

Architectural (Mis)Metaphor:

**The Creative Potential of Conceptual (D)rift
in Architectural Analysis**

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of

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under the supervision of Professor Lawrence
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CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

I, Linda Buhagiar, declare that this thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Architecture, (Faculty of Design, Architecture and Building) at the University of Technology Sydney.

This thesis is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

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Linda Buhagiar
May 2025

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Linda Buhagiar

From the true mistakes of metaphor a lesson can be learned.

Not only that things are other than they seem,
and so we mistake them,
but that such mistakenness is valuable.
Hold onto it, Aristotle says,
there is much to be seen and felt here.
Metaphors teach the mind

to enjoy error
and to learn
from the juxtaposition of *what is* and *what is not* the case.

(Extract – Anne Carson, *Essay on What I think About Most*, 2000, 31)¹

¹ Image on front cover: *Rethink Notre Dame* by Rui Serra – [rui serra on Behance](#) (accessed online 27.02.23)

Dedication

To my family; my bedrock and blue skies.

Abstract

On the evening of the 15th of April 2019, a fire broke out at *Notre-Dame* Cathedral in Paris which led to the collapse of the central spire. The event left a literal and figurative void, which initiated an influx of metaphorical responses on the internet. Articles were published using metaphors as conceptual abridgments to suggest the collapse represented the state of Christianity, French politics, or the environment. Designers, meanwhile, spontaneously uploaded rectification solutions that converted the church into a ship, garden, zoo, or phoenix. The apparent ubiquity, *and* contrariness, of the responses catalysed into my inquiry of a subject I refer to by the coined phrase ‘architectural (mis)metaphor’.

Metaphor research dates back to Aristotle, and whilst it is sizeable in volume and scope, it primarily addresses metaphor through philosophical, linguistic or literary frameworks. Architecture-centric concepts of metaphor remain under-represented. To address this deficit, my investigation was positioned at the intersection of architecture and philosophy. It applies and challenges traditional models of metaphorical analysis to provide nuanced insights specific to (re)reading architectural design and discourse.

This dissertation compares two models of metaphorology. The first is Hans Blumenberg’s (1920-1996) approach from *Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (1960) which “burrow[s] down to the substructure of thought” (1980, 5) to reveal conceptual absolutes. The second is influenced by Jacques Derrida’s (1930-2004) provisional use of the term ‘metaphorology’ in his essay ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’ (1974) which led me to create the term ‘(mis)metaphorology’. Whilst Blumenberg explores the fixed readings of metaphors, Derrida states misreadings of metaphors are inevitable due to the “sediment in the tangle of their roots” (1974, 54). (The etymology of ‘metaphor’ is itself metaphorical, mobile, and entangled, as it means ‘carrying [meaning] beyond’).

After reviewing the two existing models, my contribution to the research field is to propose a hypothetical synthesis where meaning oscillates in a gestalt manner, drifting in the rift. I refer to this third model by the portmanteau-neologism ‘conceptual (d)rift’. The three models are then applied to three architectural case studies: Adolf Loos’s *The Chicago Tribune Column* (1922), Maya Lin’s *Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (1982) and Bernard Tschumi’s *Parc de la Villette* (1983).

The research aims to reveal that alternate (mis)readings of architecture, both manifest and hidden, have always existed. (Mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift highlight the positive potential of ambiguity and the ‘creative sparks’ which can be generated by their unresolvable tension.

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PART ONE: OVERVIEW

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“A metaphor [...] ought to be like the sudden bursting of a flare, so that you see for an instant not only the road ahead but also its situation and the terrain around” (Nemerov 1991, 227).

On the evening of Monday the 15th of April 2019, the world slipped on its axis as a fire ignited inside Paris’s *Notre-Dame Cathedral*. Images of the conflagration quickly engulfed the internet as the iconic central spire, designed by Eugène Viollet-le-Duc (1814-1879), collapsed in real-time and Parisians sang *Ave Maria* beside the River Seine. When the sun rose and the smoke cleared, the full extent of the devastation was visible; Paris’s *Axis Mundi* had vanished, replaced overnight by a literal and figurative void.

News coverage of the event was varied. One article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted that the ‘world stopped’ for the fire because “Notre-Dame was a palimpsest of civilisation – layers upon layers of humanity, each built on top of what came before it to make something new and old all at once” (Roberts 2019, n.p.). Elsewhere, the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation* posted an interactive before-and-after walkthrough, utilising satellite images interspersed with graphic overlays which included the end-quote “as shocking as it was to witness, in time this episode will become just another fold in the fabric that makes up the grand old dame of Paris – to take its place alongside the stories of saints and martyrs, kings and hunchbacks” (Hoad *et al.* 2019, n.p.). Only three days after the catastrophe, it was as if a modern bent-backed Atlas shrugged at his laptop.

The author Ken Follett quickly released a fundraising book which noted that the most dramatic moment of the fiery night was when the spire “snapped like a matchstick” and crashed through the roof (2019, 7) [**Figure 1** below]. Follett wrote that *Notre-Dame* had always seemed eternal, its medieval builders assuming it would last “until the Day of Judgement” (7). The knowledge it could be destroyed, Follett wrote, was akin to the painful moment when a child realises their “father is not all-powerful and invulnerable” (7). I experienced a similar revelation watching the fire, recognising that *I* was not immortal. The intensity of the moment ignited a deep curiosity within me which both motivated this PhD and sustained it through to the journey’s conclusion.



Figure 1 : The spire of “Notre-Dame” snapping²

² Image source: ABC.net.au, [Notre-DameSpireCollapse16.4.19](#)

Online articles about the event revealed that many authors converted the conflagration into conceptual abridgments, suggesting that the singular event represented alternate circumstances. As one online author wrote, “Notre Dame was burning and everyone on Twitter was sure it was a metaphor for something” (Block 2019, n.p.). Moreover, not only were the metaphors instantaneous and ubiquitous, but they were also diverse to the point of contradiction: “what is so striking is how quickly the wounded structure has been appropriated into duelling narratives as to whether France and Europe are on the cusp of destruction, or whether they can be saved” (Rubin 2019, n.p.). One online author, for example, suggested that “the smouldering ruin of the cathedral now stands as a tragic metaphor for the church [...the] shell is still largely intact, but the building itself has been gutted” (Camosy 2019, n.p.), whilst another shifted the frame from despair to hope, noting the upcoming “reconstruction of Notre-Dame becomes [...] the metaphor of the reconstruction of France” (Fraysse 2019, n.p.).

Soon after, designers began to upload graphic solutions for *Notre-Dame*’s ‘rebirth’. In doing so, they metaphorically converted the church into a phoenix, and more abstract concepts, such as a ‘holy sprinkler’ and ‘faith rocket’ [**Figure 2** below]. The metaphorical allusions swung between novelty and naivety, requiring percipients to guess at the designers’ intentions, or alternatively, leaving them in no doubt.




Figure 2 : Online design submissions uploaded & collated shortly after the fire³

Repeated metaphors also began to appear. A metaphor such as ‘*Notre-Dame* is *Noah’s Ark*’ was used over and over to convert the church into a literal zoo, a figurative vessel for future life in the form of a seed-bank, or relied on ‘masts and crossbeams’ to create an emblem of

³ Image source: author’s own collage made at the time of the fire from screen shots (2019)

faith despite adversity [**Figure 3** below]. The online commentary accompanying these designs implied there was a ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way to use metaphor, however, it was their multivalency which made the metaphors more compelling.




Figure 3 : Design variations of a single metaphorical theme⁴

These ‘duelling metaphors’ raised questions; are alternate metaphors *mistakes* and *misreadings* – what I refer to by the coined term ‘(mis)metaphors’ – and could their ambiguity support paradigm-shifting (mis)understanding? Moreover, could the gestalt-styled oscillation between the alternatives – described by my neologism ‘conceptual (d)rift’ – ignite a creative spark where imagination can thrive off the tension?

Playing with words, this research combines *Notre-Dame’s* spire with the Latin *spirare* ‘to breathe’, to imagine a meta-metaphor of the creative breath-spark of in-spiration. It contributes something new to the existing field of metaphor inquiry by exploring architectural (mis)metaphors as a form of inspiration and aspiration, as well as a tool through which meaning transpires, conspires, or expires.

1.1 BACKGROUND

This first section, or ‘first breath’, introduces metaphor and then outlines how metaphor transfers, transforms or transcends meaning through three modes; metaphorology, (mis)metaphorology and conceptual (d)rift.

⁴ Image source: author’s own collage made at the time of the fire from screen shots (2019)

1.1.1 Understanding Metaphor

My earliest memory of metaphor was a cringe-worthy discussion in High School. Our English class was studying D.H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers* (1913), and the teacher explained how Lawrence used metaphorical language to avoid censorship. In Chapter XI, for example, the character Paul climbs a cherry tree and tosses the fruit at his friend Miriam, they then walk into a plantation of fir trees and lie down as rainfall saturates them. This fecundly figurative scenario hid a momentous narrative event which, once explained, marked an end of innocence.

Fast forward to the events of *Notre-Dame*. In my mind, metaphor was still primarily a literary device. William Golding's *The Spire* (1964) revealed multiple metaphorical references, calling the spire of the novel's gothic church "the mast for the church-ark", "a fulcrum of vertigo", "a diagram of prayer", "a stone hammer hanging up there waiting to strike", "a key to unlock a vast book" and "a colossal spike" (2013, 116, 132, 133, 206 & 216). Meanwhile, poetic inspiration was found in Sylvia Plath's 1959 poem:

Metaphors

I'm a riddle in nine syllables,
An elephant, a ponderous house,
A melon strolling on two tendrils.
O red fruit, ivory, fine timbers!
This loaf's big with its yeasty rising.
Money's new-minted in this fat purse.
I'm a means, a stage, a cow in calf.
I've eaten a bag of green apples,
Boarded the train there's no getting off.⁵

Presented as an enigma in nine lines of nine syllables, the 'answer' to the riddle is 'a pregnant woman'. It is, however, as Margaret Freeman notes, more than that; "Plath's poem is an icon of the way metaphor becomes the generic structure for the emergence of poetic creation, embodied in the metaphor of childbirth" (2020, 77). Metaphor is always a beginning, always more than it seems.

⁵ [Plath, InternetPoem.com](https://www.internetpoem.com/plath-metaphors.html)

Architecturally, ‘typical’ metaphors were found in Charles Jencks’s *The Iconic Building is Here to Stay* (2006) when he refers to *Selfridges* in Birmingham as being reminiscent of “body-hugging clothes, sparkling sequins, tits and bums” (5) [**Figure 4a** below]. A more multivalent version is Jørn Utzon’s competition sketches for *The Sydney Opera House*. Utzon’s design was referred to at the time as a “lovely ship of imagination”, “a disintegrating circus tent in a gale” and “a piece of Danish pastry” (Watson 2006, 50). In architect Simon Unwin’s *Metaphor* (2019) he includes two additional metaphorical interpretations the building “suffers (or enjoys)” (23); sails and amorous turtles [**Figure 4b** below]. A third example of metaphorical architecture was revealed when a ‘fixed’ metaphorical interpretation for a particular building changes. During the French Revolution, for example, *Notre-Dame*, ‘Our Lady’ the ‘House of God’, was temporarily renamed the ‘Temple of Reason’ (Follett 2019, 26) [**Figure 4c** below].



Figure 4 : “Selfridges” in Birmingham / “Notre-Dame” - Temple of Reason / “The Sydney Opera House”⁶

⁶ Image sources: Selfridges, Warrins (2007), [Wikimedia.org](https://www.wikimedia.org/); Cult of reason, [Wikimedia.org](https://www.wikimedia.org/); and (Unwin 2009, 23)

During initial research, metaphor kept (re)presenting itself. ‘Theories are buildings’, wrote Lakoff and Johnson in their seminal *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), as evidenced by phrases such as “Is that the *foundation* for your theory?” or “The argument is *shaky*” (2003, 43). Australian Rod Pitcher’s paper ‘The Metaphors That Research Students Live By’ (2013), surveyed postgraduates to determine whether they saw their study metaphorically in terms of space, travel, action, body or ordeal. At a high level, Pitcher revealed that the students who related to ‘travelling to a destination’ were more positive about their experience than those who saw it as ‘an ordeal to be suffered’ (7). Cultural historian Hélène Lipstadt, meanwhile, found the ‘field’ of architectural competitions was loaded with connotations relating to battle-fields, force-fields, and playing-fields (2009, 13), (to which green-fields and level-playing-fields could also be added). Each version, she noted, acted as a ‘frame’, a “relatively autonomous universe [...] with its own distinctive stakes, capitals, interests, and logic” (16-17). As Sarah Robinson’s *Nesting: Body, Dwelling, Mind* (2011) acknowledges, “Our choice of metaphor can and does powerfully shape our reality” (60).

Whilst looking for a model of metaphor to adopt, architectural historian Andri Gerber’s introduction to *Metaphors in Architecture and Urbanism* (2013), burst that bubble; “there is in fact no single metaphor theory” (2013, 15). Gerber then shifted the anticipated ‘field’ from literature and architecture to philosophy, writing that the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) had generated a potential exception when he coined the phrase ‘metaphorology’ (16). Blumenberg’s *Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (1960) believed that reviewing the changes of individual metaphors over time, could lead to a better understanding of the changes in the wider world, in the same way that the alteration of *Notre-Dame’s* ‘House of God’ to ‘Temple of Reason’ revealed a shift in French ideology.

The unexpected pivot towards philosophy was then reinforced by the awareness that a second philosopher, Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), had also used the term metaphorology. Whilst Blumenberg believed that metaphorology could “stake out the terrain” of a philosophical history (Blumenberg 2010 [1960], 5), Derrida worried that meaning is inherently fluid, and that the ‘ship’ of language is always drifting (Derrida 2007 [1978], 49). Derrida’s approach to metaphorology was sceptical of its success, and as such, the two versions began to appear as a thesis and anti- or counter-thesis.

A third, synthesised model, also began to suggest itself as investigations continued. It was the ‘rift’ between the two philosophers’ approaches, and Derrida’s notion of language

‘drift’, that combined to create my portmanteau-neologism ‘conceptual (d)rift’ to explain the way in which metaphorical meaning might move.

In the absence of an architectural metaphor model, the two philosophers’ approaches (and the synthesised response model) appeared as the most viable means of proceeding. It thus became evident that this dissertation would need to be positioned between the familiar and the unfamiliar, at the crossroads of architecture and philosophy.

1.1.2 Metaphor, Metaphorology and the Transfer of Meaning

What is metaphor? Aristotle’s *Poetics* (c. 330 BC) states a metaphor “consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else” (2022, 56 [§1457b]). Unwin elaborates, “Metaphors are a device by which we try to understand and explain things by implicitly drawing attention to corresponding characteristics between different entities” (107). The Greek etymology of metaphor is derived from ‘*meta-*’ which means ‘across’ and ‘*phor-*’ which is ‘to carry’, such that *metaphora* means ‘carrying meaning over’, or the “transference from one point to another” (Kirby 1997, 532). This notion of moving beyond, indicates that motion is inherent to metaphor.

Described in more detail in Chapter 2 [Research Context], metaphor was appreciated and denounced over time as either a conceit or a deceit, depending, in part, on the attitude towards ‘truth’ of each era. Blumenberg’s *Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (1960) reviews the iterations of several metaphors and describes metaphorology as “a subbranch of conceptual history” which identifies “the *transitions* that will allow the specificity of each metaphor and its expressive forms to appear in sharper focus” (2010, 77). Blumenberg’s metaphorology and his optimism towards specific meaning transfer is explored in Chapter 3.

1.1.3 (Mis)metaphors, (Mis)metaphorology and the Transformation of Meaning

As per its etymology, metaphor helps meaning move. Counterintuitively, however, it can also *fix* meaning. For example, we still ‘dial’ a friend on our mobile phone (Kittay 1989, 296). The ambiguity of this fix and flow of meaning becomes the topic I refer to as ‘(mis)metaphorology’.

The ‘problem’ of metaphor, and by extension, metaphorology, is highlighted very early within Professor David Punter’s *Metaphor* (2007) when he uses the metaphorical phrase ‘to draw a line in the sand’ to indicate that understanding is often temporary and unstable (10). The philosopher Paul Ricœur potentially undermines the promise of metaphorology further when he notes, “it is impossible to talk about metaphor non-metaphorically [...] the definition of metaphor returns on itself” (1986, 18). For example, when philosopher Frank Ankersmit writes, “Familiarisation truly is the heart of metaphor” (1994, 13), he simultaneously explains metaphor and metaphorises his explanation. Put another way, as soon as we *reflect* upon metaphor, we initiate a mirror-metaphor, and when we attempt to *grasp* its meaning, we employ a tactile-metaphor. As a result, metaphorical inquiry, or any model of metaphorology, tends to blur subject, object and analysis, braiding them in a self-referential bind.

René Magritte’s painting *The Explanation* (1952), [**Figure 5** nearby], is a visual representation of how metaphor works; someone notices that two objects (or aspects of life) have common attributes and combines them to create a third element. For Magritte, it is the cohabitation of two, tapered-cylindrical objects on a dining table, that births a third object. While similarities are recognised, the objects’ dissimilarities are both ignored *and* brought to our attention through the juxtaposition of scale, colour, material, and edibility. By simultaneously drawing attention to one set of factors whilst ignoring others, metaphor appears to reveal a ‘truth’ whilst utilising a ‘lie’. As such, metaphor relies on an internal (il)logic that is inherently paralogical. The idiosyncratic outcome is (un)relatable and imbued with strangeness. The result is akin to a surrealist collage, where chance affects operational logic and the colocation of disparate things produces “a new reality with all kinds of contrasting effects” (Manolopoulo 2013, 141).



Figure 5 : Rene Magritte's "The Explanation" (1952) ⁷

⁷ Image source: Wikiart.org, [MagritteExplanation](#)

This ‘new reality’ hints at the presence of ‘(mis)metaphor’; variable metaphors created for a single situation, multivalent meanings generated from a single metaphor, and/or the alternate connotations that arise from a supposedly singular meaning. Aristotle potentially recognised the presence of (mis)metaphors centuries ago when he wrote, “Then there are the ‘parasites of Dionysus,’ but the persons in question call themselves ‘artistes.’ These are both metaphors, the former one that sullies the profession, the latter the contrary” (2007, 200).

“A metaphor is a kind of magical mental changing room”, writes Mardy Grothe, “where one thing, for a moment, becomes another, and in that moment is seen in a whole new way” (2008, 10). The trick is knowing when, or if, the quick-change of transformation is taking place. For the statement ‘this task is a real *breeze*’, for example, “there is some tension, and this is how we recognise a metaphor: as a tension between the literal meaning of breeze and a metaphorical meaning”, there is, “a clash” (Taverniers 2017, 323). It is the unexpectedness of what ‘steps out of the changing room’ that creates cognitive strain and causes us to think and think again. In other words, “does metaphor *mean* something more than, or different from, or in some sense beneath, what it appears to say; or is the meaning of a metaphor precisely what it *does* say?” (Punter 2007, 17).

Derrida recognises this slipperiness in his essay ‘The *Retrait* of Metaphor’ (1978) when he notes he “can no longer stop the vehicle [of language] or anchor the ship, master without remainder the drifting, skidding, or sideslipping” (2007, 49). Adrift on the sea of language, Derrida acknowledges the ‘drama’ is that “even if I decided to *speak no longer* metaphorically about metaphor, I would not succeed; metaphor would continue to get along without me in order to make me speak, ventriloquising me, metaphorising me” (49-50). Derrida’s reservations about the success of metaphorology, and the way that meaning might be transformed through both ventriloquism and metaphor’s self-referential nature, are addressed in Chapter 4.

1.1.4 Conceptual (D)rift and Meaning Transcendence

Metaphor involves fixedness and flux, comparison and contradiction, the transference and possible transformation of meaning, *and* the risk of becoming entangled within its own meta-meaning. The upside of this entanglement is identified when author Ihab Hasan suggests that metaphor is “a knack of seeing otherwise, ‘wrong’ identification, if you wish” (2010, 112). The ‘wrongness’ of (mis)metaphor allows percipients to be aware that they are aware and,

therefore, has the potential to transcend meaning. (Mis)metaphor aids metaphor's articulation of the inarticulate via (Blumenbergian) paradigms and (Derridean) paradoxes in a dual process of simplification and complexification.

The twin-processes become two sides of the same story. They are not, however, either-or opposites in a purely 'rift' like relationship, nor do they comply to a both-and arrangement that simply 'drifts' between the two. The way that (mis)metaphor potentially demonstrates the (in)correctness of what we see is more of a flip-flop arrangement that simultaneously recognises *both* rift *and* drift, in a process I refer to as 'conceptual (d)rift'.

Architect Peter Smith's book *The Dynamics of Delight* (2003) writes that "humans share with the whole of Nature the characteristic that equilibrium is the ultimate goal; but as *mental beings* the preferred state is *disequilibrium*. Life flourishes on the interface between order and anarchy; it is successful because of asymmetry and tension" (2003, 76). (Mis)metaphor not only survives but thrives on the (dis)equilibrium of its (a)symmetry and helps conceptual (d)rift flourish.

Discussed in detail in Chapter 5, conceptual (d)rift becomes the third model through which metaphor can be analysed in architecture, a synthesis of Blumenberg's metaphorology and Derrida's implied (mis)metaphorology. It allows this dissertation to explore the risks and returns of (mis)metaphor's creative ambiguity and forms both the core and outer boundary of this dissertation.

These three models, metaphorology, (mis)metaphorology and conceptual (d)rift, are then applied to three case studies, all architectural competition entries, in Chapters 6 through 8 respectively, in order to explore their individual merit.

1.2 INVESTIGATIVE INTENTIONS

Architect Barie Fez-Barrington's book *Architecture: The Making of Metaphors* (2012) states, "Metaphor is transferring, bridging and carrying-over where transfer can bridge anything to anything and has consequences" (4). This dissertation aims to explore those consequences by demonstrating the historical significance of (mis)metaphors which have challenged the hegemony of architectural design and discourse. To do this, it examines how a

(mis)metaphorical lens expands or alters creative responses to architectural competitions and ideological debates and attempts to understand its broader impact on architectural theory.

To shape the investigation, three research questions were formulated: are existing metaphorology models *compatible* with architecture; how might they be *applied* to architecture; and what positive *contributions* could a (mis)metaphorical model lend to architectural design and discourse analysis?

Objectives were then formulated for each of these high-level inquiries. To determine the compatibility of existing models, both Blumenberg's model of 'metaphorology' and Derrida's implied counter-model of '(mis)metaphorology' would be evaluated, and an investigation conducted into a hybrid model identified by the neologism 'conceptual (d)rift'. Each of these three models would then be applied to architectural competition case studies, whilst the style and format of each chapter would be experimentally altered to exaggerate each model's difference and evidence the creative opportunities available. Lastly, conclusions would be drawn about what positive contributions the individual models, and (mis)metaphor in general, might have for architectural design and discourse analysis.

The three investigative intentions then shaped the dissertation structure as follows: Part I introduces the subject and its research context. Part II addresses Research Question 1 and adopts a dialectical model⁸ of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis to review Blumenberg's fixed version of metaphorology and Derrida's fluid (mis)metaphorology, finishing with the hypothetical third model, conceptual (d)rift. Part III answers Research Question 2 by applying the three models to three architectural competition case studies, whilst Part IV addresses Research Question 3, summarising the findings and illustrating the value of the inquiry and the positive contributions a (mis)metaphorical approach can have for architecture.

PART I: Overview

C1: Introduction

C2: Research Context

PART II: Metaphor Models

C3: Metaphorology: Hans Blumenberg

C4: (Mis)metaphorology: Jacques Derrida

C5: Conceptual (D)rift

PART III: Case Studies

>> C6: Case Study – *Chicago Tribune Column*

>> C7: Case Study – *Vietnam Veterans Memorial*

>> C8: *Parc de la Villette* – A Narrative

PART IV: Conclusion

C9: "Conclusion"

⁸ Refer to Appendix Two for a clarification of this term's usage.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

Pre-empting the notion of conceptual (d)rift, whilst qualitative research and case studies were an assumed starting point, other options including bracketing, dialectics, and intertextuality were also adopted [see Appendix Two for more detailed information]. This section briefly explains the approach and stylistic decisions adopted and outlines the case study projects selected.

1.3.1 Investigative Approach

Semiologist Roland Barthes wrote, “*tell me how you classify and I’ll tell you who you are*” (Barthes 1994 [1985], 47). Before discussing the approach adopted in this dissertation, two literary examples are summarised here to indicate the spectrum of options available.

In the opening pages of Peter Carey’s novel *Oscar and Lucinda* (1988), famous for its floating glass church, Oscar is introduced as a young boy organising his dead mother’s buttons in a boxed wooden tray, “He drilled [the] buttons as other boys might drill soldiers. He lined them up. He ordered them” (1997, 9) [**Figure 6** nearby]. Oscar’s strict father, Theophilus, reviews Oscar’s latest arrangement, recognising, “The taxonomic principle being colour. The spectrum from left to right, with size being the second principle of order”, and congratulates Oscar with a sparing “very good” (9). At the opposite end of the spectrum is a scene near the conclusion of Charlotte Wood’s *The Submerged Cathedral* (2004) in which Jocelyn, the main character, begins “weaving a halting mosaic with shells” over a large table, “placing them gently, instinctively” (215-6). Her lover Duncan, however, sees only “the smallness of this landscape of lifeless little shells”, and sensing his denouncement, Jocelyn sweeps the shells into a bucket, complaining, “It’s not *for* anything, [...] It’s for me” (217-8).



Figure 6 : Stills from the film "Oscar & Lucinda" (1997)⁹

Whilst the motivation for this dissertation is strongly aligned with Jocelyn's 'for me', my approach to classifying material is decidedly Oscar-like. As such, inquiries commenced with the intention of 'boxing' the material, however, metaphor preferred to be 'woven', its 'mosaic landscape' refusing to be contained. There was comfort in the knowledge that architects embody contradictions, being simultaneously creative and rational, open-minded but also systematic. Moreover, "Writers, like teeth, are divided into incisors and grinders" (Walter Bagehot, in Grothe 2008, 13), and we need both to turn food into a meal.

Wayne Attoe's *Architecture and Critical Imagination* (1978) notes that behind many architectural analyses is a 'master metaphor' used by the critic to position themselves and frame their material (6). Attoe gives examples of critics as tourists, stage directors, farmers,

⁹ Image source: Linnetmoss.com 2014, [OscarAndLucinda](#)

surgeons, obstetricians, and weathervanes (6-7). Using the literary examples above, investigations drifted in the rift between the roles of ‘drill-sergeant’ and ‘landscaper’ as two thousand years of interdisciplinary material was commissioned and corralled to create new scenery and new ways of looking at that scene. The philosopher Jean-François Lyotard notes in his book *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984), that it had been suggested that “under the name of postmodernism, architects are [...] throwing out the baby of experimentation with the bathwater of functionalism” (71). In many ways, ‘conceptual (d)rift’, the subject and the method, first appeared during the initial attempts at material classification, and developed into an approach that ‘throws out’ neither functionality nor experimentation, bathwater or baby, buttons or shells.

Another master-metaphor that could be utilised is the notion of ‘bricoleur’. Claude Lévi-Strauss’s *Savage Mind* (1962) describes the bricoleur as someone who works in a less skilful manner than an experienced craftsman (1966, 16). The ‘researcher-as-bricoleur’, “learn[s] how to borrow from many different disciplines” and operates “between and within competing and overlapping perspectives and paradigms” (Denzin & Lincoln 2013, 6 & 11). Such a research style reflects the amateur’s attempt to craft the oddness of metaphor into something both artful *and* useful to an understanding of architecture. The approach simultaneously accepts containers and the wilderness, the floating and the submerged, logic and intuition, strict doctrine and unbridled delight. In order to engage with architecture, it ‘(d)rifts’.

1.3.2 Case Studies

Denzin and Lincoln’s *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry* (2013) notes that the commonsense definition of a case study is the “intensive analysis of an individual unit” (51). The advantage of case studies is their ability to foster new hypotheses and material of high conceptual validity, whilst a weakness includes selection bias (198). They suggest case study selection is an intuitive choice based on what seems ‘most likely’ to help explore a hypothesis, as “no universal methodological principles exist that allow you to choose with certainty” (183-5). The aim, they suggest, is to find cases which are paradigmatic and/or extreme (185).

Intuition certainly played a part in the selection of the three case studies explored in this dissertation. The designs chosen are by architects who are designers *and* writers, and whose work has influenced architecture, in terms of design and discourse. The three case

studies were also all competition entries, and as such, all participated in a public event, potentially ‘seeding’ architectural development. The three projects chosen [*Figure 7* nearby] are as follows:

- Adolf Loos’s *The Chicago Tribune Column* (1922), Chicago – (unbuilt) international competition entry;
- May Lin’s *Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (1982), Washington – national competition winner; and
- Bernard Tschumi’s *Parc de la Villette* (1983), Paris – international competition winner.

The designs all felt ambiguous and raised questions about contrariness which seemed worth pursuing: was Loos being serious or humorous with his proposal; why was Lin’s non-traditional memorial so controversial when it was proposed; and how well did Tschumi’s conceptual deconstruction work in constructed form? As such, the three projects could also be considered as evidencing ambiguous metaphorical intention, perception, and outcome, respectively. Moreover, they each allowed meaning to be explored in different ways. Whilst Loos’s design initiated ideological queries, Lin’s design was meaningful on an emotional level that bypassed cognition, and Tschumi’s design challenged the meaning of meaning on a meta-level. The projects could also be considered as an architectural object, subject and event respectively, which transferred, transformed and transcended meaning in turn.

The number of case studies chosen was a deliberate means of triangulation; “One is a point. Two is a line. Only with three do we start to feel the strength of physical space” (Sedgwick 2018, 212). Most importantly, the quantity directly aligned with the three metaphor models being investigated. Loos’s case study is considered in terms of Blumenbergian metaphorology, Lin’s relies on an application of Derridean (mis)metaphorology, whilst the third case study, written as a speculative narrative to challenge traditional analysis, explores how conceptual (d)rift occurs when Tschumi aims to generate an architecture of disequilibrium.



Figure 7 : "The Chicago Tribune Column" / "Vietnam Veterans Memorial" / "Parc de la Villette" ¹⁰

1.3.3 Stylistic Considerations

The writing style evidenced in this dissertation originally arose from uncertainty, in a similar way that the phrase '(mis)metaphor' was initially a form of hedging. 'Mismetaphor' might have been more appropriate to better reflect words such as 'misreading' and 'misunderstanding', however, the phrase appeared too definitive. Likewise, 'mis-metaphor' was an option, the hyphenated word echoing the compound nature of metaphor, but it too implied a decided entity that was not ambiguous enough. When investigations first began, the same newness to the subject material saw a patchwork quilt of quotes created, based on the assumption that combining different perspectives close together was a form of synthesis.

¹⁰ Image sources: Sammlungeonline.albertina.at, [TribuneColumn](#); Wikipedia.org, [VietnamVeteransMemorial](#) & Tschumi.com, [ParcDeLaVillette](#)

As explorations continued, the style began to resemble metaphor's method of fusing disparate items as a means of generating a new way of seeing, as well as conceptual (d)rift's technique of recognising ideological polarities *and* their porous boundaries. Gerber writes in *Metaphors in Architecture and Urbanism* (2013) that "every discussion on metaphors – due to the very nature of metaphors – will remain on unstable ground" (16). As such, the best option seemed to be an embrace of that instability. The style appeared to resonate with the fragmentation of philosophers Heraclitus and Walter Benjamin, as well as the poetry of Anne Carson whose poem *Essay on What I Think About Most* (2000) [Appendix One] became a constant companion throughout the dissertation journey, alongside the whispered inspiration of *Our Lady of Notre-Dame*. The style also resonated with the idea of 'montage' where percipients are invited "to construct interpretations [...] built on associations based on the contrasting images that blend into one another" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2103, 9).

This blending of thematic parallels, liberated from labels, untethered from conventional chronology and categorisation, created tension and cohesion and began to embody conceptual (d)rift, the method and the subject, conflating form and content. "Metaphor", as Nicole Walker writes, "signals a different kind of nonfiction ethic than the truth and nothing but the truth. This alternate ethics suggests that inclusiveness creates a bigger net into which more readers can tumble" (Walker 2013, 203). As such, the approach, whilst both loose and crowded, was deemed worthwhile in evidencing the value of a new creativity in architectural analysis.

Author Susan Sontag's essay 'On Style' (1964) notes; "practically all metaphors for style amount to placing matter on the inside, style on the outside. It would be more to the point to reverse the metaphor" (2001, 17). "Style", she continues, "is not quantitative, any more than it is superadded" (17). The fragmentary-montage approach initially adopted accidentally, went on to shape this work from the inside, expanding the dissertation beyond traditional expectations of project inquiry.

*

In terms of appearance, each time a metaphorical model was applied, the formatting was altered to better reflect the model being investigated. By using the same shaping-device as a concrete poem, variable formatting was intended to visually reflect the shape-shifting nature of metaphor, enhance its effectiveness, and reveal the balancing act that exists between coherence and creativity. Reiterating that meaning can be transferred in a variety of new

ways, the final case study, Chapter 8: *Parc de la Villette*, goes a step further in evidencing potential theoretical propositions and uses a speculative narrative framework. By imagining a fabricated reality, told in turn by the park and its creator (amongst others), it deliberately blurs the line between fact, fiction, argument and metaphor and exaggerates the ‘net of possibilities’ readers might tumble into when understanding design discourse.

*

Lastly, the grammatical decisions made for this thesis are briefly summarised here:

- *Pronouns*: first-person pronouns are used in the dissertation’s opening and closing chapters due to the material’s more personal nature, whereas third-person pronouns are used in the chapters in between.
- *Author introductions*: authors are introduced to the dissertation by their occupation and full name and then referred to by their last name only for the rest of that chapter. If reintroduced in later chapters, their full name will initially be reused, before reverting back to last name only. In some instances, therefore, there may be occasional passages where several authors are variously referred to in full, or in part.
- *Decapitalisation*: capitalised versions of terms such as ‘Modernism’ are avoided, unless they appear in quoted texts, to reflect Loos’s concern that “It is impossible to utter a capital letter” (1982 [1897-1900], 3), and because Derrida’s passing reference to “decapita(lisa)tion” suggests an end to hegemonic practices (1982 [1968], 27).
- *‘All caps’*: Lakoff and Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) cemented a trend in metaphor research in which metaphorical phrases are italicised and underlying conceptual metaphors are written in small capital letters. For example, the saying ‘look *how far we’ve come*’ is transcribed as LOVE IS A JOURNEY (2003, 45). The technique is primarily used by linguists, and as such, is only employed when quoting another author’s work.
- *Italic text*: Italics are used conventionally for emphasis but also appear in some quoted texts to indicate metaphorical phrases. Unless otherwise noted, italics within author quotes are always as per the original.
- *Cross-referencing*: ‘§X.Y’ is used to cross-reference Chapter X, Section Y.

* * * * *

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH CONTEXT

“What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors [...] which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions...” (Nietzsche 2005 (1873), 17).

The introduction recognised that whilst no single metaphor model exists, two philosophers had laid down potential threads that could be followed. The first was Hans Blumenberg, who believed that alternate meanings of a single metaphor could reveal underlying changes in philosophical ideology. The second was Jacques Derrida, who was more sceptical, and worried about the integrity of analytical models given metaphor’s habit of speaking for itself. To better understand the divergence in paths that created the two-model dichotomy of Blumenberg’s metaphorology and Derrida’s implied counter-model of (mis)metaphorology, this chapter undertakes a review of the literature surrounding metaphor.

Although the research context was quickly recognised as being incredibly deep and wide, four (roughly) chronological ‘movements’ were identified within the literature. Each represents an ideological shift, which I have labelled as follows:

1. **AMT: Aristotelian (Alien, Atomic or Absolute) Metaphor Theory – *language is metaphoric*.** Tends towards universal order, hegemonic polarities, and uniform analyses. Includes classical philosophy and logical positivism.
2. **BMT: Behavioural (and Blumenberg’s) Metaphor Themes – *thought is metaphoric*.** Recognises contextualism, subjectivity, and meanings that are multivalent and subliminal. Includes poststructuralism, postmodernism, semiotics, and philosophical anthropology.
3. **CMT: Conceptual Metaphor Theory – *experience is metaphoric*.** Combines elements of the prior two movements, whilst emphasising that metaphor is ‘embodied’ in language and thought. Primarily used in psycholinguistics.
4. **DMT: Deconstructive (Deliberate, Dynamic and Derridean) Metaphor Theories – *everything is potentially metaphoric*.** Identifies with existential themes, recognises metaphor’s inherent indeterminism, and explores its (un)controllability. Includes deconstructionism and continental philosophy, with the potential to include scepticism, postcolonialism, feminism, and other contemporary interests.

2.1 ARISTOTELIAN METAPHOR THEORY [AMT]: LANGUAGE IS METAPHORICAL

2.1.1 Aristotle's Initial (D)rift

Derrida's paper 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy' (1974), states it is customary in metaphor discourse to start with Aristotle's definition from *Poetics* (c.335 BCE) (30). "Of course", as Derrida writes, "Aristotle invented neither the word metaphor, nor the concept of metaphor. However, he seems to have put forward the first [surviving] systematic placing of it, [...] and had the most profound historical consequences" (30).¹¹ This review of the research context will follow suit, but only after noting that *Poetics* represents only *half* of Aristotle's explanation of metaphor; the other half is contained in *On Rhetoric* (c.350 BCE). In *Poetics*, metaphor lends "dignity to style, by creating an enigma that reveals a likeness or by giving a name to something that had been nameless", whereas in *On Rhetoric*, "metaphor appears as a technique of persuasion, used to make a case appear better or worse than it is" (Cushman 2012, 865). As such, metaphor drifts, from inception, within a conceptual schism of intentionality, a functional duality where words *move* people emotionally *or* ideologically. As philosopher Paul Ricœur notes, Aristotle's two specific ways of proceeding, "mark out two distinct universes of discourse. Metaphor, however, has a foot in each domain" (1986, 12).

2.1.2 Aristotle's *Poetics* (§1457b-1460b)

In *Poetics*, Aristotle writes that metaphor "consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else" (2022, 56 [Chapter 21 / §1457b]). An alternate translation exaggerates the sense of metaphor's 'otherness'; "Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference".¹²

A metaphor might be used, according to Aristotle, when a term "has no special name of their own" (57 [C21/§1457b]). Strange, lengthened, or metaphoric words, he writes, can add interest, but "the greatest" of these is metaphor; "It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars" (61 [C22/§1458a]). Aristotle cautions, however,

¹¹ Herodotus (c. 484-425BCE) and Thucydides (c.460-404BCE) were apparently the first authors recorded as using the word *metapherein*, and Isocrates (436-338BCE) specifically used the word *metaphor* (Willson-Quayle 1996, 18).

¹² Aristotle, Gutenberg.org: ThePoeticsOfAristotle

that using too many unfamiliar terms can lead to “either a riddle or a barbarism” (59 [C22/§1458a]).

Lastly, Aristotle notes that a poet is an “imitator” for whom the use of non-standard language is “conceded” (67 [C25/§1460b]). This ‘poetic license’ indicates that metaphor simultaneously “recognises and transgresses the logical structure of language” (Ricœur 1986, 22). As Derrida notes, the manoeuvre also designates metaphor to an “ancillary status” which is permitted when “properly controlled [...] in the service of truth”, but is preferred less than transparent discourse (1974, 38).

2.1.3 Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* (Book 3, §1405a-1412a)

The notion of ‘transgression from truth’ is elaborated within Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric*. Aristotle writes that language’s role is “to be clear” and “appropriate”, noting there is a difference between “ornamented” and “flat” language (2007, 198 [Book 3 Chapter 2 / c.§1405a]). Ricœur notes that metaphor thus becomes “defined in terms of deviation”, which “leads to the eventually customary opposition between *figurative* and *proper*” language (1986, 19-20). After reiterating the need to be appropriate, Aristotle then writes that “Metaphor especially has clarity and sweetness and strangeness” (200 [B3C2/ c.§1405a]). Aristotle then suggests “metaphors are made like riddles” (201 [B3C2/§1405b]), whilst an alternate translation pushes the riddle-aspect further; “metaphor is a kind of enigma”.¹³

Aristotle acknowledges the “little” difference between metaphor and simile by using an example from Homer’s *Iliad* (c. 8th Century BCE), where Achilles “rushed as a lion” (205 [B3C4/c.§1406b]). Whereas the simile explicitly transfers a lion’s speed, strength and courage onto Achilles, a metaphor is a more implicit comparison. Centuries later, semiologist Umberto Eco converts Aristotle’s example into a metaphor to demonstrate how metaphorical-truth-perception works; “If I say that a hero is a lion, literally speaking I lie; my addressee, by recognising such a blatant case of lying, must infer that I probably intend to say something else” (1984, 157).

Later in *Rhetoric*, Aristotle suggests there are three types of words; “urbanities” (ordinary words), the “unintelligible”, and metaphors which bring about the most learning

¹³ Aristotle, Tufts.edu: [Book3Chapter2Section12](#)

(218 [B3C10/§1410b]). New ideas can be discovered from metaphors, Aristotle writes, by “bringing-before-the-eyes” vivid images (219 [B3C10/§1411a]).

Aristotle then reinforces the notion that metaphors should be “transferred from things that are related but not obviously so” (223 [B3C11/§1412a]), and in one translation, ends with a lyrical turn, noting that metaphor assists by “making your hearers see things”.¹⁴

2.1.4 Metaphor’s Risks and Rewards

Aristotle’s analyses of metaphor swings between its advantages and disadvantages, enthusiasm and concern. For the affirmative, Aristotle implies a mastery of metaphor is a sign of genius which fills linguistic gaps, challenges the intellect, generates fresh viewpoints, and paints vivid pictures before the eyes of hearers. An extract from Anne Carson’s (1950-) poem *Essay on What I Think About Most* (2000) channels these positives when, as she puts it, “something has changed in the quotient of our expectations”, when we conflate metaphor, meaning, poetry and mistakes:

“Aristotle says that metaphor causes the mind to experience itself
in the act of making a mistake.
He pictures the mind moving along a plane surface
of ordinary language
when suddenly
that surface breaks or complicates.
Unexpectedness emerges.” (Carson 2000, 30).

Whilst Carson ends her poem revelling in the instructive joy of (mis)metaphors, it was primarily the reproachful aspect of Aristotle’s outlook that was adopted in the centuries that followed. Metaphor was considered a “degenerate, incidental or non-conforming use of language” (Ritchie 2006, 3). To demonstrate, contemporary metaphor scholar David L. Ritchie notes; “According to the standard model of language comprehension [...] metaphors, such as ‘my lawyer is a *shark*,’ [or ‘Achilles is a lion’] are literally false. Because they are

¹⁴ Aristotle, MIT.edu: [TheInternetClassicsArchive_Rhetoric](https://www.mit.edu/~civnet/InternetClassicsArchive/Rhetoric)

false, they are defective” (2013, 48). This ‘defective’ nature led metaphor to be treated with caution, even castigated, for centuries.

2.1.5 Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Respectability

The rationalist and empiricist views of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries generally saw metaphor as “a decorative but superfluous means of speaking” (Way 1991, 3). When essayist Samuel Johnson (1709-84) remarked that metaphorical expression “is a great excellence in style, when it is used with propriety, for it gives you two ideas for one” (as quoted in Richards 1936, 93), he reveals himself to be a *conditional* advocate. Similarly, George Campbell’s *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776) notes on his first page that figurative language should be used to “elucidate a subject” rather than “excite admiration”, and he explicitly identifies metaphor as a means to an end (2008, 1). Later, Campbell suggests staying with phrases which have received “public sanction” (such as ‘*chewing the cud*’ (298)), because “a new metaphor is rarely to be risked” (294).

Whilst John Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), does not refer specifically to metaphor, his chapter ‘The Misuse of Words’ states, “Wit and imagination get a better welcome in the world than dry truth and real knowledge”, such that, figurative language choices, when treated as “ornaments”, do not always constitute “an imperfection or misuse of language” (2017, 189 [C10/§34]). Locke continues, however, “all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence has invented – serve only to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so they are perfect cheats” (189 [C10/§34]).

One of the most complicated examples of metaphor in discourse is Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1651), written during the English civil wars. Hobbes condemns metaphors, suggesting “senseless and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is like wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt” (Hobbes, 2010, 32). The implication is that chaotic language leads to cultural chaos (Stillman 1995, 796). Hobbes’s unequivocal denouncement, however, is contradicted by his regular reliance on metaphors. Hobbes opens his work by comparing humans to *automata*; “For what is the *heart*, but a *spring*; and the *nerves*, but so many *strings*; and the *joints*, but so many *wheels*” (Hobbes 2010, 7). For Hobbes’s contemporaries, his hypocrisy indicated he “failed to practice what he preached” and revealed “the ample gulf between

political theory and practice” (Wilson-Quayle, 1996, 15). Alternatively, his approach might represent a deliberate ‘foot in both camps’, aligning itself with rationality *and* poetic license, aiming to move readers ideologically *and* emotionally. When Hobbes’s writes in his last paragraph, “I have brought to an end my Discourse [...] without other design, than *to set before men’s eyes* the relation between protection and obedience” (Hobbes 2010, 476 [§396] – italics added), Hobbes essentially quotes Aristotle’s explanation of metaphor and thus implies *Leviathan* is an extended metaphor.

2.1.6 Logical Positivism

The themes of AMT (Aristotelian Metaphor Theory) culminate in the ideas of Logical Positivism and The Vienna Circle of the 1920s and 30s. These philosophers “attempted to formulate a ‘language of science’, constructed on the base of mathematical logic” (Snodgrass & Coyne 2006, 31). They preferred verifiable facts, which they “viewed as a sort of coded logical calculus which could be transformed into propositions that would be truth-functional” (Way 1991, 4). Metaphors, with their “ambiguous referents” and “dubious truth values”, were seen as “*extra-logical*” (4). In their attempt to “purge” philosophy of the metaphysical notions which were incompatible with modern science, they argued that “sentences whose truth cannot be verified are meaningless” (Branko 2011, 178).

Philosopher Alfred Ayer’s, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), for example, suggests both the metaphysician “duped by grammar” and the mystic “trying to express the inexpressible”, are “literally senseless” (1946, 45). Ayer takes hypothesis verification to the extreme, noting that statements such as ‘arsenic is poisonous’ cannot be conclusively proven unless everyone dies (37). A potential problem with Ayer’s work is that it is empirically unverifiable and, thus, by extrapolation, nonsense.

Philosopher Bertrand Russell’s *Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918) does not refer to metaphors but is built around an extended metaphor in which discrete propositions are made of atomic facts, and “the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built” (2019, 27 & 111). Russell takes an objective stance where “the views that I advocate result inevitably from absolutely undeniable data”, then immediately wavers, equating ‘undeniable truth’ to subjective ‘common-sense’ (3).

Russell's student Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) was the "the definitive exposition of the positivist theory of language" (Snodgrass & Coyne 2006, 31). "*The limits of my language*", writes Wittgenstein, "mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein 2021, 74 [§5.6]). The work commences with Proposition 1; "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (25 [§1.1]), and ends with Proposition 7; "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (90 [§7]). Unlike his contemporaries, Wittgenstein did not completely renounce mysticism. Towards the very end of his work, he writes, "he who understands me eventually recognises [my propositions] as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it)" (90 [§6.54]). *Tractatus* is simultaneously logical and ambiguous, and like metaphor itself, it implies an abstract meaning that lies beyond literal words.

By the middle of the twentieth century, the positivist position was "wholly demolished [...falling] apart under the self-reflexive impact of its own criteria" (Snodgrass & Coyne 2006, 31). Both Ayer and Wittgenstein recanted their earlier work. Ayer is quoted as saying, "It seems that I have spent my entire time trying to make life more rational and that it was all wasted effort" (Baggini 2019, n.p.), whilst Wittgenstein wrote to a friend, "There is a lot that is very fishy about that book [*Tractatus*]" (Klagge 2021, 310). This pivot opens an investigation into the 'fishiness' of AMT's version of metaphor.

2.2 BEHAVIOURAL METAPHOR THEMES [BMT]: *THOUGHT IS METAPHORICAL*

2.2.1 The first challenge to Aristotle

The first significant pivot in metaphor ideology arrives when theorists and researchers stopped regarding "metaphors as a matter of how language is used", and instead, began trying to explain how "interconnected words are comprehended and how they create meaning" (Ritchie 2013, 68-9). Literary critic Ivor A. Richards's (1890-1979) introduction to *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936)¹⁵ states that the lack of development on metaphor was the fault of researchers; "all they do is to poke the fire from the top. [...] Instead of ventilating by inquiry the sources of the whole action of words, they merely play with generalisations about

¹⁵ Philosophers such as Kant and Nietzsche also undermined Aristotle's approach to figurative language, however, Richards is generally considered the "direct precursor to the revolution" in metaphor research (Way 1991, 5).

their effects” (8-9). Adding fuel to that fire, Richards opens his lecture ‘Metaphor’ (1936), by challenging three long-held assumptions established by Aristotle: that an eye for resemblances is a special gift; that the skill cannot be imparted by another; and “third and worst”, that metaphor is a deviation from standard language (89-90). Instead, Richards contends that “metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language [...] We cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it” (92). Richards continues his breakaway by challenging another ‘misconception’; traditionally, metaphor was treated as “a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thoughts*, a transaction between contexts. *Thought* is metaphoric” (94).

Recognising there were no specific terms to describe the two ‘halves’ of metaphor (the underlying topic of discussion and the comparative attributes being transferred), he declared that trying to analyse metaphors “sometimes feels like extracting cube-roots in the head” (97). To overcome the headache, Richards invented terms; “Let me call them the tenor and the vehicle” (96), where the ‘tenor’ is the principal subject, and the ‘vehicle’ is what it resembles. Since then, the two terms have generally persisted, although occasionally ‘vehicle’ is changed to ‘source’, and ‘tenor’ is substituted with either ‘topic’ or ‘target’, for example; “Achilles’ character (the topic) is compared to a lion (the vehicle) with respect to specific qualities they have in common” (Ritchie 2013, 5).

Richards’s radical stance in his 1930s lecture, “was too sharp a break with tradition to be acceptable to philosophy in his day”, and failed to gain immediate traction (Way 1991, 6). Eventually, however, Richards’s ideas were taken for granted; “Metaphor is a way of understanding the world; it comes naturally to nearly all language-speakers. Any account that makes it out to be odd or queer in relation to ‘the norm’ is itself odd or queer” (Zwicky 2003, 115).

2.2.2 Poetic License and the Unconscious

Whilst philosophers might have maintained Aristotelian-AMT modes of thinking for a while longer, poets, playwrights, and novelists used vivid metaphors to their advantage. Susan Sontag suggests that in Dante’s time, “it must have been a revolutionary and creative move to design works of art so that they might be experienced on several levels” (2001, 13). In the 17th century, metaphysical poets such as John Donne used metaphors as conceits (*No Man is*

an Island), and Shakespeare's Romeo exclaimed, "But soft, what light through yonder window breaks? | It is the east, and Juliet is the sun". The 18th and 19th century romantic poets used metaphors to transgress propriety, for example, William Blake's poem *The Sick Rose* (1794) about an "invisible worm" that comes at night to degrade life with his dark love. By the twentieth century, modernist poets, including T. S. Eliot, were using extended metaphors to illustrate post-war physical and psychological deterioration in poems such as *The Waste Land* (1922) and *The Hollow Men* (1925).

When discussing metaphysical poets, essayist Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) wrote (AMT-style), "The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions; their learning instructs and their subtlety surprises; but the reader commonly thinks his improvement dearly bought, and though he sometimes admires, is seldom pleased" (2009, 398). To which Eliot directly replied (centuries later), "ideas are yoked but not united [...] a degree of heterogeneity of material compelled into unity by the operation of the poet's mind is omnipresent in poetry" (1951, n.p.).

In Margaret Freeman's *The Poem as Icon* (2020), she states there are three levels of metaphoric activity: linguistic, conceptual, and subliminal sensate metaphors (67). In some ways, poetic metaphors act like a 'Freudian slip' to reveal hidden meanings and an inner nature. As literary critic Winifred Nowotny writes, "The paradoxical or irrational features of poetic language are a means of short-circuiting the detour of consciousness through the polarised concepts of normal language" (1996, 86).

Simon Unwin's *Metaphor* (2019) notes that psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung both used architectural metaphors to model the structure of the psyche, "allowing their readers to assimilate psychological theory by relation to common spatial experience" (123). For Jung, the top storey of a house was consciousness, and the subterranean cellar represented primal thoughts, whilst for Freud, the metaphor was horizontal, and consciousness moved from a public persona to an increasingly private interior (124).

2.2.3 Semiology

Two authors, the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (who coined the phrase ‘semiology’), and American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (who created ‘semiotics’) independently researched the notion that language is a system of signs.

Like Richards, Saussure (1857-1913) also challenged Aristotle’s assumptions. Saussure questioned the notion that there was “an ideal one-to-one correspondence between a word and its object”, and concluded that “despite a few notable exceptions, the relation between words [‘signifiers’] and their objects [‘signified’] was essentially arbitrary” (Clandinin 2007, 52). For Saussure, “language and thought can be compared to two sides of the same piece of paper [...] It is impossible to cut one side of the paper without cutting the other; by analogy, it is impossible to think without forming” (Branko 2011, 149). Paradoxically, Saussure stressed that language is a social construct, existing independent of the individual speaker, even though spoken language only exists if there is a speaker (Karatani 1995, 40).

Peirce (1839-1914), meanwhile, acknowledged there were linguistic relationships between signs and signifiers, but suggested that “The linguistic sign is but one of myriad kinds of sign, and semiosis is all around us” (Kirby, 1997, 540). Pierce’s account is potentially “richer” than Saussure’s because it includes signifying phenomena outside intentional communication acts, such as disease symptoms and footprints in wet sand (Walker 1987, 47).

Several semiologists followed in their footsteps, including Roland Barthes, whose essays were compiled in *Semiotic Challenge* (1988). Barthes says Aristotle’s “taste for alienation” suggests ‘commonplace’ words are “‘transported,’ ‘strayed,’ ‘deviated’” from their proper meaning, but then asks, “What is the proper meaning?” (88). In his work *Mythologies* (1957), Barthes discusses the meaning behind meaning, the unintentional communication acts and cultural communication ‘myths’, noting “there always remains, around the final meaning, a halo of virtualities where other possible meanings are floating: the meaning can almost always be *interpreted*” (2009, 157).

Umberto Eco’s book *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language* (1984) specifically investigates metaphor and repeatedly displays its ‘(d)rifty’ personality. For example, Eco describes metaphor as “a play of *similarities*, [...] mingling with *dissimilarities*” (95), and notes, “the way in which one seems to understand a metaphor is simple, [...] Semiotically

speaking, instead, the process of metaphorical production and interpretation is long and tortuous” (129).

2.2.3 Specific Metaphor Research

After WWII, an interest in the humanities, more subjective accounts of ‘truth’, and an awareness that ‘reality’ cannot be separated from ‘perceptions of reality’, all created a new interest in language indeterminacy and metaphor analysis.

American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine’s *Word and Object* (1960), for example, explores translational perspectivism, writing that a Himalayan explorer “has learned to apply ‘Everest’ to a distant mountain seen from Tibet and ‘Gaurisanker’ to [the same mountain] seen from Nepal” (1979, 49). Quine then confesses he is not sure if his example is geographically or linguistically correct and, therefore, inadvertently proves his point; translation is a potentially flawed experience in which two (or more) ‘truths’ can coexist.

Philosopher Max Black picked up metaphor analysis where Richards left off, converting flames to ice; “Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model” (Black in Ortony 1980, 31). Black believed that metaphors triggered a whole system of conceptualisation which went beyond just the tenor and vehicle, the literal and the figurative. To understand a phrase such as ‘man is a wolf’ [or ‘Achilles is a lion’ / ‘Juliet is the sun’] required complex correlations from prior knowledge about social relations, human nature, and wildlife behaviour (Way 2019, 49). Black advocated understanding metaphor via an ‘interaction theory’ of conceptual ‘interillumination’ (Black 1962, 38-9). Criticism of Black included that his explanations were “vague and [...] metaphorical” (Way, 1991, 146-7).

In her review of metaphor history, Eileen Cornell Way notes that in American philosopher Monroe Beardsley’s model of metaphor-comprehension, “conflict lies within the meaning of words *themselves*, independently of the context in which they are spoken or the intentions of the speaker” (Way 1991, 43). Both the Black and Beardsley models suggest that metaphors transfer meaning not otherwise available with literal language, “invok[ing] a transaction between words and things, after which the words, things, and thoughts are not quite the same” (Cushman *et al.* 2012, 864).

Philosopher John R. Searle’s chapter ‘Metaphor’, in *Expression and Meaning* (1979) states, “Metaphorical meaning is always speaker’s utterance meaning” (77). According to

Searle, when Romeo states ‘Juliet is the sun’, only Romeo knows whether he means it literally or figuratively (83). Searle suggests there is no need to be apologetic about cliché examples or ‘dead metaphors’, as they “are especially interesting for our study, because, to speak oxymoronically, dead metaphors have lived on” (83). Searle goes on to note that to understand a literal utterance, “the hearer does not require any extra knowledge beyond his knowledge of the rules of language”, whereas for a metaphor they require “something more” (84-5). This ‘more’ Searle suggests is the ability to “call to mind another meaning and corresponding set of truth conditions”, and that whilst that answer seems “fairly simple”, he reiterates Eco’s stance by suggesting that trying to determine the mechanism behind ‘calling to mind’ is extremely complex (85).

The most extensive example of BMT (Behavioural Metaphor Themes) is Blumenberg’s *Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (1960) in which he takes an anthropological approach to philosophy’s history and devises a ‘paradigm’ of metaphorology [explored in detail in Chapter 3].

2.2.4 Testing and Pushback

Throughout the 1970s, researchers continued investigating, and critiquing, different metaphor models. Searle, for example, criticises the Beardsley-Black models for their “failure to appreciate the distinction between sentence or word meaning, which is never metaphorical, and speaker or utterance meaning, which can be metaphorical” (Searle 1979, 86) [although the metaphorical etymology of the word ‘metaphor’ potentially counters Searle’s argument]. Philosopher Donald Davidson’s *What Metaphors Mean* (1978), supports Searle when he writes “What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use – in this it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticising” (43), and refutes him; “I deny that metaphor does its work by having a special meaning, a specific cognitive content” (46). Eva Feder Kittay will then dispute Davidson’s notion “that literal language is context-independent while metaphors are context-bound” (1995, 75).

Within the seminal work of Andrew Ortony’s *Metaphor* (1980), there is an essay, ‘Psychological processes in metaphor comprehension and memory’ by Allan Paivio which meta-metaphorically implies an underlying reason for the debates; “For the student of language and thought, metaphor is a solar eclipse. It hides the object of study [linguistic meaning] and at the same time reveals some of its most salient and interesting characteristics

when viewed through the right telescope. [...] Metaphor obscures its literal and commonplace aspects while permitting a new and subtle understanding to emerge” (Paivio in Ortony 1979, 50). ‘Metaphor as eclipse’ contains the simultaneity of darkness with a halo of light, obscurity and clarity, understanding and ambiguity, and pre-empts the notions of (mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift.

Whilst these debates reinforced *what we think* about metaphors, even going so far as to attempt to understand *how we think* metaphorically, it was Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) which believed this was due to our metaphorical *existence*.

2.3 CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY [CMT]: *EXPERIENCE IS METAPHORICAL*

2.3.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory

The prior two sections revealed that, for centuries, research aimed to define metaphor and investigate how it worked. Pierce’s version of semiotics (§2.2.3), however, began to “pay more attention to individual embodied experience as a source of meaning” (Clandinin, 2007, 56). Whilst acknowledging linguistic meaning, Pierce also recognised that meaning can be gleaned from other signs and signifiers; “physical pain, visual stimulation, viscerally experienced affections, [...] and so forth” (56). In 1980, linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By*, combined metaphors with linguistic meaning and embodied experience to create Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). It was a significant attitudinal shift based on the authors’ belief that “metaphor [was] not merely *thinking* about something in terms of something else, but actually *experiencing* something as something else” (Ritchie 2013, 7).

Lakoff and Johnson stated that; “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003, 3). Consequently, metaphor publications increased exponentially, and the field was “plumbed not for its affective and rhetorical efficacy, but for its cognitive contribution” (Kittay 1989, 2), such that, “metaphor gained respectability as a serious and important aspect of language and cognition” (Way 1991, 1).

CMT initiated a convention of using italics for the metaphorical phrase (tenor/target/topic) and small capital letters to indicate the underlying conceptual metaphor

(vehicle/source). For example, the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS TEMPERATURE is revealed when someone speaks of a ‘warm relationship’ because “we experience the emotion of affection as actual physical temperature” (Ritchie 2013, 7). CMT believes conceptual metaphors become “embodied” due to abstract concepts [e.g. relationships] being repeatedly experienced in conjunction with concrete physical sensations [e.g. the warmth that comes from being held] (69).

Whilst Searle suggested ‘dead’ metaphors provide research insight, CMT elevates them further still, stating they are actually “‘alive’ in the most fundamental sense: they are metaphors we live by. The fact that they are conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003, 55). Lakoff and Johnson emphasised that “Metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and mostly unconscious” whilst its output, metaphorical language, “is secondary” (272). As such, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) is positioned at the end of a spectrum. Aristotelian-AMT saw metaphor as a peripheral, alien, even deviant language device. Behavioural-BMT recognised metaphor as a vital part of language and thought. CMT, on the other hand, considers metaphor fundamental to thoughts and experiences whilst demoting the language aspect.

2.3.2 Feedback Regarding CMT

The omnipresence of metaphor implies two conflicting positions the psychologist Steven Pinker labels the ‘messiah’ and ‘killjoy’ theories. The messianic model suggests all thinking occurs via metaphorical abstraction, “based on the idea that TO THINK IS TO GRASP A METAPHOR – the metaphor metaphor” (2007, 238). The killjoy theory, on the other hand, “says that most metaphors are dead metaphors, like *coming to a head*, which people would probably stop using if they knew that it alludes to the buildup of pus in a pimple” (238). As Pinker notes, whilst “it’s jarring to discover that even the airiest of our ideas are expressed (‘pressed out’) in thumpingly concrete metaphors” (237-8), nonetheless, “the ubiquity of metaphor in everyday language is truly a surprising discovery, rich with implications” (239).

Opinion polarity is replicated in other publications. David L. Ritchie writes in his preface of *Context and Connection in Metaphor* (2006) that CMT “originally inspired me with its daring, elegance and power, [but] seemed on closer examination to incorporate some questionable assumptions and unsupportable generalisations” (xii). In *Metaphor* (2013), Ritchie reiterates advantages and disadvantages. On the upside, CMT appears to solve “the

circularity problem” of using metaphors to define metaphors, by avoiding metalanguage altogether and evidencing relationships between concepts and physical experience through neurological processes (73). Ritchie worries, however, that CMT’s assumption that conceptual metaphors “represent unitary and consistent mappings between concepts and direct experiences”, ignores more practical evidence that “the underlying mappings often seem to be ambiguous, [...] interpreted differently by different people, based on their own unique experiences” (81-2). Ritchie also questions the notion that metaphors are acquired directly through experience correlations (83). [For example, a person can declare a room to be as messy as a ‘pigsty’, ‘garbage-dump’ or ‘battlefield’, and be understood, without anyone having experienced a visit to the comparison locations.] In a separate paper, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR – Or is it a Game of Chess?’ (2003), Ritchie highlights that the words CMT uses to demonstrate ARGUMENT IS WAR, such as, *defend*, *position*, *manoeuvre* and *strategy*, could equally be understood to demonstrate an argument is ‘an athletic contest’ or ‘game of chess’.

Hungarian linguist Zoltán Kövecses is similarly conflicted. In his book *Metaphor* (2010), Kövecses reiterates the positive “realisation that language, culture, body, mind, and brain all come together and play an equally crucial role in our metaphorical competence” (321). Kövecses admits, however, that “in addition to universality, there will also be cultural variation” (215). Kövecses recognises that CMT relies on “An important generalisation” which employs a unidirectionality in which “the metaphorical process typically goes from the more concrete to the more abstract but not the other way around” (7).

K. Campbell and Diane P. Janes’s article ‘Myths, Metaphors, and the Master Narratives of Instructional Design’ (2021) reiterates the risk of metaphors being lost in translation, noting that Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphors utilise “experiential gestalts”, which make metaphors a form of “cultural shorthand” (236). They note that, “Those outside the culture may not, or will not, share the gestalt” (236).

CMT’s acceptance of generalisations and apparent universality, highlights the risk of a return to AMT’s absolutism and a reversal of BMT’s perspectival gains. There is an uncomfortable sense of self-importance when Lakoff and Johnson write, “Abstract concepts are not complete without metaphors. [...] love is not love without metaphors of magic, attraction, madness, union, nurturance...” (2003, 272). Realistically, however, people fall in love without an attendant metaphor, even if they rely on metaphoricity to articulate that ‘fall’.

Whilst CMT veers back towards AMT, John T. Kirby reverses the relationship by suggesting Aristotle “anticipates” CMT when he recognised the “cognitive process of decoding on the part of the audience” (1997, 539 & 547). Richards’s seminal pivot away from AMT could also be addressed retrospectively using CMT for analysis. For example, when Richards writes, “We shall do better to think of a meaning as though it were a plant that has grown – not a can that has been filled or a lump of clay that has been moulded” (1936, 12), Richards pre-empts CMT’s conceptual metaphors IDEAS ARE PLANTS, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANINGS, and MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS respectively (Lakoff & Johnson 2003, 47 & 11). CMT ‘ventilates’ the base of the metaphorical research fire as Richards had hoped, even if the results risk feeling as unsubstantial as poked smoke.

2.3.3 CMT Research

Despite concerns about Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), it remains highly influential in metaphor research. Just as Lakoff and Johnson merged philosophy and linguistics, philosopher Earl R. Mac Cormac’s *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* (1985), adopts an interdisciplinary approach between philosophy and psychology. Mac Cormac suggests that one of the limitations of traditional (Behavioural-BMT) models was its “preoccupation with two referents, one familiar (the tenor) and the other unfamiliar (the vehicle)”, whereas real life tended to be more complicated (26). He addresses this by challenging the notion of discrete boundaries between truth-falsity, use-and-abuse and the literal-figurative dilemmas, preferring to acknowledge instead “formal but flexible” relationships that create “fuzzy sets” of semantic markers (85).

The Way We Think (2002), by linguists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, accepts the findings of CMT whilst appearing to adopt the ‘fuzzy’, by adding the notion of ‘conceptual blending’, the mental mechanism that brings thoughts together to form complex ideas. Contrary to much of the research before them, Fauconnier and Turner suggest that mapping schemes “compose in identical ways, regardless of whether the ultimate meanings are flatly literal, poetically metaphorical, scientifically analogical, surrealistically suggestive, or opaque” (154). To demonstrate, they use the metaphor of a path which thoughts travel down, where the ultimate destination will be directed by initial grammar prompts *and* the continuous influence of other imaginative encounters along the way (154). As well as blends, they suggest ‘megablends’ exist, such as the “doubly metaphoric” expression “Prayer is the

echo of the darkness of the soul” (156). These megablends navigate a vast array of meaning possibilities, generating elaborate and creative mappings, clashes and compressions, eventually arriving at a ‘harmonious’ version of understanding (159).

Feedback regarding Fauconnier and Turner’s work was mixed, with one critic suggesting that whilst “it provides a useful set of analytical tools”, it “does not appear to constitute a coherent testable theory” (Ritchie 2013, 117-8). A second review shared the reservations via a metaphorical megablend; “the substance of the book is thin below the surface [...] there was a lot of building in sand” (Georgopoulos 2003, 254).

2.3.4 CMT Experiments

Conceptual Metaphor Theory also inspired researchers to test metaphoric influences on social cognition, specifically, metaphorical ‘framing’. Examples include metaphors used to describe ‘the meaning of life’ (Landau 2018, 63), or whether a PhD is seen as a ‘journey’ or ‘job’ (Hughes & Tight, 2103). A regularly cited example is Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011), who tested the hypothesis that the analogical inferences of “different metaphors can lead people to reason differently” (1). They conducted experiments in which two sets of participants were asked to propose solutions based on the *same* crime statistics but a *different* priming metaphor which described crime as either a ‘virus’ or a ‘beast’ (2). Participants who received the first prompt were likelier to suggest preventative social reforms, whilst the latter tended to recommend ‘hunting’ and ‘capturing’ criminals (2). They concluded that “metaphors can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to solve complex problems” (10).

Daniel Casasanto and Tom Gijssels’ 2015 article, ‘What Makes a Metaphor an Embodied Metaphor?’ reiterates the “astonishing rate” that experimental research accumulated. After reviewing several examples, they state that the research provides “abundant evidence that people think metaphorically” (327), but that the psychological, neuroimaging and neurostimulation findings “*do not* provide evidence for embodiment” (332). “There is”, they note metaphorically, “a Grand Canyon-sized gap between the strength of many researchers’ belief in ‘embodied metaphors’ and the strength of the evidence on which their beliefs should be based” (334).

Regardless, everyday examples continue to reinforce the ubiquity, almost mundanity, of metaphor. A key example comes from David Rumelhart when he writes:

“I was driving down a freeway with my wife and two children when one of my sons, age eight, remarked: ‘Hey, Mom, my sock has a hangnail.’ My wife, quietly, and without special note, responded: ‘Don’t worry about it, I’ll fix it when we get home,’ and the topic was dropped. I was the only one of the four who even noticed anything unusual in this interchange. Here, a new metaphor was created, produced, and comprehended without the slightest awareness by either of the primary participants” (in Ortony 1980, 79).

2.4 DECONSTRUCTED METAPHOR THEORIES [DMT]: *EVERYTHING IS POTENTIALLY METAPHORIC*

Whilst the AMT-BMT-CMT chronological progression moves metaphor research from words to thoughts to experiences, Deconstructed Metaphor Theories (DMT) offer an ideological response to each of the preceding stages in different ways. Time wise, it could be said that it started with the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and continues today, with its ‘peak’ appearing alongside deconstruction. Aside from deconstructivist enquiries which interrogated the fundamentals of metaphor, this fourth stage of literature produced two specific theories. The first is Deliberate Metaphor Theory, whose proposition is in its name, and is in many ways a return to AMT. The second, Dynamic Metaphor Theory, or Dynamic Type Hierarchy (DTH), is its opposite; “According to [this] theory, we do *not* differentiate between literal and figurative speech. Metaphors and idioms are so interwoven in our everyday language that we have trouble distinguishing the figurative from the literal” (Way 1991, 139).

2.4.1 Deconstructive Metaphor Themes

Whilst the Anglo-American world was slowly embracing the ideas of Ivor A. Richards, the continental philosophers in Europe were already exploring the unstable multivalency of language. Nietzsche adopted an existential approach which led to questioning “such simple formulae as ‘This X is Y’ [...and] the whole process of naming and predication” (Kirby 1997, 517). For Nietzsche, metaphors in discourse trended to be “moribund or ossified” (Johnson

2012, 147) and had “lost [their] currency” (148). In Nietzsche’s essay ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ (1873), he asks:

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions – they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins (2005, n.p.).

When philosopher Paul De Man addresses Nietzsche’s statement, he suggests that the symbolic quality of all language is being forgotten (1979, 111). De Man believes that reducing metaphor to literal meaning is a ‘naïve degradation’ which forgets not the truth of metaphor, but “the un-truth, the lie that the metaphor was in the first place”, which in turn ignores the “problematic nature of its factual, referential foundation” (111). In De Man’s paper, ‘The Epistemology of Metaphor’ (1978) he suggests that empirical British philosophy thought it had gained superiority over “continental metaphysical excesses” due to its ability to circumscribe the disruptive power of rhetoric (13). He then dismantles their ‘success’ by analysing Locke’s previously mentioned *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). De Man shows, for example, that different words often rely on similar roots, including ‘understand’ (illuminate) and ‘idea’ (*eide* [or *eidō*, ‘I see’]), such that “The sentence: to understand the idea of light would then have to be translated as to light the light of light” (18).

Like De Man, Derrida also found himself “in the centre of a vortex of controversy” as he too began to ‘interrogate’ western metaphysics and language (Kirby 1997, 517). Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, Derrida’s essay ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’ (1974), picks up Nietzsche’s overused coins which have lost their ‘face-value’ [and thus their origin story], and turns them into a meta-metaphor for the historical use of metaphors in philosophy (6-7). Derrida goes on to imply that this history is a ‘white mythology’, an “effaced” metaphysics in which the “fabulous scene which brought it into being, [...] remains, active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible drawing covered over in the palimpsest” (11). Moreover, like the two sides of a coin, metaphor’s history

creates a “theatrical delineation” or “dissymmetric dialogue” between intellect and imagination, the true and the false (11).

Derrida’s palimpsest model highlights the multivalency of language which was long evident in the background of all the stages. Campbell’s 1776 work on rhetoric (AMT) noted that even an etymologist would have trouble separating ‘original sense’ from ‘metaphorical application’, in words such as ‘*conception*’ (the beginning of a pregnancy and an action of the mind), or ‘*expression*’ (which once meant ‘squeezing out’ and now stands for a verbal utterance) (2008, 297). In 1936, Richards (BMT) worried less, noting that “A word may be *simultaneously* both literal and metaphoric, just as it may simultaneously [...] serve to focus into one meaning many different meanings” (118-9). Pinker (CMT), meanwhile, chose to emphasise the uncomfortable pimple-popping origins of ‘*coming to a head*’ (2007, 238).

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), takes the palimpsest a step further by adding motion to the montage. Whilst denouncing metaphors as “appalling” and the “hysteria of signs” (1996, 278 & 117), they nonetheless use the metaphor of the rhizome to represent concepts that spread out multi-directionally; “it has neither a beginning nor an end, but always a middle from which it grows and which it overflows” (21). Their hierarchy-less, nomadic form of conceptualisation will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

These authors all highlight that behind metaphor there *might be* ossified metaphors, mobile metaphors or meta-metaphors, and in each situation, these behind-the-scenes metaphors demonstrate that *everything is potentially* metaphoric. Moreover, as Ritchie notes in his article *A Note About Meta-Metaphors* (2017), not only is it “difficult and awkward” to avoid metaphors when discussing metaphors (297), acknowledging the self-referentiality is not enough, as meta-metaphors “may have theoretical implications” (291). For example, “Does a metaphorical ‘frame’ provide ‘shape’ for a topic, or does it determine what is ‘included in the picture’ and what is ‘left out’?” (297). As such, Deconstructed-DMT, ideologically and creatively, attempts to liberate metaphors from the framework, subvert their intention, highlight their hypocrisies and challenge their deficiencies.

2.4.2 Dynamic Type Hierarchy (DTH)

Fauconnier and Turner suggested that metaphoricity was made on the run as thoughts travel down paths, signposted by grammar, distracted by memories. Similarly, computer scientist

and philosopher Eileen Cornell Way's *Knowledge Representation and Metaphor* (1991) suggests that "context *dynamically* determines" the way hierarchical clues of classification work to generate meaning, literal or figurative (155). A car, for example, "can be a means of transportation, a murder weapon, a meeting point, a status symbol, a hunting shelter" and so on, and as such, can conceptually be made to correspond to anything, including a train, treehouse or diamond necklace (154). Way notes that *both* parts of a metaphor are contextually multivalent; understanding "involves the *domains* invoked by the tenor and the vehicle, the *context* of the metaphor and the *salience* of the features invoked" (154 – second italic added).

The core mechanism of Way's dynamic metaphor theory, which she calls Dynamic Type Hierarchy (DTH), is summarised by reviewer James Martin; "interpreting a metaphor involves an upward search through the [concept] hierarchy for a common ancestor of the tenor and vehicle of the metaphor. This search is followed by the *creation* of a new concept more specialised than the common ancestor, which is made the immediate parent of the tenor and vehicle concepts" (Martin 1991, 112). Martin recognises the 'Grand Canyon' abyss between theory and practice when he concludes, there is "too much philosophy and too little implementation and experimentation. [...DTH] while intriguing, is too impoverished to be anything more than suggestive to those interested in actually implementing these ideas" (113). Whilst Way's model was designed to train computers in Artificial Intelligence and had no impact on the broader field of metaphor research, its dynamic approach reinforces metaphor's inherent mobility which will be addressed further in Chapter 5.

2.4.3 Deliberate Metaphor Theory

By the end of the 20th century, it was "fashionable to condescend to Aristotle for the limitations of his study of metaphor, or – more aggressively still – to find fault with its parameters" (Kirby 1997, 518). Whilst Conceptual-CMT turned away from Aristotelian-AMT, reducing metaphor's use in language to something unconscious and secondary, contemporary Dutch academic Gerard Steen has attempted to reverse the demotion; "language use has a linguistic, conceptual, and communicative dimension", each of equal importance (Steen 2017, 4). Steen created the Deliberate Metaphor Theory, which is premised on the notion "that language users, in production or reception, pay distinct attention to the source domain" (1-2). Steen highlights that metaphors can be measured in terms of

abstract ideologies *or* observable human behaviour, and that metaphor in practice is often different to metaphor in theory (5). Confusingly, Steen suggests that *deliberate* metaphor use is not the same as *conscious* metaphor use, as people use words in discourse intuitively and without, as he puts it, being aware of their awareness (6). Steen writes, “the longer people ponder over a deliberate metaphor in an utterance after the click of comprehension has been reached, the more likely it is that they do become conscious that they are somehow ‘doing metaphor’” (15).

Two philosopher pragmatists, Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, both in their own ways, pre-empted the value of Steen’s ‘click of comprehension’ but also undermined the need for ‘deliberate’ metaphor. Davidson states that jokes, dreams and metaphors, “can [all], like a picture or a bump on the head, make us appreciate some fact – but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact” (1978, 46). Rorty’s essay ‘Unfamiliar Noises’ (1987), goes further, suggesting that ‘metaphors are platypuses’, anomalies to the natural order which “do not (literally) tell us anything, but they do make us notice things and start looking around for analogies and similarities. They do not have cognitive content, but they are responsible for a lot of cognitions” (1987, 290). Rorty proposes a shift from focusing on metaphor as a means of (de)coding meaning and considers instead its creative potential to generate introspection and affect, even if it risks turning metaphor into “mere evocations” with “the same metaphysical status as thunderclaps and birdsongs” (291).

Few researchers have adopted Steen’s model, whilst others, including prolific metaphor scholar Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., have been vocal critics, stating that Steen’s theory “started out with a splash with the pronouncement that it provided a ‘new and improved’ approach to contemporary metaphor theory”, but in reality it remains “vague”, “dogmatic”, and undermined by the fact that “Specifying what may, or may not, be in the conscious minds of people when using language is difficult to assess” (2015, 73 & 75). In a later article by Gibbs and Chen, they denounce the approach as contradictory to empirical findings, and “a regressive attempt to take metaphor studies back to the stone ages of scholarship” (2017, abstract), an AMT-time “where metaphor was ornamental, deviant, and only employed by special people with highly conscious communicative aims” (as quoted in Steen 2017, 10). Whilst Steen attempts a counterattack, highlighting that ‘Steen’ is Dutch for ‘stone’, and hence the authors employed a deliberate metaphor, there is nothing new in his noticing. As such, Steen’s version of DMT rolls research back towards AMT, closing the research context circle.

2.4.4 Research into the Future

Whilst current metaphor analysis appears to be spinning around nuances, a combination of Deconstructive-DMT models that allows a deliberate, dynamic and disruptive interrogation of contemporary concerns could be created. For example, there appears to be no formal metaphor models shaped specifically by environmentalism, feminist critiques or studies which advocate social justice. There are, however, a few individual papers which aim to recognise marginalised voices, such as Rachel Fraser's 'The Ethics of Metaphor' (2018), which begins; "Often, we speak figuratively. Some figurative language exploits what is ethically laden and politically contested" (728).

Examples were exposed in the literature, such as when Richards wrote, "an idea or a notion, when unencumbered and undisguised, is no easier to get hold of than one of those oiled and naked thieves who infest the railway carriages of India" (1936, 5). More subtly, there is Umberto Eco's *Semiotics* (1984), which references an anecdote from the Roman writer Quintilian to provide an example of social inferencing; "if Atalanta goes walking in the woods with boys, then she is probably not a virgin any more. In certain communities this verisimilitude can be as convincing as a necessary sign. It depends on the codes and on the scripts which the community registers as 'good'" (38). The fact that Eco concedes Atalanta is a 'bad' girl without commenting on the potentially worse boys, reinforces centuries-old judgemental attitudes and consequently feels narrow-minded. In Fraser's abovementioned article on ethics, she explores the "trivialising and triggering" aspect of rape metaphors (such as 'the rape of the planet') (2018, 730), but she also raises broader issues. Whilst acknowledging the "force, bite, and immediacy" (731) of metaphors, she notes that inferences of words have inputs *and* outputs (735). She then worries that "attempts to understand and unmask pernicious ideologies can end up heightening their influence" (754). Repetition in other words, even when positively motivated, risks breathing new life into stale material and dead metaphors.

A recent paper by Raymond Gibbs Jr., 'Should Offensive Metaphors be Censored?' (2024) adopts a different view on potentially 'harmful' metaphors. He gives examples of universities trying to prevent metaphorical phrases such as 'bury the hatchet' or being 'on the warpath' to avoid offending Native Americans (155). 'Being sold down the river' or 'cracking the whip', meanwhile, are insulting phrases to African Americans (156-7). Gibbs notes that universities may want to be seen as 'virtue signalling' or avoiding legal liabilities from these 'microaggressions' (157-8). Ultimately, however, he believes that controlling

language choice is a form of linguistic determinism [AMT] (159), and he prefers “to live in a world where metaphors, good and bad, charming and offensive, are free to circulate as people strive to precisely express what they mean, even if that language may be viewed as harmful to some individuals or groups of people” (161).

Lastly, the Behavioural-BMT and Conceptual-CMT models are primarily premised on the notion that human minds are indebted to the embedded metaphoricity of European languages, and yet, non-European speakers can still think creatively. David Punter’s *Metaphor* (2019) includes a chapter explaining how western metaphors perform differently to those in the east. Whilst the west identifies parallels between two disparate realms to be witty or ingenious, Chinese poetry, for example, attempts to reveal a ‘convergence’, or ‘echoing’, of shared objectives, not between the two halves of the metaphor, but in relation to one thing and the whole natural world (35). Punter suggests ‘eastern’ metaphors are evocations [closer to Rorty’s thunderclaps and birdsong] and confirms that ‘metaphor’ is therefore “not a static, ahistorical term”, and there is no “pervasive, universal concept of metaphor which can be applied, like a template, to all ages and cultures” (40). In the 1700s, Campbell wrote that metaphorical meaning can be ‘lost in translation’ and the results are “justly chargeable with *obscurity* and impropriety, perhaps even with absurdity” (2008, 295). The same is also true in reverse; the metaphor models of Europeans might one day be labelled absurdly limited when mapped against global metaphor phenomena.

2.5 THE ARCHITECTURAL LITERATURE GAP

2.5.1 Architectural Literature

Architectural discourse on metaphors is limited but *not* non-existent. Whilst no ancient text exists that specifically addresses metaphorical architecture, Vitruvius’s *On Architecture* (c. 27 BC), includes metaphorical applications, such as when he discusses the Doric, Ionic and Corinthian orders as being masculine, matronly and virginal (2009, 91-92).

Three works specifically related to architecture and metaphor include Unwin’s *Metaphor: An Exploration of the Metaphorical Dimensions and Potential of Architecture* (2019), Barie Fez-Barrington’s (self-published) *Architecture: The Making of Metaphors* (2012), as well as a compilation of conference papers published in Andri Gerber’s *Metaphors in Architecture and Urbanism* (2013). A range of architectural articles are also available,

including a lecture by architectural critic Adrian Forty, ‘Of Cars, Clothes and Carpets: Design Metaphors in Architectural Thought’ (1989), and exploratory student papers such as Nezhir Ayiran’s ‘The Role of Metaphors in the Formation of Architectural Identity’ (2012) which highlights metaphor’s “imaginative rationality” as an appropriate tool for solving architecture’s ‘wicked’ problems (1).

Elsewhere, metaphor is occasionally addressed in explanatory chapters, such as Peter Smith’s *The Dynamics of Delight: Architecture and Aesthetics* (2003) which describes metaphor as “a bridge across unexplored territory” and an “aesthetic ‘spark’ [...] generated by the novelty or poignancy of the association; the arcing across conceptual space” (122). Forty’s *Words and Building* (2000) includes two chapters, ‘Language Metaphors’ and ‘Spatial Mechanics – Scientific Metaphors’, which relate metaphor specifically to architecture.

Metaphor is occasionally creatively used as a framing device for architectural analysis, such as Sylvia Lavin’s *Kissing Architecture* (2011) which encourages two separate industries to temporarily ‘hook-up’, confound thresholds and generate interdisciplinary creativity (22). Other works, such as Roger Luckhurst’s *Corridors: Passages of Modernity* (2019), probably did not intend to be a metaphor analysis, however, through his detailed study of a specific architectural function-form he revealed the corridor’s inherent socio-political metaphoricity throughout history. He traces its alteration from hierarchical space designed for segregation, to a utopian shared space, through to its potentially dystopian future, revealing its meaning (d)rift.

Mostly however, metaphor is used as an AMT-styled ornamental means-to-an-end discourse tool, part of a broader discussion relating to stylistic forms or meaning. For example, Charles Jencks’s article ‘In What Style Shall We Build?’ (2015) refers to Frank Gehry’s *Fondation Vuitton* in Paris as being “struggling reptile” and an “explosion in a shingle factory” (98). Robin Evan’s *The Projective Cast* (2000) hints at CMT when he notes that there is an “almost unconscious translation of architectural interiority into a metaphor of mental interiority”, such that “A person alone in a room is like the soul in the body”, and that building apertures become symbolic access points to that soul; “an exhausted literary metaphor not yet exhausted in architecture” (295).

Unwin’s introduction to *Metaphor* (2019) highlights one potential reason for the limited architectural interest. Unwin notes that when he asked friends what their favourite architectural metaphor was, “Many of them looked at me blankly as if the idea of architecture

having a metaphorical dimension was strange”, but then, after discussion, “they acknowledged only subliminally, that metaphor is a powerful element in architecture” (Unwin 2019, 1).

Architecture-specific metaphor research appeared to be missing in the incredibly dense field of metaphor material, especially in terms of something more elevated than a ‘subliminal’ influence and deeper than a mere means-to-an-end tool for design or discourse.

2.5.2 Where next?

David Ritchie’s *Context and Connection in Metaphor* (2006) notes that “No theory of metaphor [...] will be complete until we have a thorough account of cognitive processes, down at last to the level of neuron groups” (217). Such an ambition is, respectfully, unnecessary for architectural analysis. Instead, let us take inspiration from the author Annie Dillard; “The writer knows his field – what has been done, what could be done, the limits – the way a tennis player knows the court. And like that expert, he, too, plays the edges [...] can he enlarge it, can he nudge the bounds? And enclose what wild power?” (2013, 69).

In order to ‘play the edges’, ‘nudge the boundaries’ and reveal the ‘wild power’ of metaphors to future researchers, the first step is to understand the metaphor models that already exist within the field of metaphor analysis (even though they fall outside the architectural field). Part II will now look more closely at the philosophers Blumenberg and Derrida, and their models of metaphorology and (mis)metaphorology, as well as the potential for a hybrid model labelled ‘conceptual (d)rift.’

* * * * *

PART TWO: METAPHOR MODELS

CHAPTER 3: METAPHOROLOGY – HANS BLUMENBERG

“Metaphorology seeks to burrow down to the substructure of thought, the underground, the nutrient solution of systematic crystallisations” (Blumenberg 2010, 5).

‘Metaphorology’ is a neologism created by the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) to describe a model for analysing the repetition and change of individual metaphors over time. As the adopted main-in-road to metaphorical analysis for this dissertation, it is important to understand how it works and the philosophy it was built upon. This chapter introduces Blumenberg, his core concepts, and beliefs about metaphor. It then paves the way for the latter case studies by presenting a short experiment, applying Blumenbergian metaphorology to five architectural vignettes, testing out the model’s applicability to design and discourse analysis. Lastly, the chapter outlines the strengths and limitations of Blumenberg’s model of metaphorology.

3.1 HANS BLUMENBERG

Blumenberg’s approach to philosophy is expansive, open-ended, even allusive, as his quote from 1961 demonstrates; “Whether philosophy is essentially practiced as intellectual history, as epistemology, as anthropology or ontology, as ethics, or as formal logic – in the end, [...] what is human is impelled toward language and what has not yet become, or could not yet become language, is dark, unresolved, compulsive, or automatic” (Blumenberg 2020, 41).

Blumenberg is variously referred to by academics as “an intellectual giant” (Koerner 1993, 4), one of “the most prolific thinkers of postwar Germany” (Bajohr 2022, 1), and “a paragon of a bygone era of philosophers untethered from the drudgery of grant writing” (2). In terms of his scope, he was a “historian of ideas, phenomenologist of [the] modern age, hermeneutist of metaphors” (Zowislo 2009, 310), interested in “metahistorical reflections” (Hrachovec 1994, 62), and, since Blumenberg “never accepted restrictions on thought”, “everything becomes philosophically important to him” (Marquard 2022, 231).

This section captures Blumenberg’s liminal position in philosophy and condenses his variable ideas into a manageable starting place to better understand his approach to metaphor.

3.1.1 Blumenberg's (P(re))occupation

Several writers believe that Blumenberg's work is too broad and varied to be summarised. The problem, one academic suggests, is that not only did Blumenberg write “numerous thick, densely written, almost ludicrously erudite books composed in a German prose style”, but each book appears “like its author's *magnum opus*” (Koerner 1993, 2). Alternatively, as another author puts it, “To unpack the programmatic thrust of Blumenberg's text [...] would entail no less a task than writing a book about a sunken continent of learning” (Haverkamp 2015, 1231).

Other writers, however, *have* attempted to compress Blumenberg's oeuvre. One author suggests Blumenberg had “two fundamental preoccupations”: “the figure of distance [time and space] and the concept of self-assertion” (Lang 2022, 43). Another suggests his two “undersongs” are death and the self (Koerner 1993, 10). Others summarise his approach as a “lifelong concern with inexpressibility” (Helbig 2022, 197), or an “unburdening from the absolute” (Marquard 2022, 227). Yet another believes that “Dying for the truth is a hidden theme in Blumenberg's work”, hidden because Blumenberg was reluctant to address questions related to lived experience; “Hidden, which is to say, too close” (Doni 2011, 191).

Several of Blumenberg's works begin with a single fable or metaphor, whose variations or “reoccupations” (Blumenberg 2020, 194), are traced over centuries to create an “inexhaustible matrix” (Doni 2011, 182). Art historian Joseph Koerner refers to the process as building ‘thought-models’ which are “constructed, used, misused, rejected, forgotten and reborn over time” (1993, 2). Each iteration, Blumenberg believed, revealed something of its epoch's relationship to learning. Key works include *Das Lachen der Thrakerin* (1987) [*Laughter of the Thracian Woman: A Protohistory of Theory* (2015)] which follows the reoccupations of the Aesop's fable of the philosopher who fell in the well, and *Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer* (1979) [*Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence* (1997)], which explores the reoccupations of seafaring-metaphors.¹⁶

If Blumenberg's work were to be distilled into a single theme, ‘how does humanity deal with reality?’ comes close.

¹⁶ See the papers I have published covering each of these works:
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13264826.2022.2162557> and <https://doi.org/10.1080/20507828.2024.2366588>

3.1.2 Blumenberg's Philosophical Anthropology: Circumstantial Reality

In 1971, Blumenberg published an essay called '*Approccio antropologico all'attualità della retorica*' ['An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of Rhetoric'], in which he suggests that "to the extent that philosophy is a process of dismantling things that are taken for granted, a 'philosophical' anthropology has to address the question of whether man's physical existence is not itself only a result that follows from the achievements that are ascribed to him as belonging to his 'nature'" (2020, 187). For Blumenberg, human 'nature' involves "Insufficient reason" (198) and a "lack of fixed biological dispositions" (189). Blumenberg then goes on to write that humanity "looks away from what is uncanny or uncomfortable for him toward what is familiar" (189), and that he does this "by not dealing with [...] reality directly. The human relation to reality is indirect, circumstantial, delayed, selective, and above all 'metaphorical'" (189). Blumenberg reinforces this oblique perspective (and pre-empts Conceptual Metaphor Theory [§2.3]) when he writes towards the essay's conclusion; "Man comprehends himself only by way of what he is not. It is not only his situation that is potentially metaphorical; his constitution itself already is" (207).

Blumenberg utilises Aristotelian concepts *and* rebuts them. For example, Blumenberg writes that metaphor is a comprehension "detour" which makes something "alien" "more familiar" (189). However, Blumenberg also notes that it would be wrong to assume metaphor was merely "a surrogate for concepts that are missing but possible in principle", a form of rhetoric to be used in an emergency (205).

3.1.3 Blumenberg's Mythology: The Horizon of a Nebulous Terrain

Vitruvius's *On Architecture* (c. 27 BC) includes an 'origin story' in which primitive humans lived "like wild animals" in forests and caves until a forest fire drove them onto the plains, and they collectively constructed primitive refuges and innovative shelters (2009, 37-38). Similarly, Blumenberg's *Arbeit am Mythos* (1979) [*Work on Myth* (1985)], begins with Blumenberg imagining primitive humanity's attempt to safely position themselves within an unpredictable world. He writes that when our primal ancestors assumed a bipedal position and were confronted by a "widened horizon of [...] perception" they experienced "the absolutism of reality" and all the attendant existential angst that accompanied that new outlook (Blumenberg 1990, 3-4). To overcome their anxiety, humanity used 'substitution devices' such as myths and name-labels to make the unfamiliar familiar (5). "The world",

writes Blumenberg, “is not transparent for human beings, and they are not even transparent for themselves” (274). For 600 pages, the book explores the stability of “narrative kernels” and the “morphological comparability” (273) between early myths, ‘fundamental’ myths, and the unlikelihood of a ‘final’ myth.

Researchers variously express Blumenberg’s version of myth as: “surrogates for the unthinkable” (Ifergan 2020, 132); “tools against terror” (Bajohr *et al.* 2020, 19); “acts of distantiating” (Turner 1998, 43); “an ontological strategy with which to temper the inherent ruthlessness and contingency of reality” (Henke & Scepanski 2020, 18); “temporary consolations for the challenges of an intractable reality” and a way to “cope and orient ourselves, both practically and theoretically, to domesticate and distance ourselves from the relentless indifference of the real” (Jay 2017, 130 & 132).

Different authors focus on different aspects of Blumenberg’s *Work on Myth*, creating a nuanced web of interpretation. C.D. Blanton, for example, suggests the work “constitutes a posterior truth, a mode of self-legitimation bearing sufficient force to reinscribe the past in retrospect” (2015, 182). Alternatively, Robert Wallace suggests that Blumenberg’s approach to overcoming potential panic and paralysis places alien reality ‘at arm’s length’ and gives humanity ‘breathing space’, thereby making rationality and myth inseparable, and returning a “proper dignity” to myth (1984, 95-6). It is a notion articulated by Blumenberg himself when he wrote, “myth itself is a piece of high-carat ‘work of logos’” (1990, 12). James Kent, meanwhile, recognises the endlessness of horizons, suggesting that Blumenberg’s idea of naming and classifying makes the intangible tangible but not necessarily comprehensible, and as such, myths are “conditioning” but never complete, they merely ‘push the boundaries’ of consciousness, never closing them off (2017, 370). Lastly, Robert Savage recognises the “indirect approach” that Blumenberg takes towards his material, suggesting it was necessary because the existing “surveying tools of theory were of little use to him when it came to mapping out so nebulous a terrain” (2008, 121).

3.2 BLUMENBERG’S METAPHOROLOGY

Metaphorology is a repeated subject in Blumenberg’s writings, specifically addressed four times. The term ‘metaphorology’ appears to have been coined by Blumenberg in 1957 in his

essay ‘*Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit: Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung*’ (1957) [‘Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept Formation’]. He then dedicates an entire book to the concept; *Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie* (1960) [*Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (2010)]. The third time Blumenberg uses the term metaphorology is in the essay ‘*Beobachtungen an Metaphern*’ (1971) [‘Observations Drawn from Metaphors’]. (The fourth mention of metaphorology will be addressed in §3.4.2.)

Academic Hannes Bajohr labels metaphorology as a “subset” of Blumenberg’s historical phenomenology (2017, 137), whilst C.D. Blanton suggests metaphors function as the “provisional ground” of Blumenberg’s anthropological approach (2015, 182). Andri Gerber, meanwhile, addresses metaphorology as a stand-alone attempt to “systematise” metaphors and “establish a typology” (2013, 16). Gerber worries, however, that the “shifting” and interdisciplinary nature of metaphors makes Blumenberg’s quest potentially impossible (16).

This section digs deeper into the first three publications which discuss metaphorology to better understand Blumenberg’s intentions. It should be noted, however, that whilst scholar Florian Fuchs suggests Blumenberg adopts “definitory elasticity” towards metaphor (2022, 163), ‘definitory vacuum’ might be more accurate. Throughout the hundreds of pages Blumenberg discusses metaphors, he does not attempt to define what metaphors are or how they function, concentrating instead on their contextual implications.

3.2.1 Light as a Metaphor for Truth

Blumenberg’s 1957 essay ‘Light as a Metaphor for Truth’ opens with the statement, “If indications are not misleading, a revival of philosophical research into the history of concepts is imminent” (Blumenberg 2020, 129). Blumenberg then goes on to say that philosophy attempts to “confront the unconceptualised and the preconceptualised” and, in doing so, “encounters the means of articulation” (130). Blumenberg’s articulation of historical concepts resonates with the “mobilistic model” of tectonic plate theory which was being debated around the same time (Frisch *et al.* 2022, 4). For example, Blumenberg notes that concept-uptake is generally slow, subject to gradual reshuffling, and by the time new concepts are accepted into the system, “the underlying substructure is usually already in motion again” (2020, 132).

“Careful research in this area”, Blumenberg writes, “should be able to unearth a wealth of resources. The hope is that the present study of metaphors of light and their accompanying milieu will contribute, in both content and method, to a philosophical ‘metaphorology’” (Blumenberg 2020, 130). What this content-method-ology seed is predicted to grow into, however, is left unconceptualised beyond the broadest suggestion; “The intent here is not to fill in the details of this short and doubtless fully incomplete outline of the expressive potential of metaphors of light but rather to show the way in which *transformations* of the basic metaphor indicate changes in world-understanding and self-understanding” (131 – italics added). Briefly, for example, he addresses the “dualistic cast” that antiquity gave to the relationship of light-and-dark which was replaced by the primacy given to created light by the Christians in the Genesis (148), versus the Enlightenment where light moves into the realm of accomplishment (165), as compared to modernity, where city-dwellers have never seen starlight (169).

The essay includes excurses, such as ‘The Cave’, in which Blumenberg reviews the metaphor of Plato’s allegory, and the ambiguous tension of primitive instinct and “primordial intellectual accomplishment” which “runs through” the history of the motif (146). “Leaving the cave”, Blumenberg suggests, “becomes a metaphor within the philosophy of history; it denotes a new epoch of humanity” (144).

Blumenberg slides between *mythos* and *logos*, his overall position slippery. He states, for example, “Light and darkness are, like fire and earth, fundamental primordial principles [whose] enmity leads to the awareness that being is nothing assured, that truth is nothing self-evident” (132-3). A page later, however, he writes, “Truth is not only present; it is insistent” (134). Instead of following the traditional approach of interpreting truth-theories in terms of logical validity, the essay’s subheading announces this as a ‘preliminary concept formation’.

3.2.2 Paradigms for a Metaphorology

Paradigms for a Metaphorology (2010 [1960]) is elsewhere translated, perhaps more thematically accurately, as ‘Paradigms *towards* a Metaphorology’ (Moyn 2000, 63 – italics added). Noting that it took 50 years to translate this book into English, it is ‘old’ within the context of Blumenberg’s oeuvre. Academics have variously referred to the work as: “cutting-edge” for its time (Haverkamp 2017, 40); “metaphilosophy” (Zowisło 2009, 312); a

“groundbreaking ‘typology of metaphor histories’” (Johnson 2012, 154); and a “rival conception to fundamental ontology” (Savage 2010, 140).

Late in the work, Blumenberg describes metaphorology as “a subbranch of conceptual history [...] an auxiliary discipline to philosophy” and a process which, above all, identifies “the *transitions* that will allow the specificity of each metaphor and its expressive forms to appear in sharper focus” (Blumenberg 2010, 77). Subtly, but significantly, the word ‘transformations’ (used in the prior paper) has become ‘transitions’. In other words, a concept’s condition alters rather than its form.

The work contains ten chapters which explore specific metaphors including the ‘mighty’ and ‘naked’ truth. Previous themes, such as Plato’s cave, also reappear. This time, however, the allegory’s light-metaphor has transitioned to emphasise deeper-implications; “through the consequences of scepticism we drive the hidden truth from its cave, and we find perhaps that tradition was right even though it rested on unsound foundations” (27-28).

Blumenberg opens the work by acknowledging the background conditions he is challenging. He recognises, for example, that Descartes’s ideal for the “full objectification” of precisely defined terminology and concepts meant “everything *can* be defined, therefore everything *must* be defined” and, as a result, the ‘provisional’ disappeared (1-2). Consequently, elements of figurative language “prove to have been makeshifts destined to be superseded by logic. Their function was exhausted in their transitional significance” (2). Metaphors, as such, were akin to temporary scaffolds or Wittgenstein’s ladder [§2.1.6] used to obtain understanding. Seen this way, Blumenberg suggests that metaphors could be considered “*leftover elements*”, making metaphorology “a critical reflection charged with unmasking and counteracting the inauthenticity of figurative speech” (3).

Blumenberg then adjusts his master-metaphor from scaffolding to elemental, from minor to miner. He encourages understanding metaphors instead as “*foundational elements* of philosophical language, ‘translations’ that resist being converted back into authenticity and logicity. If it could be shown that such translations, which would have to be called ‘absolute metaphors’,¹⁷ exist, then one of the essential tasks of conceptual history [...] would be to ascertain and analyse their conceptually irredeemable expressive function” (3). For

¹⁷ Blumenberg qualifies his term two pages later noting: “That these metaphors are called ‘absolute’ means only that they prove resistant to terminological claims and cannot be dissolved into conceptuality, not that one metaphor could not be replaced or represented by another, or corrected through a more precise one” (2010, 5).

Blumenberg, the existence of absolute metaphors is evidence that imagination is no longer “the substrate for transformations into conceptuality”, but a “a catalytic sphere from which the universe of concepts continually renews itself” (4). As such, Blumenberg metaphorically frames metaphorical-imagination as a power source, converting it from a fossil fuel whose reservoirs can be mined to extinction, and transforming it into a renewable, and therefore infinite, supply source.

Reiterating his geological, or archaeological frame, Blumenberg then notes the role of what we might call the ‘metaphorologist’ is akin to a prospector; “the task of a metaphorological *paradigmatics* can only be to lay the groundwork for that ‘deeper investigation’. It endeavours to stake out the terrain within which absolute metaphors may be supposed to lie, and to test criteria by which they may be ascertained” (5). Once the ‘seam’ is identified, “the historical transformation of a metaphor brings to light the metakinetics of the historical horizons of meaning and ways of seeing within which concepts undergo their modifications”, such that, “metaphorology seeks to burrow down to the substructure of thought, the underground, the nutrient solution of systematic crystallisations; but it also aims to show with what ‘courage’ the mind preempts itself in its images, and how its history is projected in the courage of its conjectures” (5).

“Absolute metaphors”, Blumenberg writes, “‘answer’ the supposedly naïve, in principle unanswerable questions whose relevance lies quite simply in the fact that they cannot be brushed aside, since we do not *pose* them ourselves but find them already *posed* in the ground of our existence”, they “give structure to a world, representing the unexperienceable, nonapprehensible totality of the real” (14). Absolute metaphors are described by other academics as: “immune to paraphrase and not reducible to any logical formula” (Johnson 2012, 154); “a way to address the ineffable” (Bajohr 2017, 156); “linguistic entities that mark the uncrossable limits of conceptuality” (Ifergan 2020, 134); and a means of expressing what “cannot be translated into or brought back to the schematism of the concept. This resistance is not arbitrary but necessary, part of philosophical language itself” (Flemming 2011, 73).

In Blumenberg’s book, ‘metaphorology’ is described as a ‘paradigm’, implying a scientific, systematic approach. However, as Savage notes, Blumenberg doubly-disavows this “by presenting [his] findings in a fragmentary, inconclusive fashion, and [...] by showing how metaphor eludes the logocentric schema that the philosophical tradition had tried to

impose upon it ever since Plato” (2010, 135). Blumenberg appears unconcerned with this inconclusiveness, as he writes, “What I am submitting here is only [a] semifinished product” (2010, 17). As Fuchs puts it; “‘Doing metaphorology’ is hence not the ultimate goal of metaphorology but only the method to prepare another philosophy that can consciously behave with and make use of its metaphoricity” (2022, 180).

3.2.3 Observations Drawn from Metaphors

The third time ‘metaphorology’ appears in Blumenberg’s texts is in 1971 within the essay ‘*Beobachtungen an Metaphern*’ [‘Observations Drawn from Metaphors’], fourteen years after the original instance and 3 years before Derrida used the phrase. In this essay the *geological* foundations of metaphorology have shifted into something *biological*, again potentially in keeping with broader interests of his time; “Metaphorology renders conceptual history the service of helping it approach a genetic structure of concept formation that, while it may not meet the requirement of univocity, nonetheless permits the univocity of the end result, which indicates an impoverishment of the imaginative background and the threads leading back to the life-world” (Blumenberg 2020, 212). The historical transformation-transition-translations of metaphorical language are now a ‘genetic thread’ which runs backwards from modernity to humanity’s origins. Blumenberg reiterates the notion, and reverses his stance of 1957, writing, “metaphorology must not simply be considered a preliminary stage or substructure of concept formation”, rather, a function of “tracing back the constructive instruments to the constitution of the life-world, from which they do not actually stem, but back to which they often refer” (213).

Blumenberg thus appears to position the life-world as a reference, not a source, of metaphor. Confusingly, however, Blumenberg then allocates a large section of his essay to the ‘important but barely perceived’ metaphor of ‘the source’ (223). He notes that due to the “pictorial self-evidence” of the metaphor, it is assumed everyone knows what it means, whereas discussions could be used to redirect attention to previously unnoticed orientation systems (223-4). Blumenberg goes on, “Sources are something that one stumbles upon”, but then immediately muddies his argument by writing, “This is true of the historian’s sources because they have entered the stream of history without drowning in it” (225). ‘Entering without drowning’ implies skilful intentionality rather than accidental survival following a stumble. Blumenberg explores the source metaphor with several examples including Francis

Bacon's "malicious image of time as a torrent" (224) and what appears to be his own metaphorical phrase for meaning transfer; "Transmission has rather taken the form of an aqueduct, whose bed is cemented against loss" (226).

Blumenberg's essay investigates several absolute metaphors including 'history', 'life', and 'self' (218), as well as framing metaphors such as 'critical mass', 'groundlessness', and curiously, 'paradigm'. As author David Adams notes in a parenthesised comment, "In his usual oblique manner, [Blumenberg] makes no reference here to his earlier essay in which this word played such an important role" (1991, 162). Only briefly does Blumenberg hint at what metaphorology might be when he writes that it is a "methodical confrontation between Cartesianism and historicism" (Blumenberg 2020, 212), and elsewhere, that "By interrogating [metaphors], it is possible to go beyond the source, toward either the will that left it behind, or the conditions for its appearance" (226).

Cryptic and contrary, Blumenberg occasionally appears to demote metaphorology; "these questions [are] not supposed to constitute the development of a theory but only to hint at a possible theory" (217) and "The space of metaphor is the space of concept formation that is impossible, has failed, or is not yet consolidated" (221). Later, he appears to undermine metaphorology completely; "not only poetical but also philosophical metaphors always have some kind of this having-promised too-much that evades all demands of redemption" (220). Ultimately, he suggests it is metaphor's "duality of risk and security" that "goes beyond the area of what has been theoretically vouchsafed and that it connects this orienting, detecting, roving anticipatory quality with the suggestion of safeguards that it cannot obtain" (236). Metaphors and metaphorology now circle liminal notions of probation, redemption, anticipation and the (im)possible. That is, the opposite of a historical aqueduct "cemented against loss" (226).

3.3 BLUMENBERG APPLIED TO ARCHITECTURE

Blumenberg's work often includes glosses, excurses, and small asides within the main work to illustrate a nuanced example of his main message. Eddies at the margins of the mainstream. Moreover, his ideas were often sourced from "unpublished fragments, letters, and diaries" (Hawkins 2017, 434); the "periphery [...] or previously unnoticed places in the

text” (Ifergan 2020, 130). Recognising that a phrase such as “The door handle is the handshake of the building” (Pallasmaa in Holl *et al.* 2006, 33) opens an entire dialogue in your mind, Blumenberg would store away fragmentary quotes and anecdotes for future use in his *Zettelkasten* [or ‘slip box’ card system, **Figure 8** nearby]. To apply Blumenberg’s metaphorology to art – and by extension, architecture – academic Julian Huss suggests adopting a method of “using Blumenberg to go beyond Blumenberg” (in Henke & Scepanski 2020, 26). How do you go beyond Blumenberg? One way is through Blumenberg’s Stenorette Dictaphone on which he dictated several books (Marquard 2022, 226). Dictation requires someone to transcribe the voice recording, and that someone was traditionally a female secretary; the margin’s margin – the marginalised [**Figure 8** nearby]. Accordingly, this section experimentally applies metaphorology to five vignettes, exploring architectural metaphors, presented as ‘slip-cards’ written by the philosopher’s invisible secretary.

Architecture against angst

Blumenberg envisioned an origin story in which humanity stood upright on the horizon and invented myths and absolute metaphors to tame an unbearable reality. Several architectural writers also posit circumstances in which humanity fashioned what might be called ur-metaphors against angst. Simon Unwin, for example, implies that a standing stone equates to ‘I am here’, noting, “Thousands of years ago, architectural construction originated in metaphor” – “one of the mechanisms by which our imaginations assimilate the world” (2019, 9). Architectural historian Joseph Rykwert agrees; “The planting of a post [has] always been seen as a metaphoric act [...] a primal gesture – the ability to orient ourselves, to know the orthogonality of our body to the ground, is a condition of our being” (1996, 122). Similarly, Snodgrass and Coyne suggest that ‘positioning’ is itself an architectural metaphor, stating that the placement of a gnomon’s pole confirms a city’s relationship to the sun, and is an act of “grounding” (2006, 9). Alan Colquhoun likewise notes “man has an ineradicable urge to extract from the flow of events a token of stasis, a fixed point against which to measure himself” (1981, 24), and yet ironically, “Meanings in architecture are social; as such they will sometimes be conscious and sometimes unconscious, [but] not stable” (126). Put another way, a totem-pole is fixed spatially, but not necessarily temporally or meaningfully. To illustrate, authors Markus and Cameron worry that Norman Foster’s building *30 St Mary Axe* in London being labelled ‘the erotic gherkin’ is inappropriately judgemental “because there is something either ludicrous or perverse about the juxtaposition of gherkins and sex” (2002, 107) [**Figure 8** nearby]. They might be right,¹⁸ but as Blumenberg revealed, metaphors morph over time; the phallic symbol that once replaced primal anxiety, may have become a source of new angst.

¹⁸ “The Gherkin” is currently the official marketing name of the building: <https://thegherkin.com/>

Metaphors of (mis)conception #1

Unwin's book notes that the psychoanalyst Carl Jung dreamt of a house which represented the psyche; the uppermost storey was consciousness, then he descended through the levels to a dark cellar, then even lower, to a bone-filled cave which represented primitive thoughts (2019, 123-4). *The Madwoman in the Attic* (1979) tweaks the notion by exploring Victorian literature from a feminist perspective. Early in the work, the authors quote the poet Gerald Manley Hopkins saying that 'a poet's pen is a penis,' and creativity is thus a 'male gift' (Gilbert & Gubar 1979, 3-4). What if Hopkins had conceived of creativity as a 'pen-as-umbilical-cord' appendage instead, recognising it as a device which links creator with creation? What influence would it have had on architecture, which was, until very recently, men-and-pen-based? What would a less misogynistic, more maternal, architecture look and feel like? Sigmund Freud wrote, "the dwelling-house was a substitute for the mother's womb, the first lodging, for which in all likelihood man still longs, and in which he was safe and felt at ease" (1982 [1929], 28) [**Figure 8** nearby]. Architectural critic Adrian Forty writes that gendered architecture was the norm for millennia but was "abruptly abandoned" around 1945 for being "suspect" (2000, 52-56). Forty seems disappointed when he wonders "Do we only have gender neuter architecture now?" (55). But what if instead of rejection there was a union? The *Taj Mahal* (1631-48), built to mourn a beloved wife lost in childbirth, has "four towers that pay homage to the dome", and thus, "juxtaposes male and female architectural forms" (Unwin 2019, 96) [**Figure 8** nearby]. Homage aside, why 'juxtapose' not 'superimpose'? "It is astonishing", Blumenberg wrote in 1946-7, that "despite fundamental upheavals in thought, how few innovations [...] the conceptual language of philosophy has accomplished since the reception of its ancient foundations" (2020, 37). Mad women may be in the attic, but many authors still seem to be resting on the cellar steps.

Two girls and the naked truth

Architect Pierluigi Serraino's chapter 'Framing Icons' in *This is Not Architecture* (2002) looks at two photographic versions of the Pierre Koenig *Case Study House #22* [Stahl Residence] (1960) [**Figure 8** nearby]. Serraino notes that architectural publications typically prefer "illustrations that are analytical, abstract, emphatically editorial and self-referential in nature" (127). On the other hand, publications for lay readers preferred settings which were "transformed into displays of objects of desire" (127-8). Consequently, two images of the same cantilevered house corner were taken by photographer Julius Schulman. Serraino notes that the first version, published in *Arts & Architecture* (1960), was chosen because "the architectural editor's preference was for naked architecture" (128). Around the same time, Blumenberg himself suggested, "The metaphor of the 'naked truth' pertains to the self-awareness of enlightened reason and its claim to mastery" (2010 [1960], 47). The second photograph, colloquially titled 'Two Girls', includes furniture, plants, and the girlfriends of the two university students helping with the photoshoot (Serraino 2002,

131). Unwin suggests that the females look like “benevolent goddesses” or “angels” (2019, 94). The second version, also published in 1960, in a newspaper’s magazine editorial, was essentially “invisible” to professionals until it was published by Rayner Banham in 1971 (Serraino 2002, 132). It was only with the rise of post-modernism that capturing human experience became an alternate reading of architecture (135). In time, the ‘two girls’ went on to become “among the most published visions of modern architecture” – “a template of perception for generations of architects to follow” (131). How ironic that ‘naked truth’ was deposed by two ‘girls’ in skirts.

Metaphors of (mis)conception #2

Le Corbusier’s *Towards a New Architecture* (1923) uses a metaphorical expunging when he notes, “A great epoch has begun. [...] Industry, overwhelming us like a flood which rolls on towards its destined ends, [...] animated by the new spirit” (1986, 6). Two years later, Walter Gropius’s *The New Architecture and the Bauhaus* (1925), adopts a more personal, less biblical, scale when he states that “A quarter of a century’s earnest and pregnant struggle” preceded the “eventual emergence” of the new architecture (1971, 20). Then, after outlining those struggles, Gropius suggests, “That is why the movement must be purged from within if its original aims are to be saved from the strait-jacket of materialism and false slogans inspired by plagiarism or misconception” (23). Placing the words ‘pregnant’, ‘purged from within’, and ‘misconception’, so close together generates an uncomfortable extended metaphor for creating a clean start. The authors of *Collage City* (1978), Rowe and Koetter, are more explicit, stating upfront that the city of modern architecture is unbuilt; “it has remained either a project or an abortion” (1990, 2), filled with “impoverished banalities” (such as public housing), “which stand around like undernourished symbols of a new world which refused to be born” (4). Perceived as such, it is not hard to draw a link between modernism and dystopia and create a *Handmaid’s Tale* of a *Brave New World*. That said, Blumenberg also used the term ‘pregnancy’ [*Prägnanz*¹⁹] in *Work on Myth*, but did so to connect to “the verb *prägen* (to stamp or imprint) rather than [...] ‘pregnancy’ as in either ‘being with child’ (or, metaphorically, ‘laden with meaning’)” (Ross 2011, footnote #20, 53). So... perhaps the stamp of modernity was misconceived, its intended meaning lost in translation?

¹⁹ Online translators suggest *Prägnanz* means ‘conciseness’ whereas *prägen* means ‘coin’ or embossing, further complicating the translation-transmission.

Dove, Duck or Dog's Breakfast

Harry Frankfurt's *On Bullshit* (2005) writes that "the essence of bullshit is not that it is *false* but that it is *phony*" (46). 'Correctness' is replaced as a motivating factor by 'sincerity' (65). Frankfurt's book includes an anecdote in which philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein visits his friend Fania Pascal after her tonsillectomy; "[Pascal] croaked: 'I feel just like a dog that has been run over.' [Wittgenstein] was disgusted: 'You don't know what a dog that has been run over feels like'" (24). The implication, according to Frankfurt, was not that Pascal had failed to be accurate, but that she didn't even try (32). An ethics blog for Oxford University reverses the accusation of 'bullshit', noting Pascal conveyed precisely how she felt, whilst it was Wittgenstein who was "full of it", conveniently forgetting how figurative language functions (Leavy 2022, n.p.). Metaphors, like 'bullshit', straddle the truth-lie spectrum, containing hints of conceits and deceptions. "A metaphor", writes Jan Zwicky, "is true to the degree that it is resonant" (2003, 47); 'sincere', that is, rather than 'correct'. Or as Blumenberg writes, metaphors are "*theoretically* undecidable" and as such, "not only fail to say 'nothing but the truth', they do not say anything truthful at all" (2010, 13-14). Architect Robin Evans' *Projective Cast* (2000) asks of Le Corbusier's *Ronchamp*; "Is it an alighting dove or a sitting duck? Good taste bids us to suppress the latter in favour of the former, although the latter is as easy to see" (317). *Ronchamp*, Evans goes on, is "wildly unpredictable, eschewing iconographic stability to the same degree that its twisted carcass eschews visual stability" (317). Evans believes that even though the design "borders on farce", "Incessant commentary has rendered it universally respectable" (317). Architecturally, it is 'good taste' to see *Ronchamp*'s 'twisted carcass' as neither phony, false nor full of it. Repetition has rendered its metaphors sincere, its 'bullshit' silenced.



Figure 8 : Blumenberg's slip cards / Dictaphone advertisement (1965) / Madeline Vriesendorp's sketches for the "gherkin" / "Taj Mahal" / "Case Study House #22" ²⁰

²⁰ Image sources: IMBD.com, [DerunsichtbarePhilosoph](#); eBay.com, [1965VintagePrintAd](#); (Jencks 2006, 14); (Unwin 2019, 6 & 96); (Serraino 2002, 128 & 130)

3.4 METAPHOROLOGY'S VALUE

3.4.1 Limitations of Metaphorology: Curiosity's Consolation Prize

The most common criticisms of Blumenberg relate to his approach, suggesting he is often “entirely opaque” (Haverkamp 2017, 36), “wilfully open-ended” (Koerner 1993, 9), or he has a “thoroughgoing aversion to systematic philosophy” (Hawkins 2019, 98). As Professor Pini Ifergan writes, Blumenberg “stubbornly refrains from providing a precise and unambiguous explication” of his core concepts (2015, 362), and as such, his account “is intended as a kind of consolation prize” for satisfying our curiosity (364). Blumenberg appears to follow his interests and goes where the texts take him. He traces iterations of metaphors inductively rather than presenting general theoretical claims, and this refusal “creates frustrating interpretative difficulties” (Hawkins 2019, 92 & 97).

Philosopher Herbert Hrachovec accepts that Blumenberg’s ‘transcendental philosophy’ does not adhere to a traditional “muscular ontology” but worries that “the nonchalance with which Blumenberg shifts from talk of things to talk of methodology [...] is reason to be suspicious” (1994, 70). Blumenberg’s contemporary, philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, “repeatedly” suggested that Blumenberg “lacked philosophical rigor” (Hawkins 2019, 97). For all its apparent weightiness, the edifice Blumenberg built risked being blown away by prevailing winds. Perhaps this was Blumenberg’s point. We want to make the incredible credible and find answers to unanswerable questions. The options are to remain silent as Wittgenstein suggests [§2.1.6] or keep pondering. Blumenberg prefers the later approach. The last words of *Work on Myth* are not only inconclusive, they also establish a whole new horizon to be explored; “What if there were still something to say, after all?” (1990, 636).

A second concern regarding Blumenberg relates to style, as exemplified by Charles Turner’s review of *Shipwreck*. Turner suggests that the work is “more an accumulation, a collection of material which has the paradoxical feel of having been thrown together as much as worked on” (1998, 143). Whilst it “dazzles” due to Blumenberg’s command of his sources, it nonetheless has a “listlike character” of “stepping-stones to nowhere” (145 & 7). Bajohr agrees in his review of *Paradigms*, noting Blumenberg’s analysis of metaphors risks “appear[ing] either as overly long illustrations [...] or as virtuoso improvisations on a theme guided by [...] the vast amount of source material Blumenberg had amassed in his card catalogue” (2017, 161). Bajohr suggests that the iterations reviewed “are often impressively

erudite and highly interesting in their individual insights, but appear startlingly arbitrary in their lack of an apparent goal” (161).

The most significant concern regarding Blumenberg’s approach is its paradoxical nature. Turner, for example, expresses frustration regarding how “maddeningly reticent” Blumenberg was about how humanity gains distance from reality by attaching significance to it (1998, 143). In a similar way that the logical positivist’s arguments could not be verified, and as such risked being denounced as ‘nonsense’ [§2.1.6], Blumenberg “cannot ‘prove’ his hypothesis of limit concepts, his story of the origin of myth, or his assertion of metaphor’s primacy” (Pavesich 2008, 444). As such, his attempt to articulate the inarticulate could be seen as less of a philosophical statement and more of a mumble.

3.4.2 Prospect for a Theory of Nonconceptuality

Blumenberg either acknowledged the criticism, changed his mind, or decided to ‘double-down’. In 1979, he released an essay titled ‘*Ausblick auf eine Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit*’ [‘Prospect for a Theory of Nonconceptuality’ (1997)], which includes the fourth and final time Blumenberg mentions the term ‘metaphorology’. The essay was both an extension of *and* a pivot from his previous version of metaphorology. Blumenberg reiterates his earlier geological framing, writing for example, “metaphors are fossils that indicate an archaic stratum of the trial of theoretical curiosity”, but also shifts; “metaphorology’s function has not changed, but its referent has, primarily in that metaphors is now understood as merely a limited special case of nonconceptuality” (Blumenberg 1997, 82 & 81). “Metaphorics”, he goes on, “is no longer [...] the front line of concept formation [...] but is seen rather as an authentic way of grasping connections, one that cannot be limited to the narrow nucleus of ‘absolute metaphor’” (81). A few pages later he renews his ‘threads’ and ‘horizons’ motifs to reiterate the need for his expanded thinking; “if metaphorology does not want to limit itself to the contributions that metaphor makes to concept formation but takes it instead as the guiding thread for consideration of the life-world, it will not get by without inserting itself into the wider horizon of a theory of nonconceptuality” (88).

It is not surprising that Blumenberg broadened his focus, given the wider context of metaphorical research taking place at that time. Only one year later Lakoff and Johnson published their Conceptual Metaphor Theory in *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), in which metaphors were presented as ubiquitous and embodied. In a sense, all metaphors were now

‘absolute’, subsumed into Blumenberg’s broad conceptual field of nonconceptuality. By this stage, scholars recognised “No science and no philosophy can do without images and myths. Each is subject to metaphors” (Marquard 2022, 230). Or, as another writer puts it, “Nonconceptuality insists on the primacy of the event in which thinking encounters the world and the world encounters thinking” (Johnson 2012, 153).

The inclusion of ‘theory’ in Blumenberg’s title suggests, however, he was not prepared to fully let go of classical *logos*, even if it was hedged with a ‘prospect’. Savage suggests that by presenting a *theory* of nonconceptuality, but not outlining any details, Blumenberg “conspicuously failed to deliver” (2008, 121). As with many of his ‘theories’, Blumenberg provides only a few, esoteric descriptions of his idea, for example, “Nonconceptuality wants more than the ‘form’ of processes or states; it wants their ‘gestalt’” (1996, 96-7). What exactly that means remains unconceptualised.

3.4.3 The Positives of Paradox: A Beginner’s Guide to Beginning

Even with the addition of Blumenberg’s theory of nonconceptuality, many criticisms remain unresolved. Blumenberg, however, never sought to demonstrate fixed truth, only what he refers to in *Paradigms* as “truthlikeness” (2010, 81), highlighting an “aesthetic verisimilitude” which values *seeming* true rather than *being* true (97). Blumenberg favours conceptual liberation above all else by repeatedly sidestepping accuracy for evocation. In his essay ‘Pensiveness’ (1980) he enthuses; “One of the descriptions of pensiveness is that whatever comes to mind is allowed to pass through one’s head unaltered [...it is] the freedom of digression” (2020, 527). Elsewhere, Blumenberg likens philosophical moments to a story in which everything is unprovable and yet irrefutable (Blumenberg 1990, 269). Ultimately, Blumenberg succeeds in reminding readers that *mythos* coexists with *logos*, that humans fantasise as well as conceptualise, that questions are as valid as answers, and conclusions are impossible because history never ends.

His perpetual evasiveness can be seen to add depth as well as novelty to material. Blumenberg’s metaphorical reoccupations construct a Scheherazade-styled narrative of perpetual digressions, a conceptual matryoshka-doll. This “circular, fictive and playful” writing style (Moyn 2000, 68), aligns with his topic; “metaphor’s ‘imprecision,’ its fertile but fuzzy relationship with truth, is its richest heritage. Metaphor usually does not increase the clarity of an idea, nor is it strictly functional. Yet it can still create consensus” (Johnson

2012, 154). As Koerner puts it; the “constant, almost maddening sense of enfolding, of subjects turning on themselves as objects, is potentially Blumenberg’s controlling figure. His texts are always, quintessentially, *metatexts*. Always becoming the very thing they describe, they are frames enframing frames, until the frame becomes the thing itself” (1993, 9). This fertile-fuzzy-enfoldedness which plays with paradoxical paradigms, ensures that Blumenberg’s work retains interest.

The translator’s afterword in *Paradigms* suggests that metaphorology “cannot exist other than in paradigmatic form: as a beginner’s guide rather than as an authoritative compendium; as the bricolage of a skilled amateur rather than as a well-oiled machine subject to expert control” and, like metaphor itself, it helps communicate strategies to “cope with an otherwise alien and overpowering reality” (Savage 2010, 146). Setting the ‘amateur’ label aside, the notion that Blumenberg’s work is a beginner’s guide to beginning to understand reality via metaphor rings true.

Ihab Hasan, the contemporary Egyptian-American theorist and writer, is a world away from Blumenberg in time and space, but his *In Quest of Nothing: Selected Essays* (2010) suggests that Blumenberg’s origin stories in *Work on Myth* have been influential; “Metaphor is gravid with ancient needs. [...] Its transferences revert to the hidden caverns of the imagination, and to the dark halls of myth, where our childhood meets the infancy of our race. In sum, because realism can never free itself wholly from metaphor and myth, it remains implicated in the evolutionary inheritance of *homo proteus*, those meanings still fluttering in our dreams” (148-9). Meanwhile, Rykwert appears to specifically adopt Blumenberg’s metaphorology when he writes; “Human understanding is, after all, always enclosed – even constrained – by the boundaries that its own time must set for it, while the various transformations of a metaphor can sometimes be a trace of the concealed currents that run through the intellectual landscape of a given period” (1996, 373). Traces of Blumenberg’s change-resistant ‘absolute metaphors’ can also be seen in ‘yardsticks’ and ‘blueprints’, those persistent phrases for measuring the moment and disseminating a version of a ‘stable reality’.

Lastly, whilst scholar Axel Fliethmann recognises that Blumenberg’s process of selecting and analysing material is “rather obscure”, Fliethmann suggests it “inspires us to go out and search” (2011, 69). As Blumenberg himself wrote in ‘*Vorbemerkungen zum Wirklichkeitsbegriff*’ (1974) [‘Preliminary Remarks on the Concept of Reality’], metaphors

are not merely “the retrospective illustration of the overly abstract but the initial encouragement to engage with it in the first place” (2020, 119). In the same way that metaphorology was the “red thread” that ran “tentatively and selectively” through much of Blumenberg’s work (Haverkamp 2017, 36), it can also be the thread that we follow into metaphor’s labyrinth.

Novelist Annie Dillard describes writing in a manner which resonates here; “When you write, you lay out a line of words. The line of words is a miner’s pick, a woodcarver’s gouge, a surgeon’s probe. You wield it, and it digs a path you follow. [...] You go where the path leads. [...] The new place interests you because it is not clear. You attend” (2013, 3). Blumenberg recognises “pragmatically functional [metaphors] as a kind of forgotten epistemic infrastructure or underground” (Reynolds 2009, 186) and uses meta-metaphorology to dig down through our historical thoughts, patiently, shyly, relentlessly. We, the readers, follow his diligent digging as he makes old territories seem new, and because, in amongst the fissures and rifts, the aggregate and mud, he reveals crystals and gold.

* * * * *

CHAPTER 4: (MIS)METAPHOROLOGY – JACQUES DERRIDA

“One sees everything that these tropes maintain and sediment in the tangle of their roots” (Derrida 1974, 54).

Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) uses the term ‘metaphorology’ in his essay ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’ (1974). Derrida, however, suggests an alternative passage through the subject by repeatedly placing the term in scare quotes. His central argument in the essay is that metaphor is ambiguous and provisional, with “bottomless overdeterminability” (44). Where Blumenberg ‘burrows down’ to validate fixed readings of substructural meaning, Derrida implies *mis*readings are inevitably entwined in metaphors because of the “sediment in the tangle of their roots” (54). This belief that *mis*understanding is intrinsic to metaphor, suggested the presence of a counter-thesis to Blumenberg’s absolutism, which I refer to as ‘(mis)metaphorology’. Derrida does not dispute the value of investigating foundational-roots, rather, he reminds readers that meaning is always nuanced, and that those once-buried roots are messy with subjective, even subliminal, historical residue.

Both Blumenberg and Derrida acknowledge metaphor’s active influence on meaning and undertake their investigations with an almost compulsive attention to detail, however, they do so in different ways. In his search for clarity, Blumenberg ‘zooms in’ on a complex issue, condensing it further and further until it almost collapses in on itself, becoming ‘frozen’ solid, neat, complete, like a diamond which can be held up to the light. Derrida also ‘zooms in’ on his subject, but he takes established axioms and interrogates them under an intensely bright light, encouraging meaning to ‘melt’, deform, and be set free of rigid constructs until everything a reader thought they knew and understood, and took for granted, evaporates.

This chapter introduces Derrida and his core philosophical concepts. It then outlines his approach to metaphor and his implied model of (mis)metaphorology, to add a layer of complexity, even disruption, to Blumenberg’s fixity. (Mis)metaphorology is then experimentally applied to the previous five architectural vignettes, and the chapter ends with an assessment of (mis)metaphorology’s value in analysing architectural design and discourse.

4.1 JACQUES DERRIDA

4.1.1 Deconstructing 'Deconstruction'

Labelled “one of the most difficult philosophers of the past century” (Wheeler 2010, 900), Derrida is “the object of simultaneous adulation and denunciation” (Bennington in Derrida & Bennington 1993, 7). “Amazingly prolific”, Derrida wrote over 60 books, creating a “sometimes serpentine, always rich and elusive, body of work” (Reynolds & Roffe 2004, 2-3). Attempting to consolidate those works into key ideas is difficult, in part because “Derrida encourages us to be especially wary of the notion of the centre”, and as such, his only ‘central idea’ is potentially that of ‘*decentring*’ (Royle 2003, 15). Whereas Blumenberg’s work tended towards stand-alone tomes, Derrida’s books and essays casually cross-reference each other, altering and abandoning key terms. Although Derrida did not specifically belong to “any particular philosophical lineage, because his work upsets all the concepts that allow us to posit philosophical lineages”, his thought-lines nonetheless seem “to have remained remarkably consistent – though constantly surprising and unpredictable – since the 1960s” (Bennington 2000, 7). This chapter now turns to these (in)consistent ideas.

Derrida said, “I have never had a ‘fundamental project’. And ‘deconstructions’, which I prefer to say in the plural, has doubtless never named a project, method, or system” (as quoted in Spitzer 2011, xvi). Nonetheless, deconstructive tendencies run through all his projects. In a continuation of rejecting academic norms, Derrida “refuses to answer the question: what is Deconstruction?” and thus denies “the possibility that Deconstruction has an essential nature” (Benjamin in Papadakēs 1989, 76). As philosopher Christopher Norris acknowledges, definitions are reductive and assume singular meanings with self-authenticating truths, which is the very assumption Derrida wishes to subvert (Norris & Benjamin 1988, 10).

Derrida *not* stating what deconstruction is, appears to inspire other writers to also start their discussions in the negative. “Deconstruction is not a theory of meaning”, writes philosopher Andrew Benjamin, “It does however involve claims about meaning” (in Norris & Benjamin 1988, 35). Alternatively, philosopher John Caputo writes, “deconstruction is not [...] a destruction or demolition, but a way of releasing and responding, of listening and opening up, of being responsible not only to the dominant voices of the great masters, but also to other voices that speak more gently” (Derrida & Caputo 1997, 57). Lastly, “Deconstruction is *not* a simple rejection or negation of certain ideas in philosophy. Rather

[it] seeks the destabilisation of philosophical positions and hierarchies in the hope of creating a new perspective” (Reynolds & Roffe 2004, 3). In other words, deconstruction *is* a method of exposing marginalised voices and views, to provoke alternate meaning.

Whilst deconstruction is difficult to summarise adequately, there are recurring themes and terms in Derrida’s work that need to be accounted for before addressing his approach to metaphor. Through four texts, four aspects are briefly discussed: the supplement, dualism, wordplay and Derrida’s neologism ‘*différance*’.

4.1.2 The Supplement: *Of Grammatology*

Derrida’s first major work, *Of Grammatology* in 1967, is considered an “astonishing intellectual feat” but ‘no piece of cake’ to read (Royle 2003, 73). The phrase ‘grammatology’ was coined to indicate a “science of writing” (Derrida 1997, 4). The work is inspired by the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion that writing is a supplement to the spoken word (7). Derrida takes the word ‘supplement’ and turns it into what his translator Gayatri Spivak calls a “sleight of hand at the limit of a text” (xlix) and “the prising-lever of undecidability” (lxxv).

A supplement is generally considered something secondary, and “comes to serve as an aid to something ‘original’ or ‘natural’”, for example, “we might supplement our main income by doing some other paid work” (Reynolds in Reynolds & Roffe 2004, 47). Derrida, however, takes up the term and ‘problematise’ it (47), using it to discuss language’s inherent ambiguity and challenge the motive of labelling something ‘secondary’. Whilst he starts with the supplements of writing, Derrida extends the concept to broader notions of indeterminability through various terminological guises including, undecidability, iterability, remnants, debris, otherness, traces and hauntings.

4.1.3 Dualism: ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’

In western philosophy there has been a tendency towards oppositional dualism. Professor Geoffrey Bennington gives examples of binary structures including “presence as against absence, the inside as against the outside, the soul as against the body, meaning as against its sign, [...] the literal as against the figural, the rational as against the irrational, the serious as against the non-serious, and so on, indefinitely” (Bennington 2000, 8). Bennington notes that

whilst there is a tendency to assume a hierarchical relationship where one term is ‘positive’ and the other ‘negative’, Derrida considers ‘violence’ is present in even the most neutral of polar terms (8). Wayne Attie identifies similar polarities within architecture in the form of man versus nature, rationalist versus anti-rationalist designs, even ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ architecture, and reiterates that there is always an inclination towards assuming that “One half of dualism is ‘right’ and the other half is ‘wrong’” (Attie 1978, 120).

Derrida believed that the hierarchy itself “must be undone”, and that instead of an asymmetrical relationship between terms, there can be “a radical and universal disequilibrium”, an approach where “sameness is dissolved into a web of otherness” (Roffe in Reynolds & Roffe 2004, 41). Derrida attempts to counter oppositional dualities in several of his works, including his essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (1972). The essay opens with Derrida weaving a metaphor for texts, suggesting you must ‘get your fingers caught in the web’ and ‘follow the thread’ of the ‘embroidery’ of any manuscript (1981, 63). Derrida then suggests that the relationship between reading and writing is a “(con)fusion” (64). He goes on to review Plato’s *Phaedrus* (c. 360 BCE), noting that Socrates will compare written texts to *pharmakon*, which as Derrida notes, is “the drug: the medicine and/or poison” (70). As such, the seductive charm of writing “can be – alternately or simultaneously – beneficent or maleficent” (70). Derrida notes that “The word *pharmakon* is caught in a chain of significations”, and that “No absolute privilege allows us absolutely to master its textual system”, as its “corridors of meaning” are complicated by different readers at different times (95-6). The term *pharmakon*, Derrida suggests, is malleable and related to “skewing, indetermination, or overdetermination, but without mistranslation” (72). *Pharmakon*, effectively becomes a symbol of a language-wide ‘(con)fusion’, and emblematic of (mis)metaphor.

4.1.4 Word Play: *Glas*

As part of a broader critique of language, Derrida interrogates individual words, plays games, creates neologisms and experiments with punctuation. This fascination with language is evidenced in the book *Glas* (1974). The title, ‘*Glas*’ can be thought of in reference to its original French meaning – “what bells do: knell, sound, toll, or ring” – or the translation of the German term ‘*glas*’ as glass; “Both meanings resonate throughout this text” (Rathbone in Reynolds & Roffe 2004, 141). *Glas* can, therefore, be read as a critique of philosophy’s

structural transparency or its death knell. The book includes two columns of text juxtaposing the work of the philosopher Georg Hegel with the literary texts of Jean Genet; “on the one hand the philosopher of Absolute Reason, of the State, Christianity and the bourgeois family as embodiments of universal truth, on the other the homosexual thief-turned-writer whose aim was to tear those values apart by every means at his disposal” (Norris in Norris & Benjamin 1988, 15). Derrida’s layout allows, even encourages, the text to “invade, penetrate, betray and destabilise” the individual texts and their meaning (Wocke 2014, 750).

The games continue when you imagine, as scholar Geoffrey Hartman does in his homage to *Glas*, that Hegel is pronounced in French as *aigle*, or eagle (2007, 347), and Genet is akin to the flower ginestra (353). The combination connotes John the Evangelist and the “twin-headed monstrosity” which is the heraldic symbol of the Austrian-Hungarian empire (353), as well the allusion to the ‘flowers of rhetoric’ (Norris in Norris & Benjamin 1988, 15), which will reappear in Derrida’s writings on metaphor.

The book’s “typographical hijinks”, create a “somewhat hallucinatory” visual re-enactment of Derrida’s position regarding the contradictory meanings of words and the way that they can “violently subvert [...] or contaminate one another” (Miller 2016, 132, 135 & 143). Derrida’s use of puns, alliteration, ellipses, and sentence fragments all combine to make “a masterwork of postmodernism” (131) and suggest that wordplay can be thought of as either “a magnificent exploitation of the richness of the French language or as a revengeful deconstruction [...] of the vaunted clarity of French” (138).

4.1.5 Difference-deferred: ‘*Différance*’

‘*Différance*’, the first essay in Derrida’s collection, *Margins of Philosophy* (1982), opens with Derrida discussing how he ‘insinuated’ the letter *a* into the word *difference* to create the neologism *différance*; a deliberate lapse in discipline intersecting with a spelling mistake, situating it between a permutation and mute irony (1982, 3). Derrida welcomes the “insistent intensification of its play” for a device which is “neither a word nor a concept” (3), rather, a “strategy without finality”, an “empirical wandering”, “strategic and adventurous” (7). Moreover, the word change is only a “graphic intervention” because the change can be written or read, but not heard in the French vocalisation of the word (3), making the ‘*a*’ “a mute mark” (4). Through this visual tweak of the inaudible, Derrida juggles sight and sound, writing that “differ()nce” “eludes both vision and hearing” (4). As such, he contests

structural linguistics and illustrates, literally and conceptually, philosophy's "founding oppositions" of the sensible and the intelligible (4).

A translator's footnote neatly summarises *différance*; in English the Latin *differre* became two separate words, "to defer and to differ" (7). As such, Derrida suggests the phrase has two outcomes – temporisation and spacing (9), such that, when "the present cannot be presented" language undergoes "the detour of the sign" (9). Put another way, "Differences, thus, are 'produced' – deferred – by *différance*" (14). One word thus "conjoin[s] the two main traits that Derrida associates with writing – those of *differing* and *deferring*" (Norris in Reynolds & Roff 2004, 19-20).

4.2 DERRIDA AND METAPHOR

Whilst there are some thematic parallels between Blumenberg and Derrida's approach to metaphor, such as their conviction that philosophical language is metaphorical and their discussions regarding the metaphors of light, they are largely divergent. Whilst no evidence confirms they interacted with each other's material, academic Maria Belén Castañón Moreschi suggests Derrida's metaphorology appears to be "in dialogue" with Blumenberg's *Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (1960), even if it is never made explicit (2018, 916). Whilst Blumenberg sought to 'burrow down to the substructure of thought', Derrida cautions that language tropes maintain "sediment in the tangle of their roots" (1974, 54). Thus, the characteristics of metaphor which Blumenberg underlines, Derrida undermines. Where Blumenberg methodically follows a red thread through centuries of sources, Derrida often contorts his material into Möbius strips. Whilst Blumenberg adopts a near-glacial pace, moving his arguments like tectonic plates, Derrida's work often feels like he's performing 'burnouts'.

This section reviews Derrida's two main works on metaphor. The first is an extended paper '*La Mythologie Blanche*' (1971), published soon after in English as 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy' (1974). The second is a 1978 lecture, published as '*Le Retrait of Metaphor*' (2007). Both works employ deconstruction's broader intentions of "exposing the limits of all attempts to provide secure metaphysical foundations, grounds or

final vocabularies” (Patton in Reynolds & Roffe 2004, 28). For this reason, I refer to Derrida’s version of metaphorology as ‘(mis)metaphorology’.

4.2.1 ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’

Derrida’s essay ‘White Mythology’ is challenging to analyse with certainty. Described as “a complex, 62-page essay with many strands” (Wheeler 2016, 172), it creates a “knot of related arguments” (Harrison 1999, 512). Whilst Bennington suggests any “poor readings” of the essay are the result of not approaching the work philosophically enough (in Derrida & Bennington 1993, 124), Professor Leonard Lawlor suggests any reading will necessarily be “incomplete” due to the essay’s “convoluted and allusive” style and the “zig-zag” manner with which it approaches the subject of metaphor (1991, 297). Read(ing)ability aside, the most viable approach to analysis is the tentative identification of statements which infer Derrida’s meaning.

Starting with the title, wordplay is already in action. Scholar Bernard Harrison’s paper examining the essay notes that the French term ‘*blanche*’ has multiple connotations including “*blanchir* (to bleach, whitewash, exonerate), *blanchisserie* (laundry), and *blanchiment* (whitening of walls, blanching of vegetables, and so on)” (1999, 507). This, in turn, leads to associations of “marginalising or concealing aspects of one’s activity, of sweeping things under the carpet”, as well as inevitable racial implications (507). These associations are deliberately activated by Derrida and tied to philosophy in the mind of the reader (507). ‘White mythology’, meanwhile, is described by Derrida as “metaphysics which has effaced in itself that fabulous scene which brought it into being” (1974, 11). Philosopher’s might attempt to remove, or conceal, figurative language from their logical arguments through bleaching or sweeping away, but metaphor remains, albeit effaced and secretive. As academic Terry Boyd notes, “the clear and precise language that affords the communicability of literal and conceptual truth is revealed to be deeply metaphorical, and deeply troubled by this fact” (2020, 57). As such, the “impossible illusion [...] an unshakeable mastery” of language in philosophy is a myth (315).

The dilemma of how to speak about metaphor non-metaphorically, was raised by several authors in the Research Context [§C2]. Derrida, however, “works the paradox for all it is worth” (Harrison 1999, 532), pushing it to the point of mythical misconception, to challenge the assumed logic of all western philosophy. Once figurative and literal language are exposed as entwined, Derrida then suggests “metaphor pervades the language of

philosophy to a point where the difference between ‘concept’ and ‘metaphor’ becomes strictly undecidable” (Norris in Norris & Benjamin 1988, 27). For Derrida, philosophical concepts “are, in reality, dead or worn-out metaphors that have lost or erased their metaphorical qualities” (Rasmussen 2019, 18). According to Harrison, “Metaphorical discourse may [still] have some value [...] but only if it serves to put us on the track of a new concept” (513).

Derrida writes, “If we wanted to conceive and classify all the metaphorical possibilities of philosophy, there would always be at least one metaphor which would be excluded and remain outside the system: [...] the metaphor of metaphor” (1974, 18). When Norris writes that every position statement “must perforce take issue with philosophy on ground of its own prior choosing” (Norris & Benjamin 1988, 29), his ‘grounding’ participates in philosophical metaphoricity, willingly or not. Similarly, when Castañón Moreschi explains Derrida’s argument by writing, “Thus, Derrida relates metaphor *both* to the claim *and* to the withdrawal of metaphysics because there is an excess of metaphor that overflows the limits of metaphysics” (2018, 915), she allows figurative language to ‘overflow’ traditional philosophical-text boundaries. Lawlor, likewise becomes a victim when he explains Derrida’s notion that all words “fall prey to the same problem” (1991, 287). Or, as Harrison metaphorically puts it via a double-denouncement; “Abstraction itself is a *fraud* because it is metaphor in *disguise*” (1999, 507 –italics added).

The impossibility of separating the literal-and-figurative, and metaphor-and-concept is then extended to subject-and-system. Derrida writes that “no classification or account of philosophical metaphor can ever prosper. The supplement is always unfolding [...] The field is never saturated” (Derrida 1974, 18). When Derrida uses the term metaphorology, he predominantly places it in scare quotes, indicating his suspicion of its success. He writes, for example, “Any ‘metaphorology’ would [...] be derivative with regard to the discourse over which it could claim ascendancy, whether guided by that of which the philosopher in question was explicitly aware, or by the systematic and objective structure of his text...” (28). Metaphorology, Derrida claims, “can only be perceived around a blind spot or a deaf point. The concept of metaphor would describe [an] outline but it is not even sure that in so doing it is circumscribing an organising centre” (28). Samuel Wheeler describes the dilemma this way; “Philosophy cannot be understood as a special case of effaced, erased metaphors, or in any other reduction to ‘metaphorology.’ [...] If a term is defined in terms that essentially involve itself, then the definition is circular, and so no grounding has been supplied” (2016, 176). Metaphorology would attempt to “*use* the concept of metaphor, and explain it”, and

problematically, “‘Metaphor’ is itself a metaphor” (176-7). Both metaphor and metaphorology become simultaneously powerful and powerless, akin to a silent black hole around which meaning revolves or is sucked into.

Derrida uses several metaphorical frames to explain metaphor throughout his essay. For example, he begins the essay with echoes of Nietzsche [§2.4.1] by playing with the French word *usure* (meaning ‘wear’ and ‘usury’ (7)) to imply that metaphorical language, like a well-thumbed coin, becomes effaced over time, losing its literal signification (time, place and value stamps), but retaining its weight in gold. “Derrida insists that the metaphors whose original meanings have been eroded or worn away over time, [...] are not simply reduced to the status of dead metaphors but remain ‘alive and dead simultaneously’” (Reynolds 2009, 190). The poet-critic Howard Nemerov reflects Derrida’s simultaneity when he personifies metaphor; “That these metaphors may not be dead but only sleeping, or that they may arise from the grave and walk in our sentences, is something that has troubled everyone who has ever tried to write plain expository prose” (1991, 228).

Derrida refers to metaphors as the ‘flowers of rhetoric’ (46), writing at length about their ‘heliotropic’ nature (52), and in the essay’s conclusion, notes that “a flower always bears within itself its own double, whether it be the seed or the type, the chance of its program or the necessity of its diagram. The heliotrope may always raise itself up. And it may always become a dried flower in a book” (1974, 74). The flowers of rhetoric, in other words, may be elevated or laid to rest, as well as simultaneously ‘physically dead’ and ‘symbolically alive’. Derrida ends by extending the partial-death of metaphor to the killing of philosophy entire when he writes, “the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded”, and, “Metaphor [...] always has its own death within it. And this death, no doubt, is also the death of philosophy” (74). Then, with the dramatic demise of philosophy exposed, Derrida’s final sentence is a quirky irrelevance, except that it acts as one last, explicit, reminder of language’s “bottomless overdeterminability” (44); “the heliotrope is a stone too: a precious stone, greenish and veined with red, a kind of Eastern jasper” (74).

4.2.2 ‘The *Retrait* of Metaphor’

After the publication of Derrida’s ‘White Mythology’, another philosopher, Paul Ricœur, gave an unsympathetic review of the essay in his book *La Métaphore Vive* (1975), [*The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language* (1986)]. Known as “la querelle de la

métaphore”, the dispute essentially centred on two different approaches to metaphor analysis: hermeneutics and deconstruction (Rasmussen 2019, 18). “Ricœur defends an ‘idealistic’ position that seeks to establish universally valid norms of rationality”, writes scholar Kim-Su Rasmussen, whilst “Derrida, by contrast, promotes an ‘anti-idealistic’ position that maintains how concepts are veiled metaphors” (36). Whilst Ricœur acknowledges philosophical concepts might be “articulated in terms of an old or worn metaphor”, he believes they nonetheless contain “a dimension that is a genuine creation of new meaning” (18). Derrida’s notion that metaphysics represses metaphor “provokes Ricœur to no end” (34).

Boyd states that Derrida believed that philosophy was not “a unique kind of discourse”, that it cannot “adequately state the boundaries of its own field”, nor “exceed its metaphorical roots” (2020, 94 & 122). By contrast, Ricœur believes Derrida’s approach “moves counter to our entire effort”, arguing instead for ‘*distanciation*’ and the “autonomy” of philosophical discourse (Ricœur 1986, 285 & 122).

Boyd notes that Ricœur charges Derrida with being overly dependent on worn-out metaphors (2020, 101), such as ‘the heliotrope’, which becomes Derrida’s version of “philosophy’s dead metaphors *par excellence*, [...] truth, light, and the sun” (105). As such, “Ricœur interprets ‘White Mythology’ as Derrida reading the entirety of the history of metaphysics as a mistake” (106). Lawlor, agrees but pushes back, noting that whilst Ricœur’s response to Derrida is a “thorough reading”, Ricœur “utilises the exact notions Derridean metaphoricity questions”, and “fails to recognise ‘White Mythology’s’ implications” (1991, 285), making Ricœur’s reading a *misreading*.

Derrida’s ‘*The Retrait of Metaphor*’ was a lecture delivered on June 1, 1978, at the University of Geneva during a metaphor colloquium, which Ricœur also supposedly participated in (Derrida 2007, 48). Derrida starts his speech by describing metaphor as an old subject which “occupies the West, inhabits it or lets itself be inhabited” (48). Derrida then discusses metaphor’s motion, implying it circulates cities by walking and riding buses (48). Next, Derrida uses a nautical metaphor to explain the way that language is beholden to metaphor; “I can no longer stop the vehicle or anchor the ship [of language], master without remainder the drifting, skidding, or sideslipping” (49). Moreover, if he attempted to “interrupt the skidding, I would fail, run aground”, because “Any statement concerning anything whatsoever that goes on, metaphor included, will have been produced *not without* metaphor” (50).

The notion of language mastered versus drifting resonates with writers before and after Derrida. For example, I.A. Richards said in his 1936 lecture on metaphors [§2.2.1]; “The metaphors we are avoiding steer our thought as much as those we accept” (1936, 92). Meanwhile, Norris later adopts Derridean ‘drift’ in *What is Deconstruction?* (1988); “Deconstruction is the process of rhetorical close-reading that seizes upon those moments when philosophy attempts – and signally fails – to efface all knowledge of [...] figural drift” (Norris & Benjamin, 7).

In his lecture, Derrida then shifts the metaphorical frame from ‘vehicle’ to ‘voice’, and as quoted previously [§1.1.3] states “that even if I decided to *speak no longer* metaphorically about metaphor, I would not succeed; metaphor would continue to get along without me in order to make me speak, ventriloquising me, metaphorising me” (2007, 50).

A considerable amount of time is then spent addressing Ricœur’s critique, often appearing to agree with much of what Ricœur says. The speech reinforces the inherent difficulties associated with multivalency, and the fine-tonal-line which conceits, irony, and word games tread. For example, the word ‘*retrait*’ (‘withdrawal’) in Derrida’s title, may be a tongue-in-cheek jab at Ricœur; an attack via retreat. Or, Derrida could simply be enjoying playing with the word ‘*retrait*’ as he discusses the supplementarity of traits and re-traits, and their movement, re-turning, re-tracing, re-drawing [as opposed to with-drawing] (Derrida 2007, 50).

Derrida ends the lecture, “What is going on? we will have asked ourselves in breaching and broaching this discourse. Nothing, an answering step but no response, save that the *retrait* of metaphor goes on, happens all by itself – and without itself” (80). A few years before, philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s *Production of Space* (1974), had already recognised the independence of metaphor when he wrote, “Nothing could be more ‘conscious’ than the use of metaphors, for metaphors are an intrinsic part of discourse, and hence of consciousness; but nothing could be more ‘unconscious’ either, if one considers the content that emerges subsequently, in the course of usage (whether of words or of concepts)” (1991, 290).

Derrida’s approach to metaphor is compatible with his general approach to philosophy which reiterates “there is no grand system, only a tool for criticising other systems” (Madsen 2009, 200). Derrida undermines the dualisms and hierarchies of western philosophy to “display new possibilities which thwart our desire for reliable meanings and unequivocal

truths” (200). Bleaching, breaching and broaching, Derrida’s arguments regarding metaphor are often discursively difficult to follow, but then, that’s potentially precisely his point.

4.3 DERRIDA APPLIED TO ARCHITECTURE

To explore how metaphorology might work in an analysis of architecture, Chapter 3 presented five brief slip-cards authored by Blumenberg’s secretary. This section repeats the experiment but requires a new device. Blumenberg was a ‘dictator’, and as Derrida notes in an interview about writing, dictation is “a sort of ‘master-secretary’ relationship, whether you like it or not” (Derrida 2005, 29). Derrida might instead be called a ‘word processor’. He began writing with a “special drawing quill”, progressed to a mechanical typewriter, then an electric typewriter, moving finally to a “little Mac” which he “can’t do without” (20). Blumenberg’s ‘other’ was the invisible secretary, linked to Blumenberg in an intimate, albeit mechanical, whisper of lips-to-ear. Derrida’s other is his computer, which he variously refers to as: “the hallucination of an interlocutor”, “the internal demon of the apparatus”, “a Demiurge-Other”, “an invisible addressee”, an “omnipresent witness”, and “a mechanical Other-Unconscious” (22-3).

This section takes Chapter 3’s slip-cards and puts stamps on them, reminding readers, as Derrida (circuitously) does in *The Post Card* (1980), that messages sent are not always received. Here, ‘vignettes’ are created again, but this time, their etymology (‘little vine’) is remembered, making them graphically entangled. Also remembered are Derrida’s experiments in *Glas*, where pages appear as “an academic’s desk: layers of text” (Bearn 1995, 23). Lastly, the experiment leans into (or out of) the typo(il)logical inserts which Derrida calls ‘Judas windows’ or ‘*Jalousies*’ (‘jealousy’) (Miller 2016, 139), embraced as a breath of fresh, or fatal, air.

Architecture of angst: dreams & nightmares

Thomas Cole's painting *The Architect's Dream* (1840) shows an architect resting atop a monumental column [Figure 9a nearby²¹]. On one side of the river the (neo)classical architecture




Figure 9

is bathed in golden 'enlightenment' and on the other, the illuminated (neo)gothic church




Figure 10

resides in gloom, 'radiant' in its own way. By extrapolation, the architect 'awakens' sleeping metaphors. The scene is, however, set within curtains, making it all theatre, all allegory, all backdrop to architect Robert Venturi's truck-stop signage of the future

[Figure 9b nearby²²]. By contrast, keep in mind John Henry Fuseli's painting *The Nightmare* (1781) [Figure 10a nearby²³]. Architectural critic Mark Wigley describes Coop Himmelblau's rooftop addition in Vienna [Figures 10 b & c nearby²⁴] as "a writhing, disruptive animal breaking through" (Johnson & Wigley, 1988, 17). Wigley then extends the metaphor to all deconstructivist projects, saying they represent "an uncanny presence [...] strange yet familiar – a kind of sleeping monster" (18). Lastly, he puts the sleeping animal on the psychoanalyst's couch to suggest "The nightmare of deconstructivist architecture inhabits the unconscious of pure form rather than the unconscious of the architect" (20). Must the opposite of an architect's dream be a nightmare? It risks reinforcing the hierarchical dualism Derrida sought to undermine. Still... there is a resonance revealed when you compare images of Himmelblau's design to *The Nightmare*; foreign forms squatting stubbornly over unsuspecting hosts, accompanied by a preternatural glow. Shared too, the secretive sense of exhilaration when repressed subliminal flaws and voluptuous taboos escape...

[Ctrl Y / Ctrl Z / Ctrl Y: Redo / Undo / Redo]

²¹ Image source: Toledomuseum.org, [TheArchitectsDream](http://Toledomuseum.org)

²² Image source: (Venturi and Scott Brown, 2004, 12), also found online Aquitecturaviva.com:DelirioDeNuevaYork

²³ Image source: Wikimedia.org, JohnHenryFuseliTheNightmare

²⁴ Image source: Coop-himmelblau.at, <https://coop-himmelblau.at/projects/falkestrasse/>

(Mis)conceptions of (re)production #1

Gerard Manley Hopkins called the pen a penis; a creative appendage of writerly male dominance [§3.3]. When Derrida saw a postcard of Socrates scribing for Plato, complete with an inexplicable long rod protruding from under Socrates's "plump buttocks" [**Figure 11** nearby²⁵], it "immediately seemed [...] obscene" (1987, 17). Awkard or not, the card reminds us that knowledge was traditionally passed from master-to-student. Jeremy Till's *Architecture Depends* (2009) picks up the rod and adopts a relay-race metaphor when he writes that architecture measures progress relative to

Figure 11




Figure 12

previous architecture, evidenced by the "the presumed baton-passing of William Morris to Voysey to Van de Velde to Mackintosh to Wright to Loos to Behrens to Gropius" (33). Similarly, a chapter by Michael Kubo in *Terms of Appropriation* (Lawrence & Miljacki 2018), references Roxanne Kuter Williamson's *American Architects and the Mechanics of Fame* (1991) and her 'Chart 1: Career connections of major American architects' [**Figure 12** nearby²⁶]. The 'family tree' shows Jefferson as 'founding father' and other architects linked by the solid line of an employer-employee relationship or a dot-dash demarcation for mentor-protégés. Kubo writes that the "tangle of lines" illustrates "an increasingly knotted web of connections as it multiplies and flows forward in time, seemingly overburdened by this relentless

proliferation of authors" (24). It brings Deleuze and Guattari's 'rhizomatic' thinking to mind, less orderly baton pass, more "radicle-chaosmos" (1996, 6). The World Wide Web also comes to mind; tangled branches of a tree of knowledge, forbidden fruit, spider residing inside. Less expected is architect Rem Koolhaas stealing womanhood to suckle his 'Rem Babies' [**Figure 13** nearby²⁷].

Figure 13



[Ctrl C + Ctrl V: Copy Paste]

²⁵ Image source: (cropped) UChicago.edu, [ThePostCard](#)

²⁶ Image source (Kubo 2018, 25) - also: [misfitsarchitecture.com/architecture-myths](#)

²⁷ Image source: the original articles have been removed BabyRems (metropolismag.com) & www.bunkerarquitectura.com, but copy replicated here Famousarchitect.blogspot.com, [NotesOnBecomingAFamousArchitect73](#)

Kissing architecture in skirts

Peter Smith's chapter on architectural metaphor, within *The Dynamics of Delight* (2003), reveals the risk of indeterminacy: "The graceful curves of Oscar Niemeyer's Cathedral at Brasilia [**Figure 14** nearby²⁸] are said to represent the crown of thorns. They could also signify the opening petals of a giant flower responding to the rising sun – perhaps a metaphoric allusion to pagan roots" (122). Whilst the first sentence neatly demonstrates how metaphor works, the words 'are said to represent' reveals the first inkling of (mis)metaphor. The uncomfortable collocation of 'graceful' beside a torture device advances the trend. When Smith notes the curves 'could also signify' something else,




Figure 14

Now, ere the sun advance his burning eye,
The day to cheer and night's dank dew to dry,
I must upfill this osier cage of ours
With baleful weeds and precious-juicèd flowers.
The Earth that's nature's mother is her tomb;
What is her burying grave, that is her womb
[...]
Within the infant rind of this weak flower
Poison hath residence and medicine power...
(Father Lawrence in Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, A2:S3)

hedged this time with a 'perhaps', the untethering is complete. The 'Christian symbol of sacrifice' blooms into a 'giant flower' then flops into its 'pagan roots', conjuring associations of South American sacrifices of another kind. Like *pharmakon*'s 'in sickness and in health' or Romeo and Juliet's medicinal-poison, Smith's reading is simultaneously full of faith,

hope, and fear. Borrowing from the indecision, we can playfully imagine the plan of Niemeyer's *Cathedral* depicted in the Kenneth Noland painting *Turnsole* (1961) or a *Deconstructed Sunflower* [**Figure 15** nearby²⁹]. Architect Sylvia Lavin uses the phrase "perceptual swerve" (41) in *Kissing Architecture* (2011), which perfectly explains the paradigm shift metaphors can generate; an immediate and urgent, albeit temporary, course correction. Influenced by Lavin and Shakespeare's star-crossed lovers kissing, let's imagine one last turn of the cathedral in a clinched bodice and flow(er)ing skirt, spinning on its solar axis.




Figure 15

[Alt + Tab: Switch between applications]

²⁸ Stewart (2019) Mymodernmet.com: [LeventeSzaboMinimalIllustrations](https://www.mymodernmet.com/LeventeSzaboMinimalIllustrations)

²⁹ Image sources: MMOA.org, [Turnsole](https://www.mmoa.org/turnsole) & ProFlower (2017), Flickr.com, [DeconstructedSunflower](https://www.flickr.com/photos/proflower/1481111111/)

(Mis)conceptions of (re)production #2

The iconic silhouette of the *Taj Mahal* is produced through a juxtaposition of male and female forms. Albrecht Dürer's *Draughtsman Making a Perspective Drawing of a Reclining Woman* (c. 1600) is similar [Figure 16 nearby³⁰]. The woman lounges, naked but for a few folds of fabric, whilst the draughtsman




Figure 16

sits almost as upright as the obelisk between his legs as he drinks-or-breathes her in. Horizontal-vertical, naked-clothed, sprawling-erection. Between them, a chequered window frames the voyeuristic or scientific view. It is a matter of perspective...

“Credences of Summer”

Trace the gold sun about the whitened sky
Without evasion by a single metaphor.
Look at it in its essential barrenness
And say this, this is the centre that I seek.

view. Meanwhile, Derrida used multi-point perspectives, or else, a secretive and startling form of anamorphosis. His arguments can be as indecipherable as Hans Holbein's skull in *The Ambassadors* (1533). Nonsensical at first glance, patience and an oblique perspective reveal the subject of death. In their reproduction of reality, neither philosopher's approach is a misconception. Death-life, dusk-dawn, winter-summer. Not polar opposites, but oscillations. Cycles. Margin-and-centre, lost-and-found, fertile-and-barren. The sky can be blue, black or bleached, and the heliotrope need not be subject or system, metaphor or concept, but a feeling; flowery-fragile or rock-hard, golden or green; a Wallace Stevens's poem.

Blumenberg was one for perspective, reducing the infinite horizon to a single point of reference, a paradoxical vanishing point of nonconceptuality. Each metaphorical reoccupation a new vantage point, combining to form an axonometric, even stereoscopic,

[F12: Save As]

A dog's breakfast of bullshit

“...he has become more interested in words if you take them up one by one.

Sometimes he seems to be holding them up for scrutiny. Sometimes he seems to be poking them with a stick. Sometimes, and the comparison is unavoidable, he seems to approach them with the tail-wagging interest a dog takes in another dog's turds.”

(Hillary Mantel, *The Mirror and the Light*, 2020, 6)

A dog's breakfast inevitably leads to dog poo. When do word games become a fad or a fetish, and curiosity become a curse?

In the Sokal Hoax, a pretend paper was published, and in the fallout, the status of scientific metaphors fell under attack, as did Derrida (Derrida 2005, 70).

³⁰ Image sources: Metmuseum.org, [AlbrechtDürer](#); Thevirtualinstructr.org, [AnamorphicArt](#); Dmitriev, Dreamstime.org, [Glavbooh](#); Wikipedia.com, [Heliotrope](#); & Travis (1997, 420).

“Sometimes, for fun”, Derrida writes in reply, “I also take seriously the symptoms of a campaign”, hoping that research in the future will rely on something more than a “practical joke” (72). How do you mind your manners in architectural criticism? Wigley, looking back on the MoMA *Deconstructivist Architecture* (1988) exhibition he helped curate, says the show generated “levels of bullshit that were so spectacular they were like floral arrangements” (Wigley 2022, n.p.). Franco la Cecla’s *Against Architecture* (2012), meanwhile, bristles at ‘starchitecture’ and “the laziness of a profession that used to promise a lot and that today is a washout” (ix), whilst




Figure 17

John Silber’s *Architecture of the Absurd* (2007) chastises Daniel Libeskind’s use of diagonal slashes in the façade of the *Jewish Museum, Berlin*. Although Libeskind had stated the angled lines pointed to significant Jewish locations in Berlin, the same motif (re)appeared at the *Royal Ontario Museum* in Toronto; making it an “embarrassing repetition of a design gimmick” (58); “bloviation [...] meaningless architectural absurdity, a trick he justified after the fact with fanciful pronouncement” (58). What are the rules of etiquette for placing ‘gimmick’ and ‘holocaust’ so close together? There is a fine line between bravado and bullshit. For designers and critics. Hartman writes that Derrida’s *Glas* “sings like a siren”, as readers “scavenge it and hope for an alchemy, a philosopher’s stone to turn trash into treasure, shit into gold” (2007, 36). Boasts risk bloviation. Conversely, speak ill too often and you’ll smell like sour grapes. Ranting, like writing in a discursive stream of consciousness, or poking poo with sticks, is best done in small doses. The same is probably true for Derrida’s deconstructed version of metaphorology; less is best.³¹

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4.4 (MIS)METAPHOROLOGY’S VALUE

4.4.1 Deconstruction’s Knottiness

In an interview with Franz-Olivier Giesbert, Derrida acknowledges his work “often elicits rejection and hatred [...] sometimes crudely declared, sometimes more of an undertone” (Derrida 2005, 113). Other than the ‘quarrel’ with Ricœur, the most obvious objection to Derrida was the 1992 “terrible honorary degree crisis in Cambridge” (Derrida in Derrida & Caputo 1997, 16), where several academics wanted to stop the English Department’s nomination. One of those to sign against Derrida, was philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, who wrote (in part), “M. Derrida’s work does not meet accepted standards of clarity

³¹ Image sources: (Mantel 2020, 6) & (cropped) Dreamstime.com, [AStarkRoomFilledWithSteelPlates](#)

and rigor” (in Stangroom 2006, 168). John Searle apparently went so far as to suggest Derrida was “the sort of philosopher who gives bullshit a bad name” (in Bearne 1995, 18). One potential problem was Derrida’s “somewhat obscure style”, which sociologist Michèle Lamont suggests can be considered “a game” or “a deliberate attempt to confuse the reader” (1987, 591). Lamont states, however, that Derrida’s “rhetorical virtuosity” (592) was not unique, and was favoured by several contemporary French philosophers, who all wrote in a “highly dialectical style” (591).

Derrida would go on to win the university-wide vote 336 to 204 (Derrida & Bennington 1993, 331). Derrida later recalled of that day; “a journalist took the microphone and said, ‘Well, could you tell me, in a nutshell, what is deconstruction?’ [...] Sometimes, of course, I confess, I am not able to do that” (Derrida in Derrida & Caputo 1997, 16). Derrida’s verbose-reticence incites conflict. Caputo writes that “It is not uncommon to portray Derrida as the devil himself, [...] a street-corner anarchist, a relativist, or subjectivist, or nihilist, out to destroy our traditions and institutions, our beliefs and values, to mock philosophy and truth itself, to undo everything the Enlightenment has done – and to replace all this with wild nonsense and irresponsible play” (Derrida & Caputo 1997, 36). As Caputo notes, however, Derrida’s shift away from fixed meaning does not mean that ‘anything goes’, it “does not spell anarchism; it is not bad news” (59). Deconstruction *destabilises*, it does not *demolish*. It points to cracks in the philosophical edifice, but with curiosity, not malice.

Caputo counters the journalist’s request for a ‘nutshell’ definition of deconstruction, writing, “Nutshells enclose and encapsulate, shelter and protect, reduce and simplify, while everything in deconstruction is turned toward opening, exposure, expansion, and complexification, toward releasing unheard-of, undreamt-of possibilities to come, toward cracking nutshells wherever they appear” (31). Soon after, however, Caputo unwittingly illustrates Quine’s concern regarding lost clarity when he writes, “Deconstruction is the relentless pursuit of the impossible, which means, of things whose possibility is sustained by their impossibility, of things which, instead of being wiped out by their impossibility, are actually nourished and fed by it” (32). Attempts to mirror Derrida’s style potentially forget to acknowledge the imperfections in the glass. To avoid ‘writing him off’ they write-him-on-and-on-and-on, and in doing so, ignore the premise of deconstruction which is anti-mimetic, or mime-challenging, and favours agitation and resistance.

In a different publication, Derrida says that those who reject his work fall into one of two categories of ‘nonreaders’; “First, those who do not work hard enough [...] rapidly run out of steam by assuming that a text must be immediately accessible”, and then, “there are the nonreaders who use [the] supposed obscurity as an excuse for setting aside, really for censoring something that threatens them or makes them anxious – deranges them” (2005, 140). Derrida *is* hard to read, but opacity doesn’t have to mean obstinance. As Nemerov writes, “If I find it next to impossible to talk about what metaphor is and does except in metaphors, I hope you will take that as a difficulty of the theme itself, and not as my mere wilfulness; the word itself, after all, is a metaphor” (1991, 229). Several writers pre-empt or follow Derrida’s recognition that language’s knotted roots thematically imply or motivate discursiveness. For example, William Epsom’s *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (1930), writes that “the machinations of ambiguity are among the very roots of poetry” (3), whilst Steven Pinker states that “If we dig even deeper to the roots of words, we unearth physical metaphors for still more abstract concepts” (2007, 236). Derrida’s version of ‘(mis)metaphorology’ recognises these knotty-roots whilst braiding in additional twists and turns of his own.

4.4.2 Deconstruction and Architecture

To illustrate the relationship between deconstruction and architecture, this section looks briefly at Derrida’s participation in designing a park within a park at Bernard Tschumi’s *Parc de la Villette*. Derrida’s collaborator, architect Peter Eisenman, refers to the unbuilt project as “a study of time – past, present, and future – and a questioning of representation in architecture” which superimposes a previous Eisenman project at Cannaregio over Tschumi’s project, to highlight the “ambiguous nature of time and place”.³²

The collaboration’s transcripts, reproduced in *Chora L Works*³³ (1985-87), reveal ambiguity may have been part of the reason the project teetered on the edge of an interdisciplinary communicational abyss between the real-and-imagined, sense-and-nonsense. The project is challenged throughout by fraught discussions about the suitability of archetypes including architectural models (the labyrinth, quarry and palimpsest), and philosophical examples (such as Plato’s cave).

³² EisenmanArchitects.com; *La Villette 1987*

³³ The project is also referred to as *Choral Work*.

Eisenman explains in his first meeting with Derrida in New York, 1985, that he's motivated to investigate the "systematic privileging" of "Solid and void, absence and presence, positive and negative" (Derrida *et al.* 1997, 7). Derrida replies "the only idea" he can contribute to that investigation is an interest in Plato's *Timaeus* (8), which specifically refers to a "singularly unique place" called *chora*³⁴ (9). In Derrida's draft essay '*Chora*', prepared for the collaboration, the ancient Greek concept of space is variously described as a 'woman-figure' "within invisible quote marks" (18), a 'mother', 'nurse' 'receptacle' and 'imprint-bearer' (30). In their third meeting, Eisenman pushes Derrida to explain *chora* in design terms, and Derrida responds, "I had the feeling of walking backwards" (49). It's an honest, though not particularly helpful reply, whose physical ramifications Eisenman and a colleague deliberate without success. Even by their sixth meeting in 1987, Derrida still struggles to articulate *chora*, saying; "It is a place without space, before space and time [...] Plato says that *chora* is unthinkable, that it can only be conceived of as if in a dream. *Chora* receives everything while always remaining virgin" (91). When pushed again, this time to illustrate his version of *chora* with a drawing, Derrida reluctantly consents and says, "I drew a lyre which is also a sieve [...] for what we did together was like a musical event" (92) [**Figure 18a** nearby³⁵].

By adopting the subject of *chora*, "Derrida turns – predictably – to an unpredictable, dark, and remote spot in the vast and gleaming architecture of Platonism" (Caputo in Derrida & Caputo 1997, 83). Architectural critic Anthony Vidler calls the park's premise "an impossible and apparently perverse conundrum", which Eisenman "complained of many times" (2005, 123). Vidler describes Derrida's sketch as, "part lyre, part grid, part winnowing sieve, hastily produced on an aeroplane" (123). *Chora* thus becomes the project's 'ideas-colander', which raises the question; who decides what constitutes the valuable disciplinary-habits that are the 'wheat' versus the default-discardable 'chaff'?

Architect Stefano Corbo's exploded axonometric in *From Formalism to Weak Form* (2016) reveals the lyre-sieve as nothing but a trace in Eisenman's final design [**Figure 18b&c** nearby] and suggests Derrida later "disowned paternity of the project" (63). The implication being that any 'shared music' faded away and Derrida's lyre potentially became a performative liar. It could, however, also be said that Derrida's submission was positioned within an ambiguous time-place-palimpsest which already included Eisenman's Cannaregio

³⁴ The same term is also referred to as *chôra*, *khora* and *khôra*.

³⁵ CCA.qc.ca, [Object383824](https://cca.qc.ca/objects/383824)

and Tschumi's approach to the site, making the project an exemplar of *chora* which "receives everything while always remaining virgin" (1997, 91).

The only physical offspring of their collaboration was the book *Chora L Works* (1997), an "absorbingly theatrical collection of texts and images" (Dayan 2003, 70), punched through with random, text-obliterating holes [*Figure 18d* below].




Figure 18 : Derrida's illustration of Chora / Exploded axonometric of Eisenman's park design / Eisenman's model / photograph of "Chora L Works" ³⁶

The difficulty of finding metaphorical consistency in architecture is not unique to *chora*. As Attoe notes, "Comparative studies of underlying metaphors in various critiques of the same building are informative and sometimes amusing, though not conclusive" as the underlying

³⁶ Image sources: CCA.qc.ca, [Object383824](#); Archdaily.com, [Corbo](#); EisenmanArchitects.com, [LaVillette1987](#); and author's own

motives behind the critic's choice is uncertain (1978, 111). Andri Gerber goes further and borrows Derridean language to label the extensive use of variable metaphors in design and discourse as "a turnsole of [...] instability" (2013, 19).

4.4.3 Positive Conclusions Drawn from Uncanny Games

Derrida plays games, and in doing so, highlights that games have rules, *and* those rules are inconsistent and can be broken. For example, the word 'game' cannot be definitively defined. A game can be played solo or with others, outdoors or indoors, with balls, cards, string, or nothing and everything in the case of hide and seek. Like a game of peekaboo, déjà vu ripples in and out of metaphor. Whilst a vivid metaphor helps us 'see-anew' via the connection between two unrelated things, ambiguous metaphors, according to David Punter's *Metaphor* (2007), make us 'see-again' that which we think we have 'already seen' (87). This "uncanny power" (89) provokes a "lingering, haunting sense of strangeness" (92), because it "place[s] us in a kind of limbo where bodiless voices intersect and echo" (100). Nicholas Royle suggests this sense of the uncanny resides in all of Derrida's work because it "renders all our familiar notions, structures and presuppositions strange" (2003, 143).

Whilst the uncanny nature of Derrida's work might be labelled unclear, it can't be considered to 'lack rigor' as Quine suggested. As Professor Gordon Bearn notes, "It is sometimes assumed that there is no philosophically rigorous path from the land of logic to the land of dissemination" in Derrida's work, but Derrida's path, though different, is no less persuasive than that which lies under "the sharp and unforgiving light of what is still sometimes called analytic philosophy" (1995, 9). Derrida's "idea is not to jettison the classical discipline, but to disturb it by way of exploring what systematically drops through its grid" (Caputo in Derrida & Caputo 1997, 77). "Deconstruction is", writes Caputo, "an unconventional conventionalism, an *inventionalism*" (103). Derrida takes the plodding stepping stones of Blumenberg's metaphorology, which link *mythos* to *logos* and philosophical concept to history, and liberates them from their bedrock, creating a troublesome wobble that forces us to pay attention. (Mis)metaphorology remains a path, albeit a disturbed one.

Derrida appears to only use the term 'polymetaphoricity' once in passing (1987, 360), but it perfectly describes how anything, indeed everything, can become trapped in metaphoricity. As Derrida writes in 'White Mythology'; "Concept is a metaphor, foundation

is a metaphor, theory is a metaphor; and there is no meta-metaphor for them” (1974, 23). Derrida, more than Blumenberg, notices metaphor’s power as disconcerting.

Whist Blumenberg’s model of metaphorology sometimes suggests a soapbox smell, Derrida’s (mis)metaphorology embraces nonsense and play, and as such, occasionally exhibits a fine line of *pharmakon*-snake-oil oozing between loopy lines. Recognising it for what it is, there is value in the motion-potion. The (dis)advantage of Derrida’s writing is that it opens an infinite number of avenues to pursue. Derrida himself recognises that for both writer and reader, a text can be “more, less, or something other than what [the writer] *would mean*” (1997, 157-8). As such, it opens the door wide for a new way of analysing architectural design and discourse, above, below, or beside traditional methods.

Royle writes, “If there is a guiding dictum for approaching Derrida it would be: slow down. Take care, read (on) slowly” (2003, 4). To this should be added, challenge everything, be open minded, push boundaries, exceed them, let go, bend, sway... drift.

* * * * *

CHAPTER 5: CONCEPTUAL (D)RIFT

Metaphor “seeks to ‘fix’ our understanding, but at the same time it reveals how any such fixity, and such desire for stability and certainty, is constructed on shifting sands” (Punter 2007, 10).

Reading Hans Blumenberg and Jacques Derrida, revealed two alternate versions of metaphorology. Blumenberg’s approach exposes foundational metaphors and tracks their progress through history to reveal insights into our changing ideologies via changing metaphors. On the other hand, Derrida’s version reveals that metaphor’s metaphoricity, whilst not preventing investigation, places observations into a self-referential bind which restricts objectivity. Blumenberg’s metaphorology is idealistic and dogmatic, its repetitive nature slightly claustrophobic. Conversely, Derrida’s (mis)metaphorology is agoraphobia-inducing, being almost disturbingly open-ended. To adopt Blumenberg’s model, knowing about Derrida’s, would be simplistic or evasive. Meanwhile, replacing metaphorology with (mis)metaphorology would simply reveal the flip-side of the coin without challenging the nuanced arrangement. Lastly, to oscillate between the two approaches risks creating a one-step-forward two-steps-back manoeuvre that goes nowhere. Instead, it was decided that a third model was needed to round out and animate the prior two.

This chapter, therefore, proposes a combinatory model relating to architecture, which respects the strengths of both Blumenberg and Derrida’s models without deferring too much to either. The tripartite model of dialectics³⁷, which consists of a thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, provides an opportunity for progress. True to metaphor’s ambiguity, however, the new model should remain a hybrid of (ir)resolution, like the sandy-sea of a shoreline. It should also be akin to the manner in which the Yin and Yang symbol holds its opposites curled up against (and within) each other. The model should recognise opposing boundaries of interpretation (the *rift*), whilst resisting the need to ‘settle’ on any one reading, remaining perpetually ‘aloft’ (the *drift*). The neologism ‘conceptual (d)rift’ was invented for this model of (in)determinacy and is explored below.

³⁷ See Appendix Two for more information

5.1 ORIGINS OF THE PORTMANTEAU-NEOLOGISM '(D)RIFT'

This section explains how the neologism '(d)rift' was created, and outlines its underlying concepts demonstrated through four notions and their associated thinkers: Blumenberg, Derrida, architect Maya Lin and French Situationist Guy Debord.

5.1.1 Rift (Blumenberg)

Rift imposes itself, variously and repeatedly, on humanity. Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud wrote in *Civilisation and its Discontents* (1929) that human activities are motivated by “the two confluent goals of utility and a yield of pleasure” (1982, 31). Freud later recognises a different rift; “two urges, the one towards personal happiness and the other towards union with other human beings” (78). Author Sarah Robinson’s *Nesting: Body, Dwelling, Mind* (2011), meanwhile, states that humans desire a life of possibility without barriers, *but also*, protection and shelter; “The drama of each one of our lives”, she notes, “stretches magnetically between [these] poles” (11). Philosopher Alain De Botton’s book on *The Architecture of Happiness* (2006) places the poles deep within us; as children, “we are rarely far from displaying either hysterical happiness or savage disappointment, love or rage, mania or exhaustion”, and even as we grow older and seemingly more temperate, “we seldom succeed in laying claim to lasting equilibrium, traversing our lives like stubbornly listing ships on choppy seas” (132). Whilst human ‘mood swings’ oscillate in a manner which pre-empt (d)rift, the rift between conceptual methodologies and ideologies tends to be more fixed.

Research tends to be *either* quantitative or qualitative. In philosophy logical positivists and structuralists were *replaced by* poststructuralists and deconstructionists. Architectural designs are generally labelled modernist *versus* postmodernist, as ‘machines for living in’ *or* ‘organic’. Writing is *contrasted between* fact and fiction. Metaphor inquiries reveal a divergence between ‘decorative addition’ *as opposed to* ‘ubiquitous embodiment’, ‘literal-truth’ *compared to* ‘figurative-truthfulness’ and so on. “Cranky old Jacques Derrida notwithstanding”, writes novelist Thomas King, “we do love our dichotomies. Rich/poor, white/black, strong/weak, right/wrong [...] We trust easy oppositions. We are suspicious of

complexities, distrustful of contradictions, fearful of enigmas” (in Clandinin 2007, 60³⁸). Author Ihab Hasan suggests that such “crude dichotomies” have influenced western thinking *but also* “repel original minds who want release from either/or; they want it all” (2010, 208).

Occasionally fusion is evidenced via terms such as ‘faction’, ‘intertextuality’, ‘transdisciplinary’, ‘multitactic’ or ‘bricolage’. Metaphor, however, has *always* been a conflation of either/or/all. Metaphor recognises the disparity between two things and joins them regardless. “A metaphor”, writes Jan Zwicky, “can appear to be a gesture of healing – it pulls a stitch through the rift that our capacity for language opens between us and the world” (2003, 59). At the same time, because metaphor reminds us that distinctness is not a fundamental characteristic, there is no rift; “a metaphor heals nothing – there is nothing to be healed” (59).

This notion of an ‘unnecessary stitch-up’ is why care needs to be taken when thinking of Blumenberg’s model as a version of ‘rift’ set in opposition to Derrida’s ‘drift’. Blumenberg’s metaphorology *does* recognise metaphor’s reoccupations over eons, each shift from ‘this versus that’ creating a potential for rift. However, as art historian George Didi-Huberman notes, in researching reoccupations, Blumenberg identifies metaphors as ‘fecund images’ that transcend terminology and have interpretations that are ‘porous’ and ‘fluid’; “what is represented is repeatedly questioned, challenged and expanded” (in Henke & Scepaniski 2020, 18). Similarly, Andri Gerber notes that Blumenberg’s metaphorology attempts to ‘systematise’ metaphors whilst simultaneously recognising their “shifting nature” (2013, 16). Blumenberg’s metaphorology, therefore, is potentially a ‘ship on choppy seas’.

5.1.2 Drift (Derrida)

Language is full of drift. When someone asks, ‘do you get my drift?’ colloquially they mean, ‘do you understand?’ Drift is meaning. Linguist Mark Lakoff, however, notes that “Lack of Purpose is Lack of Direction”, and cites as an example; “He is drifting aimlessly” (1992, 17). Meanwhile, architect Adrian Snodgrass’s paper ‘Random Thoughts on the Way: The Architecture of Excursion and Return’ (2001), recognises the etymology of the unintended by noting that the ‘hap’ of ‘happenings’, ‘haphazard’ and ‘happenstance’ relates to chance (4).

³⁸ Thomas King, 2003, *The Truth about Stories*, p.25.

Derrida's deconstruction of language identifies with drift's 'haphazardness' but not in a 'directionless' way. Instead, Derrida pushes against presumed boundaries and undermines bidirectionality. Derrida reverses "oppositional hierarchy [...]" so that the previously subordinate term is valorised, at which point it can be reinscribed into the text, twisting its 'message'" (Miklitsch 1983, 102). Moreover, Derrida recognises that "borderlines are always a potential site of conflict" (Norris in Norris & Benjamin 1988, 21). As such, Derrida's deconstruction recognises traditional dualities and boundaries *and* tries to reverse or breach them, thus identifying with both 'rift' and 'drift'.

In 'White Mythology' (1974), Derrida writes that metaphors create meaning 'detours' where "sense may seem to launch out by itself, unloosened from the very object to which it nevertheless is pointed" (41). Metaphor's meaning is thus (un)tethered. Later in the same essay, Derrida writes that the "abyss of metaphor will always be in a process of self-stratification, simultaneously consolidating itself and hollowing itself out" (55). As such, Derrida's double-manoeuvre undermines Blumenberg's 'burrowing down' through fixed historical layers, creating instead a 'pulsating' version of metaphor, expanding and contracting; either/or/all/nothing. Lastly, Derrida's neologism '*différance*' [§4.1.5] is a "strategy without finality", an "empirical wandering" (1982, 7) and is thus an overture to (d)rift.

5.1.3 (D)rift and Maya Lin

The neologism '(d)rift' resulted from an accidental discovery via architect Maya Lin (1959-). Whilst studying Lin's design for the *Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (1981-2) both 'rift' and 'drift' presented themselves in the texts. The opening sentence of Lin's competition statement reads, "Walking through this park-like area, the memorial appears as a rift in the earth".³⁹ Her attendant side elevation [*Figure 19* nearby] makes the rift a wound, a half-healed flap of torn skin. On the other hand, Lin's personality appears to have been cultivated to avoid injury. In a newspaper article published when she won the competition, Lin is quoted as saying, "My parents don't consider [America] their real home. [...] I grew up with their feelings. I don't feel like I have a home... As a result, I drift..." (McCombs 1982, n.p.).

³⁹ Wikisource.org, [MayaLin'sOriginalCompetitionSubmission](#)

Rift and drift. Drift and rift. The collocation of the two words in the draft notes created not so much a ‘Eureka!’ moment as a flustered ‘what if?’ After doodling the two words over and over, the portmanteau ‘(D)RIFT’ appeared within the scribble; a squiggle with the essence of a ‘squircle’. Undoubtedly influenced by Derrida’s ‘(con)fusion’ [§4.1.3] and Lin’s diagrammatic ‘greater-than’ sign, ‘(d)rift’ obtained the essence of either/or/more, of fighting and dodging, boldly staked claims and an ultimate irresolution. Metaphor is *typically* asymmetrical; the familiar explains the unfamiliar, the concrete stands in for the abstract. As such, metaphors can reinforce hegemonies. Conceptual (d)rift on the other hand, has the potential to avoid the power struggle, the hierarchy, and the patriarchy. Much like the ephemeral nature of Lin’s sketch, (d)rift is neither day or night, but a new dawn gloaming.




Figure 19 : Maya Lin's competition submission for Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1981) ⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Image source: LOC.gov, [07040v.jpg](#)

5.1.4 Guy Debord's *Dérive*

A model precedent to (d)rift, is Debord's (1931-94) *Theory of the Dérive* (c. 1956), where 'dérive' is French for 'drift' or 'drifting'. The Situationists, formed in 1957, "were a group of artists and thinkers who questioned capitalist society, proposing alternative ways to read or describe a city" (Farrelly 2011, 22). In the 1968 student riots of Paris, pithy graffiti slogans, supposedly written by the Situationists, began appearing across Paris, including "it is forbidden to forbid" and "be realistic and demand the impossible!" (Johnstone 2018, n.p.). For the Situationists within this context, "getting lost was not an end in itself but a means of resisting prescribed orientation, and of finding or charting new paths" (Pinder 2018, 23). The emphasis was on process rather than product.

Debord's *dérive* was a means of exploring the city without preconceptions; "The idea was to drift randomly on foot through the city and observe it in an unpredictable way" (Farrelly 2011, 22). As Professor Klaske Havik writes, *dérive* "made it possible to jettison the usual motivations for moving about a city and investigate the psycho-geographic effects of the city in a playful way" (in Grafe 2006, 46).

The first "adventure" of *dérive*, scholar Karen O'Rourke notes, was in the summer of 1953 during a transportation strike, which caused Debord and his friends to hitchhike "nonstop" through Paris, going wherever their drivers were going, "frequently" stopping at bars along the way, and "Courting the unexpected" (N.D., n.p). This notion of aligning yourself deliberately with chance, of going with the flow whilst noticing everything, is (d)rift personified.

Debord's *Theory of the Dérive* relies on a simultaneous 'domination' and 'letting go' of the variations within the "objective passional terrain" (Debord in Heble & Caines 2014, 177). Different to strolling, Debord recommends walking in small groups so that impressions can be cross-checked (177), with the scope of travel being predetermined or vague "depending on whether the goal is to study a terrain or to emotionally disorient oneself" (178). Debord also outlines preferred group size and duration limits. As such, Debord's 'drift' feels ironically 'weighty', its tactical serendipity more technical than spirited; the body would be free to float, but the mind remains hitched to analysis.

Anthony Vidler's 2017 reference to Debord on the website *Drawing Matter*, suggests "*dérive* is a product, not of concentration, but of 'distraction'" (n.p.) – "a kind of collusion based on a mix of nostalgia for the original aims of a modern urbanism", and the "sense that alternative traditions, rooted in the seventeenth century conflict between Cartesians and

Pascalians, had been suppressed” (n.p.), that is; order and chance. In his chapter on ‘Vagabond Architecture’ in *The Architectural Uncanny* (1992), Vidler expands the aspect of chance, suggesting the Situationists “stumbled into the practice” of *dérive*, creating a technique “collaged” from surrealism, sociopsychology, and “more ‘scientific’ ways of measuring the use of urban space” (211).

Debord collaborated with the Danish artist Asger Jorn on several artworks and two books. Their “deliberately nonrational” ‘map’ titled *The Naked City* (1957) [**Figure 20a** nearby] was not their first, but “perhaps their most famous” (Diamond 2018, n.p.). They cut a plan of Paris into nineteen random pieces, then applied “swirling red arrows that represent the psychogeographical explorations or *dérives* undertaken in Paris in the early 1950s” (n.p.). These ‘arrows’ then ‘spear’ visited spaces into place, thereby reducing the drifty-disorientation and makes the city more ‘frozen’ than ‘fluid’. By extrapolation, (d)rift within Debord’s model is simultaneously fixed and free, (un)intentionally recognising that new meaning remains tied to traditional analysis.

The first book produced by Debord and Jorn’s collaboration was *Fin de Copenhague* [1957, *Goodbye to Copenhagen*]; 32 collages compiled from a pile of ‘found’ or ‘stolen’ newspapers and magazines (Poynor 2013, n.p.) [**Figures 20b & c** nearby]. Whilst at the printers, Jorn created “frenetic daubings” across the collages, making them “explode with wild energy” (n.p.). The second book, *Mémoires* [1959, *Memories*], was similar [**Figures 20d & e** nearby], but this time, was sold with a cover made of sandpaper.⁴¹ It is not difficult to imagine the damage done each time the book slid out of its bookshelf-cubbyhole, its ever-present-absence creating a scar shaped like Lin’s design-wound.

Dérive, as a concept, was not confined to the footpath. O’Rourke presents a list of “practitioners” who defamiliarised the cityscape, which includes (but is not limited to): the *flâneur* of philosopher Walter Benjamin, the Surrealist André Breton’s novel *Nadja* (1928), the builders of grottoes and follies, Horace Walpole’s *Strawberry Hill*, Jack the Ripper, William Blake’s poems and Giovanni Piranesi’s drawings (N.D., n.p.). As Snodgrass writes, “The job of the Rambler is to keep moving, keep the eyes (and the mind) open, be aware and receptive” (2001, 5). This chapter now pivots to the other rambling-practitioners of (d)rift.

⁴¹ Princeton.edu, [Internationale situationniste](http://www.princeton.edu/~situationniste/)




Figure 20 : "The Naked City" (1957) / "Fin de Copenhague" (1957) / "Memories" (1959) ⁴²

⁴² Image sources: NEROEditions.com, [UltimateSituationistLibrary](#); Bernardyenelousi.blogspot.com, [FindeCopenhague](#) & DesignObserver.com, [FindeCopenhague](#); and Princeton.edu, [InternationaleSituationniste](#)

5.2 PRECURSORS OF (D)RIFT

Traces of (d)rift repeatedly revealed themselves throughout the research journey, suggesting that ‘conceptual (d)rift’ has always existed. There are the ‘emblems’ of (d)rift. Fire is one, with its capacity to comfort and destroy. Visual gestalts also, including the duck-rabbit, Rene Magritte’s non-pipe in *The Treachery of Images* (1929), or Pablo Picasso’s bike-sculpture *Bull’s Head* (1942) [**Figures 21a, b & c** below]. There is also a haze of hypothetical questions raised by Schrödinger’s cat, Rorschach inkblots, cocoons and chrysalides, and all the hybrid chimeras from magical mermaids to the enigmatic Sphinx. Architecture also has them in the form of thresholds; verandas, porticos, garages, alfresco dining annexes, and all those liminal spaces which are inside-outside, home-and-away.




Figure 21 : Rabbit-duck illusion / Magritte's "Treachery of Images" (1929) / Picasso's "Bull's Head" (1942) ⁴³

⁴³ Image sources: Wikipedia.com, [RabbitSuckIllusion](#); ReneMagritte.org, [TreacheryOfImages1929](#) & MoMA.org, [Picasso1942](#)

5.2.1 Philosophical (D)rift

Investigations into Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) were made in order to understand the broader context of Derrida's ideas. The first book attempted was *Driftworks* (1984), whose title, as translator Roger McKeon notes, is "in the plural, for the question is not of leaving *one* shore, but several, simultaneously; what is at work is not one current, pushing and tugging, but different drives and tractions" (1984, 10). Specific examples illustrating the title's promise, however, were elusive. 'Drift' appeared once, in an essay about Freud, compulsions, nightmares and orgasms, part of a "drifting, excess, annihilation of the regulated" (91-2).

More helpful was Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979) and Lyotard's definition of postmodernism "as an incredulity towards metanarratives" (1984, xxiv). The hierarchies of learning institutions, he states, had been 'flattened' and their disciplinary borders 'overlapped', such that their "respective frontiers [...] are in constant flux" (39). More generally, society's bond, although linguistic, was not "woven with a single thread", but as a 'fabric' made of intersecting language games (40). Society, Lyotard suggests, whilst no longer needing "grand narratives" still relied on the '*petit récit*' ['little narrative'] (60), not to achieve consensus, which Lyotard calls "outmoded and suspect" but as a means of accessing the paralogical (65-66). Lyotard's model of postmodernity, can be likened to a tapestry whose texture is in constant motion, preventing a singular image taking hold. Likewise, (d)rift might be considered a mobile intersection of variable approaches, several 'little narratives' that combine to make a whole, but a whole that is paradoxically never complete, constantly unloosed, woven by Homer's Penelope.

Subtle threads of (d)rift run throughout the history of philosophy. Aristotle, for example, recognised ambiguity centuries ago when he wrote that metaphors generated "clarity and sweetness and strangeness" (§1405a / 2007, 200). Clarity-and-strangeness may not be an obvious polarity, but it is enough to reiterate *pharmakon* and pre-empt Derridean '(con)fusion'.

Another ancient philosopher, fifth century BC Ionian Heraclitus, was himself contrary. Whilst many of his "near contemporaries sought to find the comfort of permanence amid disorder and uncertainty", Heraclitus "embraced change and made it the centrepiece of his philosophy" (Pirie 2009, 9). From his epigrammatic fragments, such as 'we do not step into the same river twice', he pre-empts Lyotard in believing that everything is in a state of

flux. Moreover, he advocated a very (d)rifty ‘unity of opposites’ where day becomes night, and war can replace peace, “The strife between opposites will never be resolved, and none will ever triumph permanently over its counterpart” (9).

Ludwig Wittgenstein, supporter and detractor of logical positivism [§C2.1.6], hints at a form of (d)rift when he uses the metaphor of a ‘riverbed of thoughts’. Empirical propositions are in a “state of flux”, he writes in *On Certainty* (1969), constantly altered over time between being ‘fluid’ and ‘hardened’ (§96). The ‘bank’ of this riverbed “consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one” and “partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited” (§97 & 99). Elsewhere, in the same work, Wittgenstein adjusts the metaphor to a ‘hinge proposition’, suggesting they are proposals “exempt from doubt” (§341), which enable investigations to take place; “If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put” (§343). Movement thus relies on fixity, and small ‘support’ details can thus have a ‘pivotal’ power to shift closed- to open-mindedness and provide intellectual access to new theoretical positions.

Poststructuralism attempted to move away from ‘fixations.’ Everything about Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), for example, from its title, configuration and key concepts, all advocate a ‘freer’ version of philosophy. They favour ‘planes of immanence’ and the ‘nomad’, ‘noology’ over ideology, pluralism over dualism or monism, and ‘rhizomatic’ thinking rather than knowledge which is ‘rooted’ and ‘arborified’; a “radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos” (1996, 6). It is “a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing”, they write, “a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again” (20). They suggest that the opposite of history is ‘Nomadology’ (23), something mobile and not “burdened by too heavy a cultural load” (24). As philosopher Edward Casey writes, “at any given moment, I [the nomad] am somewhere and not drifting nowhere [...] But my being somewhere is not restricted to being in a single locality: the ship is always moving on, the caravan continues, the dog team careens over the ice” (2013, 360). (D)rifting is not ‘placeless’, rather ‘place-in-motion’.

If pushed far enough, this version of meaning untethered from the gravity of time, place, culture, and ideology, suggests a potential ‘metaphor(no)ology’. Meaning would, at this outer-limit, potentially transcend comprehension, becoming a mysterious blur, atmospheric rather than tangible, accidentally, or very deliberately un-constructed. Deleuze’s *The Fold* (1988) adopts this ephemeral extreme when he writes that understanding the world

involves “hallucinatory microperceptions” – “It is a lapping of waves, a rumour, a fog, or a mass of dancing particles of dust” (1993, 86).

Post-poststructural philosophy appears to preference perpetual motion. In Slavoj Žižek’s *Event: A Philosophical Journey Through a Concept* (2014), for example, Žižek writes, “One should [...] ‘let oneself go’, drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance of accelerated progress, a distance based on the insight that all this social and technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being” (65-66). Contemporary humans, in other words, should (d)rift, distancing themselves from their surroundings whilst retaining a permanent connection to their inner-selves.

5.2.2 Semantic (D)rift

Roland Barthes recognises (d)rift in the conclusion of his work on *Mythology* (1957); “The fact that we cannot manage to achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality doubtless gives the measure of our present alienation: we constantly drift between the object and its demystification, powerless to render its wholeness” (2009, 187). Barthes explains that if an object is ‘penetrated’ it is ‘liberated but destroyed’, whereas, if we ‘acknowledge its full weight’ then the object is ‘respected but re-mystified’ (187).⁴⁴ Barthes ends his work stating that a ‘reconciliation’ must nonetheless be sought “between reality and men, between description and explanation, between object and knowledge” (187). Rift and drift are thus inevitable but can be reconciled through (d)rift. Elsewhere, in *The Pleasure of the Text* (1973), Barthes highlights the ‘bliss’ of reading by likening it to ‘grazing’ rather than ‘gobbling’ (1990, 13), and then: “My pleasure can very well take the form of a drift. *Drifting* occurs whenever *I do not respect the whole*, and whenever, by dint of seeming driven about by language’s illusions, seductions, and intimidations, like a cork on the waves, I remain motionless, pivoting on the *intractable* bliss that binds me to the text (to the world)” (18). Barthes’s version of (d)rift is suitably ambiguous, and converts readers into Wittgenstein’s hinges, ‘pivoting on the intractable’.

⁴⁴ Paul Feyerabend’s 1995 biography provides an example; “Santa was my father, clearly... and yet it was Santa.” (Recounted in Julian Baggini’s *Edge of Reason* (2016, 79)).

Author Umberto Eco similarly refers to rhetorical drift in his work *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language* (1984), noting that “By the ‘drift’ of signifiers, other signifiers are produced” (24), eventually entering a “beneficial crisis” of sign and content, a semiotic “chain of signifiers” (45). Eco later refers to this as ‘Kabbalistic drift’, where a text develops a sense of ‘unlimitedness’ due to the number of free combinations generated (153). Eco outlines a benefit of (d)rift when he writes that “The chronicle of the discussion on metaphors is the chronicle of a series of variations on a few tautologies, [...] Some of these variations, however, constitute an ‘epistemic break’, allowing the concepts to drift toward new territories – ever so slightly, but just enough” (88). (D)rift benefits meaning by ‘breaking’ the tethers of fixed interpretation so that it might be free, ‘ever so slightly’, until it becomes fixed anew, but in a new position. (D)rift can thus be an analytical tool, which combined with Barthes and Lyotard, might offer an epistemic break with intractable metanarratives, to generate new, unlimited, unstable, disorienting, even paralogical perspectives of the world.

5.2.3 Linguistic (D)rift

Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) states that how we define reality is “very much a matter of metaphor” (2003, 3). They identify ‘orientational’ metaphors that relate concepts to spatial positioning. ‘I’m feeling *up* today’, for example, is evidence that HAPPY IS UP (14). Setting aside objections (‘*upset*’ comes to mind), the spatialisation and experiential nature of language, and the “inseparability” of metaphors in that arrangement (19), helps explain the need for (d)rift. (D)rift suggests that meaning can float somewhere *between* the conceptual poles of HAPPY (but also GOOD / VIRTUOUS / RATIONAL / MORE) IS UP and their opposites represented by DOWN. Conversely, Lakoff and Johnson use the example of ‘The matter is *settled*’ to suggest KNOWN IS DOWN, versus the opposite: ‘That’s *up in the air*’ (20). “It’s easier to grasp something and look at it carefully if it’s on the ground in a fixed location”, they suggest, rather “than if it’s floating through the air (like a leaf or a piece of paper)” (20). As such, (d)rift lends itself to a Deleuzian anti-gravity; ‘light-hearted’, ‘ungraspable’, a more tentative, topsy-turvy, version of understanding where THE UNKNOWN IS GOOD.

Linguist L. David Ritchie writes about metaphor in a post-poststructuralist time. As such, he echoes Derrida’s idea that communication is a gamble when he writes, “Messages are not always interpreted, even when they are noticed; and conversely they are also

sometimes overinterpreted” (2006, 7). Later, in the same book, *Context and Connection in Metaphor*, Ritchie also recognises that “a metaphor can be understood in very different ways, or even misunderstood entirely, with little impairment in overall comprehension, at least in the more global sense that the hearer understands the gist of the speaker’s intentions” (139). In other words, meaning may be mobile, but human communicators regularly ‘settle’ on the most likely option for comprehension’s sake. Conceptual (d)rift, therefore, needs to acknowledge that percipients may not participate; others may quickly ground any idea creatively released.

5.2.4 Poetic (D)rift

Picking up from Ritchie’s ‘common ground/sense’ approach, the poet T. S. Eliot’s *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (1932-3), suggests that when reading poetry, the ‘average’ reader “is apt to be thrown into a state of consternation very unfavourable to poetic receptivity”, and worried about ‘being clever’ and ‘not taken in’, they develop a version of ‘stage fright’ (1964, 150-1). A more ‘seasoned’ reader, on the other hand, “does not bother about understanding; not, at least, at first” (151). David Punter’s *Metaphor* (2007) picks up on this sense of latent, or peripheral, understanding when he writes that metaphor is “the bodying-forth of sets of correspondences of which, in some sense, we have all [...] been aware in what we might define as a *liminal* way, hovering somewhere around the threshold of articulation” (68).

Winifred Nowotny’s *The Language Poets Use* (1962), includes several references that can be used to articulate (d)rift. “Metaphor shakes our bearings on the question of how we stand in relation to ‘objective reality’”, she writes, “and a metaphor inside a metaphor unfixes those bearings altogether” (1996, 86). Similarly, Nowotny recognises that metaphor has the “power to collapse the wall between fact and fiction and between subject and object” and, moreover, those relationships “are not so much like bricks [of an edifice], as like a Maenad’s hair floating in the wind, and in a poem many winds blow at once” (96-97). Later, Nowotny echoes Blumenbergian geology when she notes that poetic language fluctuates between the “crystal-clear” and the “many-faceted” or “prismatic”, “irradiated” with meanings, which can also be projected in a “splay [...] a spectrum of colour” (147). Later, she pre-empts Derrida’s tangled roots; “It is because ordinary language is such a shifty and unreliable means of communication that poetic language can say more than one thing at a

time. [...] The fruitful ambiguity of poetry is rooted in the humdrum ambiguity of our common vocabulary” (165). As a result, (d)rift is the humdrum made fruitful.

Individual poems are filled with (d)rift, too many to mention. High school memories include Robert Frost’s *A Cabin in the Clearing* (1962), “Than smoke and mist who better could appraise – The kindred spirit of an inner haze” (2013, 415) and metaphysical poet John Donne’s *A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning* (1611-12), in which a ‘stiff twin compass’ is used to describe a romance where the woman remains at home as her man goes roaming, “Thy firmness makes my circle just, | And makes me end where I begun”.⁴⁵

5.2.5 Literary (D)rift

Stories as old as Homer’s *Odyssey* (c.700 BCE) contain (d)rift; opening on the sea with “Sing to me of the man, Muse, the man of twists and turns | driven time and again off course” (1996, 77), and closing in a bedchamber where the marital bedhead is literally rooted in place to demonstrate the ultimate commitment to the family tree. Gothic novels regularly bear (d)rift’s imprint with the recurrence of the uncanny and the ‘other’. Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* (1818), for example, with its fraught relationship between creator and reanimated corpse-creation, or the binary doppelgängers in R.L. Stevenson’s *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1886) and Oscar Wilde’s *Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890). Emily Brontë’s domestic yet, inhospitable tale, *Wuthering Heights* (1847), creates (im)moral turbulence on multiple metaphorical levels.

(D)rift is evident in the literary architecture of Italo Calvino’s *Invisible Cities* (1972) with its merger of memory and longing, and descriptions of single locations in a multifaceted way; “Each city receives its form from the desert it opposes; and so the camel-driver and the sailor see Despina, a border city between two deserts” (1979, 18).

Short stories also have (d)rift. Franz Kafka’s unfinished and convoluted *The Burrow* (1931), discursively highlights notions of (in)security whilst Virginia Woolfe’s stream of consciousness in *Street Haunting* (1930) recounts the inner journey of a strolling woman. Edgar Allen Poe’s short story *The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether* (1845) uses a visit to an insane asylum to blur the line between fact and fiction, and to explore the instability of truth and self. Louis Borges’s book *Labyrinths* (1962), meanwhile, includes

⁴⁵ Poetryfoundation.org: [AValediction:ForbiddingMourning](https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44211/a-valediction-forbidding-mourning)

multiple (d)rifty stories including ‘The Mirror of Enigmas’, ‘Library of Babel’ and ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ which reveals life to be “an enormous riddle, or parable, whose theme is time” (Borges 1970, 53).

Contemporary postmodern novels such as David Mitchell’s *Cloud Atlas* (2004) or Mark Z. Danielewski’s *House of Leaves* (2000), carry the spirit of de-structuring used in older novels including James Joyce’s *Finegan’s Wake* (1939) or *Ulysses* (1918-20) or Lawrence Sterne’s *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (1759-67). Time, place, and plot become as discursive as the sketch included to describe Tristram’s narrative path [**Figure 22** nearby].

Assuming all novels require some combination of structure and surprise, Anna Macdonald nonetheless recognises literary (d)rift of another kind in *Between the Word and the World* (2019). When she speaks of a borrowed book, she reveals its pages “were dense with signs left behind by earlier readers: a coffee stain here, a dog ear there, underlinings and marginalia everywhere. Other people had passed this way before me and their lingering traces encouraged an appropriately palimpsestic reading” (3-4). Therefore, the story of (d)rift can be seen to be one of borrowed babble.




Figure 22 : The narrative line of "Tristram Shandy" (1759-67)⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Image source: Chapter LXXXIII, Gutenberg.org, [LifeAndOpinionsOfTristramShandy](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1831/1831-h/1831-h.htm)

5.2.6 Painterly (D)rift

Artworks can be the embodiment of (d)rift, “Artistic meaning rests upon an intricate interplay of showing and concealing” (Gómez in Holl *et al.* 2006, 22). Any artwork can hold (d)rift’s essence, but artworks that challenge a viewer’s perception via manipulations, distortion and incongruity are especially promising. *The Ambassadors* (1533), for example, [discussed in §4.3, **Figure 23a** nearby⁴⁷], requires an oblique perspective to recognise the skull hidden amongst the symbols of knowledge. Punter suggests metaphor has something in common with the drawings of M. C. Escher, “famously indecipherable or, at least, irreducible to a single interpretation: they can never fully reveal their own meanings because they are perennially on the point of turning into their other” (2007, 82-3). Or, as Ihab Hasan puts it, “reading Escher’s obsessively detailed pictures becomes an exercise in unreading what we have hastily read into them” (2010, 148). Other illusory art also comes to mind; Salvador Dali’s *The Image Disappears* (1938), Pere Borrell del Caso’s *Escaping Criticism* (1874), or more tangentially, Pablo Picasso’s rendition of *Notre Dame* (1954) with its roof merging impossibly with the hazy clouds above [**Figures 23b, c & d** nearby].

McAlhone and Stuart’s book on graphic wit, *A Smile in the Mind* (1996), writes about art’s “frisky tendency” (2003, 11). They note that graphic-wit is different to language-wit, but still “involves an agile or acrobatic type of thinking – a leap, a somersault, a reversal, a sideways jump – where the outcome is unexpected. The result is not arrived at through logic, but reaches an undeniable truth” (15). Like a metaphor, or interpreting poetry, there is a balancing act in making ‘(d)rifty’ (art)work, “If a witty solution involves a great deal of recognition but little surprise, the solution will be obvious and weak. If, on the other hand, the solution involves a great deal of surprise but little recognition, it will be baffling [...] If the solution is low on both recognition and surprise – total failure. If it is high on both – if it combines great familiarity with a big surprise – the solution will be a success” (16). Graphic art, therefore, reminds us that (d)rift ought to combine ‘clarity-and-strangeness’, familiarity and *frisson*.

⁴⁷ Image source: NationalGallery.org.uk, [TheAmbassadors](https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/hans-memling-the-ambassadors)



Figure 23 : Holbein's "The Ambassadors" (1533) / Dali's "The Image Disappears" (1938) / Borrell del Caso's "Escaping Criticism" (1874) / Picasso's "Notre Dame" (1954) ⁴⁸

5.2.7 Cinematic (D)rift

Cinematic (d)rift has bearing on the third Case Study (Bernard Tschumi's *Parc de la Villette*), so two references are mentioned here. The first is cinematographer Sergei Eisenstein's *The Film Sense* (1942), which discusses the method of 'montage', a technique used to generate

⁴⁸ Image sources: lacma.org, [DrawingSurrealismImageSheet.pdf](#); Wikipedia.org, [EscapingCriticism](#) & Pablo-ruiz-picasso.net, [Picasso1954](#)

“maximum [levels] of emotion and stimulating power”, when two or more pieces of film are placed together, and “inevitably combine into a new concept, a new quality, arising out of that juxtaposition” (Eisenstein 1975, 3-4). Eisenstein suggests that the inferences raised are instantly “condensed” and “the chain of intervening [connotational] links falls away” such that only the beginning and the end of the process are perceived (14-15). Memory, he suggests, relies on essentially *ignoring* the conflation, whereas a work of art requires a viewer to *emphasise* the process (17). Later Eisenstein refers to the condensation as a ‘fusion’ and adopts an impregnation-metaphor, writing that the creative act is a union between author and spectator, and the new concept that arises will be made “out of the womb of [individual] fantasy, out of the warp and weft of [...] associations” (33), wherein “the desired image is *not fixed or ready-made, but arises – is born*” (32).

Whilst Eisenstein talks of inferential interpretation, Susan Sontag’s essay ‘Against Interpretation’ (1964) exemplifies the value of ambiguity through a review of the movie *Last Year at Marienbad* (1961). The French film utilises montages and unexplained shifts in time and perspective, making it difficult to tell present from past, dream from reality, revelation from gaslighting. The film ends without resolution. Sontag states that the creators consciously made the movie “to accommodate a multiplicity of equally plausible interpretations”, and that the temptation to construe the movie in any particular way should be resisted, because what matters most is “the pure, untranslatable, sensuous immediacy of some of its images” (2001, 100).

5.2.8 (D)rifting

As well as the examples cited above, conceptual (d)rift was found in works that straddled disciplines or addressed the overlaps. For example, in the publication of an interview between architect Jean Nouvel and philosopher Jean Baudrillard, *The Singular Objects of Architecture* (2002), the introduction states “Although at its best, theory will stay close to the historicity of its material, [...] theoretical constructions also possess an uncanny capacity to cross over, drift, and expand across disciplines, however much authors, institutions and orthodoxies try to confine them” (ix).

Similarly, in the introduction of Singer and Walker’s *Bending Genres* (2013) regarding literature, they write, “Genres are rooted in convention. They are also shape-shifters, in a continual state of flux” (4). They note that hybridization in literature “infuses

wild energy into familiar forms. The hybrid is transgressive, polyvalent, queer [...] challenges categories and assumptions, exposing the underlying conventions of representation that often seem so ‘natural’ we hardly notice them at all” (4).

Publications which compile essays by various authors writing on a central theme are also versions of (d)rift. Buchanan and Lambert’s book *Deleuze and Space* (2005), for example, includes an essay by architect Hélène Frichot which adopts an ‘architect as pickpocket’ metaphor, making her “well-practised in the redistribution of concepts she has borrowed from outside her disciplinary terrain” (63). The same book includes geographers John Dewsbury and Nigel Thrift’s essay which utilises a spatial framework. They suggest “We are hemmed in” by three dominant approaches to space: Newtonian, relative, and relative to the transcendent (89). Tweak these slightly to ‘fixed’, ‘fluid’ and ‘(d)rifty’, and space re(dis)appears in your pockets.

Eileen Cornell Way’s *Knowledge Representation and Metaphor* (1991) was written to train computers for artificial intelligence. In her work she describes a rift between AI researchers in the mid-1980s as a division between the ‘neats’ and the ‘scruffies’ (82). The ‘neats’ were researchers who looked for logical, “elegant general principles that underlie all of human intelligence” whilst the ‘scruffies’ felt that intelligence was a mixture of many *ad hoc* approaches and diverse activities (82). Way suggests that, like (d)rift, *both* sides have merit.

The philosopher Gaston Bachelard discusses poetry in *The Poetics of Space* (1957), noting metaphor ‘opens up’ what meaning ‘encloses’ (1994, 222). In the “ambiguous space” created by metaphor, “the mind has lost its geometrical homeland and the spirit is drifting” (218). For Bachelard, like Sontag and Eliot, irresolution is important, “To verify images kills them, and it is always more enriching to *imagine* than to *experience*” (88).

Lastly, Sylvia Lavin’s *Kissing Architecture* (2011), discusses the importance of architecture ‘attracting’ and ‘reaching out’ to other disciplines. “A kiss is the coming together of two similar but not identical surfaces”, she writes, “a union of bedazzling convergence and identification during which separation is inconceivable yet inevitable” (5). A kiss, like a metaphor and conceptual (d)rift, draws you in and makes you pay close attention, converting everything else to a temporary blur.

5.3 CONCEPTUAL (D)RIFT AS CREATIVE CATALYST

Testing the application of Blumenberg's model of metaphorology to architectural analysis, Chapter 3 borrowed Blumenberg's 'slip-box-cards' as its underlying motif. Chapter 4, meanwhile, put a stamp on those cards to create 'postcards', suggesting meaning travels, accumulates, even potentially gets lost. To glimpse the suitability of conceptual (d)rift in architectural analysis, the experiment is repeated. However, to explore an entirely new approach, the inspiration for this chapter comes from Debord's *dérive* and its emphasis on visual montage. Images were selected for the previous five vignette themes intuitively and impulsively, randomly evolving to create five, not always architectural, montages. After the montages were made, brief texts were written to explain the 'logic' behind the choices. The montages were then stacked on top of each other as a record of the thought-path travelled. A final element was then overlayed: red lines (rather than Debord's swishing arrows), to join repeated motifs, or 'route-roots'.

Ambiguously angsty architecture




Figure 24 : (montage) : Ambiguously angsty architecture ⁴⁹

[After the fire at *Notre-Dame* a recurring design theme was the 'beacon of light'. At *Vivid* in Sydney a few years ago an Instagram-popular installation was the 'Cathedral of Light'... ignoring / celebrating Nazi Nuremberg. Picasso's painting of *Notre Dame* (1954) has party-lights for door arches and blurs the line between building-and-blue-

⁴⁹ Image sources [left to right]: Archilovers.com (2019), [NotreDameRedesign](#); Flickr.com (2016), [CathedralOfLight](#); Pablo-ruiz-picasso.net, [Notre-DamedeParis1954](#); Rarehistoricalphotos.com (1937), [TheCathedralOfLight](#); coophimmelblau.at (1980), [TheBlazingWing](#); & artmap.com (2017), [SplittingCuttingWritingDrawingEating](#)

clouds. Architectural firm Himmelb(l)au does the same when they build a portmanteau out of “*himmelblau*” (sky blue) and “*himmelbau*” (sky building). Their *Blazing Wing* installation (1980) – “architecture must burn!” – matches the profile of *Notre-Dame*’s evaporating roof and pre-empts the 2019 flames. Meanwhile, Gordon Matta-Clark’s constructive deconstruction (1975) creates a ‘rose window’ portal to see-anew.]

Miss-conceived




Figure 25 : (montage) : Miss-conceived⁵⁰

[Figurative language swept under the carpet, and a building façade which does the same. Blumenberg’s attempt to (re)reveal the power of anecdotes in slip-boxes (building blocks and boxing); a throwback to a dictator’s ‘give your secretary a belt’. Boxing gloves versus washing up gloves (radiating like a sunburst); Banksy’s battered wife ‘pushing back’. The cover story of early feminism (Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s *The Yellow Wallpaper* (1892)). A ‘women’s liberation march’ in 1971, from Jencks and Silver’s *Adhocism* (1972) where aprons and washing gloves are turned into a scarecrow... the shape suggests a crucifixion – violence directed at stereotypes – or accidentally redirected at self as feminism miss-conceived?]

⁵⁰ Image sources [left to right]: Esl.culips.com (2013), [ToSweepSomethingUnderTheRug](#); Peguin.com.au (2011), [TheYellowWall-Paper](#); Flickr.com (2010), [ModernGeometry](#); Indesginlive.com (2018), [ArchitecturalSurrealismMVRDV](#); Amazon.co.uk (2022), [CleaningGlove](#); Arch2o.com, [TransformABoringBoxIntoAnArchitecturalMasterpiece!](#); Istockphoto.com, [GreenBoxingGloves](#); Mixmag.net (2023), [BanksyValentinesDayMural](#); Ebay.com, [DictaphoneDictatingMachiness1965VintagePrintAd](#); Imbd.com (2018), [HansBlumenbergDerUunsichtbarePhilosoph](#); jhiblog.org (2020), [TheHansBlumenbergReader](#); & (Jencks & Silver 2013, 14).

Skirts off




Figure 26 : (montage) : Skirts off⁵¹

[Deliberately dis(re)orienting – right to left: Debord’s *Naked City*; Marshall McLuhan’s extended imagery in *The Medium is the Massage* (1967); children’s illustrator Oliver Jeffers’s map of Paris with its meandering – yet “one city: five hours” deliberate – red line through the city (which puts Picasso’s *Bull* and *Notre-Dame* within touching distance). All ‘spoilt’ by the stains of blood and wine.]

Ill-conceived




Figure 27: (montage) : Ill-conceived⁵²

⁵¹ Image sources [left to right]: creativemornings.com (2013), [OliverJeffers](#); MoMA.org, [PabloPicassoBullsHead1942](#); Pablo-ruiz-picasso.net: [Notre-DamedeParis1954](#); Flickr.com, [TheMediumIsTheMassage](#); Istockphoto.com, [DrippingBloodOrRedPaint](#); OnlyGFX.com, [WineStainSpill](#); Codutti (2018), & Neroeditions.com, [WelcomeToTheUltimateSituationistLibrary](#).

⁵² Image sources [left to right]; Goodreads.com, [TheMediumIsTheMassage](#); Northcountrypublicradio.org (2020), [VanGoghPaintingStolen](#); Flickr.com (2017), [DeconstructedSunflower](#); Dreamstime.com, [Illustrations](#); Quotefancy.com, [PhillipCMcGrawQuote](#); MoMA.org (1961), [Turnsole1961](#); Deviantart.com (2013),

[McLuhan remembered again, this time as a book cover, with its liberated ‘LOVE-hole’ (reminiscent of Noland’s *Turnsole* (1961)). Adam and Eve are likewise ‘in’ love, tempted by a snake at the front door of *Notre-Dame*; he gave a rib to make her. Ribs of the church and of a sunflower stem, turned into a spine, a building whose circulation becomes a backbone. Meanwhile, earless-visionary and sunflower-painter Van Gogh recalls men fall in love through their eyes not their ears, as a push-me-pull-you creature suggests love is an amusing challenge. Worst case scenario is an exquisite corpse; you reap what you sow. Le Corbusier’s *Medusa-Apollo* is the final combination of love-and-hate / snake-and-sunshine / feminine-masculinity. United yet somehow subverted. Ill-conceived. Incendiary.]

Dog & bull break-fast




Figure 28 : (montage) : Dog & bull break-fast⁵³

[GoldApple](#); Flickr.com (2006), [AdamAndEveNotreDame](#); TraffordDataLab (2017), Medium.com, [PushMePullYou](#); Wikipedia.org, [Vault](#); (2023), Nationalgalleries.org, [Cadavre exquis](#); MoMA.org (1920), [BackboneAndRibsOfASunflower1920](#); (Evans 2000, 287); Georgiatrust.org, [AtlantaMarriottMarquis](#); Artsy.net, [VincentVanGoghTheSower](#); & Quotefancy.com, [PauloCoelhoQuote](#).

⁵³ Image sources [left to right]: YouTube (2007), [‘TheScienceOfGhosts’](#); BYU.edu (2015), [DiscoveringDerrida](#); Slought.com (2014), [UnpackingDerrida'sLibrary](#); Rawpixel.com, [DriedFlowerImages](#); Quotesgram.com, [JacquesDerridaQuotes](#); Wikimedia.org, [JamesDeanRebelWithoutACause](#); Denzeen.com (2022), [MyLateFatherWasTheFirstToDeliverTheNewMovementToArchitecture](#); Flickr.com, [FloralSwimCapVintage](#); APAonline.org (2019), [TheInvisiblePhilosopherHansBlumenberg](#); Bajor *et al.* (2020), [jhiblog.org](#), [TheHansBlumenbergReader](#); Yesofcorsa.com (2017), [FlowersInTheMountains](#); & TMCgeedesign.com, [DriedFlowersPng](#).

[Farewell Copenhagen, farewell philosophers. Blumen-berg's name is German for 'flower-mountain' (Fleithman 2011, 68). How do you represent such a thing? Derrida writes that flowers can be physically dead and symbolically alive. So too Blumenberg and Derrida. Busy tables / busy minds. 'Jackie' named like a movie star, dressed like James Dean (JD), a DJ, a ghost. Invisible Blumenberg, so few photos available. Why does he look like he's wearing a woman's bathing cap? Can we laugh like they do in memes? What manner-rules should we apply when discussing famous philosophers? Bravado or bullshit... *Déjà Vu*... "Human history is a cosmically unnoticeable event" (Blumenberg 1997, 38).]

Conceptual (d)rift's route-roots




Figure 29 : (montage) : Conceptual (d)rift's route-roots

[Wide-eyed rose-flower widows: a new way of *seeing*.
Fingers of flames / gloves-on-gloves-off: a new way of *feeling*.
Spine, ribs and nipples make a 'chest': a new way of *containing* concepts.
Bloody-bullseye-boxing-belt: a new way of *interrogating* ideas.
Love and loathing / the paradox of sin: a new way of *experiencing* concepts *and* their consequences.]

5.4 THE LIMITS OF ARCHITECTURAL (D)RIFT

5.4.1 The Downdrafts of (D)rift

If the infinite potential of language's multivalency is recognised, any word can be substituted in (d)rift's place. Without the collocation of Lin's *Vietnam Veterans Memorial*, Lyotard's 'driftworks' might still have become 'spindrift'. Alternatively, Nowotny's prismatic 'splay' of poetic meaning might have morphed into a deconstructivist's '(dis)play'. Another phrase, such as 'scruffies', 'vagabond' or 'hallucination' would have potentially come to the fore, to create alternate neologisms that still capture the mercurial, disembodied nature of meaning.

Once you become aware of the cloud of connotations hovering over every word, it can become difficult to proceed with confidence. Does 'cloud' mean sky-vapour, occluded vision, or internet storage? Could *driftwork* prevent *playfulness*? Would *spindrift* sound too close to *spendthrift*, creating associations which exude wastefulness rather than the more nuanced creative generosity desired? Equally problematic is that "like it or not [...] there is a moral dimension built into [language]: you can't say *weed* without making a negative judgement about the botanical specimens you've just assigned to the weed category" (Atwood 2002, 109). You can't say 'weed' without percipient's minds drifting to other botanical categories altogether.

Similarly, once the hinged-door opens to accept variable interpretation, the paralogical becomes permissible. But is it polite? Ethical? 'Reasonable'? Where, and by whom, does the line get drawn? Within the realm of conceptual (d)rift, Markus and Cameron cannot complain about Norman Foster's building being referred to as an 'erotic gherkin' (2002, 107 / §C3.3), and no one should object to hearing the *Sydney Opera House* being compared to "turtles making love" or Eero Saarinen's *Trans World Airlines airport* being labelled "the pregnant oyster" (Böhme in Gerber 2013, 52 & Attie 1978, 79). In the 1960s and 70s the phrase 'rape of the planet' was used to make people aware that the damage caused by

mankind to Mother Earth was a violation. Fifty years later, scholars worry that using the word ‘rape’ out of context is its own violation, triggering trauma, and trivialising the lived experience of others (e.g. Fraser 2018). Who is wrong, and is there ever a situation when it is right to be wrong?

James Wilson-Qualye’s paper reviewing Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651) [§C2.1.5], states that “the gift of imagination is different from that of reason, for imagination constantly needs reining in” (1996, 29). “The virtue of judgment”, Wilson-Qualye goes on, “is its ability to take things apart; the virtue of fancy is its ability to put things together” (30). Conceptual (d)rift *does* run the risk of ‘getting away’ from itself, of being *too* fanciful. If, however, the process keeps oscillating between (de)constructing the (un)known and the (im)possible, encouraging movement over conclusions, and never taking itself too seriously, then it still has merit. Where, how, and to whom, however, remains thorny.

5.4.2 Architectural (D)rift

Applying conceptual (d)rift to architecture is a context-dependent activity. Being abstract and hypothetical works well during the design stages of an architectural project; ‘brainstorming’ is (d)rift. As the project progresses towards construction, however, solutions need to be ‘concretised’. Ignoring gravity is no longer practical or economical. In terms of architectural discourse, on the other hand, true north and site boundaries fade away, and conceptual effervescence can float free. Although, the barbed issue of ‘professional expectation’ remains.

Walter Benjamin’s *flâneurism* in *One Way Street* (1928), recognises that “To read what was never written”, is the most ancient form of appraisal, wherein meaning was derived “before all languages, from the entrails, the stars, or dances” (1979, 162-3). Moving forward in time, Vitruvius suggests that early humans “in a haphazard way [...] generated a common language” (2009, 37), which for Vitruvius, takes the form of shared speech and the adoption of architecture made “in imitation” of animal habitats (38). Similarly, William Lethaby’s *Architecture, Mysticism and Myth* (1891), suggests “Behind every style of architecture there is an earlier style, in which the germ of every form is to be found” (1974, 2). Meaning-forms are thus communally contained, and ‘contagiously’ carried forward, rift-drift-mutating through time and space. In Ayn Rand’s *The Fountainhead* (1943) the fictional proto-modernist architect Howard Roark rages against the arrangement (as does his name ‘roar-

ark'). Roark insults an image of the *Parthenon*, telling the Dean of Architecture, "Your Greeks took marble and they made copies of their wooden structures out of it, [...] Then your masters of the Renaissance came along and made copies in plaster of copies in marble of copies in wood. Now here we are, making copies in steel and concrete of copies in plaster of copies in marble of copies in wood" (2005, 11-12).

In a similar way to Blumenberg's reoccupations, architectural ideas and styles can be traced through time as reiterations (or reversals) of their predecessors. The path is not as simple as Roark's 'clones' or Blumenbergian 'stepping stones' [§C3.3], rather, it is more akin to the 'tangled roots-and-branches of a family tree' [§C4.3]. Charles Jenck's illustration of the organic arrangement [*Figure 30* nearby], reveals a (d)rifty ideological evolution. Jencks refers to his diagrams as "streams" and "composite rivers", with "agitated blobs [that] show the turbulence of mini-movements vying as fish in a river" (2015, 99).

Similarly, architectural metaphors can also be trawled through time, as "The general argument is that metaphors live at the conceptual core of architecture; but those metaphors are of many and varied kinds, which change and grow as you try to pin them down" (Unwin 2019, 3). Adrian Forty, for example, traces the metaphorical term 'circulation' in *Words and Buildings* (2000), noting its meaning shifted from relating to blood in 1628, to becoming an economist's term, then used to describe traffic movement, but not until 1857 did architect César Daly use it to reference building services (87-89). Using the term for the movement of people through buildings, apparently came later still.

One last view of architectural (d)rift, comes from the author Margret Atwood. In preparing a series of lectures on writing, she asked other novelists what it felt like to write. A significant number of replies were architecturally (d)rifty, "walking into a labyrinth, without knowing what monster might be inside [...] groping through a tunnel [...] being underwater [...] being in a completely dark room, feeling her way [...] wading through a deep river, at dawn or twilight [...] being in an empty room which was nevertheless filled with unspoken words, with a sort of whispering..." (2002, xxii-xxiii). Simon Unwin's explanation in *Metaphor* (2019), reflects this ephemeral and uncanny nature of creative writing; "The metaphors of architecture are protean ghosts haunting a many roomed labyrinth. They morph and fuse, subtly mutating perceptions; like distorting glass. When you look more closely you realise that the labyrinth of architectural ideology is ruled by those protean ghosts" (3). In

architecture, ideas, history, design and discourse, all whisper off the walls, rebounding, reverberating, echoing, until it becomes unclear where words end and walls begin.



Figure 30 : Charles Jenck's "Style Chart" (1969) ⁵⁴

5.4.3 (D)rift's Positives: (In)stability within (Un)certainty

The more time spent with metaphor, the more conceptual (d)rift feels like the *only* way to deal with the elusive object-subject. Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan writes that “metaphor is situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning” (2006, 423). Meanwhile, Peter Smith writes that “the mind searches for ‘stability patterns’ to act as constants within the shifting kaleidoscope of the sensory stimuli [...] to create significant patterns [...] that form stable constants, or stability zones within the landscape of uncertainty” (11).

Multiple writers caution against going too far in the analysis of metaphors. Punter writes that “talking about [a metaphor] threatens to unbalance the delicate poise that sustains

⁵⁴ Image source: misfitsarchitecture.com, [Jencks Style Chart](#)

the metaphor” (2007, 8), and that “A common error about metaphor is to suppose that it can be in some sense ‘unpacked’. When that unpacking takes place, what is left is rarely of any value; it seems a paltry and colourless thing when compared to the metaphor itself” (17). Similarly, philosophers Henri Lefebvre and Richard Rorty respectively suggest, “By pointing out and labelling the work of metaphor, logic effectively hinders its operation” (1991, 297), and “To ask ‘how metaphors work’ is like asking how genius works. If we knew that, genius would be superfluous” (1987, 296).

Rather than ‘digging too deep’ or ‘stop asking questions’, (d)rift attempts a provocation, but falls short of complete unbalancing or collapse. It aims for the “perceptual swerve” of Lavin’s *Kissing Architecture* (2011, 41), and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s reference to the old verb ‘*bricoler*’ which was “always used with reference to some extraneous movement: a ball rebounding, a dog straying or a horse swerving” (1966, 16). Put another way, Clandinin and Connelly’s *Narrative Inquiry* (2000) describes their research as taking place at the “blurred borders” of “borderland spaces”, where different traditions of inquiry come together, and tensions become apparent (in Clandinin 2007, 46). They call these “bumping places” (46). Meanwhile, Thaler and Sunstein’s *Nudge* (2009) explores the power of a prod. “Defaults are ubiquitous and powerful”, they write, “Flat plates say ‘push me’ and big handles say ‘pull me’” (84-5). Imagine, however, “the effect of a large, red, octagonal sign that said GO” (84). (Mis)metaphor’s value is the opportunity for course changes and side-tracking.

Swerving, rebounding, straying, blurring, bumping, nudging, push-pulling, going-stop, sidetracking. Add to that Atwood and Unwin’s verbs from above – groping, wading, whispering, morphing, fusing, mutating, distorting – and conceptual (d)rift starts to take shape in a nudgy-smudgy ‘scruffie’ way. Any path it attempts to create also acknowledges the over-, under-, by-passes that exist around it.

Two final references slide into the frame just before the finish line. The first is from the literary critic Northrop Frye when he states, “Whenever we read anything, we find our attention moving in two directions at once. One direction is outward or *centrifugal*, in which we keep going outside our reading, from the individual words to the things they mean [...]. The other direction is inward or *centripetal*, in which we try to develop from the words a sense of the larger verbal pattern they make” (2015, 73). Like Barthes’s blissful, bobbing cork influenced by the up-down of imaginary waves, reading is equally influenced by the

inward-outward forces of attentiveness. Conceptual (d)rift has the potential not only to follow the influence of this multi-directionality, but also harness the force behind it, becoming waterwheel and windmill both.

Lastly, Hassan's book of essays, *In Quest of Nothing* (2010), picked up by accident at the library, is filled with phrases that read like mini-mantras for (d)rift, a reminder that inspiration is everywhere:

"All things move or travel, rocks, atoms, stars..." (19).

"...I know that human beings live by contraries" (30).

"We all float, in various ways, in the same alphabet soup, the same plasma of signs and algorithms" (81).

"In the past, I resort to a neologism, 'Indetermanence,' to interpret postmodernism. I meant to designate two decisive antithetical, but not dialectical, tendencies: indeterminacy and immanence" (131).

"Can postcolonial studies qualify, discriminate, contextualise the idea of universals, give it texture and nuance, instead of rejecting it outright?" (71).

5.4.4 Segue

Conceptual (d)rift, like indetermanence, *différance*, (con)fusion, *pharmakon*, and *chora*, collocates and conflates in various degrees, revealing and concealing. It adopts the same paradoxical and multivalent characteristics of metaphor itself, turning meaning into something which is constantly renegotiated, indefinite and shifting, fluid and overflowing, akin to the flash of a fish, a boat on choppy seas or a leaf on the breeze.

'Rift' implies a battle of wills, not just taking a stand but forcing your point, establishing authority at someone else's expense, conducting contentious debates that go down to the microscopic detail and adopting a winner-takes-all attitude. Rift is signified by Janus, two views, never the twain shall meet. It is made of iron and steel, a hammer and anvil. 'Drift', on the other hand, suggests a 'catch and release' approach to thinking, even relinquishing societal norms and obligations. It implies a more telescopic outlook that is not so much conciliatory as unconcerned. Taken in too large a dose, drift turns daydreamers into sleepwalkers, escapism into absconding, risking something selfish and desperate in its own way. Perpetual drift makes drifters, homeless and insecure. '(D)rift', meanwhile, is a suspension of ego, it holds opinions, but humbly and with an open mind. It agrees to

disagree. Being passionate is commended, but so too is acknowledging that you changed your mind. It is the safety of a snug room with a window that faces the horizon. It is the oscillation-vacillation along a spectrum that includes, but is never limited by, the atomic and the cosmic, the deterministic and indeterminate, the articulated and the inarticulate, logic and intuition. (D)rift is compromise – without the negative connotations. (D)rift is w(a|o)ndering, quasi-quasi, so-so...

The remainder of this dissertation applies the three models of metaphorology, (mis)metaphorology and conceptual (d)rift to three architectural case studies, reflecting the models' individual styles and quirks through variable writing styles and formatting decisions. It recognises that architectural analysis traditionally occurs within a western frame of dialectics, whilst suggesting that you need not definitively choose between opposing ideas. The following chapters advocate thinking which is neither black or white but brindled. More than anything, the dissertation now attempts to turn words and concepts into the organised chaos of a murmuration.

* * * * *

PART THREE: CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY 1 – THE TRIBUNE COLUMN, ADOLF LOOS, CHICAGO (1922)

“Seen variously as a joke, a caustic critique, and a sophisticated essay rich in metaphorical allusions, Loos’s column has triggered wide-ranging interpretations” (Solomonson 2003, 118).

In 1922 the owners of the *Chicago Tribune* held an international competition to design the newspaper’s future administrative headquarters. Intended to mark the newspaper’s seventy-fifth birthday, the event challenged architects to submit designs for “the world’s most beautiful office building” and offered \$100,000 in prize money (The Chicago Tribune 1980, 3-6). The competition received 264 anonymous designs (4) and was won by Americans John Mead Howells and Raymond Hood for their neo-gothic design [**Figure 31a** below]. The Howells and Hood design was topped with a “burst of flying buttresses” (Solomonson in Murphy & Reilly 2017, 118), which suggested the “metaphysical striving towards the beyond” embodied by the cathedrals of the Middle Ages (Murphy & Reilly 2017, 19). Le Corbusier’s book *Quand les Cathedrales etaient Blanches* (1947), [*When the Cathedrals were White* (1964)], later inverts the gothic metaphor, referring to cathedrals as “the skyscrapers of God”, where height equals success; “They had made them as high as possible, [...as] an act of optimism, a gesture of courage, a sign of pride, a proof of mastery!” (1964, 4). Later still, Rem Koolhaas noted that one of the first American high-rises, the gothically decorated *Woolworths Building* (1913), was considered a “cathedral of commerce”, and as such, optimistic height received a capitalist-spin (1994, 99).

European architect Adolf Loos (1870-1933) also submitted a design for the competition, titled ‘The Chicago Tribune Column’ [**Figure 31b** below]. Whilst the submission apparently arrived too late to be assessed by the jury, it nonetheless “became one of the competition’s best-known and most ambiguous entries” (Solomonson 2003, 122 & 118). The black granite-clad design combined an eleven-storey podium with a twenty-one storey doric column above containing offices (Rykwert 1996, 19). Robin Evans suggests that whilst both gothic and classical typologies were anti-gravitational, gothic architecture was stereotypically disconcertingly vertiginous, (“an audacity bordering on foolhardiness” (210)), whereas classical structures were reassuringly stable; the “embodiment of rational order” (212).

Loos's metaphoricity utilises a potential ur-metaphor of column-as-man, dating back, at least, to Vitruvius who equated the doric column with "the proportions, strength and grace of the male body" (2009, 91 [§Book IV, Chapter I]). As noted in Chapter 3, a standing stone (or freestanding column) represented human "dominance" over the surrounding territory (Unwin 2019, 9) [*Figure 31c* below].

Whilst Simon Unwin acknowledged Vitruvius's gendered-columns associated the doric order with "'male' attributes of strength and straightforwardness" (38), Loos's *Column* is anything but straightforward. Analytically, it has been treated as a serious submission *and* a joke; a "solemn and grandiose folly" (Rykwert 1996, 19). "Celebrated as much as criticised", writes academic Panayotis Tournikiotis, Loos's design "continues to receive mixed reviews", and has been equally considered "an insignificant, absurd, and deceptive project, undignified to mention" and "a fundamental and revolutionary project of incontestable and inexhaustible richness" (1994, 152 & 155).

As the first of three case studies, this chapter analyses Loos's *Column* through the application of Blumenberg's metaphorology [§C3], spinning the multifaceted column this way that to see how meaning might splay. It begins by investigating the reoccupations of the design through the lens of three historiographies: a serious design highlighting absolutism and naked truth, implying it is a pioneer of modernism; a facetious design akin to dadaism; and a 'seriously-funny' *fin de siècle* project which combines and juxtaposes the two prior approaches, making it potentially proto-postmodernist. A fourth reading is also included. It resists any singular interpretation and celebrates the *Column* as Loos's "most glaringly recognisable and yet also most enigmatic project [...] the signature piece that is anything but typical" (Mascheck 2013, 148). This fourth reading embraces (mis)metaphorical amorphism and, by untethering the design from the previous three traditional labels, it encourages the *Column* to speak for itself via conceptual (d)rift.




Figure 31 : Howell & Hood's "Chicago Tower" (1922) / Adolf Loos's "Column" / A stone as metaphor of presence ⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Image sources: (Tribune 1980, 48); Sammlunge.online.albertina.at, [TribuneTower](#); (Unwin 2019, 9)

6.1 LOOS AS 'PIONEER OF MODERNISM'

6.1.1 Serious Architecture Shaped by a Shovel

Loos wrote multiple lectures and journal articles throughout his life, but two remain the most oft-referenced as indicative of his ideology; '*Ornament und Verbrechen*' (1910⁵⁶, 'Ornament and Crime') and '*Architektur*' (1910, 'Architecture'). From the latter, his reference to a grave is translated in a variety of ways, but it is the alliterated version within architect Aldo Rossi's *The Architecture of the City* (1966) which is especially evocative, "If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide in the forest, formed into a pyramid, shaped by a shovel, we become serious and something in us says, 'someone lies buried here.' *That is architecture*" (1984, 107). When Loos's mega-column is viewed in this light, there is a similar rudimentary absolutism, a typological abstraction which is reductive *and* reifying, portentously reversing the grave; 'someone important stands here'. Loos appears aware of his crude manoeuvring when he unites the opposite axes into a single, sexual, symbol in 'Ornament'; "The first ornament that came into being, the cross, had an erotic origin. [...] A horizontal line: the reclining woman. A vertical line: the man who penetrates her" (2002, 29). Put simplistically, Loos's *Column* is a vertical and virile 'man'.

Several authors state that Loos's *Column* was earnestly intended. Author Wessel Krul writes, "It is certain that [Loos] was not thinking of his project as a joke or a passing fancy. He was convinced of the importance of his design, not only for the present but also as a model for the future" (2011, 133). Joseph Rykwert's *Dancing Column* (1996) agrees and extends the 'seriousness' from scheme to scholarship, noting that anyone "seriously interested in Loos" would not bypass the project as a "prank" (19). In the brochure Loos wrote to explain his competition submission, he states the building would automatically become a symbol of Chicago, as the leaning tower represents Pisa, and that by avoiding 'untraditional' forms, his design would not go out of style as quickly as dress fashions (in Münz & Künstler 1966, 193-4).

If Loos believed his design was aligned with modernity, several metaphorical connotations can be envisioned in which the 'great column' alluded to serious architecture beyond the ur-metaphor of primitive archetypes and the emblematic 'I am here' totem-pole-column. These include; Imperial triumphalism merged with capitalist up-reach; Spartan

⁵⁶ Loos gave different versions of the lecture across Europe between 1908-1910, however, 1910 appears to be the favoured attribution (Long 2009, 204 & Krul 2011, 124).

masculinity and the naked truth; and Loos's notion that "only a small part of architecture belongs to art: the monument and the tomb" (Loos 1985, 108), all explored below.

6.1.2 Imperial Triumphalism and Capitalist Up-reach

Rossi uses Loos's burial mound as a form of "extremely intense and pure architecture" because its origin and function are readily identifiable and universally acknowledged (1984, 107). Professor K. Michael Hays's article 'Architecture's Appearance and The Practices of Imagination' (2016) uses the shovel-shaped aphorism differently, recognising the mound as an 'empirical object' but suggesting architecture is not 'representation' but 'emanation', and the mound is not merely a 'physical burial' but a 'conceptualisation of ritual', a demonstration of the need for memorialisation. "Through its interaction with the symbolic", writes Hays, "the imagination gains the power to both register and overcome the limits of experience" (205-6). Loos's friend, Austrian architect Paul Englemann, stated that Loos believed that 'modern' forms of architecture need not be 'pursued' because they would "emerge *spontaneously*", with the building's use "*manifest* in it" (1967, 127). Englemann quotes Loos as saying, "New forms? How dull! It is the new spirit that matters" (128).

In Loos's 'Architecture' essay, the sentence following '*That is architecture*', is "Our culture is based on the knowledge of the all-surpassing grandeur of classical antiquity" (1985, 108). Loos's *Column* brochure cites this classical influence, noting that Napoleon's memorialising victory column at Place Vendôme in Paris (1810) relies on the classical tradition of the Emperor Trajan's detached column in Rome (c. 107-113AD) (in Münz & Künstler 1966, 194). Krul also highlights the classical column's 'universal' connotation of the power and stability of the ruling political order, and transfers the symbolism to the American context, suggesting "the Doric column came to represent republican virtues such as simplicity, honesty, strength, determination and will-power" (2011, 135-7). As such, Krul sees the design as "above all a sign of respect for the United States" (134), its energy and democratic social cohesion (137).

Loos's isolated and gigantic *Column* is, as Rykwert notes, an "aggressive homage" to classicism (1996, 19); "a *monstrum*: 'monster', but also 'exemplar'" (24). Historian Joseph Masheck agrees, and notes the 'hyper-colossal order', as evidenced by the 1893 World's Colombian Exposition (or Chicago World Fair, which Loos attended), was "exemplary of the American passion for having the biggest of whatever it is as more important than

authenticity” (2013, 158). For Masheck, Loos was perhaps, “sending the natives a calculated caricature of *just what they like*” (161). Similarly, historian Susan Buck-Morrs suggests the ‘bigger is better’ “Elephantism”, or “megalomania”, of monumental proportions became aligned with imperialist expansion and capitalist growth (1997, 92). Hence, Loos’s *Column* could be seen to juxtapose antiquity and modernity, imperial control and the modern metropolis’s mass media (Stewart 2000, 60).

Krul’s article goes a step further, inferring that Loos not only recognised the referent-relationship, he also wanted humans to be “like a classical column themselves, strong, self-restrained, severe, solid, and looking down with a mild and universal sympathy on everything going on around them” (2011, 139). This pivot from up-reach to looking down on others reiterates the arrogance of triumphalism, whilst the allusion to severe self-restraint shifts the metaphoricity towards spartanism.

6.1.3 Naked Truth and Spartan Masculinity

Vitruvius’s *On Architecture* (c. 27BC) describes the doric order as appearing “naked, undecorated and virile” (2009, 92 / §BIV,C1). Vitruvius says that the order was derived from the imitation of timber buildings, and as such, is imbued with “the force of truth” (97-8 / §BIV,C2). The order was said to have originated in the warrior nation of Sparta and was initially used for temples dedicated to Mars and Hercules (Krul 2011, 135). By the Renaissance, the order became associated with restraint and self-possession (130) and was considered most suited to buildings with serious functions, such as arsenals, prisons, tombs and funerary monuments (136-7). Rykwert elevates the order, aligning it with “the Olympic realm” (1996, 249), thereby lending Loos’s *Column* an aura of super-human authority.

Loos’s articles often referenced a similar desire for what Krul refers to as “radical abstinence” (2011, 125). For example, Loos writes in ‘Ornament’ that “lack of ornament is a sign of intellectual power” (Loos 2002, 36). Elsewhere, in ‘The Principle of Cladding’ (1898), Loos writes that he invented a ‘law’ in which materials should express themselves or be fundamentally altered, but they must not imitate another form of cladding. Timber sheeting, for example, may be painted any colour “except one – the colour of wood”, and underwear might be dyed any colour other than skin-colour (Loos 1982, 67-68). In other words, cladding “ought not to aspire” to be anything other than what it is (68). As such,

‘Loos’s law’ ignores the doric order’s mimetic origins whilst still enforcing an ‘is what it is’ aspect of ‘naked truth’.

The restrained approach is also evident in Loos’s built designs. For example, his shop and apartment complex for Goldman and Salatsch on the Michaelerplatz (1912), now generally referred to as *Looshaus* [**Figure 32a** nearby], has an upper level of private apartments with whitewashed walls, ‘stripped and silent’ (Frampton 2002, 216). “The ‘naked’ upper part of the exterior was deemed an unacceptable modernist extravaganza” which “soon became known as ‘the house without eyelids’” (Krul 2011, 130 & 125). The metaphorical name suggests a warrior’s pose as the upper level ‘looks down’, unblinkingly, on the street below, generating an unflinching game of chicken between architecture and audience.

There was, however, a darker trait to this metaphoricity. In opening his paper, ‘Adolf Loos and the Doric Order’ (2011), Krul recognises a downside to aestheticism; “aggressive dominance” and a ‘will to power’ (123). As Krul notes, Loos could not escape his *Column* becoming an “enormous phallic object” implying Loos’s desire to exhibit his own strength and sexual potency whilst reiterating cleanliness and purity, which Krul attributes to Loos contracting syphilis as a young man (133). Self-exposure aside, modernity for Loos was, as architectural historian Beatrice Colomina writes, “emphatically male [...] energetic, cool and detached” (2010, 73); in other words, a freestanding doric column. As such, Loos and his *Column* can be conflated, “Loos’s vehemence glowers menacingly, like the column itself. Adopting the imposture of a grandiloquent oracle” (Lahuerta in Colomina & Parcerisa 2017, 265).

6.1.4 The Architectural Art of the Monument and the Tomb

“Only a small part of architecture belongs to art: the monument and the tomb”, writes Loos in ‘Architecture’, all other functional designs are to be excluded (1985, 108). Masheck refers to Loos’s design as “a *guaranteed* monument” (2013, 148), but the *Column* is potentially doubly-artistic given that it carries not only the obvious genetics of the triumphal monument, but also the DNA of the tomb. As writers, including Masheck and Rykwert, point out, the plinth of Loos’s *Column* is reminiscent of Loos’s 1921 design for Czech-Viennese art historian Max Dvořák’s mausoleum [**Figures 32b & c** nearby]. Moreover, as architect Juan José Lahuerta recognises, the pedestal of Trajan’s Column included a sepulchral chamber

which contained Trajan's ashes in an urn (269), reinforcing the synthesis of the architectural tropes of monument and tomb.

When combined with the choice of black granite as the primary building material, Loos's *Column* becomes a solemn version of funerary art-architecture. "Architecture arouses moods in people", wrote Loos in 'Architecture', "so the task of the architect is to give these moods concrete expression [...] For the Chinese, white is the colour of mourning, for us black".⁵⁷ What, however, was Loos attempting to 'mourn' in Chicago? Not classicism, imperialism or masculinity, all represented by the doric monument, and admired by Loos. If we return to Hays's essay above, we are reminded that a 'burial' can be less about 'laying down' and more to do with 'lifting up', a means of giving imagination power. For an image to take on 'iconic' clarity, minimal effort should be required to uncover meaning, and "a simplified story must be told, [...] the complex logic of an architectural project must be reduced" (Ivanišin in Mateo 2000, 13). Loos's 'simple' design creates a stable platform for Loos to rest his case on.

6.1.5 Monumental Anthills

In a similar way that 'Ornament' is regarded as "one of the founding texts, even a manifesto, of incipient modernism" (Krul 2011, 124) and his *Column* is "an icon of modernist architecture" (131), Loos's wider portfolio saw him nominated as "one of the few real pioneers of modern architecture" (Münz & Künstler 1966, 33). Loos's notions of autonomy, austerity, purity, naked truth and 'calling a spade a spade' are all clear precursors to modernism. When read in unison with architect Louis Sullivan's (1856-1924) article 'The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered' (1896), Loos's *Column* is clearly "every inch a proud and soaring thing" offering "the glory and pride of exaltation" (406), as well as a literal representation of the "true prototype" of tall buildings, being classically tripartite (406).

On the other hand, Sullivan advocated his own 'law'; "*form ever follows function*" (408), and in this respect Loos's *Column* is less convincingly modern. Writers, including historian Kenneth Frampton, worry that the column's hollowness undermines the iconicity (in Schezen 2009, 20). The column becomes metaphorically 'white-anted' as Lahuerta implies because it is "riddled like an anthill" with plumbing, elevators and offices (in Colomina 2017,

⁵⁷ Loos (2014), thecharnelhouse.org: SomeoneIsBuriedHere

264). Moreover, the entrance of Loos's *Column* design includes two small doric columns holding up a wide lintel with a horizontal niche above, upon which only Lahuerta appears to have noticed the traditional motif of "two colossal figures shrunk in order to support, like atlantes, the weight of the building on their backs" (267). This bent-backed historicism breaches the promoted image of Loos's proud modernism, and acts as a reminder that Loos's *Column* might 'splay' meaning in a multifaceted, many-storied, way.




Figure 32 : Adolf Loos's "Goldman & Salatsch" (1910) / Loos's "Mausoleum " (1921) / Detail of "Column" (1922)⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Image sources: Wikimedia.org, [Eichmann2013](#); and Sammlungenonline.albertina.at, sammlungenonline.albertina.at/recordALA2184

6.2 LOOS AS 'DADAIST'

6.2.1 Why so funny?

Decades before Rykwert published *Dancing Column* (1996) which reinforced the seriousness of Loos's design, Rykwert wrote an article which referenced the *Column* as a "crass", "naughty extravaganza", also noting that, "To Loos [...] the project seemed wholly serious" (1973, n.p.). The word 'seemed' evidences the uncertainty underlying Loos's intentions. Could Loosian aesthetics be made of "particularly concrete satirical transpositions" as scholar Gilbert Carr suggests (2007, 66)? Could Loos have intentionally subverted the serious metaphorical models mentioned above, and converted them into jokes?

In 2017, the New York architectural firm *MOS* submitted a 'very late entry' for the 2017 *Chicago Biennale* titled "*& Another (Chicago Tribune Tower)*". On the firm's website they include the design statement, "Whatever this is, it is on the verge of nothing-in-particular. [...] Maybe it is a knowing wink and nod toward quote-unquote history. Maybe not. It couldn't care less or more".⁵⁹ On a separate architectural website their 'knowing wink' is clarified as the "joke" submission made by Loos.⁶⁰ But in what way was Loos's submission a joke, and how can *MOS* be so sure?

Over and over, writers use the word 'ironic' to describe Loos's design: "Loos ironically posited a relic, an icon of representation: the column" (Mäkelä 1991, 140); or "[Loos] provides us with one of the most ironic illustrations of the dialectic of antiquity and modernity" (Stewart 2000, 56); whilst Masheck references Loos's "notorious proposal" as "wilfully preposterous" and "ironically outrageous, classicism" (2013, 150). Again, was this irony Loos's intention or only in the readers' perception?

Without doubt, Loos's serious absolutism is instantly undermined by the monument's 'hollowness', but also due to the "eccentric choice" of black granite which Frampton calls a "giant parody" and "outlandish exploitation" of tradition (2002, 216-7). This blackness is at odds with "the quintessentially romantic-classical *cliché* of Greek marmoreal whiteness" (Masheck 2013, 161). The disquiet gets louder when Loos's neo-classical proposal is coupled with essays published in 'Spoken into the Void' (1982). For example, in 'Underclothes' (1898) Loos writes, "A costume is clothing that has frozen in a particular form; it will develop no further. It is [...] the symbol of resignation" (71), or when in

⁵⁹ MOS.nyc: [another-chicago-tribune-tower](https://mos.nyc.org/another-chicago-tribune-tower)

⁶⁰ Stoughton (2017), Archpaper.com: [mos-glass-block-chicago-biennial](https://archpaper.com/mos-glass-block-chicago-biennial)

‘Building Materials’ (1898) Loos suggests that things that take a long time to prepare deserve more respect than easy, predictable outcomes (63).

Was Loos’s *Column* a counter-action to modernity, akin to dadaism? This section investigates the potential that Loos’s submission was a form of subversive humour.

6.2.2 Word Play and Puns

Katherine Solomonson’s book on the history of the *Chicago Tribune Tower* notes that Loos’s design can be seen as “playfully” alluding to metaphorical language in several ways at once: the *Tribune* newspaper being considered ‘a pillar of society’; a pun for the newspaper’s printed columns; a reference to the column-metaphor which describes a skyscraper’s tripartite elevation; and that Loos might also be taking “a critical stand” against America’s reliance on that columnar design approach (2003, 118). Krul agrees, suggesting the design is rightly referred to as a verbal pun, “After all, a newspaper is printed in columns, so why not use a column as a symbol of everything the *Chicago Tribune* stood for?” (2011, 131). A publication accompanying a Loosian exhibition in Britain adds another pun, noting that “the word ‘tribune’ was to be embodied by a figure at the top of the capital: a Roman tribune, said to represent the newspaper’s owner” (Loos 1985, 60). This publication also introduces the potential for irony, “the design involves a column which carries no load” (60).

The fact that Loos’s drawing is labelled ‘The Chicago Tribune Column’, not ‘Tower’ as per the competition’s title, indicates Loos was aware he was submitting a journalistic-architectural pun. Writers, such as ‘serious’ Rykwert, however, suggest that wordplay is “an arbitrary justification” for the design’s motivation and “too weak for this eccentric and powerful project” (1996, 23). However, wordplay does not have to be reduced to ‘mere’ puns. “Surprise is common to good metaphors and good jokes”, writes Professor Jan Zwicky, “both turn on suddenly seeing connections between language-games that appear distant from one another”, and those language-games can pull meaning into focus more profoundly (2003, 45). Paul Kidder’s chapter ‘The Play of Art and the Art of Architecture’, in his book *Gadamer for Architects* (2012), notes that the German term ‘*spiel*’ in art philosophy “cannot be captured in one English equivalent”, simultaneously meaning ‘child’s play’, ‘theatre play’ and ‘game play’ (17). Kidder writes that ‘cognitive play’ looks for associations in a free-flowing, yet directionally motivated, manner (17). Loos’s wordplay, therefore, might be a

‘game’ but not one that is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘weak’ as Rykwert worries. Instead, it could be driven by a theatrical gesture to encourage people to see ‘sky-scrapers’ in a new way.

6.2.3 Universally Acknowledged Social Satire

Australian Ruth Wilson published a memoir in which she discusses the first time she read the opening sentence of Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice* (1813); “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife” (Austen 2015, 5). Wilson was instantly dubious; “Even at the age of fifteen I knew that could not possibly be true, let alone universally acknowledged” (Wilson 2022, 30). Wilson then goes on, “Is saying what you mean, I wondered, the same as meaning what you say?” (30). Roland Barthes’s short essay ‘The Kitchen of Meaning’ (1964) notes, “with regard to a written text, we are constantly given a second message to read between the lines of the first” (1994, 157). It is not difficult to imagine a ‘second message’ behind the apparent absolutism, universally acknowledged or otherwise, of Loos’s *Column* which laughs at an architectural status quo.

Carr writes that Austrian satire “thrived” on what he calls a “metaphorical texture” which created interpretations that went beyond single readings of reality, citing as an example, the “caustic satire” of Loos’s friend, writer Karl Kraus (2007, 79 & 65). It could be said that Loos’s column-pun involves dualistic homophones, but results in a ‘mono-reading’, whereas social satire is more nuanced and generates room for varied cultural critiques.

Academic Christopher Long’s essay regarding ‘Ornament’ describes Loos’s polemics as “caustic, yet entertaining” vignettes akin to Viennese cabaret; “some of his comments were intended to be funny – even while making a serious point” (2009, 207). Masheck, meanwhile, states that Loos was aware of writers such as architectural critic Montgomery Schuyler’s recommendation that tower designs should have a tripartite form, and that Loos’s response was an acceptance, but with an “edge” – “something of a dare, with some anxiety” (2013, 163 & 157). Masheck goes on to say that Loos’s design was “a facetious response” aimed at “American philistines who think that architecture is the dolling up of otherwise everyday buildings with the plutocratic grandiloquence of the classical orders” (153). Instead of employing the conventional simile ‘a skyscraper is *like* a column’, Loos converted it into an uncompromising metaphor; ‘a skyscraper *is* a column’.

6.2.4 Dadaism: Readymade Toilet Humour

It is also possible that Loos's *Column* shares the same 'toilet humour' as Loos's contemporary and dada artist Marcel Duchamp and his *Fontaine* (1917). Duchamp 'repurposed' his own form of antiquity when he placed a moustache on a postcard of the *Mona Lisa*, thereby converting a 'readymade object' into 'art'. Duchamp's "seemingly adolescent prank" combines his "gleeful sense of wit" with a more serious rebellion against traditional beauty norms and mass-produced objects.⁶¹ Loos's *Column* could easily be seen as similarly dada, an archetypical element presented with a theatrical 'voilà!'

Before Loos built architecture, he wrote about it for papers and magazines including his own, *Das Andere [The Other]*. He had entered "the scene" of European avantgardes acting as "a cultural agitator and activist of modernity" whilst "securing his own place among them" (ARQ 2017, 46). As plausible as a dada-column is, however, it risks reducing the design to a 'punny prank' with another mono-reading, unless it reiterates the dilemma of 'is it ironic?'

6.2.5 The Irony of Irony

Masheck cautions against reading Loos's project as dadaism. He notes that Duchamp's readymade witticisms are "inexhaustibly ironic yet logically respectable" *only* within 'the game of art' (2013, 169). Whilst acknowledging Loos's design *might* be a "spoof", Masheck believes Loos would have anticipated the "inevitably problematic reception" a joke would have with the commercial owners (169). "It would be impossible", writes Masheck, "to maintain that the Chicago Tribune Tower was *without* irony", however, it also must be acknowledged that "something architecturally serious is at stake" (169). In other words, the design was unlikely to be for entertainment alone.

"Irony is not comedy", writes Paul de Man in his essay 'The Concept of Irony' (1977), "It is disruption, disillusion" (1966, 182). De Man refers to Northrop Frye, whose *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957) defines irony as "a technique of saying as little and meaning as much as possible", or "a pattern of words that turns away from direct statement or its own obvious meaning" (Frye 2015, 40). De Man agrees, noting that irony involves a "deviation"

⁶¹ Nortonsimon.org: [L.H.O.O.Q. LaJoconde](https://nortonsimon.org/L.H.O.O.Q.-LaJoconde)

between literal and figurative meaning, and as such, irony is like metaphor, except that irony tends towards “a more radical negation” of meaning via a performative function; “Irony consoles and it promises and it excuses” (De Man 1966, 165). Ironic free-play, De Man suggests, “allows one to say dreadful things [from] a playful aesthetic distance” (169), but later acknowledges, “Words have a way of saying things which are not at all what you want them to say” (181).

By extension, it can be difficult to confirm when irony is in play. Duchamp’s original *Fontaine*, for example, went missing after it was rejected for display in a 1917 art exhibition, and as such, the icon of dada *ready-mades* currently on display is actually a *replica*, re-signed and back-dated by Duchamp in 1964.⁶² This strange icon-irony is separate to any original irony intended. Another example is Koolhaas’s *Delirious in New York* (1994) reference to Raymond Hood (one of the winning designers of the *Chicago Tribune* competition). Koolhaas writes that Hood was so devout a Baptist that his friends had to get him drunk before he would go inside *Notre-Dame Cathedral* (162). Although neither Hood or Koolhaas were trying to be ironic, in the context of this cathedral-inspired dissertation, it feels especially ironic that Hood would foist “sacralising metaphors” onto Chicago (Solomonson in Murphy 2017, 118), whilst shunning their origin story. Lastly, Frampton writes that the most ironic aspect of Loos’s *Column* was “the preposterous scaled and the all-too-evident bonding of the stonework” (in Schezen 2009, 20). As Masheck notes, however, masonry is supposed to be load-bearing so “couldn’t it be a nice double-irony that the masonry ‘column’ actually held itself up?” (2013, 168). Irony, is ultimately in the ear-eye of the beholder.

6.2.6 Ha-Ha Versus Ah-Ha

An article referring to the 2017 *Chicago Biennale* called Loos’s design a “tongue-in-cheek proposal”, which “went on to inspire Postmodernist architects with its readymade look and its playful engagement with language” (Shaw 2017, n.p.). As such, the article replaces subtle distinctions of intentionality with a blanket ‘cheeky’ humour. Riffing off Loos’s ‘joke’ goes back at least to 1980. In the ‘Late Entries’ event organised by Chicago architect Stanley Tigerman, two designs specifically reference Loos’s submission. The first proposal, by ‘Anonymous, from Japan’, is titled *The Bridegroom Packed Innocent by his Spinsters, Even* [*Figure 33a* nearby] which tweaks the title of Duchamp’s window-sculpture; *The Bride*

⁶² Tate.org.uk: [FountainMarcelDuchampReplica1964](https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-marcel-replica-1964)

Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even (1923) and sheathes Loos's phallic symbol in a condom. The design is also a meta-metaphor for 'sky-scraper' as its 'finger' literally tickles the sky. Similarly, Spanish architect Susana Torre's version [**Figure 33b** nearby], also relies on a metaphorical emasculation. This time the monumental-phallus appears removed altogether, and only an empty podium-tomb is left. On closer inspection, the column is noticed, minimised and placed on the edge, demoted and deprioritised. Intended as a 'mischievous' play on words, Torre turned Loos's design into "a tail (*penis*, in Latin)", a criticism against the exhibition hosts for staging the event at a time when newspapers were 'downsizing'.⁶³

Whether 'funny-ha-ha' or 'funny-ah-ha' humour underlies Loos's design remains oblique. Solomonson suggests Loos's design is simultaneously taking a stand against the American city whilst being playful, dada, ironic, and "utterly empty of meaning" (2003,188). It could, however, be more again; satire, spoof, prank, joke, parody, sarcasm, irony or double-irony. Everyone must decide for themselves if the *Column* is a "stroke of practically surreal genius", a "metaphor pushed to collapse into a mere pun", or if with Loos "the 'last laugh' is not a laugh" at all (Masheck 2013, 161, 166 & 168).




Figure 33 : Anonymous Japan's "The Bridegroom" (1980) / Susana Torre "Late Entry" (1980)⁶⁴

⁶³ SusanaTorre.net: ChicagoTribune

⁶⁴ Image sources: (Tribune 1980, 87); and SusanaTorre.net, ChicagoTribuneCompetitionLateEntries

6.3 LOOS AS 'PROTO-POSTMODERNIST'

6.3.1 *Fin de siècle* styled half-and-half

A third way to read Loos's *Column* is to assume it is neither specifically serious nor humorous, rather a (sub)conscious combination of both approaches. As a resident of the *fin de siècle*, Loos existed in two centuries and would have experienced society's paradoxical "simultaneous affirmation and rejection" of technology and progress (Stewart 2000, 55). Loos's texts, as Janet Stewart writes in *Fashioning Vienna* (2000), "articulate the experience of being torn" between "modernism and traditionalism, change and stability, [...] heterogeneity and homogeneity, display and disguise, destruction and reconstruction" (178). Long recognises that 'Ornament and Crime' was "at once a critique of the recent past *and* a glance into the modernist future" (2009, 218 – italics added), its avant-gardism still necessarily "rooted" in the prevailing conditions of the nineteenth-century Vienna (211). It is unsurprising then, that Masheck considers Loos's *Column* a conservative "touchstone of tradition", plus a "wildly overscaled" "oddball" design (2013, 155), making it a combination of pragmatism, idealism and "sheer bluster" (157).

Lahuerta suggests that there are two 'tones' or 'registers' to the *Column*, one "solemn" and one "light", and that they "do not delimit one another but are conflated – Loos confuses them [...] their meanings are superimposed" (in Colomina 2017, 262). Loos potentially blends nostalgic-newness and confident-conservatism in an architectural version of Socratic "serious play", wherein tension generates discovery, and the game also potentially "plays the players" (Kidder 2012, 21). The notion of 'serious play' is an oxymoron which simultaneously juxtaposes and conflates two disparate elements to provide new insight. Like metaphor, paradoxes and gestalts, it contains an inherent, albeit contradictory, logic. 'Serious play' is evident in the work of other *fin de siècle* members; overtly in Oscar Wilde's stage-play *The Importance of Being Earnest: A trivial comedy for serious people* (1895) and more subtly within the tragicomic premises of Franz Kafka's stories. This section of the chapter investigates Loos's *Column* positioned within the realm of serious play.

6.3.2 Schizophrenic Dress-up

Colomina refers to the dualities identified by Stewart above as design ‘schizophrenia’ (2010, 71). She writes that Loos, “so proud of his muted Goldman and Salatsch suit and the austere exterior of his buildings” (71), also “spent four months in prison accused of pederasty” and had “a succession of child-like wives” (79). Loos, she writes, encouraged a split between the defensive public-social persona and the protected private-individual interior (75-6). Whilst Frampton suggests the division was “a conscious opposition between the severity of the male encasement and the feminine nature of the encased” (in Schezen 2009, 16), Colomina refers to it as the production of a metaphorical ‘mask’ (76-77). The building façade simultaneously conceals and reveals alternate personas, in a similar way that Loos writes towards the end of ‘Ornament’, “modern man needs his clothes as a mask” (2002, 36).

Christopher Long adjusts the metaphor when he suggests that ‘Ornament’s’ reference to man’s ‘compulsion to smear walls with symbols’, is a “thinly *veiled* assault on the Symbolist painters” (2009, 208 – italics added). Krul agrees that Loos’s exteriors were “conceived as boxes [...] plain, screen-like and undecorated”, whilst the interiors were ‘luxurious backgrounds’ against which the “private fancies of the owners could be acted out” (2011, 126). Krul, however, pivots the veil-mask theme from defence towards dishonesty, believing that Loos’s built work, such as the non-structural, marble-clad, concrete columns in the entrance of his *Goldman and Salatsch* store, were “nothing but ornamentation” and when judged against the principles of ‘Ornament’ could be considered “dishonest and untrue” (2011, 131).

Returning to Loos’s essay on cladding confirms and counters these notions of (dis)honesty. Loos’s ‘law of material truth’ did not prevent materials from being creatively used, only discouraged them from mimicking other claddings. Material choice, and by extension, design in general, should be ‘naked truth’ *or* deliberate ‘charade’.

Terry Farrell and A. N. Furman’s book *Revisiting Postmodernism* (2019) could be talking specifically about Loos’s *Column* when it states, “it is the architect’s job to be able to raid the dressing-up box when needed [...] Architecture itself is on occasion required to be the actual entertainment, particularly when on a giant scale” (46). Later in the same book, Farrell refers to postmodernism as “a celebration of uncertainty, plurality, diversity and, above all, ‘choice’”, (2) and as such, the style “embraced it all, it didn’t reject” (17). This exuberant game of ‘dress-up’ comes with risk, however, as Farrell recognises when

traditional motifs are “picked up by other architects as the *clothes* of fashion”, the originally complex meanings “gave way to a superabundance of histrionic historical elements *draped* over otherwise unchanged buildings. Poetic irony turned to sarcasm” (177 – italics added). The metaphorical language suggests liberating expressionism is always at risk of sliding into pantomime-pastiche, even psychosis.

6.3.3 Monument and Tomb as Duck and Decorated Shed

Masheck’s article refers to Loos’s *Column* as “amusing”, whilst *also* relying on the serious typology of ‘real architecture’ which Loos nominated as the monument and tomb (2013, 148). What if the monument-and-tomb design was not a synthesis of tropes but a juxtaposition? Long writes that Loos’s “yoking together” of ornament with crime was intended to do more than “amuse the audience or inflame his opponents” (2009, 207). Loos’s ‘yoking’ of tomb and monument might, therefore, position the *Column* roughly between ransacked allusions and creative illusion.

What, however, would Loos’s juxtaposition *mean*? The answer splits, once again, along the modernist/post-modernist faultline. A classical monument rising from a tomb might imply that classicism is, (or should be), ‘dead and buried’ in the modern world, *or* that long-dead-antiquity is still monumental and worthy of reification. There is a third option, however, relating to another element of the design which is rarely mentioned in analysis. Instead of finishing at the column capital, Loos adds a flat plate; the ‘abacus’. Intended to support a beam (or a tribune-statue), here the abacus supports instead the tumultuous clouds of Chicago’s windy city, but the term also ‘holds’ connotations as a calculating device. Is it another hint that everything Loos does is ‘highly calculated’? Is it a jibe at the ‘tribune-less-*Tribune*’? At what point does reading become over-reading, and meaning-full analysis become overburdened and meaning-less? When does Farrell’s fear of ‘poetic expressionism’ slide into ‘sarcastic histrionics’?

British architect James Stirling’s postmodern *Neue Staatsgalerie* in Stuttgart (1984) is a potential example, with deliberately exaggerated elements such as the giant pink handrail and elaborate ‘jokes’ including the ‘ruin’ of fallen masonry which acts as an air vent to the garage [*Figure 34a* nearby]. Kidder’s review of the building suggests Stirling’s request not to be taken ‘too seriously’ reveals an aspiration to keep playfulness alive, however, the “extravagant and quirky” historical references overwhelm the visitor’s experience, and the

experiment “loses its balance” when trying to poise self-assertion against self-effacement (2012, 32-33). Given that an architect must produce a functional and cost-effective building, the request to ‘not be taken too seriously’ cannot be taken too seriously.

Anthony Vidler labels *Neue Staatsgalerie* “an already ruined monument” with “a cemetery at its heart” (1992, 95). Stirling’s ‘best intentions’ to reject the neo-classical pseudo-monumentality favoured by the Third Reich, Vidler writes, were ‘cancelled’ by the “ironic gesture” of a museum in a German city, ruined by British bombing, being designed by a British man (95). For the design to be successful, Vidler suggests the design’s *posthistoire* must disassociate itself from the cultural context and contemporary obligations and “privilege the internal discourse of an architecture turned on itself” (97).

This ‘internal dialogue’ is akin to Anonymous Japan’s sheathed phallic symbol and Torre’s emasculated high-rise; ‘inside jokes’ designed by architects for architects. When author Tom Wolfe’s *From Our House to Bauhaus* (1981) reviews the work of Robert Venturi, Wolfe attempts to reduce Venturi to an architectural court-jester, suggesting Venturi only creates architectural theories to delight and amuse other architects (107). Wolfe claims Venturi’s witty and ironic historical references are akin to a ‘kick me’ sign (109), or ‘irresistible Big Wink’ (114). Many Venturi Scott Brown designs risk such derision, including their ‘caryakids’ at the 1980 Houston *Children’s Museum* (Venturi *et al.* 2004, 56), the ‘big apple’ sculpture submitted for a forecourt competition in New York (1984) [**Figure 34b** nearby] and the “parodistic Ionic column” at the 1976 *Allen Memorial Art Museum* (Colquhoun 1981, 146).

Jokes aside, Venturi, Scott Brown and Izenour’s *Learning From Las Vegas* (1972), provides the famous metaphorical descriptors of ‘duck’ and ‘decorated shed’; where the duck *is* a symbol, whilst the decorated shed *applies* them (64). Unwin’s *Metaphor* (2019) states that the Greek temple “remained a decorated shed” throughout antiquity, but its quintessential form of columns supporting a triangular pediment, “developed into a duck” in more recent centuries (64), becoming a metaphor for “authority, wealth and cultural status” (67). Unwin considers Venturi’s application of the temple metaphor for his mother Vanna Venturi’s house (1964) a “critical subversion” of classical allusions (68), which risks becoming “incestuous” (64) and a “cliché” that can “infect architecture” (67). Loos’s *Column* could thus be seen as proto-postmodernism, a cleverly subversive over-scaled version of architecture’s ubiquitous-

duck. On the other hand, endless renditions of Loos's design risk becoming a 'plague of inbred corniness'.

6.3.4 Classical Cliches as Dead Ducks

Metaphors 'die' when they cease to be attention-grabbing and their component parts are absorbed into each other to form a meaning "amalgam" (Zwicky 2003, 22). Death is not necessarily permanent; "however stone dead such metaphors seem, we can easily wake them up" (Richards 1936, 101). The success of this revivification, or 'revival' in architectural terms, relies on positive participation by creator and percipient, and is highly influenced by sociohistorical context. For example, two forms, both titled the 'The Broken Column' [**Figures 34c & d** nearby] rely on classical metaphors that could be considered 'alive' or 'dead', inspiring or vacuous, serious or sublime, subversive or silly. The first is a deliberately truncated, habitable, neo-classical folly for aristocrat François Nicolas Henri Racine de Monville in his French garden *Désert de Retz* (c.1774-85), and the second is a 1944 painting by surrealist Frida Kahlo. Whether the works are metaphorical misappropriations changes over time. 'Original' or 'cliché', 'decorated shed' or 'dead duck' are time-bound labels.

When Tigerman launched the *Late Entries* 'competition' for the *Tribune Tower* in 1980, he lamented that the results were not 'architecturally substantial', and that "many of the participants did not take the project seriously enough" (Tigerman 1980, 7-8). In the same year Loos's *Column* reappeared, emasculated by Anonymous Japan and Torre, it was also making an iconic appearance in *La Strada Novissima*, at the *Venice Biennale* exhibition themed around 'The Presence of the Past'. Architect Hans Hollein included both a broken column (acting as a doorway into the space) and Loos's *Tribune Column* side by side beneath a neon pediment [**Figure 34e** nearby], thus cementing Loos's *Column* as a "postmodern jubilant interpretation [...] a major note in the swan song of current eclecticism" (Hartoonian 1994, 54). Hollein's design was considered successful because it "put more emphasis on the communicative power of architecture" and "used history and context ironically as double coding" (Szacka 2011, 100). Farrell writes that the *Biennale* demonstrated that a plurality of approaches, even to historical forms, was possible and was driven by a "communal desire to tell stories [and end] the mute technological silence of late Modernism" (2018, 161).

Loos's design could, therefore, be seen as a double-down on dead metaphors, a pointed reification of a metaphor already overused to the point of effacement. If it was a

deliberate misappropriation of the metaphors of wealth and power, the *Column* creates a false idol which converts the ‘ideal man’ into a ‘hollow man’. As Rossi notes, “Loos possessed [...] a peculiar power to irritate”, a power “closely related to the ability to amuse oneself” (1984, viii). Complicating things further, Rossi identified an “anger akin to disillusionment” (ix) mixed within Loos’s humour, and suggested Loos’s resultant design extremes verged on the irrational (xii). By extension, Loos and his design become a complex fusion of idealism and irrationalism.

6.3.5 Postmodern Palimpsest as Plaything

Researcher Taisto Mäkelä’s paper ‘Modernity and the Historical Perspectivism of Nietzsche and Loos’ (1991), suggests that Loos’s *Column* “was simultaneously the product of historicism *and* abstraction”, a design which can be “mis-read” as “simply another disinterested fetish of historical eclecticism” or understood as a “condensation of the past into a symbol” (141). For Mäkelä, Loos’s modernity was not about the past or the present, but *both*, because contemporary design is not built upon a blank *tabula rasa*, rather it is a palimpsest of pre-inscribed traces (141). By extrapolation, Loosian metaphors become Derridean rather than Blumenbergian, built upon a complicated and borderless terrain rather than a green field with a neatly stratified history below.

Farrell and Furman’s book on postmodernism references architect Philip Johnson appearance on the 1979 cover of *Time* magazine [**Figure 34f** below] “brandishing” a model of his AT&T ‘Chippendale’ tower, “as if it were the World Cup” or “a tombstone” (167). If Loos’s design is treated as an “anti-modernist provocation”, then it is plausible that Loos predates Johnson as “the earliest example of postmodernism itself” as some suggest (Tournikiotis 1991, 156). It is easy to imagine Loos, instead of Johnson, holding aloft a model of his tomb-trophy *Column* with “bitter sarcasm” (Lahuerta in Colomina 2017, 264). Equally easy to see the “unintended comedy” that arises from the disproportionate comingling of high and low; the “monumental eternity” of Napoleon and Trajan, combined with the “vulgarity” of journalism (262 & 265). Noticing this metaphorical compression-opposition, or conflation-juxtaposition, keeps the architectural-meaning-game playing, even as the rules keep changing, and even if that game plays us players.



Figure 34 : Stirling's "Neu Staatsgalerie" (1984) / Venturi Scott Brown's "Big Apple" (1984) / de Monville's "Broken Column" (c.1744-85) / Kahlo's "Broken Column" (1944) / Hollein's "La Strada Novissima" (1980) / "Time" magazine cover (1979) ⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Image sources: ; Artsandculture.com, [NeueStaatsgalerieStuttgart](#); Tumblr.com, [ArchiveOfAffinities_VenturiRauch&ScottBrown](#); MichaelKenna.com, [LeDessertdeRetzStudy#9](#); FridaKahlo.org, [Thebrokencolumn](#); Hollein.com, [StradaNovissima](#); and Content.time.com, [PhilipJohnson1979](#)

6.4 CONCEPTUAL (D)RIFT: THE COLUMN STAGED FOR AMBIGUITY

6.4.1 Post-postmodernism: Promoting Ambiguity over Mythical Distillation

Finish architect Juhani Pallasmaa writes that a building “is not an end to itself; it frames, articulates, restructures, gives significance, relates, separates and unites, facilitates and prohibits” (in Holl *et al.* 2006, 35). How researchers frame architecture alters how it is perceived. Loos’s contemporary, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), states that rules are akin to train rails “invisibly laid to infinity” (1986, 85 / §218), and that once he is on a ‘rule-rail’, “I obey the rule *blindly*” (85 / §219). Labelling Loos’s *Column* ‘modern’, ‘satirical’, or otherwise, establishes a predetermined course of thinking where ‘seeing-as’ prevents metaphorical ‘seeing-as-something-else’.

What if, instead of being ‘framed’, the *Column* was ‘staged’, figuratively tipped sideways and imagined as a theatrical platform upon which a design-drama was performed? The *Column*-figure-ground becomes simultaneously ‘foundational’ (dictating the action), and invisible (taken for granted and secondary to the presentation taking place). Staging creates the potential for an infinite number of alternate performative outcomes. When architect Bernard Tschumi criticises (without naming) Hollein and Venturi, he draws Loos’s *Column* into the firing range. “A door flanked by broken Corinthian columns supporting a twisted neon pediment”, Tschumi writes, “suggests farce rather than violence” (1996, 134), and “When metaphors and catachreses are turned into buildings, they generally turn into plywood or paper mache stage sets”, and (stingingly for Loos), “ornament again” (252).

Decades from now, Loos’s *Column* may be re-staged, for the umpteenth time, into yet another rendition of itself. Paradoxically, the image will be edited and altered whilst the design itself won’t change. The *Column*’s adopters will, in a typically gestalt manoeuvre draw attention to either the ‘rabbit’, ‘duck’ or ‘shed’ aspect of the design, and in doing so, not destroy other aspects, but temporarily demote them. The risk is that any ‘act of ignoring’ tightens the rule-rails, narrows alternate perspectives and lays tracks towards potential ignorance. Loos’s already ‘larger than life’ design took on mythical, or biblical, proportions to become both titanic and as fallible as the Tower of Babel, its interpretations ambiguous, neither singular nor constant; conceptual (d)rift it seems is built into the *Column*’s epic foundations.

By avoiding traditional architectonic labels and the ‘genre narratives’ of architectural movements, this section attempts to release Loos and his *Column* from ulterior motives,

allowing pure, raw, evocations, residing in the transient realm of Becoming rather than Being. The intention is to allow percipients to stop seeing what they *think* they see, or *ought* to see, and simply *see*. This speculative application of conceptual (d)rift is an opportunity to glimpse new meanings via the metaphorical language of others, but meanings which are only held lightly and for a moment. At its most liberated, ‘*the* Loos design’ might become ‘*a* loose design’.

6.4.2 Unmasking a Flayed Man

One way to look Loos’s *Column* is to extend the previously discussed metaphors of cladding-clothes and naked truth and attempt an ‘unmasking’. Imagine Loos standing by in a dapper outfit. Now imagine his suit, his mask-veil of public persona, removed, prudishly or permissively, to reveal his non-skin-coloured underwear. If that underwear-cladding was also removed, would Loos’s naked reality be revealed? Skin, after all, is yet more cladding.

As Gaspar Becerra’s illustration of *A flayed man holding his own skin* (1556) reveals [Figure 35a nearby], the man de-robed of flesh becomes a new columnar presence. Muscles become cladding. Once they are removed, the skeleton is exposed. Is *this* the *true* naked-truth? The temptation arises all over again to assign meaning to Loos’s bleached bones. If Loos was to be ‘unmasked’, how many layers from public profile to private interiority need to be stripped away to reveal his inner worth?

“Architecture resembles a masked figure”, writes Tschumi, “It cannot easily be unveiled. It is always hiding [...] Yet it is the very difficulty of uncovering architecture that makes it intensely desirable” (1996, 94). The risk-versus-return of ‘uncovering’ architecture through (over)analysis remains. Moreover, the violent and painful act of ‘digging-down’ may expose a fearful revelation, akin to Jean-Léon Gérôme’s painting *Truth coming from the well, armed with her whip to chastise mankind* (1896) [Figure 35b nearby]; a literal and figurative demonstration of ‘analysts beware’.

6.4.3 The Fixed-Movement of Pendulums and Shade

‘Fixed-movement’ is another metaphorical frame through which Loos and his *Column* can be seen. Krul mentions the swinging “pendulum” of opinion regarding Loos (2011, 217), whilst Farrell refers to the wider swing of public opinion, noting, “The pendulum effect [evidenced]

through the centuries: Action and reaction is a part of the natural way that culture, taste and society evolve” (5); architectural history “is always a story of oscillations” (22). A pendulum swings within a fixed range, however, whilst metaphorical (d)rift implies a movement without limitations.

Frampton reiterates traditional dialectics, and intimates a break from them, when he writes that Loos’s “work at every scale oscillates constantly between conformity and violence”, whilst his *Column* “push[es] a paradox to the point where it breaks apart and opens to another vista that is at once liberative and tragic” (2002, 217). Frampton, recognises the extremes in Loos’s work, such as the public and private, or the “subversive impulse” and the “conservative instinct”, but implies there is also something between the two poles, something with the essence of a moving pendulum’s blur, “there appears a third term, which, while never fully articulated, is surely implied by Loos” (208). Frampton’s enigmatic description hints at conceptual (d)rift without elaboration and sets Loos’s *Column* rocking.

A different example of fixed-movement is the ur-metaphor of post-as-presence fixity which still moves. “The planting of a post, [...has] always been seen as a metaphoric act [...] an act of taking possession of a ground: every such post implies a circle around itself if only because of the shadow that it casts whose direction will always be parallel to that cast by my upright body” (Rywert 1996, 122). The post remains still, but its shadow roams over time and space, shrinking and growing. Loos’s *Column*, both ‘framed’ and ‘framer’, is similarly ‘heliotropic’. Imagine percipients positioned in the ‘shade’ the *Column* throws, held within its ‘sway’, its meaning obscured or repelled, absorbed into the ambiguous-grey.

Paradoxically, the fixed-movement of conceptual (d)rift allows the *Column* to (mis)metaphorically be both ‘organising centre’ and ‘deaf point’ [§4.2.1]. The two extremes cancelling each other out; the *Column* becomes neutral. Personal agendas are silenced, and the *Column* is left to speak for itself.

6.4.4 How the Column Speaks and What is Heard

Metaphors of audiology are another way to investigate Loos’s *Column*. Loos was hearing-impaired throughout his life, eventually becoming completely deaf (Krul 2011, 133). As such, the title for his collected essays, *Spoken into the Void* (1982), seems particularly poignant. As discussed in Chapter 1, Loos admonishes the German practice of capitalising

nouns given that the grammar is not evident in the spoken word, and as such an “abyss” opens within the German mind between the written and spoken word (3). Curious then, that Loos included a ‘capital’ upon his *Column*, potentially reiterating the “barbaric” habit (3), or perhaps he always recognised the design would only ever be read in the mind.

Decades later, Peter Eisenman’s essay ‘Written into the Void’ (2007) gives Loos’s essay a poststructuralist turn, noting (confusingly) that “The writing of architecture will always be spoken as if it is read” (86). Architectural critic Jeffry Kipnis’s introduction labels Eisenstein’s essays “mystifying ruminations”, and in words equally applicable to Loos, writes, one “cannot help but come to wonder not just ‘of what’ [the architect] speaks, but ‘to whom’?” (vii).

Messages involve both a sender *and* a receiver and their combination invokes a ‘resonance’. Unwin’s *Metaphor* (2009), notes that metaphoricity involves implicit comparison, “We interpret what we want to explain and find resonance with our understanding of something else” (72). Solomonson’s essay referred to neo-gothic skyscrapers as having an “obvious” resonance with their gothic ancestors (in Murphy, 2017, 119). Oliver Wainwright’s review of the 2017 *Chicago Architecture Biennale*, meanwhile, mentions that the organisers wanted to replicate the “international resonance” of the original *Tribune Tower* competition (2017, n.p.). The quotes combined, demonstrate how Loos’s void-abyss could become an echo-chamber, where resonant frequencies amplify original messages, and the *Column*’s ur-metaphors becomes an *über*-metaphor... or a drowned-out-degradation.

“An architect is a builder who has learned Latin”, Loos wrote, however, “modern architects appear to be more at home with Esperanto” (from the essay ‘Ornament and Education’ (1924), in Stewart 2000, 58). As Stewart notes, “the architect is formed to work with a pre-existing grammar of architecture. ‘Latin’ signifies the prehistory of western culture [...] relevant to collective understanding” (59). She goes on, “by rejecting Esperanto in favour of Latin, Loos is privileging a return to cultural origins over new solutions” (59). In a sense, Loos’s *Column* is a very literal representation of architecture’s universally understood and easier to ‘hear’ language rules. Labelled a column *not* a tower, Loos doubles down on perceived clarity, and turns away from babble.

6.4.5 Linear Time versus Temporal Slippage

One final way to consider Loos's *Column* is to introduce the notion of atemporality. Stewart writes that Loos's texts reveal "slippage in the meaning", exposing "an (unintentionally) ambiguous position" (2000, 55). Eisenman and Elisa Iturbe highlight this 'slippage' in their book *Lateness* (2020). The authors investigate 'historical ambiguity' by reviewing the work of several architects, including Loos, who the authors felt were 'out of sync' with their time. They suggest 'lateness' reflects the preceding era while anticipating the next, acting "as a hinge between two styles or paradigms" (18), which "prevents each project from being stylistically categorized" (25). 'Late' architecture "lies somewhere *between*" accepted, inherited, historical 'norms' and prevalent avant-garde 'transgressions' (33); it is a "temporal irresolution" (100). As such, Loos and his work become untethered from traditional time.

Place two photos of Loos side by side [*Figures 35c & d* nearby]; one where he is young, moustachioed, staring intensely at the camera from his ornamental chair, and another, when he is older, looking away and cupping his hard-of-hearing-ear. Beyond the pearl neck-pin and exposed cuffs, it is hard to recognise them as the same man, and yet, of course they are. Loos-young and Loos-old co-exist, like the urn-face of a 'Rubin vase'; both can be present, just not simultaneously. It is a bi-stable system with two equilibriums available; 'this-or-that'. The conundrum is whether 'this-and-that' is possible given how time and attention work. If Loos can be *described* as young-and-old why can't his *Column* be both-and-more?

(D)rift relies on a break from traditional directionality; time need not *always* be measured as a straight line. The photos of Loos's *Steiner House* (1910) [*Figure 35e* nearby], show ivy which appears, disappears, and reappears over the decades, like a green-grey-tide coming and going. This, however, still implies a cyclical nature. (D)rift is even looser than that, a nontemporal manoeuvre, with what Frampton refers to as "a sense of time that lies outside time" (2002, 204). Loos, "never resigned himself to or became assimilated into the cultural power of the status quo; instead, he presented his oeuvre as an alternative to it" (Hartoonian 1994, 54). Combined with the notion of speech above, Loos's *Column* could be considered an ancient murmuring or an entirely new expression, a preliminary utterance or the final word; a timeless conversation, eternally inspirational.

6.4.6 Conclusion: Spinning Wheels and Turning Spades

Rykwert suggests that Loos “gropingly [...] sought for an architecture which could communicate and reconcile man to his fate” (1973, n.p.). This self-conscious grasping is hinted at in a technical drawing Loos prepared when he was 16 years old [*Figure 35f* nearby]. Titled ‘Transmission’, the two-wheeled device is turned by a handle which spins a belt, expending time and energy, yet ‘transmitting’ nothing. Created decades later, Loos’s *Column* shares a similar antilogical simplicity, its interchangeable metaphoricity denoting everything from tradition to modernity, collective masculinity and self-edification, death and rebirth, bitterness and humour, confidence and anxiety, absolutism and a desire to white-ant its tyranny. Meaning ‘spins’, perpetually second-guessing itself. The multivalent readings appear true... and yet not completely. The alternatives seem contradictory *and* complimentary, in a manner akin to Derrida’s metaphorical ‘(con)fusion’ [§4.1.3]. The *Column* resides in a place of (im)possible (un)certainty, where metaphorically, the ‘phallic’ symbol becomes ‘pregnant’ with meaning-potential.

Ultimately; “Adolf Loos remains an enigma; the more we dwell on his motives, the more elusive and paradoxical his achievements appear” (Frampton 2002, 197). Returning to Wittgenstein’s rule-rails, their foundations are also addressed, “If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’” (1986, 85 / §217). To understand Loos, scholars could dig forever and never hit rock-bottom. Stewart states that Loos ordered his papers be destroyed upon his death, and that these orders were not followed (2000, 14-15). Moreover, donated texts appear to have gone missing (16) and many of his manuscripts remain unavailable for publication (17). Loos’s intentions for his *Column* may never be known, and therefore, as Rossi writes, “with regard to the image of the Doric column, it would be useless to make any comment, presentation, or introduction, or to engage in [...] idle prattle” (in Loos 1982, xiii). It is time to cease speculation and acknowledge instead the creative potential of architectural (d)rift by saying, ‘this is simply what Loos does’, and save our spades further injury.




Figure 35 : Becerra's "Flayed man" (1556) / Gérôme's "Truth coming out of her well" (1896) / Adolf Loos (c. 1904 & unknown) / Loos's "Steiner House" (post 1914) / Loos's "Transmission" (1886) ⁶⁶

* * * * *

⁶⁶ Image sources: CPPdigitalLibrary.org, [AnatomicalDiagramOfThe muscles](#); [TruthComingOutofHerWell, Wikipedia.org](#); Wikimedia.org, [AdolfLoos1904](#) & Abitare.it, [Exhibitionforthe150thanniversaryofLoosbirth](#); Architectuul.com, [SteinerHouse](#); and Sammulungeonline.albertina.at, [LoosTransmission](#)

CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY – VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL, MAYA LIN, WASHINGTON (1982)

“The memorial appears as a rift in the earth” (Lin, 1982).

Philosopher Gaston Bachelard said, “To verify images kills them, and it is always more enriching to *imagine* than to *experience*” (1994, 88 / §6.2.8). Unlike Adolf Loos’s *Tribune Column* which remains forever experienced only in the imagination, Maya Lin’s (1959-) competition entry for the *Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (1982) was built and appears to be an explicit reversal of Bachelard’s suggestion. When Lin’s winning




Figure 36

design was announced [**Figure 36** nearby⁶⁷], public perception was torn between admiration and dismay. In a similar way that *Notre-Dame’s* “wounded structure” generated “duelling metaphors” of demise or resurrection (Rubin 2019, n.p. / §C1.0), percipients considered Lin’s design as either “a hymn to death and sacrifice with the power to move [people] to tears” (McCombs 1982, n.p.), *or* problematic because it did not conform with ‘traditional’ monument design, and was a violation “of some implicit monumental dress code” (Sorkin 1982, 120). After the black granite memorial was completed, however, the design became “the most visited and, some would say, most stirring monument in America” (Harrison 2003, 125). In this instance, experiencing the monument was more enriching than imagining it.

⁶⁷ Image source: Wikimedia.org, [MayaLinSubmission](#)

This chapter outlines the context of monument design in the 1980s, provides an overview of the *Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM)* competition, and reviews the alternate metaphorical perspectives of Lin's design. Loosely influenced by the chevron-shape of Lin's plan, this chapter relies on Derrida's implied model of (mis)metaphorology and adopts a slip-and-slide format between opposing opinions to replicate the bi-stable nature of gestalts. Support and admonishment, legacy and limitations, both sides of public perception for the design are addressed without resting on any argument for too long. The oscillation is a theoretical and visual reminder that the logical stepping stones of Blumenberg's approach are inherently wobbly and only ever loosely grounded. This case study ends, in the same manner as the chapter before, experimenting with conceptual (d)rift to see the design anew, as everything from an anchor to a springboard, a bent arrow or the napalmed wings of a butterfly.

7.1 WHITE AND UPRIGHT MONUMENTS (AND THEIR DEATH)

Monuments have been a part of the built landscape since humans planted a totem-pole in the ground to mark their presence [§3.3 & 6.0]. "The most beautiful monuments", Henri Lefebvre suggests, are those which are "imposing in their durability" (1991, 221). Having escaped death and time, transcendence becomes the monument's "irreducible foundation" (221). Architect Sabina Tanović's *Designing Memory* (2019), shifts the idea slightly, writing that whilst memorials "confirm humankind's ubiquitous craving for sacredness, sanctity and values that are lasting", the 'palpability' of the past "fades with time" and "Invariably, remembrance and oblivion continue their intricate relationship" (227-8). In a similar way that Blumenberg suggests standing upright on the horizon simultaneously provided early humanity a new outlook *and* existential angst [§3.1.3], death and reification, memory and oblivion, durability and fading, are all encapsulated within the meaning-making of memorials and monuments.

As a potential outlier to this trend, Charles Jencks writes that King Louis-Philippe (1773-1850) renamed *Place de la Revolution*, *Place de la Concorde* and erected a large obelisk taken from Luxor to create "the first icon of calculated ambiguity", an "enigmatic signifier" intended to *not* represent a single political event (2006, 4). Setting aside Jencks's suggestion that imperial-looting is apolitical, the obelisk potentially stands alone as intentionally indeterminate. Traditionally, monuments and memorials were designed as

enduring signifiers, “positive affirmation[s] of past events and people” (Stevens & Frank 2016, 43). They often took the form of vertical objects, placed on high pedestals for visual prominence, and were usually made of a light-coloured material such as white marble, “to honour, uplift and glorify” (43).




Figure 37

The site of the *VVM* in Washington D.C. is surrounded by precisely these sorts of designs [**Figures 37** nearby⁶⁸], including *The Lincoln Memorial* ‘temple’ (1922), *Washington Monument* obelisk (1884), *Tomb of the Unknown Soldier* (1921) and *Confederate Memorial* (1914). Slightly further away, the *Marine Corps War Memorial* (1954) depicts the raising of the American flag during the battle of Iwo Jima. Combined, they imply memorialisation tends to be ‘white and upright’, with various combinations of over-scaling, elevation and nationalistic flags.

After WWI however, a shift took place, exemplified by historian Lewis Mumford’s ‘The Death of the Monument’ (1937). Mumford recognised the value of monuments – ‘Men die; the building goes on’ – but felt that when humans “place their hopes of remembrance upon stone joined to stone”, they reveal themselves fixedly “oriented toward death” (1971, 263-4). Mumford felt that modernity had instead reoriented itself towards life, making static-stone-glorification outdated. Similarly, Sert, Leger and Gideon’s ‘Nine Points on Monumentality’ (1943), acknowledged monuments were “the expression of man’s highest cultural needs”, but condemned the “empty shells” of contemporary monuments, whilst positively anticipating the creation of a “lyrical” monumental modernism (48, 49 & 51). Denouncing ‘old’ monuments as symbolically-vacant clichés, cleared a space for new, experiential, humanistic and expressionist architecture; a ‘blank-slate’ which Lin’s monument would literally and metaphorically ‘unfold’.

⁶⁸ Image sources: Wikimedia.org, [LincolnMemorialTwilight](#); Wikimedia.org, [WashingtonMonument](#); Arlingtoncemetery.mil, [TombOfTheUnknownSoldier](#); Arlingtoncemetery.mil, [ConfederateMemorial](#); & Wikimedia.org, [IwoJimaMemorial](#)

Similarly, after WWII, revelations regarding the “numbing violence against civilians” instigated a shift towards designs that recognised “the notion of alienation, and concepts such as negative, voided and wounded space” (Tanović 2019, 235). Enigmatic blocks of various sizes, for example, were used at memorials including the




Figure 38

Fosse Ardeatine Mausoleum, Rome (1949), Carlo Scarpa’s *Women of the Resistance* in Venice (1968), and Louis Khan’s (unbuilt) *Commemoration of Six Million Jews* in New York (1951) (41, 44 & 51-52) [**Figure 38** nearby⁶⁹]. Such memorials adopted abstract rather than conventional architectonics, “formal inversions” of inferred valour which created a new vocabulary aligned with grief, guilt and defeat (Stevens & Franck 2016, 37&48). In turn, this new language led to designs which would “commemorate destruction rather than creation, victims rather than heroes, and society’s faults and weaknesses rather than its strengths” (48). As such, monuments underwent “a metamorphosis”, “from the heroic, self-aggrandising figurative icons of the late 19th century, [...] to the antiheroic, often ironic and self-effacing conceptual installations” (Young 1999, n.p.).

Following the Vietnam War, yet another shift took place. “Arguably the single most chastening episode in American military history” (Lair 2012, 59), Vietnam was considered an “immoral war” (Reston 2017, 9), a “lingering national nightmare” that suggested America had ‘lost its way’, disrupting the belief of America’s military triumphalism (Doss 2008, 245). Movies such as *The Deer Hunter* (1978) and *Apocalypse Now* (1979) revealed that a return, to the homeland and normality, had become “impossible” (Tarzia in Gola & Ervas 2013, 13).

⁶⁹ Image sources: Mausoleofosseardeatine.it, [HomepageMausoleodelleFosseArdeatine](#); (2009), Wikimapia.org: [Monument-to-the-Venetian-Partisan](#); (2012) Greg.org: [LouisKahnsMonumentToTheSixMillionJewishMartyrs](#)

It was whilst watching just such a movie that Vietnam veteran Jan Scruggs (1950-) suffered combat-flashbacks which motivated him to establish the *Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF)*, secure congress approval for a prominent Washington location, and organise a national design competition in November 1980 (Schulzinger 2006, 95-97). The cover of the competition guidelines [*Figure 39* nearby⁷⁰] contains the (non-alphabetical) names of several of the 57,000 soldiers who went missing or died during the Vietnam War. The opening page states that on Memorial Day at the future *VVM* site, “people were invited to join in a line and speak in turn the name of a man who was killed in Vietnam” (1980,




Figure 39

ii). One can imagine how the line stayed fast through the uttering and weeping, whilst “the brokenness [was] there for all to see” (ii). Poignantly, Lin’s design would, consciously or subconsciously, hold the power of that bent-not-broken line of names.

7.2 MAYA YING LIN

At the time of the competition, Lin was a 21-year-old architecture student at Yale University. Reporter and Vietnam veteran Phil McCombs wrote for *The Washington Post* that Lin was “a striking woman, slender, just over 5 feet tall [with] a wonderful blank expression that can suddenly break into a smile” (1982, n.p.). Her father was a ceramicist, her mother a poet and professor of literature, but, according to McCombs, “Lin’s ignorance of family and history seems almost calculated. [...] Analysis is the enemy of art. Rather, she seems to cultivate craziness in that Taoist sense of being in touch with what is true, with the awesome fact of human existence” (n.p.).

⁷⁰ VVMF.org: DesignCompetitionBooklet.pdf

Before the 1982 *VVM* competition, Lin designed a memorial for World War III as a university project. It was “a tomblike underground structure that I deliberately made to be a very futile and frustrating experience” (Lin 2000, 4:08). Lin recalls a tutor approaching her angrily and saying, “if I had a brother who died in that war, I would never want




Figure 40

to visit this memorial” (4:08). Lin was puzzled; her design was *meant* to be a “prewar commentary”, “a deterrent” (4:08). Around the same time, Lin attended a lecture on funerary architecture by historian Vincent Scully in which he referenced Sir Edwin Lutyens’s *Monument to the Missing of the Somme* (1928-32) at Thiepval, France [**Figure 40** nearby⁷¹]. Lin was greatly inspired by both the design and the way Scully described it: “a passage [...] through a yawning archway [...] a gaping scream, [...] a journey to an awareness of immeasurable loss” (4:11).

Lin writes that she has always been interested in memorials. The Woolsey Hall corridor at Yale University, with its plaques for alumni who died at war, for example, is mentioned as a direct inspiration for her *VVM* design. As a student, Lin watched stonecutters carve the names of those killed in Vietnam and remembered how it “left a lasting impression on me” (4:09) [**Figure 41** nearby⁷²]. Elsewhere, Lin stated that “If you go in a cemetery and see Greek temples it means some really rich man has done that and is misusing the




Figure 41

⁷¹ Image source: Wikimedia.org: [MémorialDeThiepval](#)

⁷² Image source: Gunther (2014), Huffpost.com: [YaleAsMetaphor](#)

style [...] It's sacrilegious to make a monument to themselves. It bothers me..." (McCombs 1982, n.p.).

As part of the Yale funerary architecture class, "Problem #3" was the *Vietnam Veterans Memorial* (Theriault 2003, 423). Lin says she chose not to research the Vietnam War, instead, she responded intuitively to the site during a student visit, feeling the desire to 'cut open' the earth with "an initial violence that heals in time but leaves a memory, like a scar" (Lin 2000, 4:15). Lin's teacher, Andrus Burr, was apparently enthusiastic about the concept and encouraged her to submit it to the national competition (McCombs, n.p.).⁷³

Lin's submission was presented in ephemeral soft pastel sketches which Lin referred to as "very mysterious, very painterly" (Lin 2000, 4:12) [**Figure 42** nearby⁷⁴]. Narrated by an anonymous identity, her project statement looks and reads like the recount of a school excursion to




Figure 42

an object which already exists: "Walking through this park-like area, the memorial appears as a rift in the earth, a long, polished, black stone wall, emerging from and receding into the earth. [...] we can barely make out the carved names upon the memorial's walls. These names, seemingly infinite in number, convey the sense of overwhelming numbers, while unifying these individuals into a whole."⁷⁵

The national competition received 1,421 anonymous entries, and after a four-day deliberation, the jury unanimously selected Lin's design for being

⁷³ Reston says Lin received an A for the Vietnam assignment, but a B+ for the overall course, and that Lin "never forgave him" whilst her teacher always resented her "ingratitude" for not acknowledging his advice to improve her design (2017, 29). History.com meanwhile notes: "Lin only got a B on her assignment; [and] ended up beating out her professor in the competition" [21-Year-Old College Student](#).

⁷⁴ Image source: Competitions.org, [The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Design Competition by Paul Spreiregen](#)

⁷⁵ Uarizona.edu: [Vietnam/Memorialhistory.pdf](#)

“reflective and contemplative in character, harmonious with the site”, as well as “conciliatory, transcending the tragedy of war” (Senie 2016, 13&17). By describing her memorial as ‘a rift in the earth,’ however, Lin “wittingly or unwittingly”, created a vision which “became a metaphor for the rift in the entire Vietnam generation” (Reston 2017, 2).

7.3 METAPHOR WAR: THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO LIN'S DESIGN

As soon as Lin's winning design was announced in October 1981, it was “instantly controversial” and a ‘cabal’ of veterans organised against it, “denigrating the design as shameful and nihilistic, an insult to veterans and a paean to anti-war protestors” (Reston 2017, 1). People recognised the unorthodox design was “as different as could be imagined from triumphal war memorials” (Schulzinger 2006, 98-9). Worse still, it reminded viewers that “Wars that are won are testaments to national virility. Losing a war is a kind of castration” (Theriault 2003, 422). A magazine article by architect Michael Sorkin titled ‘What Happens when a Woman designs a War Monument?’ (1982) was subtitled, “The Vietnam Memorial – a spare and beautiful place – has made a lot of men angry” (120). Sorkin's article supported the design but ends with the suggestion that the biggest problem to its acceptance was that a woman designed it; “the ultimate outsider [...] the final affront”, making the *VVM* “a monument emasculated” (122). As academic Karen Feldman notes, the memorial was criticised for being “too Asian, too feminine, too black, too underground, too abstract and too unheroic” (2003, 303).

McComb's 1982 *Washington Post* article was supportive of Lin and her design. Nonetheless, his wording reiterates the resistance Lin faced. Where Lin called her sketches ‘mysterious and painterly’ (Lin 2000, 4:12), McCombs notes that others referred to them as “childish and naïve” (n.p). His references to Lin's ‘blank expression’ and ‘cultivated craziness’ might not have been intended as derogatory, however, they undermine her maturity and achievement, especially when combined with comments such as “she seems to try at times to mask her power with whimsy and little-girl behaviour” and she renders “her verdicts like a housewife supervising a home contractor” (n.p.). The article's subheading, “An Asian artist for an Asian war”, is equally telling (n.p.).

The spareness of the memorial's design placed "the burden of creating meaning on the visitor rather than the monument" (Savage 2011, 21). For many, the meanings created were negative. For example, an anonymous article in *The National Review* titled, 'Stop That Monument' (18.09.1981), called the "peculiar" design "Orwellian glop" and a "perpetual disgrace" (n.p.). Tom Carhart, Vietnam veteran, Pentagon lawyer and competition entrant, wrote in the *New York Times* that the design was "pointedly insulting", "a black gash of shame and sorrow, hacked into the national visage that is the Mall" (Carhart 1981, n.p.). In private, Carhart was even more scathing, apparently likening the design to "an open urinal" (Schulzinger 2006, 99) designed by "a fucking gook" (Reston 2017, 64).

The *VVMF* jury's well-meaning assessment of the design as "uniquely horizontal, entering the earth rather than piercing the sky", only served to reinforce that the design was a (mis)metaphor: "a kind of burial" (Senie 2016, 13). "Where the [competition] Commission saw 'dignity,' 'nobility,' and 'serenity,'" writes veteran Harry Haines in his review of the memorial, "Carhart saw 'shame and sorrow,' [which was] the veterans' burden all along" (1986, 5). Moreover, in interpreting Lin's 'rift' as a 'gash' Carhart correctly read Lin's metaphor of wounded space, but in the wrong way, concentrating on the damage not the healing. "When a metaphor is taken up repeatedly but serves opposing arguments, then it suggests [...] a shared moment of perplexity relating to topics that challenge simple conceptuality" (Hawkins 2019, 100).

Demonstrating what others felt to be more 'acceptable', *The Library of Congress* holds several slides of submitted entries, and although very tiny, page one appears filled with 'white and upright' designs, whilst page two is filled with statue submissions [**Figure 43** nearby⁷⁶]. The only large-scale submission available on the website is Denzil




Figure 43

⁷⁶ Images (collated by author) source: LOC.gov, [VietnamVeteransMemorialCompetition](https://www.loc.gov/vietnam-veterans-memorial-competition/)

Jenkins's which remakes the American flag out of "a grove of fifty trees... [with names] memorialised in granite bands... draped softly over a grass mound like a flag over a warrior's grave" [Figure 44




Figure 44

nearby⁷⁷]. The text states that the design "recalls the

familiar" and designates the trees be pleached to create a "protective umbrella". The design relies heavily on literal readings of patriotism, and evidences Deleuze and Guattari's 'arborified' version of thinking [§5.2.1].

Lin's abstract design was later "credited as the impetus for America's culture wars of the 1980's" (Sirefman in Chupin 2015, 225). The avant-garde nature of the design created a cultural imbalance, according to Carhart, underscored by the absence of veterans on the competition jury (Carhart 1981, n.p.)⁷⁸. Carhart suggested the war was being perceived from a 'televised' or 'at home' perspective, rather than reflecting the 'real' war the veterans had experienced (n.p.). As such, the design prompted a "ferocious fight over what manner of public art would serve the purpose" of healing public sentiment, while also "raising questions about the inviolability of an artist's work" (Reston 2017, 1).

As Wayne Attie points out, controversy in design competitions is routine, and what is "appreciated by the jury for one set of reasons [is] deprecated by other professionals for other reasons" (1978, 148). Such discord, he notes, serves to reveal the "conflicting values regarding the meaning and role of architecture" (148).

⁷⁷ Image source: LOC.org, [VietnamVeteransMemorialCompetitionSubmissionDrawing](https://www.loc.gov/rr/education/veterans/VietnamVeteransMemorialCompetitionSubmissionDrawing.html)

⁷⁸ Paul Speiregen, who organised the jury, reveals that "Four [of the eight jury members] were veterans of other wars, but none were Vietnam veterans. That was intentional": [TheVietnamVeteransMemorialDesign](https://www.loc.gov/rr/education/veterans/VietnamVeteransMemorialDesign.html)

In 1982, Tom Wolfe wrote an opinion piece titled *Art Disputes War*, a scathing newspaper review lamenting the rise of modernism, its condemnation of ‘heroic’ designs as ‘bourgeoisie’ and ‘kitsch’, and its preference for minimalism, elementalism, and what he sardonically refers to as the ‘expression of gravity’ (Wolfe 1982, n.p.). Wolfe considered Lin’s memorial to be designed for artists not veterans, stating it was destined to become “a wailing wall for draft dodgers” (n.p.). Whereas Uncle Sam’s pointed finger had traditionally been aimed at young men who avoided armed-service, Wolfe wrote that the Vietnam War swung the finger 180 degrees. Wolfe felt the memorial did not assist the veterans, (who “had only a passing interest in ‘remembering the dead’”) achieve their *main* aim, which was to “remove the big accusing index finger from those who had returned from Vietnam and were living in its shadow” (n.p.).

Seen through Carhart and Wolfe’s eyes, it is not hard to see a crooked finger in the shape of “faculty brat” (Reston 2017, 39) Lin’s site plan. Lin later acknowledged that whilst ‘we’ll never know’ to what extent her age, gender and race played a part in the controversy, coming from an ivy-league university fuelled distrust and painted her as a ‘hippie college liberal’ (Lin 2000, 4:15). Moreover, whilst her design was intended to be ‘understated’ she acknowledged that people might misread that as “non-referential and disconnected from human experience”, an intellectual and aesthetic exercise which “automatically pitted artist against veterans” (4:15-16).

7.4 THE STRENGTH OF LIN’S VASE / COFFIN-CORNER / RETAINING WALL...

Paul Spreiregen, the architect appointed to run the competition for the *Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund*, noted that Lin’s anonymous drawings were “almost childish in character”, however, they were also a “convincing portrayal of a raw idea. The jury saw in [them] the essence of what the memorial should be” (2017, n.p.). In his recollection of the jury analysis, Spreiregen wrote that journalist Grady Clay recorded what jurors said during the “winnowing process”: “The design is like a Chinese vase – you bring to it what you are able to bring; you take away what you are able to take away”; “You always experience a great work of art in different ways”; and “Confused times need simple forms” (n.p.).

Lin's "haunting submission identified as #1026" (Reston 2017, 33) had two 'arms' or 'wings' disappearing into the vanishing points of peripheral vision, terminating on the *Lincoln Memorial* and *Washington Monument*.




Figure 45

The visual link suggested "a connection between the memorial and America's earlier history" (Foss 1986, 333). Lin's design included 140 black granite panels which created two walls intersecting in the form a flattened v-shape and ranging in height from 20cm at the outer edges, to 3 meters at the apex, onto which the names of those who died or went missing are etched in order of their loss (Zhu 2016, 323-4). The names start in the middle, up high, move to the right, then start again at the far left, ending in the middle, down low [Figure 45 nearby⁷⁹]. As Lin described it in her competition submission, "Thus the war's beginning and end meet; the war is 'complete', coming full-circle".⁸⁰ This gesture suggests that time goes by, behind your back, in a paradoxically (in)complete circle – an exemplar of (d)rift.

In his rendition of Lin's design history, Spreiregen acknowledges that Lin was inspired by Lutyens's *Thiepval* but not as a traditional arch of triumph, rather, it was Lutyens's "ironic attitude" and his "corrupted icon" that Lin mimicked when she produced "a pun of her own" (n.p.), adopting the idea of the 'domino theory'; "if Vietnam were to fall to communism Southeast Asia would follow" (n.p).⁸¹ Lin's initial sketches were apparently "an array of large black gravestone-like slabs falling into a coffin, itself sinking into the ground with one corner protruding", a design later simplified into "just the protruding coffin corner" (n.p).

⁷⁹ Image source: VVMproject.com, [ConceptsOfTime](#)

⁸⁰ VVMF.org, [MayaLin](#)

⁸¹ Reston (2017, 28) has the only other reference to the 'domino' design, whilst Lin herself implies she did not do any research into the history or politics of the war.

Humanities author Karen Feldman notes that the stylistically simple ‘v’ shape can be interpreted as an “inappropriate object”, such as a boomerang, the two-finger peace sign of antiwar advocates, or the first letter of Vietcong, “Out of a simple shape – and an ambiguous one at that – in each case a statement, and a reading” (Feldman 2003, 297). Unsupportive Wolfe saw Uncle Sam’s “big forefinger’s final perverse prank” (1982, n.p.), supportive McCombs suggests the shape closely resembles “the Chinese symbol for man [...] or the similar symbol for the Confucian ideal of benevolence or humanity” (1982, n.p.), whilst philosopher Charles Griswold worried it could be a “weak” v for victory (1986, 708). Ultimately, the V-shape can be interpreted as almost anything, from a military chevron, an open book abandoned mid-story, an open-armed embrace, or a V for veteran-victim-void. Harriet Senie’s *Memorials to Shattered Myths* (2016) adds a feminist reading, noting art critic Elisabeth Hess suggested the *Washington Monument* was a giant phallus and the *VVM* was an open grassy mound at its base (20). “One word for another: this is the formula for metaphor, and if you are a poet you will make it into a game and produce a continuous stream, nay, a dazzling weave of metaphors” (Lacan 2006, 422).

On the day of the commemoration, November 13th, 1982, one man’s placard showed how the rift between supporters and objectors (of war and memorial) had begun to heal [Figure 46 nearby⁸²]. “The distinction between heroes and victims has been eradicated” (Senie 2016, 39). In McCombs’s article Lin is quoted as saying, “I have a




Figure 46

friend whose father died in Vietnam. The mother just came up to me and said, ‘[...]’

⁸² Image source: Sanchez (2019), Buzzfeednews.com, [Emotional Pictures Show How People First Reacted](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sanchez/emotional-pictures-show-how-people-first-reacted)

I think what you've done is wonderful.' A lot of people write, thanking me" (n.p.). Lin claims she always anticipated an emotional response from veterans, "I knew that when you saw it, you would cry" (in Branch 1994, 65).

One of the most 'impressionable' things about the memorial is that the names are recessed and accessible, making visitation visceral, allowing visitors to 'handle' their grief as they 'stay in contact' with the departed. "The cut letters emulate a gravestone and act as visual scars in an otherwise perfectly smooth surface" (Theriault 2003, 424), "a visual manifestation of the wounds of the survivors" (426), and "a conduit for communication between living and dead" (425).

Another affecting aspect is that the surface of the black granite acts as a mirror for reflection. Visitors' faces are overlayed upon the names of the soldiers, merging living and dead, conflating loss and self, and collapsing the distance between 'them' and 'us'. As visitors stare at the wall, the wall stares back, such that the visitors are faced, literally and metaphorically, with the prospect of their own mortality. This capacity for reflection makes the memorial 'therapeutic' rather than 'historic', according to Haines (1986, 6). Lin writes that the reflectivity was admonished for being "too *feminine*", whilst she herself saw a 'deeper' reading, referring to it as "a dark mirror into a shadowed mirrored image of the space [...] an interface between the world of the living and the world of the dead" (Lin 2000, 4:14).

In his chapter on corners in *The Poetics of Space* (1957), Bachelard writes that the corner (of a room) is "a symbol of solitude for the imagination", a 'sure place,' 'haven,' and 'half-box' which is both inside and outside, a place around which "an imaginary room rises up around our bodies" (1994, 136-7). Bachelard refers to corners as a dreamer's repose that divides being and non-being, reality and unreality, empty and full, its opposites linked by inhabitation: "all corners are haunted" (145 & 140). When viewed through this frame, the 125-degree wide angle⁸³ of Lin's 'coffin-corner' acts as a space of (in)habitation, a poetic metaphor for grief and its haunting (non)closure.

⁸³ VVMF.org: [About-The-Wall](#)

Yet another way to read the design is as a ‘retaining wall’. American Robert Morgan’s poem *Vietnam War Memorial* (1985) opens: “What we see first seems a shadow | or a retaining wall in the park” (Morgan 2003, 90). ‘Retaining wall’ identifies both the practical and metaphorical role of the *VVM*. Functionally, the design holds back the soil behind it and contains the names of the fallen. The word ‘retain’, however, is more multivalent; Lin’s design ‘fixes in place’ the memories of the lost, ‘maintains’ the dignity of returned soldiers while allowing them to ‘preserve’ ongoing connections with each other, and ‘hinders’ future wars. When read in combination with the word ‘shadow’, the ‘retaining wall’ also generates the uncanny impression that the ‘shades’ of the fallen are, albeit impossibly, eternally entombed in the mounded earth behind the black granite.

The metaphorical ambiguity makes the memorial memorable. Paul Goldberger’s *New York Times* piece (1982), written as “the hushed granite wall” was nearing completion, states, “Miss Lin’s original scheme is, in a sense, a tabula rasa, a blank slate – not a room, not a building, not a plaza, not a park, not a conventional memorial at all. It is a place of reflection” (n.p.). The reflective resonance of Lin’s design paradoxically creates a silent echo.

7.5 MAKING THE RECLUSIVE MEMORIAL INCLUSIVE

Whilst some writers suggest the project’s controversy gave the design “a legendary quality even before it took material form” (Haines 1986, 8), the “vicious” and “underhanded” tactics to stop it were such that the project almost did not proceed (Speiregen N.D., n.p.). ‘Conservatives’ resented the design “because it included no American flag, no inscription, and no statue” (Schulzinger 2006, 98). According to journalist James Reston Jr., both veterans and artists “entered the fray” and tried to “scuttle” the design (2017, 1). Wolfe’s article in 1982 notes that H. Ross Perot [who underwrote the design competition] was against Lin’s design. Perot polled prisoner-of-war veterans and found “Ninety-six percent thought the memorial should have a flag; 82 percent thought the monument should be above the ground; [...] 70 percent thought it should be white, not black” (n.p.).

As Perot and others began to withdraw their support for the “apolitically provocative” design, two addenda were commissioned to mollify the opposition (Tanović 2019, 57). The first was the inclusion of a larger-than-life statue, *Three*

Soldiers, by Frederick Hart, and the second was the installation of a flagpole for “suggested nationalism” (Lair 2012, 38). These compromises were themselves contentious. The statue was initially proposed to stand in the apex of the V, a siting which Lin apparently hired lawyers to prevent (Schulzinger 2006, 99). Whilst Wolfe believed Lin’s objection was due to her ‘anti-soldier’ sentiment (1982, n.p.), Lin writes it was a purely aesthetic denouncement. She worried that the statue would loom over her memorial, obfuscating the names and making them mere backdrop, violating the “private and contemplative space”, and ultimately prompting a “false reading” (Lin 2000, 4:17).

Two years after Lin’s memorial was dedicated, a second ceremony took place to include the flag and statue installed in a nearby garden-bed (Spreiregen N.D., n.p.). Hart stated, “I see the wall as a kind of ocean, a sea of sacrifice that is overwhelming and nearly incomprehensible in its sweep of names”.⁸⁴ As such, the *Three*




Figure 47

Soldiers “stare at the wall as if transfixed by its power” (Schulzinger 2006, 100), “gazing at their ultimate fate” (Senie 2016, 24), positioned in a manner which suggests they are “vigilant but weary” (Stevens & Franck 2016, 35), or “beleaguered” and “unmilitary” (Lair 2012, 38) [**Figure 47** nearby⁸⁵]. *Three* soldiers now represented *all* soldiers, and individual sacrifice replaced the all-inclusive ‘sea of sacrifice’ that was embodied by Lin’s design.

⁸⁴ Fredrickhart.com: [THREESOLDIERS](https://fredrickhart.com/threesoldiers)

⁸⁵ Image source: (2019) VVMF.wordpress.com, [ThingsYouShouldKnowAboutTheThreeServicemenStatue](https://vvmf.wordpress.com/things-you-should-know-about-the-three-soldiers-statue/)

After the second ceremony, others still felt “bitter about being left out of the memorial” (Theriault 2003, 426). In 1993, a pieta-styled statue honouring the women who fought in Vietnam was commemorated⁸⁶, and in 2004 a plaque was installed to pay tribute to veterans who returned from war but later died as a result of their service [**Figure 48** nearby⁸⁷]. Lin is quoted as being unsupportive of the additions, saying of the nurse statue; “I am as opposed to this new addition as I was to the last [...] I cannot see where it will all end” (in Theriault 2003, 428). Elsewhere, however, Lin is quoted as being reconciled with the addendums; “In a funny sense, the compromise brings the memorial closer to the truth. What is also memorialised is that people still cannot resolve that war” (in Lair 2012, 38-9).

Figure 48

The memorial still leaves many ‘others’ out. The names of South Vietnamese or international allies who fought alongside the Americans are not included, and of course, none of the Vietnamese civilian casualties are recognised. To redress the latter omission, American artist Chris Burden created an artwork entitled *The Other Vietnam Memorial* (1991) on which three million names (randomly generated from a Vietnamese phone book⁸⁸) are etched onto copper plates mounted on a central pole to represent the number of Vietnamese killed (Tanović 2019, 57) [**Figure 49** nearby⁸⁹]. The result appears like the enormous pages of a bureaucratic Rolodex.

Figure 49

⁸⁶ Wikipedia.org, [Vietnam Womens Memorial](#)

⁸⁷ Image sources: Wikimedia.com, [Thousands Pause To Remember Fallen Vietnam Veterans](#); & VVMF.org, [2019-In-Memory-Honorees](#)

⁸⁸ Wiener (2015) thenation.com, [‘The Other Vietnam Memorial’](#)

⁸⁹ Image source: Mcachicago.org, [The Other Vietnam Memorial](#)

Whilst Scruggs and the *VVMF* set out to be ‘neutral’, their “embrace of the apolitical actually concealed a subtle but deeply political agenda” (Lair 2012, 38). By considering Lin’s design a ‘therapeutic’ memorial they effectively determined “whose suffering to acknowledge and whose grief to assuage”, implying “some suffering matters more than others” (38). In Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi’s book *The Drowned and the Saved* (1986), Levi writes that a friend coined the phrase ‘us-ism’ to indicate who was included in a decision (1989, 61), and, by default, who became part of an inferred ‘them-ism.’ Levi, however, also repeatedly demonstrates that the lines between us-and-them are blurred, to the point where distinguishing the difference is often “optimistic and illusionist” (14). This illusory nature relates partly to the complexity of real-life events and trauma, and partly to the variable nature of human memory itself: “a marvellous but fallacious instrument” (11).

7.6 THE INFLUENCE OF LIN’S ICONIC MEMORIAL

Looking back on the competition, Spreiregen writes that Lin’s design “succeeded in surmounting the divisive scars of the war”, “far surpassed Scrugg’s original hopes”, and almost immediately became an “American icon” (N.D., n.p.). Jencks’s *The Iconic Building is Here to Stay* (2006), asks “How does the successful iconic building inspire paranoia, fear, even initial loathing, and then go on to win over a more permanent response?” (12). Jencks proposes a few suggestions which include the project being “architecture in the shape of something uncanny, fascinating, horrible, lovely” which “must produce enigmatic signifiers that allude to unusual codes” (13). Moreover, to avoid being a ‘one-liner’ the design must “carefully code the unusual image in multiple metaphors, [with] many allusions” which relate to “divergent things” whilst being “conscious of the way aberrant readings can torpedo a building” (13). It seems plausible that Lin’s design went from loathed to iconic precisely because it was an ‘enigmatic signifier’.

Acknowledging Jenck's premise that iconicity begins with an 'unusual image', the first half of the joint essay *Unfamiliar Noises* (1987), is by Richard Rorty. Rorty uses the last line of William Butler Yeats's poem *Byzantium* (1926) – "that dolphin-torn, that gong-tormented sea" – to demonstrate how metaphorical language might carry no meaning, impart no information, adjust no beliefs about the sea, dolphins, gongs or "anything else which he or we can usefully put a finger on", however, the torn-and-tormented words 'haunt' people nonetheless and changes their lives "in ways they cannot easily articulate" (Rorty & Hesse 1987, 294). Similarly, Bachelard writes that when "Meditating upon certain passages of [poetic] work, one feels oneself carried away into a sort of antecedence of being, as though into a beyond of dreams" (Bachelard 1994, 143). Lin's design first appeared as 'unfamiliar noise,' but through interaction, visitors were 'carried away' by the form as it became an increasingly familiar part of the memorial landscape.

Academic Kim Theriault's paper 'Re-memembering Vietnam' (2003) identifies the paradox of Lin's 'wall'. A wall is "something generally meant to separate, protect, or keep people in or out", whereas Lin's wall became "a cultural phenomenon as an agent of healing" and "a prototype for mourning" (421-2).

This notion of 'prototype' is picked reiterated in Tanović's *Commemorative Architecture since 1914* (2019) when she writes that "After 1985 the public was confronted with memorial projects that aimed to destabilise the very notion of memory", creating a "so-called counter-memory or anti-memorial generation" (57). Examples she offers, which could be said to relate to (or descend from) Lin's design, include Sol LeWitt's monolithic prism *Black Form Dedicated to the Missing Jews* (1987) and the *Monument Against Fascism* (1986-93) in Hamburg by




Figure 50

Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz [**Figure 50** nearby⁹⁰]. The latter, a 12-meter-tall lead column was gradually lowered into a bunker over the course of seven years, whilst visitors were “actively encouraged” to touch and graffiti its sinking surface (58).⁹¹ The “interactive artistic installation asserts that building a monument is not sufficient”, converting “memories into action [...] is at the core of the ethical purpose of commemorative art” (58).

Another potential metaphorical successor to Lin’s design is artist Horst Hoheisel’s ‘counter-memorial’ *Aschrottbrunnen* (inaugurated 1988)⁹² [**Figure 51** nearby⁹³]. Described as an “open, non-healing wound”, the memorial is a buried concrete replica of a fountain donated by Jewish merchant and philanthropist Siegmund Aschrott which was destroyed in 1939 by the National Socialists.⁹⁴ In the same way that Lin reversed expectations, Hoheisel inverts a fountain into a water-funnel, overturning, but not deleting memory. More recently, the *World Trade Centre Site Memorial* combines Lin’s engraved black stone, LeWitt’s cubism and Hoheisel’s cascading water. The design was the result of a “remarkably complex, politically loaded, and emotionally charged architecture competition”, for which Lin served as a juror, and the fact that the winning design was “embraced quite readily by the public is most surely a direct legacy of Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial.” (Sirefman 2015, 225).




Figure 51

⁹⁰ Image sources: Artsy.net, [SolLeWittBlackForm](#); & Jochengerz.eu, [MonumentAgainstFascism](#)

⁹¹ Jochengerz.eu, [MonumentAgainstFascism](#)

⁹² Knitz.net, [AschrottFountainKassel1985](#)

⁹³ Image sources: Shaked (2016), Researchgate.net, [HorstHoheiselWithAModelOfHisAschrottbrunnen](#); (2013), Forgetyousawthis.blogspot.com, [TheAschrott-BrunnenMonument](#)

⁹⁴ Kassel.de, [AschrottbrunnenKassel](#)

A legacy certainly, but not necessarily ‘direct’. Robin Evans writes, “things do not develop by continuous extrusion through time like toothpaste squeezed from a tube” (2000, 158). Whilst Lin’s design undoubtedly has prototypical legacy, not every design that follows is automatically reducible to her flavour of toothpaste.

7.7 NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES: FORGETTING TO REMEMBER

The irony of memorials is that by erecting something permanent to remember, we highlight that human nature forgets. Levi suggests that “The memories which lie within us are not carved in stone; not only do they tend to be erased as the years go by, but often they change, or even increase by incorporating extraneous features” (1989, 11). Whilst Levi suggests that features such as “ceremonies and celebrations, monuments and flags” are probably “indispensable” for memory to persist, he also cautions, “beware of excessive simplifications” (8-9). Lefebvre writes in *The Production of Space* (1974) that symbolic simplification implies a “locus of power”, and any object, be it a vase, garment or chair “may be extracted from everyday practice” and transformed “into monumental space: the vase will become holy, the garment ceremonial, the chair the seat of authority” (1991, 225).

Lin’s iconic design has both benefited and suffered from such reification. Even though Lin wrote “I never looked at the memorial as a wall” (Lin 2000, 4:11), her design was nonetheless branded “‘The Wall’ with a capital ‘T’” (Lair 2012, 40), and the VVMF’s original logo of twin flame-leaves




Figure 52

was replaced with the twin arms of Lin’s design, reaching outwards instead of upwards, accidentally replicating a flattened version of a Vietnamese *nón lá* leaf-hat [**Figure 52** nearby⁹⁵]. On the ‘upside’, “An icon always has a trace of sanctity about it, [...] by definition it is an object to be worshipped, however fitfully” (Jencks 2006, 4). The ‘downside’ is that a saint’s toes are often worn away by kisses (Koolhaas 1996, 241).

⁹⁵ Image sources: Wikimedia.org, [Vvmf.png](#); & VVMF YouTube.com, [WallTalk](#)

Griswold writes that “The word ‘monument’ derives from the Latin *monere*, which means not just ‘to remind’ but also ‘to admonish,’ ‘warn,’ ‘advise,’ ‘instruct’” (1986, 691). Blumenberg wrote that myths were reminders of human folly and the justified rage enacted against humanity from the realm of the gods (1997, 5-6). Over time, a single name, such as Icarus, Prometheus or Pandora, was warning enough. Similarly, Lin’s black chevron can be metaphorically transformed into the burnt wings of hubris, the flesh torn by a vengeful eagle’s beak or the shadowy coffin-corner of a box of evils. If a single meaning is chosen, be it wound, wings, gift or rift, its fixity risks turning the memorial into a cliché, a dead metaphor which speaks its truth from a memorialised grave. Just as the constant admonishment of ‘never again’ risks banality and “encourages oblivion instead of active remembrance” (Tanović 2019, 75), “A memory evoked too often, [...] tends to become fixed in a stereotype, [...] crystallised, perfected, adorned, which installs itself in the place of the raw memory and grows at its expense” (Levi 1989, 11-12).

Whilst Mumford anticipated the ‘death of monuments’, instead, ‘memorial mania’ has led to “a glut of built and proposed memorials” in Washington (Doss 2010, 17). In the same way that the *VVM* kept expanding to include those who felt unrecognised, increasingly vocal ‘others’ are seeking representation in an “expanded context of ‘rights consciousness’” (Doss 2016, 107). Moreover, many of the new memorials aim to be experiential, offering “emotional discovery” as well as, or instead of, traditional expectations of ‘closure’, thereby generating a degree of disorientation, as “the character and purpose of the public monument [has] become muddled” (Savage 2009, 21).

One example of a contemporary memorial created for those who ‘missed out’ is the *National World War II Memorial* (2004) in Washington. Initiated by an elderly WWII veteran who asked where was *his* war memorial, the development is predominantly ‘white and upright’ and includes pale pillars, triumphal arches, bronze wreaths, a water feature and thousands of gold




Figure 53

stars in lieu of soldier's names [**Figure 53** nearby⁹⁶]. The memorial has been denounced as enormous yet inconsequential, bland and backward-looking (Doss 2008, 239).

An extension of memorial mania is the “lucrative business” of memory-tourism which includes the “common practice” of adding museums to existing memorials (Tanović 2019, 240 & 235). Professor Meredith Lair calls this conflation of remembrance and consumption “dark tourism” and suggests it risks converting grieving from a selfless act into something selfish (2012, 51). At Lutyens's *Thiepval Memorial*, a visitor's centre opened in 2004, offering explanatory displays, vending machines and toilets.⁹⁷ In 2001 a similar facility, labelled an ‘education centre’, was conceived by Scruggs for the *VVM*. By 2018 only one-third of the budget for the buried-facility had been raised, so the project was cancelled.⁹⁸ Interest in ‘The Wall’ is kept alive instead via a touring replica and a website called ‘The Wall of Faces’ which puts a face to each name on the memorial.⁹⁹ The landing page reveals the majority of dead soldiers to be around 21 years young – the same age as Lin when she designed the memorial. The arrangement creates the impression of a high-school yearbook, and whilst the weight of their collective eyes is poignant, so too is the memory of 21-year-old Vietnamese-American Nick Ut's photograph of Vietnamese girl Kim Phúc running, open-armed, down a road after a napalm attack.

The digital interface is a reminder that times change. A sign beside the WWII reflecting pool reads “Honour Your Veterans | No Wading”, but photos suggest it is ignored. Meanwhile, at the *VVM*, people appear to adopt a respectful “self-imposed silence” at Lin's memorial, whereas the two statues (the *Three Soldiers* and the *Vietnam Women's Memorial*) are used for photo opportunities or climbing-gyms (Senie 2016, 27)




Figure 54

⁹⁶ Image source: Wikimedia.com, [NationalWorldWarIIMemorial](https://www.wikimedia.org/wiki/NationalWorldWarIIMemorial)

⁹⁷ Greatwar.co.uk: [museum-thiepval-visitor-centre](https://www.greatwar.co.uk/museum-thiepval-visitor-centre)

⁹⁸ VVMF.org: [VietnamVeteransMemorialFundChangesDirection](https://www.vvmf.org/VietnamVeteransMemorialFundChangesDirection)

⁹⁹ VVMF.org: [THEWALLOFFACES](https://www.vvmf.org/thewalloffaces)

[**Figure 54** nearby¹⁰⁰]. Is such ‘disrespectful’ behaviour a sign of a changing society, and if so, who decides what is ‘respectful’?

Power, memory and meaning are often conflated in subtle ways. Wolfe’s 1982 article recognised that “Of the 1,203 members of the Harvard class of 1960, [...] 26 served in Vietnam and none of them got a scratch” (1982). Similarly, photographs of the names inscribed at Woolsey Hall suggest that few Yale alumni perished. A contemporary online article notes that there are no names planned for the Yale student-soldiers lost in the conflicts of Afghanistan or Iraq, because there were no Yale student-soldiers: “For the last two generations as well as the foreseeable future, the requiem of Woolsey Hall is complete” (Gunther 2017, n.p.). The Yale memorial will not change, because the world has.

In 1999, Professor James E. Young wrote that some feared that “instead of embodying memory, [...] memorials may only displace memory. [...] even as monuments continue to be commissioned and designed by governments and public agencies eager to assign singular meanings to complicated events and people, artists increasingly plant in them the seeds of self-doubt and impermanence” (n.p.). Blumenberg wrote in *Paradigms for a Metaphorology* (1960), that ‘absolute metaphors’ are not actually *absolute*, they can only be used as “a point of orientation” to indicate the “attitudes and expectations, actions and inactions, longings and disappointments, interests and indifferences, of an epoch” (2010, 14). In other words, “values alter facts” (Bachelard 1994, 100), and absolute meaning is no more.

7.8 EMBRACING CONCEPTUAL (D)RIFT

Like a Rubin’s Vase which is both container and faces reflected, the interpretive to-and-fro surrounding Lin’s memorial implied more than the sum of its parts. As Jan Zwicky notes in *Metaphor and Wisdom* (2003), “In metaphor, gestalts glitter: those inflected by being and those inflected by time, flashing back and forth over the hinge of what is common” (67). Later, in the same work, however, she uses the example of the Necker Cube and writes that it “can be seen in more than one way, yes. But it cannot be seen in *any* way. There is no gestalt shift that suddenly allows it to emerge as a sphere, or a leaf, or a human being...” (97). Academic Sonja Foss’s paper ‘Ambiguity as Persuasion’ (1986), reviews Lin’s memorial and agrees, “The predominant role of the audience in the establishment of

the meaning for a work of art, however, does not mean that a viewer has total freedom to attribute any meaning at all to the work. A viewer's interpretation is limited by the actual object itself' (330).

Architectural writer Albena Yaneva's *Mapping Controversies in Architecture* (2012) recognises that Norman Foster's glass dome atop the *Reichstag* (parliament) is motivated by the metaphor of transparency, "Yet, glass, [...] is highly brittle. When subjected to stress, it can shatter", which makes her wonder is it the right message for "young and untested parliamentary institutions?" (18-19). Similarly, when she reviews the Welsh parliamentary building, the *Senedd* by Richard Rogers and Partners and their use of Welsh slate as a symbol of 'Welshness', Yaneva queries, 'which Wales?' (20), and worries that once an answer is settled, "we freeze the building" (22), its reading becomes "pigeon-holed" (22). Ideally, she suggests, architectural meaning should be "a moving target" (45). What happens if Lin's memorial avoided being frozen into 'The Wall' and was read instead in various new ways, less homing-pigeon-wings and more bent-arrow, never intended to find a specific target?

Young noted above that artists occasionally 'plant seeds of doubt' within their memorials, implying that traditional hegemonies can be reversed with a whispered 'what if' buried just below the surface of the smothering voices of the establishment, and that meaning might blossom into something unexpected. Lin, however, apparently designs in the opposite manner, writing in *Boundaries* (2000), "The phrase that some people have used to describe my process is that I lay an 'egg'. It is a rather strange metaphor, but an accurate one. My idea appears very quickly and is fully formed when it arrives" (3:09). Lin's *Memorial* reminds us that design, and its interpretation, often contains something of an chicken-and-egg, tree-or-seed conundrum at its core.

Lin's chalky, competition drawings are the opposite of the built form's boldness, and prefigure the intense ambiguity that the design entails for so many writers: "Is it sculpture, architecture, gardening, what?" (Sorkin 1982, 122); "The forms used are so elementary and basic that their interpretation is simultaneously infinite and finite" (Theriault 2003, 424); Lin's design is "aggressive and soothing", as well as "intrusive and organically embedded into the surroundings" (Tanović 2019, 234); the memorial

“performs the valuable service of reminding us to question, without forcing any simple answers” (Griswold 1986, 712); “Rather than telling *the* story, [the memorial] tells multiple stories” – “The goal is not to locate *the* message but the multiple, frequently conflicting, messages. To attempt a unified, centred reading, thus, is to miss the point” (Blair *et al.* 1991, 279 & 269). With this in mind, let us be drifters...

Ocean Vuong (1988-), a Vietnamese-American poet and novelist, recognises in *A Letter to My Mother That She Will Never Read* (2017) that a monarch butterfly’s wings look like the “charred debris” from the napalm clouds of his mother’s youth. He remembers an occasion when she stared horror-struck at an antlered taxidermy buck hanging over a soda machine, “*A corpse should move on, [she said,] not stay forever like that*” (Vuong 2017, n.p.). Trash-or-treasure, Lin’s plan carries the traces of a blazed butterfly, the taxidermy antlers of a (trend) buck *and* a never-read letter unfolding.

In Carhart’s letter to *New York Post* (1981) he proclaimed that black was “the universal colour of sorrow and shame in all races, in all societies worldwide” (n.p.). Another veteran, African-American General George Price, declared Carhart’s “language was too much” (Schulzinger 2006, 99). “Many have pointed out [...] that what people see or do not see in The Wall is their own projection” (Theriault 2003, 429). In this instance, Lin’s plan morphs into the violent redaction of a censor’s blackout pen, a projector’s screen, and Freud’s couch reclining.

Morgan’s 1985 poem called Lin’s memorial a “black mirror” (2003, 90). The phrase means something different today. Our black-mirror-phones act as ‘touchstones’, enormous databases which can hold virtual museums beneath our fingertips. A mirror’s smooth emptiness aids its ability to ‘hold’ a reflection, but not permanently. It replicates but does not save, it is non-selective and non-judgmental, even repellent in its perpetual vacancy. By contrast, the checkerboard ‘Wall of Faces’, with its bright yellow ‘donate’ button, scrolls and scrolls and scrolls, full to overflowing in its relentless pursuit of our attention... and yet, it remains *flat*... and unaffecting.

Dance professor Ying Zhu’s article, ‘Moving Bodies Moving Architecture’ (2016), explains that to read the names on some parts of the memorial, her knees ‘bend’, shoulders ‘cave’ and her body ‘folds’ and becomes ‘wedged’ into the small space (319). As such, her

body mimics the shape of Lin's walls; the memorial 'ventriloquises' her to use Derrida's phraseology [§1.1.3 & 4.2.2]. Moreover, Zhu notes that the text which accompanied Lin's submission was filled with verbs [walking, emerging, receding, approaching] suggesting that the memorial "both mobilises and *is* mobilised by the body" (321), such that the stationary memorial is inherently 'moving' (321). What better metaphor to depict grief than a buckled-knee?

Empty open hands? Whilst Lin spoke of wounding the earth in an act of aggression (Lin 2000, 4:15), her hand gestures told a different story. In McCombs's article, "She put her hands together gently as if in prayer and then opened them slowly" (1982, n.p.). Cutting and praying, two perfectly (in)compatible motions for a war memorial. What if there those hands were invisible? "That the author of the winning design of the VVM turned out to be a woman of oriental extraction too young to have experienced the Vietnam War herself looks like [an] instance of the unifying work of the 'invisible hand' [...] the unexpected has conspired to reconcile the seeming contraries of east and west, male and female, youth and experience" (Griswold 1986, 713).

Reconciling opposites is what metaphors and *gestalts* do, and since we cannot see the vase and face at the same time, "in the awareness of one is always the shadow of the loss of the other" (Zwicky 2003, 56), "Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity" (Spinoza 1677, PII xliii). In Robert Harrison's book *The Dominion of the Dead* (2003), he acknowledges the "solemn gravity" of Lin's memorial and its "almost overwhelming power of withholding" (140), whilst Haines writes that Lin's design "mutes" debate, "makes it inappropriate in the shadow of the dead" (1986 6). Light and dark, muted silence and reflected echoes, withholding and giving, life and death... the sister-shadows of each other.

Lin's father felt the monument "is like Taoism: simple yet very direct. I'm not saying we have directly influenced it, but indirectly by the way we live..." (McCombs 1982 n.p.). Lin agrees, "It has a lot of hidden philosophy. It reflects me and my parents" (n.p.). Adrian Snodgrass's paper 'Random Thoughts on The Way' (2001) refers to Taoism when he notes that space and time are collapsed in Chinese ideograms, such that 'Tao' is the path, the journey and the traveller (5). Design, Snodgrass suggests, is a form of "actionless activity" associated with Taoism, where

the designer is moved towards ideas and by them, “They propel her on the path” (7). As such, Lin’s memorial acts as a Taoist ‘tick’, conflating time, space, purpose, visitor, veteran and Vietnam.

In the same way that a competition juror said of Lin’s submission, “he must really know what he’s doing to dare to do something so naïve” (Reston 2017, 33), Paul Ricœur’s *Rule of Metaphor* (1986), states that deep thinking requires a return to naivety, a hermeneutical knot. “We must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order to understand” (351). Lin’s loop of names causes the war to come full-circle, and thus provides a hint about metaphor’s meaning-spectrum. Metaphors can pull us towards paradigms or spin us out with paradoxes. Both approaches, ironically, end at the same location. Whether aiming for 1 or 100 readings of the memorial, the resting place is the same; to have expressed the inexpressible. Lin’s loop of names is rationally irrational, like the free-hand Zen swish of an Ensō, perfectly imperfect, open and closed, empty and full, (in)complete: “I have drawn the conclusion; now, however, doth it draw me” (Nietzsche 1917, 91 (§B2/C24)).

7.9 A DISFLUENT ETERNITY

Philosopher Nassim Taleb’s *Antifragile* (2012) promotes a deliberate ‘disfluency’ in which being “slightly inaudible” and “less clear” makes audiences work harder and “switch to intellectual overdrive” (43-44). Similarly, Lin’s design was initially unintelligible, a violation of ‘normal’ memorial design, but its ambiguity encouraged personal interpretation. Private reckonings are, however, a shared event at Lin’s memorial. The cathartic power of her memorial “has something to do with the names and something to do with the form, but the necessary third element, what makes the piece whole, is the presence of people” (Branch 1994, 65). The jurors saw the potential of Lin’s ‘raw idea’, but it was the visitors, and their reciprocity of spirit, that gave it its metaphorical poetry and power. Eventually, as the *Australian Financial Review* puts it, “The memorial is now connected to the [Vietnam] war rather like ‘bless you’ is connected to sneezing” (Kennicott 2017, n.p.).

“Memorial spaces are anchored in the past, dedicated to the present and directed towards the future” (Tanović 2019, 233). The realisation prompts two last metaphorical interpretations inspired by the shape of Lin’s plan: the springboard and the anchor. In a literal sense, Lin went on to design many other memorials and art installations, whilst Scruggs, founder of the *VVMF*, “made a career out of the memorial” (Lair 2012, 39).

More abstractly, a memorial has the difficult task of striking a balance between holding on and letting go. Artist Alberto Giacometti’s statue *Hands Holding the Void* [*Invisible Object*] (1934-5) is a visual articulation of this dilemma [**Figure 55** nearby¹⁰¹]. Created in an “ominous atmosphere” when Hitler was chancellor and artists could be labelled degenerate (Tanović




Figure 55

2019, 32), the splayed bronze fingers encapsulate an object whose dimensions are implied through its absence. Moreover, the convoluted chair-throne-pillory-cage which elevates and ensnares the woman, combined with her mismatched eyes and gaping mouth, reinforce the predicament of a quest for ‘something’ in which ‘nothing’ is gained.

A veteran who sourced photos for ‘The Wall of Faces’ noted “The goal... is a measure of immortality” (Lair 2012, 49); eternal remembrance, something-above-nothing. The original guideline for the *VVMF*’s competition speaks of a Vietnam amputee who was told it ‘served him right’, without knowing whether the soldier might have gone to war because he believed in it, felt an obligation to serve or was

¹⁰¹ Image sources: Flickr.com, [AlbertoGiacometti1948](#); Nga.gov, [\(Hands HoldingtheVoid](#); & Flickr.com, [DetailAlbertoGiacometti](#)

simply following orders (VVMF 1981, 5). One hopes that the gape-mouthed amputee, fixed in his mobile chair-cage, found something of value within Lin's open-armed-gesture.

Architect Denise Scott-Brown concludes her contribution to the book *Architecture as Signs and Systems* (2004) with the comment "Design is an adventurous journey that should be allowed to have a surprising end point: arriving perhaps at a wild, unexpected beauty; or an agonised one, as when the situations are dire and imagination draws hard truth from difficult reality" (Venturi & Scott-Brown 224). Lin's memorial, controversial and then beloved, "Even in its inscrutability", reveals the "simple V of black granite has risen to the universal" (Reston 2017, 7); a paradigm of paradox, the surprising endpoint of a dire reality.

* * * * *

CHAPTER 8: *PARC DE LA VILLETTE*, BERNARD TSCHUMI, PARIS (1983) – A NARRATIVE

“I do not do meaning in architecture” (Tschumi in Gunzelman *et al.* 2003, 35).

Bernard Tschumi intended *Parc de la Villette* to be a literal and ideological transgression without precedent or context. He did this by turning his back on traditional approaches, and utilising alternate disciplines including narrative, cinematography and philosophy. *La Villette*, Tschumi states, aimed “to encourage conflict over synthesis, fragmentation over unity, madness and play over careful management”, subverting ideals previously held sacrosanct (1996, 200). Chapter 8 recognises, and challenges, Tschumi’s intentions and considers whether instead of generating *no* meaning (metaphorical or otherwise), Tschumi’s design generated a palimpsest of *alternate* meanings, suggesting attempts to be ‘meaning-less’ are still ‘meaning-full’.

In the same way that the two prior case studies relied on the models of metaphorology and (mis)metaphorology respectively, this third case study uses conceptual (d)rift as its mode of architectural analysis. Of the three approaches, it moves the furthest from a traditional case study to nudge the boundaries of what is permissible within a PhD, and to demonstrate the broader applicability of the proposed theoretical proposition. Released from expectations, the chapter is written as a speculative narrative which blurs the line between objectivity and opinion, past and present, fact and fiction. Both *Parc de la Villette*, and its creator Tschumi, are amongst the narrators, as well as architectural criticism voiced by The Visitor, and in the middle of everything, The Ghost of Roland Barthes.

One motive for this approach is to represent, in a literal way, Derrida’s notion that metaphorical language has a ventriloquy power [§1.1.3 & 4.2.2]. Another is to create an experiment with a hint of *Chora L Works*, the Derrida-Eisenman ambiguous and unbuilt collaboration for a park within a park, which conflated and confused time and place and questioned traditional architectural representation [§4.4.2].

The third reason is to create a full-circle moment. This last project leans into the origins of my initial understanding of metaphor; literature. In the Introduction [§1.3.3] it was acknowledged that the montage-style of the dissertation began as an uncertain patchwork

quilt of quotes, whilst this chapter weaves concepts and quotes together in a more confident way to create a seamless text(ile).

Introduced briefly in Chapter 5 [§5.2.5 & 5.4.2] several of the literary works with atemporal plots, discursive devices or meta-narratives, are now given the opportunity to make another appearance, directly or obliquely. Inspirational examples include the enfolded unreliable narrators of Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847) and the A>B>C>D>C>B>A roll of storytellers from David Mitchell's *Cloud Atlas* (2004). It places the whole work within a single day, as per James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922), and draws thematically on Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) to explore the relationship between creators and their creations, and the connection between comprehending the world around us and the quest for self-understanding. In homage to the “extreme and provocative use of intertextuality” that Tschumi favoured (Martin 1990, 29), this chapter borrow-steals the blue hyperlink device from Mark Z. Danielewski's *House of Leaves* (2000), in which the word [home](#) appears to be ‘clickable’ but in reality, takes you nowhere, (in)validating the notion of know-where. Here, the ‘portal’ words are those which resonate with (mis)metaphorical power.

Lastly, as a means of implementing the visual aspect of Guy Debord's model of *derivé* [§5.1.4], graphic experiments inspired by adjacent material are injected between narrators without commentary. The intention is to create a powerful construct alerting the reader to the gulf between architecture and philosophy, language and environments. It also reminds readers that meaning transfer is never guaranteed; what is relevant to the conceiver is not always understood by the perceiver – messages sent are not always the messages received. The images reiterate (mis)metaphor's risks and returns, and are designed to enhance the enquiry.

* * *

8.1 DAWN GAMES: Origin stories (*Parc*)

Parc-to-be, fifty-five hectares of wasteland, woke one day to find itself the focus of François Mitterrand. The president had designated it to become the largest park in Paris, one of several urban renewal projects launched in the 1970s and 80s (Woke 2013, 739). Before *Parc* was a park, it was a slaughterhouse that had “seen more blood flow than all the battles

of the Middle Ages” (Baudrillard 2003, 72). *Parc* was pleased by the attention without knowing what form its parky-parkness would take; it was content to leave the [circulation](#) of blood-trails, footfall, hoof-fall and food-halls behind. It had to bide its time, however, through several years and many iterations of international competitions. *Parc* held its breath as Rem Koolhaas of OMA and Bernard Tschumi competed to see who would determine what an urban park for the 21st century would look like. Finally, in 1983, Creator-Tschumi was appointed, and *Parc de la Villette* was born into-and-out-of-consciousness.

Of all the possible 470 versions of itself it could have been, when *Parc* was eventually conceived it was in a form “based on ‘[culture](#)’ rather than ‘[nature](#)’”, comprised of more than three dozen red steel *folies*, joined by bridges and promenades, “one of the largest buildings” – albeit discontinuous – “ever constructed”.¹⁰² *Parc* could recognise within itself, three dozen bright red hearts that pushed a pulse through the scheme, but wondered if this non-natural approach made it unnatural. Three dozen hearts? Was *Parc* fantastic or a freak? *Parc* could feel the purposeful “misadventure” from which it was created, and all the “accidental”, “serendipitous” and “surprisingly productive” results that were generated (Ots & Alfano 2011, 5). *Parc* reverberated with pride at its newness.

Within its genes, *Parc* could feel the very essence of chaos. There was the spirit of André Breton’s *Surrealist Manifesto* (1924), where rationalism was replaced by dreams and hallucinations, and reality was substituted by its contradistinction; *surreality* (1990, 14). James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* [1939] was another thread within *Parc*’s genetic makeup, due to Creator-Tschumi considering it one of “the greatest works of twentieth century architecture” (Johnston 1995, 14). It was the novel of [a-wake](#) (such a thing to hold within your core! The mourning of life’s end and eternal sleep, and its opposite, an awakening, a beginning, *and more*, being, as it is, the affected space left behind a moving vessel – the after-effect of progress (beginning, end, cause and effect)). This novel was “the most terrifying document of formal instability and semantic ambiguity” – “a labyrinth of ‘coloured ribbons’ in which space and time are confusedly woven into a flowering maze of cyclical connections” (Eco 1989 [1962], 61 & 69). These ‘ribbons’ which the semiologist Umberto Eco used to tie Joyce’s discursively-cursively themes together, pre-

“The poet, whose role it is to express himself in a more and more highly evolved social state, [...] must dig the trench that separated poetry from prose even deeper; he has for that purpose one tool, and one tool only, [...] metaphor.”
(Brenton 1990 [1924], 268)

“...every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway connected with the gobbledumped turkery was moving and changing every part of the time...”
(Joyce 1975 [1939], 118)

¹⁰² Tschumi.com: [projects/3/#](#)

empted the ‘grid-ribbon’ sketches of *Parc*’s origins in *La Case Vide* (1986), as well as the playlist for *Parc*’s 1992 Fireworks: a dozen surging sealines of progress between beating hearted atolls of anchorage [**Figure 56** nearby].



Figure 56 : Ribbons¹⁰³

But *Parc* was more than that. Parisian *Parc*’s surrealist-soul was Russian. The cinematographer Sergei Eisenstein’s concept of montage was “[pivotal](#)” for Creator-Tschumi’s endeavours (Charitonidou 2020, 17), but *Parc*’s *folies* were also “indebted to Russian Constructivism” (Frampton 1992, 313). In the same way that Vladimir Tatlin’s *Tower* (1920) relied on the innovations of the Eiffel Tower, ‘mimicked’ the Tower of Babel, and “criticised the old” by slanting the new structure, Creator-Tschumi “adopted” the “ready-made” language of the Russians, and by association, their “architectural revolution” (Vidler 1992, 109 & 110). Hearts and soul aside, *Parc* knew its bones were made of Tatlin’s red-skeleton, but also the *Architectural Fantasies* (1933) of Iakov Chernikov [Helal in Chupin 2015, 239] with “hints” of the Russian Revolution [theatre](#) work by Lyubov Popova¹⁰⁴ [**Figure 57** nearby]. Whilst *Parc* felt these lines and ligaments were an inheritance that helped it stand tall in the new

“...the juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot - as it does a creation.”
(Eisenstein 1975 [1942], 7)

¹⁰³ Image sources: (Eco 1989, 71); author’s photograph of Tschumi’s *La Case Vide*; & Tschumi.com, [FireworksatParcdelaVillette](#)

¹⁰⁴ Slessor (2022), denzeen.com, [TheVeryIdeaOfDeconstructivism](#)

dawn, others, such as Catherine Slessor, were unimpressed. She described *Parc's folies* as “Shamelessly pilfered”, the “self-indulgent [...] stylistic hurrah” of a “fever dream”, out of step with more urgent real-life priorities (2022, n.p.).




Figure 57 : Russian beams & bones¹⁰⁵

In the low light of a new day, *Parc* was waking, awakening, awake, a-wake, but worried. With three dozen beating hearts, and steel beams as strong bones, surely *Parc* was more than an unrealistic fever dream. More than the sea-surge of someone else's revolutionary progress. *Parc* was as real as reality.

Wasn't it?

Parc, like dawn, dithered... so much remained unclear.

* * *

¹⁰⁵ Image sources: [Iakov Chernikhov. Arkhitekturnye fantazii 1933 MoMA](#) and [Russia's stage revolution: when theatre was a hotbed for impossibly space-age design | Design | The Guardian](#)



Figure 58 : Tristan Tzara cut up poem¹⁰⁶

* * *

8.2 MORNING MADNESS: Folly-folie (Creator-Tschumi)

Long before *Parc* was *Parc*, Creator-Tschumi was already daydreaming of misadventure. Not the breeched-tree or red-raw-scabby-knee sort either. Nor the sort that makes people blush (though that would [come](#)). Creator-Tschumi's big dreams were combined with serious doubts. The student riots of Paris-1968 made him question all authority, including his own, and as such, Creator-Tschumi declared he would build nothing until he knew what he was doing (Gunzelman *et al.* 2003, 13). Build nothing, that is, except mountains made of [moleskin](#); drawings upon drawings upon drawings... words upon words upon words.

¹⁰⁶ Image source: author's own experiment

As Creator-Tschumi carries his coffee into his home-office, memories fall from his mind and filing cabinet, conjured and forgotten...

In the early 1970s, Creator-Tschumi (in)sincerely declared himself “the first” to use narrative texts by Poe, Kafka, Borges, and Calvino as programmes for architectural [student] projects (Tschumi *et al.* 1985, 23). These experiments “were crucial” to his thought processes and would influence the [genesis](#) of *Parc*’s story (Kaji-ogradi 2008, 49).

During the late 1970s, Creator-Tschumi was drawing drawings titled *The Manhattan Transcripts* (1981) [**Figure 59** nearby] which transcribed “an architectural interpretation of reality.”¹⁰⁷ Creator-Tschumi was [content](#) playing a game of de-(re-)constructing the city using a storyboard technique of “[grafted](#) fragments of a vaguely familiar architecture” which evoked a whole, without “becoming burdened by its [order](#)” (Betsky 1990, 66). Cut... paste... draw... erase... square... square... square... square... the backing-track of beating-hearts-to-be... Creator-Tschumi feels it now as the caffeine kicks in. Just as Creator-Tschumi acknowledged that Frederick Olmstead’s *Central Park* in New York was “‘hypotext’ for the contemporary ‘hypertext’ of the *Transcripts*”, a model “that could either be *adapted* or *transformed*” (Tschumi 1996, 187), *Transcripts* would go on to become Tschumi’s hypotext for *Parc*. Under, over, around and about...

Creator-Tschumi was inspired by more than just cut-and-paste images, however. Creator-Tschumi enjoyed the pleasure of cut-and-paste words. [Stimulated](#) by Roland Barthes’s *The Pleasure of the Text* (1973), and how pleasure arrives indirectly, “tenuous, almost scatterbrained” – “the way a fly buzzes around a room: with sudden, deceptively decisive turns, fervent and futile” (Barthes 1990, 24 & 31), Creator-Tschumi wrote his essay *The Pleasure of Architecture* (c. 1977), as a series of rosy-hued fragments. Some float past now, “The

“I have completed the construction of my [burrow](#) and it seems to be successful [...] True, some ruses are so subtle that they defeat themselves...” (Kafka *The Burrow* 2017 [1931], 325)

“The philosopher was seated on the lawn. He said: ‘Signs form a language, but not the one you think you know’.” (Calvino, 1979 [1972], 40)

“Let us admit what all idealists admit: the hallucinatory nature of the world. Let us do what no idealist has done: seek unrealities which confirm that nature.” (Borges *Avatars of the Tortoise*, 1970 [1962], 243).

Figure 59

“The text is a fetish object, and this fetish desires me” (Barthes 1973, 27).

“In abandoning the Cartesian paradigm, we must also abandon the belief that we own our own minds.” (Robinson 2011, 129)

¹⁰⁷ Tschumi.com, [TheManhattanTranscripts](#)

ultimate pleasure of architecture lies in the most forbidden parts of the architectural act; where limits are perverted and prohibitions are *transgressed*” and in lieu of a “metaphorical paradise” there is “discomfort and the unbalancing of expectations” (Tschumi 1996, 91-92). Creator-Tschumi’s dreams get darker, when he titles his fourth fragment ‘Metaphor of Order-Bondage’, writing that architectural styles and their rules, become ‘[binding](#) laws’ akin to knotted ropes, which create a “paralysing constraint”, or, if ‘[manipulated](#)’ can become endowed with “the erotic significance of bondage”, such that, “the more numerous and sophisticated the [restraints](#), the greater the pleasure” (88). Creator-Tschumi laughs loudly as the fragments vibrate up, down, up, down...

Still playing games with this dark pleasure while ‘building nothing’, Creator-Tschumi invented *Advertisements for Architecture* (1976-7) [**Figure 60** below] and filled them with transgressive messages which celebrate architecture as “the enjoyment of negotiating (and sometimes violating) ever more complex [constraints](#)” (Tschumi 1996, 34-35).




Figure 60 : Tschumi's "Advertisements for Architecture" (1976-7) ¹⁰⁸

A gust of wind blows in through the open window, and more fragments arrive, arise, aroused. This time they come from the essay *The Architectural Paradox* (1975-6), and the weight of

¹⁰⁸ Image source: Designmanifestos.org, [BernardTschumiAdvertisementsForArchitecture](http://Designmanifestos.org/BernardTschumiAdvertisementsForArchitecture)

their words knocks over Creator-Tschumi's coffee cup, leaving a bitter stain. Creator-Tschumi pouts, "Most people concerned with architecture feel some sort of disillusion or dismay. None of the early utopian ideals of the twentieth century has materialised, [...] Blurred by reality, the ideals have turned into redevelopment nightmares" (1996, 27). Creator-Tschumi worries that opposites in architecture such as "structure and chaos, ornament and purity, permanence and change, reason and intuition", are "fought over" when they are often actually "complementary" (43). "Like eroticism", Creator-Tschumi thinks, "architecture needs both system and excess" (50).

Yet more fragments from this time float by. They reveal when Creator-Tschumi moved into misadventure of the comely sort. Here, in *Architecture and Transgression* (1976), Creator-Tschumi gives eroticism a deviant twist and describes his visit in 1965 to Le Corbusier's *Villa Savoy* when it was derelict, stinking of urine and defiled by obscene graffiti (1996, 63). "Villa Savoy", the fragments state, "was never so [moving](#) as when plaster fell off its concrete blocks" ... "the distinction between argument and metaphor becomes blurred" (74). This blurred zone becomes "*the rotten point*, the very point that taboos and culture have always rejected", and it is within this "metaphorical rot" that architecture lies (76). Creator-Tschumi's brain fogs with fragments. "It is my contention", words whisper-wipe Creator-Tschumi's crinkled nose, "that the *moment of architecture* is that moment when architecture is life and death at the same time, when the experience of space becomes its own concept" (74).

Whilst some might see Creator-Tschumi's approach as "sacrilegious", Creator-Tschumi cares not, he's always found "pleasure and beauty in the rotting corpse of Modernism's first born" (Hejduk 2007, 395-6). It is "eROTic", "because it no longer represents the great white hope of Modernism [...] It can no longer reproduce" (400). The defiled *Villa Savoy* ignited in Creator-Tschumi a red-[hot](#) "sadistic pleasure" (400).

Creator-Tschumi leaned into this sadism when he dreamed up the mad-hearts of *Parc*, those once-were-cubes, stretched and hacked to conform to a Procrustean Bed of his ideological making. Each of the *folies* was based on a 10m x 10m x 10m cube and then pushed, pulled, pinched and punched to become a "[decomposition](#)" of the original (Tschumi 1996, 183). Moreover, "No permutation is 'innocent'", all modifications shift meaning (186), and the more unstable those meanings, the better.

What *Parc* did not know, even in awakening, was that Creator-Tschumi was not really interested in creating a park. He loved cinema because it introduced “discontinuity [...] thereby permitting a multiplicity of combinations” (Tschumi 1996, 197). It was this multiplicity which Creator-Tschumi wanted to expand to *all* meaning. Creator-Tschumi felt that terms such as ‘park’ and ‘architecture’ had lost their universal meaning; *Parc* need not be an ideal, but something “in constant production, in continuous change, its meaning is never fixed but is always [Derrideanly §4.1.5] deferred, differed, rendered irresolute by the multiplicity of meanings it inscribes” (201). *Parc* was not a park. *Parc* was not any(one)thing. *Parc* was conceived as in-conceived. *Parc* was, therefore, born unborn, (un)real; every-thing and as such, no-thing.

What Creator-Tschumi knew, but *Parc* did not, was that *Parc*’s beating hearts were vacuums not pumps which “destabilise meaning, the meaning of meaning” (Derrida 1986, 69). *La Folie* is “the allegorical hypostasis of Unreason, non-sense” whilst *les folies* were ‘the *madnesses*’, and whilst Creator-Tschumi’s *folies* belonged primarily to the latter, they still held a sense of a ‘double metonymy’ (65). Moreover, this game of hearts was a, “Pledge but also wager, symbolic order and gamble: those red cubes are thrown like the dice of architecture. [...] it anticipates the architecture to come. It runs the risk and gives us the chance” (75). How much more freakish would *Parc* feel if it knew its hearts were nothing but playthings to be thrown about in the mouths and minds of others?

If “what is my purpose?” was a question *Parc* could ask his maker, Creator-Tschumi might mischievously distract *Parc* with a “why ask such a thing? Clearly, you’re not thinking clearly... have you gone mad?” Because madness and its transformative power, had crept into Creator-Tschumi’s bones and beams during those years of ‘building nothing’. Undoubtedly, Creator-Tschumi had grown increasingly comfortable with embracing madness, indeed, his work “invite[d] freedom through a violation of the conventional” (Chapman 2013, 300).

This was, in part, due to Creator-Tschumi’s interest in the philosopher Michel Foucault’s book *Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1961). This “unbelievably important” book (Tschumi in Dwyre *et al.* 2015, 14) convinced Creator-Tschumi that madness is a constant. ‘Good’ architecture, Creator-Tschumi felt, included typologies, dogmas, and rationalism, *but*

“If folly leads each man into a blindness where he is lost, the madman, on the contrary, reminds each man of his truth...” (Foucault 1965 [1961], 25)

“Unreason is in the same relation to reason as dazzlement to the brightness of daylight itself. And this is not a metaphor.” (Foucault 1965 [1961], 25)

also the possibility, of a role for the “lunatics, deviants, and criminals” (Tschumi 1996, 175). Only Creator-Tschumi can know how much his [designs](#) for *Parc* are indebted to a Foucaultean-frame in which *Parc*’s beating hearts are a form of psychoanalytical ‘contamination’ caused by society’s “dislocated condition” (174-5). An inflicted infection of boils, pustules, and raised red hives only a fetish could love.

If *Parc* knew what Creator-Tschumi knew, *Parc* would shudder in the shrinking shadows, as should The Visitor who approaches from the periphery.

* * *




Figure 61 : Architectural ruins ¹⁰⁹

* * *

8.3 MIDDAY TORTURE: The rapture of rupture (*The Visitor*)

The Visitor arrives at *Parc* and casts a shadow upon his own feet, no further. The midday sun is a torment to him, here, in the middle of this sea of grass. Even the red cubes in the distance scream ‘[hot box](#)’. The Visitor goes by a variety of *nom de plumes* including Anthony Vidler, Aaron Betsky, Robin Evans, Peter Blundell Jones, Tom Turner and Jean Baudrillard.

¹⁰⁹ Image sources: Van der Velde, Archdaily.org, [ImagesOfAbandonedInsaneAsylums](#); Archiwik.org, [VillaSavoyeAbandoned](#); & (stretched) Lesitedelevenementiel.com, [LaFolieL5](#)

Curious, The Visitor thinks as he glances at the glazed-sky-ceiling and the other visitors taking notes on the mown-field; no women.

Even before The Visitor arrived at *Parc*, he was primed to experience the setting in a certain way. He had been to the 1988 exhibition *Deconstructivist Architecture*, held at the *Museum of Modern Art*, New York, and co-curated by Peter Johnson and Mark Wigley. He had read in the accompanying catalogue, “This is an architecture of disruption, dislocation, deflection, deviation, dismantling, decay, decomposition and disintegration. It displaces structure rather than destroying it. [...] What is finally so unsettling about such is precisely that the form not only survives its torture but appears all the stronger for it. Perhaps the form is even produced by it” (Wigley in Johnson & Wigley 1988, 17). In this light, *Parc*’s slick, bright red *folies*, can be seen as traditional forms flayed, skin torn from exposed muscle, ripples and ripples of flying flesh [**Figure 62** below].

“‘Remembering’ as a pun may of course have two senses – it is an act of memory, but it is also the opposite of dismembering. [...] we can read, after all, only in fragments – and [make] them into an organic whole in [our] mind” (Atwood 2002, 149).




Figure 62: Fountains of flesh¹¹⁰

For The Visitor, tradition, like muscle, remains evident even after, or because of, the flaying. The Visitor can recognise the implicit force and forms of Russian constructivists and German expressionists, most notably in the memory of Creator-Tschumi’s axonometric drawings with their twisted and broken codes (Vidler 1992, 106). Looking deeper into the many hearts of *Parc*, The Visitor acknowledges that ‘the point’ of the *folies* was to create a recurring

¹¹⁰ Image sources: Vellut, Flickr.com: [0/28341364263/](https://www.flickr.com/photos/vellut/0/28341364263/) ; Addictedtodesignnet.blogspot.com, [ParcdelaVillette](https://www.addictedtodesignnet.blogspot.com/2012/03/parcdelaVillette.html); & (cropped) Eutouring.com, [PhotographsOfParcdelaVillette](https://www.eutouring.com/parcdelaVillette)

‘physical point’ which was also a ‘point of reference’ (literally in park-space, and metaphorically to the madness of contemporary cultural values). *Parc*’s hearts, in other words, were points making a point about modernity having no point. A constant non-constant. The Visitor pulls a notebook from his pocket and after glancing at a *folie* writes, “An object fully expressed without a function to [express](#)” (110). These red cubes may well have been the pulse and purpose of *Parc*, but The Visitor recognises them as Creator-Tschumi had intended, “counters in an elaborate and arbitrary architectural game” (103).

Laughing quietly to himself, The Visitor remembers how Creator-Tschumi once said he would prefer to be known as a ‘statement architect’ rather than a ‘signature’ one (Gunzelman *et al.* 2003, 19). Ironic, given how Creator-Tschumi has fashioned *folie*-red into a recurring motif, from his ubiquitous red scarf to his book covers, the red bridge at *La Roche-sur-Yon* and the red stairs and corridors of the *Athletics Centre*, Cincinnati. Whether intended or not, all this blood-red repetition created a [brand](#); a signature burnt into flesh!

The Visitor finds himself [impressed](#) by the intellectualism of Creator-Tschumi’s achievement and the way in which it created an artificial world with an internal logic *and* a “certain madness, violence, or even mystery” (Betsky 1990, 66). The “built craziness, the antithesis of order” (68) felt like it was “the architectural equivalent of [...] psychoanalytical transference” from a situation in which “the whole city is sick” from its pursuit of rationalism (67). “Yes”, The Visitor says into the whipping-wind, Creator-Tschumi’s *Parc* is “the most complete statement of an architecture of violated perfection ever constructed” (68).

The wind, turning willy-nilly, destabilises The Visitor’s point of view. Remembering back to Creator-Tschumi’s *Manhattan* manifesto, The Visitor recognises its “intoxicating ambitions” and decides, “There will be an architecture if not capable of incitement to murder, then at least hospitable to it; here will be madness in architecture, which will lead us to recognise things desired yet disturbing” (Evans 2000, 85). A moment later, however, The Visitor becomes sceptical, because it cannot be automatically assumed that if “Something has been broken, so something has been attacked, metaphorically” (102). Sweating, even in the wind, The Visitor [struts](#) towards a red cube in the hope of finding some striped shade. He looks up at the *folie* and then down to his notebook; “it reminds me of the idea of instability. I know that is what it is intended to signify, although it looks quite firm, just as the reinforcement bars extending from the top of a column represent incompleteness, though neatly finished” (87).

Inspired, he keeps writing, his pen grinding into the paper; “I would be lying if I said that the folies’ redness recalled the century of mechanised slaughter in the old La Villette abattoirs. [...] Toys and buses parked in a pleasant pasture come more readily to mind than thoughts of madness and violation” (87). The Visitor determines the *folies* “convey meaning, [but] they do not produce it except in contradiction of announced ambitions” (87). The ultimate irony, The Visitor decides, is that *Parc* “is far less intensely transgressive than [the] [butchery](#) which it replaces” (87). The Visitor underlines this last sentence with a flourish.

Cursing quietly as his pen leaks blue ink onto his fingers, The Visitor wipes the nib across the back of his hand to try to clear it. He realises that Creator-Tschumi wanted to create a work empty of meaning, however, “The trouble is that the follies are anything but empty” (Blundell Jones 2012, n.p.). Moreover, The Visitor thinks, transgressing rules and torturing tradition, might have backfired; “The breaking enhances their importance” (n.p.). The Visitor sighs and wipes his fingers down his jeans, then writes, more slowly this time, that whilst it is true that the superimposition of Creator-Tschumi’s design approach results in “any number of bizarre and unexpected combinations” that *might* produce Creator-Tschumi’s desired effect, “those of us who believe architecture a less haphazard business have our doubts” (n.p.).

An hour later, having walked past one *folie* after another, The Visitor worries that he is missing something; “dreary expanse of flat grass [...] Several cheerful red structures, somewhat resembling cranes, can be glimpsed among the trees. [...] some can be climbed, but the views they offer are unremarkable” (Turner 1996, 210). Feeling ambivalent towards his surroundings, The Visitor glances at his [watch](#). It is time to meet his lunch-date. Tucking his notebook into his pocket he reaches up to smooth his hair and laments the contrivance of it all; mown grass, weeded shrubs, piped water, an abattoir-site left “dead beyond the [scope](#) of ethic” rather than being “brought back to life” via the potential of a new ecosystem (214).

The Visitor takes one last look across the hot landscape which torments him, then turns towards the café for his rendezvous. He is enticed further and further inside by the big screen TV on the back wall. *Parc*, he whispers under his breath, has “got the [ghosts](#) of architecture [...] But where’s the drama? We get the impression we’re watching repeats of overly [tame](#) sequences and special effects in closed circuit stereo” (Baudrillard 2003, 73).

From across the room, The Visitor's date waves enthusiastically, and both big-screen and big-park are forgotten.

* * *



Figure 63 : Flayed forms¹¹¹

* * *

8.4 AFTERNOON MURDER: Architecture as death (*The Ghost of Roland*)

The Ghost of Roland pauses on the street corner opposite *Parc* and remembers the day he died. Killed by a truck filled with other people's [dirty laundry](#) - imagine! The great Roland Gérard Barthes, semiologist, philosopher, literary critic, and author of *The Death of the Author* (1967), dead because he stepped in front of a truck while walking the streets of

¹¹¹ Utilises images referenced in §C3,5 &6 & Tschumi.com, [ParcdelaVillette](#)

Paris.¹¹² He would never admit to anyone that it was probably the wine at monsieur Mitterrand's lunch that had done him in, not the truck. The irony would be too great, given that one of his essays from *Mythologies* (1957) was titled 'Bread and Milk' and spoke of how wine was "a totem drink" for the French (2009, 65). A totem, sure, he had written, but engaging in such a mythological version of wine was dangerous, because the myth was "not innocent" (68). So much of 'French' wine was made in Algeria by Muslims who abhor alcohol, their crops and cattle pushed aside by French capitalism. Not innocent either, given that wine was so bad for your health... so bad for street-crossings.

The Ghost of Roland arrives at *Parc* while smoking his invisible cigar. He lifts a fog-filled hand to greet the Rubik's-red-cubes that had been all the [rage](#) when Roland was still alive. *Parc* replies with a bow of bent grass and waving branches. The two are old friends. Roland died in 1980 while *Parc* was derelict and waiting to be (in)conceived, and then, soon after, *Parc* was pace-able by The Ghost of Roland's ever-roving feet. They made an odd couple; *Parc* who was never meant to [mean](#) 'park', and the ghostly semiologist who loved demonstrating the meanings behind meaning.

As he paced *Parc*'s promenade, The Ghost of Roland remembered *The Death of the Author* (1967), and his contention that "to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth [that the writer is the only person in literature that matters]: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author" (1977, 148). The Ghost remembered too how, in *Writing Degree Zero* (1953), he had mentioned how the Surrealists' self-destruction of literature was a myth, that no writing "can be lastingly revolutionary" (2012, 75), however, their approach did have "the very structure of suicide [...] and sets [words and art] off less as a fragment of a cryptogram than as a light... a void, a murder, a freedom" (76).

"Adolf, I think it is fair to say that Ornament and Crime has all the features of a murder weapon. As the functional knives of modernity, ornament and crime were used to slash away the surplus flesh of a decaying culture." (Koen Deprez in Grafe 2006, 109)

"Hmph! This is not about me", The Ghost of Roland mumbles, "I am here to help *Parc* understand *Parc*." Using the blurred space-time-continuum that was open to the likes of him, The Ghost said, "To really appreciate architecture, you may even need to [commit](#) a murder" [Tschumi 1978, *Architectural Advertisement* – **Figure 64a** nearby¹¹³]. The Ghost

¹¹² Wikipedia.org: [RolandBarthes](#)

¹¹³ Image source: Tschumi.com, [AdvertisementsForArchitecture](#)

sensed *Parc* [wilt](#) and tried to explain; Creator-Tschumi felt that “the most common formula plot [is] the archetype of murder” and that, “perhaps all architecture, rather than being about functional standards, is about love and death” (Tschumi 1996, 7). The Ghost and *Parc* ‘remembered’ together disparate images from Creator-Tschumi’s *The Manhattan Transcripts* (1981) in which he chose pictures carefully framed in a way that relied on connotative chains, so that, ‘man sprawled on grass = murder victim’ [**Figure 64b** below].




Figure 64 : Tschumi's architectural murders¹¹⁴

The Ghost of Roland remembered more fragments written by Creator-Tschumi and whispered them into *Parc*'s presence. “There is no architecture without violence” (Tschumi 1996, 121). This violence is “fundamental and unavoidable [...] in the same way that the guard is linked to the prisoner, the police to the criminal, the doctor to the patient, order to chaos” (121-2). Inevitable, since human bodies ‘[disturb](#)’, ‘intrude’ and ‘violate’ architectural space, order and purity (123), and this human interaction is a form of event which explicitly or implicitly, transgresses the rules of architecture, and vice versa (132).

Parc sighs with the wind as The Ghost of Roland speaks, and The Ghost is almost certain he sees flowers withering before his [opaque](#) eyes. The Ghost waits a moment, then

¹¹⁴ Image source: MoMA.org, [TheManhattanTranscriptsProjectEpisode1ThePark1976-77](#)

explains that Creator-Tschumi's version of violence referred not to "the brutality that destroys physical or emotional integrity", rather, it represents "a metaphor for the intensity of a relationship between individuals and their surroundings spaces" (122). These violations, Creator-Tschumi believed, created tension between architecture and humans which has "deep sensuality" and "an unremittent eroticism"; it was an intense relationship which underlies both rational and irrational forces of architecture, deficient or excessive, hypoactive or hyperactive (130).

The Ghost of Roland couldn't help but [notice](#) how similar Creator-Tschumi's words were to his own writings. Conflicted, The Ghost feels his invisible heart beating in time with *Parc's* three dozen, oscillating between pride and fury... vanity and violation... pleasure and pain... love and death... murder and architecture...

...and then the wind waves *Parc's* parts and The Ghost of Roland vanishes.

Far beyond this realm, beyond *Parc's* hearing, The Ghost of Roland thinks of more murders. 'Murder' is always inevitable in architecture: "Architecture, in its origins, is a destructive force. Trees are cut down, mountains are transformed into [flatlands](#), the earth is [penetrated](#) through the digging of holes for the foundations" (Mateo 2008, 7). As such, the destruction-construction dialectic is not particularly transgressive, The Ghost thinks; it is the norm.

Moreover, the competition for *Parc* was always going to be a death sentence on tradition, given the brief requested that it would generate "if possible, a model for all XX1st century urban parks" (Helal in Chupin 2015, 241). There is something the Ghost of Roland would never tell *Parc*, (he has too much affection for the mythologically unsound), but Creator-Tschumi once spoke of *Parc* as if it were an abomination. 'Deconstructing' architecture, Creator-Tschumi inferred, is always a combination of dismantling concepts and conventions, whilst deriving new forms from elsewhere, a simultaneous murder and revivification. Creator-Tschumi's idea of creation was always "to deconstruct architectural norms in order to reconstruct architecture along different axes" (Tschumi 1996, 185-6), a strategy that may "superficially resemble a variation of the surrealist '[exquisite](#) corpse'" (185).

Sadder still, The Ghost of Roland thinks, is that *Parc* might yet be 'loved to death'. The *avant-garde* always becomes the *arrière-garde*, and *Parc*, might hypothetically be sucked dry by the relentless going-over of the architectural profession, their dissertations and

case studies and speculative narratives. Their attention and affection might make *Parc*'s exquisite corpse settle into *rigor mortis*. *Parc* was not, as Creator-Tschumi openly conceded, “the *hortus conclusus* and not the replica of Nature” (Tschumi 1996, 203), but nor was it “a still life, a *nature morte*” (Vidler 1992, 114). Instead, The Ghost of Roland mused, *Parc* had become a *memento mori*.

* * *



Figure 65 : Murder victims at La Villette¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Image sources: Eutouring.com, [SunbathingInParcdeVillette](#); Vellut, Flickr.com, [Sleeping@Canal@LaVillette](#); & Dürr, Flickr.com, [TheParcdelaVillette](#) combined with authors own line drawings.

8.5 TWILIGHT EXPLOSION: A fractured soul (*The Visitor*)

Even though it is only late in the afternoon, early in the evening, (on a Monday no less), the *Métro* is full. The Visitor mutters profanities under his breath when an old lady glares at him to give up his seat. Couldn't she see *he* was struggling? He moves to another part of the [train](#) carriage, this time annoyed at his own foolishness for thinking today's lunch [date](#) would be no business and all pleasure. His face flares *Parc*-folly-red all over again at the memory of his fumbling pivot when she recoiled from the kiss he tried to plant on her cheek. "Bernard, Bernard, Bernard..." is all she said throughout their meeting. The Visitor felt sure that the only two people who would call Creator-Tschumi 'Bernard' were his mother and...

The Visitor rushes to [snare](#) a vacant seat as the train pulls up at the next station. He glances down at the Mr Bíró-blue stain on his pants-pocket and the green-grass streaks along the hems. "Blue and green should never be seen", he whispers, "without a colour in between". He chews a loose hangnail on his thumb and when a [drop](#) of blood appears, he transfers it to the fabric above his knee, creating a round red dot; "solved". He repeats the action three more times, until he has the four corners of a square. "Ugh", he groans, "a grid", and wipes his other hand across his eyes.

He recalls how his 'date' had prattled on and on, quoting artist Douglas Davis's *Death of Semiotics* (1984) and the notion that architecture had gone through a series of crises, such that the buildings of the 1970s "violated the Modernist insistence on the merging of the signifier and the signified. In its last, most violent phase" she had recounted, "Modern architecture explodes like a red star, spraying its signifiers through the void" (n.p.). Creator-Tschumi's exploded axonometric and *folies*, she had crooned, were '[super stars](#)' [*Figure 66* below].




Figure 66 : La Villette exploded ¹¹⁶

The Visitor remembered how she had also spoken of the semiotically explosive works of those who had inspired Creator-Tschumi. Umberto Eco had called Joyce's work a "dizzying explosion" of linguistic material which "throws imagination, sense and reason, fancy and logic into [discord](#)" (1989, 76). She spoke of the silent, black and white movie *Battleship Potemkin* (1925), by Eisenstein, and how it used montage to show a hungry sailor defiantly [smashing](#) an officer's dinner plate. The mutinous moment, which should take a fraction of a second in real life, lasted longer when the action was multiplied, over and over, from various angles, his arm raised and dropped, raised and dropped. She had even passed The Visitor a photocopy of an 'explosive echo' she had found in the opening of Ayn Rand's *The Fountainhead* (1943):

Howard Roark laughed. | He stood naked at the edge of a cliff. The lake far below him. A frozen explosion of granite burst in flight to the sky over the motionless water. [...] The stone had the stillness of one brief moment in battle when thrust meets thrust and the currents are held in a pause more dynamic than motion" (Rand 2005, 3).

¹¹⁶ Image source: Tschumi.com, [ParcdelaVillette](#)

The architect Roark's nakedness, she explained unnecessarily, prefigured his unadorned designs, whilst the explosion in the [quarry](#) pre-empted the book's main event when Roark blows up a building altered without his permission. She then recounted an article (which sounded like something he had written) in which Creator-Tschumi "admitted that it would be very bad news for him if a consensus interpretation were to arise [regarding *Parc*]: 'I would have to come like Howard Roark in *The Fountainhead* and blow it all up!'" (Blundell Jones 2012, n.p.). The same article, she said, quoted Creator-Tschumi referring to his *folies* as "abstract notations, meta-operational elements, a frozen image, a freeze frame in a process of constant transformation, construction and dislocation" (n.p.). "Do you see the parallel to Rand's contradictory 'frozen-explosion' and 'dynamic-pause'?" she had asked, leaning forward across the table. The Visitor had blushed at the combination of Roark's nakedness and her earnest [angle](#). Even then, he realised, he had still been holding out hope.

A moment later, however, only a thrust-meets-thrust conversation developed. "The fragment is an unavoidable symptom of this tension between architecture and history which designers and writers have appreciated greatly over time", she said, "Yet, the degree to which the fragment dominated the architectural discourse of the twentieth century in particular is remarkable" (Manolopolou 2013, 168). The Visitor agreed; "fracture became the norm, and was the persistent characteristic of texts, films, poems, buildings and art works, as well as psychoanalytic and philosophical thought. Space was simultaneously fractured and dispersed, there was no single permanent meaning" (Evans 2000, 169). Zaha Hadid's design for the *La Villette* competition, she [chimed](#) in, was a case in point [**Figure 67** below].




Figure 67 : Zaha Hadid's "Parc de la Villette" (1982) ¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Image source: MoMA.org, [Zaha Hadid](#)

“Today”, she had continued, Creator-Tschumi believes “we favour a sensibility of the disappearance of unstable images: [...] disjunctions, dislocations, deconstructions” (Tschumi 1996, 217). When the “city and its architecture lose their symbols”, she said, and become instead “fragmentation, parrellisation, atomisation”, they become a “[random](#) superimposition of images that bear no relationship to one another, except through their [collision](#). No wonder that some architectural projects sublimate the idea of *explosion*” (218).

Unexpectedly, she moved to the motive for their meeting; she *must* meet Creator-Tschumi. She had designed an event for *Parc* and needed The Visitor to act as her [conduit](#) to Creator-Tschumi. Slavoj Žižek’s *Event* (2014), she said before he had a chance to reply, describes an event as “something shocking, out of joint, that appears to happen all of a sudden and [interrupts](#) the usual flow of things” (2), something that occurs within the world, but is “*a change of the very frame through which we perceive the world and engage in it*” (10). One of the critical




Figure 68

features of Žižek’s version of the event, she went on, oblivious to his [heaving](#) sigh, is its temporality, “the abrupt reversal of ‘not yet’ [becomes] ‘always-already’”, via a slow change occurring in a ‘subterranean’ manner, “like a [secret](#) spreading of a deadly infection” which then “erupts into the open” and causes the whole status quo to collapse “like a house of cards” (146-7). The Visitor, barely listening, had balked at Žižek’s mixed metaphors that included lava-like danger, contamination, and parlour tricks. He had to admit, however, that as strange as they were, the metaphors nonetheless resonated with Creator-Tschumi’s ideologies of infection and [collapse](#), and his built forms which erupted irrationally, yet convincingly, out of their surroundings [**Figure 68** nearby¹¹⁸].

She kept talking. Creator-Tschumi, she had said, defines ‘event’ in the *Transcript*’s prologue as incidences or occurrences which have “an independent existence of their own. Rarely are they purely the consequence of their surroundings. Events have their own logic, their own [momentum](#)” (1994, xxi). She wanted to replicate this approach in her project. She grabbed The Visitor’s hand across the table, “you’ll help – [right](#)?”

All The Visitor could think of in that moment was John Caputo’s *Deconstruction in a Nutshell* (Derrida & Caputo 1997), when he wrote, “A tradition is not a [hammer](#) with which

¹¹⁸ Image source: (cropped) Vellut, Flickr.com, [0/28881740891/](https://www.flickr.com/photos/vellut/28881740891/)

to [slam](#) dissent and [knock dissenters senseless](#), but a *responsibility* to read, to interpret, to sift and select responsibly among many competing [strands](#) of tradition and interpretations of tradition” (37). At *Parc*, tradition is conceived not as a hammer but as a [nail](#). What matters most, The Visitor thought, is the resounding ‘[bang!](#)’ of Creator-Tschumi’s event. *His* event. Not hers.

Still reliving every sentence of their meeting, The Visitor [gets off](#) at station *Cité* and walks east with the tourists. “There she is”, he says as he kicks an empty drink-can skittling across the street and watches as a dog skattles after it. A passerby frowns and the Visitor shrugs, “skittle-skattle-prattle-cattle-cull-skull-[skuttle](#).” He realises that so many of Paris’s monuments are shrouded in scaffolding in the lead up to the Olympics; all that tax-payer money going into hiding behind siding. Reality, he thinks as he watches people try to find a photo-opportunity in vain, rarely matches up with picturesque expectations. He buys himself a packet of cigarettes and a lighter from a kiosk, surprised at the cost. The Visitor coughs “old friend” as he lights one, inhales, exhales, and walks towards *Notre-Dame*, the literal and metaphorical heart of Paris. “City of lovers”, he moans.

Only after the cigarette has burnt low enough to scorch his ink-covered-fingertips, does The Visitor flick the butt in a long, high arc over Our Lady’s timber [hoarding](#), and watches as the wind blows it higher still. He walks towards the waterway and hunches over the guardrail, speaking to his reflection: “hello Quasimodo.” He laughs bitterly when the wretched creature winks back from the surface of the water. “You were used and abused”, he says to his warped face, then burns again when he remembers her laughing at his objections to her planned event, “you’re just jealous that he’s a creator, and you’re just a [critic](#)”. He reaches into his pocket and pulls out his notebook and broken pen. “[Just](#)”, he says as he leans further over the railing and drops both book and biro into the water below, fracturing his face.

* * *



Figure 69 : AI Explosions¹¹⁹

* * *

8.6 EVENING VOID: The poetry of nothingness (Creator-Tschumi)

Propped up against the pillows on his bed, Creator-Tschumi reads aloud the words from Ihab Hasan's work *In Quest of Nothing* (2020): "when it comes to *knowing* final things, we bang our brains to pulp and dust against a cognitive wall. It's not really a wall, not a spandrel either. It is a void, a gap" (108). Creator-Tschumi sighs, tosses the book onto the other side of the bed, and stretches to turn out the lamp. He decides he will give himself one hour to rest before he must leave to meet a friend of a friend for dinner and hear her plans for an event she's proposing.

The unknown woman is a PhD student, and Creator-Tschumi wonders if she is an ex-lover based on the way his friend spoke about her this afternoon. Normally, Creator-Tschumi punishes overstepped boundaries – transgression is *his* thing.

"...I balk again on the brink.
The irrational haunts the
metaphysical. The opposites
meet in the looping sky above
appearances, or in the dark
alley behind appearances,
where danger and power duel
in a blur" (Dillard 1989, 89).

The emptiness of things –
their inconsequence. We
sense this most deeply
when we sense the fullness
of the world's resonance in
the thing. Nothing can echo
with being unless it is
emptied of itself."
(Zwicky 2003, 101)

¹¹⁹ Bing AI art generated from the word prompts: "follie at Parc de la Villette exploding" and "red metallic cube on green grass exploding into fireworks"

This time, however, he is intrigued. She wants to [host](#) an event [inspired](#) by a [class](#) he once held decades ago. Creator-Tschumi had adopted Edgar Allen Poe's short story *The Masque of the Red Death* (1842) and its narrative structure as the starting point for a student design project. In the story, a group of masked revellers create a procession through sequential rooms, until they reach the last room where, at the stroke of midnight, Death reveals itself in the guise of The Plague. The PhD student was proposing an event at *Parc* where VIP guests in fancy-dress moved from one red *folie* to the next, entertained along the way by minstrels, until the end, when fireworks would be let off to celebrate his next birthday... or was it *Parc*'s? "Same same", he thought as he pulled a cushion over his eyes, not to block out the lacklustre light, but to remind himself to rest.

Suddenly alert, Creator-Tschumi [shifts](#) uncomfortably onto his side and wonders if an event at *Parc* was an anachronism. The whole idea of his design had been aimed "at an architecture that *means nothing*, an architecture of the signifier rather than the signified – one that is [pure trace](#), a [play](#) of language. In a Nietzschean manner, La Villette moves toward interpretative infinity" (Tschumi 1996, 203). Even his friend had written that "the folly is, on one level, genuinely a meaningless object, a reassemblage of once-meaningful terms to make a nonsense out of them" ... they "hold no [...] symbolic connotations" (Vidler 1992, 110).

"Did you know that when the Mona Lisa vanished briefly from the Louvre in 1911, hundreds lined up to see her empty place on the wall? Including Kafka."
(Hasan 2010, 231).

"I do not do meaning in architecture", Creator-Tschumi says as he rolls again onto his back and adjusts the cushion over his eyes (Tschumi in Gunzelman *et al.* 2003, 35). He remembered back to *The Manhattan Transcripts* (1981); I was "testing as I was drawing", at a time before computers were common, which meant that making drawings included "much scratching and erasing, [...] you would erase and draw again and the paper would get really [thin](#)" (in Dwyre *et al.* 2015, 12). Thin, thin, in, in, out, out, empty, empty... he tries to practice his mindful breathing exercises to slow his heartrate and mind.

He rolls onto his other side, remembering Peter Eisenman playing his own games of erasure. For a 1970 double issue of *Design Quarterly*, eleven artists and architects were invited to articulate their understanding of ‘Conceptual Architecture’. Eisenman had submitted ‘Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition’ – five pages of blankness, with only the title and [footnotes](#) visible. Creator-Tschumi admired the [stroke](#) of genius. The essay later became a design influence for a contemporary [exhibition](#) titled *Take Note* (2010), held in Montreal. For the exhibition, Sylvia Lavin recalled that Eisenman prepared his essay on presence-and-absence, but at the last minute, felt his text did not explain his intentions, so he removed everything but the footnotes¹²⁰ [**Figure 70** below].

“We are standing on the edge of an abyss that had long been invisible: the being of language only appears from itself with the disappearance of the subject”
(Foucault 1998, 149)




Figure 70 : Peter Eisenman's "Conceptual Architecture" (1970)¹²¹

¹²⁰ CCA.qc.ca, [TakeNote](#)

¹²¹ Image sources: socs-studio.com, [PeterEisenmanNotesOnConceptualArchitecture](#) & CCA.qc.ca, [TakeNote](#)

In a similarly performative way, Creator-Tschumi remembered that Anthony Vidler had apparently once “[opened](#) a lecture at the Architectural Association speaking to the blank screen: ‘As you may see, my first slide is a slide of utopia...’” (Deriu in Borden 2014, 78).

*“When language arrives at its own edge, what it finds is not a positivity that contradicts it but the void that will efface it. Onto that void it must go, consenting to come undone in the rumbling, [...] where words endlessly unravel.”
(Foucault 1998, 152)*

Walter Benjamin said, “The destructive character knows only one watchword: make room; only one activity: [clearing](#) away” (1979, 157). This destructive character, Benjamin stated, sees nothing as permanent and reduces everything to [rubble](#), not to make a mess, but to break a way through (158-9). Similarly, Creator-Tschumi himself often implied that tradition must be swept aside to make room for new designs and new meanings. He had a predilection for theoretical crisis, “the violence of architecture also contains the possibility of change, of renewal” (Tschumi 1996, 132).

Creator-Tschumi always wanted *Parc* to be a blank slate, a new [playing field](#), made by “ignoring built precedents so as to begin from a neutral mathematical configuration or ideal topological configurations” into which he then placed his three [autonomous](#) and abstract systems of points, lines, and [surfaces](#), and allowed them to “*contaminate* one another when superimposed” (Tschumi 1996, 187). The void created the perfect ‘breeding ground’ for new developments and new understanding. Surely a masquerade ball was the wrong sort of performative event, filled with spectacle rather than nothingness. Although, he muses, still enjoying the idea of a party, if the spectacle emphasises the contemporary plague of VIPs... Creator-Tschumi wonders if he can convince the PhD student to lean that way, given they tended to be notoriously opposed to leaning...

As he starts to drift off to sleep, Creator-Tschumi recalls the ancient Greek belief that everything “starts with an empty universe” (Fry 2017, vii). Daedalus, the mythical man who made an a-mazing maze and escaped it by flying over the [abyss](#) was [proof](#) that the value of knowledge is to know-(the)-ledge and exploit it. This simultaneity of certainty and ambiguity helps architecture stay alive, Creator-Tschumi thinks as he falls deeper... Offering nothing might be a missed opportunity... or else... trying to say so much without actually saying anything at all risks making *Parc* the epitome of bloviation.

*Cosmologists tell us that it is darkness we float upon. We know that this essential darkness underlies all of life, a fact which poets of all ages have long known.”
(Robinson 2011, 90).*

A [siren](#) drags Creator-Tschumi from his sleep. Ambulance? Police? Fire truck? He tries to ignore it, but now there is the sound of another siren, and another. Creator-Tschumi sits up and glances at the bedside clock; 7pm. There's no point trying to rest in the cacophony. Whatever's happening must be serious. He wanders into his office and stares out the window at the Parisian streets below. They are awash with lights red, white and blue; liberty, fraternity, egalitarianism. His [mobile](#) phone is buzzing urgently on the table. He reads the messages and hastily fires off a few of his own. His dinner date cancelled (that event will have to wait), he grabs his jacket and red scarf and rushes onto the street to join the growing crowds and is promptly swallowed by the impending gloom.

* * *




Figure 71 : Erasure¹²²

* * *

8.7 MIDNIGHT: Filling the void (*Parc*)

Parc is still holding its breath as midnight approaches. Trying to distract itself from nihilistic thoughts, *Parc* remembers how the PhD student had placed her hands on the hot metal of one of its three dozen hearts and reverently quoted, not Creator-Tschumi, but the other architect, Louis Kahn, “the sun never knew how great it was until it hit the side of a building” (Quirk 2012, n.p.). That a building

“We both understood that society, though it may countenance artifice and deception, still abhors a vacuum” (Hasan 2010, 237).

¹²² Image sources: (2023) Widewalls.ch: [BanksyMuralInLAGoesToAuction](#) & Rikard (2019-21), tmag.tas.gov.au: [ExtinctionStudies](#)

could be so important! Amused, *Parc* thinks, I am my own muse. Before *Parc* was *Parc*, it was a wasteland, a slaughterhouse, a killing field, farmland, forest, sea-bed... *Parc* is ancient... [eternal](#). It needed no sun to reflect its glory, and no human could violate its perfection with their presence, no matter what The Ghost of Roland said. No human could last long enough to be nuisance enough. Human lives were so short, like first blooms, sun showers, autumn leaves, snow melt, they come and then they go. Only The Ghost had staying presence, and *Parc* knows that is the rare result of an accident...

“...the bloody fingerprint of a murderer on the page of a book says more than the text” (Walter Benjamin as quoted in Chapman 2013, 296).

Earlier, when he had been thinking of ancient buildings and the brevity of humans and the eternity of nature, *Parc* had overheard a gaggle of girls lamenting their lack of liberty. It was with them in mind, that he had later imagined all the women of Paris meeting in the forecourt of *Our Lady* to burn their bras. Thinking back on it now, *Parc* felt as if the thought might have jinxed the night’s proceedings.

“By day Structuralists constructed the structure of meaning [...] By night, Deconstructivists pulled the cortical edifice down. And the next day the Structuralists started in again” (Wolfe 1981, 101).

Parc’s second thought, when the smoke had filled the sky, related to The Ghost of Roland – his ephemeral cigar and his essay ‘The Eiffel Tower’ (1964). The Ghost had investigated the oneiric function of the “[useless](#)” tower, and suggested it was an ‘empty signifier’, not because it meant nothing, but because it could mean anything; the tower “attracts meaning, the way a lightning rod attracts thunderbolts” (Barthes 1983, 238).

“Like seeds, metaphors have entailments that germinate relative to our individual and cultural situation” (Robinson 2011, 60).

Parc had seen what The Visitor had written in his notebook, suggesting that each of *Parc*’s three dozen hearts whilst ‘genuinely meaningless objects’, on another level, were precisely calculated for their own purposes; “Empty or full of one activity or another, it is still full of architectural meaning; or rather, paraarchitectural significance” (Vidler 1992, 110). On another page The Visitor had written, “there is an architecture of architecture. Down even to its archaic foundation, the most fundamental concept of architecture has been [constructed](#). [...] It did not fall from the sky [...] The architecture of architecture has a history”, and moreover, “there is no work of architecture without interpretation” (Derrida 1986, 65 & 69).

“Nobody really manages to create a clean sheet, not to deliver a deconstructed conceptual space, divested of the dead connotations of architecture and everyday life.” (Baudrillard 2003, 69).

Even Creator-Tschumi had acknowledged that the title for his collection of drawings, *La Case Vide* (1986), his “*folio-folie*” (3), came from the idea that a ‘case vide’ is “an empty [slot](#) or box in a chart or matrix, an unoccupied square in a chessboard, a blank compartment”, a pre-data point open to endless permutations, each of which can be “distorted, fragmented or endlessly repeated” (3). The ‘empty spot’, therefore, was anything but voidal.

The human mind is versatile, moody and promiscuous, *Parc* thinks; there is no guarantee which way it will go. *Parc* was a destination not a motivation, a *built* game of philosophical ideologies not just a game of empty slots. Creator-Tschumi might have conceived his creature to have ‘no meaning’ but percipients provide meaning regardless. As Hans Blumenberg had suggested, the legitimacy of ‘absolute metaphors’ “appears to spring from a mental *horror vacui*” (Blumenberg 2010, 125).

Whilst Creator-Tschumi had once suggested that *Parc*’s gridded structure “inherently suggests the [bars](#) of the asylum or prison” via “a diagram of order in the disorder of reality” (1996, 179), the risk was always that the grid and bars remained *diagrammatic* rather than *real*. *Parc* seriously doubted humans ‘inherently’ imagined prison bars as they walked across the open lawn. But *Parc* also doubted its *folie*-hearts could be deemed, as Kenneth Frampton described all of deconstructivism, “elitist and detached, testifying to the self-alienation of an avante garde without a cause” (1992, 313).

Whether Creator-Tschumi aimed to be non-referential, or specifically denotive, ‘other’ references always invaded *Parc*’s presence – be they flayed flesh, construction cranes, toy buses, the *Tatlin Tower*, the circle-square ambiguity of the corpse of the *Villa Savoy* – all reinforcing or undermining Creator-Tschumi’s intentions. Moreover, the repetition of deconstruction’s fragmented, dismembered, and negated designs, all drifted from a preference for chaotic multivalency, or absolute non-meaning, towards potential tautology. *Parc* wondered if it risked becoming a park whose attempted ‘murder’ represented not so much an ‘extermination’ of meaning but a slow slide towards oblivion regardless.

“The [approach](#) behind La Villette suggests meeting points, anchoring points where fragments of dislocated reality can be apprehended”, Creator-Tschumi had written in his essay ‘Madness and the Combative’ (1996, 178). Once reality, or a design, is ‘[apprehended](#)’, its meaning ceases to be ‘on the run’; it is ‘[arrested](#)’ and becomes ‘anchored’ in place. The longer meaning remains fixed, the more rigid it becomes so that even conceptual ideologies of ‘instability’ and ‘chaos’ become ironically stable and orderly. If a fixed meaning is shared

by enough people, *Parc* realised, no matter how subversive it originally was, it may become cliché. Creator-Tschumi himself predicted the risk when he wrote, “For a while the transgression would be real and all-powerful. Yet the transgression of cultural expectations soon becomes accepted. Just as violent surrealist collages inspire advertising rhetoric, the broken [rule](#) is integrated into everyday life” (1996, 130). Until, thinks *Parc*, the rules – or people’s expectations – are broken again.

The Ghost of Roland had once told *Parc* that Benjamin believed the destructive character always positions itself at the ‘[crossroads](#)’ (Benjamin 1979, 159). As such, the architecture of deconstruction, was best understood as a game played at the intersection of sense and non-sense, a two-way bet. Even Creator-Tschumi believed that “Someone’s critical or ironic proof using [absurdist](#) gestures could always become someone else’s [sincere](#) proposal” (1996, 14).

Parc always let The Ghost of Roland ‘explain’ things, not because explanations were required (*Parc* was eternal after all), but because The Ghost of Roland needed a purpose and *Parc* felt sorry for people who have something to say and no one to say it to. *Parc*’s role, it felt... no, it [knew](#)... was to reveal that society, architecture, parks, and their meaning, have, and have not, changed over time [**Figure 72** below].




Figure 72 : Parisian parks¹²³

¹²³ Image sources: Wikimedia.com: [ASundayOnLaGrandeJatte GeorgesSeurat1884](#); & approximately 100 years later, likealocalguide.com: [ParcdelaVillette](#)

Architects of the late twentieth century, including Creator-Tschumi, had attempted to position themselves at the centre of a decentering, to recognise, [resent](#) and rely on, the gravitational pull of history and conceptual precedent. As such, Creator-Tschumi's intention to create an architecture of conceptual (d)rift, anchored by red *folies* floating in a green-grass-abyss relied on chance, madness and wordplay, [conceived](#), perceived and (in)complete. *Parc* recognised that it both benefited and suffered from its architectural ambiguity. It also felt in its steely-bones and three dozen hearts, that no matter how much Creator-Tschumi attempted to liberate it from precedent, *Parc* remained a park... even in darkness it had park-ness... but also the essence of a wasteland, an abattoir, killing field, farmland, forest, sea-bed...

Remembering all that Creator-Tschumi and The Visitor had written, and all that The Ghost of Roland and the PhD student had said, no matter what conclusions they arrived at, *Parc* knew it would go on going-on. Tomorrow the ride-on-mower would look like a *folie* [offspring](#), and the chain-link fence wrapped around one of its hearts would appear as entrails. Or not. *Parc*'s many siblings would go on too; the presence of absence at the *La Grande Arche* (1989), the disembowelled *Pompidou Centre* (1977), the fountains of flayed flesh at the *Philharmonie de Paris* (2015). Further afield, there were even more relatives, built as mad games, tortured and murdered forms that created explosions and voids. So many [splinters](#) scattered across the globe, they might appear as the largest, albeit (dis)continuous, (de)construction ever built.

All '-isms' drift towards 'post-s' to make room for 'neo-s', and even the craziest of follies eventually becomes ordinary – until the next anarchist arrives to violate the peace.

Or not.

Parc could not ignore the billowing smoke of reality any longer. *Our Lady* was burning. The sound of sirens had been replaced by a long eerie silence, now filled with singing. As midnight struck, and Monday the 15th of April 2019 melted into the ink-black sky, the coda of *Ave Maria* rang out and *Parc* realised that in the entirety of its existence, it had never felt more [pointless](#)... and less alone.

* * * * *

PART FOUR: CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 9: “CONCLUSION”

“Metaphor [remains] a kind of enigma” (Aristotle, *On Rhetoric*, Book 3, Chapter 2, Section 12, n.p.).

In one of Hans Blumenberg’s later works, ‘Beyond the Edge of Reality’ (1983), he references Sigmund Freud’s dream in which Freud’s teacher asks him to dissect the lower part of his own body (2020, 558). “In the old teacher’s command”, writes Blumenberg, “lies the metaphor for the impossible: self-dissection” (559). This chapter acknowledges the difficulty of the task but swaps the metaphor to acknowledge that all journeys must come to an end, and a review of the path travelled is helpful for future scholars.

9.1 A NOVEL DISSERTATION

This dissertation started with the ambition of identifying and applying a metaphor model to architectural design and discourse analysis. As investigations progressed, it was revealed that whilst there was no single metaphor theory, two philosophers used the term ‘metaphorology’ with differing levels of enthusiasm, and their two approaches could be utilised to examine architecture. Blumenberg’s metaphorology was a fixed form of analysis, whilst Derrida’s (mis)metaphorology was fluid. When a hybrid model of the two approaches was created, named here as ‘conceptual (d)rift’, it became apparent that metaphor and meaning were far more mobile than originally anticipated.

Utilising this new freedom, the tethers to traditional architectural sources and analysis were stretched and the thesis began to rely on an intertextuality that included semiology and philosophy, but also the written style of selected examples from literature, including novels, poetry and plays. As the case studies progressed, there was an evolving sense of ‘letting loose’ and the formatting became increasingly experimental, blending style and subject to reveal the diversity of possibilities. Wayne Attie states, “The key to effective interpretive criticism is not proof but plausibility” (1978, 49). As such, the stylistic complexities of this dissertation blurred boundaries and leaned into Blumenberg’s preference for “the freedom of digression” (2020, 527) [§3.4.3].

To determine a label for such a dissertation style, insight might be gained from an essay by Madeleine Maaskant and Manet van Montfrans, titled ‘The national museum of Ethnology, a dream’ (2006). They describe a museum director and a designer considering how to organise hundreds of items which span two centuries. The way to proceed, they decide, depends on whether the museum is intended to be “an encyclopaedia or a novel” (in Graffe 2006, 77). Ultimately, the designer approaches the museum’s layout as ‘an encyclopaedic novel’ (77). “We build museums to house history”, writes Ihab Hasan, “but it slips out through cracks of sash and jamb” (2010, 38). Similarly, any stylistic approach that attempted to contain (mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift would likely be subject to ‘leakage’ due to the fluid nature of the material. For this dissertation, the intention was to create an academic response to inquiries that maintained a sense of metaphor’s lyrical nature. As such, the eclectic style adopted could be called a ‘novel dissertation’.

*

In the tenth stanza of Anne Carson’s ever-giving poem *Essay on What I think About Most* (2000) [Appendix One], there is a fragment of another poem, written by the 7th century Spartan poet Alkman, which begins, “[?] made three seasons” (2000, 32). Carson writes in her poem: “let’s leave the question mark there || at the beginning of the poem | and admire Alkman’s courage | in confronting what it brackets” (34). It raises the question: do the brackets of (mis)metaphor share this confrontational bravery? As explained in the Introduction [§1.3.3], the phrase ‘(mis)metaphor’ was initially adopted as a form of hedging. As investigations progressed, however, it began to represent the grammatical identification of an enquiry perpetually ongoing, a recognition that interpretation is rarely fixed or factual, and a means of encouraging interpretive freedom. At the conclusion of this inquiry, Alkman’s courage can be borrowed to confirm that ‘mismetaphor’ and ‘mis-metaphor’ are inadequate terms for the ideas explored here. As such, the brackets of (mis)metaphor are challenged and maintained.

On the other hand, Robin Gearing’s essay ‘Bracketing in Research’ [see Appendix Two for more information] notes that although it is often overlooked, an important phase of bracketing is ‘reintegration’, ‘unbracketing’, or “reinvestment of the bracketed data [back] into the larger investigation” (2004, 1434). With unbracketing in mind, and in the spirit of (d)rift, perhaps the phrase ‘(mis)metaphor’ requires a different form of punctuation. Whilst ‘(d)rift’ remains a required neologism, a graphic portmanteau of the ideas at hand, what if

‘(mis)metaphor’ was written differently? Uniquely? What if the squiggly-twiddle of a tilde was used instead to make a mis~metaphor? This alternative maintains the im~possibility of in~determinate co~habitation but with the visual and spatial inclusion of a motif which replicates the image of a wave and holds the essence of the wind. The meaning of ‘tilde’ comes from the Latin *titulus* meaning ‘superscription’, and in phonics it is used as an accent, in writing to indicate an abbreviation, in mathematics an approximation, in economics indifference¹²⁴, and in chat rooms it is apparently used to indicate a flirty unfinished thought. All of which seems apt. Moreover, on a keyboard the tilde hovers directly beneath ‘escape’...

9.2 INQUIRY ‘ANSWERS’

How questions are asked tends to frame the answer you will receive; “the form of every question whispers its own retort” (Hasan 2010, 77). Moreover, this dissertation utilises a (d)rift¹²⁵ which preferences positions held lightly, and not for too long. Claiming that answers were found, or demonstrating how consensus was reached, risks an overlay of pedagogy which might reverse any gains made.

Regardless, academic diligence requires closure and an assessment of the extent to which the initial three research questions were addressed. As such, what follows is a series of comments which respond to the three inquiry questions: are existing metaphorology models *compatible* with architecture; how might they be *applied* to architecture; and what positive *contributions* could a (mis)metaphorical model lend to architectural design and discourse analysis?

*

Part I of this thesis (the Introduction and Research Context) determined there was no single metaphor model, and no apparent architectural-specific approach. Blumenberg, had however, coined the phrase ‘metaphorology’ and there was an implied counter-model, labelled here as ‘(mis)metaphorology’ which was derived from Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction. Part II of this thesis then followed their lead into the field of philosophy to explore both models and conduct short speculative applications of the models to architectural vignettes [§C3.3 &

¹²⁴ Wikipedia.org, [Tilde](#)

4.3]. The results demonstrated that both models *were* compatible with architectural design and discourse analysis and offered new insights into traditional subjects. Chapter 5 went a step further and created a synthesised model, referred to by the coined phrase ‘conceptual (d)rift’. This approach was then applied to the same five vignettes, in a graphic way, and revealed that conceptual (d)rift was *also* compatible with architectural analysis.

*

The three models [metaphorology, (mis)metaphorology and conceptual (d)rift] were then tested in more detail by applying them to three case studies in Part III, Chapters 6 through 8, respectively. The three projects were architectural competition submissions that suited a variety of ‘labels’: object, subject and event; monument, anti-monument and exploded monument; or even a masculine, feminine, and neutered version of architecture. If there was a single thread that pulled all three case studies together, ‘death’ comes to mind. Loos’s column plinth was influenced by a mausoleum and its iconicity relies on dead metaphors; Lin’s memorial was installed to honour the deceased soldiers of the Vietnam War; and Tschumi’s design had a stated intention of ‘doing away’ with meaning altogether. It is fitting that what holds the three projects together is a ‘passing away’ or ‘going over’, given metaphor’s etymology of ‘carrying over and beyond’.

The Tribune Column by Adolf Loos worked well as an object viewed from different perspectives which caused meaning to splay. The material also lent itself to a ‘stepping stone’ approach akin to Blumenberg’s version of metaphorology and his ‘reoccupations’. On the other hand, Maya Lin’s *Vietnam Veterans Memorial* was well suited to Derrida’s (mis)metaphorology, accommodating oscillating opinions between denouncement and support, legacy and limitations, without settling too long on either perspective. Both chapters concluded by trialling conceptual (d)rift and revelling in the interpretive freedom the model encourages.

The review of Bernard Tschumi’s *Parc de La Villette*, meanwhile, took its formatting inspiration from literary examples, Tschumi’s ‘floating plates’ of point, line, and surface, coupled with Guy Debord’s model of *dérive*. Here the case study approach was traded for speculative narrative to better align with the free-form style of conceptual (d)rift. Blurred lines between word and image, argument and metaphor, message and meaning, were all trialled and found to be of value in creating a new way of reviewing the project.

The progression of the three chapters [§C6-8] was intended to be increasingly liberated from traditional architectural analysis to reflect both the expansion of an idea and the growing confidence of the author, as well as slowly releasing the reader from familiar expectations.

Architect Juan Pablo Bonta refers to ‘canonical’ projects in *Interpreting Architecture* (1979), suggesting that ‘canonisation’ follows “a cumulative result of many previous responses, distilled by repetition and reduced to the bare essentials. Canon formation can thus be described not as a process of growth, but as a process of filtering. [...] The canonical interpretation emerges as a number of unrelated responses [...] gradually settle into a consistent pattern”, although, as he acknowledges, “consensus does not crystallise” for every project (145). Bonta’s description of distillation, filtering and crystallisation suggests a scientific, or alchemical, process for architectural interpretation. The case studies selected for this dissertation were those for which consensus had ‘not quite crystallised’ and via the application of different metaphorology models and stylistic devices, they were returned to a ‘pre-canonical-state’, even *de*-canonised by this dissertation, ripe for re-evaluation.

*

Attoe’s *Architecture and Critical Imagination* (1978), suggests that the fastest way to determine the impact or consequence of a critical enquiry is to ask “‘Does it matter?’ and if so, ‘Why?’” (167). The enigmatic nature of metaphor means percipients can remain (re)engaged, curious, even bewildered by architecture. This return to a state of innocence where any-(every)-thing is possible makes (mis)metaphor inherently valuable. Author Edward de Bono’s foreword to the book *A Smile in the Mind* (2003), whilst not written specifically about (mis)metaphors, nonetheless captures their significance when he writes, “The opposite of traditional logic is not irrational chaos but the more powerful non-linear logic of perception. Only perception gives value to life” (9). (Mis)metaphors and their conceptual (d)rift encourage researchers to perceive architecture anew. More importantly, instead of prompting limiting questions such as Attoe’s “why?” they promote open-ended “what if’s?”

*

Attoe’s work also notes that “criticism is just a starting point” (1978, xv). What potential do (mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift have for future research? Conceptual (d)rift could be applied to the (mis)metaphors of urbanisation, globalisation, climate change, post-

colonialism, and more. By identifying the binary metaphors of the chosen subject, then demonstrating how their boundaries are permeable, interesting dialogues can be initiated, and innovative narratives generated. Conceptual (d)rift has the capacity to solve architectural problems, not by providing answers, but by challenging us to adjust the way we ask questions, and the way we then ‘see’ the solutions that those questions imply.

*

Roland Barthes suggests that myth “is constituted by a sort of constantly moving turnstile which presents alternately the meaning of the signifier and its form, a language-object and a metalanguage, a purely signifying and a purely imagining consciousness” (2009, 146-7). Remembering Blumenberg’s metaphorical ‘reoccupations’ [§3.1.1] and tweaking Barthes spatial metaphor to make an architectural one, it could be said that (mis)metaphor in architecture is a ‘turn-style’ where each adjustment to a metaphor shapes the way architects, think, design, write and compete. As such, architectural (mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift create a continuum of continuums, spinning on tilted axes, testament to the notion that as difficult as it is to explain the inexplicable, all else is pointless, boundless, oblivion. Conceptual (d)rift, therefore, becomes a means of exploring the (im)possible.

*

For an alternate explanation of metaphor’s contribution, we can turn to David Punter’s *Metaphor* (2007). Towards the end of the work, Punter riffs off Derrida’s essay ‘The *Retrait* of Metaphor’ (1978), and uses the meta-metaphor of waves to explain metaphor; it “leaves no visible trace; metaphor comes and goes, it moves towards the margins, the verge of intelligibility, and then again it retreats.” Metaphor is not, however, weak or inconsequential. Punter reminds the reader that the waves return, and with enough time, they can reshape shorelines. As such, “there is in metaphor an uncanny combination of evanescence and permanence, of power and vulnerability, of resistance to change and the spreading of change” (142). If the waves are directed at architecture, we can see that designs, built or drawn, their creation and reception, and all their attendant metaphors, are always in a state of flux. Conceptual (d)rift recognises this variability and deliberately reinvigorates the creative potential of mixed-meaning in design and discourse analysis. As such, it offers a significant contribution to architectural metaphor understanding.

*

From a personal perspective, (mis)metaphors have made a positive contribution by facilitating a complete shift in individual thinking, liberating me from a very fixed, even dogmatic, approach to problem solving. “Wind extinguishes a candle and energises fire”, writes philosopher Nassim Taleb, “Likewise with randomness, uncertainty, chaos: you want to use them, not hide from them” (2012, 3). The fire that destroyed the spire at *Notre-Dame* in April 2019 also lit a creative spark that became the catalyst for this study. Now, as the dissertation is being completed for review, the renovations of *Our Lady* are also nearing completion, and she is being primed for reconsecration in December 2024. In the time that it has taken to rebuild an ancient edifice, I have constructed something new of my own.

As a result of those efforts, architecture is now seen afresh. The weathervane atop the doomed spire at *Notre-Dame*, for example, once shaped as the French emblem of a rooster, was crushed in the conflagration of 2019. In 2024, it was replaced by a phoenix with wings of fire, and religious relics were placed inside its copper belly¹²⁵ turning it into a time-capsule [*Figures 73a, b & c* below]. The metaphorical metamorphosis, whilst obvious, still feels incredibly poignant. The transformative power of the fire at *Notre-Dame* made its collapse – and its resurrection – mythological.




Figure 73 : “Notre-Dame” finial rooster (2019) & phoenix (2024)¹²⁶

Looking back on the original design proposals that were uploaded onto the internet after the fire, [§1.0] the once-was naivety and novelty of the designs [*Figure 74* nearby] shifts. The

¹²⁵ (2024) ABC.net.au, [NotreDameRestoration](#) & (2023) BBC.com, [Notre-DameCathedralSpireGetsNewRoosterWeathervane](#)

¹²⁶ Image sources: Wikipedia.com: [Notre-DamedeParis](#); Finn (2020), archeology.org: [ExploringNotreDamesHiddenPast](#); & (2023) newseu.cgtm.com (cropped): [NewGoldenRooster](#)

apparent lazy-literalness of a phoenix sprawled across the damaged roof might now be read in line with the bluntness of Loos's "a skyscraper *is* a column" [§6.2.3], thereby "sending the natives a calculated caricature of *just what they like*" (Masheck 2013, 161 / §6.1.2)... or not.

Likewise, placing an enormous holy-water anti-fire-sprinkler on *Notre-Dame's* roof might be nothing but a prank, the sort of narrow 'one-liner' that Charles Jencks denounced in non-iconic, non-ambiguous, forms [§7.6]. Perhaps, however, it has a hint of Lin's bold contrariness. Maybe the designer was passing comment on a secular state surreptitiously engaging in a mass-conversion event, dousing visitors in Christian zeal as they flocked to the post-fire site, suggesting there was something more alarming / wonderous behind the fundraising fervour. Possibly it was intended as something altogether different and wider reaching; a statement in response to global warming.

Lastly, what of the design that implies faith is both an earthquake and rocket ship smashing through conventional tropes in its black and white boldness? The earthquake motif borrows Blumenberg's geological substrata with Derridean disruption to (un)ground the design, whilst the rocket sends thoughts into the superstrata. The conflation of natural disaster and human achievement, collapse and liftoff, lends the design a sense of Tschumi's hypo-hyper-text complexity [§8.2], equating personal revelation with a public (de)constructive event.




Figure 74 : Initial Notre-Dame designs revisited¹²⁷

In the same way that John R. Searle believed that only Romeo knew with total certainty what he meant when he said "Juliet is the sun" [§2.2.3], (mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift teach

¹²⁷ Image source: author's own collage made at the time of the fire from screen shots (2019)

us that there is no absolute certainty with which metaphors can be determined to be ‘ha-ha’ or ‘ah-ha’ messages. What they *do* suggest, however, is that any design, no matter how apparently simplistic, is ready for (re)evaluation, which is (mis)metaphor’s most significant contribution.

*

Before ending this section on the thesis’s contribution, tradition dictates that research shortfalls are identified. This dissertation has three primary limitations: subject choice; its western-centric nature; and its time-scope.

Regarding subject choice, the focus on metaphorical word-games is potentially misaligned with urgent contemporary concerns and architectural interests. This criticism can be countered with the belief that at its heart this dissertation advocates language (spoken, written, drawn, imagined, literal and figurative), and that all architects require language. Mastery of words matters; then, now, always.

A second potential limitation is the western-centric nature of the study. Punter’s *Metaphor* (2007) dedicates a chapter to the differences between eastern and western metaphoricity and reveals the inherently different ways they perceive time and space, and their relationship to humanity and nature. When Yeoryla Manolopoulou speaks of Chinese ‘scholar rocks’ whose ambiguous forms are specifically chosen as a source of contemplation (2013, 101), she provides a way of adjusting the essentially static nature of the multifaceted crystalline form through which meaning was splayed in Loos’s *Chicago Tribune Column* case study. Whilst expanding the horizon of inquiry in this direction is exciting and theoretically possible, it nonetheless deserves a dissertation of its own.

Lastly, both philosophers read, and all three case studies, are from the last millennium. As such, other than a reference to Derrida’s Macintosh computer [§4.3], this dissertation sidesteps the digital world and all the (mis)metaphorical machinations contemporary lives entail. Moreover, by stopping philosophy with Derrida, this dissertation also minimises the contemporary voices aligned with modern ethical studies associated with feminism, post-colonialism and more. This criticism is more challenging to defend. Nonetheless, the synergies derived from the proximity of the projects and the philosophers helped illustrate an evolving concept, and the intentional close alignment between the three case studies and the three metaphorical models of analysis justifies the decision. Importantly, conceptual (d)rift demonstrated that material can ‘go beyond’ binary dynamics, including

those raised in contemporary research, such as relationships between master-slaves, margins-centres, male-female, and whole-fragments. Its application and contribution should, in theory, be timeless and limitless.

9.3 PARADOXICAL (IN)CONCLUSIVENESS

(Mis)metaphors are the Jokers in a deck of cards, drifting through the ‘normal’ cards, turning up unannounced and changing the course of the game. Conceptual (d)rift, meanwhile, is akin to Pandora’s Box and Aladdin’s Lamp combined; open with care and be careful what you wish for. Once liberated, (mis)metaphors are decidedly free-roamers.

Any (mis)metaphorical model established and applied ought not be definitive, perhaps *could not be*. Derrida reminds us that metaphor is both organising centre and blind spot (1974, 28 / §4.2.1), or as Simon Unwin writes, “metaphors live at the conceptual core of architecture; but those metaphors are of many and varied kinds, which change and grow as you try to pin them down” (2012, 3). Synergistically bigger and better than all its contents combined, any (mis)metaphorical model must remain a hybrid, chimeric, shapeshifter like metaphor itself. Although potentially counter-academic in nature, any model ends up aligned with how Bertrand Russell presented his *Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918), “not put forward as a finished theory, but merely as a suggestion of the kind of thing that may be true” (2019, 150).

Furthermore, inquiries into metaphor constantly reinforced the notion that no work is immune to ideological decay. Any academic edifice, no matter how sound its foundations or buttressing, can be white-anted, pummelled, or levelled by external forces. Any ‘conclusion’, therefore, can only be tentative. Architects Adrian Snodgrass and Richard Coyne write that a design solution (and by extrapolation design research solutions), cannot “be brought to the surface in the manner of an archaeological find – some lifeless object – dredged up from the depths of the mind. Understanding is always in process, and this process is unending” (2006, 52). “It can never reach finality or completion”, they go on, and “never reach a point where it can be said, ‘disclosure is complete’, because there is always the possibility of new understandings” (53).

A story recounted in Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) illustrates the point. They write of an Iranian student who arrived at Berkeley and interpreted the expression 'the solution to my problems' "to be a large volume of liquid, bubbling and smoking, [...] with catalysts constantly dissolving some problems [...] and precipitating out others" (2003, 143). The student was apparently "terribly disillusioned" when he discovered his fellow students had "no such chemical metaphor in mind" (143). The authors agree his disappointment was warranted, given that "the chemical [mis]metaphor is both beautiful and insightful. It gives us a view of problems as things that never disappear utterly and that cannot be solved once and for all" (143).

The final pages of Derrida's 'Plato's Pharmacy' (1968) reiterate the notion. Derrida completes his essay on *pharmakon's* cure-curse with an imagined scene: a retired Plato stands in his pharmacy, holding a vessel in his hand, within which a solution swirls and curls. As he moves the vessel, Plato mutters to himself, and as Derrida describes it, Plato's words resonate off the wall, sonorous and (in)articulate (1981, 169). This architectural scene provides a suitable (in)conclusion in that it contains a hint of infinite regress (room > vessel > solution > component parts > atoms), and because the vessel acts as a meta-metaphor, holding an alchemical (con)fusion of two items that merge to make a 'third entity' which exists as a product of the imagination. Lastly, it reiterates that Plato holds *a* solution – a mercurial substance such as the Iranian had envisioned – not *the* solution, not *the* answer. Architectural (mis)metaphors and their meaning (d)rift can only recognise, and obliquely point to, the myriad of possible readings that architecture, built and written, can offer. Moreover, the liquidity of the solution reminds us that those readings are constantly in motion, slipping and sliding ambiguously, suggesting that a fixed, final, concretised conclusion is impossible, even undesirable.

So how to end when there can be no conclusive ending? As Clandinin and Connelly write in the conclusion of their book *Narrative Inquiry* (2000): "enough is enough, at least for now" (187).

9.4 EPILOGUE

One final thought and then enough, truly is, enough. I was born in June 1971 on almost the same day that the funambulist Philippe Petit illegally strung a wire between the two towers of *Notre-Dame* [**Figures 75 a & b** below]. With daring, dexterity, and no harness, Petit walked a tightrope between two fixed and opposing points and hovered over the void. He challenged himself and the public's preconceptions of convention, finding a form of balance that required perpetual readjustment. As his confidence grew, he began to spin, dip, dance and freewheel with the birds and zephyrs. In one photograph, the wire itself disappears, and small Petit achieves the impossible; he floats. His balancing act represents conceptual (d)rift as event. It is one final reminder that (d)rift is achievable, you just need to be brave.




Figure 75 : Philip Petite on a highwire at "Notre-Dame" (1971)¹²⁸

THE END (.)

* * * * *

¹²⁸ Image source: (2013) Vintage.es: PhilippePetitWalkingOnAWireBetweenTheTwoTowers1971

APPENDICIES & REFERENCES

APPENDIX ONE: Anne Carson Poem

Essay on What I Think About Most – Anne Carson

Error.
And its emotions.
On the brink of error is a condition of fear.
In the midst of error is a state of folly and defeat.
Realising you've made an error brings shame and remorse.
Or does it?

Let's look into this.
Lots of people including Aristotle think error
an interesting and valuable mental event.
In his discussion of metaphor in the *Rhetoric*

Aristotle says there are 3 kinds of words.
Strange, ordinary and metaphorical.

“Strange words simple puzzle us;
ordinary words convey what we know already;
it is from metaphor that we can get hold of something new & fresh”
(*Rhetoric*, 1410b10-13).
In what does the freshness of metaphor consist?
Aristotle says that metaphor causes the mind to experience itself

in the act of making a mistake.
He pictures the mind moving along a plane surface
of ordinary language
when suddenly
that surface breaks or complicates.
Unexpectedness emerges.

Quoted in Research
Context §2.1.4

At first it looks odd, contradictory or wrong,
Then it makes sense.
And at this moment, according to Aristotle,
the mind turns to itself and says:
“How true, and yet I mistook it!”
From the true mistakes of metaphor a lesson can be learned.

Not only that things are other than they seem,
and so we mistake them,
but that such mistakenness is valuable.
Hold onto it, Aristotle says,
there is much to be seen and felt here.
Metaphors teach the mind

Quoted on opening
page of dissertation

to enjoy error
and to learn
from the juxtaposition of *what is* and *what is not* the case.
There is a Chinese proverb that says,
Brush cannot write two characters with the same stroke.
And yet

that is exactly what a good mistake does.
Here is an example.
It is a fragment of ancient Greek lyric
that contains an error of arithmetic.
The poet does not seem to know
that $2 + 2 = 4$.

Alkman fragment 20:

*[?] made three seasons, summer
and winter and autumn third
and fourth spring when
there is blooming but to eat enough
is not.*

Referred to in
Conclusion §9.1

Alkman lived in Sparta in the 7th century B.C.
Now Sparta was a poor country
and it is unlikely
that Alkman led a wealthy or well-fed life there.
This fact forms the background of his remarks
which end in hunger.

Hunger always feels
like a mistake.
Alkman makes us experience this mistake
with him
by an effective use of computational error.
For a poor Spartan poet with nothing

left in his cupboard
at the end of winter—
along comes spring
like an afterthought of the natural economy,
fourth in a series of three,
unbalancing his arithmetic

and enjambling his verse.
Alkman's poem breaks off midway through an iambic metron
with no explanation
of where spring came from
or why numbers don't help us
control reality better.

There are three things I like about Alkman's poem,
First that it is small,
light
and more than perfectly economical.
Second that it seems to suggest colours like pale green
without ever naming them.

Third that it manages to put into play
some major metaphysical questions
(like Who made the world)
without overt analysis.
You notice the verb "made" in the first verse
has no subject: [?]

It is very unusual in Greek
for a verb to have no subject, in fact
it is a grammatical mistake.
Some philologists will tell you
that this mistake is just an accident of transmission,
that the poem as we have it

is surely a fragment broken off
some longer text
and that Alkman almost certainly did
name the agent of creation
in the verses preceding what we have here.
Well that may be so.

But as you know the chief aim of philology
is to reduce all textual delight
to an accident of history.
And I am uneasy with any claim to know exactly
what a poet means to say.
So **let's leave the question mark there**

**at the beginning of the poem
and admire Alkman's courage
in confronting what it brackets.**
The fourth thing I like
about Alkman's poem
is the impression it gives

of blurting out the truth in spite of itself.
Many a poet aspires
to this tone of inadvertent lucidity
but few realise it so simply as Alkman.
Of course his simplicity is a fake.
Alkman is not simple at all,

Referred to in Conclusion §9.1

he is a master contriver—
or what Aristotle would call an ‘imitator’
of reality.
Imitation (*mimesis* in Greek)
is Aristotle’s collective term for the true mistakes of poetry.
What I like about this term

is the ease with which it accepts
that what we are engaged in when we do poetry is error,
the willful creation of error,
the deliberate break and complication of mistakes
out of which may arise
unexpectedness.

So a poet like Alkman
sidesteps fear, anxiety, shame, remorse
and all the other silly emotions associated with making mistakes
in order to engage
the fact of the matter.
The fact of the matter for humans is imperfection.

Alkman breaks the rules of arithmetic
and jeopardises grammar
and messes up the metrical form of his verse
in order to draw us into this fact.
At the end of the poem the fact remains
and Alkman is probably no less hungry.

Yet **something has changed in the quotient of our expectations.**
For in mistaking them,
Alkman has perfected something.
Indeed he has
more than perfected something.
Using a single brushstroke.

Quoted in Research
Context §2.1.4

(Carson, 2000, 30-36).

* * * * *

APPENDIX TWO: Research Methodologies

As noted in the Introduction [§1.3.1], research began with the intention to use a qualitative research approach combined with case studies. It was only as awareness grew during research that other options were also explored. That said, in keeping with bricolage and the overarching, or underlying, influence of metaphor's ambiguity, the thesis did not adopt a particular methodological paradigm but relied instead on the influence of several methods. The approach is not without precedent, as Groat and Wang note in their *Architectural Research Methods* (2013); "Increasingly, researchers [...] are advocating a more integrative approach to research whereby multiple methods from diverse traditions are incorporated in one study" (441). Influential methods used and outlined below include: qualitative research methods and architectural criticism, as well as the concepts of bracketing, dialectics, and intertextuality.

Qualitative Research Methods

Available research methodologies are represented by an inherent rift. William Firestone addresses this divergence when he separates quantitative research methods (which assume "an objective reality apart from the beliefs of individuals" (1987, 16)) from qualitative research (which "is rooted in a phenomenological paradigm which holds that reality is socially constructed" (16)). Firestone notes that quantitative approaches prefer 'scientific' language, which "ostensibly strips [...] multiplicity of meaning from words in the interest of precision" (17) and "persuades by de-emphasising individual judgment and stressing the use of established procedures" (18). Metaphor eludes precision and procedures, and embodies 'multiplicity of meaning', and as such, quantitative methodologies were deemed unsuitable for this research subject.

Investigations into qualitative research options led initially to Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln's *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry* (2013). They write that qualitative research "privileges no single methodological practice over another" (11), and they apply the metaphor of infrastructure to suggest that the methods selected are "the nearly invisible but indispensable support" (209) that runs beneath the surface of the research. Of all the approaches they detail, the one which seems most applicable to this dissertation is

postpositivist grounded theory (which is an “iterative, comparative, interactive, and abductive method” (294), and “views reality as fluid, evolving and open to change” (304).

John and David Creswell’s *Research Design* (2018) notes that qualitative research collects data from multiple sources and analyses it using inductive and deductive [rather than abductive] methods in a reflexive, emergent way that ‘shifts’ as it progresses (181-2). The Creswell’s include several approaches, including; postpositivism (“challenging the traditional notion of the absolute truth of knowledge [...] and recognising that we cannot be positive about our claims of knowledge when studying the behaviour and actions of humans” (6)); constructivism (where researchers “construct meanings as they engage with the world they are interpreting [...]because] we are all born into a world of meaning bestowed upon us by our culture” (8)); pragmatist (“a worldview [which] arises out of actions, situations, and consequences rather than antecedent conditions” (9)); grounded theory (“in which the researcher derives a general, abstract theory of a process, action, or interaction” (13)); and case studies (“in which the researcher develops an in-depth analysis of a case” (14)).

Lastly, Robert Yin’s *Qualitative Research from Start to Finish* (2015), notes that research methods are often not stand-alone and instead, researchers might adopt a “nested arrangement” (91). He also includes one last qualitative approach applicable here: discourse analysis (which aims at “emphasising the participants’ use of language as a way of their constructing social reality” (119)); although, this dissertation ‘nests’ language-constructs within an architectural context.

Architectural Criticism

Looking for architectural terminology to assist, Groat and Wang’s handbook outlines several applicable research strategies, which include: historical, qualitative and case studies. In historical methodologies, researchers outline the architectural past. Traditionally, they did so in the hope of finding renditions of ‘universal applicability’ akin to the law of gravity (2013, 185), later moving through frames of communal consciousness and *zeitgeist* (187), and then the ‘cultural manifestations’ of poststructuralism (193). What poststructuralism “takes away in negating the idea of transhistorical knowledge”, they write, it “gives back in grasping the immanent knowledge operating in any particular cultural-temporal space more deeply” (193).

Under their outline of architectural qualitative methods, Groat and Wang reference grounded theory and bricolage, which they reshape into a “multitactic” approach (220). Whereas historical research tends to focus on the past, they suggest qualitative studies “tend to focus on contemporaneous phenomena” (223). Accordingly, this research adopts a two-faced, Janus-like perspective, looking backwards and forwards, concentrating on past models of metaphor analysis but also suggesting a potential new approach. Echoes of conceptual (d)rift appear when Groat and Wang write, “Despite these differences in focus, the relationship between qualitative and historical research designs demonstrates once again how permeable the boundaries are between the various research strategies” (224).

Groat and Wang’s case study chapter recognises the ability of case studies to change collective wisdom (415). Furthermore, whilst not elaborated, their inclusion of the terms ‘explanatory’ and ‘exploratory’ (423) hint at additional poles between which methodology can drift.

In his attempt to provide attention to architectural criticism as a “discipline” (1978, xi) Attoe outlines three modes of criticism: normative (doctrinal, systematic, typical, etc.), descriptive (pictorial, biographical, etc.), and interpretative criticism (advocatory, evocative, impressionistic, etc.). Although no specific approach was consciously adopted for this thesis, the mode that comes closest is ‘impressionistic criticism’ (which “builds evocative images instead of relation ‘facts’” (79)). This form of criticism risks being subjective but has the advantage of “making the physical environment visible and memorable – or at least entertaining” (78-9).

Attoe writes that the critic who employs interpretation “seeks to mould others’ vision to make them see as he does [...] (usually by changing the metaphor through which he sees the building)” (49). Attoe then uses a metaphorical frame to explain the value of metaphor; “Since historians have the dual responsibility of quarrying information and constructing meaning from it, it is little wonder that key metaphors play such an important part, for metaphorical interpretation is the only efficient way of reducing the quantities of raw material to manageable size” (59). [Although, this is perhaps not entirely true for metaphorical material given how it fails to shrink and tends to self-referentially grow instead.]

Bracketing

Grammatically, brackets contain extra information (qualifications or afterthoughts) that are (in)essential to the main content. As such, brackets simultaneously include *and* exclude material. When I initially created the neologism ‘(mis)metaphor’, the brackets were used as an instinctive hedging manoeuvre. Only later, I became aware of the fact that in phenomenological research, bracketing is aligned with ‘*epoché*’, a preliminary act related to suspending judgment and avoiding specific conclusions, thus representing a form of “methodical doubt” (Farina 2014, 53). The philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) proposed bracketing as a means of setting aside traditional beliefs to better discover new phenomena (54). Moreover, the act of bracketing, by its nature is never concluded, always open to “new thematic horizons” (54) in the same way that the earthly horizon keeps receding as you walk towards it.

Later still, I learnt that qualitative research occasionally references ‘analytical bracketing’, where “the researcher acknowledges the improbability of suspending internal suppositions, [...but] he or she nonetheless endeavours to try” (Gearing 2009, 1443). Elsewhere, the term ‘bracketing’ is used to describe a “neutral stance”, or “orienting procedure”, that recognises both the hypothetical ideals of discourse practice *and* the realities of discourse-in-practice (Holstein & Gubrium in Denzin 2013, 266-7). By preferencing neither ideal nor reality, the authors suggest it is a “technique of oscillating indifference” (266). Whilst the word ‘indifference’ chafes, the notion of oscillating between theory and practice, reiterates the appropriateness of bracketing extended to conceptual (d)rift.

Lastly, as research continued, it became evident that bracketing performs a function similar to Derrida’s notion of the ‘supplement’ [discussed in §4.1.2]; “the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace” (1997, 145). It is this double manoeuvre of addition *and* substitution, which aligns supplement to (mis)metaphor’s bracketing, in addition to, or instead of, Husserl’s setting-aside of assumptions.

Dialectics

Dialectics embodies the notion that opposites can co-exist, and as such, is another frame through which (mis)metaphor and conceptual (d)rift are supported. Plato’s version of dialectics was generally a back-and-forth debate between two or more speakers of differing

points of view; what one party constructed, another deconstructed, causing the former to rebuild their construction anew. The semiologist Roland Barthes writes that Plato's "Dialectica is an art of living discourse" (Barthes 1994, 39). This notion of a 'living' dialogue, or ongoing conversation, is akin to bracketing's conclusionless motion.

The philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) adjusts the opposing speakers into opposing conceptual speculations.¹²⁹ Hegel's approach implies ideologies can be challenged, refined and ultimately advanced. Over time, Hegel's triadic version of dialectics morphed into a model of 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis' (although the "Brutal simplifications" of this attribution have been challenged (Mueller 1958, 414)). Attributions aside, the model is helpful in this dissertation to introduce the diametrically opposing opinions of Blumenberg's metaphorology and Derrida's implied (mis)metaphorology, as thesis and anti-thesis, and then recognise a synthesis of the two within my model of conceptual (d)rift.

Intertextuality

Architect Roger Connah recognises that architecture is influenced by other disciplines; "Film, photography, drawing, philosophy, and language are perhaps more familiar and fashionable interferences", but also "dance, music, opera, physics, chaos theories, the new science of materials, computer science and software, and even boxing and cuisine" (2001, xv). Several examples of interdisciplinary works were encountered during research. Daniel Purdy's *On the Ruins of Babel: Architectural Metaphor in German Thought* (2011), for example, addresses German literature and philosophy and aims at "unravelling [...] debate over architecture's boundaries", whilst recognising he will still be evaluated by the "internal guidelines of well-defined and defended disciplines" (3). *The Words Between Spaces: Buildings and Language* (2002), co-written by Thomas A. Markus and Deborah Cameron, an architect and a linguist, is premised on the notion that "our experience and understanding of buildings are always and inevitably mediated by language and discourse" (93), concluding; "*language matters*" (174).

Whilst D. Jean Clandinin notes that "Borders are abstractions" (2007, 57), Connah notes that boundaries remain important nonetheless; "Architecture is not film. [...] Nor is

¹²⁹ Plato.Stanford.edu, 2020, [HegelDialectics](#)

architecture photography, philosophy, Lego or Sufism [even] though these disciplines may appear parallel” (2001, xvi). The desire to transgress boundaries (drift) must always be mediated by the awareness that division remains, abstract or otherwise (rift).

Derrida’s *Glas* (1974), which placed poetry and philosophy in parallel columns, allowing readers to recognise the (dis)similarities was highly influential. So too literature with non-linear narratives or atemporal plots. As such, intertextuality undoubtedly shapes the writing style of this dissertation [see §1.3.3 & 9.1 for further explanation].

* * * * *

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