

# 7 Toward Global Digital Citizenship

## “Everyday” Practices of Young Australians in a Connected World

*Anita Harris, Jessica Walton, Amelia Johns,  
and Gilbert Caluya*

### Introduction

Fostering young people’s global digital citizenship in a mobile and connected world is a growing priority for policymakers. Schools are important spaces where the civic identities and practices of diverse young people are nurtured (MCEETYA, 2008; UNESCO, 2014). One key challenge in a globalized world is developing school curriculum that supports digital literacy, responsibility, rights claims, and intercultural understanding in order to cultivate global citizenship (Walton et al., 2013, 2014). As we have outlined elsewhere, “‘digital literacy’ refers to the technical and social skills to navigate technology, judge the quality and reliability of online information, and understand the social norms that apply in online settings” (Third et al., 2014, p. 3; see also Gilhooly & Lee, 2014)” (Harris & Johns, 2021, p. 401). As Caluya and colleagues (2018, p. 11) note, “A step beyond merely ensuring digital access, digital literacy is proposed as a set of teachable skills that can be imparted to vulnerable or minoritized groups to protect them from risk.”

Digital literacy skills development is primarily focused on the use of privacy settings on social media, detection of false accounts and misinformation, the use of blocking tools to limit exposure to bullying and hate speech, and so on (Siapera et al., 2018). However, digital literacy is also often linked to digital citizenship, which builds on the focus on skills and capacities but extends this into the domain of social responsibilities to others online. As Third and colleagues (2014, p. 7) argue, this “marks a shift to thinking about online practices as fundamentally social and community-based practices, as opposed to purely individual ones.” Digital citizenship approaches are interested in promoting digital participation of social groups, building social cohesion online, and understanding “how digital infrastructures can support a wider ‘civic culture’” (Couldry et al., 2014, p. 615). In this regard, digital citizenship is increasingly brought into conversation with global citizenship and the need for intercultural competencies, meaning the cultivation of global civic responsibilities and ethics (Andreotti, 2006) and capacity for respectful and ethical negotiation of participation, claim

making, and expression in shared spaces where diverse groups interact, from local communities to global digital publics.

Policymakers have attempted to address the “global” dimension of digital citizenship by joining with media industry partners and human rights organizations to develop programs that foster safe, responsible, equitable, and inclusive citizenship in a digitally connected world (UNESCO, 2014; Tan & Park, 2015). We acknowledge that there are valid criticisms of how human rights organizations, including UNESCO, frame their understanding of educational development, human rights, and social inclusion within a Western, Enlightenment model, which is often insensitive to local knowledges and practices within diverse cultural, economic, and social contexts (Andreotti, 2006, Andreotti & Pashby, 2013). Nonetheless, in principle, support for programs that harness growing global and digital interconnectedness and develop skills to engage in cross-cultural dialogue, which are core values and practices of global citizenship education, prevails in policy discussion (UNESCO, 2014). In practice, however, fears regarding who is in control in a digital era and what role governments should play in managing young people’s online behaviors and digital lives have led to a widening gap between policy—framed around human rights and global citizenship—and school-based programs—oriented toward risk management and social cohesion agendas (Livingstone et al., 2011; Third et al., 2014; Collin et al., 2011; McCosker, 2015; Walsh et al., 2020; Office of the e-Safety Commissioner, 2016a). This tension is underscored by persistent concerns about social media and internet services that make available sexualized or violent and extremist content to young people, but which are hosted in other jurisdictions beyond the regulatory powers of the state in which they are viewed (Livingstone et al., 2011; Third et al., 2014, 2019; e-Safety Commissioner, 2021b).

Nonetheless, while debates about regulation in this context are focused on platforms, services, and content, current youth digital policies and school-based programs in the Australian and regional context are more concerned with young people’s own digital practices, which are persistently framed as risky and a potential threat to social cohesion (Collin et al., 2011; Third et al., 2014, 2019; UNESCO, 2014). These concerns dominate the policies and programs of digital citizenship, reducing their effectiveness in promoting the potential benefits of online engagement to help develop young people into ethical and informed citizens. This also results in a worrying disconnect between digital and global citizenship curriculum and programs. Despite global citizenship policies and programs identifying that digital networks, technologies and cultures enable forms of youth-led civic participation, intercultural understanding, and learning (MCEETYA, 2008; Wierenga & Guevara, 2013; UNESCO, 2014), this focus is often sidelined in digital citizenship policies and programs. Although the literature may highlight links between transnational digital media use and global citizenship orientations, there is a gap between these claims and the content of programs, which are often framed by nation-centric and securitized understandings of citizenship and participation (McCosker, 2016; Johns, 2021).

In the first part of this chapter, we present a brief profile of Australian youth and digital inclusion within a striated Australian policy and program landscape to highlight tendencies to narrowly frame youth global and digital citizenship and to argue for a more integrated approach. We next consider the role of everyday youth digital media practices, with particular attention to marginalized youth who are often the target of corrective policies. We argue here that the everyday digital media use of young people should be more closely examined with attention to differences in class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexuality to bring together a more critical and expansive understanding of global citizenship and digital citizenship, in order to better align formal initiatives with young people's everyday experiences of global digital citizenship.

### **Australian youth: demographics and digital inclusion**

As reported by Lam et al. (2021), there are approximately three million youth aged 15–24 in Australia, constituting around one-eighth of the population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a). Among young people aged 12–24, just under half are either first- or second-generation migrants (VicHealth, Data61, CSIRO & MYAN, 2017). Twenty-five percent of young people aged 12–24 are from a culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) background, and this population is growing at a faster rate compared to the total population in this age group (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b; Hugo et al., 2014).<sup>1</sup> Five percent of the Australian youth population (aged 10–24), or about 1 in every 20 young people, is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018, p. 3).

Young Australians are significant users of the internet, digital and social media, and mobile technology. Ninety-seven percent of Australian households with children and young people have internet access (86% of households overall) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Ninety-two percent of Indigenous youth have internet access at home, with 86% accessing the internet at other sites, including schools and libraries (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018). People aged 15–17 years are the highest proportion of internet users (98%), and this age group also spends the most amount of time online (18 hours) for personal use each week (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Ninety-four percent of Australian teenagers have mobile devices and use these primarily for entertainment, communication, and social media, and 78% of Australian teenagers have one or more social media accounts (Rhodes, 2017). YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook are the platforms of choice for Australian Gen Zers (1991–2005) and Millennials (1976–1990), with use skewing away from Facebook and towards Instagram for the younger cohort (Roy Morgan, 2020). Comparatively, the second platform of choice among the youngest generation, Generation Alpha (2006–present), is TikTok, with increasing use among Gen Zers who are 25 years and under (Roy Morgan, 2020).

As Lam and Harris (2021) note, the internet is “increasingly regarded as an essential service” for young people's participation in education, employment,

information, community services, organization of finances, health and well-being, and connecting with family and friends (Thomas et al., 2019, p. 5). Young people's engagement with global youth cultures and digital life is widening youth horizons and enabling cosmopolitan forms of citizenship, social action, connection, and belonging (Johns, 2014; Third et al., 2014). However, internet access is stratified for young Australians, with young people from refugee, migrant, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds as well as youth from lower socioeconomic neighborhoods experiencing lower levels of digital inclusion, mainly due to issues of affordability (Lam & Harris, 2021; Harris et al., 2017). Further, rural/urban divides prevail in Australia, with studies finding that those living in remote areas experience a "double jeopardy of digital disadvantage," such that inequalities that result from lack of access to digital infrastructure are compounded by inequalities in education and work (Lam & Harris, 2021; Mossberger, 2009; Park, 2016). These issues around digital use, access, and inclusion shape considerations of global and digital citizenship education, which we turn to next.

### **Global and digital citizenship education: parallel rather than intersecting**

Global citizenship broadly encompasses a socially responsible global outlook and active participation toward creating a more socially equitable world (Wierenga & Guevara, 2013). In the past, citizenship education and global education have been scrutinized for doing "little more than add[ing] international content into citizenship activities or global education activities into citizenship" (Davies et al., 2005, p. 73). This critique, particularly of "outdated models of education associated with national frameworks," strengthened calls for global citizenship education (Davies et al., 2005, p. 73). However, with the growing trend toward global citizenship at a global and national policy level (i.e., OECD, 2018; Petersen, 2020; United Nations, 2015), studies have critiqued global citizenship education that, on the surface, proclaims to have a global outlook aiming to address international problems, but continues to operate from a nation-state standpoint acting for the nation's best interests (Moon & Koo, 2011; Schattle, 2015; Walton, 2020). Additionally, the approach to global citizenship education has been critiqued for its overemphasis on a common humanity at the expense of taking a more critical stance to understanding global inequalities and unequal power relations (Andreotti, 2006; Pashby, 2015). Although there is a place for recognizing a common humanity and common global goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals outlined in the *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (United Nations, 2015), there is a risk of counteracting those goals if a critical approach to global citizenship is overlooked. As Andreotti (2006) argues, a critical and historical approach to global citizenship education must be central to educational policies and programs; otherwise, the "generation encouraged and motivated to 'make a difference' will then project their beliefs and myths

as universal and reproduce power relations and violence similar to those in colonial times” (p. 41).

In Australia, there are some policy nods to global citizenship in key education documents, such as the recent Alice Springs Mpartwe Education Declaration (Education Council, 2019), which replaced the Melbourne Declaration (MCEETYA, 2008). The 2008 Melbourne Declaration’s preamble noted that “global integration and international mobility” required Australia to “nurture an appreciation of and respect for social, cultural and religious diversity and a sense of global citizenship” (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 5). This global citizenship ideal was retained under Goal 2 of the recent Alice Springs Mpartwe Education Declaration in 2019 to nurture young Australians to become “active and informed community members,” which calls upon educators to teach them to “understand their responsibilities as global citizens” so they can “contribute to local and global communities” (Education Council, 2019, pp. 5–6). Despite such policy gestures, there are only cursory references to global citizenship in the Australian national curriculum (Buchanan, 2018; Petersen, 2020). For example, in the Civics and Citizenship section, it is only in Year 9 that reference to the global is mentioned to “examine global connectedness and how that is shaping contemporary Australian society” (ACARA, 2021). Even then, global connectedness is still focused on the nation-state rather than also considering transnational connections. Rather than examining everyday forms of citizenship, the majority of the content on democratic participation centers on understanding Australia’s legal and political systems. Petersen (2020, p. 7) attributes this “disconnect between policy rhetoric/intention and curricular content in Australia” to a lack of priority in an overcrowded curriculum, where discipline learning within a high-stakes testing educational culture takes precedence, and to funding cuts to nongovernmental organizations that had previously provided the majority of content and teacher training in the area of global education.

Although there have been calls for a critical approach toward global citizenship education, the approach to global citizenship in Australian policy documents, similar to that of intercultural understanding (Walton et al., 2013), is still primarily framed within a celebratory approach toward internal cultural diversity and a benevolent approach to neighboring countries. For example, in the Alice Springs Mparntwe Education Declaration (Education Council, 2019), references to global citizenship are limited to how young people should “understand their responsibilities as global citizens . . . to effect positive change” (p. 6) and “who value and celebrate cultural and linguistic differences, and engage in the global community, particularly with our neighbours in the Indo-Pacific regions” (p. 8). The focus is very individualistic, with the aim to co-exist harmoniously with neighboring countries. Comparatively, a critical global citizenship education “aims to equip individuals to go beyond a benevolent discourse of ‘helping others’ and promotes recognition of complicity within geopolitical power relations and the reproduction of inequalities” (Andreotti & Pashby, 2013, p. 425).

Digital citizenship policy has likewise taken a very safe approach, with an emphasis on cyber security and online safety and an evident hesitation to embrace the potential of digital technologies to enhance global civic and political understanding, engagement and recognition (Tan & Park, 2015; Third et al., 2019). In Australia, digital citizenship is significantly determined by the government and state policies initially implemented under the Rudd Labor government with the National Strategy for Young Australians (Australian Government, 2010) and the Cyber-Safety Plan (Conroy, 2007), and has continued in this mode since then. This focus on online safety and the collapsing of all reference to digital citizenship under this less controversial term has been consolidated in recent years with the establishment in 2015 of the world's first e-Safety Commissioner to develop evidence-based school resources addressing online safety, cyber-bullying, and hate speech across numerous state departments, industry and not-for-profit (as well as for-profit) sectors (e-Safety Commission, 2016b, 2019a, 2019b, 2021a, 2021b; Walsk et al., 2020). Some of the resources developed in the context of online safety address marginalized social groups, with a new section offering resources for "diverse groups" (see [www.esafety.gov.au](http://www.esafety.gov.au)). This section makes available resources for Indigenous youth, LGBTQ+ youth, and young people with disabilities. Reports are also available to educators (e-Safety Commissioner, 2021a, 2021b). Despite the inclusion of these resources, which address broader social inequalities, and subsequently greater vulnerability of marginalized groups to digital risks, the focus continues to be on online dangers framed within an individualized understanding of risk, as well as safety education framed by a psychosocial framework of harm minimization. This coincides with what McCosker et al. (2015) found in their collection examining digital citizenship policy and everyday practices in Australian, European, and North American contexts. McCosker (2015, p. 21) specifically connects youth education around online risks to state apparatuses and domains of "security" that seek to maintain nation-centric priorities and interests.

Further, this raft of policy interventions and resources centers upon the concept of the young person as having a civic deficit, requiring them to be guided toward ideal participation. In terms of what this participation looks like, McCosker (2015) argues there is a "persistent idea" liberal ideal of citizenship in these programs, which acknowledges that to ensure children and young people's safety and wellbeing, online interactions "should be rational, conflict and risk free" (p. 24). Where young people's participation in issues-based movements and activism regarding systemic racism, sexism, misogyny, homophobia, and transphobia and so on runs counter to this ideal, for example, producing passionate disagreement, efforts to dismiss these expressions as dysfunctional forms of "cancel culture" often arise to marginalize and discredit youthful civic expression and activism (Owens, 2019). Recently, the focus on strengthening online safety and protection frameworks for young people, and a continued shift away from discourses of digital citizenship, which center young people's agency, expression and rights-claims, culminated in the Online

Safety Bill 2021, which passed both houses of parliament in June 2021, and which increases the powers of the e-Safety Commissioner to limit children and young people's access to digital content deemed harmful. Decisions regarding how harmful content is defined will be at the discretion of the Commissioner. The move has been met with criticism, with questions of how these increased powers will be targeted, and fears being raised around a "Fosta-Sesta"<sup>2</sup> type act that censors young people's digital participation in a manner that may hamper LGBTQI+ and other minority youth accessing safe spaces for information seeking and community building (Stardust, 2021). In other words, the bill is framed around a risk-based perspective rather than a rights-based perspective. This reinforces a view expressed by UNESCO (2016, p. 53) recently, which notes that, in the Asia Pacific region, Australia stands out as having far more policies oriented to safety and risk than to opportunity.

From an education perspective, and as we have found in our current research, most schools in Australia have some kind of cybersafety or information and communications technology (ICT) policy. Our preliminary findings from a systematic desktop school policy review of 670 secondary school websites (out of 3479 secondary or combined schools in Australia) conducted between September 2020 and June 2021 show that while many schools do not use the language of "digital citizenship" or "digital citizen," most (63%) have some kind of cybersafety or ICT policy. Publicly funded schools (or government schools) were more likely to have a policy (77%) than not, while private schools (sometimes called "non-government schools" or "independent schools") were more likely to not have a policy (55%). This is because many government schools derive their digital citizenship programs, policies, or curriculum from government agencies (e.g. the aforementioned federal Office of the e-Safety Commissioner or state-level education departments), as well as relying on non-profit organizations established to protect youth online.

The vast majority of government and nongovernment school policies and programs focus entirely on cybersafety, protecting students from educational distractions (mobile phone policies) and protecting youth from the dangers of the internet, including cyberbullying, online grooming, radicalization, sexting, and pornography. While these approaches seem effective for their purposes, they are limited in their capacity to: understand young people's existing everyday digital practices, competencies, and strengths; respond to complex digital media environments as a simultaneously social, civic, and political space; and engage meaningfully with young people's informal efforts for multiscalar civic life and social solidarity online. Despite government schools being more likely to have a digital citizenship-related policy, the rare schools that have a more complex, holistic digital citizenship policy that moves beyond cybersafety and educational risk were mostly private, nongovernment schools. These "best practice" examples focused on online responsibilities, civic participation, and contributions to global communities. While we are wary of drawing conclusions just yet, this raises questions about whether differences in resources shape differential responses to technology, such as punitive versus



non-punitive approaches or risk-focused versus civic-focused approaches, that might deepen currently existing digital divides or generate new ones.

As we can see from the aforementioned text, both global citizenship and digital citizenship have some limitations in both their policy framing and implementation. Given that global or international connections are primarily enabled by digital technologies and given that digital citizenship places us in contact with international content and audiences, one might imagine that these two policy domains would interact more than they do. This is particularly relevant in the Australian context where extensive transnational networks are the norm: nearly half the population is overseas-born or has an overseas-born parent, and there are high numbers of temporary migrants. Yet these discussions tend to be had in separate areas, with separate bodies, for separate purposes, and end up with separate, disconnected policies that, arguably, ill-prepare youth people to engage meaningfully, fruitfully, and safely with the global digital landscape. Further, as the digital media environment evolves alongside the changing landscape of youth participatory practice, it is timely to expand policy and practice beyond cybersafety, risk, and opportunity toward more integrative conceptualizations of youth digital citizenship. Scholars who work in this area include: Vromen (2017), Third (2019), and Collin (2011) in the Australian context; Yue et al. (2019) and Goh and Pang (2016) in Singapore; Couldry (2014) and Livingstone et al. (2007) in the UK; Leurs in Europe; Bennett et al. (2009) and Papacharissi (2010) in the US. Broadly speaking, their scholarship promotes a more rights- and social-actor-centered approach as well as bringing together the digital with the global as interconnected domains of citizenship practice, often via cross-disciplinary research. For example, innovative interdisciplinary conceptual frames can investigate practices of global digital citizenship amongst youth by bringing media and migration scholarship on “digital diasporas” (Leurs, 2014, 2015; Georgiou, 2014) into dialogue with sociologically informed conceptualizations and critiques of global citizenship and digital citizenship (Andreotti & Pashby, 2013; Couldry et al., 2014; Isin & Ruppert, 2015; Papacharissi, 2010; Wierenga & Guevara, 2013). Harris and Johns (2021) call for more field-crossing analysis of the everyday “lived” negotiations by youth from diverse racial, cultural, and religious backgrounds of local and transnational digital spaces and connections, including how they narrate their own multiscalar citizenship identities through those practices.

Building on this work, we focus on one important way that a more integrated approach could productively expand conceptualizations of global digital citizenship, that is by becoming more attentive to everyday practices of global connectedness among Australian youth. Accordingly, the following discussion provides a snapshot of young people’s everyday global digital citizenship practices, highlighting research with marginalized youth, as they are often perceived as those most in need of citizenship education and policy interventions. These examples provide a glimpse into the ways young people are already exercising new forms of digital and global connectedness but is not



meant to comprehensively represent the existing literature. In discussing the ways young people exercise a diverse range of global digital citizenship practices beyond the limits of a “soft” approach to global citizenship (Andreotti, 2006) and digital citizenship beyond a cybersafety lens, we emphasize the need for research, policy, and educational practice to take an integrative and critical approach to global digital citizenship. This can better inform efforts to build school-based global digital citizenship programs and curricula that are based on robust empirical evidence and that respond to the opportunities and challenges that everyday participation in transnational and local digital spaces present to youth.

### **Young people’s everyday practices of global digital citizenship: some insights**

Young people are at the forefront of connectivity online, and this is where new forms of youth solidarity, social action, and connectivity are emerging. Those aged 15 to 24 are “the most connected age group in the world” (UNESCO, 2019, p. 18). While policy has focused on equipping them with skills and values to safely navigate online environments as productive digital citizens, far less attention has been paid to young people’s everyday, informal, self-initiated digital practices in relation to civic participation. Young people increasingly use digital tools and especially social media to forge connections with others; build and sustain social and civic relationships; and situate themselves in local and global communities and issues. These activities are often informal and transient, and emerge organically out of youth social and civic networks. Because of these features, they are not well-captured by digital citizenship policy and engagement models, even those designed to understand and facilitate youth participatory practice and active citizenship online. Such rich, digital civic participation is certainly not captured by digital citizenship policies designed only to address the threats to personal safety of the digital environment.

In Australia, notwithstanding enduring issues of digital divide and exclusion (Thomas et al., 2019), young people are significant users of the internet, digital and social media, and mobile technology, as outlined earlier. Not only do they have access to these technologies, but also they are first adopters and users of social media platforms, apps, and digital devices, using these simultaneously for social, civic, and political purposes. Young people use these digital affordances not simply for entertainment, leisure, and information, but as a primary means for social and civic connection and everyday political participation, which include forging connections with others, creating a presence and having a voice in the public domain, building and sustaining social and civic relationships, and engaging in user-generated content production and peer-to-peer sharing on issues of personal and public significance. A significant number of young Australians feel more confident, more able to express themselves, and report greater levels of freedom online than off (Office of the e-Safety Commissioner, 2016a). Consequently, the internet and digital

media are critical spaces for youth participation, self-expression, recognition, communication, and belonging (with both positive and negative effects, for example, engagement in digital publics where they encounter new ideas versus the creation of “echo chambers” of like-minded individuals). Furthermore, there is a strong positive relationship between young people’s social media use and political engagement (Vromen et al., 2015; Xenos et al., 2014). Young people are driving new social-media-based forms of political engagement and are more likely than other age groups to engage in such activities (Vromen et al., 2016).

While there is considerable debate globally as well as in Australia specifically about the extent to which the internet, digital, and social media have changed young people’s formal political and civic participation (e.g., see: Bessant, 2016; Castells, 2007; Livingstone et al., 2007; Xenos & Bennett, 2007), much of the research and policy discussion relates to the use of social media platforms by political parties or civics education programs attempting to engage youth, or the role of social media in advancing activism and movements undertaken by young people who are highly politically engaged (Johns, 2020). These debates do not take into account young people’s everyday global digital practices, which do not always mirror conventional modes of political organizing or community building. As such, current policy approaches are not adequate to understand and harness these opportunities created by the young people themselves, which may not speak to more conventional modes of political and civic participation.

The following discussion provides examples of how young Australians, particularly marginalized young people—the vast majority of whom are neither activist nor apathetic (Harris et al., 2010)—have used the internet and digital and social media to engage in a range of civic and social networks in unprecedented ways. We note how migrant backgrounds, mobility and migration pathways, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexuality all shape their everyday digital practices as young citizens in a global, digital world. We draw particular attention to marginalized youth because, while marginalized youth are often singled out for being at risk of “civic deficit” and digital exclusion, research into their everyday participatory practices reveals that in spite of structural disadvantages, they are highly civically and politically engaged in informal ways, especially online. For example, international, comparative research shows that these youth constitute those most likely to express a sense of efficacy and positive attitude toward political engagement on digital and social media (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 527), making them “the ‘ideal’ models for the everyday-making, networked young citizen, who are yet to see their own lives and experiences reflected in formal institutionalized politics” (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 528).

In the Australian context, it is critical to acknowledge that Indigenous people are among those most marginalized from formal civic and political participation, owing to the history and ongoing effects of colonization and dispossession, including the legacy of denial of citizenship and ongoing abuse

of rights, lack of recognition of sovereignty, few mechanisms for parliamentary or other statute representation, and the absence of a treaty. And yet Indigenous Australians have always been politically active and are leaders in the digital sphere, frequently using social media to build solidarity, express political identity, and engage in social action. As Carlson and Frazer (2018, p. 1) demonstrate, “Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people have always been early adopters of technology and use social media at rates higher than non-Indigenous Australians.” In their research, they have found that Indigenous people use social media as a new “meeting place” for coming together and building community, which is particularly important in the context of forced removal of people from family and land. It is also productively used for expressing Indigenous identity, facilitating cultural knowledge translation, offering new ways to respond to racism, and enabling political activism. Indigenous youth especially take up social media to maintain connections and mobilize communities for activism; as Kennedy (2020) finds, “this is particularly the case for young people who are encouraged to travel to attend schooling, university, and gain employment away from their home Country” (p. 6).

Carlson and Frazer (2018) further document formal and informal Indigenous media advocacy, political movements, and campaigns facilitated by digital media. These include Indigenous X, a Twitter account (@IndigenousX), created by Luke Pearson in 2012 to broadcast Aboriginal voices and stories, and to provide perspectives on current issues. The account includes a weekly rotation of hosts from different sectors of the Indigenous community, including artists, politicians, academics, teachers, doctors, and students (Carlson & Frazer, 2018), and has become a major platform for community media engagement and advocacy, often countering mainstream media bias. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities have also been active in joining transnational movements addressing institutional racism and discrimination including offshoots of the #BlackLivesMatter movement, which in not all but many instances involve Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander activists using the hashtag or creating new hashtags to mobilize community and shape public discourse. Other examples are local Australian chapters of the Canadian Idle No More political group, which advocates for an end to violence against Indigenous women and girls. The Australian #SOSBlakAustralia movement also emerged in 2011 as a protest against government plans to forcibly close remote Aboriginal communities in Western Australia, and which “leveraged extensive online networks to coordinate mass protests” and also led to transnational support from Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities (Carlson & Frazer, 2018, p. 21). These examples demonstrate how Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people’s everyday engagements on social media have political intentions and effects.

The experiences of young people with a migrant or refugee background are also critical to an understanding of everyday practices of global digital citizenship in the Australian context. A recent pilot study of CALD youth (18–25 years old) in Victoria, Australia, suggests that such youth use internet and

communications technologies to participate not just at a local level but also across the state, the nation, and transnationally, and being “highly engaged in global civic practices through digital technologies, participating across all key domains of citizenship: social, political, cultural and economic life” (Caluya et al., 2018, p. 4). Take, for example, the political dimension of digital citizenship. While almost 80% of CALD youth surveyed avoided participating online with political parties and 90% avoided contacting politicians directly online, 50% nevertheless used the internet to inform themselves about elections and party politics, 57% used social media to keep up with social and political issues, and 70% used the internet to inform themselves about their rights (Caluya et al., 2018, p. 6). Thus, just in terms of political dimensions of digital citizenship, these findings provide evidence of a politically engaged diasporic youth. Other studies of CALD youth have found that they especially use social media to engage civically and politically; for example, Vromen et al. (2016) have found that speaking a language other than English at home is a positive predictor of young Australians’ political engagement on Facebook (see also Kenny, 2016; Wyn et al., 2017).

Relatedly, studies among young temporary migrants in Australia focusing on Chinese international students have shown young people use different digital platforms to create multiple communities and networks, for example, using Facebook to engage in local civic culture, and WeChat or Weibo to connect with people in other international locations (see Gomes, 2018; Martin, 2016; Wong & Hjorth, 2016; Zhao, 2019). Another example of such youth using social media platforms for global digital civic and political engagement is Johns’ (2020) research on Malaysian-Chinese youth in Malaysia and Malaysian international students in Melbourne, Australia. Social media platforms were critical for promoting outward-facing political and civic actions (Facebook), maintaining social connections with other students and family members back home (Facebook, WeChat, WhatsApp), and maintaining internal communications for activist and friendship groups (WhatsApp). These findings also give pause to accounts that Gen Z youth have abandoned Facebook and other platforms for Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, despite the significance of these platforms to emerging Gen Z civic and political cultures. As these examples highlight, Facebook and messenger apps WeChat and WhatsApp continue to be important platforms facilitating transnational civic, political and familial connections.

Young people who adhere to diasporic identities are also forming productive transnational networks of connection and belonging (Collins et al., 2011) that move beyond traditional models of local transmission of cultural and political identity from one migrant generation to the next. These function as spaces of peer-to-peer communications, youth community building, and “spaces of safety” (Nilan, 2017, p. 181), and foster collective engagement with social issues and solutions to social problems. For example, in their analysis of an email list of a Muslim youth online community, Johns and Rattani (2016) identified that a diverse spectrum of arguments and voices was able

to be maintained through the email list, with some topic threads not only producing deliberative exchanges and consensus building but also oftentimes sparking agonistic and passionate disagreements that transgressed boundaries of what is acceptable in other formal spaces of cultural or political participation. Interviews with participants and moderators identified that this led to productive discussions around what constituted a culturally safe space, while also allowing participants to reflect on their own positionality, ethics, values, rights (e.g., to safety or free expression), and beliefs. Online spaces and digital media are also integral to young Australian Muslims' forms of social, civic, and political expression, connection, and agitation, both within Australia and when forging transnational networks (Harris & Roose, 2014; Johns, 2014).

Gender and sexuality critically shape young people's digital and global citizenship practices. Young women were early adopters of ICT in Australia and globally and have led the way in the use of new technologies for hybrid purposes, blending social, personal, civic, and political activities through these means (Harris, 2008). Marginalized young women are also the group most likely to become engaged in civic and political practices through their social networks (Roker, 2008). Research with LGBTIQ+ youth has long shown how they use online spaces to develop a sense of membership and connection, but also articulate a collective voice and take action for social change locally and globally. In their study of one online group, Hanckel and Morris (2014, p. 872) find that "the community not only provides a sense of belonging for the participants and reduces their experiences of isolation, but also connects them to resources and networking opportunities that foster political participation." These global digital citizenship practices and spaces blur the boundaries of youth cultures and politics. For example, youth cultures that emerge around celebrity influencers have an important political role to play, as evidenced by a research study examining the representations and followers of queer-identifying YouTuber Troye Sivan, whose pop career was launched on YouTube and via talent shows, but who has since used his personal brand and celebrity to amplify "crucial health and well-being messages" while "continuing to foster a sense of community and loyalty among their young followers" (Abidin & Cover, 2019, p. 217). Such young people who become influencers by creating digital media content and attracting a large public following often engage in advocacy, activism and community building through their self-representation as well as their status in online networks, even while they may not produce explicitly political content.

Overall, new participatory spaces, networks, and groups are being established, but so are new participatory modes. The communicative acts themselves, not merely the platform, are important. Social networking sites, in particular, have been found to promote global youth belonging and social and community connectedness (Collin et al., 2011, p. 7), and to enable and expand mechanisms for taking action and making change (Rose & Morstyn, 2013). Social media use is significantly related to individual political engagement by Australian youth (Xenos et al., 2014). Common youth activities range

from the creation of networks, groups, blogs, and vlogs, which “create and sustain a youth friendly space for public discussions where they can address a social problem that affects them” (Caron, 2017, p. 656), to producing, consuming, and sharing content such as posts, tweets, comments, and memes that provide a “light” youth cultural entrée to and interpretation of social issues and extend the parameters of what counts as political commentary. Byron (2022) shows how informal networks of support built on platforms identified as “queer” platforms, such as Tumblr (Byron, 2022, pp. 131–135), can provide LGBTIQ+ young people with a safe space to share experiences and seek information on mental health and other chronic health conditions that is free of judgment and sensitive to different forms of gender expression and identity—conversations not always found on other platforms or in formal health settings. Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Snapchat, and TikTok have also become important platforms for such peer-to-peer health, civic, political, and social communication and community building.

TikTok has enabled young people to become engaged in social issues in a way that is entertaining and peer palatable (Abidin, 2021). One example shared by Abidin (2021) relates to the Australian bushfires of 2019–2020, where firefighters performing TikTok dance videos and the sharing of memes and other popular content related to the fires demonstrated how participatory social media cultures can facilitate playful sharing of information, but also which demonstrate the use of humor to cope with disaster and to promote solidarity. YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook are the platforms of choice for Australian Gen Z (born 1991–2005) and Millennials (born 1976–1990), with use skewing away from Facebook and toward Instagram for the younger cohort (see Roy Morgan, 2020). More than just offering an alternative space or forum, social media is fostering new ways of discussing, connecting, and collaborating with others around issues of concern, as previous examples of influencer and meme culture on TikTok and the facilitation of queer communities of care on Tumblr demonstrate. Social media is found to cultivate active and collaborative—rather than simply passive and “dutiful”—forms of youth participation; what Vromen et al. (2016), drawing on Bangs) describe as “everyday making citizenship norms.” Young people’s everyday use of social media platforms, including activities such as posting, sharing, following, commenting, and liking, constitute new and legitimate civic and political engagement practices that are “creative, horizontal and ad hoc” (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 523). Global and digital spaces and communicative practices are particularly relevant to youth who face exclusion from other more formal mechanisms for civic and political expression.

Although digital spaces have the potential toward a more global outlook, focusing on everyday practices also opens onto the discovery of social effects that may run counter to “global” orientations. Recent findings, for example, indicate that young people’s digital networks continue to be characterized by cultural and ethnic homophily rather than intercultural bridging (Groshek &

Koc-Michalska, 2017; Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2011). This indicates that the social and technical affordances of digital media may create echo chambers that amplify nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racial and religious intolerance. Social media platforms can also produce adversarial, antagonistic, and toxic cultures and practices leading to arguments that more often foster and sustain division, racism (Matamoros-Fernández, 2020), political polarization, and uncivil behavior, rather than social connection, community, consensus, and civility. For example, cultures of trolling (McCosker & Johns, 2014), bullying and harassment (Carlson & Frazer, 2018; Carlisle et al., 2019), image-based abuse (Albury et al., 2019), memefied hostility, and sharing of violent or extremist content sometimes threaten to overwhelm and derail more productive digital expressions, as outlined in our examples given earlier. Recognizing this, we argue for more empirical testing of how global digital citizenship is developed, interpreted, and actioned in the lives of young people in Australia, and where the possibilities and tensions lie in operationalizing this toward global citizenship.

## **Conclusion**

There is a need for more expansive, holistic, and responsive global digital citizenship policy. On the one hand, it must go beyond digital citizenship as limited to safety, risk, and literacy and, on the other hand, adopt a more critical understanding of global citizenship that extends further than a focus on individualistic action for common humanitarian goals that do not take into account the role that nation-states and historical global inequalities have played in creating global problems in the first place. Global digital citizenship policy needs to be grounded in strong empirical evidence that accounts for everyday digital spaces and practices as engagement in themselves. Moreover, it is critical to be able to better respond to and support emerging forms of online (global and local) civic participation, solidarity and social action that manifest in these more everyday social practices (addressing what is both productive and problematic), because the traditional distinctions between social, civic, and political practices have become blurred for youth, and their civic and political agency is intertwined with their social and digital relationships and activities.

We have argued for an approach that addresses the links between digital and global citizenship. Capturing the increasing global and digital connectedness of young people's civic and political participation will help inform educational programs that better align with young people's digital media practices and experiences of citizenship in a global context more generally. Importantly, Xenos et al. (2014, p. 161) have found that, where it exists, digital civic education, which mixes digital literacy with civic and political discussion topics, is significantly and positively related to young Australians' individual and collective political engagement. And this education is yet to encompass everyday



practices. Research and policy approaches can tackle the opportunity and challenge of diversity for global digital citizenship by examining if, and how, youth perform citizenship through their current digital media practices and how these practices compare with their perceptions of school-based digital citizenship and global citizenship programs and digital-citizenship-related policies.

It is critical to know more about the types of digital media practices that youth engage in; to explore what types of citizenship orientations and skills are fostered through these digital media practices; and to compare how these align with, or depart from, conceptualizations of global and digital citizenship as they are currently defined by policymakers and implemented in existing school curricula and programs. From this knowledge base, it would then be possible to create evidence-based benchmarks and recommendations to inform global digital citizenship school-based programs that better align with the benefits espoused in global citizenship education and that are more open to other forms of digital citizenship practices beyond being defined in relation to risk. Taking an integrated approach to global digital citizenship that is grounded in young people's everyday practices has the potential to strengthen the relevance, inclusivity, and value of existing programs for a broader student population in Australia and beyond.

## Notes

- 1 “Culturally and linguistically diverse” (often abbreviated to “CALD”) is an official term used by the Australian government to describe people who come from non-English-speaking backgrounds. It is frequently used in the policy literature to broadly identify “racial, ethnic and religious minorities in Australia who are migrants or descendants of migrants” (Caluya et al., 2018). As a result of this official designation, many funded studies and organizations are pressured to use this terminology despite its obvious flaws. First, the term is distinguished from Indigenous Australians or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, even though this group also speak languages other than English. Furthermore, the term is used even for people who come from countries with English as an official language, (e.g., the Bahamas, Fiji, Ghana, and Singapore). Finally, it is also used for people who only speak English but are seen as having a “CALD” background, usually because they are not white. By contrast, white people that speak languages other than English tend not to be designated as CALD. In short, despite its official definition, the term tends to be used to designate non-white migrants. We acknowledge that it has been problematized as a frame that subtly racializes and “others” minority cultural, racial, and ethnic groupings, setting them apart from white, Anglo or European background youth, and marking them as in need of different modes of government.
- 2 FOSTA-SESTA refers to a controversial bill signed into law by former US President Trump, which was intended to curb illegal sex trafficking online. It made the hosting of certain pornographic and sexually explicit material by various services and platforms illegal (Romano, 2018). An unintended consequence of the law was a move by litigation-averse platforms to ban any form of sexual content online, leading to a purge of content on popular social media platforms, which was found to impact negatively on queer-friendly platforms such as Tumblr (Stardust, 2021).

## References

- Abidin, C. (2021). Mapping internet celebrity on TikTok: Exploring attention economies and visibility labours. *Cultural Science Journal*, 12(1), 77–103. <http://doi.org/10.5334/csci.140>
- Abidin, C., & Cover, R. (2019). Gay, famous and working hard on YouTube: Influencers, queer microcelebrity publics and discursive activism. In P. Aggleton, R. Cover, D. Leahy, D. Marshall, & M. L. Rasmussen (Eds), *Youth, sexuality and sexual citizenship* (pp. 217–231). Routledge.
- ACARA (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority). (2021). *Australian Curriculum: Civics and citizenship*. [www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/humanities-and-social-sciences/civics-and-citizenship/](http://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/humanities-and-social-sciences/civics-and-citizenship/)
- Albury, K., Byron, P., McCosker, A., Pym, T., Walshe, J., Race, K., Salon, D., Reeders, D., Wark, T., Botfield, J., & Dietzel, C. (2019). *Safety, risk and wellbeing on dating apps: Final report*. Swinburne University of Technology.
- Andreotti, V. (2006). Soft versus critical global citizenship education. *Policy & Practice: A Development Education Review*, 3(1), 40–51.
- Andreotti, V. D. O., & Pashby, K. (2013). Digital democracy and global citizenship education: Mutually compatible or mutually complicit? *The Educational Forum*, 77(4), 422–437.
- Andreotti, V., & Pashby, K. (2013). Digital democracy and global citizenship education: Mutually compatible or mutually complicit. *The Educational Forum*, 77, 422–437.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2017a). *2016 Census—A 'selfie' of young people in Australia* (media release). [www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyReleaseDate/AC02F0705E320F58CA25817C00016A47?OpenDocument](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbyReleaseDate/AC02F0705E320F58CA25817C00016A47?OpenDocument)
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2017b). *Census reveals a fast changing, culturally diverse nation*. [www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/lookup/Media%20Release3](http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/lookup/Media%20Release3)
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2018). *Household use of information technology, Australia*. Catalogue No. 8146.0. [www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8146.0](http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8146.0)
- Australian Government. (2010). *National strategy for young Australians*. Commonwealth of Australia. <https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2010-04/apo-nid30323.pdf>
- Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2018). *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander adolescent and youth health and wellbeing*. [www.aihw.gov.au/reports/indigenous-australians/atsi-adolescent-youth-health-wellbeing-2018/contents/table-of-contents](http://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/indigenous-australians/atsi-adolescent-youth-health-wellbeing-2018/contents/table-of-contents)
- Bennett, W. L., Wells, C., & Rank, A. (2009). Young citizens and civic learning: Two paradigms of citizenship in the digital age. *Citizenship Studies*, 13(2), 105–120.
- Bessant, J. (2016). Democracy denied, youth participation and criminalizing digital dissent. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 19(7), 921–937.
- Buchanan, J. (2018). Maintaining global citizenship education in schools: A challenge for Australian educators and schools. *Australian Journal of Teacher Education*, 43(4), 51–67.
- Byron, P. (2022). *Digital media, friendship and cultures of care*. Routledge.

- Caluya, G., Borovica, T., & Yue, A. (2018). *Culturally and linguistically diverse young people and digital citizenship: A pilot study*. Centre for Multicultural Youth. [www.cmy.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CALD-Young-People-and-Digital-Citizenship-Full-Report-March-2018.pdf](http://www.cmy.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CALD-Young-People-and-Digital-Citizenship-Full-Report-March-2018.pdf)
- Carlisle, E., Fildes, J., Hall, S., Perrens, B., Perdriau, A., & Plummer, J. (2019). *Youth survey report 2019*. Mission Australia.
- Carlson, B., & Frazer, R. (2018). *Social media mob: Being Indigenous online*. Macquarie University.
- Caron, C. (2017). Speaking up about bullying on YouTube: Teenagers' vlogs as civic engagement. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 42(4), 645–668.
- Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. *International Journal of Communication*, 1(1), 238–266.
- Collin, P., Karhilly, K., Richardson, I., & Third, A. (2011). *The benefits of social networking services: A literature review*. Cooperative Research Centre for Young People, Technology and Wellbeing.
- Collins, J., Reid, C., & Fabiansson, C. (2011). Identities, aspirations and belonging of cosmopolitan youth in Australia. *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal*, 3(3), 92–107.
- Conroy, S. (2007). *Labor's plan for cyber-safety*. Parliament of Australia. [https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/partypol/KOZO6/upload\\_binary/KOZO6.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/partypol/KOZO6%22](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/partypol/KOZO6/upload_binary/KOZO6.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/partypol/KOZO6%22)
- Couldry, N., Stephansen, H., Fotopoulou, A., MacDonald, R., Clark, W., & Dickens, L. (2014). Digital citizenship? Narrative exchange and the changing terms of civic culture. *Citizenship Studies*, 18(6–7), 615–629.
- Davies, I., Evans, M., & Reid, A. (2005). Globalising citizenship education? A critique of 'global education' and 'citizenship education.' *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 53(1), 66–89.
- Education Council. (2019). *Alice Springs (Mparntwe) education declaration*. Education Council. [www.educationcouncil.edu.au/Alice-Springs-Mparntwe-Education-Declaration.aspx](http://www.educationcouncil.edu.au/Alice-Springs-Mparntwe-Education-Declaration.aspx)
- Georgiou, M. (2014). Diaspora in the digital era: Minorities and media representations. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 12(4), 80–99.
- Gilhooly, D., & Lee, E. (2014). The role of digital literacy practices on refugee resettlement: The case of three Karen brothers. *Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy*, 57(5), 387–396.
- Goh, D., & Pang, N. (2016). Protesting the Singapore government: The role of collective action frames in social media mobilization. *Telematics and Informatics*, 33(2), 525–533.
- Gomes, C. (2018). *Siloed diversity: Transnational migration, digital media and social networks*. Palgrave Pivot.
- Groshek, J., & Koc-Michalska, K. (2017). Helping populism win? Social media use, filter bubbles, and support for populist presidential candidates in the 2016 US election campaign. *Information, Communication & Society*, 20(9), 1389–1407.
- Hanckel, B., & Morris, A. (2014). Finding community and contesting heteronormativity: Queer young people's engagement in an Australian online community. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 17(7), 872–886.
- Harris, A. (2008). Young women, late modern politics and the participatory potential of online cultures. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 11(5), 481–495.
- Harris, A., & Johns, A. (2021). Youth, social cohesion and digital life: From risk and resilience to a global digital citizenship approach. *Journal of Sociology*, 57(2), 394–411.

- Harris, A., & Roose, J. (2014). DIY citizenship amongst young Muslims: Experiences of the 'ordinary.' *Journal of Youth Studies*, 17(6), 794–813.
- Harris, A., Wyn, J., & Younes, S. (2010). Beyond activist or apathetic youth: Young people and emergent forms of participation. *Young: Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 18(1), 9–32.
- Harris, C., Straker, L., & Pollock, C. (2017). A socioeconomic related 'digital divide' exists in how, not if, young people use computers. *PLoS One*, 12(3), e0175011.
- Hugo, G., McDougall, K., Tan, G., & Feist, H. (2014). *The CALD youth census report*. The Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network Australia.
- Inin, E., & Ruppert, E. (2015). *Being digital citizens*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Johns, A. (2014). Muslim young people online: 'Acts of citizenship' in socially networked spaces. *Social Inclusion*, 2(2), 1–12.
- Johns, A. (2020). This will be the WhatsApp election: Crypto-publics and digital citizenship in Malaysia's GE14 election. *First Monday*, 25. <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i12.10381>
- Johns, A. (2021). "Are we becoming the kind of nation that just blocks out all criticism?": Negotiating the gap between digital citizenship education and young people's everyday digital citizenship practices in Malaysia. *International Journal of Communication*, 15, 4690–4708.
- Johns, A., & Rattani, A. (2016). "Somewhere in America:" The #MIPSTERZ digital community and Muslim youth voices online. In A. McCosker, S. Vivienne, & A. Johns (Eds.), *Negotiating digital citizenship: Control, contest, culture*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kennedy, T. (2020). *Indigenous peoples' experiences of harmful content on social media*. Macquarie University.
- Kenny, E. (2016). *Settlement in the digital age: Digital inclusion and newly arrived young people from refugee and migrant backgrounds*. Centre for Multicultural Youth.
- Lam, K., & Harris, S. (2021). *Enhancing digital capacity among diverse youth*. CRIS Issues Paper #2. Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies Deakin University.
- Lam, K., Harris, A., & Hartup, M. (2021). *Youth, diversity and wellbeing in a digital age: A landscape review*. Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. Deakin University.
- Leurs, K. (2014). Digital throwntogetherness: Young Londoners negotiating urban politics of difference and encounters on Facebook. *Popular Communication*, 12(4), 251–265.
- Leurs, K. (2015). *Digital passages: Migrant youth 2.0 diaspora, gender and youth cultural intersections*. Amsterdam University Press.
- Leurs, K., & Ponzanesi, S. (2011). Mediated crossroads: Youthful digital diasporas. *Journal of Media and Culture*, 14(2). doi:10.5204/mcj.324
- Livingstone, S., Haddon, L., Gorzig, A., & Olafsson, K. (2011). *EU kids online final report*. EU Kids Online.
- Livingstone, S., Lunt, P., & Miller, L. (2007). Citizens, consumers and the citizen-consumer: Articulating the citizen interest in media and communications regulation. *Discourse & Communication*, 1(1), 63–89.
- Martin, F. (2016). Media, place, sociality, and national publics: Chinese international students in translocal networks. In K. Iwabuchi, O. Khoo, & D. Black (Eds.), *Contemporary culture and media studies in Asia* (pp. 207–224). Rowman & Littlefield.

- Matamoros-Fernández, A. (2020). ‘El Negro de WhatsApp’ meme, digital blackface, and racism on social media. *First Monday*, 25(12). doi:10.5210/fm.v25i12.10420
- McCosker, A. (2015). Managing cyberbullying: The three layers of control in digital citizenship. In A. McCosker, S. Vivienne, & A. Johns (Eds.), *Negotiating digital citizenship: Control, contest, culture*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- McCosker, A., & Johns, A. (2014). Contested publics: Racist rants, bystander action and social media acts of citizenship. *Media International Australia*, 151(1), 66–72.
- McCosker, A., Vivienne, S., & Johns, A. (Eds.). (2015). *Negotiating digital citizenship: Control, contest, culture*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- MCCEETYA (Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs). (2008). *Melbourne Declaration on educational goals for young Australians*. www.curriculum.edu.au/verve/\_resources/national\_declaration\_on\_the\_educational\_goals\_for\_young\_australians.pdf
- Moon, R. J., & Koo, J-W. (2011). Global citizenship and human rights: A longitudinal analysis of social studies and ethics textbooks in the Republic of Korea. *Comparative Education Review*, 55(4), 574–599.
- Mossberger, K. (2009). Toward digital citizenship: Addressing inequality in the information age. In A. Chadwick & P. Howard (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of internet politics* (pp. 173–185). Routledge.
- Nilan, P. M. (2017). *Muslim youth in the diaspora: Challenging extremism through popular culture*. Routledge.
- OECD. (2018). *Programme for international student assessment 2018 global competence*. www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2018-global-competence.htm
- Office of the e-Safety Commissioner. (2016a). *Online relationships*. Australian Government. www.esafety.gov.au/about-us/research/young-people-social-cohesion/online-relationships
- Office of the e-Safety Commissioner. (2016b). *Youth and digital dangers: Young people and social media usage*. Australian Government. www.esafety.gov.au/about-us/research/youth-digital-dangers/social-media-usage
- Office of the e-Safety Commissioner. (2019a). *Digital citizenship*. Australian Government. www.esafety.gov.au/education-resources/classroom-resources/digital-citizenship
- Office of the e-Safety Commissioner. (2019b). *Lesbian, gay, bi, trans and/or intersex people: Online safety advice and support for the LGBTIQI community*. Australian Government. www.esafety.gov.au/key-issues/tailored-advice/lesbian-gay-bi-trans-queer-intersex
- Office of the e-Safety Commissioner. (2021a). *Online hate speech: Findings from Australia, New Zealand and Europe*. Australian Government. www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-01/Hate%20speech-Report.pdf
- Office of the e-Safety Commissioner. (2021b). *Protecting voices at risk online*. Australian Government. www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-12/Protecting%20voices%20at%20risk%20online.pdf
- Owens, E. (2019, November 1). Obama’s very boomer view of “cancel culture.” *New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/opinion/obama-cancel-culture.html

- Papacharissi, Z. (Ed.). (2010). *A private sphere: Democracy in a digital age*. Polity Press.
- Park, S. (2016). Digital inequalities in rural Australia: A double jeopardy of remoteness and social exclusion. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 54, 399–407.
- Pashby, K. (2015). Conflations, possibilities, and foreclosures: Global citizenship education in a multicultural context. *Curriculum Inquiry*, 45(4), 345–366.
- Petersen, A. (2020). *Global citizenship education in Australian schools: Leadership, teacher and student perspectives*. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Rhodes, A. (2017). *Screen time and kids: What's happening in our homes*. The Royal Children's Hospital Melbourne. [www.rchpoll.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ACHP-Poll7\\_Detailed-Report-June21.pdf](http://www.rchpoll.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ACHP-Poll7_Detailed-Report-June21.pdf)
- Roker, D. (2008). Young women and social action in the United Kingdom. In A. Harris (Ed.), *Next wave cultures: Feminism, subcultures, activism*. Routledge.
- Romano, A. (2018, July 2). A new law intended to curb sex trafficking threatens the future of the Internet as we know it. Vox. <https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom>
- Rose, J., & Morstyn, L. (2013). 'What makes you tweet?' *Young people's perspectives on the use of social media as an engagement tool*. Youth Affairs Council of Victoria.
- Roy Morgan. (2020). *Facebook and YouTube strong across all generations but Pinterest, Instagram and TikTok have important user bases*. Roy Morgan. [www.roymorgan.com/findings/8373-social-media-demographics-march-2020-202004140629](http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/8373-social-media-demographics-march-2020-202004140629)
- Schattle, H. (2015). Global citizenship as a national project: The evolution of *segye shimin* in South Korean public discourse. *Citizenship Studies*, 19(1), 53–68.
- Siapera, E., Moreo, E., & Zhou, J. (2018). *Hate track: Tracking and monitoring racist hate speech online*. Institute for Future Media and Journalism, Anti-Bullying Centre, and Insight Centre for Computer Analytics.
- Stardust, Z. (2021). New online safety bill could allow censorship of anyone who engages with sexual content on internet. *UNSW Newsroom*. <https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/business-law/new-online-safety-bill-could-allow-censorship-anyone-who-engages-sexual-content>
- Tan, M. M., & Park, J. (2015). *Fostering digital citizenship through safe and responsible use of ICT*. Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education.
- Third, A., Bellerose, D., Dawkins, U., Keltie, E., & Pihl, K. (2014). *Children's rights in the digital age: A download from children around the world*. Young and Well Cooperative Research Centre. [www.uws.edu.au/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0003/753447/Childrens-rights-in-the-digital-age.pdf](http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/753447/Childrens-rights-in-the-digital-age.pdf)
- Third, A., Collin, P., Walsh, L., & Black, R. (2019). *Young people in digital society: Control shift*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thomas, J., Barraket, J., Wilson, C. K., & Rennie, E. (2019). *Measuring Australia's digital divide: The Australian digital inclusion index 2019*. RMIT University & Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne for Telstra. [https://digitalinclusionindex.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/TLS\\_ADII\\_Report-2019\\_Final\\_web\\_.pdf](https://digitalinclusionindex.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/TLS_ADII_Report-2019_Final_web_.pdf)
- UNESCO. (2014). *UNESCO education strategy: 2014–2021*. <https://en.unesco.org/icted/content/unesco-education-strategy-2014-2021>



- UNESCO. (2016). *A policy review: Building digital citizenship in Asia-Pacific through safe, effective and responsible use of ICT*. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246813>
- UNESCO. (2019). *Digital kids Asia-Pacific: Insights into children's digital citizenship*. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000367985>
- United Nations. (2015). *Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development*. <https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda>
- VicHealth, Data61, CSIRO & MYAN. (2017). *Bright futures: Spotlight on the well-being of young people from refugee and migrant backgrounds*. Victorian Health Promotion Foundation.
- Vromen, A. (2017). *Digital citizenship and political engagement: The challenge from online campaigning and advocacy organisations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vromen, A., Loader, B. D., Xenos, M., & Bailo, F. (2016). Everyday making through Facebook engagement: Young citizens' political interactions in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. *Political Studies*, 64(3), 513–533.
- Vromen, A., Xenos, M. A., & Loader, B. (2015). Young people, social media and connective action: From organisational maintenance to everyday political talk. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 18(1), 80–100.
- Walsh, K., Wallace, E., Ayling, N., & Sondergeld, A. (2020). *Best practice framework for online safety education report for the eSafety Commissioner (Stage 1)*. E-Safety Research, Australian Government. [www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-06/Best%20Practice%20Framework%20for%20Online%20Safety%20Education\\_0.pdf](http://www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-06/Best%20Practice%20Framework%20for%20Online%20Safety%20Education_0.pdf)
- Walton, J. (2020). Affective citizenship and peripheral intimacies: Children's inter-ethnic relations in South Korean schools. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 51(2), 195–211.
- Walton, J., Paradies, Y., Priest, N., Wertheim, E. H., & Freeman, E. (2014). Fostering intercultural understanding through secondary school experiences of cultural immersion. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 28(2), 216–237.
- Walton, J., Priest, N., & Paradies, Y. (2013). Identifying and developing effective approaches to foster intercultural understanding in schools. *Intercultural Education*, 24(3), 181–194.
- Wierenga, A., & Guevara, J. R. (Eds.). (2013). *Educating for global citizenship: A youth-led approach to learning through partnerships*. Melbourne University Press.
- Wong, J., & Hjorth, L. (2016). Media and mobilities in Australia: A case study of Southeast Asian international students' media use for well-being. In C. Gomes (Ed.), *The Asia Pacific in the age of transnational mobility* (pp. 41–62). Anthem Press.
- Wyn, J., Khan, R., & Dadvand, B. (2017). *Multicultural youth Australia census status report 2017/18*. Youth Research Centre, Melbourne Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne. [https://education.unimelb.edu.au/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0011/2972036/MY-Aust-Report-17-18.pdf](https://education.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/2972036/MY-Aust-Report-17-18.pdf)
- Xenos, M., & Bennett, W. L. (2007). The disconnection in online politics: The youth political web sphere and US election sites, 2002–2004. *Information, Community and Society*, 10(4), 443–464.



- Xenos, M., Vromen, A., & Loader, B. D. (2014). The great equalizer? Patterns of social media use and youth political engagement in three advanced democracies. *Information, Communication & Society, 17*(2), 151–167.
- Yue, A., Nekmat, E., & Beta, A. R. (2019). Digital literacy through digital citizenship: Online civic participation and public opinion evaluation of youth minorities in Southeast Asia. *Media and Communication, 7*(2), 100–114.
- Zhao, X. (2019). Disconnective intimacies through social media: Practices of transnational family among overseas Chinese students in Australia. *Media International Australia, 173*(1), 36–52.