the climate and security topic in 2011 they convened in July 2018 within 24 hours of two high-level security conferences on this topic, one in the US and the other organised by Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[30] The UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) had been recognised

[28] French Government, One Planet Summit, https://tinyurl.com/y7p2m59r.
[29] Planetary Security Initiative Conference, 2016, https://tinyurl.com/y93ks5hf.
[30] See International conference on climate change and fragility in the Asia-Pacific region, https://tinyurl.com/ydyq7o4m.

by the UNSC as a repository of information about (and analysis on) climate-related security risks. Its predecessor was the Dakar-based UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) that was established by the UNSC in 2002 as the first regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding office, focusing on the areas of security, democratic governance, humanitarian requirements and development. The UNOWA's overall mandate is to enhance an efficient UN and global response to the multi-faceted challenges facing the West Africa and the Sahel region. The UNSC merged the UNOWA and Office of the Special Envoy into the UNOWAS in January 2016. The merger decision was not without controversy. The Group of Five for the Sahel opposed the merger on the grounds that the merger would diminish attention to the West Africa and the Sahel region. Besides requesting relocation of the Office of the Special Envoy from Dakar to the Group's headquarters in Mauritania,[31] the Group's opposition seemed connected to geopolitical concern about Dakar's hosting of the UNOWAS. The merger nonetheless brought some changes in the traditional focus on political conflicts because the UNOWAS now provides additional strategic guidance and political advocacy for UN agencies and programmes.

Opening remarks by Amina Mohammed (UN Deputy-Secretary General) during the July 2018 debate further attested to the UNOWAS' significance. Mohammed believed the UNSC had acknowledged its responsibility to fully mobilise available resources in order to better understand and provide timely, integrated responses to climate-related security risks. In this regard, Mohammed referred to the recalibrated UN Integrated Strategy for the West Africa and the Sahel region as being climate oriented. The UNSC had expressed its support for the UNOWAS to further implement the integrated strategy in the Sahel region. Evidence for this claim can be found in, for instance, the presidential statements issued in July 2017[32]and July 2020.[33] These presidential statements can be taken as a demonstration of UNSC's commitment to climate risk management based on integrated assessments. The UNSC had already received a briefing on the report, which covered the January to June 2020 period and related trends in the West Africa and the Sahel region.[34] The reporting particularly focused on "recent developments involving the climate-security nexus" in this region."[35] Mohammed urged UNSC members to fully

[31] S/2016/88, 28 January 2016.
[32] S/PRST/2017/10, 24 July 2017.
[33] S/PRST/2020/7, 28 July 2020.
[34] Report of the Secretary-General Activities of the UNOWAS, S/2020/585, 24 June 2020.
[35] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018, p. 3.

acknowledge climate change as one factor among a set of interlinked factors that can lead to conflict. Amina Mohammed upbringing in the Lake Chad Basin region means she is a seasoned diplomat with lived experience of climate-related socio-political problems. More importantly, full acknowledgement of Mohammed's repoer could further motivate various operational reporting, susch as via the Secretary General's report.

At the UNSC level, there is ongoing debate between proponents and opponents of climate security. The groupings have maintained similar membership (in a broad sense) since 2007. In the UNSC, proponents generally comprise countries that support climate security as a topic to be debated and actioned by the UNSC. These countries have always supported statements such as those made by Amina Mohammed. The opposition group comprises countries that resisted the climate security debate in the UNSC. Here, statements by Russia largely represent a snapshot of the opposition group. The following narration therefore focuses on Russia's statements at the July 2018 debate.

Russia's posture on climate security can be determined from key statements made at the July 2018 debate. At it, Dmitry Polyanskiy (Russia's representative) acknowledged climate change as a grave threat to the international community, pointing it out that Russia participates in efforts to universalise the FCCC under the climate regime's authority. Before going any further, it is notable that no member country makes more than one speech on the topic of discussion in the same meeting, except when a country believed its statement was wrongly criticised or largely misunderstood. This happened earlier at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York: Dilyara Ravilova-Borovik (Russia's representative) requested to talk a second time because participants' comments about her statement had seemingly ignored Russia's posture on the reality of climate risks. To indicate what Russia would do or not do in the climate security debate, Ravilova-Borovik clarified that the UNSC "can participate in climate issues 'only in the case of individual country issues' of already ongoing conflict" (Orlove 2017: para. 21). At the July 2018 debate, Polyanskiy makes a similar assertion: "climate change is not a universal challenge in the context of international security but should rather be addressed with regard to the specifics of each situation."[36] One can detect a nominal positive stance in Ravilova-Borovik's clarification which is consistent with Polyanskiy's assertion. This consistency

[36] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018, p. 16.

is a crucial development because the idea then is that the UNSC can formally get involved in the climate security debate according to the facts of each specific cases. If so, the extent to which the UNSC may formally get involved is at best fuzzy because Ravilova-Borovik urged UNSC members to "concentrate" their "efforts on implementing immediate tasks of security" and to "refrain from interfering with mandates of other [UN] units" such as the UN General Assembly (Orlove 2017: para. 16). This means that Russia does not consider climate risk as an urgent security issue. The argument is consistent with Polyanskiy's statement:

> We refuse to be reconciled to the fact that in our view today's meeting is yet another attempt to link the issue of preserving the environment to threats to international peace and security. Regrettably, we are creating the illusion among those who follow our work that the Council is now taking on the climate issue and that will immediately bring about a turning point. That is a dangerous illusion and a clear deception.[37]

Note the similarity and (subtly different) choice of language between the statements that "UNSC can participate in climate issues" and statement that the "Council is now taking on the climate issue." Seven months before Polyanskiy utilised 'climate issue,' it is likely that Ravilova-Borovik used 'climate issues' in order to avoid using the climate security phrase at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York. It is also likely that some of the statements made by representatives at debates in the UNSC have been thoroughly edited by topic experts. One cannot overemphasise the careful selection of phrases, for these could later be implicated in principles or even legal frameworks. Seasoned diplomats remain acutely aware about this possibility.

Russia believes that proponents' propositions on the climate security debate imply a climate-security connection based on "highly abstract connections" without a presentation of "scientifically sound specific details."[38] One may take this criticism as the key basis of Russia's positions on climate security. When compared with Russia's insistence that there could be no connection between security and climate change, there

[37] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018.
[38] Ibid, p. 15.

arises a ray of hope because implicit in the criticism is a self-conflation which suggests that Russia would be receptive to proponents' proposition upon provision of scientific evidence. The criticism may even help climate security scholars to further narrow down areas where analytic efforts should be focused. More pointedly, one interpretation of the term "abstract connections" is that Moscow would formally support an international principle (or maybe a norm) on climate security upon provision of scientific-based empirical evidence attesting to more concrete or direct relationships between climate change and international or human security.

At the debate in July 2018, only two countries explicitly talked about national security. These included Côte d'Ivoire call to integrate climate risks into relevant national and regional conflict-prevention strategies. The other is the US, represented by Jonathan Cohen. Cohen's message was directed to UNSC members and the wider diplomatic community. According to the US's representative: as "we are all on the same side" in responding to climate crises, Washington remains focused on projects that benefit foreign policy and national security objectives.[39] Note Cohen's tacit, measured and neutral tone, as the US had to be seen as being committed to the climate security debate without inviting the wrath of President Trump who would likely denounce any explicit linkage between climate change and national security. This possibility is not lost on the diplomatic community, which is patiently waiting to see how climate strategy in the US will further unravel. Given the Trump's administration, it has been challenging for analysts to confidently interpret the fate of climate risk and national security in the US. However, things have since moved on. On his first day in office in January 2020, President Joe Biden signed the instrument that formally reinstated US membership of the Paris Agreement.

The US is not the only world power that is difficult to predict. Russia is another candidate. Consider Ravilova-Borovik's assertion at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York where she mentioned that Russia's active participation in all international fora on the climate issue is a measure of Moscow's dedication (Orlove 2017). According to Ravilova-Borovik: "we have never avoided discussing these issues … even as we become increasingly convinced that the UNSC is not the appropriate platform for this issue"

[39] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018, p. 13.

(Orlove 2017: para. 16). This statement is contradicted by Polyanskiy's statement at the July 2018 debate that "climate change is not a universal challenge in the context of international security."[40] Yet a key feature in the Paris Agreement is the recognition by all parties that responding to the risks of climate change is an international challenge with global dimensions. The FCCC negotiations offer a critical space for coordinating global action on climate change, for highlighting open questions and for transboundary phrasing to take the conversation in new directions (Benzie et al. 2018). Some of Russia's concerns may be addressed through new research into climate and conflict. In particular a new global index that quantifies transnational climate risks" (Hedlund et al. 2018, 75-81) was published two months after Polyanskiys's statements. Based on the index no country according to Hedlund et al. is fully insulated from the negative impacts of climate change outside its borders. This finding offsets Polyanskiys's rejection of climate universality. Amina Mohammed would concur as she asserted at the July 2018 debate: "while the impact of climate change may be spread unevenly across various regions today, no country will be spared from its consequences in the long term," meaning "multilateral cooperation" is essential.[41]

The 2019 UNSC Formal Debate

At the latest round of debate in January 2019, there is some continuity from the debate in 2018 as representatives of countries used constructs like those expressed at the debate in 2018 but with more convincing clarifications. The overall conclusions presented by each country, and the briefers who are specially invited, are no different either. The UNOWAS featured prominently in the opening remarks. According to Rosemary DiCarlo (UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs), the UNOWAS has been working closely with the Economic Community of West African States to analyse climate-related security risks in the region and to jointly develop regional prevention strategies. DiCarlo asserts that this "is not news" to UNSC members as the UNSC had "recognized the adverse effects of climate change" on the stability of the West Africa and the West Africa and the Sahel region,[42] UNSC members are already aware that "climate-related risks and conflict" often intersects with socio-political and economic factors,

[40] Ibid, p. 16.
[41] Ibid, p. 2.
[42] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 3.

ultimately threatening the very existence of coastal communities. DiCarlo emphasises her point: the risks associated with climate-related disasters do not represent a scenario of some distant future, "they are already a reality" that "are not going away."[43] Professor Pavel Kabat's speech was no different; the Chief Scientist at the World Meteorological Organization delivered the organisation's first-ever official briefing to UNSC members on climate and extreme weather events. Kabat scientifically asserted that a "multitude of security impacts" would increase the potential for water conflict, leading to more internal displacement and migration posing "a national security threat."[44] Although Kabat's claim supports the overall posture of Small Island Developing States and Western countries at the debates in 2018 and 2019, Russia, China and India refused to deviate from their respective positions against these claims.

Another milestone of the January 2019 debate did not simply acknowledged the risks of climate change but for the first time signified that the UNSC has recognised the term of "threat multiplier." Note that this terminology was first used by the epistemic community and was also employed at various Arria-Formula meetings much earlier (Table 6). However, it was at the January 2019 debate that various representatives first formally labelled climate change as a threat multiplier. Although the UNSC has not issued any resolution on climate change, the recognition of this terminology would imply – in the long-term – a symbolic effect on the candidate norm and a practical effect on the associated discourse. This development may encourage UNSC members to arrange more debates on climate security in the UNSC as it is a solid reason for these members to more closely consider climate security in terms of preserving international peace and security.

4.4 Applying the Epistemic Community on Climate Security Theme

This section foregrounds and confirms the fact of emergence of an epistemic community on climate security. To ground this in real-time, this thesis argues that climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies. For that to be the situation, there must be an epistemic community in situ. Hence, the claim about the emergence of an epistemic community and

[43] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 2.
[44] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 5.

its efforts in the UNSC. These efforts usually begin with issue introduction by the epistemic community on climate security whose contributions at this phase comprises clear definition and phrasing of the climate crisis as a security problem. The section complements Zwolski and Kaunert (2011) who, in turn, draw on the key conditions for identifying an epistemic community, as defined by Haas (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992).

Many actors have made the emergence of the epistemic community on climate security possible. Key among these is Germany, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and the Small Island Developing States. Since the 1990s, discourses of climate security have been actively promoted by the Small Island Developing States in the UNSC debates (Warner & Boas 2019). Early securitising moves on climate change at the global level was primarily initiated by an alliance of the Small Island Developing States and the UN General Assembly which convened its first debate on climate change and security in 2009 (Bo 2016). Thereafter, the current concerns and understandings about climatic effects on international security together with "the securitization narrative" and "the international security discourse" would not have seen the light of day had it not been for the prior political contributions of the German government, which motivated the emergence of an "epistemic community" with specialisation on this narrative (Camprubi 2016: 84-85).

Since climate security has various definitions, a clear definition of what should count as climate security has been divisive for the epistemic community – now central to how climate security and the ensuing debate has been defined and contested. As climate security has become an inseparable and a defining feature of climate change, a divisive epistemic community on climate security cannot meet this moment. Yet nearly all representatives of countries at the January 2019 debate in the UNSC openly acknowledged climate change as the defining issue of our time in which the survival of the planet is clearly at stake. As this is one definition of climate change, scholars are therefore trying to formulate a clear definition of climate security that must be approved by involved parties before it can be deemed a universally acceptable definition. In the UNSC, climate actors and representatives of countries are grappling with the same challenge.

In this regard, the debate in January 2019 is where staunch promoters of climate security strongly displayed allegiance, emphasising the clarity of the relationship between climate change and security. The definition by Netherland's representative is attestation to this allegiance: existing knowledge showed that "increased risks of climate disasters mean increased threats to human security and exacerbated vulnerabilities."[45] The UNDP's representative presented the same definition: "the science" and "empirical evidence" behind such knowledge "is becoming ever clearer, both in terms of the nature and scale of the impact."[46] According to Poland's representative, the issue of climate change and security should gain prominence in the UNSC through regular discussions and debates as a preventive tool, focusing on solutions and monitoring.[47] Indonesia supported these definitions in its own way: a task for the UNSC "is to better define" what should be included when it comes to the "security dimensions of climate-related effects."[48] Indonesia's representative thus presented the opposition with an opportunity because this type of definition provided fertile ground for disagreement. Algeria's representative drove it home: "it is true that we are still at odds when it comes to defining the notion of 'impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security,' which has to clearly be clarified in some way."[49] The basis of disagreement is based on expert knowledge. Whereas Russia "deem it excessive, and even counterproductive, to consider climate change in the Security Council,"[50] Moscow emphasised, at previous debates, the insufficiency of empirical-based data showing evidence of direct relationships between climate and security. India's representative agreed although "defining a problem as a security challenge" often increases the attention and resources devoted to addressing it;" so far, "research findings on the generalized linkages between climate disasters and security remain ambiguous."[51]

In this sense, the emergence of the epistemic community substantially rests on its ability for scientific knowledge, which is a key reason for the disagreement over climate security definition. This suggests that consensus among the representatives is nowhere in sight. This development has important implications for the remaining criteria of identifying the

[45] Ibid, p. 77.
[46] Ibid, p. 4.
[47] Ibid, p. 13.
[48] Ibid, p. 11.
[49] Ibid, p. 81.
[50] Ibid, p. 16.
[51] Ibid, p. 43.

epistemic community on climate security – dissemination of consensus-based innovation and thereafter acceptance by decision-makers that should ordinarily lead to endurance of climate security in policy settings. Just as the criteria remain contentious since the onset of the climate and security debate in 2007, so is the level of consensus among the epistemic community on climate security – this has been reliably read and constructed by scholars. The construction of consensus according to the exiting literature involves scientific knowledge, specialist expertise, politicians and a variety of actors. On the downside, the lack of consensus among representatives is an impediment to acceptance of climate security by UNSC decision-makers. On the upside, consensus normally bond together members of epistemic communities (like the epistemic community on climate security). Therefore a consensus rests on epistemic community on climate security involvement in a formalised climate security debate, which would have been practically impossible without epistemic community on climate security emergence. It should be noted that while principled reasons favouring compromises can become a vital part of what makes a position the best option when people disagree (Kappel 2018), out of this friction of competing new ideas and innovations often emerge (Cohendet et al. 2001). Alternatively, the facts of these competing views point to the representatives who made such statement as belonging to an epistemic community and thus the epistemic community on climate security's existence. For these reasons a widely acknowledged definition is yet to emerge in the UNSC. This may not be the definition we want, but it is the definition we have, for now anyway.

The emergence of the epistemic community has greatly benefitted from the expertise of the UNOWAS. The UNSC now instructs and reminds the UNOWAS to include climate change in its investigations and activities. The UNOWAS has responded to that instruction at various meetings where Chambas has briefed UNSC members about climate-related security risks with respect to the West Africa and the Sahel region. An example was the briefing that took place on 10 January 2019 where climate security proponents like the UK, Germany, and the like expressed appreciation for contributions from the UNOWAS and strongly encouraged the UNSC to provide more support to the UNOWS in its efforts to enhance knowledge on the relationships between climate and security. China clearly supported the UNOWAS in a similar fashion.

To be sure about the expertise of the UNOWAS, France's representative concluded her statement by stressing that the link between climate and security is becoming increasingly clear in the countries of the Sahel;" and that the UNOWAS must be supported with all the resources needed to accomplish its mission.[52] The latter assertion also mirrors Germany's representative statement: "we need sound international coordination as a key element of success."[53] Hoping "that the international community will strengthen its cooperation and respond jointly to the region's security challenges," China's representative emphasised that the UNOWAS should continue to cooperate and coordinate with the UNDP, and the like.[54] Within this context, Poland's representative commented on the UNOWAS: "we believe that multilateralism and cooperation will enable us to address problems together, find solutions and build consensus for the common good."[55] Reiterating full support for the UNOWAS, the UK's representative declared that one of the strengths of UNOWAS had been to act as a bridge between national players and regional and international actors.[56]

While all this indicates the effort of the UNOWAS to understand the dynamics of climate-related security risks in a regional context, it is worth mentioning that international coordination is a key criterion for identifying the epistemic community on climate security. It is also remarkable that the epistemic orientation enables expression of different arguments and postures, in turn, enabling the UNSC to claim ownership of the mobilisation of a scientific programme on climate security.

4.5 Climate-Riskification or Climate Securitisation?

The climate securitisation and climate-riskification analytical themes will be discussed in the following two sections, aimed at interpreting statements on climate security and thus the phrasings of security as expressed by the epistemic community on climate security which is the focus in the third section. These sections will provide information about the extent to which these statements have been part of UNSC's climate responses and

[52] S/PV.8442, p. 7.
[53] S/PV.8442, p. 5.
[54] S/PV.8442, p. 11.
[55] S/PV.8442, p. 10.
[56] S/PV.8442, p. 13.

therefore give us insights into how the UNSC has understood and conceptualised climate security.

In this light, some aspects of climate security have been successfully securitised. Others are not. In relation to securitisation scholars, whether securitisation has been successfully undertaken is a subjective judgement. For some scholars, securitisation has occurred whenever it is the topical focus at high-level meetings. For others, full securitisation occurs only when a securitising process has been formally adopted as a policy measure. Given these competing perspectives, determining a successful securitisation is best done by examining concrete actions on the ground. For these reasons the Section 4.4.1 focuses on securitisation in relation to the UNOWAS, an entity that is currently conducting community-based field research in some Sahelian countries in order to explain the real-time impact of climate change on the livelihoods and security of communities (Day & Caus 2020).

4.5.1 Applying the Climate-Riskification Theme

Statements made at the January 2019 debate provided a succinct snapshot of the debates on climate and security that have been held in the UNSC so far. These debates have been significantly dictated by a risk rationale. For this reason, there is growing acknowledgement that effectual risk- management approach would be best achieved through the logic of riskification. While the rise of this logic is becoming popular among security scholars, much less is known about the January 2019 UNSC debate. This section aims to fill that gap in knowledge. All actors (countries) who have participated in the debates on climate and security have already acknowledged that climate change is a security issue with respect to the risks it brings for international and human security. Recalling the two main factions in the UNSC with regards to this particular acknowledgement, the first faction includes climate security's proponents (actors or countries) who strongly acknowledge the risks of climate change. Based on statements by this faction, the climate security topic is an appropriate agenda in the UNSC. Russia, India and China are the most outspoken actors in the second faction; these countries strongly opposed the climate security being discussed in the UNSC. Despite this point of difference that has been live since the first debate in 2007, both factions remain open to

the agenda being progressed elsewhere, notably the FCCC, which may even concretise (or enable) possibilities for further securitisation of the agenda.

Those countries that opposed discussion of climate security in the UNSC made important statements relating to riskification at the January 2019 debate.[57] Statements by these countries (like Russia, India and China) clearly supported riskifying moves by those proponents that have campaigned for climate security as a legitimate agenda in the UNSC. France and the UK, in collaboration with Poland, Peru, Belgium and Germany, front the move to establish a clearing house for studying climate-overwhelmed regions at risk of collapsing into full-blown violent conflict. If established, the clearing house, besides helping the UNSC to gather real-time data that is urgently needed in confronting climate-related security risks, should alert and alter strategists' analytical capacity and enable decision-makers' stronger understandings in the context of regions susceptible to climate-related conflict. Statements relating to riskification did not end there. Confronting climate-related security risks is hugely beneficial to conflict prevention and global stability management. That was the position of many representatives who attended the January 2019 debate. According to these representatives, addressing climate-related security risks together with progress made should become a constant feature in the UNSC. While DiCarlo emphasised the need to concentrate on building (new) and solidifying (existing) alliances to leverage capacities within and beyond the UN system, Cohen's observation was about the importance of geopolitics.

The practice of riskification focuses on prevention, probabilities, possible future scenarios and managing diffuse risks (Corry 2012). Various convincing riskifying moves were made at the January 2019 debate in view of managing future possible harmful events. Poland's representative considered the question of what actions should be undertaken by the UNSC and argued for "anticipation and prevention" rather than reaction.[58] Algeria's representative held the same view: "our homework – must start through prevention and cooperation and always bear in mind that no one is immune from the effects of inaction or indifference."[59] Indonesia's representative insightfully captured all this into a point that

[57] UN security council members mount new push to address climate threat, 25 January 2019, https://tinyurl.com/ycm4nqvb.
[58] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 13.
[59] Ibid, p. 81.

is very much an ongoing scholarly focus: "our homework in the Council is to better define what falls under the ambit of climate change itself and what constitutes security dimensions of climate-related effects."[60] The topic of definition is one of the issues that Russia has been raising since 2007. Perhaps this issue may be partly resolved by considering the observation from Nicaragua's representative: "the biggest obstacle to overcome is political will."[61] The assertion by Netherlands' representative then becomes important: briefers at the January 2019 debate "demonstrated" the "clear and undeniable" knowledge of "the link between climate change and security."[62] This assertion is in alignment with the statement by UNDP's representative: "what is also important is the fact that the empirical evidence of how we can respond to those threats is becoming ever clearer."[63]

Statements by countries that have resisted debating climate security in the UNSC showed a remarkable rethinking on the practice of riskification, as many of the statements explicitly made riskifying moves. These moves are well in alignment with both the descriptions in the two paragraphs above and Corry's (2012) articulation, establishing in positive terms what processes and rules turn an issue into a question of riskification. According to Russia's representative, Moscow's posture is well known; to ensure effectiveness in international cooperation on disaster risk reduction we must engage in professional dialogue first and foremost, based on in-depth expertise and relevant knowledge. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was seen as the main mechanism for exchanging experiences and best practices – including the provision of technical assistance to developing countries, which are the most vulnerable to natural disasters.[64] Reiterating India's long-standing opposition to climate "securitization," India's representative speaks "from a policy perspective," asserting that "as practitioners wanting to address such matters through international cooperation, we therefore face dilemmas:"[65]

[60] Ibid, p. 11.
[61] Ibid, p. 32.
[62] Ibid, p. 77.
[63] Ibid, p. 4.
[64] Ibid, p. 16.
[65] Ibid, p. 43.

> Can climate security be achieved through the quick fix of securitization of climate change to address climate-related disasters? International peace and security considerations often trump other considerations… Securitizing climate change may help to heighten public awareness but securitization also has significant downsides … In short, it brings the wrong actors to the table.

On the one hand, consider the first sentence above: can climate security be achieved through the quick fix of securitization. Although India believed this is not a productive approach, the phrasing of the climate security phrase may be taken as India's shifting posture on this topic. India may become more supportive soon, especially if proponents of climate security aim for climate-riskification rather than climate securitisation. Alongside the increasing tendency for climate securitisation, "the instrumental nature of climate security framings" largely aimed for mundane security practices (Warner & Boas 2019: 1472). This suggests that a riskification process have a higher chances of success than securitisation process. On the other, consider also the last sentence: it brings the wrong actors to the table. This thesis is not interested in 'wrong actors' but very much curious about the epistemic community on climate security.

4.5.2 Applying the Climate Securitisation Theme

A case of active securitisation is the West Africa and the Sahel region. In this region, the UNOWAS presents itself as the best candidate if we are to judge the extent to which statements by the UNSC might indicate an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. According to DiCarlo at the January 2019 debate, the UNOWAS has formed a close partnership with the Economic Community of West African States to "analyse climate-related security risks in the region and to co-develop regional prevention strategies."[66] As DiCarlo clarified, this is an example of the UN System intensifying its efforts to leverage capacities and sharpen responses in where climate change contributes to unpredictable rainfall patterns that constrain livelihoods options, and thereby reduce the opportunity costs of joining armed groups, thus heighten security risks. Amina Mohammed commented on the UNOWAS at the July 2018 debate, confirming how the UN System (and thus the UNSC) had been enhancing its knowledge

[66] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 3.

on climate-related security risks. The UNSC has been proactive in its approaches to understanding the risks of climate change in the West Africa and the Sahel region over the past two decades. The approaches are decidedly ambitious – if nothing else – but achievable: from reactive to preventive engagement, including sensitising those who are reluctant to recognise the link between climate and security and the significance of climate security as an international security issue.

Securitisation occurs at high-level policy settings whenever a securitising move is adopted as a policy strategy. Evidence of securitising moves can be found in a set of formal but nonbinding UNSC presidential statements, which urge the UNOWAS to consider in its activities the UNSC's recognition regarding the adverse effects of climate change in the West Africa and the Sahel region as well as the need for long-term coordination – supported by governments and the UN – on risk assessments in view of peace and stability.[67] The first-ever presidential statement on climate change was released in July 2011 and, without mentioning the UNOWAS, requested for contextual information on the security implications of climate change.[68] A few weeks after the UNSC debate in July 2018, Karen Pierce's presidential statement followed up on important developments regarding the West Africa and the Sahel region.[69] These developments included the June 2018 Secretary General's report[70] and three debates in the UNSC (in July 2018) with a focus on the Sahel region.[71] Pierce commented that the increased demands on the UNOWAS should be matched by adequate resources and support. Perhaps taking a cue from Mohammed's statement and Russia's insistence (at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York) regarding the need for scientific evidence that should directly establish the linkage between climate and security, Pierce reminded the UNOWAS about its obligation regarding climate-related security risks assessments. The presidential statement may be tagged a missed-opportunity because Pierce did not communicate (precisely) the demand for scientific information, as emphasised by many advocates of climate security and the Russia-led opposition group. Scientific and empirical-based evidence of the linkage – if acquired and made available – may ultimately

[67] S/PRST/2018/3, S/PRST/2018/16, S/PRST/2017/10, S/PRST/2020/2 and S/PRST/2020/7.
[68] S/PRST/2011/15.
[69] S/PRST/2018/16.
[70] S/2018/649, 29 June 2018.
[71] S/PV.8306, 10 July 2018; S/PV.8313, 17 July 2018; S/2018/649, 29 June 2018; S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018.

lead to full and more formalised securitisation of climate change, at least in the West Africa and the Sahel region.

Securitisation has though been underway in the West Africa and the Sahel region. Efforts are underway in support of the "multinational securitization force" to boost "the G-5 Sahel Joint Force" in its collective and military security operations,[72] according to Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Head of the UNOWAS and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the West Africa and the Sahel region) who has formally briefed the UNSC on many occasions. That type of securitisation is one way of confronting an indirect effect of climate change which, nonetheless, directly contributed to increased radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in the West Africa and the Sahel region. To this end, Chambas explained that the inability of some countries in the region to provide sufficient aid in the face of worsening climate change has weakened public perception of the state. In those countries, according to Chambas, extremist organisations provide protection and safety to local populations, as well as social services in exchange for loyalty.

It is worth noting that while quantitative studies generally have difficulty explaining that climate-related conflicts do not automatically occur where the impacts of climate change are most severe (Ide 2017), violent groups might, for example, instigate a conflict in areas where state presence is weak (Detges 2014). Confronting this problem is one of the purposes of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, as endorsed by the UNSC. The securitisation of climate change, set against the prediction that existing tensions in this region would trigger implications for international security, has compelled security and environmental measures to prevent resort to traditional security measures (de Brito 2012). With the unfolding instability in the region, intensifying interventions aimed at geopolitical interests and the securitisation of the region unfolds against the background of multiple drivers of conflict, climate change and weak governance (Davitti & Ursu 2018). The recourse to securitisation interventions have themselves become an additional factor defining the West Africa and the Sahel region (Harmon 2015). As most regional security arrangements in Africa is focused on "risk management and not securitisation" (Seiyefa 2019: 160), one of such interventions is climate securitisation.

[72] UN Security Council, SC/12910, 8002nd meeting, 13 July 2017.

Climate actors continue to make securitising moves at the UNSC level. On 10 January 2019 Mohamed Chambas briefed UNSC members about the report of Secretary-General for the West Africa and the Sahel region (note that the briefing is different from the UNSC debate on 25 January 2019). In the respective reporting period, each report by the Secretary-General documents the activities of the UNOWAS. For these reasons one of the innovative approaches that the UN has used to address regional development and security challenges is the region-focused mandates of the UNOWAS (Mateja 2018; Boutellis & Tiélès 2018). Reflecting its mandate to preserve global security, the UNSC receives regular reports about climate-related security risks through the Secretary-General. Key players in the climate security debate attended the briefing by Chambas. Germany's representative welcomed the ongoing work of UNOWAS on the analysis of climate-related security risks and commended UNOWAS on its completion of the first stage of an analysis of climate-related risks in line with last year's presidential statement S/PRST/2018/16.[73] This parallels the statement that "UNOWAS is a valuable tool" that enables the UN to play a role in both conflict prevention and peacebuilding that prevent crises rather than resolving them after the fact is of course the best way to avoid suffering, as well as to achieve shared savings.[74]

As a response to Chambas' briefing at the debate on 10 January 2019, China's representative emphasised stability in the West Africa and the Sahel region. According to Wu Haitao (China's representative to the UNSC), "recently the situation" in this region "has been largely stable, and a number of countries in the region have registered positive progress with their political processes," although the region is "still dealing with threats" like "cross-border organized crime and natural disasters."[75] In contrast, the UK's representative welcomed the efforts of the UNOWAS which "continue to be an invaluable bulwark against the forces of instability" in the West Africa and the Sahel region, "but remains concerned by the security and political situation in large parts of the region," and "as we have discussed many times before in the Council, both military and non-military action is required to address these threats."[76] Polyanskiy (Russia's representative) welcomed actions by UNOWAS against extremism and terrorism because "security

[73] S/PV.8442, 10 January 2019, p. 6.
[74] Ibid, p. 6.
[75] Ibid, p. 11.
[76] Ibid, p. 12.

threats affect states' ability to deal with their socioeconomic problems, which is why efforts to ensure security and stability efforts have to be implemented as part of a comprehensive approach," meaning "military and counter-terrorism measures" in combination with "efforts to strengthen state institutions."[77] Bearing in mind that one of the mandates of the UNOWAS involves assessment of linkages between climate and security, this might yet be the clearest indication of Russia softening its stance in terms of this mandate. Evidence for this can be retrieved from the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York where Ravilova-Borovik (Russia's representative) made it clear that the UNSC "can participate in climate issues 'only in the case of individual country issues' of already ongoing conflict" (Orlove 2017: para. 21). The logic may also turn out as the moment of change – whether to support climate securitisation or continue the longstanding opposition to it. Alternatively, there may be a degree of indecisiveness on Russia's part.

At the debate on 25 January 2019, many representatives also acknowledged that the relationships between climate change and security should be a recurrent debate in the UNSC. In this regard, representatives from India, Barbados and the UK mentioned the climate security phrase, whereas Norway, Brazil, Tuvalu and the EU preferred climate-security. More linkages between climatic impacts and threats to international peace and security have been recognised (Sherman (2019). As pointed out by most of the 82 representatives who expressed their views at the open forum, a stronger focus on adaptation and disaster risk management is vital for addressing these impacts and threats. For these reasons Achim Steiner (UNDP's representative) clarified how the UNDP, in partnership with the Maldives, the Dominican Republic and the four biggest insurance companies in the Caribbean, has supported initiatives to "facilitate financial risk transfers from climate-vulnerable households to the private sector" and enable "disaster risk planning and disaster response."[78]

A useful argument was made before the debate on 25 January 2019 when Camilla Born, a climate security expert at think-tank E3G argued that these initiatives could be "game changing," for "new tools" to evaluate and communicate "climate risks" in a world seriously lagging behind on climate action (Mathiesen & Sauer 2019: para. 16). Born

[77] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 17.
[78] Ibid, p. 5.

further clarified this view during an interview conducted by the present author. Born explained: the challenges being created by "climate-related security risks" are being confronted "using old tools" like "moral norms" and "political norms;" however, as we are seeing geopolitics being shaped by climate change, clearly "a way of expressing a moment in multilateralism or modern kind of international diplomacy because it is the most contemporary new issue of our time that we are having to deal with in a collective way," the new tools formed "an entry point for dealing with climate change holistically" and the "security card."[79] Louise van Schaik, another interviewee, confirmed on a similar note: "the Swedes really pushed hard to establish an institutional home within the UN and now of course" there are "kind of many mechanisms in place" meaning there's somebody at the UN, the UNDP, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), including "powerful people like Amina Mohammed," who are advocating for creating an institutional home for climate security.[80] Susanne Droege affirmed in a separate interview that climate security "matters most to who has interest in having this kind norm; and of course, it could develop by itself, by the debate."[81] Based on several interviews with other experts, public perceptions of climate change ties in with apprehension of what would happen across the world while the tangible impacts may be localised with differing forms and severity, requiring specific the solutions.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has compared Arria-Formula meetings and UNSC formal debates on climate security. The analysis revealed that climate change has altered (and continues to alter) the perceptions and conceptions of security in the UNSC. It also revealed the extent to which statements by the UNSC have indicated an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. This can be found, for instance, in a set of presidential statements released by the UNSC – an actor that repeatedly expressed concerns about climate change and international security, and notably challenges to stability in the West Africa and the Sahel region. The main motivating and controlling factor for such concerns is the basics requirements of human security. In terms of how, statements by proponents

[79] Interview conducted by author, 10 September 2018.
[80] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.
[81] Interview conducted by author, 18 September 2018.

and opponents of climate security in the UNSC have prominently influenced the participation of UNSC in the climate security debate. More convincing is the trend over time whereby UNSC members formally debated climate security on three occasions, compared with ten occasions at Arria-Formula meetings. The regularity of Arria meetings ensured the status of climate security as an international agenda. Compared with 2007 and 2011 debates, the formal debate in July 2018 showed more countries are becoming more receptive to discussing climate security in the UNSC, rather than the FCCC.

Corry (2012) proposes a neat demarcation between securitisation theory and the riskification framework. Desirable as that may be, further analysis of statements on climate security showed Corry's proposition to be a difficult thing to achieve. Although these two concepts are different from each other, the extent of riskification can be judged from the progress of securitisation in policy settings like the UNSC. The analysed statements revealed how the concepts sometimes operated side-by-side, perhaps riskification is the precondition for securitisation. Thus, it would be difficult for a securitising move to be successful unless it has successfully completed the processes of riskification.

The analysis suggested that UNOWAS perhaps might be an indication of the recognition regarding climate security. The UNOWAS has current research projects focussing on climate-related security risks in the West Africa and the Sahel region, and currently provides additional strategic guidance and political advocacy for UN agencies and climate-related projects. Furthermore, on the ground, some of the presidential statements pointed to how the UNOWAS has been providing expert advice to UNSC members so that they can make better and evidence-based decisions about climate-related security risks in the West Africa and the Sahel region. The presidential statements emphasised the research-based outcomes, urging the UNOWAS to continue in this epistemic role. Clearly, the UNOWAS, by itself, is an effective answer to the question of the extent to which statements by the UNSC have indicated an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself.. In the initial phase of norm emergence, epistemic communities identify possible refinements and policy positions of the norm, as they simultaneously produce analysis of the ways in which the norm might be innovatively understood and applicable to the difficult aspects of the issues being

investigated. Transnational epistemic communities would then target the UNSC, encouraging it to formally adopt broad-based resolutions that are supportive of the emerging climate security norm or candidate norm (these two phrases are used interchangeably henceforth).

The analysis showed close linkages between the epistemic community on climate security, climate-riskification and climate securitisation. Beside the findings in the above three paragraphs, the evidence given in this regard is expressed in the Secretary-General's annual reports about the activities of the UNOWAS. One reading of the reports is that the UNOWAS is a form of practice regularly engaged by the UNSC for enriching its knowledge about climate-related security risks. The June 2010[82] and June 2018[83] Secretary-General's reports on the UNOWAS are key examples of this claim. What is more, there is no evidence that the current disputes over the topic of climate-related security risks has reduced the UNSC's heightened concern for human security. However, the debate has influenced the degree and specific types of involvement.

This chapter's findings may encourage climate security scholars and help policymakers identify priority elements for research and advocacy action. In this light, critical analysis of Arria-Formula meetings and formal debates can illuminate the progress and the possible future of climate security. While the analysis helps the chapter to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the three analytical themes, the UNOWAS has been largely side-tracked by climate and environmental security scholars even though the organisation is a crucial data source and an authoritative player when it comes to assessment of climate-related security risks. For example, Hardt (2018) insightfully argued in her book that an important reason for more research in the field of environmental security is to conduct more case study analysis on other international actors in order to improve the relationship between theory and practice. The book mentions the UNSC, the FCCC, the UNEP, the UN General Assembly and the Secretary General. I would have like to see the UNOWAS among these actors.

[82] S/2010/324, 21 June 2010.
[83] S/2018/649, 29 June 2018.

CHAPTER 5 THE FCCC'S STATEMENTS ON CLIMATE SECURITY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to answer an important question: to what extent might policy statements and discussions by the FCCC indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and therefore the recognition of the concept itself? This question cannot be seen in isolation from the prominence of the migration agenda in climate negotiation texts since 2008 (Warner 2011). This aligned with an important development in 2009 when governments agreed to consider climate-related displacement under national adaptation plans.[84] In turn, this agreement aligned with another key development as within the FCCC, the issue of climate-related risks took on a new meaning in 2010 with the creation of the Adaptation Committee as an integral part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, a principled initiative to enhance understanding and coordination of adaptation measures – including climate-related migration and/or displacement.[85]

The research question signifies the relevance of qualitative inquiry, prompting discourse analysis of statements on climate security from meetings held in the 2010–2019 timeframe which complements both Jinnah's (2014) analysis on environmental secretariat activities and Zwolski and Kaunert's (2011) evaluation of the criteria for epistemic community on climate security. Discourse analysis will help to confirm or refute the chapter's argument: climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the FCCC. The question is also relevant even though it has yet to become prominent within the FCCC. Reconciling conflictual views and values may demand attention to discourse and dialogue in the hope of addressing unclear risks (Deere-Birkbeck 2009). This implies that the ways in which the risks of climate change have been phrased remain central to answering the question and thus the interpretation of both the FCCC's conceptualisations of these risks and climate security as a potential adaption agenda.

[84] FCCC, World needs to tackle climate displacement, 19 September 2018, https://tinyurl.com/ya3xs6pp.
[85] FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011, p. 5.

Evidence in the literature shows demand for increased climate action, for better risk-management approaches (Benzie 2014; Street & Jude 2019), and for more focus on the important role of reducing climate risks in climate change adaptation (Tung et al. 2019). This perspective will both benefit from presenting adaptation as a risk-based agenda and help decision-making particularly where information flows contain uncertainty (Street et al. 2019). These arguments are clear reflections of the extent to which FCCC's statements on climate security could indicate riskification, which is yet to be comprehensively examined by scholars. But future policies on riskification would be quite difficult to pursue if weak riskifying statements are conveyed to the COP.

This chapter is presented as follows. The next section justifies the two subcases. Next, the chapter examines statements made at Adaptation Committee meetings, followed by a section on Task-Force on Displacement meetings. The chapter then analyses the epistemic community on climate security, climate-riskification, and climate securitisation in terms of these meetings. It concludes with key findings, revealing a combined line of thought which implies how the epistemic community has understood climate security is an undeniable indication of the extent to which the FCCC has conceptualised and indicated an emerging climate security discourse, thereby recognising the concept itself.

Justification of the Subcases

This chapter confines the analytical boundaries to two key actors that have undertaken advocacy work: the Task-Force on Displacement and the Adaptation Committee. Several points support this confinement, which helps a credible analysis based on transcripts of formal meetings held by these actors. Compared to the Task-Force on Displacement that held three formal meetings, one stakeholder meeting and two special events at the 2018/2019 COP, the Adaptation Committee has held several special and expert events at the COP, six workshops and sixteen meetings between 2012 and 2019. The Adaptation Committee's and the Task-Force on Displacement's mandates are broadly similar (especially in relation to the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage as related to the Cancun Adaptation Framework – that was created in 2010). The period between the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework and the 2015 Paris Agreement is vital for the emergence of climate-related

migration/displacement as a policy priority and also the stable presence of this topic on the FCCC's policy agenda – due in part to the Task-Force on Displacement's ongoing engagement with the topic (Nash 2018). A key feature of that period was a remarkably high level of collaboration between institutional actors who conducted advocacy work while individuals took it upon themselves to carve self-directed policymaking roles, argued Nash.

Yet the contrast between the Task-Force on Displacement and the Adaptation Committee needs to be explored and understood. For four key reasons, analysis of this form will offer important insights that have hitherto been understudied and also strengthen common assumptions or offer some counter-points. Firstly, the FCCC has been mandated to address the issue of climate change. It has been receptive to riskifying and securitising moves since the Cancun Adaptation Framework's creation. These moves may indicate whether climate security may become a part of the adaption agenda. Secondly, the Task-Force on Displacement and not the Adaptation Committee manages climate-related migration and/or displacement. Thirdly, the Task-Force on Displacement's mandate which conforms to the tenets of international instruments (like the Migration Compact and the Sendai Framework) does not explicitly acknowledge the possibility of a link between climatic impacts and, for instance, civil conflict onset. This is interesting. It raises a curiosity about why the Task-Force on Displacement has ventured into the climate security issue. Fourthly and perhaps more important, a distinct epistemic community on climate security has emerged around them particularly when it comes to the possibilities of climate conflict and climate-related migration and/or displacement, although, as we will see, the FCCC conceptualised climate security quite differently from the UNSC.

5.2 The Adaptation Committee

September 2013 meeting: The Adaptation Committee has held many meetings as outlined in Table 8. Evidence of engagement with riskification can be found in the concept notes for these meetings. The concept note summarises comparable attributes of invited submissions received prior to the meeting and classifies each organisation's basic response according to the Nairobi Work Programme classification of partner

organisations.[86] Central to all meetings held by the Adaptation Committee, is Decision 1/CP.16, which established the Cancun Adaptation Framework and thereby acknowledged key security challenges caused by climate change. Decision 1/CP.16 gives information on the loss and damage mechanism and also acknowledges a set of slow-onset events as climate-related risks. These comprise glacial retreat and related impacts, increasing temperature, land and forest degradation, desertification, biodiversity loss, sea-level rise, ocean acidification and salinisation.[87] The Adaptation Committee, in what might be seen as engagement with climate security, has been considering how these events would manifest in real-life situations.

Table 8. Meetings held by the Adaptation Committee (The Nairobi Work Programme focuses on disaster risk reduction and impact assessments).

Meetings	Climate securitisation	Climate-riskification
Aug 2012	Not detected	Nairobi Work Programme, Work Programme on Loss and Damage
Mar 2013	=	Work Programme on Loss and Damage
Jun 2013	=	Work Programme on Loss and Damage
Sep 2013	=	Nairobi Work Programme, early warning strategies
Feb 2014	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Disaster Risk Reduction
Mar 2014	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Work Programme on Loss and Damage, Disaster Risk Reduction, early warning strategies, slow-onset events
Sep 2014	=	Nairobi Work Programme
Sep 2015	=	Nairobi Work Programme
Mar 2016	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Work Programme on Loss and Damage
Sep 2016	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Sendai Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction, slow-onset events
Mar 2017	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Sendai Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction
Sep 2017	=	Work Programme on Loss and Damage, Sendai Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction
Mar 2018	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Sendai Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction
Oct 2018	=	Work Programme on Loss and Damage, Sendai Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction
Mar 2019	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Work Programme on Loss and Damage, Sendai Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction
Sept 2019	=	Nairobi Work Programme, Work Programme on Loss and Damage

[86] Fourth meeting, AC/2013/25, 5-7 September 2013, https://tinyurl.com/wxh68kr.
[87] FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011.

March 2014 meeting: The riskification trend and the idea of slow-onset events featured prominently in the concept note for the meeting. Among the organisations that responded to the request for submissions, the UN University listed lists Climate Change, Hydro-Conflicts and Human Security (CLICO) as one of its collaborative research projects.[88] But caution must be exercised. The submission is unavailable publicly and there is also no evidence indicating the Adaptation Committee utilised the submission which may have contained research findings by CLICO. However, a key finding on CLICO's website shows that although "large-scale state-led development projects" often "end up increasing the insecurity" of populations "who are most marginalized economically and politically," civil "violence does make the populations affected by it most vulnerable to hazards" but "violent conflict is not the result of hydro-climatic hazards."[89] The European Commission funded a CLICO project that explored whether climate impacts on "water scarcity, droughts and floods" is threatening to human security, "at least by exacerbating social tensions and intra- and inter-state conflicts in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Sahel.[90] This is a significant finding. What is more, just as the FCCC believes droughts are extreme events that are closely linked with slow-onset climate events in Africa,[91] CLICO is familiar with slow-onset events not simply in terms of climate change but also riskification. All this suggests that while how slow-onset events will unfold cannot be known for certainty, the FCCC is certainly in the known about what remains to be achieved in relation to riskification and policy formulation.

March 2018 meeting: A logic of riskification is strongly implied in the concept note for the meeting. The suggestions raised in earlier meetings may have contributed to this logic. For instance, "domestic barriers and challenges that need to be overcome" include "political barriers like political instability, conflict, or inconsistent and/or insufficient engagement of political officials."[92] These challenges are however not animated with full specificities. For instance, one reason for insufficient engagement could be due to the level of importance that political figures attach to democratic ideals. In established democracies, inconsistent engagement of political elites is hardly a concern. What is more, the concept note provides adequate information on the risks of climate change,

[88] Fifth meeting, AC/2014/7, 5-7 March 2014, https://tinyurl.com/y74rh6r9.
[89] CLICO, para. 4, http://www.clico.org/.
[90] EU, SWD/2013/0138 final, 2013, p. 7.
[91] FCCC/TP/2012/7, 26 November 2012.
[92] Thirteenth meeting, AC/2018/3, 27 Feb – 2 March 2018, pp. 14-15. https://tinyurl.com/y9l6yly6.

including both observed risks and risks that are anticipated to increase in the future, from changes in invasive species distribution to socio-economic impacts, costs and nearly everything relevant in between.

This finding broadly resonates with Corry's (2012) argument. Corry argues that pinpointing a link between security problems and climate change is not the same as climate securitisation because a discussion on security necessarily requires emphasising the notion of exceptional measures by identifying existential threats. Those warning against securitisation may effectively be effecting a de-riskifying move, potentially moving climate change away from this precautionary logic into normal politics or depoliticisation (Corry 2012). Certainly, as Nash observes, there are serious complaints against various articulations of the climate migration issue. These criticism range from the maligned narratives of migration management (Nash 2018) to the securitised interpretation that climate change will displace people who represent a security threat to developed countries (Bettini 2013). Either way, these analogies hitherto have not been explored in terms of the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement. Given this inattention in the literature, it is useful to examine the Task-Force on Displacement before the section on the epistemic community on climate security. Thus, the following section discusses how the Task-Force on Displacement has understood and conceptualised climate security.

5.3 The Task Force on Displacement

This section discusses whether climate change has altered the perception and conception of security by actors and – if so – the extent to which statements by the Task-Force on Displacement might indicate an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. It is worth recalling that the main mandate of the Task-Force on Displacement is to develop recommendations on how to avert, minimise and address displacement in the context of climate change (Decision 5/CP.23). It is noteworthy to begin with two key decisions made by Parties to the COP. The decisions are inseparable (Table 9). Firstly, Parties decided to make climate-related migration, displacement and slow-onset events as part of the agenda for the 2016/17 COP. Secondly, Parties instructed the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for

Loss and Damage to create a task force on displacement. This Committee responded by developing the Task Force on Displacement's terms of reference in September 2016, followed by the Task Force on Displacement's official creation in March 2017 (Table 9). In November 2017, Parties invited the Task Force on Displacement to consider cross-border and internal displacement in accordance with the latter's mandate. The Task Force on Displacement terms of reference imply that members have the freedom to develop recommendations as they deem appropriate for specific reports, although such freedom does not reduce the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage's influence as the overall manager of all reports' contents (Nash 2017). However, there are instances where decisions by this Committee were overruled when a specific report is turned into recommendations. Indeed, there is high likelihood for delegating human mobility tasks to the Task Force on Displacement (Serdeczny 2017).

Table 9. Key decisions relating to the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement

2010	Cancun Adaptation Framework
2011	LD[93]
2012	COP' role on Loss and Damage
2013	Exe Com / Warsaw Inter. Mechanismcreated
2014	Workplan approved for the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
2015	Paris Agreement
2016	Task Force on Displacement's reference terms approved
2017	Task Force on Displacement created / inaugural meeting
2018	Task Force on Displacement's recommendations approved

Not only has the Task-Force on Displacement intentionally and unintentionally made riskifying moves at its meetings, and becomes more sensitive and active about global climate governance – underpinned by several international instruments. Key among these instruments includes the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda, the Sendai Framework and the Migration Compact. The Task-Force on Displacement's main mandate parallels the mandates assigned to some of these instruments, which share several similarities. These instruments remain crucial for the collective goal seeking to provide immediate – where and when possible – and sustainable support to host communities sheltering people displaced within and across borders. Due to their normative underpinnings, the Task-Force on Displacement reflects

[93] Subsidiary Body for Implementation on Loss and Damage, 19 April 2011, https://tinyurl.com/y4747akk.

several aspects of climate-riskification, climate securitisation and the epistemic community on climate security.

Inaugural meeting: Statements made by international organisations at the inaugural meeting championed the riskification trend, illuminating a general understanding of how they have understood and conceptualised climate security. The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage provided general information about what should be expected from the Task-Force on Displacement.[94] The latter requested concept notes that should inform the meeting. Five key organisations were among those that submitted concept notes. These include the International Labour Organization, the UNDP, the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The technical report on the inaugural meeting is unavailable publicly – if there is one – but these organisations provided information about their strategic programmes on climate-related migration and forced displacement. Based on information made available at the respective websites, one can envisage a common posture pointing to the practise of riskification by these organisations.

Compared to the International Labour Organization's belief that labour migration is a lifeline for some people to "cope, adapt" and "prevent later displacement" because climate threats may jeopardise human livelihoods,[95] it is significant that the International Organization for Migration adopts a similar posture judging by its "institutional engagement on migration, climate change" which includes facilitating "migration as an adaptation strategy," preventing "forced migration resulting from environmental factors and climate change," and providing protection to affected populations where forced migration cannot be avoided.[96] The tone of riskification becomes clearer with the UNDP's statement that the "key root causes" driving migration and displacement include "governance challenges," climatic impacts, "protracted conflicts and violent extremism."[97] These statements underpin the UNHCR's commitments to providing

[94] The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, First meeting of the Task-Force, May 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y2eovgth.
[95] International Labour Organization, Warsaw International Task-Force on Displacement, 2017, p. 2, https://tinyurl.com/y6qfpy2q.
[96] International Organization for Migration, Migration and climate change: From shadows to spotlight, 2017, p. 3, https://tinyurl.com/y25qaseg.
[97] UNDP, Promoting development approaches to migration and displacement, 2017, p. 1, https://tinyurl.com/y28txbjw.

"practical solutions for the protection of people displaced by the effects of climate change and natural disasters" with respect to the "relationship" between "conflict and instability" and "displacement."[98] Despite engagement with displacement in the 1990s and thereafter, during which UNHCR's operations have extended to cross-border displacement resulting from sudden-and slow-onset climate-related impacts (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2017), UNHCR's coordinated involvement in climate-related displacement finally emerged in 2007 (Hall 2016a). All this intuitively demonstrates the organisations' postures at that meeting, assuming there is no significant deviation.

May 2018 stakeholder meeting: At this meeting participants were grouped into thematic sessions to facilitate collaborative, deeper and constructive dialogue. In line with the FCCC's guidelines, the Task-Force on Displacement requested submissions before the meeting. Although the request did not explicitly require the logic of riskification, it expected submissions to complement the topics already addressed in the Task-Force on Displacement's Workplan for the 2017/18 period. Eight[99] targeted organisations responded to the call. The submission by Oxfam made a clear riskifying move with the following statement: "the Global Compact on Refugees recognizes that 'environmental degradation and natural disasters' are drivers and exacerbating factors in situations of conflict/persecution" even though this Global Compact "does not explicitly guarantee protection, assistance and solutions to people displaced by disasters and/or in the context of climate change."[100] Oxfam recommends this context "should be central" to the Task-Force on Displacement's mandate. Oxfam's choice of security phrasing (should be central to the Task-Force on Displacement's mandate) could be read that the organisation might eventually become a member of the Task-Force on Displacement. One key message emerged from a session moderated by the UNHCR, that the challenge of loss and damage related to climate-related displacement was already a global concern.[101]

September 2018 meeting: For this meeting, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre lucidly articulated riskification in its reporting containing a synthesis of literature.

[98] UNHCR's Strategic Directions 2017–2021. January 2017. https://tinyurl.com/ya893f2h.
[99] ActionAid International, CARE International and Refugees International (joint submission), Changemaker Norway, Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, Overseas Development Institute, South American Network for Environmental Migrations (RESAMA), UN Convention to Combat Desertification, and World Trade Institute.
[100] Oxfam Submission, 2018, p. 5, https://tinyurl.com/ybr67uhv.
[101] Task-Force meeting report, May 2018, p. 16, https://tinyurl.com/y3vbq78f.

Alongside highlighting that the literature identifies four major ways in which slow-onset events may turn into disasters and contribute to increase displacement risks, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre points to another logic of riskification:

> Slow-onset events are not a direct catalyst for violent conflict but are often characterised as multiplier or magnifier of pre-existing conflicts because they uniquely hold the potential to not only exacerbate already fragile situations but also fuel conflict over resource scarcity. … Conflict, violence and other polarized societies, political ideologies and socio-ethnic divides can further contribute to the disruption of livelihoods. … Conflicts are a main responsibility of fragile governance structures and the inability of the state and relevant stakeholders to ensure peace. … In situations where conflict and/or other economic, social, cultural, and political instability factors are present simultaneously with slow-onset events; such factors may amplify the impacts of slow-onset events, ultimately leading to potential migration.[102]

One phrasing centres on what awaits countries who may be unlucky to fall victim of weak governance structures. In this reasoning, slow-onset events, migration and conflict are riskifying phrasings. John Podesta (2019) [founder of Center for American Progress, a conservative security-focused think tank] would support the statements because climate change is widely recognised as exacerbating of migration and conflict though only few examples of climate change as the sole factor in migration may be established. Labelling climate change as a key driver of migration may even be disadvantageous. This is because we do not have enough evidence. Podesta, White House chief of staff to President Bill Clinton suggests that the deterioration of slow-onset events will exacerbate many humanitarian crises and may lead to more climate-related migration and displacement. This perspective has been duly emphasised in the literature on climate security.

[102] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Synthesizing the state of knowledge to better understand displacement related to slow onset events, August 2018, p. 7, https://tinyurl.com/qus9fs6.

5.4 Applying the Epistemic Community on Climate Security Theme

This section applies the epistemic community on climate security analytical theme, thus confirming the fact of emergence of an epistemic community related to Task-Force on Displacement meetings. The Task-Force on Displacement regularly contacts key organisations and makes requests for research to inform its meetings. Organisations have made it a habit to contextualise climate risks in their concept notes, although details about climate risks were lacking. But is there evidence showing the epistemic community on climate security's commitment to the climate security debate? As a response, proper identification of epistemic community on climate security members and the forums where they have participated are important. The forum exists mainly through Task-Force on Displacement meetings. These meetings seemed to have helped consensus among members.

The emergence of the epistemic community on climate security benefitted from submissions by organisations such as the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction and the World Water Council. With the exception of the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction and the World Water Council, these organisations featured prominently at the May 2018 Task-Force on Displacement stakeholder meeting, co-organised by the International Organization for Migration and the Platform on Disaster Displacement on behalf of the Task-Force on Displacement. Over 70 experts from civil society, governments, scholars and representatives of regional and international organisations attended the meeting.[104] The meeting sent a decisive sign, shifting the balance in the weighting given to climate change expertise and human mobility expertise respectively, thereby underscoring the role of knowledge as a currency for decision-making in a policy setting (Nash 2019). The Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations, another influential member of the Task-Force on Displacement, led the synthesis of existing knowledge on displacement and slow-onset events, in consultation with the reference group – the International Organization for Migration, the UNHCR and the UNDP. The stakeholder meeting was symbolic of an appropriate occasion to conduct substantial work on the assignments listed in the Task-Force on Displacement's Workplan, more horizontal than other formal FCCC meetings, and more conducive for Parties to the COP and non-Parties to take stock of the

[104] Task-Force on Displacement meeting report, May 2018, p. 6.

Workplan's scheduled activities (Nash 2019). Set against this wording, Nash suggests that it seemed indisputable that a connection has been made between the Workplan and the stakeholder meeting despite being co-organised by the International Organization for Migration and the Platform on Disaster Displacement rather than the FCCC. The collections of feedback from international experts and organisations with relevant expertise implied that the Task-Force on Displacement valued stories from the frontlines as a crucial source of data for adjustment to and reduction of climate risks, that is to say, stories sourced through interviews with people who have directly experienced climate consequences. As emphasised in a press release by the International Organization for Migration,[105] the expert status accorded to the attendant stakeholders is akin to that of the co-organisers' expertise and networks (Nash 2019).

The International Organization for Migration and the Platform on Disaster Displacement (co-organisers of the stakeholder meeting) are significant to the emergence of the epistemic community on climate security. Informed by the inaugural and stakeholder meetings, they authored a technical report for the 2018 COP. In it a set of detailed recommendations provided the steps needed to further achieve the Task-Force on Displacement's mandate. It also outlined certain phrasings of climate risks as suggested by epistemic community on climate security members, promising readiness to "provide technical support" to FCCC Parties to the COP for further implementation of the Task-Force on Displacement's recommendations.[106]

The emergence of the epistemic community on climate security can be supported with evidence from other official meetings. In June 2019 the UNHCR and the University of Liege-based Hugo Observatory co-organised a conference as part of final preparations for a side event at the UN Climate Action Summit planned for September 2019. One key objective of the side event was to "showcase examples of how the recommendations are already being implemented."[107] The International Organization for Migration and the Platform on Disaster Displacement served as panel members at the conference where coherence and synergies between global policy processes and displacement featured

[105] International Organization for Migration, Experts meet to scale up efforts to tackle climate change displacement, 15 May 2018, https://tinyurl.com/yaz3o36w.
[106] Recommendations for the 2018 Conference of Parties, https://tinyurl.com/y4d2bh8z.
[107] Bonn climate change conference, June 2019, https://tinyurl.com/yd9y946m.

prominently. Following the inaugural session and stakeholder meetings, the venue for the Task-Force on Displacement "expert meeting" held in July 2019 was the International Organization for Migration.[108] Attendees included the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations, other international organizations, and FCCC Executive Committee members from several regional diverse countries. Whilst there remained heightened awareness about a need to translate how the global climatic change discourse coalition responds to local appropriation (Rudiak-Gould 2014), the attendees finalised a set of planned activities towards the "delivery of their new mandate for the next two years."[109] The attendees and their peers, including those unable to attend the meeting, remain committed to the issue at hand and were central to the FCCC's efforts to attain a balance between adjusting to climate-related migration (and displacement) and reducing or alleviating the severity of associated risks. One may well expect a deepened collaboration and coordination at future meetings.

It is important that the influence of the emergence of an epistemic community on climate security is easily discernible not in forcing decision-makers to adopt preferred policies but in actions – which are not limited to Task-Force on Displacement meetings – undertaken by some members. For example, the UNHCR has been a member of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee special subgroup which has provided collective submissions to the COP since 2008, and has sought to clarify conceptual issues surrounding the migration, displacement and planned relocation terminologies. In circa 2013–2016 the UNHCR played a significant role in ensuring that the 2015 COP decision text established the Task-Force on Displacement. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the highest-level humanitarian coordination platform of the UN system and convenes regularly. It brings together 18 UN and non-UN organisations to facilitate the UN Secretary-General's leadership role in ensuring rapid and coherent policy responses to humanitarian crises.[110] The UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration co-organised a side event aiming to maintain focus on those terminologies at the 2017 COP and thus encourage discussion on priorities identified by the International Labour Organization, the UNDP, and the like.[111]

[108] UN Climate Change, https://tinyurl.com/ycmgee3f.
[109] Platform on Disaster Displacement, Task Force on Displacement – a two-year workplan, 8 July 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y9qlq3ud.
[110] Inter-Agency Standing Committee, https://tinyurl.com/uxjgaq9.
[111] UNHCR engagement in the FCCC, November 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y7bk3tz8.

The epistemic community on climate security's influence on the Task-Force on Displacement can also be related to the latter's brief stint at the Platform on Disaster Displacement. In the 2017/18 period, the Task-Force on Displacement participated as a member of the Platform on Disaster Displacement's Steering Group. The Steering Group defines internal displacement as a forced displacement phenomenon resulting from efforts to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence and natural or human-made disasters.[112] The Group emphasises that large-scale displacement requires urgent collaboration and action beyond the strides made under the FCCC and the Sendai Framework.[113] The Task-Force on Displacement Committee's involvement with the Steering Group in the 2017–2018 period may well mean that the Committee has accepted the broad definition of internal displacement.

There is a possibility that consensus within the epistemic community on climate security could be impeded by a misunderstanding. The International Organization for Migration and the Platform on Disaster Displacement (co-authors of the technical report on the Task-Force on Displacement stakeholder meeting) assert that "existing bodies and expert groups under the UNFCCC" do not normally consider measures to address climate-related displacement.[114] Yet the Task-Force on Displacement [115] and the Adaptation Committee[116] have emphasised the importance of strengthening coordination, coherence and collaboration with each other and across the FCCC to enhance understanding on migration and climate-related displacement. In fact, the Adaptation Committee has engaged some of these measures to a certain extent, at least as discussed in this chapter. During its meeting in March 2016, the Adaptation Committee mentioned a request by Parties to the 2015 COP urging the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage to create a task force, focussing on climate-related displacement, involving already established bodies and expert groups, including the Adaptation Committee.[117] At the meetings in September 2017,[118] October 2018,[119] March

[112] Platform on Disaster Displacement, Key definitions, https://tinyurl.com/yd975wuy.
[113] Platform on Disaster Displacement, https://tinyurl.com/ya3ezory.
[114] Task-Force meeting report, May 2018, p. 24, https://tinyurl.com/y3vbq78f.
[115] Task-Force meeting report, May 2018, p. 23, https://tinyurl.com/y3vbq78f.
[116] Sixteenth meeting, AC/2019/16, p. 2, 9-12 September 2019.
[117] Ninth meeting, AC/2016/1, p. 4, 1-3 March 2016.
[118] Twelfth meeting, AC/2017/10, 19-22 September 2017.
[119] Fourteenth meeting, AC/2018/10, 24-26 October 2018.

2019[120] and September 2019,[121] Adaptation Committee members nominated to collaborate, on a longer-term mode, with other institutional arrangements that are already included in the Committee's Workplan, including the Task-Force on Displacement. According to the Adaptation Committee's report to the 2019 COP, the Adaptation Committee, besides being represented in the Task-Force on Displacement since its inception, contributed to the background material prepared for the Task-Force on Displacement third meeting and participated in it.[122] Set against all this, it might be prudent for the epistemic community on climate security to consensually adopt a clear definition of climate security in order to settle the misunderstanding.

Despite their years of hands-on experience, statements by epistemic community on climate security members should be properly scrutinised. The advocacy for inclusion of migration and displacement in FCCC texts is now redundant since the Task-Force on Displacement's creation (Nash 2018). According to Nash, this is a distinct policy shift from a simple agenda setting exercise to advocacy that is concerned with content; indeed, advocacy is now seriously concerned with the nuances of human mobility, offering suggestions for how concepts should be comprehended and proposing recommendations on the specific wording of provisions. Second, the ways some of the organisations have understood and conceptualised climate security appeared to be slightly different from each other. In its submission for the stakeholder meeting, the World Trade Institute insists on "the need to strengthen common efforts on the conceptualization and the identification of the multi-casual dimension" of climate-related displacement.[123] Such insistence, based on evidence acquired through direct interactions with displaced migrants and populations, is often backed by commissioned research, as noted, such as the research undertaken by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (interview-based investigation of internal displacement associated with slow-onset events)[124] and the International Organization for Migration.[125]

[120] Fifteenth meeting, AC/2019/1, 19-21 March 2019.
[121] Sixteenth meeting, AC/2019/16, p. 2, 9-12 September 2019.
[122] FCCC/SB/2019/3, p. 11, 10 October 2019.
[123] World Trade Institute, Submission to the Task-Force, May 2018, p. 3, https://tinyurl.com/temxwcy.
[124] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, No matter of choice: displacement in a changing climate, December 2019, p. 5, https://tinyurl.com/uee2s8e.
[125] See, for instance, some of the International Organization for Migration's works on environment and migration: https//tinyurl.com/y9ydy9jc; https//tinyurl.com/y8oo9zev; https//tinyurl.com/y6v62dv7; https//tinyurl.com/ycycx5gz; https//tinyurl.com/ybt6bpnn; https//tinyurl.com/yaweux82; https//tinyurl.com/ycdvbk8y.

Based on the discussion in this section, the emergence of an epistemic community on climate security is based on a coalition of international organisations namely, International Organization for Migration, the International Labour Organization, the UNHCR, the UNDP, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Platform on Disaster Displacement. As shown in Table 10, the list of member countries for each of these organisations seems an adequate representation of the global composition and facilitates better understanding of who gets what from each organisation and thus which countries may be perceived as potential recipients of prioritised attention when there is a need for climate-related emergency protection.

Table 10. List of member countries of Task-Force on Displacement's member organisations

	Executive	**Committee**	**Members**	
Organisations	**Elected**	**Permanent**	**Appointed**	**Regional Bureaus**
International Labour Organization	Australia, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, United States, Japan, UAE, South Africa, Algeria, Senegal, India, Colombia, Mexico.	China, United Kingdom, United States, Russia, Japan, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, India.	Nigeria, Kenya, Jordan, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Côte d'Ivoire, Guatemala, Argentina, Saint Lucia, China, Russia, Canada, Switzerland, Netherlands, Greece, Uruguay, Slovenia, Greece.[126]	
UNHCR	Kenya, Brazil, Belgium, Australia.			West/Central Africa, East/Horn of Africa/Great Lakes Region, Southern Africa, Asia Pacific, Americas, Europe, Middle East/North Africa.
UNDP	Africa (eight), Asia-Pacific (seven), Eastern Europe (four), Latin America/Caribbean (five), Western European/others (twelve).			
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre			Europe (six), Africa (three), Mexico, Japan, Iraq, Fiji	
International Organization for Migration	DG / DDG[127] elected by a two-thirds majority vote.[128]	173 member countries nominate DG and DDG.		
Platform on Disaster Displacement			Bangladesh, Kenya, Senegal, Madagascar, Maldives, Morocco, Fiji, Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Philippines, Australia, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, France, Germany, European Union.	

[126] International Labour Organization: Composition of the governing Body, 2017–2020, https://tinyurl.com/y2yfocga.
[127] Director General (DG), Deputy Director General (DG).
[128] International Organization for Migration, C/108/INF/1, 28/9/2017.

5.5 Climate-Riskification or Climate Securitisation?

The following two sections respectively applies the climate-riskification and climate securitisation themes to interpret statements on climate security. The exercise will provide insights into whether the statements have been part of the FCCC's climate diplomacy strategy, including why and how the statements are utilised and with what consequences. In other words, the sections discuss how the FCCC has understood and conceptualised climate security.

5.5.1 Applying the Climate-Riskification Theme

This section applies climate-riskification to the Task-Force on Displacement's and the Adaptation Committee's reporting to the 2019 COP. It should be noted that climate-riskification may be considered successful when the COP acknowledges, accepts and approves statements by the epistemic community on climate security that convincingly phrase and express identified climate issue(s) as urgent security risks. That said, compared to the Task-Force on Displacement Workplan for the 2019–2021 period focusing on loss and damage associated with climatic impacts, the Adaptation Committee agreed on a more flexible 2019–2021 Workplan at its fourteenth meeting.

Evidence of climate-riskification can be found in the Task-Force on Displacement's and the Adaptation Committee's technical reporting to the 2019 COP. These two bodies invited the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to consider the information contained in their reports and forward the recommendations therein for consideration and adoption at the 2019 COP. Judging by the reports, there are opportunities for strengthening climate-riskification. One of these opportunities relates to the request from Parties to the 2018 COP that the Adaptation Committee should conduct a Global Stocktake.[129] That request should be seen in the context of an inventory of relevant methodologies for assessing adaptation needs and action. The Adaptation Committee expected to develop the inventory by June 2020 in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, scholars and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice – the Nairobi Work Programme manager). The concept note for the September 2017

[129] FCCC/SBSTA/2019/INF.1, 11 June 2019, p. 1.

Adaptation Committee meeting thus confirms that a meeting will be convened where the indicators for the Sendai Framework's goals would be discussed.[130] The Adaptation Committee discussed a concept note at its sixteenth meeting regarding different approaches for developing the inventory.[131] Because planning for risk scenarios is quite challenging, the inventory will be guided by contributions from the scientific community,[132] such as current priorities of adaptation-related international instruments, as expressed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sendai Framework.[133] The technical reports partly anchored their data within the contexts of the inventory and the Global Stocktake.

The Task-Force on Displacement's report was included in the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage's reporting presented to the 2019 COP. The report holds a real potential for the climate-riskification agenda. It features some riskifying moves related to why the Task-Force on Displacement brought together key stakeholders to discuss observations on climate risks and assessment at the domestic and international level. The report also mentions comprehensive risk-management approaches in terms of the long-term resilience of vulnerable populations in the context of loss and damage, of displacement and planned relocation, and of extreme and slow-onset events.

Evidence of the claim about real potential can be traced to the reporting period during which the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage collaborated with the editors of *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability* journal. Following a call for abstract submission,[134] this Committee reviewed twenty-eight abstracts of manuscripts to be published in June 2021 as a special edition of the journal.[135] The call for submissions solicited contributions that should identify the gaps and challenges in understanding slow-onset events, climate change impacts, and loss and damage, and to keep abreast of trends in "responding to the growing need for enhancing understanding of the negative effects of slow onset events on vulnerable populations and

[130] Twelfth meeting, AC/2017/10, 19-22 September 2017, p. 7.
[131] Sixteenth meeting, AC/2019/20.
[132] FCCC/SBSTA/2019/INF.1, 11 June 2019, pp. 24-26.
[133] FCCC/SBSTA/2019/INF.1, 11 June 2019, p. 1.
[134] FCCC, https://tinyurl.com/yc5s6ewv.
[135] FCCC/SB/2019/5/Add.1, 15 November 2019, p. 5.

relevant approaches for addressing them."[136] This call succinctly captured and summarised the prime keywords, arguments relating to phrasings of climate-riskification by several organisations, as narrated in the section on Task-Force on Displacement meetings (Platform on Disaster Displacement, International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization, UNDP, UNHCR, Oxfam and especially Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre).

Since the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and Elsevier have already "invited experts" to provide "emerging" understandings about "slow onset events,"[137] the call demonstrate the usefulness of climate-riskification as an analytical theme. In this reading, each quotation could be said to illustrate the security context of climate change, the conception of security within the FCCC, and the signals (or prospects) of an emerging dominant discourse on climate security (including the growing recognition of the concept itself); at least in a scholarly setting – which oftentimes feeds into the policy arena. This is not to say that the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage's reporting is faultless. The report overlooked solid phrasings of climate-riskification or maybe even securitisation. A case in point is the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre's assertion about how slow-onset events cannot be perceived as a direct catalyst for violent conflict. But slow-onset impacts "can exacerbate already fragile situations" where national "fragile governance structures" coupled with the "the inability" of "relevant stakeholders to ensure peace" are oftentimes closely associated with "conflicts."[138]

Although the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage's peer-review engagement was a rare exception for a FCCC committee, this is not the only reason why its report appeared to hold more potential for the climate-riskification agenda than the Adaptation Committee's report. The Adaptation Committee's report itself had insufficient coverage of climate-riskification. Besides mentioning the COP' invitation to help developing countries integrate the Task-Force on Displacement's mandate into relevant national planning processes, the Adaptation

[136] FCCC/SB/2019/5/Add.1, 15 November 2019, p. 5.
[137] FCCC/SB/2019/5, 15 October 2019, p. 12.
[138] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Synthesizing the state of knowledge, August 2018, p. 7, https://tinyurl.com/qus9fs6.

Committee urged Parties to the COP to support investment that sustainably integrated adaptation through mitigation of risks – including transition and physical risks – because these factors remain central to the corporate sectors' interests.[139] This appears to be the sole explicit contextualisation of disaster risk reduction and thus the sole reference to climate-riskification despite the Adaptation Committee having been notified about important phrasings of climate-riskification courtesy of, for instance, the concept note for the March 2018 meeting.

5.5.2 Applying the Climate Securitisation Theme

The potential for an emerging dominant discourse on climate security (and thus the recognition of this concept) is quite weak when it comes to climate securitisation. The weakness cannot be ascribed to lack of engagement because the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement continue to talk about the security risks of climate change. The weakness is due to two important findings which are firstly, the FCCC is yet to make formal securitising moves about the security risks of climate change and secondly, the presence of informal securitising moves. Securitisation may be successful when securitising actors convincingly phrase and express specific issues as a security threat. When these actors phrase a statement on security, the contexts surrounding the phrasing largely dictate how the underlying interpretations of risks and threats therein are bargained with and perceived by the decision-makers or receiving audience. Success still depends on whether decision-makers will accept the phrasing as requiring forms of extraordinary political response, or at least the legitimation thereof. It is worth noting here that the COP is often very bound by previously agreed phrasings.

Taken together, the bodies' reporting to the 2019 COP reflect the absence of sufficiently convincing securitising statements on climate security. And with many statements that one may draw upon as foundational support of climate security neither satisfying the conditions of successful securitisation nor materialising in formal reports, the reporting could be commended for omitting possible climate-security-conflict linkages. It could also be held responsible for the omission because the linkage is heavily contested. On a long-term basis, the reporting may not be seen as securitisation friendly, so it seemed.

[139] FCCC/SB/2019/3, p. 15, 10 October 2019.

Recommendations for future action are completely devoid of statements that reflect a semblance of a securitising move. However, many statements in the concept notes for the meetings draw upon the logic of securitisation and repeatedly focus on the Nairobi Work Programme at Adaptation Committee meetings. With recursive focus on slow-onset impacts, securitising actors clearly encapsulated a securitisation tone at Task-Force on Displacement meetings. Various statements by Oxfam and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre are indeed clear qualifiers for opening sentences in a securitising move though the statements lost their original phrasing when addressed by the COP.

Even if we look beyond the specific contexts in submissions by organisations, the bodies' reporting to the 2019 COP are largely devoid of statements that may qualify as securitising moves for action before and after the manifestation of events like slow-onset impacts. Non-acknowledgement of securitising statements – even if informal – may impede timely provision of protection to populations in need. Examples of such statements can be found in the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre's report and the Oxfam submission. In its comprehensive technical report to the Task Force on Displacement in August 2018, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre urged the Task Force on Displacement to "systematically record loss and damage (including displacement)' in terms of slow-onset events, to improve research phrasing the interactions between slow-onset impacts and other drivers of displacement (including conflicts) and 'recognise' these contexts 'as a development issue."[140] According to Oxfam's submission for the May 2018 Task Force on Displacement stakeholder meeting, although the Global Compact on Refugees "does not explicitly guarantee protection, assistance and solutions to people displaced by disasters and/or in the context of climate change," we should not discount the fact that '"environmental degradation and natural disasters' are drivers and exacerbating factors in situations of conflict/persecution."[141] These are solid securitising phrasings. But they are nowhere to be found in the reporting to the COP.

Although most discourse analysts would probably argue against securitisation and overly strong risk statements in relation to displacement in this field, this thesis takes such a

[140] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Synthesizing the state of knowledge to better understand displacement related to slow onset events, August 2018, pp. 29-34, https://tinyurl.com/qus9fs6.
[141] Oxfam Submission, 2018, p. 5, https://tinyurl.com/ybr67uhv.

positive stance in relation to risk for an important reason. Although the dynamics of the complex climate-security-displacement nexus are contingent on a whole lot of factors that are internal and external to the nexus, upgrading attention to a security issue can be served by sensitising decision-makers to think more in security terms where and when necessary. Moreover, and as noted above, security phrasings can be found in the documents submitted by the organisations to the Task Force on Displacement. The documents are sometimes informed by public opinion poll. This is an important reason why the COP ought to be clearly notified about relevant security phrasings, which, in a sense, can be taken as voices from below – the people displaced and in need of protection.

What is perhaps more important is that Oxfam used what is essentially a clear parlance of security logic in its submission and whether there is evidence that Oxfam's submission. In 2017, Oxfam conducted a research project that investigated the disproportionate incidence and impact of displacement linked to climate change in lower-income countries, as well as on Indigenous peoples.[142] There is high likelihood that the submission for the Task-Force on Displacement stakeholder meeting[143] was influenced by the project's findings, which were based on case analysis of data on displacement data."[144]

Given the assumption that it is not compulsory to fit all security-related processes within the bounds of the security sector itself, "riskification" offers an alternative to "securitisation" because it may provide a useful perspective for analysing new topics at the margins of the security sector (Hakala 2018: 10). Understood in this way, it becomes more theoretically insightful to acknowledge that since statements on climate security largely failed to indisputably support Plan A – climate securitisation – this thesis next considers Plan B (riskification) rather than letting the statements go unacknowledged. This is a useful rationale for addressing the three themes in the order: climate securitisation, climate-riskification, and the epistemic community on climate security.

[142] Oxfam, Uprooted by climate change. Responding to the growing risk of displacement, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/ta4398v.
[143] Oxfam Submission, 2018, p. 2, https://tinyurl.com/ybr67uhv.
[144] Oxfam, Uprooted by climate change. Responding to the growing risk of displacement, 2017, pp. 30-31.

5.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter started with the claim that understanding and interpreting how the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement have understood climate security reflects the FCCC's posture with respect to security phrasings. The interpretation of the four key findings implies firstly, climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the FCCC although its original mandate requires no such conceptualisation and secondly, various statement by the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement have set climate-riskification in motion. Thirdly, it is also permissible to claim that the FCCC now embraces climate-riskification in terms of climate security to the extent that future policies on climate-riskification would be quite difficult to pursue if weak riskifying statements are conveyed to the COP. Altogether and fourthly, this implies that how the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement have understood climate-riskification indicates the extent to which the FCCC has conceptualised and indicated an emerging climate security discourse, thereby recognising the concept itself. The FCCC being the custodian of global climate governance is adopting climate-riskification if the practice of riskification is taken to mean the shift from precautionary logic to a normal politics of international climate governance. Despite the contribution to knowledge on climate security discourse, other categories of data on contestation and transformations relating to the FCCC's engagement with slow-onset events and climate-related displacement are needed if one is to present further empirical findings on governance of climate risks in the context of climate security.

Furthermore, how the epistemic community on climate security has understood climate security clearly revealed the extent to which the FCCC has conceptualised and indicated an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. Following analysis of reports of Adaptation Committee and Task-Force on Displacement meetings, several convincing riskifying statements were found in the reports to the COP. Whilst further strengthening of global adaptation governance appears contested, which suggests that governance forms and functions used so far have not been authoritative in how they seek to shape actions (Persson 2019), the scepticism that may be allocated to certain riskifying statements, including the phrasings with available information on

climate risks, especially slow-onset impacts, exemplify the likelihood of the phrasings foregrounding future decision-making by the COP and thus furthering the governance of climate risks.

Global adaptation governance occurs when state and non-state actors in the transnational and global sphere intentionally and authoritatively shape the actions of constituents towards climate change adaptation as a public goal (Persson 2019). Although climate risk-management has become a key plank in the FCCC adaptation programme, the fact that recent assessments indicate the rarity of both formal risk analysis in climate adaptation research (Travis & Bates 2014) could be due to the lack of a clear global-level problem-phrasing and/or recognition of adaptation as a global public good even though global adaptation governance is indeed emerging (Persson 2019). Still, there remains serious discontinuity regarding how best to phrase climate-security connections and the avenues through which climate security problems should be addressed despite the conceptual and practical maturation of many climate security concepts (Ewing 2014). Whilst this has meant the limited legitimacy of global governance initiatives (Persson 2019), the articulation of climate change as a security issue since 2003 indicates a risk-management approach through contingency (Oels 2013). This is more so because the interpretation of a key finding implies the FCCC, being the custodian of global climate governance, is now embracing climate-riskification, especially with respect to the Cancun Adaptation Framework's creation in 2010, in terms of climate security.

This finding is supported by little to no availability of undisputable evidence of climate securitisation if we are to believe that a securitising statement imply a compelling motion for an extraordinary measure in a high politics setting. Despite that securitising statements rarely appear on the agenda at the COP given the challenging nature of securitising moves, including the FCCC's original mandate requiring no conceptualisation of climate securitisation, how the FCCC, by following the required and available epistemic community on climate security route, has risen to this self-assigned and -defined challenge is commendable.

There are differences between securitisation tendencies and normative moves by the epistemic community on climate security. Despite this, the three analytical themes, as

unpacked in this chapter, could be mutually co-constitutive. They are currently reinterpreting extant beliefs, modifying the mandate landscape, and issuing unavoidable challenges as well as requirements for how international climate security is conceptualised and studied. Better understanding of these developments is important for advancing the capacity of decision-makers, policymakers, advocates and analysts to respond. There is an opportunity for the FCCC to build on this momentum by consolidating it into a cornerstone for future debates at the COP. Perhaps more important, this may enable the FCCC to make a decisive decision and gather political support for consideration of climate security as an adaptive strategy. Other scholars might want to build on this chapter by examining contestation and transformation associated with the FCCC's engagement with slow-onset events and climate-related displacement because discursive climate risk governance can serve to enhance the emerging dominant discourse on climate security (and thus the recognition of this concept itself). For now, we need to look and see how the EU has engaged and phrased the climate security issue.

CHAPTER 6 THE EU'S STATEMENTS ON CLIMATE SECURITY

6.1 Introduction

The EU is a global leader on the topic of climate change and security. The EU agenda on this topic is underpinned by a moral sense of responsibility to confront the issue of climate-related security risks. This sense of morality has led to various world-class climate advocacies, actions, programmes and policies. This chapter contributes to understanding recent trends in the EU's climate security agenda by focusing on the ways in which two initiatives have contributed to the agenda, particularly how they have been operationalised. The initiatives are the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the relatively new Copernicus Climate Change Security Programme (henceforth Copernicus Programme). It also contributes to existing literature by systematising EU's contributions to the climate security debate. To do so, the chapter applies the three analytical themes (climate-riskification, climate securitisation and the epistemic community on climate security).

To answer the the thesis research question, this chapter examines key conclusions in strategic documents on climate actions, especially those with climate and security mandates between 2001 and 2019. The conclusions can be found in official speeches and documents by European Council, European External Action Service, European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the EU. The documents are publicly accessible on the EU website. Since major conclusions reached at EU meetings have been known to mature into policy actions, the analysis revealed climate securitisation is much more likely to be pursued than climate-riskification. This suggests there is high likelihood for the conflict prevention dimension of climate-related security risk to eventually become inseparable from phrasings of climate security and vice-versa. Although these findings indicate the extent to which the EU has construed a climate security-development link, making a definitive policy-focused case linking climate and security currently appears impossible.

One of the main findings here is that scholars have not compared these initiatives in terms of respectively climate-riskification and climate securitisation. Accordingly, this chapter adds value to the academic debate on climate-related security risks and therefore climate security with an evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the Copernicus Programme.

This chapter is structured as follows. The next section justifies the two subcases. Next, the chapter examines the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace as an institutional response, followed by a section on its amendment. The chapter then examines the epistemic community on climate security, followed by climate-riskification, and climate securitisation. These analytical themes will be examined in terms of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the Copernicus Programme. The chapter then offers concluding remarks with and its key findings.

Justification of the Subcases

Established in March 2014, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's legitimacy rests on the amended version of its mandate in December 2017 and therefore relevant in this chapter because the amendment may be linked to climate security if we agree that the issue of climate-related security risks is a development and security concern in the EU. In the amendment, development and security strategies are defined as having one and same logic. The stated reason for this rationale is that today's complex and interwoven risks do not neatly fit into categories delineated by legal demarcations or geographical boundaries, thereby challenging the functionality of existing funding instruments that traditionally seek to maintain distinct dividing lines between development and security.[147] Consequently, the European Parliament has been adjusting the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace in order to adapt to certain emerging trends. These adjustments reflect the changing way in which the EU has conceptualised climate security. The amendment also means a renewed interest on the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace among scholars of the EU's climate security strategy.

[147] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU's new approach to funding peace and security, p.2, 30 June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yx8hk76m.

Coordinated and managed by the European Commission, the Copernicus Programme, first launched in 2014, is relevant in this chapter as it monitors the planet's various environment through satellite remote sensing, thereby providing data on six service areas comprising atmosphere, marine, land, climate change, security and emergency.[148] Within these areas, the chapter focuses on climate change, security and emergency. The Copernicus Programme is directly motivated – and legitimised – by environmental security concerns in relation to the construction of risks and threats, whereas the security and emergency services cover an array of environmental security risks such as natural disasters and environmental-related migration (Rothe 2017).

6.2 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace: A Key Institutional Response

One of the objectives of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace is to create firm responses to climate-related security risks. It is the primary instrument for supporting security initiatives and peace-building activities in partner countries. Its short-term component seeks to prevent conflict, support post-conflict political stabilisation and ensure early recovery after a natural disaster. Its long-term component assists partner countries in efforts to confront global and trans-regional threats, including new threats like climate-related security risks.[149] Its provisions are legally binding. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's Articles 2(4e) on conflict prevention and 2(4f) on climate change[150] make it the leading instrument for funding and implementing geographic and thematic programmes on these issues.[151] Other articles outline possible options for addressing climate-related security risks. Articles 2 and 5 address some crosscutting issues like the disabling effects of global and trans-regional impacts of climate change on security. While one programme under Article 5 purposely focuses on the security implications of climate change, the European Commission's Directorate for International Cooperation and Development manages activities linked to Article 5

[148] Copernicus, https://tinyurl.com/y6hgtqf3.
[149] European Commission (2017), External evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (2014–mid 2017): Final Report, p. 1., FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1, https://tinyurl.com/y5ggxmlw.
[150] European Parliament, Establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Regulation No. 230/2014, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 15 March 2014, https://tinyurl.com/y84uoofo.
[151] International cooperation and development, https://tinyurl.com/y7496vzm.

whereas the European External Action Service and the service for Foreign Policy Instrument jointly manages operational expenditures linked to Article 4 – addressing crisis preparedness and conflict prevention in technical and financial assistance contexts. Making the European External Action Service and the Directorate for International Cooperation and Development the custodians of articles 4 and 5 shows that the EU strives to enlighten the public about climate-related security risks. It also shows that Brussels takes the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace seriously.

The Instrument has assisted key decisions on peacebuilding in the context of good governance and thus helped the operation of EU's commitment to climate-related conflict prevention programmes. The assistance can be tied to regular recognition and promotion of the climate security priority since 2007, but we need more empirical analysis with explicit focus on the EU and other actors relevant in the theory-practice nexus of environmental security (Hardt 2018). Following the first acknowledgement of climate security in EU security discourse in 2008, the EU policymakers' focus on the security and migration risks of its neighbourhood prevented this acknowledgement from rising higher on agendas until 2014 (Stang & Dimsdale 2017). As far as the year 2008 is concerned, the EU policymakers' focus was a more generic acknowledgement than a call for action and, for about a decade thereafter, "it had very little impact on EU policies and instruments that might reduce such risks" (van Schaik et al. 2018). Be that as it may, examination of the EU's climate actions showed that the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace has been used as a policy tool for addressing the climate and security issue, notably in relation to funding for climate-related programmes.

Furthermore, as there is a distinct acknowledgement of the various linkages between the policy fields of development and security within the EU, there are competing views on these linkages (Bergmann 2018). Whereas some of the views according to Bergmann emphasise security as a precondition for development and therefore privilege security over development policy, others point to the mutual interdependence of security and development. According to the European Commission, since some of today's "global security challenges" require global responses which are linked to climate change just as they are linked to fragile countries that are more vulnerable to internal and external shocks

because they lack the capacity and legitimacy to take timely action,[152] the international context of the amended Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace is crucial. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace is especially significant as "global and trans-regional effects of climate change that may have a potentially destabilising impact in fragile states."[153] Efforts are thus being made to be more prepared for preventive action and promoting a convergence of the EU's development and security policy (Bremberg et al. 2019). It is worth noting an observation by Europe Aid that the German government was one of the key players that pushed the agenda to operate aid through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, linked to Germany's own bilateral initiative in 2015.[154] This logic of enhancing peace and stability through humanitarian assistance and aid is a key objective for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace currently supports around 200 projects in over 75 countries. Fundin for projects that are based on this Instrument can be generally approved without going through protracted bureaucracy. With €2.3 billion budgeted for the 2014–2020 period, the projects span programmes like demining, mediation, rehabilitation, stabilisation and reconstruction.[155] For three consecutive years, the EU has funded conflict prevention and climate security-related projects in developing countries, under Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's Article 5 in 2015,[156] Article 4 in 2016[157] and Article 4 in 2017.[158] An Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace-funded four-year project being carried out by the UNEP aims to develop a suite of tools for building resilience to climate-fragility risks.[159] Scheduled for completion in 2021, the project responds to the recommendations of a report commissioned by the Group of 7[160] and it is one of the first initiatives to take concrete action on climate-related security risks at country and community levels.

[152] European Commission, Resilience, peace and security, https://tinyurl.com/yy664qy4.
[153] IcSP/2015/037-982, p. 11.
[154] Aidwatch 2018 security aid, p. 6, https://tinyurl.com/y6s96a2j.
[155] Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, 3 May 2016, https://tinyurl.com/yb7a2brt.
[156] The Commission implementing decision on the 2015 annual action programme for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace – Global and trans-regional threats, https://tinyurl.com/ycds4b9k.
[157] C (2016) 2683, 10 May 2016.
[158] EuropeAid/158622/DD/ACT/Multi.
[159] UNEP, Addressing climate-fragility risks, November 2019, https://tinyurl.com/t8sucfk.
[160] *A new climate for peace: taking action on climate fragility risks* – 2015.

One might therefore consider whether climate security is a conveniently phrased concept for addressing the issue of climate-related security risks under the development policy track. In other words, has climate security been integrated into development policy? Although the EU has not formally codified climate change as a direct cause of conflict onset, it has formally acknowledged that climate change causes insecurity and exacerbates human suffering mainly in fragile and already conflict-afflicted countries. This acknowledgement is important. The EU conflict prevention agenda (in the development policy track) would eventually assimilate climate security (in the security policy track). Thus, one important empirical turn for the climate security debate is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The empirical gravitation toward climate-related security policy is taken much more seriously in the EU in comparison with the FCCC and the UNSC. These case studies however revealed a useful detail. These contrasting institutional case studies enable understanding about the climate security debate and barriers to its development.

What is the overarching contribution of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's conceptualisation of the security-development linkage? The answer is simple. The "two policy tracks – security and climate change – are linked, and the resultant agenda is one of 'climate security'" (Youngs 2014: 3). Within the security-development linkage and its deployment as a strategic policy tool, the EU's approach to climate-related security risks has enabled the gradual integration of climate security into the overall development strategy. And so far, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace has been doing what it is supposed to achieve. For instance, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace funded a project (2014–2019) aimed at improving the living conditions of people in remote communities because "several climate shocks in recent years have had detrimental impacts on thousands of households in Niger," leading to "an upsurge in banditry" and thus deterioration in "the security situation."[161] This is a clear funding under the Instrument's Article 5(2d): "timely response to global and trans-regional effects of climate change having a potentially destabilising impact on peace and security." In another 2014–2017 Instrument-funded project, peacebuilding groups in North East India received funding to create "an empirical database to determine whether

[161] European Commission, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace-funded projects, p. 204.

there are connections between civil unrest and access to natural resources."[162] This is a clear Article 5(4a) funding: promoting civilian research activities as an alternative to defence-related research. This chapter suggests that these two projects and thus Articles 5(2d) and 5(4a) reflect the security-development linkage in EU policy circle and how it links to climate security.

6.3 The Legal Basis for Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Amendment: Climate Security's Legitimacy

Institutional legitimacy is central to any attempts seeking to promote climate security as a principle, ideal, project or programme. Preparations are fully underway towards this end in the EU. What brought about the preparatory change? At least in the short term, there was a need to respond to the growing impact of climate change, and a capacity, as a remarkably resilient policy actor, that in the face of enormous challenges managed to advance the policy agenda (Burns et al. 2020). More pointedly, this thesis is interested in climate policy more than environmental policy given that the latter is different from climate policy even when these policy fields dovetail or complement each other. For instance, competing views between EU countries have shifted how climate policy is articulated and presented away from environmental goals to dominantly economic pursuits (Skovgaard 2014).

Institutional legitimacy for climate security is concretely rooted in the collective EU institutions. It is also rooted in the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace through which the EU has been responding to and confronting the most immediate challenges of climate-related security risks.

In the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's original version, Articles 5(2d) and 5(4a) create opportunities to focus on climate security. This means addressing global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability. Funding assistance offered under Article 4 can be spent on "conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness." Assistance under Article 5(2d) can be used for ensuring timely response to "global and trans-regional effects of climate change having a potentially destabilising

[162] European Commission, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace-funded projects, p. 3.

impact on peace and security." Funding under Article 5(4a) can be devoted to "promoting civilian research activities as an alternative to defence-related research."[163]

These provisions taken together offer several pathways to enhance a government's legitimacy, which may decrease when it fails to meet public expectations or when the risk of civil disorder and violent conflict increases at the same time with adverse effects of climate change. The provisions implicitly remind us why the EU governing institutions (the European Council, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament) have systematised a detailed set of crisis response blueprints, thus perpetuating their authority and expertise in terms of climate-related security risks, although the blueprints are yet to systematically address climate security.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's overall and immediate has been mostly in terms of operationalising the EU's commitment to managing climate-related security risks in a more systematic manner. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace offered "great potential for addressing climate security issues" (Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016: vi), and as the European Commission acknowledged, in addressing root causes of threats and conflicts. There is a "growing consensus" among conflict researchers about the linkages between climate change and "increased risks of violent conflict," but this is yet to be significantly reflected "in the ways in which the EU addresses root causes of conflict" (Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016: vi). The European Commission acknowledged the difficulty of evaluating instrument-level impacts at present for two reasons: first, political achievements rest on a complex mix of legislative and normative determinants which interact with other actors; and second, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace-funded projects are mostly still underway and assessments of actions and programmes are limited in number.[164] Beyond that, one succinct reading of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace is as follows:

> The *raison d'etre* of the IcSP is to address those conflict, peace and security issues having an impact on development or other cooperation policies of the EU – and very often on the EU's own security, too – and which cannot be addressed under

[163] *Official Journal of the European Union*, L77, Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, March 2014.
[164] Final Report, p. 2, FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1.

> any other EU cooperation instrument, which is described as a critical "programming principle" that will underpin the IcSP strategy and accompanying programming.[165]

In this way, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace appears to be a guarantor of the EU's own security too. The Legal Affairs Committee, for instance, welcomed the European Commission's proposal for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace amendment because, for all intents and purposes, it aimed to strengthen the security-development linkage established since 2003 in the European Security Strategy.[166] The European Parliamentary Research Service outlined key factors such as shocks and stresses like interstate conflicts, natural disasters and extreme weather events all of which point to the growing vulnerability of the world's population. It argued that with such a rapidly changing complex and geopolitical security environment, two concerns arise: first, "the functionality of the funding instruments that traditionally aimed to maintain clear dividing lines" between "security" and "development" breakdown, second, "the definition of the development objectives is destabilised, requiring a redefinition of the respective missions of actors involved in delivering security and development functions."[167]

With this in mind, the issue of climate-related security risks is at the forefront of the EU's climate actions. But climate security is yet to be fully formulated into a comprehensive package. In 2016 for instance, European Council Conclusions regarding climate and energy diplomacy promise to redouble its commitment to addressing the climate-security nexus. However, the area of strategic conflict prevention requires prioritising the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace funding for the type of actors that will be supported (Bergmann 2018). Alexander Carius (Director of adelphi) conducted a climate diplomacy workshop at the European Parliament in February 2018. The need to increase Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace funding for "climate change and security"

[165] *House of Commons – European Scrutiny Committee: Twenty-ninth report of session 2014–15*, p. 35, https://tinyurl.com/yxuecdfs.
[166] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU's new approach to funding peace and security, 30 June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yx8hk76m.
[167] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU's new approach to funding peace and security, p.2, 30 June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yx8hk76m.

projects, especially crisis prevention, was a key topic at the workshop.[168] This highlighted the EU's limited enforcement capacity which has opened holes in climate policy implementation owing to knowledge gaps and design flaws (Grabbe & Lehne 2019). Nevertheless, the EU's climate actions showed that climate change has altered the general perception and conception of security.

Reflecting this, there have been calls to enhance the role of the Instrument contributing to Stability. To better routinise the climate-security nexus into EU foreign and security policy-making, upgrading this Instrument could help "to step up actionable intelligence for climate security risks" if it is adapted "to include climate security in both situations of crisis and stable situations" (Fetzek & van Schaik 2018: 15). For the Instrument not simply to remain operational and "fit for purpose but at the same time to enlarge its potential for impact and positive external effects," important contexts must be considered such as how to create the appropriate balance between "non-securitised and securitised actions/programmes" in the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's contributions to EU global commitments and security priorities.[169]

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace amendment in December 2017 provides a legal basis for the EU's recognition of climate security. It serves to further concretise and legitimise the EU's climate actions. In this rspect, the European Commission has been very clear about the reasons for the amendment. The primary objective of the amendment was to institutionalise conditions that would enable the EU to support capacity-building and strengthening programmes through mentoring and the provision of non-lethal equipment in order to nurture the realisation of inclusive and peaceful societies, including sustainable development.[170]

The amendment was duly debated by European Parliament members in December 2017. Despite conflicting legal advice from the EU's own lawyers,[171] the climate change aspect of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace is beyond contest – and by extension

[168] Alexander Carius, EU responses to climate security risks: climate diplomacy workshop at the European Parliament, 20 February 2018, https://tinyurl.com/y44qzk9v.
[169] Final Report, p. 4, FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1.
[170] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU's new approach to funding peace and security, 30 June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yx8hk76m.
[171] EU's plans to militarize aid face legal scrutiny in parliament, *POLITICO*, 7 December 2017.

the potential of pursuing climate security with Instrument-funding. What was contentious about the EU's new approach to funding peace and security centred on whether it is legal for the European Commission to spend the peace-building budget on strengthening the military capability of countries like Somalia and Mali[172] or, in other words, the gradual subsumption of development policy under security imperatives.[173] For more clarification, underpinning the amendment are several objectives. Most notable in this regard is the commitment to strengthening the EU's ability to enhance security institutions within and beyond the Union as well as to enhance capacity-building in support of security and development.[174] From such position, the EU will be able to more effectively help partner countries in building their capacity to prevent and manage crises on their own.[175] This also allows the EU to concretely respond to climate-related security risks.[176] The amendment creates opportunities to better align development objectives with security objectives. For instance, countries like Somalia and Mali are highly susceptible to the impacts of climate change due to weak governance structures and weakened democracy. To roundup this section, the broader context of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace amendment conforms to this thesis' definition of climate security as highlighted above.

6.4 Applying the Epistemic Community on Climate Security Theme

In consistency with the format employed in Chapter 6, this section confirms the emergence of the epistemic community on climate security in the EU case using four criteria: innovative phrasing or definition of an issue area, dissemination of consensus-based innovation to decision-makers, acceptance by decision-makers, and endurance of innovation in policy setting. These criteria have several commonalities in the EU case. Key among these is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace which the EU has deployed as the main policy instrument for responding to climate-related security risks. Based on this chapter's analysis, one may make a case for the instrumentalisation of climate security by the epistemic community on climate security as the Instrument

[172] EU's plans to militarize aid face legal scrutiny in parliament, *POLITICO*, 7 December 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yddggv7y.
[173] Aidwatch 2018 security aid, p. 6, https://tinyurl.com/y6s96a2j.
[174] *Official Journal of the European Union*, L77, Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, March 2014.
[175] European Commission, 7 December 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y4poa5zq.
[176] European Council Conclusions 16645/09, 25 November 2009.

contributing to Stability and Peace indeed connects the EU's development and security in one important way.

The EU has funded various projects under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, which helps to connect several EU bodies in the foreign policy domain where there might have been a vacuum (Bergmann 2018). Knowledge experts affiliated with the European Commission and the European External Action Service are central actors when it comes to budget allocation for such projects. They have the capacity to advise (and have done so before) relevant decision-makers in the EU and inform them about shared knowledge. In this light, one may claim that the criterion about dissemination of innovation has been met by the EU epistemic community on climate security. In relation to budget allocation in the external policy arena, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace can serve as an institutional bridge only when there is consensus among epistemic community on climate security members.

With both climate-related security risks and the climate-security nexus in focus, formulating discursive postures on climate action of course requires conceptual definition of the issue area in question. The epistemic community on climate security has been active in this regard and invariably satisfied the criterion of innovative phrasing or definition of an issue area. In this knowledge and based on this chapter's discussion, European Commission and the European External Action Service are not the only influential actors in the epistemic community on climate security when it comes to EU climate security agenda. Other key actors that have contributed to the climate-security nexus or contributed to important decisions in this respect also include the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Council. In fact, the European External Action Service and various Directorates-General in the European Commission strive to align various EU foreign policy tools and instruments in order to address climate-related security risks (Bremberg et al. 2019).

With respect to the criterion of endurance of innovation in a policy setting, the EU is actively seeking to satisfy this criterion. For example, as "climate security issues are on the radar at the European External Action Service" and at the European Commission, notably with Directorate-General like "DEVCO, ECHO and CLIMA" (Stang & Dimsdale

2017: 2), some of the security contexts presented by the various Directorate-General differ from each other (Hofmann & Staeger 2019) just as various policy communities utilise various concepts to phrase climate-related security risks (Mobjörk et al. 2016). Indeed, "climate security is not a distinct policy field within EU foreign and security policy;" thus, "it should be understood as a cluster of different policy fields linked by the EU's declared ambition to better respond to and ultimately prevent climate-related security risks" (Bremberg 2019: 3). To mitigate the problem of conflicting information, in 2017 the EU established a specific unit on the Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation within the European External Action Service. This unit now coordinates different actors within the European Commission such as the various Directorate-General (de las Heras 2020). The unit's establishment positions the EU in a more preventive posture for addressing climate security risks (Fetzek & van Schaik 2018). Genuine efforts like this place the EU among the most active proponents of a climate security discourse internationally whereby the European Commission and the European External Action Service have undertaken significant steps to translate this advocacy into tangible actions addressing the climate-security nexus in foreign and security policymaking (de las Heras 2020).

The last criterion about acceptance of innovation by decision-makers is a work in progress. Consider the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace for instance: a comprehensive review of Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace actions and programmes was submitted to the European Commission in June 2017. The submission uses a different, but complementary view of securitisation that is closely aligned with the national security interests of EU members and partner countries and supportive of partner country government stabilisation objectives.[177] Commissioned by the European Commission, detailed analytic criteria are provided in the manual of outcome indicators for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, to be used by climate actors, analysts and others. The manual recommends, in the first place, detailed analysis of the socio-political, environmental and security dimensions of the issue under investigation.[178] Overall, the recommendations, in terms of Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

[177] Final Report, p. 1, FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1.
[178] European Commission, Manual of Indicators for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, https://tinyurl.com/yxoogq7f.

and concept notes, contain far-and-away the most specific and concrete requests to EU staff, requesting for evidence linking – where possible – specific risks to climate change (Beswick et al. 2017). To roundup this section, the emergence of the epistemic community on climate security benefitted from the expertise of various institutions within the EU. These institutions have significantly shaped, sufficiently operationalised and expertly contributed to the current status of the EU climate security agenda.

6.5 Climate-Riskification or Climate Securitisation?

The following two sections respectively applies the climate securitisation and the climate-riskification themes to interpret statements on climate security and thus the phrasings of security by the EU epistemic community on climate security, which will be discussed after these two sections. The analysis offers insights into how the EU has understood and conceptualised climate security.

6.5.1 Applying the Climate-Riskification Theme

The Copernicus Programme produces and manages data. Climate data aids decision-making and policymaking which, in turn, support governance of insecurity and vulnerability. This section focuses on the Copernicus Programme because it is a distinct case of climate-riskification that has been little studied, despite its ability to further yield insight into the research question. The Copernicus Programme is an "operational response to climate security" and supports EU external actions and crisis responses even though its deployment in Haiti and Pakistan could be interpreted as a militarised climate security (Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016: 14).

Programmes on climate-riskification thrive in the EU. Although both risk- and threat-based logics are present and interconnected in a specific way in various programmes (Bengtsson et al. 2018), it seems more fitting to accept the proliferation of early-warning system in the EU as a demonstration of climate-riskification focussing on enduring governance programmes aimed at reducing insecurity and vulnerability of the referent object (Corry 2012). The Copernicus Programme is a departure point for reflection on the construction of environmental threats and environmental security (Oels 2012, 2013, 2014;

Methmann & Oels 2015; Rothe 2017; de Roeck 2019), two ideologically parallel contexts that are inextricably linked.

Intervention for conflict prevention has profoundly influenced climate-riskification and exemplified one view of the extent to which the EU has construed climate security as a potential international principle. To determine structural risks of conflict and pre-empt the (re)emergence or escalation of civil conflict, access to reliable early warning is indispensable. This has led to the programme on conflict prevention, entailing systematic collection and analysis of data to understand and interpret the risks of violent conflict in a third country and to develop strategic responses to mitigate those risks.[179] The need for monitoring pre-empted risks in relation to the management of violent conflicts further distinguishes the Copernicus Programme as governance approach. In April 2018 for instance, researchers affiliated with the Copernicus Programme presented the key findings of the European state of the climate report to the European Parliament.[180] They asserted:

> During 2017, the southwest of Europe stood out with high temperatures, drought and repeated wildfire events … Southern Europe was exceptionally warm with multiple heatwaves from Portugal and Spain to the Balkan Peninsula. The drought in southern and central Italy persisted for the whole year. These conditions increased the number of wild fires, led to low levels in water reservoirs, and reduced agricultural yields.[181]

These assertions were reflected in Amina Mohammed's (UN Deputy Secretary-General) statement:

> Earlier this year, the World Meteorological Organization confirmed 2015, 2016, and 2017 were the three warmest years on record. The level of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere continues to rise and this build-up mean we are

[179] Factsheet, September 2014, https://tinyurl.com/y6537ro8.
[180] Copernicus Climate Change Security, European state of the climate report, 20 April 2018, https://tinyurl.com/yd86t8fz.
[181] Copernicus Climate Change Security, European state of the climate 2017: Summary, p. 5, https://tinyurl.com/y8vha2ja.

> at increasing risk from heatwaves, floods, droughts and wildfires. The impacts of climate change go well beyond strictly environmental.[182]

Within these contexts, the Copernicus Programme is an influential riskifying programme. In July 2020 the UN released $5.2 million dollars for the government of Bangladesh to prepare for a predicted flood peak in mid-July. The humanitarian assistance was triggered by the Copernicus Programme's Flood Awareness System.[183] During the same month the Copernicus Programme conducted conflict damage evaluation in Libya in order to plan drinking water extension and sewage network and get a better picture of the dynamics of the population during the past few years.[184] More specifically, the intervention focused on generating general reference content of pre-event circumstances such as administrative boundaries, land use classification and road network; the data generated is classified into four categories: possible, moderate and severe damage, including assets that were destroyed.[185] The interventions in Bangladesh and Libya are clear examples of climate-riskification and the climate security agenda being put to work.

Summarily, the Copernicus Programme observes things on the ground, it provides scientific evidence, which policymakers need to use to make decisions. This science-policy action nexus is a constant problem in climate and security politics, where governments and other policymakers fail to take action. The Copernicus Programme is interesting and definitely overlooked by the literature on climate change and climate securitisation. The present author would like to see deeper analyses why these two literatures should start to pay more attention to the Copernicus Programme. The EU agenda on this topic is underpinned by a moral sense of responsibility – this is another very interesting angle that the author would like to hear more about in the foreseeable future, especially how morality relates to climate security.

[182] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018.
[183] Copernicus Emergency Management Service, https://tinyurl.com/y2bxxtnf.
[184] EMSN080: Land use mapping and population dynamics analysis in Benghazi, Libya, 24 July 2020, https://tinyurl.com/yybruqrm.
[185] EMSN033: Satellite based conflict damage assessment of two selected cities in Libya, 8 March 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y37e2cax.

6.5.2 Applying the Climate Securitisation Theme

The securitisation of climate change appears to be advanced in the EU case more than in the UNSC and the FCCC cases. Most securitising moves have progressed beyond the stages of climate-riskification to climate securitisation. In a collective setting like the EU, how threats and risks are formulated can be interpreted as the result of processes of securitising moves in which authoritative actors discursively construct threats and initiate policies in response (Sperling & Webber 2019). In Chapter 1, climate securitisation was defined as entailing a properly planned programme to protect a significant and named referent object from an identified threat. Such a programme must imply a situation in which statements successfully convinced relevant audiences (in a high-politics setting) about the vulnerability of named referent objects and thus influenced the politics of climate security. Securitisation occurs at high-level policy settings whenever a policy statement is formally adopted (by the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC) as policy strategy. Between 2010 and 2019, it appeared the EU has placed emphasis on climate-riskification but a close reading of statements on security issued within this period also reveals a disposition towards securitisation.

A series of developments regarding climate-related security risks appeared to have culminated in what should be seen as climate securitisation since the 2000s (Table 11). This may be good news to EU security strategists because one of the ultimate ambitions of the EU security strategy is to pre-empt the emergence of climate-related security risks, if possible, on a global basis. As opposed to the largely unsuccessful efforts to formulate climate change policies in the 1990s, a period when the absence of cohesion characterised EU climate policymaking (Pavese & Torney 2012), the early 2000s witnessed efforts to improve security cooperation among EU countries. From the 2000s, there were four broad stages of key developments leading to concrete phrasings of securitisation (Table 11). In the 1990s there are increased calls for EU governments to collaborate more on environmental issues. In the early 2000s the EU began to seriously engage the security implications of climate change at a period in which the EU anti-terror campaign agenda proliferated. Based on the revised strategy for social cohesion and approved by Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, a remarkable development occurred

during the period.[186] An improved cohesion among EU countries paralleled European governments' attention to the socio-economic benefits of curbing climate change. Following a line of though developed by others (Floyd 2016; Diez et al. 2016; Dupont 2019; Sperling & Webber 2019), we can trace a policy change towards climate securitisation. A new securitised status quo was achieved by the mid-to-late 2000s during which policy measures and the way in which they were adopted strengthened the evidence for securitising moves. This chapter uncovers four progressively distinct stages, as indicators of types of security phrasings, overtime and across contexts.

Table 11. Four key stages leading to climate securitisation in the EU (CC = Climate Change)

Years	Stages	Key Contexts	Phrasings
Dec 2000 **2001** **Oct 2003**	First	Contemplation of a new global CC regime. EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Emissions Trading Scheme law.	Threat
Dec 2003 **Nov 2004**	Second	European Security Strategy created. Raising political/policy profile in terms of impact prediction, vulnerability assessment; and food security.[187]	Threat
Mar 2005 **Mar 2006** **June 2007** **March 2008** **Dec 2009**	Third	CC brings consequences for the global society.[188] Europe faces CC risks; needs medium-long term EU strategy to combat CC in a post-2012 perspective.[189] Requested for a report on CC risks. Climate Change and International Security report. Lisbon Treaty – underlines the potential risk for climate-induced international issues.	Threat Risk Risk Risk Threat
2011 **2014** **2017** **Feb 2019** **2014–2019**	Fourth	EU Conflict Early Warning System Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's creation. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace amendment. Confronting climate-related security risks. Enhanced CC diplomacy at all political levels.	Threat Threat Threat Threat Threat

[186] Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Revised strategy for social cohesion, 31 March 2004. https://tinyurl.com/y4g4axmo.
[187] 15164/04, 24 November 2004.
[188] 7619/1/05REV 1, 23 March 2005.
[189] 7775/1/06REV 1, 18 May 2006.

The First Stage

The European Council meeting in December 2000 was a departure point for climate securitisation. At the meeting Council members formally contemplated the need for a new global environmental governance (Table 11).[190] The meeting could be read as the EU's initial contribution to what later emerged as the Paris Agreement in 2015. In June 2001 the European Council adopted the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict on the back of the global anti-terror campaign. Based on detailed analysis of how Brussels could do more to keep its focus on security commitments, the conflict prevention programme clarified political actions in need of immediate attention. The European Council Conclusions added an environmental dimension to the Lisbon agenda for socio-economic reform cohesion.[191] The Council Conclusions contributed to a sub-stage – in the periodisation – in 2002 when members focused on the impacts of climate change and considered separating environmental degradation policy from economic policy.[192]

In 2003 the directive on emissions trading was adopted as a scheme by the European Council and Parliament.[193] The scheme is the world's first and most comprehensive policy for addressing climate change and therefore a cornerstone of European climate politics. After a series of meetings in Strasbourg and Brussels, the adoption occurred nearly three years after both the meeting on the need for a more consolidated global environmental governance and the adoption of the conflict prevention policy in June 2001. Although the topic of climate-related security risks was greatly neglected in the EU security debate, it was peripherally acknowledged alongside the more important anti-terror campaign agenda (Sonnsjö & Bremberg 2016) until the European Security Strategy was brought into the picture.

The Second Stage

As shown in Table 11, the periodisation's second stage began in 2003. Climate securitisation was more of a mere peripheral routine than an urgent call for action at that

[190] European Council Conclusions DOC/00/30, 7-9 December 2000.
[191] SN 200/1/01 REV 1, 15-16 June 2001.
[192] Presidency Conclusions – Barcelona EC Meeting, 15-16 March 2002, https://tinyurl.com/yyl6pcxx.
[193] Directive 2003/87/EC, 13 October 2003.

period – noted for adoption of the European Security Strategy concept document by European Council members in December 2003. The concept document brought important changes to the EU security landscape. In an unprecedented development, the EU agreed on a joint threat assessment, clearly identified objectives for progressing its security interests, introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy's conceptual framework, and acknowledges the security-development nexus.[194] The concept document made no mention of whether climate change would aggravate civil conflicts but expected (implicitly) policies to avoid unintended consequences and unanticipated secondary effects. Also, the concept document created a framework that later enabled the routinisation of climate-related security risks.

One justification of the routinisation can be found in the 1987 Single European Act, which reformed the European Economic Community Treaty with several new policy. One of these areas is Article 25 on the environment, stipulating that "environmental protection requirements should be a component of the Community's other policies" at the EU level where they are more effective than at individual country level.[195] Article 25 is not the sole reason for the inclusion of environmental terms in the European Security Strategy but the provision may be read as the main reason for the routinisation of climate issues in the early 2000s. Whereas the provision provides the basis for today's securitisation phrasings in Brussels, it encourages preventive actions to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment. The Single European Act codified EU foreign policy coordination in security, political and economic terms and was an early precursor of the 1993 Common Foreign and Security Policy – an outcome of the Maastricht Treaty. The Common Foreign and Security Policy has since been supplemented with two key revisions. First, the treaty revision with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Second, Article 191 of the EU Treaty (consolidated version) to address climate change[196] and underpin the EU's approach to environmental issues, energy security and conflict prevention.

[194] SEC(2004) 332, 19 March 2004.
[195] *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. L 169, June 1987. Single European Act, Article 25: Environment.
[196] *Official Journal of the European Union*, 59, June 2016. Consolidated versions of the treaty on EU and the treaty on the functioning of the EU: Environment.

The European Security Strategy therefore had "already identified the security implications of climate change."[197] That was the key message from Javier Solana's (Secretary-General, Council of the EU 1999–2009) in his foreword to the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, published in 2009. However, the European Security Strategy concept document only mentions the phrase environmental policies once and global warming twice.[198] What led to Solana's proclamation then becomes important. This can be found in the third stage (Table 11).

The Third Stage

The periodisation's third stage comprises the 2005–2009 period during which efforts to securitise climate change stared to make profound impacts. In a 2005 Communique to the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Commission stated that it believed "treating security and development as complementary agendas" will enhance effective governance and anti-environmental degradation programmes.[199] The proposal was met with complaints in the academic and policy spheres regarding the morality of linking security and development. The EU reacted with European Council Conclusions emphasising in November 2007 that the linkage should include implications of climate change in order to better inform policies.[200] Foregrounding the implications of climate change signified a new shift in policy, as the reaction seemingly implied the intention was to address complaints in the pursuit of progressive climate action, and more pointedly a renewed effort to securitise climate change. In June 2007 the European Council requested the European Commission and the EU High Representative to prepare a comprehensive report on climate-related security risks.[201] In their reporting in March 2008 the European Commission and the EU High Representative stated that:

[197] Council of the EU, 2009, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 14, https://tinyurl.com/yyq3v2mr.
[198] A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, https://tinyurl.com/yxc5kknw.
[199] European Commission, Policy coherence for development, para. 7, April 2005, https://tinyurl.com/yxqhwjuk.
[200] 15240/07 (Presse 262), 19-20 November 2007.
[201] 11177/1/07 REV 1, 20 July 2007.

> Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability… climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognise that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests.[202]

Note the explicit securitising move in the statement. The move parallels the securitising tone in the reporting on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, issued in December 2008. In it, the Council of the EU reiterated climate change as a clear threat multiplier for natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources that would exacerbate conflict, notably in poor regions. Given the reporting's clear warning: these contexts bring real "political and security consequences."[203] The European Council underlined the report's significance in May 2008[204] and potential climate-induced global security issues in December 2009.[205] Throughout, the security-development linkage was clear: "there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace."[206] The security-development linkage was further contextualised in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which promotes "measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change."[207] Together with the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty provided the legal and political conditions and, by extension, the functional competences necessary for the EU to act as an agent of collective securitisation (Sperling & Webber 2019).

[202] S113/08, 14 March 2008.
[203] European Council, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 5, S407/08, December 2008.
[204] 7652/1/08 REV 1, p. 14, 20 May 2008.
[205] 17218/09 (Presse 371), 8 December 2009.
[206] European Council, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, p. 8, S407/08, December 2008.
[207] *Official Journal of the European Union*, vol. 50, December 2007. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 174: Environment (Climate Change).

The Fourth Stage

The periodisation's fourth stage comprises the 2011–2019 period. Commitment to raising the political and policy profile of climate change was prevalent in this period.[208] The fourth stage began with a renewed commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the EU's foreign policy goals. In June 2011 the Council of the EU Conclusions on conflict prevention restated conflict prevention as a valid EU's policy approach and provided a strong mandate for Brussels to engage in conflict prevention.[209] The European Commission reiterated the security-development nexus in October 2011,[210] adopted a resolution in November 2012 outlining what reflected in the need for and is expected from the Common Security and Defence Policy in situations of climate-driven crises,[211] and in the June 2017 New European Consensus on Development.[212] Confronting the risks that climate change poses to stability and security featured strongly in the February 2019 Council of the EU Conclusions.[213] While the EU left no one in doubt about where Brussels is going with all this, the 2014 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the February 2018 European Council Conclusions, and the June 2018 high-level event hosted by High Representative Federica Mogherini featured strongly during the fourth stage. These all merit special mentioning due to their contextualisation of increased climate securitisation in the EU. At minimum they explicitly recognise the indirect (and to a lesser degree the direct) implications of climate-related security risks for global security. The February 2018 European Council Conclusion is special. In it, the Council, citing the 2017 Hague Declaration, which explicitly supported the growing calls for creating an institutional home for climate security within the UN system, noted the importance of "translating climate and security analysis into possible action."[214] In July 2016 a document on the Common Security and Defence Policy had reiterated the EU's role in fostering conflict prevention and stability.[215] Eleven months later the European

[208] *3106th Foreign Affairs* European Council *meeting,* 18 July 2011.
[209] 11824/11 (Presse 181), 20 June 2011.
[210] COM (2011) 637, 13 October 2011.
[211] See, 2012/2095(INI), 22 November 2012; European Council Conclusions 602/15, 20 July 2015; European Council Conclusions 6125/18, 26 February 2018; European External Action Service, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe – A global strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy, June 2016, https://tinyurl.com/y9jtlvso.
[212] The New European Consensus on Development, 8 June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y8htu8w5.
[213] Council of the EU Conclusions 6153/19, 18 February 2019.
[214] European Council Conclusions, 6125/18, 26 February 2018.
[215] Shaping of a common security and defence policy, 8 July 2016, https://tinyurl.com/ybuxdsd2.

Council decided to further integrate environmental, climate and disaster risk assessments as an early warning strategy.[216] In February 2018 European Council Conclusions resolutely emphasise several of these policy decisions.[217]

What is the meaning of all this for this thesis' research question regarding the EU? As the analysis above showed, climate securitisation is, first and foremost, a security agenda and then a development concern. It is also a discursive experiment and policy exercise. Simply put, efforts to further securitise climate change will continue to flourish as EU strategists continue their push for climate securitisation in climate and policy actions. In short, there is high likelihood the EU will remain focused on concretising the security-development linkage.

Some scholars have alluded to this observation. A case in point is Keukeleire and Raube's (2013: 560) analysis of EU's development policy; they "link the concept of 'security–development nexus' with the concept of 'securitization'" and find that the degree and nature of securitisation means the EU can also utilise it to avoid a more direct involvement in conflict areas. Paradoxically, most officials interviewed by Keukeleire and Raube questioned the artificial division of security and development. This observation is seemingly different to a certain extent to what van Schaik told me during an interview session: "it is pretty difficult in practice I know" to get "the climate people" and "the security and conflict people" talking to each other because these are two different communities.[218] Implicit in these remarks is an effort to ensure consonance in the types of securitisation approaches among EU lawmakers (and thus among EU fundamental policies). Relatedly, Furness and Gänzle (2016: 2) question the extent to which foreign aid has indeed been transformed. This is an uncertain and emergent terrain in security policies. In the periodisation's fourth stage policymakers were still exploring the basic configuration of climate-related security risks as they hoped and waited for expert contributions from EU member countries, whose national representatives held different conceptions of risk and threat. This may well explain Keukeleire and Raube's observation regarding the artificial division of security and development. Indeed, the definitional issue is yet to be completely resolved, both within and beyond the EU.

[216] European Council JOIN (2017) 21, 7 June 2017.
[217] European Council Conclusions 6981/17, 6 March 2017.
[218] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.

There is evidence for securitisation of EU development policy but this finding is best understood as an element of a broad effort to push for coherence across the EU's external policies (Furness & Gänzle 2016). Controversies over climate-related security risks and the security-development nexus remain. The present author asked several expert interviewees whether climate security is better examined from a conflict driven context or from climate risks approach. In response, the latter approach is interesting,[219] more dynamic and helpful[220] because the issue of "climate risks" is important for studying "how human beings on a global basis have been affected by the changing natural system."[221] The main connection between conflict driven and climate risks is what the EU has been pursuing all along: comprehensive response to climate-related security risks and improved policies on climate securitisation.

Securitisation statements across the four stages are prevalent, especially between the second and fourth stages. Therefore, it becomes crucial that the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's bridge-building task in the security-development link implies a securitisation of EU development policy (Furness & Gänzle 2016). It is also important there is no requirement for Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace-funded projects to be reported as Official Development Assistance according to criteria established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, thereby implying a general risk that Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace interventions may be increasingly motivated and driven by security interests (Bergmann 2018). For this reason the risk of a creeping securitisation of Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace-funded projects has become a prominent debate within the EU policy community, especially between EU security and development policy both within and among EU institutions and member countries and within the wider scholar and policy communities (Bergmann 2018). The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace itself states it "has to adjust to a number of recent and emerging threats and trends" like "the securitisation of development and peace," according to the European Commission.[222] Attempts to further securitise climate change are likely to continue unabated for various reasons. Key among these can be related to the clearer understandings on the prerequisites of linking security and

[219] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.
[220] Interview conducted by author, 10 September 2018.
[221] Interview conducted by author, 18 October 2018.
[222] Final Report, p. 1, FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1.

development. A key advantage of the linkage is its ability to enable conceptual distinctions between security and development. This may ultimately give rise to consensus-based securitising moves.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has surveyed EU's involvement in the climate security debate in order to answer the research question. Key statements from primary institutions enabled the chapter to chart the phrasings of climate security. The early 2000s is an entry point for progressively distinctive four-stage periodisation which described how the EU has engaged the issue of climate security and climate-related security risks. Each of the four stages represent key indicators of types of security phrasings, changes overtime and across contexts. The phrasings contributed to, and ultimately culminated in, extensive climate securitisation by the EU. To be sure, climate change has been securitised most notably in terms of climate-related security risks and the security-development linkage.

In terms of the Copernicus Programme, the phrasings of conflict prevention appear to be stronger than the phrasings of climate-related security risks. In a policy context, the latter phrasing performs better although there are appreciable and positive indications of conflict prevention enjoying close attention among policymakers. This finding suggests an important discursive turn for EU discourses on climate security and should perhaps form the basis for basic understanding and interpretation of EU climate security strategy.

Since the key conclusions from various meetings led to policy actions and it is likely the conflict prevention aspect of climate-related security risks will eventually become inseparable from climate security. It would become more integrated into EU climate security agenda if the EU continue to fund conflict prevention and climate security-related projects in developing countries under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The EU has acknowledged that climate change can aggravate tensions and existing civil conflicts considering its various conflict prevention programmes. This acknowledgement has been consistent since 2004, although this is not to say that Brussels takes the view that climate change can lead to civil conflict onset. That is, the EU has not codified climate change as a direct cause of conflict onset.

To what extent might policy statements by the EU indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and therefore the recognition of the concept itself? Firstly, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace provides an answer to this question, if the question is taken to be an indication of climate securitisation. Secondly, the epistemic community on climate security remains involved and decidedly committed to climate securitisation advocacy; the commitment is particularly remarkable in relation to the European Council Conclusions of February 2018. In the Conclusions, the European Council, citing the 2017 Hague Declaration, explicitly supported the calls for creating an institutional home for climate security within the UN system and emphasised the importance of translating climate and security analysis into possible action. This particular conclusion attests to the EU's support for an institutional home for climate security; it should be seen as a clear answer to the question regarding the extent to which statements by the EU might indicate an emerging security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. Furthermore, the EU's consistent engagement with the topic of climate security has led to remarkable policies, programmes and interventions on climate-related conflict prevention and security risks. However, the engagement has been subjected to intense critiques, not least in the context of the EU's nascent call for an institutional home for climate security. This chapter thus opens useful entry points for comparative analysis of the three institutional cases studies. This is the focus in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter's comparative analysis adopts a normatively discursive approach to interpret the results from the case study chapters. It provides empirical based answers to the thesis research question. In undertaking this analysis, the chapter considers the linkages between the results and exisiting research – where necessary – in order to comment on whether the new information refutes or supports extant data. Partly based on the central argument – climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies – the analysis engages with the three analytical themes as defined in Chapter 1. The epistemic community on climate security has undertaken riskifying moves if climate-riskification is taken to mean ongoing discussion of climate security as a high-level political issue. The epistemic community on climate security has undertaken securitising moves whenever policy statements successfully convince the audience about the vulnerability of named referent objects and thus influenced the politics of climate security in the form of formal adoption of such statements as specific policy strategies. A successful securitisation therefore implies a properly planned programme to protect a significant and named referent object from an identified threat. To some extent, the analysis will enable and at the same time blur the difference between riskifying and securitising moves as these reify epistemic community on climate security practices.

This chapter therefore hopes to contribute to the climate security debate. Comparative analysis in the case study chapters will pinpoint the signs of an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and associated recognition of the concept. Based in part on the thesis central argument – climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies – the analysis foregrounds the candidate norm and complements several common approaches to climate security governance. As such it is structured as follows. Each of the following main sections respectively analyses the emerging climate security discourse in each of the case studies. Next, the chapter presents the concluding remarks.

7.2 The UNSC Case: Signs of Emerging Climate Security Discourse

The current situation in the UNSC suggests an emerging climate security discourse and associated recognition of the concept, amidst serious contestation. As shown in Table 7 (Chapter 6), the climate security debate is characterised by two main opposing factions comprising the countries that supported and those that opposed the debate's key elements: the UNSC is (un)suitable for the debate; climate change can aggravate an already existing civil conflict; and creating an institutional home for climate security within the UN system. A key finding confirmed that the type of political contestation appeared to have shifted from structural factors like legitimacy concerns to the choice of venue for progressing the debate. Norm contestation takes many forms. For example, critical constructivists recognise that a norm may not become internalised due to not only a fierce struggle over the definitions and prescriptions of normative architectures but also alternative patterns of norm diffusion (Lantis 2017). As several structural conditions, especially successful politicisation, have hindered climate securitisation (von Lucke 2015), the contest over norm diffusion is clearly the current focus in the UNSC even though we must not relegate the debate over definition.

The results provided an answer to the research question: the extent to which statements by the UNSC might indicate an emerging climate security discourse and thus the recognition of the concept itself. In this regard, one interpretation of the extent to which the epistemic community on climate security has sought to securitise climate change is how they have presented it as an aggravator of an already existing conflict. Indeed, an emerging research interest is how ideas about climate conflict and mass climate migration resonate in the Global South, including how actors from the Global South perceive and respond to "the climate-security nexus" (Boas 2014: 149). Evidence for this phrasing has been consistent since 2007 and can be found in the statements that contextualised the conflict dimension of climate change (Table 7). The evidence provided answers to the research question, including the curiousity about how climate change has altered the perception and conception of security by institutional actors. In 2007, nine countries[223] and most EU countries believed that climate change is an aggravator of civil conflict. At

[223] The UK, Congo, South Africa, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, Mexico, Costa Rica and Peru.

the 2011 debate, a dozen countries,[224] the UN Secretary-General and most EU countries supported this posture. At the 2019 debate, representatives from the UNDP, the World Meteorological Organization, Canada France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, Peru, Dominican Republic, and the like emphasise the linkage between climate and conflict. For instance, according to Poland's representative: "examples of climate-induced conflicts destabilizing – sometimes quite unexpectedly – entire regions" has been repeatedly mentioned.[225] Germany's representative supports this view: "in the Sahel, there is an increasing number of conflicts because of the lack of water and land for farming."[226] At the same time, several countries resisted the climate-conflict phrasing on the grounds of insufficient evidence.

The comparison of the 2007 and 2011 debates showed clear signs of contestation (Table 7). This result together with the observations in the above paragraph raise an interesting question: at any given debate, which group of countries decides whether the UNSC or the FCCC is the appropriate platform for progressing the climate security issue? It is instantly apparent that participation by certain developing countries especially when they acted on behalf of alliance of countries influenced the UNSC debates.[227] In 2011, the US, the UK and most EU countries supported the UNSC whereas Russia, China and 21 other countries[228] preferred the FCCC as the legitimate venue. In 2018, Nauru (acting on behalf of the Small Island Developing States), the UK, the US and most EU countries supported the UNSC. Russia, Maldives and Trinidad and Tobago rallied against the UNSC. There is increased support for the FCCC as a suitable platform versus the sharp drop in the number of countries that preferred the UNSC in 2011. In 2007, only Papua New Guinea (on behalf of Pacific Islands Forum), five other countries[229] and most EU countries believed the UNSC was a suitable venue. Russia, China, Cuba (on behalf of the Non-

[224] The US, the UK, Japan, Nauru, Bolivia, Sudan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Lebanon.
[225] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 13.
[226] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 12.
[227] Such as African Group, Alliance of Small Island States, Small Island Developing States, Group of 77+China, Pacific Islands Forum and the Non-Aligned Movement. The latter is a group of countries that neither aligns with nor ally against any major power bloc, though some countries might profess support or otherwise in what has been known as behind-the-scenes politics.
[228] South Africa, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Portugal, Costa Rica, Iran, South Korea, Singapore, Lebanon, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chile, Ecuador, Cuba, Pakistan, Egypt, Argentina, Turkey, Fiji and Barbados.
[229] US, UK, Peru, Japan and Congo.

Aligned Movement), Sudan (on behalf of African Group), Pakistan (on behalf of Group of 77+China) and six other countries[230] disagreed.

Except for the Small Island Developing States that have promoted climate security since the 2000s (Boas 2014), many countries representing the Global South strongly resisted the UNSC's involvement in the debate (Sindico 2007). Sindico's assertion is at odds with a finding here that developing countries have become staunch supporters of climate security in the UNSC. Researchers should nonetheless explore the potentials of a fruitful collaboration between the UNSC and the FCCC (Sindico 2007) which seems promising for negotiations seeking to further progress key elements of the climate security debate such as loss and damage debate (Sindico 2017). Furthermore, there is close similarity in the statements by countries' representatives at the 2018 and 2019 debate, but the debate in 2019 differs in key respects. For instance, many countries at the debate in 2019 express the desire for climate and security to become a regular debate on the UNSC agenda, including further acknowledgement of the conflict dimension. In sum, the contestation suggested that the debate was unresolved over whether the UNSC is a suitable platform.

Establishing a climate security discourse rests on clear securitising moves. At the debate in January 2019, a securitising move related to the Climate Security Mechanism – proposed as a clearing house and not an institutional home per se – was made. Several representatives acknowledged clearing house would be a move in the right direction. Established within the UN system in 2018, the Climate Security Mechanism is supported by staff from the UNDP, the UNEP and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs – which manages the UNOWAS. DiCarlo clarified during the debate that the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the UNEP and the UNDP, in collaboration with practitioners from across and beyond the UN, are developing an integrated risk assessment framework to analyse climate-related security risks. Bearing in mind that securitisation entails a properly planned programme to protect a significant and named referent object from an identified threat, it is notable that Sweden's representative (and several other representatives who attended the debate) acknowledged the Climate Security Mechanism as the first phase of dedicated response to climate-related security risks.

[230] India, South Africa, Brazil, Philippines, Indonesia and Costa Rica.

The climate security norm (Zwolski & Kaunert 2011) is still in the first of norm life cycle**,** judging by a set of formal though nonbinding presidential statements released by the UNSC. This is another interpretation of an answer to this thesis research question. Against this background, the candidate norm has been engaged by certain on-the-ground practices. The analysis uncovered the phrasings of such practice. At the 2019 debate, for instance, representatives from Belgium and Canada reiterate the UNSC's leadership through *resolutions* passed in recent years recognising the climate-security nexus in regions like the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel.[231] While several representatives welcome the UNSC's inclusion of similar language focussing on climate in its resolutions on the UNOWAS, making riskfying and/or securitising moves requires certain experience; so is making a link between climate and security. The UNOWAS has extensive experience in this regard, as evidence of inclusion of similar language can be found the presidential statements. With respect to the UNOWAS, the presidential statements highlight the areas of:

> Conflict prevention … the impact of armed conflict and terrorism, extreme poverty, food insecurity, forced displacement, adverse effects of climate change and epidemics, which contribute to the high levels of structural, chronic and acute vulnerability in the region and continue to affect populations.[232]

The language in the above quotation is a clear securitising move and correlates with on-the-ground practices which confirmed the UNSC's staunch support for activities undertaken by the UNOWAS in terms of phrasing the conflict dimension. To further bring this out into the forefront, only pessimistic observers would have issue with the UNOWAS's vast experience considering that expertise should guide the phrasing of climate responses and actions. Based on the Secretary-General's annual reports since the UNOWA's inception, the UNSC has 18 continuous years of experience in the risks of climate change and the associated conflict dimensions. The Secretary-General has submitted a total of 20 reports on the UNOWA[233] and seven reports on the UNOWAS

[231] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 30.
[232] S/PRST/2018/3; S/PRST/2018/16; S/PRST/2017/10; S/PRST/2020/2; S/PRST/2020/7.
[233] UNOWA, https://tinyurl.com/y95256jj; S/2001/434, April 2001; S/2003/688, July 2003; S/2003/1147, December 2003; S/2005/86, February 2005; S/2005/135, March 2005; S/2007/143, March 2007; S/2008/426, June 2008; S/2009/332, June 2009; S/2009/682, December 2009; S/2010/324, June 2010; S/2010/614, December 2010; S/2011/388, June 2011; S/2011/811, December 2011; S/2012/510, June 2012;

and its activities.[234] With three reports in 2013, two reports each in 2003, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2017, the latest report was submitted in January 2019.[235] The UNOWAS's extensive experience in this respect can further enrich our knowledge about the interactions between climate change, security and conflict. It is particularly important that the Secretary-General's annual reporting strengthened the claim of climate securitisation: the UNSC has securitised climate change, even if only on a regional basis.

However, as norms generally emerge amidst contestation, the basic phrasing of the conflict dimension has been heavily contested. One useful finding revealed that the opposition group is a riskifying and/or securitising actor. This is particularly so if we accept this group's position. What the group wants is that any securitising move should be undertaken by and in the FCCC, regardless whether such move would ultimately lead to recognition of climate security. For this group the UNSC may get involved in the climate security debate only to complement the climate mandate and actions assigned to the FCCC, despite the recognition given to the UNSC as the ultimate decision-maker in matters of civil conflicts. Regardless, recent developments have vertainly transferred the climate security debate from scholarly discourse to discussions at the highest intergovernmental fora (van Schaik et al. 2018a) with scholars now progressing the debate from whether the UNSC should act on climate security to how the UNSC should act (Scott & Ku 2018).

Contestation does not mean that the opposition group is against recognising climate security. Set against this background, the call for creating an institutional home for climate and security was first made in 2011 by Nauru and the UN Secretary-General. Ten countries repeated the call at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York and four countries at the 2018 debate. The composition at the 2019 debate is like the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York, except at this meeting, various countries also presented climate change as a national security issue (Table 7). Most countries globally have explicitly identified the threat of climate change in national security strategy (Holland &Vagg 2013; Scott 2015;

S/2012/977, December 2012; S/2013/384, June 2013; S/2013/732, December 2013; S/2014/442, June 2014; S/2014/945, December 2014; S/2015/472, June 2015.

[234] UNOWAS, https://tinyurl.com/ycwforyz; S/2013/354, June 2013; S/2016/566, June 2016; S/2016/1072, December 2016; S/2017/563, June 2017; S/2017/1104, December 2017; S/2018/649, June 2018.

[235] S/PV.8442.

McDonald 2018) even though a survey of the burgeoning climate security literature revealed no systematic, surprise connection between climate change and national security. At the national level, climate-riskification and climate securitisation are easier, especially in terms of conflict dimensions but at the interstate institutions level, contestation is sharper. As the opposition group strives to shift the climate security debate from the UNSC to the FCCC, contestation is a clear sign of the extent to which a climate security discourse, including climate security itself, is emerging.

Contestedness in contrast is strongly evidenced by the debates on climate and security. Although researchers have not yet developed a yardstick for assessing robustness trends (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2019), contestation signals a norm's robustness and objections to a norm through a desire to undermine it or at least not engage it in a particular issue-domain (Wiener 2008). Some analysts suggest that an established norm can become neglected due to ongoing contestation, while others interpret contestation as a sign of strength (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2019). Contestation (as a practice) is mostly used descriptively to indicate objection to a norm (Wiener 2019). Because the discursive meaning of a policy principle never solidifies and is constantly the object of political contestation (Hajer & Versteeg 2005; Feindt & Oels 2005), the ongoing contestation might look like a failed securitisation at first glance. But what has happened is far from failure. According to the Copenhagen School, a failed securitising move is better understood as an ongoing event in full flight and characterised by expected contestation.

The 2019 debate is particularly remarkable in relation to this *practice*. According to the UNDP representative:

> In our work on the ground … we are witness to the ways that climate change is driving insecurity and, increasingly, conflict as well. For instance, in extreme weather events such as drought, we are already witnessing a higher number of victims arising from conflict between pastoralists and sedentary populations in West Africa than from some of the extreme violence related to political developments.[236]

[236] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 4.

Echoing this posture and welcoming "the recent resolutions" that have already taken this into account, Belgium's representative observes:

> Conflict prevention is not only a virtuous policy; it is also a profitable strategy on many levels. In particular, it makes it possible to invest resources in positive and forward-looking actions, rather than having to intervene later through peacekeeping operations, which are more costly and less effective.[237]

Mr Nebenzia (Russia's representative) took a different posture. He made it clear that Russia's position with regard to the security impacts of climate change is well known. Russia has always opposed using the UNSC as the venue for airing the climate security debate. This position makes Russia an antipreneur. Engagement with the antipreneur idea draws attention to the discursive practices that have been used to oppose the "climate security norm" and signposts the importance of locating analysis within a complex normative interplay, as opposed, in linear terms, to interpreting the climate security trajectory as one discreet normative development in climate change politics (Scott 2017: 125). Furthermore, Mr Nebenzia asserts: "climate change can be an additional risk factor in some countries and regions" like the Sahel but "we deem it excessive, and even counterproductive, to consider climate change in the Security Council;" moreover, "a generalized linking of the topic of climate change with peace can lead to the false assumption that the problems of the environment are unavoidable and always lead to conflict."[238]

While Russia's assertions shed a new light about the extent to which climate security is emerging as a dominant discourse in the UNSC, Ravilova-Borovik alluded as much at the Arria-Formula Meeting in New York when she emphasised that Russia has "never avoided discussing these issues" (Orlove 2017: para. 16). Several scholars and top-level diplomats have repeatedly urged the UNSC to commission more research specifically focussing on possible and direct interactions among climate, security and conflict. This chapter agrees the UNSC needs to help policymakers with reliable and consistent research-informed data on climate risks (Cardi 2017). Such research is a critical part of

[237] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 10.
[238] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 16.

efforts to better understand climate-related security risks and thereby potentially avoid complaints by Russia, India, and the like – within and beyond the UNSC. According to Zijlstra, expert analysis can serve as a prevention tool insofar research findings are systematically fed into the UNSC via an institutional home for climate and security within the UN system, especially when expert assessments include contributions from committed academics, determined campaigners and far-sighted politicians. It is clear Cardi and Zijlstra (two key voices among the diplomats) want the UNSC and particularly the academic community to do more and produce empirical, irrefutable – if there is such a thing – evidence that may be capable of enabling a binding presidential statement or a resolution on climate security. Such empirical evidence might reduce the level of contestation and contestedness, in both the UNSC and academic arena, especially with respect to the conflict dimension.

To close this section, the analysis of the UNSC case shows that the extent to which climate security may be emerging as a dominant discourse is perhaps best demonstrated by the series of presidential statements issued between 2011 and 2020. In one way or another, the presidential statements provided opportunity for further progress on climate security and (in)directly helped the establishment of the Climate Security Mechanism. With this, the UNSC formally acknowledged and recognised the security risks of climate change. The demand for appointing a special envoy and creating an institutional home for climate security within the UN system implied deeper normative institutionalisation of climate security in the UNSC. It is revealing that such proposals were generally prominent at both Arria-Formula meetings and formal debates.

7.3 The FCCC Case: Signs of Emerging Climate Security Discourse

Issue definition is probably the singularly most crucial element in the first stage of norm emergence. Although FCCC meetings and UNSC debates did not uniquely focus on articulating a universal definition for climate security, issue definition is a clear priority in all documents and concept notes that were examined in relation to FCCC's Adaptation Committee meetings. Furthermore, two related aspects were covered in a separate information paper for Adaptation Committee meeting in September 2013: the first emphasises possible cooperation to reduce duplication of actions and strengthen

synergies; in the second, Parties to the COP defined the role of the Convention in terms of enhancing knowledge on comprehensive risk-management approaches, on slow-onset events and on loss and damage.[239]

Alongside the definition that reflected the centrality of linkages between slow-onset events and the loss and damage policy, which has been widely debated, the events mentioned in the above paragraph may be considered a highlight of the extent to which climate security is emerging as a dominant discourse within the FCCC. Due in part to the absence of international consensus on definitive linkages, the FCCC published a key finding thirteen months before the meeting in September 2013. According to the finding, managing slow-onset risks requires reliable institutional arrangements if the FCCC is to pinpoint the synergistic intersections between slow-onset and rapid-onset events that increase the risk of loss and damage.[240] Nearly all submissions for the Adaptation Committee meeting in September 2013 responded to key risk categories, which included climate-related disaster risk reduction, early warning systems, coordination and cooperation on forced displacement as well as impact and vulnerability assessments.

In the issue definition stage, norm entrepreneurs rely on cooperative actor-centred strategies rather than confrontational strategies (Rosert 2019). The analysis found that coalition building aimed at norm diffusion is striking in the FCCC case and the UNSC case. As norm diffusion entails the ways in which a society is familiarised with the existence of a norm (Morris-Martin et al. 2019), this is one way the FCCC has sought to engage with climate-related security risks. There are several interlinked and coordinated coalitions on climate security in the UNSC. Two of these provide scientific expertise which informs UNSC responses. The Group of Friends on Climate and Security is a coalition comprising an array of UN member governments. Likewise, the Climate Security Expert Network, which is supported by Sweden and Germany, advises the Group of Friends and informs the UN-based Climate Security Mechanism. Relatedly, the FCCC's Adaptation Committee has been tasked to develop an inventory as a collaborative work with key stakeholders[241] to cover relevant methodologies for determining adaptation strategies. In the FCCC case, coalition building is best exemplified by how the Task-

[239] Second meeting, AC/2013/2, 5-8 March 2013, p. 3, https://tinyurl.com/s2kbncu.
[240] FCCC/TP/2012/7, 26 November 2012.
[241] FCCC/SBSTA/2019/INF.1, 11 June 2019, p. 1.

Force on Displacement has coordinated certain activities with international organisations (such as Platform on Disaster Displacement, International Labour Organization, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, UNHCR and IMO).

Compared with the FCCC, the UNSC has performed better in terms of issue definition. At the 2011 debate, statements by Ban Ki-moon and Nauru's representative marked the first mention of climate security as a distinct concept in the UNSC. Ban Ki-moon urged all countries to recognise the connections between energy-, food-, water- and climate-security, and Nauru's representative insisted the UNSC should formally recognise the security implications of climate change through the appointment of a special envoy on climate and security.[242] Perhaps because the climate security debate was relatively new to UNSC members, nobody commented about establishing an institutional home for climate security at the debate in 2007. The situation had morphed by 2011 when several countries addressed climate-related security issues.

Adaptation Committee and Normative Engagement

The analysis found that efforts are being made to align climate security to exisiting normative principles and structures, especially both the Nairobi Work Programme and the Sendai Framework which are clear normative instruments. This is an answer to the question of the extent to which climate security is emerging as a dominant discourse within the FCCC. The answer can be further defended by international legitimacy of the Nairobi Work Programme and the Sendai Framework. Featuring prominently at nearly all meetings held by the FCCC's Adaptation Committee, the Nairobi Work Programme primarily focuses on disaster risk reduction and impact assessments, as well as disseminating information about adaptation strategies. For these reasons the phrasings of climate-riskification in the submissions for meetings may well explain why the Nairobi Work Programme featured either as a sessional or the main topic alongside that of disaster risk reduction, slow-onset events and the loss and damage mechanism (Table 8). Within the general norm life cycle, norm grafting may describe the current phase in the FCCC case, in comparison with debates in the UNSC where the emerging nature of the climate security norm has been characterised by contestation. Research has shown that grafting

[242] UNSC/10332, 20 July 2011.

an emerging norm upon previously accepted norms often facilitates acceptance and institutional fit (Elgström 2000; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 2019).

For the FCCC, the Sendai Framework and the Nairobi Work Programme are important normative instruments. Attendees at meetings held by the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement have made connections between these instruments and their statements on the security risks of climate change. However, for such statements to be more effective in technical reports to the COP, the connections need to be presented more clearly so that decision-makers at the COP can easily pinpoint the normative justifications of such statements. For instance, with regard to "one form of norm-setting and establishing a discourse" such as "the Nairobi Work Programme, Adaptation Committee" in climate governance (Persson 2019: 12), decisions based on current events are perhaps best guided by past events and consideration of pros and cons of trade-offs. On the other hand, despite that the Sendai Framework usefully incorporates climate change as a risk driver while mentioning the climate change phrase 15 times, including strong paragraphs on implementation mechanisms at various governance levels, an examination of the paragraphs shows mixed results (Kelman 2015). One reason for this can be related to the treatment of the contributions of climate change to disaster risk which failed to articulate a full picture and thus insufficient explanation about how the Sendai Framework would be implemented in relation to disaster risk (Zia & Wagner 2015). Indeed, while the overall conclusion is that the Sendai Framework failed to deal with root causes of disaster, improvements are noted with respect to potential coherence and alignment with other components of the post-2015 Agenda especially the monitoring of governments' successes and the specificity of targets (Wisner 2020).

In a normative sense, the role of the epistemic community on climate security is vital to the progress of the candidate norm. The names of staunch supporters of climate security are not explicitly listed in the technical reports on FCCC-based meetings, although most member countries of the FCCC have established national programmes or policies that conform to the Sendai Framework or the Nairobi Work Programme or both. It is relatively straightforward to pinpoint supporters of climate security and therefore the opposing faction in the UNSC case, but more difficult to do so in the FCCC case. This finding is consistent with Morris-Martin et al. (2019): it is almost impossible to ascertain the

percentage of the population complying with a candidate norm if the norm has not first existed through compliance with the norm emergence, which includes norm creation and diffusion in which a percentage of the population or a predefined threshold of agents is observed to be adopting or following the same norm. Unlike in the FCCC case, decision-makers in the EU and UNSC cases could be said to be on a journey towards formal adoption of a climate security norm. Since the scholarship on norm emergence pays little to no attention to how long it is acceptable for this situation to persist before one can say the norm has emerged (Morris-Martin et al. 2019), the suggestion here is that climate security has same status as a candidate norm with the expectation that it will mature into a widely and internationally accepted norm over time especially if the associated discourse continues to emerge without ineliminable contraints.

The normative context means the FCCC can no longer ignore the climate-riskification trend, pervasive in submissions for Adaptation Committee meetings. Within this normative context, submissions by the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction and the World Water Council have progressively evolved to contribute and connect to the changing needs of the FCCC. The examination of Adaptation Committee meetings showed that nine submissions were made in 2016 and eighteen submissions in 2017. Only the submissions by the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (in 2016) and the World Water Council (in 2016 and 2017) implicitly made riskifying moves. In the call for submissions, the Adaptation Committee requested for information about how adaptation efforts should be defined and documented. The UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction replies that climate change will exacerbate "the frequency and intensity of weather-related hazards, with cascading impacts on poverty," people movements, water supply and conflict.[243] According to the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction, mitigating the vulnerability of people to these hazards is a critical shared priority for disaster risk reduction and the realisation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Evident here is a normative bent vis-à-vis the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which may be read as underpinning the FCCC's normative commitment to climate-riskification. In 2016 and 2017, the Adaptation Committee posed the question of what should be done about challenges of adaptation. The World Water Council answered that

[243] UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction Submission, 2016, p. 1, https://tinyurl.com/yawvggqu.

"infrastructure planning needs to evolve to fit new requirements and constraints, pressed by climate change, scarcity, conflict over resources and other factors."[244] This reflected the World Water Council's belief that successful adaptation efforts should prioritise clear assessment of climate risks. In relation to what the goals should be when assessing adaptation needs, the World Water Council replied that since climate change impacts are felt through unpredictable rainfall, floods, cyclones, salinisation, droughts and water shortages, addressing these challenges should help prevent exacerbation of existing freshwater quality and quantity challenges. Compared to the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction's responses, the World Water Council's responses tend towards climate-riskification. Insights gained during interview sessions confirmed this: according to one informant, water resources "can cause tensions between communities or countries" and such tensions, "in combination with climate change and conflict," would "lead to displacement."[245] Another informant offered a different interpretation: in some cases where "there is deep dispute about sharing waters," we may "use climate change more as the common enemy" because one good way to bring disputants to a roundtable is if they "have a common enemy."[246] The informants' perspectives encapsulate climate-riskification and reinforce the World Water Council's responses. Together with the candidate norm, all this points to the possibility of considering climate security as a critical cross-cutting focus for the realisation of the normative 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

One clear similarity between the FCCC case and the UNSC case can be related to an emerging conflict dimension with respect to the Sendai Framework. In the view of South Africa's representative at the UNSC debate held in January 2019, various evidence-based studies have shown it is difficult to determine a direct causal nexus between climate change and threats to international peace and security, although climate change may be an exacerbating factor of specific root causes of conflict. In part, for this reason, South Africa looks to the FCCC for "policy direction and leadership."[247] Many representatives[248] at the UNSC debate remained committed to the Sendai Framework as

[244] World Water Council Submission, September 2016, p. 4, https://tinyurl.com/y8v2s6h5; World Water Council Submission, January 2017, p. 2, https://tinyurl.com/y7fakufx.
[245] Interview conducted by author, 13 December 2018.
[246] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.
[247] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 23.
[248] Australia, Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, EU, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Maldives, Peru, Philippines and South Africa

the main international policy instrument for progressing the climate security debate. Kuwait's representative was very explicit: addressing the cross-border impacts of climate change requires international "political will, cooperation and solidarity" for further implementation of the "principles and purposes of the Sendai Framework."[249] Russia's representative supported the UN's "central role" in reducing the risk of disasters and strengthening resilience through "professional dialogue based on in-depth expertise and relevant knowledge." Moscow stated that the Sendai Framework is the main essential mechanism for exchanging experiences and best practices in order to strengthen the global architecture of international cooperation in the areas of disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness.[250]

Furthermore, normative discussions on climate security in the FCCC shared striking similarities to debates held in the UNSC. Key among these is the UNSC's affirmation of the FCCC as the key platform for progressing the climate security debate (Scott 2015). The affirmation however does not mean that the UNSC has explicitly or implicitly authorised the FCCC to address the security risks of climate change nor the conflict dimension. Other normative similarities in policy and practice can be demonstrated.

The FCCC's Task-Force on Displacement and Discursively Normative Engagement

Coalition building is a crucial condition for sustaining the emerging climate security discourse in the FCCC case. There is high likelihood that certain responsibilities or deliverables which the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage had assigned in 2017/2018 to several international organisations would lead to the formation of a coalition (even if informal) with these organisations as the founding members. For these reasons the idea of coalition-building becomes compelling as an array of epistemic communities (NGOs networks, interstate institutions and like-minded actors) come together to compensate for each other's deficits, including lack of direct influence, or authority, or expertise (Elgström 2017). The Platform on Disaster Displacement, the International Organization for Migration and the UNHCR are

[249] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 9.
[250] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 16.

responsible for phrasing and linkages related to the Task-Force on Displacement's main mandate to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address climate-related displacement. The UNDP and the Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations are responsible for the policy-practice nexus in particular the mainstreaming of the mandate in national and international contexts. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, together with the Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations, is responsible for data and assessment on disaster-related displacement, especially in terms of sudden- and slow-onset events.[251] This type of service and knowledge exchange is an indication of the level of trust that the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage has in these organisations on an individual organisation basis. And perhaps more important, the level of recognition accorded to each member's speciality area has meant that the deliverables become more significant in normative terms.

While one may read the allocation of the deliverables as how the issue of climate-related displacement is being confronted, the organisations' responses to the responsibilities have played a key role in their statements on the risks of climate change. As all this implied that the Task-Force on Displacement has recognised (implicitly) epistemic community on climate security emergence: the recognition has been made possible through both the epistemic community on climate security's contributions to Task-Force on Displacement meetings and the epistemic community on climate security's close relationship with the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage has recognised the aforementioned organisations' collective expertise and entrusted the coalition with important normative responsibilities or deliverables. This enables an important process of emerging climate security discourse in which networking within a coalition enables competence and expertise in specific elements within a particular issue area. This issue definition stage of such emergence is often considered as being completed when institutional decision-makers formally acknowledge and create a space on their agenda for issue definition. In the FCCC case the process may well mature into a formal recognition of the epistemic community on climate security. Through the process and

[251] Task Force on Displacement's Workplan – 2017/2018, https://tinyurl.com/yblu3xo8.

existing recognition, the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage has identified a set of international organisations and tasks that they directly perform both for the Task-Force on Displacement and at Task-Force on Displacement meetings. More pointedly, the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage engages an array of "relevant communities of practice" to co-develop and implement its activities.[252] In March 2018 this Committee created both the roster of experts to inform its activities through their networks and expert groups on risk transfer which include comprehensive risk-management approaches as well as non-economic losses and slow-onset events. Whilst the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations are two notable organisations already tasked with assessing existing data on slow-onset events, the Committee has since dedicated a new and separate webpage to the roster of experts registration in order to identify individuals and organisations whose service and expertise would be engaged in different activities mandated to experts in accordance to the Committee's five-year work schedule.

Another normative responsibility is the discursive articulation of conflict dimensions, noted in existing literature as one consequence of climate change. This particular responsibility may be seen as a stage of emergence of climate security discourse where the issue is foregrounded as an institutional agenda. Such stage begins when the issue diffuses from the public agenda into the institutional agenda and also diffuses through it by reaching other institutions (Rosert 2019). The responsibility appeared to be rapidly emerging and diffusing as a possible conflict prevention strategy in the FCCC case. As outlined in the Task-Force on Displacement's Workplan for the 2017/18 period,[253] the responsibility is being pursued by the Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre in view of a global baseline of climate-related disaster displacement risk, and reported region to inform the International Organization for Migration, the International Labour Organization and the UNDP strategies to address climate-related displacement and national adaptation.

[252] Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Roster of experts of the Warsaw International Mechanism, https://tinyurl.com/yd8a66ky.
[253] Task-Force's Workplan, https://tinyurl.com/yblu3xo8.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre is an indispensable stakeholder and has made remarkable contributions in relation to the conflict dimension. In its technical report for Task-Force on Displacement meeting held in September 2018, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre presented a strong articulation of the relationships between slow-onset events, forced displacement and violent conflict over resource scarcity.[254] Acting on behalf of the Advisory Group Civil Society Organisations, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre identified a possible cascade of hazards when slow- onset events, prompted by rapid-onset events and decreased ecosystem services, interact with other risk factors such as violence.[255] The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre believes that slow-onset events, although usually not the dominant input, can interact with and exacerbate other crisis factors:[256]

> Slow-onset events often are a hidden aggravating factor in many contexts … and may culminate in humanitarian crises, creating internal and cross border displacement … Conflicts, for example, are a main responsibility of fragile governance structures and the inability of the state and relevant stakeholders to ensure peace. However, slow onset events, although they are not a direct catalyst for violent conflict, can exacerbate already fragile situations. They can fuel conflict over resource scarcity and are often described as a multiplier or magnifier of pre-existing conflicts.

The phrasing above sets the basic groundwork through specification of the broader terms surrounding the conflict dimension. The phrasing may also be read as making the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (including its peers in the epistemic community on climate security – the IMO, the UNDP and the UNHCR) a repository of technical knowledge.

The epistemic community on climate security has actively promoted climate security as a candidate norm with similar phrasings, therefore its influencial role on the relationship between the conflict dimension and the normative progress of climate security. However,

[254] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Synthesizing the state of knowledge to better understand displacement related to slow onset events, August 2018, https://tinyurl.com/qus9fs6.
[255] Task-Force meeting report, May 2018.
[256] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Synthesizing the state of knowledge, p. 7.

owing in part to uncertainties, the target audience would be correct in interpreting the phrasing as a riskification dilemma mainly because it does not reflects direct linkage to the candidate norm. The overall weight of the phrasing is devoid of evidence of the linkages between climate and slow-onset events and then slow-onset impacts and conflict. From a normative perspective, only after the linkages have been structurally demonstrated and empirically evidenced can the phrasing become successful in convincing addressees. In the literature, the articulation of linkages is weak, although there have been indicators and claims of sufficiently strong indirect linkage. But as these remain few and far between in normative terms, structural and normative explanations are relied on to construct and explain the validity of linkages.

Thinking about risks associated with climate-related displacement, critics would intuitively say that they are most often associated with the idea of sudden-onset events, which are perceived as triggering more chaotic, spontaneous displacement situations. At a stakeholder meeting held in May 2018, the Somali context presented a normative opportunity to dig deeper into the climate-riskification aspect of the candidate norm. A participant raised "the Somalia context in 2011–2012 and 2016" as a case in which some "states recognized the multi-causality of root causes behind refugee flows," including the "dynamics" of the "nexus between climate and/or disaster with conflict and/or violence."[257] In the event there was little to no interest in this particular context, reflecting the weakness of the climate-conflict linkage. Deeper engagement with the conflict dimension is crucial in relation to conceptualising further integrated recommendations for addressing climate-related displacement.

The normatively discursive opportunity offered by the Somalia context was discussed at a parallel session during the stakeholder meeting. Besides highlighting the Somalia context, Walter Kälin's (2018) closing remarks envisioned a scenario where Somalia's future is a prototype of how the Task-Force on Displacement could have an impact. TheTask-Force on Displacement's Workplan could be argued to have acknowledged the linkage by prioritising the "mapping of existing relevant policies and institutional frameworks that deal with the climate and displacement interaction at the national level,

[257] Task-Force meeting report, May 2018, p. 16.

including identification of key actors in the policy formulation."[258] Kälin enlightened attendees on how national mobility policies often prioritise security concerns without conceptualising climate-related displacement. To minimise and even avert displacement risk, he recommends that climate responses should help people to stay by strengthening a community's resilience, planned relocation, and integrated approaches that address the protection needs of displaced people.[259] Both helping people to stay and restricting displacement potentially limits their capacity to move and adapt. Managing climate-related displacement is highly contentious and normatively difficult with, for example, various European countries attempting to contain displacement to where it originated. In any case, the technical report on the stakeholder meeting features a summary of the Kälin-led study and associated recommendations that were presented to the 2018 COP.

The overall implication of all this for the emerging climate security discourse is enormous. The unfolding developments in the FCCC has a wider significance for the discourse as the technical-level meetings and reports which featured slow-onset events and the conflict dimension indicate that the Parties may consider FCCC's recommendations in its strategic climate policies. A scrutiny the Adaptation Committee's and the Task-Force on Displacement's efforts showed one might expect a convergence that could provide prospects and potential grounds for the FCCC to consider a definitive and binding decision on climate security.

7.4 The EU Case: Signs of Emerging Climate Security Discourse

The analysis found that several EU institutions have promoted climate security discourse. Key among these are the European Parliament and the European Commission because they have prominently acted as entrepreneurs and propagators of the emerging climate security norm. Crucial in this regard is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace policy – a funding mechanism. This section explains how the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace policy is connected to climate security and how the EU has sought to diffuse the policy, notably through the idea of the security-development nexus. The analysis therefore illuminates how the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

[258] Task-Force's Workplan, https://tinyurl.com/yblu3xo8.
[259] Task-Force meeting report, 2018, pp. 9-10.

policy is gaining the status of a security discourse and how it is being propagated. This will enhance understanding of climate security and securitisation in terms of discourse in the EU.

The analysis uncovered a reliable answer to the research question regarding the extent to which climate security is emerging as a dominant discourse norm in the EU. The answer is that with the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's growing focus on the security-development nexus, climate security is in the first stae of norm life cycle. The Instrument's policy journey towards better integration of this nexus has important precedents. Evidence for the normative-focused nexus can be found in a December 2008 reporting on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, which was adopted in 2003. While, according to the reporting, sustainable development is impossible without security and vice versa,[260] the EU first clarified its vision on "multilateral leadership to promote global climate security" in a March 2008 joint report by the EU High Representative and European Commission.[261] The High Representative asserted that "the EU is well suited to taking forward the climate security agenda" in a December 2008 follow-up report.[262] And stted that "climate change … should be in the mainstream of EU foreign and security policies and institutions."[263] In March 2008, a joint report by the EU High Representative and European Commission, highlighted the significance of purposive attention to climatic risks in particular within the UNSC, the Group of Eight and UN specialised bodies.[264]

Another significant development related to the security-development nexus is the Council of the EU Conclusions in February 2018. In it, the Council expressed EU support for the continued work in the UN system and encouraged the UNSC to focus on the climate-security nexus. The Council recommends that this particular focus should be "a recurrent item within deliberations for UN Security Council resolutions and statements, and looking at options, including institutionally, to strengthen climate risk assessment and management within the UN system."[265] The Council cited the 2017 Hague Declaration –

[260] S407/08, 11 December 2008.
[261] The EU High Representative and European Commission, S113/08, 14 March 2008, p. 10.
[262] The EU High Representative, S412/08, 18 December 2008, p. 1.
[263] The EU High Representative, S412/08, 18 December 2008, p. 1.
[264] S113/08, 14 March 2008.
[265] 6125/18, 26 February 2018.

published about three months before the Council Conclusions – and emphasised the importance of "translating climate and security analysis into possible action." The citation marked the first time the EU explicitly but subtly supported the call for creating an institutional home for climate security. Unlike the Council Conclusions, the Hague Declaration clearly promoted climate security by listing "creating an institutional home for climate security" within the UN system as the first of a six-point agenda.[266] For the Council to respond to it so quickly showed how far Brussels followed the latest events in the climate security world.

Within the security-development nexus a remarkable similarity has emerged between the EU case and the UNSC case. Giving further credibility to the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, this strengthens the claim about a candidate norm in the EU and corroborates McDonald's (2013) and von Lucke's (2015) argument regarding the broad consensus in the securitisation literature which shows there is more than one way to securitise an issue. This argument confirms Floyd's (2016, 2019) assertion that there are various forms of securitisation that can help unpack divergent political implications. Although phrasing an issue of concern is certainly one way of conducting a normative securitisation process, there are other forms of elite normative emergence which include bracketing the audience from this process but this is not to say that elite norm formation does not need phrasing.

The first indicator regarding a strengthened emerging climate security discourse occurred in the UNSC context. At the UNSC debate in 2011, Bolivia's representative urged the UNSC to adopt a resolution that would cut defence and security spending in developed countries and redirect such funds towards assisting countries suffering from the impacts of climate change.[267] According to Denise Garcia (2020: 521), an academic who advises the UN on arms control, governments should "redirect military budgets to tackle climate change." These entreaties are not too different from what the EU has achieved through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace policy. According to the European Commission: the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace belongs to the international peace and security architecture which comprises "a collection of structures, norms" that have "evolved to avert and resolve violent conflicts and threats to

[266] Planetary Security Initiative, The Hague Declaration on Planetary Security, 13 December 2017.
[267] UNSC/10332, 20 July 2011.

international security."[268] The architecture has matured to a point where it is typically consulted when there is a need to address and resolve problems perceived as threatening and disabling to preserving international security, one example being climate-related security issue. The EU has been confronting this particular problem through its comprehensive Common Security and Defence Policy, which in the European Parliament's view has identified "climate-driven crises" as a major challenge for global governance.[269] According to the European Commission: the unfolding international peace and security terrain is forcing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's increasing adaptability to several evolving threats including climate-related displacement, security risks, "the securitisation of development and peace," and hybrid conflicts.[270] The Commission also describes these hybrid conflicts as situations of widespread violence that entails a mix of internal country and cross-border dynamics as well as a scenario in which "climate changes may play a role."

There is a caveat about representation, with stronger support for universal bodies like the UN General Assembly and FCCC that accord consensus power to all countries. Bolivia believed the security implications of climate change should be debated in the FCCC and the General Assembly because these institutions are forum not only with adequate representations of the main victims of climate-related security risks, but also where the main emitters of global greenhouse gases do not possess the right to veto.[271] Qatar's representative expressed similar belief at the debate in 2007 that mechanisms capable of enforcing their resolutions were needed, provided they are have wider representation.[272] Against this backdrop, the FCCC and the General Assembly are UN specialised institutions dealing with global developmental issues more than security emergencies. There may be reluctance to accord legitimacy to EU initiatives as they reflect the particular interests of high-income European countries. This could not be further from reality. As is obvious by now, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace is primarily focused on funding assistance to developing countries. This Instrument became the EU budgetary support for security sector reform with a primarily civilian objective in

[268] Final Report, p. 1, FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1.
[269] European Parliament, A7-0349/2012, 23 October 2012, p. 3.
[270] Final Report, p. 1, FWC COM 2015, EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi, Specific Contract No°2016/375238/1.
[271] UNSC/10332, 20 July 2011.
[272] UNSC/9000, 17 April 2007.

partner countries under the Common Security and Defence Policy. According to the joint communication of April 2015 from the European Commission and the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, such exclusion has negatively hampered the EU's ability to comprehensively address the deteriorating security environment, especially in African countries.[273] However, Brussels is focused on curbing in-migration to the EU – so it has its own interests uppermost. Even the focus on military aid and strategic support to pursue this can be seen as interference – this is a concern that, for instance, Russia, China and India have expressed on several occasions.

The second indicator regarding a strengthened emerging climate security discourse in the EU relates to the West Africa and the Sahel region context. Recalling the UNSC-affiliated UNOWAS with its security-development mandate for this region, there is a similar programme in the EU. The Council of the EU adopted the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in March 2011, noting that the region "faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats."[274] Four years later, the Council adopted the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015–2020. The adopted document integrates earlier adoptions and revisions in Council Conclusions of 21 March 2011 and 17 March 2014.[275]

There is evident coordination between the EU and the UNSC Sahel programmes. In May 2019 the Council of the EU reaffirmed the EU's commitment to the establishment of the governance structures for the operation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, in line with UNSC Resolution 2391. Declaring the West Africa and the Sahel region as a strategic priority speaks volumes among community of states because it implies the EU is willing and able to pursue the issue with all the resources at its disposal, including normative tools. This is precisely the status of the West Africa and the Sahel region in Brussels, judging by the Council of the EU: the Sahel is a strategic priority for the EU that stands by the authorities and people of the Sahel, who continue to face challenges of various kinds, with climate

[273] European Parliament, Briefing – EU legislation in progress, November 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y3wzjfvq.
[274] Council of the EU, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, March 2011, https://tinyurl.com/y3mg3hfs.
[275] EU 7823/15, 20 April 2015.

change adversely affecting natural resources and fuelling local conflicts.[276] Alongside being the region where the climate security card is truly playing out, the Sahel is pivotal to the success of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and vice versa. It is the region where the EU has experimented the implementation of its integrated approach (Lucia 2017): the West Africa and the Sahel region was the first test site for the reshaped EU Conflict Early Warning System, which might enable Brussels to address the responsibility to protect principles of institutionalisation, integration and rapid response (de las Heras 2020); taking stock of the EU's presence in the Sahel already revealed some governance-related contradictions in the integrated approach which also related to governance (Venturi 2019).

The third indicator about a strengthened emerging climate security discourse can be located in the discursive and policy spheres. In this context the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the phrasings of climate security unfolded with respect to the security-development nexus. A noteworthy detail before going further. In the UNSC, influential European countries emerged as the staunchest members of the epistemic community on climate security. This means their support for climate security will automatically reflect on what happens in the EU. The phrasings of climate change are indeed undergoing an important change in the development and security discourse, as this discourse reorients from phrasing climate change as a security threat to climate-related security and development risks (de Coning & Krampe 2020). Policy wise, the normative-focused nexus places strategists squarely in the mix as they strive to slot climate security into the security security-development nexus. Alongside this nexus emphasising how climate change exposes and compounds risks in conflict-affected and fragile settings (de Coning & Krampe 2020), the discourse phrasing climate change as a security risk hinders conceptualisations of climate-conflict interventions (Abrahams 2020). A policy sphere case in point occurred at the UNSC debate in July 2018 where the UK's representative emphasised that the interplay between climate and security is not an abstract theoretical risk, drawing on a compelling picture painted by Ms. Hindou Ibrahim (representative of the International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on Climate Change): "the link between development and security, what it means on the ground for ordinary families and how vulnerable they are to developments, such as terrorist acts, because of the incredibly stark

[276] 9103/19, 13 May 2019, p. 2-3.

and unfair choices they face."[277] Russia's representative also sympathised with Ms. Ibrahim's "emotional statement" but nonetheless countered the UK: "those who promulgate" the "conclusion" that "climate change is a threat to security" generally "mislead everybody" while "demanding that we recognize highly abstract connections" when they "do not as a rule make the effort to bring scientifically sound, specific details to bear or clear explanations of the notions of security, conflict, threats or stability as they relate to the climate issue."[278] The unfolding security-development nexus in the EU may eventually help bring opposing factions in the UNSC closer together on the issue, whether in climate securitisation or climate-riskification terms.

The fourth indicator regarding a strengthened emerging climate security discourse occurred in the context of interviews conducted by the author on the EU decision-making process. As narrated by one informant, "the EU is making some progress, but this is all new as we all are learning and there is still a long way to go." She suggests that there has been recognition relating to climate security, "unfortunately a lot of it sort of remained in kind of resurrect and has not really affected decision-making as systematic as it needs to."[279] The adoption of Council Conclusions, often used to identify and key issues and mandate specific course of actions, mostly lead to the presentation of legislative proposals – like that for climate security. In Brussels however, there are climate actors; and there are security actors. These groups of actors have different conceptions of climate security. From a human security perspective, climate actors are receptive to the climate risk approach. But if we are interested in presenting the instability-security perspective, then we should to include the mainstream security and conflict experts. But of course, "the big challenge is to have these two communities talking to each other and it is pretty difficult in practice because there is a different logic."[280] Climate actors are often predisposed to scientific forecast despite its high uncertainty. Though there may be no direct causal climate-security relationship, social science research-focused security actors are more attentive to politics and to understanding situations in their given contexts. "It is different reasoning if you like, different types of analysis" so to say,[281] according to the informant. There is also the issue of jurisdiction. Another interviewee commented that "the EU tries

[277] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018, p. 11.
[278] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018, p. 15-16.
[279] Interview conducted by author, 10 September 2018.
[280] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.
[281] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.

to be an actor by taking the role of foreign policymaking actor" but policymaking in Brussels depends on what these member countries want to have in the debate.[282] Thus, the EU may be seen as an economic actor.

The analysis found that the normative operation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace will proceed unabated. Since the security-development nexus is the EU's organising principle to achieve the norm of promoting sustainable peace and development" (de Heredia 2020: 173), officials insist that after 2014, the European Commission-managed Instrument for Stability will place more emphasis on climate-driven conflict because it supported projects in crisis situations (Youngs 2014). Because the nexus has emphasised security to the detriment of development, the EU now strives to rebalance by focussing on promoting military-capable third countries (de Heredia 2020). Within this context, Marta de Heredia presented a paper that "contributes to the EU-NormCon research project (Normative contestation in Europe: Implications for the EU in a changing global)." Although the overarching goal of fostering good governance and "the in-practice 'second best' goal" of promoting military-capable countries appear to be contradictory, analysis of interviews undertaken for how the security-development nexus is understood by policymakers showed that these goals are in fact complementary (de Heredia 2017: 2). Interestingly, several interviewees pointed to the growing convergence between development and security circles in the EU, whereas most officials questioned the artificial division of security and development (Keukeleire & Raube 2013).

In this context, the European Commission has sought to develop Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace activities that are implemented with respect for "judicial norms"[283] within the purview of ensuring the linkages between peacebuilding, capacity of development stakeholders in conflict prevention and "the security system so that the latter is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, "transparency and good governance."[284] It is worth mentioning that since the 2000s, "the organizing principle (type-2 norm) of 'transparency'" has been propagated by Western

[282] Interview conducted by author, 18 October 2018.
[283] European Commission, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, May 2016, p. 9, https://tinyurl.com/yyegvbvx.
[284] Ibid, p. 52.

countries and NGOs as a conduit for diffusing "the fundamental norm of good governance (type-1 norm)" in the Global South (Vlaskamp 2020: 95).

A key finding from case analysis parallels Keukeleire and Raube's (2013) argument that there appeared to be a growing securitisation of the EU's development policy and its relations with African countries, although the nature and degree of securitisation suggest that the EU can always avoid a more direct involvement in conflict areas. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's focus on military capabilities of third countries provokes legitimate concerns and paradoxes about a creeping securitisation of EU development policy (Furness & Gänzle 2016). Given the importance of such complaints, several scholars (such as Keukeleire and Raube) have explored whether securitisation can be ascertained with respect to the institutional framework, policy actions, policy instruments and discourse. Securitisation can be determined as this thesis has demonstrated, but the exact degree may be speculative. Nevertheless, as the EU takes on more security responsibilities in third countries through a renewed focus on the security-development nexus, so does Brussels reorient the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace more towards a normative trajectory.

The growing securitisation of the EU's development policy continues amidst controversy. This controversy has permeated sectors within the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament and civil society (de Heredia 2020). Since the controversy has demonstrated the real possibility for using the security-development nexus to link development cooperation instruments with security policy activities without explicitly specifying the connections between development objectives and security-relevant measures (Bergmann 2018), it may well become counterproductive. But this need not be the case; so far, there appears to be no misinterpretation and contradiction of the core values of the EU's foreign policy and its global role. Furthermore, some scholars doubted that increases in climate financing will have a direct relevance to climate security partly because the EU's approach dampens the security logic through a discourse implying that the issue is little more than a need for more sustainable development (Youngs 2014). Yet the Legal Affairs Committee, due to strategic security- and development-related benefits for EU's own security, supported the European

Commission's proposal for Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace amendment,[285] which is now a key policy response for managing climate-related security risks in the EU and beyond.

7.5 Concluding Remarks

The analysis showed each case study has dedicated programmes (and thus discourses) on climate security. Compared to the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace's growing focus on the security-development nexus in the EU, climate security is in the first stage of norm emergence judging by both the UNSC's presidential statements which mentioned the UNOWAS and the FCCC's Nairobi Work Programme in the context of the Sendai Framework. The candidate norm is stronger in the EU case than in the UNSC case, which is quite persistent in relation to Arria-Formula meetings and regular formal debates, and less strong in the FCCC case than in the UNSC case. One reason for a stronger candidate norm in the EU is because norm entrepreneurs were lucky to have been spared the intense and consistent contestation that climate security experienced in the UNSC. In the FCCC case, the epistemic community has not met any serious contestation so far, but the normative evolution of climate security trailed behind the EU and the UNSC cases. This is because international organisations formed the bulk of the FCCC's epistemic community on climate security and conducted the brunt of advocacy. In contrast, the epistemic community on climate security is largely made up of countries in the EU and the UNSC cases.

This chapter therefore believed there is high likelihood that collaboration and coordination among countries will enable the candidate norm (and climate security discourse) to progress faster in its normative journey more than a coalition of international organisations would be able to achieve. This is not to say that the influential role of international organisations should be relegated, for the FCCC's epistemic community on climate security (comprising Platform on Disaster Displacement, International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre UNHCR, UNDP, and the like) can boast of a 173-strong country

[285] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU's new approach to funding peace and security, 30 June 2017, https://tinyurl.com/yx8hk76m.

members – as shown in Table 10. These international organisations constitute Task Force on Displacement members and should be seen as coalescing into an incredibly formal alliance that pushed for stronger engagement with climate-related displacement and slow-onset events. While a finding showed that these organisations clearly belong to the epistemic community on climate security due in part to assignments allocated to them by the Task-Force on Displacement, it is important for the epistemic community on climate security to aim for deeper coordination with pro-climate security countries because such engagement can help bring climate security to the level of attention it has commanded in the UNSC and the EU.

Perhaps more important, a more direct collaboration with those countries that have resisted climate security in the UNSC knowing fully well that these countries enthusiastically supported the FCCC as the legitimate venue for progressing climate security. This would adequately equip the candidate norm in its arduous journey of normative evolution. To this end, von Lucke (2020) revisits climate securititsation and the governmentalisation of security through three country cases to demonstrate how various actors, practices and discourses have securitised climate change quite differently, which has led to significant consequences for the respective debates and has enabled a range of political and normative consequences.

In this regard, it is extremely important for future researchers to keep submissions by the organisations in sight because it is conceivable that submissions which informed Task-Force on Displacement meetings appeared to have forced the conflict dimension of climate change onto the FCCC policy agenda. The forced conflict dimension is a crucial finding because many people would think it unlikely that the FCCC would bother itself since the conflict dimension is not part of its original mandate. As such the forced context may well offer reasonable explanation as to why the candidate norm got off to a slow start in the FCCC. To eliminate the forced context, the epistemic community on climate security together with the Task-Force on Displacement must find a way to ensure that riskifying moves are clearly, appropriately included and contextualised in relevant reports to the annual COP.

It is also important that researchers keep a close eye on collaboration and coordination activities. The Task-Force on Displacement in its technical report to the 2018 COP recommended deeper collaboration with several specialised departments within the FCCC, especially the Adaptation Committee, and urged the latter to assist developing countries in their national adaptation plans on climate-related displacement. This is evidence of coordination between the Adaptation Committee and the Task-Force on Displacement, although the request may not automatically nor necessarily translate into communication exchange on displacement. But if prodded through submissions by the organisations, such coordination would flourish in the FCCC especially when there is little to no contestation as is the situation in the EU case. The UNSC case showed committed efforts by the epistemic community on climate security to securitise certain aspects of climate change and ultimately justify the basis of a candidate norm. Alongside evident opposition to making the climate security a permanent agenda in the UNSC, the opposition is largely an indirect contestation of deeper securitisation of climate change. The opposition group contested the view that the riskification and securitisation of climate change should become a viable agenda in the UNSC. The basic premise for contestation is that the FCCC is the legitimate platform to progress the climate security debate on the grounds that the debate is too contentious to be meaningfully debated in a high-level political setting like the UNSC, which is not sufficiently representative of the global composition. Once again, no evidence was found for such contestation in the EU and the FCCC cases.

When discourse-historical analysis is put to work in a comparative sense, the central argument – climate risk is a central aspect of climate security as reflected in climate security statements by the institutional case studies – is richly supported in all case studies. Partly based on this argument, the comparative analysis above critically engaged with the results from the case study chapters and contextualised the analytical themes in terms of emerging climate security discourse. As in most interdisciplinary research based on a central argument, general limitations of qualitative research turned up. Prominent among these is the choice of analytical themes: climate securitisation, climate-riskification and the epistemic community on climate security. These themes came out at the same abstractive level, as conceptualised in the literature review chapter. It is to be expected that a finding showed actors' perception and conception of climate-riskification

and climate securitisation, normatively speaking, are not necessarily on the same abstractive level. Here is why: issue definition – a finding revealed there is no universal consensus of what climate security really is. This has affected not only the extent to which climate security is an emerging discourse but also how climate change has altered the perception and conception of security by actors as well as how climate security has been promoted and received by institutional actors, especially in the UNSC case. If we cannot define the issue we are aiming to solve, chances are the suggested solutions would be fruitless. To avoid this pitfall and make the results more acceptable to the research community, this thesis examined publicly available transcripts of institutional level meetings between 2001 and 2019 and offered an inclusive definition of climate security in Chapter 1.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION – THE EMERGING DISCOURSE ON CLIMATE SECURITY

This thesis sets out to tell an analytical story about an important research question: the extent to which policy statements by three interstate institutions might indicate an emerging dominant discourse on climate security and therefore the recognition of the concept itself? Hitherto this question is yet to be satisfactorily examined in terms of the three institutional cases, although climate security scholars have explored related questions. Despite the availability of research on the case studies (the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC), there is no study that compares the unfolding but distinct conceptualisations of climate security by these institutions. Therefore, little is known about the candidate norm especially with regard to comparative analysis of these institutions. This knowledge gap underpins the importance of the research question.

The thesis' goal is to offer a preliminary assessment of the extent to which policy statements and debates by the institutions might indicate an emerging climate security discourse and the associated recognition of climate security. The overall finding is that the discourse is becoming increasingly popular while climate security itself is still in the first stage of the norm life cycle. The candidate norm is yet to be adopted as an international principle, but it has a convincing normative journey that should continue into the future. The thesis reaches these conclusions with the help of discourse-historical analysis scrutinising policy statements as normative-inclined security phrasings. These accounts support the finding that climate-riskification is a central aspect of climate security. The analysis of statements revealed security phrasings which helped to establish the growing importance of climate security based on evidence from hearings held in the three case study settings: the FCCC, the EU and the UNSC.

Policy statements that reflected security phrasings and the signs of a candidate norm were retrieved from transcripts of meetings held in the 2001–2019 timeframe. The analysis stressed normative development as a process of climate security discourse, pointing to developments into the future. This involved examining the public record of the decision-making process, as a process of normative deliberation (Paige 2019). In order to verify

interpretations, this thesis drew on perspectives sourced from Skype-based scoping interviews with ten climate security experts between 2018 and 2020.

From the standpoint of the three analytical themes, the comparative analysis revealed close linkages between the epistemic community on climate security, climate-riskification and climate securitisation. The epistemic community on climate security has promoted climate-riskification whenever climate security has been the focus of discussion in the UNSC, the FCCC and the EU. The epistemic community has undertaken climate securitisation when policy statements successfully convinced norm the target audience, leading to formal adoption of specific policy strategies and planned programmes to address an identified threat.

The analysis showed how the analytical themes reveal signs of entrepreneurial investment, guided and nurtured by the epistemic community on climate security, and its commitment to discursive advocacy for the candidate norm. Focussing on the degree of this discursiveness as the ultimate prize, the epistemic community has utilised various tactics in the pursuit of issue phrasings that might appeal to and appease the target audience. Climate-riskification and climate securitisation are the routes to the prize. The analytical themes enabled a close look at these phrasings of climate risks and threats in pursuit of climate security.

It was found that the analytical themes across the three cases could also focus on riskification and securitisation where the epistemic community on climate security can offer answers to 1) how riskifying and securitising moves have been put forward and influenced by the epistemic community and adopted by the three institutions, 2) the identities of the main actors within the epistemic community in each of the institution studied, and 3) how the perception of climate security has been altered via the various statements/policies of the institutions.

Tangible policy actions have been adopted across the three institutions throughout the debates. These can be found, for example, in a set of presidential statements issued by the UNSC, in the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and in the FCCC's Nairobi Work Programme in association with the Sendai Framework. The epistemic

community has not met any serious contestation in the FCCC case in which the normative journey of climate security trailed behind the UNSC and the EU cases. This is because international organisations formed the bulk of the FCCC's epistemic community on climate security and conducted the brunt of advocacy. In contrast, the epistemic community on climate security is largely made up of countries in the EU and the UNSC cases.

The epistemic community on climate security is largely centred on countries in the EU and the UNSC cases. More important perhaps was the latest round of debate in the UNSC in January 2019 where a notable milestone did not simply acknowledge the risks of climate change but for the first time signified that the UNSC recognised the terminology of threat multiplier – which was first promoted by the epistemic community and particularly used at various Arria-Formula meetings much earlier (Table 6). But it was the January 2019 debate that genuinely ascribed formal recognition to the terminology, as various representatives of countries clearly presented climate change as a real and current threat multiplier. That development has started to leave its influence on both the climate security discourse and the candidate norm. It may create a legitimate basis for the UNSC to convene more formal debates on climate security, which might enable consensus on adopting an international principle on climate security in pursuit of maintaining international peace and security.

The analysis showed that the approach in this thesis actually followed the abovementioned subtle finding. For instance, the analysis has revealed the centrality of epistemic communities on climate security, in the different institutional contexts, as an active advocate driving the agenda. This epistemic community is in practice an umbrella label for advocates of climate security or groups of communities within the institutions studied. In the UNSC case, it is largely made up of Small Island Developing States as well as most developed industrial countries in the West. In the FCCC case, it is mainly populated by international organisations (such as UNHCR, UNDP, Platform on Disaster Displacement, International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Task-Force on Displacement, and Adaptation Committee). In the EU case, a European climate security epistemic

community can be substantiated by the policy roles played by key EU institutions (such as European External Action Service, European Council, European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of the EU). Riskifying and securitising moves have been put forward and influenced by epistemic communities, enabling their adoption bythe three institutions. Epistemic communities have shifted the consensus on climate and recast understandings of security in each of the institution studiedand in the process have altered the perception of climate security as defined in the various statements and policies of the institutions.

Key Signs of the Emerging Dominant Discourse on Climate Security (and thus the Candidate Norm)

This thesis has sought to link concepts of climate-riskification, climate securitisation, and epistemic community on climate security. The overall finding is that climate security has become an emerging dominant discourse, but the associated institutional recognition remains very much in the first stage of the norm life cycle. This epistemic community on climate security has promoted the candidate norm much more strongly in the EU than in the UNSC. However, normative advocacy has been persistent in the UNSC, with regular debates, especially when informal meetings under the Arria-Formula are factored into the picture, and the advocacy appeared to be weakest in the FCCC – a particularly striking case. Despite important contributions by Adaptation Committee and Task-Force on Displacement, as well as the normative recognition given to the Nairobi Work Programme and the Sendai Framework at the international level (Table 8), riskifying and securitising statements made at these FCCC bodies is nowhere to be found in reports submitted to the COP. The combination of outcomes from Adaptation Committee and Task-Force on Displacement meetings do suggest the emergence of a distinct candidate norm, but they do not appear to have significant influence over the FCCC process.

The set of UNSC presidential statements may be read as the strongest indicator of progress so far. The presidential statements strongly encouraged the UNOWAS to continue engagement with the dominant phrasing of climate change as an aggravator of an already existing conflict. The presidential statements directly and indirectly helped the creation of the Climate Security Mechanism, which is not only the most reliable evidence

of climate securitisation so far but also a concrete pathway for the epistemic community to advance the candidate norm. Alongside this claim emerged three insightful revelations.

First, some of the presidential statements pointed to how the UNOWAS has provided expert advice to UNSC members so that they can make better and evidence-based decisions about climate-related security risks in the West Africa and the Sahel region. The presidential statements emphasised the research-based role, urging the UNOWAS to continue in this epistemic role. The evidence given in this regard is from the Secretary-General's annual reports about the activities of the UNOWAS. One reading of the reports is that the UNOWAS is a form of practice regularly engaged by the UNSC for enriching its knowledge about climate-related security risks. For instance, the June 2010[286] and June 2018[287] Secretary-General's reporting on the UNOWAS are key examples of this claim.

Second, the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the FCCC's Nairobi Work Programme – in connection to the Sendai Framework – are epistemic tools that appeared to have served the purposes of their parent organisations. Norm advocacy as a diplomatic strategy (Wunderlich 2020) can be built on a set of repertoires of practices that are norm-generative (Wiener 2018). Transcripts of UNSC, FCCC and EU meetings that were examined offered practical examples of the strategic use of discursive strategies such as through forum-switching in the securitisation of non-traditional threats. The transcripts also revealed securitising moves that focused on protecting human livelihoods as being more acceptable than the environmental conflict storyline employed by many EU countries in the UNSC (Kurtz 2012).

Third, these programmes showed that climate security is still in the early stage of norm emergence, clearly discernible in the FCCC's Nairobi Work Programme when considered together with the Sendai Framework and the UNSC presidential statements, and the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The security phrasings found in UNSC presidential statements are different from the level of recognition given to the candidate norm in the EU and the FCCC cases, reflecting in part their distinct areas of responsibility. This difference might give us more indication about how things would normatively unfold

[286] S/2010/324, 21 June 2010.
[287] S/2018/649, 29 June 2018.

into the future. For instance, noting that the COP is often very bound by previously agreed phrasings and international recognition, researchers might both consider whether the COP will in future shift its position on these issues. The analysis also showed that the climate security debate is increasingly complex, with ongoing and serious contestation, most notably in the UNSC case with regard to the climate-conflict phrasing, as acknowledged by the UNSC, the FCCC and the EU. A primary issue in this regard centres on the inherent complications about the exact ways in which climate change can cause a specified risk and/or threat to the referent object (human security or livelihoods). This question has both contributed to contestation about the climate-conflict phrasing and hindered the smooth journey of the candidate norm. Those wishing to progress the emerging climate security discourse in terms of the candidate norm must recognise the climate threat is understood in different ways in different institutional contexts. They must exercise caution as the complementarity between the institutional cases may not be taken on at face value unless there is equivalent and simultaneous recognition across the cases.

Climate change has itself altered the perception and conception of security by institutional actors. It is a clear game changer for these actors and opens up interesting possibilities for future expansion of this thesis. Transforming the issue of climate change to go far beyond discursive security risks and threats to practical commitment to pragmatic responses has been prioritised by scholars and policymakers. Addressing the candidate norm across the three institutional case studies is no different as such effort presumes a robust understanding of security risks and threats profile in normative terms. What is somewhat different is that militarisation of climate security is not surprisingly a key contentious issue in the UNSC case whereas the security-development nexus is central as a normative and policy instrument in the EU. Both the UNSC and the EU have focused on the West Africa and the Sahel region as a harbinger of climate-related conflict. In the EU case, there have been discussions on accountability to ensure that funded projects do not unintentionally end up being misinterpreted as support for illegitimate military actions. If the candidate norm is eventually adopted, how to prevent it from being deployed as a military intervention tool and also hold actors accountable are two of the major concerns being raised by those opposed to the adoption of an international norm on climate security.

The concern about militarisation is one way people have complained that climate securitisation potentially militarises climate security policy and violates democratic rights of people. This reasoning aligns to Goodman's (2013) argument attesting that as military practice collides with normative rhetoric, disordering and deep discrepancies, in which normative claims implode and spill over alternative humanitarianism, arise. The case analysis however revealed a relational development between theory and norm emergence whereby anchoring the candidate norm in established international principles seemed to have helped its normative trajectory.

Potential militarisation of climate security is largely unscrutinised by the FCCC, which sees the candidate norm as informing the topic of climate change and human rights protection. What is more of a concern to the FCCC in this respect was highlighted by the Task-Force on Displacement. In its technical report on the May 2018 meeting, the Task-Force recommended strengthening the FCCC's capacity to deal with the human rights implications of climate change.[288]

For several countries the potential militarisation of climate security is a nightmare. During the November 2011 UNSC Arria-Formula meeting on the crime-pandemics-climate change nexus,[289] Russia stated that "provocative calls for strengthened confrontations" or "veiled threats of use of force under the guise of humanitarian efforts contradicted the basic norms of international humanitarian law."[290] Russia's longstanding reputation for consistent dismissal of any proposition that may enable humanitarian intervention continues unabated. At the July 2018 UNSC debate Russia's representative reiterated Moscow's position, with theassertion that those who believed that climate change is a threat multiplier failed to acknowledge the adverse consequences of armed military operations, notably in "Yugoslavia, Libya and Syria."[291] At the January 2019 UNSC debate, Russia's representative noted that the Sahel region was mentioned in the concept note (S/2019/1, annex) for the meeting, and argued "we should not shift focus onto climate and droughts while pushing to the backburner the real main reasons for the conflict, which include the proactive actions of a number of countries that led to regime

[288] Taskforce meeting report, May 2018, p. 23, https://tinyurl.com/y3vbq78f.
[289] UNSC, SC/10457, 23 November 2011.
[290] SC/10457, 23 November 2011, para. 70.
[291] S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018. p. 16.

change in Libya."[292] Russia maintained this insistence that geopolitical change, in terms of Western 'humanitarian' intervention in Libya, was more important than climate change in stoking the conflict, arguing the candidate norm was another form of disguised intervention.

The importance of this objection to the candidate norm was stressed by research informants. One anonymous interviewee responded to the question of how international norm on climate security would develop in the foreseeable future, as follows:[293]

> Interestingly, Russia is no longer posing such an obstacle. We are working very closely with the German Permanent Mission in New York. Russia is not against climate change being debated in the Security Council. Russia is just sensitive to other kinds of non-traditional security risks coming in because they do not want anything that will affect their state sovereignty. Things like human rights issues, it is this side of things that they are a bit more sensitive to … the linking of climate change to other governance and human rights issues, Russia is OK with this.

The reality of the mixed signals should be substantiated by the fact that the informant is employed by an organisation that regularly collaborates with the German Permanent Mission in New York to progress the climate security agenda, which, in turn, liaises with its Russian counterpart in New York. This pattern is suggestive of institutional actors' roles within the larger schematics of norm evolution and contestation.

Highlighting Norm Emergence, Contestation and the Candidate Norm

The comparative analysis showed that the related themes of epistemic community, riskification and securitisation are quite distinct from each other, with distinct forms of development. This form of analysis has hitherto been largely missing in the existing climate security research. The process of phrasing links the three themes: members of the epistemic community on climate security must be highly adept in the art of phrasing an issue as a policy problem, in order to promote securitising and riskifying moves. The

[292] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 16.
[293] Interview conducted by author, 20 February 2020.

climate-riskification approach is in particular a resourceful and relatively new conceptualisation with considerable potential for progressing the candidate norm.

We often believe that international norms emerge at the global level, with inputs at the domestic level where and when necessary. Reflecting on both the emerging climate security discourse and the candidate norm in an institutional context matter in this process. For instance, in both EU and FCCC cases, maybe it is time we start thinking about how to make the idea of norm emergence work around, with (and in parallel to) the climate security discourse within global initiatives such as the FCCC as well as regional entitities such as the EU, rather than trying fit the these institutions into preferred preferences about how norms emerge in international society.

In the UNSC case, the candidate norm fully demonstrated the spirit of normative evolution in international society, suggesting the UNSC as the only case where the processes of contested riskifying moves later matured into securitisation – vis-à-vis presidential statements. There are several ways of explaining why the target audience of the candidadte norm authorised this phenomenon. Key among these is that it is difficult for this audience and the epistemic community on climate security to ignore securitising voices from below – the mass public. Despite the attractiveness of this observation being an emancipatory line of thinking, it seems vague and wishful thinking, and hard to fact-check because there appeared to be no publicly available evidence the public has in any major way shaped the perceptions of the security phrasings that were presented by entrepreneurs in the UNSC case. This is not to suggest that the public voice cannot and does not influence securitising moves, but rather that it is hard to assemble evidence of this.

In the early years of the climate and security debate in the UNSC, BRICS countries generally rejected the UNSC in favour of the FCCC as the legitimate platform. However, influential members have since softened their position. According to Brazil's representative at the January 2019 debate, the UNSC may not "refrain from taking climate factors into consideration when a concrete and specific situation surfaces that poses a danger to international peace and security."[294] In China's words, the relevant UN agencies

[294] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 62.

should properly "respond to climate-change-related issues" in accordance to their respective mandates.[295] But Russia, India and South Africa insist on looking to the FCCC for policy direction and leadership.[296] China's position, though, has changed substantially: at the 2007 debate, China presented climate change as a risk that "may have certain security implications"; the 2019 debate, it stated that climate change "poses grave threats" and addressing it would be beneficial to "global stability."

In this regard, a minor finding revealed that the higher the number of developing countries in attendance at specific debates, the higher the likelihood of total number of countries that will support the UNSC as the appropriate venue. This finding come into sharp focus when considered in terms of UNSC formal and Arria-Formula debates. At Arria-Formula meetings, there has been total and strongest support for the candidate norm as well as repeated calls for the UNSC to fully securitise climate change and formally adopt an international principle on climate security. At formal UNSC debates, the reverse is the case. This is to be expected because decisions reached at Arria-Formula meetings are non-binding in international politics, although they have helped in pushing climate security to prominence. Relatedly, one may argue that the voices of climate-vulnerable countries have been somewhat sidelined in the UNSC debates just as they have suffered exclusion from debates in the EU due to the lack of membership status in the EU.

In relation to the candidate norm, one reading of the above paragraphs (in this section) is that the normative view implied in this thesis is valid and more applicable in the UNSC case – than in the FCCC and the EU. In the UNSC case, the epistemic community on climate security has made clear riskifying and securitising moves accompanied by fierce contestation. This finding implies that common perspectives on norms in international society are reasonable, as it is hard for an international norm to be internalised without experiencing one form of contestation or the other. The finding brings implications for the 'interstate institutional' label attached to the case studies because a norm cannot emerge in an interstate institutional setting without undergoing contestation. The UNSC case supported the fact that norm emerges amidst contestation in an interstate institution setting. But the EU and the FCCC cases did not really conform to the spirit of

[295] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019, p. 15.
[296] S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019.

contestation. Indeed, the EU case may perhaps be described as a regional organisation that would do everything in its power to see the candidate norm survive the journey of norm emergence.

The candidate norm, following Floyd (2015), is best cast as a debate rather than a concept. Expanding this phrasing to the globalisation of climate insecurity may offer a means of generating global-level responses into the future (Pettenger 2017). Multiple forms of contestation such as those regarding expert consensus on climate science, norms inform and shape international environmental governance (Peterson 2019). This process of acknowleding, accepting, and formally adopting a norm of climate security as strategic policy for confronting climate-related security risks helps shed light on how they may develop into the future, especially in the UNSC case (Table 7). This is especially important as critics of the climate security phrasings often pointed to the FCCC as the appropriate venue to continue the climate security debate (just as some are promoting it as an institutional agenda in need of urgent extraordinary measures that would bypass normal democratic procedures).

In certain instances, how a candidate norm has been phrased, as some critics might argue, may help its internalisation with minimal contestation. It is true that a candidate norm can enjoy normative progress with little to no serious contestation. The progress of climate security in the FCCC case and the EU case is notable in this regard. The EU has promoted climate security from an international perspective even though it is fundamentally a regionally-focused entity. In contrast, the FCCC's unclear mandate regarding climate security may be seen as somewhat informal mainly because there seemed no explicit obligation for it to act on climate security.

But contestation between the epistemic community on climate security and the target audience has received little attention from a discourse theoretical perspective, especially when it comes to governance of climate risks and threats as well as levels of recognition thereof. This finding is broadly consistent with both the latest wave of conceptual work on securitisation, calling for more research from a discourse theoretical framework (Broecker and Westermeier 2019) and Floyd's (2011) specification of three criteria, including an objective existential threat, a morally legitimate referent object and a security

response commensurate with the existential threat. The thesis findings broadly mirror Floyd's model; this section reflects on its relevance before closing with some discussion of implications for further research.

First, Floyd's approach suggests a wider implication of this thesis' findings in relation to their relevance for climate security research and helping policymakers identify priority elements for research and advocacy. For instance, the analysis of Arria-Formula meetings and formal debates illuminated the progress and the possible future of the candidate norm. The analysis helped gauge the symbiotic relationship between the candidate norm and the analytical themes. It also helped foregrounded crucial aspects like the UNOWAS that has been largely side-tracked by scholars, despite the organisation being a crucial data source and an authority on assessment of climate-related security risks.

The second point relates to disputes over climate science. Although the actual interoperation over time in context and as dispersed across space arguably is still now not being adequately measured, accurately understood or aptly mitigated, climate science has worked to stabilise and legitimise a systemic set of environmental exchanges between earth systems and human systems (Luke 2015). UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner reiterated this perspective at the January 2019 UNSC debate where he warned that the world is not keeping up with the challenge but has the "data and the means" to successfully tackle climate change.[297] The changing picture of intensifying climate change, and at the same time, growing knowledge about its dimensions, create an uncertain but highly dynamic context for climate security.

Certain aspects of this thesis complement Floyd's approach given how the epistemic community on climate security operated to convince and sometimes coerce the audience into collective phrasing, as uncovered in the case study chapters. Both specific riskifying and securitising moves are found to be broadly similar in the first stage of norm life cycle in which the primary intention of such moves is to sensitise and inform the audience about the need to protect specified referent objects. However, the point of divergence between climate-riskification and climate securitisation lies in their ultimate expectations. A

[297] Catherine Wahlen, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 31 January 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y3y64eb2.

riskifying move typically seeks to convince addressees that climate change can become or is a security risk to the specified referent object, and suggest an urgent need to plan for mitigating measures or governance mechanisms. A securitising move does exactly just that but with an important difference: the epistemic community on climate security focuses on the threat nature of climate change and demands for urgent extraordinary responses to protect the referent object.

The comparative analysis also revealed signs of sense of collectiveness, as the epistemic community emphasised collective thinking in confronting climate change. Collective thinking and phrasing are beneficial to candidate norms as they offer a holistic sense of climate challenges and suggest ways to overcome collective action issues. This was often exprtessed by partcipants. For instance, at the 2007 debate, Britain's representative asserts: "climate change is a security issue, but it is not a matter of narrow national security. It has a new dimension. It is about our collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world."[298] Other countries used similar concepts: such as Belgium collective security; France, collective and urgent action, Congo, individual and collective action; and Qatar, international collective action.All these echoed Britain's posture. Of importance here is that the phrase – collective security as a key objective in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world – clearly and strongly indicates an explicit referent object: interdependent world.

Key Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

With discourse-historical analysis, the thesis scrutinised transcripts of UNSC, EU and FCCC meetings. These transcripts serve as a reliable repository of knowledge if we are to determine the indicators of a candidate norm in these case studies. The transcripts also had limitations as theycannot reveal nonverbal communication (like gestures, body posture and facial expressions) because the author did not attend the meetings. Discourse-historical analysis is a data "collection" rather than "generation" approach. Future research might want to complete this analytic approach by attending relevant meetings where the researcher can meaningfully generate data through an interpretive process. This process could enable the researcher to observe, a sure way to acquire a deeper

[298] S/PV.5663, 17 April 2007, p. 19.

understanding of the various dynamics underway between the presentation of security phrasings by the epistemic community and acceptance (or summary rejection) by the audience. In so doing, they should be able to put things in better perspective and proper context.

Applying discourse-historical analysis also raises the question of environment and climate labels, which appear to mean the same thing but often perform different functions in climate security analysis. This question is relevant only if the relationship between language and power is not sufficiently contextualised. One way to avoid this limitation is by paying attention to the language of common conceptions of the relationships between threats and institutional responses (Rose & Miller 2008) as well as nuances of hard to reach constructs if we are to understand discursive securitisation from a Foucauldian perspective (Vezovnik 2018). Such nuances will presumably have an impact on the ways in which this issue is ultimately addressed in policy settings. It would be worthwhile for researchers to provide more robust discussion about how this may affect the interaction between the audience and the epistemic community on climate security

There are other pressing concerns. Key among the obstacles that seemed to impede collective securitisation and the transformation of security governance is that security goods, energy for example, have proven more resistant to collective securitisation than those defined more broadly as public goods, including the climate (Lucarelli 2019). Also, just as the FCCC offer little guidance on climate action and cooperation (Nishimura 2017), the UN has institutionalised environmental challenges with a highly selective approach (Conca 2015) while the UN's erratic efforts to generate a collective response may imply it is getting too late for a climate security phrasing to subsume all other phrasings when the climate crisis threshold arrives as predicted by forecasters (Pettenger 2017). In this context capturing the interactive dynamics between applicable phrases that push either for securitisation or desecuritisation of the policy domain is highly important (Hofmann & Staeger 2019). To address this it may be essential to begin since the FCCC's creation in 1992 to capture the early origins of phrasing climate change as an environmental concern.

Over and above these concerns, informants believe that we have this "kind of geopolitical trends"[299] while, given "there are a lot of misunderstandings and misperceptions around the securitisation side of things,"[300] how to progress climate securitisation research is challenging because people generally suspect it as being politically motivated. We have a science-informed "threshold of 1.5 or 2 degrees" that are "politically decided figures" and "it is a travesty we have not had a conversation about what they mean in terms of security because we see it as political number which is to do with climate change discussions, not to deal with people's lives, people's security."[301] Accordingly it is commonly acknowledged that a robust geopolitical evaluation of climate change policies that address climate conflict may help minimise unforeseen side-consequences which may result from such polices.[302] Owing in part to these contexts some respondent suggested that "we have wasted a lot of time trying to prove that climate change causes conflict, yet this approach works a lot of time."[303] Obviously, the next thing is how to "identify the mechanisms" that work "in favour of conflict" and those in favour of cooperation in order to determine where "it lead to conflict" and where "climate change lead to more cooperation," including "how to communicate" the risks that should be the focus point.[304] As highlighted in the results section, the institutional cases are evidently open to further deliberation on these issue still none of the cases has bother to appoint a special envoy on climate security. This thesis leaves such discussion to future scholars.

Overall, there are several questions that researchers may wish to consider. In a commentary to one of my manuscripts,a peer-reviewer commented that while the Task-Force on Displacement has managed to arrive at common recommendations, the individual members of the Task-Force on Displacement definitely do not agree about everything; as such can the Task-Force on Displacement ultimately be conceptualised of as a homogenous entity? Future researchers might want to explore this question given that this study focuses on shared meaning and aims to show how that meaning is constituted as an object of knowledge. Furthermore, to what extent are any riskification moves that are made connected to the Task-Force on Displacement's primary mandate?

[299] Interview conducted by author, 10 September 2018.
[300] Interview conducted by author, 20 February 2020.
[301] Interview conducted by author, 10 September 2018.
[302] Interview conducted by author, 14 September 2018.
[303] Interview conducted by author, 10 September 2018.
[304] Interview conducted by author, 18 October 2018.

If this is the case, then perhaps the process of setting the mandate is more important than statements made at the meetings.

There is also the question of whether the current trend in composition of member countries of Task-Force on Displacement's member organisations reflects sufficiently the regions where climate-related migration and displacement have posed serious challenges to human security? Table 10 speaks for itself. The composition seemed adequate and fair representation, although there is always room for improvement. For example, the International Labour Organization's Executive Board comprises 56 regular members; ten of these are permanently held by industrialised countries. Some of the permanent seats ought to be exclusively reserved for developing countries since they are more susceptible to negative effects of climate change. In this respect, the International Organization for Migration's Executive Council performed better as it welcomed Uzbekistan as its 173rd member country in November 2018; a further eight countries as well as numerous non-governmental and international organisations hold observer status.[305] The International Labour Organization might want to emulate this practice. The UNHCR' Executive Committee Bureau currently comprises four elected officials (Kenyan, Brazilian, Belgian and Australian) who oversee the Standing Committee's activities; access to the Standing Committee's website is restricted to authorised users. In short, given the list of member countries of the Platform on Disaster Displacement, International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre the UNHCR and the UNDP, one must acknowledge there remains a great deal of unknowns about the composition of Task-Force on Displacement's member organisations.

All roads in this thesis lead to the events that happened in Bonn, Brussels, and New York – three sites corresponding to the FCCC, EU and UNSC meetings. Following this logic, the interest here centres on the normative journey of the candidate norm in international policy settings. Those interested in this topic might want to consider whether the phrasings are decaying or have held traction in high politics settings. With such a micro-historical approach to analysing climate security as a discursive construct in view of a disciplined security arrangement, the point outside history implicitly and yet more clearly

[305] International Organization for Migration, https://tinyurl.com/y6gb7kxk.

points to discourses, texts and relevant grammars as a wealth of resources waiting to be explored and interpreted.

Finally, aall interested stakeholders, especially political practitioners with the capacity to guide and shape climate security policies, are urged to undertake further research into climate security and norms in international society more generally. The findings open opportunities to contribute to climate security discourses. For instance, the conceptualisation of climate security is being conducted by the UNSC, the EU and the FCCC, despite these institutions having no specific mandate to undertake this work. . By focussing on the climate security debate and thus addressing certain security challenges, the thesis adds value to climate security research. Lastly, because the thesis generally advocated for enhancement of human security, it is a potent guiding tool for policymakers who may want to identify priority elements for climate security action.

APPENDIX I – Interview Participants

- **Anonymised**, Senior Official, migration-related organisation, Switzerland. 13 December 2018.
- **Anonymised**, Senior Researcher, UN University, Germany. 1 October 2019.
- **Anonymised**, Senior Advisor on climate change and security, Germany. 20 February 2020.
- **Camilla Born**, Senior Policy Advisor in the Climate Diplomacy team based at the office of Third Generation Environmentalism (E3G) in the UK. 10 September 2018.
- **Louise van Schaik**, Project Manager of the Planetary Security Initiative; Head of the Clingendael International Sustainability Centre, Netherlands. 14 September 2018.
- **Susanne Droege**, Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. 18 October 2018.
- **Kees van der Geest**, Academic Officer / Head of Migration & Environment Section), United Nations University, Germany. 30 September 2019.
- **Alex Bastien,** Research Fellow (in charge of the Climate, Energy and Security program), French Institute for International & Strategic Affairs (IRIS), Paris. 10 October 2019.
- **Judith Hardt**, Associated Postdoctoral Researcher Climate Change & Security Research Group, University of Hamburg, Germany. 31 October 2019.
- **Matt McDonald**, A/Professor (IR), University of Queensland, Australia. 10 February 2020.

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