THE FANTASY OF EXILE

SOME REFLECTIONS
ON THE
MARGINS
OF THE
'UNHOMELYCONSCIOUSNESS'

by

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CERTIFICATE

I certify that this thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not being submitted as part of candidature for any other degree.

I also certify that the thesis has been written by me and that any help that I have received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used, have been acknowledged in this thesis.

Signature of Candidate

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Dedicated to
my Mother
BESSIE JEAN MCCARTHY
and to
the memory of
my Father
NOEL FENTON MCCARTHY
1928–1989

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about exile, but exile of a particular nature. I take the term exile discursively and textually, with no particular regard to historical specificities it may offer. In this sense I intend to use the concrete to render the abstract, working backwards from the historically and generally recognised condition of exile—the relegated, the diasporic—to its discursive relocation in various forms of narrative, reflection and representation. In this the measure of the exile will be the continuities and discontinuities of the discourses of its location.

The thesis will argue that the exilic subject—that is, the subject of modern consciousness—is the product of a certain fantasy formation of a subjective homeland projected onto the various margins of discourse, history and geography. This fantasy leads to a fascination and identification of things perceived at the margins or the bounds of a psychopathological homeland, rendering the homeland itself the site of alienation. The thesis argues against the positioning of the subject as alienated 'lack' in favour of a subjective and representative plenitude. The thesis will look to various discourses on alienation and ideology, with a particular focus on the philosophy of reflection, phenomenology and psychoanalytic theory (the philosophy of the 'unreflected') to trace a sort of exilic affectability that inheres in the representation of the modern subject.

The introductory chapter 'Parenthesis' picks at the relation between the discourses of post-structuralist and post-colonial theory, looking to their fascination with the margins and positing a certain intellectual and political tendency to fantasy. Chapters One and Two explore the problem of representation in these discourses with particular emphasis on the disposition of the subject and its relation to its own reading or metaphysical positioning, taking as its metaphor the representative relation between the map and the territory. Chapters Three and Four look to the ontogenesis of the subject of exile and its reflective and metaphysical positioning in representation. Chapter Five closes the thesis with an exposition on the fantasy of subjective and representative closure. The fantasy of exile as the fantasy of closure proper.

PARENTHESIS

[SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE 'UNHOMELY CONSCIOUSNESS']

> It's all there in the maps. Sometimes all they tell you is that you're lost.
>
> Louis Nowra *Map of the Human Heart*

The *representative fiction* of Exile

On the subject of exile, Edward Said has argued that we must "map territories beyond those mapped by the literature of exile itself", that we should turn our attention from the likes of Joyce and Nabokov to the "uncountable masses for whom the UN agencies have been created."[1] To reflect on what he calls "the awful forlorn waste" of exile he exhorts us to "leave the modest refuge provided by subjectivity and resort instead to the abstractions of mass politics."[2] Few would argue with the moral and political intent of this prescription—*literary* abstractions of the exilic character pale in comparison with Said's 'card-holding' exiles and refugees, buffeted or mutilated by the political vicissitudes of competing nations and nationalisms. As he says, "exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience."[3]

And so it is that much has been written on the subject of exile, marginality and displacement. Concentrating mainly at the extremes of the concrete and the abstract, this writing—both *on* and *of* exile—has explored at great length a sort of generalised semantic of *displacement* and *difference*, pursuing its dispossessed subjects to the frontiers of both culture and philosophy—what Homi Bhabha might call "nation

1. Edward Said, "Reflections on Exile", *Granta* 13 (Autumn 1984), 161
2. *Ibid.*, 161
3. *Ibid.*, 159

and narration".[4] But from the concrete of Said's "truly displaced" persons of the various diasporas to the abstract of the existential 'stranger' who truly looks to wander, the literature tells us little of this "untranslatable identity". A phrase coined by George Steiner, this "untranslatability" refers not to the inscrutability, the ineffability of the "extraterritorial" writer, but to such writers of "extreme local strength" as Shakespeare and Montaigne—solid and grounded within a culturally and linguistically isolated canon.[5] For Steiner, the linguistic and cultural travails endured by a diversity of (particularly modern) writers forges a certain representational split, a necessary engagement and "translation" of identity: "It makes of Nabokov, Borges, and Beckett," he argues, "the three representative figures in the literature of exile—which is, perhaps, the main impulse in current literature."[6] So, for Steiner, the writer is "extraterritorial" to the extent that he is, in fact, "translatable"—that is, crossing the boundaries and margins of culture and language.[7]

Now taking as read Said's truly displaced, it is precisely this difficulty in the 'translation' of exile that I want to look at. In spite of the weight given the enterprise of deconstruction, this difficulty it seems still exists. And given a certain sharing or overlap of theoretical terrain between theories of so-called 'post-colonialism' and poststructuralism the difficulty is not only extant, but exacerbated. A certain marginal and exotic charm still obtains in this 'translatable identity'.

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4. Homi K. Bhabha, "DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation" in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1993), 291-332

5. George Steiner, *Extraterritorial: Papers on Literature and the Language of Revolution* (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), 4

6. *Ibid.*, viii. It is now commonplace to speak of these figures of apparent textual rupture in canonical terms. Horst Ruthrof has argued that "[e]ven a cursory reading of the fictive narrative of Beckett, Barth, Borges, Coover, Gass ... makes clear that what is going to be defined as narrative is a certain kind of narrative only, namely, causally linked action sequences." (Horst Ruthrof, *The Reader's Construction of Narrative* [London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981], 10) For the reader to 'make sense' of a narrative certain "transformations" of the text must be made—from "surface text" to "deep structure"—to accommodate a sense of place for the reader in that text. (*ibid.*, 12) Regardless of its impulse to rupture (and here Ruthrof implicates writers generally accepted as both modern and postmodern), a certain and driving sense of place and direction—a certain hermeneutic teleology, a 'will to meaning'—still inheres in this literature (of exile). This will be developed hereafter.

7. Echoes of this *locality* of identity may be seen the notion of 'hybridity' in the later work of Bhabha.

This thesis is about *exile*, but exile of a particular nature. I take the term *exile* discursively and textually, with no particular regard to historical or other specificities it may offer. In this sense I intend to use the concrete to render the abstract, working backwards from the historically and generally recognised *condition* of exile—the relegated, the diasporic—to its discursive *relocation* in various forms of narrative and representation. In this, the measure of exile will be the continuities and discontinuities of the discourses of its *location—the subject* is the subject of exile to the extent that it is itself *textual*. Said has argued that "'Textuality' is the somewhat mystical and disinfected subject matter of literary theory", it

> has therefore become the exact antithesis and displacement of what might be called history .... As it is practiced in the American academy today, literary theory has for the most part isolated textuality from the circumstances, the events, the physical circumstances that made it possible and render it intelligible as the result of human work.[8]

I take Said's criticism seriously but depart significantly from his critical designation of *texuality* as being essentially *ahistorical*. While this has certainly been the effect (and, largely, the agenda) of the literary theory he describes—and to this extent I agree with his definition—the *textual* approach I intend, however, is contingent on the very workings of the 'antitheses' and 'displacements' *in* history, not *of* history. For the purposes of this project I take textuality and discourse *to be* history.

In this passage by Jacques Derrida's poet Edmond Jabès, this peculiar *position* and *identity* of history's exile is reaffirmed. Jabès's wandering Jew, Yukel, is observed by one of his "imaginary" rabbis:

> Yukel, you have never felt at ease in your skin. You have never been *here*, but always *elsewhere*, ahead of yourself or behind like winter in the eyes of autumn or summer in the eyes of spring, in the past or in the future like those syllables whose passage from night to day is so much like lightning that it merges with

8. Edward W. Said, "Secular Criticism", *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (London: Vintage, 1991), 3-4

> the movement of the pen .... You read the future. You give us the future to read. Yet yesterday you were not. And tomorrow, you will no longer be.[9]

But what exactly is meant by this enigmatic pose? This is the standard reflection on exile—the 'proselyte' Jabès offers little other than an exploration of *modern consciousness as the expressive condition of the displaced, alienated or marginalised, etc.* Derrida turns on this and other passages from Jabès's 'nomad texts', allying—in a fashion now familiar—the "Poet and the Jew," whom, he reaffirms, "are not born here but elsewhere. They wander, separated from their true birth."[10] The exilic poetics of Jabès turns away from the politics of dislocation and finds refuge—with Derrida— in the space of writing, in a certain *poetics of exile* which they both argue enacts the experience of 'homelessness' from which there is no avenue of escape. The writer is the subject of his own representation but, for Derrida, in *the writing* he comes asunder—in Derrida's words: "in its representation of itself the subject is shattered and opened ... ruined, made into an abyss, in its own representation."[11]

Speaking on the transition from simple consciousness to self-consciousness Hegel wrote that "we have now passed into the native land of truth, into that kingdom where it is at home."[12] But this emergence to the self-conscious *clearing* of selfhood is not without its pitfalls since 'absolute' self knowing, even for Hegel, remains elusive. As Martin Heidegger argues, the "absolute remains the extreme for self-consciousness. Knowing itself *thus*, self consciousness knows itself as a knowledge which essentially struggles for the absolute, but in this struggle fights its way to a

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9. Edmond Jabès, *The Book of Questions*, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1976), 32

10. Jacques Derrida, "Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book", *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1990), 66

11. *Ibid.*, 65. This is precisely the kind of *textuality* that Said has in mind—the place of the exile here is more 'disinfected' than disaffected, the latter being the politics on which Said prognosticates.

12. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 219

constant subjugation."[13] For Hegel, self consciousness is only anguish over its existence and experience—an 'unhappy consciousness' which "is itself the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and itself both, and the unity of both is also its own essence; but objectively and consciously it is not yet this essence itself—is not yet the unity of both."[14] Heidegger affirms this self-consciousness as "the knowledge of failure in what drives its own essence. So, self-consciousness is unhappy, just at a place where it unfolds unto its own essential character; it is *the unhappy consciousness*"[15]—unhappy because its grip on *home* is tenuous, because it is, in Heidegger's terms, "knowing's restlessness."[16]

Derrida too affirms this *unhappy consciousness* but, unhelpfully, keeps it for the Jew, arguing that Jabès's *Book of Questions* is its poem. And Jabès agrees—the Jew is the true stranger, the stranger of the stranger. This kind of marginalism is what Adorno could have been alluding to when he said that "today it is a matter of morality not to be at home in one's home"[17]—a sort of externalisation of the unhappy consciousness as existential fashion. While Said attributes to Adorno's statement a "grave irony"[18] he takes it no further. There is, particularly in light of more recently adopted or received political positions (vis-à-vis cultural studies), to be read an even more savage irony in that Adorno is speaking of a certain political 'bad faith' (an 'unhomely consciousness') on the part of those who are, in fact, *at home.* Quoting Nietzsche—"'It is even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner'"—Adorno suggests that a certain bourgeois "trick" of self-displacement and dispossession is at play in the rhetoric of those who have property—a home, a homeland—and,

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13. Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 140

14. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, 251

15. Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 140

16. *Ibid.*, 140

17. Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978), 39

18. Said, "Reflections on Exile", 170

therefore, can afford to speak of losing it. In short, they are *slumming it*! Adorno cautions that "the thesis of this paradox leads to destruction, a loveless disregard for things which necessarily turn against people too; and the antithesis, no sooner uttered, is an ideology for those wishing with a bad conscience to keep what they have. Wrong life cannot be lived rightly."[19]

For the *ausländer* Jabès, the poet is the subject of a book greater than his own, for "the fatherland of the Jews ... [is a] sacred text surrounded by commentaries."[20] Derrida supplements Jabès with a commentary of his own: "The necessity of commentary," he says, "like poetic necessity, is the very form of exiled speech. In the beginning is hermeneutics."[21] Here Derrida argues that there are essentially "two interpretations of interpretation": a "rabbinical" hermeneutic, the search for a road back to a central and binding *truth*; and a certain "poetical" hermeneutic, an interpretive *play* or 'shift' that inheres in the text.[22] Derrida is pointing to the 'structural' implications of this *play*—an interpretive play that hovers about a centre in order to prove that, properly speaking, *centre* does not and cannot exist. The notion of centre is necessary for the structure that allows for the possibility of 'notion' (Concept, Idea, metaphysics) to hold. As he points out in a later essay, the centre functioned not only as the "organising principle" of the structure, "but above all to make sure that the organising principle of the structure would limit what we might call the *play* of the structure."[23] The centre both limits and allows for the possibility of this structural play, its inner logic being "contradictorily coherent"—a logic which "expresses the force of a desire", albeit repressed.[24]

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19. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, 39. [Said raises this passage again in "Intellectual Exile: Expatriots and Marginals" in his *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures* (London: Vintage Books, 1993), 40-4— but here too he fails to grapple with Adorno's real irony of the *unheimlich* consciousness.]

20. Jabés, as cited in Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 67

21. *Ibid.*, 67

22. *Ibid.*, 67 and 311n3

23. Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", *Writing and Difference*, 278

24. *Ibid.*, 279. "The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself

Here, the structural and positional logic rendering centre—that of its essential and oppositional terms, inside and outside—points also to that of tenuity and its attendant anxiety, the structural and positional logic, we might say, of the subject. But what of Derrida's Jabès? For Derrida, Jabès is a poet of rupture, a poet who doubles and redoubles the centre, mimicking the "contradictory coherence" of a centre that does not exist and, therefore, his own position in relation to that centre. Jabès's "interpretive play" is critical for Derrida in its very rupture with the inner logic of the structure—the centre. But in this "interpretive" and disruptive *play*, the *poet* is party to another form of *play* which, it seems, mitigates against the *interpretative*. The poet increasingly adverts to another structural logic—'unhoused' and finding himself at the margin, he seems content *to play* there, unruffled by his lack of cultural, national or existential place. But, this marginal play, while eschewing any notion of the centre all the while *turns* the "uncanny" and shifting persona of its subject towards the shelter from which it was spurned.[25]

Jabès, it should be noted, found his centre in the very place of unbelonging, it was here that he belonged, or, at least, sought belonging. Speaking of his own situation, the French-speaking Jabès states that when a foreigner seeks refuge in a country whose language he knows, "he finds his place there. But," he asks, "where in fact is this place?"[26] And this is a very good question. While he writes *of* and *at* the *margin*,

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beyond the reach of play." (*ibid.*, 279)

25. "In anxiety one feels '*uncanny*'... the 'nothing' and the 'nowhere'. But here 'uncanniness' also means 'not-being-at-home'..." (Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962], 233) As Heidegger's translators reaffirm, while the German "*unheimlich*" is rendered as "uncanny", it more literally means "unhomelike". (*ibid.*, 233n) And Freud, speaking of Schelling's use of the term, points out that "all is *unheimlichkeit* that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light." ("The 'Uncanny'", *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1971] Volume XVII: 224) For Freud, while the 'uncanny' leans towards the obscure horizon, a place of ghouls and villains, it is only thus because what we find 'there', what we feel 'there' was in fact once close to us—that is, that which was once too close for comfort: "... the *unheimlich* is what was once *heimisch*, familiar; the prefix '*un*'['un-'] is the token of repression." (*ibid.*, 245) 'Home' always and inherently contains what is 'unhomely' and to this extent they are, for Freud, effectively interchangeable. (Hereafter, references to *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* will be rendered *SE* followed by volume and pagination.)

26. As cited in Richard Stamelman, "The Strangeness of the Other and the Otherness of the Stranger: Edmond Jabès", *Yale French Studies* 82 [1993], 126

his *true writer-subject*, his reflexive Yukel, harks to the centre—a position reaffirmed when Jabès answers his own question: "His place is the very place of language ... Language is the exile's true homeland."[27] This is, to reiterate, a kind of oxymoron: for Jabès, language is a decentring, displacing process—but it is precisely this displacement that renders place. It emerges that *the narrative of displacement* is simultaneously its exact opposite, *the narrative of placement.* The poet-raconteur is a *teller of place* and in the telling writes the near into the far, space into place and writes—in anything near decipherable—the centre all over again.

But Said goes further to say that the modern mass of exiles—especially those beyond the boulevards of Paris, perhaps holed up in *spaces* like the camps by the frontiers of Third World countries—remain "'undocumented' people suddenly lost, without a tellable history."[28] That the "history" of these exiles may not be "tellable" is, at least, arguable. The trade in refugee stories and personal 'histories' at the Thai border camps post-Pol Pot was nothing short of brisk.[29] It is no coincidence that much of the literature looked at in Said's work is literature of adventure. Said asks: "How is it that the literature of exile has taken its place as a *topos* of human experience

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27. *Ibid.*, 126

28. Said, "Reflections on Exile", 161. Said rightly differentiates between exiles, expatriots, refugees and emigrés, arguing that "the word refugee has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance." (*ibid.*, 166) But he begins to head in the direction of Jabès's inscrutable Yukel when he adds, unhelpfully, that the word "'exile' carries with it ... a touch of solitude and spirituality." (*ibid.*, 166) Adding further to this 'poetic' reading, Said also cites Wallace Stevens's conception of exile as "the mind of winter". (*ibid.*, 172) (A version of this essay was published as "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on Life in Exile", *Harper's Magazine* [September 1984])

29. Said's essay appears in an issue of *Granta* entitled *After the Revolution* with, among others, the very "tellable history" of Samoth May, a Khmer refugee sponsored, promoted and arguably 'ghost written' by English journalist James Fenton. Samoth May's account of his experience in "Democratic Kampuchea" under Pol Pot was just part of a wave of refugee stories—like Pin Yathay's *Murderous Utopia* and Dith Pran's *The Killing Fields*—paid for by the international, particularly American, press. "Undocumented" refugees soon carried visas and full passage to *places* like Paris, Australia and—their preferred option—the United States, paid for with accounts of personal "history". Michael Vickery has described this "documentation", this sort of testimonial narrativisation of "eyewitness" accounts of refugees—most of which don't stand up under serious scrutiny—as the "Standard Total View". (*Cambodia: 1975-1982* [Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984], 28, *passim.*) For some correspondence here, see also Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980)

alongside the literature of adventure, education or discovery?"[30] A good deal earlier, Sartre had argued that

> [f]or the most trivial event to become an adventure, all you have to do is to start telling about it. This is what deceives people: a man is always a teller of stories, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything which happens to him through these stories; and he tries to live his life as if it were a story he was telling.[31]

The *representative fantasy* of Exile

In the concrete Said argues across the sort of 'here and there' state of national identity stressing the difference between the focused, public and all-inclusive ambitions of nationalism and the displaced sentiments of the exile. "Because exile," he argues

> unlike nationalism, is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being. Exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, their past. They generally do not have armies or states, although they are often in search of them. Exiles feel, therefore, an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people.[32]

It is this constitutive (or reconstitutive turn to) *ideology* that foils Said's dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete—between the truly displaced and the literature of the displaced. This *reconstitutive narrative of ideology* is the concretisation of a 'lost' subject as pursued in a constitutive image—the return from the margins to a homeland—be it in the head of the liberal philosopher of existence or the exile.

Where the rationalism at the root of the Orientalist discourse Said so well defines points us in the direction of *placement* and *location*, of a certain *bringing near*, so too,

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30. Said, "Reflections on Exile", 168

31. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Consciousness of Existence", *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. R. Cumming (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 58. This work is made up of extracts first published in Sartre's *Nausea*, trans. Robert Baldick (New York: Penguin, 1965), 61

32. Said, "Reflections on Exile", 163. "The crucial thing is that a state of exile free from this triumphant ideology—designed to resemble an exile's broken history into a new whole—is virtually unbearable, and virtually impossible in today's world. Look at the fate of the Jews, the Palestinians and the Armenians." (*ibid.*, 163)

it seems, does a particular trend in discourses on marginalisation and exile. Orientalist discourse, Said argues, has the power of a sort of "radical realism" that *poses* and fixes its subject somewhere between the near and the far, between other and same. Dante, as Said points out, attempted this in the *Inferno*, 'foreignising' the foreign—in this case, the figure of Mohammed (Mahomet) cast as one of the "Sowers of Discord", a "sower of Christian schism and sedition"[33]—while incorporating it "schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, manager, and actors are *for* Europe, and only for Europe."[34] This realism historicises. By means of a tangible narrative of *manageable* distances the colonisers colonise, *discursively*.

Said touches on a sort of "orientalist dream-work" by making a distinction between what he calls a *manifest* orientalism—"the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology",[35] etc—and a *latent* Orientalism: what he calls an "unconscious (and certainly untouchable) positivity"—the expression (or repression) of a fantasy or a desire *for* the Orient's "feminine penetrability" and "supine malleability".[36]

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33. Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy: I Hell*, trans. Dorothy L. Sayers (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1976), 246-51

34. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 72. "Hence the vacillation between the familiar and the alien .... the figures of speech associated with the Orient ... are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the timeless eternal; they convey an impression of repetition and strength; they are always symmetrical to, and yet diametrically inferior to, a European equivalent ... For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula *is*. Thus Mohammed *is* an imposter .... No background need be given; the evidence necessary to convict Mohammed is contained in the 'is'." (*ibid.*, 72)

35. *Ibid.*, 206

36. *Ibid.*, 206. Homi Bhabha is critical of Said's schema because of what he calls its "inadequate engagement with alterity and ambivalence in the articulation of these two economies which threaten to split the very object of Orientalist discourse as knowledge and the subject positioned therein." (Homi K. Bhabha, "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism" in *Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Culture*, ed. Russell Ferguson *et al* [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992], 73) Bhabha believes the binarism implicit in Said's account threatens the fundamental discursive power of his project, pointing to a theoretical ambivalence in Said's text. While Bhabha's criticism is *theoretically* valid, the binarism Said describes is, however, *experientially* and *practically* everywhere at work. It is precisely this *experience* that I'm interested in.

A similar discursive pattern can be seen in certain avowedly 'post-colonial' or marginalist intellectual positions. We have a sort of *manifest* marginalism—"the various stated views about marginalised cultures, minority discourses, literatures, history", etc—and, more importantly, a *latent* marginalism: the unconscious expression of a fantasy or a desire *to be* or *to have* the 'deracinated' other's "feminine penetrability" and "supine malleability"—not unlike what Julia Kristeva has called a "fantasy of incorporation", an affective disposition "by means of which I attempt to escape fear."[37] But fear of what? Few have described it better, or more honestly, than American film director George Stevens who spoke these words after his experience of the liberation of Dachau:

> All of the outrages of human nature bring these latent and deep-rooted emotions to the surface, but nothing like a concentration camp. Everything evil will be exposed in a day. It's deplorable, because it undercuts one terribly. I would examine it on the basis of what would happen if I was in the other army, the German Army ... [I] hated the bastards, what they stood for was the worst, *worst* possible thing that's happened in centuries, and yet, when a poor man, hungered and unseeing, because his eyesight is failing, grabs me and starts begging, I feel the Nazi, in any human being, I don't care whether I'm a Jew or a Gentile, I feel the Nazi, because I abhor him and I want him to keep his hands off me. And the reason I abhor him, is because I see myself being capable of arrogance and brutality, to keep him off me. That's a fierce thing to discover within yourself, that which you despise the most.[38]

But for marginalists the problem is compounded—they want to be liked. They must eschew the aggressive path to attaining the subject—or more properly the object—of their discourse, but must, at all costs, attain its position—*identify* with it and

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37. Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 39

38. A voice recording of George Stevens in, *A Filmmaker's Journey*, a film by George Stevens, Jr. (1984) [Here Stevens would concur with Adorno who wrote these words on the cold affectivity of culture "after Auschwitz": "A child, fond of an innkeeper named Adam, watched him club the rats pouring out of holes in the courtyard; it was in his image that the child made its own image of the first man. That this has been forgotten, that we no longer know what we used to fell before the dogcatcher's van, is both the triumph of culture and its failure. Culture, which keeps emulating the old Adam, cannot bear to be reminded of that zone, and precisely this is not to be reconciled with the conception that culture has of itself. It abhors stench because it stinks—because, as Brecht put it in a magnificent line, its mansion is built of dogshit. Years after that line was written, Auschwitz demonstrated irrefutably that culture has failed." (Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton [New York: Seabury Press, 1983], 366)]

incorporate it. Certain discourses *on* marginalisation and displacement have become discourses *of* marginalisation and displacement, themselves locked in a perverse logic of *identification* with the very subjects of their own intellectual endeavours. In an attempt to locate 'the subject of the margins' *at* the margins these theorists—some of whom Rey Chow has referred to as "brokers in diaspora"[39]—invest, identify and attempt to adopt a particular marginal, minority position of their own. Operating here is a fundamental contradiction: the liberal intellectual seeks the right of repatriation for its exiled, marginalised 'other' (the demand for a grounded, 'housed' subject—the subject of a 'homeland') while celebrating the *minority* discourse of the 'deracinated other' as true representative of the human subject. Seeking intellectual, political and sexual solace in a subject they can never and will never know—that, in fact, for them never existed—the intellectual seeks a repatriation of his own.

Said speaks of colonialism's vacillation between the foreign and the familiar—of a certain contradictory but conflationary move between extremes of the known and the unknown. He argues that since extremes are difficult to negotiate there is a tendency for foreignness and distance to close on the familiar, emerging as a "new median category" that allows one to see new things as if for the first time.[40] This is a means of controlling a potential threat to the established view and order of things—a means of escaping fear. While Bhabha is critical of Said's dream-work analogy, he does find in this "median category" of Said's a quality analogous to Freud's fetishism. Bhabha says

> the fetish ... gives access to an 'identity' which is predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety and defense, for it is a multiple and contradictory belief in its recognition of difference and disavowal of it .... For the scene of fetishism is also the scene of the reactivation and repetition of

39. Rey Chow, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 99. See also Sneja Gunew, "Playing Centre Field: Representation and Cultural Difference" in *Representation, Discourse and Desire: Contemporary Australian Culture and Critical Theory*, ed. Patrick Fuery (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994), 86-98

40. Said, *Orientalism*, 58

> primal fantasy—the subject's desire for a pure origin that is always threatened by its division...[41]

The colonial or marginal fetishist denies difference—in the case of this *marginalia* we can include *all* difference, but the categories of the sexual and the racial seem here to be enough—and fixes on an object that will not only perpetuate this denial of difference but take them back to some originary, pre-severant state. The important point here is that this fixation forges an *impossible* identification—an identification across a distance that cannot be bridged —a state of identification which conceals the fact that there is none.

In the context of the war in the Balkans, Renata Salecl has outlined the problematic of what she calls "the fantasy structure of the homeland".[42] She argues that the nation is based on a kind of social fiction—essentially a narration about this land which, in Lacanian terms, she defines as fantasy: the attempt to symbolise or flesh out the emptiness of reality. This fantasy functions as a scenario that conceals the essential and traumatic antagonisms and inconsistencies of society.[43] In the fantasy structure of the homeland, she argues, it is the nation that cannot be symbolised, so it is replaced with the rhetoric of home and hearth—this is national identification. The aim of war is to destroy the fantasy structure of the enemy's homeland—Salecl

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41. Bhabha, "The Other Question", 80

42. Renata Salecl, "Psychoanalysis and War: The Case of Bosnia." (Paper delivered at the "Psychoanalysis and Cultural Malaise" Conference [Annual Conference of the Australian Centre for Psychoanalysis in the Freudian Field], The Australian National University, Canberra [20 August 1994]). A version of this paper was subsequently published in her book *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism After the Fall of Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1994). See 11-20

43. It is no coincidence two of the most popular genres of cinema in Germany from post World War I to the rise of the Nazis were the *Heimatfilm* (homeland film) and the *bergfilm* (mountain film): the former characterised by a kind of 'down home and folksey' plenitude and sentimentality ('home-sweet-home' film), the latter by a certain adventurous, 'horizonal' sublimity. The breath-taking alpine extremes of the *bergfilm*—rendered and 'realised' in the extreme by the work of Arnold Fanck (and his rising star Leni Riefenstahl who would later make her own mark on the genre)—served to reinforce the wholeness and security of the *Heimat*: the fantasy of outland (the sublimity of the mountain extreme) gave flesh to the more possible fantasy of an ordered and familial homeland: *bergfilm* is *Heimatfilm*. (These kind of genre films are of course nowhere more evident than in Hollywood but this dichotomy of spatial metaphor in German cinema is notable for its mobilisation and exploitation by Nazism. After the war, the *Heimatfilm* would continue—this time under the normative sway of American culture—until the rise of the so-called 'new German cinema' [the likes of Kluge, Straub, Fassbinder, Herzog, Wenders] in the late 60s.)

argues that in the case of Bosnia, the Muslims had no such fantasy of homeland and so the Serbs forged their own myth of fundamentalism and religious extremism, attributed it to the Muslims, then set about destroying it.[44]

On the apparent re-emergence of European fascism, Etienne Balibar has elaborated on the phenomenon of "meta-racism", or "differentialist racism" as it is advanced by P.A. Taguieff.[45] A sort of "racism without races", differentialist racism has as its dominant theme "not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups of peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions."[46] Extending Balibar's thesis Slavoj Žižek calls this 'postmodern' racism: the postmodern racist expresses "horror and revulsion" at certain racial conflicts but argues quickly for a "contextualisation" of these issues, pointing to the existence of a sort of "contemporary Babilon [*sic*]" in which one's sense of ethnic and cultural identity is "losing ground"—we must expect certain casualties, the argument goes, when "cosmopolitic universalists" propagate this Babylon in the name of "multiculturalism".[47] What emerges is a 'political position' that is more than familiar with both racist and anti-racist rhetoric and which forges its problematic from between the cracks, as it were.[48]

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44. For a different perspective on this conflict see Malcolm Booker, *Conflict in the Balkans* (Sydney: Catalyst Press, 1994)

45. Etienne Balibar, "Is there a 'Neo-Racism'?", in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1991), 22

46. *Ibid.*, 22. "We now move from the theory of races or the struggle between the races in human history, whether based on biological or psychological principles, to a theory of 'race relations' within society, *which naturalizes not racial belonging but racial conduct.* From the logical point of view, differentialist racism is a meta-racism, or what we might call a 'second-position' racism, which presents itself as having drawn the lessons from the conflict between racism and anti-racism, as a politically operational theory of the causes of social aggression." (*ibid.*, 22)

47. Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 226. Salecl too advances Balibar's argument in *The Spoils of Freedom*, 12

48. Žižek adds: "What we have here is a palpable example of what Lacan has in mind when he insists that 'there is no metalanguage': the distance of metaracism toward racism is void; metaracism is racism pure and simple, all the more dangerous for posing as its opposite and advocating racist measures as the very form of

It is this fantasy structure of the homeland that the marginalist occupies better than most. In a desperate, clambering attempt to hold onto their fantasy structure, of the *subjective* homeland—this very hearth that nurtures and at the same time allows for the very possibility of a *subjective* outland—the liberal intellectual finds solace in the third world otherness of the subaltern and it is in their interest to keep them there.[49] Post-colonialism as a form of neo-colonialism.

The impulse of this liberal intellectual tendency to identification lies in this fantasy not of the margin but of the centre—that is, a fantasy of a *true homeland.* The impossibility of (a *heimlich*) plenitude is masked or re-rendered by the very possible solidity of such a homeland, fleshed out of a basic impossibility and a necessary void. Gayatri Spivak is harsh on this kind of 'subaltern identification' by Western intellectuals—of what she calls "the hyperbolic admiration or pious guilt that today is the mark of a reverse ethnocentrism."[50] While she argues that to ignore the political and discursive position of the subaltern is tantamount to the perpetuation of imperialism, we can see that critical attention to the subject-position of the subaltern is far from *identification* with it. Spivak is harsh on what she calls the

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fighting racism." (*ibid.*, 226) For a perfect correspondence here see Salecl, *The Spoils of Freedom*, 12

49. Billy Wilder's film *The Big Carnival* (1951) also had something on this. Also known as *Ace in the Hole* it tells the story of Chuck Tatum, a New York journalist on the rails in Albequerque. On his way to cover a rattle snake hunt after a year in this New Mexico backwater, Tatum (Kirk Douglas) comes upon Leo Menoza, a man trapped in an old Indian cave. While Leo could perhaps be extricated without much danger, Tatum decides to keep him there in order to get a story and boost his career. A true subaltern with identity 'hyphenated' across several boundaries—Hispanic-American, working-class, ex-serviceman—Leo is Tatum's "ace in the hole". People come from miles around for this human interest story—Tatum is in control and in constant touch with Leo. He gets 'close' to his subaltern but it's too late—Leo dies before they can save him. But, while this example serves to illustrate the position of the liberal intellectual, it also serves their position in that, again, their identification lies with the figure of the subaltern, not the star who truly represents them. It is therefore in danger of falling into the same victimology that is the narrative stuff of the marginalist. This liberal identification is savagely (if exploitatively) critiqued in Richard Rush's 1995 film *Color of Night* in which a New York psychoanalyst finds himself embroiled in a murder case in Los Angeles. As the analyst (Bruce Willis) is being questioned by a cynical Hispanic-American detective, another, African-American detective enters the room with a glass of water for the analyst. The Hispanic Captain severely reproaches his black subordinate for not knocking, telling him that "This is civilisation, bro'! Get outa here!" As Willis looks on, embarrassed as only a *liberal* intellectual can be, the Captain turns to him and shrugs, by way of explanation: "It's a Third World thing."

50. As cited in Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990), 167

"banality of leftist intellectuals' lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns," arguing that in this banal representation of the subaltern, their own position—here she is referring to the positions adopted by Deleuze and Foucault—"stands revealed; representing them [the subaltern], the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent."[51] She argues that intellectuals should undertake a sort of auto-debriefing, to "unlearn their privilege as loss" and engage with critical enterprise—they must become fully cognisant of their political and intellectual position, rather than be caught by the lures of *identification*.

Said, speaking of Fanon's "critique of the separatism and mock autonomy achieved by a pure politics of identity" and what might be called the divisions of positionality within post-colonial theory, points to a tendency of a certain "impoverishing politics of knowledge based only upon the assertion and reassertion of identity, an ultimately uninteresting alternation," he argues, "of presence and absence."[52] While Said recognises a revolution in thinking in the humanities that he believes to be "quite literally" Copernican in its scope, he laments that "the great contest about the canon continues."[53] But the point of *his* endeavour, he continues,

> cannot be simply and obdurately to reaffirm the paramount importance of formerly suppressed or silenced forms of knowledge and leave it at that, nor can it be to surround ourselves with the sanctimonious piety of historical or cultural victimhood as a way of making our intellectual presence felt. Such strategies are woefully insufficient.[54]

What Said goes on to say about the propogation of other 'centrisms' and "ethnic particularities" put forward to supplant the Otherness of Eurocentrism and its putatively repressive canon cannot be understated. "I submit," Said declares,

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51. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 70

52. Edward W. Said, "The Politics of Knowledge", *Raritan*, Summer (1991): 24. [This work has some resonance for the assertions made by Deleuze on the subject of identification vis-à-vis Hegel. This will be developed further in Chapter Two.]

53. *Ibid.*, 26

54. *Ibid.*, 26

> that these clamorous dismissals and swooping assertions are in fact caricatural reductions of what the great revisionary gestures of feminism, subaltern or black studies, and anti-imperialist resistance originally intended. For such gestures it was never a matter of replacing one set of authorities and dogmas with another, *nor of substituting one center for another.*[55]

Speaking of the rise of the *colonised* intellectual—the poets and writers in the time of Fanon—Sartre put it in a nut shell: "'You are making us into monstrosities; your humanism claims we are at one with the rest of humanity but your racist methods set us apart.'"[56] The apparent contradiction of an intellectualism based on deconstructive theories of a decentred subject which however conducts its play at the margins by means of a certain homogeneous construction—the search for a tangible, grounded subject—is not however as contradictory as it may at first seem. The actual, *latent* project of the intellectual is to find a centred subject which can only be effected by the narrative construction of an alien otherness. Again speaking on Fanon, Sartre reminds us that "colonial administrators were not paid to read Hegel and for that matter they didn't read much of him but they don't need a philosopher to tell them that uneasy consciences get caught up in their own contradictions."[57] Gramsci argued that even when the subaltern groups appear triumphant, they are "merely anxious to defend themselves"[58]—that the position of the subaltern is defensive is not at issue, that their defense should be against the simple thrust of big words and bad faith, however, is. And what happens when the new colonial administrators of the margins *do* read Hegel? Or worse, Derrida's Hegel? Here the contradictions may be less than visible. The character Sandro in Michelangelo Antonioni's 1960 film *L'avventura* is asked if there is any news of the whereabouts of his lover Anna, who has mysteriously gone missing. His answer points to the very

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55. *Ibid.*, 26-27.(my emphasis)

56. Sartre, preface to Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth,* trans. Constance Farrington (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 8

57. *Ibid.*, 8

58. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1980), 55

problematic of Antonioni's film on the 'frontiers of alienation': "Plenty of contradictions, a few vague clues." One contradiction is masked by yet another to serve the apparent seamlessness of the narrative of ideology.

It is precisely this constitutive (or reconstitutive turn to) *ideology* and, in particular, its narrative course that I want to chart. I take ideology here not in the sense of particular political expressions of any given class interest, or of the kind of 'triumphant state apparatuses' suggested by Said above, but in the manner of *subject relations* and their *representations* expressed by Althusser in this well known passage:

> In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but *the way* they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real relation and an *'imaginary', 'lived'* relation. Ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men and their 'world', that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the real relation and the imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of existence.[59]

This reconstitutive narrative of ideology is precisely the concretisation of a 'lost' subject as pursued in a constitutive image—the (re)turn from the margins to a homeland. Michael Seidel, in his book *Exile and the Narrative Imagination*, argues that the "task of the exile, especially the exiled artist, is to transform the figure of rupture back into a 'figure of connection.'"[60] The exile *reflects* on this *site*, this *figure* of rupture as dislocation, and must strive to *reappropriate* himself to *location*. While James's account may well be read as the simple melancholy affect of 'homesickness'—nonetheless exilic for that—this is also, however, the standard *reflection* on the exile as enigmatic poseur. It is no coincidence that the subject of

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59. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979), 233-4

60. Michael Seidel, *Exile and the Narrative Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), x. Seidel is referring to Henry James's *The American Scene* in which 'the exile' reflects on the nostalgia he felt for some old houses in his home town, now demolished: "... the whole figure of my connection with everything about, a connection that had been sharp, in spite of brevity, and then broken short off. Thus it was the sense of rupture ... that I was to carry with me." (*ibid.*, ix-x) [Freud may well have had something on this: "There is a joking saying that 'Love is homesickness'; and whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: 'this place is familiar to me, I've been here before', we may interpret the place as being his mother's genital or body." ("The 'Uncanny'", 245)]

these studies is literary, artistic, or, worse, intellectual. Here, Said's call for concentration on the 'truly dispossessed' bears more than a little heeding. But the problem is circular and, in the words of Paul Ricoeur, "that is why reflection is a task ... the task of making my concrete experience equal to 'I am'."[61] This circularity is suggested in Bernardo Bertolucci's 1990 film of Paul Bowles's novel *The Sheltering Sky* when Kit, the 'surviving subject' of the narrative, enters a bar at the close of her ordeal in the desert. Having lost her companion and herself to the openness of the desert, she returns to her *place* of departure, the closed space of the bar, where Bowles himself—reflected in heavily-framed mirrors—asks: "Are you lost?"—"Yes," She smiles, wistfully. She *finds* self precisely in *losing* self.

Now Seidel's exilic subject too is self-reflexive—both the subject of the enunciation and the subject of 'the enounced'—turning from the margins in order to regain some lost composure, some lost terrain or state. His *subject* is literary more than textual, further forging the familiar dichotomy between the abstract (fictive, literary, artistic, intellectual) and the concrete (the 'politically' displaced person), but simultaneously conflating and rendering this dichotomy *literal*—paying "close attention to works written in English by a Pole, a Russian, an Irishman, an American, and two Englishmen"[62]—that is, "translatable" exiles musing on both the literal and imaginary affect of their own exilic condition. With careful qualifiers, Seidel only broaches the more abstract, *textual* affect of exile. Alluding to existential, psychoanalytic and 'Marxist' approaches to the subject in his preface, he nonetheless turns his attention to the literary *location* of exile, opting for "the metaphor of politics in the Robinson Crusoe myth"[63] over any analysis of the exilic sentiment of his author-subjects. "For different reasons," he says, almost by way of apology to Said, "I have also resisted the

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61. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 45. I will take up Ricoeur's line further in Chapter 3.

62. Seidel, *Exile and the Narrative Imagination*, xi. (Read Conrad, Nabokov, Joyce, Henry James, Sterne and Defoe.)

63. *Ibid.*, xii

impulse to write excessively on modern exilic politics and émigré conditions," concentrating "instead on *literary representations of exile*, especially representations in which exile or expatriation is foregrounded as a narrative action."[64] Seidel concentrates on literary works in which exilic concerns or themes are "*foregrounded* as narrative action", again facilitating the familiar conflation between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enounced—between, the representative map and the represented territory. To this extent Seidel's work is itself *representative* of the 'literature on exile' and I cite this work as representative and precisely as my departure from that particular enterprise.[65]

A number of works touch on the terrain I wish to explore though none in the particular manner in which I wish to explore it. Some of these are worth mentioning however if only to point the way. Andrew Gurr's *Writers in Exile*[66] is a brief but worthy overview of themes of 'home' in modernist literature which he argues is 'neither here nor there'. But Gurr's text, while implicitly textual is still grounded firmly in English literary criticism, finding its focus more in authorial presence and placement than the discursive machinery that brings them there. Sante Matteo's *Textual Exile*[67] is of interest in its rejection of the nosographic approach to the text but it is to this extent only that his work is *textual*. Matteo seeks to explore what he calls the "implicit reader" or the "textual reader" in Ugo Foscolo's translation of Laurence Sterne's *Sentimental Journey* and the extent to which this reading subject

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64. *Ibid.*, xii. (my emphasis)

65. As literary criticism I have no argument with Seidel's work or the 'school' from which it emerges. He in fact intends nothing other than literary criticism, conceding that it would be "a sorry gesture" on his part to cultivate serious commitment to the concrete political concerns of the exile "for the mere pose of it." (*ibid.*, xii) As Seidel quite rightly points out early in the piece, there "is a discipline of modern academic research called Exile Studies that is much better suited to deal with the fate of displaced populations and exilic communities in the modern world."(*ibid.*, xii). In his prefatory definition of the exile, Seidel cites Paul Tabori's well-known study *The Anatomy of Exile: A Semantic and Historical Study* (London: Harrap, 1972) A wide-ranging and valuable 'survey' of the subject—sponsored, in part, by the UN Commission for Refugees—Tabori's book would, it seems, fulfil Said's call for a concentration on those "uncountable masses for whom UN agencies have been created."

66. Andrew Gurr, *Writers in Exile: The Identity of Home in Modern Literature* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1981)

67. Sante Matteo, *Textual Exile: The Reader in Sterne and Foscolo* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985)

shifts in translation. While he is critical of author-orientated scholarship, his own work is still located within the fictive or diegetic substance of the works of Foscolo and Sterne.

Island in the Stream[68] is a sort of cultural studies reader on place and identity in Australia. Here, the essays, produced at the time of Australia's bi-centenary, attempt to "dislocate the effect of being locked into a destiny established by the illusion of belonging to a particular national scene."[69] Foss, importantly, emphasises the *scene* of the nation rather than the nation itself. He invokes Patrick White: "The ideal Australia I visualised during any exile was always ... a landscape without figures."[70] Turning on the title of a television history of Australian art produced by Robert Hughes called "Landscape with Figures" and a novel by Gerald Murnane (*Landscape with Landscape),* Foss then asks: "What would the contrary look like, *a landscape without landscape?*"[71] Perhaps, he argues in the words of Mondrian, "a pure, absolutely deterritorialised landscape?"[72] For Foss, this book is about *identity* and its aim is to place it under siege. With Mondrian, he sign-posts his Deleuze and Guattari who go to the heart of the matter: "Inside or outside, the territory is linked to this intense centre, which is like the unknown homeland, terrestrial source of all forces friendly and hostile, where everything is decided."[73] Unfortunately, Foss's postmodern concerns are not explored in the rest of the book, its essays more focused on specific texts than the textuality that truly defines them.

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68. Paul Foss, ed. *Island in the Stream: Myths of Place in Australian Culture* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988)

69. Foss, "Landscape without Landscape: Prefatory Remarks", *ibid.*, 2

70. *Ibid.*, 3. [White's cultural bad faith here is salutary only for its transparency. His greatest personal tragedy was to him no less than that of the main character of his eponymous novel *Voss* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1960) who disappeared in the desert without a trace. Usually read as an indictment of the colonising mind and its incompatability with nature (that, it may well be) *Voss* is more a savage characterisation of the *colonised* mind, those 'figures in a landscape' who would in fact come to read his novel and live in a land in which he never felt *at home*. The specificity of exile for White is unimportant—he was avowedly in exile at home and abroad—because his problem was not with place, but people.]

71. *Ibid.*, 3

72. *Ibid.*, 3

73. As cited in *ibid.*, 3

Some recent Australian works that tend in the direction of the postcolonialism only alluded to in *Island in the Stream* offer more of the textual. Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin's *Past the Last Post* presents a collection of essays that to varying degrees explore the discursive and spatial parameters of the subject. Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra's *Dark Side of the Dream*[74] while focused on the specifics of the "real" of Australian literature, approaches its subject discursively with an over-riding textual orientation to the issue of place and identity. The two latter texts point up some of the important disciplinary junctures necessarily engaged in this field and show the way of the interdisciplinary approach of my own project.

A Note on Method

While I intend to plot the course of various signs and narratives of *displacement* and *dislocation*, my primary concern lies with the construction of *the centre*—precisely this *homeland*, the very locus which allows for the possibility of any writing, or reading, of exile—any transformation of space into place. This is indeed true of all who write, or speak, from the margins—there is no escape from the pull between the near and the far, the essential and defining narrative of those who *tell*.

So what kind of *telling*, what kind of *reading* of these tales do I have in mind? Writing on Marx's *Capital*, Althusser posed the question: "*what is it to read?*"[75] A 'philosophical reading', he argued, "is quite the opposite of an innocent reading. It is a guilty reading, but one that absolves its crime on confessing it."[76] While I seek no 'exculpation' or 'absolution' here, I think it important to speak of what reading I am

74. Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, *Dark Side of the Dream: Australian Literature and the Postcolonial Mind* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988)

75. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979), 15

76. *Ibid.*, 15. Earlier, on Marx's relation to Feuerbach, Althusser wrote that "borrowing a systematically interrelated set of concepts, borrowing a real *problematic*, cannot be accidental, it *binds* the borrower." (*For Marx*, 46)

guilty. The confession is posed in the very questioning of the innocence of the reading, in laying the cards on the table.

I want to withdraw from the frontiers, the margins that are the *loci* of fascination for much, particularly recent, cultural theory. In the 'work' that follows I intend to mark out *some* intuitive and reflexive spaces of language and its various narrative, ideological and representative forms as spaces of *exile*. I will approach these spaces from the very privileged position of the *homeland* in an attempted reappraisal of the essential and defining narrative of that *homeland*, from within. Writing on Nietzsche, Deleuze has argued that "[a] phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology and a semeiology."[77] I will approach the "existing force" of exile via a sort of materialist symptomatology, a methodology grounded in phenomenology (a 'grounded' phenomenology such as that issuing from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, certain Marxist critiques of ideology and their nexus in particular deconstructive approaches to the sign and its subject.

Again, my approach is textual and discursive, rather than historical or geographical, and while I will encounter some particularly Australian terrain—*this homeland*—my scope is far more general and thematic. Australia *as space* has occupied much literary and cultural theory, and not just from within this country. I invoke this particular *homeland* because it has indeed been subject of, *subject*ed to a sort of 'antipodean orientalism', inviting more than passing attention from international cultural theorists who, in their endeavour to *locate* this 'Great Southern Land' and impute to it a particular and peculiar spatial *affect*, have been quick to swallow the image of the alien 'out-thereness' that prefigured the impressions of previous colonisers. From the early 'commonwealth studies' which looked to the former colonies of Australia,

77. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), 3

New Zealand, Canada and smaller 'forgotten' colonies of the British Commonwealth —generally as anthropological and cultural curios—to the more recent studies of 'post-colonialism', the thrust, or at least the effect, has been that of a centrist valorisation of things marginal and curious.[78] And while I intend to look at discourses on alienation and marginalisation—that is, from the essentially post-Romantic 'cognitive adventure' to modernist discourses on *modern consciousness as the expressive condition of the displaced, alienated or marginalised*, etc—I take exile to be the very *precondition* of consciousness and its narratives, modern or otherwise. I will use—only thematically—two texts I believe to be exemplary in their dealings with what we might call subjective and significant *apprehension* and the textual vicissitudes of exile. These are Richard Hughes's *A High Wind in Jamaica*[79] and David Malouf's *An Imaginary Life*.[80] These will serve as diffident guides only in my exploration of the narrative of exile and I will call on them for the purposes of a certain narrative demonstration.

In Chapters One and Two I will explore various readings, reflections and positions on exile, with particular emphasis on the metaphor of "the map and the territory" as the representative *stuff* of exile. I will pursue the abstractions in representation that, I will argue, are the affect of the hidden difference between what might be called

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78. The following, by two French writers, is emblematic of this kind of writing: "A foreign reader of Australian literature cannot but be struck by this fact: although the last remaining blank in the centre of the continent was crossed in the 1870's, the Australian mind is still fascinated by the mystery of the inland which seems to have become a national cultural concern." (Michel Fabre and Patricia Maréchal, "King or Clown?: the explorer in some recent Australian writings.", *Commonwealth*, Vol. IV [1979-80], 77)

79. Richard Hughes, *A High Wind in Jamaica* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1937)

80. David Malouf, *An Imaginary Life* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1978). While these texts represent the exilic predicament of a female and a male respectively, I will not *directly* address the issue of gender in this thesis. Luce Irigaray has argued that "... female sexuality is not unifiable, it cannot be subsumed under the concept of subject. Which brings into question all the syntactical norms ..." ("Women's Exile", *Ideology & Consciousness* (May 1977), Vol. 1: 64) While this thesis deals essentially with the problem of the subject I intend to argue that this concept is in fact as arbitrary and abstract for any individual (whatever its sexual-genital manifestation). I will take the lead of Julia Kristeva who has explained (in a particular context) that her use of "'subject' ... is so abstract or universal that it concerns both sexes. We can therefore keep the 'he' ... In reality, feminine 'subjectivity' is a different question but it does not elude the general realm of *subjecthood* [*subjecticité*], or of subjectivation." (Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller [New York: Columbia University Press, 1984], 235)

the ideological map and the representative territory of the subject—that is, a certain 'metaphysical kernel' of representation itself. It is this 'metaphysical kernel' of subjectivity—the exilic 'subjective remainder' implicit, I will argue, in all discourse and representation (particularly that of modernist and postmodernist enterprises) that is at the core of *the narrative of exile.*

In Chapter Three I will take a lengthy look at what Merleau-Ponty calls the "intersection" of Being's dimensions of space and time. This will concentrate on the 'mechanisms' of *consciousness* and reflection as the work of the "exilic imagination" and will include an exposition of the nexus between various French and German 'phenomenologies' as represented by Heidegger, Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur. Chapter Four will return to "the exilic imagination" but this time through the Lacanian imaginary and the emphasis will be largely that of the unconscious or, in the words of Ricoeur, the 'unreflected'. Chapter Five will conclude by looking at the exilic subject from the perspective of what Kristeva has called "the realm of positions", a particular negotiation of the subject from the place of signification and its tendency to closure: a return to metaphysics in an attempt to 'repatriate' the subject of *textual exile*—a sort of home-coming.[81]

81. The reader should note that the extensive use of footnotes in this thesis is both intentional and to an extent unavoidable. The aim of the notation is largely to signpost the many junctures of the disciplines I have appropriated to my task, but also to halt the reader at those junctures, to draw attention to fact that while there is no 'System', properly speaking, to hold the subject, there is a drive to systematise and to narrativise. I have attempted to draw attention to the very contradictions inherent in this process of reading, if at the expense of a certain narrative flow.

1 THE SUBJECT MISSING

[BETWEEN THE MAP AND THE TERRITORY]

> His feeling is one of extreme repugnance at losing his grasp upon himself in the interests of that neutral force, formless and bereft of any destiny, which is behind everything that gets written. This repugnance, or apprehension, is revealed by the concern, characteristic of so many authors, to compose what they call their 'journal'.... Their journal is not essentially confessional; it is not one's own story. It is memorial. What must the writer remember? Himself: who he is when he isn't writing, when he lives his daily life, when he is alive and true, not dying bereft of truth.
>
> Maurice Blanchot *The Space of Literature*

1.1 The Map and the Territory

By way of a story cited by Jorge Luis Borges—of a cartographer who draws a map of England so detailed as to actually cover the terrain he surveys—Jean Baudrillard sets to negotiate the modern terrain of representation, making the professorial declaration that "the territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth ... it is the map that precedes the territory".[1] From here Baudrillard sets out to develop a critique of *appearance*—of "the representational imaginary" of metaphysics and the history of representation. He proposes the onset of a sort of black hole of signification in which the "reference principle" is not only flawed, it has imploded. The relation of map to territory, of *image to real* has, for Baudrillard, "short-circuited", leaving no possibility of differentiation between sign and referent. Representation is no longer tenable as *reference* is swallowed in the collusion between the image and the real—all that is left is a kind of paradoxical 'lost terrain': "*the desert*

1. Jean Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra", *Simulations*, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext[e], 1983), 1. The tale is cited by Borges in an essay in which he reflects on the relation of the real to the imaginary in Cervantes and others: "Every novel is an ideal plane inserted into the realm of reality; Cervantes takes pleasure in confusing the objective with the subjective, the world of the reader and the world of the book." ("The Partial Magic of the *Quixote*", *Labyrinths* [London: Penguin, 1970], 229) But it is the following passage from Borges that is at the centre of the reading that follows: "The inventions of philosophy are no less fantastic than those of art: Josiah Royce ... has formulated the following: 'Let us imagine that a portion of the soil of England has been levelled off perfectly and that on it a cartographer traces a map of England. The job is perfect; there is no detail of the soil of England, no matter how minute, that is not registered on the map: everything there has its correspondence. This map, in such a case, should contain a map of the map of the map and so on into infinity.'" (*ibid.*, 231)

of the real itself."[2] For Baudrillard, Borges's "fable has come full circle for us, and now has nothing but the discrete charm of second order simulacra. Abstraction today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal."[3]

In Baudrillard, *appearances* are not to be taken as tricks that mask or (falsely) represent the *real*, since (in this apparently new terrain) they are the real but, for him, a real without metaphysical or referential 'ground'. Royce's 'metamap', serial that it is, still holds reference for the land it charts—"everything has its correspondence". 'Perfect' that it may be the map is still however *reproduction*, re-presenting its world and thus bringing those who would read it "full circle", back to the land of its origin: a simulacrum of the "second order". By Baudrillard's reckoning, the cartographer's ideal—and the very notion of *origin* on which it is based—"disappears with simulation" and "[w]ith it goes all of metaphysics. No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept. No more imaginary co-extensivity."[4] The real has, for Baudrillard, gone "nuclear and genetic", serially reproduced without an imaginary bank to refer to: "In fact," says Baudrillard, "since it is no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it is no longer real at all. It is a hyperreal, the product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere."[5]

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2. *Ibid.*, 2

3. *Ibid.*, 1-2

4. *Ibid.*, 3

5. *Ibid.*, 3. Baudrillard's tepid Nietzscheanism may be glimpsed here. Nietzsche goes further in his philosophical overturning of the Platonic certainty of the real and its metaphysical underpinning: "The 'real world'—an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer—an idea grown useless, superfluous, *consequently* a refuted idea: let us abolish it! .... (... Plato blushes for shame; all free spirits run riot.) We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps?... But no! *With the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!* (Friedrich Nietzsche, "How the 'Real World' at last Became a Myth", *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale [Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968], 40-41)

Baudrillard's hyperreal is the causeless effect of "third order simulacrum". Correspondence disappears in *simulation*. But while speaking of appearances, it is necessary to ask: appearances for whom? It is necessary to speak of the *apprehension* of appearance—map as *appearance*, as *image* of territory—the one who would read the map of this terrain must 'move toward' its *image* in order that it be taken in, realised and rendered concrete in the process of representation. The "cartographer's mad project of an ideal coextensivity between the map and the territory"[6] is symptomatic of this representative and historical impulse to *concretisation*—the pursuit of the image as real is what history and its almost infinite narratives have depended on for their existence.[7] But Baudrillard sees something other than a process of concretisation: "...it is," he goes so far to say, "no longer a question of either maps or territory. Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference between them that was the abstraction's charm."[8]

While scanning different horizons, Baudrillard's course has some bearing on the task I have set myself here. In Baudrillard, the "something" that has "disappeared" would seem to be more than "sovereign difference"—it is the territory itself, the essential ground to which the subject's co-ordinates refer. Here, there is "no more metaphysics" because there is no more subject.[9] In attempting to chart the course of

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6. Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra", 3

7. Baudrillard does advance what may be termed a sort of '*dis*-ontogenesis' of the image, the "successive phases" of its dissolution. For Baudrillard, the image has moved from that which "reflects" a "basic reality" to that which "masks and perverts a basic reality" and then "masks the *absence* of a basic reality"—finally, the image "bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum." (*ibid.*, 11)

8. *Ibid.*, 3

9. This is, of course, the general thrust of Baudrillard's 'nihilism' in which "... all that remains is the fascination for arid and indifferent forms, for the very operation of the system which annuls us." (Baudrillard, "On Nihilism", as cited in Paul Foss, "Despero Ergo Sum", *Seduced and Abandoned: The Baudrillard Scene*, ed. André Frankovits [Sydney: Stonemoss, 1984], 9) In all Baudrillard's work since the mid-70s is the paradox of the 'remainder': while the *subject* is rubbed out—albeit an erasure perpetrated by *a system*—there is always this 'subjective left-over', someone left to watch, to be fascinated, to be further annulled, etc.—a sort of philosophical (and paradoxical, given Baudrillard's espoused lineage) incarnation of Alain Robbe-Grillet whose work too, Jameson argues, "is based on the disappearance of the subject." (Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974], 159) Something of this paradox can be seen in the ontology of the title of Foss's essay which is, at base, affirmative rather than negative. I advocate no nostalgia either for this lost subject or the real of its terrain and

this pursuit of the image, and its narrative and ideological construction in the real, I am proposing to explore the 'lost terrain' suggested by Baudrillard. This lost terrain, I will argue, is the (paradoxical) ground and reference for every subject who negotiates the map and the territory of narrative—the lost terrain is, in fact, *the real* of *the subject* itself, shifting in the face of its own signification, representation. The *real* and its *reproducibility*—the 'reference circuit'—is at the centre of any question of narrative. From the first mimetic play of the child to the mirage that tricks the eye of the lost explorer, it is precisely the nuances and vicissitudes of *appearances* that draw our attention. But for Baudrillard images *fascinate* not so much because they are sites of meaning production or representation—because in the age of simulation, these, he argues, are no longer possible—but by the fact that they signal only the *disappearance* of these processes.

But it is the apprehension and the *making real* of the images of appearance that is at stake here.[10] It is the very (ideological-subject-ive) negotiation of the real that necessitates the traversal of a sort of nether land or interstice between map and

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nor do I propose some humanist replacement. But in his apparent haste to this elision, I do believe that Baudrillard misses a step on the way. While I don't intend to deal with Baudrillard in any detail here, it is the suggestion of this 'subjective remainder', this metaphysical 'left-over' that I believe to be the repressed 'kernel' of his later writings and that I take as my leave to explore.

10. Up until now I have used the term '*the real*' unproblematically—that is, in its *apparent*, '*representative*' sense—in accordance with Baudrillard's own usage. But for Jacques Lacan, 'reality' has little to do with 'the real'—he problematises 'the real' as that which in fact resists symbolisation, as that which is caught in the montage of the dream-work and which remains intangible to the contemplation of waking life. Simultaneously full and void, Lacan's Real, it would seem, comes close to Baudrillard's own "hyperreal". As Slavoj Žižek points out, "the Real is the rock on which every attempt at symbolization stumbles, the hard core which remains the same in all possible worlds (symbolic universes); but at the same time its status is thoroughly precarious; ... that persists only as failed, missed, in a shadow, and dissolves itself as soon as we try to grasp it in its positive nature." (Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* [London: Verso, 1991], 169) This may well be due to the fact that the designation is nowhere fully fleshed out in Lacan—"lapidary comments, " as Fredric Jameson puts it, "...which are to be stumbled on throughout his work. Nonetheless," he continues, "it is not terribly difficult to say what is meant by the Real in Lacan. It is simply History itself ..." (Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Theory and the Problem of the Subject", *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise*, ed. Shoshona Felman [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982], 384) Baudrillard 'recognises' this non-symbolisable 'real' in Lacanian theory if only in order to dismiss it as irrelevant to the sway of the (essentially Maussian) 'symbolic order' of his own project—a symbolic order as "an act of exchange and *a social relation which puts an end to the real* ... an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary." (Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant [London: Sage Publications, 1993], 133; 188n10) I will develop the *ideological affect* of this 'non-symbolisable real', the real of history, as we go.

territory, between the narrative frame and the experience of the real. This difference between map and territory, between the sign and *the real* has *not* disappeared—not yet, even in 'simulation', as Baudrillard's Futurism (or, the figures in Plato's "world of shadows") would have it. Paul Foss affirms: "it is true that maps concern representation. However, no ideal co-extensivity ever exists between map and territory, nor can there be. It is in the difference between the two that the power of the map resides."[11] A paradox of distance and conflation, difference and identity, the relation of map to real is precisely a relation of "sovereign difference"—a difference that is and always has been the precondition of narrative. But this significant difference has, it's true, been subject to progressive denegation, its progressive erasure having been effected since the onset of image and narrative as significant forms. Identity requires narrative continuity, the connection of spatial and temporal attributes that ground the subject, its rational measure. The *beginning-middle-end* circuitry of narrative—*the story*—points to this very closure and apparent erasure of difference and distance. These are its essential terms. This *difference* (rendered all the more *significant* in its apparent declension) is reproduced as a kind of *exile*—a state, it will be argued, that at once forges and is forged by this "abstraction" of the cartographer's allegory.

1.2 The *place* of Exile

The great body of cultural theory on and from the *margins* has concentrated on the imperialist reason and realism of the colonisers. But what of the colonised and the dispersed? How do we account for their response to the discursive actions of others? They are *written*, but what of *their* writing? Writing on the exilic poetics of Jabès, Mark Taylor says that exile "is not only, indeed is not primarily, a matter of spatial and temporal dislocation ... the topos of exile is writing. Writing at once interrogates

11. Paul Foss, "Theatrum Nondum Cognitorum", *The Foreign Bodies Papers*, ed. Peter Botsman, Chris Burns and Peter Hutchings (Sydney: Local Consumption Publications, 1981) 22. Baudrillard would argue that the map's power resides only in the fact of the disappearance of its referent—the disappearance of the territory.

and enacts the condition of unbelonging from which there is no escape."[12] Along with his Jewish compatriots, Jabès was expelled from Egypt after the Suez crisis of 1956 and lived out his life in France. In his *relegation* he turned more fully to Judaism, coming to the belief that this faith was "an extended lesson in reading, which involves an endless questioning of the writer."[13] Quoting Adorno as saying that "after Auschwitz we can no longer write poetry", Jabès corrects this to assert that "after Auschwitz we *must* write poetry but with wounded words."[14] The writer is the subject of his own representation but in *the writing*, in *the reading*, *the subject* comes asunder as, for Derrida apropos Jabès, "in its representation of itself the subject is shattered and opened ... ruined, made into an abyss, in its own representation."[15]

Referring to the journalists of Australia's historical representation, Paul Carter puts it like this: "Such spatial history—history that discovers and explores the lacuna left by imperial history—begins and ends in language. It is this which makes it history

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12. Mark C. Taylor, foreword to Edmond Jabès, *The Book of Margins*, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), x. Maurice Blanchot had similar ideas. In *The Writing of the Disaster*, Blanchot *aphorises* that "whoever writes is exiled from writing, which is the country—his own—where he is not a prophet."(as cited in Stamelman, "The Strangeness of the Other", 127) Pointing out that "All writing, in fact, involves exile," Stamelman cites this passage from Blanchot as testimony to "the inescapable estrangement that all language creates." (*ibid.*, 127). It would seem, however, that Stamelman's citation is not a means to a particular hermeneutics of estrangement, but its poetic valorisation. In fact, Blanchot's allusion to the impossibility of *sovereignty* in one's "own country" (writing) tells us much more about (the now less than 'sovereign') Jabès and the 'predicament' of the *subject-writer* than Stamelman's circular and poetic valorisation will allow.

13. Jabès, *The Book of Margins*, ix

14. *Ibid.*, ix-x. Adorno would write that "hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question whether after Auschwitz you can go on living ... mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared." (*Negative Dialectics*, 362-3) [Heiner Müller, on the staging of his Berliner Ensemble's *Hamlet* in Berlin after the fall of the Wall, was asked if "it is even possible to stage plays at times like these?" "You can stage plays," he responds, "but the question is whether you can still sell them." (Müller, *Germania*, trans. Bernard and Caroline Schütze, ed. Sylvère Lotringer [New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, 1990], 241) While Müller here is clearly not 'quoting' Adorno, the irony is not lost as the "coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity" suggested by Adorno has been replayed with significant alacrity and cold profit since the Wall came down around the ears of those "who were spared". This 'cynical commodification' will be developed in a subsequent chapter.]

15. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 65

rather than, say, geography."[16] In an interview with Carter about his book *The Road to Botany Bay*, David Malouf poses the seemingly disingenuous question: "I suppose it's proper, Paul, that you should find yourself talking to a writer rather than a professional historian or geographer because, finally, what your book's about is the act of writing, isn't it?"[17] Carter's book is certainly *about* the "act of writing", about the act of writing history—of writing the Australian surveyors' terrain—but it is also about the act of reading, of "reading the country" as Stephen Muecke has put it in another context.[18] Carter's book sets out to trace a certain history of space via the maps constructed and pursued by a variety of early Australian explorers and surveyors. These 'journeymen' of the interior could read the country only by writing it, by spreading its strangeness before them as they would a tablecloth, directions sketched out it as if for the benefit of a stranger in town.[19] For Carter, the strangeness of this southern land was rendered familiar by *naming* it familiar—through what he calls "the haze which preceded clear outlines,"[20] the explorers narrated this land as they went by names resonant with a melancholy sense of homeland: "What is evoked here are the spatial forms and fantasies through which a culture declares its presence."[21]

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16. Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987), xxii

17. David Malouf and Paul Carter, "Space, Writing and Historical Identity", *Thesis Eleven* 22 (1989), 92

18. Krim Benterrak, Stephen Muecke and Paddy Roe, *Reading the Country: An Introduction to Nomadology* (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1984). *Reading the Country* (under the general direction of Muecke) is a sort of re-routing of the "nomadology" of Deleuze and Guattari via a tripartite 'reading' of Australia's north west frontier—three 'nations', three 'texts', three 'subjects' make a pitch for the interpretation of territory only now being charted in the nexus of poststructuralist and postcolonial theory.

19. Carter distinguishes between the surveyor and the explorer: "Where the explorer aimed to differentiate geographical objects, the surveyor aimed to arrange them significantly. His aim was to centralize figures, to compose them into regions. Where the explorer was always anxious to travel on, the surveyor always had it in mind to stop: against the explorer's high road, the surveyor was an advocate of fertile basins—conceptual places where the imagination might be enticed to settle." (*The Road to Botany Bay*, 113) Mindful of the relative pathologies of these species of traveller (fruitfully diagnosed by Carter), I will however use them interchangeably, looking more generally to *the subject*'s apprehension of space.

20. *Ibid.*, xxii

21. *Ibid.*, xxii. "It is spatiality as a form of non-linear writing; as a form of history. That cultural space *has* such a history is evident from the historical documents themselves. For the literature of spatial history—the letters home, the explorers' journals, the unfinished maps—are written traces which, but for their spatial occasion, would not have come into being." (*ibid.*, xxii) These records of survey, argues Carter, "are not like novels, their narratives do not conform to the rules of cause-and-effect empirical history. Rather they are analogous to unfinished maps and should be read accordingly as records of travelling." (*ibid.*, xxii)

Carter is at pains to stress that the subject of his text is not the history of the physical space of the map but the cultural space contained in its boundaries. It is by these bounds, these limits of inscription, that "we can discern the process of transforming space into place, the *intentional* world of the texts..."[22] Carter argues that "[t]he 'facts' of this spatial history are not houses or clearings, but phenomena as they appear to the traveller, as his intentional gaze conjures them up. They are the directions and distances in which houses and clearings *may* be found or founded".[23]

The voyager's gaze is *intentional* to the extent that his consciousness—perhaps weakened by isolation and the toil that brings him—turns to this unknown (object) space, simultaneously entering, naming and internalising it. Here the explorer's *intuition* amounts to a "fantasy of incorporation": a certain intuitive and, in this context, geographical introjection—by means of which, as already indicated, the subject attempts flight from fear. The explorer reflects, but not content to note in passing the land before him, decisively enters its realm, demarcating, delimiting and forging *a relation—reading the country,* as he goes.[24]

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22. *Ibid.*, xxiii. Carter's hermeneutic (fruitful that it is) relies on a fairly generic form of phenomenological *intuition* and *intentionality* which, however, apart from the odd reference to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, remains implicit. In this he shares much with Gaston Bachelard whose "poetics of space" and "geographical intuition" is redolent in Carter's "spatial history".

23. *Ibid.*, xxiv

24. Carter is harsh on what he calls "the imitative fallacy" of Muecke's text, arguing that in its hurry to textualise the "multi-dimensional spatiality of aboriginal culture .... Spatial, unlike discursive, horizons remain unmapped." (*The Road to Botany Bay*, 348). Since Muecke's "discursive" enterprise, it may be argued, is a counter-strategy to the sort of *writing* of the surveyors and cartographers pursued in Carter's own *writing*, then his observation is probably apt. But, importantly, of these two hermeneutic enterprises it is Muecke's *Reading the Country* that is, in Barthesian terms, the more "writerly", or 'writable', offering it seems the possibility of engagement with not only the 'work' of the text but the 'country' of its labour. [The "writerly text is *ourselves writing*, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages." (Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. Richard Miller [New York: Hill & Wang, 1986], 5)] *Reading the Country* is in fact more open, heterogeneous and 'pluralist' than "imitative"—the latter a description that is perhaps more befitting Carter's own text which, in "readerly" fashion, "follows" its subjects, mirroring and systematising their very enterprise (methodologically at odds with his own invocation of Derrida, whose call for a "different kind of writing, one that lets one 'reread past writing according to a different organisation of space'" [*Road to Botany Bay*, 158] better defines Muecke's approach.) To go beyond this simple "evaluative" dichotomy "writerly/readerly", Barthes proposes a "second operation" of interpretation—very close here to Derrida's second "interpretation of interpretation"—that is, "*interpretation* (in the Nietzschean sense of the word). To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what *plural* constitutes it." (*S/Z*, 5) But Carter calls for a

The manifest evidence from the "records of travelling"—the writing of this reading—indicates an *active* move towards this new space. Expeditions—largely commissioned, relatively official sorties from the imperial 'centre'—suggest and propagate the notion that the explorers' inland move was *offensive*. The *approach* and effect of these explorations clearly was—few would argue otherwise. But this view fails to take account of the explorer's *apprehension* of the space that spread out before him. All of these 'records of travel' affirm that their writers were in fact *confronted* by this new space—vast, strange and treacherous—which itself proved to be the inscrutable, intangible *object* of their quest. They strode out fiercely from their cities, towns and camps but, increasingly, as they encountered spaces and features unknown, trod wearily.

Their *occupation* of this land was to this extent *defensive*. They write about it and map it yet never truly *apprehend* it. Carter touches on this when he speaks of the many place names that represent a particular failure to engage, on the explorers' own terms, with the landscape before them.

> The names are extraordinary: Cape Catastrophe, Mount Dromedary, Lake Disappointment. These are names which have to do with *not* finding places: they allude to the inability of the English to impose itself readily, and in that sense they are telling us a lot about the history of the people arriving, and about the way they have to renegotiate language itself ... it's not simply a blank landscape that's written over, it's something that has to be named *in order to be brought into existence*, but its very naming then reflects on the language which is used.[25]

Foss has observed that this toponymical predilection "is a way to mobilize the pull between 'here' and 'there' ... to locate a place as possible, as within reach, as proximate, by a play of immediacy which changes outland into environment, the

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hermeneutic that he believes will take us beyond Muecke's "critical dismantling" (Muecke's deconstruction is nonetheless hermeneutic)—"there has to be something more," he says, "a restoration of meaning, a process which cannot avoid being interpretive and imaginative." (*The Road to Botany Bay.*, 349) Muecke will later address the issue of space more directly, more literally, in his *Textual Spaces: Aboriginality and Cultural Studies* (Sydney: University of NSW Press, 1992) but Carter, it seems, wants this territory for himself.

25. Carter, "Space, Writing and Historical Identity", 94

hostile into home."[26] But in this reduction or closure of distance there is also a certain closure of difference, serving to *deny* the possibility of further plunder. That is, at work in this pull between *here* and *there* is a progressive denegation, a fortification rendered *home* merely by the reduction of that which is *not,* or *appears not* to be home. These travellers apply a system which can only in fact be applied to the already known or knowable and so the result is a systematic failure. *Their maps don't fit the terrain they survey.*

> Obviously this means we can't think about objective 18th century empirical scientists marching methodically across the landscape—what we can see them doing instead is reflecting on the tools and techniques to hand and in fact deviating from the straight and narrow into endless zig-zag routes, both literally and rhetorically, as they try to make sense of what they are finding. All of that precedes what is conventionally called the history of the country.[27]

Carter argues that what separates the travellers' journals from the stuff of "heroic biography" and "theatrical or nationalist plots" is their "active engagement with the road and the horizon."[28] The road, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, takes the form of a "chronotope": a sort of spatio-temporal 'figure' in which is defined a "literary work's artistic unity in relationship to an actual reality."[29] Time and space come together in the narrative course of the road, "both a point of new departures and a place for events to find their denouement."[30] The pull between here and there is managed in this chronotope of the road which, according to Bakhtin, "is always one

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26. Paul Foss, "Theatrum Nondum Cognitorum", 23. Waxing Deleuze and Guattari, Foss continues: "maps are stratagems for the abolition of distance. In this function maps rejoin with the true role of visual images. They constitute vanishing lines, escape machines, a beacon of fascination."(*ibid.*, 64)

27. *Ibid.*, 95. With this, Carter—himself a 'Briton'—goes so far as to say that he is "a bit reluctant to say that there was, in fact, an imposition on the landscape. I don't really see that the newcomers were better or worse in this respect than any body else naming the land." (*ibid.*, 94) Muecke too points out the extent and importance of Aboriginal toponymy in his *Textual Spaces.*

28. *The Road to Botany Bay,* xxii

29. M.M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination,* trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 243. Be it a road, a threshold, an encounter or a crisis, chronotopes "are the organising centers for the fundamental narrative events of the novel ... the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied. It can be said without qualification that to them belongs the meaning that shapes narrative." (*ibid.*, 250)

30. *Ibid.*, 244. "Heroes of medieval chivalric romances set out on the road, and it often happens that all the events of the novel either take place on the road or are concentrated along the road (distributed on both sides of it)."(*ibid.*, 244)

that passes through *familiar territory*, and not through some *exotic alien world* ... it is the *sociohistorical heterogeneity* of one's own country that is revealed and depicted."[31] Bakhtin here is speaking of the picaresque tradition in, among others, Cervantes and Defoe—a tradition well-etched in the later 'realist' historical novel—depicting a Europe already (at least geographically) *charted* and *occupied*. But, we can read in this *familiar territory* its exact opposite: the necessity for the traveller to render the *exotic alien world* before him *familiar* is just this depiction—however symptomatic—of a sort of 'deep structural' *heterogeneity*. The road *closes* on the horizon—itself another chronotope—in order to render it and the land through which it must pass familiar.[32] Carter too adverts to this problematic *location* of space and time. Rather than the hero's narrative plenitude (to which he undoubtedly aspires—and this aspiration is at the root of Bakhtin's chronotope, as at the root of narrative) here the road and the horizon show us a certain open-ended narrative, the way of the narrative's *undoing*, its essential failure. The road of the title of Carter's book symbolised anything but a communicative passage between already established *places*. For the convict at least, the road pushed to an *outside*, to a *space* beyond confinement but from which, it appeared, nothing returned. It could be accommodated only by the definition: *horizon* ... *escape* (outland proper because unattainable).

> Not only does it lead back, against the imperial tide of events, towards another beginning, but also by its definition of historical space as intentional space, it articulates the historical experience which the Enlightenment apologists of settlement left out.[33]

The 'free' surveyor, on the other hand, proceeds by reading the map that he himself inscribes, marking his territory familiar as he goes. He is thus *distanced* by all he surveys, every co-ordinate adding to his sense of solitude—only a symptom of his

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31. *Ibid.*, 245

32. "It is no great coincidence if the Hugolian poem—mirror of the soul—finds an indisputable parallel in the Stendahlian novel—mirror that one holds up along the road." (Jean Ricardou, as cited in Lynn Anthony Higgins, "Typographical Eros: Reading Ricardou in the Third Dimension", *Yale French Studies* 57: 183

33. *Ibid.*, 310

true heterogeneity. He has inscribed the map of his own exile. The value of Carter's work lies precisely in the form of its "imitative fallacy", its collusion with the subject of his writing—the discursive is reciprocally spatial, the relation is necessarily collusive.

1.3 The *representation* of Exile

So, what kind of exile do I have in mind? I am *about* exile in the same way that Carter's book is *about* 'writing'. I take the designation "literary representations of exile" to be tautological—I will argue that all *representation* is exilic by its very (textual) 'nature' and that *the literary* is *merely* its canonical form—exile's *abstraction* made *concrete*. It is precisely this *concrete*, this *concretisation* that is central to my concerns here. The fundamental ideological functioning of language as oscillating turn from representation to real—from map to territory—and its exact opposite: from real to representation—is precisely this process of concretisation. But it is *just* process, and the impulse to the concrete will remain simply this, an impulse characterised merely by its inherent failure. An empty teleology that is, nonetheless, tempered by a certain metaphysical fantasy of plenitude—a means to an end. Emmanuel Levinas introduces the problem of metaphysical 'rendering' like this:

> 'The true life is absent'. But we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this alibi. It is turned toward the 'elsewhere' and the 'otherwise' and the 'other'. For in the most general form it has assumed in the history of thought it appears as a movement going forth from a world that is familiar to us, whatever be the yet unknown lands that bound it or that it hides from view, from an 'at home' which we inhabit, toward an alien outside-of-oneself, toward a yonder.[34]

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34. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 33. [I invoke Levinas here, in a sense, against himself. As Derrida points out, Levinas's "concept of desire"—which is at the core of the relation touched on here—"is as anti-Hegelian as it can possibly be. It does not designate a movement of negation and assimilation, the negation of alterity first necessary in order to become 'self-consciousness' 'certain of itself' ... For Levinas, on the contrary, desire is the respect and knowledge of the other as other, the ethico-metaphysical moment whose transgression consciousness *must* forbid itself. According to Hegel, on the contrary, this gesture of transgression and assimilation is necessary and essential." (Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas", *Writing and Difference*, 92) While Levinas's 'ethico-metaphysical moment' has strong implications for the subtleties at play in a further *unconscious* moment—his work here is in fact extremely rich and sophisticated— his ruminations

This movement toward alterity is frustrated by a fundamental narrative contradiction—that is, the narrative venture is at all times in fact introspective and, there right before its very nose, the true narrative home is unattainable to the venturer. As Levinas further argues:

> No journey, no change of climate or of scenery could satisfy the desire bent toward it.... The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is a desire for a land not of our birth, for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never betake ourselves. The metaphysical desire does not rest upon any prior kinship. It is a desire that cannot be satisfied.[35]

This at first seems logical since they who venture, by and large, eschew any notion of a true objectivity to their search. This is particularly true of the modern (re)searcher who, having been robbed of more tangible objectives by their explorative predecessors, seeks increasingly ineffable objectives that only serve to further prove their elusiveness. The signs of the alterity they pursue become increasingly evasive. This is the *uncanny* place of the 'unheimlich' writer-subject, the alterity that haunts it, as "the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez soi]. But Stranger," argues Levinas, "also means the free one. Over him I have no *power*."[36] This relation is the stuff of metaphysics.

In her well known interview with Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva poses a question critical for this discussion: "Semiology today is constructed on the model of the sign and its correlates: *communication* and *structure*. What are the "logocentric" and

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ultimately fall back on a model of reflective *consciousness* and *will*. His work no doubt represents a desirable philosophical and political positioning, but as a working model for the mapping of human relations in all their historical vicissitudes it is, I believe, considerably flawed. While this fall back position of consciousness is true also of Hegel, we can see in his project the struggle implicated in what Ricoeur will call 'the unreflected'—the *unconscious* that is, at base, the true work of human relations. While Levinas shows us the images *at play* in reflection, we find in Hegel *the work* of the unreflected—what Rodolphe Gasché might refer to as 'the tain of the mirror', "that 'beyond' of the orchestrated mirror play of reflection." (*The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986]) This thesis follows the lead of Hegel here and it is precisely this struggle of 'negation and assimilation', in the 'unreflected', that will be developed hereafter.]

35. *Ibid.*, 33-34

36. *Ibid.*, 39

ethnocentric limits of these models, and how are they incapable of serving as the basis for a notation attempting to escape metaphysics?"[37]

Derrida's lengthy negotiation of this question—in which he outlines his own *re*negotiation of the sign model in his formulation 'of grammatology'—from the very beginning adverts to the difficulties encountered in mounting such an escape attempt. "All gestures here are necessarily equivocal," he begins. "And supposing, which I do not believe, that someday it will be possible *simply* to escape metaphysics, the concept of the sign will have marked, in this sense, a simultaneous impediment and progress."[38] The concept of the sign has, he accepts, been submitted to a degree of "work and displacement" which has had a certain "delimiting effect"—a certain "marking" which has "permitted the critique of how the concept of sign belongs to metaphysics."[39] So the escape is not impossible, according to Derrida, but nor is it simple—and the route, in fact, has yet to be discovered. Derrida's equivocation is both necessary and telling: "I try to keep myself," he says, "at the *limit* of philosophical discourse."[40] His "work" is necessarily *at* the limit since his critical considerations cannot go beyond it—his *delimitations* having been forged, in fact, from *within* and *by* the very concept *sign*: the sign *form* itself. But, as Derrida rightly points out, this (semiological) "work and displacement" which has "delimited" the sign as metaphysical, also

> represents a simultaneous *marking* and *loosening* of the limits of the system in which this concept was born and began to serve, and thereby also represents, to a certain extent, an uprooting of the sign from its own soil. This work must

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37. Derrida, "Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kristeva", *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 17

38. *Ibid.*, 17

39. *Ibid.*, 17. The "displacements" to which Derrida refers are quite clearly intended as his own. In "Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse" appearing in this same volume, Ronse asks Derrida about the "organisation" of his books. Derrida responds: "In effect they form, but indeed as a *displacement* and as the displacement of a *question*, a certain system somewhere open to an undecidable resource that sets the system in motion." (*ibid.*, 3) While Derrida's "system" is open to this "undecidable resource that sets the system in motion" (the 'kernel' of the dialectic? Derrida concedes here Mallarméan "blank spaces"[*ibid.*, 3]) it is, nevertheless, *system*.

40. *Ibid.*, 6

be conducted as far as possible, but at a certain point one inevitably encounters "the logocentric and ethnocentric limits" of such a model.[41]

Derrida does go on to say that at "this point, perhaps, the concept is to be abandoned. But this point is very difficult to determine and is never pure."[42] "Everything depends upon how one sets it to work", he says, and structure—like the notion of *sign* and its *semiology*—"can simultaneously confirm and shake logocentric and ethnocentric assuredness. It is not a question of junking these concepts, nor do we have the means to do so."[43] We are, in fact—and Derrida affirms this position consistently, if equivocally—stuck with them, even when attempting to chart an escape route. The subjects' ground, the *terrain* may be approached, interpreted only with *map* in hand. The spatial metaphor of the map and the territory shows us something of the essential *ratio* of the relation *text-reader*—a relation of distance and dislocation—closed as it is in the delimitations of discourse.[44]

It is precisely these "logocentric and ethnocentric" *limits* that I take to define the 'representative' subject as *the subject of exile.* Always and already inscribed in "the old cloth" of metaphysics—the very essence of *textuality*—the subject's "work" is the plotting of the co-ordinates of his inscription, the co-ordinates of *subjective*

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41. *Ibid.*, 17. Derrida's project is, of course, *at the centre* of this very attempt at escaping metaphysics but while the sign has undergone a certain "uprooting" there is little evidence that it has pointed in any direction other than back to its metaphysical ground—the old cartoon trick of turning the sign at the crossroads ...

42. *Ibid.*, 17-18

43. *Ibid.*, 24. He goes on: "Doubtless it is more necessary, from within semiology, to transform concepts, to displace them, to turn them against their presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other chains, and little by little to modify the terrain of our work and thereby produce new configurations; I do not believe in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal 'epistemological break', as it is called today. Breaks are always, and fatally, inscribed in an old cloth that must continually, interminably be undone." (*ibid.*, 24)

44. Derrida: "The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures ... *in a certain way.*" (*Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976], 24) But here too he warns that even while "borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally ... the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work." (*ibid.*, 24) In his earlier essay "Sign, Structure, and Play" he made himself quite clear on this: "There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest." (*Writing and Difference*, 280-81)

delimitation. This "work"—or "play" as it would be variously transcribed—points to a problematic of *exile.* Far from being a problematic of *displacement* and *dislocation,* I will argue that exile is precisely about its exact opposite: a certain representative fantasy of *location* and *placement*—that is, a fantasy marked by the presentation and re-presentation of its exact opposite.

2 THE MAP AND THE TERRITORY

[INTERSTICES OF THE REAL]

> 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. In so far as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie .... But Heraclitus will always be right in this, that being is an empty fiction. The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'real' world has only been *lyingly added...*
>
> Friedrich Nietzsche *Twilight of the Idols*

2.1 *The Desert of the Real*

The narrative charm of exile has always been evident. Perhaps more than any other theme, it is exile—generally rendered from the concrete to the abstract as *outsideness* or *alienation*—that has engendered the history of narrative. History's first recorded exile Sinuhe—the Egyptian discovered in a hieroglyphic—sets the scene neatly for those who would follow: "To go into exile was written neither in my mind nor in my heart. I tore myself from the soil upon which I stood .... My heart filled with terror. My arms dropped without strength and I trembled in all my limbs. I tried to find a hiding place".[1]

The Greeks in their drama and poetry found numerous hiding places for their cast of exiles—Oedipus and Odysseus, perhaps two of its most salient heroes. But the *culture of the deject* and the first concrete images of exile emerged from the institutionalisation of 'ostracism' in Greece and its institutional translation in the Roman *relegatio* and *deportatio*—the Latin *exsilium*, a term that describes them well enough. The concretisation of these images is born of concrete narratives of exile—that is to say, narratives penned by exiles—*real* displaced persons—about exile. The writings of the Roman exile Ovid in his *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* are seminal. For Ovid, like all his Latin contemporaries, the legacy of Homeric poetry

1. As cited in Paul Tabori, *The Anatomy of Exile: A Semantic and Historical Study*, 43

and drama was salutary and the images rendered in his poetry from the Black Sea are perhaps the true beginning of the exile's elegia.

While the mass migrations of the middle European tribes—what the Germans will call the *Völkerwanderung*—and the 'lost tribes', the 'chosen people' of the various Diasporas lend a certain narrative mobility to the theme of exile, it is precisely this movement that has required orientation. From Dante's imaginary wanderings through the epic *Commedia*, Milton's *Paradise Lost* and the early novels of Swift and Defoe to the modernists who composed the *real* of *displacement* as a marginal badge of honour, the narrative has served as diffident guide in the negotiation of the relationship of map to territory.

The errant Jew—himself symbolised by the extreme voluntarism of his spiritual father Abraham—would come to symbolise the profound *difference* between map and terrain: "The first act which made Abraham the progenitor of a nation," says Hegel, "is a disseverance which snaps the bonds of communal life and love. The entirety of the relationships in which he had hitherto lived with men and nature, these beautiful relationships of his youth, he spurned."[2] Reflecting on his separation from God and forced to confront his solitude the figure of the Jewish nomad came to represent an essential separation and opposition of consciousness to life itself. In reflection is discovered only the impossibility of that reflection ever coinciding with itself and in this division is rendered the only *true* experience—an extreme example

2. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate", *Early Theological Writings*, trans T.M. Knox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 185. Hegel introduces us to this "first act" of *the narrative of exile* by way of Abraham who "tore himself free altogether from his family as well, in order to be a wholly self-subsistent, independent man, to be an overlord himself. He did this without being injured or disowned, without the grief which after a wrong or an outrage signifies love's enduring need, when love, injured indeed but not lost, goes in quest of a new fatherland in order to flourish and enjoy itself there [but] .... [t]he whole world Abraham regarded as simply his opposite; if he did not take it to be a nullity, he looked on it as sustained by the God who was alien to it .... He was a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and to men alike. Among men he always was and remained a foreigner ..." (*ibid.*, 185-87) Cf. Mark C. Taylor's exegesis of Hegel's onto-theology in *Altarity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)

of the 'spirit' of Hegel's *unhappy consciousness.*[3]

Where, for Hegel, the Greeks found their freedom and *happiness* in a union of self and nature provided by the polis, a rent comes with the melancholy reflection of the Jew who in his solitude can only remain opposed to the fruits of life and nature. The apparently pathological narrative placement of 'the Jew' as 'the perfect stranger' and the essential outsider is attributable as much to the inventions of writing and history as to philosophy.[4] Again, on the Jewish 'alterity' of Edmond Jabès, Stamelman has argued that "the need to imagine the Jew as 'being elsewhere' may not be too far removed from the need to think of him as 'forgotten', as the sign of what the West has ideologically and historically had to repress and erase, to place *sous rature.*"[5] But

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3. I use 'reflection' here in a non-technical sense. Hegel's "scientific knowledge" stands in contradistinction to "reflective philosophy" which *reflects* by positing itself outside of and is essentially unconnected to the real of its observation. See Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the* Phenomenology of Spirit, assembled Raymond Queneau, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 171-4; also Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 190-203. I will take up certain aspects of the philosophy of reflection in Chapter Three.

4. If the diaspora and the incarnation of the 'chosen people' in the various figures of the Wandering Jew may be viewed as proem to *the narrative of exile* then is it not the attempted 'final solution' of the Nazis—the annihilation that ironically precipitates a return to a sort of Jewish *Heimat*—that perhaps signals its denouement? Said scratches at this paradox from another perpective: "All Palestinians during the summer of 1982 asked themselves what inarticulate urge drove Israel, having displaced Palestinians in 1948, to expel them continuously from their refugee homes and camps in Lebanon. [Said here doesn't elaborate on the other 'dispersions' of the West Bank and Gaza in the intervening decades] It is as if the reconstructed Jewish collective experience ... could not tolerate another story of dispossession and loss to exist along side it ..." ("Reflections on Exile", 164) I am reminded of Spielberg's film of *Schindler's List* (novel *Schindler's Ark* by Thomas Keneally). In the closing scenes, the Jewish survivors, arm-in-arm, stride out from their camp to an allegorical future of freedom and prosperity—a colour dissolve transforms the survivors into prosperous, present day Zionists (mostly 'second class Hebrews', as Israelis themselves would call them, brought from New York) marching triumphantly across their new *Heimat* to pay respects at the tomb of their saviour.

5. Stamelman, "The Strangeness of the Other and the Otherness of the Stranger", 126. While Stamelman is clearly referring to the 'repression' of the anti-Semitism suffered by the Jews and their 'erasure' effected by the Nazi war machine, his attribution to 'the West' of this need to "imagine the Jew as 'being elsewhere'" is just as spurious a construct as that of the generalised 'otherness' of the 'Jew'—a generalisation contradicted by non-'Western' positions cited elsewhere in his essay. Stamelman refers the reader to Lyotard's work *Heidegger and "the jews"* which he says discusses "the need to demystify this erasure by making the forgotten unforgettable." (*ibid.*, 121n) Lyotard speaks lucidly of a certain "politics of forgetting", of the silence of the "let's not talk about that" kind of position adopted by many of the survivors of the Nazi concentration camps—and, in particular, the position of "silence" adopted by Martin Heidegger—but while he invokes "horror", Lyotard's work goes well beyond that imputed to this silence. His argument goes to the heart of it when he of speaks of "the notion of 'Judeo-Christianism'—which is fashionable after Auschwitz, *a way of conserving the horror by repressing it*, where the forgetting of the forgotten, of the Other, persists." (*Heidegger and "the jews"*, trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990], 39 [my emphasis]) A palpable example of this may be seen in the massive popular appeal in the nineties of Henryk Górecki's Symphony No. 3,

this narrative 'placement' should not be read simply as relegation. While there is little doubting this positing in Hegel, Jabès's Jew seems similarly to wander the space described by the German philosopher: the Jew, says Jabès, "is the true stranger because he is himself. Because he *wants* to be himself. Because he has always tried to be himself .... Even the stranger considers him a stranger. For this reason, he is the stranger of the stranger."[6] And, again, says Derrida of Jabès: "The Poet and the Jew are not born *here* but *elsewhere.* They wander, separated from their true birth. Autochthons only of speech and writing, of Law."[7] Derrida concurs here with Hegel, affirming that the "Jewish consciousness is indeed the unhappy consciousness, and *Le livre des questions* is its poem ..."[8]

"Symphony of Sorrowful Songs" (1976), an elegy to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust rendered by way of a Polish folk Christian prayer (Lamentation of the Holy Cross—opening with *Zdrowaś Mario*, a variation and incorporation of "Ave Maria") inscribed by an 18 year old girl on the wall of a Gestapo prison cell in Zakopane, Poland in 1944. While the girl is almost certainly not Jewish (probably a communist, she is, in any case, one of "the jews", as Lyotard might have it) the music is most often accompanied on television by Nazi footage of the collected belongings of the Jews and images of the 'liberation' of the camps—piles of luggage, shoes and spectacles, wasted, pathetic faces and death. This musical irony was played out too at the other end of the 'Jewish experience' in the coverage by much Western media of the funeral of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995. Here we encounter the *work* of simultaneous *conservation* and *repression*—the Jewish 'experience' is both conserved and repressed in a Christian prayer. This will be developed further below.

6. As cited in Stamelman, "The Strangeness of the Other", 126n

7. Derrida, "Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book", *Writing and Difference*, 66

8. *Ibid.*, 68. While affirming Hegel, Derrida adds that this "poem is inscribed just beyond the phenomenology of mind". (*ibid.*, 68) Adverting of course to Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Derrida seeks (according to Bass's translation) a certain 'poetic space' *just* outside it. Wary of the (received) 'totality' of the Hegelian Idea, Derrida is careful not to limit the possibility of Jabès's poetic 'ec-stasies'. Joseph G. Kronick transliterates this passage from Derrida as the poem "inscribed *in* the margins of the phenomenology of spirit." ("Edmond Jabès and the Poetry of the Jewish Unhappy Consciousness", *MLN*, Vol. 106 [December 1991], 967 [my emphasis]) [See original: "*La conscience juive est bien la conscience malheureuse et* le Livre des questions *en est le poème; inscrit en marge de la phénoménologie de l'esprit avec laquelle le Juif ne veut faire qu'un bout de chemin, sans provision eschatologique, pour ne pas borner son désert, fermer son livre et cicatriser son cri.*" (*L'ecriture et la difference* [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967], 104)] Later, Kronick takes this to mean that Jabès's poetry is in fact situated "*within* the margins of Hegel's phenomenology of Spirit," concluding from this that Derrida somehow defines a literature that "occupies a certain space between metaphysics and an order other than Being." (*ibid.*, 971 [my emphasis]) Kronick's 'translation' in fact misses the point. Derrida seeks in his Jabès essay(hence Bass's translation) to 'situate' the poet just beyond the grasp of Hegel's phenomenology not *within* it—here, the poet is truly *marginalised.* But Kronick's reading does point to a more interesting aspect of Derrida's work on Jabès. Derrida seems to place an each way bet which Kronick interprets—with the aid of other of Derrida's more thoroughly 'grounded' Hegelian readings—as the construction of a certain textual "betweenness" which "is not localizable within a homogeneous whole but is a 'space' that is recognizable by its ... *praxis* that articulates the relation between philosophy and literature."(*ibid.*, 971) Kronick's "betweenness" suggests a far too subtle reading of Derrida's position here which is decidedly—with Jabès himself—that of a quintessential "*outsideness*". Derrida's Jew can only "accompany" the phenomenology and only for a "short while" at that. ("Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book", 68) Derrida is avowedly not party to the 'totalisation' of Hegel, arguing that

The transition from ancient (Greek, pre-reflective) to modern (Jewish, reflective) consciousness would be the unreliable map by which later travellers would negotiate their own terrain. Joyce's *Ulysses* would chart this relationship of consciousness to life and others also by way of the Jew.[9] Stephen Dedalus, "professor and author", via "signs on a white field" takes us through his own *interior world* [D(a)edalus is the architect of the labyrinth, waxer of wings and proto-structuralist] to that of Bloom-Ulysses, the archetypal outsider and, for Joyce, true protagonist of modern history and literature.[10] Dedalus and Bloom —*jewgreek and greekjew*—momentarily united in "parallel courses" as they stagger from a brothel to Bloom's kitchen, ponder the question: "what is the word known to all men?" The signs are unreliable and the answer comes only elliptically, but as their monologues "brood upon love's bitter mystery" they negotiate the terrain of "beautiful relationships," as Hegel may have put it, "they had spurned during their youth." Their parallel course shows them *the word*—united as father to son and man to man they reconcile themselves to the word they had always known, if only at a distance: *love*. [The *word* for Dante—putative master and Muse to Dedalus—may well be more divine but he finds it by way of *l'amore che move il sole e l'altre stelle* (the love that moves the sun and the other stars)—the image of Divine Grace in Beatrice—she becomes *the mediator of the immediate* to all men] Reflection closes this distance and the map by which they had charted the course of their lives begins to prove more reliable and relative to its terrain, the hiding place that was between them no longer either necessary or desirable. While the *exile* never *truly* reaches home he is reconciled to the world in

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"Hegel's text is necessarily fissured; that it is something more and other than the circular closure of its representation."(Derrida, *Positions*, 77; cited also in Kronick, 967). In his essay on Jabès, however, it is the poet who is "more and other than the circular closure" of Hegel's "representation"—a turn that is of little assistance in the *reading* of the *poetic exile*.

9. James Joyce, *Ulysses* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986)

10. Hegel attributes the "beautiful relationships" of "youth"—that, with Abraham, the Jew leaves behind—to the "imaginatively conceived gods of their former life" and in fact assumes that their "religious life at that time was similar to the Greek." (*Early Theological Writings*, trans. notes 185n8-9]) Similar, that is, for a time, after which Hegel opposes Greek to Jew and Jew to Greek. Joyce, it seems, seeks their reconciliation.

which he has come to reside: "Womb? Weary? He rests. He has travelled."[11]

As the platitudes attendant to Joyce's work of high modernism testify, *Ulysses* is *about* love—about the relationship of man to his lost terrain, hearth and home. But it is language that is most at the service of this narrative of exile and it is about the telling of the story as much as the story itself. The narrative of exile is a grand production encompassing both the myth and the real of displacement, dispersion and dislocation but it is, nonetheless, a *production.*[12] Joyce's production problematises this textuality of exile. However, telic in essence, this narrative shows us the terrain of this identificatory distance and dislocation that is at the heart of narrative-exile. The business of narrative is to *realise* its territory and to this extent all narrative is 'realist' production—a process which is however elided in the ever-changing relationship of map to territory. It is narrative's 'mirror to reality'—a metaphor whose currency is extant even in the wake of structuralism—that engenders this relation and language, like the map, is trundled out as a sort of stand-in—Orpheus, Odysseus-Ulysses, Narcissus—for the *real world.* The narrative's mimetic play produces an identity—a process of identification in the mimetic fallacy of *representation.* "All of Western faith and good faith," says Baudrillard, "was engaged in this wager on representation: that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could *exchange* for meaning and that something could guarantee this exchange—God, of course."[13] The relationship of difference of *the sign* to *the real* has, in its extreme naturalism, always *worked* at evading detection—the mimesis of

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11. Joyce, Ulysses, 606. Hyppolite on Hegel: "For what is love? Love is the original identity which precedes any reflection." (*Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, 192)

12. "Hence universal socialization, as outlined in the narratives of the world traveler Odysseus and the manufacturer Crusoe, from the start included the absolute solitude which emerged so clearly at the end of the bourgeois era. Radical socialization means radical alienation. Odysseus and Crusoe are both concerned with totality: the former measures whereas the latter produces it. Both realize totality in complete alienation from all other men, who meet the two protagonists only in alienated form—as enemies or as points of support, but always as tools, as things." (Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming [London: Verso Editions, 1979], 62) This seminal work offers much on the relation between the subject, the quest and the homeland. (see 77-78); see also Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, 38-9, *passim.*)

13. Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra", 10

representation is a sophisticated proffering of *the real* by apparently immediate and transparent intuition: difference is rendered as identity. This move of difference and equivalence is charted rigorously in structuralist and semiotic enterprise—it's a well-worn path, as even Baudrillard's sign-form would testify—*the real* of *the sign itself* is mapped in the associative unity of signifier and signified. Barthes's roses carry for him the particular significance of "passion"—and just as it is "true to say that on the plane of experience I cannot dissociate the roses from the message they carry",[14] it is true to say that on the plane of experience it is impossible to dissociate *the sign* (of the map) from *the real* (of the territory) *itself.*

To this extent Baudrillard's Borgesian example of "second order simulacra" is co-relative to the myth explored in what we might call Barthes's 'second-order semiology': as Barthes would have it, "[t]hat which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second."[15] In this "second system" myth is, for Barthes, an insidious resort to a nature of falsehood. Significant forms proliferate, seizing history and naturalising it, they "give it something like a malaise producing immobility: in order to make it innocent, it freezes it."[16] For Baudrillard too, history will disappear with this proliferation of signs in simulation (of the third order). The relation of image to referent is a perversion of collusion—as the two realms coincide and conform so too do the masses who are seduced by "a kind of fatal strategy of conformity."[17]

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14. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies,* trans. Annette Lavers (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 113

15. *Ibid.*, 114. "We must here recall that the materials of mythical speech (the language itself, photography, painting, posters, rituals, objects, etc.), however different at the start, are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon as they are caught by myth ... Whether it deals with alphabetical or pictorial writing, myth wants to see in them only a sum of signs, a global sign, the final term of a first semiological chain." (*ibid.*, 114) From this juncture Barthes's post-structuralist venture may be plotted.

16. *Ibid.*, 125

17. Baudrillard, *The Evil Demon of Images* (Sydney: Power Institute Publications Number 3, 1987), 15. Baudrillard here is of course speaking of "third order simulcra": with the erasure of the representative relation "being and appearance"—the "theatre of representation"—goes all of reference, all of meaning. "Digitality is its metaphysical principle (the God of Leibnitz), and DNA its prophet."("The Orders of Simulacrum", 103)

Baudrillard's analysis of disappearance and conflation is aimed at this "third order" end point of narrative—our own *televisualised* time that has come to deny history, "inverting the causal and logical order of the real and its reproduction"[18] in a "hyperreal"—a sort of modern self-consciousness that comes from the ubiquity of screens and images. Here, the workings of the sign-form and the metaphysics of representation no longer count since, for Baudrillard, the "fatal strategy" dooms us to dream only of our own disappearance. This is only logical. Once image and real coincide it is only a matter of time before we are consumed by the same conflationary "strategy". This can already be seen in the current fascination with 'virtual reality'. But these workings may be seen in the imagination of all signs. The sign and the real coincide to the extent that their relation is imaged in *the real* and *experience* is *the image* of the relation between the two—so the cartographer's mad project is realised.[19] The signifier is treated in everyday experience as identical, equivalent to a signified which is *there* as *the experience*—the being and appearance—of the sign. This collusion of being and appearance is at its best in the photographic *medium*: the photograph is rarely, if ever, distinguished from its referent—the image is in this sense *immediate*, at least by its appearance suggesting an unmediated relation to the real, the object to which it refers.

On the specificity of the photographic, André Bazin observed that the image "shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it *is* the model."[20] The *medium* is a misnomer. The map is the *equivalent* of its other term, the terrain. This is not to say however that the image is verisimilar to the point of illusion, though this would begin to emerge with *image movement* in the cinema. The photo fits our frame, fixing things that are never fixed

18. *Ibid.*, 13

19. Baudrillard argues that with the implosion of meaning goes also *the imaginary*: "The cold light of television is inoffensive to the imagination (even that of children) since it no longer carries any imaginary, for the simple reason that *it is no longer an image.*"(*ibid.*, 25)

20. André Bazin, "The Ontology of the Photographic Image", *What is Cinema?*, trans. Hugh Gray (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 14

but, in Hegelian terms, always in a process of becoming, declining or evolving into something else. Our inadequate *intuition* forces us to freeze that which is not and cannot be—in real terms—frozen. The photograph makes a world of subjects artificially fixed, abandoning *process* to *identity*. The photographic image, says Barthes, "has something tautological about it: a pipe here, is always and intractably a pipe. It is as if the Photograph always carries its referent with itself .... In short, the referent adheres."[21]

But again, we are speaking of *appearances* in which difference is—in Hegelian terms—sublated, at once preserved and eliminated.[22] This is the double movement of elision by which *appearance* is affected by *disappearance*—a movement in which things are precisely what they are not (or, at least, not what they seem). "This is but a false dilemma. Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither

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21. Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 1982), 5-6. "The photographic image," says Bazin, "is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it."("The Ontology of the Photographic Image", 14) Attached to this "freedom" is a certain stasis and *irrealism* that is more appropriate to nostalgia than illusion. It is the "conditions of time and space", that is the temporal transformation of images in cinema and narrative, that will bring the image closer to illusion.

22. The term *sublation* will take on significance in the pages that follow. The word 'sublate' has become the standard English rendering of the German *aufheben*, an ordinary German verb meaning both 'to preserve' and 'to abolish'. Hegel used it in a technical sense also, giving it a third sense "to mark his conception of the way in which one logical category successively does away with and also includes an immediately preceding one." (W.A. Suchting, "Translating Hegel's *Logic*: Some Minority Comments on Terminology" [translator's preface] in G.W.F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic:* Part I of the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* with the Zusätze, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991], xxxv). While it has been taken up variously by critics and translators—adding to the difficulties inherent in its already overdetermined meaning—the *Aufhebung* is above all, for Hegel, *dialectical* in nature, expressed perhaps better than most by Kojève's rendering: "dialectical overcoming". (*Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 180-1, *passim.*) The *Aufhebung* suggests 'denial', 'supercession', 'contradiction, and 'sublimation' and "is, more or less implicitly, the dominant concept of nearly all histories of writing, even today. It is *the* concept of history and of teleology." (Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 25) While it appears a neologism 'incorporating' the meanings of 'inclusion' and 'preservation', it is this very *incorporation*, by means of *contradiction* or *erasure*, that is germane to this dissertation. It is of interest to note that the everday usage of the word for modern Germans relates strongly to the language of interdiction, to the 'lifting' of a curfew or a restriction (*heben*, lift, raise, erase; *auf*, on, up)—the curfew is lifted but at the discretion of the power that imposed it and, therefore, the restriction inheres in the very lifting, to another level. [Nietzsche's Zarathustra hails an *apparently* opposite turn in "down-going" (*Untergehen*—which also has three meanings: to set [as in going down of the sun], to go under or be destroyed) as the truly "human condition". See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), 39; and translator's note, 339] The dialectical relation of these *modalities* of the real will be developed below.

a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion."[23]

But we should go back for a moment to the sign itself in order to explore this conflationary move. Baudrillard says:

> The first-order simulacrum never abolished difference. It supposes an always detectable alteration between semblance and reality (a particularly subtle game with trompe-l'oeil painting, but art lives entirely off this gap). The second-order simulacrum simplifies the problem by the absorption of the appearances, or by the liquidation of the real, whichever. It establishes in any case a reality, image, echo, appearance; such is certainly work, the machine, the system of industrial production in its entirety, in that it is radically opposed to the principle of theatrical illusion.[24]

Jean-Luc Godard's realist war film *Les Carabiniers* (1963) shows us something of these "orders of simulation". As the film's *lumpen* protagonists Michel-Ange and Ulysse are pressed into action they are via their own maraudings forced to negotiate the semiological nightmare of war. In a famous scene Michel-Ange, seeing the cinematic image (in this instance, a medium of second order simulation) for the first time, attempts with little artifice to enter its realm, tearing the screen as he goes. They are unable to capture the real of the objects they were promised and longed for and upon their return, a concatenation of images in the form of postcards is offered to their spouses as the only *significant* spoils of war. Even the first order simulation of the 'picture postcard' is too much for these heroes of Western faith—they confuse the sign with the real, conflate the terms of the sign itself and so are denied their own appearance in the real.[25] Even at this 'realist' level of signification, of second order simulacra—Godard's 'realist' cinema, with low-tech representations in postcards and Lumière-like theatrical projections—we appear to find our subjects at the end of

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23. Barthes, *Mythologies*, 129

24. Baudrillard, "The Orders of Simulacra", *Simulations*, 94-5

25. "The secret of the image (we are still speaking of contemporary, technical images) must not be sought in its differentiation from reality, and hence in its representative value (aesthetic, critical or dialectical), but on the contrary in its 'telescoping' into reality, its short circuit with reality, and finally, in the implosion of image and reality." Baudrillard, *The Evil Demon of Images*, 27 [For more on Godard's "modes of discourse" see James Monaco, *The New Wave: Truffaut, Godard, Chabrol, Rohmer, Rivette* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 130-4]

Baudrillard's genealogy of the image, transfixed not by *representation* of the real but by total *simulation* of the real itself, "never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference."[26]

Baudrillard is right to assert that "art lives entirely off this gap" between semblance and reality but more to the point, this gap is what sustains all representation, all significance, by the mere fact of its progressive erasure. But the commodification of art (representation) and parallel course with the emergence of capital shows us something of the smoothing over of difference which comes with the proliferation of the consumer sign-form.[27] Art still lives off this gap, even in the age of virtual reality, cyber-space and the hyperreal—in fact, the more the distance between semblance and reality is closed, the further difference is denied, the closer we can come glimpse something of their relation, even if, as Barthes suggests, "it requires a secondary action of knowledge or of reflection."[28] Baudrillard's infinite serialisation

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26. Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra", 11. In this 'Pascalian sphere' Baudrillard, like a number of his contemporaries, will proclaim the loss of the referent in simulation—"*The Divine Irreference of Images*" (*ibid.*, 5)—but in keeping with the metaphor of the divine it may be worth looking to the pre-modern thought of the neo-Platonists who looked on "Him as the least tangible and at the same time the most perfect geometrical figure, the centre and circumference of the circle; for in the infinite circle or sphere, centre, diameter and circumference are identical." (R. Wittkower, *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* [London:Alec Tiranti, 1967], 28) It seems the "wager on representation" continues—even if the altar of Western faith is now the television, a shabby sepulchre by another name ...

27. Baudrillard's talk of the industrialisation that ushered in "second order simulacra" and its establishment of "reality, image, echo" in the order of industrial production owes much to his earlier works (and Walter Benjamin) in which he approached a sort of materialist semiology, appropriating a reading of Saussurian semiology for a (sort of) Marxian critique of "symbolic exchange". His critique would turn more fully towards Marx but not before *doing* to Marx what Marx had proposed to *do* to Hegel. It would appear that for Baudrillard, Marx's commodity—like Hegel's dialectic—was "standing on its head" and his project would be to "turn it right side up again" by radicalising Marx's theory of value and commodity fetishism. Implicating use-value in the same "logic of equivalence" as that of exchange value, Baudrillard paints the former as "abstraction of the *system of needs* cloaked in the false evidence of a concrete destination and purpose, an intrinsic finality of goods and products. It is just like the abstraction of social labour, which is the basis for the logic of equivalence (exchange-value), hiding beneath the "innate" value of commodities." (*For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*[1972] trans. Charles Levin [St Louis: Telos Press, 1981], 131) In this way Baudrillard extracts the rational(ist) 'kernel' from the *metaphysical* 'shell' of the commodity, marking the beginnings of the critique he delivers us to here—beholden still, however, to the 'work' of metaphysics: where Marx sees this 'work' disappear into the tailor's coat (to paraphrase Althusser), Baudrillard sees its swallowed by 'the code' of the cathode.

28. Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, 5

still has its metaphysical principle which is, as always, unreachable and therefore *always* and *only* representable.

2.2 *Where the garment gapes*

> The creative spark of the metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two images, that is, of two signifiers equally actualized. It flashes between two signifiers one of which has taken the place of the other in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present through its (metonymic) connexion with the rest of the chain.[29]

Speaking on the effect of realism in Soviet montage, Bazin made the observation that "meaning is not in the image, it is in the shadow of the image projected by montage onto the field of consciousness of the spectator."[30] Bazin here is contrasting this cinematic semantic to other cinemas in which "montage", he says, "plays no part"—he has in mind the work of von Stroheim and the documentarist Flaherty—in which, for him, meaning truly does reside *in the image*, the *mise-en-scéne*. For Bazin the meaning of montage is not *in the image* but is affected by a sort of "relay station" or "aesthetic transformer" at play between the image and the object of its portrayal.[31] This metaphor has "currency" also for (the Lacanian) Metz who speaks of "short-circuit" signification in the relation of the cinematic signifier to signified and the workings of condensation and its relation to the "film-work"—"a particular inflection in the signifying circuit."[32] The photograph points to simulation—the "short-circuit" of its signification is however contained within a *frame of reference*, giving flesh to Saussure's *sign as sheet of paper* metaphor. For the viewer, it is the frame that freezes and to this extent it is the frame that *gives* meaning

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29. Jacques Lacan, "Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious", *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 15

30. Bazin, "The Evolution of the Language of Cinema", *What is Cinema?*, 26

31. *Ibid.*, 26

32. Christian Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*, trans Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster and Alfred Guzzetti (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1982), 242

to the image. The frame is lost in cinema, darkness and movement elide and transcend it and meaning is despatched to this place apparently beyond the frame. It is *montage* that is *in* the image to the extent that meaning is only the effect of montage. Meaning inheres not *in* the image (neither von Stroheim nor Vertov) but in *the workings* of the relation of signifier to signified, sign to real, and image to image.[33] The relation *map to real* is at once lost and inverted as the viewer's experience (ideology) colludes with the projected *real*—relation becomes dislocation while dislocation is itself forged again as relation. [From discernable *ersatz* to high "simulation" (indiscernible *ersatz*) the workings of difference are there, though with increasing sophistication, increasingly difficult to detect.] Montage may no longer be "dialectical" in the sense that Eisenstein intended it—its appropriation to the seamless "realisation" of the American "dream machine" and its extreme electronic transmogrification in television has seen to that—but the dialectic and the imaginary that is "synthesised" in it has (simply) gone into hiding: *textual exile*.[34]

In speaking of the more concrete *subjection* to the photographic image—that is, *being photographed, subjected* to the photograph—Barthes "experiences" what he calls "a micro-version of death (of parenthesis): I am truly becoming a specter."[35] This *subject*

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33. At first glance, Bazin and Eisenstein would seem to concur, but then Eisenstein argues that "the basic centre of gravity ... is transferred to *inside* the fragment, into the elements included in the image itself. *And the centre of gravity is no longer the element 'between shots'—the shock—but the element 'inside the shot'—the accentuation within the fragment"* (as cited in Barthes, "The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Some Eisenstein Stills", *Image-Music-Text*, trans. Stephen Heath [London: Fontana, 1982], 67) [Barthes here is speaking of the photographic *still*—taken from Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible*—and the intangible, "obtuse" or "third meaning" that holds his gaze. (See also, p53n.1)] While for Eisenstein too the meaning of montage is a "projection" it is essentially more *dialectical* than Bazin is prepared to discern. For Eisenstein, "montage is conflict" and collision both within the shot, the frame, and without—that is, on the "field of consciousness of the spectator", as Bazin would have it. Eisenstein: "The shot appears as the cell of montage. Therefore, it also must be considered from the viewpoint of conflict. Conflict within the shot is potential montage, in the development of its intensity shattering the quadrilateral cage of the shot and exploding its conflict into montage impulses *between* the montage pieces. As, in a zig-zag of mimicry, the *mise-en-scène* splashes out into a spatial zig-zag with the *same* shattering." (*Film Form: Essays in Film Theory*, ed. and trans. Jay Leyda [New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1949], 38) The importance of this "second order montage" will be developed hereafter.

34. Heiner Müller, speaking of the "cultural situation in East Berlin", quotes Viktor Sklovsky as saying that "In Eisenstein's *October* ... the end of the commodity world becomes image." (*Germania*,14)

35. Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, 14. "... I invariably suffer from a sensation of inauthenticity, sometimes of imposture ... the Photograph represents that very subtle moment when, to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is becoming an object ..." (*ibid.*, 13-14)

on the way to objectivity experiences *inauthenticity*—in the sense Heidegger would use the term—a feeling of being lost in objects and others, sunk in an "everydayness" in which "we are not our own."[36] This is the true meaning of Barthes's *parenthesis*—he is *beside himself*, not his own since in this passage between subject and object he *becomes* neither: "Ultimately, what I am seeking in the photograph taken of me (the 'intention' according to which I look at it) is Death: Death is the *eidos* of that Photograph."[37] Barthes's phenomenology here glimpses something of the essential workings of the image—a simultaneous becoming and declension that 'synthesises' in the negative and the void—the *work* of *separation*.[38]

In his analysis of 'textual pleasure' Barthes asks: "Is not the most erotic portion of the body where the garment gapes?"[39] In charting the reader's orientation to the text Barthes negotiates what he calls a *physics of bliss*: "what I enjoy in a narrative is not

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36. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 160. Speaking of Sartre's Marxist "reformulations" in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Jameson points out that Sartre found his stimulus not in Marx but through Heidegger, which he argues is "not at all surprising, particularly when we consider that Heidegger's perception itself corresponds to the commodity-structure of modern society and is a direct reflection of it." (Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971], 299) While Jameson is careful to point out that Heidegger's notion of the "inauthenticity" of "*das Man*" (the they, the anybody, the anonymous 'one') of mass culture of the industrial world ("with other anxious critics of modern civilization in the twenties") is essentially an anti-democratic one, he also points out that "Sartre reverses it, turning it against the middle classes themselves." (*ibid.*, 250-51) Heidegger's notion of "inauthenticity" will be developed in Chapter Three.

37. Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, 15. " [F]rom the viewpoint of the beholder that which stands-there-in-itself becomes that which re-presents itself, which presents itself in what it looks like. The Greeks call the appearance of a thing *eidos* or *idea* ... a resonance of what we too have in mind when we say: the thing has a face, it can let itself be seen, it stands. The thing 'sits'. It rests in the manifestation, i.e. emergence, of its essence." (Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987], 60-1)

38. Julia Kristeva contrives the notion of "*abjection*" which she declares as a sort of state of statelessness—neither subject nor object, the *abject* is that which "draws me toward the place where meaning collapses." (*Powers of Horror*, 2) Drawing on the (psychopathological) interstices of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, Kristeva touches on the ideological 'kernel' of *displacement*: "The one by whom the abject exists is thus a *deject* who places (himself), *separates* (himself), situates (himself), and therefore *strays* instead of getting his bearings, desiring, belonging, or refusing .... For it is out of such straying on excluded ground that he draws his jouissance. The abject from which he does not cease separating is for him, in short, a *land of oblivion* that is constantly remembered." (*ibid.*, 8) Kristeva's perspective here is invaluable and will be developed further in Chapter Five.

39. Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1973), 9.(Unless otherwise indicated, the following references to this text will appear as page numbers after the reference.)

directly its content or even its structure, but rather the abrasions I impose on the fine surface: I read on, I skip, I look up, I dip in again."(11-12) He takes us via Sade: arguing that "the pleasure in reading him clearly proceeds from certain breaks (or collisions): antipathetic codes (the noble and the trivial, for example) come into contact"(6), effecting a certain severance or cutting in which "[t]wo edges are created: an obedient, conformist plagiarizing edge ... and *another edge*, mobile, blank ... which is never anything but the site of its effect: the place where the death of language is glimpsed."(6) So Barthes is *seeking* pleasure, he knows what he's doing and sets himself the task accordingly. But what emerges is precisely the *work* of the text: whether Sade, Joyce, Woolf or the snapshot, this movement of difference and contradiction is there for 'the reader'—*to each reader his text*—even though this may not be immediately apparent. "Whence, perhaps, a means of evaluating the works of our modernity: their value would proceed from their duplicity ... they always have two edges."(7) In fact Barthes "imposes" on the fabric of the text none other than its own "physics", bringing to the surface the very contradictions and fissures that render surface. While the surface denies and seemingly effaces difference it is nonetheless varied and ideological, simulation merely imposing on it a sort of reflective higher order of smoothness, denying what Royce, in speaking of the dialectics of classical and romantic literature, called "this contradictory logic of passion."[40] As Barthes would have it "all the logical small change is in the interstices."(9) Here he is writing specifically of Flaubert who, he argues, effects a sort of "perforating discourse", a language which resides in discontinuity, exposing it, dismantling the narrative while remaining "readable". The text here offers a seemingly reliable map to its terrain. But the 'perversion' that draws us to the gaping garment offers something else. It is erotic precisely because the edges don't close on the subject—it is not (just) the flesh but "the flash itself which seduces, or rather: the staging of an appearance-as-disappearance" (10) What the voyeur-subject wants "is the site of a loss, the seam, the cut, the deflation, the *dissolve* which seizes the subject in

40. As cited in Walter Kaufmann *Hegel: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 157

the midst of bliss."(7)[1] But this *reader* need never reach the *dissolve* nor meet it head on, it exists by and for it in any case. This subject "is never anything but a 'living contradiction': a split subject, who simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the consistency of his selfhood and its collapse, its fall."(21)[2]

The *telos* of Barthes's physics is that of "the groove, the inscription, the syncope: what is hollowed out, tamped down, or what explodes, detonates"(42)—our acquaintance is more usually that of the *frustrated* subject or one who is blissfully unaware of the inscriptions before him or, worse, perhaps one who can't even read. Nevertheless, Barthes's aesthetics does point to a certain *tendency* in the workings of signification toward this sublation of difference and contradiction. I use 'tendency' in the sense Marx gave it, that is *the workings* of the 'true' law of development of capitalist production, that is of its *variation*.[3] This law proffers plenitude but Marx

41. Barthes here is speaking of the relation of pleasure (*plaisir*) to bliss (*jouissance*), bliss being the "scandalous" effect of the contradictions of the text which, unlike pleasure, cannot be spoken.(21) They are, however, different effects of the same *physics*. Similarly, Barthes here *invokes* Nietzsche but *squares* with Hegel (that is, the particular Hegelian lineage of Kojève—Bataille—Blanchot—Sartre—Merleau-Ponty—Lacan—Kristeva—*desire as the disclosure of a void, the presence of an absence of the real*—[Derrida—Foucault—Deleuze]). Via Nietzschean epiphany, Barthes in fact shows (albeit, perhaps via a certain *disavowal*) a Hegel yet to be 'synthesised', a Hegel countering notions of plenitude and identity—the putative hallmarks of Hegel's System—with infinity and alterity. As Engels had it, for dialectical philosophy "nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain .... its revolutionary character is absolute—the only absolute dialectic philosophy admits."("Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works*, Vol II [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951], 328) While Lenin believed Hegel's Logic needed to be distilled, its epistemological subtleties separated out from what he saw as the "mystique" of Idealism, he would testify that it was precisely this "revolutionary side of Hegel's philosophy [that] was adopted and developed by Marx." (V.I. Lenin, "Karl Marx", *Marx-Engels-Marxism* [Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978], 11)

42. "You grasp here the ambiguity of what is at issue when we speak of the scopic drive. The gaze is the object lost and suddenly refound in the conflagration of shame, by the introduction of the other. Up to that point what is the subject trying to see? What he is trying to see, make no mistake, is the object as absence. What the voyeur is looking for and finds is merely a shadow, a shadow behind the curtain .... What one looks at is what cannot be seen." (Jacques Lacan, "The Partial Drive and its Circuit", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan [New York: Norton, 1981], 182) Voyeurism always keeps its subject at a distance from its object. "It is no accident," says Metz, "that the main socially acceptable arts are based on the senses at a distance." (*The Imaginary Signifier*, 59)

43. "Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results." (Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling [Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1956], 8) Etienne Balibar

glimpses the system it *at its edge*, defining the law of development by its very *tendency* to contradiction. Pointing to the "living contradiction" in the law of production itself over the more obvious manifestations of "social antagonisms", Marx argues that the "general and necessary tendencies (*Tendenzen*) of capital must be distinguished from the forms in which they appear."[44] Tendency itself tends to contradiction. The structure *develops*, *works* dialectically according to these tendencies which, when "distinguished from the forms in which they appear", point to the "mystificatory" mirror of contradiction itself. But, in the mean time, the system holds against its own tendency to the rift.

While Marx is himself *working* from Hegel's dialectic, he believed that this dialectic was "standing on its head", that it "must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."[45] For Althusser, the "mystical

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explores Marx's trope and defines it as "a restriction, a diminution, a postponement or a travesty of effectivity. Tendency is a law 'whose absolute action is checked, retarded and weakened, by counteracting causes'... or even one whose effects are annulled (*aufheben*) by these opposed causes .... 'Thus,' writes Marx, 'the law acts only as a tendency. And it is only under certain circumstances and only after long periods that its effects become strikingly pronounced.'" (Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, 286) Paul Virilio (the reluctant post-modernist urbanist) touches on this also: "I work in staircases ... I begin a sentence, I work out an idea and when I consider it suggestive enough, I jump a step to another idea without bothering with the development. Developments are the episodes. I try to reach the tendency. Tendency is the change of level." (*Pure War*, with Sylvere Lotringer, trans. Mark Polizotti [New York: Semiotext(e), 1983], 39)

44. As cited in Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, 287

45. Marx, *Capital*, Vol I, 20. Althusser argues convincingly that "to turn an object right round changes neither its nature nor its content by virtue merely of a rotation! A man on his head is the same man when he is finally walking on his feet." ("On the Young Marx", *For Marx*, 73) This inversion begins with Marx's criticism of what he saw as Hegel's backwards working from the absolutism of the Idea of state to individuals, families and social groups, rendering for Marx, an upside-down dialectic: "To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought .... The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell." (Marx, *Capital*, 19-20) So Marx seeks to invert this dialectic, arguing that his dialectic method is not only "different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite."(*ibid.*, 19) The dialectic, it seemed, had ground to a halt—hypostatised in what he called, in his work on Feuerbach, the "*caput mortuum*", the "dead head" and the "putrescence of the absolute spirit"—now "synthesised" in the ethos of the Prussian state itself. This view has led, in certain Marxist circles, to a rabid anti-Hegelianism, at least an anti-heuristic approach in interpretations of Marx; but the Hegelian Marxists—Gramsci, Korsch, Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno—including, arguably, Lenin—had other ideas. Lenin: "Aphorism: it is impossible completely to understand Marx's *Capital* ... without having thoroughly understood the whole of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" (V.I. Lenin,"Philosophical

shell is nothing but the mystified form of the dialectic itself: that is, not a relatively external element of the dialectic (e.g. the 'system') but an internal element, consubstantial with the Hegelian dialectic."[46] The dialectic itself then "must be distinguished from the forms in which it appears". But the *appearance* of these *forms* is rarely discernible as *dialectic*, the *movement* by which Hegel defines his dialectic is *synthesised* in the manner of Hegel himself—the "dialectical overcoming" (the *Aufhebung*) *tends* to show us form and appearance over the process by which these are achieved or affected.[47] From the "law of production" to the "narrative of production" (all narrative is production—the relation is reciprocal) it is this *production* that *works* toward plenitude, always against its inherent tendencies to failure and rift and so the *negativity* implied in this dialectical movement is seemingly *lost* to the system it forges. Marx would look for this lost terrain via an elaborate *mapping* of the commodity, via a sort of 'second order dialectic'.

> To see this invisible, to see these 'oversights', to identify the lacunae in the fullness of this discourse, the blanks in the crowded text, we need something quite different from an acute or attentive gaze; we need an *informed* gaze, a new gaze, itself produced by a reflection of the 'change of terrain' on the exercise

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Notebooks", *Collected Works*, Vol 38, as cited in Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster [London: NLB, 1971], 108) For Marx, as for Lenin, Hegelian *idealism* and *ideology* was to be rejected. But it was precisely the Hegelian doctrine of *process* and *mutability*, the *revolutionary* aspects of Hegelianism that would be taken on and developed.

46. Althusser, *For Marx*, 93

47. The "fractions" of movement that are the essential terms of the dialectic "end up" by "revealing the One-Whole—the intermediate theses, antitheses, and syntheses are *aufgehoben* ... 'overcome,' in the threefold sense of *Aufheben* ... that is 'overcome dialectically.' In the first place, they are *overcome* or annulled with respect to whatever is fragmentary, relative, partial, or one-sided in them ... Secondly, they are also preserved or safeguarded with respect to whatever is essential or universal in them—that is, with respect to what in each of them reveals one of the manifold aspects of the total and single reality. Finally, they are *sublimated*—that is, raised to a superior level of knowledge and of reality, and therefore truth .... the 'objective' real." (Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 180-1) It is the negating term, the antithesis on which the dialectic turns and as Kojève points out, Hegel "often speaks of 'Negativity,' but he rarely uses the terms 'Identity' and 'Totality.' The expressions 'Thesis,' 'Antithesis,' 'Synthesis' almost never appear in his writings. The 'dialectical' expressions he commonly uses are: 'Immediacy,' 'Mediation,' 'Overcoming' (and their derivatives). Sometimes, Hegel expresses the dialectical structure of Being and the Real by saying that they are a 'Syllogism' (*Schluss*, or *dialektischer Schluss*), in which the 'middle term' (*Mitte*) mediates the two 'extremes' (*Extreme*) of the Immediate and the Mediated. When Hegel wants to speak of the real dialectical process, he says simply: 'movement' (*Bewegung*; very rarely: *dialektische Bewegung*). (*ibid.*, 208-9n14) And Žižek argues: "The vulgar idea of 'dialectical development' as a continuous course of transformations by which the old dies and the new is born ... has nothing whatsoever to do with the Hegelian 'dialectical process'."(*Sublime Object of Ideology*, 145) [Kojève argues that Hegel's *method* is in itself not "at all dialectical"—the *real* he describes, however, is. (*ibid.*, 181-4) On this position see also Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*, 155]

of vision, in which Marx pictures the transformation of the problematic.[48]

Althusser here is at the beginning of his brilliant *reading* of Marx's *Capital. Reading Capital* "as a philosopher", he proposes a reading in the manner of Marx himself, arguing that *Capital*, again, poses a most fundamental question: "*what is it to read?*" From here Althusser poses the question of the *relation* of Capital to its *object*—that is, the discursive *workings* of the text to its object, its *real.* Althusser puts the canonical triumvirate of Marx-Nietzsche-Freud at the centre of this discursive enterprise, attributing to Freud the special status of having been first to put his ear to the text, to *listen* to the speaker's utterances and, just as importantly, for the silences: "Only since Freud have we begun to suspect what listening, and hence what speaking (and keeping silent), *means*" revealing "beneath the innocence of speech and hearing the culpable depth of a second, *quite different*, discourse, the discourse of the unconscious."[49] He attributes to Marx the *discursive* work of *reading*, maintaining "that only since Marx have we had to begin to suspect what, in theory at least, *reading* and hence writing *means.*"[50]

This "depth of a second discourse", for Althusser, can only be "charted" by what he terms, after Freud, a *symptomatic reading*—that is, a reading for *absences* in the

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48. Althusser, *Reading Capital*, 27. Althusser here is in fact savage on what he sees as a certain contradiction of terms in Marx's analysis of classical political economy—a slight he also levels at Foucault—in particular a recourse to "spatial metaphors (field, terrain, space, site, situation, position, etc)" which he argues poses a theoretical inconsistency for the analytical "science" he believes Marx ushers. "The problem may be formulated as follows: *why* does a certain form of scientific discourse necessarily need the use of metaphors borrowed from non-scientific disciplines?" (*ibid.*, 26n) Althusser is proposing a Marxist *reading* of Marx himself, an elaborate *symptomatic* reading he argues begins with Marx but who suffers the pitfalls of the very *problematic*—that is, the theoretical and ideological framework from which *he speaks*, we *speak* and *act*—the very *text* from which he wishes to emerge. But it is interesting to note that Althusser too is fall victim of the topographical metaphor—his work resounds with it (see, for example, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", *Lenin and Philosophy*)—but he is of course not alone. There is no *reading* without this metaphorical resort, this *limitation* (call it *science*, call it *philosophy*)—as Borges has it: "It may be that universal history is the history of the different intonation given a handful of metaphors." ("The Fearful Sphere of Pascal", *Labyrinths*, 226) I will cover this *terrain* as we go ...

49. *Ibid.*, 16. Here Althusser also acknowledges his debt to Jacques Lacan, whose *reading* of Freud proved profoundly influential: "I feel bound to acknowledge this *publicly*, so that 'the tailor's labour (does not) disappear ... into the coat' (Marx), even into my coat."(*ibid.*, 16n1) The 'discursive' workings of Lacan will be developed below.

50. *Ibid.*, 16

apparent *continuity* of what is spoken or rendered.

> All that a simple literal reading sees in the arguments is the continuity of the text. A '*symptomatic*' reading is necessary to make these lacunae perceptible, and to identify behind the spoken words the discourse of the silence, which, emerging in the verbal discourse, induces these blanks in it, blanks which are failures in its rigour, or the outer limits of its effort: its absence, once these limits are reached, but in a space which it has *opened*.[51]

Only by listening for the silences, for what is *not* spoken as much as what *is*, can the *reader* enter the surface 'reflected' in any given text. This is the surface of the *problematic*, the underlying structure which allows for certain utterances, the positing of certain questions, while precluding others. Althusser argues that in *Capital* Marx "measures a distance and an internal dislocation (*décalage*) in the real, inscribed in its *structure*" the effects of which are made "illegible, and the illusion of an immediate reading of them the ultimate apex of their effects: *fetishism*."[52]

Slavoj Žižek too points to *the symptom*. Picking up on a reference by Lacan, that "it was none other than Karl Marx who invented the notion of symptom,"[53] Žižek cuts through the reflective "closed circuit" fetishism of representation to question not *the secret hidden in the form*, but *the secret of the form itself*. Bringing out the Marx in Lacan, Žižek develops the hermeneutic relation between Marx and Freud, between their respective analyses of the *work* of the commodity and the *work* of the dream. "In both cases," says Žižek, "the point is to avoid the properly fetishistic fascination

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51. *Ibid.*, 86. "... by discovering that the truth of history cannot be read in its manifest discourse, because the text of history cannot be read in its manifest discourse, because the text of history is not a text in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but the inaudible and illegible notation of the effects of a structure of structures." (*ibid.*, 17); A symptomatic reading "divulges the undivulged event in the text it reads, and in the same movement relates it to *a different text*, present as a necessary absence in the first."(*ibid.*, 28)

52. *Ibid.*, 17

53. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 11. "Marx's great achievement was to demonstrate how all phenomena which appear to everyday bourgeois consciousness as simple deviations, contingent deformations and degenerations of the 'normal' functioning of society (economic crises, wars, and so on), and as such abolishable through amelioration of the system, are necessary products of the system itself—the points at which the 'truth', the immanent antagonistic character of the system, erupts. To 'identify with a symptom' means to recognize in the 'excesses', in the disruptions of the 'normal' way of things, the key offering us access to its true functioning." (*ibid.*, 128)

of the 'content' supposedly hidden behind the form (the form of commodities, the form of dreams) but, on the contrary, *the 'secret' of the form itself."*[54] Working from Althusser's exegesis of Marx's relation to Hegel, he argues that the *real work* of analysis is not to penetrate the manifest discourse of *the form* to reach the "hidden kernel" but that "it consists in the answer to the question: why have the latent dream-thoughts assumed such a form, why were they transposed into the form of a dream?"[55] And this too applies to the commodity, the problem is to question the form of the commodity itself, for Althusser, the essentially "inaudible and illegible notation of the effects of the structure of structures". These inscrutable forms are, for Althusser, the *effects* of a Scriptural pact between Logos and Being, a "magical alliance" between the "Great Book" and the World, "between the essence of things and its reading", a pact that needs to be broken such that "a new conception of *discourse* at last becomes possible".[56]

Classical political economy, says Žižek, had hit upon the 'secret' of the commodity form ("the 'secret of the magnitude of value'") but, in Althusserian terms, remained sunk in the *problematic* of the *fetishism of the commodity*—that is, bourgeois political economists continued to *fetishise* the contents of concealment—and so "what is not yet explained is simply its form, the process by means of which the hidden meaning disguised itself in such a form."[57]

Like the *tendency*, the *symptom* works at subverting the basis on which it is founded. Marx calls these tendencies "*the competition of capitals*, i.e., the mechanism by which the equalization of profits and the formation of the general rate of profit are actually

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54. *Ibid.*, 11

55. *Ibid.*, 11

56. Althusser, *Reading Capital*, 17. "... we must completely reorganize the idea we have of knowledge, we must abandon the mirror myths of immediate vision and reading, and conceive knowledge as a *production*."(*ibid.*, 24 [my emphasis])

57. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 15. (Cf. Althusser's illuminating exegesis of Marx's putative "inversion" of Hegel in "Contradiction and Overdetermination", *For Marx*, 89-160. *passim.*)

achieved."[58] The rate of profit, for example, has the *tendency* to fall. This stirs the competitive forces of *capital itself*, mobilising mechanisms by which the growth of capital in fact increases at a rate greater than that by which it would fall. This is the double movement or "two-fold effect" of capital—the same causes that affect its fall affect its accumulation.[59] But it it precisely this subversion, this "overcoming", dialectical by its very *movement*, that effects a certain paradoxical *appearance* of closure and it is this *appearance* that is at the every core of ideology.[60] As Žižek puts it: "The most elementary definition of ideology is probably the well-known phrase from Marx's *Capital*: *'Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es'—'they do not know it, but they are doing it'*." [61]

The implication is of a certain distance and dislocation, a certain gap between the *real* of our existence and that by which it is gauged or *represented*—of ideology, which for Žižek, "implies a kind of basic, constitutive *naïveté*: the misrecognition of its own presuppositions."[62] But its critique lies not in some unveiling of essences; the point is, says Žižek, "to see how the reality itself cannot reproduce itself without this so-called ideological mystification. The mask is not simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence."[63] But this "false consciousness" concept of ideology is, as Žižek affirms, already well known and perhaps too beholden to the "mirror myths" of reading and representation, as

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58. Balibar, *Reading Capital*, 288

59. *Ibid.*, 289

60. As Žižek affirms, "ideology is not simply a 'false consciousness', an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived of as 'ideological' .... *not the 'false consciousness' of a (social) being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by 'false consciousness'."(The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 21) For Žižek, this is the true domain of the symptom: "the subject can 'enjoy his symptom' only in so far as its logic escapes him—the measure of the success of its interpretation is precisely its dissolution." (*ibid.*, 21) Consciousness is not "false", it *is* all it can be, the consciousness of a certain closure...

61. *Ibid.*, 28. The *workings* of this text is the thematic of a number of Žižek's works, perhaps most notably *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor* (London: Verso, 1991) and (already cited) *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*. Here he applies his own form of *symptomatic reading* to the ideological *workings* of nationalism and the (neo-fascist) proclivity of the masses to themselves 'put the boot in' as state socialism falls about their ears.

62. *Ibid.*, 28

63. *Ibid.*, 28

Althusser argued, to be reliable. Discussing a conversation on the force of 'desire' between Deleuze and Foucault, Spivak points out that "[e]ven Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived desire: 'We must accept the scream of Reich'", she cites Deleuze here, "no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime.'"[64] But this essentially Nietzschean 'force of desire' argument falls into another trap, suggesting to many of its proponents a sort of democratic and often humanistic latency in the social—its slogan becoming a programmatic erasure of the struggles inherent in that desire which must be played out or, more significantly, *worked* out between people and across certain social strictures. "Neither Deleuze nor Foucault," Spivak argues, "seems aware that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor."[65]

Žižek takes issue with the work of Peter Sloterdijk who, in his book *Critique of Cynical Reason*, "puts forward the thesis that ideology's dominant mode of functioning is cynical, which renders impossible—or, more precisely, vain—the classic critical-ideological procedure."[66]

> The cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the less still insists upon the mask. The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: 'they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it'. Cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it.[67]

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64. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?, 69

65. *Ibid.*, 69

66. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 29. "The traditional critique of ideology stands at a loss before this cynicism ... This critique has remained more naive than the consciousness it wanted to expose; in its well-mannered rationality, it did not keep up with the twists and turns of modern consciousness to a cunning multiple realism." (Peter Sloterdijk, *Critique of Cynical Reason*, trans. Michael Eldred [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987], 3)

67. *Ibid.*, 29. Sloterdijk points out that cynicism "is that modernised, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain .... this consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered." (*ibid.*, 3)

From this "cynical", so-called "post-ideological world" a "symptomatic reading" is apparently no longer either appropriate or possible since, under the sway of "cynical reason", the "cynical" problematic has already taken the blanks, the blind spots, its *tendencies* into account.[68]

We may find a certain (paradoxical) homology here between the *space* of "cynical reason" and the ideological *space* of the Renaissance, the neo-Platonist problematic of which is founded in the evocation of an existential totality, in what amounts to a metaphysical paradox: the formality of its logic of representation suggests the plenitude of spirit and state—valorised in the conceptually and artistically rendered vanishing point of *trompe-l'oeil*—a perspective all the while pointing to an unknowable infinite. This space is articulated formally in the 'logic' of perspective—a rationalism in itself born of geometry and optics—a mathematical rendering on a plane surface effecting the relativisation of size and distance: a formalisation and effective naturalisation of space in which the Platonist notions of commensuration and proportion were of essence.[69] Here, in the pursuit of knowledge, the intellect

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68. Sloterdijk plays on the alternative German spellings of "cynicism"—*Zynismus* and *Kynismus*—on which he turns a fundamental opposition. "Kynicism" is rendered a sort of carnivalesque antagonist to the official, ideological apparatus of "cynicism" which in turn incorporates, sublates the *kynic's* oppositional nature. In the preface to his book Sloterdijk has reproduced an image of Nietzsche under which is inscribed: *Neo-"Cyniker"*: "Nietzsche's decisive self-characterization ... is that of a 'cynic' (*Cyniker*); *with this* he becomes, next to Marx, the most momentous thinker of the century. Nietzsche's 'cynicism' (*Cynismus*) offers a modified approach to 'saying the truth': It is one of strategy and tactics, suspicion and disinhibition ..." (*ibid.*, xxviii-xxix) On these blind spots, blanks and tendencies of Ideological 'cynicism', see also Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, trans. Michael Henry Heim (London: Penguin, 1983)

69. "Perspective, in transforming the *ousia* (reality) into the *phainomenon* (appearance), seems to reduce the divine to a mere subject matter for human consciousness; but for that very reason, conversely, it expands human consciousness into a vessel for the divine." (Erwin Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form*, trans. Christopher S. Wood (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 115. Heidegger develops the resonance of the Greek here: "That which places itself in its limit, completing it, and so stands, has form, *morphē*. Form as the Greeks understood it derives its essence from an emerging placing-itself-in-the-limit.... But all the definitions of being that we shall now list are grounded in, and are held together by, that wherein the Greeks unquestionably experienced the meaning of being, and which they called *ousia*, or more fully, *parousia*... For *parousia* we have in German a corresponding term—An-wesen <presence>, which also designates an estate or homestead, standing in itself or self-enclosed. In Aristotle's time *ousia* was used both in this sense and in the sense of a fundamental term of philosopy. Something is present to us. It stands steadily by itself and thus manifests itself. It is. For the Greeks 'being' basically meant this standing presence." (Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987], 60-61) This ontological perspective will be developed in Chapter Three.

"proceeds by comparison", comparison which is ironically untenable when the object of apprehension is God, the "absolute infinite" incarnate. The object of apprehension here is the *coincidentia oppositorum*, a God synthesised of opposites without *incorporation*—that is, a God who denies by His own paradoxical existence the dialectical *workings* of his own manifestation, the sublationary move at its best.[70] But this *ratio* of Renaissance space, by these very workings, points to a certain loss or absence. The infinite can only be made absolute by its rendering in the *penultimate*—that is, in pointing to the infinite or the sublime, the representation none the less falls short of it. Representational space is finite, its representation however is of the nature of a formalisation of the infinite: the *vanishing point* of *trompe-l'oeil* never truly vanishes—perhaps the best example yet of the *tendency* of *sublation* to the Absolute.[71] Knowledge of God is limited by a relation of

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70. Within this essentially neo-Platonic designation of the *coincidentia oppositorum* Žižek locates the Lacanian 'Real'.

71. Deleuze argues that the "dialectic is the thought of the theoretical man, reacting against life, claiming to judge life, to limit and measure it ... it is the thought of the priest who subjects life to the labour of the negative: he needs negation to establish his power, he represents the strange will which leads reactive forces to triumph. Dialectic *in this sense* is the *authentically* Christian ideology." (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 196 [my emphasis]) It is true that this dialectical movement finds *form*, for Hegel and others, in the Christian idea of the Holy Trinity—in God 'the Holy Spirit' moves 'God the Father' and 'God the Son'—and so, "in this sense", Deleuze's account is quite accurate. But it is this *totalising affect*, not of the dialectic *movement* as such, but of its appropriation to an apparently inert unity in the Christian Absolute and its political correlatives that is *read* here and, without the qualifier, Deleuze's argument is complicit in the same dubious *bricolage* he calls the "gaudily painted canvas of modern thought." (*ibid.*, 195) The canvas—*the map*—is only as gaudy as that which it seeks to represent. Lenin, as "theoretical man" (perhaps as good an example as any), having exalted Hegel, however cuts through what he terms "the Hegelian galimatias" of the Logic—"*Nine-tenths of it is chaff, rubbish*"—to consign God, "and the philosophical rabble that defends God, to the rubbish heap." ("Philosophical Notebooks", Vol. 38, as cited in Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy*, 112-113); see also Althusser, *For Marx*, 78n40) This sort of theoretical 'down-going' on the dialectic—founded as much on anxiety of influence and fear of historical affiliation (its detractors were almost to a person at one time vigorous cheerleaders for dialectical thought) as an espoused move toward a more 'democratic' epistemology—is nothing short of a bland erasure of the vicissitudes of history, a history replete with masters and slaves, despots and sycophants, and a litany of others who refuse to put up their hands and show themselves. Deleuze refuses the *affective* potential of recognition in Hegel's master-slave relation, arguing forcefully that "The one who says: 'I am good', does not wait to be called good. He refers to himself in this way, he names himself and describes himself thus to the extent that he acts, affirms and enjoys." (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 119) Outside of the affect of the meglomaniac, this denial of the force of recognition in human relations is untenable. A most palpable example of this may be seen in the relation between the characters of the Nazi Amon Goeth and Oskar Schindler in Spielberg's film *Schindler's List* (1994). Goeth's power *only* resides in the recognition he finds in Schindler, the identification necessary for his very functioning. The narcissistic-homosexual implications here serve only to underpin this relation of recognition and identification, this relation of master-slave (designated *Untersturmführer*, Goeth represents the underbelly of the *Übermensch*). The one who says "I am good" may only reap the power of his statement should he be given the nod of affirmation by the one who recognises him: recognition *by another and for another*. [The almost universal entreat of the retiring lover to his pensive partner "What are you thinking?"

transcendence—that is, we come to know our limitations in the face of the One *without* limitation and in this 'understanding of our own ignorance' become learned—*de docta ignorantia*—here is the paradox of 'enlightened false consciousness' or, 'learned ignorance'.

While the investment here is clearly in the transcendent, the *reason* of this essentially normative ideology is 'cynical'—in its push for plenitude it shows up absence all the more. "Is then," asks Žižek, "the only issue left to us to affirm that, with the reign of cynical reason, we find ourselves in the so-called post-ideological world?"[72] While sharing much with Sloterdijk, Žižek wades against this tide, arguing that its proponents—including even to an extent Adorno—proceed a little too swiftly, that "cynical reason, with all its ironic detachment, leaves untouched the fundamental level of ideological fantasy, the level on which ideology structures the social reality itself."[73] And further:

> If our concept of ideology remains the classic one in which the illusion is located in knowledge, then today's society must appear post-ideological: the prevailing ideology is that of cynicism; people no longer believe in ideological truth; they do not take ideological propositions seriously. The fundamental level of ideology, however, is not of an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. And at this level, we are of course far from being post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just one way—one of many ways—to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, *we are still doing them.*[74]

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is nothing if not a circumlocution of the real question: "*Am* I good?"]

72. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 30

73. *Ibid.*, 30. Žižek would concur with Sloterdijk's assessment that to "speak of cynicism means trying to enter the old building of ideology critique through a new entrance." (Sloterdijk, *Critique of Cynical Reason*, 3) This entrance may however be difficult to negotiate if—as already pointed out via Brecht—"the old building of ideology" is a mansion "built of dogshit." (Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 365) But, perhaps more cogently in pointing out culture's inherent contradictions, Adorno goes further to say: "All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage. In restoring itself after things that happened without resistance in its own countryside, culture has turned entirely into the ideology it had been potentially .... Whoever pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says no to culture is directly furthering the barbarism which our culture showed itself to be." (*ibid.*, 367)

74. *Ibid.*, 33. The opening narration of the new breed of young Polish blades in Jerzy Skolimowski's 1966 film *The Barrier* (*Bariera*) here is salutary: "Our generation, cynical and devoid of ideals, is still capable of

Žižek argues that the ideological function *par excellence* is to provide a sort of fantasy structure or scenario by which the subject completes his own picture, stitches himself into his own social position, "basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void."[75] Fantasy itself then wades against, 'antagonises' social antagonism and this is "precisely the way the antagonistic fissure is masked. In other words, *fantasy is a means for an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance.*"[76] And, for that, *ideological* all the more.

2.3 The Map of Exile

This "hegemony of representations"[77] lives entirely off this gap between the real and its representation—a gap Baudrillard puts as the preserve of art, of *trompe-l'oeil*—but it is precisely this gap that is not only necessary to *the experience of the real* but allows us, from a certain perspective, to glimpse the very *workings* of the real itself. Again, like the *workings* of the *tendency*, the *symptom* subverts the basis on which it is founded—"not simply a lie," as Žižek says, "but a lie experienced as truth."[78] While Sloterdijk is right to draw out this ideology that points to its own tendencies in advance of any attempt at detection—an old trick of counter-surveillance and, equally, a cheap trick of 'reverse psychology'—a symptomatic reading does more

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romantic outbursts."

75. *Ibid.*, 126. In a dramatic attempt to assuage what György Konrad has called, apropos the fall of Socialism in the East, "the melancholia of rebirth", another Polish filmmaker Władisław Pasikowski has described this ideological tendency succinctly in his 1992 film *Psy* (*Dogs;* international release title, *The Pigs*). As members of the Polish secret service are deployed into the ranks of the police, the corruption and inherent failure of the State machine to 'cleanly' deal with the transition from one form of order to another is described by the film's protagonist, a hitherto (relatively) corrupt and cynical but loyal upholder of order in his Motherland, Franz Maurer: "When the Reds left and the Blacks[the new *democratic* Polish Republic] came on the scene they turned this brothel into a circus, with trained pooches running around the ring." Later in the same monologue and summing up the possibility of change in such a circus, he adds: "You're either born a priest, a whore or a thief. This is not so bad. It means that sometimes they meet."

76. *Ibid.*, 126

77. Hal Foster uses this phrase to speak of the object of Baudrillard's *constructions*—perhaps, Baudrillard's *own* particular problematic. (*Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics* [Washington: Bay Press, 1985], 146)

78. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 30. "The paradox of this proposition exemplifies perfectly the classical *topos* of the Lacanian theory concerning the difference between animal and human deception: man alone is capable of deceiving *by means of truth itself*." (Žižek, "How the Non-Duped Err", *Qui Parle*, Vol. 4, No. 1 [1990], 3) [An updated version of this essay appears in Žižek's *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 69-88]

than "divulge the undivulged". This hegemony is omniscient and will appear without apparent agency or origin. The *truth* lives by and for the *lie*. Freud's famous joke about two Polish Jews who meet in a railway carriage says something of this "reason":

> *'Where are you traveling?' asked one. 'To Cracow', was the reply. 'Now see here, what a liar you are!' said the first one, bristling. 'When you say that you are traveling to Cracow, you really wish me to believe that you are traveling to Lemberg. Well, but I am sure that you are really traveling to Cracow, so why lie about it?'*[79]

The "absurdity" of this situation, for Freud, "is paired here with another technique—*representation through the opposite*, for, according to the uncontradicted assertion of the first, the second one is lying when he speaks the truth, and speaks the truth by means of a lie."[80] Freud terms this form of humour "sceptical" for it questions the very basis of what we deem to be true: "Does it constitute truth", Freud asks, "if one describes things as they are and does not concern himself with the way the hearers will interpret what one has said?"[81] Now this is more than a simple example of over-interpretation on the part of the second Jew—it points in fact to processes at work in the interpretation and the representation of truth.[82] This *representation* through its *opposite* was, in fact, in need of no particular agency from its speaker—the first Jew was telling the truth—but this 'hegemony of representations' is forged by and for its very opposite and truth is put to the lie.[83]

This question of *truth* and *falsity*—based essentially in notions of interpretation and

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79. Freud, "Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious", *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, trans. A.A. Brill (New York: The Modern Library, 1966), 707

80. *Ibid.*, 707-8 (my emphasis). This *representation through its opposite* has some resonance in Goebbels's oft-quoted "the bigger the lie, the more they believe."

81. *Ibid.*, 708

82. Žižek, like Lacan, draws much from this Jewish exchange, later "pairing" it with Lacan's commentary on the illusory nature of *trompe-l'oeil* painting.(*The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 197)

83. On the issue of propaganda, Heiner Müller: "I don't know if it's a deep feeling but remember what Hegel said: no German can tell a lie for very long without believing it. The impact of propaganda is very slow, but it has an impact, even in people who are strongly opposed to the state or to the party." (*Germania*, 27)

pragmatism (that is, their *representation*)—has serious implications for the analysis of ideology (and Ideology, in the sense of "ideological State apparatuses" given by Althusser). Andrzej Munk's 1960 film *Bad Luck* has something on this. The story of a hapless conformist Piszczyk—interpellated "Good Citizen" (*obywatel*) by his Stalinist patrons—the film spans thirty odd years in the life (and State) of a gormless pragmatist who alternately prospers by his 'lies' (more accurately his silences or omissions) and falls victim to his truths. A public service functionary, Piszczyk makes the mistake of describing things in the manner of Freud's 'first Jew'—that is, "*as they are*", not concerning "himself with the way his hearers will interpret" what he says. As he negotiates the pitfalls of 'truth', he discovers a peculiar talent for the *interpretation* of facts, eventually evading the "question of truth" by *variously* fashioning signs, slogans, facts and figures for various Party lines adopted after the war. He maps by his very pragmatism an existence that lives entirely off *artifice*—he only exists by *negotiation* of the sign—that is, by leaping the gaps that separate them and forging them anew.[84] This *negotiation*—here, however, critical and active—is what Althusser has in mind when he seeks to go beyond the simple unmasking or unveiling, pointing out that the thread picked up in the text is "related to *a different text*, present as a necessary absence in the first." It is in fact a symptomatic reading

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84. Munk is perhaps most noted for his 1957 film *Eroica* in which the national mythos of heroism and unity—born of 'the Occupation' and 'the Resistance'—was put under scrutiny. These themes were resonant in Polish post-war ideology (though clearly, they were not alone) and a wave of films, such as Wajda's *Ashes and Diamonds* (1958), began to poke holes in the edifice of 'national unity'. *Bad Luck* was 'remade' in 1988 by Andrzej Kotkowski as *Citizen Piszczyk*, a sort of post-Solidarity sequel, a 'rewrite' in which 'the real' Piszczyk reflects on his (mis)representation in the 'original'. The sequel opens with 'the real Piszczyk' at a screening of *Bad Luck*—incredulous at his misrepresentation, at what he sees as a travesty, he tells his 'real story' to a former Party stooge who recognises him in the audience (a good example of Althusser's expression of *interpellation* —"which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'" ("Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", *Lenin and Philosophy*, 163)—a *nomination* which effects by its very utterance a *subject*, who is forced by his *turning*, to recognise himself as *subject*). Piszczyk's "narration" retraces this *subject of the truth*—that is, one who is *subjected* to the vicissitudes of the *interpretation* of truth—during times when "the rights of the citizen were distorted and words were not supported by facts". [I raise these 'Eastern bloc satellite' examples because they offer sophisticated *readings* of ideology from within the very *workings* of Ideology and *censorship*. But Jerzy Kosinski's novel *Being There* (popularised by Hal Ashby's 1979 film of the same name) is a fine variation of this simple fable of the 'schmuck'—sunk, in Heideggerian terms, in the ordinariness of the everyday—translated into a culture truly reigned by 'cynical reason'. Its protagonist's only *negotiation* of the sign is effected by the button of a remote control: "I like to watch".]

that allows for the discussion of a cynical (or sceptical) reason.[85]

Distance and dislocation are precisely *the workings* and *the movement* of *the text*—but it is this very *work*, the dialectical movement of the text itself that is sublated, fashioned and rendered into something that it is not. The "dialectical overcoming" (*Aufhebung*)—that which was, according to the German Idealists, to give rise to *knowledge* and *understanding*—is, always has been, misappropriated, expropriated in the service of this 'cynical reason'. Žižek affirms: "Hegel knows very well that every attempt at rational totalization ultimately fails, this failure is the very impetus of the 'dialectical progress'..."[86] Žižek here is close to Adorno who looks more to the interstices or to the excesses of 'the system' when he argues: "Contradiction is non-identity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primary[*sic*] of the principal of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit it excedes itself."[87] It is precisely this excess that pushes the bounds of Hegel's system and metaphysics itself. Adorno further argues: "Dialectics is the consistant sense of non-identity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint.... Dialectics serves the end of reconcilement. It dismantles the coercive logical character of its own course; that is why it is denounced as 'panlogism.'"[88]

> The contradiction weighs more heavily now than it did on Hegel, the first man to envision it. Once a vehicle of total identification, it has become the organon of its impossibility. The task of dialectical cognition is not, as its adversaries like to charge, to construe contradictions from above and to progress by resolving them—although Hegel's logic, now and then, proceeds in this fashion. Instead, it is up to dialectical cognition to pursue the inadequacy of thought and thing, to experience it in the thing... The aporetical concepts of

85. It is important here to point out that Žižek's thesis goes well beyond this notion of 'cynical reason'—his entire treatise is in fact devoted to a thoroughgoing analysis of such a *problematic* and its re-evaluation by means of a sophisticated psychoanalytic reading.

86. Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do*, 99

87. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 5

88. *Ibid.*, 5-6. Jameson sums up Adorno's "negative dialectic": it "has no choice but to affirm the notion and value of an ultimate synthesis, *while negating its possibility and reality in every concrete case that comes before it.*" (Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and Form*, 56 [my emphasis])

philosophy are marks of what is objectively, not just cognitively, *unresolved.*[89]

To return for a moment to *Citizen Piszczyk*, there is a scene in which the imprisoned 'good citizen', after being mistaken for a political graffitist and impressing his warden with his wordcraft, is confined in 'privileged quarters'—with another prisoner, a Doctor of Philosophy—in order to write 're-education' propaganda. There is an exchange between Piszczyk and 'the Doctor' on the nature of Party aims.

> PhD: "I've come to the conclusion that we're entering a completely new period ... the period of the national monolith. Do you realise what it'll lead to? If the whole nation accepts one ideology, all the present divisions will disappear—progressive and regressive forces, Party members and non-Party members, believers and non-believers."
>
> Piszczyk (*incredulous*): "What are you saying?!"
>
> PhD: "I'm just being logical. The Party will simply be welded into the nation because our whole nation will follow one ideology. To paraphrase it, we can say that the Party will soon become superfluous."

And, of course, the doctor *is* just being logical, just as the Party—in this instance—must also be "logical", sublating progressive and oppositional forces, pressing them into the service of the state in order that the "national monolith" may be forged. The "dialectical overcoming" becomes an "overcoming of the dialectic".[90]

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89. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 153 (my emphasis). See also Adorno's *Minima Moralia*, "whose method," he says, was "schooled" by Hegel. (16; 148-151) It should be pointed out that Derrida too affirms (or concedes) a certain "schooling" by Hegel. Calling him "the thinker of irreducible difference," (*Of Grammatology*, 26) Derrida too shows something of the 'non-totalisable' when he says that "Hegel's text is necessarily fissured; that it is something more and other than the circular closure of its representation .... the movement by means of which his text exceeds its meaning, permits itself to be turned away from, to return to, and to repeat itself outside its self-identity."(Derrida, *Positions*, 77-8) But Heidegger's scholarship here is salutary—as W.J. Richardson points out, Heidegger takes the term *absolute* to its "Latin origin (*ab-solvere*) to give it the radical sense of that which has been 'loosened,' therefore released from another, whose bonds of dependence upon the other are dis-(ab-)solved. In terms of the Hegelian problematic, from what is 'absolute' Knowing released? From dependence upon objects in assuring itself of truth."(William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967], 332) The "Absolute" is defined (im)precisely by that which resists the absolute, resists concretion.

90. Not unlike Kojève—and, again, Adorno—Žižek eschews the Totalised, 'synthetic' Hegel—the Hegel of the "*caput mortuum*" (Marx)—arguing forcefully that "far from being a story of its progressive overcoming, dialectics is for Hegel a systematic notation of the failure of all such attempts—'absolute knowledge' denotes a subjective position which finally accepts 'contradiction' as an internal condition of every identity. In other words, Hegelian 'reconciliation' is not a 'panlogicist' sublation of all reality in the Concept but a final consent to the fact that the Concept is 'not-all' (to use a Lacanian term). In this sense we can repeat the thesis of Hegel

By means of an elaborate (ideological) ruse an elaborate map overcomes an ever-diminishing terrain.[91] Another memorable figure of this elaborate ruse of the 'Jewish joke' is the character of Jack Crabb, a sort of Piszczykian figure who recounts, with apocraphyl elaborations, his experiences in the old American West in Arthur Penn's 1970 film *Little Big Man*. Like Piszczyk, Crabb finds himself in a variety of oppositional roles and identities throughout his tragi-comic life lived between the Cheyenne Indians—by whom he was raised—and numerous caricatured roles ranging from Christian, gunslinger and snake oil salesman to putative mule skinner and something of an Indian scout to General Custer. Crabb had witnessed the

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as the first post-Marxist: he opened up a field of a certain fissure subsequently 'sutured' by Marxism." (*The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 6) But here, his similarity with Kojève ends. Žižek attributes this Marxist 'suturing' to 'dialectical materialism'—he poses the rhetorical question: "Is not 'dialectical materialism' the most extreme example of philosophical idiocy, the quintessential 'world-view', the universal ontology that comprises historical materialism as *metaphysica specialis*, the regional ontology of society?" (Žižek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality* [London: Verso, 1994], 135n) Here Žižek (himself perhaps subject to a sort of erstwhile 'Piszczykian' milieu in his own Slovenia) falls foul of his own indefatigable railing against the panlogicism attributed to Hegel. While he diagnoses some kind of 'infantile disorder' in dialectical materialism, the real 'idiocy' here would be take 'dialectical materialism' as a national or philosophical 'monolith'and to not read Engels's caveat that *revolution* is the only absolute admitted by dialectical philosophy, to not apply Lenin's dictum—that "nine tenths of it is chaff, rubbish!"—to *everything*, static or dynamic. The espoused 'dialectical materialism' that became the Soviet monolith cannot be reduced to some simplistic 'idiocy'on the part of those who *worked* at the core of that System's evolution—that is, those who worked at its interstices, its essential tendencies. I am thinking here of those who in good faith contered the old world view—the likes of Medvedkin, Eisenstein, Meyerhold, Vertov, Mayakovsky—albeit in favour of a new one. Filmmaker Roman Karmen, having missed the real thing, 'staged' the famous joining of the Russian armies outside Stalingrad—he didn't believe in 'objectivity', exclaiming to filmmaker Chris Marker: "This world is in endless war! The artist has to choose his camp and fight for victory. The rest is baloney!" (as cited in *The Last Bolshevik*, a film by Chris Marker, 1993). Bertolucci suffered similarly misguided accusations of 'left-wing idiocy' in his romantic depiction of Italian partisans in his 1976 film *Novecento (1900)*. As the beautiful Anita, daughter of Olmo the film's partisan protagonist, scans the horizon from atop a cartful of hay on 'Liberation Day', she is asked by the toothless peasant women still toiling in the fields what she can see. Accompanied by an epic Morricone score, she describes a litany of heroic and victorious deeds perpetrated by 'imaginary' partisans in the pursuit of fascists and liberty. A weathered and weary *paesana* utters: "Lucky the youth who can see what isn't there." An antidote, perhaps, to those who—no longer quite so youthful—are blinded by their own acuity of vision. Almost invariably, however, an acuity born of hindsight.

91. This ideological *move* can be evinced in Hegel's definition of the dialectic moment as "the self-sublation of these finite determinations on their own part, and their passing into their opposites." (*The Encyclopedia Logic*, 128); and elsewhere: "... the sole interest of reason is to sublate ... rigid opposites ... Life eternally forms itself by setting up oppositions, and totality at the highest pitch of living energy is only possible through its own restoration out of its deepest separation." (as cited in, Taylor, *Altarity*, xxiii) This is *the work* of Hegel's self-consciousness, the process by which the self is placed by distinguishing, opposing itself to its other, its opposite. The self comes to itself only through this opposition and by its simultaneous 'overcoming' (*Aufhebung*) and incorporation of this opposition. "This logic of self-consciousness, in Hegel's view, is fully articulated in tragedy ... and also in the Christian religion, particularly in the Christian understanding of God as manifest in and through the Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection." (Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], 98)

slaughter his wife and child and entire Cheyenne camp at the hands of Custer and resolves to avenge his people. But having attempted to murder Custer, he loses his nerve and falls into despair. Eventually, he entreats Custer to take him on as a scout. Custer, believing Crabb to be a liar, recruits him, explaining to his encredulous Major that "Anything that man tells me will be a lie, therefore he will be a perfect reverse barometer." As they prepare to enter the fray at Little Big Horn, Custer's Major advises that it is a trap and that the operation will end in their own massacre. As Custer turns to his 'reverse barometer' Crabb for advice, Crabb, in voice-over, explains the looming logic of his vengeance: "This time I had him" says Crabb, "but this time what I held in my hand wasn't a knife, but the truth." He proceeds to tell Custer to go down into the valley, if he has the nerve, because thousands of Cheyenne and Sioux brave awaited him and that all that would be left of him will be a 'greasy little spot'. Custer impetuously finds himself caught by the lure of truth's reverse logic. Custer to Crabb: "Still trying to outsmart me aren't you mule skinner! You want me to think that you don't want me to go down there but the subtle truth is, you really *don't* want me to go down there." Turning to his second in command: "Well, are you reassured now Major?" Custer's last stand.[92]

It is precisely this 'subtle truth' and reason that is at the core of the movement of history and its apparent and paradoxical closure. Paradoxical because reason is the symptom of rupture and separation—the *map*, the symptom of the *terrain* of our experience. In this, the *image* of Baudrillard's critique is plainly evident: the map has *overcome* the territory and the dialectic is nowhere to be seen.[93] Sublation *tends* to the normative, a process always assisted by selective and popular memory. As Wilden points out "the *Aufhebung* of a situation refers to the diachronic overcoming of the contradictions in a referent system and the subsequent emergence of (what is in

92. *Little Big Man* (1970), Dir. Arthur Penn, from the novel by Thomas Berger.

93. This is what Baudrillard looks to in his analysis of the generalised economy of "venality" that defines, well enough, the present stage of capital—but while affecting a certain nihilism, he does, however, seem more content to hover about its "reflected", seamless surface.

relation to it) a metasystem"[94] which, like the dialectic that forges it, is nowhere apparent precisely because it is everywhere and since it cannot be separated off from that to which it may be different. It closes on experience and memory. Žižek, again not unlike Adorno, puts the lie to the time-honoured thesis that the dialectic is the well-spring of development and regeneration, arguing instead for the 'negative term'—the rupture, the dislocation and "absolute negativity which 'sets in motion' dialectical movement ....In other words," he continues, "the suspension of movement is a key moment of the dialectical process: so-called 'dialectical development' consists in the incessant repetition of beginning *ex nihilo*, in the annihilation and retroactive restructuring of the presupposed contents."[95]

Closure denies metasystem precisely by being none other than the presentation or production of metasystem—that is to say, *the map of the map of the map and so on into infinity.*

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94. Anthony Wilden, *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange* (New York: Tavistock, 1984), 182. Hegel suggests this metasystem when he speaks of "the negation characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated." (*The Phenomenology of Mind*, 234) The "sublation of the sublation" is nothing if not *a move* to metasystem.

95. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 144. He goes further to say that this "movement is nothing but the intervention of the 'death drive' as radically non-historical, as the 'zero degree' of history—historical movement includes in its very heart the non-historical dimension of 'absolute negativity'." (*ibid.*, 144) Later in his book, speaking on another Jewish joke, Žižek is more forceful: "This is also, in a nutshell, the logic of the 'negation of the negation': this double, self-referential negation does not entail any kind of return to positive identity, any kind of abolition, of cancellation of the disruptive force of negativity, of reducing it to a passing moment in the self-mediating process of identity; in the 'negation of the negation', the negativity preserves all its disruptive power; the whole point is just that we come to experience how this negative, disruptive power, menacing our identity, is simultaneously a positive condition of it." (*ibid.*, 176) In the preface to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel invokes the 'negative term': "But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder .... *looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it.*" (*The Phenomenology of Mind*, 93 [my emphasis]) But Derrida takes a (quasi-respectful) swerve at Bataille for his poor "translation" (Bataille, unlike Derrida, apparently read his Hegel from the French) of the "negative term" in Hegel—specifically the *Aufhebung* at *work* in the master-slave dialectic, *work* privileged since Marx and a reading subsequently influenced by Kojève—a *working* Derrida relegates to "philosophy's blind spot". (Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 251-277) Derrida warns against "the 'slumber of reason', the slumber that engenders monsters and then puts them to sleep; this slumber", he warns, "must be effectively traversed so that awakening will not be the ruse of a dream ... a ruse of reason." (*ibid.*, 252). Žižek interprets Hegel against Hegel, working beyond his System and, therefore, unlike Derrida—who purports to be "interpreting Bataille against Bataille" (*ibid.*, 275)—seems able to accept it as a System with holes, and live with it. To this extent Žižek here is more adventurous and, one might argue, insightful than Derrida.

2.4 The Territory of Exile

Derrida is critical of the notion of the Hegelian *Aufhebung*, which, he asserts "is produced entirely from within discourse, from within the system or *the work* of signification."[96] But in his criticism he points, quite accurately, to the textual workings of this problematic—his criticism of the Absolute (*reason*, system, *logos*) *too* is produced entirely from within the problematic of Hegel's 'upside-down' dialectic (as Marx would have had it), however failing to entertain the possibility of its inversion and, therefore, the possibility of its transgressions. And the inversion works both ways—that is, *dialectically*. Marx would turn Him around in order to save (*aufheben*) what was *workable* from the 'metasystem' where Derrida, here, seems unwilling to let go of the System *itself*. He continues:

> A determination is negated and conserved in another determination which reveals the truth of the former. From infinite indetermination one passes to infinite determination, and this transition, produced by the anxiety of the infinite, continuously links meaning up to itself. The *Aufhebung* is included *within* the circle of absolute knowledge, never exceeds its closure, never suspends the totality of discourse, work, meaning, law, etc.[97]

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96. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 275 (my emphasis)

97. *Ibid.*, 275. "Misconstrued, treated lightly, Hegelianism only extends its historical determination, finally unfolding its immense enveloping resources without obstacle." (*ibid.*, 251) While Derrida's caution is valid, as we read on we encounter a sort of 'anxiety (not of "the infinite", but) of influence' (as Bloom might have it) as Derrida negotiates Bataille's reading of Hegel—a point, of course, on which it is difficult to pin him down. Barbara Johnson finds similar "concatenations" of quotation and competitive engagement in her analysis of Derrida's *reading* of Lacan's *reading* of Poe's *The Purloined Letter*, summing it up as: "This is the text that Jacques built." ("The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida" in *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading: Otherwise*, ed. Shoshona Felman [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982], 461n4) It is of interest to note that twenty years before Derrida's writing on Bataille, Lacan had written, in "The Signification of the Phallus": "All these propositions merely conceal the fact that it can play its role only when veiled ... when it is raised (*aufgehoben*) to the function of the signifier. The phallus is the signifier of this *Aufhebung* itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance." (*Écrits: A Selection*, 288) Nietzche would say of the Christian-theological dimension of German Idealism—the 'canon' of which he named Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Leibnitz, Kant and even Schopenhauer—that "In the history of knowledge the Germans are represented by nothing but ambiguous names, they have ever produced only 'unconscious' false-coiners ... they are are all mere *Schleiermacher*, mere veilmakers." (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale [London: Penguin Books, 1979], 92) As Heidegger points out: "The observation has two edges: it means not only that these men are at bottom camouflaged theologians but also that they are what the name suggests—*Schleier-macher*, makers of veils, men who veil things." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. I, trans. David Farrell Krell [San Francisco: Harper, 1991], 206) [Heidegger, in his citation, inexplicably elides Nietzsche's own reference to philosopher and hermeneutician Friedrich Schleiermacher, the 'ambiguous name' on which this pun turns.] Wilden touches on this 'veilmaking' when he points out that it is Freud's notion of the *Verneinung*, the

But when we 'invert' the dialectic (even against Althusser's scepticism) what we may well have is not the revelation of *truth* of the "former determination", but the *lie* of that *truth*—that is, in Hegelian terms, the truth "*looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it.*" Derrida is right to affirm the *workings* of *sublation* as never exceeding closure—that is, never exceeding the *map* of its *territory*—but, in pointing to the fact that it "thus belongs to restricted economy, and is the form of the passage from one prohibition to another, the *circulation* of prohibitions, history as the truth of prohibitions",[98] he in fact shows us the *symptom* of these very *workings*.

Derrida quotes Montaigne as saying "we need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things" and after some *work* on this theme, goes on to say:

> There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology—in other words, throughout his entire history—has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play.[99]

For Derrida, the major 'player' here in this second metasystem of "poetical interpretation" is Nietzsche who, he says, "pointed the way".[100] Deleuze here, it seems, is also shown the way, referring to Nietzsche's *will* as the "lightness of that

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negation of "the repressed presentation which provides for the 'suppression and conservation' (*Aufhebung*) of what is repressed." (*System and Structure*, 182)

98. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 275. These words, written in May 1967, receive something of a 'working over' in his June 1971 *Positions* interview with the Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta. Here, Derrida is questioned by Houdebine on the absence of "Marx" in his theoretical "position". Derrida denies ('denegates') any "reticence" to enter this realm, suggesting instead that the "lacunae" which may indeed accommodate a reading of Marx were yet to be elaborated by him or, for that matter, anyone else: "I am still, and above all thinking of the relationship of Marx to Hegel ... (dialectics, difference, contradiction, etc.) .... It requires protocols of reading. Why not say it bluntly: I have not yet found any that satisfy me." (*Positions*, 62-3) This Marx-Hegel relation—the 'kernel' of the work of Derrida's contemporaries such as Phillipe Sollers and the *Tel Qel* group with whom he had just broken—is, however, everywhere at *work* in Derrida, in spite of his failure to engage with it.

99. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 292

100. *Ibid.*, 292; see also *ibid.*, 67 re: Jabès's hermeneutics.

which affirms against the weight of the negative; *the games of the will to power* against *the labor of the dialectic*; the affirmation of affirmation against the famous negation of the negation."[101] Taking the Nietzschean line further, Deleuze argues that the dialectic is "the speculation of the pleb, as the way of thinking of the slave... Moreover, the relation of master to slave is not dialectical. Who is the dialectician, who dialectizes the relationship? It is the slave ... the way of thinking belonging to the slave's perspective."[102] This is post-Marxist rather than post-Nietzschean—a reaction perhaps to a certain Marxist imperative of the time. But Deleuze would himself later attempt to reconcile his earlier anti-Hegelianism/Marxism with a certain *identification* with the 'plebs' of '68. "We are unable to touch [power] in any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted with this diffuse mass. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense," he would argue, "is linked ... to the workers' struggle."[103] Like Deleuze, Derrida too seems to have some difficulty with the notion of *work*—at least that implied in Bataille's (Kojèvian-Marxian) reading of the *Aufhebung* in Hegel's master-slave paradigm. While Bataille too argues against the 'slavish' possibilities of the *Aufhebung*, and Derrida argues that he is "less Hegelian than he thinks"[104], his 'transgressive' Nietzsche necessarily hovers about the shadows of the System since Derrida too, like the "Hegelian *Aufhebung* is produced from entirely within discourse, from within the system or the work of signification."[105] Of course, this position is *contradictory* and Derrida scores no points for asserting,

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101. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*,197 (my emphasis)

102. *Ibid.*, 10; see also,199n5

103. As cited in Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", 67. Spivak points out that the "apparent banality" of Deleuze's 'engagement' with the politics of these times—she would also include Foucault whose conversation with Deleuze is under critique here—"signals a disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labour, a gesture that often marks poststrucuralist political theory. The invocation of *the* workers' struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism: the subject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and thus 'humanistic' training in consumerism; ... Ignoring the international division of labour; rendering 'Asia' (and on occasion 'Africa') transparent ... Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those intellectuals who are our best prophets of heterogeneity and the Other?" (*ibid.*, 67)

104. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 275

105. *Ibid.*, 275

after Bataille, that "the Hegelian *Aufhebung* in all its parts belongs to 'the world of work'".[106] It is precisely this contradiction that is at *work* here. Bataille points this up in what he called a "comic little summary" of Hegel's position in his work *Interior Experience*:

> Hegel, I imagine, touched the extreme limit. He was still young and believed himself to be going mad ... he worked out the System in order to escape.... Hegel attains *satisfaction*, turns his back on the extreme limit. *Supplication is dead within him.* Whether or not one seeks salvation ... one must continue to supplicate. While still alive, Hegel won salvation, killed supplication, *mutilated himself.* Of him only the handle of the shovel remained, a modern man. But before mutilating himself, no doubt he touched the extreme limit, knew supplication: his memory brought thim back to the perceived abyss, *in order to annul it!* The system is the annulment.[107]

Perhaps reading in Bataille the remainder of a sort of 'vulgar Marxist' work ethic that finds its champion in Hegel's slave (a reaction perhaps to a whiff of the proletarianism of Kojève and Hyppolite), these philosophers of the 'new Nietzsche' seem happier to dwell—like the *unheimlich* poet—on the notion of 'play'. While this notion clearly has strong theoretical and structural implications—found in both Hegel and Nietzsche—its dilution in populist expropriations augurs none too well for a *working* model of deconstruction. The 'world of work' is, no doubt, more difficult to negotiate than that of play, however this theoretical epithet was ever intented. Regardless of this deconstructive turn to *play* it is precisely the former determination—that of the work of the decipherer, seeking truth, origin, the mimetic—that must be reaffirmed. Not as desirable but as that which necessarily affirms the real for its subject as exilic. Representation is contingent on interpretation, comparison, imitation and however poetic and/or interpretive *play*

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106. *Ibid.*, 275. Bataille would say that while the "Marxist conception of the dialectic has often been challenged ...[t]hose who criticized it acted as simple destroyers. They tried not to see that, by removing the dialectical method from proletarian ideology, they removed the blood from the body; they took no notice of it because Hegelianism ... was incompatible with their ordinary representations. Thus the Marxist dialectic was treated in the same way that the Hegelian dialectic in general was treated: it was pushed away with repugnance." (Bataille, "The Critique of the Foundations of the Hegelian Dialectic", *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939*, ed. Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl, Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie, Jnr. [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985], 105)

107. As cited in Taylor, *Altarity*, 118

may "try" to pass beyond the "full presence" or the "origin of man", the "escape route"—in Derrida's own words—is yet to found. Žižek asks if this attempt to go beyond the 'closure' of metaphysics, of the attempt to traverse its closure, is not in any case doomed to a certain 'pyrrhic' *failure*:

> What if, perhaps, the fundamental metaphysical impetus is preserved in the this very drive to traverse the metaphysical closure—what, that is, if this impetus consists in the very striving towards meta-, beyond the given domain perceived as a closure? In other words, is not the only way effectively to step out of metaphysics, perhaps, precisely to renounce the transgressive impulse and to *comply with the closure without restraint?* [108]

An Hegelianism without reserve? Adorno asks if this "urge for an unspoiled basic stratum" (more a reference to a certain teleological imperative in hermeneutics but one that ultimately points also to the metaphysical tradition, of which the deconstructive enterprise is still, no doubt, a player), this urge "for a fresh start in metaphysics, or as they call it, for radical questioning" is not, in any case, complicit in the very culture it seeks to overcome, making "that supposed demolition even more of a conspiracy with the culture one boasts of razing."[109] Adorno argues that this "radical questioning"—this "wish to scrape off the delusions which a culture that had failed was papering over its guilt and over truth"[110]—falls victim to its own delusional metaphysics, a methodology that fails to apprehend its own bounds.

> The only possible escape route would be to define ... culture as the lid on the trash; and nature, even where it takes itself for the bedrock of Being, as the projection of the wretched cultural wish that in all change things must stay the same.[111]

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108. Žižek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment*, 184. See also the Introduction to his *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (5-6) which poses similar propositions for conceptualising the subjectivity of the protagonists of what he calls 'fundamentalist/essentialist' political positions of certain feminist, ecological, democratic and psychoanalytic movements.

109. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 368

110. *Ibid.*, 368. " While the fascists raged against deconstructive bolshevism," argues Adorno, "Heidegger was making destruction respectable as a means to penetrate Being. The practical test followed promptly. Metaphysical reflections that seek to get rid of their cultural, indirect elements deny the relation of their allegedly pure categories to their social substance. They disregard society, but encourage its continuation in existing forms, in the forms which in turn block both the cognition of truth and its realization." (*ibid.*, 368)

111. *Ibid.*, 368

3 EXILIC IMAGINATION

[PRESENT AND TENSE]

> If we succeed in understanding the subject, it will not be in its pure form, but by seeking it at the intersection of its dimensions.
>
> Maurice Merleau-Ponty *Phenomenology of Perception*

3.1 Story, imagination

SHE HAD BEEN PLAYING HOUSES in a nook right in the bows behind the windlass (on which she had hung a devil's-claw as a door knocker); and tiring of it was walking rather aimlessly aft, thinking vaguely about some bees and a fairy queen, when it suddenly flashed into her mind that she was *she.*

She stopped dead, and began looking over all of her person which came within the range of eyes. She could not see much, except for a fore-shortened view of the front of her frock, and her hands when she lifted them for inspection: but it was enough for her to form a rough idea of the little body she suddenly realised to be hers.

She began to laugh rather mockingly. 'Well!' she thought in effect: 'Fancy you, of all people, going and getting caught like this!—You can't get out of it now, not for a long time: you'll have to go through with being a child, and growing up, and getting old, before you'll be quit of this mad prank!'

Determined to avoid any interruption of this highly important occasion, she began to climb the ratlines, on her way to her favourite perch at the mast-head. Each time she moved an arm or a leg in this simple action, however, it struck her with fresh amusement to find them obeying her so readily .... Once settled on her perch, she began examining the skin of her hands with the utmost care: for it was hers.

She slipped out of the top of her frock; and having peeped in to make sure she really was continuous under her clothes, she shrugged it up to touch her cheek. The contact of her face and the warm bare hollow of her shoulder gave her a comfortable thrill, as if it was the caress of some dear friend. But whether the feeling came to her through her cheek or her shoulder, which was the caresser and which the caressed, that no analysis could tell her.

Once fully convinced of this astonishing fact, that she was now Emily Bas-Thornton (why she inserted the 'now' she did not know, for she certainly

> imagined no transmigrational nonsense of having been anyone else before), she began to reckon its implications.
>
> First, what agency had so ordered it that out of all the people in the world who she might have been, she was this particular one, this Emily: born in such-and-such a year out of all the years in Time, and encased in this particular rather pleasing little casket of flesh? Had she chosen herself, or had God done it?... Wasn't she perhaps God, herself?.... there was her family, a number of brothers and sisters from whom, before, she had never entirely dissociated herself; but now she got such a sudden feeling of being a discrete person that they seemed as separate from her as the ship itself ....
>
> A sudden terror struck her: did anyone know? (Know, I mean, that she was someone in particular, Emily—perhaps even God—not just any little girl.) She could not tell why, but the idea terrified her. It would be bad enough if they should discover she was a particular person—but if they should discover she was God! At all costs she must hide that from them.[1]

This passage from Richard Hughes's 1929 novel *A High Wind in Jamaica* speaks lucidly of what we might call the subjective and affective *emergence* of a ten-year-old. Taken aboard a pirate's ship and separated from her parents for some time, Emily was to have an adventure far more significant than the idleness of her captivity would suggest. Untutored, and unfettered but for the confines of the ship itself, Emily one day turned from her play, from a corner in the ship's bows, and realised for the first time that she was *here* rather than *there*—that, indeed, "she was *she*"—herself rather than another whom she would normally address in play. In this, her constitutive moment, Emily comes to see not only herself but something of the *relationality* of her existence, and her eyes affirm this new articulation of her play—a separate and discrete body who *now* stood in *relation* to others, "she stopped dead, and began looking over all of her person which came within the range of eyes."(34)[2]

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1. Richard Hughes, *A High Wind in Jamaica*, 134-9. Hughes's novel, originally published under the title *The Innocent Voyage*, tells the story of the captivity of several children—notably, Emily a ten-year-old girl—aboard a ship of pirates. Apart from the importance of this text for the reading that follows, Hughes's book is also an early (though subtle) text on the captor/captive relationship with particular importance for discussion on the child's relation to paternal interdiction. (All further references to this work, unless otherwise indicated, will appear as page numbers in the body of the text.)

2. "The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross. This is because its parts are inter-related in a peculiar way: they are not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each other I

In a perceived expulsion toward a new and apparent 'outsideness', seeing and tentatively feeling her difference here in an essential frontier, Emily comes to a position she is suddenly compelled to call her own—"a reaction, perhaps, to certain concentrations in a corner of her being."[3] This "lightning intuition", as Sartre calls it, singles her out and, one might say, gives direction and essence to a life that knew nothing of itself before. But, as Sartre is quick to add, this constitutional 'apparition' "is completely empty. The child has acquired the conviction that she is not just anyone, but it is precisely by acquiring this conviction that she becomes just anyone."[4] She has *emerged* from her corner to the world of this ship in the universe of the sea, and finds herself already situated in this world, the precondition for her rapidly dawning thoughts. But for Emily the question remains as to the possible becoming of this new personage: a debutante dressed with nowhere to go but the limited space (for it is this very emergence that *renders her space*) that mirrors her newly dressed self (in a corner of her lonely room), or, the outsider who showers her with platitudes from a relative distance like a frustrated courtier?[5] This phenomenon can be seen in the existential-phenomenological designation of being as *being-there*: whatever the stress of this epithet—be it verbal or adverbial, subjective (should we

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know where each of my limbs is through a *body image* in which all are included." (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962], 98)

3. Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 139. "Let us take now an ambiguous text in which being becomes manifest at the very moment when it comes forth from its corner." (*ibid.*, 138) For Bachelard, Hughes's "ambiguous" *A High Wind in Jamaica* is valuable because it "designates ... in terms of space and experience of inside and outside, the two directions that psychoanalysts refer to as introvert and extrovert: before life, before the passions, in the very pattern of existence, the novelist encounters this duality."(*ibid.*, 138) In spite of Bachelard's archetypal allusions these "two directions" will be developed below.

4. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Baudelaire* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), 19-20. Of this cognitive and affective "leap" in childhood, Sartre goes further than Bachelard to say "no one has described it better than Hughes in *A High Wind in Jamaica*."(*ibid.*, 19) The history of narrative has summoned up more than a few expressions of this "phenomenon"—from Dante and his entrée to Hell in the *Divine Comedy*, to the 'modernists' Camus, and Sartre himself—the 'self-conscious' novelists—perhaps most notable among them. Surveying the terrain at the frontiers mapped by Sartre and Camus—among others—Colin Wilson's *The Outsider* (London: Picador, 1978) is a useful introduction to the literary appropriations of notions of alienation and 'outsideness'. For a description of this *transition* that is emblematic of its 'genre' and analysed from the (sleepy) perspective of adulthood, see "Swann's Way", the "overture" to Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* (New York: Vintage International Books, 1989), 5-6

5. "To determine the properties of the image as image I must turn to a new act of consciousness: I must *reflect*." (Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination* [Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, n.d.], 3)

subjectivise this intransitive verb-noun *being*) or predicative—it *places* us such that our position could indeed be difficult to find. Do I look for being in a certain outsideness or is it this outsideness that centres me, in my very awareness of my fixation with it's *there?* This is the "transmigrational nonsense" of which Emily is so dismissive but at the masthead, we find a *figure* who points both ways.[6] Emily doesn't know whether she is coming or going and in her contemplation she truly oscillates. Heidegger says something of this dis-position when he says:

> The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world *is* itself in every case its 'there'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder'. The 'here' of an 'I-here' is always understood in relation to a yonder ready-to-hand, in the sense of Being towards this 'yonder'—a Being which is de-severant, directional and concernful. Dasein's existential spatiality, which thus determines its 'location', is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world ... 'Here' and 'yonder' are only possible in a 'there'—that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of the 'there' ... In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness.[7]

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6. Leopold to Molly Bloom: "- Met him what? he asked.—Here, she said. What does that mean?...—Metempsychosis, he said, frowning. It's Greek: from the Greek. That means the transmigration of souls." (Joyce, *Ulysses*, 52)

7. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 171. While Heidegger's '*Dasein*' has been variously translated as 'human being', 'human reality' (Sartre's *réalité humaine*), 'subject' or simply 'presence', the translators of Heidegger's *Being and Time* leave *Dasein* untranslated, except where Heidegger himself emphasises its etymology by the hyphenated "*Da-sein*" which they render as "being-there". (see translators' note, *Being and Time*, 27) Richardson transliterates Dasein as "There-being", arguing that "the English 'There' more easily than the French *là* may suggest simple presence of a being (v.g. there is a book on my desk), hence need not (here does not) suggest merely place in space, or at least no more so than does the German *Da* ..." (Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 34n17) Bachelard points out that French intonation renders the *là* (there) of *l'être-là* (being-there) emphatically, arguing that in the French transliteration of Dasein, "the *là* (there) is so forceful, that to designate being (*l'être*) by *être-là* is to point an energetic forefinger that might easily relegate intimate being to an exteriorised place." (*The Poetics of Space*, 213) While Bachelard's point on the French language is valid, as criticism of the *place*-ment of Being it would seem only to serve Heidegger's position. But, leaning on a vaguely Husserlian phenomenology, Bachelard relegates this and other (seemingly *post*-Husserlian existential-)phenomenological designations as a "geometrical cancerization of the linguistic tissue of contemporary philosophy" and "a dogmatization of philosophemes"(*ibid.*, 213)—a reference perhaps most pointedly to Sartre's super-added lexicon in *Being and Nothingness*. But in his invective he would seem to unwittingly aver with Heidegger's project when he adds: "Entrapped in being, we shall always have to come out of it. And when we are hardly outside of being, we always have to go back into it. Thus, in being, everything is circuitous, roundabout, recurrent, so much talk; a chaplet of sojournings, a refrain with endless verses.... One no longer knows right away whether one is running toward the centre or escaping." (*ibid.*, 213-14) And this, in fact, is the point. But Bachelard's words do point to the difficulties inherent in the classification, indeed, the *apprehension* of Being, much less its *designation*. Whatever Bachelard's intent, his argument does not derogate from Heidegger's phenomen(ont)ology—rather, it amplifies the problematic which I will now look to.

The moment of this 'acquisitive emergence' is similarly the textual premise of David Malouf's *An Imaginary Life*. Essentially a conflationary tale of an encounter between the exiled Roman poet Ovid and a 'wild child' (abstracted from Jean Itard's chronicle of Victor of Aveyron), Malouf's novel explores the 'landscapes' of language, intuition and imagination at the frontier of his *subject's* world. While he is *relegated* to the edge of the then known world, Ovid is exiled most notably, and for him most cruelly, from *language*. The novel sets about tracing the fundamental relation of its subject to language and the metamorphoses he experiences on his way to understanding this relation. Malouf's novel plays at the level of parallel narrative. But, while in speaking of present it also speaks of past and in speaking of one it also speaks of other, its conflationary structure ultimately refuses such distinctions. The narrative hinges on (the conflationary space of) the memory of *a meeting*:

> *WHEN I first saw the child I cannot say. I see myself—I might be three or four years old—playing under the olives at the edge of our farm, just within call of the goatherd, and I am talking to the child, whether for the first time or not I cannot tell at this distance.*[8]

From the windswept infinity of his exile at the frontiers of the Black Sea, Ovid, like some Prospero, conjures this child who, if his memory serves him right, first came to him in the warm, enclosed space of the olive groves of his father's farm. In this first sentence of an elliptical epigraph, Ovid ruminates on this enigmatic figure whom he has dreamt of since childhood. This 'child' delivered to his imagination, he rediscovers its presence in the figure of another, a 'wild child' he will later encounter in the forest while hunting with tribesmen, his adoptive kin in exile.

The *child* is presented in the beginning as *the* beginning. This first-scene ellipsis is a memory that leads Ovid back to his paternal home and a splendid vision of a companion visible to none but him and whose existence, like the phenomenon encountered by Emily, was a well kept secret. Both Ovid and Emily 'declare' their

8. Malouf, *An Imaginary Life*, 9. (All further references to this work, unless otherwise indicated, will appear as page numbers in the body of the text.)

imaginings from a certain altitude—at least, a heightened perspective. Emily, upon her discovery, climbs to the masthead as if to gain some distance on her newly found *self*, while Ovid, his position less obviously axial, appears to be pondering his 'meeting' from some lofty foothold, open at least to the elements if not a clear perspective on his thoughts. Ovid's perspective is indeed unclear, statements as to his position contradictory: "The country lies open on every side, walled in to the west and the south, level to the north and to the northeast, with a view to infinity."(15) The 'epigraph' to *An Imaginary Life* implies *beginning*, *origin* and *linearity* in *the meeting* and, coupled with Ovid's descriptive 'opening' narration, logically suggests that he is conjuring this primal memory, recounting it from some craggy height at the frontier. But this is a play of appearances—we are drawn to a conflationary space, in fact two spaces in which the exile has it both ways. He disappears on our arrival with the sole excuse: "But I am describing a state of mind, no place. I am in exile here."(16) He was never *really* there, any more than we are *really* there, but our arrival ushers in the exile's narrative. The *meeting*, however, fakes an introduction. It is diegetically more synchronic than it would have us believe—more a 'presence' to be read throughout the text as a sort of palimpsest or arche-writing in the poet's every utterance. Through this 'presence' the story is *related* to us.

Both Ovid and Emily *here* reach a reflective 'turning-point' that both harks to and finds its expression in terms of *beginnings*. The self would seem to issue from this very beginning-point, an apparent localisation of self that predicates—the essential *here* and *there*, the *when* of narrativity.[9] But they had to become individuals in order to conceptualise this 'event' a process of *individuation*, of *differentiation*—their turn to *self* is a becoming in the paradoxical relation between tenuity and unity. Emily's

9. "We shall point to *temporality* as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call 'Dasein' .... whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with *time* as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light—and genuinely conceived—as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it ... *time* needs to be *explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being*..." (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 38-39) And what of *narrativity*? For the moment I will conflate it with the problematic of Being-as-it-unfolds...

anxiety at the likelihood of others discovering her *identity*, as she herself has just done, is symptomatic of this essential occupation of a certain 'in-between'. At the masthead, fear encroaches her contemplation: as she touches her shoulder with her cheek it is "as if it was the caress of some dear friend", but, "which was the caresser and which the caressed, that no analysis could tell her." This brush with the *self* is pivotal.[10]

Emily's anxiety stems from the suggestion of a *past*, which she however effaces before an anxious projection in the possibility of what this "new person" will become. Time strikes her for the *first time*: convinced *now* of her new subjectivity—"(why she inserted the 'now' she did not know, for she certainly imagined no transmigrational nonsense of having been anyone else before)"—her ascendancy is brought to a rapid halt. She turns again "to reckon its implications" and from this timorous perspective is moved to her *first person* reflection, the narrative and ontological paradox of which is about to stir.

3.2 A *first person* Reflection

When the child was a child
It walked with its arms swinging.
It wanted the stream to be a river,
  the river a torrent and this
    puddle to be the sea.
When the child was a child
It didn't know it was a child.
Everything was full of life,
  and all life was one.
When the child was a child
It had no opinions about anything.

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10. Sartre illustrates this encroaching self-consciousness with the words of his nauseous diarist Roquentin: "What am I going to do now? Above all not move, *not move*... Ah! I couldn't prevent the shrug of the shoulders.... The thing which was waiting has sounded the alarm, it has pounced upon me, it is slipping into me, I am full of it.—It's nothing: I am the Thing. Existence, liberated, released, surges over me. I exist... It's sweet, so sweet, so slow. And light: you'd swear that it floats in the air all by itself. It moves. Little brushing movements everywhere which melt and disappear. Gently, gently." (Sartre, *Nausea*, 143) [The full, philosophical import of these words for Sartre may be found in his *Being and Nothingness*.]

It had no habits.
It sat cross-legged, took off running,
had a cow's lick in its hair, and didn't
make a face when photographed.[11]

"It is this reflective act," says Sartre, "which permits the judgement 'I have an image.'"[12] But what draws this image, this reflection on an apparent selfhood that had, hitherto, shown little promise? Emily's 'turn' is the striking of a reflective pose that is the beginning of the *apprehension of an image*—what Bachelard, in speaking from another perspective, might term "original contemplation".[13]

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11. Wim Wenders and Peter Handke, *Wings of Desire* (*Der Himmel über Berlin*, 1987). Dir. Wenders, Scr. Wenders and Handke. [In the summer heat of 1969, in the yard of a small *primary* school at Blacktown in the western suburbs of Sydney, a class of nine-year-olds gathered with their teacher to be photographed. As they prepared for this momentous occasion the Principal turned to one of his subjects, apparently somewhat dishevelled, and enquired forcefully, "Who dressed *you* this morning, son?!" As my head tilted from the height of this booming voice to a downward perusal of this child's body dressed in grey, it suddenly dawned on me (as it does now): "*I* did, Mr East." In this (perhaps) primary reflection—interestingly prompted by interpellation and a certain sartorial imperative—I find a self *to be* in the very process of apprehending it. I experience *the subjective moment*—I begin to *reflect*—I am (almost) ... become.]

12. Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination*, 3. With this, the first page of Sartre's tract, there would be little argument. But as for what passes as his premise—"It is necessary to repeat ... what has been known since Descartes: that a reflective consciousness gives us knowledge of absolute certainty; that he who becomes aware 'of having an image' by an act of reflection cannot deceive himself."(*ibid.*, 3)—there will be more than a little resistance. While Sartre would argue with the primacy of the Cartesian cogito, his debate was semantic and still beholden to its reflective lures. As Robert Cumming points out, *The Psychology of the Imagination* is Sartre's "major 'Husserlian' work" but what attracted him to Husserl's philosophy was Descartes. Sartre thought Husserl's work to be more accessible than Heidegger's—in his own words—"'by virtue of its appearance of Cartesianism.'" (Robert Denoon Cumming, *Phenomenology and Deconstruction*, Volume One: *The Dream is Over* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991], 33) As Cumming has it: "The implication is that Husserl—and Sartre after him—are merely repeating the Cartesian appeal to what is immediately given to consciousness as determining the legitimate scope of phenomenology as *subject*. Sartre is endorsing the Cartesian Husserl that Heidegger rejected ..." (*ibid.*, 33) As Adorno argued (here, in fact, alluding to the likes of Heidegger): "Metaphysical reflections that seek to get rid of their cultural, indirect elements deny the relation of their allegedly pure categories to their social substance. They disregard society, but encourage its continuation in existing forms which in turn block both the cognition of truth and its realization. The idol of pure original experience is no less of a hoax than that which has been culturally processed ..." (Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 368) The 'mirror myth' of this Cartesian reflective consciousness—however *real* or immanent for the consciousness reflecting, however *accurate* in its description of this reflective consciousness—is what will now be explored.

13. Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 184. In speaking of the "apprehension" of space in the poetics of "the daydream", Bachelard touches on something. For him, the "first truth" may well be found in the apparent *ennui* of the *daydream*, which "undoubtedly feeds on all kinds of sights, but through a sort of natural inclination, it contemplates grandeur. And this contemplation produces an attitude that is so special, an inner state that is so unlike any other, that the daydream transports the dreamer outside the immediate world to a world that bears the mark of infinity .... And one might say that daydream is *original contemplation.*" (*ibid.*, 183-84) While Bachelard's designation is in keeping with his essential aestheticism, which itself is beholden to the notions of "natural inclination" and "inner state", it will be argued that reflection is *not* the immediate, seamless apprehension of self, nor is it *intuition* as the term has come to common usage, and *contemplation* here will not be taken in this immediate sense.

From this great height she assays a past, revealed to her as that which has simply always *been*, and the "transmigrational" possibility of a future seemingly unassailable. On the horizon, Emily sights her "land" for the first time, but unlike Descartes the vicarious "sailor", is unable to cry out.[14] Her world is dawning as a sort of temporal and spatial threshold and it is from here that she fears the consequences of her newly 'directional' being—it is from here, among other things, that she sees and thinks of the possibility of her Godhood—*it* would seem to assail *her*, though she cannot tell. She wishes to keep it to herself, to prolong the 'moment', rather like the fearful who watch a horror film from between slightly parted fingers.

It is precisely this *apprehension* that is at stake here.[15] Generally taken as both 'seizure' and 'understanding', the term also implies a certain turning back on oneself of this very action. This *intuitive* ("lightning", as Sartre would have it, or otherwise) or *contemplative* 'turning' offers much but guarantees little. No sooner have we departed on our sortie than we await the return of some ineffable spectre. One is 'apprehensive'—no longer active in the pursuit of some knowledge or image, but passively, nervously awaiting its onset. While Emily's *image* returns, her *appropriation* of it is subtle indeed. From the Greeks' cave-dweller's turn in the shadows to the fateful turn of Lot, Orpheus and Narcissus, the return of *the image* in history has been so crucial it is little wonder that its subjects are apprehensive. As

14. Hegel on Descartes: "Now we come for the first time properly speaking to the philosophy of the new world and begin with Descartes. With him we enter upon a philosophy that stands on its own two feet, a philosophy that knows that it comes independently from reason, and that self-consciousness is an essential moment of the true. Here we can say that we are at home, and, as sailors after a long voyage upon stormy seas, we can cry 'land'... In this new period, the [fundamental] principle is thought, thinking that proceeds from itself..." (as cited in William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 331) Of Hegel's rumination Heidegger would later say that "if Descartes sighted new land, Hegel takes full possession of it."(*ibid.*, 332) Clearly, Emily is yet to take "full possession" of anything but in her pursuit of verification of self—of self's certitude—she approaches the horizon charted by Descartes.

15. "Apprehension, *n.* [M.E < L.L. *apprehendere*, to seize]... a seizing or arresting by legal process; the operation of the mind in contemplating ideas, or merely taking them into mind ... distrust or fear at the prospect of future evil, accompanied with uneasiness of mind." (*The International Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language* [New York: Tabor House, 1973])

the fate of these narrative figures attests, the temptation to be led by this reflective and usually illusive *image* is great—but, as Heidegger warns:

> We must first of all see this one thing clearly: the Dasein, as existing, is there for itself, even when the ego does not expressly direct itself to itself in the manner of its own peculiar turning around and turning back, which in phenomenology is called inner perception as contrasted with outer. The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, *before* all reflection. Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only a mode of *self-apprehension*, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure.[16]

Heidegger fittingly approaches this problem of "self-disclosure" with mirror in hand. He argues that this modality of "unveiling", of self-disclosure, can be accommodated by the term "reflection", though "we must not," he urges, "take this expression to mean what is commonly meant by it—the ego bent around backwards and staring at itself—but an interconnection such as is manifested in the optical meaning of the term 'reflection'."[17] The implication of an active, *intentional* turning of thought on itself and through others suggests an agency of a subject yet to be *grounded.* Heidegger argues that

> the Dasein does not first need to turn backward to itself as though, keeping itself behind its own back, it were at first standing in front of things and staring rigidly at them. Instead, it never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in fact in those things that daily surround it .... The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things.[18]

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16. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 159. This is the beginning of Heidegger's answer to his own question: "*In what way is the self given*?" (*ibid.*, 158) While this ontological modality is arguably the kernel of Heidegger's entire opus, I take it here as *entrée* to another question: *In what way is the (narrative) self given (over) to exile*, or, *In what way is the self (exile) given (over) to narrative...?*

17. *Ibid.*, 159. "To reflect means, in the optical context, to break at something, to radiate back from there, to show itself in a reflection from something. In Hegel—who saw and was able to see in philosophy so much more than had ever been seen before, because he had an uncommon power over language and wrested concealed things from their hiding-places—this optical significance of the term 'reflection' resounds, even if in a different context and with a different intention."(*ibid.*, 159) [The grammatical sense of 'reflexivity', in which the subject is the same as its pronounced object—"*She touched herself*"—has the same etymological root meaning as 'reflection' and the optical sense of a 'radiating back from' is ever-present. Though they are often used interchangeably, it is the root meaning of these two terms that has been exploited in the various 'philosophies of reflection' and which will be implicit in the readings that follow.]

18. *Ibid.*, 159

In his film *The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser* (*Jeder für sich unt Gott gegen alle*, 1974), Werner Herzog renders the famous true story of his subject in terms that would aver with Heidegger's worldly and specular reflection. In 1828, the strange figure of Kaspar emerged in the main square of Nuremburg, wearing a felt hat with a faded photo of the city tucked in its band and holding something of ā letter of introduction to the city's cavalry captain. Though the facts of the matter are sketchy, it seems Kaspar was held in a keep all his life, tended by someone he never actually saw and who was referred to by Kaspar simply as 'Man'—a mysterious master who, it seems, only appeared to Kaspar as he approached him from behind for feeding, sometimes standing behind him "drawing figures, letters and numbers over his shoulder" as he taught him, after a fashion, to read and write.[19] As he takes him to town, the master attempts to teach his Kaspar to walk, holding him from behind, kicking his heels to affect movement like Descartes's string-pulling Evil Genius. Kaspar's reflection is tempered by the shadowy, barely peripheral view of his warden—he does not, cannot nor cares not to "conduct any sort of espionage" on his self and it becomes increasingly obvious that his self is simply that which is reflected to him from 'things'. What remains clear is that this subject's "self-apprehension", however this may be affected, is far from "self-disclosure". Kaspar would ask his new teachers: "Where is my soul?" "Can I look at it?"[20]

Emily comes to 'behold' her self in the 'disclosedness' of the *there*—as Heidegger might have it—her "Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding."[21] On the truth or falsity of Emily's apprehension much could be read, but in the *beholding* there is more than a small

19. Lucien Malson, *Wolf Children* (with Jean Itard's *The Wild Boy of Aveyron*), trans. Edmund Fawcett, Peter Ayrton and Joan White (London: NLB, 1972), 67

20. *Ibid.*, 66

21. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 215. Heidegger adds: "This thesis has remained the foundation of western philosophy ever since. The Hegelian dialectic found in it its motivating conception, and is possible only on the basis of it."(*ibid.*, 215)

margin of latitude. Emily's perspective goes beyond "some internal representation"[22]—her reflective appearance is, perhaps more appropriately, "the effort to recapture the Ego of the Ego Cogito in the mirror of its objects, its works, its acts."[23]

On this "pursuit of Being", of these appearances and disappearances in the 'lost and found' of some nebulous station, Sartre puts it that "the reflecting consciousness posits the consciousness reflected-on, as its object. In the act of reflecting I pass judgement on the consciousness reflected-on."[24] In the act of *reflection* various judgements return in the gaze of this one who looks—of this apprehension she may feel shame, pride, she *will* disavow it but *posit* it all the same. But the *immediate* apprehension one has of something—that is, consciousness not mediated by the agency of reflection—allows, according to Sartre, no such judgement since it "does not know my perception, does not *posit* it; all that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the world."[25] This positing is founded on an essential judgement that this one's existence is true and this posturing, this essential self-positing in reflection as first 'truth' was called by Fichte "the *thetic judgment*. Such is our philosophical starting point."[26]

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22. "To the classic assumption that beliefs and desires underlie and explain human behaviour, Descartes adds that in order for us to perceive, act, and, in general, relate to objects, there must be some content in our minds—some internal representation—that enables us to direct our minds towards each object." (Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's* Being and Time, Division I [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991], 5) As Dreyfus affirms, Heidegger eschews the Cartesian dichotomy between a self-contained subject with a certain cognitive 'content' (*inner*) and an object independent of that subject (*outer*), arguing that Dasein cannot be understood in terms of such a simplistic dichotomy.(*ibid.*, 5)

23. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, 43. "But why must the positing of the Ego be recaptured through its acts? Precisely because it is given neither in psychological evidence, nor in an intellectual intuition, nor in a mystical vision. A reflective philosophy is the contrary of a philosophy of the immediate." (*ibid.*, 43)

24. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, liii

25. *Ibid.*, liii

26. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, 43. Such is the philosophical starting point for Ricoeur's careful positing of Freud and phenomenological philosophy, but it is precisely this "philosophical starting point" that points to the ontogeny of narrative and its essential exile. Later in the same text Ricoeur will say that "phenomenology begins by a humiliation or wounding of the knowledge belonging to immediate consciousness", that phenomenology "shows that the first truth is also the last truth known; though the Cogito is the starting point, there is no end to reaching the starting point; you do not start from it, you proceed to it; the whole of phenomenology is a movement toward the starting point." (*ibid.*, 377)

To scratch at this reflective foil, however, is to render the reflection as truly *refraction*—our subject's *thetic judgement*, her original and constitutive assessment of her experiential world, represents ... *from the very beginning* ... a baleful misconstruction. As Ricoeur puts it: "The first truth—*I am, I think*—remains as abstract and empty as it is invincible; it has to be 'mediated' by the ideas, actions, works, institutions, and monuments that objectify it. It is in these objects, in the widest sense of the word, that the Ego must lose and find itself."[27] And Emily is at once *lost* and *found*: her 'I think' vacillations and masthead mutterings point (im)precisely to the very difficulties in apprehending an image ('I am') that has the originary power to simultaneously stymie and subjectify. We can see in Hegel the early workings of this slippage: "That which has come out of its *origin* contradicts the immediacy of the origin; but is, in turn, as immediate as the origin. This concrete contradiction of immediacy and mediation is there; it is the *present moment* (Dasein), and all present moments. Being is *omnipresence*."[28] Our subject is *here* precisely because it is (perceptually) *there* and yet *cannot* be *there*. This *position* is in fact *dis*-position, "always already" in process: "the core of self-consciousness is its practical intentionality (*Trieb*) to actualise its potentiality, to *find* itself in *producing* itself."[29] Ricoeur points to this process of production through *exile*:

> I must recover something which has first been lost; I make 'proper to me' what has ceased being mine. I make 'mine' what I am separated from by space or time, by distraction or 'diversion', or because of more culpable forgetfulness ... I am lost, 'led astray' among objects and separated from the centre of my

27. *Ibid.*, 43. With this Ricoeur swerves away from the unmediated Cartesian self and introduces "a second trait of reflection, which may be stated thus: reflection is not intuition .... We can say in a somewhat paradoxical sense, that a philosophy of reflection is not a philosophy of consciousness, if by consciousness we mean immediate self-consciousness. Consciousness, as we shall see later, is a task, but it is a task because it is not a given." (*ibid.*, 43-44)

28. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, trans. Gustav Emil Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 105. "I am what thou art: Another to thee; thou art what I am: Another to me. This is the *concrete identity* of the Concept." (*ibid.*, 134) The Hegelian notion of 'the Concept' points to a subject aware of itself, an awareness come to by the sublation of the otherness that had hitherto only allowed for consciousness. This new world of self-consciousness is that which "grasps and focuses in itself the essential dialectic of Being. Like Being, it determines itself in and for itself; unlike Being, it knows this to be the case. It is ... a living mirror of the universe (*Reflexion des Wesens in sich!*). It is the identity of subject-object knowing itself as such. The Concept is the *essence of personality.*" (*ibid.*, 133)

29. *Ibid.*, 213

> existence, just as I am separated from others and as an enemy is separated from all men. Whatever the secret of this 'diaspora', of this separation, it signifies that I do not at first possess what I am ... a desert wherein I am absent to myself. That is why reflection is a task, an *Aufgabe*—the task of making my concrete experience equal to 'I am'.[30]

3.3 The Original *becoming-acquainted*

> When I begin to reflect my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience; moreover my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an event, and so it appears to itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a changed structure of consciousness, and yet it has to recognize, as having priority over its own operations, the world which is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself. The real has to be described, not constructed or formed.[31]

Merleau-Ponty here is counterposing phenomenological reflection to that of the "impregnable subjectivity" proffered by analytical reflection (Cartesian-Kantian) and scientific explanation which, he argues, "starts from our experience of the world and goes back to the subject as to a condition of possibility distinct from that experience, revealing the all-embracing synthesis as that without which there would be no world. To this extent it ceases to remain part of our experience and offers, in place of an account, a reconstruction."[32] This descriptive lineage is in Edmund Husserl's "descriptive psychology", the phenomenological method driven by his famous dictum "to the things themselves"(*zu den Sachen selbst*).[33] This "phenomenology of

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30. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, 45. Something of this reflective move can be glimpsed in Freud's observation that the "finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it." (Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality", *On Sexuality*, The Pelican Freud Library, Volume 7, [London: Penguin Books, 1977], 145) On this "finding again", see also Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol. 3: *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 113-14

31. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, x

32. *Ibid.*, ix-x. While Merleau-Ponty distinguishes analytical reflection from phenomenological reflection, he uses the unqualified 'reflection' when speaking of the latter. Merleau-Ponty also includes Hegel (the 'later' Hegel of the Absolute) in this "all-embracing synthesis" (terminology he takes from Husserl).

33. Meanings inspired only by remote, confused, inauthentic intuitions—if by any intuitions at all—are not enough: we must go back to the 'things themselves'.... The phenomenology of the logical experiences aims at giving us a sufficiently wide descriptive (though not empirically-psychological) understanding of these mental states and their indwelling sense, as will enable us to give fixed meanings to all the fundamental concepts of logic." (Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Volume I, trans. J.N. Findlay, [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970], 252) As Heidegger's translators point out, this slogan (adapted by Heidegger) "is not easy to translate without giving misleading impressions. What Husserl has in mind is the 'things' that words may be

the logical experiences" was, as Lyotard put it, aimed at "a closing off of all metaphysical avenues"[34] in a science of 'pure phenomena'—that is, a phenomenological reflection, a reflection on 'things' *only* as they appear to consciousness without resort to conjecture or hypotheses concerning the relation between the perceiving subject and that which it perceives.[35]

The basic thematic of phenomenology is, according to Husserl, *intentionality*: the fact that consciousness is and can be only *a consciousness of something*.[36] In the words

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found to signify when their significations are correctly intuited by the right kind of *Anshauung* [perspective, observation, intuition]." (*Being and Time*, 50n1) Ricoeur takes up Husserl's thoughts on signification, fleshing out the "authentic intuitions" of phenomenology's directive, indicating that "the first question of phenomenology is: What does signifying signify? .... The first act of consciousness is designating or meaning (*Meinen*). To distinguish signification from signs, to separate it from the word, from the image, and to elucidate the diverse ways in which an empty signification comes to be fulfilled by an intuitive presence, whatever it may be, is to describe signification phenomenologically." (Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967], 5-6) See also Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) I raise this difficulty in 'translation' only to indicate that this thesis cannot nor intends to explore the full import of phenomenological endeavour but that it takes a path from certain junctures in the various translations of that endeavour to other philosophical and political horizons.

34. Jean-François Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, trans. Brian Beakley (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991),40

35. Importantly, Heidegger, in what amounts to the beginning of his departure from Husserl, will add that phenomenology's maxim "'To the things themselves!' ... is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings ... to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems', often for generations at a time. Yet this maxim, one may rejoin, is abundantly self-evident, and it expresses, moreover, the underlying principle of any scientific knowledge whatsoever." (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 50; see also translators' note, *ibid.*, 50)

36. This term he takes from his teacher Franz Brentano who had argued that all mental phenomena was characterised by the "intentional"—as "the reference to a content, a direction upon an object." (Brentano, as cited in Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Husserl's Notion of Noema" in *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982], 73) This Brentano took from the scholastics who had referred to similar 'operations' of consciousness in the Middle Ages. (*ibid.*, 73) As already suggested (by way of Sartre's predilection for him) Husserl's transcendental phenomenology emerges from Descartes's methodical doubt and avowedly verges on "a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged—and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs—to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content the Cartesian philosophy." (Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960], 1) As both his critics and followers agree, this rejection never fully succeeds, a problem that comes to light in Husserl's definition of phenomenology's 'principle of principles': "But enough of these topsy turvy theories! No theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the *principle of all principles*: that *every primordial dator Intuition* is *a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge*, that *what ever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form* (as it were in its bodily reality), *is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be*, though *only within the limits in which it then presents itself*. Let our insight grasp this fact that the theory itself in its turn could not derive its truth except from primordial data." (Husserl, as cited in Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 62) Here Husserl would appear to accept more than reject the "well-known doctrinal content" of Descartes—it would take a reflection on the unconscious (a problematic Husserl

of Ricoeur,"intentionality of consciousness" is "that remarkable property of consciousness to be consciousness of . . . . , an intending of transcendence, a bursting out towards the world."[37] Attempting to go beyond what he called "Kantianising psychologism",[38] Husserl turned from an emphasis on "*noetic* analysis"—analysis of the particular and immanent modalities of *intuition* and *reflection*, the effective acts and movements of consciousness itself which, as Merleau-Ponty has it, "bases the world on the synthesizing activity of the subject"—to "his own '*noematic reflection*' which remains within the object and, instead of begetting it, brings to light its fundamental unity."[39]

> Once we have laid hold of the phenomenological task of describing consciousness concretely, veritable infinities of facts—never explored prior to phenomenology—become disclosed. They can all be characterized as *facts of synthetic structure*, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another.[40]

The *noemata* are the transcendental *appearances* which Ricoeur calls "the objective face of the subjective process (the perceived as such, the imagined as such, etc.)"[41] and it is this phenomenological emphasis that affirms the *intentional* consciousness as *outside of itself*.[42] As a means *to the things themselves*, Husserl proposes a "phenomenological reduction" which means an "'inhibiting' or 'putting out of play' of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world."[43] Also called the

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would more fully reject) to shake the certainty of this intuition.

37. Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 16

38. In a note on this 'psychologism' Husserl makes the point that "[i]t is well known that Kant's theory of knowledge has sides which it strives and successfully gets beyond the psychologism of mental faculties as sources of knowledge. Here it is enough to stress that it also has prominent sides which fall within this psychologism ... but most Kantianizing philosophers, fall in the field of psychologizing epistemologists, however little they may fancy the name." (Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 122)

39. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, x

40. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 41

41. Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 9. "All experiences, actual or inactual, are equally intentional .... We see, therefore, that we can speak, with Husserl, of an inclusion of the world *in* consciousness, since consciousness is not only the I-pole (or *noesis*) of intentionality, but equally the object-pole (or *noema*); but we must make clear that this inclusion is not *real* ... but intentional." (Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, 55)

42. Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 8

43. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 20

"phenomenological epoché" and "parenthesizing",[44] this *reduction* seeks to deliver phenomena in its purist possible form to the reflecting subject. In the words of Ricoeur, "one abstains from pronouncing (*epochê*) on the ultimate ontological status of the appearing and that one occupies oneself only with the pure appearing."[45] Our immediate apprehension of the world *as we know it*—what Husserl called the "natural attitude of mind"[46]—is parenthesised (the *phenomenological epochê*), its natural, empirical validity renounced and suspended in favour, ultimately, of a *transcendental* attitude, "the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me."[47]

> Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice; it alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical.[48]

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44. *Ibid.*, 20

45. Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 10

46. This 'natural (thetic) attitude' is, according to Husserl, that by means of which "I discover [reality] as existing and receive it, as it gives itself to me, equally as existing." (as cited in Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, 46) But, as Husserl would qualify: "Meanwhile the world experienced in this reflectively grasped life goes on being for me .... It goes on appearing, as it appeared before; the only difference is that I, as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in experiencing the world—though that believing too is still there and grasped by my noticing regard." (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 19-20)

47. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 21. To reach this pure datum of that intended, Husserl goes through a number of steps—refining Descartes's methodical doubt he "describes an ascending path which leads to ... the reduction or, perhaps better, the 'suspension' of the natural thesis of the world (thesis=positing). This movement is as yet only the inverse, the negative, of a formative, or perhaps even creative, operation of consciousness called 'transcendental constitution'. What is this thesis of the world? What is reduction? What is constitution? What is constituted? What is this transcendental subject which disengages itself from natural reality and engages in the work of constitution? These things cannot be directly told but must be achieved by the spiritual discipline (*ascèse*) of the phenomenological method." (Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 16) At this juncture it is important to note Merleau-Ponty's caution that the "most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction .... there is no thought which embraces all our thought." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, xiv) Clearly, all "metaphysical avenues" (as Lyotard put it) are far from cut off—for Husserl, the phenomenological reduction aims precisely at exploring these avenues, *as a way to metaphysics...*

48. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, xiii

Now, as Merleau-Ponty's Husserlianism prescribes, "the real has to be described, not constructed or formed", but it is precisely this description-forging self-consciousness—prior to any philosophical *working* on the perceiving subject having been elaborated—that offers its subject a construction: *a representation*, both "strange and paradoxical." Heidegger argues, in a careful 'correction' of Husserl's Cartesianism, for what he calls a *phenomenological construction*—pointing beyond phenomenological reduction, through a phenomenological construction to its ultimate destruction, he argues that "construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition."[49] There is, however, little of this *de-construction* involved in the *constructions* of the naive or 'natural attitude' forging the *representations* of this particular subject—not yet, anyway. As already pointed out, Hegel speaks of the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness as a passing into the "native land of truth, into that kingdom where it is at home."[50] A seemingly

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49. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 23. "Being [in the sense of the ontological-existential *subject*] does not become accessible like a being [that, or 'they', in which the subject is reflected]. We do not simply find it in front of us. As is to be shown, it must be brought into view in a free projection. This projecting of the antecedently given being upon its being and the structures of its being we call *phenomenological construction*." (*ibid.*, 21-22) Cumming points out that the "idiom 'in front of' suggests that Heidegger may be rejecting Husserl's 'principle of principles,' whereby 'the things themselves' are disclosed in their immediate givenness—a givenness which Husserl considers comparable to the immediacy with which something is seen." (*Phenomenology and Deconstruction*, 31) Heidegger would in fact reject Descartes in a manner his teacher Husserl was unable and unwilling to.

50. "Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness—the notion of mind—its turning-point, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote supersensuous, and steps back into the spiritual daylight of the present." (Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, 227) Heidegger exploits the Greek etymology of the word 'phenomenon' [*φαινομενον—phainomenon*] arguing that it means more than a simple 'appearing', that its root meaning suggests a more active form: "to bring to the light of day, to put in the light ... in other words, ... *that which shows itself in itself*, the manifest." (*Being and Time*, 51) From the Greek *'φαινομενον'* Heidegger further teases out the sense of 'semblance': "This kind of showing-itself is what we call *'seeming'*[*Scheinen*] ... that which looks like something, that which is 'semblant' ... but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself out to be." (*ibid.*, 51) But, if this already sheds doubt on the self-certainty of the noematic, what immediately follows shows more clearly his divergence from Husserl (however carefully uttered in these early pages): "If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of *φαινομενον* ('phenomenon' as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second ('phenomenon' as semblance) are structurally interconnected." (*ibid.*, 51) This "structural interconnection" places immediate doubt on the possibility of the objective apprehension of the phenomenon as it presents itself and, for Heidegger, points the way to what might be called a 'second order' signification of that which appears. The importance of Heidegger's proposition lies in its refusal of the simple and apparent immediacy of the phenomena, a proposition which alludes also to the refusal of the simplistic apprehension of Husserl's phenomenological imperative: *to the things themselves!*

simple transition, but, as Heidegger points out, Hegel's transition from consciousness to self-consciousness "is not to be represented according to the practice of common understanding.... his problematic does not move at all in this dimension of the 'natural attitude'."[51]

Now there is little doubt that Emily *intends* the object of her new self, simultaneously describing and constructing her phenomena, her *representation*. Emily is only just *becoming aware* of a world which spreads out before her both temporally and spatially, coming to her—by all *appearances*—both intuitively and immediately. Though she is yet to make up her mind, it is precisely this "natural attitude of mind" that is descending on her—she *will* inevitably accept it, never suspend it, and lose herself to it forever. While this reflection does *momentarily* "slacken the intentional threads" that attach her to her world it is precisely this *attachment*, characterised by an immanent, clambering panic, that will close on her as *selfhood*. And while forever intrinsically bound to the transcendence that took her to the masthead, her reflection is terminally bound to a sort of repressed but defensive solipsism—that is, she may reach out to others but will find them unattainable and retreat to the immanence of a self in exile. As Heidegger cites Hölderlin: "As you begin, so you will remain."[52] She has, in the words of Husserl, entered a realm of "an obscurely apprehended horizon of indeterminate reality. This misty horizon, incapable of ever being totally determinate, is necessarily there... The world ... has its temporal horizon infinite in both directions, its past and its future, the known and the unknown, immediately living and void of life."[53]

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51. Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 133

52. As cited in Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4. While Heidegger here is quoting Hölderlin, the reference is to his own orientation to ontology via Brentano's meditations on the ontology of Aristotle.

53. As cited in Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, 46

Emily has 'discovered land' and entered its mental phenomenon, but what value obtains in this land and how might it fit a map yet, even, to be drawn? The land reflected on gives her a *context*, a worldly predicate whose subject can however only stand before it, isolated. This is her fate—again, *I discover reality as existing and receive it, as it gives itself to me, equally as existing*—the essential and guiding *image of selfhood—image of exile*. For Cassirer a "factor of rest and inner permanence is achieved only when the image grows, as it were, beyond itself—when, in a transition which is at first almost imperceptible, it becomes *representation*."[54]

3.4 On High-Altitude Thinking

> For a philosophy that is installed in pure vision, in the aerial view of the panorama, there can be no encounter with another: for the look dominates; it can dominate only things, and if it falls upon men it transforms them into puppets which move only by springs. From the heights of the towers of Notre-Dame, I cannot, when I like, feel myself to be on equal footing with those who, enclosed within those walls, there minutely pursue incomprehensible tasks. High places attract those who wish to look over the world with an eagle-eye view. Vision ceases to be solipsist only up close, when the other turns back upon me the luminous rays in which I had caught him ... invading my field through all its frontiers, attracts me into the prison I had prepared for him and, as long as he is there, makes me incapable of solitude.[55]

Merleau-Ponty speaks here of "the analytic of Being and Nothingness" as the proposition of "the seer who forgets that he has a body."[56] While his reference here is properly to the philosophy of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty is referring to a long lineage of 'disembodied' reflective philosophers from Sartre through Husserl to Descartes and, as he sees him, Hegel.[57] Merleau-Ponty is avowedly beholden to the 'early

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54. Cassirer, *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*, 108

55. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 77-78

56. *Ibid.*, 77

57. The "eagle-eye view" of Merleau-Ponty's philosopher is decidedly that of Hegel (*l'aigle*) and, importantly, Sartre's Hegel, but his critique is necessarily, if implicitly, equivocal—while the eagle stands aloof (for the distant, imperious voyeur the view is grand but useless—the eagle can swoop but the philosopher, even with the "eagle-eye", can only observe) he also sees with an acuity unparalleled in philosophical circles. In this Merleau-Ponty would concur with Heidegger. [Mark Taylor's reading of Merleau-Ponty's 'specular' criticism

Hegel' whom he sees as being ever-mindful of life's contradictions and vicissitudes, but eschews the leanings of the 'later Hegel' whom he sees as forging the reconciliation of opposition through the "all-embracing synthesis" of reason in the Absolute: "the seer who ... tries to force the passage toward pure being and pure nothingness by installing himself in pure vision, who makes himself a visionary, but who is thrown back to his own opacity as a seer and to the depth of being."[58] Merleau-Ponty argues forcefully that the dis-position of perception mitigates against any such position in absolute knowledge: "If we succeed in describing the access to the things themselves," he argues, "it will only be through this opacity and this depth, which never cease: there is no thing fully observable, no inspection of the thing that would be without gaps and that would be total."[59] He goes further to argue that "'Identity of identity and non-identity' eventually subordinates *difference*," suggesting that the dialectical overcoming—to use Kojève's terminology—emerges as a sort of dialectical *becoming*, "presumed to have totalized, included *everything*, surpassed *everything*."[60] But, the "mind's eye," says Merleau-Ponty, "also has its blind spot"[61] and the apparent and promising certitude of the "movement of reflection"—the implicit plenitude of the Hegelian *Geist*—serves only its contradiction. The philosopher with the "eagle-eye"—disembodied by virtue of his imperious gaze—is, according to Merleau-Ponty, doomed to a distant and eternal solipsism. Derrida touches on this particular "regard of the eagle" in the opening passage of his *Glas*:

> what, after all, of the remain(s), today, for us, here, now, of a Hegel? .... Who, him? His name is so strange. From the eagle it draws imperial or historic

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is highly valuable here and while much of what follows on this point is consistent with his account (*Altarity*, 61-81), he inexplicably elides the strong reference to Sartre in Merleau-Ponty's text.]

58. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 77; see also Taylor, *Altarity*, 63

59. *Ibid.*, 77. Earlier, Merleau-Ponty argued that "Analytical reflection [as opposed to phenomenological reflection] knows nothing of the problem of other minds, or of that of the world, because it insists that with the first glimmer of consciousness there appears in me theoretically the power of reaching some universal truth, and that ... the Alter and the Ego are one and the same in the true world which is the unifier of minds." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, xii)

60. As cited in Taylor, *Altarity*, 63-64

61. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 33

> power. Those who still pronounce his name like the French (there are some) are ludicrous only up to a certain point: the restitution (semantically infallible for those who have read him a little—but only a little) of magisterial coldness and imperturbable seriousness, the eagle caught in ice and frost, glass and gel. Let the emblanched philosopher be so congealed.[62]

But it is not only the philosopher who is *installed in pure vision, frozen and congealed by the look* ... Wim Wenders's films *Wings of Desire* (1987) and *Faraway, So Close!* (1993) give another perspective on this "high-altitude thought".[63] The films depict this very dilemma of the "high-altitude" thinker, but in Wenders's case the 'sovereign gaze' is that of the angel rather than the eagle. As observers of the human condition, Wenders's angels are *not at home* either in their own ethereal world or the world they are bound to watch over. Where Merleau-Ponty's philosopher peers from the height of Notre-Dame, Wenders's angels hover about Berlin's Victory Column (the gilt Angel of Victory their own apparent guardian) and the Brandenburg Gate.[64] But the angels want to feel as people feel and to be recognised for their concern for these

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62. Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 1. Derrida goes on to say that "the eagle has not signed the text of the *savoir absolu*, absolute knowledge.... Perhaps there is an incompatibility (rather than a dialectical contradiction) between the teaching and the signature, a schoolmaster and a signer."(*ibid.*, 1) Derrida is harsh on the sense- and self-certainty of Hegel's System, but in this introduction to *Glas* is the implication of a sort of reprieve (however disavowed by he who would bestow it) for the disembodied philosopher. The text is not *signed*, not *underwritten*, to the extent that it is inherently unfinished, inherently bound to the implenitude of its own contradictions—and, for that matter, incompatibilities. The philosopher has not *disowned* the absolute, he is merely unable to take possession of it. He is bound to come down from his great height—whether he likes it (*knows* it) or not. [It is worth noting here that Derrida's homophonic reference bears some witness to Merleau-Ponty's—"those who still pronounce his name like the French (there are some)"—and can in fact be read as aversion to that particular philosopher's '*regard for the eagle*'—and Derrida takes Merleau-Ponty at his word: "I do not simply feel myself frozen, I am frozen by a look ..."; and "the other's gaze which suddenly congeals me ..." (*The Visible and the Invisible*, 71-72) Derrida has declared that transcendental phenomenology was for him formative during his philosophical apprenticeship in the fifties, that Husserlian phenomenology was for some (like him) seemingly "inescapable" and that still (he is writing in 1980) he believed it to be a "discipline of incomparable rigour". But, he added, "Not—especially not—in the versions proposed by Sartre or by Merleau-Ponty, which were then dominant, but rather in opposition to them, or without them." (Derrida, "The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations" in *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. Alan Montefiore [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 38) There is, however, more between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida—and for that matter, Sartre since this 'gaze' which falls on the French, falls via him—than Derrida is prepared to concede.]

63. Invoking the 'early Hegel' against the Hegel of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty asks: "is not the dialectic the refusal of high-altitude thinking, of the wholly exterior being as well as the reflexivity?" (*The Invisible and the Invisible*, 91; on the "high-altitude" positionality of both negative and positive ontologies, of the "nothing is not" and the "being is" conflation, see *ibid.*, 69; and Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 15)

64. Appropriately, Berliners refer to the 'Angel of Gilt' atop the Victory Column (the *Siegessäule*) as the most virtuous woman in all of Berlin since, at that height, none can touch her.

people. For the angel, time does not exist and the pull between the temporal, existential flow of the netherlands they observe and the lofty negativity in which they 'reside'—in which *they are not*—is too great for them to resist. They are moved to touch the lives of those they watch and Wenders goes so far as to actually *materialise* his angels. In *Faraway, So Close!*, the angel Cassiel has tired of his eternal wanderings and, like his angelic comrade Damiel (who had entered the earthly quotidian in *Wings of Desire*), he too wants to close the distance. This humanisation is effected by Cassiel's rescue of a child who falls from a Berlin high-rise—saving her from imminent death, Cassiel himself falls into human time and comes to experience the everydayness of the human phenomenon for himself. And, *for the moment*, he likes what he finds. In his "Theses on the Philosophy of History", Walter Benjamin describes a painting by Paul Klee, "Angelus Novus", in which an angel is about to take flight from some disturbing reflection—"This," he says, "is how one pictures the angel of history":

> His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.[65]

And so it is for Wenders's angel—he *would* like to stay but his 'regard' is ultimately incompatible with those whose lives he wants to touch, and anyway, time is not on

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65. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1992), 249. Benjamin introduces this 'fragment' with these lines from Gerhard Scholem's poem *Gruss vom Angelus*: "*My wing is ready for flight,/I would like to turn back./If I stayed timeless time,/I would have little luck.*" (*ibid.*, 249) Those 'angels of history' who stayed—some of whom returned after various sorties to the West—Brecht, Heiner Müller, Christa Wolf and Stephan Heym, to name a few—stayed also to deal with the debris that has piled up since the storm that began in 1989. (See Müller's 'quotation' of Benjamin in his "The Luckless Angel" [1958], *Germania*, 99) The question is invariably put: "You had sufficient personal authority and international fame. You could have got out. Why did you stay?!" Heym, for one, returned to the East after fighting the Nazis with the American army before being expelled for his communist sympathies. His response to this question is notable: "I don't think that if I'd left socialism would have become better. But if I stayed, I still had hope." As head of the newly formed PDS (the phoenix of the former Communist Party) and the eldest member of the German parliament—the 'Father of the House'—Heym opened the *Bundestag* in 1994.

his side. "Time itself" stalks him—reciting postmodern incantations to do with money and the end of history, this temporal spectre reminds him of his essential difference, telling him that he has no place here, that his "number is up".[66] In closing the distance he merely proves what Merleau-Ponty's solipsist philosopher had already experienced: that *there can be no encounter with another—for the look* always *dominates* and, in fact, requires *distance.*[67] This solipsism is no doubt what Nietzsche has in mind when he brings Zarathustra down from his mountain cave: "Behold! I am weary of my wisdom," he says, "like a bee that has gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to take it... To that end I must descend into the depths ... I must *go down*—as men, to whom I want to descend, call it.... Thus began Zarathustra's down-going."[68]

While Merleau-Ponty's description of the 'congealed' philosopher is apt and no doubt true, the description is no less true for those *on the ground* who already get in close, who in their everyday lives seek to 'get in touch' with others. As Merleau-Ponty rightly argues, the Cartesian *cogito*—the basis of the 'regard of the eagle' as well as for the *subject-objects* of his gaze—implies a certain "spiritual act which grasps at a distance and compresses into itself everything at which it aims, an 'I think' which is, by itself and without any adjunct, an 'I am'."[69] In this *compression* the *cogito* appears to itself as boundless—bound to nothing, that is, but the apparent self-certainty of its cogitations, owing nothing to the time or space in which it occurs.

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66. Emit Flesti ("Time itself") to Cassiel (now Karl Engel): "Someone once said that 'Time is money.' But they got it wrong. Time, is the *absence* of money." (*Faraway, So Close!*, Dir. Wim Wenders [1993])

67. Speaking on the essential solipsism of Cartesian epistemology, Anthony Wilden argues: "There are only two kinds of solipsist: those who want to be consciously and those who want to be unconsciously. Solipsism, like what we erroneously call schizophrenia, is a 'security operation'." (Wilden, *System and Structure*, 217) But Heidegger sees it like this: "Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*'" (*Being and Time*, 233) For Heidegger this solipsism, far from closing on the subject and isolating it completely, is a 'disclosure' that brings the subject "face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world." (*ibid.*, 233)

68. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 39. "For this is *our* height and our home: we live too nobly and boldly here for all unclean men and their thirsts." (*ibid.*, 122). In an attempted reversal of the sublative *spirit* (*Aufhebung*) of the 'congealed' philosopher, Nietzsche must *go down* (*Untergehen*) on Hegel.

69. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 372

"Accordingly," says Merleau-Ponty, "eternity, understood as the power to embrace and anticipate temporal developments in a single intention, becomes the very definition of subjectivity."[70] And this is precisely the point. Whether eagle, angel, or their human object, it is this "single intention", this single-minded perspective that denies access to others, that forges a simultaneous and paradoxical closure and distance that will be experienced only as insurmountable existential distance. Sartre's reading of Heidegger has something on this:

> This passing beyond the world, which is a condition of the very rising up of the world as such, is effected by the *Dasein* which directs the surpassing *toward itself*. The characteric of selfness (*Selbstheit*), in fact, is that man is always separated from what he is by all the breadth of the being which he is not. He makes himself known to himself from the other side of the world and he looks from the horizon toward himself to recover his inner being. Man is a 'being of distances.'... But this appearance of the self beyond the world—that is, beyond the totality of the real—is an emergence of 'human reality' in nothingness. It is nothingness alone that being can be surpassed. At the same time it is from the point of view of beyond the world that being is organized into the world ... Anguish is the discovery of this double, perpetual nihilation.[71]

We climb down the ratlines from the masthead into a world looking at the threads that attach us as we descend, reflecting on the world that will hold this *personality*—paradoxically—sovereign and alien. This is the *work* of (the) *exile: faraway, so close!*

3.5 Time *arises from my relation to things*

This *person*-ality is, in Heideggerian terms, "thrown" into, given over or "abandoned" to a world—a world in which this being is and can be nothing other than itself and ascertains no real knowledge of itself, its origin or destiny. Merleau-Ponty points out that the "Cogito must reveal me in a situation, and it is on this condition alone that transcendental subjectivity can, as Husserl puts it, *be* an

70. *Ibid.*, 372

71. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*,17-18

intersubjectivity."[72] While this is no doubt true—the subject is *situated*, revealed *to be* in a *situation*—this is not the problem. The problem is one of orientation. A particular disposition accompanies this ontological move—a mood descends, a certain affectivity overcomes the subject in what Heidegger would call her "state of mind."[73] This being, now dawning as (intersubjective) 'oneness'—however disclosed—is in fact a *mask*ing, as its etymology implies, of a self that can, and will be nothing other than a persona.[74] Emily's questions will reveal to her, ultimately, merely a "being-in-the-world" of the *present*—a world into which she is "thrown" by her projections and abandoned to the netherland of the everyday. Again, *time strikes her for the very first time*: between a past of having always already been "in the throw" and the possibility of a future *becoming*, her projections, like the angel, deliver her ... *for the moment* ... to a present. Emily's God is a ruse and when this present, this *presence* is disclosed to her as the everyday "being-there", she will have "fallen" into her world, finding little, or no, spiritual guidance in what will be her essential ontological condition.

> In falling, Dasein *itself* as factical Being-in-the-world, is something *from* which it has already fallen away. And it is not fallen into some entity which it comes upon for the first time in the course of its Being, or even one which it has not

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72. *Ibid.*, xiii

73. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* as "state-of-mind" but indicate that it more literally means "'the state in which one may be found'", pointing to the German idiom "'*Wie befinden Sie sich?*" which "means simply 'How are you?' or 'How are you going?'" (*Being and Time*, 172n2) This is important for the intersubjective implications of Heidegger's words that follow: "A mood makes manifest 'how one is', and 'how one is faring'. In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its 'there'. In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being .... The pure 'that it is' shows itself, but the 'whence' and the 'whither' remain in darkness .... the Being of the 'there' is disclosed moodwise in its 'that it is' .... This characteristic of Dasein's Being—this 'that it is'—is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither', yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the 'thrownness'[*Geworfenheit*] of this entity into its 'there', indeed it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world it is the 'there.' The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over.*" (*ibid.*, 173-75) This "whence and whither", at least for now, remain "in the throw" also—*with time* these positionalities will come into view.

74. person... < L. *persona*, actor's mask, character acted ...] ... a character, part or role sustained on the stage or in real life..."; persona,.... the character[s] represented in a work of fiction, as a play, story or novel; dramatis personae. *Psychol.* the social role or facade a person assumes in satisfying the requirements of his environment."(*The International Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language*)

> come upon at all; it has fallen into the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being. Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself.[75]

Emily will come down from her *temporarily* heightened perspective and take her place among others, but her descent will be by means of a "downward plunge"—her being "plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness."[76]

> Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and into the 'they' (though always with a sham of authenticity), the movement of falling is characterised by *turbulence* .... Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the 'they's' inauthenticity.[77]

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75. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 220

76. *Ibid.*, 223. Heidegger defines "inauthenticity" not as that which would "signify 'really not', as if in this mode of Being, Dasein were altogether to lose its Being," but as that which "amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world—the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of Others in the 'they'."(*ibid.*, 220) Heidegger further insists that we mustn't "take the fallenness of Dasein as a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal status'. Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for Interpreting it." (*ibid.*, 220) [The implications here for an ideology of Dasein may begin to be discerned.] The Edenic terminology is clearly metaphorical and Heidegger intends no allusion to any notion of 'original sin'. But Jean Wahl wonders if Heidegger's notion of *thrownness* "is at all meaningful independent of religious presuppositions; for perhaps only if there lingers in the back of our mind the notion of a deity who is to bring us aid and comfort, can we be surprised and shocked to find that we are here without aid. Thus our feeling of abandonment may simply be due to our abandonment of the notion of a benevolent deity." (Jean Wahl, *Philosophies of Existence*, trans. F.M. Lory [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959], 54) And further, Dreyfus sees in Heidegger's notion of "the fall" a "secularized version of Kierkegaard's account of sin." (*Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, 226) For Kierkegaard, *sinfulness* was characterised by the "distraction and denial built into our everyday practices", and humans "*sin* when they succumb to the temptation to flee anxiety by choosing 'safe' spheres of existence"(*ibid.*, 313), a movement Dreyfus equates with Heidegger's *fall* "into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness." As Heidegger points out, this plunge is often rendered or "interpreted as a way of 'ascending' and 'living concretely'."(*Being and Time*, 223), an irony that may take us not so much in the direction of Heidegger's "secularisation of sin" but of Christianity's deification of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger would argue: "Both the contention that there are 'eternal truths' and the jumbling together of Dasein's phenomenally grounded 'ideality' with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded." (*ibid.*, 272) [Later, writing on Nietzsche's 'overturning of Platonism' and struggle with the 'veilmaking' Angels of German Idealism, Heidegger weighs in with an atheisism of his own: "With the help of its own chief principle, the theoretical unknowability of the supersensuous, the Kantian system is unmasked and exploded. If the supersensuous world is altogether unattainable for cognition, then nothing can be known about it, nothing can be decided for or against it. It becomes manifest that the supersensuous does not come on the scene as part of the Kantian philosophy on the grounds of basic philosophical principles of knowledge but as *a consequence of uneradicated Christian-theological presuppositions*." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 206 [my emphasis])]

77. *Ibid.*, 223. Sartre's later existential ruminations nominate his wartime comrade Pieter [putatively the *subjective* Pierre/Peter of his *The Psychology of Imagination*] as "a fine specimen of inauthentic rationalism, or, to be precise, of the impersonal Heideggerian 'one'." (Sartre, *War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War, 1939-1940*, trans. Quintin Hoare [London: Verso, 1984], 11) This "impersonal 'one'" is translated from Heidegger's usage of "*das Man*". (see translator's note, *ibid.*, 11) Rendered by Macquarrie and Robinson in *Being and Time* as "the 'they'", this designation again shows something of the conflationary nature of the "essential Man", this subject-object that seems to exist by its very displacement in modern society. [Dreyfus contends that the

Like Herzog, the troubled subject of Saul Bellow's novel of the same name, who writes to Heidegger demanding an explanation—"Dear Doktor Professor Heidegger, I should like to know what you mean by the expression 'fall into the quotidian'. When did this fall occur? Where were we standing when it happened?"[78]—Emily too is out of sorts, her *mood*, as Heidegger would have it, the "facticity" of her *thrownness*. She, like Herzog, is in exile *now*.

As Taylor, reading Merleau-Ponty, points out, the 'look of the eagle' is reflective of a desire to taste the fruits of metaphysics, "to realize the ontotheological tradition. There is, however, a high price to be paid for such a vision—a price that is nothing less than time itself. The birth of eternally constructive subjectivity is the death of the passionate temporal subject"[79]—a death suggested in Scholem's angel's lament to eternity: "If I stayed timeless time, I would have little luck." Universal and eternal truth—absolute knowing, absolute spirit—closes on time, rendering history inaccessible to its own subject. But the height of this eternity can never be reached and "the experience that nurtures reflection cannot itself be known."[80] For Merleau-

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translation of "*das Man*" as "the They" is misleading since "it suggests that we are not part of *Das Man*." (*Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, xi) Given the intersubjective possibilities at play in this ordinary German word (we, you, they, a person, a people)—and, notwithstanding, the possibility of Heidegger's own *motivated distance* from the 'rabble' he was alluding to—I would add, this seems to be precisely the point.]

78. Saul Bellow, *Herzog* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1964), 55. Herzog, himself a "Doctor of Philosophy", is avowedly "losing his mind"—he witnesses his own "disintegration", all the while "one corner of his mind" remaining "open to the external world." His defiant rhetoric, composed in the form of letters, serves only a tragi-comic solicitude—he knows only too well the meaning of Heidegger's "fall into the quotidian". While the rest of us "live concretely" in our tranquillised everdayness, blissfully unaware of having suffered a fall, Herzog (in the German his name means Duke—a title that testifies to his 'high-altitude thought') begins to glimpse something of his fall into this alienated tranquillity and he doesn't like what he sees. When Herzog thinks "If I am out of my mind, it's alright with me" (Bellow's opening 'translation' of Herzog's cogitations, the first line of the novel), I can only suggest, *read on*—clearly, it is not all right with him. For Herzog, the "facticity" of the "quotidian" is not in question—his anxiety testifies to its existence, he just wants the *place* and the *time*. [For another modernist reading of this dawning of the "quotidian" see also, Walker Percy, *The Movie-Goer* (New York: Avon, 1980)]

79. Taylor, *Altarity*, 66

80. *Ibid.*, 66. Taylor writes: "The obscure and ambiguous 'origin' that 'is not nothing' implies a 'non-knowing' that the philosopher [*l'aigle*] struggles to repress. It is the effort to return to this repressed that leads Merleau-Ponty to chart the course leading from the Etoile, along the Champs Elysée to Notre-Dame, and back. To follow this route is to discover that the return of the repressed is the re-turn of time." (*ibid.*, 66)

Ponty, the 'journey' of reflection implies an essential return, a reflexive act of reconstitution or restoration, which would have us believe

> that it can comprehend our natal bond with the world only by *undoing* it in order to remake it, only by constituting it, by fabricating it.... It is therefore essential to the philosophy of reflection that it bring us back, this side of our *de facto* situation, to a center of things from which we proceeded, but from which we were decentered, that it retravel this time starting from us a route already traced out from the center to us.[81]

But as Merleau-Ponty further argues, this glance that is cast along the streets of Paris is that of an unreliable guide—the reflective movement toward "internal adequation" is merely a movement to coincide with that which is already the reflective subject itself—a movement "to reconquer explicitly all that we are and do implicitly."[82] The subject has sighted new land but in the process seeks to reconstitute, to recover itself by the very evidence of this new terrain. The subject is affirmed in its existence by the objects of its reconnaissance, by its objectification in those objects. "If knowledge is not incomplete," says Taylor, "the self must discover *itself* in everything that appears to be other than itself."[83] But in reflection the self comes first and, for Merleau-Ponty,

> these operations of re-constitution or restoration, which come second, cannot in principle be the mirror image of its internal constitution and its establishment, as the route from the Etoile to the Notre-Dame is the inverse of the route from the Notre-Dame to the Etoile: the reflection recuperates everything except itself as an effort of recuperation, it clarifies everything except its own role. The mind's eye too has its blind spot, but, because it is of the mind, cannot be unaware of it, nor treat it as a simple state of non-vision, which requires no particular mention, the very act of reflection which is ... its act of birth. If it is not unaware of itself—which would be contrary to its definition—the reflection cannot feign to unravel the same thread that the mind would first have woven, to be the mind returning to itself within me,

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81. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 32-33

82. *Ibid.*, 33

83. Taylor, *Altarity*, 67

> when by definition it is I who reflect. The reflection must appear to itself as a progression toward a subject X, an appeal to a subject X.[84]

It is this reflective venture in all its subjective ambiguity that engenders subjective time and it is this temporal flux—irreducible for the subject who faces it—that works to realise the subject as decentred. Time itself—the time it takes to contemplate, to conjure, to reflect on the world of others—mitigates against the possibility a fully realised, self-certain subjectivity by virtue of the very subjective experience it affords. "My confidence in reflection," says Merleau-Ponty, "amounts in the last resort to my accepting and acting on the fact of temporality, and the fact of the world as the invariable framework of all illusion and all disillusion: I know myself only in so far as I am inherent in time and in the world, that is I know myself only in my ambiguity."[85] And it is precisely this reflective ambiguity that renders—paradoxically—the *facticity* of the subject; it is this ambiguity, not self-certainty, that temporalises in the sense of a subjective 'unfolding'—a venture that always threatens the possibility of no return: the facticity of exile. "Though claiming to be the creative source or origin of the world of experience," Taylor explains, "the reflective subject is a parasite nourished by experience more 'originary' than its own deeds."[86] This experience is transcendent and incomprehensible to its comprehending subject—it transcends to the extent that the subject can never truly be in touch with it any more than it can be with the height of the eagle. "As meditating subject,"

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84. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 33-34. The image here of the thread is reminiscent of the cotton reel of the "*fort-da*" game elaborated by Freud in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle". (*SE* XVIII: 1-65). Merleau-Ponty believed phenomenology to be "the implicit philosophy of psychoanalysis", arguing that the two disciplines were in accord "in describing man as a timber yard, in order to discover, beyond the truth of immanence, that of the *Ego* and its acts, that of consciousness and its objects, of relations which a consciousness cannot sustain; man's relations to his origins and his relations to his models .... Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better, they are both aiming toward the same *latency*." ("Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis: Preface to Hesnard's *L'Oeuvre de Freud*", *Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry*, Vol.XVIII, nos.1, 2 & 3, 1982-83: 71) Latent here also may be a reference to Ariadne's clew of thread with which Theseus escaped the labyrinth. As the myth tells us, this clew (clue) has the power to lead us from the labyrinth to the light of day—from the depths of reflection to the "pure vision" of the philosopher. But Merleau-Ponty, with Freud and Lacan—though perhaps more properly with Ludwig Binswanger's *Daseinanalytik* (see *Phenomenology of Perception*, 154-173)—takes this as clue to another clue, reading it properly as symptom.

85. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 345

86. Taylor, *Altarity*, 68

Merleau-Ponty points out, "we are never the unreflective subject that we seek to know; but neither can we seek to be wholly consciousness, or make ourselves into the transcendental consciousness."[87] So we are stuck with earthly time, however much we may aspire to the eagle's nest.

Merleau-Ponty argues that:

> Time exists for me because I have a present. It is by coming into the present that a moment of time acquires that indestructible individuality, that 'once and for all' quality, which subsequently enables it to make its way through time and produce in us the illusion of eternity. No one of time's dimensions can be deduced from the rest. But the present (in the wide sense, along with its horizons of primary past and future), nevertheless enjoys a privilege because it is the zone in which being and consciousness coincide.[88]

But it is, in fact, this "once and for all" quality that forges the *experience* of subjectivity as that which is exactly *not* "once and for all" but fleeting—that is, temporal. This "illusion of eternity" is ever-tempered by the perceptual 'ebb and flow' of (the experience of) time: "We say that time passes or flows by. We speak of the course of time."[89] Merleau-Ponty illustrates this 'natural attitude' of time by placing himself as a hypothetical 'objective witness' at the edge of a river and argues, from this perspective, precisely for a revision of this temporal metaphor.

> The water I see rolling by was made ready a few days ago in the mountains, with the melting of the glacier; it is now in front of me and makes its way towards the sea ... If time is similar to a river, it flows from the past towards the present and the future. The present is the consequence of the past, and the future of the present.[90]

But Merleau-Ponty shows this "melting of the snows", or sticks that had been hurled into the river upstream a few days earlier and which now float before him, to be not

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87. As cited in *ibid.*, 68

88. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 424

89. *Ibid.*, 411. Here Merleau-Ponty seems to be paraphrasing Heidegger: "Time is understood as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of 'nows', as the 'course of time'." (*Being and Time*, 474)

90. *Ibid.*, 411

a series of events, arguing that "the notion of 'event' has no place in the objective world."[91] This temporal perspective presupposes "the existence of a witness tied to a certain spot in the world and I am comparing his successive views"[92]—he was *here*, or *there* as witness to various events at various points in time, "shapes cut out by a finite observer from the spatio-temporal totality of the objective world."[93] "Time," he argues, "presupposes a view of time. It is, therefore, not like a river, not a flowing substance."[94]

> It is not the past that pushes the present, nor the present that pushes the future, into being; the future is not prepared behind the observer, it is a brooding presence moving to meet him, like a storm on the horizon. If the observer sits in a boat and is carried by the current, we may say that he is moving downstream towards his future, but the future lies in the new landscapes which await him at the estuary, and the course of time is no longer the stream itself: it is the landscape as it rolls by for the moving observer. Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual succession that I am content to record. It arises from *my* relation to things.[95]

Here, Merleau-Ponty is illustrating Husserl who, in his theory of "time-consciousness" (*Zeitbewusstseins*), speaks of a certain perceptual and temporal "shading" (*Abschattungen*) that attends the succession of intentionalities—he "uses the terms protentions and retentions for the intentionalities which anchor me to an environment."[96] Husserl explains the temporal flow of experience, the "flux of consciousness", by means of the duration of a sound: "It begins and stops, and the

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91. *Ibid.*, 411. Brentano referred to this "intuitive experience" of time as "primordial association" or "proteraesthesis"—the sense of the temporal as the experience of a succession of events—this is the source of the common understanding of time as a sequence of 'points' in consciousness. (see Franz Brentano, *Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum*, trans. Barry Smith [London: Croom Helm, 1988], 87-93) Husserl discusses Brentano's thesis in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, ed. Martin Heidegger and trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 29-35

92. *Ibid.*, 411

93. *Ibid.*, 411. "The experience of time appears to be closely connected with the experience of the ego. 'I am' is always equivalent to 'I am now', but I am in an 'eternal now' and feel myself remaining the same in the elusive current of time." (Hans Reichenbach, *The Philosophy of Space and Time* [New York: Dover Publications, 1958], 110)

94. *Ibid.*, 411

95. *Ibid.*, 411-12

96. *Ibid.*, 416

whole unity of its duration ... 'proceeds' to the end in the ever more distant past."[97] While the sound proceeds from its "source-point"—its "primal impression"[98]—its various 'points' of perception recede, "sinking back" into short term memory. But, in "this sinking back, I still 'hold' it fast, have it in a 'retention,' and as long as the retention persists the sound has its own temporality."[99] The consciousness of the sound is continuous only to the extent that its 'flow' is retained as an ever deepening memory—a memory that is progressively recalled, fleshing out the experience of the 'now': "there takes place, moment by moment, a 'comprehension-as-now;' ... But this now-apprehension is, as it were, the nucleus of a comet's tail of retentions referring to the earlier now-points of the motion."[100] These retentions or "primary remembrances",[101] according to Husserl, are undergoing constant modification with the emergence of each new 'point' of perceptual experience—as a 'new moment' arrives its predecessor undergoes a further modification—in the words of Merleau-Ponty, "from being a retention it becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of time between it and me thickens."[102] It is this temporal 'thickening' that will temper the subject's protentions or "primary expectations",[103] shadowing them, 'shading' them, with a heavy expectancy, overdetermining its projections on the future with an anticipatory weight that will progressively bear on its present. Merleau-Ponty would underscore this overdetermination with the words "Time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities."[104] It becomes increasingly apparent that the very mention of a 'now-point' is contradictory, if not impossible and while Merleau-Ponty, in keeping with Husserl, would problematise the contradiction, it is evident that their phenomenology is unable to transcend what Heidegger would

97. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 45

98. *Ibid.*, 50

99. *Ibid.*, 44

100. *Ibid.*, 52

101. *Ibid.*, 62

102. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 417

103. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, 62

104. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 417

call the "within-time-ness"[105] of the temporal problematic. Heidegger would proffer a different direction.

Heidegger makes it plain that the common-sense view of time since Aristotle is merely that which gets "'counted': that is to say, it is what is expressed and what we have in view ... when the *travelling* pointer (or shadow) is made present."[106]

> The "nows" are what get counted. And these show themselves 'in every "now"' as "nows" which will 'forthwith be no-longer-now' and "nows" which have 'just been not-yet-now'. The world-time which is 'sighted' in this manner in the use of clocks, we call the "*now-time*"[*Jetzt-Zeit*].[107]

Heidegger eschews this "*now-time*", this sort of 'natural attitude of time'—the common-sense of the clock—in favour of what he calls "*world*-time", "grounded" in a way that shows us that "'now' is essentially a 'now that...'."[108] He argues that in the "ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of 'nows', both datability and significance are missing. These two structures are not permitted to 'come to the fore' when time is characterized as a pure succession. The ordinary interpretation of time

105. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 388

106. *Ibid.*, 473. "This, however, is nothing else than an existential-ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of 'time': .... 'For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and the later.'" (*ibid.*, 473)

107. *Ibid.*, 474

108. *Ibid.*, 474

covers them up."[109] The succession of 'nows' sheds the relations that would ground them and give them meaning.

For Heidegger, "*Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself'*" and these various *subjective tenses* we call past, present and future are "the '*ecstases*' of temporality"[110]—these phenomena, he argues, "make temporality manifest as the *εκστατκον* [*ekstatikon*] pure and simple."[111] Heidegger has it that "entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time—the '*Present*'."[112] We are *present*, however, only to the extent that we project toward an uncertain future and it is this temporal horizon of the future that is, for Heidegger, "*the primary meaning of existentiality.*"[113] The future is the first of these temporal 'ec-stases', not the present which is, for Heidegger, only brought into view, only "awakened" by the future.[114] Heidegger argues that Dasein

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109. *Ibid.*, 474. This (post-Aristotelian) "ordinary conception of time" is as paradoxical in its proposition of movement as Zeno's is of stasis and the two, while apparently opposite, are logically the same. Zeno's paradox of 'time's arrow' argues that the acceptance of the arrow's movement through space leads logically to the proof of the arrow's *actual* stasis: the arrow appears to move from one position in space to another, but, according to Zeno's logic, it is also the case that the line of the arrow's motion is constituted of innumerable points of rest. "Logically, asks Zeno, how is it possible for the arrow really to move when it only rests at different points? Therefore, he concludes, the apparent motion of the arrow is only a deception of the senses ..." (Henry Alpen, *The March of Philosophy* [New York: Dial Press, 1956], 4) Zeno denied not the *appearance* of motion but motion itself, arguing (like his mentor Parmenides) that mutability and motion were mere deception, that movement was contrary to the centrality and eternity of Being and therefore untenable. This immutable centrality, which again presupposes an objective witness tied to various 'points' in time and space (if only in order to refute the vicissitudes of time and space), is logically identical to the positionality of 'now-time' (in a philosophy that is founded on process and change)—if '*now*' can in fact be *posited* then logically nothing can move at all. This too is the paradox of the exile: the subject perpetually searches and moves toward a subjective centre (a sort of subjective *stasis* of a *homeland*) which is and can only be defined by its movement outside that homeland—that is, *ecstatically*.

110. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 377. "The root-meaning of the word 'ecstasis' [Greek *εκστασις*; German, 'Ekstase'] is 'standing outside'. Used generally in Greek for the 'removal' or 'displacement' of something, it came to be applied to states-of-mind which we would now call 'ecstatic'. Heidegger ... is keenly aware of its close connection with the root-meaning of the word 'existence'." (translators' note, *ibid.*, 377; see also, Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 267)

111. *Ibid.*, 377

112. *Ibid.*, 47. Heidegger's translators point out that while "the Present" [*die Gegenwart*] may "mean the *presence* of someone *at* some place or on some occasion, it more often means the *present*, as distinguished from the past and the future. In its etymological root-structure, however, it means *waiting towards*." (translators' notes, *ibid.*, 47 and 374)

113. *Ibid.*, 376. To this he adds: "*The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.*" (*ibid.*, 378)

114. *Ibid.*, 378

reaches a certain 'resolve', a certain opening onto the clearing of being, as it checks its fall into temporality—the subject reaches what he calls a "peculiar *openness*" which "belongs to ecstasis."[115] The subject "has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment of *vision*' as regards the Situation which has been disclosed."[116] This 'openness' points to "the *horizon of the ecstasis*", an "*open expanse* toward which remotion is outside itself."[117] The subject is 'outstanding', a being-towards its own horizon: as Wahl puts it, "the individual, properly speaking, is *not*, but is *about to be*; he is a task that he sets himself .... We are always in the planning stage, in 'projection'."[118] This 'present' situation is anticipatory, a 'waiting-towards' a self that can only be realised in what it may become, in Heideggerian terms, 'futurally'.

3.6 The Moment of [*Exilic*] Vision

> That *Present* which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is *authentic* itself, we call the "moment of vision". This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is

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115. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 267. Richard Attenborough's film *Shadowlands* (1994) offers an appropriate perspective on this positionality. The film's protagonist, C.S. Lewis (Anthony Hopkins), who has been repressing his feelings for an American poet Joy Gresham (Debra Winger), notices her in a crowd to which he has just delivered a lecture on 'The Waiting-Room of the World'. He approaches, cautiously reaching for emotion, saying: "I was thinking of you... and... *there* you were!" Gresham replies: "No, here *I am*! Present tense! Present... and tense."

116. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 376. "The German word 'Augenblick' has hitherto been translated simply as 'moment'; but here ... Heidegger has in mind its more literal meaning—'a glance of the eye'." (translators' note, *ibid.*, 376) Dreyfus points out that '*Augenblick*' "is Luther's translation of the biblical 'twinkling of an eye' in which 'we shall be changed'." ["We shall be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." 1 Corinthians 15:52] (*Being-in-the-World*, x) He adds that Heidegger derives his usage from Kierkegaard's Danish '*Oeblik*'—his technical term for "the moment that an unconditional commitment comes to define my world and redifferentiate the content of my past and future"—and while *Augenblick* is translated in *Being and Time* "as 'the moment of vision,' ... it would be better translated as 'the moment of transformation'." (*ibid.*, 321)

117. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 267

118. Wahl, *Philosophies of Existence*, 52. Wahl, here speaking of the "time-philosophies" of the likes of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Heidegger, points out: "Indeed, the primal dimension of time, for the philosophers of existence, is the future." (*ibid.*, 51) In a note he adds that "We must not overlook the fact that Sartre is not in agreement with Heidegger on this point. More akin to Husserl in this respect, he maintains that the primal dimension of time is the present, that it is in terms of the present, that we form the future and the past."(*ibid.*, 51-2) It is not my intention to go into this here but I should add that this Husserlianism is also the case with Merleau-Ponty who turns on what he calls "Heidegger's historical time, which flows from the future", countering that it "is always in the present that we are centered, and our decision starts from there." (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 427)

> carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness. The moment of vision is a phenomenon which *in principle* can *not* be clarified in terms of the 'now' [*dem Jetzt*]. The 'now' is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-time-ness: the 'now' 'in which' something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. 'In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present, or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us *to encounter for the first time* that which can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.[119]

This 'moment of vision' is the true measure of one's connection with the world precisely because in its fleeting regard it is immeasurable—it cannot record, like the camera and its photograph, the 'nows' that appear necessary to the very existence of the 'objective witness'. In the 'common understanding of time' it is as if the 'nows' are in fact witness to the subject who is supposed to catch them, to order them in their appropriate succession, but it is in fact the 'not-nows' that give flesh to the 'nows' which in themselves are further and ceaselessly divided into 'not-nows'. As Merleau-Ponty would put it: "it is the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the performance ... the zone of not-being in front of which precise beings, figures and points can come to light."[120] As Derrida explains, "One then sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is

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119. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 388. In a note, Heidegger goes on to say that Kierkegaard, perhaps more than anyone, had penetrated this 'moment of vision' but had failed to interpret it existentially. Heidegger argues that Kierkegaard was stuck with the "ordinary conception of time" and consequently reads temporality in terms of the "within-time-ness" of the "now" which "never knows a moment of vision." (*ibid.*, 497n.iii) Also here in this 'within-time-ness' perspective may be read—contrary to the assertion by Derrida (see, "Signs and the Blink of an Eye", *Speech and Phenomena*, 61)—Heidegger's implicit inclusion of Husserl.]

120. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 100-1. Lacan tells an anecdote of his youth in which he was at sea with some fishermen, one of whom pointed out to him a sardine can, floating before them in the water: "It floated there in the sun, a witness to the canning industry ... Petit-Jean said to me—*You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn't see you!*" (Lacan, "The Line and the Light", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, 95) Lacan makes the point that at the time he wasn't amused by this observation (the fisherman clearly was) because it dawned on him that in fact the can was 'looking at him' but that he was nowhere to be seen: "It was looking at me at the level of the point of light, the point at which everything that looks at me is situated .... No doubt, in the depths of my eye, the picture is painted. The picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am not in the picture." (*ibid.*, 96) The subject can only play the part of screen to the image projected on the back of its eye's retina and, therefore, caught at this juncture anterior to any construction of the picture, is absent from it. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Lacan here is implicitly tracing the figure of exile—a subject forced by self-consciousness to reside outside that very consciousness, caught in a labyrinth of intersecting and interlacing (Merleau-Ponty's *'entrelacs'*—"the intertwining, the chiasm") lines of light that amplify the subject's distance from itself. [see, *ibid.*, 71-76; also Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 130-155]

continuously compounded with a non-presence and non-perception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention)."[121] Derrida sees in this 'moment of vision' precisely the 'moment of transformation' that Dreyfus had in mind:

> As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and non-perception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the *Augenblick*; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the *blink of an instant*. There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus for *Vorstellung* [representation] in general...[122]

The "metaphysical assurance" of "self-identity" Husserl had supposed in his 'moment of vision'—'self-identity' 'at the same moment' [*im selben Augenblick*][123]- is, for Derrida, not only shaken but destroyed as alterity enters its field. The 'moment of vision', for Derrida, "radically destroys any possibility of a simple self-identity"[124] as otherness and intersubjectivity encroaches (again, in the words of Dreyfus) as a 'moment of transformation'. Derrida's reading of Husserl's *Augenblick* is not entirely in accord with Heidegger's usage which further draws out the subtleties of Dasein's perception of the 'Present'. Heidegger argues that the perception of the 'present moment' as the 'now' no longer has the sense of a 'waiting-towards' (which he argues is presence proper, authentic temporality) but that of a 'making present', the construction of inauthentic temporality.[125] In 'making present', Dasein "'arises or leaps away' from the awaiting which belongs to it, and it does so in the sense of a running away from it."[126] Here, Dasein is so curious about that which it awaits that it is distracted from the "'thing' it is curious about, [such] that when it obtains sight of anything it already looks away to what is coming next."[127] This leads to what

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121. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 64
122. *Ibid.*, 65
123. *Ibid.*, 64
124. *Ibid.*, 66
125. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 398
126. *Ibid.*, 397-98
127. *Ibid.*, 398

Heidegger calls a sort of ontological "*not-tarrying*", a subjective disengagement with its objects "which is distinctive of curiosity"[128] but which leaves Dasein 'homeless'.

> It makes present for the sake of Present. It thus entangles itself in itself, so that the distracted not-tarrying becomes *never-dwelling-anywhere*. This latter mode of the Present is the counter-phenomenon at the opposite extreme from the *moment of vision*. In never dwelling anywhere, Being-there is everywhere and nowhere. The moment *of vision*, however, brings existence into the Situation and discloses the authentic 'there'.[129]

For Heidegger, 'the moment of vision' discloses Being 'authentically' because its fleeting regard allows for no significant contemplation and is therefore less likely to be 'leaping' anxiously from object to object—the subject is 'resolute' in its 'presence' and therefore less under the sway of the vicissitudes of "temptation, tranquillization, alienation, [and] self-entanglement",[130] the essential characteristics of existential 'falling'. But for all its acuity of vision this subjective 'resolve' is nonetheless problematic—its *presence* is characterised by 'waiting towards' the possibilities and circumstances of its future, possibilities and circumstances which can only be anticipated from a particular and intersubjective stand-point: Dasein points to a *here*—a situation, a 'homeland'—from its *there* and is nonetheless caught by the lure of Heidegger's existential characteristics, however disclosed. The subtlety of position Heidegger introduces here—*in the moment of vision*—in fact takes us further into the realm of ideology which is only *inauthentic* existence lived *authentically* or, its exact opposite: *authentic* existence lived *inauthentically*. Dasein is 'subjectified' in this 'moment of vision' and lives, through others, the existence of its situation as an intersubjective lie—its *representation*.[131]

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128. *Ibid.*, 398

129. *Ibid.*, 398. [For a correspondence here see, Borges, "The Fearful Sphere of Pascal", *Labyrinths*, 224-28]

130. *Ibid.*, 399

131. This existential and ideological regression (repression) is portrayed very strongly in Miklós Jancsó's 1965 film *The Round Up* (*Szegénylegények*). Set in nineteenth century Hungary as the Hapsburgs set about repressing the resistance of the Hungarian rebels after the revolutions of 1848, *The Round Up* explores the capture and interrogation of the rebels who appear, like their mysterious caped inquisitors, like so many detached figures in a landscape. Formally the film uses a fortress contrasted by open horizons and sweeping, ever-circular camera movements to declare the vastness of the landscape as that which ultimately incarcerates its figures. Jancsó's assistant director, Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács tells it like this: "There is no place to hide: men are at the mercy of their oppressors. There are almost no close-ups: the camera moves constantly, keeping its

3.7 The Subjects' *faux pas*

The subject is a being towards a world peopled by others involved in the same 'futural', transcendental projection. The subject would seem to appear to itself 'out of the blue', with a vision that takes it forward—the contingency of anxiety, anticipation of an action, a relation—and backward, in the 'blink of an eye'. But it is precisely this future that is problematic for the projecting being. In her projection, her transcendence, she reaches beyond herself towards herself. Emily's new disposition, only just sensualised and verified in the tactility and movement of her limbs on command, had (as her narrator testifies) been with her since her first memories, but only now—I reaffirm, "why she inserted the now she did not know"—did it take on significance for her. First memories speak of a past which necessarily bears on a present and a future. Here the subject is in the very process of *subjectivisation*: Emily's considerations take a sudden and considerably temporal turn. She is *placed* temporally, finding herself in the predicative closure of space *and* time—the "intersection of her dimensions". Her reflective and quizzical gaze connects with a memory now '*here*', now '*there*'—her *now* and *before* in a memory and a narrativity predicated, here consciously, with the apposition of space and time.[132] These two axes dawn on Emily at once. She is at pains to fathom both the

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distance, as an impassive observer. We see no more than the prisoners themselves see. The fortress is always shown through their eyes: the camera walks with them, is one of them. This, and the contrasts of the black and white wide-screen image, the shadows of moving clouds and the sound of the wind, produce a deep feeling of anguish and anxiety. The prisoners are always encircled and the camera moves in circles with them." (*Movie* 66, 1981: 1318) The landscape is disclosed to its figures only to the extent that it *closes* on them, weighing on them such that the fortress and the death proffered by the interrogators becomes a retreat from its burden. Jancsó's *form* is that of an ideology of Dasein—a 'movement' of ideology that can be seen in much of Jancsó's work. This theme is developed similarly in the work of Bernardo Bertolucci—from the closed space of a Paris apartment in *Last Tango in Paris* (1972) to the 'horizonal burden' of the landscape in *The Sheltering Sky* (1989), Bertolucci has explored this sort of *figure-in-the-landscape* ideology. Speaking on *Last Tango*, Bertolucci has said: "I realized .... I was making a film about solitude ...[but] that the couple in my film are not isolated from the world as I'd planned for them to be. You cannot escape to an island: even your attempt to do so is part of our social reality. It turns out that my characters are profoundly symptomatic. You can't hide in a room; reality will come in through the window." (in Gideon Bachman, "'Every Sexual Relationship is Condemned': An Interview with Bernardo Bertolucci *apropos* 'Last Tango in Paris'", *Film Quarterly* 26: 4)

132. "We may represent a dimension of space on a horizontal axis, the dimension of time on a vertical axis, and obtain in the plane of resulting space a representation of the manifold of events which occur on a line in space at various times." (Reichenbach, *The Philosophy of Space and Time*, 111) Here Reichenbach, while at odds with the subtleties of some of the more abstract time philosophies of phenomenology outlined above, defines well enough the Cartesian coordinates that *place* the subject, as Merleau-Ponty has it, "at the intersection of its

'here' and the 'when' of this new person as, it appears to her, it is these notions that give her substance.

For Bachelard, 'vertical space' is the space of memory.Here he mobilises the phenomenolgy in Jung with his motif of the house as imaginary space to illustrate his point. The house is vertical in its bearing: "It rises upward. It differentiates itself in terms of its verticality"—a verticality, he argues, that "is ensured by the polarity of the cellar and the attic, the marks of which are so deep that, in a way, they open up two very different perspectives for a phenomenology of the imagination."[133] Creatures in the attic, he muses, scarper at the entrance of the house's "master", but those in the cellar are "slower, less scampering, more mysterious."[134] The house is memorial, oneiric, and in its vertical polarity points to the *affectivity* of the present. The more 'distant' the memory, the 'deeper' it plunges in the depths of the vertical. An old memory is a dark memory. Foucault, writing on Ludwig Binswanger's *Daseinsanalytik*, explains that "[h]orizontal opposition of the near and far exibits time only in the chronology of spatial progression. Time unfolds only between a point of departure and a point of arrival, and is wholly exhausted in the journeying; and when it renews itself, it does so in the form of repetition, return, another departure."[135]

This vertiginous height is, for Bachelard as for Binswanger, the height of the *present*, it is new territory and having just been entered stands in contradistinction to that of depth—the space of the past in which one always seems likely to fall. As Foucault takes up this line:

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dimensions." (Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, 411)

133. Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 17

134. *Ibid.*, 19

135. Michel Foucault, "Dream, Imagination and Existence: An Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's '*Dream and Existence*'" in Michel Foucault and Ludwig Binswanger, *Dream and Existence*, A Special Issue from the *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, trans. Forrest Williams and Jacob Needleman, ed. Keith Hollier, Vol.XIX, No.1, 64

> Indeed, it is along this vertical direction of existence, and according to the structures of temporality, that the authentic and inauthentic forms of existence can best be allocated. This self- transcendence of the existent in its temporal movement, this transcendence designated by the vertical axis of the imaginary, can be lived as a wrenching away from the bases of the existence itself. Then we see crystallizing all those themes of immortality, of survival, of pure love, of unmediated communication between minds. Or it can be lived, on the contrary, as transcendence', as an immanent plunge from the dangerous pinnacle of the present. Then the imaginary elaborates itself into a fantastic world of disaster. The universe is but the moment of its own annihilation: this is the constitutive moment of those deliriums of 'the end of the world'. Temporality's movement of transcendence can likewise be covered over and hidden by a pseudo-transcendence of space. Then the vertical axis is wholly absorbed into the horizontal trajectory of existence. The future lies in the spatially distant.[136]

This verticality would express time in its 'primitive' meaning, rising over the horizonal to bring out, as Foucault puts it, "almost nakedly, the structures of temporality."[137] But this 'now-time' is in fact borne of the future. What dawns on Emily is more than the *now*. From the masthead, Emily sees the horizon of self—she explains herself from this perspective, her place in the world from where she projects a self anticipated: "that of a proposition or a judgement, in other words, a realm of positions."[138] But, as Emily is in fact inserted, placed in this "realm of positions" by a structure and a means both anterior and exterior to her, her considerations merely attempt to ascertain its gravity. She realises that in being she *now* has *to be*.[139]

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136. *Ibid.*, 65

137. *Ibid.*, 64

138. Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 43. "This positionality, which Husserlian phenomenology orchestrates through the concepts of *doxa*, *position*, and *thesis*, is structured as a break in the signifying process, establishing the identification of the subject and its object as preconditions of propositionality." (*ibid.*, 43) It is precisely this subjective-objective split which ultimately and ironically connects them in the apparent homogeneity of the signifier.

139. Silverman argues that "Heidegger does not have a theory of textuality. He doesn't even have a theory of the text. Yet the place of disclosure, the Open, the differential space elaborated in his aesthetic hermeneutic circle delineates the 'traversal' place in which a topology of the text and the origination of textuality can be explored." (Hugh J. Silverman, *Textualities: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* [New York: Routledge, 1994], 3) It is precisely in entering this space of disclosure that Emily emerges as *textuality* herself.

Emily's transcendence is the beginning of her passage in exile. She is thrown, her constitution projected in this vicarious positionality—she *now* conceives of a self in a position she can't quite fathom yet which will bind her in everything she will see and do, and that once cast(e) here, once "she had declared herself, there will be no turning back" (139).

Sartre speaks of this vicariousness as "the fruitless contemplation of a singularity which is formal"[140]—a framed but cursory agency on which the child will base its entire life. This "singularity" is measured in her negotiations with the prospect of God—(an historically, symbolically unifying 'entity' that nonetheless for Emily takes the imaginary 'form' of the most rarefied heterogeneity thinkable—indeed as 'entity' it is *un*thinkable) -"Had she chosen herself, or had God done it? At this, another consideration: who was God?... Wasn't she perhaps God herself?"(136)[141] Her personal scrutiny measures a figure that is perhaps at one with that of 'God', a figure she has clearly heard much about and whose consideration frightens her. But the more she questions her position the more the answer eludes her—"(How absurd, to disremember whether one was God or not!)" (136). She comes to find a figure cast as "a kind of intermediate between God and nothingness, between the Supreme being

140. Of this little contemplator:" 'You threw me out,' he will say to his parents. 'You threw me out of the perfect whole of which I was part and condemned me to a separate existence ... If you ever wanted to get me back again, it would be impossible because I have become conscious of myself as separate from and against everybody else.'" (Sartre, *Baudelaire*, 20)

141. From the initial experience of omnipotence the baby is able to experience frustration, and then arrive one day at the other extreme from omnipotence, that is to say, at having a sense of being a mere speck in a universe that was there before the baby was conceived of and concived[*sic*] by two parents who were enjoying each other. Is it not from being God that human beings arrive at the humility proper to individuality?" (D. W. Winnicott, as cited in Madelaine Davis and David Wallbridge, *Boundary and Space* [New York: Brunner/Mazel Inc., 1981], 63)

and non-being"[142]—Descartes's words, not Emily's, but words that will surely have some bearing on her reflection and this is, indeed, Descartes's prescription for exile.

Ovid's beginnings, both constitutive and narrative, show that he did not know *who* his child was. This figure came to him as a 'wild child', without speech or any other contact with the cultured Roman world, and in its regular appearance became something of a companion to the lonely poet. Only through the anguish of his later life in *exile*—his deportation to the Black Sea—does Ovid conjure the child who is (as his narrative will show) his poetic self, outside himself. Whereas Emily's anxiety stems from her questions as to who or what *she* is (what is to become of her), Ovid's arises from his questions as to who or what *the child* is—a narrative distinction that only points up the intersubjectivity at the very centre of narrativity.[143] They emerge, however, from the same reflective space in which they gain a certain residency, albeit one of tenuity, and indeed, this is the nature, the essence of (their) narrativity—their exile.

In contemplation of this apparent "singularity" of form—skirted now by a vaguely 'unifying' sense of oneness—both Emily and Ovid are in fact in a process of separation and from that moment—when "the child left"—they are in confrontation with an essentially *other* term. Sartre is right to affirm the emptiness of this happening. The "child has undergone a purely negative experience of separation,"[144]

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142. René Descartes, "Fourth Meditation", *Philosophical Writings*, trans. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach (Middlesex, UK: Nelson's University Paperbacks, 1970), 93. It is perhaps no small co-incidence that the 'Godhead', the One 'who is supposed to know' (in the sense that we, through Him, *recognise* Him, come to *know* Him) is in the (almost) universal history of theogony, the *alienated one*, the *transcendental one* whose myth is based on an errant persona—if not exiled, at least shunned or in some way during His earthly life untouchable. With few exceptions, a tangible God would not do at all. This is the paradox at the heart of Descartes's inadvertent prescription for exile—what we may lose in the *res cogitans*, the something that thinks, *apart*—we are said to gain in the transcendency of the Godhead—oneness in the Other that is unattainable, unassailable.

143. For Descartes, the subject's relation to alterity is mediated, indeed forged by its relation to itself, a formulation that could perhaps be put as "otherness is the subject of (it)*self*".

144. "...and her experience assumes the form of universal subjectivism ... What can we make of a discovery which frightens us and offers nothing in return?" (Sartre, *Baudelaire*, 20)

from an endless reflection in the faces and actions of others (others it doesn't even recognise as such) to an apparent *oneness* about which it knows even less—for this *oneness* is "grounded" in "the groundlessness of the inauthentic Being of the 'they'".[145] Again, this is not to suggest some essential *a priori* plenitude from which the child is torn asunder. It is this state of separation that allows for the mere suggestion of plenitude—and it is the notion of plenitude that is at the heart of *exile*. It is the fruitless turn, a sort of reflexive appeal to a space that may be called 'home' that only proves that, in fact, there is none. Bachelard points to this exilic predicament when he says:

> Intimate space loses its clarity, while exterior space loses its void, void being the raw material of possibility of being. We are banished from the realm of possibility... in this drama of intimate geometry, where should one live?".... Space is nothing but a 'horrible outside-inside.'[146]

This 'horrible outside-inside' of the 'uncanny' is also at the root of the *Nausea* suffered by Sartre's Roquentin who finds that this "drama of infinite geometry" is, at base, not very dramatic at all—it is 'superfluous'.

> We are a heap of existents inconvenienced, embarrassed by ourselves, we hadn't the slightest reason for being there, any of us, each existent, embarrassed, vaguely ill at ease, felt superfluous in relation to the others. *Superfluous*: that was the only connexion I could establish between those trees, those gates, those pebbles.... each of them escaped from the relationship in which I tried to enclose it, isolated itself, overflowed. I was aware of the arbitrary nature of these relationships, which I insisted on maintaining in order to delay the collapse of the human world of measures, of quantities, of bearings; they no longer had any grip on things. *Superfluous*.... And *I*—weak, languid, obscene, digesting, tossing about dismal thoughts—*I too was superfluous*.... superfluous for all time.[147]

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145. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 223. In the "downward plunge" a kind motion is experienced "which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquillized supposition that it *possesses everything*, or that everything is within its reach." (*ibid.*, p.223) For a correspondence between this "possessor of everything" and Freud's "possessor of all perfections", see Chapter Four.

146. Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 218. This Hegelianism is borne out by Hegel himself: "Apart from this dialectical concreteness of the appearing subject-object or Concept, both sides vanish; The object-side becomes unknowable; the subject-side has no objective embodiment." (*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 137)

147. Sartre, *Nausea*, 184-5. "This is what we shall call the *contingency* of being-in-itself... Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. It *is*. This is what consciousness expresses in anthropomorphic terms by saying that being is superfluous (*de trop*)—that is, that consciousness absolutely can not derive being from

Merleau-Ponty goes further to speak of this 'superfluity' in terms of a "gaping wound through which illusion can make its way in."[148] While here Merleau-Ponty is speaking on the hallucinations of the schizophrenic, he makes the point that this 'wound' is central to the ostensibly normal subject: "His representation of the world is no less vulnerable .... the normal person does not find satisfaction in subjectivity, he runs away from it ..."[149] The 'wounded' subject seeks refuge in an impossible dream of a subjective 'homeland' but finds instead only the constancy of a 'horrible outside-inside' subjectivity. Taylor puts it like this:

> While the reflective subject attempts to close in on itself by incorporating every other and assimilating all difference, the living body resists closure and necessarily remains open to what is other than, and different from itself. As a result ... the living body cannot be defined in terms of the binary opposites that structure conceptual reflection.[150]

Being, for Merleau-Ponty is, in the words of Taylor, "neither 'subject nor object', neither *'in itself'* nor *'for itself'*" but "the *mean* between extremes—the 'milieu' (*milieu*) in which opposites like interiority and exteriority, as well as subjectivity and objectivity, intersect. Never reducible to the differences it simultaneously joins and separates, the body is forever *entre-deux.*"[151] But while the subject is only a site of

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anything, either from another being, or from a possibility, or from a necessary law. Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is *de trop* for eternity." (Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, lxvi)

148. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 342

149. *Ibid.*, 342

150. Taylor, *Altarity*, 69

151. *Ibid.*, 69. Taylor here is paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty: "There is no middle term between *in itself* and *for itself*, and since my senses, being several, are not myself, they can be only objects. I say that my eyes see, that my hand touches, that my foot is aching, but these naïve expressions do not put into words my true experience." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, 212-13) The terminology here derives essentially from Hegel's usage—the 'in itself' (*an sich*) is that which is *there* for us to behold but which does not exist, in a sense, independently of that 'beholding'; the 'for itself' (*für sich*) is that which stands apart from the 'in itself' by judging itself by what it is *not*. Hyppolite's reading of Hegel can be seen here: "Self-certainty, the for-itself, is precisely what can never attain itself; it is the subjectivity which is only [quoting Hegel] 'the movement, lacking substance, of consciousness itself'. All these phrases express the continuous escape from oneself, the impossibility for the for-itself, for self-certainty, which must be in-and-for-itself, to coincide with and be adequate to itself. Self-certainty cannot be in-itself without losing itself and becoming a thing .... self-certainty is a loss of itself. As absolutely for-itself, it cannot be in-itself. It will thus have to alienate itself, make itself *be*, so as to rediscover itself in being as an *existing spirit.*" (Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 203) It is worth persisting with this descriptive aside further given the influence of the terminology. Derrida, writing on Hegel's 'semiology', defines it like this: "Subjective spirit itself is: 1. *in itself or immediate:* this is the *soul* or

implenitude—that is, "never a body 'proper'"[152]—it does have a structure. Merleau-Ponty calls this structure the "chiasmus": "a complex structure of 'implication', 'enfoldment' and 'envelopment'" that, as Taylor puts it, "inscribes a cross that is a double cross."[153] This inscription is, in other terms, a 'horrible outside-inside'—the intersection of dimensions that folds opposite into opposite, same into other, in a manner that proffers plenitude but brings nothing. This subjective 'interlacing' is the ruse of the complete and 'knowing' subject. There is a proximity here between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger argues:

> For world and things do not subsist alongside one another. They penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a middle. In it, they are at one. Thus at one, they are intimate .... The intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the intimate—world and thing—divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their *inter*, division prevails: a *dif-ference.* The intimacy of world and thing is present in the separation of the between; it is present in the *dif-ference.*[154]

Taylor points out that from Hegel's point of view, "'the source of *the need of philosophy*' is *Entzweiung.* Derived from *entzwei*, which means 'in two, asunder, torn,' and *entzweien*, 'to separate, estrange, alienate,' *Entzweiung* designates 'dissension, estrangement, and hostility,' as well as 'dichotomy and division.'"[155] Again, this is the realm of the 'unhappy consciousness'—a self-consciousness which, as Hyppolite has it, "is split to its very depths. It stands contraposed to itself, and it experiences itself as another self-consciousness."[156] Importantly, in the *encounters* of

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natural spirit, the object of the *anthropology* that studies man in nature; 2. *for itself or mediate*, as an identical reflection in itself and in the other, spirit in relation ... *consciousness*, the object of the phenomenology of spirit." (Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology", *Margins of Philosophy*, 74)

152. *Ibid.*, 70. [Taylor here is playing on the French '*propre*' meaning the self, propriety, a 'clean' and discrete *body*.]

153. *Ibid.*, 71

154. Heidegger *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971, 202) [Taylor points to the similarities between and Merleau-Ponty's 'chiasmus' and Heidegger's notion of 'cleavage' and Merleau-Ponty's reference to same. (see, *The Invisible and the Invisible*, 214; *Altarity*, 70)]

155. Taylor, *Altarity*, xxii

156. Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, 197. "'Inasmuch as [self-consciousness is] this transition, the act of one self-consciousness looking into another,' it is a unity within its duality ... But with spirit, opposition entails unity and unity entails opposition, while with unhappy consciousness opposition still dominates.... Reflection, therefore, is truly adversary." (*ibid.*, 197)

Emily and Ovid, both play at the edge of an existence only just conceived and which is recounted in a turning from or a turning to a limitation—an edge or a parameter that confines them yet allows for a projection that will tell them only something of their new selves. Though Ovid in his narrative is declared as separate and other to a wild child—*a boy sees a boy*—and Emily, in hers, as one who is (in the process of becoming) unified as one—*a girl sees herself*—their stories, their personae would appear to emerge from precisely the same turning-point. At the *edge* of what, then? Our figure has reached a *situation*, a predicament from which it observes its very presence, a predicament that *is* its very presence. But what are we to make of this traversal of positions, these *dis*-positions? Our subject is, after all, lost. But here we speak of a loss through *reconstruction*, of a loss in which something else, *on reflection*, is found—an Emily here finds herself, an Ovid there finds a 'wild child'. And what we find "at the very moment when I experience my existence—at the ultimate extremity of reflection"[157]—is this "all-embracing synthesis" teetering, however, as if at a precipice. This 'I am', 'made concrete' by an experience that 'situates' it, is a figure that points to the very essence of *narrative*—the normative *process* that, for our subject, conjures perhaps more appropriately the more lowly image of '*concrete shoes.*' Extremes collapse and at the margins, at the very extremities of the axial trajectories of existence, we find our *reconstruction*—our *exilic homeland.*

> In fact, what human-reality rediscovers at the inaccessible limit of this flight outside itself is still the self: the flight outside the self is a flight toward the self, and the world appears as the pure distance between the self and the self.[158]

157. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, xii

158. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 249

4 SUBJECT TO A MIRROR

[THE METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE OR, NEXT TO NOTHING]

> Mirrors are doors for Death to come and go ...
> Look at yourself in mirrors all life long and see
> Death at work.
>
> Jean Cocteau *Orphée*

4.1 *To begin, at the beginning*

The previous chapters have concentrated on what might be termed the reflective surface of the subject's representative space, on the image as it *appears* to consciousness (the noematic) and the reflective operation of this appearance (the noetic). While I have touched on certain tendencies or flaws in this reflective surface, I will now pursue the terrain of these reflective tendencies.

Ricoeur, as already indicated, has argued that "phenomenology begins by a humiliation or a wounding of the knowledge belonging to immediate consciousness."[1] He goes further to say that,

> the arduous self-knowledge that phenomenology goes on to articulate clearly shows that the first truth is also the last truth known; though the Cogito is the starting point, there is no end to reaching the starting point; you do not start from it, you proceed to it; the whole of phenomenology is a movement toward the starting point. By thus dissociating the true beginning from the real beginning or natural attitude, phenomenology reveals the self-misunderstanding inherent in immediate consciousness.[2]

He goes on to say that the Cogito, far from being grounded in certitude, is perpetually under threat of delusion: "The resolute certitude of the *I am*," he argues,

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1. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, 377
2. *Ibid.*, 377

"involves the unresolved question of the possible extent of self-deception."[3] He says that a certain 'phenomenology of perception' takes us through the intentionality of a subject's consciousness to further reveal an "unconsciousness or unawareness [*inconscience*]" in that intentionality—that "into this fissure, into this non-coincidence between the certitude of the *I am* and the possibility of self-deception, a certain problematic of the unconscious can be introduced."[4] Phenomenology, he argues, is a turn toward psychoanalysis and no "reflective philosophy has come as close to the Freudian unconscious as the phenomenology of Husserl."[5] But while for Ricoeur the phenomenological reduction takes us in the direction of the unconscious—the reduction itself is not enough: "If reflection cannot itself come to the understanding of its archeology, it needs another discourse to speak that archeology."[6] That other discourse is psychoanalysis itself. "Intentionality," he contends

> concerns our meditation on the unconscious inasmuch as consciousness is first of all an intending of the other, and not self-presence or self-possession. Engrossed in the other, it does not at first know itself intending. The unconsciousness that attaches to this bursting forth from self is that of the unreflected ... the Cogito is operative [*opéré*] prior to being uttered, unreflected prior to being reflected upon.[7]

Here he is in accord with Merleau-Ponty in a move that is largely alien to the phenomenological tradition—including Heidegger and Sartre—up to this point. J.-B. Pontalis recounts a story surrounding Sartre's involvement in American director John Huston's film *Freud: The Secret Passion* (1962). Huston had commissioned Sartre to write the screenplay but after some time there was disagreement over the

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3. *Ibid.*, 378

4. *Ibid.*, 378

5. *Ibid.*, 376

6. *Ibid.*, 376

7. *Ibid.*, 378. "The impossibility of total reflection, hence the impossibility of the Hegelian absolute knowledge, hence the finitude of reflection ... are written into this primacy of the unreflected over the reflected ... This unawareness [*inconscience*] proper to the unreflected marks a new step toward the Freudian unconscious ... because of the invincible unawareness of self that characterizes intentionality in act." (*ibid.*, 378-9)

project and the partnership collapsed, Sartre withdrawing his name from the project. According to Pontalis (in his editorial preface to a published version of Sartre's script), Sartre would often say of Huston: "'What's irritating about him is that he doesn't believe in the unconscious.'" Pontalis questions this assertion, asking if in fact it was not a case of "[p]iquant turning of the tables or unwitting projection? ... I incline toward the former hypothesis," he concludes: "For it seems to me undeniable that Sartre succeeded in making perceptible—hence first and foremost in making perceptible to himself—a certain number of phenomena which could no longer be adequately accounted for by the notion of 'bad faith' that he had long promoted to 'counter' Freud."[8] Sartre's 'bad faith' (*mauvaise foi*) is a sort of 'false consciousness' in which the subject falls foul of its own 'unintended' lies; that is, the subject "who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood."[9] But here Sartre still allows for a certain unity of consciousness which, while tenuous and even vacillating—to use his word, 'metastable'[10]—is ultimately guaranteed by the 'freedom' of the reflective consciousness. In spite of Sartre's proposition of

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8. Sartre, *The Freud Scenario*, trans. Quintin Hoare, ed. J.-B. Pontalis (London: Verso, 1985), xii. Sartre had argued in *Being and Nothingness* that "Freud has cut the psychic whole into two. I *am* the ego but I *am not* the id." (*Being and Nothingness*, 50) For Sartre, in order for a repressed drive to "disguise itself" it "must include (1) the consciousness of being repressed, (2) the consciousness of having been pushed back because it is what it is, (3) a project of disguise." (*ibid.*, 53)

9. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 49. Sartre renders the 'scene' of 'bad faith' in an exchange between Freud and the character of his former Professor of Psychiatry at the Vienna University, Theodor Meynert. Meynert, having objected to Freud's use of hypnosis and his intention to visit Charcot in Paris and derided him for his affirmation of the existence of male hysteria, on his death bed confides in Freud that he himself had suffered from hysteria, that he had known about it long before Charcot, having suffered all its maladies for the past tweny years. [Freud himself recalls the exchange in the analysis of one of his own dreams where the image of his father appears as a 'screen' for his former "high and mighty idol" Meynert: "'You know," he confessed to Freud, "I was always one of the clearest cases of male hysteria.'" (Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967), 438; see also *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904*, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (London: Harvard University Press, 1985), 32-3] Meynert had denied precisely what he knew to be ailing him. Elizabeth Roudinesco observes of Sartre's 'realisation' of 'bad faith': "Meynert is a *mala fide*. He denies the existence of male hysteria although he knows he suffers from it himself. A perfect example [of 'bad faith']... Meynert dies because of his error. We find ourselves again in the Faustian world of science reminiscent of Thomas Mann. It contains Nietzsche and Mann, and at the same time, Sartre's idea of German philosophy. Meynert is brilliant right up to the end. A splendid Sartrean personality. He dies from his own error." (Roudinesco as interviewed in *Sartre*, a film by Michel Favart and André Waksman, 1992)

10. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 50

'ontological lack'—the subject here, "the for-itself is defined ontologically as a *lack of being*, and possibility belongs to the for-itself as that which it lacks ... being which is lacking"[11]—he traverses this (Hegelian) subjective interstice with an ultimate subjective and reflective certitude. For Sartre, even in its extreme 'metastability', the subject returns to itself as a conscious totality: "the lie falls back and collapses beneath my look."[12]

The subject here is one of a reflective conscious totality, ultimately incapable of fully deceiving itself. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan argues that Hegel and Heidegger (avowedly the two main 'progenitors', with Husserl, of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*) "were finally trapped in consciousness. Heidegger supposed that the human subject produces a set of symbolic data by its own existence (*Dasein*): Man exists as a project (*Entwurf*). Lacan," she writes,

> has criticized this phenomenological conception of a conscious subjectivity by his own anti-ontological move into language and identification; Lacan's primary unconscious subject—the opposite of Heidegger's being as becoming—is formed as a set of Real symbolic data produced by the impact of culture and language.[13]

There is, however, little doubt that Lacan was influenced by Heidegger, and his work, while critical, reflects a Heideggerianism of its own—albeit with a certain 'anxiety of influence'. Lacan's "unconscious subject" is 'opposite' to Heidegger's only

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11. *Ibid*, 565

12. *Ibid.*, 49. For Sartre, this ontological lack is the site of subjective freedom: " ... lack can be just as well expressed in terms of *freedom*. The for-itself chooses because it is lack; freedom is really synonymous with lack. Freedom is the concrete mode of being of the lack of being.... Fundamentally man is *the desire to be* ... desire is a lack ... the being which is to itself its own lack of being." (*ibid.*, 565) For Sartre, there is no difference between the subject's 'project for being' and that being itself—it is therefore a *project* of traversal, a traversal of what Kojève called "a revealed nothingness, an unreal emptiness." (Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 5) But what gets lost in this traversal is not only Kojève's Hegel but this very interstice itself—the void is filled, and while this is indeed the *subjective project*, we lose the place, as Sartre loses his original point of reference.

13. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, *Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 93. "Instead of the unified, conscious subject who 'knows,' Lacan gives us the split subject—supposing both itself and its knowledge (*le sujet supposé savoir*). Hegel thought the fully realized conscious subject (*Selbstbewusstein*) knew what it wanted. Lacan's conscious subject *thinks* it knows as well but is wrong about who *it* is, and about what knowledge is as well." (*ibid.*, 92)

to the extent that, in going further than Heidegger, he shows how that 'becoming' is in fact lost to the reflective clearing that is, for Heidegger, supposed—ultimately—to declare it. But Lacan's 'starting point'—contrary to his espoused anti-ontological move—is reached precisely *through* this "narcissistic structure of the coming-into-being."[14] The subject is here too a *project*, a 'wanna be', something in the manner projected by Sartre.[15] As Ludwig Binswanger—pointing directly to this influence of Heidegger—puts it, the "point of departure for this interpretation [of human existence] cannot, therefore, be consciousness. It can, instead, only be the 'unconscious,' the thrownness and determinateness of the Dasein."[16]

In the narratives of Hughes and Malouf, both Emily and Ovid are torn by events which effect an essential and reflective return—a return to an infantile *presence*, an *originary* drama which, as infants (*infans, Lat.*: without speech), appeared to them as unspeakable, inconceivable. Emily, a body developing and breaking into puberty and torn from the guardianship of her parents, comes to touch on herself as *being* for the very first time. Ovid's restaging of this drama is enacted in the 'concrete reality' of his exile, a reality in which the ageing poet conjures the traces of *a moment* when he first saw, first spoke and moved to the time and space of selfhood. Their narratives are *transitional* in their projection of a new subjective disposition. But what is this transition and how is effected and, as Emily's drama questions, why at this particular point in time? As Emily's narrator asks for her, "what agency had so ordered it", this transition, this turning-point at this particular point in time?

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14. Lacan, "Aggressivity in psychoanalysis", *Écrits: A Selection*, 22

15. Sartre's "lack of being" (*manque d'être*) becomes for Lacan "a Want-to-be (*un manque-à-être*) or a Too-much-of-it (*Un En-Trop*)". (Lacan, "The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious", *Écrits: A Selection*, 323) Jeffrey Mehlman has translated Lacan's *'manque-à-être'* as 'constitutive lack'. ("The 'Floating Signifier': From Levi Strauss to Lacan", *Yale French Studies* 48: 37) See also, Wilden, "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other", 192

16. Ludwig Binswanger, *Being in the World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger*, trans. Jacob Needleman (London: Souvenir Press, 1975), 219

Jane Gallop, in her book *Reading Lacan*, poses a similar question: "Where to begin?"[17] Where to begin reading Lacan's *Écrits* (a methodological problem posed in her reading) but, more significantly, where to begin in the reading of the ontological and psychological evolution of the subject? Gallop finds the answer to her question in Lacan's "Mirror Stage" essay. For Lacan, as for Gallop, the problem of the subject and its ontogenesis is essentially one of *a reading*. The path the child follows in subjectivity is, for Lacan, the direction emergent from a moment "experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the child into history"[18]; the important point being for Lacan that this projection "situates the agency of the ego, well before any social determination, in a line of fiction..."[19]

But where and how does this fictive, historical projection, which by its very nature incites *a reading*, begin? For Gallop, Lacan's mirror stage "is precisely about the origin of a chronology"[20]—an existential *beginning* that would appear for the subject at "the intersection of its dimensions". Lacan's scenario is by now familiar. The child, in the course of its development, enters a 'phase' unprecedented in its constitutive and structuring power. "This event can take place," he writes,

> ... from the age of six months, and its repetition has often made me reflect upon the startling spectacle of the infant in front of the mirror. Unable as yet to walk, or even to stand up, and held tightly as he is by some support, human or artificial... he nevertheless overcomes, in a flutter of jubilant activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude in a slightly leaning-forward

17. Jane Gallop, *Reading Lacan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), 74

18. Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience", *Écrits: A Selection*, 4

19. *Ibid.*, 2. This quotation is modified to include Fredric Jameson's translation, which emphasises the diachronic and historical affectivity of the scenario. (Jameson, "The Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan", 353) Importantly, Jameson refuses to differentiate between what he calls "the particular materialism" of the subject—the 'object' of psychoanalysis—and the "historical materialism of Marx", arguing that their confrontation "can no longer be postponed. It is a confrontation whose first example has been set by Lacan himself, with his suggestion that the notion of the Symbolic as he uses it is compatible with Marxism .... his entire work is permeated by dialectical tendencies." (*ibid.*, 384)

20. Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 77

position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image.[21]

Lacan's "essay is about the 'formation'", says Gallop, "the forming of an 'I', of an identity."[22] The essay then is seemingly about two things: (1) an essential apprehension by the child of a 'form', an ideal unity—an imaginary representation or imago, itself represented spatially—a Gestalt; and (2), again, this apprehension experienced as a temporal dialectic—a sort of existential and temporal 'antagonism' or 'tendency' by which the subject's history is effected. The subjects' questions of "why here?" and "why now?" are correspondent. As Bachelard put it, "space contains compressed time. That is what space is for."[23] Bachelard would apparently privilege space over time, to the extent that for him, "we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of being's stability" and that, therefore, "the calendars of our lives can only be established in its imagery."[24] But Lacan's small essay offers something more which, while inclusive of Bachelard's 'projection', could perhaps be put inversely: that is, "time contains compressed space. That is what time is for."[25]

The *reflective* terrain of Lacan's mirror stage is well-trodden. As Anthony Wilden

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21. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 1-2

22. Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 77

23. Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 8. Bachelard's project here is avowedly a 'topoanalytical' one, "a systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives." (*ibid.*, 8) However arguable the systematicity of Bachelard's proposition or questionable its epistemology (convergent as it is on Jungian 'archetype' theory and the phenomenology he had believed less than scientific in his earlier distinguished career as a philosopher of science) it holds importance for the analysis of the relation between epistemology and existence, and between space and time—that is, our reading of space and time in the sense of memory ("space contains compressed time") and its rendering in poetic language. "Memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are." (*ibid.*, 9)

24. *Ibid.*, 8-9

25. Merleau-Ponty has argued that in "order to arrive at authentic time it is neither necessary or sufficient to condemn the spatialisation of time as does Bergson. It is not necessary, since time is exclusive of space only if we consider space as objectified in advance, and ignore that primordial spatiality which we have tried to describe, and which is the abstract form of our presence in the world. It is not sufficient since, even when the systematic translation of time into spatial terms has been duly stigmatised, we may fall very far short of an authentic intuition of time." (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 415)

has pointed out,

> the empirical facts of narcissism, identification, fascination, and, of course, the double (the *Doppelgänger* sometimes appears reversed, as in a mirror), as well as their vast progeny in literature and in the various explanations offered by the psychologists who write literature, make the topic especially important. This one concept may stand as one of Lacan's most important contributions to the interpretation of psychological data.[26]

Here, the question of specularity and *spatialisation* as formative of the subjective function—the subject's configuration in space—is more than apparent. The specular fixity by which the subject locates and is located by its own image in the framed space of the mirror illustrates Lacan's spatial concerns adequately, but, the problem of temporality—the chronology Gallop privileges in Lacan's text—he expresses somewhat less so. In fact, pivotal to Lacan's thesis is this very notion of "a temporal dialectic" that "decisively projects the formation of the individual into history"—but this history, in Lacan, remains implicit and needs to be extracted. We need, for a moment, to follow its chronology.

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26. Anthony Wilden, "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other" in Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*, translated with notes and commentary by Anthony Wilden [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968], 174) Cornelius Castoriadis—an exemplar in the lineage of Lacan's critics—eschews this 'specular philosophy', preferring to speak of a "social imaginary", the *imaginary* aspect of which, he forcefully asserts, has nothing to do with the psychoanalytic use of the term which he believes to be hopelessly misguided: "The imaginary does not come from the image in the mirror or from the gaze of the other. Instead, the 'mirror' itself and its possibility, and the other as mirror, are the works of the imaginary, which is creation *ex nihilo*. Those who speak of the 'imaginary' understanding by this the 'specular' reflection of the 'fictive' do no more than repeat, usually without realising it, the affirmation which has for all time chained them to the underground of the famous cave: it is necessary that this world be an image *of* something. The imaginary of which I am speaking is not an image *of*. It is the unceasing and essentially *undetermined* (social-historical and physical) creation of figures/forms/images, on the basis of which alone there can ever be a question *of* 'something'. What we call 'reality' and 'rationality' are its works." (*The Imaginary Institution of Society*, trans. Kathleen Blamey [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987], 3) And Wilden too (somewhat later in his career) will take a hatchet to Lacan's 'mirror stage', arguing that it "depends on a set of psychoanalytical values which are non-critical and anti-contextual. It is replete with Hegelianism; it is phallocentric; it is based on the equivalent of a 'human condition' which is then used to support the theory of the 'splitting of the subject' ... and it smells of the graveyard: the existential anguish of individual being-for-death." (*System and Structure*, 462) I raise these objections—similar in their own reliance on a certain 'human condition' and philosophical and political cant of their own time (they are, however, by no means alone)—merely to point to the fact that where their interpretations of Lacan are flawed by their own theoretical position, their very objections describe his *problematic* perfectly, serving further the Lacanian schema *they* wish to problematise. The assertion of a sort of speleology in Lacan's mirror stage or of its rampant Hegelianism is in keeping precisely with the 'human condition' Lacan seeks to elaborate. Needless to say, the literature on Lacan's 'mirror stage' alone is vast and while I do not attempt here an exposition of it or its critics *per se*, I will cover something of this in order to seek out certain tendencies in my own exploration of *the subject of exile*.

> What we have there is a first captation by the image in which the first stage of the dialectic of identifications can be discerned. It is linked to a Gestalt phenomenon, the child's very early perception of the human form, a form which, as we know, holds the child's interest in the first months of life, and even, in the case of the human face, from the tenth day. But what demonstrates the phenomenon of recognition, which involves subjectivity, are the signs of triumphant jubilation and playful discovery that characterize, from the sixth month, the child's encounter with his image in the mirror.[27]

The mirror stage is a 'turning-point' in which the child, pre-subjective, pre-verbal, *recognises* itself in the mirror forcing it to register the connection between its 'inner drives'—which have hitherto dominated it in bodily sensation—and the movement that returns to it in an image—'specularised' and captivated: "We have only to understand the mirror stage," says Lacan, "as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image—whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago."[28] When Hughes's Emily *turns* from her play she regards herself with such captive specularity (in the bows of the ship, Hughes has a truly captive audience); reflecting on a self only just registered, she enacts, again, in this fictive presentation this 'phenomenon of recognition' spelled out by Lacan.

> This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the *infans* stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject.[29]

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27. Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", 18. [In this essay, written in 1948, Lacan 'develops' the 1949 version of the "mirror stage" (the version used here) which was first presented to the fourteenth International Psychoanalytical Congress of 1937 as "The Looking-Glass Phase"—a paper that was itself, however, never published. (see Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 74) It is, however, Lacan's 1964 series of seminars "Of the Gaze as *Objet Petit a*" in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* where the positionality of the specular subject is more fully explored.]

28. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 2

29. *Ibid.*, 2

Though in a constant state of change, affected as the child is by social and familial pressures into which it immediately enters upon birth, it is not until this 'moment' that the infant is captivated, binding its drives, relatively, in a specular fixity that is essentially the conscious inception of spatiality. The positing of the mirror stage as a *moment* is in keeping with Lacan's presentation of a subject constituted and *constitutive* in a fiction. It is important here to note that the story of the mirror, the "lightning intuition" (Sartre) and the apparently progressive, staged development of the child is a diachronic, *narrative* expression of a 'process' that should be more appropriately described as synchronic: that is, the child is affected by its environment—images, words, senses of all kinds—from the very beginning, and all at once. In the manner Merleau-Ponty argued, that "the notion of 'event' has no place in the objective world,"[30] Wilden argues that, "that the *stade du miroir* never 'occurs' at all—any more than the genesis of the ego does ... it is evident that the *stade du miroir* is a purely structural or relational concept..."[31] Wilden goes further to say that the mirror stage must be read in three (synchronic) directions simultaneously: "backwards—as a symptom of our substitute for a much more primordial identification; forwards—as a phase in development; and timelessly—as a relationship best formulated in algorithmic terms. The subject's 'fixation' on (or in) the Imaginary as a matter of degree."[32] But the effect of this process on the subject is a narrativisation and certainly an historicisation that *situates* the subject,

30. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 411

31. Wilden, "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other", 174

32. *Ibid.*, 174. Lacan himself would later say that "What I'm recounting to you is also a myth, for I in no way believe that there is anywhere at all a moment, a stage, at which the subject first acquires the primitive signifier, that subsequently the play of meanings is introduced, and that after that, signifier and signified linking arms, we then enter the domain of discourse." (*The Psychoses 1955-1956, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book III, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg [London: Routledge, 1993], 151); and later, "the very originality of psycho-analysis lies in the fact that it does not centre psychological ontogenesis on supposed *stages*..." ("Tuché and Automaton", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, 63) Nevertheless, Lacan has been criticised for his 'ontology' on the grounds of this *narrative* presentation of the subject—a presentation presumed to gloss over discontinuities and differences in the constitutive process. But, any 'gloss' is an expression precisely of the 'misrecognition' at the core of Lacan's subject; like condensation in the Freudian dream-work, an expression of the subjective drive to diminish difference and overcome it in the assertion of a unified totality - "a sole idea represents several associative plains at whose point of intersection it is located." (J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [London: Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1985], 82) A question of censorship.

diachronically.

However totalising, captivating this moment between the subject (the subject of our discussion since it is yet to be a subject in and for itself) and its image may be, for Lacan—like Merleau-Ponty—it is vitiated by a fundamental gap or rent (*béance*) "which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will rejoin the subject's evolution in asymptotic fashion only."[33] It is this gaping, not registered as such by the infant, that is at the root of Lacan's presentation of the subject which fundamentally misrecognises (*méconnaissance*) as itself the unified and apparently perfect image in the mirror.[34] As Taylor puts it, "Merleau-Ponty's 'gappy' (*béant*) body reappears as Lacan's holey subject. Lacan goes so far as to insist that the unconscious 'conforms to the structure of a gap' (*béance*). This irrepressible gappiness points to the *primal* repression that constitutes subjectivity."[35]

Again, for Lacan, this form "situates the agency of the ego in a line of fiction"; words Jameson points out, "which underscore the psychic function of narrative and fantasy in the attempts of the subject to reintegrate his or her alienated image",[36] an alienation however not privy to consciousness. This identification of the mirrored image is the first moment of 'captation' in which the child apprehends an image of

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33. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 2. [This quotation is also modified after Jameson.]

34. In her critique of the appropriation of Lacan to a popularised 'screen theory', Joan Copjec argues logically that "[d]espite the fact that the term *misrecognition* implies an error on the subject's part, a failure to properly recognize its true relation to the visible world, the process by which the subject is installed in its position of misrecognition operates without the hint of failure. The subject unerringly assumes the position the perspectival construction bids it to take." (*Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists* [Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994], 32-3) Copjec points out that while 'Lacanian' film theorists appear to get it right with Lacan on the function of the mirror as the ideological construction of the subject as "source and center of the represented world... to suggest, too that the subject is *not* the punctiform being that Renaissance perspective would have us believe it is, film theory's notion of misrecognition turns out to be different from Lacan's in important ways." (*ibid*, 32) In a sense, there is no trick here. The subject is subject by virtue of its 'puctiform' positionality in the scene—this is the scene of metaphysics, rendered perfectly in the discovery of perspectival space—a scene from which there is no escape. This 'scene' will be developed further below.

35. Taylor, *Altarity*, 92

36. Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan", 353

itself, separate from its inner motility and dominated by its relation with its first true personage, its mother.

> This act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of the monkey once the image has been mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the case of the child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates—the child's own body, and the persons and things, around him.[37]

The infant is reflected in its surroundings at a moment of "primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination";[38] but, what returns to the child from the mirror is an image of a whole and totalised body—"an identity, a salutary imago"[39]—co-ordinated and interactive with its surroundings. With this captation of the reflected image the child undergoes a structural transition in which can be seen the origin of 'bodily fantasies'—images of the body in various stages of 'undress', cohesion - and the ultimate assumption of a bodily rigidity, an armouring which will define the subject's existential space. For Lacan, it is this imaginary capture of the infant by its imago between the ages of six and eighteen months, that "dominates the entire dialectic of the child's behaviour in the presence of his similars."[40] The subject's identification is the instance of a dual relation, the situation of its identity as separate—as a body among others. It is in this gap—again, not seen as such, the child has misrecognised its station as (initially) seamless—which opens between the infant and its associates that Lacan sees the very source of aggressivity in humans.

> During the whole of this period, one will record the emotional reactions and the articulated evidences of a normal transitivism. The child who strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries. Similarly, it is by means of an identification with the other than [*sic*] he sees the whole gamut of reactions of bearing and display, whose structural

37. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 1

38. *Ibid.*, 4

39. Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", 19

40. *Ibid.*, 19

> ambivalence is clearly revealed in his behaviour, the slave being identified with the despot, the actor with the spectator, the seduced with the seducer.[41]

Lacan refers to this transitivism as a "structural crossroads"[42] in which he discovers a multiplicity of roles taken up by the infant at this stage. The infant takes on an image that effectively alienates it from itself, its drives and desires now focused, in a sense, on its own multiplicity. The figure moves from one position to another, positions however yet undifferentiated.

> This form will crystallize in the subject's internal conflictual tension, which determines the awakening of his desire for the object of the other's desire: here the primordial coming together (*concours*) is precipitated into aggressive competitiveness (*concurrence*), from which develops the triad of others, the ego and the object, which, spanning the space of specular communion, is inscribed there according to a formalism proper to itself that so dominates the affective *Einfühlung* [empathy] that a child of that age may mistake the identity of the most familiar people if they appear in an entirely different context.[43]

These relations, this affective transitivism, for Lacan, characterises the register of the imaginary. The mirror image before the child can no more be assimilated than the "part objects" (Klein) it sees emanating initially from its mother's body—from "the cartography drawn by the child's own hands, of the mother's internal empire"[44]—but still the child defines itself in its seeming plenitude in the mirror. The gap between its 'truth' and its vision (splendid) widens, formulating a structure which would occupy Lacan's schema as the dialectic of the subject and its environment—"or, as they say, between the *Innenwelt* and the *Umwelt*."[45] The subject resides where these two worlds meet—a "structural crossroads", a threshold.

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41. *Ibid.*, 19
42. *Ibid.*, 19
43. *Ibid.*, 19
44. *Ibid.*, 20-21
45. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 4

But it seems this conflictual dualism—of oneness and alterity, the source of transitivism—is without a conductor, as if in fact there is no passage between them. D.W. Winnicott designates such a passage—a space or a field neutral to "internal reality" and "external reality"[46] he finds in illusion. More than the description or delimitation of another object, Winnicott's work here, on the incorporation of objects—sensually orientated to the various openings of the body but specifically here the mouth - is the designation of such objects and alterity as "transitional phenomena in as much as they constitute a space: a potential space, surpassing the split between inside and outside."[47] Winnicott observed this 'potential space' through the acquisition of what he termed the child's "first 'not-me' possession": again, objects sensually orientated in that they are incorporated by the child, often entering or at least caressing the nose or mouth, complicating the auto-erotic nature of such activities as thumb-sucking or nose-rubbing. The "first 'not-me' experience" is often prefigured by the child's simultaneous thumb-sucking and radial fingering of the upper lip and nose, the "mouth is then active in relation to the thumb but not in relation to the fingers"[48]—for Winnicott, the "first 'not-me'" sensation. Objects such as sheets, blankets, pieces of wool or cotton, are incorporated as "mouthing occurs, accompanied by sounds of 'mum-mum', babbling, anal noises, the first musical notes, and so on"[49]—transitional phenomena—which become obsessively important to the child, particularly when it is about to sleep. These objects/phenomena are incorporated in a defensive agency against anxiety, the child often investing its 'faith'

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46. The dichotomy is made here in a particularly Kleinian sense: the notion of the 'internalised', 'introjected' objects—in fantasy the subject transposes objects from 'outside' to the 'inside' of itself— a process in contrast to that of 'projection', the building up of the ego by opposition. This dialectic of introjection and projection is of particular interest regarding orality in the sense of its expressing a margin or border: "Introjection is further characterised by its link with oral incorporation ... Freud shows how the antagonism between introjection and projection, before it becomes general, is first expressed concretely in an oral mode: 'Expressed in the language of the oldest—the oral—instinctual impulses, the judgement is: 'I should like to take this into myself and to keep that out.'" (Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, 230)

47. J.-B. Pontalis, *Frontiers in Psychoanalysis: Between the Dream and Psychic Pain*, trans. Catherine Cullen and Philip Cullen (London: Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1981), 81

48. Winnicott, as cited in Davis and Wallbridge, *Boundary and Space*, 59

49. *Ibid.*, 59

in a particular object, its transitional object. As Pontalis argues, this object holds importance for its in-between status—as mediate functionary—falling somewhere between inside and out. But this is also its very difficulty: between "me-not-me", "ego-non-ego", it is the "non", the "neither", which defines it and makes it indefinable, bastard—it has no status. It does, however, have a value, and,

> above all, its value is in its function: on the one hand, the intermediate field plays a mediating role, it is a necessary go-between, establishing a relationship which is not one of submission, or compliance, between an individual and the surrounding world. On the other hand, as a field of experience, it is open: its boundaries are not defined, as in the case of the objective, which is inserted in spatio-temporal co-ordinates, or in the case of the psyche: however complex its organisation, it appears modelled on a cellular organism.[50]

The 'place' of the transitional object - neither 'me' nor 'not me', neither real nor false—falls, for the child, within the space of illusion and as Winnicott designates it, the space of play. In play, the child, as time honoured idiom would support, is 'in a world of its own', the potential space between the inside and outside environment. Here, the child is preoccupied—the content is of little importance, its significance lies in the child's state of concentration. It is here that "the child manipulates external phenomena with dream meaning and feeling."[51]

Transitional phenomena mediate the first stages of play and may be seen, by extension, as the prefiguration of all cultural experience: "Children make friends and enemies during play, while they do not easily make friends apart from play."[52] As 'play' falls between that which is subjectively and objectively perceived, its nature is inherently tenuous, 'dizzy' and essentially exciting. The 'dizzy ascent/assent' is that made in the anticipated maturation of the child's 'power', the illusion Winnicott locates in the potential space as the "illusion of omnipotency"—an omnipotence

50. Pontalis, *Frontiers in Psychoanalysis*, 81

51. *Ibid.*, 81. This "submission" or "compliance" bears somewhat on the above-cited passage from Lacan ("dizzy Assent in which one can perhaps see the very essence of Anxiety"). As has already been noted, Winnicott places the transitional object as a defence against such "Anxiety".

52. Winnicott, as cited in Davis and Wallbridge, *Boundary and Space*, 62

which, at least in health, is tempered by anxiety, "the humility proper to individuality".

4.2 Of the Coming-into-Being

Freud would seem to verify Lacan's 'moment' when in 1914 in his paper "On Narcissism"[53] he distinguishes between the auto-erotic drives of the infant, and its constitutive break in the formation of an ego quite separate from its hitherto auto-sensual function: "The auto-erotic instincts... are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-eroticism—*a new psychical action*—in order to bring about narcissism."[54] In Lacan's scheme of things, this "new psychical action" would correspond to the imaginary capture of the mirror stage—the constitution of the ego as an imaginary agency. Writing on Freud's essay, Lacan reiterates: "In the development of the psyche, something new appears whose function it is to give form to narcissism. Doesn't that indicate the imaginary origin of the ego's function?"[55]

It is this ego development in Freud that, for Lacan, functions as *the imaginary*—the mediator of an essentially illusory relation between the self and the world of its experience, "the real world", and the images with which it identifies, placing it as Freud's *Urbild*, an original and unitary 'I'—"the mirror image would seem to be the threshold of the visible world."[56] Hughes's Emily "stopped dead, and began looking over all of her person which came within the range of eyes. She could not see much... but it was enough for her to form a rough idea of the little body she suddenly

53. Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction", *SE* XIV: 73-102. The essential point of departure for Lacan's projections on the theory of the ego and the mirror stage.

54. *Ibid.*, 77 [my emphasis]

55. Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-1954, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book I, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 115

56. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 3

realised to be hers."(134-5) As Freud would have it: "The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface."[57]

For Lacan, the imaginary is the precondition of narcissism rather than its effect and would therefore seem to correspond more to the *process* of this development than the crystallisation of the ego formation. The imaginary, a narcissistic register, remains as the fundamental relation—in essence, both the "primary" (auto-cathexis) and "secondary" (object-cathexis) forms Freud variously designated—of the subject to its ego; a dual, illusory relation which, in its proposed irreducibility, remains with the subject, for better or worse, for the duration of its history. In the words of Lacan: "The ego is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the imaginary captures which constitute it from head to foot: by another and for another."[58]

The ego 'appears' here as the *Idealich*, the ideal ego, the basis of all further identifications which, by this very fact, are alienating identifications. The other is internalised and from "the point of view of the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression"[59] and the essential separation between the unconscious and conscious processes. For Freud, "the essence of repression lies

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57. Freud, "The Ego and the Id", *SE* XIX: 26. "I.e. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body..." (*ibid.*, 26n) It is from this tenet that Merleau-Ponty's notion of the "body-subject" may be seen to emerge: "The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations [those seen necessarily outside the body] do not cross. This is because its parts are inter-related in a peculiar way: they are not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each other.... Similarly my whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and I know where each of my limbs is through a body image in which all are included". In these terms, "the body-image is finally a way of stating that my body is in-the-world." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, 98-101) In perception the body plays the major role. As being-in-the-world, the body is that which articulates space—from a relational, necessarily totalised standpoint—space which beyond a figure-ground relation is only 'abstract space', idealist and ultimately untenable. It is the subject in space which gives that space meaning. The notion of a "bodily ego" or a "body-subject" necessarily rejects the mind-body dualism of the Cartesian tradition, a position which similarly foregrounds Lacan's proposition of the mirror stage.

58. As cited in Anika Lemaire, *Jacques Lacan*, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 73

59. Freud, "On Narcissism", 94. This quotation borrows also from The Pelican Freud Library translation in *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis* [London: Pelican Books, 1973], Vol.II, 51) which emphasises (however idiomatically) the visual aspect of the ego formation.

simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious."[60] But what incites this "flight of the ego" at a time of apparent transfixation and idealisation by the child? The still unorganised 'infantile ego' which flounders in indistinction with the *id* is confronted with an ideal of infantile narcissism, a phenomenon it necessarily negotiates in order to gain a constitutive footing.[61] The image which captivates the child is omnipotent by the very fact of this captivation; the child is transfixed by its 'very own' image, an apparently wondrous discovery which to the child is truly and specially ideal, exalted and revered in the extreme: "The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced onto this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value."[62]

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60. Freud, "Repression", *SE* XIV: 147. Elsewhere: "The formula that repression is a process which occurs between the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.* (or *Cs.*), and results in keeping something at a distance from consciousness must in any case be modified, in order that it may also be able to include the case of *dementia praecox* and other narcissistic affections. But the ego's attempt at flight, which expresses itself in the withdrawal of the conscious cathexis, nevertheless remains a factor common... The most superficial reflection shows us how much more radically and profoundly this attempt at flight, this flight of the ego, is put into operation in the narcissistic neuroses." ("The Unconscious", *SE* XIV: 203) Freud sees in the subject at this point a special psychical agency which ensures narcissistic satisfaction from the ego-ideal, and it is from this premise, the combination of these two agencies, that he was later to develop the proposition of the super-ego in his noted 'second topography' of the psyche forged after 1920 and given 'flesh' in "The Ego and the Id". But Lacan is careful to stress the importance of Freud's earlier work on the theory of the ego: "Perhaps you've already heard mention of the famous Freudian topography. I fear that you've heard only too much mention of it," he says, "since the way it's interpreted goes in a sense contrary to Freud's reason for introducuing it. It was in 1914, with his major article, "On Narcissism," which is prior to this topography that has now come to the foreground, that Freud constructed the theory of the ego .... There can be no mistaking Freud's intentions in emphasising the theory of the ego. It was a question of avoiding two traps. The first is dualism. There is a kind of mania in some analysts which consists in turning the unconscious into another ego, a bad ego, a double, a symmetrical counterpart to the ego—whereas the theory of the ego in Freud is on the contrary designed to show that what we call the ego is a certain image we have of ourselves, which gives us a mirage, of totality no doubt." (Lacan, *The Psychoses*, 240)

61. The designation of the *Idealich* (ideal ego) holds some ambiguity in both Freud and his followers particularly in relation to the *Ichideal* (ego ideal) but here, at least, Freud's intentions seem clear. This apparent "ego disjunction"—between the *Idealich* and the *Ichideal* - seems here contingent on the function of temporality; that is, a *before* formed through the child anticipating its prospects in the 'real world'—a question of what it will become - and through its very anticipation gauges what apparently went before. The ego may be seen here, according to Freud's "narcissistic type", as "what he himself was" and the ego ideal as "what he himself would like to be." ("On Narcissism", 90) The ideal ego would then be an image on which is formed the basis of the child's *projection*—its initial 'mirroring', relating to the "imaginary captures" of Lacan's mirror stage—with the ego ideal an agent of 'recapture' in that it seeks to regain, through this projection, its (illusory and alienating) totality in the imaginary.

62. Freud, "On Narcissism", 94

As if in order to optimise her view, Emily scaled the "ratlines" to the mast-head where she "slipped a shoulder out of her frock ... and ... peeped in to make sure she really was continuous under her clothes."(135) In order that her discovery be crystallised, realised, Emily gets an apparent distance on it. The surface on which her new self is based—rendered in that first meeting on the deck, when she discovered that "she was *she*"—is projected further, elevated and idealised in the affective 'height' of her world, the 'threshold of her visible world'. As Freud would have it, the child, necessary to its cognitive and affective development, departs from this "narcissistic ideal"—for Lacan, a 'precipitous' move in the direction of 'history'—a prospect at which the child is anxious. In the process of idealisation the ideal is 'inflated' and, as it is merely a narcissistic reflection, the child too is promoted to its station, one of apparent great height and its implication, a great fall. Emily climbs the ratlines to the mast-head and it is only here, at the height of her world, expressed here as a 'limit', that she feels able to scrutinise her person. It is here that she conceptualises herself as an 'enclosure', "a particular little body (which now began on its own account to be aware of a sort of unlocated itch...)."(137-8)

As she sat in contemplation of these happenings, pondering their possibilities, it occurred to her that once "she had declared herself there would be no turning back; it was much better to keep her godhead up her sleeve for the present"(139), to hide that from "them", to hide that from herself. But, she had "declared" herself, to herself, and her *presence*—again, "why she inserted the 'now' she did not know" - was now afflicted by the vicissitudes of temporality, she was "done for"! However, this developmental course is swayed by a pressing desire to return to the narcissistic ideal, the 'moment' of the first meeting—the moment experienced by Emily as she first discovered that "she was *she*", as she touched her shoulder with her cheek and it "gave her a comfortable thrill, as if it was the caress of some kind friend"(136), the moment before the "terror struck her" and her "godhead" was her uppermost consideration.

The apparent omnipotency of this ideal seems lost to the child as, in the course of its maturation, it encounters and, "is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the awakening of his own critical judgement, so that he can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal."[63] The pleasure of omnipotency, hastily envisaged in that first apprehension of the child by its image, succumbs to its anxiety—omnipotency is a power that surrounds, *subjects* the subject to subjectivity. This developmental path, culminating in the ego ideal and based on the agency of the ideal ego, leads to what Daniel Lagache has termed "heroic identification"—identification with exemplary or admirable figures both socially encountered and historical[64]—and the "fascination" or "bondage" Freud posits when he observes that: "It is even obvious, in many forms of love-choice, that the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own. We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism."[65]

This, for Freud, accounts for various forms of affective subjection. From the submissive lover to the patient on a hypnotist's couch and subordination to leaders, he finds "the same humble subjection, the same compliance, the same absence of criticism .... the object has been put in the place of the ego ideal"[66]—"what he himself would like to be." This agency, apparently in the converse, is also registered as "the delusion of being noticed" or, more pressingly, of being watched. Freud paints this "power", of "watching, discovering and criticising all of our intentions", in a

63. *Ibid.*, 94

64. Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, 202

65. Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego", *SE* XVIII: 112-13

66. *Ibid.*, 113-14

regressive form, locating its genesis in "the critical influence" of the child's "parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice)"[67], and, the innumerable instructions and "admonitions" encountered in the course of its educational and social development—this "power", rendered finally, as the general affect of public opinion.

4.3 The Axis of *Tragic* Expression

Following both Freudian and existentialist perspectives, anxiety, as distinct from fear, has no apparent object—it has been repressed and in the process its object is rendered unconscious. Emily may realise the effect of this "Godhead" upon her, but, as her words testify, its "reality" eludes her, she "disremembered" it, "let it slide."(136) In existentialist tradition, this anxiety expresses to the anxious the possibility of 'freedom'. The repression itself is triggered by an 'unthinkable' possibility: if I am capable of such acts, the object of which I am forced to flee from, then what other objects and acts are available to me? But, the possibility of freedom is far from freedom 'in-itself' and, like the ideal of which it is an apparent property, remains elusive and alienating. The 'dizziness' with which the existentialist subject approaches this possibility - for Sartre, one is here confronted with "a vertigo of possibility"[68]—is addressed when Lacan refers to this narcissistic 'moment' as our "first implicit experience of death."[69] He would seem to be commenting on this notion of existential 'freedom' as, more appropriately, the limits of our freedom, and it is this at which the subject is vertiginous. Sartre elsewhere deals with this "purely negative experience":

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67. Freud, "On Narcissism", 95

68. Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1961), 100. This 'dizziness', or its affective similar, abounds in existentialist lineage, from Kierkegaard, whose "dread is the dizziness of freedom... [which] then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself" (*The Concept of Dread* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973], 55), through to Lacan, who placed his anxious subject "over the abyss of a dizzy Assent [sic] in which one can perhaps see the very essence of Anxiety." ("Some Reflections on the Ego", *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 34 (1953): 13)

69. Lacan, "Some Reflections on the Ego", 13

> Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute the In-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the *Ens causa sui*, which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion.[70]

The 'loss of self' here is the implication of the narcissistic relation, "the first implicit experience of death", a relation which engenders the "tearing apart" (Lacan's *béance*), a reflective abandonment in which is the substance of alienation, the limitation of affect: "The anticipation of a future 'coming to realization' is like death, for in order to realize his 'identity', the subject has to take over his own mature functions in the world, on his own account, and escape the Imaginary situation of being the alienated witness of the acts of his own ego."[71]

As Emily quickly resolves, "'You can't get out of it now, not for a long time: you'll have to go through with being a child, and growing up, and getting old, before you'll be quit of this mad prank!'"(135). To "be quit" of a "prank" which is the foundation of her existence, Emily must surely "be quit" of life itself, a prospect she entertains in the existential chronology of "childhood, and growing up, and getting old". With this prospect, a "sudden terror struck her: did anyone know?"(138)—her ("heroic") identification with God finds its corollary in her defensiveness at the possibility of 'being watched"; is she God, or is she being watched by God, the true "possessor of all perfections"? A question Emily cannot answer, but, as Barthes cites Angelus Silesius: "The eye by which I see God is the same eye by which He sees me."[72] In the "dialectic of identifications" (Lacan), this duality is the expression of affective

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70. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 615. Wilden points out that in spite of Lacan's (implicit) criticism of Sartre, that the mirror stage "is in effect a commentary on" this very passage from the penultimate pages of *Being and Nothingness*. (*System and Structure*, 468)

71. Wilden, *System and Structure*, 468. "The pure duality of the discordance of the Imaginary engenders a 'tearing apart' (*déchirement*, in the Hegelian sense), or an 'abandonment' (*déreliction*: Heidegger's *Verlassenheit*), as at the origin of the 'human condition'." (*ibid.*, 468)

72. Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, 16

extreme, one which incorporates the existential movements between such limits as life and death, self and other, height and depth. Foucault, speaking again on Binswanger, says that it would seem that

> the axis of tragic expression is located along the vertical axis of existence. The tragic movement is always of the order of ascent and fall. Its special mark is that privileged moment in which it completes its rise and balances imperceptibly, still, yet oscillating, before faltering. That is why tragedy hardly needs time and space in which to extend itself, nor foreign lands, not even the surcease of the night, for it sets itself the task of manifesting the vertical transcendence of destiny .... there is an anthropological basis for the characteristic structures of epic, lyric, and tragic expression... the expressive forms of exile, of a descent into an Inferno, of the mountain, of the prison.[73]

But this "tragic expression" of exile is encountered in the contemplation of 'omnipotency', the "first implicit experience of death", is an imaginary death—what the French would probably call a 'little death'—since recognition, the necessary agency of narcissism and 'emergence', cannot occur for the individual alone: the imaginary "is in effect dependent on an implicit or unconscious pact between the participants: that they shall both survive..."[74] This, again, is Hughes's Emily's dilemma and one which Foucault further articulates. The "vertical axis" of space, he writes:

> can also be the vector of an existence that has lost its place on earth and, like Solness the Builder, is going to resume, up above, its dialogue with God. Then it indicates flight into excess and from the start is marked by the vertigo of a fall ('he dare not, he cannot climb as high as he builds')... it is toward him that he wanted to ascend... But from such summits one returns only in a vertiginous fall.[75]

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73. Michel Foucault, "Dream, Imagination and Existence", 64

74. Wilden, *System and Structure*, 469. Wilden adds to this: "Metaphysical anguish over death, like psychoanalysis in itself, is a middle-class or aristocratic intellectual luxury."(*ibid.*, 469)

75. Foucault, "Dream, Imagination and Existence", 62. Foucault's reference to the Solness of Ibsen's *The Master Builder* as fable relates to Binswanger's case study of a schizophrenic named Ellen West, the affective heights and depths of whom took on a dramatically spatial polarity—"the underground world of burial, symbolised by the cold dark of the tomb which the patient resists with all her might by refusing to gain weight, grow old, or be trapped in the crudely materialistic life of her family. And there is the ethereal, luminous world, where in a single moment a totally free existence could arise, an existence without the weight of living ... Life has become possible for her only in the form of a flight toward the distant and lofty space of light, and the earth, in its dark closeness, holds only the immanence of death." (*ibid.*, 63)

Emily's 'emergence' is the normative expression of this polarity; that is, she finds 'residence' in a normative space where extremes, possibly tragic, are balanced in the apposition of space and time. She emerges in the interstice of what ultimately binds her, where the existential axes of space and time intersect. This problematic is not so readily negotiated by Malouf's Ovid whose *raison d'être* is precisely Malouf's interest in exploring the directions such 'emergencies' take. Ovid's narrativisation—foreshadowed in the works of the 'original' Ovid—travels the heights, depths and far horizons of selfhood. His schema, his rationale is the "nothingness" he sees (at first) in the "presence" of the child—we can perhaps posit this perception as the paradox: "Being is nothing!"[76]

4.4 The Fictional *Affect* of Depth in a Surface

But in speaking of history and its narrativity we speak generally of that which is written, recounted, told or at least remembered and here—in his writing of the mirror stage—Lacan speaks primarily of a vision, a specularity. I say 'primarily' with reservation as, for Lacan, nowhere is the child free of 'outside' influence (*Umwelt*), beginning—since the child's vision is developmentally bound in relation to these other senses—with corporeal and aural sensation. Lacan qualifies the apparent visual primacy of his schema by adding that "the idea of the mirror should be understood

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76. Sartre's 'theology' is of interest here, both to our fictive characters and the bent of the analysis brought to bear on them: "We must observe first that the being postulated can not be passive in relation to Nothingness, can not receive it; Nothingness could not come to this being except through another Being—which would be an infinite regress .... The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world must nihilate Nothingness in its Being, and even so it still runs the risk of establishing Nothingness as a transcendent in the very heart of immanence unless it nihilates Nothingness in its being in connection with its own being ... This way of being or this being is veiled; there always remains the possibility that it may unveil itself as a Nothingness. But from the very fact that we presume that an Existent can always be revealed as nothing, every question supposes that we realize a nihilating withdrawal in relation to the given, which becomes a simple presentation, fluctuating between being and Nothingness." (*Being and Nothingness*, 22-3) The 'veiled' and oppositional, dialectical nature of this "being and nothingness", in all its theoretical difficulty and even confusion, tells us something of the 'emergence' of our narrative figures, specifically here, Malouf's Ovid, whose 'position' is one of oscillation—'metastability'—a rebounding projection which finds its reference always in the boundary stones of his father's farm: "every desire is, in the last analysis," says Wilden, quoting René Girard, "'a desire for the obstacle because it is a desire for the sacred'." (*System and Structure*, 470)

as an object which reflects - not just the visible, but also what is heard, touched and willed by the child"[77]; an argument echoed by Geoffrey Hartman when he says: "We are in bondage to our ears as well as to our eyes."[78] This bondage, however, finds its 'cartography' in the physics of vision. It is specularity which allows for a mapping—of sounds, senses, sights—and renders them spatially. There is little doubt that the senses other than sight in fact predispose the child to specular fixity but sight—for the sighted—connects senses, verifies them, distances them and makes them truly relational.[79]

"I cannot urge you too strongly to a meditation on optics," says Lacan. "This strange science which sets itself to produce, by means of apparatuses, that peculiar thing called *images*, in contrast to other sciences, which import into nature a cutting up, a dissection, an anatomy."[80] Lacan here is meditating precisely on the fixity of specularity - in essence, the point of 'capture', of crystallisation he designates (in) the imaginary. Elsewhere he draws our attention to the "visual geometry" of Holbein's painting of 1533, *The Ambassadors*: two corpulent, aristocratic figures who in, their

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77. Lacan, as cited in Jacqueline Rose, "Introduction—II" in *Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne*, eds. Jacqueline Rose and Juliet Mitchell, trans. Jacqueline Rose (London: MacMillan, 1985), 30

78. Geoffrey Hartman, *Saving the Text: Literature/Derrida/Philosophy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 128

79. Clearly, I am generalising here, taking as my paradigm a fully, sensually capacitated being—faultless and unified and, in a sense, perfect for subjection to discourse, the seeing and hearing of narrative and history. For a discussion of sensually 'abnormal pathology' in terms of Lacan's schema, see W.J. Richardson, "Piaget, Lacan and Language" in *Piaget, Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc., 1980), 163-170. See also Lacan's reference to Diderot's *Lettre* "which shows to what extent the blind man is capable of taking account of, restructuring, imagining, speaking about everything that vision yields to us of space." ("The Line and Light", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 92-93) Lacan here emphasises that the subject's ordering and control of objects in its environment is not solely dependent on its capacity for vision but on the coupling of this with its sense of distance—as he suggests, this perception is evident in the blind and in fact prefigures the visual aspect of the imaginary in noise and, again, in the sighted, the 'pre-imaged' shades of light and dark—the body-image is synthesised in a totality. For a sustained argument on the "remarkable priority of 'seeing'" in its full philosophical and sensual import see, Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 214-16.

80. Lacan, *Freud's Papers on Technique*, 76. The implication here of a unity born of optical geometry, in opposition to the "divisions" of other sciences, is not as contradictory as it may at first seem. The fixity with which the gaze is held in the construction of the image effects an apparent unity—the root of Lacan's misrecognition, his proposition of *méconnaissance*—but through this very function is effected a division. He is speaking here of appearances.

sartorial finery stand facing us, representative with all their symbolic props of the two 'modern' realms of the arts and sciences. But in the foreground, cutting diagonally through the lower quadrant, appears an object quite abstract in relation to the rest of the painting—seemingly a large piece of cuttlefish or even driftwood levitating from the floor between the painting's two subjects—all the other objects, symbolising the cultural and scientific conquests of the age of expansion, acutely and obviously rendered allowing no mistake in their discernment. "But what is this peculiar object?" asks not only Lacan but the history of the painting's viewers: "You cannot know—for you turn away, thus escaping the fascination of the picture. Begin by walking out of the room in which no doubt it has long held your attention. It is then that turning round as you leave... you apprehend in this form... What? A skull."[81]

For Lacan, this trickery, "at the very heart of the period in which the subject emerged and geometrical optics was an object of research",[82] was Holbein's illustration or visualisation of that very subject 'annihilated', a disembodiment expressed well enough for Lacan in "the imaged embodiment of ... castration."[83] But the symbolism of this death's head figure aside, its placement has implications not only for the "visual geometry" of the painting but for that of its viewing subject, any subject who 'views'. The effect of this subject is, according to Lacan, a way "of showing us that, as subjects we are literally called into the picture, and represented here as caught."[84] The object is one of entrapment, it is there to attract our attention yet it is only by turning from it, slowly (as one would normally depart from an object of fascination), that we apprehend its significance. "It reflects our nothingness," argues Lacan, "in the figure of the death's head. It is a use, therefore,

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81. Lacan, "Anamorphosis", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 88

82. *Ibid.*, 88

83. *Ibid.*, 89

84. Lacan, "The Line and Light", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 92

of the geometrical dimension of vision in order to capture the subject, an obvious relation with desire which, nevertheless, remains enigmatic."[85]

For Lacan, Holbein's painting is an illustration, an exceptional one, but, with "this matter of the visible, everything is a trap,"[86] labyrinthine in its complexity. This complexity, the trap-like fixity Lacan terms "visual geometry", recalls his urge to us to meditate on the science of optics, or more specifically, catoptrics.[87] His illustration of the 'moment' of subjective structuring before an image, in the production of image, is afforded by the experiment of the "inverted vase". With a concave mirror the illusion of a vase holding flowers can be effected with the actual vase in fact upside down and concealed from view. The vase is obscured by a stand on which flowers are free-standing but the convergence of light rays reflected from the mirror produce a "conflated" image—the vase apparently upright and containing the flowers. For this image to 'appear' the viewer need only align her or himself with this point of convergence. This alignment, necessary for the appearance of the image is, for Lacan, the appearance of the subject—its structuration is primary narcissism and that which orders its environment. It is the "visual geometry" necessary for the unity and totality of the subject—the foundation on which is based its future projections.

At this stage another, plane mirror is placed before the "real" image, the coming-together in a projection of the separated vase and flowers where, in the first illustration, the viewer would stand. The viewing subject is now placed such that he or she sees only the reflected, 'virtual' image, the basis of this reflection being obscured from view. The first part of the experiment is essentially *a montage of one*

85. *Ibid.*, 92

86. *Ibid.*, 93

87. A more thorough exposition of this subject, in relation to the process of subjectivisation, can be found in Jacqueline Rose, "The Imaginary" in *The Talking Cure: Essays in Psychoanalysis and Language*, ed. Colin MacCabe (London: MacMillan, 1986), 142-6; and in Umberto Eco, *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language* (London: MacMillan, 1984), 134-5; 202-226.

generation—the viewer is looking squarely at that which is only partly reflected, a reflection effectively superimposed onto the original and that which is called 'real' because of its projected, apparently graspable (mistakeable for the real) state. The second stage of the experiment is *a montage of two generations*—now a seamless illusion given depth as it appears in the space, the 'inside' of the mirror—the fictional effect of depth in a surface.

What is at stake here is the illustration of the subject's distance from its own self in the very construction of an image of that self. It is the reflective process that is necessary for the capture of this image and, as the optical experiment shows, the subject must be fixed at a particular point of this process for its return. So, in the mirror image the subject finds itself but at a remove from its corporeal source—a simultaneous distance and conflation in that the image, in its virtuality, totalises and unifies, and yet, in its reality, is illusive—a "stand-in". This is the "virtual complex" of the mirror stage—*per speculum in aenigmate*—an "enigma by means of a mirror."[88]

In observing the generally accepted belief that the mirror inverts—showing left where we 'know' right should 'really' be—Umberto Eco points to the fictive power of this virtual image:

> But the point is that vertical mirrors themselves do not reverse or invert. A mirror reflects the right side exactly where the right side is, and the same with the left side. It is the observer (so ingenuous even when he is a scientist) who by self-identification imagines he is the man inside the mirror and, looking at himself, realizes he is wearing his watch on his right wrist. But it would be so

88. Jorge Luis Borges, "The Mirror of Enigmas", *Labyrinths*, 245. In this essay Borges ruminates on the work of theologian and metaphysician Leon Bloy whose numerous though "fragmentary" writings, like those of Barthes's "excessive" writer Silesius, affirmed that: "No man knows who he is." (*ibid.*, 247). Bloy's inspiration and the source of the reference here, is a verse from St Paul (1 Corinthians, 13:12): "For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face." (often and popularly rendered as "through a glass darkly.") Rather than to our vision of Divinity, Bloy suggests that its reference is to the way we, as humans, see things in general. As Borges cites him: "The statement by St Paul: *Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate* would be a skylight through which one might submerge himself in the true Abyss, which is the soul of man. The terrifying immensity of the firmament's abysses is an illusion, an external reflection of our own abysses, perceived 'in a mirror'. We should invert our eyes and practice a sublime astronomy in the infinitude of our hearts, for which God was willing to die .... If we see the Milky way, it is because it actually exists in our souls." (*ibid.*, 245)

only if he, the observer I mean, were the one who is inside the mirror (*Je est un autre!*).[89]

It is this exilic fiction, the virtuality of the subject—allegorised by Lacan in the 'fiction' of Holbein and the science of catoptrics, and discussed by Eco in terms of common, though ill-conceived 'Alice'-like fictions in everyday mirrors—that is at the centre of the subject's psychic functioning. The virtual image, the second montage, is the functioning of secondary narcissism, the process by which the subject places—in the sense that 'inside' the mirror it is framed and necessarily orientated—its imaginary in relation to its environment. And it is this second functioning, which therefore points to the ego-ideal.

Though physically (catoptrically) speaking the virtual image is not a projection, its effect of depth is fictively placed as that of projection—the subject here is at the threshold of its 'projection into history', looking 'into' an image of itself it seeks to regain. This is the specular drama of Lacan's "dialectic of identifications"—identifications alienating in their spatial configuration and confused in their relationships posited as inside and outside. We can only know ourselves as reflected, reflective entities. When we see ourselves doubly reflected—that is, our reflections reflected - we see another, we see ourselves differently, as others would perhaps see us. The outcome of this phenomena, dialectical in its functioning, is the

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89. Eco, *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, 205. As Wilden points out, Lacan and Sartre also cite Rimbaud's "*Je est un autre*", suggesting perhaps some poetic French appropriation of Heidegger's Hegelianism "Everyone is the other and no one is himself." (*System and Structure*, 466n; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 165) But Lacan's citation is one of caution: "It is quite well expressed in Rimbaud's fleeting formula—poets, as is well known, don't know what they're saying, yet they still manage to say things before anyone else—*I is an other* ... Don't let this impress you. Don't start spreading it around that *I is an other*—it won't impress anyone, believe me! And what is more, it doesn't mean anything. Because, to begin with, you have to know what the other means. The other—don't use this term as a mouthwash." (Lacan, *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book II, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 7) Here, Merleau-Ponty would aver: "For the 'other' to be more than an empty word, it is necessary that my existence should never be reduced to my bare awareness of existing, but that it should take in also the awareness that *one* may have of it, and thus include my incarnation in some nature and the possibility, at least, of a historical situation." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, xii-xii)

construction, the 'synthesis' of spatiality and its corollary, temporality—in the subject's vision, again for Lacan, a "temporal dialectic": an exilic

> drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic—and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of the alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. Thus, to break out of the circle of the *Innenwelt* into the *Umwelt* generates the inexhaustible quadrature of the ego's verifications.[90]

4.5 From *insufficiency to anticipation*—Exile to Nowhere

The subject is, *by all appearances,* formed in the mirror then projected into a history that it experiences precisely as such—a chronology in "a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation". This dialectic is the 'turning point' of the mirror stage both in terms of Lacan's posited subject and his writing of it. But the chronology here is problematic. Is the experience of the dialectic actually that of a progression—from the fragmented, non-totalised body through this turning point to a totalised self which continues this movement from then on, 'writing' its own history? This would appear to be the general understanding of the mirror stage and would seem to correspond to Freud's postulation of the subject's transition from a similarly non-totalised auto-eroticism through an ego to the 'advanced' stages of narcissism. But the 'insufficiency' Lacan speaks of—the fragmented, morcelated body—is, explicitly, a body-image and it is this image from which a succession of phantasies emerges. For Lacan, however, this image is conjured 'retroactively' from the imaging agency of the mirror stage. As Gallop translates Laplanche and Pontalis,

90. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 4

"it would be the mirror stage which would retroactively bring forth the phantasy of the body in bits and pieces".[91]

It is from the formation of this image—the totalised body-image—that the turning point of the subject emerges as such; that is, the formation, the unitary function of the 'I', is necessary for any perception of what went before. In this problem of the 'body-image', "the spatiality of the body must work downwards from the whole to the parts"[92]—the fragmented body-image necessarily 'appears' after, and like the unified body-image, is only a representation. Baudrillard's 'second order myth' is worth recounting here:

> Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory—PRECESSION OF THE SIMULACRA—it is the map that engenders the territory... the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map.[93]

This "model" may coincide with the "appearance" of the subject—a concurrence may be seen to emerge between Baudrillard's "precession of simulacra" and what we might call Lacan's "precession of the totalised 'I'". Baudrillard's 'map', like the cartography of Lacan's totalised 'I', has always preceded that which it is supposed to represent. The territory, like the subject's space—that is, pre-conceptualisation, that

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91. Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 80. "Furthermore, this image is selectively vulnerable along its lines of cleavage. The fantasies which reveal this cleavage to us seem to deserve to be grouped together under some such term as the 'image of the body in bits and pieces'(*image du corps morcelé*) may show, for example, the body of the mother as having a mosaic structure like that of a stained glass window. More often the resemblance is to a jig-saw puzzle, with the separate parts of the body of a man or an animal in disorderly array. Even more significant for our purpose are the incongruous images in which disjointed limbs are rearranged as strange trophies; trunks cut up in slices and stuffed with the most unlikely fillings, strange appendages in eccentric positions..." (Lacan, "Some Reflections on the Ego", *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 34(1953), 13) See Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception*, 98-99) on the symptoms of "allocheiria", a "disorder of sensation" in which sensations, such as pain, are registered in the wrong part of the body. Like Lacan, Merleau-Ponty locates such pathology—including the phenomenon of the "phantom limb", the sensation experienced by amputees of itchiness or pain at the place where their limb once was—in the "mapping" of the body, "a superimposed sketch of the body" (*ibid.*, 99), a totality of situation which is necessary for the subject's 'being-in-the-world'.

92. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 99

93. Baudrillard, "The Precession of Simulacra", 2

which it is born into—quite simply cannot exist (for the subject) without a way of 'mapping' it, conceptualising it in some form of representation. A question of chronology? The subject, both in its perceived totality and (subsequent) fragmentation, is precisely this "generation by models without origin or reality." The more elaborate 'cartography' of language reinforces this as the constitutive break that establishes differentiation between 'the one and the other' which is doubled as the subject enters language: here, "the 'I' is a division but joins all the same, the stand-in is the lack in the structure but nevertheless, simultaneously, the possibility of a coherence, of the filling-in."[94]

Simulation occurs precisely at this process of *separation*, a term which by etymology implies a process of engendering, of making ready, literally, "decking (oneself) out"—in the process of signification.[95] Baudrillard's allegory on the hyperreal is of interest also in its illustration of the 'fraying' of the map—that which is (now) itself the territory—conflated as "an aging double", confused with the real thing; a process of fragmentation not unlike the notion of the "body-in-bits-and-pieces" in that such disintegration necessarily works "downward from the whole to its parts" and that which appears to precede is then preceded by its initially apparent successor. Whichever precedes—a chronological difficulty exemplified in the absurdity of the preceding sentence—proves tenuous since it is merely a representation—a model, a

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94. Stephen Heath, "Notes on Suture", *Screen*, Vol.18, #4 (1977-78): 56. The mirroring function of the imaginary is co-extensive with the symbolic (realm of language/discourse/communication)—the 'gap' through which the subject enters discourse, is however prefigured in the "imaginary captures" of the mirror stage.

95. "We call this operation: Separation. In it we recognize what Freud called the *Ichspaltung* or splitting of the subject.... The subject realizes himself in the loss from whence he sprang forth as an unconscious. Here *separare*, separate, ends in *se parare* to engender oneself .... What he will place there is his own lack. But what he thus fills in is the constituent loss of one of his own parts, because of which he finds himself constituted in two parts." (Lacan, as cited in Lemaire, *Jacques Lacan*, 77; see also, Lacan, "The Subject and the Other:Alienation", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, 213-14) ["Separate" is traceable to the Latin—*separare* (*se-*,apart; and *parare*, to provide, arrange, to make ready—and further, to the French - *parer*, to deck, to dress and also to parry, to defend or ward off a blow. (Walter W. Skeat, *An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], 428; 529)] This will be developed further in Chapter Five.

signifier—and that is indeed the point—as Baudrillard says, "a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal".[96]

Now it is precisely this tenuity that is of essence to subjectivity and, in particular, the subject of exile. The 'fixity' (or, in Heideggerian terms, the 'facticity') of the subject before the mirror, as outlined above, is what delivers to it an image, a representation. From its situation, verified in the images which confront it, the subject's identity is 'fleshed out' - objects surround it, repeat it. But, contingent on this fixity is movement—"in order to vehicule the image, the subject's own position must be fixed"[97]—the subject's movement in and out of this point and ultimate frame of reference is co-extensive with its introduction to the movement of temporality—that is, the vicissitudes of the temporal dialectic. Fixity is at once the subject's placement (in that it must be placed, fixed in order to appear) and projection (of the formation of the individual) into history. But, again, this specular fixity, the moment of simulation, is simultaneously a separation which, by etymological protraction (from the French) implies a defensive action—culminating in a formation, symbolised, well enough for Lacan, "in dreams by a fortress, or stadium—its inner arena and enclosure, surrounded by marshes and rubbish tip."[98] In defence is the implication of anxiety. In the 'construction' of a fortress, or stadium—a *homeland*—the subject flees, keeps at a distance the disorder from which it apparently sprang. As has been indicated, the infant is mirrored in its surroundings at a time of its "intra-organic natal prematuration"[99], yet what returns to the child is

96. Whatever its "origin or reality", "[t]he real", as Merleau-Ponty would have it, "is a closely woven fabric. It does not await our judgement before incorporating the most surprising phenomena, or before rejecting the most plausible figments of our imagination." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, x) The textual (*text*-ile) significance of Merleau-Ponty's "real" is not lost here.

97. Rose, "The Imaginary", 139. Merleau-Ponty argues more for a "spatiality of situation" than a "spatiality of position". The subject is contextual not just in terms of the objects which surround it but in and of itself; that is, the subject's body-image contextualises the position of, say, hands on a desk. The hands are situated in relation to the subject's perceived position in-the-world: "every figure stands out against the double horizon of external and bodily space." (*Phenomenology of Perception*, 101)

98. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 5

99. Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", 19

that of a co-ordinated whole—exemplified in the actions of 'others' who surround it, most specifically the movement and countenance of the mother or primary carer—the child's first alienating identification.

> The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as a Gestalt, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears to him above all in a contrasting size (*un relief de stature*) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it in contrast with the turbulent movements the subject feels are animating him.[100]

The child passes "from insufficiency to anticipation", a precipitous action the child apprehends in "triumphant jubilation."[101] Much has been made of this "jubilant" apprehension by the infant of its image—"in a flutter of jubilant activity" the child will move forward from what or whom is supporting it in an endeavour to hold in its gaze its own image—a jubilation attributed to a kind of mastery over its (only now perceived as) prior insufficiency. Lacan implies not a mere chronological progression. The child's drama progresses by projection, a progression in anticipation of its ultimate sufficiency, a capacity it is yet to achieve. The mirror stage is decisive—precipitous in that on confrontation with its image the infant is pressed into movement and action, the basis not only of what is to come but also of what it thinks to have preceded: "It produces the future through anticipation and the past through retroaction."[102] The drama proceeds as prolepsis: the subject's image is depicted, in its anticipation, as having already been. The retroaction, or what may be termed analepsis, is founded on that which has been anticipated—the subject is drawn to a space from which it can conjure what went before—and, as this dialectic determines the subject's capture in the lure of spatial identifications, "temporal becomes spatial prolepsis"[103]—the subject's projection into history, its

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100. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 2

101. Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis", 18

102. Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 80-1

103. James Creech, "'Chasing After Advances': Diderot's Article *'Encyclopedia'* " in *The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a Literary Genre*, *Yale French Studies* 63: 190

historicisation. As Gallop puts it, that "violently unorganized *image only comes after* the mirror stage so as to *represent what came before.* What appears to precede the mirror stage is simply a projection or a reflection. There is nothing on the other side of the mirror."[104]

This is the problematic at the root of Gallop's question which prefaced this excursus on Lacan, "where to begin?", a question similarly fielded by the infant in its anticipatory dilemma: "where to from here?". In this subjective mirage the subject anticipates "the maturation of its power"—from insufficiency to the illusion of sufficiency—a moment that, for Lacan, "turns the I into that apparatus for which every instinctual thrust constitutes a danger, even though it should correspond to a natural maturation."[105] And, as he argues elsewhere: "This illusion of unity, in which a human being is always looking forward to self-mastery, entails a constant danger of sliding back again into the chaos from which he started; it hangs over the abyss of a dizzy Assent[*sic*] in which one can perhaps see the very essence of Anxiety."[106]

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104. Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 81. "Both anticipation and retroaction are violations of chronology, but separately either can, if necessary, be sorted out, their elements reassigned to their proper chronological place. The specific difficulty in thinking the temporality of the mirror stage is its intrication of anticipation and retroaction." (*ibid.*, 81)

105. Lacan, "The mirror stage", 5

106. Lacan, "Some Reflections on the Ego", 15. Part of this passage—"... the abyss of a dizzy Assent [*sic*] in which one can perhaps see the very essence of Anxiety"—is rendered by Gallop to read: "... the abyss of a dizzy Ascent [*sic*] ..." (as cited in, *Reading Lacan*, 84) Perhaps a typographical error - the translator's, the typesetter's, editor's—the word Ascent is clearly more pertinent to its context of other such words as 'abyss', 'dizzy' and 'sliding'. But what of the possibility of a more characteristically Lacanian pun in which he plays on the dualism of this 'illusion' and one in which accord - the epitome of that which is apparently totalised, unified, ideal - is rendered "dizzy" to the extent that its implication is that of a fall? Assent, perhaps "... a relationship to external reality which is one of compliance, the world and its details being recognised but only as something to be fitted in with or demanding adaptation. Compliance carries with it a sense of futility for the individual and is associated with the idea that nothing matters and that life is not worth living." (Winnicott, as cited in Davis and Wallbridge, *Boundary and Space*, 64). The concurrence, the acquiescence or even deference implied in "Assent" - the terms Lacan places at the centre of the myth of the unity of the image in the mirror - has only one direction in which to move, downward. Hence, the anxiety of this Assent (accented with capital 'A'), perhaps not unlike the veiled dissent of anyone tied to the terms of a contract: the contract itself, *assent* legitimated. Given that the source for Gallop's 'translation' is the English translation in *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*—the only available rendering of this essay delivered to the British Psychoanalytical Society in 1951—her transliteration is of interest. In the French - *assentiment*, assent; *ascension*, ascent - the distinction would seem more than apparent to the task of the translator, the homophony of the rendering in English is clearly greater than in the French. The premise of Gallop's book is a reading in the tradition of both Freud and Lacan, that is, a symptomatic reading, a reading between the lines. As misprision - a fault with which she indefatigably charges other readers of Lacan, including, it must be admitted, her own occasional "blind

The process of "natural maturation"—cognitively speaking—is now swayed by its new anticipatory logic, and so the subject no longer proceeds, develops 'naturally' but is thrust forward as *history*: "Any 'natural maturation' simply proves that the self was founded on an assumption of maturity, the discovery that maturity was prematurely assumed is the discovery that the self is built on hollow ground."[107] The child's anticipation of "the maturation of its power"—its "jubilant assumption"—is then at the core of anxiety and alienation - from its 'great height', anticipation, abysmal vision, a fall. The child's glee, it has been noted, arises from an "imaginary triumph" in anticipating a measure of bodily co-ordination of which, in reality, it has little. This split between the subject's apparent (virtual) unity and its actual biological and cognitive prematuration engenders for Lacan a "thrownness" similar to that spoken of by Heidegger—a sense in which the subject is 'out of kilter' with its visual unity—again, a unity 'misrecognised' and which Lacan posits in the unconscious and ideological functioning of human knowledge. In this penumbra of developmental chronology it seems the child is in the position of having to defend against its "natural maturation". Since the child's temporal positioning—its perceived progression from past through present—is contingent on an "anticipated" future maturity—projected, virtual and ideal. The prospect of a "natural maturation", even though it may resemble the anticipatory ideal, "must be defended against, for it threatens to expose the fact that the self is an illusion done with mirrors."[108]

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spots" - her 'translation' exemplifies the difficulties in such reading. "Nor is this all. It is the gap separating man from nature that determines his lack of relationship to nature, and begets his narcissistic shield with its nacreous covering on which is painted the world from which he is forever cut off, but this same structure is also the sight where his own milieu is grafted on to him, i.e. the society of his fellow men." (Lacan, "Some Reflections on the Ego", 16). A similar play—if, indeed, that is what we can call it—can be seen at work here in Lacan's use of the word "sight" in the generalised context of a reading which would render it "site" - the place and space of such impression. But, in terms of Lacan's schema, the conflation is appropriate since the sighted subject (at least) locates its space, its 'site', according to its illusive image spied in "the visual geometry of the mirror"—an illusion at once masking and forging its own subjective 'gap'.

107. Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 83

108. *Ibid*, 83. In his oft-cited 'translation' of Freud's similarly well-worn, even overdetermined, "Where id was, there ego shall be" ("New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis", *SE* XXII: 80), Lacan himself *defends* against what may be termed the "egoisation" (or Americanisation) of the unconscious. "The end that Freud's discovery proposes for man," he argues, "was defined by him at the apex of his thought in these moving terms: *Wo es war, soll Ich werden.* I must come to the place where that was. This is one of reintegration and harmony, I could even say of reconciliation." ("The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud", *Écrits:*

The tenuity of this anticipated future—lived, in a sense, in the present, as a future perfect—is the contingency of the subject's past—the "retroaction is based on the anticipation". And so, the subject may "never simply fall back on some accomplishment, rest on some laurels already won, since the 'past' itself is based upon a future that is necessarily an uncertainty."[109] The drama Lacan observes in the mirror stage is evinced by Gallop to be more "high tragedy: a brief moment of doomed glory, a paradise lost."[110] Reflecting on such terms used by Lacan as "rigid structure", "armour" and "totality", she questions this drama as to its "finality", another term which seems to open Lacan's text to further question. In the schema the child's path is mapped: "insufficiency (body in bits and pieces) to anticipation (orthopedic form [the child's 'natural maturation' is corrected according to this anticipation]) and 'finally' to a rigid armor."[111]

Again, the chronology causes difficulty—in its drama the subject is "thrust" forward from its "insufficiency" to its "anticipation" but that insufficiency is registered only from the point of view of the anticipation—the *corps morcelé* is conjured only retroactively from the mirror stage.

> Thus the impetus of the drama turns out to be so radically accelerated that the second term precedes the first—a precipitousness comparable to the speed of light. In this light, we must question the 'finally' of the 'alienating identity'. In a temporal succession where the second term can precede the first, what is the status of a 'finally'?[112]

A Selection, 171) This 'reconciliation' is one that both the subject and its *writers* alike—the ego psychologist and 'philosophical novelist' (as Althusser called Sartre)—seek but shall never find. The subject *is* a 'project', unfinished and unfinishable. (See Lacan, "The Freudian Thing", *Écrits: A Selection*, 128-9; also, Gallop, *Reading Lacan*, 93-110) To restate Heidegger's Hölderlin: "As you begin, so you will remain."

109. *Ibid.*, 84

110. *Ibid.*, 85

111. *Ibid.*, 85

112. *Ibid.*, 86

These temporal projections are intricated in a way Lacan's text only implies. The 'finality' and the 'rigidity' proposed in the mirror stage suggests still a separation of its two chronological movements - retroaction and anticipation—ultimately rendering it linear and, for Gallop, somewhat less than dialectical. For Gallop, this is what leads Lacan to the domain of *tragedy* and leads her to question this subjective rigidity. Rigidity, and armour, may well be effective in addressing anxiety, but it would seem that this anxiety would be more probably met by a sense of instability—a wavering, faltering ego appropriate to its designated formation in the dialectic of identification. And so it does, in the manner of Sartre's 'metastability'. Forged on a notion of its seeming contrary stability and totality, however founded, this instability has as its (pre)cognitive precursor what Lacan called a *hommelette* - the child (seen in the insufficiency stage of the mirror and from as early as the moment of its birth) as at once "little man" and the (in)consistency of a broken egg: "If you want to stress its yokey side, you can call it *l'hommelette.*"[113] But as the child is born into constraint—familial and social pressures brought to bear even at this stage of its existence—its "inner motricity" strives to surface only at the various openings of the body—"...lips, 'the enclosure of the teeth,' the rim of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids, even the horn-shaped aperture of the ear..."[114]—openings that sensually orientate the subject. These "zones", characteristic of a "cut (*coupure*) expressed in the anatomical mark (*trait*) of a margin or border,"[115] are thus delimited—distinguished also from their simple organic or metabolic function—as areas of stimulation and ultimately sexual excitation, erogenous, erotogenic.

These openings appear on the very surface of the body and are not actually outside it—"they have no specular image or, in other words, alterity. It is what enables them

113. Lacan, "From Love to the Libido", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, 197

114. Lacan, "Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire", *Écrits: A Selection*, 314-15

115. *Ibid.*, 314

to be the 'stuff', or rather the lining ... of the very subject one takes to be the subject of consciousness."[116] The subject senses both at and as edge—the limitation or border, perhaps frontier, of the subject in that it fundamentally registers itself bodily. But the child's specular image, its alterity emergent from the mirror stage, is where its defence in anxiousness at instability is observed—this pre-specular marginalisation merely gives it fertile ground, space for a symptom or two.

> This transitivism binds together in an absolute equivalent attack and counter-attack; the subject here is in that state of ambiguity which precedes truth, in so far as his ego is actually alienated from itself in the other person.[117]

The resolution, or, perhaps more appropriately, the 'normalisation' of this alienating alterity is founded through paranoiac conflict in the vicissitudes of which the ego is built up by opposition. As Freud would have it: "Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, a forsaken object."[118]

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116. *Ibid.*, 315. Though, clearly—at this stage, specular or not—they are important for the somewhat later visualisation of the body-image—the 'mapping' that occurs here brings with it its entire developmental history.

117. Lacan, "Some Reflections on the Ego", 16

118. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", *SE* XIV: 249

5 THE REALM OF POSITIONS

[THE MARGINS NOTWITHSTANDING]

> We are the same and the other ... We shall try to show the *relation* between the same and the other—upon which we seem to impose such extraordinary conditions—is language... The relation between the same and other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted as conversation [*discours*], where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as "I," as a particular existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself..... Alterity is possible only starting from *me*.
>
> Emmanuel Levinas *Totality and Infinity*

> Is there not, however, a manifest circularity in such an undertaking?
>
> Martin Heidegger *Being and Time*

5.1 Scene, image, fascination

In the forgoing chapters I have sought to chart the subject of exile through what might be termed the contradictory vicissitudes of subjective placement. To this end I have argued that the very term *subject of exile* is itself both tautological and contradictory: the subject is at once defined by a certain metaphysical closure—the subject is *individual*—and, according to the various epistemologies I have mobilised to my task, is irredeemably split before its own illusive reflection. While I have sought to track the exilic subject in the wake of its apparent and well-chronicled displacement, I have argued that the exile is, in fact, nowhere to be found. This needs some clarification. The reader will by now be aware that *the subject* I speak of bears little resemblance to the diasporic masses that are the stuff of UN policy. I am, however, speaking of the essentially modern construct of the subject—that is, a construct forged by a certain diasporic affectivity: an identification and a fascination with the bounds that ultimately define it—to quote Ricardou again, between 'the mirror of the soul' and 'the mirror one holds up along the road'. Sartre's 'metastability' is a term that defines this subjective-narrative predicament well enough.

But while I have spoken at some length about the textuality or the discursivity of the subject and, to an extent, the manner in which such a subject could be *read*, I have till now concentrated on the more abstract notions of such a reading—from the subject's reading of the relation between representation and the real and an existential-phenomenological description of subjective placement or emergence, to a psychoanalytic 'rendering' of that emergence. Again, this rendering, from all accounts touched on hitherto, is characterised most saliently by a process of division and it is precisely this division that engenders the subject as the subject of exile. What emerges is a subject driven to close the distance that inheres in this division and this brings us to the subject's discursivity proper—what Lacan calls "the drama of the subject in the verb."[1]

But what precisely is this drama? As already indicated, Lacan's schema posits the child's first drama as a speculative and temporal shift between a 'perception' of its insufficiency and its anticipation of a possibly homogeneous entity. Caught now by its own mirror myth—the "lures of spatial identification"—the child, at this stage, emerges to its first subjective scene. The subject, in the throes of its metastability, is said to misrecognise itself in its 'coming-into-being'. But the subject misrecognises nothing. What it sees is, in a sense, what it gets. There, before its very eyes, is the true fullness of its subjective being—in the travails of its drama it completes its own scene and finds itself where it truly is: the centre of its world. And while it has doubts—it is doubt that forges this reflective labour between 'insufficiency' and 'anticipation'—it *plays* at pasting them over. Play is the essential *work* of the child, as Winnicott and Klein have elaborated, and it is precisely this play that turns the child into the adult 'working stiff' who recognises—who truly recognises—his full potential. As already pointed out by Copjec, "the subject unerringly assumes the

1. As cited in Lemaire, *Jacques Lacan*, 72. "*The drama of the subject in the verb is that he faces the test of his lack of being.* It is because it fends off this moment of lack that an image moves into position to support the whole worth of desire: projection, a function of the Imaginary." (*ibid.*, 72) While this chapter will look to some aspects of the rendering of the subject in language, my interest lies more in the rendering, by the subject, of its own space in language—a certain narrative and phenomenological scenography of the subject *before* the verb.

position the perspectival construction bids it to take."[2]

This perspectival construction of the scene allows for no mistake, that is what it is for. But this misrecognition, this lack, division and separation that has characterised the modern subject—the modern exilic subject of this thesis—is nonetheless at work in this scenography of the subject and, paradoxically, unbeknownst to the subject who sees all, is crucial to its bearing: an affective paradox summed up by Malouf's Ovid when he qualifies his opening narration: "But I am describing a state of mind, no place. I am in exile here."[3] Foucault takes up the spatial polarity spanned in this subjective scenography:

> [I]t is the space of encounters not merely the intersection of lines which trace the shortest distance between two points, but overlapping of journeys, paths crossing, roads which converge to the same place on the horizon, or which ... suddenly arrive, after the widest turn, at a birthplace. The dream deploys itself in this original spatiality of the scene and finds there its principle affective meanings.[4]

Original spatiality of the scene: it is here that "the dream deploys itself", says the Foucault of Dasein, and "if dreams are so weighty for determining existential meanings, it is because they trace in their fundamental co-ordinates the trajectory of existence itself."[5] The subject is drawn in the fullness of the space of the scene and if not dream space, imaginary space—hence the various spaces he comes to in reflection. "*L'espace signe de ma puissance* ('Space, sign of my power.')"[6], says Foucault, pointing to the 'clearing' or ordering of subjective space that allows for (an initial) sense of omnipotence. The emergence of the subject to its space allows for a sense of security that "rests on the articulation of near space and far space: the latter, by which one withdraws and eludes, or which one sets out to explore or conquer;

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2. Copjec, *Read My Desire*, 32-3 [See Chapter Four, note 34]

3. Malouf, *An Imaginary Life*, 16. (Unless otherwise indicated, further references to Malouf's text in this chapter will appear as page numbers after the citation.)

4. Foucault, "Dream, Imagination, and Existence", 60-1

5. *Ibid.*, 60

6. *Ibid.*, 60

the former, that of rest, of familiarity, that which is right at hand."[7] But this security is, at best, tenuous as the bounds of the subjective clearing open to the elements, as it were. Here, subjective space appears more in the manner of a threat or, as Foucault more accurately concludes,"sign of my weakness."[8]

But in order for this space to declare itself it needs a scene, a stage on which to play out its drama.[9] The essential scene of Malouf's exilic narrative is the imaginary space of its poet. The central figure—at least one term of this narrative's *centrality*—is the poet Ovid whose exile delivers us to the landscapes of his imagination. The 'imaginary life' at the frontiers of this Roman world is managed in the drama according to the dreams, memories, and longings of Ovid's encounter with his other term—the child of his first meeting. In the first pages of Malouf's text these short lines put an abrupt halt to Ovid's descriptive ruminations on the place of his exile. These first-page notes describe a state of mind as "country that lies open on every side, walled in to the west and south, level to the north and to the northeast, with a view to infinity." (15) Open and walled, infinite and finite, Ovid's 'here' and the officiousness with which its sentence both opens and closes the text—this is the beginning *and* the end—points to this play of polarities that is the essential work of what Sartre, as already noted, has called "this double, perpetual nihilation" in the space of being's nothingness.[10]

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7. *Ibid.*, 61

8. *Ibid*, 61

9. Jeffrey Mehlman translates the French *scène* "alternatively as scene (with its accent on visibility) and stage (accent on conflict)." (see introductory note, Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing", *Yale French Studies* 48: 73) Mehlman points out that Derrida "presses in the direction of a theatre of writing by translating the metapsychological term *representability* as *aptitude à mis en scène.*" (*ibid.*,73) This 'representability' is, in Freud, the mechanism by which certain strictures impose themselves on the dream-work, pushing the more strikingly visual aspects of the dream to the fore. "This condition regulating the dream-work undoubtedly originates in regression—regression at once topographical, formal and temporal. In regard to the temporal aspect Freud stresses the polarising role played by infantile scenes of an essentially visual character in the fabrication of dream images." (Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, 390)

10. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 17-18

The heretical crimes of the poet deliver him to a space of solitude that affects an essential return. The perpetual present of solitude, drawn on the very physicality of distance and division, paradoxically allows for a return to a space the strictures of his Latin culture had all but forced him to forget. Writing on 'the journal' of the writer's 'essential solitude', Blanchot put it like this:

> To write is to surrender to the fascination of time's absence. Now we are doubtless approaching the essence of solitude... Rather than a purely negative mode, it is, on the contrary, a time without negation, without decision, when here is nowhere as well, and each thing withdraws into its image while the 'I' that we are recognizes itself by sinking into the neutrality of a featureless third person. The time of time's absence has no present, no presence.... The time of time's absence is not dialectical. In this time what appears is the fact that nothing appears. What appears is the being deep within being's absence, which is when there is nothing and which, as soon as there is something, is no longer. For it is as if there were no beings except through the loss of being, when being lacks.... Only time itself, during which negation becomes our power, permits the "unity of contraries."[11]

The 'time of time's absence is not dialectical' because it is not temporal at all—all that remains here is the aridity of 'fascination' with the faceless 'third person', of a consuming slippage into an alterity without a tellable history. This too is the lack at the core of the 'luckless' Being of the Angel of History. Because to write the relation of oneness to alterity is to try and pin it down with a close reading, to map the subtle exigencies of intentionality. But this road leads inexorably, and impossibly, to the all-knowing self-consciousness of what Levinas calls—referring to Hegel's absolute knowledge—"the imperial ego".[12] The subject may never grasp the workings of its own intentionality. Writing on Levinas's extension of the reading of the 'gaping body' in both Bataille and Merleau-Ponty, Taylor points out that "there are at least two things the subject never sees directly: his face and his backside. Bodily orifices like eyes, eyes, ears, nostrils mouth, and anus elude the specular gaze. Nor can the thetic subject 'see' itself constituting itself in acts intended to establish its identity by

11. Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 30

12. Taylor, *Altarity*, 204

repressing everything that defiles the body proper."[13] This is essentially what Heidegger reads in Hegel himself when he refers to self-consciousness as the "knowledge of failure in what drives its own essence."[14] What the subject does see, at least senses, is its own *image in fascination*—fascination with this impossible reflexivity and this is the essence of "knowing's restlessness" (Heidegger). Blanchot here offers more, asking:

> Why fascination? Seeing presupposes distance, decisiveness which separates, the power to stay out of contact and in contact avoid confusion. Seeing means that his separation has nevertheless become an encounter. But what happens when what you see, although at a distance, seems to touch you with a gripping contact, when the manner of seeing is a kind of touch, when seeing is *contact* at a distance? What happens when what is seen imposes itself upon the gaze, as if the gaze were seized, put in touch with the appearance? ... What is given us by this contact at a distance is the image, and fascination is passion for the image.[15]

In the early pages of Malouf's Ovid—ruptured only by his subjective placement, a reminder of his dystopia—"a state of mind, no place. I am in exile here"—the poet's reflections are drawn from his 'sketches' of poetic imagery: poppies blowing in the spring breeze, smells, colours, the metamorphoses of mythic creatures into humans: "I know how far I have come because I have been back to the beginnings. I have seen the unmade earth .... It is a place of utter desolation, the beginning." (30) This is Ovid's fascination with the landscape of time's absence. Scanning the horizon of a virgin land, lamenting the gravity of his solitude, his reflection ebbing and flowing with his breath, he takes in the landscape of self's solitude.

But this 'beginning' is poetic, torn from the pages of his fiction—the birthplaces of his metamorphosing creatures—and now cast in his vision of a lonely landscape he feels to be as primitive as the beginnings of time. We rise from this repose with the sight of a spring poppy which suddenly erupts in Ovid: "Poppy, you have saved me,

13. *Ibid.*, 204

14. Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 140 (see "Parenthesis", 5)

15. Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, 32

you have recovered the earth for me. I know how to work the spring."(32) Spring is the well of his poetic imagination—the time of birth, change, regeneration—his metamorphosis which poses perhaps the most important question of his existence: 'From where do I come and where do I go?' In this he is not original, but it poses for him the realm of 'true' beginnings: "It is about to begin. All my life till now has been wasted. I had to enter the silence to find a password that would release me from my own life. And yet the words were already written. I wrote them years ago, and only now discover what they meant, what message they had for me: 'You will be separated from yourself and yet be alive.' Now I too must be transformed." (32-33)

It is this feeling of metamorphosis that rises with him to his feet but the implications are yet to be realised—he is patient. His presence, still bound in his Latin "singularity which is formal" (Sartre), finds its frame in ever-regressing memories of his life in the space of his father's farm and the *distances* that forged the few relations of those early days: "I have already begun to leave—starting away from him on the narrow path from the grove and keeping the whole horses length between us. I am already on my way to Rome. I am already, though I cannot know it yet, on my way to exile, setting out for this day, thirty years later, when I will be an old man riding with barbarians at the edge of the world, outside the Roman Law that my father believed in so passionately, and the Roman State to which he dedicated our lives, with not a man now in nine day's riding distance who knows the Roman tongue."(46)

The distance opened between he and his father is the occasion of his brother's funeral and this memory, filled with anguish, draws Ovid closer to his 'new beginnings', closing the distance between he and the child he has conjured only in the occasional inscrutable dream. The dream which prefaces this work—paradoxically, epilogue more than prologue—comes slowly to surface in the reflections of Ovid's 'present', the sense of which he is slowly losing as he lapses into "the time of time's absence." In his telling of the hunting party in the birch woods which forces the memory of

that first departure from his father's farm, Ovid dismounts his horse to follow the wary steps of one of his 'barbarian' companions who is in search of animal tracks. "Astonishingly", they come upon the prints of a human foot. "It is a child, a boy of ten or so, a wild boy, who lives with the deer... I am in a ferment... Where does the boy come from?... How did he get here?" (47-48) In attempting to ascertain the physicality of this footfall, he is barely, inexplicably unable to contain his adulation for this creature whom he is yet to recognise as his 'own'. He pictures the child's agility, pitting him against the deer with whom he is thought to roam. He is excited as he captures a fleeting glimpse of the boy: "Did I really see him? Or did I see suddenly, after all these years, the Child who used to be my secret companion at Sulmo, and whose very existence I had forgotten. Suddenly he was there again before me. Was the vision real? I am skeptical." (49)

5.2 Boundary Stones

Here, the 'unity of contraries' loses sight of its 'contraries' as the unity conflates—this is contact at a distance. But what closes this distance, conflates the only possible terms of the subject's scenario and yet leaves it rent? The paradox is narrative and metastatic. Kristeva points to these metastases when she describes what she calls the semiotic '*chora*'—a term borrowed from Plato's *Timaeus*, the *chora* is a receptacle that is, in Plato's own words, "a form that is difficult and obscure. What must we suppose its powers and nature to be? In general terms, it is the receptacle and, as it were, the nurse of all becoming and change."[16] This 'receptacle of becoming' is crucial precisely for its inherent ambiguity. As Kristeva points out: "On the one hand, the receptacle is mobile and even contradictory, without unity, separable and divisible: pre-syllable, pre-word... Yet, because this separability and divisibility antecede numbers and forms, the space or receptacle is called

16. Plato, *Timaeus* and *Critias*, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 67

amorphous."[17] For Kristeva, pointing to her interest in Freud, this is articulated by the restriction or repression of drives, which are "'energy' charges as well as 'psychical' marks"—the *chora* is "a nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated."[18] Kristeva differentiates this "uncertain and indeterminate *articulation* from a *disposition*" in that such disposition or positing "already depends on representation, lends itself to phenomenological, spatial intuition, and gives rise to a geometry"[19]—a subject, already. "The *chora*," she argues, "is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it is not a sign); nor is it a *position* that represents someone for another position (i.e., it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, generated in order to attain to this signifying position."[20]

Kristeva identifies a junctural phase in the subject's development that points up this paradox of the subject's simultaneous division and plenitude: "We shall distinguish the semiotic (drives and their articulations) from the realm of signification, which is always that of a proposition or a judgement, in other words, a realm of *positions*."[21] Between the identification of the subject and the objects that predicate it occurs a "rupture and/or boundary", a break "which produces the positing of signification, a *thetic* phase. All enunciation, whether of a word or a sentence, is thetic. It requires

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17. Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 238n13; see also, Kristeva, *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*, trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (London: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 133, 283

18. *Ibid.*, 25. "Plato emphasizes that the receptacle (*ὑπδοχεῖον*), which is also called space (*χώρα*) vis-à-vis reason, is necessary—but not divine since it is unstable, uncertain, ever changing and becoming; it is even unnameable, improbable, bastard.... Why then borrow an ontologized term in order to designate an articulation that antecedes positing? ... the Platonic term makes explicit an insurmountable problem for discourse: once it has been named, that functioning, even if it is pre-symbolic, is brought into a symbolic position. All discourse can do is differentiate, by means of a 'bastard reasoning,' the receptacle from the motility, which, by contrast, is not posited as being 'a *certain* something'.... Is the Platonic *chora* the 'nominability' of rhythm (of repeated succession?" (*ibid.*, 239-40n12)

19. *Ibid.*, 25-26

20. *Ibid.*, 26

21. *Ibid.*, 43. "We understand the term 'semiotic' in its Greek sense: *σημεῖον* = distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or written sign, imprint, figuration.... This modality is the one Freudian psychoanalysis points to in postulating not only the *facilitation* and the structuring *disposition* of drives, but also the so-called *primary processes* which displace and condense both energies and their inscription." (*ibid.*, 25)

an identification; in other words, the subject must separate from and through his image, from and through his objects."[22] Kristeva's thetic phase is the subtle underside of Fichte's 'thetic judgement'—which is the subject's "first truth" in self-positing—because it points to the beginnings of an essential division before that self-positing and that will inhere with the subject. Kristeva quotes Husserl here: "'Every thesis begins with a *point of insertion* [Einsatzpunkt] with a point at which *the positing has its origin* [Ursprungssetzung]; so it is with the first thesis and with each further one in the synthetic nexus.'"[23] The subject—subject now by and to its own self-positing—is simultaneously formed and deformed in its positing. Identity is posited precisely in difference and it is here that the subject first enters the realm of its exile. Later, Kristeva will write that "we are confronted with a limit that turns the speaking being into a separate being who utters only by separating."[24]

Ovid's *first scene* memory of his meeting with the Child is conflated with another of the sight of a wolf's head having been reaped by a hunter: what "was frightening was the way the head had been hacked off, with ropes of dark blood hanging from it and the fur from its throat matted with blood".(10) This violence occurs in narrative contiguity with Ovid's attempt at discerning the origins of the child who, it is conjectured, lived with the wolves. The contiguity here appears as a mark of violence. The memory of the wolf's decapitation is uttered in the same breath, the same space as he questions the origins of his strange creature. "*There really are wolves out there ... I think I heard one howling in the snow. Unless it was the child. And I have seen a wolf's head ...*"(10) Their meeting, their apparent coupling—though at somewhat of a distance (it is after all distance that plays in this narrative of spaces)—suggests more a violent separation: the conclusion of Ovid's first memory at a moment when, as he tells, "my own body began to change as I discovered the first signs of manhood

22. *Ibid.*, 43

23. *Ibid.*, 44

24. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 46

upon me, the child left and did not return though I dreamt of him often enough in those early years, and have done so since."(10) The image issuing from this 'contact at a distance' is simultaneously solid and evanescent, particularly so when conjured in memory. This contact at a distance signals for the subject its own effective absence. As it scans the image of its alterity for itself, it finds that very selfsame subject only in a kind of remote objectivity that appears to announce its positionality from without. Kristeva, turning on the Lacanian extrapolation of the theory of the unconscious, puts it that "we find the thetic phase of the signifying process, around which signification is organized, at two points: the mirror stage and the 'discovery' of castration."[25] Pointing once again to her phenomenological influence, Kristeva speaks of the effectuation of "spatial intuition" in the mirror stage, a spatial apprehension "which is found at the heart of the functioning of signification—in signs and in sentences."[26] This is precisely what Ricoeur has in mind in his phenomenological rendering of Freud: "If intentionality is that remarkable property of consciousness to be consciousness of . . . . , of moving out from itself toward something else, then the act of signifying contains the essence of intentionality."[27] Ricoeur here elaborates on "the empty act of signifying"[28] touched on by Husserl and points, at the same time, to the 'empty' side of the metastases of the Platonic 'chora' taken on by Kristeva. The subject, as it apprehends its alterity is borne by two processes of intentionality: there is a "first intending" in which the subject grasps its object, *apparently* free-standing and stable but which is graspable only in its tenuity; and, "[t]hen, there is a second intending which goes to presence

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25. Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 46

26. *Ibid.*, 46

27. Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 6. "It is important to notice that the first question of phenomenology is: What does signifying signify? Whatever the importance subsequently taken on by the description of perception, phenomenology begins not from what is most silent in the operation of consciousness but from its relationship to things mediated by signs as these are elaborated in a spoken culture. The first act of consciousness is designating or meaning [*Meinen*]. To distinguish signification from signs, to separate it from the word, from the image, and to elucidate the diverse ways in which an empty signification comes to be fulfilled by an intuitive presence, whatever it may be, is to describe signification phenomenologically." (*ibid.*, 6)

28. *Ibid.*, 6

and which resolves itself finally into intuition."[29] It is this intuition in which the subject is posited in its initial self-certainty—the subjective 'metastability' itself borne of "the original dialectic of sense and presence and which is best illustrated by the empty-full relationship..."[30]

From the positing that emerges from the "spatial intuition" of the mirror the subject first grasps itself in a *representation* which, in order to be apprehended at all, must be kept at a distance. For Lacan this is "the dialectic of identifications", in the throes of which the subject first finds its form. "Captation of the image and the drive investment in this image," says Kristeva, "which institute primary narcissism, permit the constitution of object from the semiotic *chora*."[31] The specular image of the mirror inaugurates the "imaged ego" which, for (the Husserlian-Lacanian) Kristeva, "leads to the positing of the object, which is, likewise, separate and signifiable."[32]

> Thus the two separations that prepare the way for the sign are set in place. The sign can be conceived as the voice that is projected from the agitated body (from the semiotic *chora*) onto the facing *imago* or onto the object, which simultaneously detach from the surrounding continuity. Indeed, a child's first holophrastic utterances occur at this time, within what are considered the boundaries of the mirror stage ... On the basis of this positing, which constitutes a *break*, signification becomes established as a digital system with a double articulation combining discrete elements. Language learning can therefore be thought of as an acute and dramatic confrontation between positing-separating-identifying and the motility of the semiotic *chora*.[33]

Separate and signifiable: this is the evanescence of the image that is central to the negativity that is simultaneously central to the positing of subjectivity—the "double, perpetual nihilation"—*the castration*, as Kristeva puts it, that "puts the finishing

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29. *Ibid.*, 6

30. "... described by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* ... This phenomenology of 'sense,' rather than the clumsy hypostatizing of 'significations in themselves' to which the anti-psychologistic polemic occasionally led, constitutes the essential Platonism of the early period." (*ibid.*, 6)

31. Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 48

32. *Ibid.*, 48

33. *Ibid.*, 47

touches on the process of separation that posits the subject as signifiable, which is to say, separate, always confronted by another: *imago* in the mirror (signified) and semiotic process (signifier)."[34]

This otherness is post-partum signification: the otherness signified is that of the full and respondent body of the maternal that "takes the place of all narcissistic, hence imaginary, effects and gratifications; she is, in other words, the phallus."[35] Here is the famous, notorious stumbling block for many a theorist of this "double, perpetual nihilation" that remains veiled ("it can play its role only when veiled"—Lacan) in the apparent plenitude of subjectivity.[36] But, as Kristeva elaborates on Lacan, "[t]he discovery of castration ... detaches the subject from his dependence on the mother, and the perception of this lack [*manque*] makes the phallic function a symbolic function—*the* symbolic function."[37] *It can play its role only when veiled*: again, "that is to say, as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiable is struck, when it is raised (*aufgehoben*) to the function of signifier. The phallus is the signifier of this *Aufhebung* itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance."[38] Lacan has called this disappearance, after Ernest Jones, *aphanisis*: an eclipse or "the *fading* of the subject"[39] suffered as it is subordinated to the strictures of the signifier. The

34. *Ibid.*, 47

35. *Ibid.*, 47

36. "The phallus reveals its function here. In Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a phantasy, if by that we mean an imaginary effect. Nor is it as such an object (part-, internal, good, bad, etc.) in the sense that this term tends to accentuate the reality pertaining in a relation. It is even less the organ, penis or clitoris, that it symbolizes. And it is not without reason that Freud used the reference to the simulacrum that it represented for the Ancients.... That is why the demon of *Αἰδως* (*Scham*, shame) arises at the very moment when, in the ancient mysteries, the phallus is unveiled ... I then becomes the bar which, at the hands of this demon, strikes the signified, marking it as the bastard offspring of this signifying concatenation." (Lacan, "The signification of the phallus", 285-88)

37. Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 47

38. Lacan, "Signification of the phallus", 288. "The fact that the phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the Other that the subject has access to it. But since this signifier is only veiled, as ratio of the Other's desire, it is this desire of the Other as such that the subject must recognize, that is to say, the other in so far as he is himself a subject divided by the signifying *Spaltung*. " (*ibid.*, 288)

39. Lacan, "The Subject and the Other: Alienation", 207-8. Lacan develops the subtle underside of Ernest Jones's designation—which he coined to signal the fear of the disappearance of desire, linked to the fear of castration (Lacan would argue that Jones was in fact alienated from his own discovery)—to show that "*aphanisis* is to be situated in a more radical way at the level at which the subject manifests himself in this movement of

subjective 'splitting' (*Spaltung*) is veiled in its effective transcendence and 'un*seam*ly' closure—it can play its role precisely because its *work*, its sublative process is nowhere to be seen. For Lacan, "the subject designates his being only by barring everything he signifies"[40]—the sublative force of the signifier simultaneously hides that which it elevates to consciousness and in its raised state merely serves to remind the subject that it is, in fact, 'not-all'—the significance only of its inherent failure in the face of the Symbolic (Lacan's 'big Other').

Lacan constructs this *appearance in disappearance* in his famous 'desire graphs' which draw on what he poses as the "question *of* the Other, which comes back to the subject from the place from which he expects an oracular reply in some such form as '*Che voui?*,' 'What do you want?', is the one that best leads him to the path of his own desire..."[41]

> This is what is symbolized by the sigla ($\$ \Diamond o$), which I have introduced in the form of an algorithm; and it is no accident that it breaks the phonematic element constituted by the signifying unity right down to its literal atom. For it is created to allow a hundred and one different readings, a multiplicity that is admissible as long as the spoken remains caught in its algebra.[42]

Here, for Lacan, is the map of the relation of the subject to its alterity and an inadvertent map of that subject's exile. Lacan separates the already barred subject (barred S) from its other ('little *o*'—for Lacan's '*objet petit a*', 'little other') by means of an algorithmic 'losange' ($\Diamond$) that symbolises the integration of "some of the finished products of this dialectic."[43] This lozenge, for Lacan, is to be read as a "functioning rim"[44] on which turns the dialectic of identifications, the sublationary force of which may be seen to precipitate and govern the direction of fantasy. The

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disappearance." [*ibid.*, 208]; see also, Lacan "Signification of the Phallus", 283; and, Lacan, "Subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious", 313)

40. Lacan, "Signification of the Phallus", 288
41. Lacan, "Subversion of the subject", 312
42. *Ibid.*, 313
43. Lacan, "The Subject and the Other: Alienation", 209
44. *Ibid.*, 209

lozenge too is split, invisibly, so as to point to the very possibility of this dialectical slippage implicit in the "hundred and one different readings" in this relation of the subject to alterity. Lacan splits the quadrilateral unit into a '∨', the lower half of this unit of his algorithm, indicating what he calls a '*vel*'—the Latin conjunction *either/or*. The emphasis here, for Lacan, is not on the outcome—the synthesis—but the very conjunction itself, the slash that simultaneously joins as it separates. "Alienation consists in this *vel*, which ... condemns the subject to appearing only in that division ... if it appears on the one side as meaning, produced by the signifier, it appears on the other as *aphanisis*."[45] This conjunction implies choice—one can *either* go there, *or* go there—but Lacan raises the term from this everyday meaning of the word to render it somewhat more threatening. The choice offered in the demand "*Your freedom or your life!*" leaves little choice at all: "If he chooses freedom, he loses both immediately—if he chooses life, he has life deprived of freedom."[46] Lacan finds refuge for the definition of his "alienating *vel*" in Hegel's dialectical struggle of labour: "the production of the primary alienation, that by which man enters into the way of slavery."[47] Heath sums up this "*vel* of alienation": "As active break, the unconscious is finally not so much a position as an *edge*, the junction of division between subject and Other, a process interminably closing."[48]

The sigla ($\$ \lozenge o$): map of fantasy and map of exile—it is in this "*vel* of alienation" that the subject of exile takes on its mien. Working from Lacan's desire graph, Žižek

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45. *Ibid.*, 210. "The subject is grounded in the *vel* of the first essential operation .... we call *alienation*." (*ibid.*, 210) Elsewhere Lacan defines this algorithmic unit: " I have been able to articulate the unconscious for you as being situated in the gaps that the distribution of the signifying investments sets up in the subject, and which figure in the algorithm in the form of a losange [◊], which I place at the centre of any relation of the unconscious between reality and the subject." ("The Partial Drive and its Circuit", *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, 181)

46. *Ibid.*, 212

47. *Ibid.*, 212

48. Stephen Heath, "Notes on Suture", 49. "In the separation of the subject, its passage, is given the *encroachment* of the unconscious, the permanent action of the edge: one lack covers another (the originating division of the subject in the signifier run over by the divisions—the gaps, the desire—to which the subject replies in the signifier), which indeed is the whole expense of the subject, thenceforth held in the ceaselessly displacing join of symbolic and imaginary, the very *drama*." (*ibid.*, 54)

argues that while it is now axiomatic that the "Lacanian subject is divided, crossed-out, identical to a lack in a signifying chain ... the most radical dimension of Lacanian theory ... is in realizing that the big Other, the symbolic order itself, is also *barré*, crossed-out, by a fundamental impossibility, structured around an impossible/traumatic kernel, around a central lack."[49] He points out that without this inherent structural and symbolic lack the signifying system would be necessarily a closed circuit, allowing for no possibility of the subjective slippage in fact necessary for its primary alienation. "So it is precisely this lack in the Other," argues Žižek, "which enables the subject to achieve a kind of 'de-alienation' called by Lacan *separation.*"[50] Here the separation is not that experienced by the subject of its essential barring from its object by language, "but that *the object is separated from the Other itself*, that the Other itself 'hasn't got it', hasn't got the final answer—that is to say, is in itself blocked, desiring; that there is also a desire of the Other."[51]This allows for a certain identification, according to Žižek, of a lack with a lack, thus avoiding total subjective alienation. Such total alienation would of course be untenable—it would allow for no subjective synthesis or thetic positing which is central to the very constitution of the subject. But Žižek here is working with Lacan, against the vulgarisation of this alienated identity[52]—and what he points to is the importance of the workings of fantasy in this slippage of the "*vel* of alienation". "The function of fantasy," he argues, "is to serve as a screen concealing this inconsistency .... to fill the opening in the Other, to conceal its inconsistency—as for instance the fascinating presence of some sexual scenario serving as a screen to mask the impossibility of the sexual relationship."[53] Fantasy works the "functioning rim" of

49. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 122

50. *Ibid.*, 122

51. *Ibid.*, 122

52. "One has to admit," says Lacan with a good degree of ironic venom for the philosophers of existence, of the purveyors of the 'affectability' of modern consciousness, "that there is a lot of this alienation about these days. Whatever one does, one is always a bit more alienated, whether in economics, politics, psych-pathology, aesthetics, and so on. It may be no bad thing to see what the root of this celebrated alienation really is." (Lacan, "The Subject and the Other: Alienation", 209)

53. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 123

the dialectic of identifications, seeking plenitude where there is the possibility of failure. This is the true work of the exile. The subject of the modern consciousness—the poetic consciousness of affectability—is the seeker of the void that will counter its own, similarly tenuous, plenitude.[54] Likewise, this is the fantasy of the marginalist who seeks to fill the perceived void in their identification with the third world other when the void is truly that of the first world Other, which stalks them with a plenitude at complete odds with their shifting guilt and affectability. This is the fantasy of exile.

5.3 Screen, memory

Jacques-Alain Miller elaborates on this (Lacanian) drive to complete the perceived lack by means of the term "suture" which, he argues, "names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in. For, while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent ... it implies the position of a taking-the-place-of."[55] The subject who says 'I' announces its place in that chain at the same time as it opens a distance between itself and that signification—the subject of the 'enounced' and the subject of the enunciation "are always in the distances of the symbolic, the subject not one in its representation in language."[56] From the suturing emerges the ego—"the *me*: 'it's me!', the little linguistic scenario of the ego"[57]—precisely the drive to fill the void by

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54. "Affectability! A vanity spawned by fear." This is the salutary cry of a truly alienated figure in the hot sun of the Australian outback (an English doctor, drunk with beer and classical education) to a 'borderline alien' (a quasi-intellectual school teacher) stranded in the Australian outback in Canadian Ted Kotcheff's 1970 film of Australian Kenneth Cook's novel *Wake in Fright*.

55. Jacques-Alain Miller, "Suture (elements of the logic of the signifier)", *Screen*, Vol.18, #4 (1977-78): 24. "It is important that you realise that the logician, like the linguist, also sutures at his particular level. And, quite as much, anyone who says 'I'." (*ibid.*, 26) Here, the reference to Benveniste is clear. Benveniste would say: "It is by identifying himself as a unique person pronouncing *I* that each speaker sets himself up in turn as the 'subject'....The 'subjectivity' we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as 'subject' .... 'Ego' is he who *says* 'ego'." (Emile Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek [Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971], 220-24)

56. Heath, "Notes on Suture", 55

57. *Ibid.*, 56. "The ego is not to be confused with the subject: it is the fixed point of imaginary projection and identification, where the subject as such is always on the side of the symbolic, the latter the order of its very constitution; but then, precisely, there is no ego without a subject, terrain of its necessity and its hold: function of the symbolic, suture is towards the imaginary, the moment of junction—standing in, a taking place, a something, a *some one there*." (*ibid.*, 56)

means of a certain fantasy structure that, while born of the exilic reaches of lack, seeks a *heimlich* plenitude. On his 'desire graph', Lacan speaks of a certain "anchoring point" (*point de capiton*) or symbolic underpinning which holds the subject in its place of signification—here is the means "by which the signifier stops the otherwise endless movement (*glissement*) of the signification."[58] The anchoring, or quilting point serves to 'stitch' the subject into the signifying chain by means of a certain archaic—perhaps '*choral*'— and intentional gravity. A pre-symbolic remnant (unsignified, resisting signification because unsignifiable) eludes the subject's apprehension and, according to Lacan, "tries to bury it in the mass of the pre-text."[59] Emerging from its "pre-symbolic intention (marked △)" into the signifying chain, the subject (now subject by and to this very emergence) is quilted by its own unknowable pre-symbolism:

> The product of this quilting (what 'comes out on the other side' after the mythical—real—intention goes through the signifier and steps out of it) is the subject marked by the matheme $ (the divided, split subject, and at the same time the effaced signifier, the lack of signifier, the void, an empty space in the signifier's network).[60]

But this split subject finds some consolation in the sentence that utters its existence. The sentence serves to hold the subject in its diachronic functioning, the emergence of the 'temporal dialectic', "even if the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect."[61] Žižek takes this 'emergency' further, arguing that

> This minimal articulation already attests to the fact that we are dealing with the process of *interpellation of individuals* (this pre-symbolic, mythical entity—with Althusser, too, the 'individual' which is interpellated into the subject is not conceptually defined, it is simply a hypothetical X which must be presupposed) *into subjects*. The *point de capiton* is the point through the

58. Lacan, "Subversion of the subject", 303

59. *Ibid.*, 303

60. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 101. "The signifier doesn't just provide an envelope, a receptacle for meaning. It polarizes it, structures it, and brings it into existence." (Lacan, "The quilting point", *The Psychoses*, 260)

61. Lacan, "The subversion of the subject", 303

> subject is 'sewn' to the signifier, and at the same time the point which interpellates individual into subject by addressing it with the call of a certain master-signifier ('Communism', 'God', 'Freedom', 'America')—in a word, it is the point of the subjectification of the signifier's chain.[62]

While the quilting in effect processes the subject *as* subject and effects a totalising superstructure for the new agent of signification, it is ever-beholden, through its necessary and unconscious retroaction or regression, to its "pre-symbolic intention" (marked △). Malouf's Ovid's epilogue is nothing if not a pasting over this void *a priori* his exile proper (*propre*). The *distance* opened between the poet and the Child (the wild child will find itself alternately capitalised and not), the poet and his brother, from his earliest memories by the olive groves of their father's farm and, perhaps most importantly, the poet and *woman*, the women of his life who are almost completely elided, are the stuff of this fantasy of exile. These are the "traumatic impossibilities" which, for the poet Malouf-Ovid, cannot be symbolised but which must, in any case, be screened. Freud speaks of these scenes of screening:

> In these scenes of childhood, whether in fact they they prove to be true or falsified, what one sees invariably includes oneself as a child, with a child's shape and clothes ... the so-called earliest childhood memories we possess not genuine memory-trace but a later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the influences of a variety of later psychical forces.[63]

The subject is reconstructed through the narrativisation of a process that goes way before its depicted emergence. But this process is enacted, or re-enacted in the course of their *narrative* exile and, in the pages of fiction, we hear tell of the story of an *originary* one—as Bachelard might have it, these transliterated thoughts "correspond to what we are obliged to call *invented childhood*, with which novels abound."[64] This

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62. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 101

63. Freud, "Childhood and Screen Memories", *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, trans. and ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Ernest Benn, 1960), 47-48. "Thus the 'childhood memories' of individuals come in general to acquire the significance of 'screen memories' and in doing so offer a remarkable analogy with the childhood memories that a nation preserves in its store of legends and myths." (*ibid.*,48)

64. Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 138. "For novelists often return to an invented childhood which has not been experienced to recount events whose naivety is also invented. This unreal past projected through literary means into a time that precedes the story, often conceals the actuality of a daydream which would assume all its phenomenological value if it were presented in really actual naiveté. But the verbs to be and to write are hard to reconcile." (*ibid.*, 138) The empirical validity of this 'experience' is not in question—the fact that it is recounted at all is. It is precisely this reconciliation—between *ontology* and *narrative*—or, indeed, its difficulty, that is at play here.

invented childhood is a kind of safe-house for the poet-exile—it is the space of the voyeur who craves closeness but who "is very careful to maintain a gulf, an empty space, between the object and the eye, the object and his own body; his look fastens the object at the right distance ... the voyeur represents in space the fracture which forever separates him from the object."[65] While the cinematic reflection is somewhat less subtle than that of a reflection where no screen, no scene or stage is evident—the contemplations of everyday life—there are times during such a screening where the distance closes and fantasy takes over—times when the viewer-voyeur is unaware of their relation to the screen and the image there projected. But the relation viewer-voyeur is itself founded on an essential distance, the voyeur being the quintessential being of distances, bringing into relief the unconscious fantasies of the simple, reflexive lumpen viewer who closes distance in order to be.

As Žižek points out, "fantasy is, in the last resort, always a fantasy of the sexual relationship, a staging of it. As such, fantasy is not to be interpreted, only 'traversed': all we have to do is experience how there is nothing 'behind' it, and how fantasy masks precisely this nothing."[66] Fantasy masks the dialectical, antagonistic workings of the "*vel* of alienation"—the dialectic of identifications which is in itself exilic—"In other words, *fantasy is a means for an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance.*"[67] Here is the fantasy of exile—a fantasy of a certain traversal of an indeterminate subjective distance, of incorporation. This is why Freud's Little Hans "is afraid of the unnameable."[68]

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65. Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier*, 60

66. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 126

67. *Ibid.*, 126

68. Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, 34. "What is striking in the case of Hans, as little as he may be, what Freud does not cease to be astonished by, is his stupendous verbal skill: he assimilates and reproduces language with impressive eagerness and talent. So eager is he to name everything that he runs into the unnameable—street sounds, ... horses in front of the house, the intensity with which his father ... is interested in his body ... the somewhat elusive, somewhat frail presence of his mother... It all becomes necessarily crystallized in the epistemophilic experience of Hans who wants to know himself and to know everything; to know in particular, what seems to be lacking in his mother or could be lacking in himself." (*ibid.*, 34)

5.4 Closure, [dis]closure

Nicolas Poussin's famous painting *The Arcadian Shepherds* (c.1655)[69] points to this indeterminate subjective distance and, it may be argued, is a depiction, by means of the most formal perspectival rendering, of a return to the subject's "pre-symbolic intention" (marked △). The painting depicts three shepherds, and something of a knowing Muse, who come upon a tomb in a grove in the Arcadian province with the inscription '*Et in Arcadia Ego*'. The shepherds this trace this inscription with their fingers as the only female in the picture—the one who is supposed to know—looks on, her hand benevolently placed on the shoulder of one of the readers. "How are we to translate the inscription: 'Even in Arcady, I am' or 'I too was born or lived in Arcady'? In the first case, it is Death itself that writes the inscription on the tomb; in the second, it is a dead shepherd who has written his epitaph."[70] The Peloponnesian Garden of putative idyll and natural perfection, Arcadia comes to represent both sides of Lacan's desire graph simultaneously. The overdetermined inscription is what lures these subject's to its reading: "Once more our reading is led to that central locus, a syncope or break between the two groups of figures, a locus and a moment of narrative transformation which is filled up by the inscription 'Et in Arcadia Ego.'"[71] But here translation and overdetermination converge on the very same vanishing point—again, the formalisation of the infinite, the masking of its own impossibility. Death—the reflective Muse of the tableau—is the potential fading (*aphanisis*) or absence that points to the 'pre-symbolic intention' (marked △).

But the significance of this painting, particularly the significance of its overdetermined 'translation', is precisely that it exposes the quilting point of the subject. At the height of its formalised rendering—perspectival space, signification—the image exposes the fact that the quilting point may not hold. This classicist formalism (formulation) heightens the tension between the signifying chain

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69. There are two versions of Poussin's painting, *Et In Arcadia Ego* (c. 1630), the Chatsworth Collection, England, and *The Arcadian Shepherds* (c.1655), the Louvre, France. My point of reference is to the latter.

70. Louis Marin, "Toward a Theory of Reading in the Visual Arts: Poussin's *The Arcadian Shepherds*", *The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation*, eds. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 319

71. *Ibid.*, 319

and the possibility of its dissolution—as Barthes would have it, "its collapse, its fall"—before the very subject it constitutes. The quilting point cannot hold, it is in the midst of metastability. Death (absence, void, break) stalks the Garden, the reflection, and all who would seek meaning—Death is the essence of the subject and inheres in any translation of the inscription, any inscription. Exile is this very reflection depicted in Arcadia and it is, no doubt, a reflective fantasy, a play at the bounds of the metaphysical question.

Donald Cammell and Nicolas Roeg's 1970 film *Performance* too turns on this metaphysical question. Chas (James Fox), a working-class pug in the pay of a kind of Kray brothers conflation, finds himself in a sort of Arcadian Chelsea flat as he goes on the lam from south London mobsters. Here he meets Turner (Mick Jagger) and a coterie of nymph-like women who occupy the Garden of Earthly Delights in which he seeks refuge. Chas poses as a 'performer' like his reluctant host, the proselytised Turner, failed rock star turned would-be prophet.

Turner begins to pick at the respective quilting points of himself and Chas, by means of drugs, poetry, myth and music. As Turner decides it's "Time for a change", Chas begins a reluctant metamorphosis with the aid of slipped drugs and seduction. He is fellated by Turner's Muse (Anita Pallenberg) as Turner himself mouths an aphorism: "Nothing is true, everything is permitted." These, according to Turner, are the "last words of the Old Man of the Mountain".

> The Old Man was called in the language of Persia, Hassan i Sabbah, and his people were called the *hashishin*. He had caused a valley between two mountains to be enclosed and turned into a garden, so large and beautiful his people believed it was Paradise. And there was a fortress at the entrance, strong enough to resist all the world. Now the Old Man, who had caused those of his young men who he had chosen to be his *hashishin*—his assassins!—to be given a potion that cast them into a deep sleep, and to be carried into the Garden so that when they awoke they believed they were in Paradise. And there were damsels and young girls there who dallied with them to their hearts' content so that they had what young men desire. Thus it was that when the Old Man decided to send one of his assassins upon a mission, such as to have prince slain, he would send for one of these youths and say: "Go thou and kill. And when thou returneth, my Angels shall bear thee into Paradise. And shouldst

> thou die, nevertheless I will send my Angels to carry thee back into Paradise." They enjoyed their work.[72]

These words find their inspiration in William Burroughs's 'translation' of the story of Hassan i Sabbah as told him by him by his 'cut-up' companion Brion Gysin. Hassan i Sabbah was something of a fallen deity and political agitator who lived a reclusive life atop a mountain fortress called Alamout about the 11th century in what is present day Iran. As 'master of the assassins', this figure appealed to Burroughs—as much as Gysin himself—as a certain figure of rupture who would, in his words, "*rub out the word forever.*"[73] While Hassan i Sabbah's Garden is apparently nihilist, his *topos* is essentially defensive, a fortified place of retreat where, possessed in contemplation, the Old Man merely repeats his own metaphysical rendering. He attempts an inversion of his perspective—his retreat is reflected in the outward missions, projections of his assassins, from *inside.* His assassin's forays are attacks on his own space reflected, their hostile perspective serves only to reinforce *his* armour, to reinforce *his* quilting point in the realm of positions. The Old Man of the Mountain is the quintessential marginalist—forged on the fantasy of rupture and alienation his lament should be translated as "Nothing is permitted. What is true?" His ontology is *performance* which is itself the frightening work of the *vel* of the subject's alienation—the Garden whose bounds cannot hold.[74]

Nietzsche's Zarathustra too is Persian and founder of a religion which also turns on the notion of truth. Nietzsche asks, since none will ask of him,

> what the name Zarathustra means in precisely my mouth, in the mouth of the first immoralist: for what constitutes the tremendous uniqueness of that Persian in history is precisely the opposite of this. Zarathustra was the first to see in the struggle between good and evil the actual wheel in the working of

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72. *Performance.* Scr. Donald Cammell, Dir. Donald Cammell and Nicolas Roeg. 1970

73. William. S. Burroughs, "Nova Express", *A William Burroughs Reader,* ed. John Calder (London: Picador, 1982), 202. Burroughs spells out the metaphysical construct with the following penetrating question: "What scared you all into time? Into body? Into shit? I will tell you: '*the word*' ... Prisoner, come out. The great skies are open. I Hassan i Sabbah *rub out the word forever.*" (*ibid.*, 202-3)

74. Under the influence of quality mushrooms and the musicating rhythms of Turner's tale, Chas touches on his 'pre-symbolic intention' and his potential fading (*aphanisis*) as Pherber (Anita Pallenberg) reposes after fellating him. Wiping her mouth, she asks: "Are you in that Garden?" "Yeah" replies Chas. "Stay there!" she advises: "Never trust old men, old showmen, old wankers!"

> things: the translation of morality into the realm of metaphysics, as force, cause, end-in-itself, is *his* work... His teaching, and his alone, upholds truthfulness as the supreme virtue.... To tell the truth and *to shoot straight with arrows*: that is Persian virtue.—Have I been understood? The self-overcoming of morality through truthfulness, the self-overcoming of the moralist into his opposite—*into me*—that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth.[75]

Where Hassan i Sabbah is holed up in his fortress, descending only vicariously through his assassins to take vengeance out on those he believed a threat, Zarathustra 'goes down' into the 'rabble' from his mountain cave to show that without truth, there is nothing. Where Hassan i Sabbah wreaks vengeance, Zarathustra descends so "*that man may be freed from the bonds of revenge*: that is the bridge to my highest hope and a rainbow after protracted storms."[76]

This 'rainbow after protracted storms', however, traverses more than the violence implicit in revenge. Nietzsche-Zarathusta actually picks at the quilting point and, lifting the veil of metaphysics, doesn't like what he sees. Turner puts it to Chas: "The only performance that makes it, that *really* makes it, that makes it all the way, is the one that achieves madness." This is the alternative to the bondage of signification. Nietzsche (like Lacan here) *plays* at the *vel* of alienation and *works* at the telic and metaphysical promise of the rainbow, putting faith in neither. This is not an idealism which, argues Nietzsche, is the cowardice of he "who takes flight in the face of reality",[77] but a savage realism that, to reiterate Žižek, traverses the metaphysical fantasy of division, of separation, to experience that "there is nothing 'behind' it, and how fantasy masks precisely this nothing. This is his symptomatology—to shoot straight with arrows.

But this symptomology can only, *in the last instance*, point to the 'functioning rim' of subjective closure. It cannot excede it. And in the pointing, resides precisely *the fantasy of exile* (Δ)

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75. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 97-98
76. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 123
77. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 98

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