

Coastal Architectures and Politics of Tourism: Leisurescapes in the Global Sunbelt

Chapter 26 / Walkerhill Resort: A Space of Exception in Post-war South Korea

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Abstract

This chapter examines South Korea's first modern resort Walkerhill that was built to attract foreign tourists and the American GIs in the region. It shows how the resort operated as a liminal space of tensions and ambiguities: as a tool for the authoritarian state to coerce a more favourable discourse of modernity through the prolonged stimulation of an imminent threat from the North on the one hand, and stirring the public's imagination of a capitalist prosperous society while patronising national doctrines of frugality on the other. Through a selective imposition of rules and physical boundaries, Walkerhill disrupted the locals and their basic rights to the city, functioning as a reminder of their exclusion. Ironically, however, it was also these rules that had made Walkerhill unique. In the same manner as it was identified as an icon of discrimination, Walkerhill also came to act as a zone of spatial emancipation.

In the eastern outskirts of Seoul's Ahcha hill, with an impressive view over the Han River, lies the country's very first modern resort—Walkerhill. The resort is named after Walton H. Walker, a fallen American general during the Korean War and comprised of five hotels each tributed to American war heroes: Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgeway Maxwell Taylor, James Vanfleet and Lyman Lemnitzer. Offering rare modern amenities such as heated swimming pools, a stable, a bowling alley, a theatre and a night club, a golf course, a casino, a shooting range, and a yacht house, Walkerhill was one of the biggest and most luxurious resorts in the Asia-Pacific at the time of its opening in April 1963 (Fig. 01).¹ It signalled the start of South Korea's post-war tourism that was exclusively built to attract foreign tourists and the American GIs stationed in the region.² The developmental state, likewise, begun developing tourism well before a culture of leisure had developed for and by its people—the emerging *civilization*

du loisir—a leisure-based society yet to emerge in South Korea's post-war landscape. This distinction, which was indicated in unison by reports from the United States Operations Mission to Korea (1966) and Boeing Company (1974), was the disparate concept of a vacation between Koreans and the international tourists: who, for the former, enjoyed resting quietly in simple surroundings (often around old Buddhist temples) while the latter sought leisure and entertainment in a modern resort setting that called for new facilities.³

As an outcome of both the diminishing US's foreign aid and the complex geopolitical tension ensued by the Cold War, the construction of the resort came at a time when modernization was measured in reference to its northern counterpart. The South Korean government, impressed by Pyongyang's neat grid and carefully arranged monumental architecture along the banks of Daedong River, placed tremendous psychological pressure on the public for drastic urban change.⁴ Beginning with Walkerhill on the eastern side of Han River, the South Korean regime explored new ways in which grand architectural projects could emulate the spectacles of the enemy's capital.

Beyond its significance as one of the first large-scale projects of the new authoritarian regime that came to power in 1961, Walkerhill is important in that it operated as a **space of exception** to all other sectors of the South Korean society that were mobilised for war preparation under the ideology of total national security (*ch'ongnyōkanbo*) and total unity (*ch'onghwadangyōl*).⁵ It was in Walkerhill that the suspension of many of the external rules that apply to the outside world was accepted: in place of the kind of ascetism and egalitarianism marked by pre-emptive restrictions on excessive consumption came prestige, extravagance and night-life. Operating as a liminal space of tensions and ambiguities, Walkerhill stirred the public's imagination of a capitalist prosperous society while patronising national doctrines of frugality. By skilfully deploying a series of spatio-temporal regulations such as bypass roads, curfews, symbols, and body politic, the state had created favourable conditions that would

legitimise exceptions and discriminations that took ostentatious public form (occurring in conjunction with the construction of the resort) such as the eviction the urban poor and the resultant fragmentation of the urban fabric. Further to these strategies of state coercion, however, this chapter will show how Walkerhill, though restricting and discriminatory for the majority, was exploited by a more privileged members of the public as a zone of escape from the largely limiting state.

Making Walkerhill: material signifier of modernity

The idea for a resort arose in July 1961, during a short, unpremeditated conversation between Kim Chong-p'il, Park Chung Hee's (hereafter Park) trusted Lieutenant and the Founding Director of the Korean Central Information Agency, and Guy Meloy Jr., Commander of the UN forces (primarily American) stationed in South Korea since the 1953 ceasefire of the Korean War. Pointing out the lack of recreation and rehabilitation facilities in South Korea, Meloy shared his concerns for a "possible security vacuum" at the border due to some 30,000 troops having to spend their vacation in Japan at any one time, making it "inefficient and difficult to respond in a **state of emergency**".⁶ From South Korea's point of view, its socio-political (regime stability) and economic (flow of revenue) benefits would be overwhelming should the UN forces in Korea go for leisure in Seoul.

Several days after the discussion, the government enacted the *Tourism Promotion Act* that categorised the 'Tourist Hotel' (*Kwan'gwanghot'el*) for the first time as "a place with adequate structure and facility that provides food and accommodation to foreign tourists."⁷ Tourist Hotels, likewise, became synonymous with a place for foreigners. And as daily newspapers posted names of notable international visitors' occupation, travel itinerary and accommodation, hotels were increasingly associated with prestige, distinction and foreignness.

Personal preference, not scientific logic, governed the selection of the Walkerhill site. Park's appraisal of the scenery during a flyover in an L19 helicopter (high-modernists' popular perspective of analyzing the city) sealed the short survey mission.⁸ The new hotel would be constructed across sixty-three hectares of land on the same site that housed Seungman Rhee's (the country's former President) favored summer villa—a conscious decision that symbolised a decisive shift in the country's policy geared towards a 'economy above all else' (*Kyōngjejeilchuŭi*) agenda that mobilized citizens as 'dutiful nationals'. Despite the significant number of private properties that fell within the pre-conceived site boundary, as a prostrate civil society, they lacked the capacity to resist the plan and were quickly removed with little or no compensation. The inevitable violence imposed by the *Land Expropriation Order* (*t'ojisuyongnyōng*)—a remnant of a colonial decree which allowed the state to expropriate the land in the interest of the public—later ruptured prolonged legal disputes, and many more silent victims.⁹

The construction of Walkerhill, further to its economic and political propositions, played a significant part in both promoting and unsettling the way architects practiced modernism by forcing them to seek ways to practice alongside the authoritarian state who provided the context for their creativity and success. The six architects selected for the project were a new generation architects who were mostly educated or practiced internationally, but less established in the South Korean architectural scene.¹⁰ For example, Kim Swoo-Geun, a leading architect of the project, was a fresh graduate from Tokyo with no practical experience. He was called upon by Kim Chong-p'il, who is said to have been duly impressed by Kim Swoo-Geun's grandiose design aesthetics expressed in his winning submission for South Korea's National Assembly Building (1959, not realized) that appealed to serve as "testimony to the grandeur of the regime."¹¹

The basis for their selection, was closely aligned with the state's pursuit of the notion of modernity as a doctrine for nation-building concerned with productivity and desire for scientific and technological progress—something which the state could proudly showcase internationally and domestically. As an enthusiastic advocate of high modernism who was faithful in the grand building projects, Park pursued the notion of modernity as a nation-building project concerned with productivity but less so in aesthetic terms.¹² His idea of aesthetic was hardly an aesthetic of modern beauty, but rather monumental images of heroic progress. Kim Swoo-geun's Hill Top Bar (Fig. 02) and Douglas House (Fig. 03) in Walkerhill, to an extent, are outcomes of such preference noted for their unique sculptural qualities designed to make a powerful visual impact as a *form*. The Hill Top Bar's inverted braced frames, for example, despite its technical ingenuity, was marketed instead as a symbolic tribute to the fallen American hero that seemed to mimic Walker's initials. Kim Swoo-geun himself, known for his criticism on the country's modernism's shortcoming of its expression of 'Korean-ness',¹³ in like manner, oddly made no reference to the building's use, habits, tradition, desires and practices of Korea or of its city. Instead, he came to compare the Hill Top Bar to Jørn Utzon's Sydney Opera House, praising it as a "re-founding of architectural history that had lost the balance between functionalism and rationalism",¹⁴ somewhat echoing Sert, Léger and Giedion's attempt to place monumentality within the historical evolution of modernism and the architectural culture at large. The focus on monumentality of these buildings inevitably contributed to a reductionist reading by architectural historians that its design was indubitably Oscar Niemeyer's Caracas Museum and Hotel da Pampulha.¹⁵

As beneficiaries from state patronage the architects of the project rarely challenged the state's ideology and, instead, readily played, according to Jung In Kim, the role of "state technocrat."¹⁶ Naturally, many of the project's architects went on to assume prestige as 'national architects': Lee Hee-Tai was chosen to design the National Theatre of Korea (1967); Aum Duk-Moon won

the proposal for the Sejong Cultural Center (1973); Kim Swoo-geun went to establish himself as "Lorenzo de' Seoul" (as referred to by *Time* magazine in 1977) for his pioneering influence on spatial, social, and cultural spectrum of Korea's post-war scene. "This was in part generated by Kim himself," Melany Sun-Min Park writes, "who encouraged the public to celebrate his reputation alongside the monumental architecture he constructed".¹⁷ On the contrary, those who, like Kim Jung-eop, remained critical towards the architectural and urban policies of the military regime, lost prestige in South Korea's post-war architectural scene.

Walkerhill as a zone of discrimination: highways and housing

Soon after its construction, Walkerhill became a popular target of the media as an untimely and reckless development. The level of housing shortage in Seoul during the 1960s averaged at forty-five per cent—a figure surpassing the national average by more than twofold—and in its process, earned a disgraceful cognomen as 'Epang Palace of Korea'—a mythical ancient Chinese palace so grand and extravagant that is said to have outshined the sun and sky.¹⁸ The mounting criticism had forced Kim Hyun Ok, the newly appointed 'bulldozer' mayor of Seoul in 1966 known for his single-minded focus on 'modernisation through construction', to quickly devise a new housing plan, creating two disparate housing policies being implemented concurrently.¹⁹ Just as new apartments were being built to house the more favourable population; existing squatter communities (*muhögach'on*)—some 136, 650 known units—were being evicted and forced to relocate to the outer parts of the city.²⁰ As a result, neighbourhoods abutting Walkerhill underwent a rather explicit land redevelopment in 1967 to house the emerging middle-class.

By late 1970s, with the newly developed Walkerhill Apartments, the area came to be known as the most luxurious residential area in Seoul. Built with expatriates, diplomats and American military personnel in mind—and with the highest ratio of foreign residents per square

meter in Seoul—the entire neighbourhood had the sense of being 'off limits' as a place reserved largely for foreign riches. What was one of the most under-populated, under-developed and under-serviced areas in Seoul, soon became one of the most affluent neighbourhoods in South Korea. The hierarchy of urban space in which Walkerhill occupied pride of place presupposed the displacement of the urban poor toward the periphery revealing the dark side of the glamorous leiscapescape.

The relocation of squatter settlements, however, did not always follow the same scientific rhetoric the state had used to rationalise other urban schemes. Instead, the process foremostly revolved around the visual appeasement of those travelling to and back from the resort. By presenting an undisrupted view of the city from a distance, the planners had hoped to negate prevailing ground conditions marked by poverty, disarray and confusion through the construction of two high-speed motorways in the outer and inner part of the city. From the airport, the four-lane highway (*Kangbyŏnbukro*) stretching over 75 kilometers along Han River provided an entirely new perspective of the city compared to an old route cutting through the city centre. The virtue of its distance (from the city centre) and speed (time taken between airport and Walkerhill), the highway resolved what might have exposed the disorderly city into an apparently vaster order and serenity. Any squatter settlements that disrupted the visual appeasement along these routes were ordered to be cleared and replaced by modern factories and regimented apartment blocks that pronounced (at least in aesthetic terms) modernisation.²¹ Further design treatment was carried out to assist with this aesthetical cleansing: despite being engineered as an outer-city motorway, seemingly contrary efforts have been made to embellish the shoulders of the thoroughfare with vegetation, five-foot fences and even fountains in the median strip. While these accoutrements were largely incongruous amidst the rapidly moving traffic, it did help to mask the less desirable views of the city.

The new inner-city motorway (*Ch'ōnggyegogadoro*), designed by Kim Swoo-geun, also served a similar purpose: replacing in its path, what was once home to Seoul's largest squatter population. Instead of acting to unify the inner city, the elevated motorway provided high-speed connection between the Blue House (presidential house) and Walkerhill, while seamlessly dissociating its user from the rest of the city fabric and hence, earning its name "the Skyway" (Fig. 04). Not only did these motorways evade the challenges of urban integration, they simultaneously maintained a rift amongst the rest of the urban population due to the lack of number of motor vehicles at the time of its conception (20, 638 in 1966), and was therefore considered more of Park's personal affair.²²

Similar to the city's housing policies, while not segregated by law, the separate road systems produced two modes of movement: bypass roads to Walkerhill for the motorized few, and the original old roads left as they were for the non-motorized many. These bypass roads created very different understandings of the city: for the former, one that was continuous, ordered and serene, which had no necessary relationship to the highly congested and disorderly ground conditions; and for the latter, a fragmented urban fabric that disconnected the rest of the public to the place.²³ It was exactly from the perspective of the privileged few, in the same way the Skyway functioned in space-time, that the term 'miracle of Han river' was coined to describe the high-speed modernisation they observed. As much as these highways promised urban integration, they worked as physical and psychological boundaries reinforcing the class segregation enacted by the divisive housing policy, all the while helping to sustain Walkerhill's sanctuary-like environment that appealed to the privileged. Walkerhill was part of a visual regime of progress, hiding anything that does not fit.

Walkerhill as a space of exception: curfew and night-life

Seoul's night-life, until the abrogation of the curfew in 1982, was virtually non-existent except in few specially designated Tourist Hotels such as Walkerhill.²⁴ As a city exposed to constant threat of war, security has taken on an overly dominant role filling the defence of spaces and transgressions in the form of a curfew. Operating under the state of emergency sustained by its military confrontation with North Korea (and in the wider backdrop of the Cold War), the South Korean state had implemented a strict mobility restriction (*t'onghaenggŭmji*) between 12am–4am. It is no coincidence that stories of Seoul after dark are so rare: as Kim Seung-Ok puts it, in his novel *Travels to Mujin (Mujin'gihaeng)*, "All things and all thoughts soaked into to the sound of the siren. Alas, everything disappeared from the world."²⁵

In *A Day in a Life of Novelist Kubo (Sosŏlga kubossiŭi iril)*, a popular fiction by Choi In-Hoon, the author questions the right to the city by criticising the state's selective imposition of curfew as 'time rationing': "Night. The time when half of lives are confiscated [...] The night that should be ours, monopolized by nameless men [...] The night that only opens to foreigners and their prostitutes, dips us into an endless sorrow."²⁶ Similarly, in his description of the process of time being 'granted' at the mercy of the state, Lee Haeng-Seon argues that the particularities of 'time rationing' have, as a consequence, led to an inevitable process of 'space rationing'.²⁷ The uninterrupted movement of foreigners in the Tourist Hotels and throughout the city has been interpreted by local news as contingent upon the disruption of locals and their basic rights,²⁸ those who are effectively imprisoned by the power relations—not simply capital relations—which construct and define the (uneven) rules and boundaries.²⁹ This selective imposition of a curfew, which had come from both the state's desire for order and equally from its awareness that such custom is regarded as a sign of backwardness inappropriate for any ambitious city, made Walkerhill unique: a space of exception.

In the same manner as it was identified as an icon of class division and discrimination, Walkerhill also came to act as a hallmark of spatial emancipation and an identifier of night-life

almost non-existent at the time. For the small portion of the public who could afford it, Walkerhill provided ways to lawfully infringe on the existing curfew. All of its buildings and streets were lit throughout the night, cafés and bars bustled, while the guests flooded the seats at the casino—one of many illicit activities made licit within the grounds of Walkerhill. Further, the composition of various facilities scattered across the entire hillside, unlike other hotels that consisted of a single building, provided its guests with a rare chance to experience Seoul at night as they walked or drove between these facilities. What may seem like simple acts of stepping out from bed to smoke a cigarette in the middle of the night, heading to the hilltop bar for a late supper, or going for a stroll in dusk constituted (at least for the locals) a story of agency in times of constraints. The Walkerhill Show, which hosted a prestigious list of American and Korean performers such as Louis Armstrong, Jewel Brown, Honey Bee, Johnny Brothers, and Yoon Bok-Hee, also entertained its guests until dawn (Fig. 05).³⁰

In so doing, a variety of meanings were incorporated: Walkerhill defined the status of the user and symbolized privilege. It soon became a popular culture amongst the prestigious group of people who were given access (and later followed by the rising middle-class) to flout the curfew by "going for a drive to Walkerhill in the evening and returning home the next morning".³¹ Walkerhill thus appeared well-positioned as sites of enquiry for understanding how the power dynamics of time play out in urban space—a space for potential transgression within the boundaries of the law.

Walkerhill as a site of inculcation: conflicts and opportunities

Just as much as Walkerhill alluded a sense of freedom, it was also perceived as a material symbol that kept the idea of conflict alive. By portraying the stability of national security in militant and defensive terms—vis-à-vis the North—it not only justified the need for exceptions as a socio-spatial norm, but Park Chung Hee as a "'tough-shooter' that Korea needs today in

putting the house in order".³² As Jang-Jip Choi puts it, "the North Korean threat of invasion, though more psychological than physical [...] served as a tremendous resource for the state" to keep alive the myth of emergency.³³

Under the pretence of the state of emergency, the scene of American GIs taking vacation in Seoul generated both a sense of security and fear (Fig. 06). In the public eye, the visual presence of the GIs at Walkerhill was seen as a palpable reassurance against North Korean hostilities at the border. According to Sun-ho Lee, a former bell-boy at Walkerhill, "You won't find any other place in Korea with a greater number of [military] stars packed in one building [...] Witnessing the number of American military ribbons and insignia in the hotel, we felt most safe whilst at work".³⁴ Lee's comment discloses how the presence of a huge number of foreign soldiers compelled Seoulites of the war that "never formally ended, but has been maintained—as a quasi-permanent state of exception—via an unusual ceasefire".³⁵ More importantly, it reveals a spatial dynamic between the centre and the periphery: how the resort in the city is used to understand the distant border as an origin of the state of emergency, where the recent memory of war remains a live issue that cannot be forgotten, to the point that it becomes the norm. The prolonged simulation of an imminent threat—the dual anxiety of economic fallout and military security—over time, becomes so concrete that it begins to sustain the state of emergency, which becomes the foundation of the entirety of the nation's worldview. In other words, Walkerhill provided the state with the power to choose a window into one of thousands of narrow competing discourses of modernity.

Driven by Park's vision of 'rich nation, strong army', the military junta adopted modernism as a nation building strategy that called for "construction on the one hand and national defense on the other", and preached the virtue of "frugality, hard work, and saving"—a process Seungsook Moon refers to as 'militarized modernity'.³⁶ The conflation of politico-military exigency with the economic imperative of national economic development as

mutually-reinforcing bases of his regime, Park tried to impose new societal values in order to create more obedient and industrious subjects. The state-sponsored nationalism, channeled in the anxiety of further conflict, did not encourage individuals to see themselves as rights-bearing subjects,³⁷ which, in turn, prevented them from questioning the state-led urban projects.³⁸ Indeed, a shared conception of Seoulites under the authoritarian regime, in popular fiction, was their timid and recumbent attitudes whose everyday life is circumscribed by the ineffaceable fear of being 'banished' from the city.³⁹ In the same manner, grand national projects like Walkerhill were depicted as a much-needed national sacrifice: a "patriotic civic duty" one must endure as it was a tool to win American hearts and currency; a kind of "pro-American salvationism" that was coerced as a strategy, not discrimination.⁴⁰ In this context, the Korean people's inability to access Walkerhill was because Korea, as a nation, was not yet modern and, thus, undeserving. Those who raised questions on the state's elective affinity to modernity's drive for 'economy above all else', would be branded a communist or 'anti-nation' (*Panminjokchuŭija*). Beneath the society armed with 'can-do spirit' and the glamour of leisure, the discriminatory nature of the resort helped to equate 'pro-Americanism' with 'anti-communism', and conflate sacrifice with frugality and modernity.⁴¹

One example of this process is Walkerhill's role in instilling individual members of the body politic for quotidian war preparations: where the leaders of residential associations (*pansanghoejang*), model students, and border residents were regularly invited for a day of pampering at the resort (Fig. 07). According to Kim Gwi-nam, one of the attendees of the event, as a token of appreciation for their "anti-communist morality (*pan'gongdodŏk*), right living (*parŭnsaenghwal*) and national ethics (*kungminyulli*)", the participants were handsomely rewarded with a tour of the resort, a swim in the pool, a seat at the Walkerhill Show, and a lunch buffet, which the organisers described as the "fruits of freedom",⁴² which was often complimented with a carefully curated visit to the national cemetery and war memorials.⁴³

It was also in this process that Walkerhill became an acceptable outlier essential to bring about necessary order to help guide the yet immature nation towards becoming a moral citizen. Drawing yet again on the strategy of exception, Walkerhill was made open to public during Christmas (a city-wide attraction which sold out within days) offering a rare chance of night-life and extravagance: the bodily habits that thought to constitute an immoral citizen. Despite being inconsistent to the state's ongoing effort to steer the public away from excessive expenditure and consumption in the face of Western goods being introduced—which the developmental state calibrated people's expenditure in relation to their ethics⁴⁴—it was just as necessary for the state to provide vignettes 'modern life' which, for many, the meaning remained vague. The news of the party, however, was almost always paired with reports of "derailing behaviour", "violence" and "turmoil" which, in turn, helped to legitimise the state's advocacy in reaffirming (even strengthening) its spatio-temporal restrictions. In December 1966, the Seoul City Council, along with many other institutions like the YMCA, had begun a campaign with a slogan: "silent nights, not frenzy nights."⁴⁵ In the view of the state, the spatio-temporal restrictions had not caused the frenzy, rather it was a reflection of poor civic awareness requiring further discipline.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to show how different approaches to analyzing the leisurescape from the perspective of the state and the public would allow architecture to be seen as a site of tension and ambiguities. It has revealed that Walkerhill was regarded as a potential 'zone of freedom' that offers an escape from disciplinary regimes of paternalistic nation-states on one hand, all the while normalizing a culture of consumption, entertainment and American-style "good life" as desirable, thereby legitimizing capitalism in the backdrop against the threat of communism on the other. The socio-spatial consequences of an 'economy first' approach reveal Walkerhill's

discriminatory modes of operation, but also how the resort was incorporated into peoples' consciousness as a place of yearning.

The efficient looks of highways and housing plans related to the Walkerhill scheme were not only instrumentalized to demarcate physical segregations as well as class divisions, but were also built as expressions of a modern and orderly society, without any critical scrutiny of the fact that 'order' and 'modernity' are not truly compatible if we understand the latter as not just efficiency but also individual freedoms, even transgression. Indeed, compared to the abstract sentiment of an invisible Northern enemy kept alive by the government that thrives on the 'system of division',⁴⁶ Walkerhill offered tangible experiences of certain achievable outcomes should they endure the 'necessary sacrifices' in their struggle for 'modernisation'. In other words, as a space of exception associated with images of discrimination, Walkerhill was just as successful in replacing this structure of thought within which 'exception' was associated with 'freedom'.

Beyond its vale as an enclave, Walkerhill functioned as a conduit of desire within which Korea's emerging middle-class could assert their presence in pursuit of 'modern life' not just in its aesthetical terms. While the resort's remoteness and its resulting inaccessibility was very much an outcome of its intended design, such qualities became its virtue by functioning as a window for those who sought to, though mostly opportunistic, bend the rules put in place by the oppressive regime. While the state never induced America as an object of desire, it was through these social, spatial as well as cultural 'exceptions' that Walkerhill became a symbol of opportunity and freedom, which the Korean people themselves pinned their hopes on, not only against poverty, but also the extreme level of censorship and discriminatory policies imposed on them by the highly restricting state. Concurrently and paradoxically, it was here that the subversion of many of the external rules that apply to the outside world could begin to take place.

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Captions

Figure 1 – Aerial photograph of Walkerhill, circa 1963. Source: Republic of Korea National Archives.

Figure 2 – Hilltop Bar by Kim Swoo-geun. © Kim Swoo Geun Foundation.

Figure 3 – Douglas Hotel by Kim Swoo-geun. © Kim Swoo Geun Foundation.

Figure 4 – Aerial photograph of the inner-city overpass or the 'skyway'. The squatter settlements along the highway were either screened or replaced by modern factories, gridded villas, and apartments. Source: Republic of Korea National Archives.

Figure 5 – The opening night of the Walker Hill Show. Source: Republic of Korea National Archives.

Figure 6 – Rows of the US army trucks or the "Willys Jeep" parked outside Walkerhill, circa 1963. Source: Republic of Korea National Archives.

Figure 7 – Walkerhill swimming pool, 1970s. Source: Republic of Korea National Archives.

¹ Sheraton Walkerhill, *Walkerhill samshimnyōnsa* (Seoul: Sheraton Walkerhill, 1993).

² Though within few years of its exclusive operation, the resort gradually opened its facilities to the public due to falling revenue and mounting deficit.

³ United States Operations Mission to Korea. *Tourism to Korea* (Washington, D.C.: USOM, 1966); Boeing Company, Field Operations and Support Division. *Korea Tourism Development Masterplan* (Seattle: Boeing Company, 1974).

⁴ Changmo Ahn, "Seoul and Pyongyang: Architecture as the Embodiment of World Systems," in *Crow's Eye View: The Korean Peninsula*, eds. Hyungmin Pai and Minsuk Cho (Seoul: Archlife, 2014), 75-88.

⁵ The same ideology was chanted until the late 1980s, gradually declining thereafter following the global mood of *détente*. Seungsook Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005).

⁶ Jung Mok Son, *Seoulto shigyehoe kiyagi vol. 2* (Paju: Hanul, 2003), 140.

⁷ *Tourist Promotion Act 1961* (Republic of Korea). <https://www.law.go.kr>.

⁸ A high-modernists' definitive view of a plan or a city which James Scott refers to as a "God's-eye view." James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), 57.

⁹ For example, see newspaper articles "Walkerhill hanpokp'an ttang kaei-kōsūlo p'ankyōl," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 28, 1967; "Changssie soyugwōn wōk'ōhiran ttang samch'ōnp'yōng," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 6, 1967.

- ¹⁰ Kim Hee-Choon was educated in the US and worked as an architect in the US Military Government in Korea; Kang Myung-Koo graduated from Waseda and worked with I. M. Pei in New York; Aum Duk-Moon, also a graduate at Waseda and worked with Ra Sang-Jin as an architectural engineer at a Japanese civil engineering company; Kim Chung-Up was educated in Japan and practiced under Le Corbusier. Only one, Lee Hee-Tai, was a local and self-taught architect in the project.
- ¹¹ Son, *Seoul toshigyehoek iyagi vol. 2*, 142-144.
- ¹² Suk Jung Han, "Park Chung Hee, and Spread and Implementation of Manchukuo's Version of High Modernism," *Korean Journal of Japanese Studies*, 3, (2010), 120-137.
- ¹³ Sung Soo Lee, "A Study on the Koreaness of Kim Swoo-geun's Architectural Philosophy," *Chohyo ŋgmidio hak*, 11, 3 (2008), 107-116; Inha Jung, *Architecture and Urbanism in Modern Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013), 82-83.
- ¹⁴ Changmo Ahn, "Influence of American and Japanese Architecture on Building the Post-war Korean Contemporary Architecture," *Journal of the Korean Academia-Industrial Cooperation Society*, 12, 12 (2011), 5980.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid*, 5974-5983.
- ¹⁶ Jung In Kim, "Constructing a "Miracle," Architecture, National Identity and Development of the Han River. *A Critical Exploration, of Architecture and Urbanism: Seoul, 1961-1988*," PhD diss., (University of California, Berkeley, 2008), 31.
- ¹⁷ Melany Sun-Min Park, "The paradox of excess: Kim Swoo-geun's *Môt* and his economical architecture", *The Journal of Architecture*, 22, 6 (2017), 1023.
- ¹⁸ It is estimated that in 1970, approximately 180,000 households or 770,000 people were considered as urban squatters making up thirteen per cent of Seoul's 5.8 million people. Young-wook Kim et al., *Chōsotūkh'ūng chukōchi pyōnch'ōnsayōnku: muhōka chōngch'akchilūl chungsimūlo* (Seoul: Seoul Special City, 2003), 25.
- ¹⁹ "The 7th Standing Committee Meeting of the 57th National Assembly", 8 July, 1966.
- ²⁰ Between 1966-1971, Seoul underwent city-wide resettlement of the squatter settlements relocating some 90,000 households or 390,000 urban poor. It followed a rudimentary process of 'Land Repartition' (*T'ochi-kuhoek-chōngli*) involving a violent process of appropriation of 'illegal' or 'irregular' sites followed by reallocation or removal. Jung In Kim, "The birth of urban modernity in Gangnam, Seoul", *Architecture Review Quarterly*, 19, 4 (2005), 372; Erik Moberg, "Struggles over Unlicensed Housing in Seoul, 1960-80", *Urban Studies*, 45, 2 (2008), 367-389.
- ²¹ On the problem of aesthetics in modernity, and as a prime factor of modernity, see Dalibor Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation: The Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 251-261.
- ²² Son, 181-203.
- ²³ Infrastructures, especially those for mobility, have the capacity to shape temporalities by connecting across space as well as by instilling a sense of progress. For discussions on this topic, see Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta and Hannah Appel, eds., *The Promise of Infrastructure* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2018); Brian Larkin, "The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 42, 10 (2013), 327-343.
- ²⁴ By May 1966, removal of night-time curfew in tourist hotels was extended to other cities. "T'onggūmhaeje," *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 29, 1966.
- ²⁵ Seung Ok Kim, *Mujin'gihaeng* (Seoul: Sasangye, 1964), 142.
- ²⁶ In Hoon Choi, *Sosōlga kubossūi iril* (Seoul: Moonji Publishing Company, 2009 [1970-1972]), 169-170.
- ²⁷ Lee Haeng Seon, "Night Curfew, Safety, and Freedom and Disaster", *Journal of Democracy and Human Rights*, 18, 1 (2018), 5-41.
- ²⁸ See, for example newspaper article "T'onggūmūn kibon'gwōnūi yurin," *Dong-a Ilbo*, January 29, 1964.
- ²⁹ For the discussion of power geometries, see Doreen Massey, "Power geometry and a progressive sense of place," in *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*, eds., John Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson and Lisa Tickner (London: Routledge, 1993), 59-69.
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- ³¹ Sun-ho Lee. Interview with the author. Personal Interview. Seoul, November 10, 2020.
- ³² R. C. Lee, "Korean Walker Hill," *Chicago Tribune*, May 29, 1963.
- ³³ Jang-Jip Choi, "'Political Cleavage in South Korea' and 'The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea,'" in *State and Society in Contemporary Korea*, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 33.
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- ³⁵ "Agamben, Postcoloniality, and Sovereignty in South Korea," in *Antipode*, 46, 3, (2014), 657.
- ³⁶ Moon, *Militarized Modernity*.
- ³⁷ *Ibid*.
- ³⁸ On the analysis of the ideological role of the top-down spatial process see James Duncan, *The City as Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- ³⁹ See, amongst many Il-nam Choi, *Portraits of Seoul* (Seoul: Sosōlmunhak, 1983).
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- ⁴³ For example, see newspaper article "Chūlgōun sōulgugyōng," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 23, 1966.
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- ⁴⁵ Joon-man Kang, "Hankuk k'ūrisūmasūi yōksa: 't'onggūm haejeūi kamkyōk'esō 'hankukhyōng tawōnchūū'ro," *Inmulkwa sasang*, 105, (January 2007), 155-205.

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