

Australia as “the most successful multicultural society in the world”

by Ly Ly Lim

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

under the supervision of Andrew Jakubowicz

University of Technology Sydney
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

19 January 2021

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

I, Ly Ly Lim declare that this thesis, is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Technology Sydney.

This thesis is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

This document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

This research is supported by the Australian Government Research Training Program.

Signature: Production Note:
 Signature removed prior to publication.

Date: 18 January 2021

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Doctoral studies are challenging. When I started my PhD journey a wise person said to me: “It’s like going through a pregnancy, along the way you can go through the entire spectrum of emotions: from excitement, apprehension, fear, frustration, at times loneliness and exhaustion, but overall exhilarating. But you don’t get to take a baby home.” They were right.

But writing a thesis during a period that looks, sounds and feels like apocalyptic times takes it to another level. While writing this thesis, my hometown Canberra went through a summer of bushfires, hailstorms and floods. Then there is, of course, the COVID-19 pandemic.

After sweating through its hottest year on record and with the region in drought for almost a decade, bushfires raged through the region for weeks from November 2019. The city, with its hazed dusky air and glowing red skies, felt more like Mars than its ‘bush capital’ image. We experienced a number of days recording the highest pollution levels in the world; worse than Beijing, New Delhi or any of the large metropolis renown (deserved or otherwise) for air pollution. In between the bushfires, there was a bout of hailstorms that morphed into floods. And just as the bushfires were expelling their last reluctant breaths, the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Although it sounds clichéd, these experiences do simplify the priorities of life.

First, my heartfelt appreciation to my better half, Dany and our son, Alexander. Their love, support and encouragement are priceless to me. They are with me all the way: through good, bad, frustrating and difficult times. I am thankful to my mother, whose path in life was directed by circumstances beyond her own control and thus never had the opportunities that came my way. I also want to thank my sister Samantha Lim, whose support helped unburden my own interim financial situation while I undertook this PhD. These are the people who without their love and support, I could not complete my doctoral studies.

I am most grateful to my supervisor Emeritus Professor Andrew Jakubowicz. Andrew is unique as a supervisor in that he places significant trust and confidence in me in ways unexpected. He asks me the difficult questions I unconsciously try to avoid but knowing that I must address in undertaking this thesis. If not for his reassuring guidance, my hesitation to inject myself so directly into the discourse on race, multiculturalism and power would not have been overcome. I would have been left with a poorer understanding of myself and the political issues at hand. He also trusted me implicitly in how I directed and prioritised my time and research. A rare faith in someone whose mental energy is at times sapped by the parasitic imposter syndrome.

I also want to thank my alternate supervisor, Associate Professor Christina Ho, whose positivity, encouragement and feedback have been invaluable to me.

My most sincere thanks also to all participants of my original research proposal, particularly the respondents who kindly participated in the interviews. Thank you for giving me your valuable time and sharing your thoughts with me. I salute your passion and enthusiasm in advocating for a more equitable and fairer Australia. Unfortunately, that research had to be abandoned because of a lack of response from the policy decision-makers group.

Last but not least, one of the unexpected joys in undertaking this journey was meeting the amazing, and marvellous Dr Annmaree Watharow, my friend and *accomplice extraordinaire*.

This thesis is in the format of a conventional thesis with chapters that cover: an introduction, review of literature, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion.

PREFACE

That hot wet monsoonal day in the camp, I remember the arrival of the white man. We had been on the run for months, from war-ravaged Cambodia now into Thailand. I was eight. I would meet him again, nearly twenty years later, in Canberra, where with my law degree achieved, I was working for the Australian government. We were introduced, and I said something like, 'we've met before'. He clearly couldn't place me. I described the thatched and rickety makeshift unofficial refugee camp on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. He immediately recalled the lone little Asian girl, standing by the barbed wire fence, barefoot and in torn old clothing. She looked him in the eye and smiled.

Life, growing up Asian in Australia I was often plagued with feelings of being an outsider. Of being an "impostor" in any space I occupied and a fraud who didn't belong. Growing up and living in a society that preferences the voices of men, usually white, middle-aged conservative men above all others, it is not difficult to feel like anything other than an imposter.

In conservative Australia, these men are continuously seen as the default model. One that everyone should aspire to. They are the "norm"; the voices of reason; of authority. They are viewed as "impartial", "experts" and automatically valued. Those who don't fit this mould are "fringe" or "shrill" or "alternative", or any other adjective designed to deride, belittle and marginalise.

When they raise their voices, it is because society has gone "off track"; overrun by the PC brigade. Their mirrored brethren in government and the vast Australian media landscape with their powerful platforms, respond.

A white conservative man can express a controversial opinion quite freely and with little repercussion. A white man can be racist or sexist, homophobic, or all of that — yet will likely maintain his platform. If, there is some backlash, he complains that his "free speech right" is attacked. Yet even then he'll continue to enjoy more freedom of speech than any of the groups of people he has vilified.

Should women, or people of colour venture into the public eye with a contrary voice, they will be attacked with racist slurs, called derogatory names or told to go back where they came from and more. Women will be ridiculed, shamed, subjected to misogynistic tirades and threatened with rape threats. Google Annaliese van Diemen or Yasmin Abdel-Magied: the barrage of nasty misogynistic, racist slurs and death threats these two women were subjected to become clear. All for simply tweeting something conservative Australia did not agree with. Both women are highly educated and articulate but still could not hold an opinion in twenty-first century Australia. What chance would those racialised and marginalised have?

I often ask myself ‘WHY?’ and ‘HOW’ could this be changed? How can the voices of the marginalised in Australian society navigate the status quo? It is difficult to say you have a voice when Australia’s institutions of authority – the parliaments, judiciary, government ministers and senior government departmental officials look nothing like you. When you turn on the television and the faces you see rarely reflect someone like yours.

The inner pragmatist in me questioned why bother. Doing a PhD made utterly no sense as I could not change the status quo. But what it does is allow me the introspection of my own "impostor syndrome" – to understand the source is a powerful psycho-hypnotic metanarrative, enforced daily through the media, television and the daily interactions, of who belongs in this country. A power structure that upholds the status quo of privileging people who are white, and will continue to do so. Partly due to my need to find my own voice, as well as through exposing the system, that this endeavour commenced.

In work settings I've been “welcomed” by older colleagues who said “it was time the department had some brown faces”, that “there are a few like you around” and were surprised my English was “really good”. My white peers found these comments “quaint” and amusing but failed to see the patronising and underlying unconscious racism. While this may not be the intention of those who engage me, unfortunately these are the experiences they expose me to throughout my career as a young lawyer, a public servant and an Australian diplomat overseas.

I decided the unconscious bias of others was no longer going to be my problem. I therefore feel my role in this is simple: I am highly qualified, with the ability to decipher the inner workings of this unequal society. I can use the skills and privilege that I personally have in a bid to raise awareness and effect change. My voice is important because it can help bring the struggles experienced by people of colour to the forefront in connected ways no white conservative man will ever possess.

At the same time, I have a responsibility to myself to remember my words deserve space.

There are still times when I still feel that "impostor syndrome" creeping through. How could I not in a society that still sees Asian women, particularly from Southeast Asia, in 3Ds – diminutive, docile and deferential? Their voices unimportant, and lives disposable.

Yet the voices of people of colour, particularly women of colour, are crucial if this country wants to heal, to right the wrongs and to commit to an inclusive and healthier future. Undertaking this PhD has enabled me to express my views unpolluted by the current status quo. My voice; that of a coloured woman living in Australia, is worth this respect.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Graphs	xv
List of Figures	xxiii
List of Tables	xxiv
Abstract	xxvi
Glossary	xxviii
Chapter 1: Introduction – Australia as “the most successful multicultural society in the world”	1
Background	1
Aims and contribution of thesis	2
Structure	4
Chapter 2: Understanding Australia’s version of multicultural nation–building	8
2.1 Australian Multiculturalism – the journey so far	9
2.2 Research question	25
2.3 ‘Multiculturalisms’ in Canada, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK	28
2.4 Multiculturalism and Australia	31
2.5 Ethno-racial hierarchy in a multicultural Australia	39
Chapter 3: Literature Review – three “understandings” of multiculturalism	45
3.1 Liberalism and the management of cultural diversity in liberal democracies	47

3.2	Sociological and socio-political theories of multiculturalism	52
3.3	Ethnocracy in poly-ethnic societies	56
3.4	Weber on ethnicity.....	72
3.5	Ethnic stratification.....	81
3.6	Recent research	87
Chapter 4: Methodology, Methods and Measurement.....		90
4.1	Background and purpose of study.....	91
4.2	Methodology – the need for methodological pragmatism	92
4.3	Data sources	95
4.4	Interrogating the ‘multicultural’ criteria.....	100
4.5	Interrogating the ‘successful’ criteria.....	102
4.6	Methods	105
4.7	Analysis	109
Chapter 5: Interrogating ‘Multicultural’ Australia		111
5.1	Definition and conceptual issues	112
5.2	Interrogating the ‘multicultural’ of Australia.....	118
5.3	Challenges to data collection.....	140
Chapter 6: Interrogating ‘success’: International perspective – Australia vs Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.....		143

6.1	World Bank Gini Index and OECD Gini Coefficient on income inequality	147
6.2	Socio-cultural policies for a multicultural society.....	151
6.3	Australia's state of democracy.....	174
6.4	State of peace and security	186
6.5	United Nation's Human Development Index	192
6.6	Discussion.....	197
6.6.1	Assessing Australia's MCP Index score for 2019.....	198
Chapter 7:	Interrogating 'success': National perspective.....	205
7.1	Australia's Westminster-style of parliamentary democracy	206
7.1.1	Cultural diversity in Australia's parliaments	207
7.1.2	Cultural diversity in Australia's local governments	210
7.1.3	Cultural diversity in Australia's national government.....	213
7.1.4	Cultural diversity in Australia's government and corporate leadership	215
7.1.5	Cultural diversity in Australia's institutions of hard power – the military and police forces.....	218
7.1.6	Cultural diversity in Australia's judiciary	223
7.1.7	Cultural diversity in Australia's tribunal and legal profession.....	226
7.2	Weber on Class, Status and Party	230

7.2.1	Ethnic differentials in Class: Top 10 incomes	232
7.3	Ethnic differentials in Class: Bottom 10 incomes	245
7.4	Ethnic differentials in qualifications and educational attainment.....	262
7.4.1 - 7.4.8:	Ethnic differentials in educational attainment versus ancestry versus medium income	270-273
7.5	Ethnic differentials in political Power.....	275
7.6	Ethnic differentials in Status.....	281
7.7	Mapping informal power holdings.....	283
Chapter 8:	Australia – a racial ethnocracy	299
8.1	Is Australia an ethnocracy?	300
8.1.1	Ethnicity, not citizenship, forms the main basis for resource and power allocation.....	301
8.1.2	Only partial rights and capabilities extend to minorities, thus there is a constant ethnocratic-civil tension	310
8.1.3	The dominant ‘charter’ ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus and shapes the political system, public institutions, geography, economy and culture, so as to expand and deepen its control over the state and territory	319
8.1.4	Political boundaries are vague, often privileging the co-ethnic of the dominant group in the diaspora, over minority citizens	327

8.1.5 Politics are ethnicized, as the same logic of power distribution polarises the body politic and party system	330
8.1.6 Rigid forms of ethnic segregation and socio-economic stratification are maintained despite countervailing legal and market forces	332
Chapter 9: Challenges for multicultural Australia	337
9.1 Australia – a racial ethnocracy	337
9.2 Australian Constitution – racialisation, exclusion and ethnocracy.....	344
9.3 Ethnocratisation and racialisation central to Australia’s racial ethnocracy....	347
9.3.0 Racialisation and ethnocratic spectrum of Australian political parties in the federal Parliament	350
9.3.1 The characteristics of Australia’s racial ethnocracy	351
9.4 Policy implications	354
Chapter 10: Conclusion - towards a multicultural ‘We’	368
Bibliography	380

Appendices:

- Appendix A: ABS Data 2006 Census Occupations vs ancestry (top 10)
- Appendix B: ABS Data 2016 Census Occupations vs ancestry (top 10)
- Appendix C: ABS Data 2006 Census Educational attainment vs ancestry (top 10)
- Appendix D: ABS Data 2016 Census Educational attainment vs ancestry (top 10)
- Appendix E: ABS Data 2006 Census - average salary vs educational attainment vs ancestry (top 10)
- Appendix F: ABS Data 2016 Census - average salary vs educational attainment vs ancestry (top 10)

LIST OF GRAPHS

<i>Graph</i>	<i>Page</i>
5.2.3(a) Top ten countries of birth for 2016	119
5.2.3(b) Top ten countries of birth 2016 (overseas)	121
5.2.3(c) Overseas-born – top ten countries – trend	122
5.2.3(d) Country of Birth by Continents 2016 (excluding Australia)	123
5.2.4(a) Country of birth of parents 2016.....	124
5.2.4(b) Migration to Australia (1975/76 to 2015/16).....	125
5.2.5(a) Top 20 ancestries by country 2016 (1 st response)	126
5.2.5(b) Ancestries by region 2016 (1 st response).....	128
5.2.5(c) Ancestries by region 2016 (2 nd response).....	129
5.2.5(d) Top 20 Ancestries 2016 (1 st and 2 nd responses)	130
5.2.6(a) Top 20 languages spoken at home 2016.....	131
5.2.6(b) Mandarin speakers vs top ten countries of birth 2016	133
5.2.7(a) Distribution of religious affiliation in Australian population 2016	135
5.2.7(d) Population vs religious affiliation by ancestries (1st & 2nd responses).....	138
5.2.8(a) Indigenous Australian population 2016.....	139
6.1.1 Australia's Gini Index vs Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2004-2014).....	148

6.1.2	Australia's World Bank Gini Index on income inequality vs Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2015)	149
6.1.3	Australia's Gini coefficient (income inequality) vs Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2015)	149
6.2.1(a)	Australia on the Multiculturalism Policy Index for Immigrant Minorities ..	152
6.2.2(a)	Australia's 2014 MIPEX scores	159
6.2.2(b)	Australia's 2014 MIPEX score and ranking vs New Zealand, Canada, UK, US, Netherlands and Sweden	161
6.2.2(c)	Australia's MIPEX scores vs New Zealand, Canada, UK, US, Netherlands and Sweden (2010-2014)	162
6.3.1(a)	Democracy Index ranking: Australia vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	178
6.3.1(b)	Democracy Index scores: Australia vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	179
6.3.2	Australia's electoral pluralism score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	180
6.3.3	Australia's functioning of government score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	181
6.3.4	Australia's political participation score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	182
6.3.5	Australia's democratic political culture score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	183

6.3.6	Australia's civil liberties score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	184
6.3.7	Change in Australia's Democracy Index vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)	186
6.4.1	Australia's GPI ranking compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2007-2019)	188
6.4.3	Australia's level of ongoing domestic and international conflict compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019	190
6.4.4	Australia's level of safety and security in society score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019	191
6.4.5	Australia's level of militarisation score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019	192
6.5.2(a)	Australia's HDI scores vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2017)	195
6.5.2(b)	Australia's HDI ranking vs top ten HDI ranked nations vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK US from 2006 to 2017	196
7.1.1	Top ten ancestries of Australia's parliamentarians	208
7.1.2	Top ten ancestries of Australia's local government legislators	211
7.1.4(a)	Top ten ancestries of Chief Executives or Managing Directors	216 & 243
7.1.4(b)	Top ten ancestries of corporate general managers in Australia	217
7.1.5(a)	Top ten ancestries of ADF senior officers	220

7.1.5(b)	Top ten ancestries of Australia’s commissioned military officers.....	220
7.1.5(c)	Top ten ancestries of commissioned police officers.....	221
7.1.6(a)	Top ten ancestries of Australia’s judges.....	225 & 239
7.1.6(b)	Top ten ancestries of Australia’s magistrates	225 & 239
7.1.7(a)	Top ten ancestries of tribunal members.....	227 & 240
7.1.7(b)	Top ten ancestries of barristers	228
7.1.7(c)	Top ten ancestries of ‘Other judicial and legal professions’	228 & 240
7.1.7(d)	Top ten ancestries of solicitors	229
7.2.2	Top ten ancestries of surgeons.....	234
7.2.3	Top ten ancestries of anaesthetists	234
7.2.4	Top ten ancestries of internal medicine specialist.....	235
7.2.5	Top ten ancestries of financial dealers	236
7.2.6	Top ten ancestries of psychiatrists	237
7.2.7	Top ten ancestries of ‘Other medical practitioners’	238
7.2.9(a)	Top ten ancestries of mining engineers	241
7.2.9(b)	Top ten ancestries of petroleum engineers	242
7.2.11	Top ten ancestries of engineering manager	244
7.3.1(a)	Top ten ancestries of fast food cooks (<i>lowest income earning occupation</i>)....	255

7.3.1(b)	Top ten ancestries of hospitality employee (<i>2nd lowest income earning occupation</i>) – bar attendants.....	251
7.3.1(c)	Top ten ancestries of hospitality employee (<i>2nd lowest income earning occupation</i>) – gaming workers	252
7.3.1(d)	Top ten ancestries of hospitality employee (<i>2nd lowest income earning occupation</i>) – hospitality workers (<i>not elsewhere classified</i>)	252
7.3.1(e)	Top ten ancestries of food trade assistants (<i>possibly equivalent to the 6th lowest income earning occupation</i>).....	255
7.3.1(f)	Top ten ancestries of kitchenhand (<i>possibly equivalent to 6th lowest income earning occupation</i>).....	256
7.3.1(g)	Top ten ancestries of waiters (<i>7th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	253
7.3.1(h)	Top ten ancestries of commercial cleaners (<i>possibly 8th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	257
7.3.1(i)	Top ten ancestries of domestic cleaners (<i>possibly 8th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	258
7.3.1(j)	Top ten ancestries of drycleaner (<i>possibly 8th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	258
7.3.1(k)	Top ten ancestries of carpet cleaner (<i>possibly 8th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	259
7.3.1(l)	Top ten ancestries of window cleaners (<i>possibly 8th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	259

7.3.1(m)	Top ten ancestries of cleaners not elsewhere classified (<i>possibly 8th lowest income earning occupation</i>).....	260
7.3.1(n)	Top ten ancestries of café worker (<i>10th lowest income earning occupation</i>)	253
7.4.0(a)	Top ten ancestries of postgraduate degree holders (2006 & 2016)	263
7.4.0(b)	Top ten ancestries of bachelor degree holders (2006 & 2016).....	263
7.4.0(c)	Top ten ancestries of certificate level holders (2006 & 2016)	264
7.4.0(d)	Top ten ancestries of Year 12 holders (2006 & 2016).....	264
7.4.0(e)	Top ten ancestries of Year 11 or below (2006 & 2016)	265
7.4.0(f)	Top ten ancestries of ‘No Education’ attainment (2006 & 2016).....	265
7.4.1	Top ten ancestries of ‘postgraduate degree level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	270
7.4.2	Top ten ancestries of ‘bachelor degree level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	270
7.4.3	Top ten ancestries of ‘advanced diploma and diploma level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	271
7.4.4	Top ten ancestries of ‘certificate III & IV level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	271
7.4.5	Top ten ancestries of ‘certificate I & II level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	272

7.4.6	Top ten ancestries of ‘Year 12 level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	272
7.4.7	Top ten ancestries of ‘Year 11 or lower level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income	273
7.4.8	Top ten ancestries of ‘no education’ attainment versus median weekly income	273
7.7.1(a)	Top ten ancestries of media producers	287
7.7.1(b)	Top ten ancestries of radio presenters	288
7.7.1(c)	Top ten ancestries of television presenters	288
7.7.1(d)	Top ten ancestries of editors of newspaper or periodicals	289
7.7.1(e)	Top ten ancestries of print journalists	289
7.7.1(f)	Top ten ancestries of radio journalists.....	290
7.7.2(a)	Top ten ancestries of actors.....	292
7.7.2(b)	Top ten ancestries of dancers/choreographers	292
7.7.2(c)	Top ten ancestries of entertainers or variety artists	293
7.7.2(d)	Top ten ancestries of actors, dancers & other entertainers (not elsewhere classified).....	293
7.7.2(e)	Top ten ancestries of singers	294
7.7.2(f)	Top ten ancestries of musical professionals.....	294
7.7.2(g)	Top ten regions of birth of Australia’s audiovisual industry employees.....	296

8.1.1	Reported experience of racial discrimination (Scanlon Foundation 2007-2019)	
	308

LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure</i>	<i>Page</i>
5.2.4(b) Migration to Australia by region (1975-2016).....	125
5.2.7(b) Changes in religious affiliation over time (1966, 1991 and 2016)	136
5.2.7(c) Emerging major religions in Australia (2006, 2011 and 2016).....	137
6.5.0 The Human Development Index and its components.....	193
7.2.0 Illustration of Weber’s concepts of Class, Status and Party within <i>Gemeinschaft</i> and <i>Gesellschaft</i>	231
7.2.1 Top ten highest income earning occupations in Australia (2016-17 financial year).....	233
8.1.3 Media ownership in Australia (ACMA).....	328
8.4.0 Racialisation and ethnocratic spectrum of Australian political parties in the federal Parliament.....	352
8.4.1 Characteristics of Australia’s racial ethnocracy reflects a typical power holder in Australia.....	353

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table</i>	<i>Page</i>
6.2.1(b) Australia on the Multiculturalism Policy Index for Indigenous Peoples	154
6.2.1(c) Multiculturalism Policy Index for Indigenous Peoples (Australia vs other nations)	155-6
6.2.2 Australia's 2014 MIPEX scores across the eight policy areas	160
6.2.4 Summary of prejudice against immigrants, other religions and other races.	165
6.2.5 Prejudice against people of a different religion	167
6.2.6 Prejudice against people of a different race	168
6.2.7 Prejudice against foreign immigrants/workers	169
6.2.8 Prejudice against foreign immigrants/workers	170
6.2.9 Willingness to discriminate against foreigners	171
6.2.10 Changes in prejudice over time	172
6.2.11 Australia vs Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK and US on the importance of teaching tolerance and respect for other people to children.....	173
6.6.1 Australia's 2019 MCP policy scores on immigrant minorities based on evidence – federal versus State/Territories	199-202
7.1.3 Composition of the national Executive government (as of 15 Jan 2020).....	214
7.3.0 Lowest paid ten occupations (2016-2017 financial year)	246

7.3.1	ATO bottom 10 versus ABS occupation (or equivalent(s)) versus graph....	249
8.1.1(a)	Prospect of becoming a parliamentarian versus proportion in general population in accordance with the top ten ancestries of Australian parliamentarians in 2006 and 2016.....	302
8.1.1(b)	Prospect of being chosen as a judge versus proportion in general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian judges in 2006	304
8.1.1(c)	Prospect of being chosen as a judge versus proportion in the general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian judges in 2006 and 2016	304
8.1.1(d)	Prospect of being chosen as a magistrate versus proportion in general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian magistrates in 2006.....	305
8.1.2(a)	Prospect of being a police officer versus proportion of the general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian police officers in 2006 ..	317
8.1.2(b)	Prospect of being a police officer versus proportion of the general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian police officers in 2006 and 2016.....	317

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores in what ways and to what extent Australia's claim to exceptionalism as "the most successful multicultural society in the world" can be supported by evidence. The reiteration of this claim by successive Australian national governments, most recently in 2020, is tested in a series of increasingly focussed analyses. Beginning with a comparison at the international level with other multicultural societies in liberal democracies (Canada, New Zealand, UK, US, Sweden and the Netherlands), the thesis then investigates the nature of power in multicultural Australia on the basis of equity and inclusion, key ideas in the multicultural mantra.

What might be expected if "multicultural" is introduced as an additional modifier into claims of being a successful and even the most successful society in the world? Four parameters – those of economic participation and opportunity, state policies on cultural diversity, social equality and opportunity, and levels of human development – are used to test the comparative claims at a global level. These parameters are then applied through a detailed analysis of both formal and informal power positions and structures in Australia.

Finding an appropriate single marker of "multicultural" is complex, as there are both objective and subjective factors that can be operationalised. Typically in Australia the current officially sanctioned terminology "culturally and linguistically diverse" (CALD) refers to an ensemble of criteria including at least one of country of own and parents' birth, language spoken at home, faith, and self-identified heritage. Choosing the self-identified cultural/ethnic heritage – of ancestry – as recorded in the Census return captures the subjective aspect and some of the objective overtones. The research then explores how this independent variable is associated with the dependent variable of occupational status as expressed in both professional and income groups. The approach also demonstrates similar patterns in the realms of social, cultural and political power, leadership and influence.

The key outcomes point to an apparent hierarchy of power, class and status in which whiteness (Anglo-Celtic and Northern European origin), Abrahamic faith (Christian or

Jewish rather than Muslim), and male gender characterise those who hold the dominant positions across the board. These patterns reflect the persistence of an ethnocracy founded in an earlier period marked by White Australian values and practices, rather than an inclusive and open democracy reflecting multicultural values and opportunities. However the disjunction between rhetoric and reality appears to be bridgeable, should public policy be implemented that better institutionalises the aspirations of equity and inclusion.

GLOSSARY

ABARES. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences

ABS. Australian Bureau of Statistics.

ADF. Australian Defence Force

AHRC. Australian Human Rights Commission

AIMA. Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs.

ASCCEG. Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups

ATO. Australian Taxation Office.

CALD. Culturally and linguistically diverse.

EIU. Economist Intelligence Unit.

FECCA. Federation of Ethnic Communities Council of Australia.

GDP. Gross Domestic Product.

GPI. Global Peace Index.

HDI. Human Development Index

HILDA. Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey.

ICERD. International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.

ICESC. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

IGR. Intergenerational Report.

MIPEX. Migrant Integration Policy Index.

OECD. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

SBS. Special Broadcasting Service (Australian government funded television channel).

UN. United Nations.

UNESCO. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

White Australia Policy (WAP). The official Australian social policy from federation (1901) until 1975; formally repealed when Australia enacted the *Racial Discrimination Act* 1975 (Cth).

WWII. World War Two.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Australian mainstream politicians often acknowledge that Australia is multicultural. But how does that idea work itself out in contemporary Australia, where many different takes and perspectives shape and modify the multifactorial object created out of and recognised in the settlement of Australia from “outside”? While it could just be taken as a sociological fact, simply reflecting how population is counted and their origins marked, there now appear to be many interpretations of the term and many renderings of its impact and policy implications.

Background

On 20 March 2017, the then Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, officially announced that ‘Australia is the most successful multicultural society in the world’ during a media conference (Turnbull 2017). On the same day, the Turnbull government released its Multicultural Statement, *Multicultural Australia: United, Strong and Successful*, reasserting the same claim in writing. Turnbull had been using the same phrase since 2015 (Kimmerley 2015); throughout his prime ministership; and, during his final media briefing as Australian Prime Minister (Murphy and Jabour 2016, para. 4; Turnbull 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; J-Wire 2015; Remeikis 2018 (ABC News (Australia) 2018, 8:02). Turnbull’s successor, Scott Morrison, has also repeated his predecessor’s claim including on the last day of 2020 (Morrison 2019, 2020; Soutphommasane 2019).

The claim now appears to be the new political catch-cry of Australian politicians from the two major political parties when challenged on the state of social relations in Australia. The Shadow Minister for Home Affairs, Kristina Keneally (Keneally 2020) used the phrase

while calling for a reduction in migration to Australia. The federal Minister for Tourism, Simon Birmingham, pronounced it in a statement when China raised the issue of increasing racism against Asian-Australians, particularly Chinese-Australians, during COVID-19 (Birmingham 2020).

Without its own multicultural policy, the Morrison Government (2020) in effect, endorses the Turnbull Multicultural Statement by default. There has been no record of such assertion by previous Australian governments, whether under Labor or the Coalition (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2019). There is also no reference as to *when* Australia “achieved” this status of being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’; nor is there any reference on the basis of such a claim, whether economically, socially, politically or culturally.

For a portion of Australians, the government’s claim creates a jarring cognitive dissonance with the lived reality of their experience. A cursory look at the representation in Australia’s institutions of legitimate authority – the parliaments, judiciary and ministerial positions including the leadership of the vast bureaucracies supporting them – would decry such a claim. Turn on any of the Australian commercial television channels at any moment of any day, the white Euro/Anglo faces staring back from the silver screen would clearly challenge the government’s claim (Screen Australia 2016). Yet walk on a street of any of Australia’s cities, few could fail to see the diversity. Australia’s multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multicultural diversity is self-evident.

Aims and contribution of thesis

The aims of this thesis are to dig deeper than this superficial political rhetoric. The research addresses questions that are of fundamental importance to the democratic governance of Australia as a multicultural nation: what are the linkages between Australia’s power holdings and its culturally diverse society? How does ethnicity shape the power structure and consequently, government (in)action on matters of cultural diversity and, relatedly,

government policies aimed at promoting equal opportunity? Does race, once a core social foundational element to the nation's formation – that found its formal expression in the White Australia Policy for most of the twentieth century – still resonate? Why is this important? What is the significance of multiculturalism to Australian society, and why does it need to be re-examined?

The underlying contention of this research is that multiculturalism must be re-thought if it is to have any impact on the contemporary social, cultural and political milieu in Australia. The term has become prosaic and ambiguous; few people seem to know what it intends or how it works. Multiculturalism has become a catch-all term somewhat like “information”; it is opaque, weighty yet dull. As an official government policy, its role as an agent of change for the ethno-racially diverse communities of Australia has stagnated and, its goals remain largely misunderstood by mainstream Australia. It could be argued that multicultural policy is just one in a nexus of policies that affect the lives of minority groups, and therefore should not be given excessive attention. However, the power differential among Australia's diverse ethno-cultural groups continues to have significant implications. The pervasiveness of power discrepancies between white and racialised Australians impacts not just the direction of social relations in Australia but also on the policy measures that can enable inclusions or exclusions. All of these criticisms point to a single issue: Australia's multicultural policy in its current form fails to adequately address the issues of equity and inclusion for migrants and non-white Australians alike.

This research seeks to assemble empirical evidence, data that is unvarnished and unspun politically, to “test” the government's claim to national exceptionalism. The central investigations of this thesis are threefold: first, to interrogate the (ethnic) differentials in Australia's power structures; second, to analyse the foundations that contribute to the existing power holdings in Australian society; and third, to ascertain the conditions and processes that could effect social change towards Australia becoming a successful multicultural democracy. These objectives are examined through problematising the

Australian federal government's claim of Australia being 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'.

Structure

Following this **Introductory** chapter, the next chapter (**Chapter 2**) explores Australia's policy developments concerning diversity management and the journey towards multiculturalism to foreground the existing social hierarchy of twenty-first century multicultural Australia. This chapter aims to introduce the problematic; to magnify the social location of the racialised and explore the multiplier impacts that Australia's social policies have on them. It includes a critique of how, for most of the twentieth century, the ideological core of Australia's national social strategy was to utilise physiognomic difference to exclude those racialised. Expressed and implemented as the White Australia Policy (WAP), the strength of that racial fear and preoccupation with preservation of a White Australia contributed to Australia's decision to participate in the Great War (World War I) (Cochrane 2018). This ideology, centred around whiteness, underpinned the system of ideas, values and beliefs that oriented Australia's efforts at nation-building.

Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of three theoretical framings of diversity management to understand multiculturalism. The first is the political theory of liberalism as advanced by Will Kymlicka and other liberal theorists. These liberal theorists share the common belief that multiculturalism falls within the philosophical remit of liberalism, a philosophy centred on the individual. But they differ in how each characterise the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, and the degree of government intervention – through the philosophy of multiculturalism – to address the "difference". Kymlicka, Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor and similar-minded scholars propose "group rights" as the avenue to ameliorate historical and structural processes that privilege white people and oppress those racialised.

The second theoretical lens of understanding multiculturalism is through the socio-political theory that frames cultural difference as normative of society. The ‘Bristol school of multiculturalism’ (Levey 2019a), led by British scholars such as Tariq Modood, Bhikhu Parekh and so forth, exemplify this philosophical tradition. It is premised on cultural diversity as arising from differences in normative systems that consist of the rules and principles that define acceptable belief and practice. Every culture and subculture, from the simplest to the most complex, has normative systems, and all are distinctive to one degree or another. Ethnic, national, religious, regional, and other forms of diversity are based largely on these distinctions (Parekh 2000). Under the rubric of multiculturalism, this philosophical approach takes a civically-framed citizenship framework to managing the existing diversity in society.

Oren Yiftachel (2006), on the other hand, employs ethnocracy as the perspective to scrutinise diversity management for poly-ethnic societies. The analytical lens of ethnocracy focuses on power differentials among the various ethnic grouping with one ethnic group, or a coalition/collaboration, dominating the power structures of society. The analysis draws upon Weber’s articulation of ethnicity and his tripartite aggregates of power: class, status and party.

This is followed by an exploration of the complex relationship between “difference” and “multicultural” in Australia. I analyse and contextualise how “difference” is operationalised in Australia’s state-formation, employing Attwell’s (2016) ethnocratisation processes and Commaroff’s (1997) analysis of the operationalisation of ethnicity. The analysis illuminates whiteness and racialisation as material and constitutive in the power structures of Australia’s contemporary society.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology, methods and measurements to be employed in this research. Methodological pragmatism provides the rationale for employing a multi-method approach, assisted by triangulation. Sources of data, primarily from the Australian Bureau

of Statistics (ABS) 2006 and 2016 censuses, and how they will be exploited will also be explained. The chapter also explores the difficulty in settling the concept of “multicultural”.

In **Chapter 5**, I advance the problematic explored in Chapter 4 in order to identify and define culture, the foundation of difference that the philosophy of multiculturalism is hailed to address. A review of the broad scholarship on the concept enables a working definition of culture for this research. This chapter aims to determine the ‘multicultural’ element of the Australian government’s claim of Australia being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’. A critique of the six ethno-cultural traits collected by the ABS during the quinquennial census collection – ancestry, language spoken at home, country of birth of person, country of birth of parents, religion and Indigenous status – demonstrates each has significant limitations. Charting and analysing the results of each of these six ethno-cultural characteristics demonstrates Australia is culturally diverse, and reveals the state of that multiculturalism. Based on the results, ancestry presents as the most reliable proxy for ethnicity and culture among the six ethno-cultural traits collected by the ABS.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the second element of the Australian federal government’s claim – that of being the most “successful”. **Chapter 6** focuses on “success” from an international perspective. Utilising a cross-national comparative approach, Australia’s international standing is compared to six other “like-minded” nations – Canada, New Zealand, the UK and US, and two nations that have formally adopted multiculturalism as their national social strategy: Sweden and the Netherlands. Four dimensions of society are employed for comparisons: economic participation, multicultural policy, state of democracy and human development. Seven international indices underpinning these four dimensions will be utilised for the comparisons: the Gini Index and Gini Coefficient; Democracy Index and Global Peace Index; Multiculturalism Policy Index and International Migrant Integration Policy Index; and, the United Nations Human Development Index.

Chapter 7 focuses on a domestic, or national perspective of the government’s claim to “success”. The objective is to interrogate the ethnic differentials in the formal and informal

power holdings in Australia. The top ten ancestries of three arms of government – essentially the parliament, judiciary and the Executive including leaders in Australia’s Defence and police forces and the corporate sector – are examined to ascertain the multicultural reality of Australia’s formal institutions of authority. For informal power holdings, the lineage of the occupational holders in the media and the arts industries are interrogated. Also, using Weber’s three bases of power (class, status and party) as the framework, the chapter also investigates the cultural compositions of the top ten highest income-earning occupations and the bottom ten lowest income-earning occupations. An examination of the income differentials against the top ten ethnic groups among eight levels of educational attainment illustrates race and ethnicity still resonate in the power structures of Australia.

Chapter 8 analyses and discusses the results within the framework of Yiftachel’s (2006) six indicators of ethnocracy.

Chapter 9 outlines the challenges ahead for multicultural Australia as well as policy implications. It concludes with a proposed framework, and the processes and conditions required, for Australia to become a successful multicultural society the foundation of which much be underpinned by principles of democracy and civic rights – that is, a successful multicultural democracy.

The **Conclusion chapter** explores the implications for Australia from the findings in this research, pointing to the policy changes needed and the importance of further research on key unresolved questions.

Chapter 2

UNDERSTANDING AUSTRALIA'S VERSION OF MULTICULTURAL NATION-BUILDING

2.0.1 Introduction

The meaning of multiculturalism in contemporary Australia lies in the way it is used and the contexts in which its use is embedded. For some advocates the term is used to promote openness, tolerance, intercultural pollination, social justice and cultural rights, as well as the politics of identity. In the wider community, for those less engaged by philosophical debate, it has come to stand as a shorthand descriptor for migrant communities and ethno-religious clusters of settlement. That is, its advocates see it as a term encompassing equity and inclusion, while in common parlance neither of these values is necessarily present. For its antagonists and critics, it has come to stand for special privilege, exclusion, and marginalisation from an acceptable common core Australian culture.

Contestation of the term multiculturalism is partly in the normative realm: is multiculturalism a path to the good life? Is it morally correct? More fundamentally, however, there is little agreement on what multiculturalism actually *is*. Instead, multiculturalism is often used as a *post hoc* description of packages of disparate policy prescriptions and/ or ethical commitments (Hall 2000; Hesse 2000). Multiculturalism can be an ideology, set of policy practices, description of society and/ or political philosophy (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). It is both a category of practice, used by actors to convey practical orientations to diversity in society, and a category of analysis intended by scholars to carry analytical weight.

This chapter interrogates Australia's multiculturalism journey. Section 1 reviews Australia's official diversity management strategy since federation in 1901 when Australia

became a nation. Section 2 discusses the research question of this thesis and its operationalisation. Section 3 examines the experiences of the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Australia in implementing “multiculturalism”. Finally, Section 4 explores Australian multiculturalism through the prism of Weber’s stratification framework: class, status and party. The chapter concludes with the current status of Australian multiculturalism and the likely contribution of this study.

2.1.0 Australian Multiculturalism – the journey so far

The evolution of Australia’s official diversity management strategy can generally be categorised into five distinct stages: (i) exclusion as a founding national principle (1901 – WWII); (ii) full assimilation (post-War – 1966); (iii) integration (1966 – 1972); (iv) multiculturalism (introduced in 1973, but coming into effect some years later when formally adopted in 1978); and, (v) Howard and post-Howard administration multiculturalism (from 1996 to now) (Moran 2017; Ho 2013). The rhetoric of contemporary discourses of multiculturalism in Australia is framed as the incompatibility of ethnic cultural practices with Western value systems around equality; particularly exacerbated in relation to Western interpretations of Muslim views on gender. How Australian multiculturalism has developed towards this axis is complex but Australia’s socio-economic growth and political leadership play important roles, and so are Australia’s colonial history and immigration policies (MacLeod 2006).

2.1.1 *A nation founded on exclusion (federation to WWII)*

At the birth of modern Australia in 1901 when six former British colonies federated to become the Commonwealth of Australia, one of the first “acts” of the nation’s newly minted parliament was to enact the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* (Cth), repealed. This piece of legislation would have a more wide-ranging impact on the nation’s psyche than its formal legislative function to underpin the White Australia Policy (WAP) (Tavan 2005). Since its commencement and throughout its formal operation for three-quarters of the twentieth century, the WAP barred non-white – particularly Asian – immigrants from entering

Australia. It also authorised the deportation and forcible removal of non-British residents already in Australia. This included those “blackbirded” to Australia, a practice from the 1850s-1870s where Pacific Islanders were coerced or kidnapped to work as indentured labourers on Australia’s northern cane fields and who had settled with families in Australia (*Sugar Slaves* 1995; Haxton 2017; Farrow-Smith 2018). The implementation of the WAP in Australia was much harsher and lasted much longer than similar policies in other Anglophone countries such as Canada and the United States (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Perhaps the WAP’s most insidious (and greatest or worst) accomplishment is its embedment in and normalisation of a racialised power imbalance in Australian society. It still casts a long shadow over contemporary Australia.

2.1.2 Assimilation – post-War Australia

The authorised heightened racial awareness under the WAP pervaded and filled interstices of Australian society for three generations. Like the concept of race, whiteness is an evolving social construct. Its application and construction is evident in Australia’s immigration practice until the late 1970s which barred all non-whites from entering Australia. The demand for a population boom and national security fears after the Second World War (WWII) saw Australia slowly broaden its immigration sources. The construction of white was no longer limited to those from the United Kingdom (UK). Apart from Britain, Australia began accepting Displaced Persons from northern Europe, followed by Eastern Europe then expanded to include southern Europeans and even Latin America (Jupp 2002). The common characteristic of these immigrants was that they were physiognomically white. The colour line continued to be enforced and immigrants of “colour”, even from Europe, remained excluded (Jayasuriya 1996). This was notwithstanding the discomfitures at times experienced by Australian diplomats posted to the Asia-Pacific region during this period (Tavan 2005).

Australia’s diversity management strategy of choice during the post-War immigration “boom” was assimilation. As Christin Inglis (2006) pointed out:

...for most of Australia's history, the favoured policy was that of assimilation, which assumed, and required, that immigrants would rapidly adopt Australian culture and practices and become 'invisible' (Inglis 2006, p. 14).

The desire was that the European migrants would quickly forget their original language and culture, and be grateful for the liberties and benefits of living in Australia (Hirst 1994). It was anticipated that these 'New Australians', being racially similar to the resident White Anglo-Celtic Australians, would quickly 're-clothe' and assimilate to become Australians (Jupp 2002; Markus, Jupp and McDonald 2009; Pakulski 2014). But many European migrants who had become citizens were dissatisfied with being required to assimilate into an Anglo-Australian society, reinforcing the notion that ethnic diversity would not simply disappear. Further, the 'New Australians' were sceptical of Australian exceptionalism and British imperialism. Many supported trade unionism, providing increased electoral support for the opposition Labor Party in major cities (Jupp 2011, pp. 44-45). With immigrants becoming a major part of Labor's support base, they also began to influence Labor's policy platform.

2.1.3 *Integration (1966-1972)*

By the 1960s, it was becoming more and more acceptable for immigrants to retain their cultural practices as long as they did so in the privacy of their own homes. This change in public attitude was reflected in the introduction of the Integration policy in the late 1960s. Integration marked a recognition that the rate of return of European immigrants after the recession of 1961, resentment of assimilation, and in the wake of the reinvigoration of European economies was undermining the settlement model assumed to be operative in Australia. It was not so much an active policy per se, but a reactive process, accelerated by immigrant political organisation in Australia demanding right, participation and policy recognition. Further, the push to end White Australia was no longer limited to students and religious leaders (Tavan 2005). The change in the political leadership in the two major

parties also provided renewal and vigour to dismantle the WAP. This manifested in the then Immigration Department where the Assimilation Division was renamed as the Integration Division in 1964 (Jupp 2011, p. 46).

Under Integration, ethnicity and cultural backgrounds were considered in policy-making. Ethnic organisations, religions, and the speaking of foreign languages were also recognised as an entrenched part of contemporary Australian society (Clyne 2011, pp. 54-60). The policy of Integration was a transition away from assimilation as diversity was accepted and taken into consideration by policy-makers, while the expectations of ‘Australian loyalty’, English speaking ability, and citizenship remained.

2.1.4 Multiculturalism (1972-1996)

With the election of a Labor government in 1972, the “look the other way” approach to ethnic diversity during the Integration period was challenged by the newly elected Labor Party. Al Grassby, Minister for Immigration at the time, famously tabled a reference paper to the Australian Parliament entitled, *‘A Multi-cultural Society for the Future’* in 1973 (Grassby 1973). But long before Grassby’s action in parliament, advocacy of a change to Australia’s social policy, towards the adoption of multiculturalism, was already actively occurring. Multi-prong grass-root level activism within the community, in academia and internally within the then Immigration Department had been agitating for change behind the scene for several years.

One former immigration officer who deserves specific recognition for his role, but rarely mentioned in the historical accounts of Australia’s multiculturalism journey, is James Houston (Houston 2018). Through his own personal experiences living overseas and across Australia, Houston long advocated for a social policy that recognised the lived reality of Australia’s multicultural demographic. The results from the three-year National Groups Survey in the late 1960s and early 1970s further cemented Houston’s belief – and others who shared similar views – that Australia’s persistence at maintaining an assimilationistic Anglo-form national social strategy was untenable (Houston 2018, pp. 160 and 162).

In his autobiography, Houston (2018) recalled his excitement at the opportunity to draft Grassby's famous speech at the Cairnmillar Institute in Melbourne on 11 August 1973. In addition to the very tight timeframe (of a day and a half) to complete the speech, he also faced the risk that his assimilationist defending senior departmental officers would change the message before it reached Grassby (Houston 2018, pp. 178-182). The task of managing this delicate balance, of advocating for a (his) multiculturalist view of Australia and ensuring the messaging passed his superior's scrutiny, caused Houston significant anxiety. Fortunately, Houston's proposed words in the speech went unaltered to Grassby. Its title, '*A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future*', was to become the paper Grassby tabled in the Australian Parliament. Sadly for Houston, it was also to be the last speech he would be tasked to write in the Immigration Department (Houston 2018, p. 183).

Although the term 'multicultural' entered Australian political parlance in 1973, formal adoption of multiculturalism as Australia's social policy did not eventuate until several years later (Koleth 2010). Nonetheless, practical steps such as funding 'ethnic radio' programs commenced. Australia also ratified its commitment to the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) that it signed in 1966 but maintained its reservation on Article 4 of the treaty (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006). Thus, the enacted national law against racial discrimination, the *Racial Discrimination Act* 1975 (Cth), bypassed the race hate speech element of the ICERD.

The change to a conservative government under Malcolm Fraser in 1975 did not slow Australia's progress on multiculturalism. If anything, the Fraser government (1975-1983) embraced multiculturalism and conducted the landmark 'Review of Migrant Services and Programs' in 1977 (chaired by Frank Galbally). The subsequent report, commonly known as the Galbally Report, released in 1978, provided the first official policy steps, a "charter" of sorts, that were approved by the government in 1978. The Galbally Report determined that ethnic welfare organisations must receive government funding, community groups were to be consulted about their needs, and ethnic and linguistic diversity were not

damaging to national unity (Galbally 1978, pp. 4-5, 104). This was Australia's period of 'ethnic welfare multiculturalism' (Ho 2013). In addition, the Fraser government allowed large numbers of Asian immigrants, by way of Vietnamese 'boat people' — who were escaping the communist regime of Vietnam — to enter Australia (Martin 1978; Colic-Peisker 2011). For the first time since federation, Australia instituted a racially non-discriminatory immigration policy (Babacan and Babacan 2007).

The Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) was established under an Act of Parliament in 1979 with the mission to promote tolerance, social cohesion and intercultural understanding. The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), which began as two ethnic radio stations in 1975, following experimentation in 1979 became the national broadcaster and provided with legislative footing in 1991. Its functions were to provide news and other broadcasting services in multiple languages (including English) to Australia's diverse population. Attempts were also made to recast multiculturalism as for all Australians. A 1982 Australian government brochure titled *Multiculturalism For All Australians*, stated:

Multiculturalism is...much more than the provision of special services to minority ethnic groups. It is a way of looking at Australian society, and involves living together with an awareness of cultural diversity. We accept our differences and appreciate a variety of different lifestyles rather than expect everyone to fit into a standardised pattern. Most of all multiculturalism requires us to recognise that we each can be a 'Real Australian', without necessarily being a 'Typical Australian'.

The change to a Hawke Labor government in 1983 — while changing some earlier structures supporting multiculturalism such as replacing the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs with the Office of Multicultural Affairs — allowed work on multiculturalism to expand. The Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research was established to provide high-quality social research and planning to government. Another

significant step forward for Australian multiculturalism came in 1989, with the introduction of the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* policy. This policy expanded multiculturalism to include Anglo-Celtic Australians and Indigenous peoples, offering them access to cultural resources and equality appeals. Although the concept of multiculturalism was adopted from Canada, Australia's multicultural programs, having emerged as a distinct policy entity by the early 1980s, flourished under this policy (Fleras 2009; Borowski 2000; Roberts 2009); and so laid foundations for the establishment of the community consultation process that took place in the mid-1990s. The then Labor government sought to determine how best to provide services and expand equality through the program, particularly considering its enlarged audience.

In 1994 the Keating Labor government struck a panel to conduct the Community Consultations on Access and Equity. The resultant report released in 1995, *Multicultural Australia: the Next Steps, Towards and Beyond 2000* (Next Steps 1995), outlined the next evolution in Australian multiculturalism. This included progressive anti-racism measures, strategies to combat labour market inequalities and new community access programs for underrepresented groups. Unfortunately, these 'next steps' did not include or discuss legislative progress, nor implemented before a change in elected government (Theophanous 1995).

2.1.5 Howard's "multiculturalism" (1996-2007)

Progressive steps towards equality between the mid-1980s and 1994 were comparable to those made in Canada from 1992-1996 but were undermined by the Howard government in opposition, and in power. Howard's personal animosity to multiculturalism is a well-documented matter of public record (Tate 2009; Theophanous 1995). Hostile to the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act in 1975, Howard vehemently opposed multiculturalism during the 1980s, and made numerous anti-Asian remarks during the course of his early engagement with multiculturalism (Henderson 1995a; Errington and van Onselen 2007). In his opposition, Howard recognised that multiculturalism was a genuinely

radical social vision that was soon seen to constitute a threat to the hierarchal status quo in Australia. Consequently, to preserve the status quo, the policy had to be subtly transformed and its radical potential neutralised.

This neutralisation was achieved through increasing the emphasis on cultural celebration and de-emphasising the amelioration of economic, political and other social disadvantages suffered by minority ethnic groups (Shen 2008; Babacan and Babacan 2007; Stratton 2017). Kobayashi (1993) calls this ‘symbolic multiculturalism’ – a term used to describe a sanctioned celebration of culture and equality in principle rather than in practice without disrupting long-held support structures serving the interests of the numerically dominant Anglo-Celtic group. Fundamentally, Howard was invested in the neoliberal concept of a free market economy and the ‘trickle down’ economics theory in that the effect of profit would create all the necessary social cohesion Australia required. Firmly invested in the ‘self-sufficiency’ model of neoliberalism, the Howard Coalition government set about dismantling the multicultural programs that were in place prior to the 1996 election, beginning with the full-scale rejection of the 1995 ‘Next Steps’ report on recommended advancements for multiculturalism. Instead, a more assimilationist approach and the reduction of government financial support for programs supporting multicultural service delivery was instituted.

Howard’s later “softening” on multiculturalism from his earlier advocacy for the total abandonment of the concept in 1980s, is attributed to his Greek-Australian adviser Arthur Sinodinos who suggested that he see it as a uniquely Australian achievement rather than as a foreign imposition (Henderson 1995a and 1995b). Under Howard, multiculturalism became a tool of government that facilitated the transition of foreigners into becoming Australian citizens. While his government made a concerted effort to correct the perceived previous government’s experimentation with cultural diversity by exalting ‘national values’, it also emphasised that the sole function of multiculturalism was to enhance national cohesiveness (Babacan and Babacan 2007; Shen 2008; Koleh 2010). Significantly, anti-racism and equality measures recommended in the 1995 ‘New Steps’

report commissioned by the Keating government were never developed. As Papastergiadis (2013) pointed out:

In broad historical terms, multiculturalism [under Howard] was accused of promoting a masochistic discourse that exaggerated racial injustices, unfairly rewarded minorities, and distracted attention from the great success stories in Australian settlement (Papastergiadis 2013, p. 3).

Multiculturalism in the early years of the Howard government was marketed as ‘productive diversity’, beginning with the release of the 1999 *New Agenda for Multicultural Australia* (A New Agenda 1999), a program highlighting the ‘economic benefits of multiculturalism’. This document – and other multicultural policies of the period – emphasised the need for increasing education in Australia around the benefits of multiculturalism, primarily in relation to the economy, but entirely failed to address social inequality, discrimination in the labour market, interracial hostilities or systemic racism. Under Howard’s policies, participation by Australia’s ‘ethnic’ communities was relegated to the realm of cultural activities, such as food and to a limited extent, the arts or ‘symbolic multiculturalism’ (Kobayashi 1993).

This difference-blind rhetoric at ‘encouraging understanding among all’ was a deliberate attempt at maintaining the unequal power relations between the official and unofficial cultures, which demanded the voluntary subordination of the latter groups for the totalising aim of ‘national unity’. While the rhetoric of ‘inclusion’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘unifying force’ and ‘social harmony’ were invoked wherever possible, this was to be deferential to the special status of the charter group ‘whose origin is wholly or partly from Great Britain and Ireland’ (A New Agenda 1999, p. 14-15). Howard believed those of Anglo-Celtic heritage ‘can take special pride in their heritage, for its substantive contribution to the development and success of Australian society’, and upon which ‘the underlying philosophy and principles and the essential components of Australia’s democratic system, which is the

foundation on which our society has been built, and in our special social values' (A New Agenda 1999, p. 15). This denied critical contributions by non-Anglo Australian communities and the vital role these immigrants play in the Australian economy, helping carry the nation forward during tough times through their labour and entrepreneurial spirit (Collins 1991).

The focus on symbolic multiculturalism, of 'ethnic' foods and dance, or 'add-ons' to the existing system, rather than being mainstreamed and integral to a changing society reflects a 'divide-and-conquer' strategy (Fleras 2009). It is imbued with a colonial mindset, aimed at keeping minority communities isolated and unable to mobilise against socioeconomic inequalities. The strategy creates division in reflecting an ethnic/cultural essentialism that denies the migrant experience, exaggerates cultural differences and emphasises the intrinsic worth of Anglo-Celtic values (Jayasuriya, Gothard and Walker 2003; Stratton 2016). The effect is to retrogress Australia back to its anachronistic White Australia past and reinforce Anglo-privilege, which multicultural policies since the 1970s have sought to challenge.

Indeed, rather than evolving to combat systemic racism, multiculturalism under the Howard administration has become a prime example of systemic racism in action. In the final years of Howard's government, he spoke of a 'core culture' of Anglo-Celtic values which is supposed to bind the Australian nation together (Fozdar and Spittles 2009). Therefore, other cultures ought to blend with it, rather than the reverse (Tate 2009, p. 113). Howard's final policy in 2003, entitled, *Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity*, lacked any methods to address social inequality. Instead, the policy focused on a host of references to individual responsibilities to support Australian ways of doing things and to not rock the boat. Rather than acting as a policy designed to promote diversity and freedoms, this was a policy that controls individual expressions of culture in such a way that there are no opportunities to redress inequalities, and no acknowledgement of the value of difference beyond a fiscal interest.

Under the Howard government Australian multiculturalism became little more than a

business advantage in keeping with a neo-conservative agenda (Stratton 2011a, 2017). The Howard government marketed multiculturalism as a commodity to compete in the global arena. ‘Ethnics’ or community-based organisations were expected to define their vision by how they conformed to local needs (Papastergiadis 2013). In essence, a policy that emphasises multiculturalism primarily as a business advantage will not yield the resourcing and programs that spontaneously promote anti-racism in daily life as a valued philosophy. While Canadian multiculturalism at the time refocused towards anti-racism and equality of inclusion, Australian multiculturalism under Howard still emphasised the responsibilities of ‘ethnic’ and immigrant groups to integrate well into a ‘core Australian culture’ of Anglo-Celtic heritage.

2.1.6 *Post-Howard multiculturalism*

From the mid-1990s, many of the nations that adopted multiculturalism in other parts of the world shared similar political predicaments to Australia. The policies did not function to promote ethnic integration because they continued to rely on ingrained principles that disproportionately served the interests of dominant groups without revisions, while ignoring the rationales that promote structural or rights-based equality. The only exception was Canada.

The return of a six-year Australian Labor Party to government (2007 – 2013) failed to rehabilitate the structural commodification of multiculturalism embedded during the Howard years. Many of the Howard era’s “containment and minimisation” policy components, that reduced multiculturalism to superficial celebration of culture and economic advantage, were retained (Jakubowicz 2016a, para. 19). For example, Howard’s vanilla ‘Harmony Day’ – which appropriated the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – was retained. Racism as an institutional barrier to equity and inclusion remained unacknowledged and unaddressed. Nevertheless, the Gillard Labor government attempted to strike a more inclusive tone and lessen the negative discourse towards multiculturalism through a new policy, *The People of Australia – Australia’s*

Multicultural Policy 2011 (Australian Department of Immigration and Border Security 2011). However, the opportunity to implement policies to realise the social and cultural capitals of diverse communities to build an inclusive and harmonious Australian society was lost (Woodward, Skrbis and Bean 2008).

The strong emphasis on the idea that cultural diversity should not be gained at the expense of national cohesion reflects a prevailing unease over the balance of interaction between the global and the local. The election of three conservative Coalition governments since, together with an entrenched anti-Asian anxiety (Fozdar and Spittles 2009) and anti-Muslim sentiment after 9/11, has continued to substantially weaken multiculturalism in Australia. In twenty-first century Australia, the old *bete noire*, China, has re-emerged as a target of concern (Biddle et al. 2019). As the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate, in one fell swoop, Australians of Chinese heritage have again become targets of suspicions of disloyalty, and potential perfidy (Xiao and Dziedzic 2020; Hurst 2020a). The shadow of the WAP remains powerful and influential.

Overall, the Australian government's approach to policies on multiculturalism has been mostly a top-down, goal-oriented approach designed to enhance cultural governance, or as Fleras (2009) argued:

...[the] theoretical possibility and practice of a multicultural governance without multiculturalism (Fleras 2009, p. 115).

Adopted in the 1970s, following three-quarters of a century of 'Anglo-conformity' assimilationist policies (Levey 2008a), multiculturalism was devised at a time when immigrants to Australia were Europeans. They shared many traditions and commonalities with the existing Anglo-Celtic Australian population, being predominantly identified as white and most were Christians (ABS Census 1976, p. 7). They suffered discrimination based on 'ethnic' prejudice, rather than the racialism applied to non-whites. Although prejudice and racism share many commonalities, the source and origin of the discrimination differ. Notwithstanding that, perpetrators of prejudice or racism share similar objectives:

they view the victim or the target of their prejudice or racism in a negative light and because of that perception, aim to exclude or exploit them (Cole 2015).

2.1.7 *Prejudice and multiculturalism*

Allport's (1954) seminal analysis suggests the nature of prejudice contains three essential ingredients: (a) hostility and rejection, (b) the basis of the hostility is the target individual's membership in a group, and (c) resistance to new knowledge. He defines prejudice as:

an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed towards a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he [*sic*] is a member of that group (Allport 1954, p. 9).

In essence, prejudice is 'an unfavourable attitude directed toward others because of their membership in a particular group' (Fishbein 2002, p. 3). A common manifestation of prejudice is stereotyping, where exaggerated and simplified descriptions are applied to every person in a particular category. Early advocacy of multiculturalism, particularly in the 1970s, demonstrates that reducing and eliminating prejudice against 'New Australians' of non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds were strong driving factors (Zubrycki and Martin 1977). Such advocacy came from both within academia and included scholars: Jerzy Zubrzycki, Jean Martin, Charles Price and others, and community organisations such as state-based ethnic community councils.

2.1.8 *Racism and multiculturalism*

Racism, on the other hand, is significantly more difficult to define (Rattansi 2007). It is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon bound up with myriad other divisions including class and gender. The idea of racism is closely tied with the concept of race, which at its core reflects a colonialistic social construct of a social and power order within society (Lentin 2011, 2020; Foster and Stockley 1984). As a nation born out of invasion and colonialism, with a history of exclusion and indentured labour, racism in Australia is

multifaceted (Cole 2015). It often involves discrimination against one group by another, in order to maintain its own power, to control the other groups (Castle 1993, p. 2).

Castles (1993) defines racism as:

...the process whereby social groups categorise other groups as different or inferior, on the basis of phenotypical or cultural markers, or national origin. This process involves the use of economic, social or political power, and generally has the purpose of legitimating exploitation or exclusion of the group so defined (Castles 1993, p. 1).

Racism as a cycle often starts with a strategy by a certain group to consolidate economic, social or political power. This prejudice then motivates discrimination against minority group(s), both at an individual and institutional level, which forces the group into a lower position in society. The target victim or group(s)'s lower position in society puts them in a position of social disadvantage, which means they are viewed as less successful. Their lack of success is explained as, or equated to, their inferiority to the majority group; and finally, the cycle repeats and continues (Castles 1993; Cole 2015).

Lentin (2020) on the other hand, posits that racism operates as a 'technology' in support of white supremacy in diverse societies. Its operation cuts across society and embedded into the interstices of social relations. Foster and Stockley (1989) noted racism, particularly against Indigenous Australians, is structured into the formation of Australia as a nation.

Charting Australia's racialised history, Stratton (2006, 2011b) demonstrated how 'the practice of everyday racism' continues to pervade modern Australian life (Stratton 2006, p. 662). Using the vastly different treatments of two rescue incidents that took place on the same day (9 May 2006), Stratton illustrated how 'everyday racism permeates the dominant institutional order' (Stratton 2006, p. 662). The rescue of two white Anglo-Celtic miners trapped underground for a fortnight received round the clock media coverage; hailed as embodying the indomitable spirit of Australia across the political spectrum including the

then Prime Minister John Howard. The rescue of three Indigenous Australians who survived a three-week shipwreck, on the other hand, was barely mentioned in the media. Further, subsequent media reportage was laced racialised language, their story of survival treated with skepticism, suspicion and Othering. In Stratton's words: 'race and racialised preferences are core structuring mechanisms of Australian culture', embedded in the everyday differentiation, assumptions and expectations of non-whites (Stratton 2006, p. 663).

Australia has struggled over the years to reform and remove racialised values that haunt its government policies. Multiculturalism, since its adoption in the 1970s has faced revisions in the 1980s as Australia seeks to move increasingly towards an equality-based, anti-racist society. But under the Howard government, multicultural policies underwent a reversal towards a more multicultural (in name) but assimilation (in practice) trajectory. Further, the racialisation embedded in the values of these revisions is often not widely recognised. The failure to fully address racism has significantly hampered multiculturalism's progress in Australia (Lentin and Titley 2011; Jakubowicz 2019a).

Prejudice and racism are discussed very briefly here because they remain critical to the success of multiculturalism, whether as a strategy, philosophy or practice. Further analysis of these two issues is in the (next) literature review chapter.

2.1.9 The promise of multiculturalism

The lack of clear government articulation and custodianship of what multiculturalism means to Australia since its adoption as government policy in the 1970s reflects the populace's ambivalence over the concept. It morphed from the social justice through 'ethnic welfare' in the 1970s/1980s, to 'productive diversity' of the 1990s, which was then downgraded to 'social cohesion' despite the rhetoric of the vanilla 'Harmony Day' of the Howard government (Ho 2013; Jakubowicz 2017a, para. 4). The inconsistencies of government messaging on multiculturalism over the last generation, particularly during the Howard government, has eroded gains made by earlier governments. The majority of

Australians now consistently associate the term ‘multiculturalism’ simply with liberal toleration and increased presence of diversity in the community, provided perceived national interests are not affected (Markus 2007-2019). In fact, many analysts feel successive Australian governments have done little to advance multiculturalism since the mid-1990s (Jakubowicz 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b and 2019b; Tavan 2012; Pastergiadis 2013; Moran 2017; Levey 2008b, 2019b; Babacan and Babacan 2007; Colic-Peisker 2011; Lentin and Titley 2011). Instead, many assimilationist-like strategies have normalised Australian political discourse. They manifest in strategies such as the ‘Pacific Solution’, instituted during Howard years and reinstated in 2013, to deter a renewed flow of asylum seekers and adoption of populist anti-multiculturalist narratives with respect to national security.

There have been four federal elections in Australia (2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019) since Howard’s defeat in 2007. During these periods, only the Greens minor political party has fully articulated of what multiculturalism means to Australia and provided strategies for implementation, including plans to tackle racism (The Greens 2019a, 2019b). The two major Australian political parties, Labor and the Coalition, have taken a minimalist celebratory approach, reflective of Kobayashi’s (1993) ‘symbolic multiculturalism’ and Fleras’s (2009) ‘multicultural governance’ (Australian Labor Party 2019; Liberal Party 2019; Murphy et al. 2019; Manifesto Project 2016). While the Coalition comprises of an alliance between the Liberal and National political parties to form government, they maintain separate political identities. Both parties see multiculturalism as an issue relevant only to minority or “ethnic” groups and have made few, if any, advocacies on it over the last two decades (Donegan and Jeyaratnam 2019; Collins 2019).

The conservative Coalition government, which has been in power since 2013, has resumed Howard’s neoliberal trajectory of minimisation and containment (Kilkemeijer et al. 2019; Menadue 2019a and 2019b). Its central multiculturalism strategy is a ‘rhetoric of respect and recognition of diversity masking a sustained pattern of ethnic power residing in the

Charter communities of white Anglo-Celtic Australia’ (Jakubowicz 2019b, para. 9). For other minor political parties, such as the National Party of Australia and the Centre Alliance political party (Centre Alliance 2019), multiculturalism simply does not feature as an issue worth mentioning. The ironically named One Nation political party is explicitly hostile to multiculturalism (One Nation 2019; Dorling 2017; Remeikis 2016).

2.2.0 Research question

In the midst of all this, the Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, described Australian multiculturalism as a ‘fragrant garam masala’ (SBS News 2019, paras. 1 and 3). He also reasserted his predecessor’s claim that ‘Australia is the most successful multicultural society in the world’ (Morrison 2020). As noted in the Introduction chapter, without its own multicultural policy, the current Morrison government, by default, acquiesces to the Turnbull government’s multicultural statement. There is no reference within the government’s multicultural statement on how it arrived at this conclusion, nor any substantiation provided on the basis of the claim.

This research seeks to interrogate this claim to assess the state of success, or otherwise, of Australia’s multicultural society. It asks the questions: if Australian society is a ‘fragrant garam masala’, who is cooking? Who determines what goes into the ‘garam masala’ and what ingredients are excluded and on what basis? Who gets to eat and evaluate that garam masala dish? Finally, what makes it the ‘most successful’ garam masala spice mix in the world? Two elements are essential to the government’s claim of Australia being the most successful multicultural society in the world: firstly, Australia is a ‘multicultural’ society; and secondly, among multicultural societies in the world, if a ranking on ‘success’ was to be made, being ‘most successful’ Australia ranks at the very top.

While this research focuses on investigating the Australian government’s claim, it also attempts to compare Australia to other “like-minded” nations with respect to four elements: economic participation, multicultural policy, society and human development. Importantly, this thesis will focus on a single case study, Australia, and investigate the processes and

conditions that are barriers to Australia becoming a successful multicultural democracy.

2.2.1 Thesis statement

My thesis argument is:

To become a successful multicultural democracy, Australia needs to embrace its ethno-cultural diversity, promote cultural plurality, and its normative expression – an approach that recognises the common humanity, equal value and dignity of all its people. As a nation with increasing diversification, a recipient of continuing immigration, and one dependent on a relatively integrated society, multiculturalism remains the most prominent and suitable model of normative pluralism. Its philosophical foundation of maximising emancipation of human agency should find expression in equal opportunity for minorities to fully participate in Australian society, in the economic, social, cultural and political spheres. But this national project of political modernity, has stalled.

This process formally commenced in the 1970s when there was a growing awareness of the need to be a multicultural society, defined essentially as open and tolerant (in another word, non-discriminatory), capable of optimising the participation and the capacities of a diverse population, rather than constraining and repressing it.

We are now moving into the third decade of the twenty-first century. The old *bete-noires*: of ethno-nationalism and racial tribalisms, have become resurgent with global influence. If the philosophy of multiculturalism is to be given its full potential, then government investments in counter-strategies must extend beyond the current securitised measures of focusing on countering terrorism. The example of the United States of America under the presidency of Donald Trump provides a glimpse of the potential attendant social divisions. For if unaddressed, conflict and competition from underlying worldviews that support the differently-legitimised divisions will continue and put into jeopardy hard-won successes of the past. Increasing polarisation leads to social conflicts with society fragmenting, *and* with it possible attendant issues of sectarianism. The extreme end of sectarian conflict is the

collapse of society into an undifferentiated homogeneous mass (Simmel 1896, cited by Haferkamp and Smelser 1992).

If Australia's democracy is a project of political modernity, it is based on three concepts of peoplehood, or the 'indivisible trinity' (Wimmer 2002, p. 2): first, of popular sovereignty; second, of equality before the law; and, last, the people as a community undifferentiated by distinctions of honour and prestige. The focus of this research is on this third pillar – the search for a new type of “national” self-understanding – a pan-Australian project of pluralist nation-building. Multiculturalism was once hailed as the response to this national project, of equity and inclusion, for Australia's culturally diverse society. It also reflects why multiculturalism is so controversial because its opponents perceive the ideology as incompatible with national unity, failing to see that national unity itself is a process. Australia's history of colonialism, white nationalism and assimilationistic social strategies suggest an audit of the state of multiculturalism in Australia be completed in order to find a way forward.

2.2.2 Operationalising the research question

This research locates its theoretical matrix at the juncture of three philosophical understandings of multiculturalism: (a) the political philosophy of liberalism in the management of diverse societies within liberal democracies; (b) the sociological and socio-political plural framework in liberal democracies; and, (c) ethnocracy in poly-ethnic societies. To ascertain the criteria of 'multicultural', an examination of Australia's demography will be completed. The source data will be the quinquennial census data collected by the ABS in 2006 and 2016. The ABS collects six ethno-cultural characteristics to determine cultural diversity in Australia. Together, one or more, a combination thereof, or all of these six characteristics determine the ethnicity and/ or ethnic identity of a resident in Australia on census night (ABS 2019). Chapter 5 of this thesis, titled: 'Interrogating multicultural Australia', examines and analyses Australia's multiculturalism and provides a detailed analysis and explanation of the rationale for choosing ancestry as the proxy for

ethnicity.

Success is operationalised through the interrogation of occupation as the dependent variable against the independent variable of ancestry to ascertain the cultural diversity of Australia's institutions of formal and informal power. The analytical framework for analysis is twofold: first, the tripartite power structures of Australia's system of government – the parliament, Executive and judiciary. Second, Weber's tripartite aggregate bases of power – class, status and party. The aims are: (a) to ascertain whether ethnicity exists as a status measure in Australia; (b) to interrogate the dispersal of ethnic stratification within the formal and informal power structures of Australian society; and (c) to test the extent of concentration, if any, of ethnic power holdings in Australia. Following this, discussion of the results will be conducted employing Yiftachel's (2006) six-indicators of ethnocracy to assess whether Australia's democratic aspirations retains its historic ethnocratic practices.

2.3.0 Multiculturalisms: UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada and Australia comparisons

While this research focuses on Australia as a single case study, it is nevertheless useful to have some comparative references on the experiences of other liberal democracies deploying multiculturalism as a strategy for managing diverse societies.

In terms of their historical trajectory of multiculturalism(s), Canada was the first nation to formally adopt multiculturalism, followed by Australia in 1973 (but multicultural policies were only officially approved following the Galbally Report in 1978) and Sweden in 1975. British multiculturalism was established slowly and through small anti-racial regulations and attitudinal approaches to governance but without direct, or formal multicultural policy. The introduction of anti-racial measures in the UK was in response to the 1958 racial violence against oppressive laws that curtail the rights of new immigrant to freely seek work and reside in Britain (Chin 2017). The Dutch policy was the latest amongst these nations. Multiculturalism did not appear in a concrete way until the mid-1980s notwithstanding the prior plurality of Dutch national social geography through pillarisation (Chin 2017).

Although a relatively latecomer, the Dutch policy appeared to be the most intensive and yet a decade later in the mid-1990s, the policy metaphorically, collapsed (Vasta 2007). Sweden's policy like that of the Dutch declined when Sweden, like the Netherlands, faced pressure with mass influx of asylum seekers from Muslim, Eastern European and African nations. This refugee influx prompted both the Swedes and Dutch governments to veer towards traditional values and national identities (Taras 2013). Politically, the Netherlands, Britain and Australia in the mid-1990s experienced a shift to the right of the political spectrum with conservative governments in charge. For Australia, this marked the commencement of the Howard era, and the re-ignition of an emphasis on the desire to protect Australian interests from Asian prowess.

If the driving principle of multiculturalism is social justice with the resultant outcome being social cohesion, there are clearly identifiable problems in the nations that have weakened or abandoned multiculturalism. The most noticeable differences are that the European versions of multiculturalism clearly and openly reflect a mechanism for 'managing ethnics'. The policy guidelines openly state that multiculturalism is for migrants and not for Europeans (Joppke and Morawska 2003). While Canada and Australia acknowledge that multiculturalism is for everyone, the trajectory of development of multiculturalism for both nations has significantly diverged since the mid-1990s (Hiebert, Collins and Spoonley 2003). Unlike Australia, Canada's multiculturalism has formal political support, legislative foundation, constitutional endorsement, employment equity strategies and anti-racism measures.

2.3.1 The "retreat" of multiculturalism

It is always difficult to effectively compare multiculturalism in settler-colonial nations, such as Australia and Canada, with multiculturalism in European states. There are significant differences to warrant comparison problematic. In general European nations such as Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands, have large indigenous populations and deep-rooted nationalistic, historical and cultural myths of common origin. The adoption of

multiculturalism is mostly designed at managing the migrants' integration into their respective societies rather than inclusion (Chin 2017). Nevertheless, it is still useful to examine the experience of these states' experimentation of multiculturalism.

The Netherlands was among the first states to move away from multiculturalism in the 1990s, but it can hardly claim that social integration and inter-ethnic relations have improved since implementing policy changes (Vasta 2007). The shift from multiculturalism towards an assimilationistic policy frame has significantly impacted political discourse and negative social outcomes for minority groups. Carlsson and Pijpers (2021) found that the Dutch approach of 'diversity-mainstreaming' policies, the practice of embedding 'diversity in a generic approach across policy areas as well as policy levels', negatively 'affected care provision for ethnic minority elders' (Carlsson and Pijpers 2021, pp. 1-2). In the 2017 general and 2019 provincial (upper house) elections, a record number of politicians associated with right-wing politics were elected correlating with the reduced support for multiculturalism (Hosteyn 2018; Henley 2019). As the Dutch Multicultural Society report (2009) mildly states, white native Dutch perception of 'ethnic minorities are not overly positive' (Dutch Multicultural Society Report 2009, p. 17), and Dutch opinions on multiculturalism continue its negative trend (Dutch Multicultural Society Report 2009, p. 18).

Similarly, even though it never formally adopted multiculturalism, Britain began to reduce the prioritisation of its 'light-touch multiculturalism' strategies in the 2000s (Ashcroft and Bevir 2017). It formally abandoned the concept of multiculturalism altogether with former British Prime Minister David Cameron's speech in February 2011. Cameron blamed multiculturalism of having 'encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream' and argued for a more 'muscular liberalism' (Cameron 2011). Despite that, Joppke (2017) and (Mathieu 2017) contend multiculturalism in Britain in practice has taken a 'civic turn', while Meer and Modood (2009, 2013) suggest it is more of a 'civic-thickening'. Of considerable concern, however, is the noticeable increase in levels of inter-ethnic violence, marked in particular by terrorist attacks (Hayden

2017), increasing racial violence and hate crimes (Frost 2007; Athwal and Burnett 2014), particularly since Brexit in 2016 (Burnett 2017a, 2017b). Sweden, while constitutionally endorsing multiculturalism, has continued to prioritise its multicultural programs through ethnic segregation rather than integration. The increasing racial violence and hate crimes targeting minority groups (United Nations Association of Sweden 2018; Equinet 2019) have drawn concerns from the United Nations (UN News 2014; UN Human Rights Council 2015). In addition to racial riots, terrorist attacks have also increased in Sweden (Glenday 2017; Savage 2019).

Australia has also witnessed its share of communal violence since the 1990s. There were violent attacks perpetrated against Asian people in the 1990s (Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Report 1991), the 2005 Cronulla riots (Noble 2009), 2012 violent protests by Muslim-Australians in Sydney and Melbourne cities and the Lindt Cafe siege in 2014. In addition, there have been a number of Islamist inspired deaths as well as increasingly violent protests by right-wing white supremacy groups and counter-protests by anti-racism supporters. While it is difficult to conclude that these incidences are the direct result of Australia's comparatively weaker commitment to multiculturalism, particularly with respect to its social justice element, nevertheless, there are noticeable differences when the Australian situation is compared to the Canadian.

Within the space of government-endorsed multiculturalism, Canada remains the only nation that has the longest continually running government-sponsored policy and the only nation to persist with the policy without scaling back or doubting the philosophy supporting its version of multiculturalism. Of interest are some of the Canadian findings: with each successive decade since 1971, the scope, public support, government support and increase and positive results of Canadian multiculturalism have grown (Bohatyrets 2017; Chin 2019). Furthermore, there is an absence of major interracial violence, riots (particularly from its 'visible minorities') and few Islamist-inspired terrorist acts which by contrast have occurred in the other nations mentioned. This takes place notwithstanding Canada's

perennial internal issue of Quebec nationalism and separatism, and external influence on Canada from its powerful southern neighbour, the United States (US), where racial divisions have come to the fore since the election of Donald Trump and remains a “ticking time bomb” that can easily ignite with minimal provocation.

While Canadian multiculturalism remains far from ideal, it must be achieving something through its policy decisions that clearly diverge from those of these other countries. This does not make Canada immune to acts of violence, but it does indicate that immigration is translating well into social integration, as opposed to the segregation and isolation identified as persistent and substantial problems in the other nations. Since the Trudeau government came to power in 2015, Canada’s parliament and cabinet are the most diverse, with its ‘visible minority’ parliamentarians almost reflective of their proportions in the general population (Griffith 2019). Canadian government agencies are also ‘slowly becoming as diverse as Canada’ (Wherry 2017). Internal scandals have reduced the Trudeau-led Liberal party to a minority government in 2019 and cabinet diversity has also slightly reduced compared to 2015. That being said, seven of the 37 Trudeau cabinet members are ‘visible minorities’, and gender parity remains. Importantly, a ministerial portfolio was established to include a ministerial appointment for diversity, inclusion and youth (Allen 2019; Aiello 2019; Government of Canada n.d.). The latest (2019) Australian federal parliament and cabinet – comprising overwhelmingly of white, able-bodied men – has little semblance to its population (Australian Parliament 2019; Blakkarly 2019a). Drawing on a mix of official websites, party biographies, media articles, social media, and name and photo analysis, the composition of the 23 Australian cabinet members in early 2020 comprises: six women of Anglo-Celtic heritage; 17 men with one Indigenous, one Jewish heritage, one European background (Belgian), the remainder 14 Anglo-Celtic lineage. No racialised minority (except for the Minister for Indigenous Affairs), or ‘visible minority’, holds a ministerial position.

2.4.0 Multiculturalism and Australia

Australia's diversity management strategies are perhaps better illuminated through the parameters of demography, philosophy, policy and practice. It is within this framework that I now analyse Australia's multiculturalism journey.

2.4.1 *Race underpins philosophy*

The demographic diversity of Australia's current population is associated with a significant renegotiation of the politically regulated social economy of the post-War period. A fear of 'cultural transformation' (Kukathas 2008, p. 31) determined Australia's pre-War pro-British isolationist immigration practices under the WAP. The result was that the Australian pre-War population was 98-99 percent Anglo-Celtic (British and Irish), more British than the population of Great Britain itself at the time (Jupp 2001, p. 802). Post-War labour needs saw Australia accept European refugees and migrants, and even some from South America even though Australia's most desirable migrants remained British. The main criteria were that they were physiognomically similar to the resident Anglo-Australians, being physiognomically white and Christian. This explains the intake of Christian Lebanese in the 1970s. The acceptance of Vietnamese refugees in the late 1970s broke the last shard of WAP immigration practice.

Immigration policies from the late 1970s and 1980s onward applied a non-racially discriminatory practice. Adjustments were in accordance with Australia's perceived economic needs (Inglis et al. 1994) instead of through a racialised lens. The use of immigration as a population tool to drive economic growth 'assumed much greater importance' (Jupp 2002, p. 198) from the Howard years and into the twenty-first century. Skilled migration has since dominated Australia's immigration programs (Collins 2008; Phillips and Simon-Davies 2017). As of 2018, the top two source countries of immigrants to Australia are India and China, respectively (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2018). The result of applying racially non-discriminatory immigration practices over the last four decades have helped to create Australia as one of the most diverse nations on earth.

A nation that as of the 2016 Census, has over 300 ancestries, with approximately one in three born overseas, one in two either born overseas or has a parent born overseas, one in five speaking a language other than English at home, and one in ten with Asian ancestry (ABS 2017).

Colonialism, ethnonationalism and illegitimate occupation of the land fuelled the desire to create a British and White Australia. Australia's WWII experience heightened its long-held fear of the 'yellow peril' – that is, the vulnerability to being invaded by people living in countries – to the north of the nation (Neumann 2004, 2009). Combined with the economic need to establish 'a stronger manufacturing sector to safeguard national sovereignty' (Vasta 2006, p. 19), the fear was a sufficient factor to slowly prise open Australia's immigration doors to European migration in the 1950s and 1960s. The admission of Vietnamese refugees in the late 1970s did not culminate from the nation resiling from three generations of racist national culture. The driving factor was the moral compass of Australia's 22nd prime minister, Malcolm Fraser (Australian Perspective 2016, 46:50; Menadue 2009; Smit 2010; Stats 2014; Higgins 2017), and global events at the time. In the era of civil rights and anti-racial discrimination activism, Australia was highly active in the international arena in the 1960s and 1970s (Tavan 2005). Australia participated in the drafting of the United Nations conventions on human rights, refugees, and the safety of life at sea. Domestic political aversion to granting asylum to the Vietnamese refugees after the fall of Saigon contradicted Australia's desire to appear as a good international citizen (Neumann 2009). Furthermore, the US policy of allowing entry to hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees at the time made Australia's reticence even more stark, particularly given both nations were involved in the Vietnam war. The acceptance of Vietnamese refugees marked the turning point towards a racially non-discriminatory immigration policy. Despite that, the event of 9/11 has entangled Australia's immigration policy with terrorism. This is in part due to the 'wars on terror' creating geopolitical instability and the outpouring of refugees from the Middle East and Afghanistan, most of whom are Muslims (Hugo 2002; Colic-Peisker 2011).

But unlike Australia's immigration policies, the current social transformation in Australia is unplanned. The multicultural Australian society envisioned in the mid to late 1970s – when multiculturalism glinted across Australia's political and social horizon – was one of a 'European' Australia or a Western European outpost. Non-Europeans did not enter the Australian national social consciousness. That stated, Australia's earlier concept of multiculturalism was deeply embedded in a normative discourse of civic rights. Walter Lipmann, the founding chair of the Ethnic Communities Council of Victoria and one of the earliest advocates of multiculturalism (Markus & Taft 2016), defined multiculturalism to include freedom of religion, linguistic and social customs and equality in terms of access to civic resources and services, and added:

There would be diversity, equality, empathy of interaction. All groups would stress tolerance of cultural, linguistic and religious differences, which would be complementary to the loyalties the individual shares with other Australians, and which form part of his or her identity as an Australian in the Australian ethos (*The Quiet Revolution* 1983).

Australia's multicultural policy of the 1980s to the mid-1990s reflected elements of Lippmann's sentiment above. The election of the Howard Coalition government in mid-1996 not only halted the fledgling structural social reforms that had just only commenced but sidelined multicultural developments towards a neoliberal agenda. Howard government 'ministers gleefully rebuked the excesses of political correctness, ridiculed the advocates of 'mushy' multiculturalism and had no hesitation in showing contempt for the migrants who they claimed were stuck in their ghettos and could not even speak English' (Papastergiadis 2013, p. 2). In the anxiety of growing global competition in the late 1990s, multiculturalism under Howard morphed into a mechanism that could enhance Australia's global trade relations and strengthen social cohesion.

Howard's push for a market-driven neoliberalism trajectory espouses palpable Hayek-eque thinking (Hayek 1960). Adherents of F. A. Hayek, the British economist and philosopher's,

minimalist government, self-service ideology and reliance on the rule of law permeate the ranks of conservative politics in Australia, including think-tanks that serve them (Knopelmacher 1984; Sammut 2012; Kurti 2013; Oriel 2018; Kenny 2018). They advocate for public policies that support privatisation and marketisation of public assets and services. However, the control of these organisations should still remain under (read white) Australians. These policies serve to maintain white domination of which existing processes are already designed to privilege (Yuan and Zhang 2017; Shen 2008). Multiculturalism, devised to attenuate this power imbalance challenged the status quo and was among the first casualties. The Howard government dismantled fledgling institutions – the Office of Multicultural Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration Multicultural and Population Research – established in the mid-1980s under the Hawke/Keating government to support multiculturalism.

Underpinning neoliberalism's appeal is its support of the rule of law. Indifferent and selective of the sufferings of those marginalised and disadvantaged, supporters of neoliberalism decry social justice measures with any element of cultural reference (Tebble 2009; Davis 2014). The Australian law, derived from former colonial power Britain and instituted by invaders of this nation, is not value-free. As Anatole France adroitly penned:

The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.

Supporters of a neoliberal ideology continue to demand the repeal of the law providing minimal provision to protect racialised minorities from offensive and humiliating speech. Under the guise of 'free speech', they argued for the 'right to be bigots' (Brandis 2014; Griffiths 2014). When faced with strong opposition from an alliance of Australia's diverse communities, a new demand surfaced to dilute the racial harassment law. Despite strong opposition from the communities (Rice 2014; Soutphommasane 2014), limited government resources were unnecessarily devoted to an ideologically-based government inquiry (Australian Government Inquiry 2016; Norman 2016). Yet hypocritically, provisions under

Australia's defamation laws, designed to protect the wealthy and likely to be availed by them, were conspicuously ignored.

2.4.2 *Whiteness as status*

Demographically, contemporary Australian society has incontrovertibly changed from the imagined monoculture of the White Australia days. While the policy of assimilation has officially ended in government vernacular, however, its entrenchment in social stratification remains with Anglo-Celtic Australians staying at the apex of the social hierarchy. In a similar vein to Weber's notion of 'lifestyle' that sets aristocrats apart from other residents in nineteenth century Europe, white Anglo-Celtic Australians achieved the 'status' of being Australian through Anglo-Celtic cultural privilege. They need not work towards becoming an 'Australian', for they *are* the 'standard' Australian. Everyone else must work towards becoming Australian by conforming to the Anglo-Celtic 'norms' – emulating the behaviour, embracing the culture and ways of living and so forth. The power disparity is readily evident. Being white Anglo-Celtic Australian means being ahead of the starting line, while others must start further behind. Further, it grants Anglo-Celtic culture superior status, and establishes it as the culture to be adulated. Other cultures are not only different but through implication, inferior, and should be repressed if not discarded.

Australia's reorientation towards neoliberalism since the Howard years means a retrogression towards the assimilationist frames that multiculturalism sought to challenge. This is reflected in the conditional and occasional acceptance of some non-whites, such as Asian-Australians, into middle-class Australia if they are perceived as have sufficiently assimilated 'Australianness' (Stratton 2009, pp. 16-18). Stratton (2009) refers to this as 'honorary whiteness...a particular form of racism where the known person is distinguished from the general group against which the individual is prejudiced' (Stratton 2009, p. 17).

Successive Australian governments, particularly since the mid-1990s, have not incorporated multiculturalism into the necessary structural reforms (Martin 1972, 1978, 1983; Castles 1993). This has meant that unlike other social institutions, Australian

multiculturalism has not consolidated an irreversible position in Australian society. Take for example, the concept of public education, if there is a failing *in* its delivery, the response is not elevated into a debate on the failure *of* the institution, that is, whether Australia should still pursue a public education system but how to address the *delivery* failure. Yet the same could not be said of multiculturalism in Australia. But the consequences of (Howard's) neoliberalism is broader than multiculturalism. As Toktas noted:

As a result, deregulation, privatization and the withdrawal of the state from many areas [of the nation] were accelerated. All these changes were significant and affected the structure of almost everything, including education, culture, life and trends in thought (Toktas 2018, p. 526).

2.4.3 *Ethnocracy permeates party politics*

Regardless of Australia's vicissitudes with respect to social policy, the entrepreneurial spirits of Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds have carried the nation through tough economic times (Collins 1991). But the political construction of race and ethnicity still loom large within Australian society. Former assimilationist policy, while officially discarded, remains strong in practice (Jakubowicz 2016b; Hage 2000, 2003). The façade of Australian democracy is under the ever-darkening shadow of an underlying white ethnocratic regime, ready to overtly materialise whenever economic stresses stretch the veneer of tolerance.

So when Pauline Hanson launched a political comeback in 2016, this time fuelled by resentment of Muslims, few of then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and the Liberal Party's backers seemed worried. They had seen this before during Hanson's first foray into Australian politics in the mid-1990s. In her crosshairs then were Asian immigrants and the perceived excessive welfare towards Indigenous Australians. Howard's reticence to utter or recognise the 'M' word allowed white Australia to find comfort again. Their discomfiture at Australia's attempt of a national multicultural identity in the 1980s was no

longer an irritant worth blinking over. Howard had shown how to exploit multiculturalism under neoliberalism.

History now shows that racial and cultural tensions continue to lie dormant beneath the flimsy cling-wrapped economic layer of Australian political life, ready to seethe back into life whenever the prospect of Australia's three decades-long continuous economic growth is threatened. Hanson, and what she outwardly represents – an ethnocratic regime of White Australia – remains active and alive. The economic stresses of the COVID-19 pandemic will no doubt test the fabric of tolerance of Australian society.

With the toxicity of Howard's ideal of 1950's white Australiana infused into its ideological bent, the Coalition has long dismissed the idea of multiculturalism. It has worked out that paying lip-service is sufficient to keep the 'ethnics' at bay. The Labor Party, bruised by the 'unlosable election' of 2019, has long put multiculturalism in the back burner, focusing instead on other interests and priorities. Internally within the party, there is an uneasy coalition whose unity masks fragility. Its sympathetic left-faction might call for compassion toward refugees, however, its union arm will demand priority for Australians in economic downturns. All in all, Australia's two main political parties are reliant on a more explicit hierarchy of peoples.

2.5.0 Ethno-racial hierarchy in a multicultural Australia

At the top of the Australian political pyramid remains a white elite pulled from the affluent and proximate urban capital cities of each Australian State and Territory (Pietsch 2018). This elite is 'true-blue', equally equipped with Australia's so-called two "founding" traits, white and Anglo-Celtic heritage. Politically savvy and with connections, they are often the by-product of politically-linked upbringing, employment or a privileged education, is their exclusionary standard for upward mobility. This group considers itself, of all Australians, the most aware of Australian history, law, economics and political institutions, and thus perceives themselves as the natural holders of the country's leadership positions, which they disproportionately occupy (Pietsch 2018).

Below them are the ‘multicultural’ Australians, understood to be the offspring or descendants of mostly European migrants. The notion of politically accommodating the post-War migrants only stretches back a few decades and varies from Australian State to State. Correspondingly, politicians with European backgrounds are more prominent at the State level, with a number holding ministerial portfolios. As of 2019, history was made in Australia with two eastern Australian State premiers being daughters of post-War white European migrants.

A tier lower is Australia’s Indigenous peoples, whose importance to Australian liberalism has grown rapidly in recent decades. Previous attempts were to first exclude and replace through brutal colonisation, then ‘include’ them. But Indigenous Australians in remote towns remain the most disadvantaged of all Australian peoples. Notwithstanding that, Indigenous representation in the 2020 federal parliament is five out of 226: three of whom are in the Labor Party, one holds the portfolio of Minister for Indigenous Affairs and the other an Independent representing the State of Tasmania (Parliament of Australia 2019a). Under a new postcolonial frame, Indigenous Australians have called for recognition of their community with special status to the rest of Australia. Yet politically, the myriad of social problems continued to be endured by Indigenous Australians remains in the ‘too hard’ basket of intractable social problems to solve.

The dearth of Australians of non-British and non-European backgrounds in the socio-political milieu suggests that last in formal importance are immigrants of colour (including refugees) and their descendants. Physiognomically non-white and often racialised, they comprise racialised minorities such as Black African-Australians, Asian-Australians, Muslim-Australians etc., the fraction of the Australian mosaic that is more often seen than heard. This portion of the Australian community is useful for both major political parties to mobilise in the context of the Australian political system, which relies on mass fundraising of party donations. The 2019 Australian federal Parliament comprises of three non-white minority immigrant politicians: Penny Wong (Penny Wong 2019), who is of

Eurasian background; Gladys Liu (Parliament of Australia 2019b), the first Chinese-Australian woman elected to the Australian Parliament; and, Ian Goodenough, who identifies as of multicultural heritage. The composition of the federal government's smaller coalition partner, the National Party of Australia reflects the White Australia days. With the exception of the Greens, the rest of the immigrants of colour serve political parties primarily as diversity symbols or get-out-the-vote strategists. They remain largely shut out from more authoritative positions, such as the Australian judiciary, police forces and Defence. The nation's highest court – the High Court of Australia – while improving on gender parity, comprises one Jewish and six white Anglo-Celtic Australians only.

As with all hierarchies, the “living mosaic” of Australian multiculturalism can only continue so long as there exists internal agreement on the wisdom of its power imbalances. Pro-diversity progressives in both major political parties must learn to rationalise that their goal of encouraging political inclusion must accommodate white chauvinism. For instance, progressive Liberal senators voted in support of Hanson's 15 October 2018 motion that ‘It's ok to be white’ (Norman 2018; Australian Senate 2018a) – a well-known global white supremacist slogan – at the direction of the Party (Taylor 2018). The Australian federal government's subsequent feeble attempt to attribute the vote to ‘administrative error’ (Australian Senate 2018b) and ‘following party instructions’ (Hutchens 2018) insults the intelligence of the Australian people. When it comes to preserving ‘Australian jobs’, pro-diversity Labor politicians remain silent when unions claim migrants are taking Australian jobs – a sentiment that ignited Australia's past racist and xenophobic WAP. As tensions rise between government policies and the growing immigrant population, so too will national progressive anxieties about whether white cultural empowerment remains a worthy objective.

Indigenous Australians similarly expect to preserve their cultural cohesion amid Australia's growing diversity. This can take the form of policing who is or isn't a ‘true’ Indigenous person, given that Indigenous self-identification has been rising rapidly (ABS

2017j)), and official ‘Aboriginal’ or Indigenous status can be a gateway to state-support benefits. Danger also looms that Australian immigrants will resent the federal government’s preoccupation with Indigenous concerns, particularly when they see no physiognomic difference between a blonde, white Indigenous Australian and a “white” face. The appeasement of Indigenous reconciliation takes for granted that the Australian national government should spend a lot of time adjudicating disputes between descendants of peoples that inhabited Australia centuries ago. The result is that Australians of colour find their own substantial, historically rooted desires for social justice subordinate to this historical schedule of priorities. Efforts to entrench the hierarchy of loyalties, such as the Australian federal government’s defunct proposal for university-level English test to gain citizenship (Belot 2018), feels counterproductive in their bluntness.

2.6.0 Conclusion

The national conversation on multiculturalism has traversed extreme terrain. At the right-wing end of politics, it has descended into an animated, prolonged and widespread national anxiety about the demands of ‘ethnics’, their lack of assimilation, prevalence toward ‘ghettoization’, ‘white flight’ (Davies 2018; Gerathy 2018) and living in ‘separate and parallel lives’ (Cameron 2011). At this end, the narratives merge assimilation with integration and multiculturalism with separation (Albrechtsen 2016). Questions continue to be directed at non-white Australians questioning their contribution to Australian society, loyalty and compliance with ‘Australian values’ (Kurti 2013; Albrechtsen 2016; Dziedzic, Zhao and Yang 2020). For example, Australians of Jewish ethnicity face accusations about being too ‘pro-Israel’. For Australians of Chinese ancestry, allegations are made about being propped by the Chinese government and disguising as Australian businessmen silently invading Australian academia, business or buying up Australiana; subject to covert Chinese government control wittingly or unwittingly (Dziedzic, Zhao and Yang 2020); and, pushing for multiculturalism to infiltrate and divide Australian society (Hamilton 2018). Being, or identifying as, Chinese-Australian is sufficient to draw questions of loyalty (Xiao and Dziedzic 2020). But those who are physiognomically white

– likely of British, American, Canadian or even European backgrounds – are unlikely to face such accusations, or suspicions. The basis of assumed loyalty is to do with skin colour, ethnicity, race or cultural background.

Search Google for “Chinese” and “real estate in Australia” and it will throw up a desultory collection of stories about how “the Chinese” are buying up Australiana. For the most part, the world assumes that a white person is the “true” Australian (Wang and Hameed 2017) and Australian governments, federal and State/Territory, have done little to change that narrative. This assumption has been actively cultivated by successive Australian governments during the White Australia days and surreptitiously reinstated since Howard came into power in 1996. Racialised communities were policed and policied to a place beyond white Australiana’s field of vision.

In contemporary political Australia, having an Anglo-Celtic or European heritage is effectively a kind of buy-in, like joining the local club. Anglo-Celtic or European heritage means loyalty or membership is never questioned. But for those whose heritage is otherwise, anticipate never-ending suspicions of loyalty to Australia even in formal settings (Bang and Dziedzic 2020; Hurst 2020a). Among all the other things Australians of non-English speaking communities have to deal with — negative media attention (All Together Now 2017, 2019), the unpredictability of the political discourse, lack of power — people of non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds also know that they will regularly receive jaundiced commentary that paints their community as a ‘burden’, disloyal or worse still, susceptible to criminal behaviour (Ryan 2018; Asher 2018; Baker and Wiedersehn 2018).

But in the broader community, there is a small glimmer of hope on the horizon. In the past decade, support for diversity and multiculturalism has remained reasonably high (Markus 2007-2019). The highest support appears to be from the ‘new generation’ – the generation of young Australians who want to be able to build an inclusive society (Markus 2018, 2019). But their voices are drowned out by the booming voices of conservative Australia which dominates the Australian media landscape and has powerful political connections.

Notwithstanding that, reports are now drawing attention to the lack of leadership representation of non-English speaking communities in corporations and government (Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) 2016, 2018).

Academics and the broader community have long lamented the retreat, weakening and neglect of multiculturalism within Australian government priorities (Jakubowicz 2016a and 2016b; Levey 2019b; Australian Government Inquiry 2017 submissions). Yet amidst all these developments, the Australian government promulgates the artifice that ‘Australia is the most successful multicultural society in the world’. There are, as we have seen, potentially competing world views and social pathways within the broad space of multiculturalism.

What is not being given enough attention is the idea that as a social practice multicultural policies themselves can yield more than the government’s vaunted social cohesion. If championed with appropriate leadership, equipped with proper resourcing, the agendas embedded in the philosophy of multiculturalism – of equity and inclusion – have the potential to produce highly advanced equality in building an inclusive society. The ability to see this potential of maximising human agency is compromised by failures to acknowledge and address systemic and institutional barriers to full participation faced by Australia’s ethnic and racialised minorities.

To start this conversation, this research seeks to audit the state of power relations in Australia; investigating its link to the development, stagnation and possibility of reassertion of multiculturalism and its value of affirmative cultural diversity in Australia at a time of increasing parochialism, nationalism and economic stress.

Chapter 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0.1 Introduction

The defining parameters of a successful multicultural society must include a careful assessment of how far and in what ways the society approaches more widely agreed standards of high quality in relation to key dimensions of social, political, economic and cultural life. Economic success (defined by the accumulation of wealth, ownership of property or the receiving of high monetary reward), prestige as defined by being the recipient of honours or recognition in other ways as an effective achiever, and power as the expression of capacity to direct or influence key societal decisions, come together as elements of a successful society. What then are the relations between these parameters in contemporary Australia?

Underpinning these three interlinked spheres – economic, status and power – of inequality is a type of stratification that is based on physical and cultural differences – race and ethnicity. Perhaps considered a fourth element, but really a sub-set of status, it reflects the influence accorded to race and ethnicity in society. As a modern capitalist society, Australia also bears the impact of social stratification generated by its history of colonial and post-colonial development. Social stratification, expressed in terms of economic, social and political inequalities, finds expression in differential access to economic resources, social status and political power and influence. Given the colonial and immigration history of Australian society, ethnicity and race play important roles in shaping the expression of stratification. In particular, for the purposes of this thesis, ethnicity – defined in part as the assignment of social status through the identification and valuation of cultural and physiognomic differences – helps shape the way in which all dimensions of stratification

are both rendered in the public realm, and experienced in the private one.

The focus on stratification necessarily draws on a range of disciplines, including history, sociology, political science, cultural studies, and socioeconomics. The key concepts selected to aid in this analysis include: a) ethnocracy and multiculturalism, b) social bases of formal and informal power in advanced capitalist societies, and c) how the ongoing processes of nation-state formation and the related power structures are explicated by interpretations drawing on ethnocracy and multicultural theories.

This chapter commences with exploring three philosophical foundations of multiculturalism – different and divergent approaches – as theoretical frameworks directed towards addressing inequality in society. Section 1 examines the political and moral philosophy of liberalism, grounded in the deontic traditions of Locke, Rousseau and Kant. The philosophy underpins contemporary deontological defences of multiculturalism, favoured by North American and Canadian scholars. Section 2 explores the sociological framework of socio-political or civic-based pluralism, advanced by European, particularly British, scholars in support of multiculturalism. Section 3 examines Oren Yiftachel’s formulation of ethnocracy as an analytical framework to understand poly-ethnic societies, and; compares and contrasts ethnocracy with democracy. I then apply Yiftachel’s ethnocracy lens to interrogate Australia’s legal and historical processes to discern Australia’s ethnocratic foundations and their nexus to inequality in Australia. Section 4 discusses Weber’s formulation of ethnicity as the foundation to understand Australia’s ethnoctratisation processes and consequent ethnic stratification. Section 5 compares the Marxian and Weberian views on stratification. I argue Weber’s theoretical framework of tripartite (class, status, power) aggregates of power provide a superior foundation to interrogate Australia’s claim of being ‘the most successful multicultural society’ (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2017, p. 3). The chapter concludes with recent studies on stratification in Australia and the likely contribution of this research.

I do not address other understandings of multiculturalism, such as anthropology, psychology and so forth, because they are not the main concern or locus of this research.

3.1.0 Liberalism: the political-theoretical seed of multiculturalism?

By strict definition, multiculturalism is the commitment to equitable recognition and management of the cultural plurality of society. Since its inception, the concept has received a myriad of scholarly treatments. North American and Australian scholars, such as Will Kymlicka, John Rawls, Chandran Kukathas and Geoffrey Levey, have all defended the liberty of the manifold ways of life under the political theory of liberalism. The central tenets of liberalism as a political and moral philosophy are individualism and liberty.

At the heart of society is the individual; moreover, social order is built around the individual. Society's role is to give individuals as much liberty as possible in order to allow them to reach their full potential, if they want to. Western philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries including Locke, Rousseau and Kant laid the philosophical foundation of liberalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2016). The importance of their work lies in Locke's advocacy of the separation of the public and private spheres, Rousseau's articulation of the social contract and Kant's defence of respect for individual persons. These foundational deontological understandings forged the basis for four common principles: opposition to tyranny; a rejection of universalist assimilation; the advancement of commitment to the autonomy of equality among individuals; and, an affirmation of mutual toleration as a mode of co-existence between individuals and groups (Johnson 2017). Other liberal philosophers, including John Stuart Mill, qualify such libertarian freedom with 'the harm principle', arguing individuals should be allowed to do whatever they want as long as they do not harm anyone else (Doyle 2015).

Drawing inspiration from these earlier philosophies, late twentieth century American philosopher John Rawls in his seminal work, *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1971, p. 67), draws 'the two principles of Justice as Fairness' to address the foundation for a just society. The first concerns rights and liberties of individuals within a society and holds that society must assure each citizen 'an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties' (Rawls 1993, p. 5). The second principle concerns those aspects of the basic structure that shape the distribution of opportunities, offices, income, wealth, and in general,

social advantages. This latter principle comprises of two parts: the first part of the second principle holds that the social structures that shape this distribution must satisfy the requirements of ‘fair equality of opportunity’. The second part of the second principle is the famous – or infamous – ‘Difference Principle’, concerning income and wealth. It holds that ‘social and economic inequalities...are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society’ (Rawls 1993, p. 6). The consensus view is overall, these principles adequately secure the social basis of self-respect for individuals (Rawls 1971, pp. 477-8).

3.1.1 Individualism heart of liberal multiculturalism

The above mentioned liberal philosophies find adherents and supporters in Australia and overseas alike as the theoretical foundation in defence of multiculturalism. These ‘liberal multiculturalists’ argue that respect for cultural groups – the kernel of multiculturalism – helps secure the liberal goal of individual autonomy (Kymlicka 1989, 1995; Taylor 1992; Raz 1994; Levey 1999, 2001, 2008, 2011, 2012 and 2019b). Groups in this instance, refer to ‘a set of people who by virtue of their shared characteristics think of themselves as forming a distinct group’ (Miller 2002, p. 178). They ‘may be formed on the basis of their members’ physical features (such as a disability), on the basis of shared beliefs (such as a religious creed), or on some other basis’ (Miller 2002, p. 179). It is a condition of being a group that members identify themselves as belonging to that group, to the extent that they are ‘conscious of their membership’ (Miller 2002, pp. 178-179). So, a cultural group is a group that shares, and/ or identifies as having a shared, common culture.

Others adopt Rawls’s philosophy to argue that liberal states, like Australia, ought to secure the social basis of self-respect for their members (Soutphommasane 2012; Taylor 1992). The rationale being that a person’s self-respect is interlinked with a person’s cultural group. The respect afforded to the cultural group an individual belongs to will influence their dignity and self-respect (Margalit & Raz 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Raz 1994; Taylor 1992; Levey 2011; Patten 2014). In turn, that will impact on the individual’s pursuit of goals as self-respect is the foundation to their autonomy. Cultural identity provides individuals with

an ‘anchor for their self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging’ (Kymlicka 1995, quoting Margalit and Raz 1990, p. 448 and also citing Taylor 1992). Thus, state support for cultural maintenance is critical, particularly for threatened cultures. Multiculturalism represents the philosophical foundation of state support for cultural recognition, maintenance and support.

The rationale for state intervention is that a dying culture undermines an individual’s self-respect and their ability to make choices. Thus, in liberalist thinking, culture is one important adjunct to support the pursuit of individual autonomy. Other liberal philosophers take a more centrist position, arguing that while freedom is the core liberal value for both individuals and groups, the claims of freedom can never be absolute. There is space for plurality within liberalism (Raz 1994; Berlin 1969; Levey 2011). Indeed, cultural plurality reflects modern liberal societies (Carens 2000).

3.1.2 State recognition and accommodation: A liberal response to cultural diversity

Liberal multiculturalists argue that the recognition of individuals as part of a community or cultural group requires states to respond to, and where appropriate accommodate, the differentiated needs of the different cultural groups that make up society. Kymlicka (1995) coins this ‘group-differentiated’ rights, used ‘to describe a right that is accorded to a particular group but not to the larger society within which the group exists’ (Kymlicka 1995, p. 45; Jones 2016, para. 4). These ‘group-differentiated rights’, at times referred to as ‘group rights’ (Jones 2016), could be exercised by individual members of the group, or by the group as a whole (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 45-48). Ideally, the group-rights should be enshrined in law, or at minimum, accommodated in government policy and practice. For example, Levey (2012) rebuked the Australian government that despite decades of government official multiculturalism, it hosted the Australia 2020 Summit in 2008 during the Jewish festival of Passover. The Australia 2020 Summit was a national government convention where 1,000 of Australia’s best and brightest were invited to share their ideas for the nation’s future from 18-19 April 2008 (Davis 2008). Invited Jewish-Australians observing the religious holiday

were not able to attend.

The kernel of the philosophy of liberal multiculturalism are the principles of liberty and equality. In contrast to majority cultures, members of minority cultures are disadvantaged in terms of access to their own cultures and are thus entitled to special protections. In a similar vein to those in society born into poor families are entitled to collective support and assistance via the state through a redistributive tax scheme, people from minority cultures suffer disadvantages and need government support (Kymlicka 1995). This is because they do not enjoy the advantages available to people in the majority culture. Such advantages extend beyond the scope of anti-discrimination laws as governments are not neutral actors with respect to culture (Kymlicka 1995).

Citing language as a paradigmatic marker of culture, Canadian scholars demonstrated how the Canadian government's use of English and French as the official language(s) advantaged these two dominant cultural communities (Kymlicka 1995, p. 111; Carens 2000, 77-78; Patten 2001, p. 693). This is because 'linguistic advantage translates into economic and political advantages since members of the dominant cultural community have a leg up in schools, the workplace, and politics' (Song 2017, para. 12). The linguistic advantage can also be symbolic. With the Australian government sanctioning public holidays around Anglo-Celtic domination (Australia Day on 25 January, Queen's Birthday) and Christian-based religious observance dates (Easter, Christmas), it effectively extends symbolic affirmation to those of Anglo-Celtic cultural groups but not others. More concerning is that such actions have a normalising effect, suggesting that the English language and the Anglo-Celtic group's customs are more valued than those of other groups in Australia's multicultural society.

3.1.3 Institutional representation critical for liberal multiculturalism

For liberal multiculturalists, institutionalising representation that reflects the cultural plurality of society is key to advancing equality in a multicultural society. Such representation should include all spheres of public life: from socio-cultural (Bottomley

1987; see also Jakubowicz, Goodall and Martin 1994), economic life (Fraser and Honneth 2003) and political participation (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992; Young 2009). Calls for institutional representation rest upon the core foundational principles of liberalism: the intrinsic worth of individuals and the importance of respecting the individuals' pursuit of happiness. In essence, the goal of institutional arrangements, through the philosophy of multiculturalism, is aimed at institutionalising fairness through equality.

Multiculturalism reflects liberalism's concern for equality, to ensure that individuals, irrespective of their backgrounds, are afforded the same rights and freedoms. Institutionalising representation is grounded in liberalism's intolerance of political arrangements that privilege some individuals merely because they belong to the majority or historically favoured culture. Institutional arrangements are aimed at preventing the tyranny, oppression and coercion of individuals, the underlying philosophy of liberalism. Raz (1994) describes this in terms of anti-discrimination honoured, difference embraced and individual choice respected.

3.1.4 Criticism of liberal multiculturalism

The views of liberal multiculturalists are not without critics. Post-colonial theorists argue that liberalism itself is not without culture but expresses a distinctive culture of its own. State responses to diversity should be grounded in historical injustices, the voices of minority and oppressed groups in society, reflected in constitutional and political dialogues that recognise culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting (Ivison, Patton and Sanders 2000; Ivison 2000, 2010; Spinner-Halev 2001). Ivison (2000) cited the examples of Indigenous peoples' claims to self-determination, sovereignty, reparations for dispossession of lands and revival of cultural practices as areas demanding state redress. Interculturalists argue liberal theory cannot provide an impartial framework governing relations between different cultural communities (Parekh 2000). Cosmopolitan and communitarian critics content that liberal theories of multiculturalism are premised on an essentialist view of culture.

Perhaps the most vociferous critiques have come from within the ranks of liberal theorists. There are criticisms that allude to the rubbery definition of culture itself which continues to evolve and change in accordance with the environment, unlike the enduring principles of individualism (Barry 2001). In the ebb and flow of time, some cultures will flourish while others will decline. The focus should be to help people join a different, more vibrant culture if their culture is receding rather than spend valuable government resources buttressing a dying culture (Buchanan 1991). Some argue that liberal multiculturalism essentialises and reifies cultures. They contend multiculturalism allows liberal governments to promote the superficial recognition through ‘food, folksongs and festivals’ while maintaining the existing power imbalance between the dominant majority culture over minority cultures (Bannerji 2000; Ghosh 2011; Malik 2015). Others contend liberalism and multiculturalism are simply incompatible (Barry 2001, pp. 325-6). The rationale is a ‘political programme that aims to institutionalise cultural difference by segmenting society’ is in turn antithetical to the liberal ideals of state neutrality (Barry 2001, p. 23). In addition, the pre-existing cultural homogeneity of liberal societies should be allowed to progress its creolisation or ‘melting pot’, if that is the case, without state intervention. Moreover, ‘illiberal’ cultural practices undermine the values espoused under liberalism, particularly with respect to gender equality (Okin 1998, 2004). Shachar (2001) and Benhabib (2002, Chapter 4) among others argue for a limited protection of culture, while Kukathas (2003) advocates for state intervention in situations where protection of individuals is needed.

Other theorists, particularly British scholars, advance understanding of multiculturalism from the sociological theory of pluralism through a civic framework. It is to this particular theoretical framework that I now turn to understand Australian multiculturalism.

3.2.0 Sociological and socio-political theories of multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is, by definition, ‘concerned with the multiplicity of cultures: it deals with what may be radical differences in values, belief-systems, and practices, and has been especially preoccupied with the rights, if any, of non-liberal groups in liberal societies’

(Dryzek, Honig and Phillips 2006, p. 24). The sociological literature on multiculturalism has its pedigree in the literature on cultural pluralism. These ‘non-liberals’ or ‘pluralists’ assert there is intrinsic value in and of culture itself (Berlin 1969; Parekh 2000; Hall 1992), and that culture is a ‘critical site of social action and intervention, where power relations are both established and potentially unsettled’ (Proctor 2004, p. 1).

Sociological multiculturalism, in a similar vein to the political philosophy of liberalism, refers to the acceptance of, and support for, the culturally heterogeneous composition of the population of a society. Multiculturalism in this sense can be understood both descriptively and normatively. In the descriptive sense, it simply describes a culturally diverse demographic population. In the normative sense, it points to attitudes people ought to hold; for instance, that of a tolerant attitude towards cultural diversity in their society. The state has a role in promoting such tolerance. British scholar Tariq Modood (1998) cited the Ottoman Empire’s *millet* system as one historical example of a strategy to accommodate minority cultures in a society:

[In] the *millet* system of the Ottoman empire...some powers of the state were delegated to Christian and Jewish communities, which had the power to administer personal law within their communities in accordance with their own legal system (Modood 1998, pp. 86-87)

For Modood (2007, 2008, 2010), multiculturalism seeks ‘to pluralise, and hence adapt not undermine, the unity and equality of citizenship and national identity’ (Modood 2008, p. 549). Equality and membership are central to the ideas of citizenship. Citizenship is not a monistic identity but a work-in-progress, an evolving concept that could incorporate hybridity of identity.

Through a civic framework, the philosophy of multiculturalism allows the simultaneous assertion of claims of difference and inclusion in public spaces. To enable this to occur, group recognition and accommodation is critical to resist the tyranny of homogenisation by the majority, and by the dominant culture within society. Recognition and accommodation

could include ‘the funding of ethnocultural associations and special measures to raise political representation’ (Modood 2008, p. 551). From this perspective, multiculturalism articulates the value of cultural pluralism and a response to the existing diversity of society including, the continuing hybridisation of culture (Modood and Dobbernack 2011).

Such framing of multiculturalism shares similar philosophical positioning to interculturalism. The ideological assumption of interculturalism asserts that cultural diversity will transform both newcomers and their new society (Juteau 2002). In a similar vein to multiculturalism, interculturalism promotes ‘mutual effort of rapprochement emphasizing social values over cultural characteristics, and institutional mechanisms for equality over symbolic promotion of diversity’ (Gilbert 2007, p. 17). In this sense, cultural diversity promotes innovation and new synergies, or “productive diversity”, with a shared civic identity. This contrasts significantly to the Howard government’s appropriation of “productive diversity” that co-opted multicultural policy into a neoliberal rationality emphasising competitive trade advantage, individual responsibility and contribution by ethnic groups in Australia rather than diversity and equality.

3.2.1 *Multiculturalism without groups*

While in agreement with and in defence of multiculturalism in grounding the philosophy of the concept of equal citizenship, Anne Phillips (2007) contends group recognition or accommodation is unnecessary (Modood 2008). She argues that *inherent* in the philosophy of multiculturalism *is* the empowering of individual agency of minority or disadvantaged groups. Group recognition and accommodation in effect reifies cultures. Furthermore, group-based recognition and accommodation could inadvertently enhance the regulatory authority of some members over others within the group. She noted that:

We can aim at multiculturalism without reified understandings of culture, but it would be unrealistic to think this will deliver us a multiculturalism without groups. And wherever there are groups, there’s always the potential for coercion (Phillips 2007, pp. 175-6).

3.2.2 *Multiculturalism as social justice*

For many Australian sociologists and scholars, multiculturalism is an attempt to temper the racism blatant in Australia's history and a public policy response to the lived reality of the multiculturalism of Australian society (Jakubowicz and Ho 2013; Forrest and Dunn 2006; Mansouri 2015; Martin 1977; Zubrzycki 1982, 1986; Castles 1993; Noble 2007; Jayasuriya 2003). At the theoretical level, the multicultural promise is unequivocally about a promotion of empowerment, justice and respect for all, irrespective of cultural or religious backgrounds (Mansouri 2015, p. 7). In practice, multiculturalism is an acknowledgment of the everyday realities of the cultural diversity of Australia's society. The philosophy of multiculturalism provides the possibilities for a more proactive, reciprocal and ongoing cultural, political and social exchange within, and between, all diverse communities of Australia (Jakubowicz and Ho 2013; Harris 2009).

The crucial commonality among multiculturalists, liberals and non-liberals alike, is that they not only observe but also approve of the presence of multiple cultures within a single society and accord public recognition and support to those cultures (Crowder 2013, p. 2). They see multiculturalism as a normative response to the fact that many societies contain people from diverse cultural backgrounds (Parekh 2006). In this sense, multiculturalism is a hopeful and important symbolic repudiation of the race concepts of the Australian nation. It opens up opportunities and space for intercultural dialogue and the expression of cultural diversity, and a limited assistance to access public services readily available to Anglo-Celtic Australians.

The core criticisms of multiculturalism reflect the tension between diversity and national unity. Across liberal democracies, critics of multiculturalism fear that recognising and accommodating diversity, in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion and so on, risks fragmenting societies and challenging nations' cohesiveness. They contend the philosophy atomises society into tribal elements and risks national unity. The focus on difference allows supporters of multiculturalism to fetishise cultural diversity (Kurti 2013). The 'too easy valorisation of an increasingly inward-looking and self-defining 'difference'' (Alexander

2002, p. 553) erects insurmountable boundaries even within minority communities themselves.

Both understandings of multiculturalism – the political theory of liberalism and a pluralistic civic framework of equal citizenship – do not directly address the historicised processes that still constitute power structures of contemporary Australia. It is from this perspective that I draw on the theoretical analytical lens of Oren Yiftachel on ethnocracy in Israel (1997, 1999, 2000 and 2006) to understand the power structures of Australia's poly-ethnic society.

3.3.0 Ethnocracy

Yiftachel (2006) developed the concept of 'ethnocracy' or 'ethnocratic regime', terms which he used interchangeably, as an analytical framework to expose the existing connections between a political system and identity politics, between structural elements and its contents. Yiftachel (1997, 1999, 2006; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004) saw ethnocratic regimes as neither democratic nor autocratic but a hybrid political regime with a mix of democratic and non-democratic features. An ethnocratic regime promotes:

...the expansion of the dominant group in contested territory and its domination of power structures [within a multiethnic settler nation] while maintaining a democratic façade....[It is] a regime premised on a main project of ethnonational expansion and control and on a parallel self-representation of the system as democratic (Yiftachel 2006, p. 3-5).

Within this definition, power, control, domination and democratic façade are key terms. Power and control are located in the power structures of the nation where 'key state institutions are ethnicized: they are run by personnel who actively seek to use them to the benefit of their respective ethnic clientele' (Bakshi and Dagupta 2018, p. 147). Domination refers to the exclusive maintenance and/ or expansion of power and control over the state power infrastructures along ethnic lines. It is a façade because the commitment to formal democracy coincides with the determination of a closed ethnic group to use the state to

protect and expand its exclusive claim. The arrangement is; one ethnic group has exclusive or undemocratically dominant control over a state in spite of, or because of, the presence of other ethnic groups (Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004).

An ethnocratic society is based on ethno-national hierarchies. The system is 'a distinct type of regime that facilitates the expansion of a dominant ethnic nation in a multi-ethnic' nation (Kedar 2003, p. 402). From this perspective, an ethnocracy reflects the operation of an oligarchic regime. The ethno-oligarchisation of liberal democracy commanded by the 'ethno' forces, or by liberal-oligarchic ruling collectivities.

Although it constitutes a noteworthy example, Israel is not alone in practising ethnocracy. Australia, Estonia and Sri Lanka are among the other states that form and practice ethnocracy within the 'continuum' that separates democracy with an ethnic bias and ethnocracy (Yiftachel 2006, pp. 21, 26-28 and 41). Crucial conceptual and historical elements contributing to the development of an ethnocracy include the formation of a settler society, ethnonationalism and ethnic logic of capital. Thus, colonialism, nationalism and capitalism, are the political-historical engines of an ethnocracy which allows creation of social and political gaps and lines of power between ethnic groups. An ethnocracy is sustained through the diffusion of hegemonic truths by powerful elites throughout all corners of society and reproduced via control over social institutions and the political community (Yiftachel 2006).

The seizure or monopolisation of power within liberal democracies by an ethnic group is not a new phenomenon but perhaps has existed without the label of 'ethnocracy'. Scholars have long argued that 'Western state-building has been associated with power seizure by specific ethnic groups' (Conversi 2009, p. 57). Irish philosopher Brendan O'Leary (2001) uses 'Staatsvolk' to depict the 'national or ethnic people, who are demographically and electorally dominant', and who 'own the state' and can 'control it on their own through simple democratic numbers' (O'Leary 2001, p. 285). Kaufmann (2009) calls this 'dominant ethnicity: the phenomenon whereby a particular ethnic group exercises dominance within a nation' (Kaufmann 2009, p. 36).

Yiftachel's conceptualisation of Australia historically as an ethnocracy is not without challenge. Brodsky (2007) contends strict ethnic equality is not possible in a democracy. Democratic nations act in accordance with the will of the majority ethnic group. It is within the normal realm of democratic systems that the 'majority ethnic group acts to promote its own interests, culture, language, and composition by immigration, but where it accords rights to its minorities to avoid 'tyranny by the majority'' (Brodsky 2007, p. 851). These minority rights may vary, and at times disadvantaged. For Brodsky, minority groups should assimilate to the dominant group's 'values, culture, and language...to be fully accepted' and share in the benefits enjoyed by the majority ethnic group (Brodsky 2007, p. 851).

Perhaps a counter-thesis to Yiftachel's ethnocracy is Sammy Smooha's 'ethnic democracy' (Smooha 1989, 1990, 1997, 2000, 2002a and 2002b), used to describe the emerging political regimes of post-Communist states of Eastern-Central Europe. Smooha posits that ethnic democracy is one of five types of democratic systems, conceptualised as a 'deficient or a second-rate democracy' based on the 'contradictory combination of democracy for all [but] with ethnic ascendancy' (Smooha 2002a, p. 425). Using the example of Israel as the archetype of 'ethnic democracy' (Smooha 1997, 2002b), Smooha explains that the political system 'accords minority groups collective rights that are deemed non-threatening in the eyes of the majority' (Smooha 2002a, p. 425). State control remains with the dominant ethnic majority.

3.3.1 Is Australia a settling ethnocracy?

In the twenty-first century, ethnic nationalism has become resurgent throughout supposedly 'liberal' settings. Dominant ethnic groups continue to leverage ethnic nationalism to deny the claims of minority 'Others' to the resources of the state and to national belonging all over the world. And Australia is not immune to this. It is in this context that Yiftachel's analytical lens can help illuminate Australia's claim to be 'the most successful multicultural society in the world' (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2017).

Australia's current society comprises the three major ethno-grouping described by Kedar

(2003) in a 'settling ethnocracy' (Kedar 2003, p. 403; Yiftachel 1997). The first group is the 'founders', or 'charter', group which dominates the nation's politics, military, cultural and economic spheres through institutional structures that were specifically formed to support their dominance. In Australia's case, this refers to British settlers who first invaded and then colonised the continent. They brought with them and implemented British (primarily English) law to both justify and manage their conquest. In this process they set in place the conditions for an ethnocratic state, one which sustains their privilege over both the Indigenous peoples and settlers from other cultural backgrounds, especially those outside Europe.

The next socio-cultural grouping is the 'immigrants' group, primarily referring to the post-War immigrants and their descendants. This group also includes Asian immigrants, once excluded entry, but are now selectively chosen because of their skills and wealth in Australia's skilled and investment migration programs. It would appear refugees should also fall within Kedar's (2003) definition of the 'immigrants' group as together with the other migrants they are 'formally...part of the new nation being built in the settler society. However, while they undergo a prolonged process of 'upward' assimilation...they remain in lower economic, geographical and political positions' (Kedar 2003, p. 403).

The last of Kedar's (2003, p. 403) described ethno-groups is the 'indigenous' or 'natives' who are 'characterized by long-term marginalisation through the process of nation – and state – building' and who are 'generally isolated in the geographical, economic, and social periphery of the settler society' (Kedar 2003, p. 403).

The socio-cultural composition of a nation does not make it an ethnocracy per se. It is the power disparity between the social groups that defines an ethnocracy. According to Yiftachel (2006, p. 16) and Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004, p. 650), the key indicators are:

- (1) Ethnicity, and not citizenship, forms the main basis for resource and power allocation;

- (2) Only partial rights and capabilities extend to minorities, thus there is a constant ethnocratic-civil tension;
- (3) The dominant 'charter' ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus and shapes the political system, public institutions, geography, economy and culture, so as to expand and deepen its control over the state and territory;
- (4) Political boundaries are vague, often privileging the co-ethnic of the dominant group in the Diaspora, over minority citizens;
- (5) Politics are ethnicised, as the same logic of power distribution polarises the body politic and party system; and,
- (6) Rigid forms of ethnic segregation and socio-economic stratification are maintained despite countervailing legal and market forces.

3.3.2 *Power and minorities in an ethnocracy*

The power imbalance between the three groups, a core element in Australia's ethnocracy and that of other colonial settler societies, has the founder's group dominant in arenas of politics, status, culture and law. Little (2008) defines power as:

...a compound social characteristic in virtue of which an individual or group is able to compel the actions or inactions of other individuals or groups against their will or contrary to their interests, needs, and desires (Little 2008, para. 4).

Power can derive from the ability to impose coercion — batons, prisons, and other punishment — and from the ability of some agents within society to set the agenda for future action. While normally exercised by governments — through the military and police, agencies, bureaucracies, and legislations — corporations, other large private organisations, social movements and other groups (such as lobby groups) also exert influence as power.

But power is wielded for non-economic purposes as well – for example in effecting the will of the state, achieving ethnic domination, and influencing national culture.

In twenty-first century Australian society, the power asymmetry is reflected in an Anglo-Euro-centric group's ('white') dominance of all spheres of public life. The AHRC 2018 report, *Leading for Change*, revealed over ninety-five percent of leadership positions are held by those of Anglo-Celtic or European backgrounds. The nation's 2019 parliament remains overwhelming 'white', male and able-bodied (Blakkarly 2019b). As Jakubowicz noted, Australia's federal parliament is 'essentially a white boys club' (Jakubowicz cited in Bakkarly 2019a, para. 8). A quick search of Australia's 2020 and previous parliaments demonstrates the saliency of Jakubowicz's comment. The dominance of able-bodied, middle-aged white men is particularly stark during periods of coalition Liberal/National governments (Kennett 2012; Tasevski 2018).

3.3.3 *The colonial roots to Australia's racial ethnocracy*

The Australian ethnocratic story is that of a 'racial ethnocracy', not a 'settling ethnocracy' as Kedar (2003) argued. Its foundations were laid in the British colonisation of the continent and colonial system of governance.

The predominant British imperial rule during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the period which when Australia was colonised, was a decentralised system of governance of indirect rule. Colonies established representative institutions for local governance combined with negligible imperial intervention on behalf of non-Europeans. Like other British colonies, the imperial centre in London played no significant role in curbing autonomous representative government in Australia. The far-flung colonies of Australia were encouraged to institutionalise their domination in law and to form a notion of peoplehood that was specifically 'white' and British. There were no specific instructions as such regarding the 'natives' or Indigenous peoples and other non-British nationals unless the interests of the British Empire were at stake. Two exceptions to this took place in late nineteenth century.

In 1883 the British Colonial Office repudiated Queensland colony's annexation of then New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea) over the colony's appalling record on its treatment of Indigenous peoples and South Sea Islanders 'blackbirded' to Australia to work in slave-like conditions in its northern cane fields. By 1884 New Guinea was strategically established as a British Protectorate to counter possible German claims (Nelson 1973; Sack 1983). Notwithstanding that, Britain displayed little interest in New Guinea and allowed Queensland to administer the protectorate three years later in 1887 (Conley 1960, pp. 433-434). On another occasion in late nineteenth century when pursuing an alliance with Japan to neutralise Russian expansion in Asia (Nish 1963; Sissons 1972), Britain insisted, albeit unsuccessfully, that Australia excludes the Japanese from the *Immigration Restriction Act* 1901 (Atkinson 2015).

Limited British imperial intervention on behalf of non-British subjects and local autonomy meant non-Europeans – Indigenous Australians and other coloured people – were subjected to the local colonial governments' caprice. The colonies' road to 'self-governing democracies' was paved with a 'tradition of brutality' (Reynolds 1987, p. 58), 'laissez faire genocide' (Kociumbas 2004, p. 90), subjugation (Markus 1994) and massacres of Indigenous peoples (University of Newcastle 2017). The colonies' treatment of the Chinese, whose numbers arriving to Australia increased during the 1850s gold rush, were at times tolerated but mostly subjected to harsh racially discriminatory measures, exclusion and massacres (Harris 2018; Ryan 1995).

In 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia was formed through the federation of six former independent British colonies. Non-British people, who were resident on the continent, were excluded from participating in discussions on the nation's formation. As Jakubowicz (2016b) argued:

Australia as a Commonwealth was founded as an 'ethnocracy' in 1901. It was designed to ensure nationals of British descent would be able to create a society populated by individuals as much like

themselves as possible. And it has yet to fully transition to a more egalitarian pluralist contemporary democracy (Jakubowicz 2016b, para. 4).

Federation in 1901 formalised the ethnocratising role from the six independent British colonies to a federal government of Australia. One of the first laws passed by the newly minted Australia parliament was the *Immigration Restrictions Act* 1901 (repealed). This piece of legislation would underpin elaborate legal and administrative measures aimed specifically at excluding those of non-British, then non-white ‘races’, from entering or participating in social relations in Australia. It was the foundation to the WAP that remained in place until formally abolished in 1975.

3.3.4 *The legal foundation to Australia’s racial ethnocracy*

The ‘racial’ element to Australia’s ethnocracy was instituted in its founding document and supreme law, in Sections 127 and 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution. Section 127 was repealed with the 1967 referendum to recognise Indigenous Australians in the Australian Census. Section 51(xxvi), however, was modified but with the racial provision remaining embedded. As it currently (2020) stands, Section 51(xxvi) *permits* racial discrimination (Williams 2013, 2015 and 2017; Pritchard 2011). Specifically, the provision gives the Commonwealth [Australian] Parliament:

power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to...the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws (Australian Constitution, Section 51(xxvi)).

Research into the historical development of Section 51(xxvi) reveals the original targets of the provision were:

...the Indian, Afghan and Syrian hawkers; the Chinese miners, laundrymen, market gardeners, and furniture manufacturers; the

Japanese settlers and Kanaka plantation labourers of Queensland, and the various coloured races employed in the pearl fisheries of Queensland and Western Australia (Sawer 1976 cited in Hinton 2015).

Records of the two conventions debating the formulation of the Australian Constitution reveal the degree of embedded ethnocratism discussed to ensure British ethnic dominance in the soon-to-be newly formed Australian nation (Commonwealth of Australia 1891, 1898). Delegates to the Conventions, comprised only of white male British subjects, focused on excluding the 'coloured races' in the new nation. Records of the formulation of Section 51(xxvi) 'reveal only too clearly a widespread attitude of white superiority to all coloured peoples, and ready acceptance of the view that the welfare of such people in Australia was of little importance' (Sawer 1966, p. 18). The former Chief Justice of Australia's highest court, Robert French, observed that the provision was directed to the 'control, restriction, protection and possible repatriation of people of 'coloured races' living in Australia' (French 2003, p. 180). Section 51(xxvi) unified laws that had already been passed by many States – and former British colonies – of Australia (Moore 1910, p. 464). These laws targeted the 'coloured races'. They were designed 'to localize them within defined areas, to restrict their migration, to confine them to certain occupations, or to give them special protection and secure their return after a certain period to the country whence they came' (Quick and Garran 1910, p. 622).

Delegates to the conventions were the first ethnocratists who constructed, installed and subsequently enhanced 'a state structure that they saw as a buttress for, and defender of, what they imagine to be their ethnic nation' (Attwell 2016, p. 308). They were political actors, legislators and lawyers, astute in the domains of propaganda and mobilisation and captive to a white British nationalist discourse and passionately embroiled in their project of White Australia.

Bolstered by institutionalising their domination in law, the British-European population of

Australia undertook profound racial ethnocratism to form a notion of peoplehood that was specifically 'white.' The Australian 'nationality itself is often defined in terms of the majority ethnicity' (Pieterse 1997, p. 373). Attwell (2016) describes ethnocratism as 'the processes carried out by nationalist activists who, in thrall to a particular kind of nationalist discourse, establish states which favour the category to which they see themselves as belonging, at the expense of those deemed Others' (Attwell 2016, p. 304; Triandafyllidou 1998). It is a form of cultural despotism that manifests in the elevation of the Anglophilic ethnic's histories, symbols and heroes into national ones. The crux of the ethnocratic doctrine is an unbridled determination to establish a hegemonic narrative that projects Anglophilic pride, ascendancy and dominance. The goal is to subordinate, eliminate and replace the local Indigenous peoples, and supplant British-Europeans as the nation's indigenes to legitimise their domination in the nation (Wolf 1999, 2006; Veracini 2011). The narrative captures the creation of the modern Australian nation by an Anglophilic ethnic group, and that group's subsequent employment of the state to advance its interests at the expense of resident non-members (Ghanem 2009, p. 463). Australia and Australian national identity became equated with being white.

As Edmund Barton, the first Prime Minister of Australia, explicitly declared during the debate of the Immigration Restriction Bill in 1901:

I do not think either that the doctrine of the equality of man was really ever intended to include racial equality. There is no racial equality. There is that basic inequality. These races are, in comparison with white races – I think no one wants convincing of this fact – unequal and inferior. The doctrine of the equality of man was never intended to apply to the equality of the Englishman and the Chinaman. There is a deep-set difference, and we see no prospect and no promise of its ever being effaced. Nothing in this world can put these two races upon an equality. Nothing we can do by cultivation, by refinement, or by anything else will make some races equal to others (Hansard 1901, p. 5233).

The most emblematic were the depictions of Chinese and Indigenous peoples. The Chinese were depicted as opium addicts with immoral traits and corrupting behaviour incompatible with white British ‘virtues’ (Curthoy 1973; Fitzgerald 2007; Markus 1983; Chan 1999; Bagnall 2004). Indigenous Australians were depicted as primitive, backward and harboured ‘undying hostility’ owing to ‘the reign of terror by which they have hitherto been kept in subjection’ (Reynolds 1987, pp. 63-65). Racial ethnocratism was already well established in the nineteenth century British colonies in Australia.

From federation until the formal abolishment of the WAP (through the enactment of the federal *Racial Discrimination Act* 1975 (Cth)), the Australian state became the formal producer, agent and disseminator of a racist nationalistic discourse. The WAP is the most evident manifestation of this. It is operationalised through government policies, implementation and socialisation, or what Attwell described as ‘discriminatory containerisation, a process that involves the creation of categories and the continual process of convincing citizens and subjects that they belong inside them’ (Attwell 2016, p. 309). Those categorised as ‘coloured races’ did not. Discriminatory containerisation involves the placement of Anglo-privilege and de-privileging non-European others leading to the domination of power structures by Anglophilic groups. The intensity and duration of such racial ethnocratism process in Australia went beyond nations with similar policies such as Canada and the US (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014).

The discourse remains salient in twenty-first century Australia because the ‘institutional practices brought about by the first [racial] ethnocratists generate political conflict between the state and those who identify with its mission on one hand and those Othered by state policies on the other’ (Attwell 2016, p. 309). The hegemony lies in the way individuals and groups in powerful positions subscribe to seeing twenty-first century multicultural Australia this way. The discourse offers a cogent explanation as to why differential treatment, by maintaining the status quo, remains a necessary “defence”. Therefore, the basis for the nation’s ethnocratism justifies its continuation. As former Australian Prime Minister,

Tony Abbott, asserts: ‘you don’t migrate to this country unless you want to join our team’ (Cox 2014, para. 1). For those who subscribe to this view, the Australian state has a responsibility to disseminate this discourse in perpetuity, legitimising the differential treatment of citizens or subjects and ensuring domination by Anglo-morphic individuals and groups. The success and rootedness of Australia’s racial ethnocratism is so deep that it resurfaces regularly in twenty-first century Australia. In a 2016 Essential poll, many Australians ‘think racial equality has gone ‘too far’’ (Keane 2016). In 2019, the nation re-elected the coalition Liberal/National conservative government that offered few policies during the 2019 federal election campaign except for ‘border security’.

3.3.5 *Domination as foundation of ethnocracy*

Knowledge provides the instrumentality for domination where leaders generate meaning, disciples disseminate, intellectuals interpret, officials administer and enforce, and the mass believers conform. Political philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2008) notes that European ‘political thinkers, from Blaise Pascal to Immanuel Kant and Joseph de Maistre, elaborated the notion of the illegitimate origins of power, of the ‘founding crime’ on which states are based, which is why one should offer ‘noble lies’ to people in the guise of heroic narratives of origin’ (Žižek 2008, p. 118). If Žižek’s idea of the ‘founding crime’ of the creation of a nation is applicable to Australia at a broader scale, what are the future prospects for such a nation? What can we say in the case of Australia, a nation founded on a process of brutal colonisation, hierarchical racialisation and assimilation? What are the consequences for the structure of its society and what could be done to overcome the intrinsic conflictual structure of such states? Is rehabilitation possible? Žižek’s answer is that an important dimension is ‘oblivion’ and if a ‘state that hasn’t yet obliterated the ‘founding crime’ of its ‘illegitimate’ origins, [it] repressed them into a timeless past’ (Žižek 2008, p. 117). Anderson (1983) attributed a similar idea to Ernest Renan (1882) who stated that:

L'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun et aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses —

roughly translated in English as ‘the essence of a nation is that all the individuals have many things in common and that they have as well forgotten many things’ (cited in Anderson 1983, p. 199).

A cursory examination of the government’s account of Australia’s history would suggest that Australia’s ‘founding crimes’ and its ‘illegitimate’ origin have been relegated to ‘oblivion’, or ‘repressed’ to the past as Žižek relates.

History is more than a record of temporal developments and events. It is also the arbiter and interpreter of events and developments that inform and educate future generations. History provides the linguistic accounts of legitimacy, the emotional geographies of belonging and exclusion. The repression of Australia’s history, or in the words of Žižek of its ‘founding crimes’, is exercised on multiple fronts. It stresses the British settlement project as a constitutive element of the nation, as the ‘charter’ and ‘founding’ group and painting the landscape with Anglophilic stories. It is abetted by employing a commemorative strategy that reflects only Anglo-Celtic heritage to collectivise the population and reinforce the perception of that as sacred (Azaryahu 1996). For example, by fusing the past with the operational functions of a street or road through the process of naming using Anglo-European names help promote and inoculate subliminal values of white superiority (Alderman 2000).

The current Australian secondary educational ‘Australian history’ curriculum places emphasis on “white” men’s endurance to tame the harsh Australian environment and of their sacrifice during the World Wars (ACARA 2019), not fought for Australia but for another nation, Great Britain. The ANZAC myth of white nationalist heroism ignores the contribution by non-white ANZACs to Australia’s war efforts and their place in Australian history. Indigenous ANZACs and their role in the two World Wars were only officially recognised in 2017. The racial discrimination against them, however, reinstituted itself upon their return from the wars (Brennan 2017). The call to recognise and commemorate the contributions by Chinese-Australian soldiers – who were only accepted to be enlisted on the

basis of the “Europeanness” of their physical traits – to the ANZACs heroism narrative is yet to materialise. The return ‘back to the White Australia Policy’ after completion of their service was nevertheless swift (Fang, Burton-Bradley and Walsh 2019).

In twenty-first century Australia, the dominance is partly achieved by a duality in the Australian state between a democratic facade and a deeper undemocratic regime logic. It facilitates the dispossession, control, peripheralisation and marginalisation of groups that do not belong to the dominant Anglo-form collectivity. The combination of colonisation, expansion, settlement, segregation and ethno-group stratification, militates against the effectiveness of challenges emanating from peripheral groups and paints Australia as a racial ethnocracy in operation. The selective openness of the regime, which allows for public protest, free speech, and periodic elections, is largely illusionary: Australia’s racial ethnocratic regime has arranged itself politically, legally, culturally, and geographically so as to absorb, contain, or ignore the challenge emerging from its peripheries, thereby trapping them in their respective predicaments. As Rubenstein (2018) noted: ‘who governs and how they govern is central to the questions of power, control and citizenship that are at the core of a democratic society’ (Rubenstein 2018, p. 17).

3.3.6 *Democracy versus racial ethnocracy*

Australia’s racial ethnocracy is perhaps best illuminated through a comparison with a fictitious non-racial democracy. Yiftachel (2015) noted that democracy and ethnocracy vary significantly:

Democracy is about the universal treatment of all people...treat all people under this regime as equal. This is the first step of creating a democracy and it will be the first sentence in every constitution [in a democracy].... [I]t is about inclusive membership...everybody will be included.... [In] ethnocratic states, the main pattern of power [holding] is ethnic, the main logic of power is ethnic [based]. (Yiftachel 2015, 06:29)

Whereas democracy refers to a system of government where the ‘demos’, or citizen, the central figure, provides the underpinning for claims to authority by the state, reflecting the sort of ‘social contract’ Locke, Rousseau and Kant conceptualised. Three pillars underpin a democracy: a government elected from free and fair form of election; the rule of law to govern all; and a community undifferentiated by dissimilitude. In a liberal democracy such as Australia, the ‘liberal’ emphasis is on the individual. Therefore, political representation is based on individual and not group rights. As Howard (2012) puts it:

All individuals, regardless of race, religion, gender, or other differences, are viewed as equal under the law and are free to participate in political parties and to elect leaders based on their political preferences. Flexible, countrywide, civic-oriented electoral and educational institutions, while at times imperfect, are designed to include all individuals equally. Discrimination based on group membership is outlawed, and power is systematically divided in order to guard against majority or minority tyranny (Howard 2012, p. 156-7).

3.3.7 *Theoretical foundation of a racial ethnocracy*

In terms of etymology, the term ‘ethnocracy’ which means ‘rule by ethnic group’ is a derivative of two Greek words: *ethnos* meaning ‘race, culture’ and *kratos* denoting ‘rule’ or ‘government’. Neither words designate singularity. From this perspective Australia is technically a poly-ethnocracy as opposed to mono-ethnocracy. The salience lies in the operation; specifically, in how power is distributed. In Australia, the composition of poly-ethnicity of ‘white European’ heritage coalesces in operation as a single racial ethnocracy around whiteness or of white Anglo-morphic collectivity. It manifests as a regime structured around multiple ethnic groups working in cooperation to ensure white power dominance with a façade of competitive elections. As Jakubowicz (2016b) noted:

Australia displays many of the hallmarks of such an ethnocracy –

albeit one cloaked in the rhetoric of multiculturalism (Jakubowicz 2016b, para. 11).

The cooperation is based mostly on ethnoreligious and/ or of European heritage membership – of white ‘ethnos’. Indeed, the most common ethnoreligious denominators are white and Christian. While there may be some minimal cross-cutting of class, gender and possibly race, the most significant shared political identity is white, Anglo-European lineage. The second primary empirical signifier is political affiliation or ideology. In this sense, ethnic identity in an ethnocracy is taken to be primordial, stable, and bounded rather than something that can be influenced by human decisions. Rogers Brubaker (2004) calls this:

...the tendency to take bounded groups as fundamental units of analysis...[despite] widespread acknowledgement that ‘cultures,’ ‘communities,’ ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nations,’ and ‘ethnic groups’ are not bounded wholes (Brubaker 2004, p. 3).

Thus, Australia’s racial ethnocracy is advanced by those who advocate the construction of political systems based on subnational primordial assumptions, who assume that ethnicity is a primordial category, and that institutions ought to reflect this assumption. Those in power see ethnic groups as fundamental units in Australian society but power must remain or be in control by an Anglo-morphic ethnic collectivity. In sum, Australia is an ethnocracy because it has the façade of a democracy – it has parties and elections – but is not a successful democracy as power is concentrated within a pan Anglo-morphic ethnic grouping.

But ethnic differences, on their own, do not create an ethnocracy. Ethnic groups vary significantly in composition, boundaries, and “groupness”, and so cannot be assumed to be “like units” either for empirical analysis or for policy purposes. Ethnic identities are cultural forms of expression that can be mobilised, politicised, and reified in state institutions – or not. Ethnicity as a basis for politics is not a given; it is a choice. Thus, in Australia’s ethnocracy, the two main political parties – which are dominated by the charter group – will

include minorities when politically opportune. But its overall operation undermines the bases of national consensus of plurality or multicultural societies.

3.4.0 Weber on ethnicity

Identity and ethnicity are central to the idea of ethnocracy. The complexity of the notion of identity is reflected in the vast scholarly literature on the subject. It is a multifaceted concept explored across the humanities and social sciences, from anthropology, history, law, political science, psychology to sociology. In this research, a person's identity could be analogised as a coin involving the union of two main dimensions: a personal heritage on one side and on the obverse, lived experience. Personal heritage includes the transmission of more than simply biological and familial inheritance. It incorporates culture, communal practices and associated embodiments such as tradition, language and so on. Lived experience is the more complex ensemble of ideas, opinions, reflections that derive from the person's interactions with the outer world. Identity is thus the mental construct that combines personal heritage and lived experience.

Ethnicity is one of the multiple dimensions of identity. Perhaps the earliest contributor to the scholarship of ethnicity is Max Weber. While attending the Congress of Arts and Science of the Universal Exposition in America, Weber noted the notable difference in the hierarchical occupational status of European-Americans in comparison to that of Anglo-Americans. He observed 'the Greek shining the Yankee's shoes, the German acting as his waiter, the Irishman managing his politics, and the Italian digging his dirty ditches' (Stone 1995, p. 392). However, what struck Weber most was the distinct disparity in status between African-Americans and Native Americans. African-Americans were treated with such degree of contempt that even the slightest observable African ancestry would relegate an individual to subordinate status; a practice legitimised and institutionalised as the 'one-drop' rule law dating back to the 1660s (Ho et al. 2011). In contrast, Native Americans, despite also having dark skin, were treated markedly better (and enjoyed higher status) than African-Americans, even those with significant 'Indian' blood. In the years following his

visit to St Louis, Weber developed a definition of ethnic identity and belonging that remains central to contemporary studies of ethnicity. For Weber, ethnic groups are:

Human groups (other than kinship groups) which cherish a belief in their common origins of such a kind that it provides a basis for the creation of a community. This belief may be based on similarities of external custom or practice or both, or on memories of colonisation or migration. The question of whether they are to be called an 'ethnic' group is independent of the question whether they are objectively of common stock the sense of a common ethnic identity is not itself a community, but only something which makes it easier to form one. It facilitates the formation of widely varying kinds of community, but chiefly, judging by the empirical evidence, of political communities. Conversely, it is often the political community, even when formed in a highly artificial way, which gives rise to beliefs in ethnic identity which survive even its downfall, unless there are such obstacles as extreme differences in custom and practice or, most important of all, in language....The belief in ethnic identity...sets limits to a community (Runciman 1978, pp. 364-365).

Fundamental to Weber's definition of ethnicity are: belief, memory, community, politics and boundaries, which help produce the tendency towards closing the group to outsiders. These terms remain key concepts in ethnic studies. Later theorists (and scholarship) are devoted to exploring one or more aspects of Weber's work on ethnicity. Barth's (1969) work explored ethnic boundaries. Glazer and Moynihan (1963, 1975) investigated the persistence of ethnic attachment in America and its political deployment. Others analysed ethnic belonging and nationalism (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983, 1996; Eriksen 1993; Rouse 2016); ethnic cultures and cultural identity (Hall 1997; Ang 2001); and, ethnic identity within multicultural states (Collins et al. 2000; Hage 2000, 2003) including youth ethnic identity (Jakubowicz, Collins and Chafic 2012; Jakubowicz et al. 2014).

3.4.1 *Weberian legacies of ethnicity*

The above-named theorists on ethnicity amplified understanding of different aspects of Weber's original formulation of ethnicity, depending on their respective social science discipline/orientation. Their focus remains on accounts of how different groups formed and performed their ethnicities, and how these behaviours persist or change over time. Within this context, the literatures on ethnicity bifurcate: one, a primordial approach which emphasises the rigidity and primordial nature of ethnic identity (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963), and the other, an instrumental approach that conceives ethnicity as a resource and fluid (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Nagel 1994; DeVos 1975; Burgess 1978). Ethnicity is perceived as the 'subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any aspect of culture' by a group, 'in order to differentiate themselves from other groups' (DeVos, 1975, p. 16). Burgess (1978) described ethnicity as 'the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, based on an identity with and/ or a consciousness of group belonging that is differentiated from others by symbolic 'markers' (including cultural, biological, or territorial), and is rooted in bonds to a shared past and perceived ethnic interests' (Burgess 1978, p. 270). Herbert Gans (1979, 1994 and 2017) stretched the concept of ethnicity even further towards a 'symbolic ethnicity', a practice where individuals of multi-generation descendants of migrants selectively practice aspects of what they perceive to be their ancestral culture. For example, Gans' (1979) studies noted that third and fourth generation migrants of Irish descent celebrating St Patrick's Day or taking part in Irish dancing or music, but not practising other aspects of Irish culture.

These interpretations of ethnicity are rooted in a level of subjectivity of which the group shares: one is the consciousness or some level of organisedness of difference, and the other being a certain 'distancing act' or mobilisation, whether cognitive or temporal, invoked by the group (or imposed upon them by others) to differentiate the group from others. From this perspective, ethnicity in a sense acts like an extended 'pseudo-familial' relationship, with emotional characteristics of a bond of some sort – a kind of *pseudo-kinship writ large*. Such a perception of ethnicity is critical to the development, formation and sustenance of

an ethnocracy.

This argument is supported by Comaroff (1997, pp. 60–85) whose five propositions about the character of ethnicity can be used to illuminate the Australian situation. Firstly, ethnicity does not function according to primordial ties. Its genesis is in specific historical realities which are simultaneously structural and cultural. Secondly, ethnicity describes a set of relations and a mode of consciousness rather than being a unitary phenomenon. As a form of consciousness, ethnicity is one among many (including totemism), each of which emerges within particular historical structures and impinges on human action. Thirdly, ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy. Fourthly, while ethnicity is a product of specific historical processes, it tends to take on the “natural” appearance of an autonomous force and a principle capable of determining the course of social life. The final proposition is that ethnicity, as an objectified principle of collective consciousness of society, may be perpetuated by factors notably different from those that cause its emergence, and may have a direct and independent impact on the context in which it arises.

Comaroff's (1997) propositions read as if he were specifically analysing the Australian situation. The historical development and formulation of the Anglo-morphic collectivity reflects, and are applicable to, all five of Comaroff's propositions. The actions of the early ethnocratisers forged the incorporation of British Europeans to become the single dominant Australian political economy against the ‘coloured races’. The ‘white’ discourse enveloped the post-War migration programs incorporated ‘New Australians’, a term applied to European migrants in Australia. By late twentieth century the policies of the Howard conservative government had reinserted whiteness to morph this narrative into an Anglo-morphic pan ethnic collectivity.

The mechanism of forging an Anglo-morphic pan ethnic collectivity involves the creation of whiteness that operates akin to ethnicity and ethnic consciousness through identifiable historical processes and experiences that separates whites from ‘coloureds’. Once a shared

ethnic consciousness is achieved, the ethnocratisers spend considerable intellectual energy on identifying those events and processes that enhance and reproduce Anglo-morphic ethnicity, temporally and spatially. With specific reference to Australia, a number of discursive and historical processes that enact and reproduce white ethnicity are discernible. The first is colonialism's divide-and-rule practices of governance which not only produced 'settlers' and 'natives' but also 'Others'. The second is that Australian white nationalism once unfolded, cements the racialisation of politics. The third is the deployment of racialised and ethnically-biased postcolonial nation-building strategies by Australian governments via the WAP. The consequences of these processes are perceptions, and the realities, of economic marginalisation among Indigenous Australians, and the normalisation of existing asymmetrical power configurations that have banished non-white groups to the peripheries of the corridors of power.

Attwell (2016) argues the theoretical foundation of ethnocracy is laid in the reification of ethnicity. The reification of ethnicity is effected through the ethnocratisation process discussed earlier. A reified view of ethnicity grants ethnic categories meaning, enables those subscribing to this framework to frame their identifications, lives and social significance, and determines behaviour and outcomes. From this perspective, 'it is not an ethnic group that captures or creates the state, but rather a particular way of seeing that becomes hegemonic; a particular approach to identification becomes taken for granted' (Attwell 2016, p. 308). Individuals who subscribe to this way of seeing contribute to conservative politics in Australia. They support the building and maintenance of Australian institutions and the operation of policies from an Anglophilic privilege, and perceive whiteness as innate so becoming the basis for organising Australian society.

3.4.2 *'Race' versus 'ethnicity'*

Ethnicity is often conflated with the issue of "race". It is not difficult to understand the reasons for doing so – both concepts are social relational constructs that have shaped the formation and organisation of societies locally and globally. These concepts influence

policies and have helped establish the current systems that privilege some groups and, at the same time, deny those privileges exist. The social construction is reflected in the fluidity of the meaning assigned to these concepts, changed in accordance to the best interests of those in power that, ‘whites patrol to protect privilege, blacks as they struggle for liberation’ (Dalmage 2000, p. 34). The cleavages within modern liberal democracies are mostly along racial, political and cultural lines. In the field of ‘race’ studies, Franz Boas’s contribution is critical.

The concept of “race” which categorised people in accordance to their phenotypical expression or skin colour, while now scientifically proven to have no biological basis, was the foundation to which human anthropological groupings were made in nineteenth century. Race was more than mere biological classification. Social Darwinists then purported as scientific evidence that biological differences between “black”, “yellow” and “white” races were attributable to evolutionary processes that resulted in “whites” being the supposedly most advanced race with superior cultures and civilisations. The typologies offered by these evolutionary social theorists such as de Gobineau (1915), Spencer (Connell 1997, p. 6), Morgan (1976), and Tylor (Ratnapalan 2008) were used to rationalise European expansionism through colonisation, exploitation, annexation and domination of other lands and peoples (Banton 1987; Winant 2001) as well as the proselytisation of Christianity. These ideologies of racial superiority granted power to white Europeans to subordinate others, morphed as a narrative of the white man’s burden to civilise the “primitive” natives rather than the enslavement, oppression and destruction that manifested (Hawkins 2014; Cornell and Hartmann 2007). The impact of a history of racialisation, in which coloured people were subjected to discrimination, segregation, subjugation and oppression by white European colonisers, remains evident and ubiquitous in immigrant nations across the globe. In Australia, 95 percent of political and corporate leaders are white while remote Indigenous Australians communities remain the most disadvantaged (AHRC 2018). In America, despite the many generations of African Americans have lived in the country, wealth and power remain concentrated with white people at the top and ‘a large residue made up

disproportionately of a black underclass stubbornly persists' (Stone and Harris 2017).

3.4.3 *The Boasian tradition and refutation of race*

Against the prevailing evolutionary social theorists of the nineteenth century was the lone voice of Franz Boas who challenged such racialisation of humanity. Boas, who had studied and lived among Inuit groups in Canada argued:

There is no fundamental difference in the ways of thinking of primitive and civilised man. A close connection between race and personality has never been established. The concept of racial type as commonly used in scientific literature is misleading....[The] achievements of races do not warrant us to assume that one race is more highly gifted than another (Boas 1938, p. v)...that each 'race' contains so much variation within it that the average differences between it and others are much less than each contains within itself...[and] that environment has an important effect upon the anatomical structure and physiological functions of man [sic] (Boas 1911, p. 75).

Boas's work on countering the ideology of race and racism would remain influential in the work of many modern scholars on these issues including his student Ashley Montagu.

3.4.4 *Race, racism and race relations*

Despite claims of advanced technological achievement, human rights, anti-racial discrimination laws and "civilised" society, race, racism and race relations remain intractable problems affecting liberal democracies (Hanchard 2018). Australia is not immune. Data from several recent studies on racial discrimination and racism – by the Scanlon Foundation surveys (Markus 2007-2019), Dunn et. al (2009; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2008), Booth et. al (2010), the AHRC and during the making of the 'FU2Racism' (2017) documentary – demonstrate they remain intractable issues affecting Australian

society (Acharya 2018).

Race is a social construction, used by dominant groups to assign and justify the othering of less powerful groups (Cornell and Hartmann 2007). Boas's 1894 comment noting that racial prejudice remains 'the most formidable obstacle to a clear understanding' of human difference proves prescient (Boas 1911, p. 245). In Australia, the colour line remains a powerful stigmatiser and integral to the perpetuation of social stratification in which "whites" maintain themselves at the top.

Race and ethnicity are two very different concepts that need to be understood separately. Weber himself did not entirely abandon the notion of race, but he rejected the proposition that nature could explain the cultural and social status of individuals in society (Runciman 1978). Race is an ascribed characteristic, usually assigned by racial dominants. Cornell and Hartmann (2007) defined race as a 'human group defined by itself or others as distinct by virtue of perceived common physical characteristics that are held to be inherent' (Cornell and Hartmann 2007, p. 25). As Gans (2017) notes:

...it [race] cannot be shed by those designated as non-whites and cannot be altered until whites decide to do so (Gans 2017, p. 1412).

Ethnic groups, on the other hand, are socially constructed categories based on cultural traits that a society finds important, rather than rigid biological traits. They include language, traditions, customs, religions and so on. Ethnicity is thus a relational construct used to distinguish one group from another on the assumption of one or more commonality of which other groups do not share (Cornell and Hartmann 2007); it is asserted by forming, performing and through practice. This accounts for the myriad post-War European migrants and cultures that migrated to Australia, where many share the same white "race" as such, but are of different ethnicities, whether internally within a country or between nations. Race is discussed here as it still has social valency in Australian society and augments the ethnocratism process. There is a racial element to the positioning of ethnicity as demarcation for political interest in Australia's racial ethnocracy. As Yiftachel (2015)

noted, in an ethnocracy, racist politics is acceptable (Yiftachel cited in Grasso 2015, 12:58).

When state structures are dominated by an ethnic group who see through a racialised lens, decisions on the direction and trajectory of the nation will be biased towards that group and de-privilege those considered as “Others”. In secular liberal democracies, voluntary religious organisations form an essential component of civil society. In such regimes, individuals are free to express themselves as members of religious or ethnic groups through civil society organisations. In ethnocracies, rather than civil society exerting a cross-cutting or moderating impact on political processes, society (or its religious component) in effect overwhelms those processes. Secular democratic states developed in order to give freedom to all religions, which enabled the emergence of civil society, whether religious or secular. In Australia’s racial ethnocracy, both freedom of religious expression and the development of civil society, more generally, are curtailed by the state and society.

3.4.5 *Indigenous versus immigrant*

Scholarship on ethnicity differentiates ethnic groups from indigenous groups. Weber saw ethnic groups as immigrants or descendants of immigrants and differentiated ethnic groups from the Indigenous peoples who were ‘native’ to the land (Rumciman 1978). Later theorists draw similar distinctions. Kymlicka (1995) and Fleras (2009) distinguished between Indigenous peoples as First Nations peoples and the remainder ethnicities as immigrants in Canada. Both saw First Nations peoples as having special status in relation to the land that should be acknowledged in the country’s constitution, and is a significant difference in comparison to immigrants.

Among immigrant nations, Indigenous peoples themselves have argued for recognition and achieved some level of accommodation of their special status in the nation. America has allowed a limited self-determination. Native American tribes have signed treaties with the American government and were assigned designated reservations — lands on which they have a high degree of autonomy. Canada has signed treaties with its First Nations peoples who are also recognised in the Canadian Constitution (Section 35 of the Canadian

Constitution Act 1982). New Zealand has the *Treaty of Waitangi* 1840 and the Waitangi Tribunal to oversee its implementation. The only exception is Australia, which has not signed a treaty nor acknowledged Indigenous Australians' first nation status in its legal infrastructure. In 2019 the Australian federal government announced it would commence a three-year process of 'consultation' with Australia's Indigenous peoples on recognising their status in Australia (Wyatt 2019; NAIDOC 2019; Probyn 2019; Crow 2019). Yet a year earlier, the very same government rejected their calls for 'a voice' in the Australian Parliament through the *Uluru Statement from the Heart*, the statement that outlined how Indigenous Australians would like to be recognised (McKay 2017; Karp 2018).

3.5.0 Ethnic stratification

In immigrant nations such as Australia, the degree to which ethnic stratification will manifest will depend on government policies and strategies. Ideas of ethnic and social stratification cannot be explored without reference to Marx and Weber, who dominate most scholarship in western literature in this field. For Marx, a dichotomy of civil/bourgeois society exists as a class society. The class structure of bourgeois society is such that two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, directly confront one another. The starting point is the economic structure of society, from which it is ultimately possible to unravel the significance of the whole superstructure of religious and other ideas as well as of political institutions (Marx 2000):

Definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically...the connection of the social and political structure with production (Marx 2000, chapter 1, p. 5 of 12).

Through such empirical observation, Marx brought to light the fact that the owners of the means of production also monopolise the sources of ideological domination, and wield political power in bourgeois society. Marxist theory reduces all ethnic awareness to

instrumental political interests and strategies. Ethnic consciousness is treated as a dependent variable, or a mere epiphenomenon of the more paramount issue of society, which is class.

Weber also regarded society as being characterised by conflicts over power and resources. While he and Marx both regarded society as organised in a stratified system of hierarchy, Weber's perspectives diverges on the explication of the unequal distribution of power between various groups that make up a society (Weber 1978). For Weber, the salient point is that 'the explanation of everything by economic causes alone is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever in *any* sphere of cultural phenomena, not even in the economic sphere itself' (Weber 1949, p. 71). Dissatisfied with Marx's unidimensional economic-centric model, Weber proposed a three-dimensional model of the hierarchical realities of society. His central thesis was that 'classes', 'status groups', and 'parties' are the social phenomena of the distribution of power within a community (Weber 1978, p. 927).

In the economic order, which Weber referred to as classes, constituents derive their relative advantage from the distribution of goods and services; in the social order status groups derive their relative advantage from the distribution of prestige or social honour; and in the legal order parties derive their relative advantage from the distribution of power. Each dimension, whether class, status group, or party, allows an individual to possess different degrees of relative advantage compared to others. For Weber, classes, status groups and parties are the bases of the aggregation of power in society. The study of social inequality should be pivoted around the analysis of the distribution of economic, social and political power.

Weber's multi-dimensional approach to social stratification provides a far more complex and nuanced picture of social inequality than Marx's unidimensional model of a battle between the rich and the poor. His reflection of the distribution of power within society and social conflict (potential or otherwise) incorporates more than economic factors in social stratification. It provides the framework to examine the struggle for power among ethnic groups, and to understand the relationship between the state, ethnicity, and class in

Australia's racial ethnocracy.

3.5.1 *Weber on Class*

Class is important because different classes have different 'life chances' – described by Weber as the ability to access to things that are regarded as necessary and desirable in a society. They include access to basic necessities such as food, housing as well as good health, educational and job opportunities. For Weber, the concept of class refers to people who share the same economic interests. The traditional Marxist conception of class focuses on ownership or lack of ownership of production. In contrast, Weber argues that class divisions derive not just simply from that but also from an individual's capacity to obtain financial rewards for selling their skills or labour within society's marketplace. From the Weberian perspective, class is a power of relationship, that of the relationship of exchange in the market. It is the economic power within modern capitalist market-economy. Classes are:

not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases of communal action. We may speak of a 'class' when (a) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (b) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (c) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets (Weber 1968, p. 927).

Employment and access to the labour market are potential indicators of class. In Australia, class contains an ethno-racial element consistent with a racial ethnocracy. In the nineteenth century, the Kanakas and Chinese comprised the ethnic underclass. Kanakas were Pacific Islanders 'blackbirded' to Australia to work on Australia's northern cane fields. Outside the goldfields, Chinese people worked mostly in labouring jobs – market gardeners, furniture makers, shepherds, hawkers, cooks and so forth. The Henderson Poverty Inquiry 1975 found (recently arrived) migrants were more likely to fall below the poverty line in

Australia. Further, the life experiences of parents and children of non-English speaking backgrounds demonstrated a pattern of systemic exclusion and sacrifice. Martin's (1978) research into migrant experiences in Australia found that most migrant families achieved an income above the poverty line at significant personal hardship and lasting health problems. The disadvantages experienced by post-War migrants in Australia was one of the triggers for the 1977-8 Galbally Inquiry into migrant services in Australia discussed in Chapter 2. Booth et al. (2010) found racialised minorities suffered discrimination when applying for employment at entry-level jobs. The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare identified ethnicity and sex as enduring factors in the persistence of disadvantage in Australia (Hayes and Hacker 2017). Recent research into inequality in Australia revealed people born in non-English speaking countries were one of the most over-represented groups in the lowest 20 percent of income households (Davidson, Saunders and Phillips 2018, p. 17). Importantly, across all the research, Indigenous Australians are commonly identified as the group facing inequality, persistent disadvantage and poverty in Australia.

3.5.2 *Weber on Status*

Weber argued that while class forms one possible basis for social inequality, other factors also needed to be taken into account including, the status of particular groups. For Weber, the concept of status refers to differences between social groups in the amount of 'prestige' that they are accorded by others. Prestige is the respect and 'social honour' given to some people in society. Whereas class refers to the unequal distribution of economic or financial rewards, status refers to the unequal distribution of social honour or prestige. A high social status entitles the individuals within a particular group to deferential and respectful treatment while low social status groups receive very little respectful treatment.

Status groups are defined by a status signifier and a common identity or communal spirit. Weber writes that:

[In] contrast to classes, *Stände* [status groups] are normally groups. They are, however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the

purely economically determined ‘class situation’ we wish to designate as ‘status situation’ every typical component of the life of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor. This honor may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality, and, of course, it can be knit to a class situation (Weber 1968, p. 932).

Comprising of individuals who are awarded a similar amount of social honour and they often share a similar lifestyle and social identity, status groups can vary. They may, for instance, be differentiated by ethnicity, language, religion, gender or caste. Furthermore, status groups may try to place restrictions on outsiders joining them. Weber refers to this as social closure, which involves the exclusion of some people from membership of a status group. While the notion of status is essentially grounded in concepts of value and meaning, it also encompasses the realm of ideas and broad symbolic concepts such as ‘religion’, ‘culture’, ‘identity’ and ‘ideology’. Weber’s conceptualisation of status is most evident within an ethnocracy where ethnicity is expressed as a status order. As discussed in the previous chapter on Australia’s multiculturalism journey, there exists an ethno-racial hierarchical order in Australia’s society, most evident in the political sphere. Here, white Anglo-Celtic Christian ethnic identity emerges as the key constitutive element to entering Australia’s political institutions and public life.

3.5.3 *Status and Class*

According to Weber, the relationship between class and status is not always obvious. In a capitalist society, status often varies independently of class. While the mere possession of financial wealth (class) may confer a high status, it is not universal. A lottery winner may become a multi-millionaire but they may not necessarily be respected and therefore may not be ranked highly in a stratification system based on status. On the other hand, university academics may earn a relatively modest salary but may command a reasonable level of respect, prestige and social honour, and thus a higher status.

3.5.4 *Party as power politics*

The previous section on race and power introduced the concept of the group, now discussion will re-contextualise group with respect Weber's concept of 'party'. By Weber's definition parties are associations, formed to pursue particular ends, be they class, status or other interests' ends. A 'party', therefore, is a qualitatively different concept from that of class or status. It refers to any organised group of individuals that try to gain power and influence society, particularly relevant in the pursuance of political ends. 'Parties' thus include political parties and other various forms of pressure groups that seek to influence government policy. Some 'parties' are clearly linked to class interests. They include the many trade unions that represent groups within the working class. On the other hand, groups prominent in the Australian marriage equality plebiscite debate in 2017 reflected status politics.

When groups form within a society to engage and inhabit the state, and when they are not necessarily reducible to either classes or status groups, they are likely to be various 'parties' or 'power groups' or 'political factions' (Weber, 1968, p. 938). States are 'territorial political organizations' with their own material interests and with the unique means to achieve them (Weber, 1968, p. 901). They have authority over lands beyond physical boundaries, are able to grant legitimacy to other groups and to make people within "their" borders feel they are members of a large status group called the nation (Collins 1985).

For Weber, the world consisted of a plurality of contending groups – classes, status groups and parties, whose economic, social and political interests could differ or overlap. Weber's distinctions among class, status group and party are analytical rather than concrete. In addition, they are not mutually exclusive; that is, the same individual or group could belong to all three at the same time (Collins 1986). Further, struggles for domination occur 'inside' each of these groups/spheres of social action as well as among them.

3.6.0 Recent research

Weber's framework of class, status and party as bases of power are useful to illuminate the power infrastructures of Australian society. Since the election of the Howard Coalition government in 1996, there has been little government funding allocated towards research on the state of social relations within Australian society. Consequently, there have been relatively few studies in the area of the impact on Australian multicultural policies and social inequality. Most investigations have utilised what some consider to be "proxy" measures of multiculturalism: that is, of racism, migration, diversity and settlement or inclusion. To date, several studies have investigated the prevalence of racism in Australia (Dunn et al. 2009; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006; 2008; Markus 2007-2019; Biddle et al. 2019); attitudes to migration and cultural difference (Markus 2007-2019); the impact of racism on employment opportunities (Booth et al. 2010); racism on health (VicHealth 2007, 2008); economic costs of racism to Australian economy – estimated to be approximately \$44.9 billion (Elias 2016); refugee settlement and strategies (Wilding and Nunn 2018; Dandy and Pe-Pua 2015); a lack of funding towards migration-related social and health inequalities (Renzaho et al. 2016); leadership and cultural diversity (AHRC 2016, 2018); various migrant-related social cohesion and inclusion studies in Australian suburbs (Barnes 1998; Wickes et al. 2014; Nagatomo 2016) and in schools (Kamp and Mansouri 2010).

Others have looked into ethnic stratification and income inequality and also the economic benefits of social inclusion. In 2016, Haller, Eder and Stolz (2016) conducted a cross-national comparison of ethnic stratification and income inequality. Australia is mentioned as one of the 123 nations under comparison in the study. In 2019, Deloitte estimated that the economic contribution from improving social inclusion is \$12.7 billion annually.

There has been no investigation into Australian society specifically through the lens of ethnocracy and using Weber's tripartite aggregates of power – class, status, party. As the former Chairman of the Ethnic Affairs Commission of New South Wales Stepan Kerkyasharian noted:

Real political power is exercised when you are in there making the decisions and not at the receiving end expressing continued gratitude for what is coming to you. If ethnic communities are to realise their full potential power to influence politics in Australia, these are the areas into which they must move (Kerkyasharian 1995).

When multiculturalism was adopted in the 1970s, there was optimism the philosophy would enable Australian governments to advance a more redistributive and social justice policies. The goals were to progress towards a more equitable society where each Australian could participate in the nation's development and have a voice in its future. From this perspective, the philosophical foundation of multiculturalism seeks to attenuate the existing power relationships in Australian society, challenging the existing ethnocratic framework (Jakubowicz 2016c).

3.7.0 Conclusion

In this chapter, three theoretical paradigms of multiculturalism are explored as frameworks to provide insight into ethnic stratification in Australia. The liberal framework and pluralist theory of multiculturalism fail to account for the reality of political, social and economic inequalities in Australian society. Both theories cannot recognise that capitalism presumes unequal natural talents and abilities. Inequalities in Australia's capitalist society have both economic, social and political implications. In short, they defend inequality in the name of equality through the idea of equal opportunities for all individuals in the marketplace and equal political access to the state. Both theories fail to address the historicised processes that contribute to the maintenance of power inequality. They view capitalism and democracy as compatible while, in effect, an unequal social order is being reproduced. Ethnocracy addresses this gap, probing into the domination of state power infrastructures along ethnic lines.

This research will thus draw on the pioneering work of Oren Yiftachel on ethnocracy which provides the most pertinent analytical framework through which to examine Australia's

contemporary society. The triangle of colonialism, ethno-nationalism and capitalism, positions Australian society as a racial ethnocracy. The merit of Yiftachel's paradigm is that it pays significant attention to the role of the structural dominance of power and recognises the interpenetration of ethnicity and power. The group that controls the state has the power to impose or destroy subordinate group structures, and/or decide how they can be incorporated through corporatist arrangements. Weber's conceptualisation of ethnicity and stratification theory – class, status, party – provides the parameters to test Australia's claim as 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'.

In this research, power politics, ethnicity (status), and class are viewed as independent variables that are interrelated to one another. The causal primacy of which variable cannot be settled in isolation of each other. Power, ethnicity, and class are mutually reinforcing and located within specific historical and concrete contexts. To understand the level of progress on multiculturalism in multicultural Australia, it is necessary to integrate these insights from Yiftachel's analytical lens of ethnocracy, and the role of ethnicity in perpetuating political power imbalances.

The research aims to contribute to existing literature by interrogating empirical data to investigate the presence, manifestation and perpetuation of racial ethnocracy in Australia. It also examines whether the philosophy of multiculturalism could still offer avenues to remediate the power imbalance, and what conditions and processes would be required for Australia to progress towards a successful multicultural democracy.

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND MEASUREMENT

4.0.1 Introduction

This chapter will outline the methodology employed in this research, the methods used for data collection and empirical analysis. The first section summarises the background and the research question, explaining the reasons for this thesis's focus on Australia, as well as theoretical methodological foundation. The second section discusses the need for methodological opportunism and outlines overall analysis strategies used for this research. This is followed by a presentation of the data sources in section 3, and variables and measurement strategies in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Sections 6 and 7 will outline the methods that will be employed in this research. In testing its theories, this research will employ both qualitative and quantitative data in its analyses. This combination of multiple methods, or 'triangulation', is aimed at strengthening an understanding of social phenomena (Ezberger & Prein 1997).

The next three chapters will cover the findings of this research and analysis of the results to address the two main criteria: of Australia being a "multicultural" and "successful" society. The main sources of the data to be examined will be the 2006 and 2016 Censuses. Chapter 5 identifies and analyses the elements that contribute to Australia being 'multicultural' society based on the 2016 Census data. The rationale for choosing only the 2016 Census to ascertain the Australia's multiculturalism are twofold: first, the 2006 Census the ABS employed a different set of indicators (from the 2016 Census) to determine Australia's cultural diversity making comparisons between the two sets of data difficult; second, the 2016 Census data is the latest available from a reliable and trusted source, the ABS, and thus more extrapolatable to 2020 and the future. Chapters 6 and 7 will examine the

‘successful’ element to the government’s claim of Australia being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’. This will involve quantitative examination of the ethnic composition of Australia’s formal and informal power structures: in the political spheres, Executive government, judiciary, economic participation, educational attainment, and the media and arts sectors. In addition, the ‘successful’ criterion is also triangulated with cross-national comparative analysis of international data specifically relevant to this research.

4.1.0 Background and purpose of study

As noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, since the former Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, made the claim of Australia being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’ (Turnbull 2016, 2017), a number of Australian politicians, from both sides of politics, have also made the same claim. Without the announcement of a new policy, the Statement remains the 2020 Australian federal government policy (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2017). In its literal interpretation, it is the Australian federal government’s public affirmation of multiculturalism in Australia. Given Australia is being compared, the government’s claim contains two important characteristics. Firstly, a multicultural society means it is a society that is demographically diverse in terms of culture, ethnicity, race and so on. Secondly, and perhaps more important, the government has public policy measures that recognise, welcome or advance that plurality. This perspective brings forth countries such as Canada and Sweden, but not the UK or the US.

While all these countries mentioned are ‘multicultural’ in the adjective sense, the latter two have not adopted ‘multiculturalism’ in the noun form by way of public policy framework. Moreover, there are many nation-specific conditions that impact on whether a nation state is successful or not as a multicultural society. They include what criteria should be used to measure success as a comparative framework. It would be difficult to be able to conduct a complete and comprehensive comparative analysis of all multicultural nations. Thus, it is beyond the scope of this research. For example, who is to say that any of the Australian States or Territories cannot claim it has the most successful multicultural society in the

world? This research will thus focus on investigating the criteria for success for *Australia's* multicultural society, and determine the conditions and processes that will lead to the success. Within this, power politics is a core essential element in determining whether multiculturalism works or not.

Within the Australian federal government's claim of Australia being 'the most successful multicultural society in the world', two elements could be tested: that of Australia being 'multicultural' and 'successful'. They are the two factors that will frame the parameters of this research. In terms of timeframe, Turnbull held leadership of the federal Coalition government from 15 September 2015 to 24 August 2018 (Parliament of Australia 2018). By extrapolation, it could be inferred that Australia's "most successful multicultural society status" was achieved during, or prior to, his prime ministership for Turnbull to make such a claim. This narrows the timeframe for this research to the decade from 2006 to 2016; the nearest decade to assess the Australian government's claim. This timeframe also simultaneously includes two census collection periods, 2006 and 2016, respectively. In addition, by 2016 more than four decades have passed since Australia officially adopted multiculturalism, with two generations of Australians living their entire lives under Australia's version of multicultural policies (Wise and Velayutham 2009).

4.2.0 Methodology

As discussed in the previous chapter, this research will primarily employ the two dominant theoretical lenses of Weber (1968, 1978; Stone 1995; Lassman and Speirs 2002; Gane 2005; Llanque 2007; Kunz 2010) and Yiftachel (2006), which together will filter the substantial body of research employed in this work. Having said that, this thesis is epistemologically and ontologically situated in an understanding of a political and social world that is constituted foremost through agency, norms and ideas. As the influential social constructivist researcher Alexander Wendt (1999) noted, the socio-political world and its structure, is constituted primarily through social relations, through a

shared knowledge...[that] leads to an idealist view of structure as a

distribution of knowledge or “ideas all the way down” (Wendt 1999, p. 21).

And social relations are moderated and shaped by the ideas that individuals possess, through the culture with which they make sense of their world. Thus the underlying political-social structures are materially, socially and ideationally defined. Individuals, or agents, mutually constitute identities and power relations within the society which they live and aim to effect change (Wendt 1987, p. 41; Banton 2007, p. 23; Wegener 1992; Llanque 2007; Kunz 2010). Scholars must rather combine material, ideational and historical considerations – to examine all these factors in order to develop a comprehensive approach to the study of social change (Vago 2005).

In terms of methodological approach, this thesis will employ what is seen as multiple complementary methods (Creswell et al. 2003; Hunter & Brewer 2015). Recognising the relative complexity of the subject matter, methodological opportunism will be required at times. This approach of course is nothing new. I follow in the habit of American-Polish philosopher, Adam Przeworski, who confessed:

I am a methodological opportunist who believes in doing or using whatever works. If game theory works, I use it. If what is called for is a historical account, I do that. If deconstruction is needed, I will even try deconstruction. So I have no principles (Przeworski 1996, p. 16).

Denzin and Lincoln (2005) refer to this methodology as the ‘seventh and eighth’ moments of research within the complex historical developments of qualitative research. This is a research methodology within the social sciences and the humanities that embraces ‘critical conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation-states, globalisation, freedom, and community’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. 3; Denzin 2007), highlighted through empirical evidence. Accordingly, it is the world of lived experience, for this is where individual belief and action intersect with culture and history as expressed in statistical outcomes. Under this model, there is no preoccupation with discourse and method as

material interpretive practices that constitute representation and description. Thus it is the textual, narrative turn rejected by the positivist orientation.

This research focuses on a single case, Australia, while drawing on cross-national comparative elements of “like-minded” countries. They comprise of Australia’s “cultural kin” – Canada, New Zealand, the UK and US – and two other liberal democracies that have formally adopted multiculturalism as the socio-cultural national strategy to manage their respective diverse societies – Sweden and the Netherlands.

In an interconnected and interdependent world where ideas, ideologies and individuals operate transnationally, any attempt to understand subject matters such as the growing opposition to multiculturalism without understanding transnational influences, is highly problematic. However, while recognising the growing prevalence of transnationalism in an increasingly globalised and inter-connected world, Australia is marked by differing social, economic, political and historical experiences that shape experiences with social change and multiculturalism. It is argued that these local particularities can only be understood within an in-depth case study. Thus, the primary focus of this research is a single nation, Australia. The extent to which findings from this research could be exported outside of Australia is debatable. As academics recognise, “small-N studies” do not lend themselves to extensive generalisation beyond the case(s) at hand. Instead they are intended to act as intensive qualitative analysis that perhaps can later be included in larger studies with similar studies from other localities at a later date (Ebbinghaus 2005, p. 134).

The focus of this research remains in seeking to identify some key explanatory factors and a probable explanation for outcomes, and possible ways forward rather than positing objective truths. In order to demonstrate connections between the three primary focuses of power, ethnocracy and multiculturalism, this thesis relies primarily on a narrative style analysis that seeks to contextualise casual connections (Ruane 2005, p. 89). Both qualitative and quantitative data will be employed to investigate the central research question. Having recognised the limitations and possibilities offered by these approaches used in isolation, a minority of innovative inter-disciplinary academics has been advocating for increased

methodological fusion (e.g. Denzin 1989, 2013; Smaling 1994; Cresswell et al. 2003; Oleinik 2011; Besen-Cassino and Cassino 2017), aimed at strengthening and understanding of social phenomena (Erzberger and Prein 1997, p. 142). This is achieved through triangulation, employing methods that operate in complementary fashion but with the ultimate aim of converging research methods on the issues investigated (Olsen 2004; Oleinik 2011).

This commenced with the previous chapters which covered an extensive literature review of Weber's tripartite bases of power – class, status and party (Walters et al. 2010; Wallimann 1977; Mommsen 2005) – and Yiftachel's conceptualisation of ethnocracy to understand Australia's multiculturalism journey (Jakubowicz 2016b and 2016c). The review contextualises this research as one that embraces a politicised, historicised and cultural studies agenda that demands that interpretive texts advance issues surrounding social justice and racial equality. One of the objectives of this research is that the findings will provide a more nuanced picture to future socio-cultural policy. The goal is to moderate the current obsession/focus with the nebulous and ill-defined 'social cohesion' mantra, pursued by Australian governments at both the federal and State levels, by highlighting the inherent power discrepancy that acts counterproductive to this objective.

4.3 Data sources

In addition, this thesis will make use of a number of empirical data to investigate the issue(s) being researched. Six primary data sets are relied upon. They are:

- 1) Demographic, income, occupational, educational and cultural diversity of Australia from the 2016 Australian Census collected by the ABS, and where available the decade earlier 2006 Census data for comparative purposes;
- 2) International indices with respect to economic development (inequality), multicultural(ism) policy, state of democracy and human development. They comprise: the World Bank Gini Index, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Gini Coefficient; Queen's University two

Multiculturalism Policy Indices (MCP) for Migrant Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, International Migration Integration Index (MIPEX), World Values Survey (WVS); the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index and the Global Peace Index (GPI); and, the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), respectively;

- 3) The twelve-year long annual reports of the Scanlon Foundation Social Cohesion surveys from 2007 to 2019;
- 4) The Manifesto Project Data;
- 5) Submissions to, and reports from, the two Australian federal government inquiries in 2013 and 2017 on, and related to, multiculturalism in Australia; and
- 6) Australian government and non-government published information including websites, reports, publications, media releases and announcements by Australian politicians.

4.3.1 ABS Census data – 2006, 2016

The Australian Census of Population and Housing (Census) is a national quinquennial statistical collection measuring 'key characteristics of people in Australia on Census night and the dwellings in which they live' (ABS 2017a, para. 4). The last Census, administered by the ABS, took place on 9 August 2016. Data collected provide a snapshot of Australia on the date. Participation in the Census is compulsory (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2019; ABS 2016a), although answering some questions (such as religion) is optional. Census data have high integrity and reliability value and are used to underpin government funding and planning. There are internal oversight and external independent assurance over the data collected (ABS 2016b). The 2016 Census data present a unique and rich repertoire for quantitative analysis of Australia's mosaic: demographically, economically, socially and culturally (ABS 2017b). Previous census data have underpinned established academic studies in Australia including on matters pertaining to

multiculturalism. For example, the Scanlon Foundation annual survey, *Scanlon Foundation Mapping Social Cohesion Reports* 2007 to 2019 (Markus 2007-2019).

As mentioned previously, the Australian federal government's assertion of Australia being 'the most successful multicultural society in the world' has been challenged by a number of academics and civil society advocates (Jakubowicz 2017b; Colvin 2017; Dellal 2017; Pearson 2018). But no Australian political party, including the Opposition Australia Labor Party, has questioned the government's claim. Even the Greens political party, arguably the most active and ardent supporter of multiculturalism in Australia, did not challenge the government's claim.

With the last Census taking place in 2016 and the government making its claim since March 2017, the census data of 2006 and 2016, together with its high integrity value establishes it as the preferred site for a comprehensive examination of the Australian federal government's claim.

4.3.2 *International indices*

International indices provide macro-level cross-national comparative perspective of Australia's international standing relative to the six "like-minded" nations mentioned earlier. Four facets of each nation's national development will be investigated: economic participation, multiculturalism policies, state of democracy and human development. The international indices have been specifically chosen to interrogate these four dimensions. Where possible, two or more indices are chosen to examine each aspect. Below is a quick synopsis of each international index selected. Chapter 6 of this thesis will provide a full explanation of the rationale for choosing each of the international indices chosen and analysis of the results therein.

(a) *Economic participation*

The World Bank Gini Index and the OECD Gini Coefficient will be employed to examine Australia's relative economic participation compared to the six nations identified. These

two indices provide measures of the distribution of income and degree of economic inequality of each nation.

(b) Multicultural policies and state of political and socio-cultural change

Two international multicultural indices will provide insight into Australia's multicultural policies compared to the other nations. They comprise the MCP (for Immigrant Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, respectively) and the MIPEX. In addition, the results from the World Values Survey, known in Australia as the Australian Values Survey, will be examined to ascertain the state of political and socio-cultural change through exploring ethno-racial and ethno-religious prejudice.

(c) State of democracy

Two international indices, the EIU Democracy Index and the GPI, will be employed to ascertain Australia's relative state of democracy compared to the six nations under analysis. A number of reasons make these two indices more suitable for this research than others. First, they cover the years within the period this research, 2006 to 2016, or more. Second, they provide a macro-perspective of a nation, allowing nation-to-nation comparison. Third, the indices have reasonable ease of use and extrapolation making them more suitable than other international indices on democracy which appear to be targeted for academic studies on democracy. Lastly, the indices have been cited by Australian scholars and governments.

The EIU's Democracy Index provides a snap shot of the state of democracy of a nation, while the GPI measures a nation's internal state of peacefulness. In addition, each index is the composite of a number of indicators or criteria which allows further examination to unearth a more granular picture of a nation's state of democracy. The EIU Democracy has five criteria while the GPI contains three broad themes or dimensions, each of which will be explored in further detail in Chapter 6.

(d) Human development

The United Nation Human Development Programme's HDI will be employed to examine the state of human development of a nation. The HDI is a counter measure to utilising

national economic measures such as gross domestic product (GDP) to measure a nation's human development. It is a composite of three simple criteria: a long and healthy life, education and a decent standard of living.

4.3.3 *Scanlon Foundation annual survey reports*

The Scanlon Foundation Mapping Social Cohesion survey is an annual survey tracking 'public opinion on social cohesion, immigration and population issues' with reasonably high sampling size through a detailed questionnaire (Markus 2019, p. 1). Commencing in 2007 and with the latest survey in 2019, twelve annual surveys have been conducted. As Markus noted:

The surveys continue to provide a reference point to understand pattern and extent of change, of the views held within the mainstream and within minorities....for example the extent and nature of support for multiculturalism (Markus 2019, p. 6).

The Scanlon Foundation annual survey employs five criteria as the nominal index of social cohesion: (a) belonging; (b) worth; (c) social justice and equity; (d) participation; and, (e) acceptance, rejection and legitimacy (Markus 2019, p. 19). Two elements of the survey that resonate strongly with this research and will be examined are: the state of support for multiculturalism and reported experiences of racial discrimination.

4.3.4 *Manifesto Project Data*

The Manifesto Project database 'provides the scientific community with parties' policy positions derived from a content analysis of parties' electoral manifestos' (Volkens et al. 2020, para. 1). Australia is among the 50 countries participating and contributing to the database content. The database comprises:

...[a] collection and the comparative content analysis of parties' manifestos with the support of coders from over 50 different countries (Volkens et al. 2020, para. 2).

Access to the Manifesto Project database enables retrospective research into Australian political parties' past election manifestos and policy promises no longer available after elections. The database will be searched for Australian political parties' manifestos and policy announcements in the 2013, 2016 and 2019 federal elections with respect to racism, Indigenous issues, diversity and multiculturalism to ascertain each party's racialisation and degree of ethnocratism in the Australian federal parliament.

4.3.5 *Australian federal government inquiries (2013 and 2017)*

The Australian federal parliament has conducted two parliamentary inquiries into multiculturalism: the *2013 Inquiry into migration and multiculturalism in Australia* (Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2013), and the *2017 Ways of protecting and strengthening Australia's multiculturalism and social inclusion* (Senate Inquiry 2017). The submissions to, and reports from, these two inquiries provide significant insight into the concerns of Australians with respect to multiculturalism as well as the opportunity to assess Australian federal government responses to the recommendations made in the reports.

4.3.6 *Government and non-government information*

Information from a mix of government and non-government sources will also be drawn upon to assist with data collection and analysis. They include the Hansard, parliamentary records and websites, Australian government – both federal and State/Territory levels – announcements and media releases; political parties' official websites; party biographies; media articles; social media; name and photo analysis; and, reporting and data produced by government funded agencies such as the AHRC, Screen Australia etc.

4.4.0 *Interrogating the 'multicultural' criteria*

What makes a society multicultural? Is it a multi-ethnic polity; different languages; or overarching public sentiment? The adjective multicultural is subjective. As discussed in Chapter 1, although used widely within government policies and paraphernalia, there is no official government definition of the parameters for Australia to be 'multicultural'. Would

two cultures be sufficient to be multicultural? Or would there be a minimum requirement of three, ten or more?

The current generally accepted overarching public sentiment in Australia is that Australia is a “multicultural” society with few, if any, challenge. It is a ubiquitous adjective use widely within Australia’s society, politics and media. The term ‘multicultural’ slowly entered successive government rhetoric following Grassby’s first use of the term ‘multi-cultural’ as a politician in his 1973 speech at the Cairnmillar Institute (Grassby 1973; Houston 2018, pp. 180-182). It has been politically exploited by politicians across the political spectrum since. But it still lacks clarity (Groutsis 2019). There is no government definition of the term. The ABS uses the term ‘cultural diversity’ (ABS 2016c), not ‘multicultural’, to describe Australia’s cultural mosaic. Thus, after nearly five decades of official adoption of multiculturalism, Australia still does not have clarity over cultural diversity. An important starting point would be to define, measure, monitor and report on cultural diversity (Groutsis 2019).

4.4.1 Defining and measuring the ‘multicultural’

‘Culture’ is not one of the identifiable/collectable criteria collected in Australian censuses to date. The ABS employs six criteria collected in the 2016 Census to derive ‘cultural diversity’. They include: a person’s country of birth, their ancestry, the country of birth of their parents, what languages they speak, whether they are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent, and their religious affiliation (ABS 2016c). These criteria bear no reflection on the degree of Australia’s “multiculturalness” but simply reflect that Australian society is ‘culturally diverse’.

This process to identify “culture” is far from perfect. As Tim Soutphommasane, the former Australian Race Discrimination Commissioner illustrated: he was born in France to parents of Laotian and Chinese ancestries but raised in Australia since he was three years of age (AHRC 2015; Hutchison 2016, 1:25). How does one determine his “culture”? Is he of “Australian culture” because he was raised here since three years old? Is it French given he

was born there? Is it Laos because his parents were born there? Is it Laos or Chinese given his mother's and father's ancestry, respectively? The complexity of the issue, as per Soutphommasane's example, reflects the lack of clarity with respect to the definition, measurement, monitoring and reporting of cultural diversity in Australia.

Furthermore, the debate over the remit of what should be included in the term "multicultural" remain alive among scholars of multiculturalism. Chapter 5 of this will explore this element in detail. In this thesis, data from the 2016 Census will be employed for quantitative analysis to explicate the 'cultural diversity' of the population of Australia, through exploring the six ethno-cultural characteristics of cultural diversity collected by the ABS (2016c). Analysis of these categories (explored in the next chapter of this thesis) suggests ancestry is the most reliable proxy for ethnicity and culture.

4.5.0 Interrogating the 'successful' criteria

What makes a multicultural society successful? Obviously this will depend on the perspectives of the inquirer and those providing the answer. For an epidemiologist, it could be lifespan; while an economist it could mean the average income per capita. Berry (2000, 2006), Berry and Kalin (1995, 2000) and Berry et al. (1977, 2006) in their decades of studies on multiculturalism in Canada theorised that a successful multicultural society goes beyond the factual demographic features of having a culturally diverse population. A successful multicultural society is one where all ethno-cultural groups are largely able to maintain their traditional cultural heritage and identity while participating in a fair and equitable way in the wider society. At the core of this theory is the assumption that cultural pluralism is a resource and that social inclusion must be supported by policy.

Berry and Kalin (1995) enumerated four preconditions for a successful multicultural society in the Canadian context:

In our view, there needs to be general support for multiculturalism, including acceptance of various aspects of the policy, and of cultural diversity as a valuable resource for a society. Second, there should be

overall low levels of intolerance or prejudice in the population. Third, there should be generally positive mutual attitudes among the various ethnocultural groups that constitute the society. And fourth, there needs to be a degree of attachment to the larger Canadian society, but without derogation of its constituent ethnocultural groups (Berry and Kalin 1995, p. 302).

This research analyses “successful” using these conditions as foundation within the context of Australia’s multicultural society, but also extends the investigation of the ‘successful’ criterion to include power disparity and economic participation. Overall, this research interrogates the “successful” criterion through the lens of equitable participation in the 3Rs: of *resources* or participation in the economy; cultural *recognition* in terms of public accommodation of different cultures and government measures to address prejudice and racism; and, *representation* in the formal and informal power structures of Australia.

4.5.1 *Resources: Economic participation*

Economic participation is reflected in the income, in education participation as potential for economic and social mobility, and representation in highly paid occupational groups (Australian Tax Office 2018). Quantitative analysis of these three economic factors will be drawn from both the 2006 and 2016 Census data as part of this research to enable comparison and analysis of changes, if any, over the decade.

4.5.2 *Recognition and cultural participation*

Societal attitudes towards cultural diversity, intergroup perceptions and attachment to the nation state are important dimensions of the success of multiculturalism (Berry and Sam 2013). Cultural recognition includes participation and representation in the cultural landscape of the nation by investigating the cultural diversity of the arts and media sectors, and public national culture. Further, examination of Australian political parties’ election manifestos over the last three elections (2013, 2016 and 2019) through the Manifesto Project Database provide insight into their policies on racism, Indigenous issues, cultural diversity

and multiculturalism. In addition, policies and publications such as the results of the Scanlon Foundation annual surveys help discern public opinion on racism, social cohesion and multiculturalism.

4.5.3 Representation in institutions of power

Government policies and resourcing can impact on social inclusion. The outcome of which could be reflected in the representation of minority groups in positions/occupations of authority, politics and leadership roles and educational attainments. Cultural diversity in leadership roles and political representation will be investigated through quantitative analysis of the 2006 and 2016 Census data of cultural diversity in Australia's institutions of authority: essentially the parliament, judiciary and the Executive government. In addition, the cultural diversity in institutions of hard power such as the Department of Defence and police forces, which fall under the responsibility of the Executive arm of government, will also be examined. Other resources, such as from the AHRC publications (2016, 2018) will also be drawn upon.

Central to social and political representation is how power is attained, maintained and sustained in Australia. The structure of power in Australia is reflected both formally and informally. Formal power rests in the tripartite checks and balance of Australian democracy – the Australian parliament as the people's representative, the Executive government (and the various supporting agencies and departments), and the judiciary. Informal or soft power, on the other hand, resonates socially and manifests in spheres that influence public life. They involve the control and spread of information, ideas and attraction. In this sense they include the arts and the media, and public cultural life.

The arts and the media reflect mass communication, persuasion and influence. Representations in these sectors inform ideas, challenges, hopes and responsibilities. The power to influence the opinions, decisions and actions of individuals and groups over key issues around power, inequality and identity.

In the contemporary cultural politics produced by the colonial legacy in Australia, discussions on ethnicity and power will inevitably intersect with the issue of gender. Thus this research will also draw upon the gendered disparities in its analysis of the results.

4.5.4 Census Data – limitations of results to the top ten

Owing to the large data involved, such as Australians identifying more than 300 ancestries, this research will limit quantitative data collection to the top ten ABS results of the data criteria/variables sought; unless data limits allow a higher result. Initial samplings showed the results obtained from the 2016 Census data are significantly skewed. For example, results after the tenth rank – that is, the 11th or later – could fall within less than one percent of the population. This suggests the pragmatic decision should be to focus on data from only the top ten results of a data criterion or category. Further, inclusion of data less than one percent makes comparisons and graphical representations difficult to illustrate.

Notwithstanding that, where data is available and relevant, ancestry results by region would also be illustrated to provide a broader or aggregate view.

4.6.0 Methods

4.6.1 Interrogating the ‘multicultural’ criteria

To interrogate the criterion of whether Australia is a multicultural society, the ABS Census TableBuilder function will be employed to obtain a mosaic of Australia’s cultural diversity through its six indicators of ethno-cultural traits. The following data from the 2016 Census will be obtained and developed for analysis:

- (i) Country of Birth of Persons/Parents
- (ii) Ancestry
- (iii) Language spoken at home
- (iv) Immigration sources by country/region of immigration

(v) Indigeneity

(vi) Religion

4.6.2 Methods and measurement – interrogating multicultural Australia

The ABS Census TableBuilder tool will be employed to ascertain and interrogate the cultural diversity of Australia. The top ten results of the above data will be presented in a table format and graphed for comparative quantitative analysis to ascertain the state of Australia's multiculturalism. The results should demonstrate that among the six ethno-cultural characteristics the ABS employs to determine cultural diversity in Australia, ancestry is the most reliable indicator of ethnicity and culture.

4.6.3 Interrogating the 'successful' criterion

To ascertain the "success", or otherwise, of Australia's multicultural society, two perspectives will be examined. First, as mentioned earlier under Section 4.3.2 of this chapter, Australia's relative international standing with respect to four dimensions of society – economic participation, multicultural policy, state of democracy and human development – will be compared to the six nations listed using the international indices detailed earlier. Detailed results and analysis will be covered in Chapter 6. Second, a national perspective investigating participation in three spheres of Australian society – economic, cultural and political life – will be undertaken in Chapter 7. The objective is to interrogate the cultural diversity of Australia's society with respect to economic participation; formal institutions of authority; and, informal power holdings. The goal is to ascertain whether the results corroborate, refute, or provide alternative explanations to the Australian government's claim of Australia being 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'.

Names of occupations are guided by the ABS Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANSCO) which provides the individual naming, description, skill level or qualification and educational attainment, and six-digit level ABS coding of each occupation (ABS 2009). Below outlines the methods that will be employed.

4.6.4 Method – interrogating the success of multicultural Australia

(i) Economic participation and outcome

Utilising ancestry as the proxy for ethnicity, the ABS Information Consultancy Service (ABS n.d.) will be tasked to provide data – at a cost – to interrogate the multicultural reality of Australia’s economic participation. The dependent variable of occupation will be charted against independent variable of ancestry for the timeframe of 2006 and 2016 censuses (ancestry versus occupation versus 2006/2016). The ABS *ancestry* data sought will be at the four-digit code level, which represents the most granular level of cultural and ethnic origin grouping (ABS 2019). The ABS *occupational* data sought will be at the six-digit code level, representing the individual level occupation unit (ABS 2009). The aim is to investigate the top ten ancestral compositions of Australia’s top ten highest income earning occupations and bottom ten lowest income earning occupations for 2006 and 2016. The occupations are drawn from the Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO) annual list of income earning occupations based on the tax returns posted by individuals during the 2016/2017 financial year (ATO 2019). The ABS ancestry versus occupation data will be graphed to visually chart the results and analysed to determine whether there has been any change over the decade between the two censuses.

In addition, two further sets of data will be sought from the ABS in an attempt to triangulate economic participation. First, data for the top ten ancestral composition of the eight levels of educational attainments for the 2006 and 2016 censuses (ancestry versus education level versus 2006/2016). This will range from ‘no education’, at the lowest level, to postgraduate degree level, the highest level of educational attainment (ABS 2001). Second, data for the top ten ancestral composition of educational attainment against income for the 2006 and 2016 censuses (ancestry versus educational level versus income versus 2006/2016) will also be obtained and graphed for comparative quantitative analysis. The aim is to ascertain whether ancestry impacts income with educational attainment as the reference parameter.

(ii) Mapping cultural diversity in Australia’s formal institutions of authority

To map the cultural diversity of Australia’s institutions of formal authority, ABS data will be sought on the ancestral composition of Australia’s three arms of government – parliament, Executive government and judiciary – for both the 2006 and 2016 censuses. Again, the services of the ABS Information Consultancy Service will be sought to provide the data (at a cost). These tripartite formal institutions of authority contain multi-level institutional structures with different occupational titles. The ABS data to be sought, at the six-digit code or individual occupation level, will reflect this difference. For example, legislators will include the occupations of parliamentarians and local councillors; while the judiciary will include judges, magistrates and tribunal members, reflecting the system’s hierarchy.

Where available, the ancestral composition of “pipeline” occupations to these three institutions of authority will also be sought. For example, judges and magistrates in Australia are primarily sought from barristers. Given this, the ancestry of those who identified as holding the occupation of “barristers” for the 2006 and 2016 censuses will be sought from the ABS. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier ABS data will also be sought for the ancestry composition of Australia’s two primary “hard power” agencies, the Australian Defence Force and police forces. Where ABS data is not available, such as for government ministers, information will be drawn from other official sources including parliamentary and government websites, the Hansard, ministerial websites, official media release and so forth.

In addition, to triangulate the ABS data, websites of the three arms of government will be trawled for information on the ethno-cultural heritage of:

- a) Elected members of the Australian Parliament;
- b) Ministers and assistant ministers;
- c) Heads of federal government departments, agencies and funded organisations such as the AHRC, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, university chancellors and vice-chancellors;

- d) The judicial hierarchy – the High Court, Chief Justices of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Australian States and Territories, Family Court, Magistrates’ and Federal Circuit Courts.

Results will be presented in tabulated format or graphed against the ancestry’s relative proportion in the general population to provide a comparative analytical perspective.

(iii) *Mapping cultural diversity of informal power holdings in Australia*

For informal power holdings, the ABS ancestry data of occupations within the media and the arts sectors will be sought for the 2006 and 2016 censuses. The occupations will include: media producers, radio presenters, television presenters, newspaper or periodical editors, print journalists, radio journalists, and entertainment industry occupations such as actors, dancers, music professionals and other entertainers. The data will be triangulated with data and reporting from Screen Australia, the federal agency ‘charged with supporting Australian screen development, production and promotion’ (Screen Australia n.d., para. 1). The results will be graphed against the relative proportions in the general population for visual analysis and to provide a comparative analytical perspective.

4.7.0 Analysis

The above quantitative and qualitative data will be “strengthened” with analyses of two Australian federal government Inquiries into multiculturalism mentioned earlier, in 2013 and 2017, respectively. The 2013 Inquiry, conducted under a Labor government, received a total of 485 submissions. The 2017 Inquiry, received a total of 102 submissions from the public. Submissions to both Inquiries provide a rich repertoire of information providing insight into community concerns and reflections about state of multiculturalism in Australia.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the methodology and methods that will be employed in this research and the rationale for doing so. A complementary multimethod approach, of a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, will be employed to test the objectives

and theories of this thesis. The aim is to ascertain the multiculturalism and determine the state of “success”, or otherwise, of Australia’s multicultural society, broadly enhancing the framework outlined by Berry et al. (1977, 1995 and 2000). They comprise attitudes towards cultural equality positioning; racial discrimination as a measure of prejudice and intolerance; support for government diversity policy as an indicator of acceptance of a pluralistic Australian society; and economic security as indicators of a confident identity. In this research, these challenges will be reflected in the cultural diversity representation of Australia’s formal institutions of authority; in informal power structures; and, economic participation. These parameters provide the framework to scrutinise the state of Australia’s society.

The next chapter will provide a quantitative analysis of the results from the ABS 2016 Census data interrogating whether Australia’s society is ‘multicultural’ and in what sense it is ‘multicultural’.

Chapter 5

INTERROGATING AUSTRALIA’S “MULTICULTURALITY”

5.0.1 Introduction

Typically in Australia the current officially sanctioned terminology “culturally and linguistically diverse” (CALD) refers to an ensemble of criteria including at least one of country of own and parents’ birth, language spoken at home, faith, and self-identified heritage. The Australian federal government itself asserts that ‘Australia is one of the most ethnically diverse societies in the world today’ (Australian Government n.d., paras. 1). Yet the state of that ethno-cultural diversity, in terms of composition and cultural relations, is not mentioned.

In the 1980s, the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) undertook some studies into the state of Australia’s ethnic composition to support policy advice. However, since then Australia has not conducted a comprehensive study specifically looking into the state of multiculturalism of its population. Canada, for example, conducted the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) in 2002 which represents a unique and substantive analysis of cultural relations in Canada. The EDS has been the subject of established academic study and applied to subject matters such as multiculturalism (see Reitz et al. 2009). As discussed in the previous chapter, perhaps the most reliable, and accessible, cultural diversity data for Australia derives from the ethno-cultural information collected by the ABS during the quinquennial census.

In this chapter I analyse data from the ABS 2016 Census on indicators of Australia’s multiculturalism to assess the most reliable indicator of ethnicity. The ABS collects six ethno-cultural data on what it classifies as the Australia Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (ASCCEG) (ABS 2019) during the quinquennial census. In the 2016

Census, the six categories of ethno-cultural data collected were: country of birth, their ancestry, the country of birth of their parents, what languages they speak at home, whether they are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent, and their religious affiliation (ABS 2016c). Quantitative analyses of these data, including through the lenses of diversity indices, provide insights into the statistical state of Australia's multiculturalism.

A strong analysis requires proper definition of culture and diversity, and a reliable methodology in order to correctly interpret the series of ABS census data. Section 1 reviews the definition, features and stakes of cultural diversity including the sources of data available to examine cultural diversity in Australia. Section 2 reviews the different models of measuring cultural diversity. Section 3 presents the ABS 2016 Census data, the empirical aspects of the methodology and discusses the results. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.

5.1.0 Definition and conceptual issues

The question of which groups can be considered to make up a multicultural society is open to debate. Scholars on multiculturalism have taken varied "boundaries" on the concept of a multicultural society. For example, in her account American scholar Iris Marion Young (1990) takes a broad scope to include social movements and marginalised groups such as women, gays and lesbians, the disabled, African American and Marxists (Young 1990, p. 196). Yet another Canadian scholar, Will Kymlicka, takes a narrower approach and considers multicultural societies to be comprising of national and indigenous groups, or ethnocultural and ethnoreligious groups (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 329-330 and 335). For British scholar Ali Rattansi (2011), the concept refers to ethnic or racial groups in a society. His compatriot Tariq Modood (2010) applies the concept to immigrant groups that have migrated to 'western countries from outside the prosperous West' (Modood 2010, p. 5).

This section examines the rubbery concept of culture and cultural diversity as one expression of ethnic diversity, with particular emphasis on how to measure culture. The first part of this section discusses the concept of 'culture' and the lack of a definition for the

concept notwithstanding its ubiquitous use; in Australian government policies and statements, and in the international arena. The next section concentrates on a brief review of the literature and draws a working definition of culture for this research. The final part presents the sources of cultural data available in Australia and discusses the suitability of the data currently collected in Australia compared to New Zealand.

5.1.1 *What is Culture?*

This begs the question, what is culture?

The Australian federal government website states:

Before the arrival of British colonisers in 1788, Australia was inhabited by the Indigenous peoples – Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, sometimes referred to as the First Australians....There were over 500 different clan groups or 'nations' around the continent, many with distinctive cultures, beliefs and languages (Australian Government, n.d., paras. 4-5).

The terms 'culture', 'cultural', and 'cultural groups' have been used in the Australian federal government lexicon to describe Australian society over the last three decades but are rarely clearly defined. It is not defined within any of the Australian federal government's policies to date on multiculturalism, nor in related legislations alleged to support multiculturalism. The relevant law, the federal *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth) makes it unlawful actions in public life that limit the 'cultural' freedom and rights of a person (Section 9) but does not define 'culture'. The Act gives effect to Australia's international obligations under the ICERD (Australian Attorney General's Department n.d.), of which Australia was a signatory in 1966 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995).

Australia is also signatory to two other international legal instruments on culture. Australia signed the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* [ICESC] in 1972 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995). This ICESC treaty has

not been ratified into domestic law and Australia remains the only liberal democracy without a Bill of Rights, which includes the right to culture. Australia also has accession status to the other international treaty on culture, the 2005 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) *Convention to Protect and Promote the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*. Under international law, accession means Australia accepts the offer or opportunity to become a member to the treaty after it has been negotiated and signed by other nations. The UNESCO Convention noted the difficulty in defining culture and nebulousness of the concept. Tylor's (1871) classical anthropological definition of culture was noted as a commonly used definition:

[Culture] is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, laws, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by [a human] as a member of society (Tylor 1871, p.1, cited by Avruch 1998, p. 6).

Since accession to the UNESCO Convention Australia has submitted two reports, in 2015 (UNESCO 2015) and 2018 (UNESCO 2018), outlining its implementation and compliance of the Convention. Notwithstanding that, the Australian national government has not adopted the UNESCO definition of culture nor provided its own definition of culture.

5.1.2 Defining culture

Scholarly expositions and debates over the definition of culture date back to the 1950s (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). The debates reflect scholarly treatments of representations of culture and the role that culture plays in affecting individual decisions or actions. In essence, culture can be considered as having two components (Keesing 1974):

- (1) An ideational system comprising of perceptions, beliefs and norms that is relatively stable, as the result of socialisation early in life through childhood which includes the schooling system; and,

- (2) An integrated and adaptive socio-cultural system that refers to the characteristics of social groups that result from the dynamic interactions between the group's members.

The significance is in understanding culture as 'interpretation', not 'decipherment' that evolves with environmental change (Keesing 1974, p. 79; Geertz 1973).

Culture provides the 'framework that we use to impose some sort of order and coherence on the stream of events' (Rayner 1991, p. 84). It is 'the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next' (Matsumoto 1996, p. 16; Latour and Woolgar 1979). In this sense, culture is 'the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one category of people from others' (Hofstede 1991, p. 5). The 'programming' comprises of core values and practices that are linked to rituals, heroes and symbols. Like an onion, the change in the programming typically takes longer the deeper the layer (Hofstede 1991).

This idea of culture as the 'collective programming of the mind' parallels Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' (Hofstede et al. 2010), roughly translated as a set of durable and transferable principles that provide individuals with a sense of group identity and belonging (Bourdieu 1980, 1986). This is reflected in shared beliefs, representations, rules, taboos, symbols, rituals and practices. 'Habitus' has the power to shape individual action and constrain preferences and aspirations based on an individual's perceptions of his or her own chance or failure in taking a particular course of action (Swartz 2000). Bourdieu's analysis of culture is from the lens of power, and culture is another form of capital that individuals or groups could use to modify their position or the position of others in the social order.

This research draws on Hofstede and Bourdieuan interpretations of culture that has some relatively stable and some more dynamic components to which individuals and the group concerned make sense of their world. As Bourdieu (1986) posits, it is a form of power or capital that occurs in embodied, objectified or institutionalised states. Embodied cultural capital refers to ways of understanding and appreciation which have been acquired through

socialisation processes and internalised by individuals. Objectified cultural capital refers to artifacts, such as music, books, art, information technology and scientific instruments (which themselves require cultural capital in order to be used and appreciated). Institutionalised cultural capital uses systems of credentialing to maintain the status quo. These can be found in administrations or educational and religious establishments (Bourdieu 1980; Swartz 2000).

5.1.3 *Culture and cultural diversity in Australia*

In adopting multiculturalism as an official socio-cultural policy framework, there is an important assumption that cultural diversity is beneficial. Therefore, cultural diversity is an important concept. However, the concept has been criticised for its vagueness (Bonet and Negrier 2011) and policies to embrace cultural diversity have been accused of allowing support to policy and strategies that support illiberal, inequalitarian practices in Western liberal democracies (Barry 2001). One consequence from the lack of clarity of the concept is the difficulty in measuring, at least in a statistical framework and material sense, cultural diversity (Ranaivoson 2007, 2010). Measuring cultural diversity informs policy and policy implementation, and more importantly, allows assessment of their impact. Thus, operationalising quantifiable dimensions of the broad concept of cultural diversity is critical.

5.1.4 *Sources of data on cultural diversity*

As of 2020, culture-related data is available from three main sources in Australia. Namely, (1) the quinquennial census, (2) administrative records, and (3) sample surveys.

Administrative records held by government departments such as the Department of Social Security, Education, Training and Employment, both at the federal and State/Territory levels, hold limited information that pertains to an individual's culture and ethnicity. These may include information such as place and country of birth, language spoken and year of arrival to Australia. Other institutions such schools and tertiary education institutions also collect these ethno-cultural data on behalf of the government. The data collected is not readily available to the public and subject to privacy laws.

Another potential source of cultural diversity data is through social research agencies and institutions that conduct surveys on attitudes to cultural diversity in Australia. These include university-based research institutes, the Scanlon Foundation, Diversity Council of Australia, and others commissioned by State or Territory governments. None specifically collects data on the diversity of cultures present in the Australian community per se, but as an aside to the objectives of the survey conducted. The ABS, on occasions as part of its responsibility to collect, interpret and disseminate information on the socio-economic conditions of various demographic groups in Australia, conducts supplementary *sample* surveys in addition to the monthly Labour Force Surveys (ABS 2016d). These surveys include questions such as birthplace, birthplace of parents, languages spoken, English language ability and periods of residence that may allude to cultural diversity.

Neither administrative records, nor sample surveys provide a clear picture of the breadth of Australia's cultural diversity. The only exception is the quinquennial census which provides the most extensive and comprehensive data on aspects of culture. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2016 Census collects six categories related to culture: country of birth, their ancestry, the country of birth of their parents, what languages they speak, whether they are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent, and their religious affiliation (ABS 2016c). This set of data provides the most comprehensive source of information on the origins, composition and conditions of the Australian population on the date of collection. The data is valuable in a number of ways. It allows the collection of data even for those whose composition is extremely small, either geographically or small in number.

Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the data collected by the ABS during census collections, the type of data collected by New Zealand's Statistics (StatsNZ) during its census collection reflects a closer correlation with the American Sociological Association's definition of culture. StatsNZ collects data on culture to include languages spoken; people's sense of belonging; religious affiliation; participation in cultural activities; trust and participation in government; and, the well-being of different groups (StatsNZ 2018, 2019).

5.2.0 Interrogating the ‘multicultural’ of Australia

In this section, each part begins with a description of the ethno-cultural criterion currently collected by the ABS and an assessment of their suitability as cultural diversity indicators. It is then followed by discussions and critiques of the findings of the data extracted from the 2016 Census under each of the six ABS ethno-cultural criterion.

5.2.1 *The availability of variables*

In this research, cultural diversity is the integration of six inter-related ethno-cultural criteria collected by the ABS during the 2016 Census. Quantitative analyses of the extracted data under each criterion provide statistical insights into the state of Australia’s multiculturalism and to assess the best proxy, among the six ABS ethno-cultural indicators, for ethnicity.

As mentioned earlier, these six culture-related criteria (ABS 2016f) are based on the ASCCEG (ABS 2019). The ASCCEG Standards are based on the premise that the use of a single indicator, such as country of birth, or a non-standard composite concept such as Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD), is an inadequate measure of culture. Within the hierarchical structure of the Standards, there are three levels (ABS 2019). The first (‘broad group’) is the most general level of the classification and consists of 9 broad groups which are formed by aggregating geographically proximate narrow groups. Therefore, they consist of cultural and ethnic entities which are broadly similar in terms of social and cultural characteristics. The second (‘narrow group’) or middle level of the classification consists of 28 narrow groups of cultural and ethnic entities which are similar in terms of the classification criteria. The third (‘cultural and ethnic group’) level of the classification consists of the base level units and contains the most detail of the identified cultural and ethnic groups. Overall the classification at the third level consists of 277 cultural and ethnic groups (ABS 2019).


5.2.2 Multicultural Australia

The 2016 Census reveal Australia is a nation of people from over 190 different countries and 300 different ancestries (ABS 2016c). The following sections will extract and discuss the composition of Australia's multiculturalism based on the 2016 Census.

5.2.3(i) Ethnic/cultural indicator: Country of Birth of Persons

The ABS collects 'Country of Birth of Person' data as one of the six ethno-cultural characteristics to ascertain Australia's cultural diversity. This collection criterion identifies the country in which a person was born on the night of the Census collection in 2016. This variable is primarily used to determine whether someone is a migrant to Australia, the country from which they originated, and the community group to which they are likely to be attached. In the 2016 Census, Country of Birth of Person is defined as the country the respondent identifies as being the one in which they were born (ABS 2017d). **Graph 5.2.3(a)** below displays the top ten countries of birth of Australia's population for the 2016 census.

Graph 5.2.3(a): Top ten countries of birth for 2016




[Data source: ABS 2017d – Cultural Diversity (Country of Birth of Person)]

The 2016 Census was a snapshot of Australia's population as of the night of census collection (9 August 2016). It revealed that Australia's population was 23.4 million. Of these, 'approximately two thirds (67 percent) of the Australian population were born in Australia' (ABS 2016c), and 28.2 percent (of the Australian population were) born overseas (ABS 2017e). By April 2019, the overseas born proportion had increased to 29 percent (ABS 2017e) accounting for approximately 7.3 million people born overseas living in Australia. This ranks Australia as having the highest overseas born population amongst western liberal democracies (EIU 2017). Much of this change can be attributed to Australia's migration program which sees approximately 200,000 people permanently migrating to Australia annually over the past decade (ABS 2019a). Of this, the humanitarian stream comprises on average less than ten percent of the total annual migration to Australia (Phillips 2017).

A more detailed examination of the overseas born population of Australia reveals that six Asian countries – People's Republic of China (PRC), India, The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Sri Lanka – were listed in the top ten countries of birth (see Figure 5.3.5(b) below). Notwithstanding that, the UK remains number one on the list of overseas countries of birth for Australia. Those born in the UK represented almost one million or 4.6 percent of the overall Australian population (ABS 2019a). Furthermore, the number of people who were born on continental Europe (including the UK) living in Australia still dominated the overseas born population of Australia, accounting for approximately ten percent of the nation's overall population. **Graph 5.2.3(b)** below illustrates the top ten overseas country of birth of Australians.

Graph 5.2.3(b): Top ten countries of birth 2016 (overseas)




[Data source: ABS Census 2016 – Cultural Diversity (Country of Birth)]

To make better sense of the overseas born population data, it is important to take a longer – at least a decade – look at Australia’s overseas born population. A comparison over the last three censuses (2006, 2011 and 2016) reveal the changing patterns of overseas born population. The results reveal an increasing trend in the number of people born in Asia living in Australia, notably those born in China, India, The Philippines and Malaysia but also those born in South Africa. **Graph 5.2.3(c)** below charts the changing demographics of overseas born population over the last three censuses: 2006, 2011 and 2016. The years 2008, 2013 and 2018 on the graph reflect ABS publication dates.

The profile for those born overseas has also changed significantly. The ABS population data reveals a trend towards an increase of migrants from Asian countries who are younger, with India and China leading the change. There is a corresponding decrease in the number of

migrants from continental Europe, who are ageing (ABS 2019a). These results reflect the impact of Australia’s changing migration policy favouring skilled migration.

Graph 5.2.3(c): Top ten countries of birth (overseas) from 2006, 2011 & 2016 censuses




[Data source: ABS 2019b cat. no. 3142.0 – Migration, Australia, 2017-2018 based on the 2006, 2011 and 2016 censuses]

5.2.3(ii) Overseas born population remains predominantly European

But this granular data belies the ‘true’ picture of the composition of Australia’s overseas born population. If based on a macroscopic view or ‘region of birth’ perspective, those born overseas remain predominantly from European countries, accounting for approximately 40 percent of all people born overseas in Australia on 2016 Census night. **Graph 5.2.3(d)** below charts Australia’s population by overseas region of birth based on the 2016 Census data.

Importantly, overseas born data alone reveals just the numerical numbers of existing facts. It does not reflect the length of time the people have lived in Australia.

Graph 5.2.3(d): Country of Birth by Region in 2016 (excluding Australia)



[Data source: ABS Census 2016 – Cultural Diversity (Country of Birth by Region)]


Country of birth is an indicator of ethnic and cultural diversity. However, as it will be demonstrated below, as a category on its own Country of Birth is not necessarily a reliable indicator of ethnic or cultural diversity. A recent investigation by Porter et al. (2016) arrived at the same findings that country of birth is not a reliable proxy measure for ethnicity or culture.

5.2.4 Ethnic/cultural indicator: Country of Birth of Parents

The country of birth of the parents reflect the source and pattern of migration to Australia (ABS 2017f). The diversity of the countries listed is one manifestation of the multi-ethnic and multiculturalism of the Australian demographic. The results reveal approximately one in two Australians have both parents born in Australia, while the other half have either one or both parents born overseas. The 2016 Census's top five nominated country of birth of parents were the same for mothers and fathers, and matched the top five countries of birth

for the total population – being Australia, England, PRC, New Zealand and India (ABS 2017g). **Graph 5.2.4(a)** below illustrates the proportion of the population with one or both parents born either overseas or in Australia.

Graph 5.2.4(a): Country of birth of parents 2016



[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Country of Birth of Parents)]


The source and pattern of migration to Australia is better reflected when examined from a longer-term perspective. Since the formal abolition of the WAP in 1975 (through the enactment of the federal *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth)), a non-racially discriminatory migration policy was implemented. Results from interrogating ABS migration data through its TableBuilder function for the period from 1975 – 2016 reveal the following trends:

- (a) migration from Australia’s ‘traditional’ post-War source countries of Europe, including the UK and Ireland, plateaued;

- (b) migration from Australia's neighbour, New Zealand, has remain relatively steady throughout the period;
- (c) a continuous increase of migration from Asia which has become Australia's largest source of migrants since the turn into the twenty-first century;
- (d) migration from North Africa and the Middle East, while small in numbers, began to increase from the turn into the twenty-first century; and
- (e) migration from sub-Saharan Africa, while very small in numbers, has steadily increased since the late 1990s.

These trends generally reflect geopolitical events and Australia's migration and refugee policies during the period. **Figure 5.2.4(b)** below illustrates the regions and proportion of migrant sources to Australia since 1975.

Figure 5.2.4(b): Migration to Australia (1975-2016) by region




[Data source: ABS 2017, 2018 – cited in Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2018, p. 2)]

5.2.5 Ethnic/cultural indicator: Ancestry

As mentioned previously, the ABS reports that Australians claim 300 plus ancestries in the 2016 Census (ABS 2017g). While factual in terms of the number of self-nominated (ABS 2016e) – separately identifiable – category of ancestries captured on Census night (9 August 2016), the statement does not reveal the spread nor proportion of people claiming each ancestry. Using the ABS TableBuilder function to interrogate the top 20 nominated ancestries in the 2016, the results demonstrated that statistically and numerically, the Australian population remains predominantly Eurocentric by ancestries. Pictorially, the ancestries of the Australian population resemble a comet. It comprises a concentrated oversized head of Anglo-Euro-centric ancestries and an extremely long tapering tail that constitutes the remainder ancestries that are categorically significant but numerically insignificant. **Graph 5.2.5(a)** below charts in graph format the percentage of the population nominating, the first response, as their ancestries as recorded in the 2016 Census.

Graph 5.2.5(a): Top 20 Ancestries by country 2016 (1st response)



[Data source: ABS 2016 Census - Cultural Diversity (Ancestry – 1st Response)]


The results revealed the highest proportion was ‘English’ ancestry at 33.38 percent followed by ‘Australian’ at 20.65 percent. If the European, Anglo-Celtic (English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh etc.) and ‘Australian’ ancestries were combined, the proportion would comprise approximately 73 percent of the Australian population (17,408,828 counts over the total population of 23,401,891 on 2016 Census night). Accordingly, Australia’s population remains – at least by ancestry – numerically biased towards Europe in terms of its ‘multi-cultures’.

A note on ‘Australian’ ancestry

As discussed in Chapter 2, Australia’s migration program since federation until the 1970s selected migrants based on being physiognomically white. Initially migrants were sourced from Britain, then broadened to include Europe post-WWII. Non-white migration to Australia was only legally possible from late 1970s onward. While a person identifying as having ‘Australian’ ancestry could be of any ethnicity or race, however, it is more likely that person would be of white Anglo-Celtic and/or European descendant.

Drawing a macroscopic perspective also corroborates this picture. **Graph 5.2.5(b)** below charts the proportion of Australians who nominated their first ancestry according to a regional view.

Graph 5.2.5(b): Ancestry 2016 by region (1st Response)




[Data source: ABS Census 2016 Cultural Diversity – Ancestry 1st response (by region)]

The combined total proportion of people in Australia claiming European (including Anglo-Celtic at 53.94 percent), Australian (21.09 percent) and North American (0.16 percent) ancestries comprised approximately three quarters of the population. The remaining quarter (25 percent) of the population comprised of: 12.89 percent from Asia (comprising 5.57 percent Northeast Asian, 4.30 percent Southern and Central Asian and 3.02 percent Southeast Asian); 2.38 percent from North Africa and the Middle East; 1.3 percent from a combination of South & Central America and sub-Saharan Africa regions; ATSI heritage at 2.8 percent; and, 6.98 percent ‘not stated’.

The numerical bias towards Eurocentric ancestries in Australia’s population is further corroborated when examining the results of ‘2nd ancestry’ responses in the 2016 Census. The results demonstrate that the bias towards Eurocentric ancestries is even more marked. **Graph 5.2.5(c)** below charts the results in pie-graph format.


Graph 5.2.5(c): Ancestry by region 2016 (2nd Response)



[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Ancestry 2nd Response)]

The overall results, based on ‘1st response’ and ‘2nd response’, to the ancestries question reveal that the ABS statement from the 2016 Australia Census stating that Australians have over 300 *categorical* (my emphasis) ancestries may be factually correct. However, it does not reveal the fuller picture of how these ancestries are distributed, which is numerically skewed towards Eurocentric cultures. **Graph 5.2.5(d)** below illustrates the spread of ancestries in Australia.

Graph 5.2.5(d): Top 20 Ancestries by country (1st and 2nd Responses)



[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Ancestry: 1st and 2nd Responses)]

5.2.6 *Ethnic/cultural indicator: Language (spoken at home)*


As the ‘common speak’, language is the predominant basis of culture (Henslin 2019). The primary way people communicate with each other is through language. It is essential for cultural development in three aspects. It allows human experience to be cumulative; gives individuals within the group capacity to share understandings about the past and develop common perceptions about the future; and, provides for complex but shared and goal-directed behaviour (Henslin 2019, p. 47). A common language thus provides the medium through which communication could be made and culture transmitted from one generation to next. Language is thus the instrument through which ethnic identity is activated, actioned and accentuated.

In Australia, ethnicity as reflected in different languages, has been highly politicised in Australia. As a key term in the development of multiculturalism in Australia, ethnicity was a marker of diversity within an overall common repertoire of norms and values, if one was to use the functionalist terminology typical of 1960s and 1970s discussions of assimilation

and multiculturalism. On the other hand, race is used as the marker of absolute difference, of Otherness. Consequently, racial differences remains problematic in everyday understandings of multiculturalism and religious difference tends to be collapsed into racial difference.

The primordial view of ethnicity would reflect language as an ascriptive feature of ethnicity. Primordialism sees ethnicity as either fixed, biologically given entities, or, if they are social conventions, that they are deeply rooted, clearly drawn, and historically rigid convention manifested in the continuation of the language within the same ethnic group. From this perspective, language is a proxy for ethnicity. It reflects the ‘common descent’ argument of primordialists. Language can, and has been used, to delineate ethnicities. The case in point is the classification of the different ethnicities in the PRC which utilises linguistics as the foundation of its system (Mullaney and Anderson 2010, Chapter 2). **Graph 5.2.6(a)** below reflects the diversity of languages spoken in Australian homes as reflected in the 2016 Census.

Graph 5.2.6(a): Top 20 languages spoken at home 2016




[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Language Spoken at Home)]

With approximately 73 percent of Australians speaking English at home, English remains the predominant spoken language. The remainder 27 percent comprises of a long list of other languages. This suggests that approximately one in four Australians spoke a non-English language at home in 2016. Mandarin was the second most common language spoken in Australian homes, but only spoken by approximately 2.55 percent of the population. Even when this figure is added to the proportion of people speaking Cantonese – the other Chinese dialect of which approximately 1.2 percent speak at home – the combined result, at 3.75 percent, is still significantly lower than the proportion of the Australian population claiming a Chinese ancestry (at 4.81 percent). The difference suggests those who identify as having Chinese ancestry may not necessarily speak Mandarin or Cantonese but perhaps speak another Chinese dialect at home, or do not speak a Chinese language at all at home. Overall, these results demonstrate that for Australia, the criterion of ‘language spoken at home’ is a poor proxy for ethnicity.

Furthermore, using the TableBuilder function within the ABS website, data is extracted using the criteria of Mandarin speakers and country of birth. The results, as shown in **Graph 5.2.6(b)** below, demonstrate that a person’s ability to speak Mandarin does not necessarily reflect their country of birth. Conversely, a person’s place of birth is also not necessarily a good indicator of their language ability.

The inability to speak one’s “ancestral language” could be attributable to the global employment migration that took place since the nineteenth century when many people left their countries of origin, whether by force or choice, for work elsewhere in the world. The loss of language reflects the results of the graph below (Graph 5.3.6(b)) which illustrates a comparison between the ABS ethno-cultural criteria of ‘language spoken at home’ and ‘country of birth’.

Graph 5.2.6(b): Mandarin speakers by top ten countries of birth (2016)



[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Language Spoken at Home: Mandarin)]

The results reveal that about two-thirds bulk (65 percent) of people who speak Mandarin at home were born in China and one third born elsewhere. In fact, the second highest proportion of people speaking Mandarin at home were born in Australia, likely of China-born parents. Furthermore, there were more people who speak Mandarin at home born in New Zealand (again likely to China-born parents) than people speaking Mandarin at home born in Vietnam.

Another example of where language is a poor proxy for ethnicity is the Arabic language. A myriad of pan-Middle East ethnicities speak the language but identify as separate, distinct ethnic groups. Other examples include the Jewish ethnicity – identified in Australian State law (Section 4, *Anti-Discrimination Act 1977* (NSW)) and society as an ethnic group – but members often lack ‘a common language, universally shared customs or even common religious practice since non-believers may also be included in the group’ (Fearon 2003, p. 200).

Overall, the results demonstrate ‘country of birth’ and ‘language spoken at home’ are poor indicators of ethnicity in Australia, and not as strong as often thought. Furthermore, the intensity of the implementation of strong assimilationist ideology in Australia over the decades likely contributed to the many children of non-English speaking immigrants not able to speak a parent tongue.


5.2.7 *Ethnic/cultural indicator: Religion*

Religion shares many commonalities, and is often closely-associated, with culture rather than ethnicity. Nonetheless they are different in nature and definition (Furseth and Repstad 2016; Bonney 2004). The scholarship points to religion as a subset or dimension of culture; a practice socially learned, expressed and reproduced (Furseth and Repstad 2016; Hill 1973). As a dynamic of personal and group identification, religion is a marker of social difference that signifies boundary of community membership and helps construct the meanings of the boundary (Furseth and Repstad 2016; Mitchell 2006). It functions to provide individuals as being a part of larger totality. Religious belief or faith, often linked to ‘supra-empirical’ or ‘supernatural’ power, is a central tenement to religion that helps explain cognitive doubt over inexplicable phenomena (Roberts and Yamane 2015; Robertson 1970, p. 47; Hill 1973). Often accompanying religions are formal written scriptures, considered to be holy and transcending the passage of time. Obeisance of the contents of the scriptures is generally required and considered as part of the ritual practice of religious activity. Culture on the other hand, likely will evolve over time with the development of humans, their society and beliefs and practices (Bonney 2004).

The global migration of people – whether through forced or self-selected migration – and globalisation processes have enabled ethnic groups to be exposed to the proselytisation and take up religions that are different to their familial or ancestral practices. It is no longer uncommon for an ethnic group to have members practising different religions. This is reflected in the uptake of Christianity in Asia and Buddhism in the West. Religion may be an indicator of ethnicity in other nations and regions in the world. However, as an immigration nation, it is perhaps one of the least reliable indicators for Australia.

Within the ABS definition of cultural diversity, religion is one of the six ethno-cultural characteristics collected during the 2016 Census (ABS 2015). The results from the 2016 Census demonstrate that religion is a poor indicator of ethnicity with many people sharing the same ancestry but different religions. The graphs below, **Graphs 5.2.7(a) to (d)** reflect Australians' religious affiliation in the 2016 Census and the diversity of religious affiliation within the top ten recorded ancestries in Australia.

Graph 5.2.7(a): *Distribution of religious affiliation in Australian population (2016)*




[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (religious affiliation)]

In terms of religious distribution, Christianity – of which there are multiple variations and different practices forms – remains the dominant religion observed by Australians. Since post-WWII, Christianity is often taken as a unified religion with the assumption that an underlying moral repertoire informs all the forms of Christianity. This is what informs the multiculturalism that sought to manage the post-WWII ethnic groups.

Just over fifty-two (52.14) percent of the population identify as being Christian. The ABS (2017h) reports there have been significant changes in the reporting of religious affiliation

of Australians over the past fifty years. There appears to be a decreasing trend of reports of affiliation with Christianity commensurate with the start of informal dismantling of the WAP in 1966 and subsequent relaxing of immigration restriction from non-European countries. In 1966, the proportion of the population reporting to be affiliated with Christianity was slightly over 88 percent. Two generations later by 2016, this had decreased to 52 percent. Conversely over this period, the proportion of Australians reporting to be affiliated with a religion other than Christianity, while still very small in numbers, had increased significantly from 0.7 percent in 1966 to 8.2 percent in 2016. Of interest is the proportion of Australians who reported no religious affiliation, which had increased from 0.8 percent in 1966 to 30.1 percent in 2016. This means one in three Australians reported as having no religious affiliation with any of the identifiable major religions in 2016. **Figure 5.2.7(b)** below illustrates this.

Figure 5.2.7(b): *Changes in religious affiliation over time (1966-2016)*




Source: ABS Census of Population and Housing, 1966, 1991, 2016

[Data source: ABS 2017h]

The change in Australians' reported religious affiliation is most stark over the last decade from 2006. There appear to be steady smaller increases in reported religious affiliations associated with other religions – Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism – which appear to correspond with the changing sources of immigrant countries to Australia. The most

notable change, however, is the number of Australians reporting no religious affiliations which increased from 19 percent in 2006 to 30 percent in 2016 (ABS 2017i). **Figure 5.2.7(c)** illustrates the emerging major religions observed by Australians from 2006-2016.

Figure 5.2.7(c): Emerging Major Religions in Australia (2006-2016)




[Data Source: ABS 2017h]

On the issue of the link between religion and ethnicity, the data on reported religious affiliation by ancestry indicate the link, if any, appears to be tenuous. Each nominated ancestry group reported religious affiliations across the range of the major religions identified – Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism (ABS 2018). Each nominated ancestry group also reported varying degrees of no religious affiliation. Perhaps of interest is the data on those who nominated Chinese ancestry of which the majority, nearly 60 percent (58.94 percent) reported as having no religious affiliation. This correlates with immigration data where over the past decade, the PRC, a Communist Party-led society

espousing atheism as the official ideology, has been the number one or second highest immigrant source country for Australia (Simon-Davies 2018).

Graph 5.2.7(d): Population vs religious affiliation by ancestries 2016 (1st & 2nd responses)




[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Religious Affiliation)]

5.2.8 *Ethnic/cultural indicator: Indigenous Australians – Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSI)*

The ABS groups Indigenous Australians as one group comprising of ‘Aboriginals’, a term referring to Indigenous Australians of the Australian mainland, and ‘Torres Strait Islanders’, a term referring to the Indigenous peoples of the Torres Strait, a set of islands that lie between the tip of Cape York on Australia’s north and Papua New Guinea. Although grouped by the ABS as one of the six ‘ethno-cultural’ collection characteristics, Indigenous Australians in fact comprise of highly diverse cultural groups despite comprising a very

small proportion of the Australian population at approximately 2.8 percent of the population. Notwithstanding that, the ABS (2019c) estimates the number of people identifying as having Indigenous status is projected to increase in the years ahead with the ATSI population of Australia expected to reach one million people by 2027 (ABS 2019c). **Graph 5.2.8(a)** below reflects the proportion of Australians with Indigenous versus non-Indigenous status from the 2016 Census. The data also displays the proportion of Australians identifying as ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Torres Strait Islander’ or both.

Figure 5.2.8(a): Indigenous Australian population 2016



[Data source: ABS 2016 Census – Cultural Diversity (Indigenous Status)]

5.2.9 *Ancestry as the preferred criterion to reflect ethnicity and culture*

The use of ancestry as a proxy for culture could present as problematic given the effect of socialisation on culture. Migration, ideological and institutional changes further elasticise the issue. However, Spolaore and Wacziarg’s (2016) research demonstrate ‘a positive relationship between genetic distance and cultural distance’ over time and space (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2016, p. 175). The study corroborated Desmet et al.’s (2011) finding which

showed a positive and significant correlation between genetic distance – ancestry – and cultural values which remains even after controlling for linguistic and geographic distances.

The results of this section reveal that of the six ethno-cultural traits collected by the ABS, ‘ancestry’ is the most reliable indicator, and suitable proxy, for ethnicity and thus culture. Ancestry is a self-nominated ethno-cultural category reflecting the person’s ethno-political self-identification capturing the subjective aspect as well as some of the objective overtones. Based on the results, the other indicators – particularly country of birth, language spoken at home and religion – presented as less reliable indicators of ethnicity. Ancestry will thus function as the chosen ethno-cultural criterion to interrogate the “success”, or otherwise, of Australia’s multicultural society.

5.3.0 Challenges to data collection

One of the most interesting but least discussed findings of the 2016 Census cultural diversity data was the high proportion of persons who did not provide a response, and the proportion of those in minority ethnic/cultural groups who eschewed the pre-designated categories to give non-standard responses in the free text fields (ABS 2016). For example, in the 2016 Census, there were two responses allowed under the ‘Ancestry’ criteria – Ancestry First Response and Ancestry Second Response. Over 1.6 million persons, or almost 7% of the population, entered a description against ‘Not Stated’ and almost 100,000 persons, 0.43%, against ‘Supplementary codes’ where they either ‘inadequately described’ their ancestry, or described them in a manner not part of the ABS’s classification. These include ‘Eurasian’, ‘Asian’, ‘African’, ‘European’, ‘Caucasian’ or ‘Creole’. The results would imply that a notable proportion of the population who could not find a satisfactory category or, for whatever reason(s), chose not to state their ancestry; while a smaller proportion found the categories provided by the ABS inadequate and decided to provide their own identification label, or did not fully understand the Census instructions in this collection criterion. It is not possible to say exactly what proportion of the total in the Census 2016 are of mixed ethnicity/culture.

How the size of the mixed group will change in the future is difficult to determine. It substantially depends on the rates of intermarriage in the different cultural/ethnic groups, the number of children born to inter-ethnic/cultural couples, and how those children choose to identify their ethnic group. It will also depend on how the children of those with mixed ancestries – the ‘superdiversity’ groups (Vertovec 2007) – choose to identify in terms of their ethnic/cultural groups.

5.4.0 Conclusion

Australian society is culturally diverse. Population-wise the diversity is numerically dominated by European cultures. This diversity is likely to increase in response to current trends in society and unforeseen pressures. Statistical ethno-cultural data from the ABS Census 2016 data confirms and projects Australia’s multiculturalism will continue in the foreseeable future even without migration. The numbers present a highly diverse nation in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, religion and Indigenous status. The population remains biased towards European ancestries but with a trend of increasing numbers of people with Asian ancestries. The proportion of Indigenous Australians, while still numerically a very small minority, is also increasing and projected to increase into the future.

Nearly one in three Australians are first generation migrants to Australia and one in four Australians speak a non-English language at home. Although one in two Australians have either one, or both, parents born overseas; however, the overseas countries they were borne in are likely to be within Europe and the UK (ABS 2017e). From the mid-1970s when the WAP was formally abolished, migration patterns have changed, both in the number of migrants and the country or region where migrants to Australia are from. The number of migrants from Asia began to increase and this pattern has continued over the last four decades. Over the same period, migration from New Zealand and Europe including the UK and Ireland have steadied.

Looking ahead, the projection for the Australian demographic is increasing diversification, where Australians will have, or identify with, more than the two ancestries allowed on the

census form. The challenges of measuring this increasing diversity will confront statistical and other agencies. New conceptual approaches may be required. Finding ways of capturing the dynamic, multifaceted and, sometimes, fractured identities of Australia's ethno-cultural groups in the decades to come will require a continuing, sustained and multidisciplinary research effort. Furthermore, increasing ethno-cultural diversification of the population will also bring forth further challenges to the government's management of cultural diversity, particularly in terms of balancing the competing demands of a highly diverse society, without pandering to any of the racist forces that continue to exist.

Chapter 6

INTERROGATING THE ‘SUCCESS’ OF MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA (INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE)

6.0.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the demographic diversity of Australia using Australia’s 2016 Census. The results substantiated one component of the Australian government’s claim: that is, the demographics of the Australian population could be described as ‘multicultural’. As to the second element of the government’s claim, of being ‘the most successful’, there remains a conceptual fog as to what the government means by the term “success”. The government’s multicultural statement, *Multicultural Australia: Strong, United, Successful*, provides no further illumination on its claim. Parsing out components that obviously contribute to the government’s claim of success could have helped ameliorated some of the confusion.

Without any substantiation to its claim, the Australian government opens itself to remonstrations from scholars, social commentators, researchers and others. Jakubowicz (2017b) rebuked the government’s Multicultural Statement as being ‘bereft of new ideas or policies’. Colvin (2017) noted the irony and contradiction in the government announcing its Multicultural Statement on the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, while ignoring racism in the Statement’s content. Moreover, the government discussed proposed changes to dilute Australia’s racial discrimination law on this very day. Tons (2017) illustrated the similarity between the government’s statement and Rawls’ articulation of justice, while highlighting the disparity between the Statement and the government’s lack of action on social justice. Levey (2019b) argued the government’s Multicultural Statement reflects a ‘post-multiculturalism’ mentality, absolving the government from further action on the issue.

A successful society is a desirable goal for most, if not all, governments. However, there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes a “successful society”. The addition of the modifier “multicultural” can add further complexity to the issue. If the philosophy of multiculturalism theoretically aims to attenuate economic, social and political disparities, disaggregating and distinguishing the different components or social phenomena that constitute a society help clarify assessments. They allow scrutiny of Australia’s implementation of multiculturalism as a social policy across a range of societal areas and assist with determining the veracity of Australia’s claim to exceptionalism.

As discussed in Chapter 4, this thesis examines three aspects of Australian society – resources, recognition and representation – to interrogate the success, or otherwise, of Australia’s multicultural society. It interprets and reframes the four elements of Berry and Kalin’s (1995) proposition of a successful multicultural society. The underpinning core principle is to embrace ethnocultural plurality as a valuable resource, by the different ethnocultural groups as well as society the broader society. Difference, in terms of ethnicity or culture, should not be a barrier to access full and equitable participation in society. Underpinning all this are the three principles of democratic success as outlined in the research question in Chapter 2.

In this chapter, I interrogate the government’s claim of “success” from an external cross-national comparative perspective, with special reference to Australia. The focus is on exploring the following four dimensions of Australia’s national development: (a) economic participation; (b) multicultural policy; (c) state of democracy; and, (d) human development. These four aspects reflect the state of inclusion and participation in Australia’s multicultural society under multiculturalism compared with similar liberal democracies.

Section 1 examines Australia’s standing in international indices with respect to economic inequality through the World Bank Gini Index and the OECD Gini coefficient on income inequality. Section 2 examines Australia’s multiculturalism and integration policies compared to other liberal democracies utilising the MCP and the MIPEX. The MCP contains two components; one evaluates ‘multiculturalism policies related to immigrant

minorities' (Multiculturalism Policy Index n.d. (a), para. 1), while the other evaluates 'multiculturalism policies related to Indigenous peoples' (Multiculturalism Policy Index n.d.(b), para. 1). The section is then followed by scrutiny of the state of Australia's society through the WVS on political and sociocultural change. Section 3 investigates the state of Australia's democracy from the perspective of the EIU Democracy Index and the GPI. Finally, section 4 looks at Australia's development through the United Nation's HDI.

6.0.2 *Australia's international standing*

The Australian government's assertion that 'Australia is the most successful multicultural society in the world' suggests it has relied upon comparisons to arrive at this conclusion, with Australia being at the apex of the international field of nations. However, the Australian government's lack of explanation regarding the basis of this contention makes analysis a moot point. Furthermore, the concept of a "successful society" is fundamentally complex. Different scholarly disciplines offer their own perspective on what constitutes "success" and the frameworks used to define that success. The addition of diversity, in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and so on – elements that make up a "multicultural society" – further compounds that complexity. This chapter investigates Australia's international standing in an attempt to unmask the bases, if any, of the Australian government's claim.

To determine a nation's state of affairs, a plethora of indices proliferate in the international arena providing different aspects of a country to measure myriad conceivable facets of the national development (Data World 2015; IPI Global Observatory 2016). These indices allow nation to nation and region-based comparisons, as well as permitting global ranking. In a world often woven together by global trading forces, economics has long dominated as the measure of national success. At the same time, there have also been decades-old challenges to economic measures, for example, the GDP, as a measure of national success. For instance, the United Nations has developed the HDI, and the Kingdom of Bhutan insists on aiming to maximise for "gross national happiness". The GDP is under siege for a number of reasons. Notably even on its own terms, it is inevitably flawed in attempting to use a single-digit to represent vast, complex systems that constitute a society. Even at its basic,

when measuring economic activity, it fails to include unpaid work. The GDP also neglects to take into account the impact of many other factors including societal, environmental, governance and sustainability, to name a few.

The recognition of the GDP as providing an incomplete picture of the state of a nation has culminated in alternative metrics being developed to evaluate a nation's progress. In interrogating the "success" of Australia's multicultural society, this research will focus on exploring Australia's international standing with respect to its economy, multicultural policy, state of democracy and human development for the period from 2006 to 2016. These four elements largely incorporate Berry and Kalin's (1995) proposition for a successful multicultural society discussed earlier in Chapter 4: where all ethno-cultural groups are able participate in a fair and equitable way in the wider society while also maintaining their traditional cultural heritage and identity.

For the purpose of this research, Australia is being compared to "like-minded" countries – the Anglophone countries of New Zealand, Canada, UK and US – with similar political systems, and nations with multicultural policies discussed earlier in Chapter 2 of this research, the Netherlands and Sweden. The key focus is to determine whether Australia is so distinctive in the four above-mentioned aspects to be investigated – economic participation, multicultural policy, state of democracy and human development – to warrant the claim, 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'.

As a capitalist country with a multicultural population, distribution of its economic "success" is one indication of the economic participation of Australia's diverse constituents. It is also a barometer of economic inequality. Socio-cultural policy provides a means of focus on the legitimacy and fairness of the society. Political participation looks to effectiveness of the democracy, and a peaceable (or conflicted) society reflects an overall internal state of security and safety. These normative approaches are necessary because they help identify important elements and the underlying values of Australia's society. However, alone they are insufficient and provide only a restricted view, or angle, of that society. The

problem remains that there is no consensus on any one framework that can identify a “successful multicultural society”.

6.03 *Limitations*

Global indices measure qualities that are difficult to quantify. Moreover, methodologies often change from year to year, as they seek to improve the product they produce; therefore, sometimes multiyear comparisons can be invalid if the comparison is for Australia only. However, analysing Australia as part of a “cohort” of “like-minded” nations – Canada, New Zealand, UK, US, and Netherlands and Sweden – helps reduce the significance of these variations in methodology. They reflect Australia’s cultural kin or Anglophone countries, and liberal democracies that have adopted multiculturalism to manage their diverse societies. Moreover, examinations of the methodologies of the global indices chosen, EIU Democracy Index, GPI, MCP, MIPEx, etc. have been undertaken, and where methodologies have been modified, these have been noted.

ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

6.1.0 World Bank Gini Index and OECD Gini coefficient on income inequality

The World Bank’s research arm, the Development Research Group, produces the Gini Index, which ‘measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.... [Hypothetically] a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality [all households having an equal share of income], while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality [one household having all the income and the rest having none]’ (World Bank 2019, para. 1). The Gini Index provides a convenient summary measure of the degree of inequality. Another instrument is the OECD Gini coefficient, which is ‘based on the comparison of cumulative proportions of the population against cumulative proportions of income they receive...it ranges between 0 in the case of perfect equality and 1 in the case of perfect inequality’ (OECD 2019, para. 1). Gini coefficient measures relative, not

absolute, wealth. Both are commonly-used as a gauge of economic inequality, measuring income distribution or, less commonly, wealth distribution among a population.


The OECD defines income:

as household disposable income in a particular year. It consists of earnings, self-employment and capital income and public cash transfers; income taxes and social security contributions paid by households are deducted. The income of the household is attributed to each of its members, with an adjustment to reflect differences in needs for households of different sizes (OECD 2018, para. 1).

Data on the distribution of income or consumption comes from nationally representative household surveys (OECD 2019).


Graphs 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 below chart Australia's Gini Index (World Bank) and Gini coefficient (OECD) on income inequality in comparison with Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US. Unfortunately, data for New Zealand were not available for the World Bank Gini Index.

Graph 6.1.1: Australia's Gini Index vs Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2004-2014)




[Source: Branko L. Milanovic, All the Ginis Dataset, World Bank Group 2016]

Graph 6.1.2: Australia's World Bank Gini Index on income inequality vs Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2015



[Source: World Bank 2016]

Graph 6.1.3: Australia's Gini coefficient (income inequality) vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006 – 2016)



[Source: OECD 2018]

For both the World Bank Estimate of Gini Index and the OECD Gini coefficient for income inequality, Australia's position from 2010 to 2017 was in the mid-range with respect to the nations compared. In fact, according to the World Bank Gini Index income inequality in Australia edged closer towards being the second most unequal, only ranking above the US. Among the nations being compared, Sweden had the lowest income inequality.

Studies in recent decades have pointed to the salience of income disparity in impacting on the individual, society and national growth. Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) found a direct association between greater income disparity and poorer population health in developed nations. Countries with greater income disparity tend to have higher rates of obesity, imprisonment, violence, chronic stress and diminished social cohesion and trust (Pickett and Wilkinson 2015); higher infant mortality (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Pabayo et al. 2019); poorer dental health (Peres 2015); and, the disparity impacted values and attitudes especially concerning religion and the family (Pryor 2012). Individuals on the lower end of the income spectrum were most affected by income inequality. They were likely to suffer more conditions associated with lower socioeconomic status, with an increase in stress associated with being on the lower end of the income spectrum, which was associated with unhealthy behaviours and outcomes such as smoking, higher alcohol consumption and poor health (Dunn 2010).

The importance of income inequality becomes even more pertinent in multicultural societies where gender, ethnicity, race, or religion, could be barriers to economic participation. Such saliency was reflected in Australia's considerably low score of 58 out of 100 on market mobility policy area of the International Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX – see Section 6.2.2 below).

SOCIETY

6.2.0 Socio-cultural policies for a multicultural society

6.2.1 *Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) of Queen's University*

Canadian scholars on multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, developed the Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index as an attempt to monitor 'the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western democracies' (Queen's University n.d., para. 1; Tolley 2011). The MCP Index scores a nation's "multiculturalism policies" and ranks the nation on those policies in accordance to eight "indicators":

- (1) Affirmation of multiculturalism by government;
- (2) Adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum;
- (3) Inclusion of ethnic representation in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
- (4) Exemptions or accommodation of dress codes on religious grounds;
- (5) Allowing dual citizenship;
- (6) Funding of ethnic group organisations or activities;
- (7) Funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and,
- (8) Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

A nation is awarded a score between zero to one point for each of the eight indicators: a 'No' (0 point), 'Partially/Limited' (0.5 point), or 'Yes' (1 point). The maximum total score a country could achieve is eight points (one point for each indicator), and the minimum is zero point (Tolley 2011, pp. 5-6). The MCP Index is only available to the year 2010.

As a multicultural society with multicultural policies since the late 1970s, Australia was ranked highest on the MCP Index in 2010 having achieved the highest possible score of 8 (Tolley 2011, p. 3). **Graph 6.2.1(a)** below illustrates Australia's position with respect to the

21 “Western democracies” under monitor in the MCP Index with respect to ‘immigrant minorities’ (Queen’s University n.d.; Tolley 2011, p. 3).

Graph 6.2.1(a): Australia on the Multiculturalism Policy Index for Immigrant Minorities

MULTICULTURALISM POLICY INDEX



[Source: Queen’s University n.d.]

A notable number of identifiable deficiencies were contained in the score awarded to Australia on the MCP Index. The most evident was the fact that the MCP Index was available only up to the year 2010, which meant a decade of developments since 2010 have not been included. A deeper scrutiny into the MCP’s methodology and the evidence relied upon to derive at Australia’s score revealed a level of reliance on the multicultural policies and frameworks of Australia’s States and Territories (Tolley 2011, pp. 9-10, 12-13). Importantly, with the rules for ranking multiculturalism policies on a trichotomy basis of zero, half or one, the MCP Index treated all criteria equally, irrespective of the degree or extent of government support, or amount of funding available. For example, Australia was awarded a full one point on the criteria of ‘the funding for ethnic group organisations or activities’. This was despite recognising that the Australian federal government funding for

this area of the policy was a one-off funding and specifically excluded multicultural events (Tolley 2011, p. 11-12).

Overall, the MCP Index on policies related to immigrant minorities presented as a documentary-led examination of multicultural policies, rather than an assessment of policies of multiculturalism. As mentioned, it erroneously incorporated the multicultural policies and frameworks of Australian States and Territories as part of Australia's overall multiculturalism policy, and treated Australia's national multicultural policies as a continuous exercise rather than newer policies updating and/or superseding previous ones. By doing so, the MCP Index presented as an evaluation that focused on policy areas to award points, or 'the presence or absence of a range of multiculturalism policies' (MCP n.d., para. 3) rather than an objective and impartial tool to assess the compliance of a nation's multicultural policies with the objectives and goals of multiculturalism.

Importantly, the MCP treats policies with respect to 'migrant minorities' and 'Indigenous peoples' separately. This is notwithstanding that both groups, particularly those that fall within the parameters of racialised minorities, share significant commonalities in terms of racial discrimination, power inequality and lack of representation in Australia's institutions of authority (Markus 2007-2019; AHRC 2016, 2018).

Prior to the 1990s Indigenous Australians were not included into Australia's multicultural policies. This was considered positive development given they are not a migrant group. But Australia's multicultural policies failed to incorporate the basic fundamental rights afforded under human rights principles, let alone the unique needs of Indigenous people.

In evaluating multiculturalism policies related to Indigenous peoples, the MCP employs nine indicators that appear to be addressing issues specifically relevant to Indigenous peoples. They are (Tolley 2011):

- (1) Recognition of land rights/title;
- (2) Recognition of self-government rights;
- (3) Upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties;

- (4) Recognition of cultural rights (language, hunting/fishing, religion);
- (5) Recognition of customary law;
- (6) Guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government;
- (7) Constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of Indigenous peoples;
- (8) Support/ratification for international instruments on Indigenous rights; and,
- (9) Affirmative action.

The MCP index on policies for Indigenous peoples employs the same methodology as that of its index on immigrant minorities. A nation is awarded a score between zero to one point for each of the nine indicators listed: a ‘No’ (0 point), ‘Partially/Limited’ (0.5 point), or ‘Yes’ (1 point). The maximum total score a country could achieve is nine points (one point for each indicator), and the minimum is zero points. The MCP Index related to Indigenous peoples is only available for the years, 1980, 2000 and 2010. **Table 6.2.1(b)** below displays Australia’s scores compared to the nine other nations monitored under the Multiculturalism Policy Index for Indigenous peoples for the years 1980, 2000 and 2010.

Table 6.2.1(b): Australia on the Multiculturalism Policy Index for Indigenous Peoples

	TOTAL SCORE		
	1980	2000	2010
Australia	1	4.5	6
Canada	5.5	7	8.5
Denmark	6	7	7
Finland	3.5	3.5	4
Japan	0	1	3
New Zealand	6	7	7.5
Norway	0.5	4	5
Sweden	1	2	3
United States	7.5	7.5	8

[Source: Queen’s University n.d.: Multiculturalism Policies for Indigenous Peoples, Table 1]

The results showed Australia achieved an overall score of six out of nine in 2010, placing it in the mid-ranking among the nine nations compared. Canada had the best score of eight and one half out of nine, followed by the US at eight points. It is not surprising New Zealand achieved a better result than Australia with a score of seven out of nine. The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 provides foundational protection of Maori rights. Notwithstanding that, its implementation has been problematic until the establishment of the Treaty of Waitangi Commission in 1975 to enforce the principles written therein.

Among the nine nations under assessment, Japan and Sweden scored the worst achieving a paltry score of three out of nine each, respectively. Examining the breakdown of the scores of each of the nine indicators helps to provide the granularity of areas in which Australia had done well, as well as detailing the areas needing improvement. **Table 6.2.1(c)** below illustrates the breakdown of scores for each of the nine indicators for the years 1980, 2000 and 2010.

Table 6.2.1(c): Multiculturalism Policy for Indigenous Peoples – Scores for each indicator, Australia vs other nations

		Australia	Canada	Denmark	Finland	Japan	NZ	Norway	Sweden	US
Land Rights	1980	0	1	1	0	0	0.5	0	0	1
	2000	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
	2010	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.5	0	1
Self-Government Rights	1980	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	1
	2000	0.5	1	1	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1
	2010	0.5	1	1	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1
Treaties	1980	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	2000	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	2010	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Cultural	1980	0.5	1	1	1	0	1	0	0.5	1
	2000	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	1
	2010	1	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	1
Customary	1980	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
	2000	0.5	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
	2010	0.5	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
Rep. in Central Government	1980	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0.5
	2000	1	0	1	1	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0.5
	2010	1	1	1	1	0.5	1	1	0.5	1
Distinct Status	1980	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.5	0.5	1
	2000	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.5	1
	2010	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.5	1
International Instr	1980	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2000	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	2010	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0
Affirmative	1980	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	2000	1	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	1
	2010	1	1	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	1
TOTAL	1980	1	5.5	6	3.5	0	6	0.5	1	7.5
	2000	4.5	7	7	3.5	1	7	4	2	7.5
	2010	6	8.5	7	4	3	7.5	5	3	8

[Source: Queen's University n.d.: Multiculturalism Policies for Indigenous Peoples, Table 2]

The results showed Australia performed well with respect to 'land rights', 'cultural rights' and 'affirmative action', scoring one point for each indicator. However, Australia performed

poorly on ‘treaties’, receiving a zero point for this indicator. For the remaining five indicators – support or ratification of international instruments, self-government rights, distinct status, recognition of customary law and representation or consultation in central government – Australia scored partial points for each indicator, respectively. In fact, based on current 2020 evidence, Australia would likely receive a lower score than the allocated total score of six out of nine points achieved in 2010. Since 2010, Australia has retreated on two main policy areas – customary law and representation in central government, highlighted in red in **Table 6.2.1(c)** above – in which some points were awarded in 2010. Firstly, the federal government rejected the *Uluru Statement from the Heart* in 2017 and the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples closed in 2019 (Karp 2018; Gordon 2017; Allam 2019; Morgan 2019). The federal government established a new National Indigenous Australians Agency within the portfolio of the Minister of Indigenous Affairs (Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2019). Such measure is contrary to the wishes of Indigenous Australians who instead chose a direct voice to the national parliament via the *Uluru Statement from the Heart* after a lengthy consultative process (*Uluru Statement* n.d.). The consequence is that Indigenous Australians no longer have a direct voice or representation in central government, and the previously allocated one point should be reduced to a partial zero point five score.

Furthermore, despite previous reports by the Australian Law Reform Commission (1986) recommending the recognition of Indigenous customary law, implementation is still yet to take place (Wood 2016). The previously awarded score of half a point in 2010 would likely be reduced to zero. Consequently, the retreat in these two policy areas suggests if a new assessment were made based on 2020 evidence, Australia would probably achieve a total score of five out of nine.

6.2.2 *International Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)*

Another international policy index relevant to measuring the “success” of Australia’s multicultural society is the MIPEX. According to its website, the MIPEX:

...measures [a nation's] policies to integrate migrants...using 167 policy indicators...to create a rich, multidimensional picture of migrants' opportunities to participate in society [of the 38 countries analysed] (MIPEx 2015, paras. 1-2).


In other words, the MIPEx is a tool to compare and evaluate what the participating 38 governments – comprising of all European Union member states, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway Switzerland, Turkey and the USA – are doing to promote migrant integration in their respective nations. In addition to the 167 indicators, eight policy areas are also included in the MIPEx. Overall, the MIPEx provides a significantly more comprehensive suite of factors to evaluate migrant integration policy than the MCP Index on immigrant minorities. Below is a brief MIPEx explanation of the eight policy areas assessed for migrant integration and the relevant policy indicators (MIPEx 2015, 'Policies'):

- (1) Labour market mobility assesses whether migrants have equal rights and opportunities to access jobs and to improve their skills;
- (2) Family reunion assesses how easily migrants can reunite with their family including the right to work for families;
- (3) Education looks at whether the domestic education system is responsive to the needs of the children of migrants;
- (4) Health assesses whether the local health system is responsive to the needs of migrants and their families;
- (5) Political participation assesses whether migrants have comparable rights and opportunities to participate in political life. MIPEx considers promoting migrants' political participation to reflect a nation's confidence of immigration;
- (6) Permanent residence assesses the ease/difficulty that migrants face in becoming a permanent resident, where gaining permanent residency provides the security path to full citizenship and in better integration outcome;

- (7) Access to nationality assesses the ease/difficulty migrants face in becoming citizens, and views citizenship as boosting other integration outcomes; and,
- (8) Anti-discrimination assesses whether protection measures exist for racial/ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination in all areas of life.


The most up to date MIPeX ranking for Australia was for 2014. Australia ranked eighth out of 38, with an overall MIPeX score of 66 out of 100. Within the eight policy areas assessed under the MIPeX, Australia scored well in the policy areas of education and anti-discrimination (76 and 74, respectively), but scored poorly in the policy areas of permanent residency and labour market mobility (54 and 58, respectively). **Graph 6.2.2(a)** and **Table 6.2.2** below show Australia's MIPeX scores across the eight policy areas evaluated for 2014.

Graph 6.2.2(a): Australia's 2014 MIPeX scores



[Source: MIPeX 2015 – Australia]


Table 6.2.2: Australia's 2014 MIPEx scores across the eight policy areas



[Source: MIPEx 2015 – Australia]

As an international policy assessment tool, the MIPEx enabled comparison of Australia's scores to those of other Anglophone countries and nations with multicultural policies. The results showed that as of 2014, Australia sat in the mid-range across all eight MIPEx policy areas among the seven nations compared, falling below both Sweden (which ranked first) and New Zealand (which ranked third). The UK was the worst performer, among the seven nations compared, with a rank of 15th. **Graph 6.2.2(b)** below charts Australia's MIPEx ranking and scores relative to New Zealand, Canada, UK, US, Netherlands and Sweden across the eight policy areas for 2014.

Graph 6.2.2(b): Australia's 2014 MIPEX score and ranking vs New Zealand, Canada, UK, US, Netherlands and Sweden




[Source: MIPEX 2015 – Countries]

A comparative timeline perspective can provide a broader picture of Australia's MIPEX position relative to the other nations discussed in this research. Unfortunately, MIPEX publicly available data was only available for the years 2010 to 2014, which did not cover the European immigration crisis from North Africa and the Middle East that has taken place since 2015. Since then European nations, including Sweden and the Netherlands, have tightened their respective migration policies and imposed restrictive border controls (Skodo 2018; van Selm 2019). These policy changes likely have impacted, and might well change, the assessment of these two countries. An update of the MIPEX data is scheduled for the end of 2020 but is beyond the timeframe of this research. Overall, Australia consistently achieved average MIPEX scores of just above the mid 60s across the timeframe concerned, while both Canada and New Zealand achieved average scores in the early 70s. Sweden was the best performer across this period, consistently achieving the overall average score of 80.

Graph 6.2.2(c) below provides illustration of Australia’s position (overall average scores) with respect to New Zealand, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden UK and US for the period between 2010 and 2014.

Graph 6.2.2(c): Australia’s MIPEx scores vs New Zealand, Canada, UK, US, Netherlands and Sweden (2010-2014)



[Source: MIPEx 2015 – Time Explorer]

6.2.3 State of social relations – World Values Survey

Australia is a participant in the WVS, ‘a crossnational, crosscultural comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe’ (Sheppard, McAllister and Makkai 2018, para. 1). The WVS consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in almost 100 countries, using a common questionnaire. Each question on the survey contains responses that are either ranked in a Likert scale or respondents are asked to choose from a list of applicable responses. The results are collated from when an item on the list of answers is chosen (“mentioned”), or not

(“not mentioned”). The WVS collects data regarding various dimensions of a whole range of issues most of which are related to attitudes toward democracy.

Known in Australia as the Australian Values Survey (AVS), the study investigates political and sociocultural change in Australia. Two of the elements the WVS explores are ethno-racial and ethno-religious prejudice. As a multicultural country, the values and attitudes of Australians, toward new migrants and ethnic and religious diversity impact on the success of its society. Clearly, a civil environment of shared attitudes of tolerance of difference and respect for diversity contribute to social cohesion. Conversely, prejudice hinders economic and political participation and can be a source of conflict. The WVS data are collected in five-yearly ‘waves’ since 1981. The latest data, from “wave 7” (2015 – 2018) is currently unavailable as the survey is still being conducted. With data for Canada and the UK missing, “wave 6” (2010 – 2014) of the survey data is unsuitable for the purpose of this research. Instead, “wave 5” (2005 – 2009) will be used in this section’s analysis. In addition, data from Evans and Kelley’s (2019) investigation into ethno-religious prejudice within the European Union and UK will also be utilised.

Evans and Kelley’s (2019) investigation employed data from the WVS (2015) and the European Values Study datasets (EVS 2015), comparing responses from the UK to those of the European Union nations and the world. The full dataset they relied on contained over 340 surveys and over 100 countries with over 500,000 individual respondents (Evans and Kelley 2019, p. 3). Their investigation included data which was not the focus for their analysis and discussion on but proved pertinent to Australia’s situation. Comparison of Evans and Kelley’s (2019) datasets showed they were accurate copies of the WVS “wave 5” (2005 – 2009) data and were more complete, containing additional data not available from the WVS data site (Inglehart et al. 2014). Owing to these reasons and for greater accuracy, an initial attempt was made to obtain the original data from the WVS site. Where the WVS “wave 5” data was unavailable, then data were drawn from Evans and Kelley’s (2019) investigation.

Data sought were for Australia, US, UK, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The purpose was primarily to explore multiple specific examples of ethno-religious and ethno-racial prejudice of Australians through considering the proportions of respondents who would reject specific groups as neighbours. The results provided ‘a kind of social epidemiology of prejudice’ (Evans and Kelly 2019, p. 4) for Australia and also allowed comparisons between Australia and the peer nations mentioned to be discussed.

6.2.3.1 *A note on terminology*

Scholars have used a variety of terms to denote negative feelings toward ethno-religious minorities by the dominant majority group. They included terms such as ‘social distance’, ‘aversion’ and ‘group-focused enmity’ (Evans and Kelley 2019, p. 3, citing Park and Burgess 1921, Park 1924; Zick et al. 2008). For the analysis of this section, I have adopted Evans and Kelley’s terminology of prejudice (2019, p. 2) which focused on negative feelings toward immigrant, racial and/ or religious minority groups. The key questions on prejudice in the WVS concerned objecting to a member of a possible minority outgroup as a neighbour. For the purpose of this analysis, the relevant items within the WVS “wave 5” (2005-2009) were those questions about people whom the respondents would reject as neighbours. They included ‘people of a different race’, ‘immigrant/foreign workers’, ‘people of a different religion’ and ‘people who speak a different language’ (WVS 2014, V35, V37, V39 and V43, respectively). These were questions reflecting characteristics in which the general population were likely to regard as a marker of, or equivalent to, a different ethnicity.

6.2.4 *Overall prejudice scale and ranking*

Evans and Kelley (2019) listed the mean levels of prejudice against immigrants and other races for the 100 countries surveyed in the WVS as well as their relative ranking (Evans and Kelly 2019, pp. 12-14). The data has been reproduced in **Table 6.2.4** below for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US. The results showed that within the overall ranking on prejudice, Australia ranked eighth out of the 100 countries surveyed

in the WVS. New Zealand ranked the highest at fifth on the ladder, while Canada ranked ninth just below Australia. Among the seven nations compared, the Netherlands and UK ranked lowest at 20th and 23rd places, respectively (Evans and Kelley 2019, p. 12).

Table 6.2.4: Summary of prejudice against immigrants, other religions and other races

Rank (mean prejudice): 1 = least	Nation	Prejudice scale (immigrant & race)	Prejudice against:			Discrimination against foreigners
			Other religions	Other races	Immigrants	
1	Argentina	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.72
2	Trinidad & Tobago	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.87
5	NZ	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.61
8	Australia	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.52
9	Canada	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.55
11	Sweden	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.23
14	US	0.09	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.62
20	Netherlands	0.11	0.03	0.08	0.14	0.38
23	UK	0.11	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.62

[Source: Evans and Kelley 2019, p. 12 and Appendix A]

Legend:

- = Anglophone countries
- = liberal democracies with multicultural policies
- = Anglophone countries with multiculturalism

Scale 0.01 = 1 %

6.2.5 *Prejudice against people of a different religion*

With respect to prejudice against other religions, data was derived from responses to the WVS survey question (V39) on individuals who would not like to have as neighbours ‘people with different religion’. Unfortunately, data for New Zealand on this question was not available in the WVS site. It was unclear why this anomaly of missing data existed in the WVS website and why no explanation was available for it. Nonetheless, data for New Zealand was available in Evans and Kelley’s investigation (Evans and Kelley 2019, Appendix A), reproduced in **Table 6.2.4** above for all the seven nations compared. Based on the results, which were expressed as decimal digits rather than percentage, New Zealand scored the best among the 100 countries surveyed in the WVS. One percent (0.01) of New Zealand respondents indicated they ‘did not like having as neighbours people of different religion’. Canada, Sweden and the UK were placed in the middle at two percent (0.02), while Australia, Netherlands and the US sat on the lowest scale at three percent (0.03) (Evans and Kelley 2019, Appendix A). **Table 6.2.4** above also showed the results, per country, of the percentage of respondents who answered this specific question.

When comparisons were made for the six nations (excluding New Zealand) using the two datasets (Evans and Kelley 2019 and WVS “wave 5” data), the results presented slight discrepancies, most noticeably for Sweden. That being stated, if a general rounding (up or down) of the figures in the WVS data was made to the nearest two figures after the decimal point, then the results were comparable. The only exception was Sweden. **Table 6.2.5** below produces the results for the six nations – Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US – for both Evans and Kelley’s data and the WVS data on the question of ethno-religious prejudice. Sweden’s results showed 1.2 percent of respondents in the WVS reflected ethno-religious prejudice while on Evans and Kelley’s (2019) data, the level was two percent. The plausible explanation for the difference may be the sources of data Evans and Kelley (2019) relied upon for their investigation which included both the WVS and the European Values Survey where the final data was a mean pooled average (Evans and Kelley 2019, p. 3).

Table 6.2.5: Prejudice against people of a different religion

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

V39 - Neighbours: People of a different religion

	TOTAL	Country/region					
		Australia	Canada	Netherlands	Sweden	UK	US
Mentioned	2.2	2.8	2.1	2.8	1.2	1.8	2.5
Not mentioned	97.7	97.2	97.9	97.2	98.8	98.2	96.9
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.6
(N)	7.928	1.421	2.164	1.05	1.003	1.041	1.249

[Source: WVS Wave 5: 2005-2009]

Evans and Kelley's (2019) data	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03
--------------------------------	------	------	------	------	------	------

[Source: Evans and Kelley (2019), Appendix A]

6.2.6 Prejudice against people of a different race

Australia's results for racial prejudice placed it in the mid-range among the seven nations compared. Approximately five percent of Australians indicated they 'did not like having as neighbours people of a different race' in both the WVS (WVS 2014, V35) and Evans and Kelley's data (2019, Appendix A). New Zealand, Canada and Sweden all scored better than Australia with a lower percentage of respondents indicating racial prejudice. The UK and US (in Evans and Kelley's (2019) data), both have scores worse than Australia. Irrespective of which set of data is used, the Netherlands scored the worst of all seven nations analysed

with almost eight percent of respondents reflecting racial prejudice. **Table 6.2.6** below shows the results from both the WVS “wave 5” (2005-2009) and data from Evans and Kelley’s (2019) investigation.

Table 6.2.6: Prejudice against people of a different race

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

V35 - Neighbours: People of a different race

	TOTAL	Country/region						
		Australia	Canada	Netherlands	NZ	Sweden	UK	US
Mentioned	3.9	4.5	2.2	7.7	4.1	1.4	4.8	4
Not mentioned	96	95.5	97.8	92.3	95.9	98.6	95.2	95.4
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.6
(N)	8.882	1.421	2.164	1.05	954	1.003	1.041	1.249

[Source: WVS Wave 5: 2005-2009]

Evans and Kelley’s
(2019) data

0.05	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.07
------	------	------	------	------	------	------

[Source: Evans and Kelley (2019), Appendix A]

6.2.7 *Prejudice against foreign immigrants/workers*

On the issue of prejudice against immigrants, **Table 6.2.7** below provides the results for both the WVS data (2005-2009) and Evans and Kelley’s (2019, Appendix A) investigation. Although there were discrepancies in the results between the two data sets, particularly for New Zealand, the Netherlands and Sweden, however, the findings for Australia were consistent. Australia again ranked in the mid-range of the seven nations analysed. Approximately six percent of Australian respondents indicated they did not like having as

neighbours ‘immigrants/foreigners’ (WVS 2014, V35). The results showed both Canada and Sweden had better scores than Australia, while the UK, US and the Netherlands had worse results. The UK presented as the most discriminatory against immigrants among the seven nations analysed. Thirteen percent of UK respondents in the Evans and Kelley (2019) data and fourteen percent in the WVS survey, respectively, indicated they ‘did not like having as neighbours, immigrants’ (WVS 2014, V35). The Netherlands and the US also did not score well in both datasets. Fourteen percent (Evans and Kelley 2019) and almost nine percent (WVS 2005-2009) respondents in the Netherlands show prejudice against immigrants, respectively. For the US, eleven percent (Evans and Kelley 2019) and nearly thirteen percent (WVS 2005-2009) of respondents, respectively, indicated they were not favourable to having immigrants as neighbours (Evans and Kelley 2019, Appendix A; WVS 2014, V37).

Table 6.2.7: Prejudice against foreign immigrants/workers

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009								
V37 - Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers								
	TOTAL	Country/region						
		Australia	Canada	Netherlands	NZ	Sweden	UK	US
Mentioned	7.4	5.6	4.1	8.9	7.3	1.8	14.2	12.7
Not mentioned	91.8	94.4	92.8	91.1	92.7	98.2	85.8	86.7
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer	0.8	0	3.1	0	0	0	0	0.6
(N)	8.882	1.421	2.164	1.05	954	1.003	1.041	1.249
Evans and Kelley’s (2019) data		0.06	0.05	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.13	0.11

[Source: WVS Wave 5: 2005-2009; Evans and Kelley (2019), Appendix A]

6.2.8 *Prejudice against people who speak a different language*

Findings from the WVS prejudice inflection corroborated the results on prejudice against immigrants/foreigners. The results for Australia reflected similar patterns for other inflections of prejudice. Approximately 8.7 percent of Australians indicated they ‘did not like having as neighbours people who speak a different language’ (WVS 2005-2009, V43), placing Australia again in the mid-range among the seven countries analysed. Sweden’s results reflected the least prejudice with only 1.2 percent of respondents objecting to having neighbours speaking a foreign language. The Netherlands and the US showed the least favourable results with nearly ten percent of respondents objecting to having neighbours speaking a different language. **Table 6.2.8** displays the results for Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US. Unfortunately, the data for New Zealand was missing. Moreover, Evans and Kelley (2019) did not have data on this inflection of prejudice.

Table 6.2.8: *Prejudice against people who speak a different language*

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

V43 - Neighbours: People who speak a different language

	TOTAL	Country/region					
		Australia	Canada	Netherlands	Sweden	UK	US
Mentioned	6.3	8.7	3.3	9.7	1.2	5.6	10.6
Not mentioned	91.6	86	92.9	90.3	98.8	94.4	88.8
Don’t know	0.2	0	0.8	0	0	0	0
No answer	1.8	5.3	3.1	0	0	0	0
Missing; Unknown	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.6
(N)	7.928	1.421	2.164	1.05	1.003	1.041	1.249

[Source: WVS 2014, Wave 5]

6.2.9 *Willingness to discriminate against foreigners*

Related to the earlier findings on prejudice against ethno-religious and ethno-racial groups were the results that demonstrated the willingness of locals to discriminate against foreigners. Evans and Kelley (2019) found a direct inverse correlation between a nation's gross domestic product and their willingness to discriminate against foreigners, with the higher the GDP, the lower the willingness to discriminate. **Table 6.2.9** below shows the results of the seven countries under analysis with respect to prioritisation of employment when jobs are scarce. Australia again sat in the mid-range among the seven nations analysed. Approximately over half the respondents agreed employers should prioritise employment to local applicants over foreigners when jobs were scarce. Interestingly, the results for the two European Union nations – Netherlands and Sweden – showed lower scales of willingness to discriminate against foreigners on job scarcity than the Anglophone countries. Among all countries analysed, the US had the highest score at 55 percent which was slightly above the other English-speaking countries.

Table 6.2.9: Willingness to discriminate against foreigners

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009								
V45 - Jobs scarce: Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants								
	TOTAL	Country/region						
		Australia	Canada	Netherlands	NZ	Sweden	UK	US
Agree	41	40.8	40.1	38.3	49	11.7	50	55
Neither	15.1	21.5	12.8	9.7	17.7	8.2	10.1	24.4
Disagree	41	35.7	45.1	47.6	27.6	78.9	34.4	19.8
Missing; Not asked by the interviewer	0.2	0	0	0.4	0	0	0.2	0.6
No answer	1.3	2	0	1.6	3.1	1.2	2.2	0.2
Don't know	1.4	0	2	2.3	2.6	0	3.2	0
(N)	8.882	1.421	2.164	1.05	954	1.003	1.041	1.249

[Source: WVS Wave 5: 2005-2009]

Evans and
Kelley's
(2019) data

0.52 0.55 0.38 0.61 0.23 0.62 0.62

[Source: Evans and Kelley 2019, Appendix A]

6.2.10 *Changes in prejudice over time*

Another useful dimension on prejudice was whether it changed over time. The incomplete availability of WVS data made this difficult to analyse. Notwithstanding that, Evans and Kelley (2019, Table 4) provided data on this aspect for the period between 1981 (when the WVS commenced) and 2014. The results are reproduced in **Table 6.2.10** below for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US. Of the seven countries analysed, Australia, the Netherlands and US had noticeable, and statistically relevant, increase in prejudice over a twenty-year period from 1990 to 2010. Over the same period, prejudice in New Zealand and Canada decreased, while there were no changes in Sweden and the UK.

Table 6.2.10: *Changes in prejudice over time*

Nation	Change in prejudice, 1990-2010	
	Amount	Significance
New Zealand	- 0.07	$p < 0.001$
Australia	0.02	$p < 0.01$
Canada	- 0.02	$p < 0.05$
Sweden	0.00	ns
US	0.02	$p < 0.001$
Netherlands	0.02	$p < 0.05$
UK	0.00	ns

[Source: Evans and Kelley 2019]

6.2.11 Importance of teaching children tolerance and respect for other people

While predicting potential prejudice is likely to be fraught with unreliability, nevertheless, one feature of the WVS asked the importance of teaching children the qualities of tolerance and respect for others. The WVS does not define the terms tolerance or respect, and neither of the terms are defined in the national surveys of the seven nations analysed. The terms are thus assumed to refer to their everyday usage and meaning. The results for the seven nations analysed provide interesting reading. The findings showed Australians and the Swedes highly valued these qualities with over 90 percent of respondents agreed tolerance and respect for other people were important in children. On the other hand, the US showed the lowest result at 78 percent. It would appear Americans were less concerned over these qualities in children. **Table 6.2.11** below provides the WVS results for Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK and US on this issue. Evans and Kelley's (2019) study did not explore this issue.

Table 6.2.11: Australia vs Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, UK and US on the importance of teaching tolerance and respect for other people to children

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009								
V16 - Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people								
	TOTAL	Country/region						
		Australia	Canada	Netherlands	NZ	Sweden	UK	US
Important	85.3	91.7	82.6	85.8	82.5	93.6	85.1	78.3
Not mentioned	14.7	8.3	17.4	14.2	17.5	6.4	14.9	21.7
(N)	8.882	1.421	2.164	1.05	954	1.003	1.041	1.249

[Source: WVS Wave 5: 2005-2009]

6.2.12 Data on other specific inflections of prejudice unavailable

The WVS also contained questions on ethnic-specific and/ or religion-specific group prejudices. The surveys covered questions exploring prejudice against Jews, Hindus, Muslims, Christians etc. Findings from these inflections of prejudice would have provided a more detailed picture, perhaps attenuating, strengthening or refuting the other neighbouring prejudice results discussed earlier. Unfortunately these datasets were not available for Australia or New Zealand as they were not part of both countries' national surveys for the WVS.

6.2.13 Australia's overall prejudice patterns against other races, religions and immigrants

Australia's overall pattern of prejudice against other races, religions and immigrants fell within the middle-range among peer nations of Anglophone countries, and liberal democracies that have adopted multiculturalism as diversity management strategy. Among the seven specific inflections, six of which were "neighbouring prejudices" and one 'willingness to discriminate', Australia's results were similar across all patterns and scales of prejudice. The findings were the same for both the WVS data and the dataset drawn from Evans and Kelley's (2019) investigations.

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

6.3.0 Australia's state of democracy

"Australia is a democracy" is a statement that many people, scholars, politicians, and "ordinary" citizens would agree with. The MCP Index listed Australia as one of 21 Western democracies. The MIPEX corroborated this assertion. Clearly, Australia's political system reflects that of a democratic system – a government and legislative body (or parliament) elected by the people, and an independent judicial system or where the rule of law applies. It is an understanding of democracy as popular control over public decision-making and political equality is compatible with different formal and informal institutional

arrangements (Skaaning 2018a, p. 8). Yet it is the very same political system that dispossesses and subjugates its Indigenous people and authorised racial discrimination against non-white people for three quarters of the twentieth century. These measures demonstrate that Australia's version of democracy is not without flaws. This section explores the state of Australia's democracy in the twenty-first century, particularly, given Australia's claim to be 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'.

Measuring the state of the democracy of a nation is complex (Fuchs and Roller 2018; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Fiorino and Ricciuti 2007; Kekic 2007). There is no consensus on what constitutes a democracy despite lively interest from academics, policymakers, activists and citizens around the world on the concept (Wiesner et al. 2019; EIU Democracy Index 2008; Sawyer 2006). An index of "democracy", a broad term, sometimes ill-defined, can be a challenging task without a universal definition (Campbell 2008). Measuring an abstract and contested concept such as democracy to universal consensus is hard, if not impossible. Notwithstanding that, a proliferation of democracy indices currently attempt to measure democracy. They rely on a number of datasets and what they assess as "indicators of democracy" for their measurements and increasingly draw on sophisticated statistical methods of causal inference. Skaaning (2018b) noted that the extant indices of democracy rely generally on four different data typology:

...observational data OD [where data is derived from directly observable facts]...such as turnout rates or the presence or absence of formal political; [judgement-based data in the form of coded indicators employing]...'in-house' IC coding by researchers and/or their assistants based on an assessment of country-specific information found in reports, academic works, newspapers, archival materials, etc.; expert surveys ES, where selected country experts provide an evaluation based on their case-specific knowledge; and representative surveys (RS), where a sample of ordinary citizens provide judgements about particular issues (Skaaning 2018b, p. 106).

Based on these data typologies used to measure democracy, Skaaning (2018b, p. 107) and Coppedge et al. (2017, p. 6) compared a list of indices commonly viewed as asserting to measure democracy, and tabulated the results. They relied on the following criteria for their review: the types of data sources; the number of indicators relied upon; types of indices; years of coverage; and impact as measured by the number of Google searches and Google Scholar citations (the last three criteria listed in Coppedge et al. 2017 only). The results showed that ‘many of the leading democracy indices are insensitive to degradations in the degree or quality of democracy...and fall short of the ideal’ (Coppedge et al. 2017, p. 13). They focused on institutional and procedural characteristics of a democracy rather than based on the perspective of the citizens (Fuchs and Roller 2018).

6.3.1 *Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index*

Whilst other indices might have achieved higher review by Skaaning (2018b) and Coppedge et al. (2017) in certain areas, for the purpose of this research, the Democracy Index compiled by the EIU was assessed as the most suitable tool to measure Australia’s state of democracy. The EIU Democracy Index’s ease of use and extrapolation, providing continuous years of coverage since 2006 and a reasonable number of indicators in its assessment criteria of the state of democracy made it well suited for the purpose of this research. Furthermore, it has been cited by Australian scholars in their submission to the government inquiry in a democratic audit of Australia (Brent, Costar and Kelly 2007). The focus on governance in the Worldwide Governance Indicators made it less suitable for this research (Langbein and Knack 2008, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2011; Thomas 2010; Apaza 2009). The complexity of the data employed by the V-dem index made it difficult to analyse. It employed approximately 400 indicators and five country experts while other democracy indices only used one country expert. The final V-dem data for a specific country was detailed and complex, making it more suitable for the specific purpose of academic studies on democracy. Based on the review by Skaaning (2018b) and Coppedge et al. (2017), the Democracy Barometer index appeared to be the closest parallel to the EIU’s Democracy Index. The Democracy Barometer employed 105 indicators while the EIU’s Democracy

Index utilised 60 indicators for their respective assessments of democracy, and both achieved similar impact via Google searches and Google citations at 5730/173 and 5700/156, respectively (Coppedge et al. 2017, p. 6). However, the Democracy Barometer's more complicated data manipulation feature, which appeared to be targeted for academic studies focusing on democracy, made it less suitable for this particular research (Democracy Barometer 2018).

According to the EIU:


The Democracy Index provides a snapshot of the state of world democracy for 165 independent states and two territories. The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Based on their scores on 60 indicators within these categories, each country is then itself classified as one of four types of regime: full democracy; flawed democracy; hybrid regime; and authoritarian regime (EIU 2018, para. 1).

The five criteria listed were admittedly simplifications with rough categorisations. Moreover, the EIU acknowledged problems with several of their scoring scales because of the difficulties in devising analogous criteria and guidelines. Nonetheless, the EIU integrated public opinion surveys into their index, an attribute that was lacking in many of the other democracy indices (Fuchs and Roller 2018).

Australia consistently stayed in the top ten rankings of the EIU's annual Democracy Index over the past decade. Despite this, Australia also consistently lagged behind New Zealand and Sweden during this period. Australia's Democracy Index rank was consistently in the mid to lower range of the seven nations analysed for the period from 2006 to 2018. Australia achieved its highest rank, at number sixth from 2010 to 2013, during the Gillard Labor government. Since then, Australia's position on the Democracy Index has slid to the current rank of ninth in 2019. The UK's ranking has an increasing trend. The US on the other hand,

continued on a sliding trend, accelerating from 2017 when the Trump presidency commenced to its lowest rank of 25. **Graphs 6.3.1(a)** and **(b)** below show Australia's ranking and scores, respectively, compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US on the EIU's Democracy Index from 2006 (when the Index commenced) to 2018.


Graph 6.3.1(a): Democracy Index (DI) ranking: Australia vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)



[Source: EIU's Democracy Index annual ranking (2006-2018)]

Australia's Democracy Index scores over the same period (2006-2018) reflected its ranking status. The scores placed Australia generally in the mid-range among the seven nations analysed. From the year 2013 onwards, Canada surpassed Australia in terms of Democracy Index scores and ranking. **Graph 6.3.1(b)** below charts Australia's overall Democracy Index scores relative to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US over the period from 2006 to 2018.

Graph 6.3.1(b): Democracy Index scores: Australia vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)



[Source: EIU's Democracy Index (2006-2018)]


Comparative analysis of Australia's scores across the five criteria that the EIU employed to compile the Democracy Index from 2006-2018 provide a more detailed picture including an indication of the areas needing improvement. **Graphs 6.3.2 to 6.3.7** below illustrate Australia's scores with respect to the five criteria (electoral pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties) of the Democracy Index compared with Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US.

6.3.2 Democracy Index criterion 1: Electoral process and pluralism

The Democracy Index's criterion of electoral process and pluralism considers 'whether elections...for the municipal, national legislature and head of government...are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range of choices' (EIU Democracy Index 2008, pp. 20-21). Indicators included transparency of financing for political parties, freedom to associate and form political parties, equality before the law, voting rights and adult

universal suffrage. Australia's scores for the electoral process and pluralism element of the Democracy Index dipped over four points from 2013 to 2016 during the Abbott-Turnbull Coalition government period. With the exception of this period, Australia scored perfect scores of 100 for the other years from 2006 to 2012 and 2017 to 2018. New Zealand had the best scores of all the seven nations compared, scoring a perfect score of 100 for the entire 2006 to 2018 period. Sweden started optimally from 2006 to 2008 also scoring the perfect score 100 but declined from 2009. From the period 2010 to 2018 Sweden's electoral pluralism score plateaued at approximately 96. The US consistently achieved the lowest scores among the seven nations compared across the 2006 to 2018 period. The US commenced with a low score of 87 from 2006 to 2008 but rose slightly from 2009 to level at just under 92 percent from 2010 to 2018. **Graph 6.3.2** below charts Australia's electoral pluralism score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2018.

Graph 6.3.2: *Australia's electoral pluralism score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)*




[Source: Gapminder 2018]

6.3.3 Democracy Index criterion 2: Functioning of government

The “functioning of government” criterion of the Democracy Index considers the extent of independence of the national legislature and government. Indicators of this dimension include whether the ‘freely elected representatives determine government policy’; the levels of influence from economic; religious or other powerful domestic groups; corruption levels; confidence in government, political parties and public service; and, government accountability measures (EIU Democracy Index 2008, pp. 21-24). On this criterion, Australia’s score placed it in the mid-range among the seven nations analysed. Australia achieved a consistent score of approximately 89 for the entire 2006 to 2018 period. Sweden achieved the highest initial score of 100 from 2006 to 2008 but started to decline from 2009 to plateau at the score of 96 from 2010 to 2018. The scores for UK and US on this criteria generally showed a declining trend for the entire 2006 to 2018 period except for the year 2017 when the UK’s score increased slightly. **Graph 6.3.3** below charts Australia’s functioning of government score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US over the period from 2006 to 2018.

Graph 6.3.3: Australia’s functioning of government score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)




[Source: Gapminder 2018]

6.3.4 Democracy Index criterion 3: Political participation

The criterion of “political participation” within the Democracy Index covers indicators such as voter participation or turn-out for national elections; the representativeness of parliament; adult literacy levels; citizens’ engagement with politics and the extent to which authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation (EIU Democracy Index 2008, p. 24-26). On this criterion Australia and Canada shared the same score of approximately 78, maintained for the entire 2006 to 2018 period. The scores placed both countries in the middle among the seven nations analysed. Sweden’s results were interesting: it commenced very well with a score of 100 from 2006 to 2008 but then fluctuated from 2009 to 2014 before settling at 83 from 2015 to 2018. The UK’s political participation scores commenced at a low level of 50 from 2006 to 2007 before rising steadily to over 83 by 2017/2018. The US’s scores held a steady level at 72 for the decade from 2006 to 2016 but increased slightly from 2017 to 2018 to reach a score of approximately 78, matching the Australian and Canadian results. **Graph 6.3.4** below charts Australia’s political participation score relative to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2018.

Graph 6.3.4: *Australia’s political participation score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)*




[Source: Gapminder 2018]

6.3.5 Democracy Index criterion 4: Democratic political culture

The Democracy Index's "democratic political culture" dimension looks at whether there is 'a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy' (EIU Democracy Index 2008, p. 26-28). Indicators for this criterion include perceptions of leadership, the military; support for democracy and public order; and, a separation of Church and State. On this criterion Australia's score commenced at about 87 from 2006 to 2008, then starts increasing until reaching a high of approximately 94 in 2013, but from 2014 it decreased to plateau at 87 for the remaining years. Australia's democratic political culture scores placed it in the middle among the seven nations analysed. Canada's scores was a consistent 87 for the entire period. Of interest, the Netherlands' scores on this criterion commenced positively with a high score of 100 from 2006 to 2008 but plunged to 81 by 2010 and has stayed at this score for the remaining years. The US's scores commenced with a high of approximately 87 from 2006 to 2008 then decline to a score of 81 from 2010 to 2018 before reaching its lowest level of 75 in 2018. **Graph 6.3.5** below charts Australia's democratic political culture score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2018.

Graph 6.3.5: *Australia's democratic political culture score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)*




[Source: Gapminder 2018]

6.3.6 Democracy Index criterion 5: Civil liberties

The “civil liberties” criterion in the Democracy Index looks at a number of indicators reflecting and promoting civil liberties. They include the degree of a free electronic and print media that has robust coverage with: a reasonable diversity of opinions; freedom of expression and protest; judicial independence; personal freedom and gender equality including human rights; and, discrimination based on race, colour or religious beliefs (EIU Democracy Index 2008, pp. 28-30). On this criterion Australia and Canada lead the seven nations analysed, achieving the highest score possible of 100 across the entire period from 2006 to 2018. Sweden also commenced very well with a score of 100 from 2006 to 2014 but then began to slide in 2015 before plateauing at the score of 94 from 2016 to 2018. Civil liberties score for the US was the lowest among the seven nations analysed for the entire timeframe. It commenced at 85 from 2006, plateaued at this score until 2014 when it decreased to a score of 82 in 2015 and plateauing at this level for the remaining years.

Graph 6.3.6 below charts Australia’s civil liberties score against that of Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2018.

Graph 6.3.6: *Australia’s civil liberties score vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)*




[Source: Gapminder 2018]

6.3.7 *Change in Democracy Index*

Examining each criterion of the Democracy Index provides a more detailed view of Australia's developments with respect to the seven nations analysed across the period from 2006 to 2018. In addition to this, an examination of the annual comparative changes can provide a more nuanced picture of developments. To this end, comparing the percentage points of change to the previous year provides relative perspectives of changes on a yearly basis across the 2006 to 2018 period. This is calculated simply by taking the Democracy Index from EIU one year and subtracting the value for the previous year. A negative number result means the Democracy Index declined (Gapminder 2018).

Graph 6.3.7 below charts the change in Australia's Democracy Index compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2018. The results showed Australia's Democracy Index fluctuated slightly throughout the period examined, within a one-percentage mark (minus 1 and positive 1 percentage point). The two European nations, Sweden and the Netherlands, demonstrated significant fluctuations in terms of upswings and declines at almost three percentage points throughout various periods from 2006 to 2018. Their Democracy Indices appeared to correspond with their national political developments, declining during periods when support for right-wing political parties were rising (generally 2008-2010 and 2012-2015, respectively). New Zealand and Canada appeared to be the most "stable" with little change in their respective Democracy Indices over the timeframe concerned. The exception was a small rise of almost one percentage point in 2015 for Canada when the Trudeau government was elected.

Graphs 6.3.7: *Change in Australia's Democracy Index vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2018)*



[Source: Gapminder 2018]

6.4.0 State of peace and security

Another perspective through which to examine the state of a nation's democracy is through a measure of its internal state of peacefulness. Like democracy, the concept of peace is difficult to define let alone measure (GPI 2007). Nonetheless, the Global Peace Index (GPI) is an attempt to measure and quantify the state of peace of a nation through determining 'what cultural attributes and institutions are associated with states of peace' (McConaghy 2008, p. 85). The Index attempts to conceptualise a framework for understanding and describing factors that create a peaceful society, and develop measures for those factors (GPI 2012).

The rationale behind the GPI is 'that peace is the preferred state for business to operate in.... [Its] definition of peace is the 'Absence of Violence'....The perfect state would have no police, jails or crime' (Killelea 2007). The GPI ranks the countries of the world by their

peacefulness using 23-24 indicators, ‘ranging from a nation’s level of military expenditure to its relations with neighbouring countries and the level of respect for human rights’ (GPI 2007, p. 2), and ‘tested against a range of potential drivers or determinants of peace’ (Killelea 2007). The data comes from various sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies, The World Bank, various bits of the UN offices and Peace Institutes and its own internal source within the EIU (McConaghy 2008, pp. 88-93).

The GPI now covers 163 independent states and territories from the initial 121 countries with first publication in 2007. While the GPI’s publisher, The Vision of Humanity, originally warns against year-on-year comparisons due to the expansion of the GPI from 121 countries to 140, from 2007 to 2008, nevertheless, they subsequently developed a special comparative version of the GPI in 2008 for the original 121 countries. The comparison excludes the new 2008 countries. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and the US are part of the original 121 countries, thus allowing comparisons between them to be made.

6.4.1 *Global Peace Index*


The GPI assesses global peace using three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic or international conflict, and the degree of militarisation. The first category, societal safety and security, refers to internal and interpersonal aspects of violence. The last two categories, of ongoing conflict and militarisation, capture the extent of current violent conflicts and each country’s military capacity.

The GPI is a composite index of the total number of indicators weighted and combined into one overall score. Each indicator, of the absence of violence or fear of violence, is banded or normalised on a scale of 1 to 5 to the third decimal point (GPI 2019, pp. 83, 88), with the lower the score, the more peaceful, and conversely, the higher the score, the least peaceful. The GPI also assesses the economic impact of violence on the global economy by monetising the global value of peace within its annual reports. While this element of the

report is noteworthy, for the purpose of this research this aspect of the GPI is not analysed as it falls outside the parameters of this work's research questions.

Graph 6.4.1 below charts Australia's GPI ranking compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2007 to 2019 (Vision of Humanity 2019). The results showed Australia ranked in the mid-range among the seven nations compared for the timeframe analysed. Australia's rank commenced in the mid-twenties in 2007/2008 and increased slowly to the mid-teens by 2016 to 2018. Australia's highest achieved GPI rank was 9th in 2015. New Zealand had the best ranking of the seven countries analysed, consistently achieving a ranking in the top four nations throughout 2007 to 2019, and achieved number one ranking in 2009 and 2010. The US's GPI rank was starkly deficit among the seven nations, as it never achieved a rank higher than 82nd. From 2012 the US's GPI rank continued a sharp decline from 88th in 2012 to 128th in 2019.

Graph 6.4.1: *Australia's GPI ranking compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2007-2019)*



[Source: Vision of Humanity 2019]


6.4.2 *Three dimensions of the GPI*

A more detailed analysis of the three dimensions of the GPI – societal safety and security, extent of domestic or international conflict, and the degree of militarisation – provides a more extensive picture of Australia’s state of peace. Unfortunately, GPI data on these three GPI criteria are only available for the years 2014 to 2019, not for the period from 2007 to 2013. **Graphs 6.4.3 to 6.4.6** below illustrate Australia’s overall GPI scores across these three broad categories of the GPI assessment compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019.

6.4.3 *GPI dimension 1: Ongoing domestic and international conflict*

The first GPI domain ‘investigates the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their role and duration of involvement in conflicts’ (GPI 2019, p. 84). Like the other two domains of the GPI, the score for this domain is derived from assessments of six indicators weighted to form a composite score on a scale of 1 to 5 (GPI 2019, pp. 88-95). The lower a country’s score in this category (the closer it is to 1) means the country is relatively more peaceful compared with a country with a higher score. **Graph 6.4.3** below illustrates Australia’s level of ongoing and international conflict compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019. The results showed that Australia’s score positioned it in the mid-range among the seven countries analysed. The most peaceful was New Zealand and the least peaceful, the US.

Graph 6.4.3: *Australia's level of ongoing domestic and international conflict score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019*




[Source: GPI 2014-2019]

6.4.4 GPI dimension 2: Societal safety and security

The GPI dimension of “societal safety and security” focuses on the level of harmony or discord within a nation. It includes assessments of levels of criminality, terrorism, proportion of displacement of the population, political instability and likelihood of violent demonstrations (GPI 2019, p. 84-85). Ten indicators are assessed to form a composite score of 1 to 5, with 1 being the most peaceful and 5 the least. **Graph 6.4.4** below illustrates Australia's assessed level of societal safety and security compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019. The results showed that like the other domain, Australia sat in the mid-range among the seven nations analysed while the US again scored the lowest, or was comparatively the least peaceful.

Graph 6.4.4: *Australia's level of safety and security in society compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019*




[Source: GPI 2014-2019]

6.4.5 GPI dimension 3: Level of militarisation

The “militarisation” domain of the GPI reflects the ‘link between a country’s level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness, both domestically and internationally’ (GPI 2019, p. 84). Seven indicators are assessed, again with a composite score of 1 to 5. Like the other two GPI categories, a score of 1 means most peaceful, while the higher score indicates a comparatively less peaceful country. Australia’s result showed similar patterns to the other two GPI dimensions discussed above, placing it in the mid-range among the seven nations analysed. New Zealand again achieved the best results with consistently low level of militarisation, while the US showed a surge in militarisation level from 2015 to 2016, then plateauing for the remainder years. **Graph 6.4.5** below illustrates Australia’s level of militarisation relative to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019.

Graph 6.4.5: *Australia's level of militarisation score compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2014 to 2019*



[Source: GPI 2014-2019]


HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

6.5.0 United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI)

The United Nation Human Development Programme's (UNDP) HDI is the final international index used to assess the Australian government's claim as 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'. The UN introduced the HDI as a counter to measures of national economic measures such as GDP (Hopkins 1991; United Nation 2018, para. 1; Langerfelder 2016). Created to emphasise that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, the HDI highlights economic growth should not be the only measure of a nation (Klasen 2018). It is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: a long

and healthy life, education and a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalised indices for each of these three dimensions (HDI Statistical Update 2018, p. 1). The health dimension is reflected by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more, and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean (HDI Statistical Update 2018, pp. 2-3). **Graph 6.5.0** below illustrates the three dimensions of the HDI in geographical format, demonstrating how they contribute to the overall HDI score.

Figure 6.5.0: *The Human Development Index and its components*



[Source: UNDP Human Development Index 2019]

6.5.1 A note on terminology – defining human development

Within the concept of human development, people are at the centre of this paradigm and human development reflects the process of enlarging people's choices (Langerfelder 2016, p. 3). The primary concern is to build human capabilities. The United Nation within its first Human Development Report defined human development as:

...a process of enlarging people's choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a


decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible (United Nation Development Programme 1990, p. 10).

The HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development entails. It does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment etc. These broader aspects of human development, or key issues that provide a fuller picture of a country's human development, are measured in other United Nation indices such as the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, Gender Development Index, Gender Inequality Index, Multidimensional Poverty Index and so forth (HDI Statistical Update 2018, pp. 1, 4-11).

6.5.2 *HDI – scoring and ranking*

HDI is ranked on a scale from 0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being the highest human development. Thus, the highest possible achievable HDI score is 1.0. The HDI score is also broken down into four tiers: very high human development (0.8-1.0), high human development (0.7-0.79), medium human development (0.55-0.70), and low human development (below 0.55). Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US are 'developed countries' and thus achieved HDI scores within the 'very high human development' range (0.8-1.0). For the period from 2006 to 2017, Australia's HDI scores were consistently higher than the other six nations by comparison (Human Development Reports 2006-2018). **Graph 6.5.2(a)** below illustrates Australia's HDI scores compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US for the period from 2006 to 2017 (UNDP Human Development Reports Country Profiles 2006-2018; UNDP Human Development Reports 2006-2018). Overall, all seven nations showed increasing trends in human development levels over the 2006 to 2018 period.


Graph 6.5.2(a): Australia's HDI scores vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US (2006-2017)



[Source: UNDP Human Development Reports 2006-2017]

Notwithstanding Australia achieving consistently the highest HDI scores compared to Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US for the period from 2006 to 2017, analysis of Australia's international HDI ranking provides a more nuanced picture. **Graph 6.5.2(b)** below illustrates Australia's international HDI ranking compared to the top ten HDI ranked nations as well as Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US from 2006 to 2017. The results showed Australia ranked consistently second to third in the HDI from 2006 to 2017 while Norway ranked first for the same timeframe with the exception of 2007/2008 when Iceland pipped Norway to rank first. All the other six nations analysed showed fluctuations in their HDI rankings throughout this period, particularly New Zealand, UK and US, while Canada showed a general trend of decreasing ranking.

Graph 6.5.2(b): *Australia's HDI ranking vs top ten HDI ranked nations vs Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK US from 2006 to 2017*



[Source: Human Development Reports 2006-2017]

In addition, Cooke et al. (2007) compared the HDI scores of Indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, US and New Zealand for the decade between 1990 and 2000 and found:

...the HDI scores of Indigenous peoples in North America and New Zealand improved at a faster rate than the general populations, closing the gap in human development. In Australia, the HDI scores of Indigenous peoples decreased while the general populations improved, widening the gap in human development (Cooke et al. 2007, p. 9).

Thus, while Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US were considered to have high human development overall according to their respective HDI, however, the Indigenous populations that reside within these nations had only medium levels of human development (Cooke et al. 2007).

6.6.0 Discussion

The measurement of the success of society poses considerable conceptual problems. The principal difficulty in measuring the success of a particular society or political system stems from the essential non-comparability of societal systems in modern liberal democracies, both spatially and temporally. Situationally and circumstantially, no two countries are the same, and no single nation stays the same over time. Countries range in size in many, if not all, aspects, whether in terms of geography, population, history, societal systems and so forth.

The focus on measurement is on identifying common metrics that accurately capture the essential quality of key factors and attributes that define complex, social phenomena and so reveal changes. In social processes, means and ends are forms of indicators of performance. The rationale for employing international, or macro-level, indices is that they allow a cross-national comparative perspective, with special reference to Australia. Moreover, one advantage that producers of macro-comparative data have is that their commentary is informed by the broader body of information from which macro-comparative data is distilled. They have intimate and intricate knowledge of how the data relates to the broader context from which it has been taken.

Four aspects of a nation – economic participation, multicultural policy, state of democracy and human development – were specifically chosen for comparisons for their relevance to multicultural nations. They reflect complex societal-systems that find their focal point in the “government”. The prominence of the government is through its capacity to regulate activity, and manage conflict, between and among its constituencies, and facilitate greater interaction densities throughout society and social systems. In other words, as a country that asserts democracy as its political system, the Australian government – elected to “govern” for the people – is placed in the unique position of being authorised to establish systems and processes to reduce inequalities. The government can institute the “terms and conditions” of a societal-wide social contract to enable inclusive participation by its diverse constituents in Australian society.

The four facets examined, and their respective indicators, provide broad multivariate elements to assess the comparative success, or otherwise, of Australia's society to "like-minded" multicultural nations. Moreover, they capture the substantive rather than the formal elements of an effective society. The underlying premise of the analysis presumes Australian society functions as a capitalist system. Furthermore, measures of societal success will incorporate more than economic indicators and involve policies and social structures that promote participation and inclusion in the social and political spheres – measures the philosophy of multiculturalism advocates. Other recent studies have focused on individual or citizen-centric views of "success" such as well-being, quality of life and happiness indices. However, it is worth noting these alternative metrics have not been around long enough for longer-term multiyear comparisons to be made.

The results reveal that, with the exception of the MCP Index on Migrant Minorities and HDI, on all other indices explored – income inequality, social/multicultural policies, state of democracy and peace – Australia sits in the mid-range among the seven nations analysed. In fact, Australia and Canada shared very similar results across all four dimensions examined. This finding is unsurprising. Australia and Canada share many similarities: a history of British colonialism, with genocides of Indigenous peoples, racial exclusion, Westminster style parliamentary-democracy political systems and the earliest two nations to formally adopt multiculturalism to manage its diverse population. That being said, Canada generally performs slightly better on income inequality, MIPEx ranking/scores, improvements in Democracy Index, GPI, and improvements in reducing ethno-racial and ethno-religious prejudice.

6.6.1 MCP – assessing Australia's score for 2019

The two areas that Australia performed better than Canada – and also the other nations analysed – were the MCP Index on Migrant Minorities and HDI. Several reasons can explain this outcome. Firstly, the MCP Index uses a limited number of (only eight) indicators for assessment. Secondly, its limited trichotomous point allocation system which

incorporates the policies of Australian State and Territories into an overall “Australian” policy can provide unrepresentative result. Importantly, the MCP Index ranking is outdated. Nearly a decade has elapsed and new multicultural policies since 2010, the last year of the MCP Index available, have not been assessed. It is perhaps more accurate to note that the MCP indicates as of 2010, Australia performed better than the other six nations analysed. For example, **Table 6.6.1** below re-examines Australia’s MCP score on immigrant minorities based on the latest (2019) available multicultural policy evidence and separating Australia’s federal policies from that of the State/Territory policies.

Table 6.6.1: Australia’s 2019 MCP policy scores on immigrant minorities and evidence – federal versus State/Territories

MCP Criteria	Australia (federal)	States/Territories
1. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities	<p>Partial – 0.5</p> <p>There is a ministerially appointed Australian Multicultural Council acting in an advisory role to the federal government (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2020). However, the Council’s role and influence on policy appears to be limited.</p> <p>Australia’s latest multicultural statement – ‘Multicultural Australia: United, Strong, Successful’ contains no additional policy measures outside of the general Access and Equity Policy guidance which is a non-mandatory guideline for the federal government to deliver services and programs responsive to the needs of the diverse Australian population.</p>	<p>Yes – 1.0 for all Australian States and Territories (Department of Premier and Cabinet (SA) 2019, p. 7).</p> <p>All States and Territories have multicultural councils or advisory boards.</p> <p>Victoria, Australian Capital Territory (ACT), NSW, SA and Queensland all have multicultural legislations; Western Australian repealed its legislation to replace with a Charter of Multiculturalism in 2004.</p> <p>Under its legislation (Section 26), Victoria has additional reporting requirements imposed on Victorian government departments and Ministers with respect to inclusion of Victorians of diverse backgrounds.</p>

2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum	<p>Partial – 0.5</p> <p>Education generally falls within the responsibility of State/Territory governments but funded by the federal government. Notwithstanding that, the federal government has responsibility for national education policies and programs. Analysis of the current (2020) Australian national school curriculum illustrate the teaching of multiculturalism is limited. The concept is submerged across several subjects, mostly in the teaching of languages, humanities and social sciences, and civic education if chosen as an elective in Year 10 (ACARA n.d). The federal government has the authority to impose a national policy specifically on multiculturalism education allowing a nationally uniform policy on adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum but has failed to do so.</p>	<p>Generally ‘Yes’ but unevenly implemented. Australian States have responsibility for education. Depending on the States/Territories, adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum varies. For example, for Victoria, legislation requires that school curriculum promote and affirm multiculturalism as a department of the government. However, in other States and Territories, policies on multiculturalism education are more aspirational documents (Department of Premier and Cabinet (SA) 2019; Northern Territory Government 2016; ACT Government 2019; South Australia Department of Education n.d.; NSW Department of Education 2020)</p>
3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing	<p>Yes – 1.0</p> <p>The federal government funds the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) which is the national multicultural and multilingual broadcaster. In addition, the federal government also provided some funding for ethnic community broadcasting (National Ethnic and Multicultural</p>	<p>Yes – 1.0</p> <p>There are various multilingual radio programs and services funded by the State/Territory governments. For example, the ACT and Western Australian governments fund the ‘Canberra Multicultural Station and ‘6EBA’ radio stations, respectively</p>

	Broadcasters' Council 2019). The relatively better non-Anglo or ethnic representation on SBS (compared to the dearth in commercial broadcasting) could be contributing to the broadcaster being perceived as for "ethnic" groups rather than for all Australians.	(CMS Radio 2020; 6EBA-FM95.3 Radio 2017.
4. Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases)	Undefined. Currently there is no legislation specifically dealing with religious freedom but there are anti-discrimination laws covering the grounds of: race, colour, descent, national, ethnic origin; gender; disability; sexual orientation (Squelch 2013, p. 52).	Yes – but ill-defined; it depends on the relevant States/Territories and provided the requirement does not impinge on human rights and anti-discrimination laws. For example, the ACT and Victoria have enacted human rights and anti-discrimination legislations. No other Australian State/Territory has legislated on human rights (Squelch 2013, p. 52-56).
5. Allows dual citizenship	Yes – 1.0 But under Section 44 of the Australian Constitution, federal parliamentarians could not hold dual citizenship.	Not applicable. Citizenship falls within the federal government remit.
6. The funding of ethnic group organizations or activities	Yes – 1.0 The federal government provides funding for the Federation of Ethnic Communities Council.	Yes – uneven. Australian States and Territories provide limited funding to multicultural bodies/organisations within their respective states.
7. The funding of bilingual education or	Yes – 1.0 Support for languages is through the Australian Curriculum. In addition,	Yes – uneven. The States of Victoria, NSW, Queensland, Western Australia and ACT

mother-tongue instruction	the federal government provides limited funding under its ‘Community languages multicultural grants program’ (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2020) and ‘Early learning languages Australia program’ (Department of Education, Skills and Employment 2020).	all have community languages program (Community Languages Australia n.d.). The State of South Australia has an ‘Ethnic and community languages schools program’. The Northern Territory is without a community language program. Notwithstanding that, the Northern Territory maintains the ‘NT Indigenous languages and cultures curriculum’ for all schools across the Territory, replacing the previous ‘Bilingual education program’ in operation from 1973 to 2008 in remote areas/schools teaching Indigenous languages.
8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups	No – only available for Indigenous Australians. Federal government departments maintain ‘diversity’ aspirational statements with respect to cultural diversity. However, it is not a policy nor are there mandatory affirmative action requirements.	Yes – but uneven. Victoria is the only State that has legislative requirement for reporting by government departments and Ministers on diversity. Other States/Territories have varying levels of policy or statements with respect to diversity but not mandatory.
Total score	6 out of 8	7 out of 7 for Victoria, NSW, ACT, Queensland and WA. 6.5 out of 7 for SA and Northern Territory.

[Australia’s 2019 MCP score based on author’s interpellation of the criteria using data available as of 2019]

The above table – a comparison of Australian federal versus State/Territory multicultural policies – demonstrates the deficiency of the MCP Index. It fails to distinguish the

multicultural policies of the Australian federal (national) government against those of the Australian States and Territories. Consequently, separating the multicultural policies of the two different levels of government (federal versus State/Territory) enables a more nuanced picture of Australia's development on multiculturalism. It reveals where Australian States and Territory governments have stepped up and forged ahead on multiculturalism, including enacting multicultural legislations, while the federal or national government has stagnated.

With respect to the HDI, Australia's relatively better performance compared with the other six nations analysed likely correlates with the HDI's rather basic three-dimension assessment criteria. The HDI comprises of just three simple criteria: the number of people living a long and healthy life; being educated; and, attaining a decent standard of living, the HDI is an overall aggregate of a nation's performance in these areas. For example, on its first criteria of 'living a long and healthy life', the HDI only takes into account life expectancy. On this criterion Australia scores very well as the average life expectancy in Australia in 2015-2017 was 82.5 years, with the life expectancy for men being 80.4 and 84.6 years for women, respectively (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2019, Table 6.3). However, a closer look reveals that for Indigenous Australians, 'the life expectancy was estimated to be 8.6 years lower than that of the non-Indigenous population for males (71.6 years compared with 80.2) and 7.8 years for females (75.6 compared with 83.4)' (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2019, Table 6.2). The HDI provides an aggregate macro-perspective, lacking the granularity that can expose the disparities within the multivariate communities that comprise Australian society.

Further, the HDI does not address other key issues that provide a fuller picture of Australia's human development such as inequalities, empowerment and so forth. As Cooke et al. (2007) demonstrated, Australia may have achieved high scores in terms of HDI ranking, yet its Indigenous peoples have much poorer health and social conditions than non-Indigenous peoples. Moreover, Australia's higher levels of immigration – relative to its population – may inflate Australia's per capita gross national income, one

of the three components contributing to the HDI. The contribution of immigration to Australia's economy – increasing productivity, labour participation and taxation revenue benefits – and therefore, national wealth (or Gross National Index) is well-documented (Nieuwenhuysen and Storer 2011; Australian Government Inquiry on Migration and Multiculturalism 2013; The Treasury & Australian Department of Home Affairs Report 2018).

6.7.0 Conclusion

This chapter interrogates Australia's overall state of affairs from an external or comparative, cross-national perspective among seven "like-mind" nations – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and the US. The overall result places Australia in the middle of the seven nations analysed. When examined through international indices on income inequality; multicultural and integration policies; prejudice against immigrants, ethno-racial and ethno-religious groups; and, state of democracy and peace, Australia's standing is not so distinctive or outstanding to warrant the claim of being 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'.

Chapter 7

INTERROGATING THE ‘SUCCESS’ OF MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA (NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE)

7.0.1 Introduction

The previous chapter investigated Australia’s claim to national exceptionalism from an external, international perspective. At the outset, the claim suffers from a lack of conceptual and definitional clarity. Australia’s international standing, with respect to four elements – of economic participation, multicultural policy, state of democracy and human development – failed to substantiate the claim.

The claim of being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’ implies Australia’s implementation of multiculturalism has triumphed to the extent that the “cultural” – and impliedly racial – elements of Australia’s multicultural society have no bearing on the participation and inclusion of its constituents. The inference being that individual ability becomes the core determinant of participation, particularly with respect to economic, social and political spheres. This chapter interrogates the Australian government’s claim from a national, domestic viewpoint, by distinguishing and disaggregating the different types of bases of power within Australian society. Utilising the dependent variable of ancestry against the independent variable of occupation, this chapter examines the multicultural reality within Australia’s formal and informal power structures over the decade from 2006 to 2016.

Section 1 maps the cultural composition of Australia’s formal power structures by investigating the antecedents of Australia’s formal structures of authority; the members of: Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary. Sections 2 to 5 scrutinise power holdings within Australia’s society from Weber’s perspective: class, status, and party. Class is

explored through economic participation, in particular the composition of ancestries within Australia's top ten highest income earning occupational groups and the lowest 10 income earning occupational groups as determined by the ATO. In addition, the sections will also investigate ethnic differentials in incomes and educational and qualification attainments for the 2006 and 2016 censuses. Section 5 specifically examines Weber's party via the ancestries of Australia's politicians, local councillors/alderman and political interest groups with specific focus on lobbyists. Status is extrapolated and discussed from the results of class and party. Finally, sections 6 and 7 explore the ancestral make-up of those employed in other influential sectors within Australia's society – the media and the arts.

7.1.0 Australia's Westminster-style democracy

Australia's system of government, a Westminster-style democracy and constitutional monarchy, reflects its British colonial roots (Hirst 2000; Parliament of Australia 2007). The Australian Constitution, the premier law of the land, prescribes the anatomy of the nation's formal legitimate authority. The framework reflects a check-and-balance system with the separation of powers between three arms of government: the Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary. Elected by the majority populace to enact laws for the people, the Parliament constitutes the people's representatives (Australian Constitution, Chapter I). The Executive arm of government's role is to carry out and enforce laws passed by the Parliament — as such, the Executive is supported by a swath of nominally non-partisan government departments and agencies. The third arm of government is an independent judiciary, which the Constitution authorises with judicial power to interpret laws and to judge whether they apply in individual cases (Australian Constitution, Chapter III; Elder and Fowler 2018, p. 18).

The Australian Constitution also establishes Australia as a federation where power is divided between the Commonwealth and States, coming into effect in 1901 (Australian Constitution, Part V). In doing so, the Constitution did not abolish the existing colonial


parliaments, colonial executive governments and colonial courts. They were retained under Australia's federal system as State parliaments, State executive governments and State courts, respectively. Australia's two mainland self-governing Territories (Northern Territory and ACT), on the other hand, were established by Acts of the Commonwealth government and endowed with similar powers to the States. Thus the tripartite – check and balance – power structure is replicated at the State and Territory levels. In this way Australia has nine parliaments and nine governments reflecting the six States, two self-governing Territories and a federal/national government. This section examines the top ten ancestries of holders of formal power within these three arms of government.

7.1.1 Australia's parliament and politicians

At the national level, the Australian federal Parliament has 227 parliamentarians. Its bicameral structure, comprising of two Houses mirrors its British roots. The Senate, or Upper House, represents Australia's States and Territories, and functions as a house of review (Australian Constitution, Chapter I, Part II). The Senate 'consists of 76 senators, twelve from each of the six States and two from each of the mainland [self-governing] Territories' (Australian Parliament House 2019, para. 1). The other House of the Australian Parliament, the House of Representatives or Lower House (Australian Constitution, Chapter I, Part III), consists of 151 members with each member representing an electoral division. This bicameral structure of the federal parliament is replicated in five of the six Australian States: New South Wales (NSW), South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. The State of Queensland and the two self-governing Territories have unicameral parliaments. During census data collection, information provided by Australia's parliamentarians reflect their State/Territory of residence and employment. Such raw data would have allowed aggregation of the data into their respective State, Territory or federal spheres, and enable reviewers/scholars to determine whether they are federal or State/Territory parliamentarians. However, in its final presentation and availability, the ABS conflates these data into a single occupational unit category, 'Member of Parliament' (ABS 2009a). Separation of the data is not possible

owing to privacy concerns. As of 2016, Australia's nine parliaments comprised of 1151 parliamentarians, 375 of whom were female and 776 males. **Graph 7.1.1** below displays the top ten ancestries of Australia's parliamentarians in the 2006 and 2016 censuses against their respective proportions in the population.

Graph 7.1.1: *Top ten ancestries of Australia's parliamentarians*



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results showed Australian politicians overwhelmingly comprised of individuals of Anglo-Celtic heritage or of European ancestries. In the 2006 Census, they comprised a combined total of over 95 percent of all members of parliaments. A small proportion, approximately four percent, are of 'other ancestries', of whom just under one percent have Lebanese ancestry and the remainder 'not stated'. This picture barely changed by the 2016 Census. Parliamentarians of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries still comprised 94 percent of parliamentarians in Australia. Overall, the presentation of Australia's

parliamentarians lacked any semblance to the cultural diversity of Australia's population as discussed in Chapter 5. In 2016, the proportion of Australians with Anglo-Celtic and European heritage was approximately 73 percent of the population, while their representation in Australia's parliaments was a massive 94 percent. The remainder 27 percent of the population had six percent representation in Australia's parliaments.

Significantly, there was a stark difference in the over-representation of parliamentarians of Anglo-Celtic and north-west European ancestries and the absence of members of parliament with "Asian" ancestries. Asian-Australians are specifically mentioned here because numerically they comprise the largest "minority" population in Australia. According to the ABS's ASCCEG (ABS 2019), Asian-Australians constitute three sub-groups of Asian ancestries: north-east Asian, south-east Asian, and southern and central Asian. As noted in Chapter 5, together these three sub-groups of Asian ancestries comprised a total of 12.89 percent (see **Graphs 5.35(a) & (b)** of Chapter 5) or over three million of the Australian population in 2016 (12.89 percent of 23,401,892 (population of Australia on 2016 Census night)).

In respect of gender, the results appeared to be slightly more positive. As of 2016, women comprised approximately thirty percent of Australia's politicians. This corroborated the 50/50 Foundation figures on 'Australian women in Parliament' (50/50 Foundation 2017). According to the 50/50 Foundation (2017) figures, the ACT had the highest proportion of women members in Parliament at 52 percent, while South Australia had the lowest at 27.6 percent and the Commonwealth Parliament had 28.6 percent. Notwithstanding these relatively positive numbers, the results for participation by women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries were almost absent. Over 99 percent of Australia's female politicians had either Anglo-Celtic or European ancestries, while women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds comprise barely one percent of Australia's total politicians. Thus, overall irrespective of gender, Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European heritage were significantly over-represented in Australia's parliaments while those of other backgrounds were overwhelmingly under-represented.


7.1.2 Ancestries of local councillors and alderman

In addition to the federal and State/Territory parliaments, Australia's lowest level of government representation is the local council. As an "entry level" political foray for those hoping to enter State/Territory and/ or federal politics to "cut their teeth", local governments also serve as a channel for aspiring politicians. The ABS defines a local legislator as a person who 'represent the interests of people in a constituency as their elected member of local government authority (ABS 2009b, para. 5). **Graph 7.1.2** below displays the top ten ancestries of local government legislators/aldermen/local councillors.

A note on local councillors/aldermen:

State and Territory governments have constitutional responsibility for local government (Australian Local Government Association 2020). Consequently, the roles and responsibilities of local government differ from State to State. Notwithstanding that, local councillors are members of an elected body that makes decisions on behalf of a local government through a formal meeting process but do not have authority to act or make decisions as individuals. Generally, local councillors act in a part-time capacity (similar to a company board) while maintaining employment – usually full-time and in their relevant professional capacity – elsewhere. This explains the low number of local councillors reported within the ABS data provided, of which only 1684 identified 'local councillor/alderman' as their occupation in the 2016 Census and 1307 in 2006 Census. However, by adding the number of local councillors across Australia's 537 local government areas as reported in their respective annual reports for 2016, the total was 3537 (Office of Local Government 2017, p. 10; Local Government Association of Queensland 2017, p. 13; Electoral Commission South Australia 2014, p. 57; Local Government Association Tasmania 2017, p. 5; Western Australian Electoral Commission 2016, p. 18; Victorian Electoral Commission 2016, p. 164; Northern Territory Electoral Commission 2017, p. 52-53). The graph below thus only displays the ancestral composition of the ABS data of local councillors for 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.1.2: Top ten ancestries of Australia's local government legislators



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results generally reflected those of the composition of the ancestries of Australia's politicians at the State, Territory and federal levels but show hope of a positive trend. In 2006, local government legislators from non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries were barely represented in the top ten ancestries of councillors. However, by the 2016 Census approximately four percent of local government legislators were Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European heritage. The notable increase was the number of local legislators of Chinese ancestry, which increased from a total of nine members in the 2006 Census to 24 members by the 2016 Census. This was the first time local government representation by those with Chinese ancestry appears in the top ten ancestries, albeit at the miniscule proportion of just 0.01 percent of all local government legislators. In the general population in 2016, Australians of Chinese ancestry comprised more than 1.2 million people (ABS 2018a), or just under five percent of the population.

Perhaps the more positive development was the level of Indigenous Australian representation at the local government, at approximately two percent which was just slightly lower than their composition in the overall Australian population at 2.8 percent (ABS 2017i). The results, however, maybe skewed owing to the way the ABS data is compiled, conflated and averaged. Further research into the geographic presentation of local councillors of Indigenous ancestry showed they reflected the concentration and dispersal of Indigenous Australian population in the community. Thus, many local councillors of Indigenous heritage were concentrated in the Northern Territory where Indigenous local government representation was high. In other Australian States/Territories, Indigenous representation remained pessimistically low.

Gender representation provided the most optimistic outlook. As of 2016, elected women local councillors reached nearly forty percent. Approximately fifteen percent of mayors or shire presidents were women and twenty percent were in senior management (50/50 Foundation 2017). That being stated, further scrutiny demonstrates that for women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds, the results painted an abysmal picture. They comprised barely four percent of all local councillors. Furthermore, their representation at the senior leadership roles in local councils remained insignificant.

Overall, cultural diversity representations at local government level in Australia generally reflected the federal and State/Territory parliaments, overwhelmingly dominated by local legislators of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries, albeit not as extreme. The prospect of change of a more equitable and diverse representation of formal power, at least in the legislative arm of government, one reflective of Australia's demography, is unlikely in the near future.

7.1.3 Ancestries of the Executive arm of government

As a constitutional parliamentary democracy, the legislative (Parliament) and executive functions overlap as members of Australia's Executive arm of government – the ministers – are drawn from the Parliament (Australian Constitution, Chapter II; Elder and Fowler 2018, pp. 1-42; Parliament of Australia n.d., Infosheet 20). Formed by achieving a majority of members in the lower House of the Parliament, the Executive arm of the Australian government sets and carries out agendas for the nation during its elected term. This arm of government comprises of the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, the Prime Minister, Ministers and their departments (Elder and Fowler 2018, Chapter II; Parliament of Australia n.d., Infosheet 20). The 2016 Census allows individuals to nominate two ancestries. As mentioned previously, the raw data collected by the ABS include data of individual members of the Executive arm of governments (both State/Territory and federal). Owing to confidentiality requirements imposed on the census data collected, the final data is conflated into just a single occupational category of 'Member of Parliament' in the overall final ABS data. Conflation of the data on Australia's parliamentarians at the federal, State and Territory levels into a singular category of 'Members of Parliament' also has the effect of undifferentiating the two [upper] levels of Australian government – the federal national government and State governments. Notwithstanding that, with holders of the Executive arm of government drawn from members of the Parliament, extrapolating the ancestries of the holders of ministerial responsibilities is not difficult. **Table 7.1.3** below lists holders of federal Australian ministerial portfolios as of 15 January 2020. The selection of federal government ministries reflect its national representation and the power to impact change across the Australian nation. State/Territory governments may be affected by localised factors which influence elections.

Table 7.1.3: Composition of the national Executive arm of government (as of 15/01/2020)

Ministry		
Scott Morrison	Simon Birmingham	David Littleproud
Michael McCormack	Simon Birmingham	Mathias Cormann
Josh Frydenberg	Greg Hunt	Paul Fletcher
Christian Porter	Alan Tudge	Ken Wyatt
Peter Dutton	Karen Andrews	Linda Reynolds
Michaelia Cash	Susan Ley	Marise Payne
Daniel Tehan	Matthew Canavan	Angus Taylor
Bridget McKenzie	Stuart Robert	Anne Ruston
Outer Ministry		
Mark Coulton	David Coleman	Richard Colbeck
Alex Hawke	Michael Sukkar	Darren Chester
Melissa Price		
Parliamentary Secretaries		
Ben Morton	Trevor Evans	Nola Marino
Andrew Gee	Jonathon Duniam	Zed Seselja
Michelle Landry	Jason Wood	Scott Buchholz
Jane Hume	Steve Irons	Luke Howarth

[Source: Parliament of Australia 2020a]

The above list, with the exception of Michael Sukkar, contains only Anglo-Celtic and European surnames. It provides insight into the degree of Anglo-European dominance in Australia's national government, reflecting a dearth of cultural and ethnic diversity. While surnames do not necessarily correspond directly with ethnicity, nevertheless surnames have been used to identify 'cohorts of ethnic minority patients' in health service studies with a high degree of accuracy (Shah et al. 2010, p. 2). Further, surnames are also commonly used to identify ethnicity in social settings (Waters 1989) and can allude to ancestry and ethnicity.


As expected, the 2020 Australian federal government comprises overwhelmingly of men of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries. In fact, the incumbent national Australian Executive government has only one minister of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestry, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, who is an Indigenous Australian (Wyatt 2020). Even parliamentary secretaries who assist the ministers or act as understudies contain only individuals of Anglo-Celtic and European backgrounds (Parliament of Australia 2020a). Although Michael Sukkar, the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Housing, has a non-Anglo and non-European surname, however, he is of dual heritage and Christian faith (Sukkar 2013). Sukkar's father is of Maronite (Christian) Lebanese heritage and his mother has Norwegian ancestry and 'fifth-generation Australian' (Sukkar 2013, para. 4). The results demonstrate an overwhelming Anglo-European dominance with the prospect for change, of an Australian national government more representative of its population in the future, grim.

7.1.4 Ancestries of federal government departmental heads: Chief Executives and Managing Directors

A range of government departments and agencies support the national Executive government to administer its priorities and agendas (Australian Government 2020). These bureaucracies propose, propagate and implement policies in support of the government's agendas in the nation's interests. Officially, these government bureaucracies are non-

partisan in carrying out their functions. However, the government appoints the heads of each government department or agency on five-year contractual terms. Often, incoming governments restructure or manoeuvre these bureaucracies to create positions for their chosen person, usually male (Doran 2019). The federal government’s website provides information on the ‘function, composition, origins and other details’ of each of these ‘Australian Government bodies’ (Australian Government Directory 2020, para. 1). In similar account to the occupational category of Members of Parliaments, the ABS collects the information on the ancestries of government departmental and agency heads individually but conflate the data nation-wide into an overall occupation unit category of ‘Chief Executives or Managing Directors’ (ABS 2009c, last para.). Occupations within this category include: Director-General, Executive Director and Secretary of government departments. **Graph 7.1.4(a)** below illustrates the top ten ancestries of those who identified their occupations within the categories of Chief Executives and Managing Directors in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.


Graph 7.1.4(a): Top ten ancestries of Chief Executives and Managing Directors



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

In addition, the ABS also has another category of senior leadership occupational category under the title of ‘General Managers’ (ABS 2009d). This group encompasses positions that lead major commercial, industrial, government and Defence organisations (ABS 2009d, para. 1). **Graph 7.1.4(b)** below illustrates the top ten ancestries of those whose occupations fall within the category of ‘general managers’ in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

7.1.4(b): Top ten ancestries of corporate general managers in Australia



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results demonstrated that senior leadership positions within the federal government and corporate sectors bore no semblance to the demographic diversity of Australia’s population. Particularly stark was the paucity of holders of these leadership positions with non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds. For example, in the 2006 Census Australians of Asian ancestries comprised approximately seven and a half percent of Australia’s total population. By the 2016 Census, the proportion of Australians with Asian ancestries had jumped to nearly 13 percent. Yet they made up under two percent of all these senior corporate and government departmental leadership positions in the 2006

Census. In 2016, they comprised under three percent of senior leadership positions. The results corroborated the AHRC's 2016 and 2018 reports exposing the dearth of cultural diversity in Australia's leadership positions.

While the picture of gender equality reflected a more positive development when compared to cultural diversity, nevertheless, the results still fell significantly short of parity. Women comprised approximately a quarter of corporate general managers and 16 percent of chief executives or managing directors. Importantly, the numbers of female leaders of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds were negligible. Less than five percent of women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries held leadership positions within the government or the corporate sector in 2006 and 2016, respectively. The overall trajectory on cultural diversity in these leadership occupational categories, irrespective of gender, remains pessimistic.


7.1.5 Ancestries of Australia's institutions of hard power – military and police officers

Among the government departments and agencies supporting the national Executive government, two organisations stand out in their role as enforcers of hard power (a concept popularised by Joseph Nye in the field of international relations three decades ago (Nye 1990)): the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and the State and federal police forces. The ADF functions as defenders from external threats to the nation (Australian Department of Defence n.d.) while police forces are tasked to maintain domestic law and order. Nye's term refers to the 'ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants' (Nye 2009, p. 61). Hard power can act as coercive power wielded through inducements or threats (Nye 2009, p. 63). While Nye's conceptualisation of hard power focuses on the international arena in nation to nation relations, nevertheless the concept is useful in framing the understanding of the functions of the ADF and Australia's police forces.

Both organisations are instruments of the nation authorised with accessibility to powers that evoke compelled action. Tasked to "protect" Australia and its people, both the ADF


and the police forces have access to armouries including lethal weapons unavailable to other citizens. The ADF's role has traditionally focused on offensive and defensive measures during war and times of national emergencies defined within legislations. Nonetheless, recent government amendments to the ADF's role, particularly with respect to the issue of terrorism has blurred the boundaries of its role specifically between domestic and international threats. Both the ADF and police forces have strict hierarchical organisational structures that authorise firm discipline. Legislatively entrusted to defend the nation and enforce compliance of the law, the ancestral composition of the people working in both these two organisations can be symbolic reflection of the success, or otherwise, of Australia's multiculturalism journey. This is salient given Australia's brutal, colonialist and exclusionary history. It reflects the broader extent of inclusion of Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds into Australia's institutions of hard power. This is particularly significant in the ADF where the organisation's primary function is 'to defend Australia and its national interests' (Australian Department of Defence 2019, para. 1). In fulfilling its functions, the ADF contains policies clearly delineating the "insider" and "outsider" status of individuals and groups. The cultural/ethnic composition of the ADF can provide insight into the extent of change, if any, of Australia's strategic organisation entrusted to display and enforce hard power internationally. **Graphs 7.1.5(a) to 7.1.5(c)** below display the ancestral composition of the ADF and police forces, respectively, for the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.1.5(a): Top ten ancestries of ADF senior officers




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.5(b): Top ten ancestries of Australia's commissioned military officers



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.5(c): Top ten ancestries of commissioned police officer



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results reflected earlier results in all spheres of Australia's formal institutions of authority but proved even more biased towards Australians of Celtic and north-west European ancestries. The representation in the ADF and the police forces of those with Celtic and north-west European ancestries when compared to their respective proportions within the general population was almost double. There also remained a conspicuously and extremely low representation of Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries. The most obvious example were Australians of Chinese ancestry. In the general population, they comprised nearly five percentage of Australia's overall population but made up just 0.59 of senior Defence officers in 2016. Australians of Chinese ancestry did not register on the top ten ancestries of Australia's senior Defence officers in 2006. As for commissioned Defence force officers, those of Chinese heritage comprised 0.74 percent in 2006 (of which 0.66 percent were males and 0.08 percent were

female) and 1.07 percent (of which 0.81 percent were males and 0.26 percent were female) in 2016.

In contrast, those with Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries were over-represented in Australia's military. Australians of European, Anglo-Celtic and "Australian" ancestries combined together comprised approximately 73 percent in the general population. However, in Australia's Defence force, the Anglo-European antecedents that made up the top ten ancestries of Defence officers (both senior and commissioned) composed of 'Australian', English, Scottish, Irish, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek and Welsh. Together they comprised over 95 percent and 94 percent of senior Defence force officers in 2006 and 2016, respectively. These ancestries also made up approximately 91 percent and 90 percent of commissioned Defence officers in 2006 and 2016, respectively. The results reflected the findings of cultural diversity among Australia's parliamentarians where those of Anglo-Celtic and European heritage overwhelmingly dominate. Furthermore, the domination increased with increasing seniority of rank in Australia's Defence force.

With respect to Australia's police forces, the results reflected a worse trend than that of Australia's Defence force officers. No Asian-Australian ancestry registered among the top ten ancestries of Australia's commissioned police officers. Welsh was the top tenth ancestry of all commissioned police officers, with 0.17 percent of the total. Commissioned police officers with Asian ancestries, if they existed, would comprise less than this figure or fall within either one of the two categories of 'other ancestries' or 'not stated'. In 2016, the combined figure for these two categories was 2.7 percent of all commissioned police officers. Thus, 2.7 percent of all commissioned police officers represents the 27 percent of Australia's overall non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European population. The trend of non-representation of Australians of non-Anglo-European within the top ten ancestries of Australia's commissioned police officers did not change between the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

From a gender perspective, the results were slightly better if based on women of Anglo-Celtic and European backgrounds who comprised ten percent of these occupations.

However, for women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European heritage, their participation if any, did not even register statistically.

7.1.6 *An independent judiciary: Third arm of government*

Australia's Constitution vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth – the power to interpret laws and to judge whether they apply in individual cases – in Australia's judiciary. Australia's judicial system is a hierarchical network of State and federal courts with the High Court of Australia sitting at the apex, and the magistrate or local courts as the lowest level. Magistrates preside over matters before the magistrate or local courts while judges preside over matters in courts superior to the magistrates/local courts. Both judges and magistrates:

are appointed by the Governor-General acting on the advice of the Prime Minister and Cabinet....[They] can only be removed from office by the Governor-General following a request for the removal from both Houses of Parliament on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity (Parliament of Australia n.d., Infosheet 20, para. 29).

These processes enhance the independence of the Australian judiciary as the third arm of Australia's system of government.


Officially, the Governor-General of Australia on the advice of the incumbent national Executive government (Prime Minister and Cabinet) appoints judges. In reality, judges have been appointed by the incumbent government on the basis of their perceived political "bent" and the Governor-General in effect rubber-stamps these appointments. For example, John Howard during his eleven years in government appointed judges to Australia's High Court who supported his conservative views for Australia. This group of judges, known as the "Gleeson Court" under the leadership of Chief Justice Anthony Murray Gleeson, were appointed by the Howard government since 1998. They oversaw

the winding back of many progressive developments in law (Dixon and Lau 2015; Lynch 2003) during the Keating government and earlier eras.

The Gleeson Court upheld the Howard government's favoured 'rigorous border control regime over competing human rights and humanitarian concerns' irrespective of the impact of these conditions on children (Dixon and Lau 2015, p. 284; *Behrooz v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs* (2004) 219 CLR 486; *Re Woolley* (2004) 225 CLR 1; *Ex parte applicants M276/2003*). It also supported the Howard government's harsh pre-emptive counter-terrorism policies (*Thomas v Mowbray* (2007) 233 CLR 307) and extensive anti-terrorism legislations that impinged on human rights (Brett 2003). In respect of industrial relations, the Gleeson Court upheld the Howard government's decision to expend \$20 million of public funds to advertise its then Work Choices (now defunct) laws (*Combet v Commonwealth* (2005) 224 CLR 494). This legislation, epitomising the market driven *laissez faire* of neoliberal ideology, placed the onus on the individual employee to negotiate with his/her employer the terms and conditions of employment.


While the names of Australia's judicial officers (judges and magistrates) and the biographic details of a limited number of the senior judges are available publicly, however, information on their ancestries is absent. In similar ways to the information collected in the census on members of parliaments and the Executive government, the ABS collects the ancestries of individual judges and magistrates in the 2016 Census. Information collected would have provided the ancestries of individual judges at the various court levels of the Australians judicial hierarchy – High Court, senior, intermediate and magistrates/local courts. Again, the information has been conflated into just two general occupational categories of 'judges' and 'magistrates' (2009e). **Graphs 7.1.6(a) and 7.1.6(b)** below display the ancestries of Australia's judges and magistrates in the 2006 and 2016 censuses, respectively.

Graph 7.1.6(a): Top ten ancestries of Australia's judges



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.6(b): Top ten ancestries of Australia's magistrates



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results showed that cultural diversity beyond the Anglo-Celtic and European heritage did not exist among the top ten ancestries of Australia's judges and magistrates. There appeared to be no difference between the results of the 2006 or 2016 censuses. With respect to gender, there appeared to be a positive shift with increased female representation within these two occupational categories over the decade. The results corroborated the 50/50 Foundation findings (5050 Foundation 2017). That being noted, the result for female judges and magistrates of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds was grave. In 2006, women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries comprised just under one percent of judges and magistrates (0.78 percent and 0.93 percent, respectively) within the 'other ancestries' and 'not stated' categories. However, by the 2016 Census female judges and magistrates of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries was so low the figures, if any, did not even register statistically.

7.1.7 Tribunal members, barristers, other judicial officers and solicitors


In the Australian judicial system, superior court judges are generally drawn from judges experienced in the inferior courts, and on occasion, experienced barristers. Former judges have also reverted to work as barristers. Magistrates, as junior judges or, as judicial officers of Australia's lowest level courts, are officially also appointed by the same processes as judges. They are normally drawn from legally qualified members of tribunals and the legal profession, both barristers and solicitors. In addition, legal officers within the occupational category of 'other judicial officers' such as judicial registrars, coroners and parliamentary counsel can also be appointed as magistrates (ABS 2009f). However, the ABS classification of 'other judicial officers' is broader than the three legal professions mentioned earlier. It includes, administrative lawyers, family law mediators, law researchers, legal officers, and patent and trademark attorneys (ABS 2009f).

Technically, Australia's tribunals do not fall within the remit of Australia's judiciary. Tribunal members, on the other hand, may be drawn from any fields within or outside of the legal profession. The power to appoint tribunal members rests within the authority of

the incumbent government and the process has given rise to lack of transparency. For example, the recent appointment of tribunal members has been polluted with political bias to such an extent that the then President of the Law Council of Australia, Arthur Moses SC, was compelled to comment on the matter in a speech to the Council of Australasian Tribunals National Conference in 2019 (Moses 2019).


Graphs 7.1.7(a) to 7.1.7(d) below display the ancestries of Australia’s tribunal members, barristers, other judicial officers and solicitors in the 2006 and 2016 censuses, respectively.

Graph 7.1.7(a): *Top ten ancestries of tribunal members*




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.7(b): Top ten ancestries of barristers




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.7(c): Top ten ancestries of 'Other judicial and legal professions'



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.7(d): Top ten ancestries of solicitors



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results of the ancestral compositions of Australia’s judiciary generally reflected the other two arms of government: the Parliament and the Executive. The judiciary (judges and magistrates), tribunals and legal professions (barristers and solicitors, and other legal professionals) presented a landscape overwhelmingly dominated by individuals of Anglo-Celtic and European heritage. The results depicted a picture lacking any semblance to the cultural diversity of Australia’s population.

Overall, the multicultural realities of Australia’s parliamentarians, the Executive government and the judiciary makes a mockery of Australia’s claim as being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’. The representation of cultural diversity in these institutions lacks any similitude to the general population. Within these formal institutions of power, Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European heritage overwhelmingly dominate. Over the decade from 2006 to 2016, there was little change to warrant any optimism. The prospect of Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries being able to participate in the nation’s formal power structures remains bleak. The

Australian government's claim of "success" appears to refer to the success of Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries in commanding and dominating the power institutions of the nation. The "multicultural" refers to the "multi" of Anglo-Celtic and European cultures, not the other 290 of the 300 plus ancestries that comprise Australian society.

The results demonstrate that having either one of the Anglo-Euro-Australian English heritage of: 'Australian', English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, German, prove to be most advantageous. Their domination in all three of Australia's institutions of authority appear unshakeable. In the judicial and legal system – judges, magistrates, tribunal members, barristers, solicitors and other judicial officers – the European heritage represented broadened to include Jewish, French, American, Austrian and Polish. But for those of non-Anglo-European ancestries, the prospect of being in any of Australia's legitimate institutions is bleak. Thus, from the standpoint of Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European ethnicities, Australia is indeed 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'. Having one, both, or a combination of the "multicultural" of Anglo-Celtic or European heritage enable a privilege, an unearned advantage, not available to other Australians, that advances their participation and success in dominating the formal power structures of the nation.


7.2.0 Weber's Class, Status and Party

While examining the cultural diversity of Australia's formal power institutions enables a constructive view of representation within Australia's formal power structure, it is also useful to investigate Australia's power structures from other frameworks. Weber's treatment of the distribution of power within society as a tripartite structure of class, status and party provides another lens through which to examine the cultural diversity of Australia's power structures. He defined power as the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action (Gerth and Mills 1991; Waters and Waters 2016).

Weber's conceptualisation of class is based on market opportunity, status based in estimations of honour, and party is where power is distributed (Gerth and Mills 1991). Class and status 'emerge out of two different parts of society' (Waters and Waters 2016). Status with its emphasis on honour is rooted in abstract emotion of loyalties of what Weber identifies as "the community" or *Gemeinschaft*. Class, on the other hand, 'emerges out of a sub-unit of the *Gemeinschaft*', within the framework of 'rationally ordered markets and legal structures' of society or *Gesellschaft* (Waters and Waters 2016). And party emerges out of both. Thus, the marketplace, honour and politics are the 'homes' of class, status, and party, respectively (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 4).

Waters and Waters (2016) depict the relations between these concepts (of *Gemeinschaft*, *Gesellschaft*, Class, Status and Party) as follows (per **Figure 7.2.0** below):

Figure 7.2.0: Illustration of Weber's concepts of Class, Status and Party within *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 3)



Weber's *Gemeinschaft* or community, 'refers to a group held together by an emotional ties', whereas society or '*Gesellschaft* relations tend to be utilitarianism and rational and emerge from the mode of market exchange' (Waters and Waters 2010, p. 154). 'The former is rooted in abstract emotion and the latter in rational calculation' (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 1). In this sense, the locus of relationships between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* differs in that:

Gemeinschaft relationships imply a communion between the present and a shared past, and by implication a shared future (Waters and Waters 2010, p. 154, citing Roth 1992)...[Of] emotional feelings of

shared commonality rooted in beliefs about the past or hopes for a relationship rooted in personal feelings of loyalty....*Gesellschaft* relationships [on the other hand] are of the present, a solidarity that is rooted in the labour, credit, or commodity markets (Waters and Waters 2010, p. 154).

Thus, the ‘sentimental *Gemeinschaft* gives birth to Stand (status), and rationalized *Gesellschaft* to Class’ (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 3), and Party derives from both.

This section explores the distribution of power within Australian society employing Weber’s analytical framework of class, status and party. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 view class-based cultural diversity through the prism of occupations and income. Section 7.4 examines party through the paradigm of political representation and lobbyists. Finally, section 7.5 critically analyses the results of sections 7.2 to 7.4 to examine the role of ethnicity as status in Australian society.

7.2.1 *Ethnic differentials in class – occupation reflecting class*

Weber argued inequalities of classes emerge from rational marketplaces or economic advantages within society, ‘without reference to honour, affection, scorn, privilege or other pre-existing relationships’ (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 2). In this sense, economic achievements such as the capacity to earn a high income become a good paradigm to measure class. The ATO publishes an annual list of ranking occupations in accordance to average incomes earned during the 2016-2017 financial year as part of its annual taxation statistics report. The combination of ancestry data with specific income earning occupational groups can provide information on cultural diversity elements within these occupations. **Figure 7.2.1** below lists the ATO’s top ten highest income earning occupational groups for the 2016-2017 financial year out of approximately 1,100 occupations recorded for the 2016-2017 annual tax returns. **Graphs 7.2.2 to 7.2.10** below illustrate the top ten ancestries of the ATO’s top ten highest average income earning occupational groups for the 2016-17 financial year.

Figure 7.2.1: *Top ten highest income earning occupations in Australia (2016-17 financial year)*




[Data source: ATO 2019)

7.2.2 *Top ten ancestries of highest average income earning occupational group – surgeons*

The ATO lists surgeons as the category with the highest average income for the 2016/2017 financial year. The designation ‘surgeons’ is an umbrella term adopted by the ATO from the ABS occupational unit group 2535 (ABS 2009g). It refers to a group of medical specialists including surgeon (general), cardiothoracic surgeon, neurosurgeon, orthopaedic surgeon, otorhinolaryngologist, paediatric surgeon, plastic and reconstructive surgeon, urologist and vascular surgeon (ABS 2009g). **Graph 7.2.2** below illustrates the top ten ancestries of surgeons in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.2.2: Top ten ancestries of surgeons




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.3 Top ten ancestries of the second highest average income earning occupation (anaesthetist)

The second highest average income earning occupational group is anaesthetists, a specific medical specialty that provides medical care with respect to patients requiring general or local anaesthesia (ABS 2009h). **Graph 7.2.3** below illustrates the top ten ancestries of anaesthetists in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.2.3: Top ten ancestries of anaesthetists




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.4 *Top ten ancestries of the third highest average income occupational group – internal medicine specialist*

Internal medical specialists are the group with the third highest average income for the 2016-17 financial year. The category of internal medicine specialist, an American term, covers a range of medical specialties or specialisation within the medical profession. Such specialisation requires several years of advanced medical training post general medical qualification (Australians College of Physicians 2019). The ATO adopts the ABS terminology in this occupational group category, Unit Group 2533 (ABS 2009i), which covers thirteen medical specialties including: specialist physician, cardiologist, clinical haematologist, medical oncologist, endocrinologist, gastroenterologist, intensive care specialist, neurologist, paediatrician, renal medicine specialist, rheumatologist, thoracic medicine specialist and other non-specified specialist physicians (ABS 2009i). **Graph 7.2.4** below exhibits the top ten ancestries of internal medicine specialists, comprising of the average of the 13 listed medical specialties, in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.2.4: *Top ten ancestries of internal medicine specialist*




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.5 *Top ten ancestries of the fourth highest average income earning occupational group (financial dealer)*

The only non-medical employment group within the top five average income earning capacity is that of financial dealers, whom the ATO has ranked as the fourth highest average income group. The ABS identifies this occupational group as Unit Group 2222 encompassing occupations such as financial market dealer, futures trader, stockbroking dealer and unspecified financial dealers (ABS 2009j). **Graph 7.2.5** below displays the top ten ancestries of financial dealers in the 2006 and 2016 Censuses.

Graph 7.2.5: *Top ten ancestries of financial dealers*




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.6 *Top ten ancestries of the fifth highest average income earning occupational group – psychiatrists*

The fifth highest income earning group is that of psychiatrist, a medical specialty associated with diagnosing, assessing, treatment and prevention of ‘mental, emotional and

behavioural disorders’ (ABS 2009k, para. 1). The ABS classifies this psychiatrists as occupation Unit Group 2534 (ABS 2009k). **Graph 7.2.6** below illustrates the top ten ancestries of psychiatrists in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.2.6: Top ten ancestries of psychiatrists




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.7 Top ten ancestries of the sixth highest average income earning occupational group –other medical practitioner

The sixth highest average income earning cohort identified by the ATO is another (and final) group of medical specialists under the category of ‘Other Medical Practitioners’ (ABS 2009l, para. 1). Grouped as the occupational Unit Group 2539, they include the following medical specialists: dermatologist, emergency medicine specialist, obstetrician and gynaecologist, ophthalmologist, pathologist, diagnostic and interventional radiologist, radiation oncologist and non-specified medical practitioners (ABS 2009l). **Graph 7.2.7** below shows the top ten ancestries of ‘other medical practitioners’ in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.2.7: Top ten ancestries of ‘Other medical practitioners’




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.8 Top ten ancestries of the seventh highest average income earning occupational group – judicial/legal professionals


The ATO identified ‘judicial and other legal professionals’, ABS occupational Unit Group 2712 (ABS 2009f), as the seventh highest average income earning occupational group for the 2016-2017 financial year. This occupational group includes judges, magistrates, tribunal members, and judicial and other legal professionals (unspecified) (ABS 2009f). The ancestral composition of these four occupational groups were illustrated earlier in **Graphs 7.1.6(a) & (b) and 7.1.7(a) & (c)**, but are reproduced below for ease of reference.

Graph 7.1.6(a): Top ten ancestries of Australia's judges




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.6(b): Top ten ancestries of Australia's magistrates




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.7(a): Top ten ancestries of tribunal members



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.1.7(c): Top ten ancestries of 'Other judicial and legal professions'




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

As discussed previously under Sections 7.1.6 to 7.1.7, the constitution of these four occupational groups, which form the judicial arm of government, (and a pathway towards Australia's judicature), do not reflect the cultural diversity of Australia's population.

7.2.9 *Top ten ancestries of the eighth highest average income earning occupational group – mining engineers*


Mining engineers are the eighth highest average income earning occupational group for the 2016-2017 financial year identified by the ATO. This occupational Unit Group 2336 includes two occupations: mining engineer (excluding petroleum) and petroleum engineer (ABS 2009m). **Graphs 7.2.9(a) and (b)** below display the top ten ancestries of these two occupations in the 2006 and 2016 Censuses, respectively.

Graph 7.2.9(a): Top ten ancestries of mining engineers



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.2.9(b): Top ten ancestries of petroleum engineers




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.10 Top ten ancestries of the ninth highest average income earning occupational group – chief executives and managing directors

Chief executives and managing directors, which the ABS identify as occupational Unit Group 1111 (ABS 2009c), is the ninth highest average income earning occupational group for the 2016-2017 financial year as identified by the ATO. This professional group includes those who identified their occupations as ‘Chief Executive’ or ‘Managing Directors’ (ABS 2009c). **Graph 7.1.4(a)** (reproduced below) under Section 7.1.3 of this chapter discusses the composition of the Executive arm of government using the occupational groups of chief executives or managing directors as proxies.

Graph 7.1.4(a): Top ten ancestries of Chief Executives and Managing Directors




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

7.2.11 Top ten ancestries of the tenth highest average income earning occupational group – engineering managers

Engineering managers round out the careers the ATO identified as being the top ten average income earning occupations in the 2016-2017 financial year. Classified by the ABS as occupational Unit Group 1332, engineering managers are one of the specialist managers within the ‘construction, distribution and production’ sectors (ABS 2009n, para. 1). **Graph 7.2.11** below exhibits the top ten ancestries of those who identified their occupation as engineering managers in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.2.11: Top ten ancestries of engineering manager



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The ancestral composition of the top ten high earning income professional group results demonstrate two emerging trends: occupational groups requiring measurable, externally validated high technical skills reflect a higher level of non-Anglo-Celtic cultural diversity. Conversely, occupational groups requiring a higher proportion of “fuzzy”, “relatable” or where “management” skills play more significant role present with high Anglo-Celtic and Western-European dominance. The former trend was depicted in the medical professions (which comprise half of the top ten highest earning occupational groups in Australia), engineers and financial dealers where there were significantly higher levels of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European cultural diversity. For example, the medical professions showed Chinese and Indian ancestries were significantly over-represented compared to their respective proportions in the population.

On the other hand, occupational groups where appointment could be made through processes that may involve personal contacts, and/ or interactions with those in positions of formal power, presented with significant under-representation of those of non-Anglo-

Celtic and non-European backgrounds. These occupational groups included government sector leaders, judges and other judicial officers, and engineering managers. Overall, the results showed that those of Irish, Scottish and German ancestries were over-represented across all top ten highest income earning occupational groups.

The outlier results for Asian migrants in the medical and engineering professions reflect the confluence of factors Ho (2020) identified in her research into Asian migrants and education in Australia. Non-white migrants experienced ‘three invisible barriers comprising a glass gate, a glass door and a glass ceiling’, a reflection of their lack of social capital and discrimination, both direct and indirect, in an unequal society (Ho 2020, p. 104 citing Guo 2013). Faced with these barriers, Asians-Australians focus on professions that ‘are seen as ‘safe’ because of their basis in technical skills and objective standards’ but also provide economic security (Ho 2020, p. 111). In addition, seeing other people whom they can identify with, who succeeded despite the barriers and obstacles, can be a powerful incentive to younger generations of Asian-Australians to enter the fields.

In relation to gender, the top ten highest income earning occupational groups presented a dismal landscape across all occupational groups. For women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds, the picture was even more pessimistic. With the exception of psychiatrists, in all the other occupational groups women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries comprised five or less percent under the ‘other ancestries’ category.

7.3.0 Bottom ten lowest income earning occupations

The ancestry composition of the top ten highest income earning occupational groups provide insight into the economic participation of those with non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds. Examining the lack of economic success, in terms of cultural diversity, can provide a more comprehensive topography of economic participation in Australia. In addition to the top ten highest income earning occupational groups, the ATO also publishes the bottom ten lowest paid occupations in the 2016-2017 financial year (Khadem 2019). These ten occupations fall within the agricultural and hospitality sectors

and within the ABS's three occupational groupings: hospitality workers, cleaners and farm labourers (ABS 2009o). Occupations within these three major groups generally require skills and educational attainment at secondary schooling or equivalent or lower levels, or on-the-job training. **Table 7.3.0** below lists the bottom ten occupations with the lowest income earning capacity in the 2016-2017 financial year.

Table 7.3.0: Lowest paid ten occupations (2016-2017 financial year)

Lowest paid occupations:		
Bottom 10	Occupation	Average taxable income
1	Fast food cook	\$18,616
2	Hospitality employee	\$19,102
3	Hospitality apprentice or trainee	\$19,282
4	Farm, forestry or garden worker apprentice or trainee	\$19,744
5	Farmer	\$22,378
6	Food, drink or meat processor apprentice or trainee	\$23,085
7	Waiter	\$23,537
8	Cleaning services apprentice or trainee	\$23,924
9	Cleaner	\$24,063
10	Café worker	\$24,136

(Source: Khadem 2019)

7.3.1 Hospitality and cleaning sectors among lowest income earning occupations

Jobs in the hospitality and cleaning sectors comprised the bulk of the ten lowest income earning brackets in the 2016-2017 financial year (Khadem 2019). They included a range of jobs such as fast food cooks (the lowest paid occupation), trainees or those in apprentice positions in the sector, cleaning jobs, café workers, bar attendants and baristas, gaming workers, hotel service managers, waiters and so on. The ABS groups these occupations

into three sub-major occupational groupings of ‘hospitality workers’, ‘food preparation assistants’ and ‘cleaners and laundry workers’ (ABS 2009o).

Furthermore, there appears to be some discrepancy with the ATO’s reference of occupational titles. For example, within the ATO’s ten lowest paid occupations, ‘hospitality employee’ is listed as the second lowest paid occupation (see Table 7.3.0 above; Khadem 2019). However, in the ATO’s (2016, p. 14) own publication, *Guide for tax agents: Salary and wage occupation codes 2016*, the term ‘hospitality employee’ refers to a range of occupations within the hospitality sector. They include: bar useful or busser, barista, bartender, café, cafeteria or canteen worker, casino host, cleaner, cook, door attendant, fast food cook, housekeeper, luggage porter, waiter and so forth. In fact, with the exceptions of apprentice/trainee positions and those of farmers, the remaining occupations listed by ATO within the ten lowest paid occupations all fall within its 2016 occupation classification of ‘hospitality employee’.

The ATO’s classification appears to be referring to both a collective term where a number of occupations are grouped together as ‘hospitality’ workers as well as individual occupations, such as ‘fast food cook’. The ABS, on the other hand, categorises occupations in a pyramid structure in the following order: the apex comprises eight major occupational groups, followed by sub-major groups, then minor groups, unit groups (which is the lowest level of group classification) with the base of the pyramid containing individual occupation classification (ABS 2009).

Graphs 7.3.1(a) to 7.3.1(n) below display the ABS data for the top ten ancestries of workers within the ATO’s ten lowest income earning occupations for the 2016-2017 financial year. For each graph, the y-axis reflects the percentage each of the ten ancestry occupies in the occupation concerned while the x-axis reflects the order of the ancestry. Thus, the far left ancestry reflects the ancestry with the highest number of workers in the occupation concerned. The ‘other ancestries’ column reflect the proportion of the remainder 290 ancestries within the general population while the ‘not stated’ column is self-explanatory. The graphs are numbered according to their respective ATO ranking

commencing with the lowest paid occupation (fast food cooks) as the first graph, labelled as Graph 7.3.1(a), and the tenth lowest paid occupation (café worker) as the last (graph), labelled as Graph 7.3.1(n). Where the ATO occupation concerned has no direct ABS equivalent, data of similar/parallel occupations within the same ABS occupational category assessed as being equivalent position(s) are substituted. Unfortunately, ancestry data for ‘farmer’ and those of apprentices/trainees for all groups were not included in the ABS data sought. Therefore, the graphs below reflect only data for five of the ATO’s ten lowest paid occupations – fast food cook, hospitality employee, waiter, cleaner and café worker, respectively – and the ABS parallel/substitute equivalent(s).

For ease of reference and analysis, the graphs are grouped into four main industry sectors in accordance with their respective ABS occupational groupings. The first grouping, (A), contains the positions of ‘hospitality employee’, ‘hospitality apprentice or trainee’, ‘waiter’ and ‘café worker’ all of which fall within the ABS classification of ‘hospitality workers’ minor group (ABS 2009p). The second group, (B), comprising the occupations ‘fast food cook’ and ‘food, drink or meat processor apprentice/trainee’, fall within the ABS occupational category of ‘food preparation assistants’ minor group (ABS 2009q). The third group, (C), which includes the occupations of ‘cleaner’ and ‘cleaning services apprentice/trainee’ are contained within the remit of ‘cleaners and laundry workers’ minor group (ABS 2009r). The final group, (D), contains the occupations of ‘farmer’ and ‘farm, forestry/garden worker apprentice/trainee’, and are grouped into “Other group” category as these two occupations fall within a number of ABS employment groupings including the ‘farm, forestry and garden workers’ minor group (ABS 2009s). For clarity and ease of reference, **Table 7.3.1** below illustrates how the data is organised.

Table 7.3.1: ATO bottom 10 lowest income earning occupation vs ABS occupation (or equivalent(s)) vs graph

ATO bottom 10	Occupation	ABS occupation	ABS grouping	Possible ABS equivalent(s)	Graph
1	Fast food cook	Fast food cook	(C) Food preparation assistants	N/A	7.3.1(a)
2	Hospitality employee	Not available	(A) Hospitality workers	Bar attendants; gaming workers; hospitality workers (nec)	7.3.1(b); 7.3.1(c); 7.3.1(d)
3	Hospitality apprentice /trainee	Data not available	(A) Hospitality workers	Not available	Not available
4	Farm, forestry or garden worker apprentice /trainee	Data not available	(D) Farm, forestry and garden workers	Not available	Not available
5	Farmer	Data not available	(D) Farm, forestry and garden workers	Not available	Not available
6	Food, drink or meat processor apprentice /trainee	Data not available	(C) Food preparation assistants	Food trades assistants; kitchenhand	7.3.1(e); 7.3.1(f)

7	Waiter	Waiter	(A) Hospitality workers	N/A	7.3.1(g)
8	Cleaning services apprentice /trainee	Data not available	(C) Cleaners and laundry workers	Not available	Not available
9	Cleaner	Not available	(C) Cleaners and laundry workers	Commercial cleaner; domestic cleaner; drycleaner; carpet cleaner; window cleaner; other cleaners	7.3.1(h); 7.3.1(i); 7.3.1(j); 7.3.1(k); 7.3.1(l); 7.3.1(m)
10	Café worker	Café worker	(A) Hospitality workers	N/A	7.3.1(n)


(A) ABS 431 Minor group – ‘hospitality workers’ within the lowest ten paid occupations

As mentioned previously, there is a disjuncture between the ABS and ATO naming convention with respect to the term ‘hospitality employee’. The ABS classification of occupations does not contain a direct reference of ‘hospitality employee’ as a specific occupation, while the ATO uses the term as both a specific occupation and a general reference to a group of occupations within the hospitality industry. The ABS occupational category of ‘hospitality workers’ include occupations such as: ‘bar attendants and baristas’, ‘café worker’, ‘gaming workers’, ‘hotel service managers’, ‘waiters’ and ‘other hospitality workers not elsewhere classified (nec)’. Given this and based on the ABS definitions of the occupations within the ‘hospitality workers’ employment grouping, it is assessed that these three occupational units – ‘bar attendants and baristas’, ‘gaming

workers’ and ‘other hospitality workers’ – fall within the remit of the ATO’s occupations of ‘hospitality employee’.


The graphs below display the top ten ancestral heritage of the above mentioned three occupations (**Graphs 7.3.1(b) to 7.3.1(d)**), plus the occupations of ‘waiter’ (**Graph 7.3.1(g)**) and ‘café worker’ (**Graphs 7.3.1(n)**) – they represent the ATO’s second, seventh and tenth lowest paid occupations, respectively.

Graph 7.3.1(b): *Top ten ancestries of hospitality employee (2nd lowest income earning occupation) – bar attendants*




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(c): Top ten ancestries of hospitality employee (2nd lowest income earning occupation) – gaming workers




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(d): Top ten ancestries of hospitality employee (2nd lowest income earning occupation) – hospitality workers (not elsewhere classified)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(g): Top ten ancestries of waiters (7th lowest income earning occupation)



Graph 7.3.1(n): Top ten ancestries of café worker (10th lowest income earning occupation)




The results showed that in general, those of non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds presented higher proportions of workers in the ‘hospitality workers’ occupational grouping than their relative proportions in the general population, particularly the Asian ancestries. Furthermore, with the exception of ‘gaming workers’ which had a relatively balanced proportion between the two genders, the other ‘hospitality workers’ occupations had higher proportions of women than men. The trend of gender imbalance was particularly stark in the occupations of ‘waiters’, ‘café workers’ and the ‘hospitality workers not elsewhere classified (nec)’. The last employment grouping refers to occupational positions in the hospitality industry that provide supporting roles. They comprise positions such as those involving the cleaning of the bar, club or dining areas (‘bar back’ and ‘glassie’), doorperson/luggage porter, cloakroom attendants, hotel cellar hand, uniform room attendant and so forth.

(B) ABS 851 Minor group – ‘food preparation assistants’ occupational grouping


The lowest paid occupation of the 2016-2017 financial year was ‘fast food cook’; an occupational title within the ABS minor occupational group unit of ‘food preparation assistants’. Although the ABS data provided did not include specific data for the third lowest paid occupation of ‘hospitality apprentice/trainee’, however, ancestry data of parallel occupations that were likely to share the same duties – ‘food trade assistant’ and ‘kitchenhand’ – were provided. **Graphs 7.3.1(a), 7.3.1(e) and 7.3.1(f)** below display the top ten ancestries of ‘fast food cook’, ‘food trade assistant’ and ‘kitchenhand’ for the 2006 and 2016 censuses, respectively.

Graph 7.3.1(a): Top ten ancestries of fast food cooks (lowest income earning occupation)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(e): Top ten ancestries of food trade assistants (possibly equivalent to the 6th lowest income earning occupation)



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(f): Top ten ancestries of kitchenhand (possibly equivalent to 6th lowest income earning occupation)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results revealed a lower representation of Anglo-European heritage and a higher proportion of Asian ancestries among the three occupations of ‘fast food cooks’, ‘food trade assistants’ and ‘kitchenhand’ than their respective proportions in the general population. Five Asian ancestries – Chinese, Filipino, Nepalese, Korean and Indian – were presented within the top ten ancestries of these occupations. Together they represented at least ten percent of these occupations which was more than double their relative proportion in the general population. From a gender perspective, with the exception of ‘fast food cook’, there appears to be an emerging trend of moving towards parity between men and women.

(C) *ABS 811 Minor group – ‘cleaners and laundry workers’ occupational grouping*


‘Cleaner’ was listed as the ninth lowest paid occupation by the ATO in the 2016-2017 financial year. As noted previously, it was among the occupations where there was a discrepancy in the use of the terminology between the ATO and the ABS. According to the ABS, occupational groups within the ‘cleaning services’ definition incorporate jobs such as laundry workers, cleaners (both domestic and commercial) gaming workers and housekeepers (ABS 2009r). The ABS has no specific reference to a single occupation of ‘cleaner’. The ATO’s own guide to occupations contain nine references for the occupation of ‘cleaner’ – from carpet, drycleaner to window etc. – depending on the type or environment of cleaning concerned (ATO 2016, p. 8). Given these discrepancies and the ATO not specifying which ‘cleaner’ occupations it referred to within its ten lowest paid occupations, the six ABS defined occupations with ‘cleaner’ in their respective titles have been chosen in this study. They include: ‘commercial cleaners’, ‘domestic cleaners’, ‘drycleaners’, ‘carpet cleaners’, ‘window cleaners’ and ‘cleaners not elsewhere classified’ (ABS 2009r). **Graphs 7.3.1(h) to 7.3.1(m)** below display the top ten ancestries of these occupations.

Graph 7.3.1(h): *Top ten ancestries of commercial cleaners (possibly 8th or 9th lowest income earning occupations)*




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(i): Top ten ancestries of domestic cleaners (possibly 8th or 9th lowest income earning occupations)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(j): Top ten ancestries of drycleaner (possibly 8th or 9th lowest income earning occupations)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(k): Top ten ancestries of carpet cleaner (possibly 8th or 9th lowest income earning occupations)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(l): Top ten ancestries of window cleaners (possibly 8th or 9th lowest income earning occupations)



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.3.1(m): *Top ten ancestries of cleaners not elsewhere classified (possibly 8th or 9th lowest income earning occupations)*



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results showed similarities to the other occupations of the ATO's ten lowest paid occupations: women of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds dominated the 'cleaning' occupations. In particular, women of Asian antecedents – Chinese, Vietnamese, Nepalese, Filipino, Korean and Indian – over-represented these "cleaning" occupations compared to their respective proportions in the general population.

(D) Agricultural jobs among lowest income occupational groups

The remaining two occupations that the ATO lists as among the bottom ten lowest income earning occupations – 'farmer' and 'farm, forestry and garden worker apprentice/trainee' – fall within three ABS occupational categories depending on the specific farming practice. The occupational categories include minor groups of 'farm, forestry and garden workers' (ABS 2009s), 'farmers and farm managers' (ABS 2009t) and 'mobile plant operators' (ABS 2009u). Each category contains a further number of occupations within. Together these three occupational categories incorporate a large range of jobs covering

the following unit groups of occupations: aquaculture workers, crop farm workers, forestry and logging workers, garden and nursery labourers, livestock farm workers, mixed crop and livestock farm workers and other farm, forestry and garden workers (ABS 2009t). In its own reference guide, the ATO (2016, p. 10) lists 25 different types of ‘farmers’. Under the term ‘farm hand/worker’ a further 28 occupations are listed (ATO 2016, p. 10). It is thus unclear specifically which occupation or occupations the ATO is referencing as ‘farmer’.

In its 2019 report into the demand for farm workers, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) noted that aside from family members, farm workers comprised mostly of locals from the same or neighbouring district and New Zealand workers (Dufty, Martin and Zhao 2019, pp. 16-17). Farm labour is supplemented by overseas workers, particularly backpackers, during high seasons. The proportion of overseas workers employed on a farm depends on the type and size of the farm concerned. Nuts, fruits, vegetable and larger farms tended to have a higher proportion of overseas workers. Backpackers or ‘working holiday’ visas are only available to a limited number of countries and/ or jurisdictions: mostly north and western European countries, British passport holders, Canada and two Asian countries, Japan and Korea, plus Hong Kong and Taiwan passport holders (Australian Department of Home Affairs 2020).

Given the indeterminate definition of the term ‘farmer’ and ‘farm, garden’ occupations, it is not possible to graph the ancestries of the vast array of occupational groups incorporated within these terms. The ABS advises separation of the data is available at a significant cost through its data consultancy service. Furthermore, the added complexity of seasonal workers in the farming industry makes it difficult to determine the proportion of data that makes up the Australian population against that of overseas visa holders. Notwithstanding that, Krivokapic-Skoko and Collins’ (2016) investigation into migrant settlement in rural communities in Australia found a changing rural landscape, albeit slowly, which may impact the cultural and ethnic composition of rural occupations such as ‘farmer’ and ‘farm and garden workers’. Furthermore, whether these demographic changes will become


permanent will depend on a number of factors including reduction in parochialism, job opportunities, improved infrastructure and community support for their cultural and religious connection (Krivokapic-Skoko and Collins 2016, pp. 174-176).

7.4.0 Ethnic differentials in qualifications and educational attainment

Education is often touted as the gateway for advancement in society, particularly in terms of class. The top ten income earning occupational groups identified by the ATO contain professions that control entry into the respective fields through setting educational and qualification attainments. This is particularly salient for the medical specialties which require a decade plus university education and extensive on the job training. This section investigates the ethnic differentials in educational attainment and educational attainment against median income.


The ABS classifies formal educational qualifications into nine ‘broad levels’ based on level and field of study. The classification ranges from the lowest level of ‘other education’ which covers non-award courses and ‘miscellaneous education’ to the highest level of ‘postgraduate degree level’ (ABS 2001a). Within each level, other ‘narrow levels’ may also exist. For example, the broad level of ‘postgraduate degree level’ is further subdivided into ‘doctoral degree level’ and ‘master degree level’. For ease of analysis and reference, the nine broad levels of educational attainment have been compressed into five distinguishing levels: no education; high school; certificates; bachelor degree; and postgraduate degree. Together, they cover a sufficiently wide range to enable comprehensiveness analysis of educational attainment among the top ten ancestries of each level. **Graphs 7.4.0(a) to 7.4.0(f)** below illustrate the relative proportions of six broad levels of educational attainment among the top ten ancestries of the population for the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.4.0(a): Top ten ancestries of postgraduate degree holders (2006 & 2016)




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.0(b): Top ten ancestries of bachelor degree holders (2006 & 2016)




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.0(c): Top ten ancestries of certificate level holders (2006 & 2016)




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.0(d): Top ten ancestries of completed Year 12 (2006 & 2016)




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.0(e): Top ten ancestries of Year 11 or below educational attainment (2006 & 2016)



[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.0(f): Top ten ancestries of 'No Education' attainment (2006 & 2016)



[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results showed Australians with Chinese, Italian and Greek backgrounds had higher levels of ‘no education’ attainment compared to the other ancestries. Chinese antecedent had the highest proportion ‘no education’ level, comprising of over thirteen percent in 2006 but decreased to just over twelve percent by 2016. The high presentation of ‘no education’ among Chinese ancestry is likely a reflection of the arrival of the large number of Indochinese refugees in the 1970s to 1990s. For the remainder ancestries, with the exception of Irish ancestry which had 1.75 percent of the overall proportion of ‘no education’ attainment, the others had less than one percent each.

Conversely, Indian heritage led the ‘postgraduate degree level’ educational attainment, achieving just under nine percent of the proportion of this level of educational attainment, or about four times their relative proportion in the general population in 2016. This was followed by Chinese, Irish, Scottish, German and Dutch ancestries with 11.4, 13.5, 11.1, 4.8 and 1.7 percents, respectively; or equivalent to about two and one half times each of their relative proportions in the general population. The remainder antecedents – English, ‘Australian’, Italian and Greek – were about on par with their respective proportions in the Australian population. The results of the higher levels of postgraduate degree level educational attainment among those of Chinese and Indian backgrounds likely reflected Australia’s changes in migration policies. Since 1996, the Howard government prioritised and significantly increased skilled migration over other forms of migration. These changes also reflected the change in migration patterns, where India and China have become the top two source countries of migrants for Australia (Australian Department of Home Affairs n.d., para. 1).

With respect to ‘high school level’ educational attainment, ‘Australian’, Dutch, German, Greek, Irish and Scottish ancestries held higher proportions than the other ancestries achieving about one and one half to twice their relative proportions in the general population. The other antecedents’ achievements were equivalent to, or slightly under, their relative proportions in the general population.

The quadripartite Anglo-Celtic ancestries of – English, Australian, Scottish and Irish – dominated the ‘certificate’ level educational attainment for 2006 and 2016. Chinese and Indian heritage had the lowest levels, occupying approximately one and one half percent and one percent of the overall ‘certificate’ level educational attainment, respectively, representing less than one fourth of their respective proportions in the general population. At the ‘bachelor degree level’ educational attainment, Dutch, German and Chinese heritage achieved just over twice their proportions. The remainder of the top ten ancestries were either at equivalent to, or slightly higher, than their relative proportions in the general population.

Overall, the results corroborate the latest ABS publication on qualifications which noted the number of people with non-school qualification – from ‘certificate level’ to ‘postgraduate degree level’ – have increased over the decade from 2006 to 2016 (ABS 2017k). On the other than, those with non-school qualifications decreased over the decade. The results also reveal three emerging trends: firstly, the percentage of people with educational achievement at the bachelor degree level or higher are increasing; secondly, Chinese and Indian ancestries have the highest increase in the proportion of people with postgraduate degree level educational attainment; and lastly, the proportion of people with ‘no education’ attainment are decreasing.

7.4.1 Ethnic differentials in educational attainment and median weekly income

A key assumption to Australia’s claim to be ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’ suggests that Australia is an open, modern Western liberal society where socioeconomic background and ascribed attributes such as ethnicity, culture or family influence would have little impact on educational and socio-economic outcomes. As Marks and Mooi-Reci (2016) put it:

Modernization theory hypothesizes [the] declining effects of socioeconomic background and other ascribed attributes on educational attainment and increasing effects of educational

attainment on subsequent socioeconomic outcomes’ (Marks and Mooi-Reci 2016, p. 171).


It is a key principle underpinning Australian government policies – at both the federal and State/Territory levels – on education, including the establishment of selective schools, to ensure students receive education that qualify them for university entrance. The central thesis is that education reduces inequality and disadvantage, at least with respect to income inequality. This is one of the core driving factors parents, particularly Asian parents, invest and aspire for their children to succeed educationally in Australia (Ho 2020).

A large empirical literature has explored the effects of education on incomes or earnings. Studies overseas demonstrate there is a direct positive correlation between education levels and employment, re-employment and income, with higher levels of educational attainment corresponding with higher salaries (Carlson and McChesney 2015; Abdhullah, Doucouliagos and Manning 2015; Riddell and Song 2011; De Gegeorio and Lee 2002). In the Australian context, studies since the mid-1990s showed similar trends. In comparing the earnings of workers with different levels of educational attainment in Australia for over two decades from 1968/69 to 1989/1990, Borland (1996) found that if expressed as *relative earnings* to workers without high school educational attainment, there was a decline in the relative earnings of those with a degree and with trade qualifications or diploma. However, based on comparison between income and educational levels, those with university degrees still earned higher average annual incomes than those with lower levels of educational attainment (Borland 1996, Table 1).

Kennedy and Hedley (2003) observed that the findings in the Australian government’s quinquennial 2002 Intergenerational Report (IGR) noted a positive correlation between educational attainment and labour force participation. Subsequent IGRs also noted the link between an individual’s level of educational attainment and skills as ‘a key determinant of their participation in the labour force’ (The Treasury 2007, p. 13), with


‘higher educational attainment associated with lower levels of unemployment and higher wages levels’ (The Treasury 2010, p. 98). Furthermore, ‘improving educational attainment is likely to play a role in addressing disadvantage over time’ because ‘low educational outcomes...are generally associated with poorer health and wage outcomes’ (The Treasury 2010, pp. 93, 97; 2015). These assertions were corroborated in the 2018 Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey which revealed that educational attainment impacted employment participation. The trend reflected a higher propensity of underemployment associating with lower educational levels and higher employment participation with higher levels of educational attainment (Wilkins and Lass 2018, Table 4.2). Among immigrants, Tam and Page (2016) found a direct causal effect of immigrants’ English language proficiency on income, labour participation and social outcomes. Immigrants in Australia with better English proficiency were ‘able to earn higher income, attain higher level of education, have higher probability of completing tertiary studies, and get more hours of work per week’ (Tam and Page 2016, p. 66). **Graphs 7.4.1 to 7.4.8** below illustrate the top ten ancestries of eight levels of educational attainment, from the highest level of ‘postgraduate degree’ to the lowest level of ‘no education’, against median income for the 2006 and 2016 censuses. The levels of educational attainment are in reference to the ABS classification and definition of educational attainment (ABS 2001a).

Graph 7.4.1: *Top ten ancestries of 'postgraduate degree level' educational attainment versus median weekly income*




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.2: *Top ten ancestries of 'bachelor degree level' educational attainment versus median weekly income*




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.3: *Top ten ancestries of ‘advanced diploma and diploma level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income*




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.4: *Top ten ancestries of ‘certificate III & IV level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income*




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.5: *Top ten ancestries of ‘certificate I & II level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income*




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.6: *Top ten ancestries of ‘Year 12 level’ educational attainment versus median weekly income*




[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.7: *Top ten ancestries of 'Year 11 or lower level' educational attainment versus median weekly income*



[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.4.8: *Top ten ancestries of 'no education' attainment versus median weekly income*



[Source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results corroborated the literature on income and educational attainment, with higher levels of educational attainment reflecting higher median incomes across both 2006 and 2016 censuses irrespective of ancestry. The highest median income was achieved by those with postgraduate degree level educational attainment. The lowest median income was among those with ‘no education’. Nonetheless, the results also demonstrated that ethnicity or cultural background impacted on income. Australians of Anglo-European heritage earned consistently and proportionately higher median incomes than those of Chinese or Indian heritage across all eight levels of educational attainment. Australians of Chinese ancestry earned somewhere between thirty-five to eighty-four percent of those of Anglo-European backgrounds.

The differences in median incomes were most prominent among the higher and lower levels of educational attainment. For example, there were minimal differences – with less than one percent disparity – in the median incomes of those of Anglo-European backgrounds at the postgraduate degree level of educational attainment. However, for those of Chinese background with postgraduate level educational attainment, the median income was approximately seventy percent of their Anglo-European peers. Those of Indian heritage fared slightly better but still fell below their Anglo-European peers with a median income of roughly seventy-five percent of the median incomes of their Anglo-European peers.

At the ‘Year 12’ and ‘Year 11 or below’ levels of educational attainment, those of Chinese heritage earned approximately forty and thirty-five percent, respectively, of the median incomes of those of Scottish ancestry who had the highest median incomes among the top ten ancestries at both these levels.

The results also reflected a lack of data on median incomes for those of Indian backgrounds at the ‘Year 11 or below’ and ‘no education’ educational levels for the 2016 Census. The ABS advised that either the data did not exist or was unintelligible.

Overall, with respect to economically determined power, or as Weber articulates it, class, a notable trend emerges: those with Anglo-European antecedents have higher median incomes than those of other ancestries irrespective of levels of educational attainment. For those of Chinese and Indian heritage, obtaining higher educational qualifications will highly likely reflect in higher income. However, the achievements did not necessarily translate to income *parity* when compared to their Anglo-European peers with the same educational attainment levels. Australia's "waves" of migration may help explain some of the disparities in the median incomes of the different ancestries. For example, the post-War migration from Europe following WWII. Thus, those with European heritage have been in Australia for at least two generations and have become non-distinguishable with the local Anglo-Australian population. They may have risen through the ranks to hold managerial positions which are associated with higher incomes. However, the migration waves (and consequent length of time in Australia) fails to explain the *consistency* in the disparity of median incomes among all eight levels of educational attainment. The only glaring factor appeared to be ethnicity or race. Chinese and Indian heritage were the only two non-white ancestries registered within the top ten and consistently with the lowest levels of median incomes across all educational attainment levels. The results corroborate Pietsch's (2017) research which demonstrated that migrants and ethnic minorities in Australia 'face a number of social and institutional barriers' that result in lower socio-economic outcomes than those with British and European backgrounds 'despite having similar educational qualifications and length of time living in Australia' (Pietsch 2017, p. 32).

7.5.0 Party – ethnic differentials in political power

As mentioned in this chapter's introduction, class, status and party are significant structures of power bases in society. Weber's other element of stratification in society is 'Party'. Its "home" is in politics. As discussed in sections 7.1.1 to 7.1.3, the multicultural reality of Australia's members of parliaments, and those who hold corporate and government leadership roles lack any similitude to the Australian population. As of 2020,

Australia has no legal requirement for political parties to publish details of their membership. Furthermore, political parties hold information on the composition, cultural or otherwise, of their membership under tight control. Without such data, it is difficult to ascertain the state of cultural diversity of political parties and to analyse the prospect of change. Notwithstanding that, Weber's conceptualisation of party extends beyond party politics to include groups that 'seek control of the monopoly over the use of coercive force in a given territory, that is, government' (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 10 citing Waters 2015). From this perspective, an examination of political interest groups, specifically lobbyists, can provide some proxy insight into the cultural diversity of "parties" within Australia's informal power holdings.

The normative view of a multicultural democracy suggests that equal opportunity ought to be provided for interested parties to exercise their voice in public policy decisions through contacts with their representatives and public officials who serve their communities. However, owing to time and resources constraints, decision makers including policy makers (as part of the Executive arm of government) cannot possibly meet and hear every group vying for their attention. In an ideal democratic system, groups most representative of their constituency and/ or the most approximate of the targeted constituency's interests should be given preference. Nonetheless certain non-state actors, of citizens and interest groups, have access and influence beyond their legitimate engagement with the democratic processes. These interest groups, or lobbyists, access and influence Australia's political leaders, and lobby for what they want. Their advocacy in the policy process brings forth challenges to democratic legitimacy, effective government and justice. The role of these external actors, and organisations, in affecting policy and processes reflect a deficit in democracy. An examination of lobbyist backgrounds, who they represent and their access can provide significant insight into one element of the informal power structures of Australia's society.

Halpin (2019) argues the term lobbying should incorporate more than direct 'contact – written or oral – between lobbyists and public officials (civil servants and elected

officials)’ (Halpin 2019, p. 1). Other ‘indirect lobbying’ such as efforts ‘expended on media coverage, social media campaigns, and advertising which targets the general public’ must also be acknowledged (Halpin 2019, p. 1). Lobbyists ‘seek to engage and mobilise public’ opinion on the issues they advocate for (Halpin 2019, pp. 1-2). Of concern to Halpin (2019; Halpin and Warhurst 2017) is what he refers to as:

[T]he revolving door where elected officials, or those serving within government, move from these roles and into jobs in the advocacy sector...especially where the individual possesses contacts and knowledge of key processes and issues (Halpin 2019, p. 4).

The consequence is 56 percent of registered lobbyists have previously held roles in politics or worked within government (Halpin 2019, p. 4). Such a result is comparable to the investigation conducted by *The Guardian Australia* into the backgrounds of lobbyists. They found that of all the 483 individuals listed on the federal government’s lobbyist register in July 2018, nearly 53 percent ‘have a previous history within government or political party hierarchies’ (Evershed and Knaus 2018, para. 3).

Australian journalists Richard Aedy and Eleni Psaltis (2019, para. 1) identified ‘10 of the most powerful Australians’:

...their access and influence give them real clout. Many of them regularly meet our political leaders to lobby for what they want, although only one would admit to being a lobbyist (Aedy and Psaltis 2019, paras. 2-3).

They run peak bodies, are connected to the gambling and mining industries, work in the education sector, activism and represent pharmacy owners. With the exception of possibly three who are of European heritage, the remainder have Anglo-Celtic backgrounds. The one commonality they all share: whiteness.

Of the ten people, perhaps the most powerful is Dr. John Kunkel, the chief of staff to the current (2020) Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison. In his ex-officio position as the gatekeeper and “minder” of the highest political office holder, the Prime Minister of Australia, Kunkel holds what Steven Lukes identified as the second dimension of power (Lukes 1974, 2003). Initially conceptualised by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), this facet of power refers to the ability to shape and influence agenda. It is a type of power lobbyists attempt to effect but perhaps more efficient by political staffers whose proximity to political power holders may give them an advantage.

In Kunkel’s case, his experience with conservative causes can add to the shaping of national government priorities towards conservative agendas that aim to maintain the status quo in Australian society. His previous work history includes time as deputy head of the lobby group Minerals Council of Australia and ministerial staffer roles to former senior Liberal ministers including time within the Cabinet Policy Unit under the Howard government. However, there is no information on his cultural background. An extensive internet and library search of Kunkel provides little public information on his ethnicity or heritage. Searches on the ancestry.com and surnamedb.com websites reveal the surname “Kunkel” is a German surname.

The other two lobbyists of non-Anglo-Celtic but European backgrounds are Peter V’landys (of Australian Rugby League Commission) and George Tambassis (of the Pharmacy Guild of Australia) who are both of Greek heritage (Notable Kytherians 2014, para. 5; Cadzow 2019, para. 17).

In addition to Kunkel, five others have political or political staffer experience. They include: Jacinta Collins, (of the National Catholic Education Commission) a former Labor senator; Paul Everingham (of WA Chamber of Minerals and Energy) and Stephen Galilee (of NSW Minerals Council), who were former Liberal Party political staffers; David Bell (of Crosby Textor Group) a former UK Conservative Party strategist; and, Natalie O’Brien (of GetUp!) who previously worked in the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet and has campaigned on progressive issues during the 2012 presidential election (Aedy and

Psaltis 2019). These ten lobbyists are discussed here because they exemplify the invisible and rarely questioned concentration, augmentation and control of power, both formal and informal, among the white Anglo-morphic group within Australia.

In a democracy the movement of individuals between industry, civil society and government is not in itself problematic. Of concern, however, is the imbalance in proportion, resourcing and access between the different interest groups and lobbyists. Through their research into interest groups in Australia, Fraussen and Halpin (2016) found that the sector 'is numerically skewed towards economic and professional interests' (Halpin 2019, p. 4; Fraussen and Halpin 2016). Business and professional groups together account for 73 percent of the entire national interest groups. In contrast many groups advocating for non-economic interests experience double disadvantage – staff must juggle advocacy as well as provide service delivery. Furthermore, they likely lack the political connections developed through previous history within political party hierarchies or within government. These findings resonate with Weber's conceptualisation of party. The alliances created by those seeking influence in decision making power – business and professional interest groups – via parties are economically grounded classes.

Importantly, these ten individuals exemplify the operation of Lukes' (1974, 2003) third dimension of power, an aspect that is 'least accessible to observation' and where 'power is at its most effective when least observable' (Lukes 2003, p. 1). Previous scholarship on power focused on state-centred forms of power, derived from authority in decision making (Dahl 1957) or the ability to influence and shape agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). The underlying presumption is that actual conflict is necessary for power. But for Lukes, the most insidious and important form of power is domination, particularly where the dominated acquiesce to – either resignedly, gladly or even celebrate – their domination.

Several aspects of this domination (in the third dimension of power) are important and reflected in the traits of the ten people identified. First, they provide empirical evidence of the normative operation of whiteness outside the legitimate institutions of authority: as a social status corresponding with values, preferences, interests, beliefs and desires of

where power should reside and be accepted in Australian society. Second, those who benefit from whiteness-afforded status perceive their achievements as individualised meritocratic effort rather than a system established and operationalised over the generations to cement the advantage to those similar to them. Third, the dominant may know what they are doing or that their privilege is a by-product of forces they do not understand. Nonetheless, they perceive the existing systems and institutions as the optimal of a non-perfect world and themselves as the most qualified – aware of Australian history, law, economics and political wherewithal – and natural holders and with the requisite traits to steer the way forward, whether they lead organisations or set directions for the nation. Fourth, the dominant–dominated relationship is not a zero-sum game where everyone who gains at the expense of others are dominant and everyone who loses are dominated. However, the consequence allows entrenchment of the status quo of inequality, where whiteness becomes a privilege or unearned advantage in Australian society.

Overall, these factors reinforce the pernicious perception and narrative of whiteness as not only central to power, but normalises whiteness with power. The effectiveness of its operation is in the acceptance of the status quo (Lukes 1974, p. 23). As discussed in Chapter 2, the manifestation reflects a normativity of a social hierarchy based on whiteness and the maintenance of Australia as an ethno-racial hierarchical society. At the apex of this hierarchy resides an Anglo-Celtic elite, followed by those of white European migrant backgrounds with racialised minorities at the bottom of the power order. As the results of this research demonstrate, the trend reflects a concentration of an Anglo-Celtic whiteness at the centre of national government reflective of the Howard government's agenda of an 'Anglo-Celtic core' in the power landscape, and social conditioning to maintain the status quo. The domination can be through explicit means such as in formal institutions of authority – the parliament, Executive government and the judiciary – and delegated organisations such as Defence and police forces, but also in the mechanisms of informal spheres of power. The next section will analyse this.

7.6.0 Ethnic differentials in status

Weber's exposition of class as merely representing one of three possible bases for communal action contains three elements. He refers to this as 'class situation'. Firstly, there is a situation where a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances. Secondly, this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income. The final element is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets (Gerth and Mills 1991, pp. 180-182; Waters and Waters 2016, pp. 3-4). Weber defines class as any group of people found in the same situation where they share:

...the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences...as determined by the power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for income in a given economic order (Gerth and Mills 1991, p. 181).

Beneath this conceptualisation assumes "other things being equal", reflecting unambiguously economic interest and only those interests involved in the existence of the "market". However, as Weber noted, social 'inequality is rooted in the abstract honour and privilege. And it is the inequality in abstract honour and privilege that has financial consequences' (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 3). Class and status are thus related but through different forms of social stratification.

Status with its roots in honour is the most basic type of inequality. Its saliency is deeply embedded in social relations, directly linked to privilege and the prestige of ancestors and profession, barriers impenetrable to those considered "outsiders". The concept of status is typically based on the elements of:

[the] manner of living one's life, hence training for the conventions via formal training and socialization, and the prestige of ancestors and profession (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 4)

Central to Weber's conceptualisation of status is the community, or *Gemeinschaft*, of which 'feelings of solidarity related to ethnic identity, real and fictive kinship, professional organizations, neighbourhood associations, fraternities, religious orders, and so forth' that can emerge (Waters and Waters 2010, p. 154). This formulation strongly links to his articulation of ethnicity and race, among the other many examples of types of status at work, and how they sustain and maintain inequality in a society.

7.6.1 Subordination, domination and the white thoroughbred

The operation of ethnicity and race are crucial elements of inequality in Australia's multicultural society. To understand how they operate, the theoretical framework of status and its sustainment provide critical constituents. To sustain a status, a 'legitimated ideology explaining the past, the status quo and a future must be created. These include origin stories, stereotypes and traditions' (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 7). To this end, Australia's journey to become a nation provides a classic canvas of ethnicity and race as status at work. From the brutal British colonisation of Australia, the perpetuation of the myth of *terra nullius*, the WAP and the continued ethnocratism of modern Australian society, race and ethnicity remain deeply etched as types of status in Australian society.

As discussed previously, Weber considered race as an example of an extreme form of an ethnic status at work, where 'inherited but arbitrarily selected visible characteristics are perceived as a common trait and a basis for repulsion' (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 9). The embedding of race as status in Australian society began with the arrival of British colonisers to Australia in the eighteenth century. Nowhere is this more evident than the attempted genocide of its Indigenous peoples through the policies employed. Such racialisation extended beyond the coloured peoples of Indigenous Australia to include those considered non-white, particularly Asians. The WAP was but one public manifestation of race as an extreme ethnic status at work.

Notwithstanding Australia's adoption of multiculturalism as a national socio-cultural strategy for over four decades, ethnicity and race remains in operation as a gauge of status

in Australian society. As Sections 7.1 to 7.4 of this chapter demonstrate, a symbolic whiteness operating as a form of status – comprising of Anglo-Celtic and north-west European heritage – overwhelmingly dominate Australia’s formal power structures, its political parties, judiciary and administrative organs. In the economic sphere, possessing whiteness advantages life chances in Australia with higher income brackets while being non-white becomes a negative. To sustain the status quo, whiteness is employed to create pseudo-anthropological characteristics that narrate inclusion (and exclusion): common heritage, tradition (Christian) and superiority in ideology; or nominally the “West”, well suited culturally and equipped with the wherewithal on the notions of democracy, freedom, liberty, rule of law and so forth. In the words of Weber, rooted in ‘an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive privileges’ to lead this country (Waters and Waters 2016, p. 4). But beneath this murky narrative, whiteness blazes through as the dominant and latent trait.

Weber’s framework of class, status and party provides a useful tool to shine a light on the Anglo-Celtic and European majority domination and subordination of other ethnicities within Australia’s society. The focus of this chapter so far has been mainly on formal expressions of power. Within Australian society, informal power structures also hold significant societal wide influence on individual perceptions and choices. Of these, the influence (and power) of Australia’s arts and media sectors predominate.

7.7.0 Mapping informal power holdings

7.7.1 *Australian mass media*

The mass media, whether print, broadcast or via the internet, are significant forces in shaping public opinion and national conversation in modern liberal democracies. Australia is no different. For the vast majority of Australians, the mass media may be their only window into policy debates over national issues (Devereux 2007), and the means through which they acquire information on other cultures, nationalities or ethnicities. But the media are not flawless windows any more than they are objective mirrors of reality. While

formal power-holders such as political elites play a central role in shaping the boundaries (and terms) of policy debates, the news media shapes the inflection, bias and slant of the debates including the cues used to label individuals and groups featured in the news (Jakubowicz and Goodall 1994). Such framing ‘plays an important role in shaping the responses of audiences, their thought processes, their mental sophistication, their social tolerance and their political expression’ (McLeod and Shah 2015, p. 159-160).

The media’s functions extend beyond simply informing its audiences, but additionally play a vital role in shaping national conversation over inclusion and exclusion. As Bell (1995) noted, the media are more than just important social institutions:

They [the media] are crucial presenters of culture, politics, and social life, shaping as well as reflecting how these are formed and expressed. Media ‘discourse’ is important both for what it reveals about a society and for what it contributes to the character of society (Bell 1995, p. 23).

Particularly salient are the conservative Australian media’s presentation and treatment of issues impacting nationhood, national identity and belonging. The 2020 COVID-19 health crisis typifies such xenophobic narrative. It has convulsed the ghosts of the ‘yellow peril’ era of nineteenth century and the White Australia reign of the twentieth century past, enlivening a barely suppressed sinophobia (Fozdar 2016). The ongoing media narratives weave a China that straddles identities between being a national security menace and taking opportunistic risks. The employment of war-like terms such as ‘battleground’ and ‘Chinese virus’ depict a sense of impending besiegement from a disease possessed, or caused, by Chinese people (Shields 2020, para. 1). It invokes an existential threat, feeding into the broader ongoing anxieties over China and the pre-existing sinophobia narrative. Particularly virulent is the portrayal of those considered “Chinese” as incompatible with ideals of civility, democracy but as the carrier and transmitter of uncivilised behaviour bringing forth diseases. The framing, priming and agenda-setting effect of the language used within the media have unleashed a torrent of repressed anti-Chinese hostility (Young

2020). Even frontline medical professionals such as medical doctors have not escaped the racial abuse (Zhou 2020; ABC News 2020). The Australian College of Emergency Medicine has had to warn its members of increasing instances of racism within hospital emergency departments, and where ‘some hospitals staff have needed to be issued with ‘scripts’ to manage incidents of racism’ (Australian College of Emergency Medicine 2020, para. 8).

The racism reflects colonialism’s broader racialisation strategy that still infuses Australian society. The type of bias and exclusion formally brought forth during federation and the enactment of the *Immigration Restriction Act* 1901 (repealed), administered and enforced through the WAP. At the receiving end are visible Asian-Australians, irrespective of their having or not having Chinese heritage. The reporting personifies and personalises the policy debate that frames these social issues as the incompatibility between an illiberal racialised other and a civilised and loyal white culture. The framing of such narratives are not just guides in the meaning-making process but are ‘imprints of power’ (Carragee and Roes 2004, p. 222) and reflections of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991).

The racialisation is broad-brush across all those considered non-white. A 2017 report by the non-profit community organisation, All Together Now, demonstrated conservative Australian media reporting overwhelmingly employed a racialised lens that framed Muslims in a negative light (All Together Now 2017). Such framing enhances a sense of danger and threat, becoming a potent tool in the hands of power-holders (D’Angelo and Kuypers 2010). This influence is bestowed by the factors shaping the production of news, entertainment and cultural perceptions that frame narratives of inclusion or exclusion. The imbrications between language, ideology and discourse reflect the deeper intimate links between social institutions and political structures that engages with issues of power and hegemony (Fairclough 2010). For a nation born of colonial brutalisation of its indigenous peoples and racial exclusion of others, the mass media’s role in advancing sociocultural change will become even more vital (Downing and Husband 2005; Happer and Philo

2013) – particularly in the current time of unplanned cultural and social influence brought about by the technological revolution.

The focus of cultural diversity in the media centres on the representation and participation of minorities to enhance diversity in media content and staffing. Diverse representation reflects a pluralism of ideas, opinions and presentation. Importantly, it normalises participation and the diversity in the population. Most research on media and cultural diversity generally covers analysis of image, stereotyping, framing, ideology, discourse and text analysis of the media content but lack insight into the team(s) producing the contents (Downing and Husband 2005, Chapter 2; Siapera 2010; Ross 2019; Hughey and Gonzalez-Lesser 2020; Turner 2020).


Calls for a more cultural diversity in the media workforce hold the assumption that a diverse workforce will lead to a distinctively different media content, one that fairer media representation, less racialised and less Othered of those different. But research into the link between cultural diversity of production, or the team behind the media content, and media content remain limited particularly from an Australian perspective. Cottle's (1997) well-intentioned magazine series work to highlight race relations in Britain, *Television and Ethnic Minorities*, but inadvertently also exposed the dearth of cultural diversity within behind the scenes organisational process of the British national broadcaster (Downing and Husband 2005). Fursich (2010) posits that one element of increasing more diverse representation in the media is through 'providing space for other voices and by working towards a fluid rather than static and fixed production logic' (Fursich 2010, p. 122). This involves broadening the ethnocultural and ethno-racial diversity of creators of media content.

While a more diverse workforce in itself is a worthwhile goal, the paucity of research makes it less clear that a more diverse workforce directly leads to a better and fairer representation of minority groups. What the evidence demonstrates is that in White-majority nations such as the USA, Britain and Australia, media organisations are very White at the top (Downing and Husband 2005). The media contents produced in these

nations, particularly from the conservative elements, contain high levels of racialised content, furnishing harmful stereotypes and othering of non-whites (Hughey and Gonzalez-Lesser 2020; Downing and Husband 2005; Ross 2019; All Together Now 2017, 2019). Furthermore, in business organisations priorities and decisions are generally set and shaped by those in charge or at the top. And most media organisations operate as commercial corporations (Saha 2018). Although the question of causal link between the ethno-racial profile of media producers and content needs further studies, however, the correlation between the lack of cultural diversity in the media sector and production of harmful, negative representation of non-white people is clear.


The section below explores the ethnicity (and cultural diversity) of those working within Australia's media industry by interrogating the ancestries of these media professionals. They include those whose role is to produce, create, investigate, analyse, provide commentary and present the information in the mass media, in television and working in the sector generally (ABS 2009v). **Graphs 7.7.1(a) to 7.7.1(f)** below illustrate the top ten ancestries of those working in Australia's media industry in the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

Graph 7.7.1(a): Top ten ancestries of media producers




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.1(b): Top ten ancestries of radio presenters




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.1(c): Top ten ancestries of television presenters




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.1(d): Top ten ancestries of editors of newspaper or periodicals




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.1(e): Top ten ancestries of print journalists



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.1(f): Top ten ancestries of radio journalists



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results painted a media landscape awash with, and dominated by, Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European backgrounds, corroborating much of Arvanitakis et al.'s (2020) investigation into cultural diversity within the Australian media. In essence, Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds, if they make it in the top ten ancestries as media professionals at all, comprise of barely one percent of the total. For the few media professionals who are of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries, it is likely their audiences of news coverage fall within the so-called “multicultural” and non-mainstream sector of Australia’s communities whose languages are not English.

7.7.2 *Entertainment and artistic industry*

The entertainment industry is another component of Australia’s informal power institutions. Much of the content of the entertainment industry could be categorised as ‘developed, commissioned, financed, scripted, cast, directed, edited, programmed and


marketed as a carefully constructed product’ designed to entertain (Screen Australia 2016, p. 1). Despite that, the entertainment industry reflects the national psyche shaping subconscious conversations over who belongs, whose stories matter and who gets to have their voices heard. Particularly relevant is the television industry, which as Screen Australia (2016) noted:

Television matters because it is so much a part of contemporary daily life, and television drama matters in particular because of its capacity to create emotional connections, insight and identity. It reflects our sense of who we are as a society, and who we might be (Screen Australia 2016, p. 2).

According to Screen Australia’s study, there is ‘a perception among audiences that mainstream Australian content failed to reflect the multicultural reality of urban life’ (Screen Australia 2016, p. 1).


The ABS 2016 Census statistics show that over 30 percent of Australians have non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds (ABS 2017g), yet their representation on Australian television is less than half of that figure. People of non-European and non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds were significantly under-represented. While comprising approximately 17 percent of the Australian population, they make up only seven percent of television drama characters (Screen Australia 2016, p. 3). **Graphs 7.7.2(a) to 7.7.2(f)** below display the top ten ancestries of Australians in the ‘arts professionals’ (ABS 2009w) occupational category in the 2006 and 2016 censuses. The ABS classifies ‘arts professionals’ as those who ‘communicate ideas, impressions and facts in a range of media to achieve particular effects, and interpret compositions such as musical scores and scripts for performance’ (ABS 2009w, para. 1). Professions within this occupational category include actors, dancers and other entertainers, and music professionals.

Graph 7.7.2(a): Top ten ancestries of actors




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.2(b): Top ten ancestries of dancers/choreographers




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.2(c): Top ten ancestries of entertainers or variety artists




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.2(d): Top ten ancestries of actors, dancers & other entertainers (not elsewhere classified)




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.2(e): Top ten ancestries of singers



[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

Graph 7.7.2(f): Top ten ancestries of musicians




[Data source: ABS 2006 and 2016 Censuses]

The results corroborated Screen Australia's (2016) findings on diversity in Australian television dramas, which concluded that:

...a number of Australia's minorities and marginalised communities are under-represented in [Australia's] TV drama compared to the population, in particular people of non-European backgrounds such as Asian, African or Middle Eastern, and people with disabilities (Screen Australia 2016, p. 3).

Graph 7.7.2(g) on the next page displays Screen Australia's (2018) statistical analysis of the cultural diversity of Australia's audiovisual industry for 2006 and 2016, based on country of birth. The graph includes data on selected segments of the industry including film and video production and post-production, film and video distribution, film exhibition, television broadcasting (subscription and free to air), and video hire.

Graph 7.7.2(g): Top ten regions of birth of Australia's audiovisual industry employees



[Source: Screen Australia 2018]

As discussed previously in Chapter 5, country of birth and/ or region of birth are poor indicators of cultural diversity. That being said, the results of Screen Australia's analysis showed significant under-representation in all areas of the industry for those born outside of Australia, and an over-representation of those born in Australia. Overall, 79 percent of individuals working in Australia's audiovisual industry identified as being born in Australia, compared to their proportion in the population of 67 percent in 2016 (Screen Australia 2018, paras 2-6). The only positive trend from 2006 to 2016 was Indigenous Australian representation, which doubled in the decade, increasing from 1.3 percent to 2.8 percent, reflecting approximately equal representation to their respective proportion in the general population (ABS 2017).

7.8.0 Conclusion

This chapter investigated the cultural diversity of Australia's formal and informal power structures, and employed Weber's framework of class, status and party to analyse social inequality in Australia. The investigation findings show the power structures of Australia, whether formal or informal, reflect a landscape dominated by Australians of Anglo-Celtic and northwest European heritage. The domination is most prominent in Australia's parliament, the Executive arm of government and the judiciary where Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European backgrounds comprise at least 94 percent of positions within these institutions of authority. The domination also extends through a revolving door of lobbyists, who more often than not, comprise of former political staffers, politicians and political party hierarchies. The influential media and arts sectors also disclose the landscape of Australia's informal power structures, albeit with the domination of Anglo-Celtic and northwest European heritage having become slightly less intense. The results of economic participation, in terms of income, reflect a more sanguine picture. Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds have made some inroads in high-income earning professions requiring significant technical skills and extensive training such as medical specialists, engineers and financial dealers. Despite that, for women of colour, Australia's power landscape is an excluding one irrespective of whether from the

perspective of formal or informal power. Women of colour have little, if any, representation in Australia's formal and informal power structures and occupy disproportionately large segments of the low income-earning occupational groups. The findings demonstrate Weber's conceptualisation of status, particularly of whiteness operating in similitude to a status group, in full operation in Australia. Overall, the Australian government's claim of being 'the most successful multicultural society in the world' has no foundation.

Chapter 8

AUSTRALIA – A RACIAL ETHNOCRACY

8.0.1 Introduction

National and international data challenge Australia's claim to be 'the most successful multicultural society in the world'. Australia's comparative international standing among "liked-minded" liberal democracies – the UK, US, Canada, NZ, Sweden and the Netherlands – demonstrates it neither leads the pack, nor sits at the bottom of the ranking. Whether with respect to economic participation, multicultural policy, democracy or human development, Australia falls within the "middle band" of rankings among these seven nations. Domestically, Australia's power landscape paints a grim picture with respect to cultural diversity. Australians of Anglo-Celtic and north-western European backgrounds overwhelmingly dominate formal and informal power institutions. As noted in the previous chapter, the domination increases as one moves closer to the centre of national power, with the innermost core of national power overwhelmingly concentrated with Australians of Anglo-Celtic and north-western European heritage (Parliament of Australia 2020a, 6 February).

This chapter discusses the results of this research by drawing on Yiftachel's (2006) theorisation of ethnocracy and Yiftachel and Ghanem's (2004, 650) six indicators of ethnocracy, discussed earlier in Chapter 3. They provide the analytical framework to map the degree of domination of Australia's institutions of authority by an Anglo-morphic pan-ethnic grouping of Australians with Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries.

8.1.0 Is Australia an ethnocracy?

Of the three theoretical frameworks – liberalism, pluralism and ethnocracy – employed to understand Australia’s version of multiculturalism, Yiftachel’s (2006) conceptualisation of ethnocracy provides the most pertinent analytical lens through which to account for Australia’s management of cultural diversity. Although Yiftachel’s (2006) work on ethnocracy focuses on the Israel/Palestine situation, which is, of course, outside the scope of this thesis; nonetheless, the analytical lens he employs on ethnocracy provides an excellent aid to discussing the results of this research and better understanding Australia’s situation. I will restrict the analysis and discussion to reviewing the applicability of Yiftachel’s indicators for Australia, vis-à-vis three important questions: what indicators of ethnocracy are portrayed in the results of this research? how?, and to what end? The first question goes to the heart of this research – is Australia a successful multicultural society, or an ethnocracy? The second, “how?”, addresses the issue of how to unpack the ideas of multiculturalism and ethnocracy. The third speaks to the normative boundaries that circumscribe power relations in multicultural Australia. Taken together, the three questions provide a coherent and insightful theoretical context for discussing the concept of ethnocracy as applied to Australia, both from an empirical, analytical and normative perspective.

Yiftachel saw ethnocracy as:

...a political regime that facilitates expansion and control by a dominant ethnicity in contested lands. It is neither democratic nor authoritarian, with rights and capabilities depending primarily on ethnic origin and geographic location (Yiftachel 2006, abstract).

He posits that Australia was a ‘classical settling ethnocracy’ from the commencement of British colonisation, developing as a ‘pure’ settler colony through the implementation of the WAP measures to ensure a white demography and white ethnicisation (Yiftachel 2006, pp. 25-28). As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the key to ethnocracy is control and domination

by the dominant ethnic group over power structures of the nation. Though not exhaustive, Yiftachel (2006, p. 16) and Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004, p. 650) identified six indicators marking an ethnocracy. These references provide useful frameworks to analyse the results of this research and discuss where such power domination manifests.

8.1.1 Ethnicity, and not citizenship, forms the main basis for resource and power allocation

The first indicator of an ethnocracy is the power imbalance between the three major ethnogrouping – the ‘charter/founder’ groups, immigrants and indigenes – of a society, with the ‘charter/founder’ group dominating the nation’s power structures. Empirical results from this research corroborate this element of Yiftachel’s conceptualisation of ethnocracy. In general, Australians of Anglo-Celtic heritage dominate the nation’s formal and informal power structures. They are joined by Australians of north-western European ancestries. As graphs 7.1.1 to 7.1.7 in the previous chapter demonstrated, they overwhelmingly dominated the three arms of government that constitute the nation’s formal institutions of authority. In the 2006 Census, 95 percent of all parliamentarians were of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries. By the 2016 Census, the percentage was approximately 94 percent, a reduction of less than one percent. Their proportion of the general population was only 73 percent. Overall, the top ten ancestries of Australia’s parliamentarians did not change between 2006 and 2016.

Of these, other than the generic “Australian” ancestry, the most prominent antecedents of Australia’s parliamentarians comprise the quadripartite ancestries of English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh, followed by European ancestries notably, German, Italian, Dutch and Greek. In 2006, for those with English and Australian backgrounds, the prospect of being selected as a candidate, and also, the prospect of then becoming a parliamentarian, corresponded to their proportion in the general population. However, for those of Irish, Scottish and Welsh ancestries, the likelihood was significantly higher. Compared with their respective proportions in the general population, those of Irish heritage had over three and a half times

more likelihood of becoming parliamentarians; with Scottish and Welsh ancestries, it was two point seven times and six and one half times, respectively. Of the European ancestries, Germans were almost twice as likely to become parliamentarians, while Greek and Dutch ancestries were one and one quarter and one point one times compared to their respective proportions in the general population. Parliamentarians of Italian ancestry were on par with their proportion in the general population. The only ancestry outside of the Anglo-Celtic and European antecedents to make it within the top ten ancestries of Australia's parliamentarians was Lebanese.

By 2016, Australia's parliaments remained dominated by those of Anglo-Celtic and European antecedents that comprised the top ten ancestries of parliamentarians in 2006, but their proportion had changed. **Table 8.1.1(a)** below illustrates the prospect of becoming a parliamentarian based on the top ten ancestries of Australia's parliamentarians relative to their respective proportions in the general population, and the changes over the decade from 2006 to 2016. The results are determined by using the number 1 to reflect the theoretically perfect equal and proportionate representation. Thus if for example, people of Icelandic ancestry comprise ten percent of the general Australian population and they make up ten percent of Australia's parliamentarians, then their prospect for becoming an Australian parliamentarian would be 1.0, which is equal and proportionate to their percentage in the population.

Table 8.1.1(a): *Prospect of becoming a parliamentarian versus proportion in general population in accordance with the top ten ancestries of Australian parliamentarians in 2006 and 2016*

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	Dutch	Greek	Lebanese	Welsh
2006	0.96	0.89	3.58	2.71	1.80	0.99	1.11	1.26	1.24	6.50
2016	0.88	1.06	3.08	3.19	2.39	1.23	3.17	1.05	1.60	5.54
Change	-0.07	+0.17	-0.50	+0.48	+0.59	+0.24	+2.07	-0.21	+0.26	-0.96

The domination of the quadripartite Anglo-Celtic ancestries extended to the Executive arm of government and the Australian judiciary. A closer examination into the leadership of government bureaucracies reflected similar proportions and ancestries of Australia's parliamentarians. Approximately ninety-eight percent of the leadership of these bureaucracies had Anglo-Celtic and European heritage in 2006. A decade later in 2016, ninety-seven percent of these leadership positions stemmed from people with Anglo-Celtic and European heritage. Graphs 7.1.1 to 7.1.7 in the previous chapter illustrated these results.

The ancestries of Australia's judiciary mirrored those of its parliamentarians, being overwhelmingly Anglo-centric and Euro-centric. Among the Anglo-Celtic heritage, being of Irish and Scottish ancestries appeared to be more advantageous of being chosen as a judge. The prospects were about three and a half times and three and a quarter times, respectively. Of significance was the representation of Australians of Jewish ancestry amongst Australia's judges but not magistrates. Having a Jewish ancestry had the prospect of over twenty times (23 in 2006, and 20.5 in 2016) being selected as a judge compared to their proportion in the general proportion. Other ancestries with a higher likelihood of being chosen as a judge included Russian at five times, Polish and South African at two and a half times, and German at over one and a half times. Based on patterns of Jewish migration to Australia after WWII (Goldlust 2016; Rutland 2005), it is possible these ancestries may overlap with Jewish heritage. However, the ABS data obtained contained no indication of such. Jewish ancestry was listed as a separate antecedent among the top ten ancestries of judges. The only European ancestry within the top ten lineages of judges with low likelihood of being chosen was Italian, at under one third of a percent of their proportion in the general population. A search of the names of judges across Australia's State, Territory and federal court systems revealed there were no judges indicative of black South African surnames. This suggests the judges of South African heritage were likely to be white South African. Importantly, there appeared to be not a single judge with an Asian surname. **Tables 8.1.1(b)** and **(c)** below illustrate the prospect of being chosen as a judge among the top ten ancestries

of Australian judges compared to their proportions in the general population in both 2006 and 2016.

Table 8.1.1(b): *Prospect of being chosen as a judge versus proportion in general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian judges in 2006*

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	Polish	Jewish	Russian	Sth African
2006	0.94	1.04	3.53	3.24	1.77	0.29	2.54	23.07	4.99	2.57

By 2016, again judges of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries dominated the Australian judiciary. The only exception was the inclusion of Lebanese heritage, which appeared to have replaced Russian ancestry among the top ten ancestries of judges. Information on the religion of the judges would have provided some further granularity on the (lack of) cultural diversity among Australia's judges. However, the ABS data provided contained no such indication. What was evident though was that once again, none of the non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestries were included in the top ten ancestries of Australia's judges.

Table 8.1.1(c): *Prospect of being chosen as a judge versus proportion in the general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian judges in 2006 and 2016*

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	French	Jewish	Lebanese	Greek
2006	0.94	1.04	3.53	3.24	1.77	0.29	N/A	23.07	N/A	N/A
2016	0.88	0.91	4.03	3.34	1.54	0.58	6.85	20.50	1.07	0.99
Change	-0.06	-0.13	+0.50	+0.10	-0.23	+0.29	+0.21	-2.57	N/A	N/A

The results for magistrates shared similarities to those of judges, albeit with different combinations of European heritage included in the top ten ancestries in 2006 and 2016. Again, not one of the non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European ancestry was included in the top ten ancestries of magistrates.

Table 8.1.1(d): Prospect of being chosen as a magistrate versus proportion in general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian magistrates in 2006

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	Polish	American	Welsh	NZ
2006	0.92	0.97	3.70	2.85	1.60	0.73	2.37	11.49	4.13	1.85

By 2016, Anglo-Celtic and European heritage dominance persisted among Australia's magistracy, but with changes to the European ancestry groups.

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	Polish	Austrian	French	Dutch
2016	0.93	0.89	4.64	3.00	2.93	0.68	2.58	11.79	5.21	1.48
Change	+0.01	-0.08	+0.94	+0.15	+1.33	-0.05	+0.21	N/A	N/A	N/A

Overall, Australia's formal institutions of authority were dominated by an Anglo-morphic pan-ethnic grouping comprising of Australians of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries. Among these, individuals of Irish and Scottish ancestries had the best prospects, or at least three times the likelihood compared to their respective proportions in the general population, of occupying a position within Australia's formal power institutions. They include becoming a parliamentarian, occupying a position within the Executive government or leadership in its vast bureaucracies, or being chosen as a judge or magistrate. Having Welsh ancestry proved to be the most advantageous of the top ten ancestries to becoming a parliamentarian. Within the European antecedents, having German and Dutch heritage provide almost twice the prospects of occupying a position within the three arms of government; having Jewish background gave one the best chance overall, compared to the other ancestries, of becoming a judge.

As noted earlier, with respect to power allocation, the overall emerging trend is that the closer one moves towards the centre of national power, the whiter and more Anglo-Celtic the ancestry of the power holders will be. For those outside of this Anglo-Euro-centric Anglo-morphic pan-ethnic collection of heritage, with the exception of Lebanese ancestry, the prospect of occupying a position within Australia's three arms of government was close

to zero, or non-existent. The trend did not change in the decade between the 2006 and 2016 censuses.

In parallel to power domination, ethnicity not citizenship, forms the basis of resource allocation. This was evident in the government's handling of anti-Asian racism during the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). Australia experienced its first cases of COVID-19 infection on 25 January 2020 (Ting and Palmer 2020). The Australian media reported continued and extensive racism, discrimination and abuse against Chinese-Australians (Zhou 2020; Fang, Yang and Zhou 2020; Yang 2020, Chang 2020; Walsh 2020; Siebert et al. 2020; Schneiders and Lucas 2020; Walden 2020) since late January 2020 (Young 2020). However, Australian governments' responses, both State and federal, have been desultory (Giles 2020; Soutphommasane 2020). The Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison's response as the epidemic entered its second month in Australia, reflected the ethnocentric ideological orientation of the Coalition government he helms. When asked about reporting of increasing racial abuse against Chinese-Australians on 21 April 2020, Morrison said:

Stop it. That's my message. And I think that is the message of every Australian...I would remind everyone it was Chinese-Australians in particular that provided one of the greatest defences we had in those early weeks. They were the ones who first went into self-isolation, they were the ones who were returning from family visits up into China and they were returning home. And it was through their care, it was through their commitment, their patience that actually Australia was protected through that first wave...so absolutely I deplore that sort of behaviour against *any* [speaker's emphasis] Australian regardless of their ethnicity or their religion or whatever it happens to be....It's not on (Sky News 2020).

At face value, the statement appears supportive of the Chinese-Australian community's suffering from racial abuse but in tone it can be heard as a schoolmaster-ish put-down that is more counterproductive than helpful. A closer inspection of the Prime Minister's words

revealed significant failures on a number of levels. Foremost, Morrison did not take the initiative to address this matter but responded to questions asked by a journalist. This creates a parallel underlying message: the issue is not a priority. Morrison's comment thus becomes political messaging in the face of journalistic questions, and/ or possibly to appease complaints from Chinese-Australians. Morrison's language itself lacked force and inclusion. The reference to Chinese-Australians visiting family in China and doing the "right thing" after returning home refocuses his message towards their compliance to government COVID-19 rules instead of addressing the racist behaviour. It would have been far better for Morrison to call out the racist behaviour as "un-Australian", to acknowledge that racism exists, and to demonstrate his government's willingness to address the issue. Furthermore, the reference to Chinese-Australians visiting family in China heightens the communal perception of possible and potential risk given COVID-19 infections started in China. Of the 1.2 million Chinese-Australians, those from China, and likely to have family in China, comprise approximately 41 percent of the Chinese-Australian population (ABS 2018a). Among them, it is likely a small percentage may have visited family in China. Consequently, the overwhelming majority either stayed in Australia or travelled elsewhere. Morrison's acknowledgement of such factual information could have helped dampen fear in the community.


Morrison's omission in acknowledging that Australia's COVID-19 infections have largely come from Australians returning from the US, UK, Europe and the mismanagement of disembarking cruise ships nurtures community ignorance and maintains Chinese-Australians as scapegoats. For example, the government's failure to properly inspect and quarantine the Ruby Princess passengers resulted in ten percent of Australia's COVID-19 infections coming from passengers of this cruise ship as of late April 2020 (Cockburn 2020; McKinnell 2020). Furthermore, Morrison's language lacked clarity, diluting its effectiveness. The reference to '*any* Australian regardless of their ethnicity or their religion or whatever it happens to be' downplayed the severity of the racism and racial attacks specifically targeting Chinese-Australian, Asian-Australians more broadly, and later joined

by Arab Muslims, those of African and Middle Eastern backgrounds during the COVID-19 pandemic (Renaldi 2020). It generalised the impact of the racism and diverted attention towards other discriminatory grounds (ethnicity and religion) and behaviour that Australians could be subjected to, which Morrison ‘deplore(s)’.

The climate of inaction and indifference by Australian governments, both federal and State/Territory, on racism is not new. The Scanlon Foundation’s twelve years of annual ‘national study on social cohesion, immigration and population issues’ drew attention to the ongoing increase in the reported experience of racial discrimination by racialised minorities since 2007 (Markus 2019, p. 1). Yet governmental response, if any, to this issue remains indifferent, with no new policy or funding. Even the funding of existing anti-racism program and institutions tasked with handling racial discrimination complaints, the AHRC, remain uncertain. **Graph 8.1.1** below reproduces the Scanlon Foundation’s findings on reported experience of racial discrimination from 2007 to 2019.

Graph 8.1.1: *Reported experience of racial discrimination (Scanlon Foundation 2007-2019)*

Figure 29: ‘Have you experienced discrimination in the last twelve months because of your skin colour, ethnic origin or religion?’ Response: ‘yes’, 2007-19 (RDD and LinA)



[Source: Markus 2019, p. 72, Figure 29; RDD = random digit dial (random phone survey), LinA = Life in Australia (online panel)]

The Australian federal and State governments’ response to racism in general, and racial attacks on Asian-Australians during the COVID-19 crisis in particular, reflect Yiftachel’s (2006) contention that in an ethnocracy ethnicity, not citizenship, forms the basis of

government resource allocation. Following Australia's first record of COVID-19 infection in late January 2020, Australian media began reporting on the increasing numbers of racial abuse against health practitioners of Asian backgrounds, then Asian-Australians in general. When questioned about this, Prime Minister Morrison and the premiers of Queensland and NSW made the following comments to media, respectively, on 1 February 2020 (ABC News 2020):

...all communities should be supported...that's why it's important to remain calm about this (Morrison 2020, 0:59).

...people should not be afraid and they should not discriminate. It is very important that people do not discriminate against our Chinese community (Palaszczyk 2020, 1:07).

...I think in the main people are acting very responsibly and I ask them to continue (Berejiklian 2020, 1:14).

Such perfunctory responses from Australian political leaders, at both the federal and State levels, together with no government resource allocated to deal with the problem of racism articulates the reality of living in an ethnocratic state in times of crisis for minority communities. These responses comprising of admonishment and cheap rhetoric prove hollow; devoid of any meaningful penalties for racist behaviours. The only reason the political leaders were acknowledging these things and, more significantly, responded, is because the media questioned them. If the questions weren't asked, they would still be denying the racial abuses happening, dismissing racism exists in Australia and continue without considering the Asian-Australian experience of racism.

In contrast, subsequent reports of attacks against frontline workers – police, health professionals and other support staff such as supermarket workers – commencing from late March 2020 drew immediate interventions by governments in the form of heavy monetary fines and/ or potential incarceration. For the State of NSW, it is \$5,000 on the spot fine (Hazzard 2020; Nguyen 2020). In Queensland, a new regulation (Health Direction) allows

a \$1,335 on the spot fine or a court ordered penalty of up to \$13,345 (Palaszcauk and Miles 2020; ABC News 2020). Western Australia chose to institute a 12-month temporary new COVID-19 pandemic criminal provisions with a penalty of up to 10 years' imprisonment (Quigley and Roberts 2020), and for Northern Territory a \$5,000 fine and possible incarceration (Dornin 2020). South Australia already has existing criminal provisions for assaults on emergency workers since October 2019 (Government of South Australia 2019; Legal Services Commission of South Australia 2019).

It is important to note that the COVID-19 pandemic crisis simply laid bare the disparities in Australia's ethnocratic state. Times of crises can highlight the fragility of inter-social relations and the government's lack of will, including resource allocation, to effect social change with respect to issues such as racial abuse of minorities.

8.1.2 Only partial rights and capabilities extend to minorities, thus there is a constant ethnocratic-civil tension

According to Yiftachel (2006), another indicator of ethnocracy is reflected in the differential, or partial, rights and capabilities afforded to minorities. This creates a constant civil-ethnocratic tension. In a democracy, the socio-political framework is established to enable widespread inclusive participation of citizens in society (Habermas 2005). The foundation to a democracy is an inclusive constitution as the basis of a democratic order for sustaining a free and open society (Habermas 2003). Thus, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, constitutionally guaranteed rights and civil liberties are indispensable components of an open and democratic regime (Habermas 2005).

While Australia projects a façade of democracy, the operation of its socio-political infrastructure manifests ethnocratic disposition. As will be discussed later (in this section and next chapter), Australia does not have a constitutionally endorsed or legislated Bill of Rights to protect the civil rights of its citizens. Its parliament, leadership roles and judiciary are dominated by Anglo-morphic constituencies (AHRC Report 2018). Without imputing bad faith, a nation without legislative or constitutional protection for minorities and with its

institutions of authority in a stranglehold by a pan-ethnic white collectivity could hardly claim to be a successful democracy, let alone ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’.

A society that perceives and presents itself as democratic cannot set up a political order on exclusionary or discriminatory constitutional principles or a marginalising social mind-set. When public spaces are characterised by a serious violation of basic human rights by other citizens, there exists ‘an incomplete or unequal inclusion of citizens, to whom full status as members of the political community is denied’ (Habermas 2005, p. 16).

As discussed previously, the Australian governments’ handling of racism, particularly the COVID-19 induced racism, demonstrated a lack of political will to recognise, let alone address the civil rights of its minority communities. Senior federal government ministers have dismissed that racism exists and racial attacks have increased due to the coronavirus (Walden 2020), despite evidence of increasing attacks against racialised minorities during the COVID-19 pandemic (Handley and McCarthy 2020). In response to China’s claim of increased racism and racial attacks against Chinese and Asian-Australians, Simon Birmingham, Australia’s Trade and Tourism Minister, stated that the Chinese government claim had ‘no basis in fact’ (Fang and Weedon 2020, para. 25). He claimed ‘Australia is the most successful multicultural and migrant society in the world’ (Birmingham 2020). Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Michael McCormack, denied there had been an increase in racist attacks in Australia (Walden 2020). But these claims wither under cursory scrutiny, particularly given that Australia has anti-racial discrimination laws at both the national and State levels. Further, the Racial Discrimination Commissioner acknowledged a spike in racial discrimination complaints during COVID-19 just a month earlier (Tillett and Bolton 2020). Research by the Asian Australian Alliance revealed there were over three hundred incidents of racist attacks and abuse against Asian-Australians months into the COVID-19 pandemic (Chew and Chiu 2020).

Australian governments, federal and State/Territory, recognised that COVID-19 pandemic impacts more than the health of Australians (Fisher 2020). Measures such as the easing of

restrictive social restriction, the appointment of a Deputy Chief Medical Officer for Mental Health (National Mental Health Commission 2020; Willis 2020), and the JobKeeper program (The Treasury 2020) have been instituted to address the social, mental and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Australians. However, racialised minorities alone, specifically Asian-Australians, Muslim-Australians and Jewish-Australians, must also bear the additional and unnecessary psychological toll of social stigmatisation, racial abuse and physical attacks (Weedon, Yang and Xiao 2020; Fang, Renaldi and Yang 2020; Renaldi 2020; Walsh 2020). The governments' deflection, denial and dismissal with regards to the issue of racial discrimination, as exemplified by the unavailability of remedies for violations from racial attacks against Asian-Australians during the COVID-19 pandemic in particular, reflect that only partial rights and capabilities are extended to racialised minorities. The AHRC, tasked with managing complaints of racial discrimination, did not receive additional funding to handle the increasing load of complaints during the first wave of COVID-19. The Australian government failed to continue funding its national anti-racism program, *Racism: It Stops With Me*. By employing tokenistic measures such as in speeches and in response to the media, Australian political leaders provide a façade of care and also plausible deniability against any charge of covert complicity through the lack of action, or accusations of explicit overt complicity, while maintaining the status quo.

The differential rights afforded to racialised minorities become most evident with respect to Indigenous rights. British colonisation and subsequent Australian governments operated on the defunct doctrine of *terra nullius* that effectively denied Indigenous Australians' prior occupation and connection to the land. The Mabo court decision (Mabo v Queensland (No. 2)) overturned the legal fiction in 1992. However, the Howard government under its 'Ten Point Plan' (Australian Government 1997), later legislated as the *Native Titles Amendment Act* 1998 (Cth), placed significant constraints to limit claims of land rights by Indigenous Australians.

In the twenty-first century, the partial rights extended to Indigenous Australians are more subtle. The Australian government opposed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. Australia was one of four nations to vote against the Declaration, an aspirational document that ‘brings together the pre-existing rights that are relevant to Indigenous peoples into one coherent document’ (AHRC 2009, para. 7). Interestingly, the other three nations that voted against the Declaration were Canada, New Zealand and the US, all of whom are self-proclaimed “immigrant nations” (UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007, para. 1). Although the Australian federal government has since made a statement in support of the Declaration, it lacks authority conferred by domestic ratification. Without this legal foundation, support for Indigenous initiatives – such as the Uluru Statement from the Heart (Referendum Council 2017; McKay 2017) that calls for the establishment of a First Nations Voice to Parliament – are destined to fail, and demonstrably so. The Uluru Statement was a radical invitation to rethink Australia’s ethnocracy, confronting the very core of the legitimacy of Australia’s political order. It is unsurprising that the Australian ethnocratic national government rejected the Uluru Statement, while proffering the inane rationale that it would become a ‘third chamber of Parliament’ (Higgins 2018; Karp 2018, para. 1; Gordon 2017). There is no legal basis for such a claim (Rubenstein 2018; Davis et al. 2018), nor was legal expert advice offered by the Australian government to substantiate this claim.

Unsurprisingly, progress on human rights and anti-racism protections in Australia’s laws and policies with respect to Indigenous peoples, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; racist hate speech and hate crimes have been found wanting for decades (Bielefeld 2017; Imtousal et al. 2017). This is notwithstanding Australia’s formal responses (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016) to earlier CERD reports that denounced Australia’s lack of progress on measures to remedy racism and promote racial equality (CERD Committee Report 2016). The latest UN Special Rapporteur on human rights of migrants found ‘Australia’s human rights record tainted by ‘regressive’ migration policies’ (UN News 2016, para 1). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees found Australia’s

ongoing offshore indefinite detention of refugees causes ‘extensive, avoidable suffering’ (UN News 2017, para. 1). In essence, Australia has made little, or minimal, progress since 2010. In a report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, endorsed by over 100 non-government organisations, the Australian Human Rights Law Centre (2019) summarised the in situ rights of racialised minorities in Australia as follows:

...racial and religious minority groups in Australia continue to experience racism in their daily lives and to suffer unequal human rights treatment and outcomes. There remain serious concerns about the racially discriminatory character and impact of a range of Australian laws, policies and practices. Many of the advances in human rights protection since the election of the Labor Government in 2007 have been symbolic in nature; structural changes necessary to turn commitments into practice still need to be made (Human Rights Law Centre 2019, para. 2).

Perhaps the most obvious disparity of rights afforded to minorities in Australia is the absence of protections afforded through human rights legislation. Among western liberal democracies, Australia remains the only nation-state without a Bill of Rights (AHRC 2019). Without the minimal legal protections afforded by a Bill of Rights to place them on formal equal footing with the broader white Australian community, minorities are subjected to the vagaries of the powers of the ethnocratic state.

The partial rights and capabilities extended to minorities in Australia are further compounded by a lack of voice. Advocacy groups and organisations, such as the Federation of Ethnic Communities Council of Australia (FECCA), that provide a limited voice for minorities rely on government funding to function. There is a potential conflict between the essential independence of their work and the dependence that is created and wielded by government in influencing the work programs of FECCA by means of the potential threat of restricting funding, actual funding restriction, or both.

With legal deficiencies in addressing racism, racial discrimination and racial abuse, enforcement becomes even more important to safeguard the rights of racialised minorities. The capabilities and resources rendered by governments through its enforcement bodies can help provide significant balance to affording racialised minorities with some protection of their rights. The locus of enforcement responsibility, particularly with respect to race hate crimes, lies with Australia's police forces through their investigative, compliance and prosecutorial duties. But research shows Australian police 'don't take hate crimes seriously' and often prove reluctant or unwilling to pursue hate crimes (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 6). Hate crime is an umbrella term for prejudice-related crimes of which are 'wholly or partly motivated by, grounded in, or aggravated by, bias or prejudice towards particular groups of people' of whom the majority comprise of racialised communities (Mason 2009a, p. 327). In her research, Mason (2009a) found that:

...the primary targets of hate crime in Australia are members, both individuals and organisations, of minority groups including the Jewish, Muslim, Arab, Asian, Aboriginal, gay/lesbian, transgender and disabled communities (Mason 2009a, p. 327).

The purpose of hate crime laws is to address problems of prejudice-related crime and violence, with the goal of placing 'discriminatory violence on the public agenda' (Jenness and Grattet 2001, p. 18) and as a 'recognizable social problem' (Jenness and Broad 1997, p. 106). In their investigation, Australian journalists Cohen and Mitchell (2019) found that as of 2019, 'only 21 people have been convicted under hate crime laws in Australia, despite state police forces recording thousands of offences connected to discrimination' (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 1). Of these, 'only three people have ever been convicted under *Victoria's Racial and Religious Tolerance Act*' (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 3), despite Victorian police flagging '4,257 incidents during a four-year period as being linked to prejudice' (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 3). Three convictions have also been recorded in Queensland; while in NSW and South Australia, 'no-one has been convicted of threatening or inciting violence on the basis of prejudice since records began' in 1994

and 1996, respectively (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 4-5). Notwithstanding that, criminalisation of intentional or reckless public acts of threatening or inciting violence on the basis of race, religious belief or affiliation, sexual/gender identity or HIV/AIDs status was enplaced in law in NSW in 2018 (see section 93z of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW); NSW Government 2018). Racial vilification is not a criminal offence in Tasmania nor in Australia's two self-governing Territories.

The dearth of research into racially motivated hate crimes in Australia further silences the voice of minorities and confounds the exercise of their rights to protection. In examining the extent of racial, ethnic and religious violent nature of hate crime in Australia, Smith (2012) found that Australian law enforcement agencies have not implemented the formal procedures used for identifying hate crimes. Mason (2009b) found Australian political leaders and police services deployed discursive strategies amounting to denial of the racial character in the violent racist attacks against Indian students in Australia in 2009. Research into police handling of hate crimes in NSW, Australia's most populous State, revealed that the State's police force lacked the training to recognise racially motivated crimes; are under political pressure to minimise reporting, investigation and prosecution of prejudice-related crimes; and consequently, the already under-resourced 'Bias Crimes Unit of NSW Police had its staff reduced from four officers to one' (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 24; Mason 2019; Mason and Moran 2019; Mason and Stanic 2019).

Furthermore, the inherent culture of disrespect towards racialised minorities remain entrenched in Australia's police forces. Members of the NSW elite counter-terrorism team, the Tactical Operations Unit, mocked the acknowledgement of country at its 2019 Christmas party. The acknowledgement of country is a practice to reflect respect for traditional owners and ongoing custodian of the land (Gordon 2020). In 2020, the Northern Territory police force dismissed a 61-year-old police officer for printing singlets with offensive reference to the shooting of an Indigenous Australian in late 2019 (Zwartz and Mackay 2020). Consequently, the minimal convictions for racially motivated crimes in Australia should not be surprising (Mason and Macintosh 2014). It reflects the operation of

an ethnocratic state where only partial rights and capabilities are extended to minorities. The results of this research revealed that Australia's police forces in 2006 and 2016 comprised only a collection of Anglo-centric and Euro-centric pan-ethnic ancestries. In a similar vein to Australia's formal institutions of authority, the Anglo-Celtic ancestries of Irish, Scottish and Welsh, and German antecedents were represented at least twice their proportion in the general population. Again, none of the non-Anglo-Euro ancestries were represented in the top ten ancestries of commissioned police officers. **Tables 8.1.2(a)** and **(b)** below display the likelihood of being a police officer in comparison to the proportion of the general population within the top ten ancestries of police officers in 2006 and 2016 Censuses.

Table 8.1.2(a): Prospect of being a police officer versus proportion of the general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian police officers in 2006

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	Dutch	Serbian	Welsh	Greek
2006	0.95	1.28	2.52	2.76	2.09	0.60	0.84	1.70	2.89	0.65

By 2016, the top ten ancestries of Australian police officers remained dominated by Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries, but changed with respect to the combination of European ancestry groups. French and Maltese ancestries joined the top ten ancestries of police officers in 2016, replacing Serbian and Greek heritage. Relative to their respective proportions in the general population, having French or Maltese ancestry provided over six times or twice, respectively, the prospects of being police officers.

Table 8.1.2(b): Prospect of being a police officer versus proportion of the general population in accordance to the top ten ancestries of Australian police officers in 2006 and 2016

	English	Australian	Irish	Scottish	German	Italians	Dutch	French	Welsh	Maltese
2006	0.95	1.28	2.52	2.76	2.09	0.60	0.84	N/A	2.89	N/A
2016	0.99	1.23	3.06	3.44	1.80	0.61	3.07	6.32	4.07	2.19
Change	+0.04	-0.05	+0.54	+0.68	-0.29	+0.01	+2.23	N/A	+1.18	N/A

Without imputing bad faith, given racialised minorities are noticeably under-represented in the Australian police forces, it is simply very unlikely police officers would understand the racial character of discrimination, hate and abuse. Being unlikely to experience the racial prejudice directed towards racial minorities in Australia, Australian police forces are unlikely to recognise racially motivated conduct and crimes (Cohen, Aydogan and Mitchell 2019). Importantly, no Asian ancestry, which comprised almost thirteen percent of the Australian population in 2016, made the top ten ancestries of Australia's police forces. Notably, Chinese ancestry – the largest minority group and fourth largest ancestry group in Australia comprising just under five percent of the population – was absent from the top ten ancestries of Australian police officers. With racialised minorities woefully underrepresented in Australia's police forces, the prospect of change is unlikely. As an anonymous NSW police officer commented:

The biggest issue with NSW Police is we're run by old white men....

I think the direction in this organisation has always been to shut the minorities up (Cohen and Mitchell 2019, para. 16).

The lack of sufficient legal protection from racial discrimination and abuse in Australian law, policy and practice, including the ineffectiveness and, at times, unavailability of remedies for violations continue to impede the rights and capabilities of racialised minorities in Australia. The Australian national ethnocratic government appears indifferent, incompetent and characterised with inaptitude when it comes to addressing these differential rights. Further, with Australian politicians – comprising overwhelmingly of Anglo-Euro-centric ancestries – preferring denial, deflection or dismissal of racism, or acknowledging the centrality of race to the inequalities experienced by racialised minorities, the prospect for change is grim.

The overall societal landscape points to a nation subject to a tug-of-war between two conceptions of rights for racialised minorities: the enjoyment of full civil rights espoused by the principles of democracy on the one hand, and that afforded by an ethnocratic state still defined by white colonial mind-set.

8.1.3 The dominant ‘charter’ ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus and shapes the political system, public institutions, geography, economy and culture, so as to expand and deepen its control over the state and territory

The results of this research demonstrate the strongest manifestations of Yiftachel’s (2006) third indicator of ethnocracy, where ‘the dominant ‘charter’ ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus and shapes the political system, public institutions, geography, economy and culture, so as to expand and deepen its control over the state and territory’ (Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004, p. 650). They manifest across formal and informal power structures in Australia.

National culture

Notwithstanding Australia’s claim of being multicultural, Australia’s public culture remains Anglo-centric and Euro-centric. All nationally declared public holidays – New Year’s Day, Australia Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Anzac Day, Christmas Day and Boxing Day, Queen’s Birthday and Labour Day – are either Anglo-centric or Euro-centric, or both (Australian Government 2020; Klein 2018; State Library of Victoria n.d.). The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) is the only Australian jurisdiction with public recognition of a Territory-wide non-Anglo-Euro-centric public holiday. In 2018, the ACT Government declared the first day of the National Reconciliation Week as the Reconciliation Day public holiday to ‘celebrate Aboriginal Australian culture and promotes cultural understanding’ (Time and Date 2020, para. 1), to be observed annually from then. The National Reconciliation Week, a seven-day nationwide observance, is an attempt to ‘give people across Australia the opportunity to focus on reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians’ (Time and Date 2020, para. 3).

Australia’s 2016 Census confirms the nation is demographically multicultural. A quick search of the terms “multicultural festival” reveal the ubiquitousness of these events peppering the towns and cities of each Australian State and Territory (South Australian Government 2019; DevelopmentWA 2020; Victorian Multicultural Commission 2020; Queensland Government 2020; ACT Government 2020; Multicultural NSW 2020). These

multicultural festivals serve multiple political purposes: they enable the creation of media moments for politicians, being served with exotic cuisines and yet keep the alien and inferior cultures at bay. Yet none hosts a “Multicultural Day” as a public holiday; a symbolism to formally recognise, celebrate and embrace the multiculturalism of their respective demographics. The provision of “exotic” food, folksong and festival, is nonetheless clearly enjoyed by white Australia.

Geography

As Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) posit, the shaping and expansion of control over the nation by a white Anglo-morphic pan-ethnic grouping extends to economy and geography. Like other sovereign nations, Australia rightly must protect its sovereignty and national interests including having control over the level, domain and breadth of foreign investments in the country. The changes to the foreign investment framework announced at the commencement of the COVID-19 pandemic reflect these considerations. With the economic fallout associated with the COVID-19 pandemic being uncertain, all proposed foreign investments in Australia should rightly be subjected to government review (Australian Foreign Investment Review Board 2020). However, the hysteria and shrill associated with conservative Australian media reporting on Chinese investments in Australia fans xenophobia, lacking balance. Search the term “Chinese investment” in any of the Murdoch-owned media outlet. The results would reveal reporting that employs language with conspiratorial racialised undertones emerging as efforts to undermine Australia’s national interests and sovereignty; or unfairly squeezing out local buyers (Rogers 2018; Rogers, Wong and Nelson 2018). It belies the statistics compiled by the government itself (ATO 2018). Australian agricultural lands owned by nationals of the UK, US, or Canada do not appear to receive the same level of hype, hysteria or hostile language specifically reserved for reporting on China, or China-related media coverage (AFP Fact Check 2019). In 2018 the Australian Taxation Office prepared the *Register of Foreign Ownership of Agricultural Land* in response to growing concerns about Chinese investment

in Australia's agriculture sector. From 2015-2018, the level of foreign interest in Australian agricultural land reduced slightly from 13.6 percent to 13.4 percent (ATO 2018, p. 4).

The United Kingdom remains the largest foreign agricultural land holder (2.6 per cent of agricultural land), followed by China (2.3 per cent of agricultural land) and the United States of America (0.7 per cent of agricultural land) (ATO 2018, p. 4).

Importantly, the fact that 'over 92 per cent of foreign held agricultural land is held within Australian incorporated entities' appears to have no value in the hyperbolic media reporting on Chinese investment in Australia (ATO 2018, p. 4). Nor the fact that Chinese land equity in Australia is mostly in pastoral leases and as minority shareholders in Australian companies (Gaetjens 2018), with private investors accounting 'for 92 percent of the Chinese deal volume and 87 percent of deal value in 2018', respectively (Ferguson et al. 2019, p. 25). Furthermore, the fact that the UK's agricultural land ownership in Australia has been increasing over the years has had limited coverage in the Australian media's reporting on foreign ownership in Australia (ATO 2018, p. 10).

Economy

The hype – myths and misinformation – over China's alleged incursion into Australia, particularly into its economy and buying up "Australiana", continued unabated even during the COVID-19 pandemic (Hutchison and Galloway 2020). For example, the manner to which the current Australian federal government pronounced policies such as the tightening of restrictions to foreign investments, likely directed at Chinese investments in Australia, at a time when Australia enters a COVID-19 pandemic recession, reflects its ethnocentric orientation (Frydenberg 2020; Clarke 2020). A subtler and more nuanced approach would have been more likely to be beneficial to the nation's overall interests. It is self-explanatory that nations would seek to protect their territorial borders and national interests.

Fanned by conservative media and right-wing politicians, the Morrison-led federal Coalition government has reasserted a ‘macho strain of nationalism’ (Hurst 2020b, para. 1) during the COVID-19 pandemic, joining the slipstream of the anti-China agenda of the US Trump Administration (Reynolds 2020; O’Connor 2020; Mitchell 2020; Greene 2020). The anti-China rhetoric adopted demonstrated a complete about-face to its earlier approach to China after the Coalition came to power in 2013 (Mitchell 2020). The inherent racialised element within the rhetoric reflected a lack of consideration for the impact on Chinese-Australians or recognition of the value of their contribution to Australia.

As expected, the deterioration in bilateral relations with China corresponded with Chinese-Australians becoming the inevitable targets caught in the cross-fires (Zhao, Handley and Walsh 2020). Furthermore, with no messaging or mechanisms instituted to address the potential backlash, the federal government’s rhetoric added fuel to the existing COVID-19 induced racism, discrimination and racialised attacks against Chinese-Australians. These developments reflected a revival of the “yellow peril”, reminiscent of the social pathology that infected Australian society in the past. The process bore striking similarities to the vilification and subjugation of Chinese-Australians of nineteenth and twentieth centuries Australia: vilification by word and image; socio-cultural separation; and, turning a blind eye to acts of violence (Welch 2003). During these periods, the demonising of Chinese people for their cultural difference became a national sport, exhorted at the highest levels of colonial governments, later the Australian federal government, and grounded in Australian law (Welch 2003).

Among the media hyperbole on China-related matters, what is hidden and not reported is the record trail of red ink that befell “China Inc”. Over the last decade of investment in Australia, Chinese entities have incurred an estimated loss of at least 25 billion dollars (Grigg 2020, para. 6). Grigg (2020) outlined where Chinese companies, both state-owned and private, have made losses investing in Australia over the last decade, which ranges across the fields: from mining, airline to agriculture, to name a few. Overall, China’s investment in Australia ranks just ninth. The US, UK and Belgium are the top three


countries of investors in Australia. In fact, China's investment in Australia is two percent of the overall total foreign investments in Australia. The amount is barely a fraction of the US or UK investments which hold 26 percent and 18 percent, respectively, of the overall foreign investments in Australia (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2020, citing ABS catalogue 5352.0).

In an effort 'to set the record straight and debunk the myths associated with Chinese investment' in Australia (Ferguson et al. 2019, p. 2), a joint collaboration between KPMG and the University of Sydney Business School began publishing an annual report on Chinese investment since 2011. Its latest report in 2019 showed that Chinese investment has declined by about a third from the previous (2018) year. Furthermore, the bulk or approximately 42 percent of Chinese direct investment in Australia in 2018 was in the healthcare industry which aids Australian healthcare companies in entering the massive Chinese market (Hendrischke and Li 2019).

Media

Arguably, both the Australian conservative media and right-wing think-tanks are enablers of Australia's ethnocracy. Australia's media ownership concentration is one of the highest in the world (Papandrea and Tiffen 2016; Dwyer and Muller 2016). The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) maintains a record on media ownership in Australia, which shows that a handful of corporations and interconnected family interests control much of Australia's media. In short, with the exception of Bill Caralis, who is of Greek background and who owns a number of radio licences in mostly regional NSW, the Australian media are under the full control an Anglo-Celtic oligopoly. **Figure 8.1.3** below replicates the infographic from the ACMA on media ownership in Australia.

Figure 8.1.3: Media ownership in Australia (ACMA)



[Source: ACMA 2020]

The lack of diversity in media ownership is not an issue per se. Rather, the lack of diversity has translated into influence on policy and politics to maintain an ethnocratic Australia; impacting on attitudes towards race and influencing how the general public treated racialised minorities (Schemer 2014; Nolan 2011). The coverage weaved a xenophobic narrative, portraying non-white people as a potential threat and casting suspicion on their loyalty to Australia. The threat of terrorism became associated with Muslim-Australians (Abdel-Fattah 2018; ABC News (Australia), 1:05); while the language employed in reporting on China implied Chinese-Australian complicity in China's alleged attempt to infiltrate Australian politics, society and undermine its democracy. These narratives contained shades of the earlier racial vilification against Chinese people in Australia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The overall focus of these media narratives is to perpetuate an image that promoted a white Australia rather than a multicultural Australia. The objectives are to facilitate white dominance, the consequence threatening racialised minorities' well-being and their rights as citizens. The media outlets owned by the Murdoch family, which controls about 70 percent of Australia's newspaper circulation (Alcorn 2019, para. 2), appears particularly virulent in terms of its support for an ethnocratic Australia. The latest examples included the coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic by its right-wing flagship bearer, *The Daily Telegraph* and its sister newspaper *The Saturday Telegraph*. In their effort to drive a narrative linking the COVID-19 pandemic to a Chinese government laboratory in Wuhan where the pandemic started, they published a number of articles laced with colourful languages referring to Chinese 'bat virus' researchers as 'bat men' and 'bat women', basing the reporting on a so-called 'Western governments (sic) dossier' with implied 'Five Eyes' intelligence intervention or cooperation in its production. The narrative began with its headlined front-page exclusive of 'China's Batty Science' (Markson 2020), continued in several subsequent articles and syndicated across the Murdoch and other news outlets throughout the world including right-wing Australian and American television channels. The reporting and media coverage failed to acknowledge that the so-called source, the 'dossier', was in fact a widely distributed and deniable US State Department "non-paper" containing no intelligence or any direct evidence of a link between the lab and the emergence of SARS-CoV-2' (Welch 2020, para. 10), the scientific name for the coronavirus. As former Australian diplomat and current academic Rory Medcalf explains:

A non-paper is a diplomatic document intended to have essentially non-official status, to be almost deniable, and to be used essentially to generate discussion with foreign governments. It doesn't hold enormous weight or credibility (Welch 2020, para. 12 quoting Medcalf).

The 'dossier' in essence is a document compiled from publicly available information that has not been assessed for credibility or accuracy. The Murdoch controlled media outlets'

coverage has repeatedly demonstrated an absence of critical thinking, a lack of professionalism and a shameful bias (Welch 2020; Rudd 2020) to the extent of drawing criticisms from within (Koch 2019). Its targeting of racial minorities is well known (All Together Now 2017, 2019). The research results by the Australian non-profit organisation All Together Now (2017) revealed what many racialised minorities already know. The Australian mainstream media target them by negatively racialising them. Often the language used and tone employed portrayed them as illiberal, associating with threats or disease that harm the broader white Australian community and questioning their fitness to live in Australia (Phillips 2011; Zhou 2020). The inference being that they lack fitness or appreciation for Australia's democratic, equal and freedom-loving society. The net impact for most racialised minorities likely included a feeling of living in a constant haze of suspicion and dislike, a sense of being second-rate people. Of interest was the fact that ninety-six percent of the writers and media commentators producing the negative, inferiorised and racialised media pieces were of Anglo-Celtic or European heritage (All Together Now 2019, p. 3).

The Murdoch controlled media groups were the worst offenders within the Australian media. For example, coverage of COVID-19 matters within the Murdoch affiliated media is typically accompanied with photos of an Asian person or Asian people with masks on, irrespective of the content of the reporting. The underlying messaging is to associate COVID-19 with Asian people as the carriers of the infection.

All signs point to the fact that as a society, Australia still feels uncomfortable about racialised minorities having a voice, let alone demanding their rights as citizens of this nation. For migrants, the expectation of toeing the line and being perceived as "good little migrants", "who don't rock the boat", or the more insidious "model migrant" weigh heavily on their decision to step up and own their place in this society. The sense of powerlessness, compared to white Australians, remains palpable. Many are socially conditioned to take the invidious option of toleration, or accommodation of racial discrimination as the necessary evil and part of the reality of life as people of colour in Australia (Gul 2020).

Research by the Asian Australian Alliance on COVID-19 racism against Asian-Australians revealed over ninety percent did not report racist abuse to police. One of the main reasons for not doing so was the victims' resignation that racial discrimination was part of living in Australia (Chew and Chiu 2020; Baker 2020; Chiu 2020; Om 2020; Zhou 2020).

Australia's anti-racial discrimination laws provide few legal recourse for victims of racial discrimination. Enacted by a parliament full of white, able-bodied men to provide what they considered to be protection for racialised minorities, in reality they grant them little protection. Racism and racial abuse fall outside the remit of racial discrimination laws which are focused on individualistic acts of denial of goods, services, employment, or vilification. Furthermore, the legal hurdles to establish racial discrimination or abuse remain inordinately high and the rate of success extremely low (Gaze 2015).

8.1.4 Political boundaries are vague, often privileging the co-ethnic of the dominant group in the Diaspora, over minority citizens

Yiftachel's (2006) fourth indicator of ethnocracy is the privileging of co-ethnics over minority citizens. The results of this research corroborated Yiftachel's assertion. As discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter, Australia's formal institutions of authority comprised overwhelming of those with Anglo-Celtic heritage. They formed a disproportionately large percentage of each of the three arms of government which did not reflect their percentage of the factual demographics. The most under-represented demographics within the three institutions of authority were the racialised minorities. In contrast, other European minority antecedents such as German, Dutch, Polish, French and Austrian had better prospects of inclusion in Australia's power institutions.

Socially, it is reflected in the proliferation and adoption of Anglicised or European names, often chosen by people of colour or their parents, hoping to minimise the racial or ethnic discrimination they are likely to face in life. As Karen Attiah (2020) wrote during the recent debate over the appropriation of the name "Karen" by millennials to denote a white woman with a sense of entitlement and who likes to complain:

My mother, who grew up in Nigeria, named me Karen precisely because she wanted me to blend into white American society and face fewer problems in life than I would have with a foreign or a "black-sounding" name (Attiah 2020, para. 7)

Attiah's explanation echoes the anxieties of many non-white parents when naming their newborn infant. The consequences of having a "foreign" sounding name could be severe not just socially but also economically. The results of Booth et al.'s (2010) study into racial discrimination in employment in Australia reflect the underlying reasons for Attiah's mother's concerns in the Australian perspective. Employing what they determined were names distinctive of five ethnic groups in Australia – Anglo-Celtic, Italian, Middle Eastern, Indigenous and Chinese – Booth et al. (2010) found that having Anglo-Celtic names were advantageous in applications for entry-level jobs. Conversely, having Chinese or Middle Eastern names were a disadvantage. Fewer applicants with these "foreign" sounding names were called back for an interview. Applicants with Indigenous sounding name fared better than those with Chinese or Middle Eastern sounding names but were nonetheless also discriminated against. Of most relevance is the advantage afforded to those considered co-ethnics of "white" – applicants with "Italian" sounding names – experiencing none of the discrimination meted out against those perceived as "Chinese", "Middle Eastern" or Indigenous. As Booth et al. (2010) pointed out:

...we find clear evidence of discrimination, with Chinese and Middle Easterners both having to submit at least 50% more applications in order to receive the same number of callbacks as Anglo candidates. Indigenous applicants also suffer a statistically significant level of discrimination, though the effects are smaller (for example, Indigenous applicants in Australia appear to fare a little better than African-Americans in the US job market). We observe virtually no discrimination against Italian applicants. To the extent that we can compare our results with earlier evidence for Australia, our results do

not suggest that ethnic and racial discrimination fell from 1986 to 2007 (Booth et al. 2010, p. 20-21).

Booth et al.'s (2010) study demonstrates that the prejudice against Australians of Chinese and Middle Eastern heritage extends to the general population. In addition to application for entry-level jobs, they also surveyed the rate of 'Return to Sender' of mis-addressed letters based on the presumed names reflecting the five ethno-racial groups. They found 'around 3-5 percent of individuals who would have returned a mis-addressed letter bearing an Anglo-Saxon name do not do so if the intended recipient has a Chinese, Italian, or Middle Eastern name' (Booth et al. 2010, p. 21).

The preferencing of co-ethnics is most evident in the formalised post-War United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement of 1946, commonly known as the "Five Eyes Alliance" of Anglophone countries (Pfluke 2019; Farrell 2013; Norton-Taylor 2010). The closest alliance – with Australia's Department of Defence – sees Australia joining every UK or US war effort from the eighteenth to the twenty-first centuries. It is not implausible to extrapolate that non-Australians – nationalities of the other four Anglophone nations – are employed within Australia's various Defence subsidiaries. The results of the top ten ancestries of the Australian Defence personnel (commissioned), being overwhelmingly Anglo-Celtic and Euro-centric provides significant insight into the privileging of co-ethnics of other Anglo heritage over Australians of other ancestries (see Graphs 7.1.5(a) and (b) of Chapter 7). For example, the prospect of a person with Chinese ancestry becoming a commissioned Defence officer was less than one quarter (0.24 in 2006 and 0.22 in 2016) of their proportion in the general population. In contrast, having a New Zealand ancestry had ten times the prospect of becoming a commissioned Australian Defence officer than of a person of Chinese ancestry (at 2.24 times). These results corroborate Yiftachel's assertion that in an ethnocracy co-ethnics of the dominant group diaspora are preferenced over minority citizens.

8.1.5 Politics are ethnicised, as the same logic of power distribution polarises the body politic and party system

In addition to the privileging of co-ethnics, the results of this study with respect to the backgrounds of Australia's parliamentarians reveal there is an overwhelming ethnicisation of Australia's politics in terms of representation in Australia's parliaments. Based on surnames data, State and Territory parliaments appear to have a European substitution effect to Anglo-Celtic domination but absent in the federal parliament (Parliament of Australia 2020b; NSW Parliament 2020; Victorian Parliament 2020; ACT Legislative Assembly 2020; Queensland Parliament 2020; Northern Territory Parliament 2020; Western Australian Parliament 2020; South Australian Parliament 2020).

The reduction of Anglo-Celtic domination through the incorporation of those of European heritage to join them within the major political parties demonstrate the privileging of co-ethnics, or those considered "white". Australians of Mediterranean Europe heritage – Italian, Greek and other Southern Europeans – once designated as outside the "Anglo-Celtic core" are now brought into the whiteness bubble of Anglo-morphic grouping. It reflects the depth of entrenchment of socialised whiteness within Australian society. The kernel of such ethnocentric tendencies has long historically been ingrained in the Australian national psyche, manifesting as the WAP. Consequently, the dearth of Asian-Australian representation in Australian politics across Australia's nine jurisdictions should be unsurprising. The same logic of power distribution through ethnicisation, of privileging whiteness, polarises the body politic and party system of Australia's political parties. While the term Asian-Australian can connote a number of different delineations embodying identity, nations, belonging, territorial belonging and so forth (Kwok 2017), the current reference reflects the ABS definition that refers to geo-cultural delineation (ABS 2019). The specific reference to Asian-Australians here is because they are Australia's largest "non-white" pan-ethnic group comprising of just under 13 percent of the Australian population in 2016. Yet in the 2016 federal parliament, there were only two parliamentarians, Penny Wong, a shadow Cabinet member of Eurasian heritage, and Ian Goodenough who identifies

as having ‘multicultural’ heritage. The exception is the Greens political party which appears to have the most culturally diverse representation in parliaments at the federal, State or Territory levels.

The ethnicisation of politics in Australia becomes even more conspicuous when compared to similar Anglophone nations. Pietsch (2018) compared political representations of ‘immigrants and ethnic minorities’ or ‘non-whites’ at the federal level of politics between Australia, Canada and the US. She found that the representation of Australians of non-European or “non-white” backgrounds comprise a woeful 2.7 percent of Australia’s House of Representatives in comparison to their 17 percent proportion of the general population (Pietsch 2018, p. 39). In contrast, as of 2015 Canada had 14 percent of ‘visible minority’ members of parliament in its House of Commons who comprise 23 percent of its general population. The US has 20 percent of its members of the House of Representatives coming from ‘non-white’ ethnic minority backgrounds as of 2015 who make up approximately 39 percent of the American population. Importantly, there is a notable trend of increasing representation by ‘non-white ethnic minority representation’ in both Canada and the US towards parity in the population, but not in Australia (Pietsch 2018, pp. 35-40).

In Australia’s party-oriented political system, ethnicisation processes create significant barriers for those categorised as “racialised” to succeed. Most, if not all, face internal perception of not ‘having the characteristics that party selection committees perceive as likely to be popular with voters’ unless the party perceives that from ‘a strategic perspective, doing so might increase the party’s attraction in the eyes of immigrant and ethnic minority voters’ (Pietsch 2018, p. 19).

The ethnicisation extends beyond the political sphere. Search any government appointed committees, review panels, inquiries, boards of a government agency or entity and so forth including universities. Irrespective of the purpose in commissioning the team, the two common characteristics will be white and male. The majority members, if not all, will be white male, either of Anglo-Celtic heritage or European ancestries. Rarely would a coloured person be invited to be included. The rarest member of all would be a woman of colour. If

a person/people of colour are involved, they would be relegated to the niche fields of “multicultural”, “diversity” or “culinary” rather than committees or panels advising government on the pathways for the nation’s trajectory. For example, the respective boards of the Diversity Council of Australia and FECCA contain a number of women of colour (Diversity Council of Australia 2020; FECCA 2020). Yet the two important government-appointed committees tasked to advise the federal government on the dual-impact from the COVID-19 pandemic – economic and health recovery – lacked any representation by people of colour. Both the National COVID-19 Co-ordination Commission Board members and experts, and the COVID-19 medical expert panel all have Anglo-Celtic or European backgrounds (National COVID-19 Co-ordination Commission 2020; Australian Department of Health 2020). This is notwithstanding the fact that Australians of Chinese or Indian ancestries were more than twice as likely to become medical practitioners/specialists or hold postgraduate level qualifications compared to their proportions in the general population. The paucity of cultural diversity, particularly women of colour, is particularly stark in publicly listed non-government corporations or agencies (AHRC 2016, 2018).

8.1.6 Rigid forms of ethnic segregation and socio-economic stratification are maintained despite countervailing legal and market forces.

The final indicator of ethnocracy, as advanced by Yiftachel, is the maintenance of rigid forms of ethnic segregation and socio-economic stratification despite countervailing legal and market forces. In Australia, this element is reflected in the perpetuation of the perception of the concepts of “white flight” and “ghettoisation” or “ethnic” enclaves. Adopted from the US, the term “white flight” connotes a racially-motivated exodus of Anglo-European derived groups “forced out” by “migrant” groups moving in. The use of the term by former opposition leader of Australia’s most populous State NSW, Luke Foley, to describe the changing demographics of Western suburbs of Sydney reflects the deeper ideological orientation to which Australia’s political class segregates the community, not just geographically but also ethnically (Davies 2018). Notwithstanding his denial and backpedaling, there was clear political calculation in Foley’s use of the term; sentiments

reproduced by his successor, Michael Daley, a year later claiming Asian workers ‘with PhDs’ taking young people’s jobs in Sydney (Australian Associated Press 2019). They were appealing to the broader ethnocratic Anglo-Australian majority whose white privilege was being challenged. Foley and Daley’s behaviour was clearly unacceptable and rightly lost their jobs in the party.

On a deeper level, these party practices demonstrate a high degree of ‘ethnocratic liberalism’, a term coined by Griffin (2000) to describe the paradoxical qualities of a type of party politics that enthusiastically embraces the liberal democratic system, but considers only members of one ethnic group to be a full member of society. The inability of Australia’s political class – with the exception of the Greens political party – to incorporate Australians of all backgrounds on an equal basis echoes the earlier ethnocratic ideology underpinning the WAP that barred non-Europeans from Australia’s shores. Like a potent psychological toxin, the ideology remains a significant part of the Australian psyche in twenty-first century Australia. None of the political parties to the right of the political spectrum has policies on diversity. In fact, the One Nation political party even denounced multiculturalism (One Nation 2020). Unlike its UK counterpart, the Australian Labor Party’s perspective on diversity focuses only on gender equality (Australian Labor Party 2020). As of 2020, the UK Labour Party has a policy campaigning towards a more representative parliament by increasing the representation of women and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic groups (UK Labour Party 2020).

For the 2019 federal election, the Diversity Council of Australia surveyed Australia’s two main political parties on diversity and inclusion. Their responses provide significant insights into their respective thinking on the matter. One of the questions on the survey asked:

- ix. Culturally diverse Australians. Policies to enable workforce participation of people from culturally diverse backgrounds, including in relation to their representation in leadership roles. Actions to improve Asia capability for the future workforce (Burnie 2019).

The response from the incumbent Coalition Morrison-led government was most telling. It ignored the ‘leadership’ element of the survey question but highlighted the ‘unique workforce opportunities for people from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds’ through the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Hirst 2019, p. 11). In another word, the Coalition of Liberal/National parties saw “CALD” people as primarily suited to working in the lowly-paid sector of disability care and unable to make a connection between being of CALD background and leadership. The Coalition response also referenced English language training services available for newly arrived refugees to Australia but made no reference to utilising existing or improving future Asia capabilities.

The Australian Labor Party response, while mentioning ‘Labor will work to tackle the under-representation of women from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds in leadership positions’, lacked any specific policy in this area (Australian Labor Party 2019, p. 9). Instead, its ‘FutureAsia’ policy appeared to be focused on Asia literacy rather than addressing the cultural diversity and inclusion in Australian society or leadership representation (Australian Labor Party 2019, pp. 9-10). This is unsurprising. The strategies appear to be a re-embellishment of its earlier foreign policy paper while in government. In 2011, the Labor government’s *‘Australia in the Asian Century’* foreign policy paper failed to recognise the existing advantage and benefit of Australia’s multicultural society to foreign policy strategies. It failed to appreciate the contributions of Asian-Australians as socio-cultural bridge-builders linking Australia with Asia. Instead, the policy oriented on establishing links with Asia as if Australia has no existing connections.

Since the federal election loss in 2019, the Australian Labor Party has subsequently established a ‘new caucus committee to focus on multicultural affairs and to help the party shape its policies’ (Hall and Mason 2019, para. 1). It remains to be seen whether this new strategy will have any substance or just “politics as usual”. Overall, the responses of Australia’s two major parties on diversity and inclusion reflect ethnocratism at work. Their perception of the role of Australians of non-Anglo-Celtic and non-European backgrounds

remain to support the broader white Australia, and not as full members capable of participating fully in Australian society including in leadership roles.

With political leaders setting the tone of conversation for the nation, it should be of no surprise terms such as ‘white flight’ have been used by Australian politicians. As discussed in Chapter 7, such manifestations reflect the perniciousness of whiteness in operation. The narratives abet the continuing legitimacy of a white Australia in practice but a multicultural Australia as necessary political messaging. The deployment of familiar tropes of alleged threats posed by non-Anglo and non-European people is unsurprising. Conservative Australian media commentators have long weaved narratives of them rejecting and being incompatible with “liberal values”, harbouring ill-defined customs or cultures, language barriers, and predicting the collapse of the white population or “Australian way of life”. These narratives divert attention from the struggles experienced by marginalised communities who like their “white” neighbours, are also struggling with surging housing prices, rising living costs and underfunded social services. They also provide a convenient cover for governments’ systemic failures to plan and their lack of policy foresight to establish infrastructures to service a larger population.

Like the yin-yang of the Taoist symbol, “white flight’s” conjoined twin is the term “ghetto”. The misappropriation of the word “ghetto” aside – a term previously used in Europe to designate where Jewish people could live – it implies a neighbourhood that constitutes a higher level of minorities than tolerable. Yet the term “ghetto” is never applied to neighbourhoods saturated with Anglo-Australians. In the liminal moments between white flight and ghettos, Australian politicians enjoy the availability of exotic cuisines during multicultural festivals held in these neighbourhoods. However, an immediate flush of discomfiture takes place when the producers of those exotic cuisines demand for equal rights as citizens of the nation.

This research reveals that the most overt segregation is occupational stratification despite the countervailing legal dictum of non-discrimination. As the graphs in Chapter 7 show, a clear trend emerges. Occupational groups associated with formal authority, ‘based on the

authority legitimated in positions of political and bureaucratic nature' (Daniels 1983, p. 5), are dominated by a pan-ethnic group of Anglo-morphic collections of ancestries. For example, the existing top five ancestries that persist in all three arms of government, in priority order are: English, Australian, Irish, Scottish, German and Italian. In parallel, occupational groups of informal power – a proximity to power but without the legitimate authority conferred by legal foundation but recognised as socially capable of influencing social behaviour – are also dominated by the same collection of ethnic groups. On the other hand, occupations correlated with occupational prestige as announced by credentials – where the credentials can confer authority (Daniels 1983, p. 1) such as medical specialists – allow a more equitable prospect for minority groups, particularly Asian-Australians, where they are over-represented compared to their relative proportions in the general population. For example, having Chinese ancestry gives one approximately twice the prospect of becoming a medical practitioner/specialist relative to the proportion of Australians having Chinese ancestry in the general population. For those with Indian heritage, it is even higher at two and one half times their proportion in the general population. Notwithstanding that, the most overt economic stratification is reflected in the overwhelming over-representation of women of colour in occupational groups with the lowest average income. In short, women of colour disproportionately occupy low-paid occupations.

CHALLENGES FOR MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA

9.0.1 Introduction

Yiftachel's analytical lens of ethnocracy provides an excellent perspective to unravel the power structure of Australia's society – the politics, economy and national culture. At its core, Australia's ethnocracy is supported by a politics of difference and spatiality. The differences in cultures, customs and languages are morphed into the spatiality of status, class and power. However, Yiftachel's conceptualisation of Australia as a settler ethnocracy moving towards a multicultural democracy fails to incorporate the historicised and racialised elements that are entwined with power in Australia. To categorise Australia only as an ethnocracy is premised on Australia being a settler state in ways that occlude the significant complexity of colonialism and the colonality that still pervade Australian society.

This chapter analyses the historical developments in Australia that contribute to the status quo and considers implications for the future. Section 1 analyses the historical social infrastructures, particularly the salience and embedment of racialisation in the operation of Australia's ethnocracy. Section 2 examines the ethnoctratisation and racialisation evident within the Australian Constitution, followed by discussions on the current challenges for Australian society based on the results of this study. Sections 4 and 5 discuss policy implications from the results of this research and challenges facing Australia.

9.1.0 Australia – a racial ethnocracy

Yiftachel's theorisation of Australia as a settler ethnocracy fails to incorporate the theoretical gap of race and its logics in structuring the conditions of state formation for

Australia. Race continues to underline the ongoing relations in modern Australia: politically, socially and economically. It is deeply ingrained in power disparities cutting across the lives of Australia's racialised minorities. The continuing impact of racial capitalism – the process of employing racialisation against coloured people, politically, economically and socially – remains discursively prominent in Australian debate. Australia is, in fact, a racial ethnocracy. The fundamental characteristic of Australia's racial ethnocracy is whiteness.

9.1.1 Racialisation foundation to Australia's racial ethnocracy

Federation in 1901 formalised Australia's ethnocracy. But as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the ethnocratisation process began long before 1901. The six British colonies that became the six States of Australia at federation had emplaced varying legislative and administrative measures to anchor the foundations of an ethnocracy (Curthoys 2003; Atkinson 2015; Jupp 2002). Recordings of the debates during the Intercolonial Conferences (1880, 1888, 1890, 1891 and 1897-8) reflect the strength of the desire to establish Australia as a white ethnocracy (National Archives of Australia 2020; Australian Constitution Centre n.d.). The *Immigration Restriction Act* 1901 (Cth, repealed), enacted by the newly minted federal Australian parliament after federation, merely extended and formalised the consciousness of racialisation and ethnocratism. Even British imperial concerns over the impact of the Act on its trade and strategic interests in China and Japan were insufficient to deter the overt discrimination favoured by the legislators of Australia's first parliament (Jupp 2002, p. 8; Atkinson 2015). This piece of legislation, together with regulations and complementary administrative measures, underpinned the WAP for three-quarters of the twentieth century. Some white Australian scholars such as Bob Birrell (2001) and Keith Windschuttle (2004) treated the WAP sympathetically and continue to deny or downplay its devastating impact on racialised minorities in Australia while advocating for an Anglo-centric migration program reminiscent of the 1950s white Australia (Birrell 2010). The effect of the WAP was to render whiteness 'a palpable, material and eminently quantifiable category against which those to be excluded were measured, rather than one that functioned

as an implicit structuring presence'. 'Those to be excluded' were 'multiple racial others': non-white others, indigenes and aliens (Perera 2005, p. 31). The single most crucial factor in the formation and development of the modern Australian nation that manifests as the WAP was race (Jayasuriya, Walker and Gothard 2003).

Race and racism

Lentin (2020) argues that race operates as a technology employed to maintain white supremacy and the continuation of the colonial imperial project. It infiltrates the political, social and economic processes for the management of difference. Lentin's (2020) conceptualisation of race provides a salient analytical lens to discuss Australia's racial ethnocracy. A nation established through a history of land dispossession of Indigenous peoples and labour extraction of those of non-Anglo-Celtic heritage (Wolfe 2006, 2016). The duopoly of race and ethnocratism remains fundamental to modern Australia. The incorporation of Australians of European backgrounds into institutions of formal and informal power but not those categorised with a "race" reflect their continued currency. Race is the critical factor defining the systemic power disparity between those considered as "white Australians" – of Anglo-Celtic and European backgrounds – and the racialised other. The ideology of race demarcates the fault line of power in Australia. Racialisation becomes the process and tool to which power inequality is retained by "white" Australians of Anglo-European heritage over Australians of "colour", or those racialised.

Racialisation comprises of the multi-layered linked processes of racial categorisation, racial differentiation and problematisation, marginalisation and exclusion, inferiorisation and devaluation (Hollero 2007). These processes provide a productive way of understanding racist experiences as they allow for the unpacking of the experiences of people of colour. For Indigenous Australians, the racial element is more than just a radical abrogation of their sovereignty through land dispossession. The initial ultimate goal of British colonisation was their elimination, as in destroy to replace. Although referring to the European settler colonialism imposed on Latin America, Gott's (2007) summation of the process readily

applies to Australia with respect to British colonisation, if the term “European” is replaced with “British”:

The characteristics of white settler states of the European [British] empires are generally familiar. The settlers sought to expropriate the land, and to evict or exterminate the existing population; they sought where possible to exploit the surviving Indigenous labor force to work on the land; they sought to secure for themselves a European standard of living; to justify or make sense of their global migration; they treated the Indigenous peoples with extreme prejudice, drafting laws to ensure that those who survived the wars of extermination remained largely without rights, as second or third class citizens (Gott 2007, p. 273).

In Australia, the labour processes initially focused on non-white peoples as a group. They include Pacific Islanders “black-birded” to work in slave-like conditions in Australia’s northern cane fields from the 1850s, but subsequently forcibly removed after federation. Australia’s Indigenous peoples, without a destination to deport them to, were subjected to ongoing racialisation and dispossession. Measures such as their removal from families, clans and tribes, direct physical or assimilationist violences and being placed under the continuous control of a white state-appointed ironically named, Aboriginal “protector”. Consequently, multiple generations of Indigenous Australians were displaced and annihilated. The racialisation of Indigenous peoples includes state-sanctioned measures that worked to construct them as uncivilised and savage; unfit for modern life and inevitably doomed to fade into extinction. Additional processes, through the combination of the ideology of miscegenation and forcible assimilation, serve coordinated colonial ends to discursively eliminate indigeneity (Wolfe 2006).

The outcome of the colonialism takes place not just in the abstract realm of ideology but at the point of contact between power and the land, at the level of usufruct in the colonialists’

home-making. The consequence: irreversible harm to the Indigenous peoples. Indigenous land dispossession was a fundamental aspect of colonialism in Australia, combined with various regimes of labour extractions on which most of Australia's immigration programs were based, since WWII, formulates the triangle foundation of Australia's racial ethnocracy – of colonialism, ethnocentrism and capitalism. That dynamic, in turn, necessitates distinct processes of racialisation imposed on non-Europeans, particularly those of Chinese heritage, separately and in addition to those imposed on Indigenous peoples. They became amorphous and immoral characters infused with undemocratic values. The corresponding gender tropes of racialised women are that of subordinate and inherently subject to white male domination and control. These racial logics work to construct Australia as a racial ethnocracy. Its foundation lies in the settler-colonial logics that structure the conditions of the Australian state formation, maintain through the ongoing internal colonialism and coloniality that underpin power relations in modern Australia.

Race defines the history of Australia's immigration, exclusion, and deportation of "coloured" people: from the arbitrariness in the quotidian enforcement of immigration law against Chinese people, which became the precedent for the racialised use of general law against non-European immigrants in later periods of the twentieth century. Its ideological toxicity infiltrates the tangled web of interconnectivity of political, social, economic and cultural relations of Australian society.

The powerful monologue of Australian actor of Indigenous heritage, Meyne Wyatt (2020), passionately and chillingly pinpoints the racial element to Australia's ethnocracy.

I'm always going to be a black friend, aren't I? That's all anyone ever sees.... I'm always in the black show, the black play. I'm always the angry one, the tracker, the thief. Sometimes I just want to be seen for my talent, not my skin colour, not my race. I hate being a token, box to tick, part of some 'diversity' angle.... [You ask] "But how will we move forward if we dwell on the past?" That's your privilege. You get to ask that question. Ours, we can dance and be good at sport....

“No no, you’re not your ancestors, it’s not your fault you have white skin” – but you do benefit from it.... You can be OK – me? I have to be exceptional. I mess up, I’m done. You take a hit whether you like it or not, because you want your ‘blacks’ quiet and humble.... [You say] “Nah, we’re progressive, now, we’ll give you the small, subtle shit”. The shit that’s always been there. Not the obvious, in-your-face shit. It’s the “we can’t be seen to be racist” kind of shit. Security guard following me around the store, asking to search my bag. Walking up to the counter first being served, second or third or last kind of shit. Or hailing down a cab and watching it slow down to look at my face and then drive off. More than once. More than twice.... But it’s not about that one time, it’s about all those [other] times (Wyatt 2020, 1:00:20-1:04:04)

Although the whole of Wyatt’s (2020) emotional speech calls out racism – direct, casual, or unconscious – against Indigenous Australians and Indigenous deaths in custody, his experience resonates across racialised communities, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous. His rage pours out of humiliation that derives from generations dominated by successive white ethnocratic governments.

As a nation formed from racial and gender logics that underpin violent Indigenous dispossession, racialisation of people of colour and successive waves of labour exploitation, Australia’s institutions are derived from colonial occupation as permanent structures (Beilharz and Cox 2007; Wolfe 2016). The neoliberal myth perpetuated by white Australia that colonialism ended with the 1967 Referendum to include Indigenous peoples in Australia’s census, or the enactment of the national anti-racial discrimination law, provide facades for the inherent coloniality in the nation’s systems and processes. The history of racial prejudice in Australia is well documented (Dunn et al. 2004; Dunn et al. 2008; Islam and Jahjah 2001); and its legacy continues. But as the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates, a crisis will revivify its ugliness.

Australia's history provides plenty of examples of the racialised lens applied to decisions taken by Australian governments. Racialisation was the critical factor to the nation's formation and remained steeped in the nation's processes and systems (Cochrane 2018). A scan of any official Australian history text would reveal the tendency to assign Australia's development as a modern nation from the perspectives of firstly Anglo-Celtic convict and colonial history, and subsequent European migration settlement. Thus, British colonisers became "settlers" and Indigenous peoples positioned last, not as their rightful place as first. Subsequent arrivals become "migrants" and further subdivided into "white", "non-white" or "non-British" and so forth. Rarely would there exist the voices of the Indigenous peoples who have lived and cared for this land for at least sixty thousand years. Nor the acknowledgement of non-Europeans, such as Chinese vegetable farmers and furniture makers, Afghan cameleers, who in small and larger measures contributed to the nation's development despite entrenched and pervasive discrimination (Boileau 2014; Gibson 2018; Jones and Kenny 2007). After surveying recent scholarship on migrants and refugees in Australian history, Balint and Simic (2018) lamented that 'migrant and refugee history has hitherto been largely quarantined from mainstream Australian historiography' (Balint and Simic 2018, p. 378). In effect, they were "white-washed" from Australian history. As historian Michael Williams from the Chinese Australian Historical Society said about the WAP and the exclusion of Chinese people in Australia's history:

It wasn't just a law that said only certain people can come into Australia, it was also a mindset that said this is going to be a white country. People began to write the history and think about the history in that way and just deleted from the history the reality of other people existing in the communities at all (White 2019, citing Williams).

Any mention of the people of colour or other racialised minorities, if it exists at all, would be perfunctory and factual such as the tome by James Jupp (2001), *The Australian People*. History underpins social legitimacy and lends identity. It legitimises the narrative of who belongs and who is alienated.

9.2.0 Australian Constitution – racialisation, exclusion and ethnocracy

As discussed in chapters 3 and 8 of this thesis, as the ultimate source of legal authority and pre-eminent law of the land, the Australian Constitution could be the keystone underpinning lasting social change under multiculturalism – symbolically, legally, politically, socially and culturally. But it is also the locus and most evident exclusion of racialised Australians. Forged in the racial laboratories of nineteenth-century British colonies in Australia, the Australian Constitution has become the overarching authority for modern multicultural Australia. But shaped in the racial regimes of the colonial sphere, the Australian Constitution is neither representative, nor democratic, nor does it hold legitimate authority. Its retention and legitimacy lie in its acceptance in the common sense tradition and the support of the legal fraternity, not as an instrument of popular sovereignty.

The questions of where political power originates and who wields it are at the centre of theoretical and philosophical discourse about politics and law (Nootens 2013). Political theory argues that the underlying principle of democracy as a system of government directs the authoritative source of power from the people or popular sovereignty. “The people” thus underlie and give legitimacy to the exercise of public power, and that government ought to be carried out for their benefit. As discussed in Chapter 2, the three pillars of democracy work towards this goal and consist of: firstly, a system of government that is representative of the people, to establish laws for the people (one person, one vote); secondly, with the rule of law to operate independently of individual or group interests (equality before the law); and finally, a community undifferentiated by difference. If applied with due diligence, these are the democratic foundational principles that underpin a successful multicultural society, or a successful multicultural democracy.

Yet none of these principles of democracy can arguably be applied to the Australian Constitution.

9.2.1 Unrepresentative

Among liberal democracies and unlike other similar nations, the Australian Constitution lacks terms that give ideational clarity to its nexus to the people as sovereign, nor does it elucidate links to government and its institutions existing for them. The Australian Constitution was the result of consultations that took place during the Australasian Federation Conference 1890, the Sydney Convention 1891 and the Intercolonial conferences 1897-98 (Australian Constitution Centre n.d.). Despite the absence of terms clearly articulating its purpose is for the people, Saunders and Kennedy (2019) argued that the Constitutional drafters intended to create a constitutional structure that emanated from the people, to establish institutions of government through which the people would rule, institutions subject to the will of the people, bound to follow the dictates of public opinion. However, this argument falls apart when we acknowledge the drafters of the Australian Constitution comprised only of selected white men (Australian Constitution Centre n.d.). Even if they had been chosen as delegates to the Federation Conventions to draft the Constitution, they were not representative of the Australian people. During that time, few non-white men were eligible to vote. Assuming white men who were eligible to vote comprised fifty percent of the population, at most, they represented that proportion – the white men of nineteenth-century Australia. While there were a few exceptions, such as Quong Tart, who held significant social standing within the Australian community in the nineteenth century (Lea-Scarlett 1974; Tart 2001); however, on the whole, women, workers and others such as Indigenous Australians and other peoples of colour, who together were likely to comprise of more than fifty percent of the population, were largely excluded. Voting turnout at the Federation referendums varied between 39.5 percent and 72.6 percent of registered electors in the different British colonies in Australia, which amounted to between 7.9 percent and 36.3 percent of the total population in each colony (Pringle 2008, pp. 1 and 6). Without the participation of at least sixty percent of the population, the Australian Constitution could be hardly called representative, or democratic.

9.2.2 *Undemocratic*

Notwithstanding some subsequent revisions through referenda, the content of the Australian Constitution still contains ethnocentric and racialised language. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, race power remains formally etched in section 51(xxvi), or the “race power provision”, of the Australian Constitution which authorises the Australian federal government to legislate for the benefit, or disadvantage, of a particular race. While the diversity of the Australian population and “common sense” would dictate that the Australian government should not enliven that provision; however, it remains a latent power constituted to enable a racially-minded ethnocentric government to maintain its domination (Lee 2020). The Australian federal (mostly Labor) governments in the late twentieth century have employed the race power provision of the Constitution to enact anti-racial discrimination law, and establish services specifically to benefit Australia’s Indigenous peoples. The purposes of the laws and service provisions were to alleviate the significant disadvantage Indigenous Australians continue to experience from the impact of brutal colonisation. They include the Aboriginal Medical Service, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services, Aboriginal housing companies, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Studies and the now-defunct Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. However, the High Court ruled in the 1998 *Hindmarsh Bridge* case that the race power provision could also be employed by the Australian government to advantage or disadvantage Indigenous Australians. As former High Court judge, Michael Kirby, who dissented on the *Hindmarsh Bridge* case warned:

But politics can sometimes be tricky in protecting minorities and the plain fact of the matter is that over the history of the Australian nation back to settlement, we have not by our legislation adequately protected the Aboriginal people of Australia....Therefore we have a warning — and that warning should make us careful about the interpretation of our Constitution, especially where it says you can make special laws on the basis of race....They can be good or bad

[laws] according to the majority in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case (Lee 2020, paras. 40-42).

9.2.3 *Lacks authority*

The original Australian Constitution drew its authoritative legitimacy and power via Australia's connection to the British Parliament and its royal assent through the then British monarch, Queen Victoria. The dual-enactments of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) by both the British Parliament and the Australian Parliament severed the legal connection between Australia and Britain. The severance of legal ties also creates the paradox of the Australian Constitution losing its original source of authority, the British Parliament. Indeed, in a legal sense, and constitutionally Britain is a foreign power. Without the approval of the Australian people through a vote, the current Australian Constitution draws no legitimate source of authority.

9.2.4 *For “the People” and by “the People”*

If the sovereign authority resides in the people and is exercised on their behalf by their representatives, it is difficult to accept that the Australian Constitution is an expression of popular sovereignty. A constitutional document could be considered a formative act whereby a people legitimates the creation of a new polity. The making of the Australian Constitution ‘was neither representative nor inclusive of the Australian people generally’ (Williams and Hume 2013, pp. 56-7). Its continuing legitimacy lies in its acceptance by Australia's institutions, the parliaments and the Executive governments, but more importantly the judiciary and associated legal fraternity that recognise and embrace its operation. Perhaps its most critical role, is that it functions as the foundation to legitimise the formation and operation of Australia's racial ethnocracy.

9.3.0 *Ethnocratisation and racialisation central to Australia's racial ethnocracy*

The WAP was formally in operation, actively encouraged and legally authorised, for only three generations (from 1901 to 1975). However, its implementation was much harsher and

lasted much longer than similar policies in Anglophone countries and had a profound effect on Australia's cultural and political identity (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Its socialisation and embedment into the interstices of Australian society existed long before 1901; Australia's ethnocracy commenced with the first fleet in 1788. They brought with them and implemented British (primarily English) law, setting the foundations and conditions to enable an ethnocratic state to flourish. Notwithstanding the WAP's formal repeal (National Archives of Australia 2020(a)) – including enacting the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Cth) and the removal of discriminatory immigration policies – the ethnocratisation continues, albeit less overtly than under the WAP. Its multitudinous tentacles continue to be rooted in every aspect of Australian society.


Justification for Anglo-Celtic dominance is through a narrative of the perceived contribution of colonial settlers to the development and defence of Australia as a modern nation. This narrative also allows the incorporation, not necessarily acceptance, of European migrants, but likelier their descendants, to participate politically. In parallel, denial of the existence of systemic barriers to participation in Australian life by Indigenous peoples, and other racialised minorities, is part of the cultural logic of those subscribing to such ethnocratic ideology. The brutalisation of Indigenous peoples and racialised minorities through the colonisation process is minimised, or denied responsibility, by their descendants. The warrant to recognise these past wrongs and their continuing impacts is fashioned as the catch-cry of an over-vocal, overzealous minority, aided by academics and others, such as human rights advocates, who seek to exploit the issue for self-interested purposes; or exaggerate it. The call for the government to address the consequent social problems, such as racism, is reframed as providing minorities with an unfair advantage or in breach of freedom of expression.

In Australian politics, political parties such as the Nationals and Liberal Party of Australia and One Nation, embody the most vehement version of such ethnocratic ideology. Except for the Australian Greens political party, all other Australian political parties reflect varying

degrees of ethnoctratisation practices. The degree of ethnoctratism of Australia's political parties parallels the degree of racialisation, denial of racism or lack of support for diversity.

Figure 9.3.0 on the next page illustrates where each Australian political party represented in the federal Parliament sits on the ethnoctratic spectrum based on their policy positions on cultural diversity. The data is derived from information from the Manifesto Project Data, the official website of each Australian political party and their policy announcements during the 2019 federal election. The degree of racialisation and ethnoctratism score is allocated according to the policies or public statements relating to four topics: racism, Indigenous issues, diversity and multiculturalism. A positive announcement on each topic receives a score of zero; non-mentioning of either of the four topics receives half of one mark; while a negative announcement (such as denial of racism) receives one mark. Thus, the Greens political party, which announced positive policies on all four topics scored zero (denouncing racism, supporting anti-racism measures, Indigenous recognition and treaty, and announcing support for a national multicultural legislation). On the other hand, the Centre Alliance party which has no policy/statement on racism, diversity or multiculturalism but has called for the Australian federal Parliament to fly all three flags – Australian, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Centre Alliance 2018) – received one and one half points. At the extreme end is Pauline Hanson's One Nation party which denounced multiculturalism and cultural diversity, denies racism and made negative statements with respect to Indigenous Australians, received the full four marks.

Figure 9.3.0: *Racialisation and ethnocratic spectrum of Australian political parties in federal Parliament*



[Source: Author's summary of data from the Manifesto Project Data, Australian political parties' websites and announcements on the issues cultural diversity, multiculturalism, racism and Indigenous issues]


The ethnocratism manifests through the domination of the nation's formal structures of authority by people of Anglo-Celtic and European ancestries in the Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary.

9.3.1 *The characteristics of Australia's racial ethnocracy*

In the twenty-first century, the politics of difference in Australia translates into the politics of power by enabling co-ethnic identification with specific social markers that define and augment the nature of ethnic domination and co-ethnic behaviour. This manifests as a white, Anglo-morphic pan-ethnic grouping comprising of Anglo-centric and Euro-centric collection of heritage, encased in whiteness. White men of this grouping dominate Australia's institutions of authority and informal power structures. The results of this research demonstrate that the common characteristics of this grouping reflect a combination of five indicators: Christian, male, sharing a common ideology, and of Anglo-European

backgrounds. **Figure 9.3.1** below presents an illustration of the typical characteristics of power holders in the national government of Australia.

Figure 9.3.1: *Characteristics of Australia's racial ethnocracy reflects a typical power holder in the national government of Australia*



The degree, and strength, of ethnocratism varies depending on the ideological orientation of the (Australian) political party concerned and the level of government. Each ring also condenses the degree of racialisation. Political parties with the most rooted and embedded ethnocratic ideology, of Anglo-Celtic supremacy, reflect the rigidity/strength of separation between the different indicators. Thus, a strong ethnocratic orientation finds its expression in (the current and previous) Coalition-led national governments. Having Anglo-Celtic ancestry presents as the core to being in power, with being male, white, sustaining neoliberal ideology and Christian faith as augmenting traits. On the other hand, state level Coalition-led governments reflect neoliberal political ideology as central to being in power, with being white, of Anglo/European heritage and Christian faith becomes secondary augmenting characteristics. Political parties with low ethnocratic tendency, such as the Greens political party, reflects more diverse constituencies that are more representative of the population.

Weber's three-dimensional typology, where status or prestige appears beside class (economy) and authority (party) as manifestations of power, provides a useful theoretical framework to interpret Australia's racial ethnocracy. The results of this research point to whiteness coalescent to operate as a pan-ethnic group that translates as status in Australia,

particularly institutions of authority. The existing top five ancestries persisting in all three arms of government, in priority order are: English, Australian, Irish, Scottish, German and Italian. The other five antecedents that generally make up the top ten ancestries comprise various combinations of other European ancestries. As discussed earlier, the results of this research demonstrate none of the non-European heritage appeared among the top ten ancestries of Australia's institutions of power. The most evident is Chinese ancestry, which makes up almost five percent (or 1.2 million people) of the population but never made it to the top ten ancestries of Australia's institutions of power, formal or informal.

Yet, being of Welsh ancestry which comprises approximately 0.2 percent of the general population provides over six times the prospect of being selected into Australia's parliaments. Representation of minority groups in Australia's institutions of authority carries important symbolic and normative implications that relate more than to the broader perception of social power structure. It duplicates the narrative of who belongs in the nation and who is excluded, and diminishes the prospect for change. Michael Hing's comment, as a fifth generation Chinese-Australian comedian and host of the Australian documentary *Where Are You Really From?* about working in the media industry speaks to the experiences of people of colour and those racialised:

...there is a kind of criticism that I would get that my white colleagues wouldn't – people calling me ch**k and telling me to go back to China or accuse me of being involved in the WHO plot to release coronavirus. The reality is, for some people, despite the fact that I was born here, my parents were born here, my grandparents were born here, my great-grandparents were here, I'll never be Australian enough for them, because of how I look. Those people exist, and those people aren't just racists in basements on the internet. They have jobs, some of them hire and fire people, they're throughout society (Ma 2020, paras. 15-17 citing Hing).

Hing's comment echoed the prescient sentiments of Greek-Australian actor Nick Giannopoulos a generation ago. In a 1996 interview, Giannopoulos noted popular Australian television programs including those presented overseas were predominantly of a white Anglo-Celtic Australia. He argued that until leadership of Australia's arts and media sectors, from ownership to management, changes to become more reflective of the general population, the *situ* would prevail (Giannopoulos 1996, 0:47).

Multicultural frameworks and policies are meant to normatively embed plurality in a culturally diverse society. But the government's contradictory messaging on multiculturalism in Australia – abetted by the conservative Australian media and echoed in the cybersphere – since the mid-1990s appears designed to skew public conversation and policy debate on diversity in ways that advantage Anglo-Australians and disadvantage racialised Australians. Attempts by racialised minorities to have a voice, whether on history, social issues or political developments brings forth the accusation of attempting to rewrite history and destroy “our heritage”. Yet that heritage does not include the voices of anyone else but that of the white perspective, who laid down conditions and processes to privilege them and their descendants, and to exclude non-white others. The overall effect is to ensure being white remains a privilege; in short, an unearned advantage that maintains white domination in Australia's culturally diverse society: politically, socially, culturally and economically.

In contrast, the effect of racialisation is to diminish status. Beyond individual, historical and institutional constraints, being perceived or applied with a racial category can be detrimental to participation in Australia. Views on race, norms and belonging are shaped by political leaders, institutions and cultures (Tolley 2016). Race, gender, age and appearance impact on candidate selection by political parties (Pietsch 2018). These factors continue to reverberate across Australia's institutions formal and informal, structuring life chances and the experiences of discrimination and racial prejudice (Heath and Cheung 2007). Racialised Australians continue to experience racial prejudice at more than double the levels of those of European heritage (Markus 2007-2019). Australian political leaders' continued denial,

dismissal and disdain of the existence of racism and its impact on racialised minorities help sustain the prevailing racial order of white domination and racial ethnocracy.

9.4.0 Policy Implication

Individual factors will no doubt contribute to one's aspiration to occupy a public role including within Australia's institutions of authority. However, institutional frameworks provide the most significant barriers. The laws, policies and practices adopted by Australia's governments, political parties and social institutions can either facilitate or hinder political participation and representation of minority groups (Pietsch 2018). Kymlicka (1995) refers to these constraints as "internal restrictions" that may inhibit individuals' freedom in the interests of group cohesion and "external protections" that secure minority rights, respectively.

In addition to individual and institutional constraints, the other significant social barriers to political, social and economic participation by minority groups rest with political parties, discriminatory practices and racial prejudice that permeate the nation's institutions and Australian society overall. Pietsch (2018) in her research found that the under-representation of racialised minorities in Australia's political system 'is not due to a lack of political engagement or interest' on their part (Pietsch 2018, p. 21). Discriminatory processes and practices within political parties, and 'the lack of incentive by the main political parties to recruit "non-white" immigrants and ethnic minority candidates' play significant roles. As noted previously, the WAP implemented was much harsher and lasted for much longer than similar policies applied in other Anglophone countries (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Its impact across the nation is thus more entrenched, more pervasive and more deep-rooted. Given these factors, perhaps it is unsurprising that some politicians of non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds may have resorted more to branch stacking to get elected despite its corrosive effect on Australia's political process (Sakzewski 2020; Willingham and Dunstan 2020).

The political challenges for governments in Australia's culturally diverse society are twofold: firstly, to institute measures enabling minority groups to have social agency and the resources to maintain cultural independence; and, the removal of barriers to being treated with equal respect and making people feel alienated from society and institutions. As Ivison (2012) noted:

...citizens come to value their membership in the general community when they feel that their identity-related differences, among other things no longer block or distort their access to the opportunities and resources of a liberal political order (Ivison 2012, p. 137).

To date, Australia's version of multiculturalism has the integrity of rice paper; beautiful but fragile and insufficient in its measures and implementation to socially institutionalise Australia to weather the storms of ethnocentric and racist impulses manifesting as populism, domestically and internationally. The existing social policy framework of formal equality rather than addressing the underlying racism helps to sustain the prevailing order, undermining Australia's claim to be the most successful multicultural society in the world.

9.4.1 Recognition, Rehabilitation, Research and Renewal

History is written by victors. In Australia's case, history has been written by and from the perspective of the descendants of colonisers and migrants to the nation. This past cannot and should not be disguised if we are to learn its lessons to understand the challenges of the present and the future. It showed that, in its formation as a nation, Australia gave way to ethnocentric impulses and fear of difference. Australia now needs to unlock the doors to its silenced history and unearth the nation's dark past in order to step forward in the right direction. The opportunity, as presented by COVID-19 pandemic and Black Lives Matter movement, to have the conversations that needed to be had will again be missed if Australian political leaders continue with the status quo. The findings of this research identify socio-political mechanisms that interact as constraints and barriers to minority groups' participation in the nation's social, political and economic life. As a nation, the

whole of Australia is on an important journey and must consider what, as a nation, we want to be and are to become. For this to occur, foundational principles should be drawn, empowered with legislative foundation, implemented by policies and practise in everyday relations.

The core of Australia' racial ethnocracy manifests as power hegemony over people racialised. Australia's history demonstrates the destructive impact of such hegemony: of peoples, languages and cultures annihilated; with social relations that result in a significant portion of the population marginalised, under-appreciated and their considerable potential contribution to the nation unrealised. The nation is poorer for it. But no vision of the nation's future is realistic that does not take account of the existence of social, economic and strategic interactions of its people. Minority groups in society are not islands insulated from the rest of the larger society. Nor do the ethnocratic tendencies in Australia's institutions mean they have taken them captive, determining what they do and how their identities are framed. As Wolfe (2016) noted, 'the incompleteness of racial domination is the trace and the achievement of resistance, a space of hope' (Wolfe 2016, p. 37). The sections below identify some of the public policy areas needing addressing if Australia is serious about wanting to become the most successful multicultural democracy in the world.

9.4.2 *Recognition*

In similar processes to a personal journey towards better health, habit or behaviour, the minimum process must be to address bad habits before new patterns of action can be instituted. The first step towards these goals is recognition. The recognition that we can create a better society and do better than the past; and identify the barriers in achieving these outcomes. In a public policy sense, this requires Australia's leadership to set the "tone" for the nation's future. The strength of leadership is to acknowledge Australia's dark history, that the modern Australian nation was founded on exclusion and brutalisation of its Indigenous peoples and exclusion of people of colour. Secondly, the recognition that one product of that history, racism, continues to exist. And that the process of racialisation,

creates systemic and institutional barriers to participation by Australia's minority groups who are racialised, and this casts a long shadow over the nation's development. Thirdly, to recognise Australia's lived reality of a multicultural demographic, and demonstrate a willingness to incorporate the multiculturalism in government public policy measures. Successful leadership is one that brings people together. Lastly, the recognition that Australia's diversity has more potential than simply to advance an economic agenda: Australia's diversity can provide a wealth of ideas, innovations, and cultural and social enhancements to enrich the nation.

9.4.3 *Rehabilitation*

The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis provides significant lessons that are valuable to social change. It confirms social change requires strong leadership, accompanied by public policies that can enforce changes in community behaviour. Firstly, to achieve moral legitimacy as a modern nation Australia needs to constitutionally recognise the continuous custodianship of the land by Indigenous Australians (Pearson 2014). The Australian Constitution itself needs rehabilitation, to better represent the people and clearly articulate its ideational purpose, "for the people". Such constitutional rehabilitation can commence with the initial phase of constituting groups of people, drawn from across the community, government and academia, and reflective of the demographic composition of the population, to research, analyse and discuss relevant issues on an ongoing, and continuing basis.

Socially, this requires the removal of structures that institutionalise racist behaviour and implement measures to address the behaviour. It could start with removing Australia's reservation on Article 4(a) of the ICERD, and domestically ratify the provision by criminalising racial vilification and racial attacks or abuse. There is strong community appetite to address the scourge of racism and racist behaviour in Australia and support change for a better society that is inclusive for its diverse population. The groundswell of

Australian participation in the Black Lives Matter movement demonstrates this. What is required, is the Australian government action to make this happen.

Australia's educational curriculum needs to be overhauled to better reflect Indigenous and people of colours' historical perspectives. The obliteration of people, cultures and annihilation of languages will continue if we do not reconcile with the past. Without doing so, we continue to ignore these uncomfortable truths.

Unlike other similar nations, such Canada and the US, Australia has no affirmation action measures to counter the real impacts of racialisation and racism impacting on racialised communities. In the Indigenous space, the policy measures to assist Indigenous Australians with economic advancement are haphazard, lacking co-ordination and at times, Indigenous people's input. Politically, discrimination and racial prejudice continue to act as barriers to minority groups, both Indigenous and migrants, participating in Australian political life (Pietsch 2018). Public policy measures can drive change in the processes and practices of political parties. American studies have shown 'experiences in a politically active community, acquiring skills for political action, engaging in political discourse, and inclusion in collaborative pluralist contexts' can enhance both political capacity and political equality (Beaumont 2011, p. 216). In parallel, acquiring skills for political action reduces the influence of largely unchosen political advantages such as ethnicity and white privilege, creating an alternative pathway to political empowerment.

9.4.4 Research

If the objective of public policy is to address societal problems, then public policy ought to be about 'what governments do, why they do it and what difference it makes' (Parsons 1995, p. xv citing Dye 1976). In today's challenging and ever-changing environment, effective policymaking requires policymakers to have a strong grasp of developments in the community, emerging ideas and future trends while developing policies that are responsive and relevant.

To tackle today's complex social issues, research can play a significant role. Australia's cultural and social policies will be better informed in the future with research that help advance understanding of the nation's past, discern the major issues that confront us today and analyse the trends that will shape the nation's future. It is thus vital for Australia to go beyond importing or extrapolating knowledge from similar Anglophone countries, but to develop its own understanding of social issues specific to Australia as it is manifested in this country.

For this purpose, research helps generate ideas that shape how we understand problems, give definition to goals and strategies, and employed as the currency to communicate about societal issues. Research can uncover unpalatable truths but it is a crucial ingredient of good decision-making. It underpins ideas about how society should be governed on empirical observations, about how societies actually function. Research can also demonstrate how ideas shape political behaviour and outcomes, and how focusing on ideas provides richer explanations of Australia's culturally diverse society. 'Hating to know' by governments on social issues such as racism (Jakubowicz 2015) should no longer be an option if Australia is serious about becoming the most successful multicultural society in the world.

In the seventies to mid-nineties Australian governments placed some priority to understanding of the socio-cultural health of the nation and future strategies. Institutions of research worked hand-in-hand with policymaking. The cross-pollination of the then Office of Multicultural Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural Population Research exemplified these collaborations. But examples such as this are now thin on the ground. As subjects of social scientific inquiry, research that generate ideas about diversity have held a beleaguered status, often derided as imprecise, too focused on the needs of racialised minorities or placed lower in priority than political interests as motives for political and social action. For much of the past two and a half decades, this has led to the denigration of the broader social studies on multiculturalism since the mid-nineties in favour of political interests. Studies into counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism have been favoured by Australian governments over investigations into social inclusion, diversity, racism and

multiculturalism – studies that can help underpin a successful multicultural society. As this research demonstrates, such studies can unearth the uncomfortable truths about political, social and cultural inequality that exists in Australian society.

By giving definition to our values and preferences, research can generate ‘ideas [that] provide us with interpretive frameworks that make us see some facts as important and others as less so’ (Beland and Cox 2010, p. 3). As Beland and Cox (2010) argued:

Political action is motivated by ideas, but the goals people articulate and the strategies they develop have feedback effects that further shape their original ideas (Beland and Cox 2010, p. 5).

Research can advise governments how best to institute public policy by paying attention to ‘the impact of ideas, culture, discourse, and framing processes and their effects on politics, political economy, social movements and policy making’ (Beland and Cox 2010, p. 5; Anderson 2008; Béland 2005). Research, therefore, can afford power to actors. As this study shows, when the ideas are embedded in institutions, they also institutionalise, even legitimise, power differentials. This is ‘because these institutionalized ideas participate in the definition and the reproduction of group boundaries and inequalities, the study of these ideas can directly contribute to our understanding of power and domination’ (Beland and Cox 2010, p. 9).

Given public policy can be a heavily contested area, research can play a vital role in informing the development and review of government policy. The purpose of research into Australia’s culturally diverse society is to enable a better understanding of how people develop sets of ideas to make sense of the world. These ideas guide people’s actions and shape their interactions with others. As Beland and Cox (2010) noted:

Shared ideas lend themselves to routine practices that give rise to institutions. Then lesson-drawing processes reshape ideas, exposing and sorting out the tensions among competing ideas. Such processes offer opportunities for conflict, misinterpretation, miscommunication,

deception, and duplicity, as well as cooperation, enlightenment and resolution (Beland and Cox 2010, p. 12).

At the core of research is the way ideas are packaged, processed, disseminated, adopted and embraced. The lesson is that the most value-effective public policies are made when policymakers seek out and incorporate the insights of those working in the fields with empirical data and observations, rather than working diligently to perfect their material or ideologically-driven policy direction of inquiry (Jakubowicz 2015). As Duncan (2011, para. 1) remonstrated, ‘good research is not cheap, but neither are failed policies’.

As noted earlier, without government support and resourcing research with respect to issues impacting on racialised minorities has been minimal since mid-1990s. Yet, the full participation and inclusion of racialised minorities in Australian life – politically, socially, culturally and economically – hinge on research into these areas to draw government attention and action. Dedicated resourcing for social research into these areas, particularly from government which has the authority to implement research-backed policies, is now urgently required to change the status quo. What is required is the political will and ambition to resource social change towards a diverse and inclusive society.

9.4.5 *Renewal*

As a culturally diverse society, the nation we want, and what we want to become requires parameters to guide inter-social relations. Legislating the framework for inter-social relations such as human rights and multicultural affairs, provides legitimacy to public policy measures, enhancing community inter-relations. There is a moral urgency to questions about how to embrace multiculturalism. It requires a wholesale national mindset change that should commence with Australia’s current democratic process, which needs renewal to ensure participation by minority groups. The existing processes maintain Australia as a racial ethnocracy and reinforce white privilege. These issues are not new. Calls for change towards the development of a new political structure and culture reflective of Australia’s

demographic diversity in decision making have long persisted over the past several decades. As Carson et al. (2013) noted:

[A] growing number of [concerned] scholars, practitioners, politicians, and citizens recognise the value of deliberative civic engagement processes that enable citizens and governments to come together in public spaces and engage in constructive dialogue, informed discussion, and decisive deliberation (Carson et al. 2013, Abstract)

In the current political climate of partisan-fuelled parliaments of Australia, ideas and propositions on alternative models of democracy have a lot to offer, especially as we set our gaze towards spaces for reform towards a more equitable power structure. The challenge should focus on re-designing Australia's democracy with components of both representative and direct forms of democracy that are representative of the nation's diverse demography. A number of proposed models of deliberative democracy (Elstub 2010), examining ways in which democracy might be made more effective and meaningful for a multicultural Australia and based on empirical research, are worth considering (Carson et al. 2013; Dryzek et al. 2019; Ercan and Dryzek 2015; Hartz-Karp 2005; Niemeyer 2011, 2013; Parkinson 2003, 2006; Uhr 1998, 2000; Yankelovich 1991). They range from variants of sortition, 'where a group of citizens drawn by the lot are given a mandate to deliberate and propose, if not decide, policies that bind the rest of the polity' (Curato and Parry 2017, para. 9), to substituting a certain portion of the current representation with randomly selected members of the community (Dunlop 2018; Hartz-Karp and Briand 2009; Yankelovich 1991). Others seek to do democracy differently by advancing the case against elections (van Reybrouck 2016) or eliminating the need for politicians (Henning 2017). These ideas and propositions are worth considering in light of the current power asymmetry between white Australia and racialised minorities.

A critical lesson from the Australia 2020 Summit that should be incorporated in any renewal of Australia's democratic process is the inclusion of Australia's cultural diversity as a key factor in the deliberation (Australia 2020 Summit Report 2008). It defies logic that as a nation with the highest cultural diversity in the world, Australia failed to consider its multiculturalism in a conference aimed to set the path for a future Australia. That being said, the fact that the Australia 2020 Summit (18-19 April 2008) was held at the commencement of the Jewish festival of Passover (19 April 2008) was prescient. It speaks to Australia as a racial ethnocracy.

9.5.0 Conclusion

In Australia, there is often tension between celebrating one's non-Anglo-Celtic heritage and the demand – often from neoconservative politicians and the ethnocratic portion of the population – to integrate or “assimilate” into what is perceived by them, to be an Australian identity rooted in the monoculture of Anglo-Celtic heritage. The tension derives from the operation of racialisation and ethnocratisation, processes that are embedded in the nation's formation and manifest in the Anglo-European domination of Australia's institutions of authority and informal power. These processes work to create unequal life chances between those racialised, and white Australians.

But there is cause for optimism. The national debate is slowly shifting from whether there is a problem to solving it. The diversity among young Australians of all backgrounds calling for a change to the nation's trajectory is growing. The future is for us all to write, and we have powerful tools if we are willing to use them: openness, optimism, and a shared spirit of curiosity. As Pearson (2014) wrote:

There is our ancient heritage, written on the continent and the original culture painted on its land and seascapes. There is its British inheritance, the structures of government and society transported from the UK fixing its foundations in the ancient soil. There is its multicultural achievement: a triumph of immigration that brought

together the gifts of people and cultures from all over the globe – forming one indissoluble commonwealth (Pearson 2014, para. 34).

The salient question is whether Australians are willing to pursue this future.

But to achieve a successful multicultural democracy requires a transformation of social relations and Australia's institutions, and this will not be accomplished if the existing power domination by an Anglo-morphic grouping persists. There must be recognition that minority voices do not need to be submissive, they need not be passive, that they always deserve a seat at the table, a voice in the discussion of the future of the nation.

Such social change is fundamentally a process of collective mobilisation. The role of governments loom large in setting and establishing firm foundations to set the motion for such social change. For political leaders can play a central role in mobilising social change. It is through a process of social influence, underpinned by law, that such a multicultural 'we' is created, and ultimately, embodied in collective behaviour – of standing up for what 'we' believe in and against which that violates the values that define who 'we' are. Multiculturalism remains the prominent philosophy compatible with managing Australia's multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multicultural society. But any proposed framework needs to incorporate four principles/factors: of power, policy, plan and practice, to effect the social change desired.

Any proposed framework needs to have strong, legitimate foundation – the *power* authorised by law – to define and articulate a set of ethos that multiculturalism represents for Australia. As the champion of social change, American civil rights activist Dr Martin Luther King said:

Power properly understood is nothing but the ability to achieve purpose. It is the strength required to bring about social, political, and economic change (Martin Luther King, Jr. 1994, cited in Kahane 2009, p. 13).

In addition to the legitimacy that law can provide, legislation also enables setting benchmarks, establishing accountability and anchors of *policy* measures providing guidance towards achieving the objectives/goals set.

In order to set goals and objectives, planning needs to take place. As discussed earlier in this chapter, research helps to inform and prioritise goals and objectives. But none of the best plans in the world could seek to effect social change without implementation. This takes us to *practice*. The plans, multiculturalism and its political and social mandate, can be put into practice by government departments and bureaucracies leading by example.

All in all, the path to a successful multicultural democracy needs to commence with multiculturalism having an overarching presence, as a set of principles, as a cultural ethos, as public policy, as institutional practice, enshrined in law and entrenched in a Bill or Charter of Rights. The multicultural ideals of sharing in the ethnic heritage of others, recognition for diverse cultures and so on has had little impact on the day-to-day problems faced by racialised minorities. They should include the creation of affirmative action and employment equity programs under the rubric of multiculturalism to compensate for certain social inequities. The cultural issues preventing these communities from fitting in need to change into more concrete concerns – employment, education, and racial discrimination.

Together these programs represent a set of guiding principles that can help to build an equitable society, and fit into a political framework that increasingly invokes social libertarian ideals as a reason for which to do things supporting employment equity within provincial government; policies that espouse an egalitarian ethos. Under these principles, multiculturalism thus is not only to better accommodate the needs of the people it addresses, but also to defend its objectives against its powerful critics, and to maintain its legitimacy as a guiding force in Australian life.

CONCLUSION – TOWARDS A MULTICULTURAL “WE”

In Australia, social inequities are often addressed through the rhetoric of “multiculturalism”. But as discussed in Chapter 2, the term has come to encompass a mixed array of meanings across social and political contexts. For those on the right of the political spectrum, multiculturalism has morphed to cover a range of social afflictions that will test the cohesion of the nation; in contrast, for those on the political left, it is aimed at addressing social inequities associated with cultural difference. Officially, the language of multiculturalism in Australia has become inert, lacking creativity and intellectual progress. Australian multicultural policies to date have failed to address the processes of ethnocratisation and racialisation that remain sources of oppression and marginalisation on those racialised (Babacan and Babacan 2007). Structurally, multiculturalism has failed to attenuate the stranglehold over power structures by a white Anglo-morphic pan-ethnic collectivity in Australian society.

Apart from a component of cross-national comparative approach with six other liked-minded nations (Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US), this study builds on earlier treatments of the underlying foundation to the success of multiculturalism: power inequity in Australia’s multicultural society (Stratton 1998, 2011b and 2020; Hage 2000; Gunew 1994; Stratton and Ang 1998; Perera and Pugliese 1995, 1998). It provides an alternative theoretical perspective from which to assess Australia’s multiculturalism; by analysing ethnic differentials in power holdings that influence the construction of multiculturalism as expressed in Australia’s multicultural policies. What marks this study apart from other studies is that it substantiates, through empirical evidence, the power inequalities in Australia’s institutions of formal authority – essentially parliamentary

representation, the judiciary and the Executive government – as well as informal power holdings. This is innovative, for in the past, access to government services and other social and cultural rights have figured more prominently in the concerns of advocates of multiculturalism in Australia; but lacking the hard empirical evidence to substantiate that power as a key dimension to explicate the Australian federal government's persistent minimalist approach. Myriad factors contribute to this: conceptual inconsistencies in the definition of multiculturalism; limitations to conventional analytic frameworks in situating multiculturalism in broader social, historical and political contexts; properly orienting key political actors and sponsors in the construction of framing strategies; and, a lack of assessing the relationship of powerful actors and institutions through time.

Drawing upon well-established philosophical arguments and three main social-scientific theories of multiculturalism, and building on a growing empirical literature, the present study speaks to these questions in novel and, one hopes, articulate and persuasive ways. From the standpoint of power holdings in Australia, it builds new measures that meaningfully capture the specific criteria demarcating exclusion from the national community, tests these measures against rigorous and detailed measures of the different forms of power and analyses the hypothesised dynamics both cross-sectionally and over time. From a policy perspective, it examines the effect of policy regimes on a series of measures related to economic, social and political integration, using a variety of national and cross-national international indices.

Summary of result: Australia's international standing

Seven international indices were employed in this research to compare Australia to Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. The international indices measured four aspects of society: economic participation through income inequality (Gini Index and Gini Co-efficient); multicultural policy (MCP Index and MIPEX); state of democracy (Democracy Index and GPI); and, human development (HDI). With the exception of the HDI, Australia's results were not so distinctive to warrant a claim of being

‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’. Although Australia performed well in the HDI compared to the other nations analysed, however, Australia’s results were not spectacular and only slightly exceeded the other nations compared to. Furthermore, the aggregate nature of the HDI masked the existing inequalities among Australia’s multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multicultural groups. Importantly, the HDI has been shown to overlook the decreasing level of human development among Indigenous Australians while the general population improved.

Summary of result: Economics participation

Race and whiteness remain salient factors in economic participation in Australia. The results from this research revealed those ascribed as non-white, and female, dominate occupations and industries with the lowest average annual incomes. While achieving higher educational attainment improved income; however, for non-white Australians it failed to achieve income parity with their white Australian peers. The results revealed that irrespective of educational attainment, Australians of Chinese and Indian heritage did not achieve income parity with their white peers of the same level of educational attainment. Notwithstanding that, their representation in the medical professions were at least twice their respective proportions in the general population, as well as their educational achievements in postgraduate degree levels. It demonstrates the myth of meritocracy, as reflected in Prime Minister Morrison’s mantra of ‘a fair go for those who have a go’, is shrouded in whiteness (Morrison 2019; Murphy 2019).

Summary of result: Social and cultural representation

Australia’s national public culture, social institutions and use of English as the national language (albeit not formally stated) all contribute to reflect a symbolic, if not overt, advantage to those of Anglo-Celtic and European backgrounds over other groups. It effectively extends a symbolic affirmation of Anglo-European cultures and heritage as more valued than other cultures, and to be celebrated by the nation. The white physiognomic trait

also enables the formation of alliances, not just in the formal institutions of authority, but also domination across the social constellation and cultural fields within the media and the arts sectors. Being white – particularly of Anglo-Celtic or European background – provides a “leg up”. The media and arts depict the national conversation over Australia’s social and cultural make-up – of “our culture and who we are”. The lack of presence of racialised Australians in Australia’s social and cultural spheres further exacerbates their exclusion in the national conversation over belonging.

Summary of result: Politics, power and representation

White Anglo-morphic Australians have a stranglehold on the nation’s formal and informal power structures. The results revealed irrespective of whether in the institutions of legitimate authority – the parliament, judiciary and Executive government – or the media and the arts, the typical holder of these positions was a white, Christian, able-bodied male of Anglo-Celtic heritage. The trend reflected a trajectory of increasing whiteness and increasing level of domination as one moved towards the centre of national power. A similar trend also applied to leadership of the corporate sector and government bureaucracies of hard power – the military and police forces. White Anglo-morphic Australians comprised of at least 94 percent of Australia’s parliamentarians, judiciary, government and non-government agency heads, and commissioned Defence and police officers.

Interpretation

The results of this research found a bleak story for multicultural Australia. The statistical analysis revealed that Australia, in effect, falls within Yiftachel’s conceptualisation of an ethnocracy. The structure of Australia’s ethnocracy is centred around whiteness, with the power holders characterised by five features: white, Christian, able-bodied, male and Anglo-Celtic heritage. Why should this be surprising? Clearly, it contradicts the Australian government’s claim of Australia being ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’. The claim is not only disingenuous and ahistorical but tinged with racism. It

represents only the voice of white, Christian, Anglo-morphic Australians who overwhelmingly dominate the nation's formal and informal power structures. Their whiteness affords them privilege, an unearned advantage, in a system established to entrench their continued advantage. The "multicultural" – particularly the racialised – communities of Australian society remain voiceless and powerless. Racism, racial discrimination and racial abuse remain an increasing feature of their lives with few avenues of redress (Markus 2007-2019).

By the results of this research, Australia is not just an ethnocracy, but in fact, operates as a *racial* ethnocracy, albeit cloaked in the hazy rhetoric of multiculturalism. This approach of understanding Australian society bridges the rift between the objective and the subjective, the structural (in terms of power) and the agentic (in terms of the individual); but also accounts for the historicity of race and its continuing social valency. It gives a new framework to understand Australia's multicultural society; one that encompasses both a diagnostic and prescriptive conceptualisation of social problems. A comprehensive structural and inclusive attempt most research on multiculturalism neglects – from a power perspective.

The domination of the nation's power structures by an Anglo-morphic grouping reflects the climate of federal government inaction and indifference since the mid-1990s. Federal government multicultural policies since then, in effect, have been dehistoricising and homogenising an Australian society that is raced and gendered. These policies have failed to address historically wrought differences ascribed by relations of power, hegemony and domination. The impact of this power discrepancy manifests as a relational ethno-racial social hierarchy, with whites at the top and people of colour at the bottom. But among racialised minorities in Australia, unlike their white ethnic counterparts, inequalities in social life experiences are not limited simply to differentials in social status. The physiognomic differentiation, whether in reality or presumed, also produces differential

outcomes in cultural, economic and political life experiences (Booth et al. 2010; Pietsch 2018).

While the Australian federal government harbours the illusion of Australia being the most successful multicultural society in the world; however, the colour demarcation line remains present albeit not fully visible. White Australians in Australia are privileged with full enjoyment of citizenship and rights while those considered “coloured”, or racialised, remain on the fringe, culturally, socially and politically. Often their loyalty is questioned, their organisations investigated and their voices suppressed. Even having Indigenous ancestry provides no protection. As the experiences of Indigenous women during WWII demonstrate, being married or partnered to a Japanese resident in Australia was sufficient ground for them to be interned along with their ‘mixed-race’ children (Ah Kee, n.d., para. 2; Broom Historical Society & Museum 2019; Balint 2012, p. 551; Nagata 1993). The result is the full enjoyment of democratic rights for privileged whites; with lesser democratic rights for those with undesirable skin colour, ethnicity, religion, culture or race.

The rationale for this intransigence was implanted since white British arrival. The formal processes of colonisation, racialisation and assimilation upon which modern Australia is found is deeply embedded within the nation’s unconsciousness programming. Social relations have and continue to revolve around these processes. This applies first and foremost to Australia’s Indigenous peoples, who were hunted down, brutalised and dispossessed of their land in the home-making processes of British colonisers (Veracini 2011; Wolfe 2016). Their oppression continued when federation in 1901 founded the modern Australian nation. But the racialisation also applies to those non-white. It is expressed in the White Australia Policy, with its associated arbitrary implementation, formal discriminatory practices against Chinese and other coloured people in Australia, and the exclusion of those ascribed as “coloured” from entering the nation.

Multiculturalism was an attempt to temper these blatant discriminatory practices. But white domination in Australian society persists by becoming unmarked. Although vocal and overt

representations of whiteness and otherness in Australia have become less visible than during the White Australia days, the constructs themselves endure. Manifestations of these constructs are evident in the conservative Australian media which continue to position white people at the centre of the nation, and non-whites at the margins. The substantive nature of these constructs have changed: less overt assertions of white superiority and constructions of others as different but impliedly deficient, and thus outside the boundaries of inclusion and belonging within the nation. These less overt formulations shield the racialised nature of the polity from critique, ensuring that white dominance is retained rather than interrupted. These discursive strategies (re)construct Australianness as white, irrespective of the racial diversity of the contemporary Australian population.

How these frames are utilised by dominant white actors to interact with other informal fields of power is reflected in the revolving door of politicians and government staffers transitioning politics to the corporate sector. Government advisory bodies, boards, heads of bureaucracies and lobbying firms are filled with ex-political personnel. Precisely, the coercive influence of whiteness is central to positions of leadership, both directly and indirectly. These influences have evolved, adapted and are consistent through time. 'The truth of the interaction, is not to be found in the interaction itself' (Bourdieu 2005, p. 148), but instead the interaction is an expression of the power that preserves the structures that encompass these interactions. These interactions provide clear indications of relative institutional position through time – multiculturalism is for non-Anglo-Celtic Australians. The white Anglo-morphic stranglehold on power helps elucidate the persistence of political indifference and inaction and the cadaverised discourse on multiculturalism in Australia.

In the same space racialised Australians are habituating the periphery of power in Australia; with the perpetual uncertainty and potential of being subjected to racism, racial abuse and racial attacks in the nation they help to build and live in. The 'fair go' of Australia, even under multiculturalism, has not proceeded past the colour line. The egalitarian promise of an antipodean democracy imagined in Donald Horne's 1964 book, *The Lucky Country*, has

not fully extended to those racialised. The vision of Australia as a land of opportunity where neither class nor creed limits individual achievements still maintains a physiognomic colour barrier. Increasing incidents of racism, racist abuse and attacks, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, are not changing the political conversation, let alone steer politicians toward action.

In the absence of a robust national strategy on inclusion, racialised Australians, particularly Asian-Australians, do the most Asian thing in believing their individual actions could indeed reduce their circumstance. They avoid situations that may subject them to racist attacks or abuse and focus on the next generation: for their children to study hard to achieve academic success and enter careers perceived as potentially providing economic security (Ho 2020), or choosing not to do any of that. This is reflected in the results of this study which showed that Australians of Chinese and Indian backgrounds have higher representations at the bachelor and postgraduate degrees level qualifications compared to their relative proportions in the general population. Notwithstanding that, they remain under-remunerated compared to their white peers with the same level of educational attainment and qualification.

Within this environment, politicians are claiming ‘Australia is the most successful multicultural society in the world’ as an overarching theme in the national political discourse over immigration and racism. Yet never very far from such claims lie animating fears associated with race. Fears about the loss of national unity and trust often draw attention to looming changes in the racial demographics of the body politic. Lost amid these debates are often the more complex legacies of race and ethnocriticism. Anxieties over the disintegration of the fabric of Australian national identity likewise forget not just how they echo past fears of subversive racial and cultural difference, but also exercise as well the changing nature of society and social interaction. For a brief time in the 1980s, serious considerations of the force of multiculturalism entered into a variety of philosophical and policy debates. But in the Australian context, these debates led to a reaffirmation of some

variants of economic rationalism in “productive diversity” and neglecting the continuing operation of race within the avowed norms and policy goals of Australian politics.

By situating the Australian multiculturalism discourse within the larger frame of Australian history through the lens of power domination, this research yields significant insight into the production of hegemonic forms of whiteness and how race continues to haunt the contours of debates on cultural diversity in Australia.

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Coalition federal governments – commencing in the Howard era – view their governance style as a blunt rejection of any interventionist approach in socio-cultural affairs, particularly where there is potential that the privilege enjoyed by white Australians could be challenged. Conservative commentators have not only aided this view, they have also expressed strong opposition to any plan or ideas considered to be antithesis to ‘white’ Australia. Wedged between a vocal and hostile conservative-dominated media environment and a militant union movement, the opposition Australian Labor Party, even in government, maintains an equality in rhetoric but with minimalist action. If anything has come out of Australia’s version of multiculturalism, it is that the loudness of the language of assimilation has muted, and that integration is a more acceptable way to talk about the transformation that takes place among people new to Australia. However, their comments also bring to light the superficial language of integration and the goals of multiculturalism as a way to assimilate minorities as “Australians”. Overall, white privilege is retained. It becomes a psychosomatic power, drawn from continuing historicised ethnocriticism processes, that manifests as white domination over the power structures of the nation. Without imputing bad faith, those privileged by it will not want it dismantled.

Yet dangers loom, not least of which are the ever-present threat of internal divisions and a sense of cleavages widening. One only needs to turn to the US, under the presidency of Donald Trump, and the tearing of social fabric therein, to see the dangers such divisions and cleavages can pose.

The 2016 Census reveals that demographically, even if Australia stops immigration permanently, the existing diversity is here to stay. We need to continue to find ways to live with and comprehend cultural difference. There is still the opportunity to implement a theoretical framework to work more effectively for Australia than the current state of government inaction and indifference. But any proposed framework needs to incorporate the four principles articulated in Chapter 8 of this thesis for lasting social change. Such a framework needs to be *empowered* with legitimate authority, ideally constitutionally endorsed or at least with legislative support, to articulate the rationale and define the purpose of multiculturalism as a public policy; a set of principles to guide *policy*; with *planning* for the future supported by research; and, implemented in *practice* through employment equities, strengthening anti-racism and anti-racial discrimination measures, and through government departments and bureaucracies to lead by example.

Further Research

The original proposal for my doctoral research was to audit Australian multiculturalism by interviewing three elite groups who have direct impact on multiculturalism in Australia: (a) the scholars and researchers who are experts in the field; (b) the frontline workers with first-hand experience of the issues the philosophy and policy are meant to address; and, (c) the policy and decision-makers who are in positions of authority to set direction on the what, where and how multiculturalism can/should work in Australia. The initial plan was to interview at least fifteen participants from each group. Unfortunately, that research had to be abandoned mid-way because of a lack of participation from the policy decision-makers group.

With respect to the policy decision-makers, ideally comprising of ten politicians and five officers. Formal invitations to participate in the study were sent to the three main political parties in Australia. Ten invitations were sent to parliamentarians of each of the two major political parties of Australia, Labor and Liberal. Two invitations were sent to the Greens political party. The proportion of invitations for parliamentarians was based on a

combination of two factors: (a) each party's share of elected representatives in the federal parliament; and, (b) the fact that the federal government has to date been formed by either one of the two major political parties. The parliamentarians were chosen on the basis of their previous or current interest (such as ministerial or shadow ministerial responsibilities), or opposition, to multiculturalism in Australia.

Three senior public servants working within the two federal departments with policy responsibility for multicultural affairs, the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Social Services, were also invited to participate. Unfortunately, they were not able to obtain ministerial approval to participate in the study.

After repeated follow-ups, responses were received from three Labor parliamentarians but none from the Liberal party including the then Coalition-led government Assistant Minister for Multicultural Affairs, Zed Seselja. The then Shadow Minister for Multicultural Affairs (Labor) initially accepted the invitation but his office subsequently postponed the interview twice. After repeated follow-ups, a five-minute phone interview was offered but again subsequently postponed. The other Labor politician agreed to a thirty minutes phone interview but subsequently cancelled and could not commit to a future interview time. Only Maria Vamvakimou, the Labor Member for Calwell, participated in a full interview. Both Greens politician accepted but it was not possible to interview them. The party had a reshuffle of responsibilities with the sudden proposed retirement of their leader, Richard Di Natale, who had previously agreed to be interviewed. They recommended interviewing colleagues who had assumed responsibility for the multiculturalism portfolio after a period of settling in. With so few parliamentarians willing to participate in the study, it was assessed best not to proceed ahead with the research format.

Without contribution from this group, the prospect of Australia reinvigorating the national conversation on equity and inclusion would lack the formal authority they hold. Notwithstanding that, interviews were completed for the other two groups containing rich

data which, together with the submissions to the 2013 and 2017 parliamentary inquiries on multiculturalism, should be invaluable if fed into Australia's social policy development.

The cost of obtaining data from the ABS limited the opportunity to ascertain a more granular picture of the impact of ethno-cultural difference on the economic, social and political participation of multicultural Australia. For example, cost limitations meant there was no opportunity to obtain ABS Census data on the income earnings of the top ten highest income earning occupations (top ten occupation vs ancestry vs income) and lowest ten income earning occupations (lowest ten occupation vs ancestry vs income) against ancestry. Such data could have substantiated (highly likely) or refuted (less likely) the other data used in this research in terms of ancestry against educational attainment and income (see Chapter 7).

Costs of obtaining data also meant the results were restricted to the top ten ancestries rather than the full result. A full dataset of the results can provide much needed granularity. For example, such data would have allowed insight into the actual/raw number of parliamentarians with Chinese or Indian heritage, the two ancestries that comprise the fourth and eighth top ancestries within the Australian population respectively, but were not among the top ten ancestries of Australian politicians. Other data that would have been useful included information on the educational attainment of other minority group Australians – such as Black African, Muslim heritage etc. – against income. Such data could help to illustrate the impact of discrimination on their economic participation in Australian society. Unfortunately, again owing to costs, such data had to be condensed into the nebulous 'Other ancestries' group in this study.

Studies from the perspective and standpoint of racialised minorities, or the 'visible minorities' in Canadian political speak, on their views of participating in Australian life are far and few since Jean Martin's seminal work on Vietnamese refugees in Australia in the late 1970s. Pietsch's (2018) comparative study on political representation in Australia, Canada and the US, provided significant insight into the barriers and obstacles racialised

minorities faced in trying to enter politics. However, it lacked the input from the people who faced these barriers.

Final comment:

I don't want to conclude this research on a negative note for deontologically, indications of some changes are afoot. The following are examples of some positive changes:

The Terms of Reference for the (current) 2021 federal parliamentary Inquiry into Extremist Movements and Radicalism in Australia include a reference to 'further steps that the Commonwealth could take to disrupt and deter hate speech' (Parliamentary of Australia 2021, Terms of Reference 3(d)). The establishment of this Inquiry reflects the government's recognition that 'far right-wing' extremism, and not just Islamist extremism, also poses as threats to Australian society. That being said, with government members on the Committee overseeing the Inquiry comprising overwhelmingly of its conservative faction, it remains to be seen if, and to what extent, the Inquiry (and subsequently the government) would be willing to address these issues. Previous government responses and the lack of action so far on the recommendations from the 2013 and 2017 parliamentary inquiries on multiculturalism do not bode well for this Inquiry. Notwithstanding that, the 6 January 2021 violent and deadly riots by right-wing insurgents on the US Capitol (and state Capitols) should serve as wake-up calls for the Committee, and Australia, of the consequences of right-wing extremism.

The fallout from Rio Tinto's destruction of the 46,000-year-old culturally significant Juukan Gorge in Western Australia shows that commercial consequences over the destruction of Indigenous cultural heritage can be severe and likely to become the new norm (Perpitch 2020; Chau and Janda 2020; Verrender 2020). Submissions to the federal Parliamentary Inquiry over the issue revealed increasing community awareness of the need to protect Australia's unique Indigenous history. The contents of the submissions demonstrate

extensive concerns over government inaction over the years. Calls for immediate government intervention are getting attention (Australian Senate 2020).

The recognition and awareness of racism and lack of legal redress on racial hate crimes are spreading, with some communities demanding political action (McKenna 2020). Calls to address racism, at least in sport, are resonating in the community (South Australian Government n.d; Tate 2020; Tyler and Ryan 2020; Hart 2020). The Black Lives Matter movement has sprouted similar protests in Australia, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, energising the campaign against police prejudice against Indigenous Australians and raising awareness of the issue.

For the first time in history one of Australia's most prominent art prizes – the Archibald Prize exhibition for 2020 – 'looks more representative of contemporary, everyday Australia itself than ever before' (Jefferson 2020, para. 23). The Scanlon Foundation's twelve years of social surveys (Markus 2007-2019) reveal that support for multiculturalism and cultural diversity continues to be very strong among young Australians.

These events suggest there is space for hope, of change for a more equitable and inclusive Australia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. 50/50 Foundation 2017, 'Target 50/50 leadership by 2030. So, where are we now? Australian women in Parliament', *5050 Foundation website*, <<https://www.5050foundation.edu.au/>>
2. 6EBA-FM 95.3 2017, 'World Radio', Perth-based multilingual radio station, <<https://www.6eba.com.au/>>.

A

3. ABC News (Australia) 2014, 'Government conferring 'permission to hate' Muslims: Randa Abdel-Fattah, videorecording Youtube, 22 September, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XrcvCU8V8dQ>>.
4. ABC News (Australia) 2018, *Malcolm Turnbull's final message as PM: Australians must be 'dumstruck'*, videorecording, YouTube, viewed 23 August 2018, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=usNDjso9uxc>>.
5. ABC News (Australia) 2020, 'Coronavirus fears prompt new fines for deliberately coughing, sneezing and spitting on frontline workers in Queensland', *ABC News (online)*, 27 April, viewed 27 April 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-27/coronavirus-queensland-fines-for-coughing-spitting-sneezing/12183010>>.
6. ABC News (Australia) 2020, 'Coronavirus has sparked racist attacks on Asians in Australia', videorecording, Youtube, 1 February 2020, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFIkH3JpkGI&feature=youtu.be&t=56>>.
7. ABCQandA, 'Hard truths', *Q+A*, 8 June, videorecording, Youtube, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMAinmBpNL8>>.
8. Abdel-Fattah, R. 2018, *Islamophobia and everyday multiculturalism in Australia*, Routledge.
9. Abdel-Magied, Y. 2017, 'What are they so afraid of? I'm just a young brown Muslim woman speaking my mind', *The Guardian*, 6 July, viewed 6 June 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jul/06/what-are-they-so-afraid-of-im-just-a-young-brown-muslim-woman-speaking-my-mind>>.
10. Abdulla, A., Doucougliagos, H. & Manning, E. 2015, 'Does education reduce income inequality? A meta-regression analysis', *Journal of Economic Surveys*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 301-316.

11. Acharya, M. 2018, 'Is Australia racist? Here are the 10 stunning stats', *SBS Hindi (Online)*, 8 April, viewed 1 August 2019, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/language/english/is-australia-racist-here-are-the-10-stunning-stats>>.
12. Ackland, R. 2017, 'The Yassmin Abdel-Magied bash-a-thon is all part of the Anzac Day ritual', *The Conversation*, 28 April, viewed 6 June 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/28/the-yassmin-abdel-magied-bash-a-thon-is-all-part-of-the-anzac-day-ritual>>.
13. ACT Government 2019, *ACT Multicultural Framework 2015-2020: Section action plan 2019-2020*, Australian Capital Territory Government, viewed 29 July 2020, <https://www.communityservices.act.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1362462/ACT-Multicultural-Framework-2015-2020-Second-Action-Plan-2019-2020.pdf>.
14. ACT Government 2020, *2020 National Multicultural Festival*, <<https://www.multiculturalfestival.com.au/>>.
15. ACT Legislative Assembly 2020, *Members*, website, <<https://www.parliament.act.gov.au/members>>.
16. Aedy, R. & Psaltis, E. 2019, '10 of the most powerful Australians you've likely never heard of', *ABC News (online)*, 13 June, viewed 13 June 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-13/most-powerful-australians-you-dont-know-politics-lobby/11133934>>.
17. AFP Fact Check 2019, 'China holds just 2.3 percent of Australia's agricultural land', *AFP Australia*, 19 December, viewed 19 December 2019, <<https://factcheck.afp.com/china-holds-just-23-percent-australias-agricultural-land>>.
18. Ah Kee, A. n.d., *Aboriginal-Asian families*, viewed 8 January 2021, <<https://colouredcolonials.yolasite.com/aboriginal-asian-families.php>>.
19. Aiello, R. 2019, 'Regional and gender breakdown of Justin Trudeau's new cabinet', *CTV News (online)*, 21 November, viewed 1 December 2019, <<https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/regional-and-gender-breakdown-of-justin-trudeau-s-new-cabinet-1.4696687>>.
20. Albrechtsen, J. 2016, 'Multiculturalism has proven divisive, not coalescent, so let's ditch it', *The Australian*, 24 February, viewed 28 October 2019, <<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/opinion/multiculturalism-has-proven-divisive-not-coalescent-so-lets-ditch-it/news-story/f29ed6f5fa55a20c90972af13e7d8589>>.
21. Alcorn, G. 2019, 'Australia's Murdoch moment: Has News Corp finally gone too far?', *The Conversation (online)*, 11 May, viewed 21 May 2020,

- <<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/may/10/australias-murdoch-moment-has-news-corp-finally-gone-too-far>>.
22. Alderman, D. 2000, 'A street fit for a king: Naming places and commemoration in the American South', *The Professional Geographer*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 672–684.
 23. Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Esterly, W., Kurlat, S. & Wacziarg, R. 2003, 'Fractionalization', *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 8, pp. 155–194.
 24. Alexander, C. 2002, 'Beyond black: Re-thinking the colour/culture divide', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 552–571
 25. All Together Now 2019, *Social commentary and racism in 2019*, November, <<https://alltogethernow.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Social-Commentary-and-Racism-2019-1.pdf>>.
 26. All Together Now 2017, *Who watches the media? Race-related reporting in Australian mainstream media*, December, <<https://alltogethernow.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ATN-Who-Watches-The-Media-FINAL.pdf>>.
 27. Allam, L 2019, 'Dodson, Burney call for government to fund National Congress of Australia's First Peoples', *The Guardian (online)*, 12 June, viewed 4 August 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jun/12/national-congress-of-australias-first-peoples-fights-for-financial-survival>>.
 28. Allen, S. W. 2019, 'Disappointing' cabinet picks show Trudeau still needs to address diversity 'blind spot', say advocates', *Hill Times (online)*, 27 November, viewed 1 December 2019, <<https://www.hilltimes.com/2019/11/27/cabinet-diversity-disappointing-missed-opportunity-for-trudeau-to-prove-blind-spot-is-being-addressed/226070>>.
 29. Allport, G. W. 1954, *The nature of prejudice*, Addison-Wesley publishers, Cambridge.
 30. American Sociological Association 2019, 'Culture', *ASANet.org*, viewed 28 March 2019, <<http://www.asanet.org/topics/culture>>.
 31. Anderson, B. 1983, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London and New York.
 32. Anderson, E. 2008, 'Experts, ideas and policy change: The Russell Sage Foundation and Small Loan Reform, 1909–1941', *Theory and Society*, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 271–310.
 33. Ang, I. 2001, *On not speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West*, Routledge, New York.

34. Apaza, C. R. 2009, 'Measuring governance and corruption through the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Critiques, responses, and ongoing scholarly discussion', *Political Science & Politics*, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 139-143.
35. Arvanitakis, J., Cage, C., Groutsis, D., Kaabel, A., Han, C., Hine, A., Hopkins, N., Lattouf, A., Liu, I. J., Lo, I., Lumby, C., Rodrigues, U., Soutphommasane, T. & Weerakkody, S. U. 2020, 'Who gets to tell Australian stories?', *Media Diversity Australia*, August, <https://www.mediadiversityaustralia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Who-Gets-To-Tell-Australian-Stories_LAUNCH-VERSION.pdf>.
36. Ashcroft, R. & Bevir, M. 2017, 'Multiculturalism in contemporary Britain: Policy, law and theory', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 1-21.
37. Asher, N. 2018, 'Regional South Sudanese young people defend reputations in wake of Melbourne gang violence', *ABC News (Online)*, 8 January, viewed 8 January 2018, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-08/regional-south-sudanese-youth-defend-reputations/9310414>>.
38. Athwal, H. & Burnett, J. 2014, 'Investigated or ignored?', *UK Institute of Race Relations*, <<https://irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2014/02/Investigated-or-ignored.pdf>>.
39. Atkinson, D. 2015, 'The White Australia Policy, the British Empire, and the world', Paper 4, *Department of History Faculty Publications*, Purdue University.
40. Attiah, K. 2020, 'The 'Karen' memes and jokes aren't sexist or racist. Let a Karen explain', *The Washington Post*, 28 April, viewed 28 April 2020, <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/28/karen-memes-jokes-arent-sexist-or-racist-let-karen-explain/?arc404=true>>.
41. Attorney-General's Department 2018, 'International human rights system', viewed 3 April 2019, <<https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/Pages/International-Human-Rights-System.aspx>>.
42. Attwell, K. 2016, 'Ethnocracy without groups: Conceptualising ethnocratise states without reifying ethnic categories', *Ethnopolitics*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 303-318.
43. AustLii 1995, *Australian Treaty Series 1976 No 5*, viewed 3 April 2019, <<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1976/5.html>>.
44. Australasian College for Emergency Medicine (ACEM) 2020, 'ACEM calls for unity and respect in Coronavirus response', *ACEM media release*, 3 February, viewed 3 February 2020,

- <<https://acem.org.au/News/February-2020/ACEM-calls-for-unity-and-respect-in-evidence-based>>.
45. Australia 2020 Summit 2008, *Australia 2020 Summit initial report*, April, available at <<https://www.smh.com.au/multimedia/pdf/2020Summitinitialreport.pdf>>.
 46. Australia Department of Home Affairs 2017, *Australia's multicultural statement – Multicultural Australia: strong, united, successful*, 20 March, <<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/mca/Statements/english-multicultural-statement.pdf>>
 47. Australia Government Directory 2020, *Australian Government Organisations Register*, viewed 5 January 2020, <<https://www.directory.gov.au/reports/australian-government-organisations-register>>.
 48. Australia, Senate 2014, *Debates*, speech by Senator George Brandis, 24 March, p. 1797.
 49. Australian Associated Press 2019, 'Michael Daley claims Asian workers taking young people's jobs in Sydney', *The Guardian Australia (online)*, 19 March, viewed 19 March 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/19/michael-daley-claims-asian-workers-taking-young-peoples-jobs-in-sydney>>.
 50. Australian Bureau of Statistics 1978, *Census of Population and Housing, October 1976, cross-classified tables Australia*, cat. no. 2140.0, viewed 1 October 2019, <[https://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/19C544E5791E7FF1CA25758A000F38A3/\\$File/24260_1976_Cross_Class_Aust.pdf](https://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/19C544E5791E7FF1CA25758A000F38A3/$File/24260_1976_Cross_Class_Aust.pdf)>.
 51. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, *Australian Standard Classification of Education (ASCED), 2001*, cat. no. 1272.0, viewed 20 September 2020, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/56C477941726CF0CA256AAF001FCA50?opendocument>>.
 52. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001a, *Australian Standard Classification of Education (ASCED), 2001: Definitions*, cat. no. 1272.0, viewed 19 July 2020, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/F148CC2C8F5EA951CA256AAF001FCA39?opendocument>>.
 53. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1: Profile and summary of ANZSCO structure*, cat. no. 1220.0, viewed 21 February 2018, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/E3031B89999B4582CA2575DF002DA702?opendocument>>.

54. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009a, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 111312 Member of Parliament,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/863F580F9ED8DD4ACA2575DF002DA7A4?opendocument>>.
55. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009b, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 111311 Local Government Legislator,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/863F580F9ED8DD4ACA2575DF002DA7A4?opendocument>>.
56. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009c, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 111111 chief executives and managing directors, viewed 17 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/47602A55387B572ECA2575DF002DA607?opendocument>>.
57. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009d, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 111211 corporate general managers, *Australian Bureau of Statistics*, 25 June, viewed 17 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/7FB98D459B099DB0CA2575DF002DA701?opendocument>>.
58. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009e, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupations 271211 and 271212 judge and magistrate, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/74DECC655D7E06A7CA2575DF002DA6F1?opendocument>>.
59. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009f, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 271299 judicial and other legal professional, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/74DECC655D7E06A7CA2575DF002DA6F1?opendocument>>.
60. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009g, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Unit Group 2535 surgeons, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/B61A751C0D64CC6CA2575DF002DA741?opendocument>>.
61. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009h, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 253211

- anaesthetists, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/6ACFE2D8F0BCB493CA2575DF002DA6D5?opendocument>>.
62. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009i, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Unit Group 2533 specialist physicians, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/24ED79D1706EE8A9CA2575DF002DA60D?opendocument>>.
 63. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009j, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Unit Group 2222 financial dealers, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/3DCB0CF7CBB18D20CA2575DF002DA6F2?opendocument>>.
 64. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009k, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 253411 psychiatrist, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/2DFE3CA85604A68ECA2575DF002DA6F8?opendocument>>.
 65. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009l, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Unit Group 2539 other medical practitioners, viewed 18 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/103D57A19C64A996CA2575DF002DA74E?opendocument>>.
 66. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009m, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Unit Group 2336 mining engineers, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/07D1FF0A1DDA45DBCA2575DF002DA6EE?opendocument>>.
 67. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009n, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Occupation 133211 engineering manager, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/4E702585EA6AEF64CA2575DF002DA7A0?opendocument>>.
 68. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009o, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO): Contents, First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, viewed 21 February 2018,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/7437179C7B7C1EEECA2575DF002DA5D8?opendocument>>.
 69. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009p, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*,

- First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 431
hospitality workers, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/B01ACCD5C5C23B22CA2575DF002DA5AA?opendocument>>.
70. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009q, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 851
Food preparation assistants, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/940664DAC051E4E5CA2575DF002DA5DA?opendocument>>.
71. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009r, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 811
cleaners and laundry workers, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/D823B53FD8F48DF8CA2575DF002DA5E7?opendocument>>.
72. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009s, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 841
farm, forestry and garden workers, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/07D6CF63ABE9DBEFCA2575DF002DA664?opendocument>>.
73. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009t, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 121
farmers and farm managers, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/C3D8A1D13BA42CF4CA2575DF002DA63D?opendocument>>.
74. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009u, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 721
mobile plant operators, viewed 19 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/17049538E0A733E8CA2575DF002DA67E?opendocument>>.
75. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009v, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 212
media professionals, viewed 29 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/50240BBE6C52148CCA2575DF002DA601?opendocument>>.
76. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009w, *Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO)*, *First Edition, Revision 1*, cat. no. 1220.0, Minor Group 211 arts
professionals, viewed 29 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Product+Lookup/7F505BBA232EED59CA2575DF002DA5D2?opendocument>>.

77. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015, *Census of Population and Housing: nature and content, Australia 2016 - Religious affiliation*, cat. no. 2008.0, viewed 3 September 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2008.0~2016~Main%20Features~Religious%20affiliation~111>>.
78. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016a, *Census privacy policy*, Canberra, viewed 8 March 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/privacypolicy>>.
79. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016b, *About the Census: Answers to FAQs*, Canberra, viewed 9 March 2019, <<http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/4a256353001af3ed4b2562bb00121564/c3506c30271f9b95ca258072000fff29!OpenDocument>>.
80. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016c, *Cultural diversity in Australia*, cat. no. 2071.0, Canberra, viewed 18 Jul 2018, <<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Cultural%20Diversity%20Data%20Summary~30>>.
81. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016d, 'Differences between the LFS and the Census', *ABS*, 20 September, viewed 4 April 2019, <<http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/factsheetslfsc>>.
82. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016e, *Census of Population and Housing: Census dictionary, 2016 – Ancestry*, cat. no. 2901.0, viewed 17 April 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2901.0Chapter20802016>>.
83. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016f, 'Ethnicity', *ABS*, viewed 16 Apr 2019, <<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/ViewContent?readform&view=productsbytopic&Action=Expand&Num=5.5>>.
84. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017a, *Population and Housing (Census of)*, Canberra, viewed 10 March 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/DOSSbyTopic/443A697C7E11DF33CA256BD00026C79C?OpenDocument>>.
85. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017b, *2016 Census*, ABS, Canberra, viewed 8 March 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/2016>>.
86. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017c, *TableBuilder*, Canberra, viewed 27 February 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder>>.

87. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017d, *Country of birth of person*, cat. no. 2900.0, viewed 6 May 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2900.0main+features100432016>>.
88. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017e, *Australia's population by country of birth*, cat. no. 3412.0, Migration, Australia, 2015-2016, Canberra, viewed 6 May 2019, <<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/previousproducts/3412.0main%20features32015-16>>.
89. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017f, *Census of Population and Housing: Understanding the Census and Census data, Australia 2016*, cat. no. 2900.0, 8 November, viewed 26 April 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2900.0~2016~Main%20Features~BPPP%20Country%20of%20Birth%20of%20Parents~10045>>.
90. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017g, *Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census 2016*, cat. no. 2071.0, viewed 26 April 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/2071.0Main%20Features602016?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=2071.0&issue=2016&num=&view=>>>.
91. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017h, *Religion in Australia – 2016 Census Data Summary*, cat. no. 2071.0, viewed 3 September 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Religion%20Data%20Summary~70>>.
92. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017i, *2016 Census data reveals “no religion” is rising fast*, media release, 27 June, Canberra, viewed 4 September 2019, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyReleaseDate/7E65A144540551D7CA258148000E2B85>>.
93. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017j, *Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census 2016: Cultural diversity in Australia, 2016*, cat. no. 2071.0, viewed 12 February 2018, <<http://abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Cultural%20Diversity%20Article~60>>.
94. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017k, *Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – stories from the Census, 2016: Educational qualifications in Australia*, cat. no. 2071.0, viewed 15 July 2020, <<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Educational%20Qualifications%20Data%20Summary%20~65>>.

95. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017l, *Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia - Stories from the Census: Snapshot of Australia, 2016*, cat. no. 2071.0, viewed 15 January 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Snapshot%20of%20Australia,%202016~2>>.
96. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017m, *Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Population, 2016*, cat. no. 2071.0, viewed 18 February 2018,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Aboriginal%20and%20Torres%20Strait%20islander%20Population%20Article~12>>.
97. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018, *Census reveals Australia's religious diversity on World Religion Day*, Media Release, 18 January, Canberra, viewed 4 September 2019,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyReleaseDate/8497F7A8E7DB5BEFCA25821800203DA4?OpenDocument>>.
98. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018a, 'ABS reveals insights into Australia's Chinese population on Chinese New Year', *ABS*, media release, 16 February 2018, Canberra,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/D8CAE4F74B82D446CA258235000F2BDE?OpenDocument>>.
99. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019, *Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (ASCCEG), 2019*, cat. no. 1249.0, viewed 13 October 2019,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/1249.0>>.
100. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019a, *Migration: Australia 2017-2018*, viewed 23 April 2019,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/migration-australia/2017-18>>.
101. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019b, *Australia's population by country of birth*, cat. no. 3412.0 Migration, Australia, 2017-2018, viewed 6 May 2019,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3412.0Main%20Features22017-18?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3412.0&issue=2017-18&num=&view=>>>.
102. Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019c, *Estimates and projections, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, 2006-2031*, cat. no. 3238.0, viewed 4 September 2019,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3238.0Main%20Features402006%20to%202031?opendocument&tab>>.

name=Summary&prodno=3238.0&issue=2006%20to%202031
&num=&view=>.

103. Australian Bureau of Statistics n.d., *About the ABS information consultancy service*, ABS, Canberra, viewed 22 September 2020,
<<https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/4a256353001af3ed4b2562bb00121564/d8af80699d9a2f74ca2570cd007db441!OpenDocument#The%20ABS%20Information%20Consultancy%20S>>.
104. Australian Communications and Media Authority 2020, 'Media interests snapshot', *Australian Government*, 9 March, viewed 22 May 2020, <<https://www.acma.gov.au/media-interests-snapshot>>.
105. Australian Constitution Centre, n.d., 'The writers of the Constitution', *Australian Constitution Centre (website)*, <<https://www.australianconstitutioncentre.org.au/the-writers-of-the-australian-constitution.html>>.
106. Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) 2019, *Australian curriculum: history, Year 9*, <<https://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/humanities-and-social-sciences/history/?year=12318&year=12319&year=12320&year=12321&strand=Historical+K>>; see also Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) 2019, *Australian curriculum: history, work sample portfolio*, <http://docs.acara.edu.au/curriculum/worksamples/Year_9_History_Portfolio_Satisfactory.pdf>.
107. Australian Department of Defence 2019, 'Department of Defence', *Australian Government*, viewed 18 April 2020, <<https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/defence/departement-defence>>; <<https://www.defence.gov.au/AboutUs.asp>>.
108. Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment 2020, 'Support for arts and languages', *Australian Government*, <<https://www.education.gov.au/support-arts-and-languages>>.
109. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 1995, *Australian Treaty Series 1975 No 40*, viewed 3 April 2019, <<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1975/40.html>>.
110. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, 'Treaties: Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination', *Australian Government*, viewed 6 January 2019, <<https://www.info.dfat.gov.au/Info/Treaties/treaties.nsf/AllDocs/2F70352A0B65EB67CA256B6E0075FE13>>.
111. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016, 'Reporting under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', *Australian*

- Government*, viewed 2 May 2020,
<<https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/reporting-under-the-international-convention-on-the-elimination-of-all-forms-of-racial-discrimination>>.
112. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2020, 'Statistics on who invests in Australia', *Australian Government*, <<https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/investment-statistics/Pages/statistics-on-who-invests-in-australia>>.
 113. Australian Department of Health 2020, 'Our experts', *Australian Government COVID-19 Health Response*, 22 July, <<https://www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/government-response-to-the-covid-19-outbreak/our-medical-experts>>.
 114. Australian Department of Home Affairs 2018, '2017-2018 Migration program report', *Australian Government*, viewed 20 October 2019, <<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-stats/files/report-migration-program-2017-18.pdf>>.
 115. Australian Department of Home Affairs 2019, *Multicultural affairs – Australia's multicultural policy history*, Australian Parliament, viewed 23 August 2019, <<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/multicultural-affairs/about-multicultural-affairs/our-policy-history>>.
 116. Australian Department of Home Affairs 2020a, *Australian Multicultural Council*, Australian Government, 20 May, viewed 2 August 2020, <<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/mca/Pages/australian-multicultural-council.aspx>>.
 117. Australian Department of Home Affairs 2020b, 'Community languages multicultural grants 2019', *Australian Government*, <<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/multicultural-affairs/programs/community-languages-multicultural-grants-program>>.
 118. Australian Department of Home Affairs 2020c, 'Working Holiday visa (subclass 417) – eligibility', *Commonwealth of Australia*, 28 January, <<https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/work-holiday-417/first-working-holiday-417#Eligibility>>.
 119. Australian Foreign Investment Review Board 2020, 'Changes to foreign investment framework', *Australian Government*, media release, 29 March, viewed 29 March 2020, <<https://firb.gov.au/about-firb/news/changes-foreign-investment-framework-0>>.
 120. Australian Government 1997, *Wik 10 Point Plan*, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, media release, 1 May,

- <<https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00010323.pdf>>
121. Australian Government 2020, *Public holidays*, <<https://info.australia.gov.au/about-australia/special-dates-and-events/public-holidays>>.
 122. Australian Government Inquiry 2016, *Freedom of speech in Australia*, Parliament of Australia, 8 November, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights_inquiries/FreedomspeechAustralia>.
 123. Australian Government Inquiry 2017, *Inquiry into protecting and strengthening multiculturalism in Australia*, submissions 1-198, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Strengthening_Multiculturalism/Multiculturalism/Submissions>.
 124. Australian government n.d., *Department of Defence*, viewed 2 January 2020, <<https://www.defence.gov.au/AboutUs.asp>>.
 125. Australian Government n.d., *Our people*, viewed 16 April 2019, <<https://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people>>.
 126. Australian Government n.d., *Our people*, viewed 18 April 2019, <<https://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people>>.
 127. Australian Government Publishing Services, Canberra.
 128. Australian Government Report 2013, 'Inquiry into Migration and Multiculturalism in Australia', March, viewed 8 November 2019, <https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=mig/multiculturalism/report.htm>.
 129. Australian Human Rights Commission 2009, 'Questions and answers on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples', *Australian Human Rights Commission*, April, <<https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/questions-and-answers-un-declaration-rights-Indigenous-peoples-2009>>.
 130. Australian Human Rights Commission 2015, *Tim Soutphommasane, Race Discrimination Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission*, 2 March, viewed 22 March 2019, <<https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/index.php/news-and-events/profiles/item/1160-tim-soutphommasane-race-discrimination-commissioner-of-the-australian-human-rights-commission>>.
 131. Australian Human Rights Commission 2016, *Leading for change: A blueprint for cultural diversity and inclusive*

- leadership*, viewed 3 April 2017,
[<https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/race-discrimination/publications/leading-change-blueprint-cultural-diversity-and-inclusive>](https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/race-discrimination/publications/leading-change-blueprint-cultural-diversity-and-inclusive) .
132. Australian Human Rights Commission 2018, *Leading for change: A blueprint for cultural diversity and inclusive leadership revisited*, viewed 30 April 2018,
[<https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/Leading%20for%20Change_Blueprint2018_FINAL_Web.pdf>](https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/Leading%20for%20Change_Blueprint2018_FINAL_Web.pdf) .
 133. Australian Human Rights Commission 2019, 'How are human rights protected in Australian law?', *Australian Human Rights Commission*, 27 March, viewed 27 March 2019,
[<https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law>](https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law) .
 134. Australian Human Rights Commission n.d., 'No place for racism', viewed 3 August 2019,
[<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/no-place-racism>](https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/no-place-racism) .
 135. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018, *Australia's health 2018: Culturally and linguistically diverse populations*, Series 16, Canberra, viewed 2 July 2019,
[<https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/f3ba8e92-afb3-46d6-b64c-ebfc9c1f945d/aihw-aus-221-chapter-5-3.pdf.aspx>](https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/f3ba8e92-afb3-46d6-b64c-ebfc9c1f945d/aihw-aus-221-chapter-5-3.pdf.aspx) .
 136. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2019, *Deaths in Australia*, 17 July, viewed 27 July 2020,
[<https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/life-expectancy-death/deaths-in-australia/contents/life-expectancy>](https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/life-expectancy-death/deaths-in-australia/contents/life-expectancy) .
 137. Australian Labor Party 2019, 'ALP response – Diversity Council federal election survey', letter the Australian Labor Party to the Diversity Council of Australia, undated,
[<https://www.dca.org.au/sites/default/files/alp_on_di_-_election_2019.pdf>](https://www.dca.org.au/sites/default/files/alp_on_di_-_election_2019.pdf) .
 138. Australian Labor Party 2020, 'Campaigns', *Australian Labour Party website*, [<https://www.alp.org.au/campaigns/>](https://www.alp.org.au/campaigns/) .
 139. Australian Labor Party, *A fair go for Australia – national platform*, viewed 18 May 2019,
[<https://www.alp.org.au/media/1539/2018_alp_national_platform_constitution.pdf>](https://www.alp.org.au/media/1539/2018_alp_national_platform_constitution.pdf) .
 140. Australian Law Reform Commission 1986, *Recognition of Aboriginal customary laws (ALRC Report 31)*,
[<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/recognition-of-aboriginal-customary-laws-alrc-report-31/>](https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/recognition-of-aboriginal-customary-laws-alrc-report-31/) .
 141. Australian Parliament 2019, *Senators and members*, Parliament of Australia,
[<https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members>](https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members) .

142. Australian Parliament House 2019, *Senate*, viewed 15 January 2020, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate>.
143. Australian Perspective 2016, *Immigration nation (Part 3)*, videorecording, Youtube, viewed 21 October 2019, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-WNRb8Hypjo>>.
144. Australian Senate 2018a, Debates, 15 October, pp. 7118-7119.
145. Australian Senate 2018b, Debates, 16 October, pp. 7205-7221, 7235-7236.
146. Australian Senate 2020, *Inquiry into the destruction of 46,000 year old caves at the Juukan Gorge in the Pilbara region of Western Australia*, Australian Parliament, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Northern_Australia/CavesatJuukanGorge/Submissions>.
147. Australian Taxation Office 2016, 'Guide for tax agents: Salary and wage occupation codes 2016', Australian Government, <<https://www.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/MEI/downloads/Salary-and-wage-occupation-codes-2016.pdf>>.
148. Australian Taxation Office 2018, 'Register of foreign ownership of agricultural land', *Australian Government*, 30 June, viewed 30 June 2018, <https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/79/2018/12/Register_of_Foreign_Ownership_of_Agr.pdf>.
149. Australian Taxation Office 2019, *2016-17 tax stats released*, ATO, Canberra, viewed 21 September 2020, <<https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/2016-17-Tax-Stats-released/>>.
150. Australian Taxation Office 2019, *2016-17 Tax Stats released*, viewed 29 April 2019, <<https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/2016-17-Tax-Stats-released/>>.
151. Australian Taxation Office 2019, *2016-17 Tax Stats released*, viewed 29 April 2019, <<https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/2016-17-Tax-Stats-released/>>.
152. Avruch, K. 1998, *Culture and conflict resolution*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC.
153. Azaryahu, M. 1996, 'The power of commemorative street names', *Environment and Planning*, vol. 14, no. pp. 311-330.

B

154. Babacan, A. & Babacan, H. 2007. 'Multiculturalism in Australia', *The Journal of Industrial Relations and Human Resources*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 25-38.
155. Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M. S. 1962, 'Two Faces of Power', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 56, no.4, pp. 947-52.

156. Bagnall, K. 2004, ‘‘He would be a Chinese still’’: negotiating boundaries of race, culture and identity in late nineteenth-century Australia’, in S. Couchman, J. Fitzgerald and P. Macgregor (eds), *After the Rush: regulation, participation and Chinese communities in Australia 1860-1940 – Otherland Literary Journal*, no. 9, pp. 153-170,
157. Baker, N. & Wiedersehn, S. 2018, ‘Are Australia’s African communities really experiencing a ‘gang’ crisis?’, *SBS News (Online)*, 24 July, viewed 24 July 2018, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/what-s-behind-the-african-gangs-fallout>>.
158. Baker, N. 2020, ‘Women have been the most common target of anti-Asian racism during the pandemic, a report has found’, *SBS News (online)*, 24 July, viewed 24 July 2020, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/report-reveals-shocking-anti-asian-racism-in-australia-during-coronavirus-pandemic>>.
159. Baksh, D & Dasgupta, I. 2018, ‘A model of dynamic conflict in ethnocracies’, *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 147-170, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1092204
160. Balint, R. 2012, ‘Aboriginal women and Asian men: A maritime history of color in White Australia’, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 544-554.
161. Balint, R. & Simic, Z. 2018, ‘Histories of migrants and refugees in Australia’, *Australian Historical Studies*, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 378-409.
162. Bannerji, H. 2000, *The dark side of the nation: Essays on multiculturalism, nationalism, and gender*, Canadian Scholars' Press, Toronto.
163. Banton, M. 1987, ‘The classification of races in Europe and North America: 1700-1850’, *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 45-60.
164. Banton, M. 2007, ‘Max Weber on ‘ethnic communities’: A critique’, *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-35.
165. Barnes, D. 1998, ‘A threat to social cohesion? A perspective of young Vietnamese men living in Australia’, *Australian Social Work*, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 9-15.
166. Barth, F. 1969, *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organisation of cultural difference*, Allen & Unwin, London.
167. Barton, E. 1901, ‘Immigration Restriction Bill’, *House of Representatives Debates*, 26 September, p. 5233, viewed 4 September 2019, <<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1901-09-26%2F0023%22>>.

168. Battani, M., Hall, J. R. & Neitz, M. J. 2004, *Sociology on Culture*, Routledge, London.
169. Beaumont, E. 2011, 'Promoting political agency, addressing political inequality: A multilevel model of internal political efficacy', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 216-231.
170. Beilharz, P. & Cox, L. 2007, 'Review essay: Settler capitalism revisited', *Thesis Eleven*, Vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 112-124.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513607072461>
171. Beland, D. & Cox, R. H. 2010 (eds), *Ideas and politics in social science research*, Oxford University Press, USA.
172. Béland, D. 2005, 'Ideas and social policy: An institutionalist perspective', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 1-18.
173. Bell, A. 1991, *The language of news media*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
174. Belot, H. 2018, 'New migrants living in 'cultural bubbles' need to improve their English skills, Government warns', *ABC News (Online)*, 7 March 2018, viewed 7 March 2018,
<<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-07/english-language-tests-need-to-be-tougher-government-warns/9522412>>
175. Benhabib, S. 2002, *The claims of culture: equality and diversity in the global era*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
176. Berlin, I. 1969, *Four essays on liberty*, Oxford University Press, pp. 119-172.
177. Berry, J. & Sam, D. L. 2013, 'Multicultural societies', in V. Benet-Martínez and Y.-Y. Hong (eds), *Handbook of multicultural identity: Basic and applied perspectives*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 97-117.
178. Berry, J. W. & Kalin, R. 1995, 'Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of the 1991 national survey', *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 301-320.
179. Berry, J. W. & Kalin, R. 2000, 'Multicultural policy and social psychology: The Canadian experience', in S. Renshon and J. Duckitt (eds), *Political psychology: Cultural and cross-cultural foundations*, Macmillan, London, pp. 263-284.
180. Berry, J. W. 2000, 'Socio-psychological costs and benefits of multiculturalism: A view from Canada', in J. W. Dacyl and C. Westin (eds), *Governance and cultural diversity*, UNESCO & CIEFO, Stockholm University, Stockholm, pp. 297-354.
181. Berry, J. W. 2006a, 'Mutual attitudes among immigrants and ethno-cultural groups in Canada', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 719-734.

182. Berry, J. W., Kalin R. & Taylor, D. M. 1977, 'Multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada', *Ministry of Supply and Services*, Ottawa.
183. Berry, J. W., Westin, C., Virta, E., Vedder, P., Rooney, R. & Sang, D. 2006, 'Design of the study: Selecting societies of settlement and immigrant groups', in J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam and P. Vedder (eds), *Immigrant youth in cultural transition: Acculturation, identity and adaptation across national contexts*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey, pp. 15–47.
184. Besen-Cassino, Y. & Cassino, D. 2017, *Social research methods by example: applications in the modern world*, Routledge, London.
185. Biddle, N., Gray, M., Herz, D. & Lo, J-Y. 2019, 'Asian-Australian experiences of discrimination', Research Note, *ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods*, viewed 29 October 2020, <https://csrcm.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/2019/9/Asian-Australian_experiences_of_and_attitudes_towards_discrimination_-_Research_Note_10092019.pdf>
186. Bielefeld, Shelley, 'The Intervention, Stronger Futures and Racial Discrimination: Placing the Australian Government under scrutiny', in E. Baehr and B. Schmidt-Haberkamp (eds), *'And there'll be NO dancing': Perspectives on policies impacting Indigenous Australia since 2007*, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Chapter 5, pp. 145-166.
187. Birmingham, S. 2020, 'Statement from Federal Tourism Minister Simon Birmingham', *Australian Embassy (Beijing) website (online)*, 8 June, viewed 8 June 2020, media release <<https://china.embassy.gov.au/bjngchinese/StatementfromFederalTourismMinisterSimonBirminghamEN.html>>.
188. Birrell, B. 2001, *Federation: The secret story*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney.
189. Birrell, B. 2010, 'The risks of high migration', *Policy*, vol. 26, no 1, pp. 8-12.
190. Blakkarly, J. 2019 'Australia's new parliament is no more multicultural than the last one', *SBS News (online)*, 21 May, viewed 21 May 2019, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australia-s-new-parliament-is-no-more-multicultural-than-the-last-one>>.
191. Boas, F. 1911, *The mind of primitive man*, Macmillan, New York.
192. Boas, F. 1938, *The mind of primitive man*, 2 ed., Greenwood Press, Connecticut.

193. Bohatyrets, V. 2017, 'Embracing multiculturalism of Canada: The roots & the present-day realities', *Journal in Historical & Political Sciences*, vol. 35-36, pp. 32-41.
194. Boiloeau, J. 2014, 'Chinese market gardening in Australia and New Zealand 1860s-1960s: A study in technology transfer', PhD thesis, <<https://rune.une.edu.au/web/retrieve/61ebc1adcf5e-4c1b-a702-5e7c61c7e87f>>.
195. Bonet, L. & Negrier, E. 2011, 'The end(s) of national cultures? Cultural policy in the face of diversity', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 574-589.
196. Bonney, R. 2004, 'Reflections on the differences between religion and culture', *Clinical Cornerstone*, vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25-33.
197. Booth, A., Leigh, A. & Varganova, E. 2012, 'Does racial and ethnic discrimination vary across minority groups? Evidence from a field experiment', *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 74, no. 4: pp. 547-573.
198. Borland, J. 1996, 'Education and the structure of earnings in Australia', *The Economic Record*, vol. 72, no. 219, pp. 370-380.
199. Borowski, Allan. 2000. 'Creating a virtuous society: Immigration and Australia's policies of multiculturalism', *Journal of Social Policy*, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 459-475.
200. Bottomley, G. 1987, 'Cultures, multiculturalism and the politics of representation', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 1-9.
201. Bourdieu, P. 1980, 'The aristocracy of culture', *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 2, pp. 225-254.
202. Bourdieu, P. 1986, 'The forms of capital', in J. Richardson, *Theory and research for the sociology of education*, Greenwood Press, New York, pp. 241-258. Initially published in French as Bourdieu, P. 1980, 'Le capital social', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, vol. 31, pp. 2-3.
203. Bourdieu, P. 1991, *Language and symbolic power*, edited and introduced by J. B. Thompson, translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson, Harvard University Press.
204. Bourdieu, P. 2005, *The social structures of the economy*, translated by C. Turner, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.
205. Brennan, B. 2017, 'ANZAC Day: Indigenous soldiers thought 'when we got back we'd be treated differently'', *ABC News (Online)*, 25 April, viewed 23 August 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-25/anzac-day-indigenous-soldiers-shunned-by-society/8468364>>.

206. Brent, P., Costar, B., & Kelly, N. 2007, 'Democratic audit of Australia', Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on electoral Matters on the *Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election*,
207. Brett, J. 2003, *Australian liberals and the moral middle class: From Alfred Deakin to John Howard*, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 9.
208. Brian Barry, B. 2001, *Culture and equality: An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism*, Polity Press.
209. Brodsky, H. 2007, 'Book review: Ethnocracy: land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine', *Journal of Regional Science*, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 850-852
210. Broom Historical Society & Museum 2019, *Aboriginal internees*, viewed 8 January 2021, <<https://broommuseum.org.au/race-rights-rivalries/aboriginal-internees/#:~:text=Soon%20after%20Japan%20entered%20the,t he%20duration%20of%20the%20war>>.
211. Brown, D. 2008, 'The ethnic majority: malign or benign?', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 768–788.
212. Brown, W. 1995, *Wounded attachments states of injury: power and freedom in late modernity*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
213. Brubaker, R. 2004, *Ethnicity without groups*, Harvard MA.
214. Brumann, C. 1999, 'Writing for culture: why a successful concept should not be discarded 1', *Current Anthropology*, vol. 40, no. S1, pp. S1–S27.
215. Buchanan, A. E. 1991, *Secession: the morality of political divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*, Westview Press, Colorado.
216. Burgess, E. 1978, 'The resurgence of ethnicity: myth or reality?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 265-285.
217. Burnett, J. 2017a, 'Racial violence and the Brexit state', *Race & Class*, vol 58, no. 4, pp. 85-97.
218. Burnett, J. 2017b, 'Racial violence and the Brexit state', *UK Institutes of Race Relations*, <<https://irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2016/11/Racial-violence-and-the-Brexit-state-final.pdf>>.
219. Burnie, A. 2019, 'Where do Australia's major parties stand on diversity and inclusion', *B&T*, 15 May, viewed 18 July 2020, <<https://www.bandt.com.au/australias-major-parties-stand-diversity-inclusion/>>.

C

220. Cadzow, J. 2019, 'Sydney powerbroker Peter V'landys has Melbourne's spring racing crown in his sights', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 October, viewed 12 February 2020, <<https://www.smh.com.au/sport/racing/sydney-powerbroker-peter-v-landys-has-melbourne-s-spring-racing-crown-in-his-sights-20191014-p530jc.html>>.
221. Cameron, D. 2011, 'PM's speech at the Munich Security Conference', 5 February, <<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference>>.
222. Campbell, D. F. J. 2008, 'The basic concept for the democracy ranking of the quality of democracy', *Democracy Ranking*, Vienna.
223. Carens, J. 2000, *Culture, citizenship, and community: A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
224. Carlson, R. H. & McChesney, C. S. 2015, 'Income sustainability through educational attainment', *The Exchange*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 44-56.
225. Carlsson, H. & Pijpers, R. 2021, 'Diversity-mainstreaming in times of ageing and migration: Implementation paradoxes in municipal aged care provision', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1857231
226. Carragee, K.M & Roefs, W. 2004, 'The neglect of power in recent framing research', *Journal of Communication*, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 214-233.
227. Carson, L, Gastil, J., Hartz-Karp, J. & Lubensky, R. 2013, *The Australian Citizens' Parliament and the future of deliberative democracy*, The Penn State University Press.
228. Castles, S. 1993, 'Racism: A global analysis', *Centre for Multicultural Studies*, University of Wollongong, Occasional Paper 28, <<http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=cmsocpapers>>.
229. Centre Alliance 2018, 'Let's fly all our national flags in parliament', *Centre Alliance website*, 18 August, viewed 23 July 2020, <<https://centrealliance.org.au/media/media/lets-fly-all-our-national-flags-in-parliament/>>.
230. Centre Alliance 2019, *Centre alliance – Working in South Australia's interests*, Centre Alliance website, viewed 18 May 2019, < <https://centrealliance.org.au/>>
231. Chan, H. 1999, 'The identity of the Chinese in Australian history', *Queensland Review*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1-10.

232. Chang, C. 2020, 'Survey reveals disturbing stories of racism against Asians in Australia', *news.com.au (online)*, 12 May, viewed 12 May 2020, <<https://www.news.com.au/national/survey-reveals-disturbing-stories-of-racism-against-asians-in-australia/news-story/78a16ca46afb01df622c73ddb86fd53c>>.
233. Chau, D. & Janda, M. 2020, 'Rio Tinto boss Jean-Sebastien Jacques quits over Juukan Gorge blast', *ABC News (online)*, 11 September, viewed 11 September 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-11/rio-tinto-boss-jean-sebastien-jacques-quits-over-juukan-blast/12653950>>.
234. Chew, E. & Chiu, O. 2020, 'COVID-19 coronavirus racism incident report', *Asian Australian Alliance (online)*, <<https://asianaustalianalliance.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/COVID-19-racism-incident-report-preliminary.pdf>>.
235. Chin, C. 2019, 'Why immigration wasn't an issue in Canada's election', *Pursuit (Melbourne University)*, 25 October, viewed 10 November 2019, <<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/why-immigration-wasnt-an-issue-in-canada-s-election>>.
236. Chin, R. 2017, *The crisis of multiculturalism in Europe: A brief history*, Princeton University Press.
237. Chiu, O. 2020, 'COVID-19 Racism Incident Survey', *The China Story (blogpost)*, 10 August, viewed 10 August 2020, <<https://www.thechinastory.org/covid-19-has-led-to-widespread-incidents-of-anti-asian-racism-in-australia/>>.
238. Clarke, M. 2020, 'Foreign Investment Review Board to be given greater approval powers amid increasing national security risk', *ABC News (online)*, 5 June, viewed 5 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-05/foreign-investment-restrictions-tighten-australian-businesses/12324276>>.
239. Clyne, M. 2011, 'Multilingualism, multiculturalism' and integration', in M. Clyne and J. Jupp (eds), *Multiculturalism and integration: A harmonious relationship*, ANU E-Press, Canberra, pp. 53-71.
240. CMS Radio 2020, 'CMS FM91.1 – we're multicultural', *Canberra Multicultural Radio Station*, <<https://www.cmsradio.org.au/>>.
241. Cochrane, P. 2018, *Best we forget: The war for White Australia, 1914-1918*, Text Publishing, Melbourne.
242. Cockburn, P. 2020, 'How the coronavirus pandemic would look in Australia if Ruby Princess had never docked', *ABC News (online)*, 23 Apr, viewed 23 April 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-23/coronavirus-across-australia-if-ruby-princess-never-docked/12172314>>.

243. Cohen, H. & Mitchell, S. 2019, 'Hate crime laws rarely used by Australian authorities, police figures reveal', *ABC News (online)*, 3 May, viewed 3 May 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-03/hate-crimes-rarely-prosecuted-in-australia/11055938>>.
244. Cohen, H., Aydogan, M. & Mitchell, S. 2019, 'Why are so few hate crimes prosecuted in Australia?', *ABC News (online)*, 5 May, viewed 5 May 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-05/why-are-so-few-hate-crimes/11078972>>.
245. Cole, M. 2015, *Racism: A critical analysis*, Pluto Press, London.
246. Colic-Peisker, V. 2011, 'A new era in Australian multiculturalism? From working-class "ethnics" to a "multicultural middle-class"', *International Migration Review*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 562-587.
247. Collins, H. 1985, 'Political ideology in Australia: The distinctiveness of a Benthamite society', in S. R. Graubard (ed.), *Australia: the Daedalus symposium*, Angus and Robertson, North Ryde, Sydney, pp. 147-169.
248. Collins, J. 1991, *Migrant hands in distant lands: Australia's post-War immigration*, Pluto Press, Sydney.
249. Collins, J. 2008, 'Globalisation, immigration and the second longest post-War boom in Australia', *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, vol. 61, pp. 244-266.
250. Collins, J. 2019, 'Dog whistles, regional visas and wage theft – immigration policy is again an election issue', *The Conversation*, 11 April, viewed 14 May 2019, <<https://theconversation.com/dog-whistles-regional-visas-and-wage-theft-immigration-policy-is-again-an-election-issue-113557>>.
251. Collins, J., Noble, G., Poynting, S. & Tabar, P. 2000, *Kebabs, kids, cops and crime: youth ethnicity and crime*, Pluto Press, Annandale, NSW.
252. Collins, R. 1986, *Max Weber: A skeleton key*, Sage Publication, Beverly Hills.
253. Colvin, N. 2017, 'The devil's in the detail of Malcolm Turnbull's new multicultural statement', *New Matilda*, 21 March, viewed 21 March 2017, <<https://newmatilda.com/2017/03/21/the-devils-in-the-detail-of-malcolm-turnbulls-new-multicultural-statement/>>.
254. Comaroff, J.L. 1997, 'Of totemism and ethnicity: Consciousness, practice and the signs of inequality', in R.R. Grinker and C.B. Steiner (eds), *Perspectives on Africa: a reader in culture, history and representation*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp. 69–85.

255. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2016, 'Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention', *United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination*, 15 March, viewed 2 May 2020, <<https://www.refworld.org/publisher,CERD,,AUS,5a13faee4,0.html>>.
256. Commonwealth of Australia records n.d, *Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Convention* 1891, 2 April, Sydney, pp. 701–704.
257. Commonwealth of Australia Records, *Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention*, Melbourne, 27 January 1898, pp. 228–229.
258. Community Languages Australia n.d., *Language policy*, <<https://www.communitylanguagesaustralia.org.au/language-policy/>>.
259. Conley, J. 1960, 'Australia in New Guinea prior to annexation', *The Royal Historical Society of Queensland*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 424–434.
260. Connell, R. 1977, 'Why is classical theory classical?', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 102, no. 6, pp. 1511–1557.
261. Conversi, D. 2009, 'Dominant ethnicities, dominant cultures and cultural resemblance: state building, boundaries, assimilation and violence', in A. Lecours & G. Nootens (eds), *Dominant nationalism, dominant ethnicity: identity, federalism and democracy*, PIE Peter Lang S.A., Brussels, pp. 57–72.
262. Cooke, M., Mitrou, F., Lawrence, D., Guimond, E. & Beavon, D. 2007, 'Indigenous well-being in four countries: An application of the UNDP's Human Development Index to Indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States', *BMC International Health and Human Rights*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 9–19, DOI:10.1186/1472-698X-7-9.
263. Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S. E., & Teorell, J. 2017, 'V-dem comparisons and contrasts with other measurement projects', The Varieties of Democracy Institute Working Paper Series 2017: 45, University of Gothenburg, Germany.
264. Cornell, S. & Hartmann, D. 2007, *Ethnicity and race: making identities in a changing world*, 2 edn., Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks.
265. Cox, L. 2014, 'You don't migrate to this country unless you want to join our team': Tony Abbott renews push on national security laws', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 August, viewed 23 August 2019, <<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/you-dont-migrate-to-this-country-unless-you-want-to-join-our-team->

tony-abbott-renews-push-on-national-security-laws-20140818-3dvbx.html>.

266. Crawford, A. 2013, 'Adam Goodes 'gutted' by racial slur but wants AFL fan educated', *ABC News (online)*, 25 May, viewed 1 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-25/goodes-gutted-but-places-no-blame/4712772>>.
267. Creswell, J. W., Plano Clark, V. L., Gutmann, M. L. & Hanson, W. E. 2003, 'Advanced mixed methods research designs', in A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (eds), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*, Sage Publications, pp. 209–240.
268. Creswell, J. W., Plano Clark, V. L., Gutmann, M. L. & Hanson, W. E. 2003, 'Advanced mixed methods research designs', in A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie (eds), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*, Sage Publications, pp. 209–240.
269. *Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, vol. 8, iss. 2, pp. 1-16, DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v8i2.1137.
270. Crowder, G. 2013, *Theories of multiculturalism – an introduction*, Polity Press.
271. Crowe, D. 2019, 'Ken Wyatt pledges to hold Indigenous recognition referendum within three years', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 Jul, viewed 10 July 2019, <<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/ken-wyatt-pledges-to-hold-indigenous-recognition-referendum-within-three-years-20190710-p525rg.html>>.
272. Curato, N. & Parry, L. J. 2017, 'Deliberative democracy must rise to the threat of populist rhetoric', *The Conversation (online)*, 7 June, viewed 27 July 2020, <<https://theconversation.com/deliberative-democracy-must-rise-to-the-threat-of-populist-rhetoric-76576>>.
273. Curthoy, A. 1973, 'Race and ethnicity: a study of the response of British colonists to Aborigines, Chinese and non-British Europeans in New South Wales, 1856-1881', PhD thesis, Macquarie University.
274. Curthoys, A. 2003, 'Liberalism and exclusionism: a prehistory of the White Australia Policy' in L. Jayasuriya, D. Walker and J Gothard (eds), *Legacies of White Australia: Race, culture and nation*, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley (Western Australia), pp. 8–32.

D

275. D'Angelo, P. & Kuypers, J. A. 2010 (eds), *Doing news framing analysis: Empirical and theoretical perspectives*, Routledge, New York.

276. Dahl, R. A. 1957, 'The concept of power', *Behavioral Science*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 201–15.
277. Dalmage, H. 2000, *Tripping on the color line: Black-White multiracial families in a racially divided world*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick.
278. Dandy, J. & Pe-Pua, R. 2015, 'The refugee experience of social cohesion in Australia: exploring the roles of racism, intercultural contact and the media', *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp
279. Daniels, A. 1983, *Power, privilege and prestige: Occupations in Australia*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, Australia.
280. Data World 2015, 'Data: 92 global indices & rankings', 12 June, viewed 24 November 2019, <http://www.dataworldwide.org/websites/data_indexes.htm>.
281. Davidson, P., Saunders, P. & Phillips, J. 2018, 'Inequality in Australia 2018', *Australian Council of Social Service and University of New South Wales*, <<https://www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Inequality-in-Australia-2018.pdf>>.
282. Davies, A. 2018, 'Luke Foley apologises for 'white flight' comment, saying he now knows it's offensive', *The Conversation*, 24 May, viewed 24 May 2018, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/24/luke-foley-defends-white-flight-comment-but-denies-dog-whistling>>.
283. Davies, A. 2018, 'Luke Foley apologises for 'white flight' comment, saying he now knows it's offensive', *The Guardian*, 24 May, viewed 24 May 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/24/luke-foley-defends-white-flight-comment-but-denies-dog-whistling>>.
284. Davis, G. 2008, *Australia 2020 Summit – final report*, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra <<https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2008/06/apo-nid15061-1228151.pdf>>.
285. Davis, M. 2014, 'Neoliberalism, the culture wars and public policy', in C. Miller and L. Orchard, *Australian public policy: progressive ideas in the neoliberal ascendancy*, Bristol University Press, UK, pp. 27-42.
286. Davis, M., Saunders, C., McKenna, M., Morris, S., Mayes, C. & Giannacopoulos, M. 2018, 'The Uluru Statement from Heart, one year on: Can a First Nations Voice yet be heard?', *ABC News (online)*, 26 May, viewed 26 May 2018, <<https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-uluru-statement-from-heart-one-year-on-can-a-first-nations-v/10094678>>.

287. De Gobineau, A. 1915, *The inequality of human races*, trans. A. Collins, William Heinemann, London.
288. De Gregorio, J. & Lee, J-W. 2002, 'Education and income inequality: New evidence from cross-country data', *Review of Income and Wealth*, Series 48, no. 3, pp. 395-416.
289. De Vos, G. 1975, 'Ethnic pluralism: conflict and accommodation', in G. Devaustalia and L. Romanucci-Ross (eds), *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*, Mayfield Publishing Company, Palo Alto.
290. Dellal, H. 2017, 'Restoring faith in our democracy is key to future social cohesion, says the executive director of the Australia Multicultural Foundation', *SBS News*, 29 November, viewed 29 November 2017, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/opinion-a-culturally-diverse-society-does-not-make-a-successful-multicultural-country>>.
291. Deloitte Access Economics 2019, *The economic benefits of improving social inclusion: A report commissioned by the Special Broadcasting Services*, August, viewed 29 August 2019, <<https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/economics/articles/economic-benefits-improving-social-inclusion.html>>.
292. Democracy Barometer 2018, 'Data', viewed 27 November 2019, <http://www.democracybarometer.org/dataset_en.html>.
293. Denzin, N. K & Lincoln, Y. S 2005, *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research*, 3 edition, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
294. Denzin, N. K. 1989, *Introduction to qualitative research*, Blackwell Publishing.
295. Denzin, N. K. 2007, 'Qualitative methodology', in C. D. Bryant and D. L. Peck, *21 century sociology*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412939645.n9>.
296. Denzin, N. K. 2013, *Strategies of qualitative inquiry*, Sage Publications, California.
297. Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Australia) 2011, 'The People of Australia – Australia's multicultural policy', *Commonwealth of Australia*, <<https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2011/02/apo-nid27232-1143641.pdf>>.
298. Department of the Premier and Cabinet (SA) 2019, 'Multicultural legislative review 2019 research paper: Approaches in other jurisdictions', *Government of South Australia*, viewed 27 July 2020, <https://www.dpc.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/91555/Multicultural-Legislative-Review-2019-Research-Paper.pdf>.

299. Desmet, K., Le Breton, M., Ortuno-Ortin, I. & Weber, S. 2011, 'The stability and breakup of nations: A quantitative analysis', *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 183-213.
300. Development Western Australia 2020, 'Buddha's Birthday & Multicultural Festival', *Government of Western Australia*, <<https://www.mra.wa.gov.au/see-and-do/elizabeth-quay/events/buddha-s-birthday-multicultural-festival>>.
301. Devereux, E. 2007, *Media studies key issues and debates*, Sage Publications, London.
302. DiMaggio, P. 1997, 'Culture and cognition', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 263-287.
303. Diversity Council of Australia 2020, 'Our board', *Diversity Council of Australia website*, <<https://www.dca.org.au/about-dca/our-board>>
304. Dixon, R., & Lau, S. 2015, 'The Gleeson Court and the Howard era: A tale of two conservatives (and isms)', in R. Dixon & G. Williams (eds.), *The High Court, the Constitution and Australian politics*, pp. 284-310.
305. Donegan, A. & Jeyaratnam, E. 2019, 'Compare the pair: Key policy offerings from Labor and the Coalition in the 2019 federal election', *The Conversation*, 14 May, viewed 14 May 2019, <<https://theconversation.com/compare-the-pair-key-policy-offerings-from-labor-and-the-coalition-in-the-2019-federal-election-116898>>.
306. Doran, M. 2019, 'Scott Morrison appoints former chief of staff Phil Gaetjens to head department', *ABC News (online)*, 25 July, viewed 26 July 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-25/scott-morrison-appoints-former-chief-of-staff-to-head-department/11345560>>
307. Dorling, P. 2017, 'Still anti-Asian? Anti-Chinese? One Nation policies on Asian immigration and multiculturalism', *Australia Institute*, May, viewed 22 June 2017, <<https://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/P349%20Is%20PHON%20still%20anti-Asian%20FINAL.pdf>>.
308. Dornin, T. 2020, 'Big NT fines over virus scaremongering', *MSN (online)*, 21 April, viewed 21 April 2020, <<https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/australia/big-nt-fines-over-virus-scaremongering/ar-BB12XF2E>>.
309. Downing, J. & Husband, C. 2005, *Representing 'race': Racisms, ethnicities and media*, Sage Publications, <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446220412>
310. Doyle, M. 2015, *The question of intervention: John Stuart Mill and the responsibility to protect*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

311. Dryzek, J. S., Bächtiger, A., Chambers, S., Cohen, J., Druckman, J. N., Felicetti, A., Fishkin, J. S., Farrell, D. M., Fung, A., Gutmann, A., Landemore, H., Mansbridge, J. Marien, S., Neblo, M. A., Niemeyer, S., Setala, M., Slothuus, R., Suiter, J., Thompson, D. & Warren, M. (2019). 'The crisis of democracy and the science of deliberation: Citizens can avoid polarization and make sound decisions', *Science*, vol. 363, (6432), pp. 1144-1146, DOI: <http://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6432/1144>.
312. Dryzek, J.S., Honig, B. & Phillips, A. (eds.) 2006, *The Oxford handbook of political science*, Oxford University Press.
313. Dufty, N., Martin, P. & Zhao, S. 2019, 'Demand for farm workers: ABARES farm survey results 2018', *Department of Agriculture, Commonwealth of Australia*, Canberra, Australia, <https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/sitecollection/documents/abares/DemandForFarmWorkers_FarmSurveys2018_v1.0.0.pdf>.
314. Duncan, S. 2011, 'Why policy research is more important than ever', *Research-live website*, 22 September, viewed 26 July 2020, <<https://www.research-live.com/article/opinion/why-policy-research-is-more-important-than-ever/id/4006053>>.
315. Dunlop, T. 2018, *The future of everything: Big, audacious ideas for a better world*, NewSouth Publishing, NSW, Australia.
316. Dunn, J. R. 2010, 'Health behaviour vs the stress of low socioeconomic status and health outcomes', *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 303, no. 12, pp. 1199-1200.
317. Dunn, K. M., Forrest, J., Burnley, I., & McDonald, A. 2004, 'Constructing racism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 39, pp. 409-430.
318. Dunn, K. M., Forrest, J., Ip, D., Babacan, H., Paradies, Y., & Pedersen, A. 2008, 'Challenging Racism: The anti-racism research project', Paper presented at the *4Rs Conference: Rights, reconciliation, respect, responsibility*, Sydney, Australia.
319. Dunn, K., Forrest, J., Pe-Pua, R., Hynes, M. & Maeder-Han, K. 2009, 'Cities of hatred? The spheres of racism and anti-racism in contemporary Australian cities', *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-14.
320. Dunn, K.M. & White, A. 2008, Report on 2007 Australian Capital Territory Racism Survey, *Challenging Racism: The Anti-racism Research Project*, Sydney.
321. Dunn, K.M., Forrest, J., Burnley, I. & McDonald, A. 2004, 'Constructing racism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 409-430.

322. Dunn, K.M., Forrest, J., Burnley, I. & McDonald, A. 2004, 'Constructing racism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 409-430.
323. Dunn, K.M., Forrest, J., Pe-Pua, R. & Smith, S. 2005, 'Experiences of racism in the Australian body politics: extent, spheres, and cultural unevenness', in T. Khoo (ed.), *The body politic: racialised political cultures in Australia*; University of Queensland Australian Studies Centre Conference, University of Queensland Australian Studies Centre and Monash University National Centre for Australian Studies, Brisbane, pp. 1-13.
324. Dutch Multicultural Society Report 2009, 'Factbook October 2009', *Forum: Instituted for Multicultural Development*, <<https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration>>.
325. Dutch Multicultural Society Report 2009, 'Factbook October 2009', *Forum: Instituted for Multicultural Development*, <<https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration>>.
326. Dwyer, T. & Muller, D. 2016, 'FactCheck: is Australia's level of media ownership concentration one of the highest in the world?', *The Conversation*, 12 December, viewed 21 May 2020, <<https://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-australias-level-of-media-ownership-concentration-one-of-the-highest-in-the-world-68437>>.
327. Dye, T. R. 1976, *Policy analysis: What governments do, why they do it, what difference does it make?*, University of Alabama Press.
328. Dziedzic, S., Zhao, I. & Yang, S. 2020, 'Immigration Minister accused of fuelling distrust of Chinese Australians', *ABC News (online)*, 28 August, viewed 28 August 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-28/immigration-minister-accused-fuelling-distrust-chinese-aussies/12607826>>.

E

329. Ebbinghaus, B. 2005, 'When less is more: selection problems in large-N and small-N cross-national comparisons', *International Sociology*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 133-152.
330. Economist Intelligence Unit 2018, 'Democracy Index 2018', *Economist Intelligence Unit*, viewed 21 November 2019, <<https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>>.
331. Elder, D. R. & Fowler, P. E. 2018 (eds), *House of Representatives Practice*, 7 edition, Parliament of Australia, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_procedure/Practice7>.

332. Elder, D.R & Fowler, P.E. (eds), *House of Representatives practice*, 7 edition, Department of the House of Representatives, Canberra.
333. Electoral Commission South Australia, *Local Government election report 2014*, viewed 11 March 2020, <<https://www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/about-ecsa/publications/council-election-reports>>.
334. Elias, A. 2015, 'Measuring the economic consequences of racial discrimination in Australia', Ph.D. thesis, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University.
335. Elstub, S. 2010, 'The third generation of deliberative democracy', *Political Studies Review*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 291-307, DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2010.00216.x
336. Equinet 2019, *Sweden: Racist and xenophobic hate speech on the rise despite considerable preventative efforts*, viewed 11 November 2019, <<https://equineteurope.org/2019/sweden-racist-and-xenophobic-hate-speech-on-the-rise-despite-considerable-preventive-efforts/>>.
337. Ercan, S. A. & Dryzek, J. S. 2015, 'The reach of deliberative democracy', *Policy Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 241-248, DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2015.1065969.
338. Eriksen, T.H. 1993, *Ethnicity and nationalism*, Pluto Press, London and New York.
339. Errington, W. & van Onselen, P. 2007, *John Winston Howard*, Melbourne University Press.
340. Erzberger, C. & Prein, G. 1997, 'Triangulation: Validity and empirically-based hypothesis construction', *Quality and Quantity*, vol. 31, no.2, pp. 141-154.
341. Evans, M. D. & Kelley, J. 2019, 'Prejudice against immigrants symptomizes a larger syndrome, is strongly diminished by socioeconomic development, and the UK is not an outlier: insights from the WVS, EVS, and EQLS surveys', *Frontiers in Sociology*, vol. 4, article 12, DOI: 10.3389/fsoc2019.00012.
342. Evans, R., Saunders, K. & Cronin, K. 1975, *Exclusion, exploitation and extermination: race relations in colonial Queensland*, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.
343. Evershed, N. & Knaus, C. 2018, 'Lobbying in Australia: How big business connects to government', *The Guardian Australia (online)*, 19 September, viewed 13 June 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2018/sep/19/lobbying-in-australia-how-big-business-connects-to-government>>.

F

344. Fairclough, N. 2010, *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language*, Routledge, New York.
345. Fang, J. & Weedon, A. 2020, 'Chinese Australia caught in the crossfire from Beijing's Australian travel warning', *ABC News (online)*, 7 June, viewed 7 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-07/china-travel-warning-australia-racism-coronavirus-covid-19/12330618>>.
346. Fang, J., Burton-Bradley, R. & Walsh, M. 2019, 'ANZAC Day 2019: historic racism hides true extent of Chinese soldier's legacy, historian says', *ABC News (Online)*, 25 April, 23 August 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-25/chinese-soldiers-reflect-on-forgotten-anzac-history/11037594>>.
347. Fang, J., Renaldi, E. & Yang, S. 2020, 'Australians urged to show kindness' amid reports of COVID-19 racial discrimination complaints', *ABC News (online)*, 3 April, viewed 3 April 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-03/racism-covid-19-coronavirus-outbreak-commissioner-discrimination/12117738>>.
348. Fang, J., Yang, S. & Xiao, B. 2020, 'Racist coronavirus graffiti sprayed on Chinese-Australian family's home in Melbourne', *ABC News (online)*, 22 April, viewed 22 April 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-22/racist-coronavirus-graffiti-sprayed-on-family-home-in-melbourne/12170162>>.
349. Fang, J., Yang, S. & Zhou, C. 2020, 'Coronavirus has fuelled racism again Asian-Australians, but why isn't the data showing it', *ABC News (online)*, 5 May, viewed 5 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-05/coronavirus-racist-attacks-asian-australians-missing-data/12211630?nw=0>>.
350. Farrell, P. 2013, 'History of 5-Eyes – explainer', *The Guardian (online)*, 2 December, viewed 27 May 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer>>.
351. Farrow-Smith, E. 2018, 'Australia still slow to remember its South Sea Islander heritage and industry it helped create', *ABC News (online)*, 21 December, viewed 21 December 2018, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-21/south-sea-islander-people-remembered-in-history/10628250>>.
352. Fearon, J.D. 2003, 'Ethnic and cultural diversity by country', *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 195-222.
353. Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia, 'FECCA Executive Committee', FECCA website, <<http://fecca.org.au/about/people/>>.
354. Ferguson, D., Dent, H. Z., Barber, V., Hendrischke, H., Li, W. & Burston, B. 2019, 'Demystifying Chinese investment in Australia', *KPMG & The University of Sydney*, April,

- <<http://demystifyingchina.com.au/reports/demystifying-chinese-investment-in-australia-april-2019.pdf>>.
355. Fiorino, N. & Ricciuti, R. 2007, 'Determinants of direct democracy', CESifo Working Paper No. 2035, *Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)*, Munich.
 356. Fishbein, H. D. 2002, *Peer prejudice and discrimination: The origins of prejudice*, 2 edition, Routledge, New York.
 357. Fisher, J. 2020, 'With all our lives changing because of coronavirus, you could be experiencing disenfranchised grief', *ABC News (online)*, 27 July, viewed 27 July 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-27/coronavirus-impact-on-mental-health-disenfranchised-grief/12477398>>.
 358. FitzGerald, D. S. & Cook-Martin, d. 2014. *Culling the masses: The democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas*, Harvard University Press, USA.
 359. Fitzgerald, J. 2007, *The big White lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia*, UNSW Press, Sydney.
 360. Fleras, A. 2009, *The Politics of multiculturalism: Multicultural governance in comparative perspective*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
 361. Forrest, J. & Dunn, K. 2006, 'Racism and intolerance in eastern Australia: a geographic perspective', *Australian Geographer*, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 167-186.
 362. Forrest, J. & Dunn, K.M. 2006, 'Racism and intolerance in Eastern Australia: a geographic perspective', *Australian Geographer*, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 167-186
 363. Foster, L. & Stockley, D. 1989, 'The politics of ethnicity: Multicultural policy in Australia', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 16-33.
 364. Fozdar, F. 2016, 'Asian invisibility/Asian threat: Australians talking about Asia', *Journal of Sociology*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 789-805.
 365. Fozdar, F. & Spittles, B. 2009, 'The Australian citizenship test: Process and rhetoric', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 496-512.
 366. Fraser, N. & Honneth, A. 2003, *Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange*, Verso, London.
 367. Fraussen, B. & Halpin, D. 2016, 'Assessing the composition and diversity of the Australian interest group system'. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 75, no. 4, pp. 476-91.
 368. French, R. 2003, 'The race power: a constitutional chimera', in H. P. Lee and G. Winterton (eds), *Australian constitutional landmarks*, Cambridge University Press, p. 180-212.

369. Frost, D. 2007, 'The 'enemy within'? Asylum, racial violence and 'race hate' in Britain today', *Twenty-First Century Society*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 227-248, DOI: 10.1080/17450140701631411.
370. Frydenberg, J. 2020, 'Major reforms to Australia's foreign investment framework', media release, 3 June, viewed 3 June 2020, <<https://joshfrydenberg.com.au/latest-news/major-reforms-to-australias-foreign-investment-framework/>>.
371. *FU2Racism* 2017, television program, SBS TV, Australia.
372. Fuchs, D. & Roller, E. 2018, 'Conceptualising and measuring the quality of democracy: The citizen's perspective', *Politics and Governance*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 22-32.
373. Furseth, I. & Repstad, P. 2016, *An introduction to the sociology of religion: Classical and contemporary perspectives*, Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon.
374. Fürsich, E. 2010, Media and the representation of Others, *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 61, pp. 113-130.

G

375. Gaetjens, P. 018, 'Foreign investment is important for Australia', Speech to the *Chinese Investment and Australia Forum 8 October 2018, Sydney*, <<https://treasury.gov.au/speech/chinese-investment-and-australia-forum>>.
376. Galbally, F. 1978, 'Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants',
377. Galloway, A. 2020, 'Foreign Investment Board braces for Chinese takeovers of distressed Australian assets', *Sydney Morning Herald (online)*, 26 March, viewed 26 March 2020, <<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/foreign-investment-board-braces-for-chinese-takeovers-of-distressed-australian-assets-20200326-p54e3z.html>>.
378. Gane, N. 2005, 'Max Weber as social theorist 'Class, Status, Party'', *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 211-226.
379. Gans, H. 1979, 'Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-21.
380. Gans, H. 1994, 'Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: towards a comparison of ethnic and religious acculturation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 577-592.
381. Gans, H. 2017, 'Another look at symbolic ethnicity – a response to John Stone and Kelsey Harris', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 40, no. 9, pp. 1410-1417.

382. Gapminder 2018, 'Democracy Index', *Gapminder*, viewed 21 November 2019,
<<https://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/democracy-index/>>.
383. Gaze, B. 2015, 'The Racial Discrimination Act after 40 years: advancing equality, or sliding into obsolescence?', *Papers from the 40 years of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) Conference 19-20 February, Sydney*, p. 66-
384. Geertz, C. 1963, *Old societies and new states*, Free Press, New York.
385. Gellner, 1983, *Nations and nationalism*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
386. Gerathy, S. 2018, 'NSW Labor leader Luke Foley apologises for 'white flight' comments as Pauline Hanson backs him in', *ABC News (Online)*, 25 May, viewed 25 May 2018,
<<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-24/foley-apologises-for-white-flight-comments/9796548>>.
387. Gerth, H. & Mills, C.W. 1991, *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology*, Routledge, London.
388. Ghanem, A. 2009, 'Democratizing 'ethnic states': the democratization process in divided societies—with a special reference to Israel', *Constellations*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 462– 475.
389. Ghosh, R. 2011, 'The liberating potential of multiculturalism in Canada: ideals and realities', *Canadian Issues*, pp. 3-8.
390. Giannopoulos, N. 1996, 'Festival of the Arts – Debates interview', videorecording *Making Multicultural Australia*,
<<http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/video/id/448.Festival-of-the-Arts-Debates>>.
391. Gibson, P. 2018, 'Australia's bankrupt Chinese furniture manufacturers, 1880-1930', *Australian Economic History Review*, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 87-107.
392. Gilbert, L. 2007, 'Legitimizing neoliberalism rather than equality: Canadian multiculturalism in the current reality of North America', *Norteamerica*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 11-35.
393. Giles, A. 2020, 'Coronavirus-related racism against Chinese Australians is abhorrent', *Canberra Times (online)*, 21 April, viewed 21 April 2020,
<<https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6727552/coronavirus-related-racism-against-chinese-australians-is-abhorrent/>>.
394. Glazer, N. & Moynihan, D. P. 1963, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York city*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
395. Glazer, N. & Moynihan, D.P. 1975, *Ethnicity: theory and experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

396. Glenday, J. 2017, 'Stockholm attack: Makeshift memorials pay tribute to victims', *ABC News (online)*, 9 April, viewed 10 April 2017, <<https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-09/makeshift-memorials-pay-tribute-to-stockholm-attack-victims/8428480>>.
397. Global Peace Index 2007, 'Global Peace Index 2007: Methodology, results & findings', *Institute of Economics & Peace*, pp. 1-44.
398. Global Peace Index 2012, 'Quantifying peace and its benefits', *Institute for Economics & Peace*, viewed 3 November 2019, <<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Peace-Index-Report.pdf>>.
399. Global Peace Index 2019, 'Methodology, results & findings', *Vision of Humanity*, viewed 21 November 2019, <<http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/06/GPI-2019-web003.pdf>>.
400. Goldlust, J. 2016, "'The Russians are coming": Migration and settlement of Soviet Jews in Australia', *Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 149-186.
401. Gordon, O. 2020, 'Elite NSW counter-terror police under investigation over mock acknowledgement of country at Christmas party', *ABC News (online)*, 17 June, viewed 17 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-17/nsw-police-mock-acknowledgement-of-country-at-christmas-party/12359744>>.
402. Gordon, S. 2017, 'Indigenous recognition: Turnbull Government's rejection of Uluru Statement from the heart indefensible', *ABC News (online)*, 27 October, viewed 4 August 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-27/decision-to-reject-uluru-statement-is-indefensible/9093408>>.
403. Gordon, S. 2017, 'Indigenous recognition: Turnbull Government's rejection of Uluru Statement from the heart indefensible', *27 October*, viewed 27 October 2017, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-27/decision-to-reject-uluru-statement-is-indefensible/9093408>>.
404. Gott, R. 2007, 'Latin America as White settler society', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp.
405. Government of Canada, n.d. 'Cabinet', *Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada (website)*, <<https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet>>.
406. Government of South Australia 2019, 'Criminal Law Consolidation (assaults on prescribed emergency workers) Amendment Act 2010', *South Australia Attorney-General's Department*, 3 October, <[https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/V/A/2019/CRIMINAL%20LAW%20CONSOLIDATION%20\(ASSAULTS%20ON%20PRESCRIBED%20EMERGENCY%20WORKERS\)%20AMENDMENT%20ACT%202019_17.aspx](https://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/V/A/2019/CRIMINAL%20LAW%20CONSOLIDATION%20(ASSAULTS%20ON%20PRESCRIBED%20EMERGENCY%20WORKERS)%20AMENDMENT%20ACT%202019_17.aspx)>.

407. Grassby 1973, 'A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future: Reference paper', *Department of Immigration*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
408. Grasso, G. 2015, 'Ethnocracy in the promised land, Israel's African refugees', *Naretiv Productions*, viewed 5 May 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GoAmX_GOYrU>.
409. Grasso, G. 2015, 'Ethnocracy in the promised lands Israel's African refugees', 30 December, videorecording, Youtube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GoAmX_GOYrU>.
410. Greene, A. 2020, 'Australia joins United States and Japan in naval exercise as concerns grow over China', *ABC News (online)*, 22 Jul, viewed 22 July 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-22/australia-joint-show-strength-united-states-japan-china-concerns/12479144>>.
411. Greenfeld, L. 1992, *Nationalism: five roads to modernity*, Harvard University Press.
412. Greenfeld, L. 2006, *Nationalism and the mind*, Oneworld Publications, Oxford.
413. Greenfeld, L., & Chiot, D. 1994, 'Nationalism and aggression', *Theory and Society*, Cambridge, MA vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 79–130
414. Griffin, R. 2000, 'Interregnum or endgame? Radical right thought in the 'postfascist' era'', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 163–178.
415. Griffith, A. 2019, 'An analysis of candidates who ran and those who won the 2019 election shows again gains in diversity. Still, some groups remain under-represented', *Policy Options*, 5 November, viewed 1 December 2019, <<https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2019/house-of-commons-becoming-more-reflective-of-diverse-population/>>.
416. Griffiths, E. 2014, 'George Brandis defends 'right to be a bigot' amid Government plan to amend Racial Discrimination Act', *ABC News (Online)*, 24 March, viewed 23 October 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-24/brandis-defends-right-to-be-a-bigot/5341552>>.
417. Grigg, A. 2020, 'Why Chinese investment fears are overblown', *Australian Financial Review*, 9 May, viewed 9 May 2020, <<https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/why-chinese-investment-fears-are-overblown-20200507-p54qyq>>.
418. Groutsis, D. 2019, 'What is needed to improve diversity and inclusion in Australia', *University of Sydney*, 21 March, viewed 21 March 2019, <<https://sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2019/03/21/what-is-needed-to-improve-diversity-and-inclusion-in-australia.html>>.

419. Gul, J. 2020, 'Basketball champion and Indigenous mentor Patty Mills has found 'a way to live with impact and purpose'', *ABC News (online)*, 14 September, viewed 14 September 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-13/nba-star-patty-mills-on-racism-black-lives-matter-and-canberra/12658016>>.
420. Guo, S. 2013, 'Economic integration of recent Chinese immigrants in Canada's second-tier cities: The triple glass effect and immigrants' downward social mobility', *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 95–115.
421. Gunew, S. 1994, *Framing marginality: multicultural literary studies*, Melbourne University Press.

H

422. Habermas, J. 2003, 'Intolerance and discrimination', *ICON*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 2-12.
423. Habermas, J. 2005, 'Equal treatment of cultures and the limits of postmodern liberalism', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 13, no., 1, pp. 1-28.
424. Haferkamp, H. & Smelser, N. J. 1992 (eds), *Social change and modernity*, University of California Press, Berkeley
<<http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft6000078s/>>.
425. Hage, G. 2000, *White nation: fantasies of White supremacy in a multicultural society*, Pluto Press, NSW.
426. Hage, G. 2003, *Against paranoid nationalism: searching for hope in a shrinking society*, Pluto Press, NSW.
427. Hall, A. & Mason, B. 2019, 'Labor launches strategy to better reflect Australia's diversity in parliament', *SBS News (online)*, 23 October, viewed 23 October 2019, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/labor-launches-strategy-to-better-reflect-australia-s-diversity-in-parliament>>.
428. Hall, S. 1992, 'The question of cultural identity', in Hall, S., Held, D. & McGrew, A., *Modernity and its futures*, Polity Press in association with the Open University, pp. 274–316.
429. Hall, S. 1997, 'Race, the floating signifier' - <http://www.mediaed.org>. See also ChallengingMedia 2006, 'Race, the floating signifier: featuring Stuart Hall', videorecording, Youtube, viewed 23 July 2019, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMo2uiRAf30>>.
430. Hall, S. 2000, 'Conclusion: The multi-cultural question', in Hesse, B. (ed.), *Un/settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*, Zed Books, pp. 209-241.
431. Haller, M., Eder, A. & Stolz, E. 2016, 'Ethnic stratification and patterns of income inequality around the world: a cross-national comparison of 123 countries, based on a new index of historic

- ethnic exploitation', *Social Indicators Research*, vol. 128, no. 3, pp. 1047-1084.
432. Halpin, D. & Warhurst, J. 2016, 'Commercial lobbying in Australia: Exploring the Australian Lobby Register', *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 100-111.
 433. Halpin, D. 2019, 'Submission to the NSW ICAC: Operation Eclipse', Submission 40, <<https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/investigations/current-investigations/2019/lobbying-and-the-nsw-public-sector-operation-eclipse/operation-eclipse-submissions>>.
 434. Hamilton, C. 2018, *Silent invasions: China's influence in Australia*, Hardie Grant Books, Australia.
 435. Hanchard, M. G 2018, *The spectre of race: How discrimination haunts Western democracy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
 436. Handley, E. & McCarthy, J. 2020, 'The Government has dismissed China's warning to its citizens about racism in Australia. Let's take a look at the evidence', *ABC News (online)*, 11 June, viewed 11 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-11/china-warns-students-racism-australia-evidence-covid19/12340208>>.
 437. Happer, C. & Philo, G. 2013, 'The role of the media in the construction of public belief and social change', *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 322-336.
 438. Harris, A. 2013, *Young people and everyday multiculturalism*, Routledge, New York.
 439. Harris, L.C. 2018, 'The riots history erased: reckoning with the racism of Lambing Flat', *The Conversation (Online)*, 7 August, viewed 20 August 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2018/aug/07/the-riots-history-erased-reckoning-with-the-racism-of-lambing-flat>>.
 440. Hart, C. 2020, 'Penrith Panthers Brent Naden digs deep after alleged racial abuse, powers towards perfect NRL season', *ABC News (online)*, 17 October, viewed 17 October 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-17/brent-naden-penrith-panthers-nrl-racial-abuse-premiership/12771110>>.
 441. Hartwig, M. 1972, 'Aborigines and racism: an historical perspective', in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *Racism: the Australian experience*, vol. II, ANZ Book Co., Sydney.
 442. Hartz-Karp, J. & Briand, M. K. 2009, 'Institutionalizing deliberate democracy', *Journal of Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 125-141, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.320>.
 443. Hartz-Karp, J. 2005, 'A case study in deliberative democracy: Dialogue with the city', *Journal of Public Deliberation*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-15, available at

- <https://espace.curtin.edu.au/bitstream/handle/20.500.11937/30139/164056_164056.pdf?sequence=2>.
444. Hawke, R. L. 1979, 'The resolution of conflict', *Boyer Lectures series*, pp. 48-49.
 445. Hawkins, M. 2014, *Global structures, local cultures*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
 446. Haxton, N. 2017, 'Australia's slave trade': The growing drive to uncover secret history of Australian South Sea Islanders', *ABC News (online)*, 22 December, viewed 22 December 2017, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-22/australian-south-sea-islanders-blackbirding/9270734>>.
 447. Hayden, M. E. 2017, 'Terror in the UK: A timeline of recent attacks', *ABC News (online)*, 16 September, viewed 16 September 2017, <<https://abcnews.go.com/International/terror-uk-timeline-recent-attacks/story?id=47579860>>.
 448. Hayek, F. A. 1960, *The constitution of liberty*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
 449. Hayes, A. & Hacker, A. 2017, 'Persistent disadvantage in Australia: extent, complexity and some key implications', *Institute of Health and Welfare*, Australia's Welfare series paper 1.6, pp. 1-16.
 450. Hazzard, B. 2020, '\$5000 on the spot fine to protect all workers', media release, *NSW Government*, 19 April, viewed 19 April 2020, <<https://www.nsw.gov.au/news/5000-on-spot-fine-to-protect-all-workers>>.
 451. Heath, A. & Cheung, S. Y. (eds) 2007. *Unequal chances: Ethnic minorities in Western labour markets*, Oxford University Press.
<<https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197263860.001.0001>>.
 452. Henderson, G. 1995a 'What Howard has to do'. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 January, p. 25.
 453. Henderson, G. 1995b, *A Howard Government?*, Harper Collins, Sydney
 454. Hendrischke, H. & Li, W. 2019, 'Chinese investment in Australia is down 36%. It's time for a more balanced debate about the national interest', *The Conversation (online)*, 8 April, viewed 8 April 2019, <<https://theconversation.com/chinese-investment-in-australia-is-down-36-its-time-for-a-more-balanced-debate-about-the-national-interest-114984>>.
 455. Henley, J. 2019, 'Anti-immigration populists surge in fragmented Dutch elections', *The Guardian (Online)*, 21 March, viewed 14 October 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/21/anti-immigration-fvd-party-wins-most-votes-netherlands-election>>.

456. Hennig, B. 2017, *The end of politicians: Time for a real democracy*, Unbound, London, UK.
457. Henslin, J. 2019, *Essentials of sociology*, 13 edn, Pearson Education, New York.
458. Hesse, B. 2000, 'Introduction: Un/Settled multiculturalisms', in Hesse, B. (ed.), *Un/settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, 'transruptions'*, Zed Books, pp. 1-30.
459. Hiebert, D., Collins, J. & Spoonley, J. 2003, 'Uneven globalization: Neoliberal regimes, immigration and multiculturalism in Australia, Canada and New Zealand', *Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis* (Working Paper Series, No. 03-05), Vancouver Centre of Excellence.
460. Higgins, C. 2017, 'Australian refugee policy: twists in the tale', *The Interpreter*, 25 May, <<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australian-refugee-policy-twists-in-tale>>
461. Higgins, I. 2018, 'Indigenous voice to parliament should be reconsidered, bipartisan committee finds', *ABC News (online)*, 29 Nov, viewed 29 November 2018, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-29/Indigenous-voice-to-parliament-should-be-reconsidered-committee/10563378>>.
462. Hill, M. 1973, *A sociology of religion*, Heinemann, London.
463. Hinton, M. 2015, 'Is Australia's Constitution racist?', *Law Society of South Australia Bulletin*, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 12, viewed 16 August 2019, <https://www.lawsocietysa.asn.au/LSSA/Lawyers/Publications/Articles/Is_Australias_Constitution_Racist.asp>.
464. Hirst, A. 2019, 'Morrison Government response to Diversity Council of Australia', letter to Lisa Annese, Chief Executive Officer of the Diversity Council of Australia, 8 May, <https://www.dca.org.au/sites/default/files/coalition_response_on_d_and_i_for_2019_election.pdf>.
465. Hirst, J. 1994, 'National pride and multiculturalism', *Quadrant*, November, pp. 29-34.
466. Hirst, J. 2000, *The sentimental nation: The making of the Australian Commonwealth*, Oxford University Press.
467. Ho, A., Sidanius, J. Levin, D. & Banaji, M. 2011, 'Evidence of hypodescent and racial hierarchy in the categorization and perception of biracial individuals', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, pp. 492-506.
468. Ho, C. 2013, 'From social justice to social cohesion: A history of Australian multicultural policy', in A. Jakubowicz and Ho, C., *For those who've come across the seas*, Anthem Books, pp. 31-42.

469. Ho, C. 2020, *Aspiration and anxiety: Asian migrants and Australian schooling*, Melbourne University Press.
470. Hobsbawm, E.J. 1983, *The invention of tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
471. Hobsbawm, E.J. 1996, 'Ethnicity and nationalism in Europe today', in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the nation*, Verso, London and New York, pp. 255-266.
472. Hofstede, G. 1991, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
473. Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J & Minkov, M. 2010, *Cultures and organizations: software of the mind*, 3 edn, McGraw-Hill, New York.
474. Hollero, M. E. 2007, 'Deconstructing the racialisation experience of Asian-Australians: Process, impact and response', PhD thesis, University of New South Wales.
475. Holsteyn, J. 2018, 'The Dutch parliamentary elections of March 2017', *West European Politics*, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1364-1377.
476. Hopkins, M. 1991, 'Human development revisited: A new UNDP report', *World Development*, vol. 19, no. 10, pp. 1469-1473.
477. Houston, J. 2018, *A multicultural odyssey: A memoir (almost) sans regrets*, Coventry Press, Melbourne.
478. Howard, L. 2012, 'The ethnocracy trap', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 155-169.
479. Hughey, M. W. & Gonzalez-Lessor, E. 2020, *Racialised media: The design, delivery and decoding of race and ethnicity*, New York University Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0242-8_26-1
480. Hugo, G. 2002, 'Australian immigration policy: the significance of the events of September 11', *The International Migration Review*, vol. 36, pp. 37-40.
481. Human Rights Law Centre 2019, 'CERD: NGO Report for review of Australia', *Human Rights Law Centre*, <<https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/cerd-ngo-report-for-review-of-australia>>.
482. Hunter, A. & Brewer, J. 2015, 'Designing multimethod research', *Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry*, viewed 5 Dec 2018, <<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199933624.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199933624-e-13>>
483. Hurst, D. 2020a, 'Eric Abetz refuses to apologise for demanding Chinese-Australians denounce Communist party', *The Guardian Australia (online)*, 15 October, viewed 15 October 2020,

- <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/oct/16/eric-abetz-refuses-to-apologise-for-demanding-chinese-australians-denounce-communist-party>>.
484. Hurst, D. 2020b, 'Penny Wong says coronavirus catastrophe fueling 'a macho strain of nationalism'', *The Guardian (online)*, 11 Jul, viewed 11 July 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jul/11/penny-wong-says-coronavirus-catastrophe-fuelling-a-macho-strain-of-nationalism>>.
485. Hutchens, G. 2018, 'Government blames 'administrative error' for its support for 'it's OK to be white' vote', *The Guardian (Online)*, 16 October, viewed 16 October 2018, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/16/government-blames-administrative-error-for-its-support-for-its-ok-to-be-white-vote>>.
486. Hutchison, J. 2016, *One Plus One: Tim Soutphommasane*, video podcast, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 25 February, viewed 22 March 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/programs/one-plus-one/2016-02-25/one-plus-one:-tim-soutphommasane/7200900>>.

I

487. Imtousal, A., Walters, A., Leikin, A., Athaide, R. & Hirsch, A. 2017, 'Australia's compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', *Australian NGO Coalition Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*, October, <<http://www.natsils.org.au/portals/natsils/CERD.pdf?ver=2017-11-24-095513-213>>.
488. Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds) 2014, 'World Values Survey: round six - country-pooled datafile version', *JD Systems Institute*, Madrid, viewed 18 November 2019, <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp>>.
489. Inglis, C. 2006. 'International approaches to integration: Australia', *Canadian Diversity*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 14-18.
490. Inglis, C., Birch, A. & Sherington, G. 1994, 'An overview of Australian and Canadian migration patterns and policies', in H. Adelman, A. Borowski, M. Burstein and L. Foster (eds), *Immigration and refugee policy. Australia and Canada compared*. Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Australia.
491. IPI Global Observatory 2016, 'Catalogue of Indices 2016: data for a changing world', 28 September, viewed 24 November

2019, <<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/catalogue-indices/>>.

492. Islam, M. R., & Jahjah, M. 2001, 'Predictors of young Australians' attitudes toward Aboriginals, Asians and Arabs', *Social Behavior and Personality*, vol. 29, pp. 569- 580. DOI: 10.2224/sbp.2001.29.6.569
493. Ivison, D. (ed.), 2010, *The Ashgate research companion to multiculturalism*, Ashgate, Surrey.
494. Ivison, D. 2006, 'Historical Injustice,' in J. Dryzek, B. Honig, and A. Phillips (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, Oxford University Press, pp. 507–25.
495. Ivison, D. 2012, 'Multiculturalism and resentment', in G. B Levey (ed.), *Political theory and Australian multiculturalism*, Berghahn Books, New York, pp. 129–49.
496. Ivison, D., Patton, P. & Sanders, W. 2000, *Political theory and the rights of Indigenous peoples*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

J

497. Jakubowicz, A. & Ho, C. 2013, *For those who've come across the seas*, Australian Scholarly Publishing.
498. Jakubowicz, A. 2015, 'Hating to know': Government and social policy research in multicultural Australia', in C. Husband (ed.), *Research and policy in ethnic relations: Compromised dynamics in a neoliberal era*, Policy Press, pp. 53-78.
499. Jakubowicz, A. 2016, 'Once upon a Time in.....ethnocratic Australia: migration, refugees, diversity and contested discourses of inclusion and exclusion', *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 144-167.
500. Jakubowicz, A. 2016a, 'Who's ever one nation it is: Explaining, please, what multicultural politics is about to become', *Andrew Jakubowicz blog*, 30 July, <<https://andrewjakubowicz.com/2016/07/>>.
501. Jakubowicz, A. 2016b, 'First the words, then the deed: how an 'ethnocracy' like Australia works', *The Conversation*, 6 December, viewed 6 December 2016, <<http://theconversation.com/first-the-word-then-the-deed-how-an-ethnocracy-like-australia-works-69972>>
502. Jakubowicz, A. 2017a, *Two Strong's don't make it Right*, Andrew Jakubowicz (weblog), 6 July, viewed 27 July 2017, <<https://andrewjakubowicz.com/2017/07/06/>>.
503. Jakubowicz, A. 2017b, 'The government's multicultural statement is bereft of new ideas or policies – why?', *The*

- Conversation*, 21 March, viewed 21 March 2017,
<<http://theconversation.com/the-governments-multicultural-statement-is-bereft-of-new-ideas-or-policies-why-74838>>.
504. Jakubowicz, A. 2019a, 'Six actions Australia's government can take right now to target online racism', *The Mandarin (online)*, 14 June, viewed 15 June 2019,
<<https://www.themandarin.com.au/109989-six-actions-australias-government-can-take-right-now-to-target-online-racism/>>.
 505. Jakubowicz, A. 2019b, 'Difference not division: 40 years of multiculturalism in Australia – FECCA 2019', Federation of Ethnic Communities Association Conference 2019, 10-11 October Hobart, viewed 17 October 2019,
<<https://andrewjakubowicz.com/2019/10/10/40-years-of-multiculturalism-in-australia-fecca-2019/>>.
 506. Jakubowicz, A., Collins, J. & Chafic, W.F 2012, 'Young Australian Muslims: social ecology and cultural capital', in F. Mansouri and V. Marotta (eds), *Muslims in the West and the challenges of belonging*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, pp. 34-59.
 507. Jakubowicz, A., Collins, J., Reid, C. & Chafic, W.F 2014, 'Minority youth and social transformation in Australia: identities, belonging and cultural capital', *Social Inclusion*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 5-16.
 508. Jakubowicz, A., Goodall, H. & Martin, J. 1994, *Racism, ethnicity and the media*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
 509. Jayasuriya, L. 1996, 'Immigration and settlement in Australia: An overview and critique of multiculturalism', in N. Carmon (ed.), *Immigration and integration in post-industrial societies*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 206-226,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24945-9_12>.
 510. Jayasuriya, L. 2003, 'Australian multiculturalism: Past, present, and future', *University of Western Australia (Discipline of Social Work and Social Policy)*, viewed 13 September 2019,
<<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200.6396&rep=rep1&type=pdf>>.
 511. Jayasuriya, L., Gothard, J. & Walker, D. 2003, *Legacies of White Australia: Race, culture and nation*, University of Western Australia Press, Perth.
 512. Jefferson, D. 2020, 'Archibald Prize: Meyne Wyatt wins Packing Room Prize as finalists announced', *ABC News (online)*, 17 September, viewed 17 September 2020,
<<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-17/archibald-prize-finalists-packing-room-prize-meyne-wyatt/12668754>>.
 513. Jenness, V. & Broad, K. 1997, *Hate Crimes: New social movements and the politics of violence*, Aldine Transaction.

514. Jenness, V. & Grattet, R. 2001, *American Sociological Association Rose series in sociology. Making hate a crime: From social movement to law enforcement*, Russell Sage Foundation.
515. Johnson, M. 2017, 'Getting multiculturalism right: deontology and the concern for neutrality', *Open Cultural Studies*, vol. 1, pp. 32-45.
516. Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2013, *Inquiry into Migration and Multiculturalism in Australia*, Australian Parliament, viewed 13 December 2018, <https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=mig/multiculturalism/report.htm>.
517. Jones, P. 2016, 'Group rights', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Online)*, viewed 19 September 2019, <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/rights-group/>>.
518. Jones, P. G. & Kenny, A. 2007, *Australia's Muslim cameleers: Pioneers of the inland, 18602-1930s*, Wakefield Press, Australia.
519. Joppke, C. & Morawska, E. 2003, 'Integrating immigrants in liberal nation-states: Policies and practices', in C. Joppke and E. Morawska (eds), *Toward assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation-states*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
520. Joppke, C. 2017, *Is multiculturalism dead? Crisis and persistence in the constitutional state*, Polity, London.
521. Jordan, M. 2005, 'Rewriting Australia's racist past: How historians (mis)interpret the White Australia Policy', *History Compass*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1-32.
522. Jupp, J. 2001, 'The making of the Anglo-Australian', in J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian people. An encyclopaedia of the nation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
523. Jupp, J. 2001a, *The Australian people: An encyclopedia of the nation, its people and their origins*, 2 edition, Cambridge University Press.
524. Jupp, J. 2002, *From White Australia to Woomera – the story of Australian immigration*, Cambridge University Press.
525. Jupp, J. 2011, 'Politics, public policy and multiculturalism', in M. Clyne and J. Jupp (eds), *Multiculturalism and integration: A harmonious relationship*, ANU E-Press, Canberra, pp. 41-52.
526. Juteau, D. 2002, 'The citizen makes and entrée: Redefining the national community in Quebec', *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 441-458.

527. J-Wire 2015, 'The most successful multicultural society in the world', *J-Wire*, 13 October, viewed 16 March 2019, <<http://www.jwire.com.au/the-most-successful-multicultural-society-in-the-world/>>.

K

528. Kahane, A. 2009, *Power and love: A theory and practice of social change*, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Incorporated.
529. Kamp, A. & Mansouri, F. 2010 'Constructing inclusive education in a neo-liberal context: promoting inclusion of Arab-Australian students in an Australian context', *British Educational Research Journal*, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 733-744.
530. Karp, P. 2018, 'Scott Morrison claims Indigenous voice to parliament would be a third chamber', *The Guardian*, 26 Sep, viewed 20 July 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/26/scott-morrison-claims-indigenous-voice-to-parliament-would-be-a-third-chamber>>.
531. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. 2011, 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators: methodology and analytical issues', *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 220-246.
532. Kaufmann, E. P. 2009, 'Dominant ethnicity and dominant nationhood: empirical and normative aspects', in A. Lecours and G. Nootens (eds), *Dominant nationalism, dominant ethnicity: Identity, federalism and democracy*, PIE Peter Lang, Brussels, pp. 35-56.
533. Keane, B. 2016, '“The system is rigged”, ‘racial equality has gone too far’: Australians more like Trump than they’d admit', *Crikey (Online)*, 22 Nov, viewed 22 August 2019, <<https://www.crikey.com.au/2016/11/22/essential-australians-backward-looking-and-nanny-statist/>>.
534. Kedar, A. 2003, 'On the legal geography of ethnocratic settler states: Notes towards a research agenda', *Current Legal Issues*, vol. 5, pp. 401-441, viewed 11 August 2019, <<https://ssrn.com/abstract=934622>>.
535. Keesing, R.M. 1974, 'Theories of culture', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 3, pp. 73-97.
536. Kekic, L. 2007, 'The Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy', *The Economist*, pp. 1-11.
537. Ken Wyatt 2020, *Hon Ken Wyatt AM, MP*, Parliament of Australia, viewed 3 January 2020, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=M3A>.
538. Keneally, K. 2020, 'Do we want migrants to return in the same numbers? The answer is no', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 3

- May, viewed 3 May 2020,
<<https://www.smh.com.au/national/do-we-want-migrants-to-return-in-the-same-numbers-the-answer-is-no-20200501-p54p2q.html>>.
539. Kennedy, S. & Hedley, D. 2003, 'Educational attainment and labour force participation in Australia', *Economic Round-up*, winter, pp. 27-41.
 540. Kennett, J. 2012, 'Of the people?', *About the House Magazine (Newsletter of Australian Parliament)*, April, viewed 1 September 2019,
<[https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of Representatives/About_the_House_Magazine/Previous/ATH44/Of_the_people](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/About_the_House_Magazine/Previous/ATH44/Of_the_people)>.
 541. Kenny, C. 2018, 'Australia can't afford to 'hide behind the fluffy multicultural cliches'', *2GB (Online)*, 9 January,
<<https://www.2gb.com/australia-cant-afford-to-hide-behind-fluffy-multicultural-cliches/>>.
 542. Kerkyasharian, S. 1995, 'Ethnic communities and political power in Australia', *Conference on Global Cultural Diversity 1995*, Sydney, Australia.
 543. Khadem, N. 2019, 'Australia's richest and poorest postcodes reveal in ATO's 2016-17 tax statistics', 29 March, viewed 6 February 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-28/australias-richest-and-poorest-postcodes-revealed-for-2016-17/10949790>>.
 544. Khoo, S-E., Birrell, B. & Heard, G. 2009, 'Intermarriage by birthplace and ancestry in Australia', *People and Place*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 15-28.
 545. Kilkemeijer, A., Maguire, A., Gelber, K. & Whiteford, P. 2019, 'The Coalition's record on social policy: Big on promises, short on follow-through', *The Conversation*, 10 April, viewed 14 May 2019, <<http://theconversation.com/the-coalitions-record-on-social-policy-big-on-promises-short-on-follow-through-114611>>.
 546. Killelea, S. 2007, 'Measuring and foster the progress of societies', *Second OECD World Forum on Statistics, Knowledge and Policy*, Istanbul, 27-30 June, PowerPoint presentation, viewed 27 November 2019, <www.oecd.org/site/worldforum06>.
 547. Kimmorley, S. 2015, 'We are the most successful multicultural society in the world, now come together to fight radicalism, says Turnbull', *BusinessInsider*, 15 October, viewed 16 March 2019, <<https://www.businessinsider.com.au/we-are-the-most-successful-multicultural-society-in-the-world-now-come-together-to-fight-radicalism-says-turnbull-2015-10>>.

548. Klasen, S. 2018, 'Human development indices and indicators: A critical evaluation', Background Paper, UNDP Human Development Report Office, viewed 5 November 2019, <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-indices-and-indicators-critical-evaluation>>.
549. Klein, C. 2018, 'Why is the day after Christmas called Boxing Day?', *History Stories (online)*, 22 August, viewed 5 May 2020, <<https://www.history.com/news/why-is-the-day-after-christmas-called-boxing-day>>.
550. Kluckhohn, C. & Kroeber, A. L. 1952, *Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions*, Vintage Books, New York.
551. Knopfmacher, F. 1984, 'The multicultural enterprise and its consequences', *Quadrant*, May, pp. 9-11.
552. Kobayashi, A. 1993, 'Multiculturalism: Representing a Canadian institution', in J. Duncan, and D. Ley (eds), *Place/Culture/Representation*, Routledge, London, pp. 205-231.
553. Koch, T. 2019, 'For 30 years I worked for News Corp papers. Now all I see is shameful bias', *The Conversation (online)*, 9 May, viewed 26 May 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/09/for-30-years-i-worked-for-news-corp-papers-now-all-i-see-is-shameful-bias>>.
554. Kociumbas, J. 2004, 'Genocide and modernity in colonial Australia, 1788-1850', in D. A. Moses (ed.), *Genocide and settler society: frontier violence and stolen Indigenous children in Australian history*, Berghahn Books, New York, pp.77-102.
555. Koleth, E. 2010, 'Multiculturalism: A review of Australian policy statements and recent debates in Australia and overseas', *Department of Parliamentary Services*, Canberra.
556. Krivokapic-Skoko, B. & Collins, J. 2016, 'Looking for rural idyll 'Down Under': International immigrants in rural Australia', *International Migration*, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 167-179, DOI: 10.1111/imig.12174.
557. Kukathas, C. 2003, *The liberal archipelago: a theory of diversity and freedom*, Oxford University Press.
558. Kukathas, C. 2008, 'Anarcho-multiculturalism: the pure theory of liberalism', in G. B. Levey (ed.), *Political theory and Australian multiculturalism*, Berghahn Books, New York.
559. Kunz, B. 2010, 'Hans J. Morgenthau's political realism, Max Weber, and the concept of power', *Max Weber Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 189-208.
560. Kurti, P. 2013, 'Multiculturalism and the fetish of diversity', *CIS Policy Monographs*, vol. 138.

561. Kwok, J. T. 2017, 'An etymology of "Asian Australia" through associational histories connecting Australia to Asia', *Journal of Australian Studies*, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 351-366, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14443058.2017.1346696>
562. Kymlicka, W. 1989, *Liberalism, community, and culture*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
563. Kymlicka, W. 1995, *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
564. Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy*, 2 edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

L

565. Langbein, L. & Knack, S. 2008, 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators and tautology: causally related separable concepts, indicators of a common cause, or both?', Working Paper of the World Bank Group.
566. Langbein, L. & Knack, S. 2009, 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators: six, one or none?', *The Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 350-370.
567. Langerfelder, C. 2016, 'Policies for human development', Background Paper, *United Nation Development Programme Human Development Report*, viewed 4 November 2019, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/lengfelder_-_policies_for_human_development.pdf>.
568. Lass, I. 2019, 'Language of love: a quarter of Australians are in inter-ethnic relationships', *The Conversation*, 30 July, viewed 2 September 2019, <<http://theconversation.com/language-of-love-a-quarter-of-australians-are-in-inter-ethnic-relationships-120416>>.
569. Lassman, P. & Speirs, R. (eds) 2002, *Max Weber: Political writings*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
570. Latour, B. & Woolgar, S. 1979, *Laboratory life: the construction of scientific facts*, Sage, Beverly Hills, California.
571. Lea-Scarlett, E. J. 1974, 'Mei Quong Tart (1850–1903)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, viewed online 27 July 2020, <<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mei-quong-tart-4181/text6719>>.
572. Lee, J. 2020, 'Does the races power still have a place in the Australian Constitution?', *ABC News (online)*, 4 June, viewed 4 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-04/races-power-in-constitution-should-change-say-retired-judges/12312362>>.

573. Legal Services Commission of South Australia 2019, 'Law handbook', *Legal Services Commission of South Australia*, 14 October, <<https://lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch12s06s03.php>>.
574. Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory 2020, *Members*, website, <<https://parliament.nt.gov.au/members>>.
575. Lentin, A. & Titley, G. 2011, *The crises of multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age*, Zed Books, London.
576. Lentin, A. 2011, *Racism and ethnic discrimination*, Rosen Publishing, New York.
577. Lentin, A. 2020, *Why race still matters*, Polity Press, UK.
578. Levey, G. B. 1999, Liberalism, multiculturalism, and the value of individual autonomy, PhD thesis, Brown University.
579. Levey, G. B. 2001, 'The political theories of Australian multiculturalism', *UNSW Law Journal*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 869-881.
580. Levey, G. B. 2008a, 'Multicultural political thought in Australian perspective', in G. B. Levey (ed.), *Political theory and Australian multiculturalism*, Berghahn Books, New York.
581. Levey, G. B. 2008b (ed.), *Political theory and Australian multiculturalism*, Berghahn Books, New York.
582. Levey, G. B. 2011, 'Multicultural integration in political theory', in J. Jupp and M. Clyne (eds) 2011, *Multiculturalism and integration: a harmonious relationship*, ANU E-Press, chapter 4, pp. 73-87.
583. Levey, G. B. 2019a, 'The Bristol school of multiculturalism', *Ethnicities*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 200-226, <<https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796818787413>>.
584. Levey, G. B. 2019b, 'The Turnbull government's 'Post-multiculturalism' multicultural policy', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 456-473.
585. Levey, G. B. 2019c, 'Differentiating multiculturalisms: A rejoinder', *Ethnicities*, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 999-1014.
586. Levey, G.B. 2012, 'Defending multiculturalism is in all our interests', *ABC News (Online)*, viewed 21 September 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-25/levey-defending-multiculturalism-is-in-all-our-interests/4278128>>.
587. Little, D. 2008, 'Power and social class', *Dan Little's web-based monograph*, 24 August, viewed 2 June 2018, <<https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2008/08/power-and-social-class.html#:~:text=%22Power%22%20is%20a%20compound%20social,interests%2C%20needs%2C%20and%20desires.&text>>

=Power%20is%20needed%20to%20prevent%20striking%20miners%20from%20shutting%20down%20La%20Paz.>.

588. Llanque, M. 2007, 'Max Weber on the relation between power politics and political ideals', *Constellations*, vol. 14, no. 14, pp. 483-497.
589. Local Government Association 2020, *Facts and figures*, ALGA, viewed 18 September 2020, <<https://alga.asn.au/facts-and-figures/>>.
590. Local Government Association of Queensland 2017, *Annual Report 2017*, viewed on 10 March 2020, <<https://www.lgaq.asn.au/documents/10136/4acb7af4-9bfc-4b38-8649-04c8ff28302f>>.
591. Local Government Association Tasmania 2017, *Year in Review 2016-2017*, viewed on 10 March 2020, <http://www.lgat.tas.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/LGAT_2017_Annual_Review.pdf>.
592. Luke, A. 2013, 'Eddie McGuire makes on-air gaffe linking Adam Goodes to King Kong musical, videorecording, Youtube, 28 May, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wS2Y8ZGHTz8>>.
593. Lukes, S. 1974, *Power: A radical view*, Macmillan, London.
594. Lukes, S. 2003, *Power: A radical view*, 2 edn, Macmillan Publishers Limited, Basingstoke.
595. Lynch, A. 2003, 'The Gleeson Court on Constitutional law: An empirical analysis of its first five years', *University of New South Wales Law Journal*, vol. 26, nol. 1, pp. 32-65.

M

596. Ma, W. 2020, 'Where Are You Really From? Presenter Michael Hing on multicultural stories in Australia', *News.com.au*, 23 June, viewed 23 June 2020, <<https://www.news.com.au/entertainment/tv/tv-shows/where-are-you-really-from-presenter-michael-hing-on-enriching-stories/news-story/c608bb703dad1a5fd8dd4ea3f77bb037>>.
597. Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) ("Mabo case") [1992] HCA 23
598. Mackay, D. 2020, 'Commonwealth Sports Moments #4: Cathy Freeman carries the Aboriginal and Australian flags on victory laps at Victoria 1994', *The Commonwealth Games* (website), <<https://thecgf.com/stories/commonwealth-sports-moments-4-cathy-freeman-carries-aboriginal-and-australian-flags-victory>>.
599. MacLeod, C. L. 2006, *Multiethnic Australia: Its history and future*, MacFarland and Co. Inc Publishers, London, UK.

600. Macquarie Dictionary 2019, *Multicultural*, Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, Sydney, viewed 8 March 2019, <<https://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/>>.
601. Malik, K. 2015, 'The failures of multiculturalism', *Kenan Malik blog*, viewed 25 Sep 2019, <http://www.kenanmalik.com/papers/engelsberg_mc.htmulticultural>
602. Manifesto Project 2016, 'About', *Manifesto Project Data*, <<https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents/information>>.
603. Mansouri, F. (ed.) 2015, *Cultural, religious and political contestations: the multicultural challenge*, Springer, Heidelberg.
604. Margalit, A. & Raz, J. 1990, 'National self-determination', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 87, pp. 439–61.
605. Marks, G. N. & Mooi-Reci, I. 2016, 'The declining influence of family background on educational attainment in Australia: The role of measured and unmeasured influence', *Social Science Research*, vol. 55, pp. 171-185.
606. Markson, S. 2020, 'Coronavirus NSW: Dossier lays out case against China bat virus program', *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 May, viewed 25 May 2020, <<https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/coronavirus/bombshell-dossier-lays-out-case-against-chinese-bat-virus-program/news-story/55add857058731c9c71c0e96ad17da60>>.
607. Markus, A. & Taft, M. 2016 (eds), *Walter Lipmann, ethnic communities leader: 'creative thinker, dogged worker, the kindest of men'*, Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation Monash University, Melbourne.
608. Markus, A. 1983, 'Chinese in Australian history', *Meanjin*, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 85-93.
609. Markus, A. 1994, *Australian race relations 1788-1993*, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard's, Australia.
610. Markus, A. 2007-2019, 'Mapping social cohesion: Previous reports 2007-2019', *Scanlon Foundation*, viewed 3 August 2019, <<https://scanlonfoundation.org.au/archived-research/>>.
611. Markus, A. 2018, 'Mapping social cohesion reports 2007-2018', *Scanlon Foundation*, viewed 3 August 2019, <<https://scanlonfoundation.org.au/current-research/>>.
612. Markus, A. 2019, 'Mapping social cohesion 2019 report', *The Scanlon Foundation*, <https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/2040268/mapping-social-cohesion-national-report-2019.pdf>.
613. Markus, A., Jupp, J. & McDonald, P. 2009, *Australia's immigration revolution*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

614. Martin, J. 1972, *Community and identity: Refugee groups in Adelaide*, Australia National University Press, Canberra.
615. Martin, J. 1978, *The migrant presence: Australian responses, 1947-1977: Research report for the National Population Inquiry*, George Allen & Unwin Australia.
616. Martin, J. 1983, 'The development of multiculturalism', in *Report to the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Committee of Review of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs*, pp. 120-160.
617. Marx, K. 2000, *A critique of the German ideology*, Marx/Engels Internet Archive (Marxists.org), viewed 15 March 2019, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_The_German_Ideology.pdf>.
618. Mason, G. & Macintosh, K. 2014, 'Hate crime sentencing laws in New Zealand and Australia: Is there difference?', *New Zealand Law Review*, vol. 4, pp. 647-680.
619. Mason, G. & Moran, L. 2019, 'Bias crime policing: 'The graveyard shift'', *International Journal for*
620. Mason, G. & Stanic, R. 2019, 'Reporting and recording bias crime in New South Wales', *Current Issues in Criminal Justice*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 164-180, DOI: 10.1080/10345329.2019.1594920
621. Mason, G. 2009a, 'Hate crime laws in Australia: Are they achieving their goals?', *33 Criminal Law Journal* 326.
622. Mason, G. 2009b, 'Naming the 'R' word in racial victimization: Violence against Indian students in Australia', *International Review of Victimology*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 39-56.
623. Mason, G. 2019, 'A picture of bias crime in New South Wales', *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 11, iss. 1, pp. 47-66, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6402>
624. Matsumoto, D. 1996, *Culture and psychology*, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, California.
625. Matthiew, F. 2017, 'The failure of state multiculturalism in the UK? An analysis of the UK's multicultural policy for 2000-2005', *Ethnicities*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 43-69.
626. McConaghy, C. 2008, 'Appendix 2B: The Global Peace Index 2009', *Institute for Economics and Peace*, pp. 85-93.
627. McKay, D. 2017, 'Uluru Statement: a quick guide', *Australian Parliament Library*, 19 Jun, viewed 20 July 2019, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/UluruStatement>.

628. McKay, D. 2017, 'Uluru Statement: a quick guide', *Parliament of Australia*, 19 June, viewed 19 June 2018, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/UluruStatement>.
629. McKenna, K. 2020, 'Queensland groups say racial hate crimes not taken seriously and stronger laws are needed', *ABC News (online)*, 14 September, viewed 14 September 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/racist-hate-crimes-amid-pandemic-prompt-calls-for-stronger-laws/12660174>>.
630. McKinnell, J. 2020, 'Ruby Princess coronavirus inquiry hears outdated records were supplied to NSW Health before ship docked', *ABC News (online)*, 5 May, viewed 5 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-05/inquiry-into-coronavirus-outbreak-from-ruby-princess/12215270>>.
631. McLeod, D.M. & Shah, D.V. 2015, *New frames and national security: Covering big brother*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
632. Meer, N. & Modood, T. 2009, 'The multicultural state we're in: Muslims, 'multiculture' and the 'civic re-balancing' of British multiculturalism', *Political Studies*, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 473–497.
633. Meer, N. & Modood, T. 2013, 'The 'civic re-balancing' of British multiculturalism, and beyond....', in R. Taras (ed.), *Challenging multiculturalism: European models of diversity*, Edinburg University Press, Edinburg, pp. 75–96.
634. Melbourne University 2014, *General dictionaries and thesauri: Multicultural*, 16 December, viewed 8 March 2019, <<https://web.archive.org/web/20150103005711/http://unimelb.libguides.com/content.php?pid=130967&sid=1123371>>.
635. Menadue, J. 2009, 'We need leadership that appeals to our 'better angels': John Menadue', *Centre for Policy Development*, 22 April, <<https://cpd.org.au/2009/04/we-need-leadership-that-appeals-to-our-better-angels-john-menadue/>>.
636. Menadue, J. 2019a, 'Spare us the details!', *John Menadue - Pearls and Irritations*, 24 May 2019, viewed 1 June 2019, <<https://johnmenadue.com/john-menadue-policies-and-programs-must-be-anchored-in-values-and-principles/>>.
637. Menadue, J. 2019b, 'Negativity and a policy vacuum win the day – John Menadue', *Croakey*, 24 May 2019, viewed 24 May 2019, <<https://croakey.org/negativity-and-a-policy-vacuum-win-the-day-john-menadue/>>.
638. Miller, D. 2002, 'Group rights, human rights and citizenship', *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 178-195.

639. MIPEX 2015, 'Australia', viewed 26 November 2019, <<http://www.mipex.eu/australia>>.
640. MIPEX 2015, 'Time explorer by country', viewed 26 November 2019, <<http://www.mipex.eu/play/>>
641. MIPEX, 'What is MIPEX?', *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015*, viewed 26 November 2019, <<http://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex>>
642. Mitchell, A. 2020, 'Morrison has joined the US led war party against China', *John Menadue blog – Pearls and Irritations*, 17 July, viewed 21 July 2020, <<https://johnmenadue.com/alex-mitchell-morrison-has-joined-the-us-led-war-party-against-china/>>.
643. Mitchell, C. 2006, *Religion, identity and politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of belonging and belief*, Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon.
644. Modood, T. & Dobbernack, J. 2011, 'A left communitarianism? What about multiculturalism?', *Soundings*, no. 48, pp. 54-65.
645. Modood, T. 1998, 'Multiculturalism, secularism and the state', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 79-97.
646. Modood, T. 2007, *Multiculturalism: A civic idea*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
647. Modood, T. 2008, 'Multiculturalism and groups', *Social & Legal Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 549-553.
648. Modood, T. 2010, *Multiculturalism*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
649. Mommsen, W. J. 2005, 'Max Weber's 'Grand Sociology': the origins and composition of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. *Soziologie*', in C. Camic, P. S. Gorski and D. M. Trubeck, *Max Weber's economy and society: A critical companion*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 70-97.
650. Moore, H. 1910, *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 2nd edition, Maxwell.
651. Moore, R. 2016, 'The more things change, the more they stay the same: Representations of whiteness in Australian history narratives 1950-2010', PhD thesis, University of Tasmania.
652. Moran, A. 2017, *The public life of Australian multiculturalism*, Springer, Switzerland.
653. Morgan, C. 2019, 'National Congress of Australia's First Peoples' closure a step back for Aboriginal people: Rodd Little', *The Canberra Times (online)*, 17 October, viewed 4 August 2020, <<https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6443649/closure-of->

aboriginal-organisation-means-loss-of-first-peoples-voice-former-co-chairman/>.

654. Morgan, L.H. 1976, *Ancient society*, Gordon Press, New York
655. Morrison, S. 2019, 'Meet and greet at the multicultural communities event in Koondool, WA', Twitter, 30 April, viewed 30 April 2019, <<https://twitter.com/scottmorrisonmp/status/1123132889367863296?lang=en>>.
656. Morrison, S. 2020, 'Now is the time to recognise that Australia is 'one and free'', *Sydney Morning Herald (online)*, 31 December, viewed 31 December 2020, <<https://www.smh.com.au/national/now-is-the-time-to-recognise-that-australia-is-one-and-free-20201231-p56r39.html>>.
657. Morrison, S., '2019 election campaign', Twitter, 6 May, viewed 6 May 2019, <<https://twitter.com/scottmorrisonmp/status/1125332350882029572?lang=en>>.
658. Moses, A. 2019, 'Accountability, transparency and diversity – the importance of an independent tribunal appointment process', speech to the *2019 Council of Australasian Tribunals National Conference*, 7 June, available at <<https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/docs/9fbf380b-d6ad-e911-93ff-005056be13b5/Accountability,%20transparency%20and%20diversity%20%E2%80%93%20the%20importance%20of%20an%20independent%20tribunal%20appointment%20process.pdf>>.
659. Moss, I. 1991, *Racist violence – report of the national inquiry into racist violence in Australia*, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, <<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/NIRV.pdf>>.
660. Mullaney, T. & Anderson, B. 2010, *Coming to terms with the nation: ethnic classification in modern China*, University of California Press.
661. Multicultural NSW 2020, 'Multicultural March', *NSW Government*, <<https://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/multiculturalmarch>>.
662. Multiculturalism Policies for Indigenous Peoples, n.d., 'Table 1: Summary scores from 1980, 2000, 2010', *Queens University*, viewed 3 August 2020, <https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.mcp/www/files/files/Indigenouspeoples/results/IndigenousPeoples_Table1_SummaryScores_2016.pdf>.
663. Multiculturalism Policies for Indigenous Peoples, n.d., 'Table 2: Scores for each indicator, 1980, 2000, 2010', *Queens University*, viewed 3 August 2020,

- <https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.mcpwww/files/files/Indigenouspeoples/results/IndigenousPeoples_Table2_IndicatorScores_2016.pdf>.
664. Multiculturalism Policy Index, n.d.(a), 'Immigrant Minorities – decision rules', viewed 3 August 2020, <<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/decision-rules>>.
 665. Multiculturalism Policy Index, n.d.(b), 'Indigenous Peoples – decision rules', viewed 3 August 2020, <<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/Indigenous-peoples/decision-rules>>.
 666. Munck, G. & Verkuilen, J.2002, 'Conceptualizing and measuring democracy', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 5-34.
 667. Murphy, K. & Jabour, B. 2016, 'Campaign day 10: Peter Dutton's comments on refugees dominate debate – as it happened', *The Conversation (online)*, 18 May, viewed 21 March 2017, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2016/may/18/australian-election-2016-peter-dutton-says-illiterate-refugees-will-take-australian-jobs-politics-live?page=with:block-573bddd2e4b0670dcbee9399>>.
 668. Murphy, K. 2019, 'The meaning of Morrison's mantra about getting a fair go is clear. It's conditional', *The Guardian (online)*, 17 April, viewed 17 April 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/apr/17/the-meaning-of-morrison-s-mantra-about-getting-a-fair-go-is-clear-its-conditional>>.
 669. Murphy, K., Chan, G., Remeikis, A. & Karp, P. 2019, 'Who should I vote for? Guide to party policies in the 2019 Australia federal election', *The Guardian*, 15 Apr, viewed 15 May 2019 <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2019/apr/15/who-should-i-vote-for-policy-guide-to-the-2019-australian-election>>.

N

670. Nagata, Y. 1993. 'Japanese internment in Australia', PhD thesis, University of Adelaide.
671. Nagatomo, J. 2016, 'Changes of social cohesion within ethnic communities: a case study of the Japanese community in Sydney, Australia', *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, vol. 9, no. 4, pp.
672. Nagel, J. 1994, 'Constructing ethnicity: creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture', *Social Problems*, vol.41, no. 1, pp. 152-176.

673. NAIDOC 2019, *Minister Ken Wyatt: walking in partnership to effect change*, National Press Club of Australia, 10 July, viewed 10 July 2019, <<https://www.naidoc.org.au/get-involved/naidoc-week-events/minister-ken-wyatt-walking-partnership-effect-change>>.
674. National Archives of Australia 2020(a), 'The Immigration Restriction Act 1901', *National Archives of Australia* <<https://www.naa.gov.au/explore-collection/immigration-and-citizenship/immigration-restriction-act-1901>>.
675. National Archives of Australia 2020(b), 'Archives of the Intercolonial Conferences 1863-1901', *National Archives of Australia*, <<https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ListingReports/ItemsListing.aspx?page=0>>
676. National COVID-19 Co-ordination Commission 2020, 'National COVID-19 Co-ordination Commissioners and key staff', *Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet*, <<https://pmc.gov.au/nccc/who-we-are>>.
677. National Ethnic and Multicultural Broadcasters' Council 2019, 'Ethnic community broadcasting – submission to federal budget 2019', <<https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/360985-National-Ethnic-and-Multicultural-Broadcasters-Council.pdf>>.
678. National Mental Health Commission 2020, 'The Commission welcomes the appointment of Dr Ruth Vine', *Australian Government*, 13 May, viewed 13 May 2020, <<https://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov.au/news/2020/may/commission-welcomes-appointment-of-dr-vine>>.
679. Nelson, H. 1973, 'The proclamation', in B. Jinks, P. Biskup and H. Nelson (eds), *Readings in New Guinea history*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp. 32-41.
680. Neumann, K. 2004, *Refuge Australia: Australia's humanitarian record*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney.
681. Neumann, K. 2009, 'Oblivious to the obvious? Australian asylum seeker policies and the use of the past', in K. Neumann and G. Tavan (eds), *Does history matter? Making and debating citizenship, immigration and refugee policy in Australia and New Zealand*, ANU E Press, Canberra, pp. 47-64.
682. Nguyen, K. 2020, 'NSW Health introduces \$5,000 fine for spitting or coughing on frontline workers in coronavirus lockdown', *ABC News (online)*, 9 April, viewed 9 April 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-09/fines-for-spitting-coughing-in-nsw-coronavirus-lockdown/12138086>>.
683. Niemeyer, S. 2011, 'The emancipatory effect of deliberation: Empirical lessons from mini-publics', *Politics & Society*, vol.

39, no. 1, pp. 103-140, DOI:
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329210395000>

684. Niemeyer, S. 2013, 'Democracy and climate change: What can deliberative democracy contribute?', *Australian Journal of Politics & History - Special Issue*, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 429-448.
685. Nieuwenhuyson, J. & Storer, D. 2011, 'The economic advantages of cultural diversity in Australia', Report prepared for NSW Government and Community Relations Commission, Sydney, Australia.
686. Nish, I. 1963, 'Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1901-1911', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 202-203.
687. Noble, G. 2009 (ed.), *Lines in the sand: The Cronulla riots, multiculturalism and national belonging*, Institute of Criminology Press, Sydney.
688. Nolan, D., 2011, 'Mediated multiculturalism: Newspaper representations of Sudanese migrants in Australia', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 655-671.
689. Nootens, G. 2013, *Popular sovereignty in the West: Politics, contention, and ideas*, Routledge
690. Norman, J. 2016, 'Cory Bernadi leads Coalition backbench senators in push to dilute Racial Discrimination Act', *ABC News (Online)*, 30 August, viewed 22 October, <
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-30/cory-bernadi-leads-coalition-push-to-change-18c-race-hate-laws/7796356>>.
691. Norman, J. 2018, 'Scott Morrison says it's 'regrettable' his senators backed Pauline Hanson's 'it's OK to be white' motion', 16 October, viewed 16 October 2018, <
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-16/morrison-regrets-senators-backing-anti-white-racism-support/10381038>>.
692. Northern Territory Electoral Commission 2017, *2017 NT council elections report*, viewed 11 March 2020, <
https://ntec.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/745061/2017-NT-Council-Elections-Report-website-version.pdf>.
693. Northern Territory Government 2016, *Northern Territory Multicultural Participation Framework 2016-19*, viewed 29 July 2020, <
https://territoryfamilies.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/290547/NT-Multicultural-Participation-Framework-2016-19.pdf>.
694. Norton-Taylor, R. 2010, 'Not so secret: deal at the heart of UK-US intelligence', *The Guardian (online)*, 25 June, viewed 28 May 2020, <
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/25/intelligence-deal-uk-us-released>>.

695. Notable Kytherians, *Peter V'landys*, viewed 25 June 2019, <<https://www.kythera-family.net/en/people/notable-kytherians/peter-vlandys-22219>>.
 696. NSW Department of Education 2020, *Multicultural education policy*, NSW Government, 29 June, viewed 28 July 2020, <<https://policies.education.nsw.gov.au/policy-library/policies/multicultural-education-policy>>.
 697. NSW Government 2018, 'Tough penalties for inciting violence now in force', *NSW Government Department of Justice*, media release, 17 Aug, viewed 1 June 2020, <<https://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/media-news/media-releases/2018/tough-penalties-for-inciting-violence-now-in-force.aspx>>.
 698. Nye, J. S. 1990, 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, Iss. 80, pp. 153-171.
 699. Nye, J. S. 2009, *Understanding international conflicts*, 7 edition, Pearson Publishing, New York.
- O**
700. O'Connor, J. 2020, 'The domestic agenda for Australia' anti-China rhetoric', *John Menadue blog – Pearls and Irritations*, 18 May, viewed 21 July 2020, <<https://johnmenadue.com/justin-oconnor-the-domestic-agenda-for-australias-anti-china-rhetoric/>>.
 701. O'Leary, B. 2001, 'An iron law of nationalism and federation? A (neo-Diceyan) theory of the necessity of a federal Staatsvolk and of constitutional rescue', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 273–296.
 702. OECD 2018, 'Gini coefficient for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US', <<https://data.oecd.org/pinboard-editor/>; <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm>>.
 703. OECD 2018, 'Income inequality', viewed 25 November 2019, <<https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm>>
 704. OECD 2019, 'Income distribution database: by country', viewed 26 November 2019, <<https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=66670>>; see also <<http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm>>
 705. OECD 2019, 'Income inequality (indicator)', viewed on 25 November 2019, DOI: 10.1787/459aa7f1-en.
 706. Office of Local Government 2017, '2016-2017 Annual Report', *NSW Government*, viewed on 10 March 2020, <https://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/OLG%20Annual%20Report%202016-17_0.pdf>.

707. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2019, *The Australian Bureau of Statistics has asked me to complete a survey. Do I have to answer the questions in the survey?*, OAIC, Canberra, viewed 9 March 2019, <<https://www.oaic.gov.au/individuals/faqs-for-individuals/government/the-australian-bureau-of-statistics-has-asked-me-to-complete-a-survey-do-i-have-to-answer-the-questions-in-the-survey>>.
708. Okin, S. M. 1998, 'Feminism and multiculturalism: some tensions', *Ethics*, vol. 108, pp. 661-84.
709. Okin, S.M. 2004, 'Mistresses of their own destiny: groups rights, gender, and realistic rights of exit', *Ethics*, vol. 112, pp. 205-30.
710. Oleinik, A. 2011, 'Mixing qualitative and qualitative content analysis: Triangulation at work,' *Quality & Quantity*, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 859-873.
711. Olsen, W. 2004, 'Triangulation in social research: qualitative and quantitative methods can really be mixed', in M. Holborn (ed.), *Developments in sociology: an annual review*, Causeway Press, Ormskirk.
712. Om, J. 2020, 'Report reveals racist abuse experienced by Asian Australians during coronavirus pandemic', *ABC News (online)*, 24 July, viewed 24 July 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-24/coronavirus-racism-report-reveals-asian-australians-abuse/12485734>>.
713. One Nation 2019, *Multiculturalism*, viewed 18 May 2019, <<http://www.onenation.com.au/multiculturalism>>.
714. One Nation 2020, *Facing up to the failings of multiculturalism*, One Nation (NSW Division), viewed 20 March 2020, <<https://nsw.onenation.org.au/policies/facing-up-to-the-failings-of-multiculturalism/>>.
715. Oriel, J. 2016, 'West proves not all cultures are equal', *The Australian*, 12 December, <<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/opinion/west-proves-not-all-cultures-are-equal/news-story/146149c99d7daa26472a3efc3a2d1be9>>.
716. Oxford Dictionary 2019a, *Multi*, Oxford University Press, viewed 8 March 2019, <<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/multi->>.
717. Oxford Dictionary 2019b, *Multicultural*, Oxford University Press, viewed 8 March 2019, <<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/multicultural>>.

P

718. Pabayo, R., Cook, D.M., Harling, G., Gunawan, A., Rosenquist, N.A. & Muennig, P. 2019, 'State-level income inequality and mortality among infants born in the United States 2007–2010: A Cohort Study', *BMC Public Health*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1333. <<https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-019-7651-y>>.
719. Pakulski, J. 2014 'Confusions about multiculturalism', *Journal of Sociology*, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 23-36.
720. Palaszczyk, A. & Miles, S. 2020, 'Queensland introduces big fines for coughing on essential workers', media release, *Queensland Government*, 27 April, viewed 27 April 2020, <<http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2020/4/27/queensland-introduces-big-fines-for-coughing-on-essential-workers>>.
721. Papandrea, F., & Tiffen, R. 2016, 'Media ownership and concentration in Australia', in E. M. Noam (Ed.), *Who owns the world's media?: Media concentration and ownership around the world*, First ed., pp. 703-734, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199987238.003.0023>
722. Papastergiadis, N. 2013, 'Why multiculturalism makes people so angry and sad', in H. Skyes (Ed.), *Space place & culture*, <http://www.futureleaders.com.au/book_chapters/pdf/Space-Place-Culture/Nikos-Papastergiadis.pdf>.
723. Parekh, B. 2000, *Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political theory*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.
724. Parekh, B. 2006, *Rethinking multiculturalism*, Macmillan Education, UK.
725. Park, R. E. 1924, 'The concept of social distance as applied to the study of racial attitudes and racial relations', *Journal of Applied Sociology*, vol. 8, pp. 339–344.
726. Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. 1921, *Introduction to the science of sociology*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
727. Parkinson, J. 2003, 'Legitimacy problems in deliberative democracy', *Political Studies*, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 180-196, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00419>
728. Parkinson, J. 2006, *Deliberating in the real world: Problems of legitimacy in deliberative democracy*, Oxford University Press.
729. Parliament of Australia 2021, *Inquiry into extremist movements and radicalism in Australia*, Canberra, 13 January 2021, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/ExtremistMovements/Terms_of_Reference>.

730. Parliament of Australia 2018, *Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP*, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, viewed 1 September 2018, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=885>.
731. Parliament of Australia 2019a, *Senators and members*, Canberra, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members>.
732. Parliament of Australia 2019b, *Ms Gladys Liu MP – Member for Chisholm, Victoria*, Canberra, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=282918#t1-content-panel>.
733. Parliament of Australia 2020a, *Current Ministry list*, viewed 15 January 2020, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Parliamentary_Handbook/Current_Ministry_List>.
734. Parliament of Australia 2020b, *Senators and Members*, website, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members>.
735. Parliament of Australia n.d., ‘Infosheet 20 – the Australian system of government’, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_procedure/00_-_Infosheets/Infosheet_20_-_The_Australian_system_of_government>.
736. Parliament of Australia, *Parliamentary Handbook of the 42 Parliament*, Parliamentary Library.
737. Parliament of New South Wales 2020, *All members*, website, accessed 29 May 2020, <<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/members/Pages/all-members.aspx>>.
738. Parliament of Victoria 2020, *List all members*, website, <<https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/about/people-in-parliament/members-search/list-all-members>>.
739. Parliament of Western Australia 2020, *Current Members*, website, <<https://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/parliament/memblist.nsf/WAllMembers>>.
740. Parliament South Australia 2020, *Members Home*, website, <<https://www.parliament.sa.gov.au/Members/Members-Home>>.
741. Parsons, W. 1995, *Public policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK.
742. Patten, A. 2001, ‘The rights of internal linguistic minorities’, in A. Eisenberg and J. Spinner-Halev (eds), *Minorities within minorities: equality, rights and diversity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

743. Patten, A. 2014, *Equal recognition: the moral foundations of minority rights*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
744. Pearson, L. 2018, *Australia is not a multicultural country*, IndigenousX, 22 July 2018, viewed 20 March 2019, <<https://indigenoux.com.au/australia-is-not-multicultural/>>.
745. Pearson, N. 2014, 'Time to bring us into the nation' through constitutional recognition', *Cape York Partnership (website)*, 13 September, viewed 2 June 2020, <<https://capeyorkpartnership.org.au/constitutional-recognition/time-to-bring-us-into-the-nation-through-constitutional-recognition-noel-pearson-the-australian/>>.
746. Penny Wong 2019, *Senator Penny Wong*, South Australia, <<http://www.pennywong.com.au/>>.
747. Perera, S. 2005, 'Who will I become? The multiple formations of Australian Whiteness', *Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association Journal*, vol. 1, pp. 30–39.
748. Perera, S. & Pugliese, J. 1995, 'Multicultural histories and paternal genealogies: babes and bastards at the Global Cultural Diversity Conference', *Law Text Culture*, vol. 2, pp. 260-265. <<https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol2/iss1/17>>.
749. Perera, S. & Pugliese, J. 1998, 'Wogface, Anglo-Drag, contested aboriginalities...making and unmaking identities in Australia', *Social Identities*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 39-72.
750. Peres, M. A. 2015, 'Income-related inequalities in oral health over time among adults from Australia, Brazil and USA', *International Journal of Epidemiology*, vol. 44, issue supplement 1, p. i30, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyv097.101>>.
751. Perpitch, N. 2020, 'Rio Tinto executives stripped of bonuses over destruction of Juukan Gorge rock shelters', *ABC News (online)*, 24 August, viewed 24 August 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-24/rio-tinto-executives-lose-bonuses-over-juukan-gorge-destruction/12588516>>.
752. Pfluke, C. 2019, 'A history of the Five Eyes Alliance: Possibility for reform and additions', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 302-315.
753. Phillip, A. 2007, *Multiculturalism without culture*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
754. Phillips, G. 2011, 'Reporting diversity: the representation of ethnic minorities in Australia's television current affairs programs', *Media International Australia*, vol. 139, pp. 23–31.
755. Phillips, J. & Simon-Davies, J. 2017, *Migration to Australia: a quick guide to the statistics*, Parliament of Australia Research papers 2016-2017.

756. Phillips, J. 2017, *Australia's humanitarian Program: A quick guide to the statistics since 1947*, Parliament of Australia Research papers 2016-2017.
757. Picket, K. E. & Wilkinson, R. G. 2015, 'Income inequality and health: a causal review', *Social Science & Medicine*, vol. 128, pp. 316-326.
758. Pieterse, J.N. 1997, 'Deconstructing/reconstructing of ethnicity', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 365-393.
759. Pietsch, J. 2017, 'Diverse outcomes: Social citizenship and the inclusion of skilled migrants in Australia', *Social Inclusion*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 32-44.
760. Pietsch, J. 2018, *Race, ethnicity, and the participation gap*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada.
761. Porter, M., Todd, A.L. & Zhang, L.Y. 2016, 'Ethnicity or cultural identity of pregnant women in Sydney, Australia: is country of birth a reliable proxy measure?', *Women and Birth*, vol. 29, pp. 168-171.
762. Prime Minister and Cabinet 2019, 'New National Indigenous Australians Agency starts 1 July', *Australian Government media release*, 14 June, viewed 15 June 2019, <<https://www.Indigenous.gov.au/news-and-media/announcements/new-national-Indigenous-australians-agency-starts-1-july>>.
763. Pringle, R. 2008, 'The Federation issue in New South Wales politics 1891-9', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 1-12.
764. Prior, F. L 2012, 'The impact of income inequality on values and attitudes', *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, vol. 41, pp. 615-622.
765. Pritchard, S. 2011, 'The 'Race' power in Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution', *Australian International Law Review*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 44-57.
766. Probyn, A., 'Scott Morrison needs to support Ken Wyatt's push if Indigenous constitutional recognition is to be achieved', *ABC News (Online)*, 12 Jul, viewed 12 July 2019, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-12/scott-morrison-needs-to-support-ken-wyatt-indigenous-recognition/11300138>>.
767. Proctor, J. 2004, *Stuart Hall*, Routledge, London.
768. Przeworski, A. 1996, 'The role of theory in comparative politics: a symposium', *World Politics*, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 1-49.
769. Putnam, R. D. 1994, 'Social capital and public affairs', *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. 47, no. 8, pp. 5-19.

770. Putnam, R. D. 1995, 'Bowling alone: America's declining social capital', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, no.1, pp. 65-78.

Q

771. Queen's University n.d., 'Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP)', viewed 26 November 2019, <<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/home>>.
772. Queen's University n.d., 'Multiculturalism Policy Index', viewed 25 November 2019, <<https://www.universityresearch.ca/projects/multiculturalism-policy-index/>>.
773. Queen's University n.d., 'Multiculturalism Policy Index', viewed 25 November 2019, <<https://www.universityresearch.ca/projects/multiculturalism-policy-index/>>.
774. Queensland Government 2020, *Multicultural month*, Department of Local Government, Racing and Multicultural Affairs, <<https://www.dlgrma.qld.gov.au/multicultural-month/events.html>>.
775. Queensland Parliament 2020, *Members*, website, <<https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/members>>.
776. Quick, J. & Garran, G. 1910, *The annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney.
777. Quigley, J. & Roberts, M. 2020, 'Serious penalties for COVID-19 related assaults or threats to frontline workers', media release, *Government of Western Australia*, 31 March, viewed 31 March 2020, <<https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/McGowan/2020/03/Serious-penalties-for-COVID-19-related-assaults-or-threats-to-frontline-workers.aspx>>.

R

778. Ratnapalan, L. 2008, 'E.B. Tylor and the problem of primitive culture', *History and Anthropology*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 131-142.
779. Rattansi, A. 2007, *Racism: A very short introduction*, 1 edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
780. Rattansi, A. 2011, *Multiculturalism: A very short introduction*, 2 edition, Oxford University Press.
781. Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.
782. Rawls, J. 1993, *Political liberalism*, Columbia University Press.

783. Rayner, S. 1991, 'A cultural perspective on the structure and implementation of global environmental agreements', *Evaluation Review*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 75–102.
784. Raz, J. 1994, 'Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective', in *Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 170–91.
785. Referendum Council 2017, *Uluru Statement from the Heart*, <https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/sites/default/files/2017-05/Uluru_Statement_From_The_Heart_0.PDF>.
786. Reitz, J. G., Dion, K. K., Dion, K. L., Phan, M., Breton, R. & Banjerjee, R. 2009, *Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion: Potentials and Challenges of Diversity*, Springer, New York.
787. Remeikis, A. 2016, 'One Nation policies: The definitive guide to the views of Pauline Hanson and her senators', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 October, viewed 18 October 2016, <<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/one-nation-policies-the-definitive-guide-to-the-views-of-pauline-hanson-and-her-senators-20161017-gs3z1s.html>>.
788. Remeikis, A. 2018, 'Australia could add 'values test' for migrants, Malcolm Turnbull says', *The Guardian (online)*, 20 July, viewed 20 July 218, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/jul/20/australia-ethnic-segregation-minister-alan-tudge>>.
789. Renaldi, E. 2020, 'Melbourne Muslims feel 'unfairly tarnished' by reports linking them to rising covid-19 cases', *ABC News (online)*, 15 July, viewed 15 July 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-15/muslims-melbourne-raising-concern-over-covid19-reports/12454846>>.
790. Renzaho, A., Polonsky, M., Mellor, D. & Cyril, S. 2016, 'Addressing migration-related social and health inequalities in Australia: call for research funding priorities to recognise the needs of migrant population', *Australian Health Review*, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 3-10.
791. Reynolds, H. 1972, 'Violence, the Aborigines (sic) and the Australian historian', *Meanjin Quarterly*, December.
792. Reynolds, H. 1987, *Frontier: Aborigines, settlers and land*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
793. Reynolds, H. 2020, 'The extraordinary ambush of China Matters', *John Menadue blog – Pearls and Irritations*, 17 July, viewed 21 July 2020, <<https://johnmenadue.com/henry-reynolds-the-extraordinary-ambush-of-china-matters/>>.
794. Rice, S. 2014, 'Racial vilification, social values and humility', *John Menadue – Pearls and Irritations*, 14 April, viewed 25

- October 2019, <<https://johnmenadue.com/simon-rice-racial-vilification-social-values-and-humility/>>.
795. Riddell, C. & Song, X. 2011, 'The impact of education on unemployment incidence and re-employment success: Evidence from the US labour market', IZA Discussion paper no. 5572, *Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA)*, Bonn, Germany, <<http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104133943>>.
 796. Roberts, D. 2009, 'A long winding road: From cultural homogeneity to a multicultural society: An analysis of inclusion and exclusion in Australia', in D. Gopal and A. Mayne (eds), *Cultural diversity governance and policy: India-Australia*, Shipra Publications, Delhi.
 797. Roberts, K. A. & Yamane, D. 2015, *Religion in sociological perspective*, 6th edn, Sage Publications, USA.
 798. Robertson, R. 1970, *The sociological interpretation of religion*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
 799. Rogers, D. 2018, 'Five lessons from Australia's foreign real estate investment boom', *The Conversation*, 31 May, viewed 26 December 2020, <<https://theconversation.com/australias-foreign-real-estate-investment-boom-looks-to-be-over-here-are-five-things-we-learned-97460>>.
 800. Rogers, D., Wong, A. & Nelson, J. 2018, 'Public perceptions of foreign and Chinese real estate investment: Intercultural relations in Global Sydney', *Australian Geographer*, vo. 48, no. 4, pp. 437-455, DOI: 10.1080/00049182.2017.1317050
 801. Ross, T. 2019, 'Media and stereotypes', in S. Ratuva (ed.), *The Palgrave handbook of ethnicity*, Springer, Singapore.
 802. Rowse, T. 2016, 'Nation', in K. Huppatz, M. Hawkins and A. Matthews (eds), *Identity and belonging*, Palgrave, London.
 803. Royal Australian College of Physicians, *2019 Handbook: Adult internal medicine*, viewed 23 January 2020, <<https://www.racp.edu.au/trainees/basic-training/adult-internal-medicine>>.
 804. Ruane, J. 2005, *Essentials of research methods: A guide to social science research*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
 805. Rubenstein, K. 2018, 'Power, control and citizenship: The Uluru Statement from the Heart as active citizenship', *Bond Law Review*, vol. 30, iss. 1, pp. 19-39.
 806. Rudd, K. 2020, 'The Murdoch media's China coronavirus conspiracy has one aim: get Trump re-elected', *The Conversation (online)*, 8 May, viewed 25 May 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/may/08/murdoch-media-china-coronavirus-conspiracy-trump-kevin-rudd>>.

807. Runciman, W. (ed.) 1978, *Weber: Selections in translation*, trans. E. Mathews, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
808. Rutland, S. 2005, 'Jewish immigration after the Second World War: The transformation of a community', *Teaching History*, vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 12-15.
809. Ryan, B. 2018, 'African gang crime 'out of control' in Melbourne: Greg Hunt', *ABC News (Online)*, 9 January, viewed 9 January 2018, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-01/african-gang-crime-out-of-control-in-melbourne-minister-says/9296476>>.
810. Ryan, J. (ed.) 1995, *Chinese in Australia and New Zealand: a multidisciplinary approach*, New Age International Publishers, India.

S

811. Sack, P.G. 1983, 'Protectorate and twists: law, history and the annexation of German New Guinea', *Australian Year Book of International Law*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1-66.
812. Saha, A. 2018, *Race and the cultural industries*, Polity Press, Newark.
813. Sakzeski, E. 2020, 'What is the definition of branch stacking and why is it bad for Australian politics?', *ABC News (online)*, 15 June, viewed 15 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-15/branch-stacking-definition-australian-politics-is-it-illegal/12354790>>.
814. Sammut, J. 2012, 'Hummus, Hamas and the hopeless naïve', *Quadrant (Online)*, 18 October, viewed 22 September 2019, <<https://www.cis.org.au/commentary/articles/hummus-hamas-and-the-hopeless-naive/>>
815. Sapiera, E. 2010, *Cultural diversity and global media: The mediation of difference*, Wiley-Blackwell, UK.
816. Saunders, B. & Kennedy, S. 2019, 'Popular sovereignty, 'the People', and the Australian Constitution: A historical reassessment', *Public Law Review*, vol. 30, pp. 36-57.
817. Savage, M. 2019, 'Sweden's 100 explosions this year: What's going on?', *BBC News (online)*, 12 November, viewed 12 November 2019, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50339977>>.
818. Sawyer, G. 1966 'The Australian Constitution and the Australian Aborigine' (1966) 2 *Federal Law Review* 17, especially at 25-30.
819. Sawyer, M. 2006, 'The democratic audit of Australia: Populism vs citizen rights', Paper prepared for the 20 IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka, 10-13 July, viewed 27 November 2019,

- <<https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2006/06/apo-nid2617-1077306.pdf>>.
820. SBS News (online) 2019, 'The Prime Minister has told a Deepavali function that multiculturalism in Australia is like a 'fragrant garam masal'', 23 October, viewed 23 October 2019, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/scott-morrison-says-multicultural-australia-is-like-a-fragrant-garam-masala>>.
 821. Schemer, C., 2014, 'Media effects on racial attitudes: evidence from a three-wave panel survey in a political campaign', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 531–542.
 822. Schneiders, B. & Lucas, C. 2020, 'Asian-Australian groups report surge in racist abuse, assaults during pandemic', *The Age (online)*, 13 May, viewed 13 May 2020, <<https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/asian-australian-groups-report-surge-in-racist-abuse-assaults-during-pandemic-20200512-p54s6f.html>>.
 823. Screen Australia 2016, *Seeing ourselves: Reflections on diversity in Australian TV drama*, viewed 20 March 2017, <<https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/getmedia/157b05b4-255a-47b4-bd8b-9f715555fb44/TV-Drama-Diversity.pdf>>.
 824. Screen Australia 2018, *Employment trends: Country of birth – proportions of employees from various countries and regions, 1971-2016*, viewed 19 December 2019, <<https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/fact-finders/people-and-businesses/employment-trends/country-of-birth>>.
 825. Screen Australia, n.d., *About us – who we are*, viewed 22 September 2020, <<https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/about-us/who-we-are>>.
 826. Senate Inquiry 2017, *Ways of protecting and strengthening Australia's multiculturalism and social inclusion*, Commonwealth of Australia, viewed 13 December 2018, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Strengthening_Multiculturalism/Multiculturalism/Final_Report>.
 827. Shachar, A. 2001, *Multicultural jurisdictions: cultural differences and women's rights*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
 828. Shah, B., Chiu, M., Amin, S., Ramani, M., Sadry, S. & Tu, J. 2010, 'Surname lists to identify South Asian and Chinese ethnicity from secondary data in Ontario, Canada: a validation study', *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, vol. 10, no. 42, pp. 2-8.

829. Shen, J. 2008. '*A documentary analysis of Australian multicultural policy under the Howard Government*', Master thesis. Beijing Foreign Studies University.
830. Sheppard, J., McAllister, I., Makkai, T. 2018, 'World Values Survey, Australia 2018', *ADA Dataverse*, V3, viewed 18 November 2019, <UNF:6:jSdDKd7nhs4PQOWWEnVovg==>, DOI:10.26193/DJLJV1.
831. Shields, B. 2020, 'Fear, fashion and face masks: Milan an unlikely battleground over a Chinese virus', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 February, viewed 26 February 2020, <<https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/fear-fashion-and-face-masks-milan-an-unlikely-battleground-over-a-chinese-virus-20200225-p543zs.html>>.
832. Shils, E. 1957, 'Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 8, pp. 130-145.
833. Siebert, B., Campbel, C. & Carter, M. 2020, 'SA Police to investigate 'appalling' fake sneeze on Asian man captured on video', *ABC News (online)*, 22 May, viewed 22 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-21/sa-police-investigating-wuhan-sneeze-video-amid-coronavirus/12273100>>.
834. Siisianinen, M. 2000, 'Two concepts of social capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam', Paper presented at the ISTR Fourth International Conference "*The Third Sector: What and for Whom?*", Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 5-8 July 2000.
835. Simon-Davies, J. 2018, 'Population and migration statistics in Australia', *Australian Parliamentary Research Paper Series 2018-19*, 7 December, viewed 4 September 2019, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/6377182/upload_binary/6377182.pdf>.
836. Sissons, D. 1972, 'Immigration in Australia-Japanese relations, 1871-1971', in A. Stockwin and K. Tamura (eds), *Bridging Australia and Japan: volume 1. The writings of David Sissons, historian and political scientist*, ANU Press, Canberra, pp. 193-210.
837. Skaaning, S. E. 2018a, 'The global state of democracy indices methodology – conceptualization and measure framework, version 2', Working Paper of the *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*, pp. 1-82.
838. Skaaning, S. E. 2018b, 'Different types of data and the validity of democracy measures', *Politics and Governance*, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 105-116.
839. Skodo, A. 2018, 'Sweden: By turns welcoming and restrictive in its immigration policy', *Migration Policy Institute*, 6 December, viewed 1 August 2020, <<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/sweden-turns->

welcoming-and-restrictive-its-immigration-policy#:~:text=In%202015%20a%20record%2Dbreaking,of%20protection%20and%20better%20lives>.

840. Sky News 2020, 'PM issues strong condemnation of attacks on Asian Australians', *Sky News (online)*, 21 April, viewed 21 April 2020, <https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_6150962601001>.
841. Smaling, A. 1994, 'The pragmatic dimension', *Quality and Quantity*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 233-249.
842. Smit, J. H. 2010, 'Malcolm Fraser's response to 'commercial' refugee voyages', *Journal of International Relations*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 97-103.
843. Smith, L. 2012, 'Hate crime in Australia: An analysis of the views of police detainees', Masters thesis, <<https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/en/publications/hate-crime-in-australia-an-analysis-of-the-views-of-police-detain-3>>.
844. Smootha, S. 1989, *Arabs and Jews in Israel*, vol. 1, Westview Press, Boulder.
845. Smootha, S. 1990, 'Minority status in an ethnic democracy: the status of the Arab minority in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 389-413.
846. Smootha, S. 1997, 'Ethnic democracy: Israel as an archetype', *Israel Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 198-241.
847. Smootha, S. 2000, 'The regime of Israel: civil demo, non-democracy, or ethnic democracy?', *Sociologia Yisraelit*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 565-630.
848. Smootha, S. 2002a, 'Types of democracy and modes of conflict management in ethnically divided states', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 423-431.
849. Smootha, S. 2002b, 'The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 475-503.
850. Song, S. 2017, 'Multiculturalism', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, viewed 19 September 2019, <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/multiculturalism/>>.
851. South Australian Department of Education n.d., 'Ministerial Advisory Committee: Multicultural education and languages', South Australian Government, <<https://www.education.sa.gov.au/department/about-department/minister-education/melc>>.

852. South Australian Government 2019, *2019 Multicultural Festival*, website
<<https://www.dpc.sa.gov.au/responsibilities/multicultural-affairs/events/the-multicultural-festival>>.
853. South Australian Government n.d, 'Racism: "Australia must and can be better than this"', *Office for Recreation, Sport and Racing*, Human Rights Commission statement, viewed 12 October 2020, <https://www.orsr.sa.gov.au/ors_news?a=4276>.
854. Soutphommasane, T. 2014, 'Australians unite in opposing race law change', *Australian Human Rights Commission*, 8 August, viewed 25 October 2019,
<<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/news/australians-unite-opposing-race-law-change>>.
855. Soutphommasane, T. 2019, 'Why Morrison's preferred M-word is migrant rather than multicultural', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 January, viewed 19 January 2019,
<<https://www.smh.com.au/national/why-morrison-s-preferred-m-word-is-migrant-rather-than-multicultural-20190118-p50s6j.html>>.
856. Soutphommasane, T. 2020, 'COVID-19 is playing host to another contagion: Anti-Asian racism', *Sydney Morning Herald (online)*, 11 April, viewed 11 April 2020,
<<https://www.smh.com.au/national/covid-19-is-playing-host-to-another-contagion-anti-asian-racism-20200409-p54irl.html>>.
857. Soutpommasane, T. 2012, *Don't go back to where you came from*, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney.
858. Spinner-Halev, J., 2001, 'Feminism, multiculturalism, oppression, and the state', *Ethics*, vol. 112, pp. 84–113.
859. Spolaore, E. & Wacziarg, R. 2016, 'Ancestry, language and culture', in V. Ginsburgh & S. Weber (eds), *The Palgrave Handbook of economics and language*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 174-211. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-32505-1_7
860. Squelch, J. 2013, 'Religious symbols and clothing in the workplace: Balancing the respective rights of employees and employers', *Murdoch University Law Review*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 38-57.
861. Stanford University, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, listings for John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, viewed 1 Jun 2017,
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries>>.
862. State Library of Victoria n.d., 'Winning the 8-hour day', website
< <http://ergo.slv.vic.gov.au/explore-history/fight-rights/workers-rights/winning-8-hour-day>>.

863. Statistics Canada 2003, *Ethnic diversity survey: portrait of a multicultural society*, Journals and Periodicals 89-593-X, viewed 14 April 2009, <<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/89-593-X>>; <<https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/ref/92-135/surveys-enquetes/ethnicdiversity-diversiteethnique-eng.cfm>>.
864. Stats NZ 2018, 'Culture', 1 January, viewed 2 April 2019, <<https://www.stats.govt.nz/topics/culture>>.
865. Stats, K. 2014, 'Welcome to Australia? A reappraisal of the Fraser government's approach to refugees, 1975-1983', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 69-87.
866. StatsNZ 2019, *Wellbeing statistics: 2018*, 26 June, viewed 1 July 2019, <<https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/wellbeing-statistics-2018>>.
867. Stone, J. & Harris, K. 2017, 'Symbolic ethnicity and Herbert Gans: race, religion and politics in the twenty-first century', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 40, no. 9, pp. 1397-1409.
868. Stone, J. 1995, 'Race, ethnicity and the Weberian legacy', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 391-417.
869. Stratton, J. 2006, 'Two rescues, one history: Everyday racism in Australia', *Social Identities*, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 657-681.
870. Stratton, J. 2009, 'Preserving white hegemony: Skilled migration, 'Asians' and middle-class assimilation', *Borderlands e-journal*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp.1-28. <https://espace.curtin.edu.au/bitstream/handle/20.500.11937/31744/193103_193103.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y>.
871. Stratton, J. 2011a, 'Non-citizens in the exclusionary state: Citizenship, mitigated exclusion, and the Cronulla riots', *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies*, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 299-316.
872. Stratton, J. 2011b, *Uncertain lives: Culture, race and neoliberalism in Australia*, Cambridge Scholars publishing.
873. Stratton, J. 2016, 'Whiteness, morality and Christianity in Australia', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 17-32.
874. Stratton, J. 2017, 'Whatever happened to multiculturalism? *Here Comes the Habibs!* Race, identity and representation', *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 242-256.
875. Stratton, J. 2020, *Multiculturalism, whiteness and otherness in Australia*, Palgrave MacMillan

876. Stratton, J. & Ang, I. 1998, 'Multicultural imagined communities: Cultural difference and national identity in the USA and Australia', in D. Bennett (ed.), *Multicultural states: Rethinking difference and identity*, Routledge, pp. 135-162.
877. *Sugar slaves* 1994, Film Australia National Interest program, Australia.
878. Sukkar, M. 2013, 'Maiden speech', *Parliament of Australia*, 18 November,
<<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22chamber/hansardr/585f8e84-c281-4991-9ab8-437f9b9ff0f8/0110%22>>.
879. Swartz, D. 2000, *Culture and power: the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

T

880. Tam, W. T. & Page, L. 2016, 'Effects of language proficiency on labour, social and health outcomes of immigrants in Australia', *Economic Analysis and Policy*, vol. 52, pp. 66-78.
881. Taras, E. (ed.) 2013, *Challenging multiculturalism – European models of diversity*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
882. Tart, M. 2001, 'The life of Quong Tart: or, how a foreign succeeded in a British community', first published in 1911 by W. M. Maclardy, "Ben Franklin" Printing Works, Sydney,
<<http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/ozlit/pdf/fed0048.pdf>>.
883. Tasevski, O. 2018, 'Australia's Parliament looks nothing like its community. A quota would help fix it', *ABC News (Opinion)*, 16 March, viewed 1 September 2019,
<<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-16/ethnic-diversity-quotas-multicultural-australian-parliament/9538954>>.
884. Tate, A 2020, 'Sport's promise of diversity, equality and fair play is a work in progress', *The New Daily*, 7 July, viewed 12 October 2020,
<<https://thenewdaily.com.au/sport/2020/07/07/sports-diversity/>>.
885. Tate, J. W. 2009, 'John Howards's "nation": Multiculturalism, citizenship, and identity', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 97-120.
886. Tavan, G. 2012, 'No going back? Australian multiculturalism as a path-dependent process', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol 47, no. 4, pp. 547-561.
887. Tavan, G. 2005, *The long slow death of White Australia*, Scribe, Victoria.
888. Taylor, C. 1992 'The politics of recognition', in Gutmann, A. (ed.) 1992, *Multiculturalism and the politics of*

recognition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 25-73.

889. Taylor, J. 2018, 'Emails reveal the Coalition was always going to support Puline Hanson's 'It's OK to be White' motion', *BuzzFeed (Online)*, 14 December, viewed 15 December 2018, <<https://www.buzzfeed.com/joshtaylor/emails-reveal-the-coalition-was-always-going-to-support>>.
890. Tebble, A. J. 2009, 'Hayek and social justice: a critique', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 581-604.
891. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2017, 'Australian economy: almost one in three', *The Economist*, 7 October, vol. 425, no. 9061, pp. 52-54.
892. The Global Peace Index 2007, 'The Global Peace Index 2007: Methodology, results & findings', *Institute of Economics & Peace*, pp. 1-44.
893. The Greens 2019, *Multiculturalism*, 18 May viewed 2019, <<https://greensmps.org.au/portfolios/multiculturalism>>.
894. The Greens Party 2019, *We're building a future for all of us*, viewed 10 May 2019, <<https://greens.org.au/policies>>.
895. The Liberal Party of Australia 2019, *Our plan*, viewed 18 May 2019, <<https://www.liberal.org.au/our-plan>>.
896. *The quiet revolution* 1983, television program, SBS TV, available at <<http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/Audio/id/527.The-Quiet-Revolution>>.
897. The Treasury & Department of Home Affairs Report 2018, 'Shaping a nation', *Commonwealth of Australia*, viewed 8 November 2019, <<https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/107/2018/04/Shaping-a-Nation.pdf>>.
898. The Treasury 2007, '2015 intergenerational report', *Australian Government*, <<https://treasury.gov.au/publication/2007-igr>>.
899. The Treasury 2010, '2015 intergenerational report', *Australian Government*, <<https://treasury.gov.au/publication/2010-igr>>.
900. The Treasury 2015, '2015 intergenerational report', *Australian Government*, <https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/2015_IGR.pdf>.
901. The Treasury 2020, 'Economic response to the coronavirus', *Australian Government*, 12 March, viewed 12 March 2020, <https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Overview-Economic_Response_to_the_Coronavirus_2.pdf>.
902. Theophanous, A. 1995, *Understanding multiculturalism and Australian identity*, Elikia Books, Melbourne.

903. Thomas, M. A. 2010, 'What do the Worldwide Governance Indicators measure?', *The European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 31-54.
904. Tillett, A. & Bolton, R. 2020, 'Troubling surge in anti-Asian sentiment as China triggers race row', *Australian Financial Review*, 11 June, viewed 11 June 2020, <<https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/troubling-surge-in-anti-asian-sentiment-as-china-triggers-race-row-20200611-p551k0>>.
905. Time and Date 2020, 'Reconciliation Day in Australia', *Time and Date* (website), <<https://www.timeanddate.com/holidays/australia/reconciliation-day>>.
906. Ting, I. & Palmer, A. 2020, 'One hundred days of the coronavirus crisis', *ABC News (online)*, 4 May, viewed 4 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-04/charting-100-days-of-the-coronavirus-crisis-in-australia/12197884?nw=0>>.
907. Toktas, S. 2018, 'How liberal is neoliberalism? Rethinking the conceptions of the welfare state, legislative organs, social justice, and competition in Hayek's thought', *Alternatif Politika*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 526-543.
908. Tolley, E. 2011, 'Multiculturalism Policy Index: immigrant minority policies', Research Paper, *School of Policy Studies of Queen's University*, <<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.mcp/www/files/files/immigrantminorities/evidence/ImmigrantMinoritiesApr12.pdf>>.
909. Tolley, E. 2016, *Framed: Media and the coverage of race in Canadian politics*, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, Canada.
910. Tons, J. 2017, 'Shared values? The thick rhetoric of Malcolm Turnbull's multicultural statement', *New Matilda (Online)*, 21 March, viewed 21 March 2017, <<https://newmatilda.com/2017/03/21/shared-values-the-thick-rhetoric-of-malcolms-multicultural-statement/>>.
911. Triandafyllidou, A. 1998, 'National identity and the 'other'', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 593– 612.
912. Turnbull, M. 2016, 'Australia is the most successful multicultural society in the world', Facebook, 25 May, viewed 21 March 2017, <<https://www.facebook.com/malcolmtturnbull/videos/australia-is-the-most-successful-multicultural-country-in-the-world-we-rejoice-i/10154280472731579/>>.
913. Turnbull, M. 2017, *Remarks at the release of the Multicultural Statement*, Malcolm Turnbull weblog, 20 March, viewed 22 March

2017, <<https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/remarks-at-the-release-of-the-multicultural-statement-2017>>.

914. Turnbull, M. 2017a, 'Remarks at the Australian Migration and Settlement Awards', Transcript, released 22 March 2017, <<https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-40837>>.
915. Turnbull, M. 2017b, 'Radio interview with Chris Kenny, 2GB', Transcript, released 20 Dec 2017, viewed 20 December 2017, <<https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-41389>>.
916. Turnbull, M. 2017c, 'Doorstop with John Alexander OAM', Transcript, released 17 Dec 2017, viewed 17 December 2017, <<https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-41386>>.
917. Turner, G. 2020, 'Dealing with diversity: Australian television, homogeneity and indigeneity', *Media International Australia*, vol. 174, no. 1, pp. 20-28.
918. Tyler, M. C. & Ryan, C. 2020, 'Sports can show Australia's better face', *Public Affairs*, 25 August, viewed 13 October 2020, <<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/sports-can-show-australia-s-better-face>>.
919. Tylor, E. 1871, *Primitive culture: researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art and custom*, John Murray publishers, London.

U

920. Uhr, J. 1998, *Deliberative democracy in Australia: The changing place of Parliament*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
921. Uhr, J. 2000, 'Testing deliberative democracy: The 1999 Australian Republic Referendum', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 189-210.
922. UK Labour Party 2020, 'About us: Diversifying our Parliament', *Labour Party website*, <<https://labour.org.uk/about/diversifying-parliament/>>.
923. Uluru Statement n.d., *Voice. Treaty. Truth. Uluru Statement from the Heart*, website, <<https://ulurustatement.org/>>.
924. UN News 2014, 'UN experts urge Sweden to intensify fight against discrimination of people of African descent', *United Nations*, 8 December, viewed 11 April 2017, <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/12/485732-un-experts-urge-sweden-intensify-fight-against-discrimination-people-african>>.
925. UNESCO 2015, 'UNESCO Diversity of cultural expressions – periodic report Australia', *UNESCO*, viewed 21 April 2019, <<https://en.unesco.org/creativity/governance/periodic-reports/2015/australia>>.

926. UNESCO 2018, 'UNESCO Diversity of cultural expressions – Australia 2018 report', *UNESCO*, viewed 21 April 2019, <<https://en.unesco.org/creativity/governance/periodic-reports/2018/australia>>.
927. UNESCO n.d, *UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions – alphabetical list*, viewed 21 April 2019, <<http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&language=E&order=alpha>>.
928. United Nation 2018, 'Frequently asked questions – Human Development Index', *UN Development Programme – Human Development Reports*, viewed 25 November 2019, <<http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/faq-page/human-development-index-hdi#t292n2867>>.
929. United Nation Development Programme 1990, 'Human Development Report 1990: Concept and measurement of human development', Oxford University Press, New York.
930. United Nation Development Programme 2019, 'Human Development Index', viewed 25 November 2019, <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>>.
931. United Nation Human Development Index 2018, 'Calculating the human development indices – graphical presentation', *Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 statistical update*, viewed 4 November 2019, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2018_technical_notes.pdf>
932. United Nation Human Development Programme n.d., 'Human Development Reports – country profiles', viewed 10 November 2019, <<http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/countries>>.
933. United Nation Human Development Programme, 'Human Development Reports 20016-2018', viewed 6 November 2019, <<http://www.hdr.undp.org/>>.
934. United Nations 2007, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, 13 September, <<https://www.un.org/development/desa/Indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-Indigenous-peoples.html>>.
935. United Nations Association of Sweden 2018, *Alternative report to Sweden's 22 and 23 periodical reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*, viewed 12 November 2019, <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CERD_NGO_SWE_30715_E.pdf>.
936. United Nations Human Rights Council 2015, *Report of the working group of experts on people of African descent on its sixteenth session*, viewed 11 April 2017,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A%20_HRC_30_56_Add_2_ENG_.docx&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1>.

937. United Nations News 2016, 'Australia's human rights record tainted by 'regressive' migration policies – UN expert', *United Nations*, 18 November, viewed 1 May 2020, <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/545762-australias-human-rights-record-tainted-regressive-migration-policies-un-expert>>.
938. United Nations News 2017, 'Australia's offshore refugee processing causes 'extensive suffering' and must end, says agency chief', *United Nations*, 24 July, viewed 1 May 2020, <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/07/562152-australias-offshore-refugee-processing-causes-extensive-suffering-and-must-end>>.
939. University of Newcastle 2017, *Colonial frontier massacres in central and eastern Australia 1788-1930*, The Centre for 21 Century Humanities, viewed 21 August 2019, <<https://c21ch.newcastle.edu.au/colonialmassacres/introduction.php>>.

V

940. Vago, S. 2005, *Social change*, Pearson Education, US.
941. Van Reybrouck, D. 2016, *Against elections*, Seven Stories Press.
942. Van Selm, J. 2019, 'Migration in the Netherlands: Rhetoric and perceived reality challenge Dutch tolerance', *Migration Policy Institute*, <<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-netherlands-rhetoric-and-perceived-reality-challenge-dutch-tolerance>>.
943. Vasta, E. 2006, 'Migration and migration research in Australia', in E. Vasta and V. Vuddamalay (eds), *International migration and the social sciences. Confronting national experiences in Australia, France and Germany*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.
944. Vasta, E. 2007, 'From ethnic minorities to ethnic majority policy: Multiculturalism and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 713-740.
945. Veracini, L. 2011, 'Introducing, settler colonial studies', *Settler Colonial Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-12.
946. Verrender, I. 2020, 'Consequences for Rio Tinto over Juukan Gorge catastrophe are the new norm', *ABC News (online)*, 14 September, viewed 1 September 2020,

- <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-14/superannuation-forcing-change-rio-tinto-juukan-gorge/12659824>>.
947. Vertovec, S. & Wessendorf, S. 2010, *The multiculturalism backlash European discourse, policies and practices*, Routledge.
 948. Vertovec, S. 2007, 'Super-diversity and its implications', *Ethnic Studies and Racial Studies*, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 1024-1054.
 949. VicHealth 2007, *More than tolerances: embracing diversity for health: Discrimination affecting migrant and refugee communities in Victoria, its health consequences, community attitudes and solutions*, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, Melbourne.
 950. VicHealth 2008, *Ethnic and race-based discrimination as a determinant of mental health and well-being*, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, Melbourne.
 951. Victorian Electoral Commission 2017, *Local Government election reports*, viewed 11 March 2020, <<https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/files/Report%20on%20the%20conduct%20of%20the%202016%20Local%20Government%20Elections.pdf>>.
 952. Victorian Multicultural Commission 2020, 'Victoria's Multicultural Festival', *Victorian Government*, <<https://www.multiculturalcommission.vic.gov.au/victorias-multicultural-festival>>.
 953. Vision of Humanity 2019, 'Research reports – Global Peace Index (2007-2019)', *Institute of Economics & Peace*, viewed 3 November 2019, <<http://visionofhumanity.org/reports/>>.
 954. Volkens, A., Burst, T., Krause, W., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S., Weißels, B. & Zehnter, L. 2020, *Project description*, MARPOR, <<https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>>.

W

955. Walden, M. 2020, 'Australia says China travel warning 'unhelpful' amid escalating diplomatic row', *ABC News (online)*, 8 June, viewed 8 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-08/china-coronavirus-travel-ban-australia-diplomatic-row/12332016>>.
956. Walden, M. 2020, 'Australia says China travel warning 'unhelpful' amid escalating diplomatic row', *ABC News (online)*, 8 June, viewed 8 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-08/china-coronavirus-travel-ban-australia-diplomatic-row/12332016>>.
957. Wallimann, I. 1977, 'On Max Weber's definition of power', *Australian New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 231-235.

958. Walsh, M. 2020, 'Here's what you told us about racism in Australia during the coronavirus pandemic', *ABC News (online)*, 14 May, viewed 14 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-14/racism-in-australia-during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic/12234832?nw=0>>.
959. Wang, B. & Hameed, L. 2017, "Stop asking me that": Questions about race and identity that need to be retired', *ABC News (Online)*, 17 November, viewed 17 November 2017, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-17/race-and-identity-questions-you-should-really-stop-asking/9144856>>.
960. Waters, D., Waters, T., Hahnke, E., Lippke, M., Ludig-Gluck, E., Mal, D., Ritzi-Messner, N., Veldhoen, C. & Fassnacht, L. 2010, 'The distribution of power within the community: Classes, *stande*, parties', *Journal of Classical Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 137-152.
961. Waters, M. C. 1989, 'The everyday use of surname to determine ethnic ancestry', *Qualitative Sociology*, vol. 12, pp. 303-324.
962. Waters, T. & Waters, D. 2010, 'The new Zeppelin University translation of Weber's "class, status, party"', *Journal of Classical Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 153-158.
963. Waters, T. & Waters, D. 2016, 'Are the terms "socio-economic status" and "class status" a warped form of reasoning from Max Weber?', *Palgrave Communications*, vol. 2, no.1, DOI:10.1057/palcomms.2016.2
964. Weber, M. 1949, *The methodology of the social sciences*, trans. and ed. E.A Shils and H.A. Finch, Free Press, New York.
965. Weber, M. 1968, *Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology*, 2 volumes transl. G. Roth & C. Wittich (eds), Bedminster Press, New York.
966. Weber, M. 1978, 'Economy and society', in G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds), *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology / Max Weber*, University of California Press, Berkely.
967. Weber, M. 1978, *Economy and society*, vols. I & II, trans. and ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles.
968. Wegener, B. 1992, 'Concepts and measurement of prestige', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 18, pp 253-280.
969. Weitzman M.L. 1992, 'On diversity', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 107, no. 2, pp. 363-406.
970. Welch, D. 2020, 'Coronavirus 'dossier' was a basic timeline of facts handed out by US State Department with no new evidence', *ABC News (online)*, 25 May, viewed 25 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-26/china-coronavirus-dossier-came-out-of-us-state-department/12282994>>.

971. Welch, I. H. 2003, *Alien son: The life and times of Cheok Hong Cheong, (Zhang Zhuoxiong) 1851-1928*, PhD thesis, DOI 10.25911/5d7a2bfde8969
972. Wendt, A. 1987, 'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory', *International Organization*, vol. 41, no.3, pp. 335-370.
973. Wendt, A. 1999, *Social theory of international politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
974. Western Australian Electoral Commission 2016, *2015 Local Government ordinary elections*, April, viewed 11 March 2020, <<https://www.elections.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/2015%20Local%20Government%20Ordinary%20Elections%20Report.pdf>>.
975. Wherry, T. 2017, 'How the federal government is slowly becoming as diverse as Canada', *CBC News (Online)*, 29 December, viewed 13 October 2019, <<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-appointments-diversity-analysis-wherry-1.4448740>>.
976. White, L. 2019, 'Digging up hidden history of Chinese gold mining on North Coast beaches', *ABC News (online)*, 19 July, viewed on 21 July 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-19/curious-north-coast-hidden-history-of-chinese-gold-mining/11309694>>.
977. Wickes, R., Zahnow, R., White, G. & Mazerolle, L. 2014, 'Ethnic diversity and its impact on community social cohesion and neighborly exchange', *Journal of Urban Affairs*, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 51-78.
978. Wiesner, K., Birdi, A., Eliassi-Rad, T., Farrell, H., Garcia, D., Lewandowsky, S., Palacios, P., Ross, D., Sornette, D. & Thebault, K. 2019, 'Stability of democracies: a complex systems perspective', *European Journal of Physics*, vol. 40, 014002 (19 pages).
979. Wilding, R. & Nunn, C. 2018, 'Non-metropolitan productions of multiculturalism: refugee settlement in rural Australia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 41, no. 14, pp. 2542-2560.
980. Wilkins, R. & Lass, I. 2018, *The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey: Selected findings from Waves 1 to 16*, Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research, University of Melbourne.
981. Wilkinson, R. & Pickett, K. 2009, *The spirit level: Why more equal societies almost always do better*. Penguin, London.
982. Wilkinson, R. G. & Pickett, K. E. 2006, 'Income inequality and population health: a review and explanation of the evidence', *Social Science & Medicine*, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 1768-1784.

983. Williams, G. & Hume, D. 2013, *Human rights under the Australian Constitution*, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia.
984. Williams, G. 2013, 'Race and the Australian Constitution', *Australasian Parliamentary Review*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 4-16.
985. Williams, G. 2015, 'Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples in the Constitution', *University of Tasmania Law Review*, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 115-129.
986. Williams, G. 2017, 'Uluru Statement offers up different set of priorities', *The Sydney Morning Herald (Online)*, 28 May, viewed 16 August 2019, <<https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/uluru-statement-offers-up-different-set-of-priorities-20170528-gweya1.html>>.
987. Willingham, R. & Dunstan, J. 2020, 'Adem Somyurek quits Victorian Labor Party after 60 Minutes airs allegations of branch stacking, offensive language', *ABC News (online)*, 15 June, viewed 15 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-15/victorian-labor-minister-adem-somyurek-sacked/12354870>>.
988. Willis, O. 2020, 'Mental health toll of coronavirus to create 'second wave' of pandemic, experts warn', *ABC News (online)*, 30 April, viewed 30 April 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/health/2020-04-30/coronavirus-mental-health-second-wave-impacts-of-pandemic/12197930>>.
989. Wimmer, A. 2002, *Nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict: Shadows of modernity*, Cambridge University Press, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490415>.
990. Winant, H. 2001, *The world is a ghetto: Race and democracy since World War II*, Basic Books, New York.
991. Windschuttle, K. 2004, *The White Australia Policy*, Macleay Press, Sydney.
992. Wise, A. & Velayutham, S. (eds) 2009, *Everyday multiculturalism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
993. Wolfe, P. 1999, *Settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology*, Cassell, New York.
994. Wolfe, P. 2006, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 387-409.
995. Wolfe, P. 2006, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 387-409.
996. Wolfe, P. 2016, *Traces of history: Elementary structures of race*, Verso, London.
997. Wood, A. 2016, 'Why Australia won't recognise Indigenous customary law', *The Conversation (online)*, 10 June, viewed 4

August 2020, <<https://theconversation.com/why-australia-wont-recognise-Indigenous-customary-law-60370>>.

998. Woodward, I., Skrbis, Z. and Bean, C. 2008, 'Attitudes towards globalization and cosmopolitanism: Cultural diversity, personal consumption and the national economy', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 207-226.
999. World Bank 2016, 'Gini Index for Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US', <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2015&locations=AU-CA-NL-NZ-GB-US-SE&start=2006&view=chart>>.
1000. World Bank 2019, 'GINI Index', 28 October, viewed 25 November 2019, <<https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/gini-index-world-bank-estimate-1>>.
1001. World Bank Estimate 2016, 'Gini Index for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US', viewed 25 November 2019, <<https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/compare#country=au:ca:nl:nz:se:gb:us>>.
1002. World Values Survey 2010-2014, 'Online data analysis', *WVS* website, viewed 18 November 2019, <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>>.
1003. Wyatt, K. 2019, 'Walk with me, Australia: Ken Wyatt's historic pledge for Indigenous recognition', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 Jul, viewed 10 July 2019, <<https://www.smh.com.au/national/walk-with-me-australia-ken-wyatt-s-historic-pledge-for-indigenous-recognition-20190710-p525rx.html>>.

X

1004. Xiao, B. & Dziedzic, S. 2020, 'Senator Eric Abetz's controversial questions about loyalty rattle Chinese communities in Australia', *ABC News (online)*, 22 October, viewed 22 October 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-22/senator-abetz-questions-about-loyalties-rattle-chinese-community/12797638>>.
1005. Xiao, B. 2020, 'Melbourne vloggers fined \$5,000 after filming themselves breaching curfew for McDonald's run', *ABC News (online)*, 12 August, viewed 12 August 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-12/melbourne-international-students-break-curfew-for-maccas-run/12546682>>.

Y

1006. Yale University 2020, 'eHRAF user guide: Browse cultures by region', *Yale University eHRAF World Cultures*,

<https://ehrafworldcultures.yale.edu/webhelp/#Browse/browse_cultures_region_t.html>.

1007. Yang, S. 2020, 'Video shows Chinese woman being racially attacked in Melbourne over coronavirus', *ABC News (online)*, 6 May, viewed 6 May 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-06/coronavirus-woman-racist-attack-in-melbourne/12216854?nw=0>>.
1008. Yankelovich, D. 1991, *Coming to public judgment: Making democracy work in a complex world*, Syracuse University Press, N.Y.
1009. Yiftachel, O. & Ghanem, A. 2004, 'Understanding ethnocratic regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories', *Political Geography*, vol. 23, pp. 647-676.
1010. Yiftachel, O. 1997, 'Israeli society and Jewish-Palestinian reconciliation: 'ethnocracy' and its territorial contradictions', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 505-519.
1011. Yiftachel, O. 1999, 'Ethnocracy': the politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine', *Constellations*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 364-390.
1012. Yiftachel, O. 2000, 'Ethnocracy' and its discontents: minorities, protests, and the Israeli polity', *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 725-756.
1013. Yiftachel, O. 2006, *Ethnocracy: land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine*, University Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
1014. Young, E. 2020, 'This is racism': Chinese-Australians say they've faced increased hostility since the coronavirus outbreak began', *SBS News (online)*, 31 January, viewed 31 January 2020, <<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/this-is-racism-chinese-australians-say-they-ve-faced-increased-hostility-since-the-coronavirus-outbreak-began>>.
1015. Young, I. M. 2009, 'Structural injustice and the politics of difference', in T. Christiano and J. Christman (eds), *Contemporary debates in political philosophy*, Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
1016. Young, I.M. 1990, *Justice and the politics of difference*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
1017. Yuan, Z. & Zhang, Z. 2017, 'An ideological critique of neo-liberalism: a case study of Hayek', *International Critical Thought*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 493-506.

Z

1018. Zhao, I., Handley, E. & Walsh, M. 2020, 'China is attacking Australia over racism – but ordinary people are getting stuck in the middle', *ABC News (online)*, 18 Jul, viewed 18 July 2020,

- <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-18/china-australia-coronavirus-racism-affects-on-ordinary-people/12469092>>.
1019. Zhou, N. 2020, 'Asian Australians threatened and spat on in racist incidents amid coronavirus', *The Guardian (online)*, 24 Jul, viewed 24 July 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jul/24/asian-australians-threatened-and-spat-on-in-racist-incidents-amid-coronavirus>>.
 1020. Zhou, N. 2020, 'Asian Australians threatened and spat on in racist incidents amid coronavirus', *The Guardian (online)*, 24 July, viewed 24 July 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jul/24/asian-australians-threatened-and-spat-on-in-racist-incidents-amid-coronavirus>>.
 1021. Zhou, N. 2020, 'Survey of COVID-19 racism against Asian-Australians records 178 incidents in two weeks', *The Guardian (online)*, 17 Apr, viewed 21 April 2020, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/survey-of-covid-19-racism-against-asian-australians-records-178-incidents-in-two-weeks>>.
 1022. Zick, A., Wolf, C., Küpper, B., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Heitmeyer, W. 2008, 'The syndrome of group-focused enmity: the interrelation of prejudices tested with multiple cross-sectional and panel data', *Journal of Sociology*, Iss. 64, pp. 363–383. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00566.x
 1023. Zizek, S. 2008, *Violence*, Picador, New York, US.
 1024. Zubrycki, J. & Martin, J. 1977, *Submission to the Australian Population and Immigration Council on the Green Paper, Immigration Policies and Australia's Population*, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, pp. 1-2 and 4-19.
 1025. Zubrzycki, J. 1982, *National consultations on multiculturalism and citizenship: report*, Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
 1026. Zubrzycki, J. 1986, 'Multiculturalism and beyond: the Australian experience in retrospect and prospect', *New Community*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 167-176, DOI: <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/10.1080/1369183X.1986.9975963>.
 1027. Zwart, H. & Mackay, M. 2020, 'NT Police officer dismissed over Yuendumu shooting singlet', *ABC News (online)*, 10 June, viewed 10 June 2020, <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-10/nt-police-officer-dismissed-over-yuendumu-shooting-singlet/12341252>>.