

***Moral Accountability in the MBA:
A Kantian response to a public problem***

Dissertation for the award of

Doctor of Education (Ed.D)

from

The University of Technology, Sydney (UTS)

Walter Patrick Jarvis

2009

Supervisor: Professor Carl Rhodes

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements & dedication	v
Abstract	ix
A preface of hope in ‘friendship’	xi
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION: Moral accountability in the MBA	
1. Introduction and context	1
2. Legal and legislative approaches to accountability	5
3. Concerns for the public good and social-moral impacts	7
4. Globalisations’ fault-lines	9
5. Public roles of universities	11
6. Fiduciary tensions	16
7. Personal background to this dissertation	17
8. A view from the balcony	28
9. Questions framing this dissertation	28
10. An outline of the dissertation	30
11. In closing	31
12. Summary and conclusion	33

PART A: RESEARCHING A FORMATIVE-PUBLIC PROBLEM IN THE MBA

Chapter 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: to address the problem of social-moral *salience* in the MBA

1. Introduction	36
2. Questions for this empirical phase	37
a. First qualification: this research is not about building theory	39
3. Methodology: <i>Phronesis</i> over Problem-based methodology (PBM)	40
a. <i>Phronesis</i> and methodology	45
b. Second qualification: A licence to work with tensions	48
4. Case Study as method	49
a. Ethnographic case study?	51
b. <i>Phronesis</i> and the case study method	52
5. Case Study details	54
a. Research sample: to explore significant themes	54

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

b. Data-collection methods: to enable plausible interpretations	55
c. Data Analysis and Synthesis: toward a worthwhile argument related to the literature	57
d. Ethical considerations	58
e. Issues of trustworthiness: a resonating alternative	58
f. Limitations of the study	61
6. Conclusion	61

Chapter 3: A CASE STUDY on the *salience* of social-moral impacts of management decisions in an Australian EMBA program.

1. Introduction	63
2. Background	63
3. First phase: The EMBA curriculum review	64
a. Analysis of Curriculum Review Process	69
4. Second phase: The Interviews with EMBA Students and Academics	73
a. Student interviews	73
b. Interviews with Academics: 'Professor Jones' and 'Dr. Jim'	83
5. Summary of analysis	97
6. Conclusion	99

Chapter 4: LITERATURE REVIEW: A Critical Review of the Management Studies Literature on the *integration* of the ethical dimension in the MBA

1. Introduction	102
2. Questions framing the critical review of the management literature	105
3. The ethical dimension in university-based management education: a broad view	107
4. An historical context on professionalising management: Khurana	109
5. Selections from the Management Learning literature	112
6. Critical Management Studies/Education (CMS/E)	114
1. What defines the CMS identity and its concerns?	114
2. CMS and ethics generally (in management education)	115
3. CMS and Business Ethics: Jones et al	125
a. Bowie's distortions of Kantian ethics exacerbates foreclosure problems	127
7. Ethical economics	130
8. Themes and a brief for Part B	132
9. Conclusion	135

**PART B: A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO
A FORMATIVE-PUBLIC PROBLEM IN THE MBA**

**Chapter 5: A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO A FORMATIVE PROBLEM IN THE
MBA: Kant's two-part moral anthropology – Part One: A modest metaphysics
of justice**

1. Introduction	139
2. A Kantian metaphysics of justice – a propaedeutic for moral accountability	
2.1 Why metaphysics?	139
(a) Korner: immanent metaphysics	142
(b) Flikschuh: indispensable metaphysics	144
2.2 Why a metaphysics of justice?	146
3. <i>Scope</i> of Kant's metaphysics of justice: cosmopolitan and intelligent	146
3.1 Justice and intelligent accountability	146
3.2 Cosmopolitan justice	147
3.3 A Kantian metaphysics of justice	148
4. <i>Mode</i> of Kant's metaphysics of justice: action-guiding principles and public reasoning	148
4.1 Kantian based action-guiding principles of justice	148
4.2 Justice-oriented public reasoning and deliberation: intelligent accountability	151
5. <i>Content</i> of Kant's metaphysics of justice: second-person standpoint and the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative	152
5.1 The second-person standpoint and moral accountability	152
5.2 The humanity formulation of Kant's categorical imperative	155
6. Conclusion to the first part of Kant's moral anthropology	158

**Chapter 6: A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO A FORMATIVE PROBLEM IN THE
MBA: Kant's two-part moral anthropology – Part Two: Anthropology-
Philosophy of experience**

1. Introduction	159
2. Reflective orientation	160
3. Kant's anthropology	162
4. Kant's 'is' versus 'ought': opening a mediating role for the creative power of imagination and motivation	164

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

4.1 The mediating, transforming role of creative imagination	165
5. Kant's provisional politics	168
6. Cultivating character	169
7. An evaluation of Kant's moral anthropology for the formative problem	171

Chapter 7: A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO A FORMATIVE PROBLEM IN THE MBA: a pedagogical approach

1. Introduction	174
2. University learning: discernment and meaning	176
3. Justice-based capabilities	181
4. Kantian ideas in management education: reflective judgments in situations of 'hot action'	183
5. Arendt's ideas on narrative as relevant for public reflective judgment	188
5.1 Narrative and the cultivation of reflective judgment	189
5.2 Public reasoning and judging in public	192
6. Towards an ethical commonwealth	192
7. Two illustrations of cultivating reflective moral judgment for intelligent accountability	196
a. Tri-Star	196
b. Wil Quinane	199
8. Conclusion	206

Chapter 8: CONCLUSION: a radical alternative to management education

1. Introduction	208
2. A Kantian pedagogy <i>for</i> moral accountability?	212
3. Challenges and questions will define public relevance	215
4. But is ' <i>management</i> ' key to the formative problem?	218
5. Conclusion: <i>celebrate</i> the formative problem via a radical approach	221
Exhibit 1: A Kantian pedagogical framework preparing graduates for <i>Intelligent</i> Accountability	211

Works cited	224
--------------------	-----

Acknowledgements & Dedication

This dissertation has been an exceptionally demanding and rewarding experience. But it has also been too one-sided as it has tried the patience of good friends and members of my family. It is time to at least try to make amends. This is the purpose of acknowledgements and it is easy to see why this section serves such an essential role. Without this vehicle few writers would be able to return to life, let alone be let back in. I have much to do to warrant re-entry.

Many academics have been wonderful sources of encouragement on this journey but none more than Carl Rhodes and John Garrick — my original supervisors and in John's case the first teacher and academic I encountered in adult learning. To Carl and John I am indeed grateful for such generous support and the bonus of warm friendship. Carl is the embodiment of collegial support as insisting on rigorous academic standards. I could not have asked for a more generous nor appropriately demanding academic advisor. From the UTS Faculty of Education for more than a decade of encouragement and inspirational belief: in particular from Alison Lee, who was from the outset an uplifting and demanding supporter. In their different but crucially valuable ways both Jenny Hammond and Margaret McGrath have been 'true believers' – Jenny in the educative merit of my project, Margaret in ensuring I follow the university's processes and meet expectations. I thank the head of the School of Management at UTS, Anne Ross-Smith, as an early supporter. Sami Hasan is a dear colleague who not only 'understood' but through many hours of discussion believed most in what I was striving to do.

I am deeply grateful for the generous measures of insight, comment and encouragement from Martin Parker, Stephen Cohen and Edward Wray-Bliss. Others of my academic colleagues offering sustained encouragement include: Bronwen Dalton, Jonathan Pratt, Graham Pratt, Jenny Green, Ray Gordon, Antoine Hermens, Thomas Clarke, Robyn Johns and Tyrone Pitsis. I am grateful too for collegial sustenance from Jenny Tomkins, Peggy Hui, Sandra Chia, and Kerry Levi. They have shared some of the joys and tribulations along the way. For generous correspondence during some of the critical phases: Felicitas Munzel, Katrin Flikschuh and Angelica Nuzzo, plus John Kekes for early and sustained inspiration. This correspondence was one of the unanticipated joys of working on this dissertation. To the numerous students and participants in management programs over the last 15 years — many of whom have endured various false starts and iterations of this journey: thank you for your honest engagement.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

I dedicate this work to my parents Belinda and Maurice Jarvis and to my family – my wife Andy, daughter Sally, son Tim, my brothers Paul, Mike and Richard and to my uncle, Max Jarvis.

For my parents education in all forms was a passionately held commitment, calling for many sacrifices for their four boys. I am sure my late Renaissance father would have been especially interested (he would likely say “tickled pink”) to see how his convictions about injustice, integrity and courage eventually found their way into my thinking. Such is the formative gestation of unconditional love from both a gorgeous mother and father unstinting in their generosity and silent in their myriad sacrifices.

Beyond those formative roots my wife Andy is at the centre of this extended work. This labour of love has taken its toll in terms of time and priorities; through firstly a masters degree and then this doctorate. These studies have been undertaken on what is euphemistically called a part-time basis. When added to other essential activities they seem to become full-time and when consuming some 15 years they constitute what others would call overtime. Andy has sacrificed much and I am beyond doing justice in words to her love and support. Now it is time for some holidays and simply being with the centre and love of my life for now 38 years. A quite different and special thanks is extended to my beloved sister-in-law Robyn (‘Bob’) Guthrie. Bob has been ‘a rock’ and a believer. She has also been a loving sister-in-law who is thankfully ‘joined-at-the-hip’ with Andy, leaving them to joyously pursue activities together and with friends during my excessive absences.

I thank family and friends for their support and encouragement. I am indeed fortunate to have been encouraged by some in particular. Firstly, my much loved brothers, each of whom understood the parental influences behind these endeavours. Paul, Mike and Rich have been witnessing all this unfold; well, perhaps more figuratively via a prized photo in my office. Max (Francis Bede) Jarvis is a dear uncle and an educator of renown in his own right. At every birthday and Christmas during my youth Max nourished the habit of reading with gifts of books. He will be pleased to know that those seeds have taken firm root – with this dissertation as one major harvest.

Other family and close connections were increasingly valued sources of support through this saga. Both Sally and Tim have been a source of joy and inspiration in

just listening and being so strong in believing in this work. I am profoundly proud of them as good people who care deeply about each other, their own and extended families and their friends; they have developed those dispositions directly from their mother. Two cherished 'close connections' have also shared the latter stages of this project with gentle encouragement: daughter-in-law extraordinaire Jude Jarvis, and Matt Bookallil, gifted educator, emerging scholar and son-in-law. Indeed during the final stages of completing this work two new families have begun, presenting precious grandchildren to strengthen those bonds of family affection: Scarlett Francesca (in Singapore) and Angus Walter (in Sydney). By extension and as always, grandchildren serve to heighten essential generational sensitivities and imagined retrospectively relevant accountabilities. Those sensitivities and accountabilities are thankfully more conspicuously both deeply personal and global in scope and impact.

Secondly, much prized encouragement came from very special friends who also 'understood' (with all the subtleties implied): Humphrey Armstrong, Di Derenzie, Simon Tregoning, Russell Trood, David Leonard and Dexter Dunphy. This work is testimony to their understanding and friendship. Many other good friends supported in general and equally vital terms - even if at times some were more than a little mystified as to the motivation at this stage of life - let alone the direction this has taken and above all the time it has consumed away from Andy. I thank them for their love and friendship over now for most many decades — not least to Andy in my 'absence': Pete and Leigh Maloney, Julia Tregoning, Dale Trood, Robbie Leonard, Bill and Anne Grose, Richard and Rosalie Harpham, Keith and Isabel Bainbridge, Geoff and Kirsty Glenwright, Len and Barb Antcliff, Shawn and Roseanna Clifford, Pat Goodman, Tony Jollye and the Bellantonio family. Finally I am fortunate to acknowledge a unique group of people from the Riverview College community as dear friends who expressed support for my studies for well over a decade. To successive College Council Chairs: Peter Joseph, Neville Harpham and Paul Robertson. To Rectors Chris Gleeson SJ, Andy Bullen SJ and Headmaster Shane Hogan. To fellow Councilors who also 'understood': Nina Reimer, Jenny Gribble, Brendan Hannelly, John Hannelly, Gabrielle Trainor, Kerry James and Sr. Margaret Beirne. While impossible I would nevertheless like to thank each individually. This has been a richly rewarding journey — not least for realising how impossible it would have been without the support and affection of so many. I hope that what has been gained along the way justifies the sacrifices made by so many good friends and cherished family.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

I thank the above circle of family, friends, students and faculty for enabling me the time and opportunity to better understand — *and respond to* — what I see as a major *public* problem in management education. Because of the response effort it has taken far longer and made more demands on others than I ever imagined. Thankfully the felicitous result is a deep need to do further work on this problem – an ambition to be pursued without imposing anything like the demands from those named. After all, I do seek re-entry into that circle. Thank you.

Sydney

25th March 2009

Abstract

We live in an age of public accountability. For university-based business schools, housed within institutions with responsibilities for fostering public wellbeing, public accountability represents major challenges. The specific challenge of this dissertation is interpreting that accountability in *moral*, as opposed to legal or bureaucratic terms. Much of the academic attention to public accountability has focused on the legal aspects of compliance and regulation. The systemic nature of the educative-formative problem of moral accountability argued herein is especially evident inside postgraduate management education. I argue that nascent ideas of moral accountability foreground a systemic and inescapable challenge to the legitimacy of the now ubiquitous Masters of Business Administration (MBA) within university-based management education.

Illustrating the formative-educative problem via a case study at an Australian university and drawing on a critical review of the management studies literature I argue that current approaches to meeting those public responsibilities are at risk of being marginal at best. This is a view increasingly recognised by those within the management studies field already committed to redressing amoral management theory and practice. Efforts to professionalise management by bringing management studies inside universities have long been abandoned in favour of following *market logic* — a predominantly financially driven logic that is formatively *amoral* — thus exposing universities' moral legitimacy to rising public skepticism, if not acute and justifiable concern.

Beyond the professionalisation efforts and the compliance mentality of corporate governance and *against* the commonplace smorgasbord approach to business ethics (foreclosing engagement with larger and relevant political, ethical and philosophical dimensions) I *argue for* cultivating a specific capability for management graduates - one area that will yield considerable philosophical scope and pedagogical options while meeting the university's public responsibility. I make a case for *cultivating reflective judgment* on matters of moral accountability (and specifically at the individual level) as a defining capability in management studies — a capability that is worthy of public trust in universities.

To that end I argue for a *Kantian approach* to cultivating reflective moral

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

accountability. The scope of this approach is *global*, the mode is *action-guiding principles* under public scrutiny, where *reverence* for individual human dignity is at its base: a civic or enlightened accountability, oriented to earning and warranting public trust, by individuals and through institutions. Kantian *hope* in a cosmopolitan ethical commonwealth sustains practical-idealist commitment to cultivating this capability.

This Kantian approach is shaped by Kant's grossly under-recognised moral anthropology: a composite of a modest metaphysical framework of justice intersecting with his almost completely ignored philosophy of experience/anthropology. The pedagogical approach developed here is based on Kant's moral anthropology and notion of maturity. It is oriented to deeply experiential organic learning as university-based preparation for reflective moral-judgment in pressured, complex situations of uncertainty. The aim here is fostering ideas on approaching what is problematic not to develop a comprehensive theory of moral accountability in the MBA. Taken together this Kantian response sees *paideia* as central to the public role of university education, and as such represents a radical challenge to seemingly unassailable assumptions of authority in management theory and practice.

I follow a *phronesis* approach in this research, a perspective on knowledge that views the social sciences as categorically different from the natural sciences, calling less for universal laws and more for knowledge drawing on *wisdom* and *moral judgment* derived through extensive experience. Flyvbjerg's *phronetic* approach to the social sciences guides the case study, influences the selection of perspectives in both the literature review and the Kantian considerations. I approach this educative-formative problem out of liberal-humanist, social-contract traditions.

A preface of hope in ‘friendship’

As the raw human impacts of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis (GEC)¹ publicly unfold I hope my efforts here go some way to foreground the educative *universal* merit of Kant’s ‘moral dignity’ of the individual in management education. This merit is expressed here as a call for *publicly stated* support for, and belief in, management education that positions what we *share* as a natural species as central. Put bluntly, this call sees the complex challenges of Kant’s exact and demanding notion of *maturity* trumping entrenched educational concerns that see and champion technical skills and or diverse perspectives as central if not sole concerns. Championing techniques, strategies and diverse perspectives (the latter also referred to as ‘standpoints’²) too easily misses or simply assumes the roots of our unity as given. From what follows it seems to me that the emphasis on technical (management) skills has too little - if any - debate about ends (purposes), while diverse perspectives risks being a relativistic *end in itself*³. Concerns about means and ends (their neglect and abuses) are central in what follows. While technical skills and appreciating multiple standpoints are valuable in shaping our judgments, focusing predominantly on these two functional learning outcomes has I believe come at great cost to understanding and responding to (increasingly public) civic concerns about management practice, and therefore management education. More specifically I interpret these concerns as matters of *practical wisdom* – that is, moral concerns that connect and question means and ends — where outcomes of judgments are impacts on people and communities. It seems to me that what has long ‘faded from sight’⁴ in management education is that a defining justification (purpose) for university-based education is to both cultivate *practical wisdom* and provide experiences for fostering *maturity*⁵, to progressively *learn* and *know* – our possibilities and our limitations in

¹ Increasingly referred at the final stage of writing (March, 2009) as *The Great Recession of 2009*. I will however retain the reference to the GEC so as to ensure the ‘global’ perspective of the economic (and thus social) impacts. The terms ‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘impacts’ are addressed in Chapter 1.

² Appreciating multiple standpoints is also one of Kant’s requirements of maturity (see below). However, while vital and often difficult, it is but one and, crucial for what follows, needs to be linked to something larger. I argue in Chapter 4 that this link is at best missed.

³ In advocating an institutional oriented approach to thinking and acting (with commitment to public wellbeing as the defining, self-transcending characteristic) Hugh Hecló describes as ‘self-destructive nonsense’ the contrasting *critique as an end in itself* – a postmodern view Hecló claims is endemic in school and higher forms of education in the US (Hecló, 2008, pp. 91-97).

⁴ Perhaps ‘been forgotten’ or, as Khurana (2007) argues, been simply ‘abandoned’? I take up these and related questions in Chapters 1, 4 and 8.

⁵ My preference is Kant’s view of maturity as “(i) Having the courage and resolve to think for yourself, (ii) to think from the standpoint of others, and (iii) to act consistently on both counts” (Kant, *An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?* 1991, pp. 54-5)

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

our judgments, what we share *as a species* and must work to challenge, renew, accept and change⁶.

And yet what is at stake is more than a simplistic zero-sum contest between management techniques and strategies with differences in viewpoints on one side and ideas about human unity on the other. Some aspects of what we have in common *ought* to be beyond debate: avoiding 'undeserved harm' to the inherent dignity of the individual and our commonly shared nature. It seems (to me and others⁷) that recognition of 'ought' here means that something important is missing. This 'ought' calls for more than an inclusive conservative attitude or adding another perspective. It calls for affirming robust educative *commitments*, linking notions of 'undeserved harm' with deep understanding of our individual and collective 'wellbeing' – that is, toward *practical wisdom*. Both practical wisdom and maturity need extensive *formative* experiences in making and understanding the impacts and consequences of our judgments – therein defining a direction that I believe is increasingly and publicly problematic for university-based education about management.

I earnestly hope that stories of the stresses and strains of individuals, families and communities affected by the unfolding 2008 GEC will resonate with educators and the broader public for many years. I hope those stories of undeserved human stress pose a poignant and insistent *question* for educators and broader public alike: just what have we *learned about ourselves* (from this and previous experiences) that will be important for educating future generations? There will be endless responses about the need for better *systems* of governance and the like. But important as systems might be it would not in my view come close to much larger questions. The stories

⁶ *Cultivating the mind as well as the heart* (i.e. beyond functional skills and plural standpoints) is a view of a contemporary university's *purpose* that is shared by others. According to Shih Choon Fong, President, National University of Singapore (NUS):

I would like to suggest that the university for the 21st century has both a functional mission and a civilising mission. The functional mission is to develop human capital, encompassing both intellectual and socio-cultural aspects. The civilising mission relates to character development of the global citizen and the ongoing quest for shared values in a fragmented world. Within its (increasingly metaphorical) walls we cultivate the mind and the heart. (In Slattery, L., The Australian Financial Review, July 2, 2007).

This view is similar in direction to the under-explored and under-recognised *kind of thinking* advocated by Hecló (2008): '*thinking (and acting) institutionally*' - in this instance thinking from, and acting for, the public purposes of higher education.

⁷ Discussed in chapters 1 and 4.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

from the 2008 GEC will I hope *insist* on asking what we have learned about *ourselves*. Answers here might pries open larger questions. But learn we must.

Inescapable questions such as the above will be answered through *public assessments* of management practice, seen through the formative experiences offered — and thus gained — in university-based management education. In light of such questions I believe – and hope – that it would be reasonable to expect that beyond systems, ideas of *cultivating maturity* and *practical wisdom* would be at the *centre* of an appropriate educative response. In what follows I argue that an education *for* (inter alia) practical wisdom would stand in sharp contrast to what has been offered to date. The humanities would be at the base of deeply experiential embodied learning to *cultivate* and *prize* practical wisdom - for both living and in complex pressured decision-making practice. Here learning to make judgments in these situations would be linked to the equally vital learning experiences of being (ideally willingly) accountable for those judgments (especially, but not only, by those affected)⁸. By contrast, that would mean that learning which privileged ‘bounded rationality’ (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002) would surface concerns about minimising commitment and accountability. Instead, instrumental, functional skills would be learned *for* a much larger public context: a unique form of civic accountability for the social and moral impacts of those decisions — *on individuals* — as minimally equal to economic and ecological impacts. This would be learning for moral accountability and commitment informed by impacts and consequences. This is a larger public context that willingly *accepts* such accountability as *essential to community* (Block, 2008). Much like the role of trust (Putnam, 2000; O’Neill, 2003). A quite different curriculum is needed.⁹

Cultivating practical wisdom (moral judgment) - as one distinctive and defining educational goal in management education - would move graduates toward being

⁸ Otteson, 2006, p. 11.

⁹ I do not in this dissertation fully develop ideas about what that curriculum would look like but a brief sketch of a management pedagogy drawing on the humanities (and Kant in particular) is part of Chapter 7 (section 7). When more fully developed it would be highly focused on the *cultivation* of capabilities for a civic form of accountability. Minimally, political and moral philosophy and rhetoric (for public fora) would form part of such an orientation. However, just what that *cultivation* would look like would shape much-needed academic and practitioner dialogue, a topic that I hope to contribute to in the future. There is for example a great deal to learn from promising new Kantian studies in education more broadly where Munzel views Kant’s pedagogy as *Menschenfreundschaft*, a critical education as ‘friendship of humanity’ (Munzel, forthcoming). There have of course been notorious perversions throughout history of what some (usually an exclusive ‘us’) believe is ‘good for humanity’; all too often meaning the exclusion/removal of others (usually a collective ‘them’ as the cause(s) of the problems for ‘us’) (Todorov, 2003). The notion of an *inclusive* view of humanity motivates the reconceptualisation of management education in this dissertation.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

suitably prepared to both *appreciate* and *meet* higher standards of public-moral accountability of decisions impacting on individuals and communities, locally and globally. Committing to the preparation of graduates for such public scrutiny would in my view move universities much closer to meeting their own fiduciary responsibilities. Some aspects of that preparation are sketched through two examples (in Chapter 7). Nevertheless I hope that this dissertation begins to do some justice to what may reasonably and increasingly be publicly *demand*ed from higher education in management – reflecting part of what broader communities *need* from higher education. More specifically, what follows reflects a little of how the humanities might *uniquely* serve as a true ‘friend of humanity’ (Munzel, 1999; forthcoming): in *cultivating* practical wisdom — as preparation to meeting a long abandoned form of civic accountability. This is friendship as critical hope in recognising what I believe is the now starkly urgent relevance of something like Kant’s practical-idealism. This is a wholly different Kant that both marks that relevance and underlines the urgency of what is now increasingly evident, and tragically, formatively missing in much that is contemporary university-based management education. Our first responsibility is to learn from what has happened and is happening still. This will help make sense of my claim on Kant. I begin with the problem at hand: an introduction to mounting concerns about moral accountability in the MBA.

Chapter 1: Moral accountability in the MBA

1.1 Introduction and context

It is said, and broadly agreed, that we live in ‘an age of accountability’ (Savitz, 2006; Gallop, 2007). Yet this broad agreement would seem to constitute a narrow view of accountability¹. It seems, more specifically, to be an age that has focused on legal and or bureaucratic accountability — most often reflected in calls for greater transparency and corporate governance. The concern of this dissertation relates to *moral* accountability. I am deeply at odds with much of the management studies literature around views of accountability. In what follows I illustrate how ideas of legal accountability and ethical concerns have often been conflated and how, in my view, this easy conflation has served neither management education, nor the public, at all well.

Problems at the heart of this dissertation are concerns of public trust in university-based management education²: specifically, concerns that management education seems to have largely abandoned *moral* accountability in the curriculum and teaching, focusing instead on *legal* accountability, corporate governance and meeting market demands for graduates with strategic, numerate and communication skills. A major premise in what follows is that educative approaches to *moral* accountability inside management education (such as the Masters of Business Administration, the MBA) have *formative* implications for management practice. Abandoning educative concern for moral accountability in the MBA would suggest that universities consider ideas around *moral* accountability as either not relevant in management practice, or of little concern for management education. Fundamental fiduciary concerns relating to public trust in the legitimacy of higher education for management are therefore central here. Rakesh Khurana describes this fiduciary issue and concern as universities abandoning the ‘professional agenda’ of management education to *amoral*

¹ Roger Scruton distinguishes *accountability* from *responsibility* in these terms: “A is accountable to B if B may *sanction* and *forbid* his actions. It does not follow that B is responsible for A; *chains of responsibility run downwards by delegation, chains of accountability upwards*; if the two chains coincide then this is a political achievement” Scruton (2007) p. 5, emphasis added. Ideas such as *sanction, granting, forbidding, and refusing* consent emerge in varying degrees of significance in what follows.

² References to management education throughout this dissertation will assume an education that is university-based. Inherent in this assumption are significant educative warrants about public accountability that will be sketched in this chapter and addressed more fully in subsequent chapters. The focus is post-graduate, management education - typically accessed via university business schools. Thus the terms ‘business schools’ and ‘university-based’ will forthwith mean management education or more specifically the Masters of Business Administration (MBA). I use ‘management education’ to reference the larger contexts of universities, business schools and the MBA.

market-logic (Khurana, 2007). And yet by a first gloss, this educative concern does not seem to sit comfortably with the prominence in contemporary management education of topics relating to public issues of sustainability, corporate governance and transparency. For example, growth in the adoption of Triple Bottom Line and related sustainability initiatives is evidence of increased corporate recognition of the multiple impacts of management decisions beyond economic impacts³.

A spate of corporate collapses at the end of the last and during the first decade of this century has resulted in a heightened public awareness of the consequences of management decisions⁴. This includes 'social impacts' with consequences (of management decisions) for individuals and communities, locally and globally.⁵ Management students are aware through the daily financial press that shareholder activists are placing increasing pressure on institutions and governments to address broader ranges of accountability. However, despite what may reasonably be expected, there is an apparent lack of concern for, or effectiveness in incorporating the moral dimension in management education, typically the MBA.⁶ The management studies literature illustrates, for example, that many academics struggle with the introduction of moral issues in management programs (Grey, 2004). There are serious misgivings in the literature about the effectiveness of integrating the ethical dimension into management programs (Garten, 2002; Ghoshal, 2005; Adler, Forbes, & Willmott, 2007) as well as Business Ethics and ethics in management studies generally (Jones, Parker, & ten Bos, 2005; Clegg et al, 2006; Wray-Bliss, forthcoming). An apparent lack

³ I do not engage with issues of sustainability, Triple Bottom Line, corporate governance or transparency in this dissertation.

⁴ This includes extensive global experiences with Enron, WorldCom et al during 2001-3 and, at the time of writing, the still unfolding economic and related consequences for the 'real economy' (ie jobs, individual and community wellbeing, locally and globally) of the collapse in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of institutions making up the historic Wall Street. This marked the beginning of what is now referred to as the Great Recession of 2009.

⁵ I consider 'the ethical dimension of management' as 'sensitive moral issues in management', and use the phrases interchangeably. 'Sensitive moral issues' in this dissertation refer to social-moral impacts on people and communities, locally and globally. 'Social impacts' in turn canvas various dimensions of individual well-being: personal identity, plus economic, social, and political means and ends. In addition, while there are distinctions and disputes between the use of 'ethical' and 'moral' (with 'ethical' often related to individual behaviour and 'moral' frequently related to societal norms) I will at times use them together and interchangeably. The Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary treats 'ethical' and 'moral' as synonyms. The emphasis on 'moral' accountability in this dissertation is intended very specifically to convey a broader public interest in norms. Ethical behaviour will be important to practice but it is generally oriented to the individual whereas my interest and focus is very much a public relationship concerning norms – universities and societies together, in order to influence the behaviour and practice of individual (management) graduates through formative education. The kinds of formative education involved is at the heart of the problem I seek to address and respond to in this dissertation.

⁶ The MBA is increasingly globally recognised as the primary qualification for senior management practice. *The Economist* magazine (www.economist.com) and the Aspen Institute (www.aspeninstitute.org) both make cases for the role and significance of the MBA.

of concern for or effectiveness in incorporating moral accountability in management studies exposes management education to a loss of public legitimacy (Khurana, 2007). And it seems that something happens, or perhaps does not happen in the MBA. A recent survey (April 2008) by the Aspen Institute into the attitudes of MBA graduates illustrated that even in those universities committed to ideas of stewardship beyond the financial bottom line students were less inclined at the end of their studies to entertain the merits of this broader stewardship.⁷

Globalisation compounds the problem in two ways. First, the escalating influence of economic globalisation calls for greater numbers of graduates with management skills. Second, the impacts of globalisation are broadly assumed to be universally beneficial. However, if the lack of concern or effectiveness in addressing the moral dimension is not adequately addressed in that management training the impacts of economic globalisation may result in serious economic, social, and ecological harm. A liberal senator in the Australian parliament recently referred to the geopolitical consequences of globalisation as creating international 'fault-lines' (Trood, 2008). I draw on Trood's observations regarding globalisation later in this chapter but for the moment it is important to arrest a potential misapprehension. The position adopted in this dissertation is by no means against globalisation. What I seek to do here is express a concern for the global scale of potential, if not real, harm if management education does not adequately address the moral consequences of management decisions. At base is a concern for the role and public legitimacy of universities in preparing graduates for moral accountability in management decisions.

After illustrating my concerns via a case study at an Australian university and evaluating related management studies literature I propose an alternative approach to much that is the focus of attention in the management studies literature. Where that literature points to ideas of greater *integration* of the ethical dimension I argue that this attempt is problematic. I argue that this conflating problem (legal with ethical) is due largely to the tendency (especially evident within the Business Ethics field) to foreclose discussion on much larger, and I argue, more important and complex issues: philosophical, political, economic, social and moral. In making this charge I am following the critique of Jones, Parker and ten Bos (Jones et al, 2005).⁸ What follows here is an argument for a much broader, more cosmopolitan view of the role of management education: toward building a pluralist community, one that seeks to

⁷ www.aspenbe.org/documents/ExecutiveSummaryMBAStudentAttitudesReport2008.pdf

⁸ There are exceptions, with two recently available in English: Rich (2006) and Ulrich (2008).

foster, in Kant's surprising practical-idealist⁹ terms, an ethical commonwealth. That cosmopolitan and community role is a view that is under serious threat — and if successful that threat could undermine the role of the university and have consequences that, I argue, the university may well find increasingly difficult — and on the grounds of public legitimacy — seemingly impossible to defend.

I make a case for deliberately setting out to develop the capabilities of management graduates to address, and be publicly accountable for, the moral dimension in their decision-making. This focus on *capabilities* however, needs to address key deficiencies perceived in the alternatives currently available through a dominant mainstream source of management legitimacy, the MBA. They are seen as deficiencies only when viewed from the contested perspective of the role of the university in society. It is this contested public role that I claim is a source of major fiduciary tensions. I argue for *reconceptualising management education as preparation for moral accountability* - as a defining capability of graduates, but an accountability of a quite specific kind. In the sections that follow I develop a limited and still heavily contested sketch of the public role of universities that provides the unique characteristic of the education that is central here. In other words the very fact that management education (in the form of the MBA specifically) is provided by a university sets that education apart in terms of the public role it is expected to fulfill. It is that public role which significantly influences the outcomes of this dissertation both in terms of current omissions and in terms of future opportunities.

That preparation, however, requires a far deeper understanding of moral accountability and to that end I set out to develop a Kantian-based perspective. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) becomes for this dissertation a guiding and dominant influence. Along the way I seek to illustrate how Kant offers a great deal more than the widely viewed arid and abstract metaphysician. I present a more human and modest Kant than is generally discussed. Far more significantly, I illustrate that Kantian ideas on moral reflection enable a much deeper engagement with multiple dimensions of moral accountability — and in ways that provide ample opportunities for pedagogical practices consistent with the public responsibilities of university-based management education. The pedagogical practice I propose will have a

⁹The modification 'practical' to Kant's far better known idealist position is a major feature of this dissertation. The implications of that modification are vital for my response to formative problems in post-graduate management education.

defining basis in experiential 'embodied learning'¹⁰.

In the balance of this opening chapter I firstly sketch distinctions between legal and moral accountability, relate ideas of 'social impact' to the public good as a defining context, propose the theme of 'fiduciary tensions' as relevant to the dissertation, argue for a larger more strategic perspective in addressing the formative problem¹¹ of moral accountability in the MBA, and outline ideas on the public role of the university as a key premise for the argument. Some personal background (Section 1.7) will illustrate the origins of my concerns and some indication of how the perspective of this dissertation emerged as a personal project. I then outline the overall argument through each of the chapters. Key terms are addressed in the process.

1.2 Legal and legislative approaches to accountability

A former Australian state premier, Geoff Gallop, recently viewed the question of accountability in the following way:

We live in an age of accountability. Whether we are looking at the private or

¹⁰ By 'embodied learning' I am marking out what will be a vital experiential distinction with cognitive learning for propositional/conceptual knowledge. In so doing I am drawing on the differing contributions of both Angelica Nuzzo (2008) and Mark Johnson (2007) - which I address in Chapter 7.

¹¹ I use the terms 'formative' and 'educative' both interchangeably and jointly to depict what I perceive is a serious systemic problem in management education, and a problem with broad impacts: a formative public problem. Both 'formative' and 'educative' are terms also implicit in what I will at times abbreviate to 'my project' or 'my problem'. In other words, my formative-educative project/problem in this dissertation is the prospective formative influence of how ideas on moral accountability are, or are not, addressed in management education. It will be largely 'prospective' and thus implicit as my focus is teaching and learning experiences in preparing for, and during, MBA coursework, not behaviour after graduation.

Despite this *prospective* qualification there is also an implicit assumption that the formative influences of education do have their impact in graduate's practices as managers. I do not explore those assumptions beyond illustrating mounting expressions of concern about management education though some sections of the public media. For example, there has been speculation in the international financial media about links between contributing causes of the 2008 GFC and the MBA seen in (1) the *Financial Times* of Oct. 21, 2008 with a front page headline: "Blame it on Harvard: Is the MBA culture responsible for the financial crisis?"; (2) an article entitled "It's time to make management a true profession" by Khurana and Nohria in *The Harvard Business Review* (and reported in various forms in *Business Week*, *The Economist* and the *Financial Times* during October-November 2008) wherein Khurana and Nohria specifically reference the role of the MBA in the 2008 GFC and propose as a corrective a code of ethical management practice (Khurana, R, Nohria, N. (2008)); (3) a web debate at *The Economist* during December 2008 under the provocative heading "Insidious MBAs" (www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12724353; last accessed 22nd December, 2008), and finally (4) George Cooper (2008) singled out the academy as culpable in the current GFC and previous financial crises. *The Economist* praised Cooper's critique in September 2008. More diverse concerns about the impacts of management education, including those of Khurana, will be addressed in Chapter 4. Nevertheless this most recent financial media speculation serves to illustrate (at this most basic level of 'public interest') an extension of previously expressed concerns (linking the MBA to broad social-moral impacts). I hope that this dissertation constitutes one reasonable and relevant response to increasingly discernable public tensions with the MBA.

public sectors, we see institutions armed with the power and responsibility to investigate performance and call to account those in positions of authority. ... There has been a decline in trust and lowered expectations about the ability of the individual conscience to ensure that the pursuit of individual interest and power is not at the expense of the public good. It follows that if morality can't be assumed it needs to be legislated. (Gallop, 2007)

While supporting the general premises of the above argument I differ on such a definitive conclusion. I argue instead that there is also an educative conclusion that is at best implicit but at worst omitted — albeit on a significantly larger and equally problematic scale. I am concerned that a conclusion favouring legislation to secure the public good means leaving what is deemed right conflated with what is legal¹². This specific conflation is a major factor contributing to the tensions inherent in what is central to this dissertation: addressing moral-public accountability in management education.

In the interest of reinforcing the relevance of the above issues it is instructive to consider a recent work by Robert Reich (2007). In *Supercapitalism* Reich offers a typically nuanced critique. In this instance it is a critique of global business management and what Reich sees as related distortions of power in global society. In so doing he presents the scale of the problematic central to this dissertation. Reich describes a progressive distortion over the last 30 years or so of power shifting distinctly and unfavorably toward business, investors and consumers and away from democracy. He claims the latter is the means to deliver a self-transcending common good. While focusing primarily on the US he demonstrates that these issues are increasingly on a global scale. He argues that 'changing the rules' (i.e. legislating to change how business, investors and consumers 'play the game') will restore some vital lost balance to the common good. As in the case of Gallop above I am also not as sure as Reich that 'rules as regulations' are sufficient, let alone desirable, for the common good. At the base of Reich's justifiable concerns is another issue which is central to this dissertation: education for a cosmopolitan outlook that is befitting Kant's entire critical project of a *paideia* for humanity (Munzel, 2003; forthcoming); an education that is more than technical training, more than being reduced to what Loudon calls a *Brotstudium*, that is, something valued for its economic utility and not for its transformative possibilities (Louden, 2007, p. 149).

Distinguishing legal from moral accountability is critical in this dissertation. I argue that

¹² Bauman (1993) makes a related point, critiquing the view that reason will legislate moral issues in postmodern uncertainty.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

almost all attention in management education is focused on legal limitations, with ideas on moral accountability barely salient. Exploring the literature and giving consideration to a case study yields insights into deeply problematic issues for the fiduciary responsibilities of management educators and management graduates alike. Sources of potential fiduciary tensions become evident in considering approaches to commonplace decisions in management practice, in for example, cost cutting programs or organisational restructuring through outsourcing, downsizing, and offshoring. In all cases there are impacts on people and communities, locally, and internationally, as seen through the dramatic unfolding of the 2008 GFC. Those impacts can be any combination of social, economic and ecological factors, testing inter alia issues of individual self-esteem and questions of sustainability, increasingly in complex, related ways. To a few that complexity is acknowledged but too little understood¹³.

While legal requirements may well be met in undertaking and implementing management decisions leading to the above outcomes — myriad moral issues may remain dormant, under-recognised, and unaccountable. Daniel Yankelovich describes this situation as legalism, where “the law is the floor — a foundation on which the norms of society rest. (The law) is not, and cannot be, a substitute for the ethical norms that sit atop it” (Yankelovich, 2006, pp. 29-31).

Accounting for decisions which may be legal but not right, is increasingly in the public domain. The high profile saga in Australia of James Hardie Industries is a clear example (Haigh, 2006). In corporate circles ethical concerns appear to be primarily confined to matters of corporate compliance, governance and codes of behaviour. Bennett and Gibson describe this situation as a minimalist approach to ethics and decision-making, where “anything that does not directly violate law or policy becomes ethical and acceptable. Ethics has become synonymous with compliance” (2006, p. xi). Bennett and Gibson continue: “Compliance with law and policy is necessary but not sufficient for an ethical and effective decision. Ethics is not simply about turning away from what is wrong or bad, but about turning toward what is right and good. We make good decisions, decisions that work, when

¹³ During the early stages of the 2008 GFC Central Bankers and media commentators increasingly referred to the complexities of the issues involved. For example, in a recent public address, Dr. Ken Henry, Secretary to the Australian Treasury, attributed one factor causing the crisis to the inability of senior executives to understand the implications of the complexities inherent in the models used in their (financial) business decisions (Henry, 2008). When questioned about this speech Henry further claimed that finance executives ‘do not have much concern for’ the implications and consequences of these decisions. A clear though empirically unsupported assumption in offering this example is that many senior finance executives have MBAs, often deemed a prerequisite qualification for senior management roles.

we understand and act on what we believe is important, when we anticipate the consequences of our decisions on others, and when we hold ourselves accountable for our decisions”(p. xii). It might reasonably be asked whether those affected by management decisions also hold managers and organisations accountable and if so how? In turn, the questions focus on management education and ask how management graduates are prepared for such accountability?

1.3 Concerns for the public good and social-moral impacts

The two statements above focused attention on concerns for the public good. Both Gallop and Reich set out arguments that posit legislation as the means to arresting and securing that good. In what follows I sketch aspects of the formative problem that are central to this dissertation, but in different terms to Gallop and Reich. I am concerned also with the public good but more specifically where public wellbeing is threatened or adversely affected by management decisions. Such decisions are commonplace and may be seen as consequences of restructuring strategies undertaken by business organisations: outsourcing, downsizing, and off-shoring are typical. These commonplace decisions are usually taken in the interests of ensuring the economic viability of organisations — often to secure economic returns expected or demanded by owners and investors. However, while economic interests may warrant such action there are always consequences for those affected by these decisions. It is those impacts that are the focal point of this dissertation. The corporate collapses in the late 1990s and early 2000s have only exacerbated the scale of impacts on public wellbeing. For example, an Australian judge, Justice Neville Owen, in the 2003 inquiry into the collapse of the Australian insurance company HIH singled out the adverse impacts of the collapse on individuals, various communities and the broader public (Owen, 2003)¹⁴.

The hyphenated term *public-moral* calls for clarification. I use this term exclusively in relation to accountability with the intention of conveying a relationship between moral impacts and public scrutiny. First, the notion of ‘moral’ is concerned with moral *impacts*. Conversations and public scrutiny about environmental impacts and financial impacts are commonplace. We are yet to see social and, more specifically, moral impacts in the same light. Those impacts focus on ideas of harm, and in particular ‘undeserved harm’ (Kekes, 1989, 2000). Without conflating the two I intend to include ideas from the ‘quality of life’ field under the

¹⁴ Events of the 2008 GEC have profoundly illustrated consequences for the ‘real economy’ (jobs, communities) of multiple collapses in banks, corporations, trust (notably, but not only, lending between banks) and consumer and business confidence (*Financial Times* editorial, Dec. 30, 2008, *The return of the ‘real economy’*).

rubric of the social-moral. I clarify that quality of life concept in the next section. Second, the notion of *public* also warrants clarification. Here I draw on ideas from Edwards who says, “the concept of a ‘public’ — a whole polity that cares about the common good and has the capacity to deliberate about it democratically — is central to civil society thinking. Civil society becomes the arena for argument and deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration” (2004, pp. 54-55). Edwards also offers insights that are relevant to questions behind my formative-educative concerns in this dissertation. While his comments relate to ‘civil society’ they are just as appropriate to ideas of ‘educating for public-moral accountability’:

civil society must be able to be described and understood in terms accessible to the skeptic, tested rigorously and successfully against the available empirical evidence, and converted into practical measures that can be deployed in real-world contexts. None of these criteria requires that we accept a single, universal interpretation of civil society in every circumstance, but all of them demand a level of openness and objectivity that has been lacking in much of the discussion to date. (Edwards, 2004, Page. xi)

Perhaps the very idea of public accountability may be one expression of a political and moral sensitivity derived from ‘democracy’, powerfully described by John Dunn as “pressing on claims of authority and a demand for respect” (2005, p. 23). In sum the joint term public-moral is intended to distinguish a specific form of accountability, one that is capable of giving public accounts for moral impacts. In the same sense of public here, accountability is not a simple substitution for responsibility. I take accountability to be an active expectation, often in public, and for reasons of trust. A great deal more follows in later chapters on notions of accountability but they share the common characteristic of being oriented towards earning and warranting trust, and again in specific circumstances, that trust is public. The most obvious example at this point is public trust in the institution of the university. Later it is the trust that other institutions and individuals need to earn from the public.

The context for much of the concerns about public accountability is predominantly economic and in that regard a great deal of academic and media attention over the last 10 to 20 years has focused on the phenomenon of globalisation. While I do not propose to add to those diverse discussions I equally do not want to assume it without acknowledging the influence globalisation has on educative issues influencing the formation of management graduates. In many respects that influence is now a fact of life. To assist in highlighting the importance

here of that context I draw briefly from a leading figure in the international relations field before returning the focus to decision makers in organisations.

1.4 Globalisation's fault-lines

Australian Senator and international relations academic Russell Trood has recently depicted the pressures of globalisation in balanced, sober terms:

Much about the emerging global order remains confused and confusing, but the fault-lines that now divide the international community all point in the direction of profound change: strong clashes of ideas and interests are creating widespread instabilities and insecurities which are shaking the foundations of the international order. ... (where) the many disjunctions of globalisation ... undoubtedly benefits significant sections of the international community ... but it is leaving considerable political, economic and social wreckage in its wake. (Trood, 2008, p. 124)

While usefully depicting pressures of globalisation manifesting as 'fault-lines' the reference helps to underline the seriousness of what is at stake. His reference to the many 'disjunctions' of globalisation and in particular the benefits but also the 'wreckage' highlight earlier observations about needing to understand the moral consequences of globalisation. This understanding is especially pertinent in considering the growing demand for university trained managers. For it is clearly managers and executives who make decisions. Many of those decisions are directly related to the pressures of globalisation, with corporate responses to the pressures of economic globalisation often resulting in decisions to restructure an organisation through outsourcing and/or off-shoring (Lodge & Wilson, 2006). Such decisions can lead to employees, their dependents and communities being subjected to Kekes' 'undeserved harm' (Kekes, 1990) — in the short, medium and long term. Such harm can be psychological and social, manifested through varying degrees of anxiety through loss of self-respect, loss of identity, loss of earning power, or family-community disruptions, across time.

As signaled earlier I draw on the 'quality of life' literature (via Phillips) to expand on some of these social dimensions. Phillips defines 'quality of life' in these terms:

Quality of life requires that people's basic and social needs are met and that they have the autonomy to choose to enjoy life, to flourish and to participate as citizens in a society with high levels of civic integration, social connectivity, trust and other integrative norms including at least fairness and equity, all within a physically and socially sustainable global environment. (Phillips, 2006, p. 242)

Phillips explains that this definition has been constructed in a way which privileges objective over subjective individual quality of life and which uses a capabilities framework in relation to enjoyment, fulfillment and participation (p. 242). The notion of a capabilities framework — albeit of a different, educational nature — has a significant bearing on the pedagogical approach developed in the second half of the dissertation.

However, because the primary focus is on how such ethical and social issues are linked and explored in management education, discussion on the links per se is limited to establishing the connection between management decisions and the social impacts of those decisions. By moral impacts then I intend to single out the idea that decisions made by managers and others have an impact or impacts (positively or adversely) on the wellbeing of individuals, where that wellbeing can be considered as consistent with ideas concerning 'quality of life'. For example, decisions that affect an individual's life as in their sense of identity (as in employment status), and/or their capacity to derive an income, provide for family, and so on are decisions that have moral, as in personal, impacts¹⁵.

Such decisions warrant close attention and in the terms of this dissertation such decisions warrant an account from those making the decisions to those affected by those decisions — an account delivered between people of equal moral authority, not between a higher to a lesser authority. In the Kantian terms that this dissertation considers, this is an account of

¹⁵ Links between 'undeserved harm' and 'social-moral-personal impacts' (from management decisions) are at the root of a booklet produced mid December 2008 (the timing is crucial to my argument here) to 'help Australians cope with the Global Economic Crisis (GEC)'. As President of *Beyond Blue*, an Australian depression initiative, the former Premier of Victoria (Australia), the Hon. Jeff Kennett, described the materials in these terms:

Many people have lost their jobs or are worried about being retrenched, while others have been shocked and distressed to see the value of their assets tumble. Even thrifty, diligent and cautious people have been dealt a financial blow which has been *beyond their control* - and all this can take its toll on people's *health*, their *relationships*, their *families*, their *well-being* and *how they see their future*. Kennett, J. (2008) *Taking care of yourself after retrenchment or financial loss*, p. 2 (emphasis added). www.beyondblue.org.au Last accessed 20th December, 2008

What was originally referred to as a financial and credit crisis has moved to an *economic* crisis and is not only referred to an abstract terms, but also now clichéd as 'Wall Street to Main Street'. Thus these concerns for the *Beyond Blue* organisation that we recognise that the GEC impacts will affect *individuals* and communities, in ongoing and serious ways. The American Economic Association is forecasting that the impacts of the GEC (increasingly being referred to as 'The Great Recession of 2009') will be 'deep and long', and depending on the economic dimensions adopted, in the order of minimally 4 and up to 7 plus years, i.e. 2009 - 2015 +, ('Drastic Times', *The Economist*, 8th January, 2009).

(with concomitant obligations) the impacts of such decisions. An account that should ideally take place face-to-face between human beings with equal dignity — not, that is, between Weber's bureaucratic authority and a distant collective. The nature, scope and mode of that account calls for considerable depth of reflection if it is to be an intelligent and thus responsible account. But these reflections can give rise to tensions. Understanding those tensions requires focusing on the unique role of universities.

1.5 Public roles of universities

I start with the broader role of universities in society and then move to more specific issues within management education. With one exception (Clark, 2006) I do not address the checkered history of university-societal relations but move instead to contemporary depictions of those relationships. First, ideas of universities having social obligations in the sense of a social contract:

The social contract with universities is formulated over time and shaped by history ... The social contract requires continuous reflection and dialogue among the university and society, as each era renews the social contract according to its needs ... the university must permit public scrutiny of its affairs, be transparent in how choices are made to achieve its academic mission and to be accountable to government and to the public about how public funds have been spent ... In order to maintain its autonomy, the university must make a commitment to dialogue — about these tasks and the role of university in society. (George Fallis 'The Mission of the University' submission to the Rae Commission, in *Planet U*, M'Gonigle and Starke, 2006, p. 199)

In my view the notion of a 'social contract' for universities is pivotal for addressing the educative-formative problem in management education. My concern is that the implied reciprocity of a social contract seems to be at quite serious risk through different perceptions of what is expected and delivered in university education. The case study and the literature review will attest to the view that many business schools and management students see that role as responding to market demands for functional skills. This is not a view I share. Fallis does justice to a far larger expectation in these observations (Fallis, 2007, pp 339-420).

While referring to the US William Bowen's (1999) position on higher education's social role is clear and relevant:

Higher education plays a unique role in our society. The obligations of a university is to the society at large over the long run, and, even more generally, to the pursuit of

learning. Although this may seem amorphous, there is no escaping a university's obligation to try to serve the long term interests of society defined in the broadest and least parochial terms, and to do so through two principle activities...: advancing knowledge and educating students who in turn will serve others, within this nation and beyond it, both through their specific vocations and as citizens. Universities therefore are responsible for imparting civic and democratic values that are essential to the functioning of our nation (in Chambers, T. (2005), p. 12)

Chambers extends the notion of contract to *covenant* and *charter* to "express the moral, enduring, reciprocal, and socially articulated nature of the relationship between ... universities, as social institutions, and the public(s) that create and support them. ... that relationship ... has both transactional (contractual) and transformational (moral and mutually developmental) qualities embedded within it. " (ibid, p. 7). The extension by Chambers of contract to covenant and charter in these terms illustrates a very specific investment on the part of the broader public for values that are conducive to 'good societies'. In other words, the reciprocity at work here is public investment for public goods, the latter as values serving the common good. Sullivan (2005) considers this relationship between society and higher education as a 'social partnership'¹⁶ as 'civic professionalism'.

Lest the idea be that a social-contract between higher education and society be dismissed as a romantic historic illusion Ford argues the merits of a contemporary take on those responsibilities via what he terms a 'postmodern' university. He avers that a postmodern university will "openly and explicitly affirm the value of human life and all living beings ... The idea of a university that is value-laden is in stark contrast to the modern university's dubious claims to be value-neutral... A postmodern university will oppose any activity that, all things considered, devalues human life or needlessly destroys the earth. The postmodern university will seek to promote human development, social justice, strong communities, cultural diversity, and environmental stewardship, because each is a way of promoting the overall good of the world". (Ford, 2002, p. 102). Once again even when speculating about what might constitute a renewed social-contract Ford sees these public values as central, values that are life affirming, and the domain in this instance of higher education.

What will shape discussion in this and the chapters to follow will be explorations of just what might be understood by the concept of 'academic mission' and not just the 'tasks' of a

¹⁶ William Sullivan develops this notion of a social partnership into specific relationships around providing public goods via the professions. In extensive work on the professions with the Carnegie Foundation he calls this latter relationship 'civic professionalism' (Sullivan, 2005, p. 5)

university in society, but with the need for accountability to the public in delivering on those roles. Fallis again:

The social contract implies an obligation on the university to reflect upon these tasks, to think and to write about them publicly, to articulate their value in society, to defend them when they are threatened but also to reconsider them in light of criticism and evolving social needs (Fallis, in M'Gonigle and Starke, *ibid*)

The significance of these observations about the social contract of universities is the *obligation* of the university to respond to criticism. In exchange for public funds there is an obligation that those funds will be directed to social needs. In what follows I argue that those social needs are for moral, not just legal, accountability for management decisions. The social (public) need to address moral accountability holds out profound challenges to assumptions of management as taught. Just how profound those challenges are will be evident initially in a case study of an Australian university management program. It will also be evident in considering the management studies literature on the *integration* of moral accountability in management education.

William Sullivan has written of his concerns about the social contract in university education (Sullivan, 2005). His focus is predominantly on education for the professions. Whether management is a profession in the traditional sense (engineering, medicine, law, and so on) is a moot point that will be addressed in chapter 4. For my purpose however it is enough to consider Sullivan's concern about whether the social contract is operating as intended, that is, to favour the profession and its privileges in exchange for public trust in the application of knowledge gained by the profession for 'public goods' (for example, *health* in medicine, *justice* in law, *transparency* and *accuracy* in accounting). Writing post Enron and WorldCom, at a time when there were increasing instances where health, legal and accounting institutions had 'broken faith' with public trust in the US, Sullivan posed disturbing questions of the role of professional education in these breaches (pp. 2-5). He suggests at minimum a return to what he calls education for 'civic professionalism', which focuses on instilling 'stewardship values', to protect those public goods.

Would such a concern be valid in management education? After all, as I argue in Chapter 4, management is *not* a profession in the traditional sense, and yet as already mentioned, reactions to executive performance might suggest otherwise¹⁷. Nevertheless, universities have a history – certainly in the US (Khurana, 2007), of seeking to professionalise

¹⁷ Section 1.3 above; footnotes 13 and 14.

management. This professionalisation agenda will be a major issue for discussion as will Khurana's critique where he argues that (US) universities have in his view now abandoned that agenda in favour of what he calls 'market-logic' where ideas of providing for public goods are absent. This leaves quite some tension within management education. If the professionalisation agenda has been abandoned then so has the social contract, which would leave the question hanging, if that is the case then what is a university education in management actually *for*? Addressing that question will occupy much that follows. Indeed, renewing the social contract between society and the university shapes considerations for the second half of this dissertation. There is however a need to take into account some observations about the lack of understanding about the public role of a university:

The university is a critical part of the social fabric, but its role is still not well understood, its functions usually just taken for granted, its social role and potential unappreciated ... Certainly the university produces technical experts, but what is its role in producing citizens? Today it responds to the corporate marketplace — but how did its current preoccupations come about? There are many such questions but few answers because not a lot of people give the university a moment's notice (McGonigle and Stark, 2006, p. 23).

A lack of understanding of the public role of a university as part of the social fabric contributes significantly to the tensions that are the subject of the next section. Ford's *Beyond the Modern University* (2002) offers observations about the influence of disciplines and the prospect of that influence diminishing what otherwise might be. Each discipline offers a view of the world but it is a view confined to that discipline. The result is a lack of a coherent view because each discipline is unable to transcend its own starting point, with the result that

it undermines the possibility of a rational framework within which people can make sense of their lives. If the whole does not make sense, neither do the parts. Our beliefs and our values require some kind of metaphysical authority. Yet, academic disciplines stand in the way of framing such overarching categories of understanding because each is constructed in near-perfect isolation for all other disciplines" (2002, p. 45).

The influence of disciplinary thinking is evident in the case study as are furtive attempts at offering capstone subjects. While endorsing Ford's view I do not want to suggest that the role of the university is one that is universally agreed, nor to suggest that it is a one that is of a nostalgic kind, a now lost-identity. William Clark has recently offered a finely nuanced

account of the origins of much that passes in this dissertation as ‘fiduciary tensions’ over the last few decades (2006). I address those tensions in the next section. Clarke offers an account that raises a crucial question of relevance in this dissertation — just what is a management education *for*? Indeed Clark ensures Khurana’s critique, and my own, are seen as views ‘from the balcony’ — but still views restricted to varying degrees by a lack of understanding of historical context, and a long historical context at that. It is from this longer-term perspective that Clark opens an historical vista that goes back to the origins of German universities of the 16th century — consisting of contests over what it means to be ‘enlightened’. In so doing Clark traces the development of tensions between ‘market and ministries’ from the German reformation through to the rise of today’s research universities. Clark depicts in graphic detail a compelling reminder of the long contested mix of scholarship and markets, a ‘palimpsest’ (Grafton, 2006) of contests of new over traditional views of motives in learning.

Clark provides a backdrop to university life and its public justification that later (Chapter 6) suggests an institutional depiction of Kant’s ideas on ‘unsocial sociability’ — the tensions that come from doing socially acceptable things simply to ‘stay in the game’ (the sociable dimension of civility, engagement, and so on) while being self-interested and competitive at the same time (the unsociable dimension of striving to ‘win the spoils’ of battle reflected in patronage, funding, rankings, etc). Khurana calls this latter view ‘market logic’ — a view which if adopted may exact a Faustian price (Khurana, 2007).

It is this larger *public* context that gives direction to this dissertation¹⁸. In the absence of this larger role toward public wellbeing, and given Clark’s even larger concerns, management education verges on being illegitimate. As Khurana suggests, in the absence of this legitimacy, the university business school becomes nothing more than a sophisticated trade school — that is, one without the prestige and standing claimed for a university. Perhaps a contributing factor here is a lack of understanding about the public role of a university and the impacts of disciplinary thinking alongside market pressures and demands that create tensions within the academy. So a better understanding of those tensions would be relevant

¹⁸ This larger public context is, in broad terms, a concern shared with what is at the heart of Paulo Friere’s (1996) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Friere illustrates a strong dehumanising pedagogy operating in favour of those in power, when those oppressed by such power are in need of a pedagogy that is humanising. Fiduciary tensions born of an implicit dehumanising pedagogical agenda will be clearly evident in the case study and, while avoiding generalisations, will nevertheless be the subject of some discussion in Chapters 7 and 8.

before addressing questions of public legitimacy. What kinds of tensions? More specifically, what kinds of tensions are evident in management education?

1.6 Fiduciary tensions

A significant literature on business and management studies has since 2002 looked at the role of management education in bringing about corporate collapses and executive excesses (Garten, 2002; Mintzberg, 2004; Grey, 2004; Ghoshal, 2003, 2005; Khurana et al, 2005; Khurana, 2007; Cooper, 2008; Salter, 2008). The finding broadly in that literature is that management education has indeed contributed to these excesses and failures largely through curriculum priorities and inadequacies of major theories taught in post-graduate business and management. The works of Pfeffer & Fong (2002), plus the seminal contribution of Ghoshal (2003; 2005) have challenged the management academy to understand the difficulties created specifically through the MBA. Much of this debate has been carried out through the journals of the Academy of Management.

Where there have been calls through this literature for a greater emphasis on Business Ethics, Corporate Governance and a more critical approach I take a different line. I claim that these calls in the management studies literature reflect to a reasonable degree a kind of fiduciary tension for management academics — that is, a tension between what is taught and what academics have as public responsibilities to the public good. These tensions are not expressed in those terms but they are evident in the agenda addressed through the literature. I claim that some of this tension is also evident ‘on the ground’ – ie though a case study.

I strive to contribute to the field of management studies initially by considering questions drawing on this research informed by the views of Munzel (forthcoming). In considering those questions I offer a Kantian response, and one that I sense will be deeply challenging for many educators involved in contemporary offerings through the MBA. I bring this distinction to the foreground via the mix of what I am calling ‘public-moral accountability’. My response challenges much of the mainstream thrust of education in management both from the conceptualisation of public accountability and also the Kantian *paideia*-oriented response to public critiques of university legitimacy.

I hasten to add, however, that creating new educational theory is not my objective; this dissertation is more about fostering discussion on ideas (Thomas, 2007). Those ideas are seen more as conceptual structures to understand the largely under-explored and under-

researched territory of moral accountability in management.¹⁹ Those ideas focus on teaching and learning quite specific moral issues that, based on the research herein, are increasingly central but deeply problematic to management education. Indeed, rather than new theory, what follows in this dissertation is more a kind of normative narrative. This normative story starts with a case study undertaken to illustrate my concerns about to ‘the salience of moral impacts in the MBA’ and then to the management studies literature relating to issues involved in ‘integrating the moral-ethical dimension in the MBA’. I conclude by arguing — as a result of this research — for ‘cultivating a capability for reflective moral judgment and intelligent accountability — to and for individuals’ as a defining characteristic of management graduates. This phased story, this argument, is intended specifically to foreground an increasingly shared concern (albeit from a low base) about foundational compromises to the role of public wellbeing in business schools. Some personal background will I hope help to situate my early concerns with management education regarding moral accountability. It will also hopefully provide some formative context to the broadly Kantian approach I adopt toward moral accountability in the second half of this dissertation.

1.7 Personal background to this dissertation

Much of what follows has been influenced by the ideas on *reflexive methodology* (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 1999) wherein the authors argue for a heightened sense of self-awareness regarding how a researcher interprets research data, “turning a self-critical eye onto one’s own authority as interpreter and author” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 1999, p. vi). This calls for awareness of political, ideological and ethical issues relating to the research and how the researcher views these issues. Here I sketch some background to illustrate the line of thinking and action evident in this dissertation. Some brief mention of relevant working experience is followed by some reflections on the formative experiences of ‘working independently’ from the early 1990s. This is followed by some of the most prominent philosophical influences shaping my approach to this research and dissertation.

It is a sketch written at the age of 59, after some 20-plus years as a corporate executive,

¹⁹ The 2007-2008 *Beyond Grey Pinstripes* (BGP) report claims that only 5% of staff at the more than 130 participating universities published work on social and environmental issues. Given that these 130 universities are predisposed to develop a stewardship approach in their MBA programs this is a remarkably low finding under a very broad umbrella – see www.aspeninstitute.com/beyondgreypinstripes. It is worth noting that a prerequisite for inclusion in the BGP report is accreditation with the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). This is especially noteworthy for the US model of business that is embedded in the AACSB, and more poignantly, for the implications and pervasive influence that this US model has for viewing and studying business. This latter aspect is a key theme clearly evident in both the case study (Chapter 3) and the literature review (Chapter 4).

followed by a further 18 years of so-called self-employed independence; which in effect of course means being wholly dependent on being contracted by employers — such as my recent and much cherished academic role at UTS. I trust the following reveals something of the motivation and perspectives behind this dissertation. Both are no doubt evident as much through pieces chosen as through the gaps in what might be implied and those that I've simply missed.

I can readily trace the origins of my major concerns about management thinking to increasingly disillusioning discourses and engagements with many MBA graduates, executives and mainstream management textbooks over the last two decades. Two major concerns became increasingly disturbing in those discourses and engagements: (a) a relative *absence of critique* of contemporary management theory and practice and (b) a perceived progressive and (to me at least) significant *diminution of the salience for moral impacts* amid the rise to domination of a kind of reductionist outlook on the financial dimension: a form of what looked like *economic fundamentalism* (reflected in shareholder primacy largely to the exclusion of all other views). I discovered later that Ghoshal and others used exactly the same terms to describe their concerns. This discovery was a major fillip.

These were personal interpretations but the frequency with which they emerged and the difficulties they presented to my own views were a source of some preoccupation. In some respects these views only become clearer following two related developments. First, these views became more obvious following some 20 generally satisfying years of corporate life (the last 15 years, and the most professionally rewarding, spent progressing to divisional management with Esso Australia — aka Exxon). Second, following the acquisition by Mobil of Esso's Australian operations, of wanting to find some degree of independence. More accurately, these views on management came into sharper focus as a result of my interest in, and need, to think independently (ie the irony inherent in that being independent means dependence on others for contracted employment).

Personal experience with colleagues through the Esso/Mobil sale/acquisition and generous 'outplacement' arrangements had a strong and positive influence on my thinking. In some respects, although not all, this personal and shared experience served as something of a benchmark for looking at many subsequent corporate experiences. This independent thinking led increasingly to scrutinising contemporary management practices. This same scrutiny led subsequently into management education and learning.

My views on management thinking and management education seem now to have moved over some decades from one of minor irritation through comprehensive disillusionment to renewed and heightened engagement. Throughout this process there was also a rising awareness of an absence of critique in my own undergraduate studies almost 40 years ago — especially in economics, a major in my undergraduate degree. In the late 1960s we were taught positivist, neo-classical economics — and knew of little else. More than mystified, I was intrigued and disappointed to learn many years later that we had been exposed to such a seemingly narrow view of economics in these undergraduate studies. Not quite ‘rage’ (see Olesen, below) but certainly wanting to *understand* and *confront* the *kinds of thinking* where the relative absence of critique and what seemed a significantly lower salience for moral impacts seemed as characteristic in much that passed for management education and practice in Australia and elsewhere through the 1990s and well into the first decade in the new millennium. Was I right in these perceptions? How could these perceptions be assessed? Why ‘confronted’? What was at the base of this personal response? Were the problems more a reflection of my own difficulties than with those who held countering views? If even some of these perceptions were only partially accurate what approaches might I need to learn to engage effectively — beyond confronting such views? These questions are easier to write now but they were largely unarticulated although increasingly felt concerns throughout the decade or more of working wholly independently.

But as Ginnie Olesen states “rage is not enough” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. x). I too wanted to “move enquiry beyond rage to theory and method that *connect politics, pedagogy, and ethics to action in the world*” (2005, p. x, emphasis added). I started with graduate studies in adult learning at UTS. These studies coincided with the beginning of the independence outlined above and with progressive educational engagement with what now amounts to some 1000 or so managers and executives through a professional management association.²⁰

A pivotal personal influence, however, revolved around being commissioned in mid-1990s by this particular professional association to conduct research into how organisational leaders perceived and addressed major challenges facing their organisations. From semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 60 of Australia’s most senior leaders across the spectrum of sector, industry and size there was a stunning similarity in their responses. Not so much with the listing of challenges as much as the similarity of both the strategies to meet

²⁰‘Professional’ in the sense of a membership-based organisation committed to practice-oriented development of members but not ‘professional’ in traditional terms of (i) an agreed body of knowledge (ii) self-regulation and (iii) commitment to a code of self-transcending ethical standards.

those challenges and, more particularly, with the similarity of many leader's attitudes to how they viewed the success or otherwise of these strategies and considerations for, or planned next steps.

It was clear from their responses that many of these strategies involved staff redundancies but went under the rubric of 'restructuring' (ie outsourcing, downsizing, off-shoring). However, two themes emerging from these interviews played a formative role in shifting and sharpening my thinking about their responses. First, the overwhelming majority of these senior leaders were *not happy* with the uptake of and/or impact of their strategies. Second, they were determined to *try other options* and soon.

This was Australia in the mid-1990s — and given the reflections above some obvious questions were stirring: apart from the considerable pressures on these senior leaders (board, investors, institutions alike) what must *life* be like inside these organisations with waves of structural change? What must *life* be like for the middle managers in these organisations? And what might *life* be like for those individuals at the sharp end, furthest away from understanding the nuances of the pressures on senior leaders? ²¹

There was no doubting the earnest engagement of these leaders with the challenges they described, but there lingered deepening impressions of an uncritical and too-easy adoption of the most recent cost cutting techniques. This was often expressed in terms of seeing what was happening in other industries, other organizations, including headquarters overseas. The operative word seemed to be 'seeing' — evidence was not always clear in terms of outcomes for these senior executives other than their commonplace descriptions of raw numbers. What alternative kinds of 'evidence' would be persuasive? I did not at the time have the wit or subsequent opportunity to explore this increasingly more relevant line of question.

With conspicuous exceptions (IBM was one of those exceptions that can be named) in quite a number of cases there also seemed (upon reflection) too little reference to *employees* in

²¹ By 'life' I could only begin to imagine the multiple and individual dimensions beyond work-hours: for example, questions of job or work-related identity, tensions around work-place and domestic relationships, views of hope for the future. Asking questions about what 'life' was like for individuals (then, now, into the future) became a revealing means into larger and complex issues for those asked. This was a line of questioning that only progressively emerged from these early experiences: a line of existential-type questions that I asked, and continue to ask — mostly fruitfully — but also instructively, not always in welcomed ways.

discussions about restructuring strategies — that is, the dominant references were to *costs*. Through the course of these interviews I gradually become increasingly disillusioned and angry. The era I had experienced, and at the risk of a glossing generalisation, of seeing employees as ‘our greatest asset’ seemed more like ancient history in an era where employees were, still glossing, increasingly through these interviews viewed more as expenses — ‘costs to be cut’. From these glossing general conclusions disturbing questions were becoming increasingly stark: What *was* the personal toll of these restructuring strategies both individually and collectively? What *would* the toll be if these same kinds of cost-reducing, market-driven, restructuring strategies continued and expanded in this vein, not just locally but obviously and increasingly globally? What kinds of options were considered? How were those options evaluated and by whom? What kinds of pressures led these clearly capable senior leaders into these kinds of evaluations? Did they seek advice, and if so from whom, and with what kinds of terms of reference? In other words what were the benchmarks of ‘success’? The list of questions simply expanded — seemingly exponentially — and with no prospect at the time of going back to the interviewees to explore more fulsome answers.

Long after these interviews when through the course of my management education work I would question other managers and executives, most confirmed the kinds of views expressed by these senior leaders (in terms of challenges and strategies) but (these other managers and executives) had little or nothing to say about the additional and emerging questions of options explored, alternative perspectives. More disturbing, however, was that concern for those affected by these restructuring decisions rarely moved beyond ideas around what could be dubbed ‘due HR process’ that is, as per organisational Human Resources *policy* covering employee entitlements. I was frequently being reminded (this included friends and family) that my so-called probing questions were ‘not of the real world’. My questions (again, long after the interviews) became increasingly unwelcome and in some cases clearly vexatious. At the base of my concerns was this nagging sense that people made redundant through restructuring were increasingly viewed simply, uncritically and quite literally, as *resources*, as means to organisational ends. Similarly, the dominant attitude conveyed through many interviews and subsequent discussions was that people are indeed seen as resources. If the attitude of seeing employees as resources was the case then it would make business decisions increasingly a matter of financial issues — and much easier. It sounds incredibly old-fashioned and even naïve but my working experience and upbringing had a different premise. This was that people are not simply resources to be

used up but viewed for what they are — people, individuals with capabilities, members of families and communities, and so on. If viewed as resources to be used, like any other commodity, then consideration beyond the financial of how business decisions impact on them seems irrelevant and unnecessary. If viewed as individuals then considerations were much more testing, sensitive and difficult. There were, of course, examples of interviews with senior leaders who clearly shared such a view but the problem then and now was that such a view seemed very much in the minority and waning.

This unwelcome line of questioning has only been exacerbated over the last 10-12 years with the rise and dominance of *shareholder primacy*, where questions about options to restructuring and alternatives to seeing people as ‘costs to be cut’ are now viewed in many educational and workplace settings as naïve and unworldly. This is the world of fundamental ‘market-logic’ (Khurana). Shareholder primacy is a view that ‘Professor Jones’ in the case study considered “simplistic, crude, brutal”. I shared, and still share, this view and over the years witnessed, and continue to witness, exactly the outcomes of such simplistic reductionist thinking in its undignified crudity and brutality: often named by multitudes of managers over too many years as what they believe ought for me to be a wake-up call, as this is what happens in ‘the real world’. But if this is so what kind of world is it? Sounds incredibly Hobbesian, but disturbingly more so when named and rejected in the same breath as ‘unworldly’.

During these early experiences personal doubts about my own perspective surfaced. Seemingly unable to question dispassionately I was aware of becoming *ironically obsessive* with what seemed to me to be largely *uncritical and myopic mindsets* in much management theory and practice. This irony stays with me and serves as a kind of vigilant muse, occasionally smiling, but too often frowning with disappointment at my inability to somehow *manage* these questions. Too often the muse and I are on the edge, often on edge with each other. Is the problem then with the muse or me? This is why we need to move past reflexive accounts. They lead into some unanswerable or perhaps equally unthinkable questions. New questions are needed.

I (can only) sense that this same muse smiles when I conclude that the role of management educators is one where *we ought* to do a whole lot better. We are back to normative territory — and it becomes quite familiar territory in the end. We could start by putting market-logic beyond its clearly reductionist perspective; that is, by subjecting such ideas to scrutiny regarding how an *amoral* (by definition) market-logic serves (now quaint sounding but

hardly irrelevant notions of) 'public wellbeing'?

However, such scrutiny means that we acknowledge first that 'ought implies can'. As a management educator I include myself in this and hope to influence others that *business schools do indeed have a public mission*, which calls for new ways of thinking about what it is we 'ought' to be doing in terms of public good. This dissertation offers one line of argument in making that 'ought' a pedagogical option, but an option that calls for considerable engagement in its implications as the philosophical and pedagogical challenges are extensive and demanding. I believe they are challenges that are wholly coherent and entirely consistent with that public mission.

In sum, the aspirations driving this dissertation have progressively emerged to become a dominant area of interest in my postgraduate studies. Fourteen years ago, after only one year of independent teaching and consulting I returned to university to undertake initially some work in adult learning. That graduate certificate of adult learning morphed into a masters of education and then into these doctoral studies. Midway through these part-time doctoral studies (ie now five years ago) I was invited to teach management subjects in the MBA and other postgraduate studies at UTS. These studies together constitute an additional career. After two dimensions of a management career (ie as an executive and as an independent consultant and educator) these postgraduate studies amount to a third career-related dimension: some 14 years of *postgraduate studies in education* and, bar the first year, all centered on *management education*. I have enjoyed and still thoroughly enjoy the field of teaching and learning in management; indeed I thrive on it and hope, with good health and opportunity, to seriously extend my use-by date through usefully teaching and researching issues central to and emerging from this doctorate. But I am increasingly disenchanted with what has to date been a largely entrenched uncritical view of management. It seems to be some kind of heresy to even question the assumptions of management (most especially assumptions of management authority, employee consent or absence of consent, and notions of control over the destiny of others).

I write from broadly *humanist-liberal* convictions and traditions.²² That is, the likes of Kant

²²My humanist and liberal views are each and together hard-won convictions developed now over many decades — after inevitable challenges to previously long-held views (mostly, but not only, views based in religious faith). Those challenges emerged through evolving and ultimately overwhelming doubt when faced with inexplicable, undeserved and indiscriminate harm to all forms of life, on increasingly unprecedented and unrelenting scale over millennia. The response to theodicy was not nihilistic existential despair but hopeful and tempered convictions born of progressively realising and sensing a shared, deeper interdependency, increasingly coming to view humanity as an

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

and Montaigne especially have influenced my thinking most (along with Kant scholars such as Allen Wood, Hannah Arendt, Onora O'Neill, Felicitas Munzel, Robert Louden, Jane Kneller and Elisabeth Ellis among numerous others). As has the *pluralist* influence over many years through John Kekes — although I do not share Kekes' espoused conservatism (Kekes, 1990, 1993, 2000). It is obvious through this dissertation that Kant's philosophies continue to have a profound and still growing influence, especially when his extraordinarily rich moral and political works are matched with the grossly neglected (certainly in English translations) human works in anthropology, history and education. I am happy contemplating the prospect of sustained engagement with Kant scholarship to advance beyond my novice standing.

In thinking through philosophical and pedagogical responses to what I perceived as problematic in management education I started with Hannah Arendt and her ideas linking thinking, willing and especially, (moral) judgment exercised through the ancient Greek concept of *rhetoric* in the public sphere. I imagined then that ideas of moral judgment (again the Greek *phronesis*) were at the centre of decision-making, and that moral judgment may be a defining issue for the research. I also engaged with Onora O'Neill on Kantian constructions of reason and the role of rationality in moral judgment. Along the way I progressively realised that I was depending too heavily on the secondary literature on Kant without engaging more fully with Kant's works. Returning to Kant required a wholly unanticipated enormous investment in time and far greater scholarly effort on a scale that I did not foresee. But in so doing the rewards were bountiful and unexpected. I found a very

integral part of the natural world, still privileged but in the fuller sense of responsibility; far more fragile and individually finite. This summed as a reverence for the dignity of the individual (Timmermann, 2007, p. 181), and a reverence for natural ecology in its interdependent complexity and mysteries (Woodruff, 2001).

Charles Darwin and Rachel Carson's influence has been as profound in progressively shaping my views of the natural world as Kant and Montaigne for the human within that same world: sharing a sense of humility, respect and awe for the interdependent fragility of life. A spiritual sense of intimacy, reverence and faith palpably persists (the latter as *hope* in practical-idealism); but now without a universal theological dogma as a somehow assured foundation. One clearly interconnected but finite life here and now - replete with responsibility for how it is enjoyed, lived and used; no 'other world' rewards or damnation. A hint of that interdependency and reverence is pithily expressed in Hawken: "*We are nature*" (Hawken, 2007, p.171, emphasis in original).

The fragility of this interdependency may also explain the source of one of the major tensions that is a sub-text to my research and this dissertation, viz opposition to rampant, basic utilitarianism: specifically, opposition to the generally *lifeless* cost-benefit economic maths of basic utilitarianism, typically seen in considering questions of human-ecological values as marginal if not irrelevant in the pursuit of creating (mostly business) value. Basic utilitarianism is a hallmark of now ubiquitously entrenched neoclassical economics, the object of my chagrin and also much of Ghoshal's critique (as discussed in Chapter 4 and above).

different Kant to the one that I was all too superficially aware of. I found a very human Kant and far more accessible if not still a little beguiling — given the one-sided treatment as a wholly abstract thinker — in an overwhelming number of English translations. Equally unexpected was the reward in striving to understand Kant’s complex thinking and then to progressively find different perspectives by linking the neglected anthropological writing to his better known although still selective critical works.

As a result of sustained, intense, and sometimes despairing efforts over the last few years I have begun to piece together (what seems to me) a coherent and remarkably fecund suite of Kantian concepts with which to consider and approach ideas on moral accountability and moral judgment for the problem at the heart of this dissertation. Not with a view to constructing some all-encompassing theory but rather to explore ideas, ways of thinking that facilitate reflection, ideally based on experience. I hasten to add the obvious qualification that even after such an effort I still have only a necessarily modest understanding of Kant’s critical project and the connections between his works over time. I aspire to advance my still novice standing here. The three Kantian chapters (making up almost half the dissertation) illustrate the enormity of the debts owed specifically to three Kant scholars within the last ten years: Allen Wood, Robert Louden, and Felicitas Munzel, and in addition more recently Jane Kneller, Philip Rossi, Susan Neiman, Holly Wilson, Elisabeth Ellis, and Angelica Nuzzo, with many of these Kant scholars opening the “almost totally neglected” anthropological works of Kant (Wood 2008)²³. It is my fervent hope that this handful of Kant scholars succeeds in redefining the role that Kant may play in approaching global political-moral-educational issues. In my view management studies need the stimulus of a Kantian outlook in approaching global political-moral-educational issues of management. I hope to contribute to that redefining agenda through reconceptualising management education in the light of public-moral accountability.

The three Kantian chapters illustrate my concerted attempts to think through and envisage dimensions to a distinctive Kantian approach to my perception of the problem. In so doing I am deeply conscious of exposing gaps in my understanding of Kant’s *oeuvre*. Nevertheless, the problem at the centre of this research seems ideally to lend itself to an exploration of the richness of Kant’s extraordinary and still grossly underrated insights. I hope my Kantian

²³ Nuzzo may be the exception here as she retains a revealing focus on *a priori* conditions of sensibility in each of Kant’s critical works, holding that these are as important as *a priori* principles of reason to Kant’s critical project. Future work from Nuzzo is projected at how Kant’s anthropological and political works look when informed by these *a priori* transcendental conditions of sensibility (Nuzzo, 2008, pp. vii-viii).

chapters begin to do some justice to that rich heritage, and open new areas and new questions. In my increasingly settled view Kant warrants many years of concentrated study — and that there is thankfully still plenty to do — is obvious in what follows. In other words I do not purport to be a Kantian scholar bringing new insights into Kant's works, instead I strive as a management academic to avail of Kant's work to bring new insights into the educative problem that is at the heart of this dissertation.

Tzvetan Todorov has also sharpened my humanist sensitivities, especially as he looks back and interprets the horrors of the 20th century. His writing is quite literally shocking in recounting the risks of losing sight of individuals over collectives — one of several defining characteristics of Todorov's depiction of humanist thinking and values.²⁴ There is clearly a strong alignment in his thinking with that of Stephen Darwall's *second-person* standpoint (Darwall, 2006), also a major point of Kantian influence discussed in the second half of this dissertation.

I am aware of the risks of moralising (Coady, 2006) and hope to have found some balance in championing *ideals* for the public role of the university with humanity and the public good as objectives alongside the inadequacies of subjective awareness. I am also aware of the risk of taking myself all too seriously in offering views on a problem that is defined from a quite privileged position. To have the opportunity to undertake this work is the extraordinary privilege of doctoral study, one that I cherish in the sense of recognising both the opportunity and responsibility it affords. Uppermost are the sacrifices of many to my investigations and excessive ruminations — family, friends, students, practitioners and several prized colleagues. Thus I harbour an abiding sense of my own moral accountability to each. I hope above all else to have justified this effort — at least for some; I know from exchanges it will not, nor could it possibly, even desirably, be to the satisfaction of even most. Thus I am as equally grateful to those who did not agree with my line of thinking. Their dissension has hopefully sharpened my thinking. These outcomes and others is the subject of a brief discussion in the final chapter.

²⁴ Todorov describes what he calls the "grammar of humanism: the *autonomy of the I*, the *finality of the you*, and the *universality of the they*" (Todorov, 2002, p. 30); which he contrasts with the "grammar of totalitarianism", where Todorov says "there are only two persons: *us*, among whom the distinctions between individual *Is* have been suppressed; and *them*, the enemies who must be fought" (Todorov, 2003, p. 39).

1.8 A view from the balcony

Almost half of this dissertation is an exploration into Kantian approaches to my educative problem with the MBA. Instead of focusing narrowly from the outset I have deliberately tried to step back and away to see larger connections between the MBA and the broader public, not just students and employers. In a remarkable work of influence beyond its governmental focus, *Leadership Without Easy Answers*, Ronald Heifetz uses the images of the dance floor and the balcony to illustrate the point I am seeking to make here. Heifetz says that we are all engaged in the dance (of life; of the disciplines) but we need from time to time to get on to the balcony to see what is going on (i.e. in order to see a larger context: the players, the patterns, the gaps, the clashes of values, the connections to the outside world)(Heifetz, 1994). On the dance floor we may be simply too close to see those connections, clashes or gaps. It is a view from the balcony that I am after in this research. I sense it is perhaps the narrow, discipline-based focus that may be part of the problem. Only after imagining and reflecting on the view from the balcony did I feel I could 'come back to the dance floor', in this instance to step again 'into the MBA', into reflecting on the pedagogical challenges emerging from the perspective offered 'from the balcony'. It has been primarily through following this strategy that Kant emerged so seriously. The multiple dimensions glimpsed through the case study and the literature called, in my judgment, for an alternative, a comprehensive perspective, one that would strive to encapsulate something of the parts, but also and crucially, parts of what I sensed might be a larger, although always incomplete view, of a whole. 'From the balcony' I sensed that Kant could be a most helpful guide to consult before returning to the dance floor, and indeed a guide in time to exit from the party into the wider world. In the pedagogical section of Chapter 7 the metaphors change again with the dance floor more of the workplace domain where 'hot action' in learning takes place, as opposed to an arguably unworldly university classroom.²⁵

1.9 Questions framing this dissertation

The following questions guide the empirical and literature research phases. The key opening questions look to the salience of the moral-social dimension in management education. This will be addressed via a case study of an MBA program, which will serve to illustrate some of my central educative concerns. Broader questions that emerge will be posed through the literature: what is happening in 'integrating the ethical dimension in management education

²⁵ Hot action, dance floors, and balconies: some narrative! And normative? It is easy to see how metaphors can be both useful and limiting. It also illustrates something of the justifiable research merit afforded to thinking about problems also from a playful perspective. Would humour serve as an inroad into addressing sensitive issues? The arts in all their forms are replete with a long history of affirmative answers to that question and more besides. See Rhodes and Westwood (2006).

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

- notably the MBA? Each question that emerges is viewed from the intersecting perspectives of applied educational and moral philosophy toward business management practice. In other words, postgraduate business management education is the central focus, undertaken from the joint perspectives of an applied educational philosophy on the one hand and on the other toward management practice. I expand on the challenges and motivations of these joint perspectives through the literature review. Those questions include the following:

1. What do management educators regard as 'ethical dimensions in management'? How are ethical dimensions manifested?
2. How do management educators 'integrate' ethical dimensions of management in the MBA?
3. How do management educators (in selected fields of, for example, Business Ethics and Critical Management Studies/Education) address morally sensitive issues in the MBA?
4. What problems do management educators in these fields experience regarding addressing morally sensitive issues in the MBA?
5. What is the role of the business faculty in addressing ethical dimensions in management?
6. What issues emerge for future research directions?

Such a broad range of questions is at best directional but, for this dissertation, some are beyond the scope chosen. For example, I only selectively address the rich literature covering historical origins and development of moral-public tensions in management educations, and I do not address international distinctions in moral concepts, nor the breadth of moral and political philosophies across cultures. Important as each is in understanding the issues involved I have chosen a far more limited range of sensitivities.

In closing this section, Charles Taylor's *A Secular Age* (2007) is important to signal awareness of the perspective I've adopted in this dissertation. Taylor would see this perspective as 'exclusive humanism', that is exclusive of a larger creator, and a form of humanism that believes we can be/are motivated out of a substitute for *agape* — one that is part of our nature. That this substitution has occurred is attributed by Taylor to the process of disenchantment with religious belief since 1500 and the gradual formulation of diverse alternatives. Taylor believes that even in this search for alternatives there is evidence of human need for meaning and a sense of something larger than self — 'fullness' in meaning. Whether that larger sense is an ideal remains to be seen.

Kant, and in particular, what emerges as Munzel's picture of Kant's *paideia*, can be understood in this aspirational and meaningful mould (Munzel, forthcoming). Whether this depiction of a life of meaning (again, what Taylor calls an exclusive humanism) enables educators to address their fiduciary tensions is one aspect of what motivates this dissertation. I believe that a larger and more appreciative view of Kant's philosophical project focuses even greater attention on those tensions.

1.10 An outline of the dissertation

This dissertation situates the moral accountability problem squarely within business schools, and management education in particular, specifically the MBA. The dissertation is in two parts. In the first part I set out the empirical and literature research that serves to define and illustrate the formative-educative issues I see as problematic in the MBA. In the second part I consider a Kantian response to what I sense are factors contributing to this problem. This second part includes a modest Kantian metaphysics and his much-neglected 'philosophy of experience'. Together these provide the coherence needed to consider pedagogical ideas. The conclusion then poses questions for leaders of management education and presents a radical proposal.

Chapter 2 addresses the methodological outlook to explore ideas about the *salience* of moral accountability in the MBA. Here I avail of the licence described by Denzin and Lincoln as the *eighth* moment in the evolution of qualitative research: to engage less with methodological boundary disputes and more with social justice problems (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). In the view of Denzin and Lincoln this is a licence to draw in the humanities to address social problems. In my appropriation of their view this justifies commissioning Kant into the moral accountability problem. In Chapter 3 I illustrate some of the key issues and tensions by tracing the salience of the moral dimension through a case study of one MBA program at an Australian university. While one case only, and without making any claims for generalisation, it will nevertheless provide some empirical references to illustrate what I see as educative-formative problems in the MBA. In Chapter 4, I canvas the management studies literature on the *integration* of the ethical dimension in the MBA. This review is both selective and broad in the sense that a wide range of literatures are considered but through a very selective prism, that of integrating the ethical dimension into management education. Management studies serves as a broad rubric under which are housed a number of quite specific fields, ranging from Business Ethics through Critical Management Studies to the emerging field (in English) of Ethical Economics. This review leads to deeper concerns about the formative *salience* of moral-impacts in management education.

The second part of the dissertation then addresses my educative problem with the MBA through a Kantian perspective. This second part is made up of three chapters (5, 6, & 7) plus a conclusion (Chapter 8). This perspective is Kantian in the sense that Kant's works are understood as the source of the interpretation, without necessarily quoting from Kant directly. For example, Stephen Darwall draws on Kant's works to develop an insight into what Darwall calls the 'Second-Person standpoint' (2006). Kant has not written on the Second-Person standpoint but Darwall attributes his analysis to Kant's works as the source of his own contribution.

Chapters 5 and 6 together provide the two-part Kantian framework of moral anthropology that I am proposing to address my educative project, while Chapter 7 focuses specifically on the pedagogical application. Chapter 5 sets out the first part of that approach through constructing a modest metaphysics of justice, with justice as the vehicle chosen to explore ideas of moral accountability. This metaphysics of justice is intended simply but crucially as a conceptual framework to see something of the *scope*, *content* and *mode* of Kant's dimensions on justice. I call these dimensions 'points of discernment' to signal the role they might play in decision-making and judgments. The second part of Kant's moral anthropology is where, according to renowned Kant scholar Allen Wood, "his empirical theory of human nature is usually totally ignored" (2008, p. xii). This second part of Kant's moral anthropology is the focus of Chapter 6. Here critically important aspects of his anthropology give direction and orientation to his metaphysics. When the two parts are seen together a much stronger sense of the coherence of Kant's entire critical project emerges. Many Kantian concepts are addressed in these two chapters, but together the coherence that emerges enables in Chapter 7 a focus on the pedagogical issues. In chapter 7 the focus is on cultivating justice-based capabilities — specifically about cultivating reflective moral judgment — and cultivating in deeply experiential ways that challenge the concentration on the cognitive domain in education. It includes an account of two worked examples of the Kantian approach in a management class. Chapter 8 poses a challenge to business school leaders around just what management education is *for*. An exhibit is presented early in this final chapter to summarise the Kantian approach developed as a response to what I see as the formative-educative problem. I close in Chapter 8 with questions addressed to leadership concerning the public role of management education — posing a radical alternative that is wholly consistent with Kant's critical project. It is radical in being both a challenge to established assumptions about management authority and what that might mean pedagogically. I plan to address those pedagogical challenges in future work.

1.11 In closing

I recognise that assumptions underpinning the perspectives adopted here are open to many challenges. For example, the explicit assumption that Kant has a more comprehensive approach to what I perceive is problematic here than another philosopher. I certainly recognise that this would from the outset be a heavily contested assumption. However, in the course of the dissertation I quite deliberately question that challenge and argue for a wholly different and more relevant Kant. I also make the assumption that ideas of moral accountability can be effectively addressed at the postgraduate level — that is, challenging the view that an individual's ethical and moral frame is already established but the time they arrive at postgraduate studies. Further assumptions centre on how best to depict the purpose of the university. These assumptions and perspectives are openly recognised and defended not out of disregard for alternatives but in the conviction that a defensible position is required to address what I believe is a serious formative problem in management education, a problem that is of public concern.

While recognising the importance of such challenges I nevertheless argue for what might look like an immodest, and for some no doubt, pompous proposition. In my judgment the historical and contemporary social-contract role of universities demands a bold affirming commitment to public wellbeing. I offer one response, but one that I hope is deemed by others useful, coherent and enabling. I hope that what follows may also be ennobling in motivating educators, students, practitioners and broader communities to demand a great deal more of management education. I hope others feel the need to be part of the solution. It is my firm conviction that the public legitimacy of universities depends on responses to questions about graduate preparation for intelligent, moral-public accountability. The substance for making this argument hinges on questioning the *salience* of moral accountability in a situated case study and researching the *integration* of moral accountability in the management studies literature.

As would be evident by now I identify and approach these concerns from the liberal, social-contract tradition and in doing so signal opposition to the contractarianism of Hobbes and Locke, a view that favours authority over individual freedom. Naming this liberal, social-contract approach offers a foretaste of the difficulties I see. Kant is in many respects a forerunner (along with Rousseau) of the social-contract view and Kant's critical project and Enlightenment views on maturity influence my experientially-oriented educational position.

Indeed Kant's Enlightenment-inspired notion of maturity²⁶ serves as an underpinning aspirational premise to what I see as ideally defining university and especially postgraduate education. Yet through much of what follows in the case study and the literature Kantian notions of maturity will be seen ironically as an ideal that is arguably considered 'unworldly', that is, not of the 'real-world' of work and management. By contrast I argue that accepting without challenge the supposed 'real-world' views of management and work would merely sanction the *status quo* – and in so doing put at risk what is worthy of the social contract response expected of a university. Ideas as to what constitutes the *status quo* in both management education and management practice might well be factors contributing to making moral accountability problematic.

1.12 Summary and conclusion

Despite rising public awareness of accountability issues in many sectors it seems to be more an awareness of legal rather than moral accountability. This is especially the case for management education. The problem at the centre of this dissertation is a concern for the place of moral not legal accountability in the MBA. Others sharing this concern attribute the genesis of this problem to schools of management having abandoned the professionalisation agenda (with an implicit if not explicit commitment to public wellbeing) in favour of following market demands for functional skills. A case study at an Australian university illustrates key concerns central to the educative-formative problem and a review of the management studies literature address those concerns to assist an understanding of the issues, tensions and their relevance for the educative project here. I argue that the unique public status of universities warrants no less and a great deal more.

I have outlined a two-staged approach to the problem. The first stage consists of assessing what may be learned from a case study of an MBA program at an Australian university and from the management studies literature on moral accountability in the MBA. The outcome of those assessments becomes the problem I address and respond to in the second stage - via a focus on Kant. This is a wholly different Kant to the established image. The Kantian perspective adopted in the second half of this dissertation is powerfully relevant to what I see as problematic in management education. My proposal attests to the increasing influence of this quite different, practical, unexpectedly radical and relevant Kant. I claim that this Kantian proposal invites a reconceptualisation of learning for practice. Such a reconceptualisation would challenge assumptions of authority in a great deal of

²⁶ (i) Having the courage and resolve to think for yourself, (ii) to think from the standpoint of others, and (iii) to act consistently on both counts (Kant, "An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?" 1991, pp. 54-5)

contemporary management practice. Kant saw the role of philosophy as challenging the higher faculties of law and theology (1979). The same challenge might now be posed of the business faculty, or more specifically, graduate schools of business and management. With the 2008 GEC clearly creating serious consequences in the real economy public questions about the role of the MBA in organizational decision-making are again being asked²⁷. Indeed if public trust in higher education's commitment to delivering public goods is warranted then these questions would now seem not only inescapable but also wholly appropriate. Persuasive responses will be needed about just how schools of management are preparing graduates to publicly address the moral impacts of their management decisions. Public trust in the institution of higher education demands a persuasive, reasonable and followable response. This dissertation sets out to explore what might be involved in offering one such response, and in so doing, hopefully poses more questions for management education to consider.

²⁷ As in footnotes 7 and 11. The seriousness of the consequences is the concern clearly driving the *Beyond Blue* initiative of mid December 2008 (as in footnote 15).

PART A:
RESEARCHING A FORMATIVE-PUBLIC PROBLEM
IN THE MBA:
A case study and a critical review of the
management studies literature

Chapter 2: Research methodology to address the *salience* of social-moral issues in the MBA

All enquiry is moral and political.
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. x)

*Phronesis is an intellectual and moral virtue
that develops out of experience.*
(Thiele, 2006, p. 188)

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the approach I use to explore the educative-formative problem I see in management education. My overall objective is to gain some insights into the practical *salience* of social-moral impacts in the MBA program.²⁸ The intention in this empirical phase is to illustrate what I see as the educative-formative problem here, what I will later refer to as my 'educative project'. It is important to note that I am approaching this empirical phase in a manner that does not conform to normal scientific conventions. Where those conventions would start with a problem and proceed through exploration to gather data for analysis I use a different approach. In this dissertation there is no attempt to suggest objectivity in data gathering and or analysis. This research does not seek to emulate the values-neutrality of the natural sciences; indeed this is values laden research. It is normative. I come to this research with views shaped by some extensive experience in witnessing what I see as a major public problem. That problem relates to the formative relevance (or otherwise) of practical wisdom and moral judgment in management education. I am concerned about the relevance and salience of ideas about practical wisdom. So my research interests are more accurately described as an exploration of a personally perceived problem. What I need is a better *understanding* of that problem whilst reflexively aware of the many, though not all, of the influences shaping those perceptions. This chapter describes the approach I followed in furthering that understanding.

As an introduction to the research methodology I begin with some of the questions of management education emerging from the previously sketched background and reading (Section 1.7). This is followed by a discussion of epistemological issues leading to the choice of *phronesis* as a defining methodology for this empirical phase of the research. Two qualifying notes are made along the way: one relating to the question as to whether this research is concerned with building theory per se and the second anticipating potential

²⁸ Social-moral impacts suggest only human or personal impacts. While an accurate portrayal of the problem at the beginning of the field-work it became by the end short-hand for impacts that affected not only individuals but also ecologies, or the human as part of natural ecology.

tensions between the research objectives for this empirical phase and what I am proposing for exploration in the second part of the dissertation. The end result of both qualifications brings to the fore two vital aspects developed through this research: (a) contemporary appropriation of Aristotle's *phronesis* (practical judgment) and (b) the central role and importance of tensions in theory and practice for management education and learning. The choice of the case study method informed by *phronesis* is then discussed together with related case details: the research sample, data collection methods, analysis and synthesis, ethical considerations, issues of trustworthiness, and the limitations of the research. The empirical research questions, related epistemology issues, *phronetic* methodology and methods²⁹, plus my reflexive background together set the stage for the case study in the next chapter. The case study plus the literature review pose major questions of management education which is focus of the second half of this dissertation: a practice-oriented approach informed by the outcomes of each phase of this research.

2.2 Questions for this empirical phase

From the previously sketched background section (1.7) I was interested in gaining some understanding of how relevant or salient were ideas about social-moral impacts of management decisions in management education. There may be issues of integrating the ethical-moral dimension into the curriculum and those issues may in one sense be simpler and in another sense more complex. The simpler issues might revolve around understanding concepts (such as what is meant by 'social impacts' of management decisions). The more complex issues might go to questions of ideology, politics and questions about academic and graduate public accountability. But rather than being drawn too soon into these questions it seemed more appropriate to seek some contextual perspective about *salience*, that is, questions regarding the prominence of 'social impacts' in what MBA students learn. At the base of this empirical phase is an abiding concern about the formative influence of salience. If social/personal/moral impacts are not discussed in anything like a comprehensive manner (i.e. not warranting attention let alone debate) what does that say to graduates about what is important for them in practice? And how might they respond to others who claim that their moral concerns are indeed salient - for this manger standing before them? Sufficiently salient to not just expect questions but to have answers demanded - perhaps publicly? What kinds of questions and answers would be

²⁹The case study method chosen is *informed* by an ethnographic framework, with ethnographic elements added to illustrate aspects of the case. The connection between the two is such that I considered labelling the method as an ethnographic case study, but to do so favours each equally and that is not justifiable here. To add ethnographic elements to the case study would, however, be consistent with the licence taken from Denzin and Lincoln's views (2005, pp. 9-10). The ethnographic elements in the case study are discussed below.

considered reasonable? Accordingly questions for this early phase of the research include the following:

- i. How do both MBA students and academics *understand* the idea of 'social-moral impacts'?
- ii. Are social-moral impacts *perceived* to be related to ideas of responsibility: e.g. business ethics, corporate social responsibility or corporate governance? And if related then of what kind and to what degree?
- iii. What do MBA students/academic staff *see* as social-moral impacts? What examples come to mind?
- iv. How *relevant* are social-moral impacts perceived to be in the practice of management decision-making (by MBA academic staff and students)
- v. How *important* are social-moral impacts in management *practice*?
- vi. Are social-moral impacts an issue for individual managers or for management generally? In other words is there some idea of separation between the individual and the collective around responsibility for social-moral impacts of management decisions?
- vii. What do MBA students/academics make of ideas of *public scrutiny* regarding management responsibility for the social-moral impacts of their decisions?

It was anticipated that terms such as 'social-moral impacts' when coupled with others such as 'public scrutiny' were likely to be seen as equally ambiguous and lacking definition. Indeed, coming to grips with interpretation of such terms was one of the challenges underpinning the research. Accordingly some latitude was needed to seek/give/explore examples. The opportunity and licence to explore responses and develop a line of enquiry as a result of responses was as an important factor motivating this research. These needs (to explore, seek examples) collectively suggested that a qualitative approach to these questions was the most appropriate option (Mason, 2002, p. 64). Qualitative enquiry provided opportunities to explore responses with both individuals and within contexts of the research, or the settings, be they individual or a meeting of academics and/or students. Quantitative research, in contrast, might offer insights into questions of scale but not the needed opportunity to seek some perspectives about contexts of learning, plural expectations, and the politics related to each and further insights into the tacitly known (Polanyi, 1983). This latter notion was more concerned with what the students, graduates, and academics might know but not necessarily express, that is, issues of unexplored assumptions about management theory and practice and management education. If salience was going to be the required fulcrum then some latitude would be needed to respond to,

enquire about and interpret what was being said, or not said.

In addition to the need for some flexibility in the research approach, there was a recognition that seeking definitive responses to any one question was not the purpose of the research, apart from, perhaps, a collective perception of *salience*. Of equal importance was the opportunity to explore data so as to gain some insights into linking teaching and learning practice with ill-defined normative ideas on social-moral impacts. Being able to explore what *might* emerge as extensions or clarifications about that problem was an important licence. Accordingly I chose an approach that offered this kind of flexibility: a *phronesis*-based approach. The rationale for choosing this *phronesis* approach follows shortly. First, it is necessary to add a context-setting qualification to the research.

2.2 (a) First qualification: This research is not about building ‘theory’

Before discussing *phronesis* as such it is necessary to qualify what is to follow throughout this chapter and the entire dissertation. I heartily agree with Thomas that what is needed in educational research and practice is less dependence on theory and more licence to explore and reflect through experience and practice (Thomas, 2007). The following table sets out some examples that illustrate the point:

‘Theory’ as used		Possible alternatives to ‘Theory’
Theory contrasted with fact	<i>Call it</i>	conjecture
Theory, or theorising, as thinking	<i>Call it</i>	thinking
Personal theory or practical theory	<i>Call it</i>	reflection; reflective practice
Theory as a body of knowledge	<i>Call it</i>	a body of knowledge
Theory as a clearly developed argument	<i>Call it</i>	a clearly developed argument
Theory as craft knowledge	<i>Call it</i>	craft knowledge

(Thomas, 2007, p. 147)

In a memorable phrase Thomas says “wanting theory is like wanting to hold Mummy’s hand in the dark” (2007, p. 146). In other (Kant-based) words, seeking the comfort of theory is risking not having “the courage and resolve to think for ourselves” (Kant’s notion of maturity in response to the question “What is Enlightenment?” (Kant, 1991), discussed in Chapter 5). In this regard *less* theory holds out the prospect that there is *more* to be gained educationally and practically through reflective engagement³⁰ on practice and experience. In

³⁰ This includes an emphasis on ‘embodied reflection’ as a vital form of learning - which will be discussed as akin to Beckett and Hager’s notion of ‘organic learning’ (discussed in Chapter 7, section

this I am not suggesting a choice one side or the other, instead an emphasis on reflection and experience over, not instead of, theory as something to be merely understood, full stop. Fish explains this succinctly:

The student studies not rules but cases, pieces of practice, and what he or she acquires are not abstractions but something like 'know-how' or 'the ropes', the ability to identify (not upon reflection, but immediately) a crucial issue, to ask a relevant question, and to propose an appropriate answer from a range of appropriate answers. Somewhere along the way the student will also begin to formulate ... general principles, but will be able to produce or understand them only because he or she is deeply inside — indeed, is a part of — the context in which they become intelligible.

(Fish, 1989, in Thomas, 2007, p. 144)

I am not seeking to build a *theory* of how to approach moral impacts in management. In what follows I seek to better understand the kinds of problems experienced (by teachers and students in the first instance) in addressing those impacts and then as a result to think about and offer some ideas for practice, not as a wholly constructed, all-encompassing theory. Why? Because, like Thomas, my sense is that learning (again for teachers and students alike) is more effective when problems and issues are recognised, experienced and reflected upon in multiple ways (as in Thomas' table above, ie thinking, in argument, etc), rather than conceptualised as theory. This emphasis goes some way to also explaining the preference of *phronesis* over problem-based methodology (below) where the latter avails of Argyris' 'theory in use'. With a deeper appreciation of the problems being experienced by educators and students I seek ways for both to engage with what will aid — although challenge, perhaps radically — understanding and practice in both management education and management practice. Theory is useful but in Thomas' view (and I agree) we become too dependent on it, at the cost of thinking independently, and it must be added, where such independent thinking calls for going over old ground. Thomas likens theory to a virus, it eventually damages the host (2007, p. 146); in (my view) as much as it undermines the host's capacity to build immunity to viruses. The case study brings to bear the need above all else to *think anew* about social-moral impacts. And there is, in my view, a great deal to think about, much that is by implication radical for practice.

7.4). Reflective engagement will be distinguished from the purely cognitive function in learning and will be linked to ideas on Kant's embodied reflection discussed through Part B.

2.3 Methodology: *Phronesis* over Problem-based Methodology (PBM)

This research problem is normative: what kind of management education is needed to foster personal awareness of moral accountability on the part of managers for the impacts of their decisions? What *should* such an education look like? In order to engage with such questions the research objective is to explore the *salience* of a specific connection of business schools to societal wellbeing: relating the teaching and learning inside one MBA program to ideas of fostering *moral accountability* in management decision making. That exploration consists primarily of a case study centered on an Australian business school. Connections between ideas of public wellbeing and business school education will be identified in the literature review as problematic. In this context universities are deemed to be at risk of “compromising public trust and accountability” (Greenwood & Levin, 2000). This risk was then — and still is — especially acute in the case of business schools (Khurana, 2007). Accordingly, specific and related *values are at the centre of this research*: public trust and moral accountability. As such the research methodology cannot emulate the idealised values-free nature of the natural sciences.

Practice-based problems are a central characteristic of this dissertation. So too are situations of practice, that is, educational settings for students and educators alike, and eventually of workplace situations for graduates. I considered drawing on Robinson’s Problem-based Methodology (PBM) as it offered an approach that set out to address and solve practice-based problems (Robinson, 1993). Robinson offered an approach that suited a learning environment in that the process is focused on identifying Argyris’ ‘Theories in Use’, a useful way into the problematic. Eventually, however, I opted for a different methodology. One that would focus on issues of values, and moral values more specifically. This is the *phronesis*-based approach most recently restored by Flyvbjerg. While PBM (and other action-learning oriented approaches) is attractive in its focus on practical problems, my educative problem called for a more nuanced understanding of what is involved, including the kinds of knowledge being addressed, modes of address, formative influences — all these being very specifically related to normative questions of moral impacts. I consider that the ancient notion of *phronesis* (as a context-dependent knowledge of practical wisdom) is a concept that provides a helpful way into developing a richer understanding of what is problematic in management education. *Phronesis* was powerfully restored by Bent Flyvbjerg to guide the social and political sciences (Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2001). Flyvbjerg also positioned *phronesis* as specifically relevant for giving merit to knowledge from case studies and I draw on his insights in addressing some commonplace misunderstandings of case studies (Flyvbjerg,

2006). However, where Flyvbjerg incorporated ideas on power into his interpretation of *phronesis* I did not, at the outset, intend to explore power through the case study or elsewhere. This was not to suggest that power and politics were irrelevant as nothing could be further from what happened; there were as it turned out ample signs of power being exercised in clearly political ways in both the case study and the literature. Still, for my purposes, I hoped that power and related politics would be less significant. Of greater significance, I sensed, was developing a better understanding of the educative problem per se. With some better understanding, ideas of power may become relevant again in terms of questions around business school leadership. Questions of leadership are sketched in Chapter 8. With this objective of seeking deeper empirical understanding of the problem I set out to put any questions and issues of power and politics in the background.³¹ Questions around power had been a long-standing focus of intense interest in qualitative research, so rather than imagine that I could add anything more to that perspective my judgment was that educational questions were of far greater import here. That is, I sought to foreground educational questions, hoping to leave political and power issues in the background. Politics would of course matter but I set out not to focus on power per se. Flyvbjerg (along with innumerable researchers and writers previously writing on issues within institutions³²) was however soon to be vindicated, making for a more realistic and far more interesting situated account. As Freeman so accurately portrays it:

Educational activities ... are moral enterprises in terms of both their enactments and the 'goods' towards which they project learners. Both the enactments and projects alert us to *the political nature of educational practice*. Educational practices have histories that we can view as the story of their victories and defeats. In this sense, educational practices can be seen as the traces or records of the successes and failures of the interests, dispositions, capacities and cultural modes of operation of certain groups, who act out their particular cultural and economic interests thorough education. (Freebody, 2003, p. 56 emphasis added)

The moral issue was a different matter altogether in this so-called 'real world'; moral issues shaped the research questions and infused all the deliberations. Those questions sought in the main to identify a place in the MBA for ideas on moral *accountability* and even more particularly moral *judgment* informed by *phronesis*. Why *phronesis*? What is it about *phronesis*

³¹ Carspecken, 1996, p. 119.

³² Stewart Clegg for example covers a vast literature on power over several decades. See (Clegg, 1989, 2003; Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Clegg, Hardy, & Nord, 1996; Clegg & Haugaard, forthcoming)

that is central to the problem?³³

The conceptual foundations for *phronesis* are firstly described via Flyvbjerg. The connections of *phronesis* to qualitative research methodology are developed *after* situating this research within Denzin and Lincoln's methodological frames, or what they refer to as evolving 'moments', in the development of qualitative research. I then link *phronesis* as an epistemology to *how phronesis* shaped the details of the case study method.

This research is normative in the clear sense of wanting to address *moral* questions. As mentioned above, and in line with Thomas' recent work, I do not seek to develop a *theory* of education but rather to generate discussion around educational ideals (Thomas, 2007). Nor do I want to denigrate theory per se. This desire to generate discussion around ideals also seems to be wholly consistent with what Denzin and Lincoln claim is needed in qualitative research, namely to address *social issues and problems*. Denzin and Lincoln argue that academics should have less concern with scientific methodological rigour and more license to engage in reasoned argument toward (publicly) needed outcomes. This is a view that I wholly endorse. The relationship of theory to *normative* educational study can thus now be glimpsed in the sense that "all enquiry is moral and political" (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. x).

As such, this research reflects some of the ideas inherent in what Denzin and Lincoln refer to as the current "eighth moment" in the evolution of qualitative research methodology³⁴, which they depict as the *methodologically contested present*. This eighth moment "asks that social sciences and the humanities become sites for critical conversations about ... globalization, freedom, and community" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). Denzin and Lincoln describe one of the characteristics of this eighth moment as "the reconnection of social science to social purpose" (pp. 1117—8). Drawing on Bleier, Denzin and Lincoln argue that social science should be driven by an *ameliorative purpose*; it should seek to solve some problem, to allay some misdistribution of resources, to *meet a genuine need* (p. 1117, emphasis added). Further they seek to have an engaged social science, one that "speaks truth to

³³ Beyond the central role of *phronesis* in Aristotle's works (Aristotle, 1976; 1995) there is an extensive contemporary literature on *phronesis*: from the broadly epistemological-hermeneutic (Vetlesen, 1994; Ricoeur, 1992) to specific application in education (Dunne, 1997), politics (Garver, 1994; Villa, 2001), and as here, in case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006).

³⁴ Denzin and Lincoln depict eight *moments* of qualitative research. The first: *traditional* (1900-1950); the second: the *modernist*, or golden age (1950-1970); third: *blurred genres* (1970-1986); fourth: the *crisis of representation* (1986-1990); the fifth: *postmodern*, a period of experimental and new ethnographies (1990-1995); sixth: *post experimental inquiry* (1995-2000); seventh: the *methodologically contested present* (2000-2004); and eight: the *fractured future*, which is now (2005-). Denzin, N. and Y. Lincoln (2005, p.3).

power”, by “locating points where professional ethics and political effectiveness converge” where the professional ethics issue is one of *social justice* (p. 1117, emphasis added). Denzin and Lincoln sense a new community of qualitative researchers is emerging, characterised by a sense of “interpersonal responsibility and *moral obligation* on the part of the researchers, to respondents, to consumers of research, and to themselves as qualitative fieldworkers. This includes the quality of ‘being *with* and *for* the other, not looking *at* the other’ ... where ‘values of interpretative qualitative research *mandate* a stance that is democratic, reciprocal, and reciprocating rather than objective and objectifying’“(p. 1118, emphasis added).

I submit that Denzin and Lincoln’s notion of this eighth moment in qualitative research is reflected in the prominence of philosophical concepts in this research and dissertation. At the centre of my formative-educative problem is a concern for moral accountability. That accountability has social justice at its base and it is argued in later chapters that concerns for social justice constitute much that link the role of universities to public wellbeing. Accordingly Kantian ideas of justice, moral obligation and judgment are linked with Aristotle’s *phronesis* (practical wisdom) as essential concepts defining the outlook adopted in this research and dissertation. Indeed, these same and similar philosophical concepts inform much of the work that is addressed by other researchers³⁵— however with Kantian contributions notably limited to very few scholars, fewer still in management studies, and none to my knowledge with the orientation offered here. This eighth moment is not only representative of this and other research; it is also aspirational in the sense that it suggests a direction that invites participation by those affected and involved. I am calling the research described herein as being ‘toward’ Denzin and Lincoln’s eighth moment because I cannot yet claim direct participation in designing outcomes or ways forward. I propose some ways forward here but they remain limited in their participative influence. Many of the ideas expressed within have been canvassed with my management students over the last 5 years but I am cannot claiming that experience warrants empirical status here — rather it is anecdotal, interesting and potentially instructive. It is context-dependent knowledge.

The eighth moment also points to a sharing of research aspirations around, inter alia, a social justice agenda; an agenda that this research suggests be increasingly and publicly scrutinised. That is, qualitative researchers will develop according to Denzin and Lincoln “a new set of practices and purposes — a new praxis that is deeply responsive and *accountable to those it serves*” (p. 1123, emphasis added). *Whom then do business schools serve?* This

³⁵ Represented in the literature review (Chapter 4).

dissertation is grounded in the shared conviction³⁶ that beyond the immediate and longer term needs of students there are also larger, public needs for an education which is responsive to and accountable for fostering public goods and wellbeing. Onora O'Neill (O'Neill, 2003) makes the point that at the centre of public wellbeing are ideas of *trust* and institutional trustworthiness, and that accountability is and will be central to that trust and trustworthiness. O'Neill's work is central to this dissertation and is discussed in the Kantian chapters.

2.3 (a) *Phronesis* and methodology

Flyvbjerg expresses this clearly:

Phronesis is problem-driven, not methodology driven. Thus the most important issue is not the individual methodology involved, even if methodological questions may have some significance. It is more important to get the result right — to arrive at social and political sciences that effectively deal with deliberation, judgment and praxis ... rather than being stranded with social and political sciences that vainly attempt to emulate natural science. (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 77)

In his groundbreaking work *Making Social Science Matter* Flyvbjerg revisits the fundamental distinctions in Greek understanding of knowledge, and in so doing, clarifies the contemporary significance — or more accurately, insignificance — of *phronesis*:

- *Episteme*: Scientific knowledge. Universal, invariable, context-independent. Based on general *analytical rationality*.
- *Techne*: Craft/art (knowledge). Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented

³⁶These convictions are shared by those who are prominent participants in the management learning and critical management studies communities. These academics and others dominate the literature review chapter and include: the late Sumantra Ghoshal, Rakesh Khurana, Christopher Grey, Campbell Jones, Martin Parker, Rene ten Bos, together with Paul Adler, Linda Forbes, Anne Cunliffe, Bill Cooke, John Roberts, Hugh Willmott and Edward Wray-Bliss. There are many others of my colleagues in the School of Management at UTS who are less prominent in this dissertation and who also share many of these convictions: Dexter Dunphy, Stewart Clegg, Thomas Clarke, Carl Rhodes, Suzanne Benn, Anne Ross-Smith, Jenny Onyx, Bronwyn Dalton, Jenny Green, Tyrone Pitsis, and Sami Hasan to name but a few. Examples of public goods that are prominent in the case of my colleagues include research, teaching and learning in: corporate governance, sustainability, management ethics, gender issues, community building, and innovation in collaboration.

The management learning focus of this dissertation is developing a critical *capability* with postgraduate management students: one that seeks to *enable* them to be accountable publicly — and to publicly account — for the moral impacts of their decisions *on individuals*, not just collectives, and ecologies. That capability is directly linked to the related public wellbeing ideas of trust and what Onora O'Neill calls *intelligent* accountability. (O'Neill, 2003).

towards production. Based on practical *instrumental rationality* governed by a conscious goal.

- *Phronesis*: (Knowledge of) Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical *value rationality*. (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 57, brackets and emphasis added)

Caterino and Schram summarise these knowledge distinctions in the following terms:

Phronesis is, as Aristotle termed it, akin to practical wisdom that comes from an intimate familiarity with the contingencies and uncertainties of various forms of social practice embedded in complex social settings. *Episteme* is knowledge that is abstract and universal; *techne* is the know how associated with practising a craft (2006, p. 8).

Here is Flyvbjerg on the significance of *phronesis* for the social sciences:

besides focusing on values – ‘what is good and bad for humans’, which is the classical Aristotelian focus — a contemporary reading of *phronesis* must also pose questions about power and outcomes:

- Who gains, and who loses?
- Through what kinds of power relations?
- What possibilities are available to change existing power relations?
- Is it desirable to do so?
- What are the power relations among those who ask the questions? (Flyvbjerg, 2006)

According to Caterino and Schram, Flyvbjerg emphasises *phronetic* social science for the following “five interrelated reasons”:

- a. Given the contingent nature of human interaction in the social world, social inquiry is best practised when it seeks not general laws of action that can be used to predict courses of action but *the critical assessment of values, norms, and structures of power and dominance*. Social inquiry is better when it is linked to questions of the good life, that is, to questions of what we *ought* to do.
- b. Social inquiry is a species not of theoretical reason but of *practical reason*. Practical reason stays within the horizon of involvements in social life. For Flyvbjerg, this entails a context-dependent view of social inquiry that rests on the *capacity for*

judgment.

- c. Understanding can never be grasped analytically; it has a holistic character, given that the social world is both historical and connected by narrative structures.
- d. Understanding also has ineliminable subjective elements that require researchers to forego a disinterested position of detachment and to enter into dialogue with those they study. Dialogical social inquiry challenges traditional notions of impersonal objectivity and truth.
- e. A dialogical social inquiry into a dynamic and changing social world draws philosophical sustenance, in Flyvbjerg's view, from fusing Aristotle and Nietzsche with Foucault and Bourdieu, while using ideas from other significant philosophers and social scientists. This combination emphasises that interpretation is itself a practice of power, implying an a priori involvement in the world that researchers have to take into account. (Caterino & Schram, 2006, pp. 8-9, emphasis added)

These five assumptions lead Flyvbjerg to propose what he terms "*phronetic* social science," which calls for mixing methods in *the naming of understanding and informing situated practice*. This is part of an effort to "encourage 'problem-driven' research in the name of a more relevant, civic-minded scholarship that can challenge power and change society for the better" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 8, emphasis added).

Situated practice is thus a major factor in considering the research approach. It is also a dominant consideration when pedagogical factors are taken up in Chapter 7. This is so because situated practice in management is characterised as needing to take decisions in 'hot action', that is, under pressure (Beckett & Hager, 2002). Those pressures include decision making amid uncertainty where there are social/person impacts, and probably scrutiny as well. In summary, the choice of a *phronetic* approach to the research informed not just the empirical phase but also what follows into considerations of practice, for educator and management practitioner alike.

It is thus readily apparent that *phronesis*-based research focuses on ideas of developing capacities for *practical judgment* in social settings where values and norms matter. The very practice settings that define this research are thus the domain of *phronesis*-based questions. That is, questions about developing a capacity for moral judgment, where norms and values may be in conflict and yet where decisions are called for and action may need to be taken. These are the settings not only of business school classroom discussions but clearly workplaces and communities. These are the settings of *practice* for educators and students

alike, for managers as *practitioners*. Accordingly, *phronesis*-based research offers the kind of approach my educative project requires — a values-based approach to practical, concrete problems in institutional settings both educational and places of employment as managers.

But the role of *phronesis* in case studies has not as yet been discussed. A return to Flyvbjerg aids understanding the significance of *phronesis* as context-dependent and values-based knowledge, and how such knowledge is of itself valuable in learning to make judgments in situated practice. The case study assists in developing such knowledge. Before moving to Flyvbjerg on case study I anticipate some questions as to where this is heading.

2.3 (b) Second qualification: A licence to work with tensions

Before closing this section on methodology and moving to details of how the case is conducted I draw together several potentially perplexing tensions from the earlier parts of this chapter and anticipate how they relate to what is achieved in the second half of the dissertation. Not to do so is to raise questions that are best addressed now. I have distanced this work from ideas of developing *theory* while holding onto the notion that what this dissertation does is inform practice (Thomas, 2007). Like Thomas I want to place a lesser reliance on the role of *theory as objective* and more on *thinking about* approaches to the problematic. Thinking without the objective of building a theory provides a licence to explore. That exploration is about practice. But to inform practice I need evidence of the problem. *Phronetic* social research provides that vehicle. At the same time I baulk at making too much of the case, that is to risk generalisations — even “fuzzy generalisations” (Bassey, 1999, p. 12). As with the *phronetic* approach I use the case to think about, explore and illustrate the problem not to generalise.

Nevertheless, another tension needs to be anticipated so as to avoid confusion over the approach to theory and the *phronesis*-based methodology adopted here. After considering the case findings along with the literature review I proceed in the second half of this dissertation to develop what may well appear to be an attempt at doing exactly the opposite of what I claim to be avoiding: constructing a theory to approach the problem, and more to the point one based on a deeper understanding of Kantian concepts. But the approach in the second part of the dissertation refers to one perspective of theory as ‘ought’ and relating it to practice as ‘is’, with each challenging the other. That Kantian approach can be seen as a quite radical challenge to contemporary management education and practice. Radical in two senses: in what it says about the role of educators and radical in what it says about the givenness of fundamental assumptions in management theory and practice. While some

aspects of this particular is/ought tension are more appropriately handled in the second part of the dissertation one aspect is important in this methodological chapter, especially as it relates to case studies and what follows. Simons provides something of the licence I am seeking when describing the tensions between single case studies and generalisations. I seek the same kind of licence regarding tensions involved in addressing the educative problem here. According to Simons:

One of the advantages cited for case study research is its uniqueness, its capacity for understanding complexity in particular contexts. A corresponding disadvantage often cited is the difficulty of generalising from the single case. Such an observation assumes a polarity and stems from a particular view of research. Looked at differently, from within a holistic perspective and direct perception, there is no disjunction. What we have is a paradox, which if acknowledged and explored in depth, yields both unique and universal understanding.

(We need to) embrace the paradoxes inherent in the people, events and sites we study and explore rather than try to resolve the tensions embedded in them ... Paradox is for me the point of case study. Living with paradox is crucial to understanding. Then tensions between the study of the unique and the need to generalise is necessary to reveal both the unique and the universal and the unity of that understanding. To live with ambiguity, to challenge certainty, to creatively encounter, is to arrive, eventually, at 'seeing' anew. (Simons, 1996, in Bassey, 1999, p. 36).

Simons serves here to justify rather than resolve tensions inherent in case study research. Fiduciary tensions are a defining part of this research. Indeed in later chapters I focus on responding to those fiduciary tensions in management education and in so doing I seek to *accentuate* not ease those tensions, as a unity. Kant is both vital to that approach and at the same time serves to illustrate that it is not new theory but engaged, embodied thinking about key issues that matters here. What matters is developing a deeper understanding of the problem and then approaching it in ways that recognise but do not seek to resolve inherent tensions — non-prescriptively. Finding ways to engage with the problem depends less on building new theory, and more on striving to 'see', to experience, anew. I share Thomas' view that theory per se may have the damaging effect of relieving us of the need to strive for embodied understanding. The striving in this research hinges more on addressing and responding to awkward questions of educational leadership and educational practice. Kantian ideas help to justify those questions and more. Specifics on how the case was

addressed is the next focus.

2.4 Case Study as method

In this case study I rejected the positivist paradigm³⁷ of Yin in favour of the interpretative orientation of Stake (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995, 2005). In Stake's view "all research depends on interpretation ... where standard qualitative designs call for the persons most responsible for interpretations to be in the field, making observations, exercising subjective judgments, analysing and synthesising, all the while realising their own consciousness" (Stake, 1994, p. 41). The reason for choosing the interpretative over the positivist-scientific follows the choice of *phronetic* social research outlined above. I am seeking some understanding of the salience for educators (and formatively, for students) of ill-defined normative ideas of social-impacts in the MBA. That those ideas are normative, ill-defined and in complex teaching, learning, and politically sensitive situations means that they are open to multiple interpretations. Yin's scientist approach to cases does not provide what I am striving for in addressing questions of salience, which requires interpreting participants' comments and following through to clarify what may or may not be said. Interpretation is inescapably essential with the documentation and observation aspects of the curriculum review phase. In other words, interpretation is a defining requirement. As outlined below the complexities involved in interpretation are challenging in themselves.

Stark draws distinctions among three types of case study: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. The intrinsic case is undertaken "because, first and last, one wants a better understanding of a particular case" (Stark, 2005, p. 445). "Study is undertaken because of an intrinsic interest in a particular ... curriculum. An *instrumental* case study is undertaken with a view to provide insight into an issue. The case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else. The case still is looked at in depth, its contents scrutinized and its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this helps us pursue the external interest. The case may be seen as typical of other cases or not" (ibid). When a number of cases are studied to investigate a phenomenon or a general condition it is a multiple case study, or collective case study. Clearly Stark's last type does not describe this case study. While my research interests are indeed in a curriculum that would be only one aspect of a more complex whole, I am, however, far more interested in understanding what is happening inside this case in order to consider more broadly the fruits of management education. To that extent the case study to follow is of Stark's *instrumental* kind, where I am concerned to more specifically focus on the salience of social-

³⁷ Bassegy, 1999, p. 27.

moral impacts in the MBA. In Stark's terms again (2005, p. 451), the "phenomenon on the table" was one that emerged as a dominant personal concern, that is the salience of social-moral impacts in the MBA.

Accordingly, the study site offering the largest opportunity to learn would be a management education program, and of course one where MBA studies are offered. That opportunity was afforded through an Australian university, where entry was arranged (via a supportive Head of School and Sponsor) to gain access to the beginning of a formal faculty review of their MBA curriculum. This opportunity turned out to be rich in offerings, providing exceptional accessibility to academics and students alike, to observe, to enquire, to reflect — mostly alone as the researcher but in the course of a couple of final interviews to jointly reflect on issues with key academics in the teaching program. I detail key aspects below.

2.4 (a) An ethnographic case study?

A number of the elements in this case study had ethnographic characteristics. According to Bryman:

Ethnography is a research method in which the researcher:

- is immersed in a social setting for an extended period of time
- makes regular observations of the behaviour of members of that setting
- listens to and engages in conversations
- interviews informants on issues that are not directly amenable to observation or that the ethnographer is unclear about
- collects documents about the group
- develops an understanding of the culture of the group and people's behaviour within the context of that culture
- writes up a detailed account of that setting

Thus, ethnography is taken to include participant observation and is also taken to encapsulate the notion of ethnography as a written product of ethnographic research. (Bryman, 2001, p. 291)

There are, however, two aspects of the case that limit warranting the ethnographic description: questions of 'immersion' and cultural objectives. First, attending nine meetings over seven months, interviewing students and academics over several more months and holding informal discussions with the Course Director probably does not constitute 'immersion' in the sense intended by Bryman. I was unquestionably an observer but on

Gold's classifications of participant-observer roles I moved from "complete observer" to an occasional "observer as participant" (Gold in Bryman, 2001, p. 299). I also had many informal conversations with the Course Director, Dr. Jim. Interviews with self-selecting students and two academics teaching in the program (including the Course Director) followed. My role during the curriculum review process was predominantly as observer but there were occasions when I was invited to participate and chose to accept. My role here shifted to Gold's "observer as participant", but with participation limited to requests from meeting participants (academics) and the Course Director. With my educational background³⁸ I was asked on several occasions technical questions about constructing learning goals. In preparing for the end of review presentation to the Faculty I was asked by the Course Director if I would be prepared to write a précis of the background together with some very general comments about the processes used: numbers of meetings, range of participants. Upon discussing with the Course Director any potential conflict (including of course prejudicing the outcomes of the fieldwork) I agreed on the condition that what I wrote would not be attributed to me and it could be edited by the Course Director. Beyond such nominal involvement, the meetings, documents and interviews I would classify this engagement as extensive, but not one of "immersion".

Second, while most of the other characteristics that Bryman uses to describe ethnography were present the primary hesitation in naming the case ethnographic is that I did not set out to research the culture of the settings, a defining dimension. Cultural issues about relationships and processes were of interest but they were not primary. Nevertheless, it is useful to depict some of the above elements as being present in the case study as it illustrates the depth of engagement.

2.4 (b) *Phronesis* and the Case Study method

In order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between *phronesis* and the case study method Flyvbjerg offers valuable insights into common misconceptions about the case study method (Flyvbjerg 2006).³⁹ It assists my purpose to juxtapose what Flyvbjerg sees as misunderstandings alongside the corrective he proposed against each misunderstanding. I use in each corrective the subheading Flyvbjerg gives to each. In this manner a more informed idea emerges of Flyvbjerg's views on the merits of *phronesis* in approaching case studies broadly — the approach adopted in this research.

³⁸ I had been introduced to the meeting as a doctoral researcher coming from a Faculty of Education. I explain further in the next chapter other details of my introduction to the review committee.

³⁹ Flyvbjerg lists five misunderstandings but only four are included here. The fifth, excluded here, relates to the process of selecting cases and it has little bearing here.

Flyvbjerg depicts misunderstandings of case studies as follows:

Misunderstanding 1: general, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge.

Correction 1: The role of cases in human learning: Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals.

Misunderstanding 2: One cannot generalise on the basis of an individual case: therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development.

Correction 2: Cases as “black swans”: One can often generalise on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via generalisation or alternative to other methods. But formal generalisation is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the force of example” is underestimated.

Misunderstanding 3: The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions.

Corrective: Do case studies have a subjective bias? The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification.

Misunderstanding 4: It is often difficult to summarise and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies.

Corrective: The irreducible quality of good case narratives. It is correct that summarising case studies is often difficult, especially as concerns case process. It is less correct as regards case outcomes. The problems in summarising case studies, however, are due more often to the properties of the reality studied than to the case study as a research method. Often it is not desirable to summarise and generalise case studies. Good studies should be read as narratives in their entirety. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, selections drawn from pp. 219-245)

In the next chapter I transgress Flyvbjerg’s recommendations on correcting common misconceptions of case study research. This is especially at issue in giving full narratives of the interviews. Flyvbjerg has emphasised the merits of knowledge gained through context-dependent situated practice. The knowledge that has been foregrounded in this research study depends in large measure on describing the context of both the curriculum review

process and the narratives of the interviews to both academics and students. Selecting passages in the interviews reveals a distinctive bias in my interpretation: I am looking for evidence to illustrate themes that to me seem to emerge from this one situated case *and* are illustrative of what *I perceive* is problematic in management education. My reflexive background (section 1.7) is an ever-present concern in those selections. How well I have accounted for this selective process is beyond my capacity to judge. Clearly other researchers would see other themes. However, I have sought to retain as much of the relevant extracts as are sufficient to also illustrate some of the necessary complexities and perhaps contradictions found in real life — that is, the life described by MBA students and academics alike in grappling with the MBA curriculum (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 84). Details of how the case was undertaken, including its own tensions, and in this instance some valuable resolutions follow.

2.5 Case study details

Bassey usefully sets out the specific *ends* of an educational case study: sufficient data should be collected so that the researcher is able to:

- (a) explore *significant* features of the case;
- (b) create *plausible* interpretations of what is found;
- (c) test for the trustworthiness of these interpretations;
- (d) construct a *worthwhile* argument or story;
- (e) relate the argument or story to any relevant research in the literature;
- (f) convey *convincingly* to an audience this argument or story;
- (g) provide an audit trail by which other researchers may validate or challenge the findings, or construct alternative arguments. (Bassey, 1999, p. 65, emphasis in original)

Bassey's chosen verbs are instructive in describing not only the process overall but also the processes involved in developing a situated case: *explore, create, test, construct, relate, convey* and *provide*. In one sense these words serve to underline the instrumental intention in the case. They are also consistent with the licence called for earlier in exploring the problem as opposed to constructing a definitive Theory.

2.5 (a) Research Sample: to explore significant features

The site of the EMBA program chosen was one which was being evaluated for purposes primarily of revision, with AACSB accreditation a coincidental consideration. Both the

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

review/revision and accreditation agendas for this EMBA program represented new experiences for students and staff. The research is in two stages and incorporates two distinctive roles: first as observer in the curriculum review process (including awareness of the accreditation agenda) and second as interviewer in subsequent interviews with academics and students. Engagement with the review process consists of being enabled to join an already established committee at an early stage in their review process. That engagement was facilitated by the Head of the School of Management and arranged through an invitation from the Director of the EMBA. Members of that review committee therefore had already been determined but my role as observer to their deliberations was not signalled until I arrived at the first meeting.

The research population of academics and students participating in the EMBA was comprised of 25 students and 8-10 academics. This executive program (EMBA) incorporated a cohort model of teaching. Two significant advantages were gained in availing of a cohort model: (i) a coherent and bounded program of learning and teaching with a common beginning and (ii) the opportunity to have a point of entry which would enable access to common learning and teaching experiences. Each of the academics involved in both the curriculum review and the interviews were seasoned practitioners engaged in postgraduate teaching, roughly half of whom had direct industry experience as managers. All, however, were engaged with industry via research. Accordingly the academics involved in both the EMBA curriculum review process and the interviews were not isolated from managerial practice.

The student interviews that followed were shaped by the review experience. I was given the opportunity to address a cohort class to invite student engagement. After outlining my research interests as being about exploring ideas on 'social impacts of management decisions' five students out of an attending cohort of 20 volunteered their time. These students were all midway through a two year program and had approximately 10 years work experience.

The final two interviews were with academics deeply involved with the EMBA program. Both interviews took place after the student interviews and thus after the curriculum review process. One of the academics was approached for interview on the basis that he was mentioned by students as the academic they expected would most likely be addressing the research topic as they understood it. The second academic and the last to be interviewed was the director of the EMBA, who had also led the curriculum review process.

Nevertheless, this case covers just one EMBA program at one university, and with what was addressed is still empirically limited.

2.5 (b) Data-Collection Methods: to enable plausible interpretations

There are several important dimensions to Bassey's requirement here: data collection methods, plausibility and interpretations. All are valid but I treat each in different ways. I leave the plausibility question to the discussion on 'trustworthiness' below. Questions of interpretation are across several sections so here the focus is on the data-collection methods. The processes involved in data collection vary with each of the two phases. The curriculum review process took place over nine meetings during which I made notes on comments and observations. Discussions with the EMBA director ('Dr. Jim') often preceded and succeeded each meeting. I made notes and observations during each meeting as well as reflecting extensively on the experiences. Noting carefully what was said, not said, moods, inflections, responses was the intention throughout. As previously mentioned, I realised after the fieldwork was completed that Carspecken's use of 'foregrounding and backgrounding' could have better informed my approach (Carspecken, 1996). I was too quick to put political issues into the background, when I could have explored 'taken for granted' references during the review process and the subsequent interviews. By the time I reached the final interview with Dr. Jim the political was inescapable and had become a dominant theme. That theme may have emerged more strongly earlier if I had not been so quick to focus on 'foregrounding' educational questions of salience. As described in the case study, all notes of meetings were kept in specifically dedicated field books. These include reflections on those notes and observations. The same discipline was invoked: for example, what was not said, how a remark may have jarred with what was previously said, signs of conflict and agreement, what agendas were emerging other than those formally prepared by the EMBA director. Characteristic throughout is a concern about interpreting events accurately and fairly. Stake usefully distinguishes categorical aggregation from direct interpretation (Stake, 1995, p. 74) suggesting that both are needed in case study interpretation. Categorical aggregation emerges from reflecting on ideas or experiences over the course of events. For example, in describing the case in the next chapter there are several references to palpable experiences, both with the senior academics involved in teaching the EMBA program. Those 'palpable' experiences became an important source of reflecting on the emotional dimensions, or tensions, being experienced.

I was also very conscious of the influence my presence had in the research process (Schostak, 2006). This was clearly evident in the opening meeting with the curriculum

review process and throughout those review meetings where I describe the sense of being an 'unwelcome outsider'. From that opening meeting through to writing the report for and presentation to the Faculty committee I was conscious of my influence on proceedings. This also serves as both as an example of Stake's direct interpretation, an event that was self-evident on the one hand and his claim that both forms of interpretation are needed, that is, I was conscious throughout the case of reinforcing the opening experience at every meeting I attended. Attendees may have become accustomed to my presence but the outsider tag did not diminish.

Copies were retained of all minutes of meetings together with related documents. This documentation process culminated in a presentation and report to the Faculty Committee. Notes were made on the preparation process and presentation to the Faculty Committee. As mentioned above I was asked by the Course Director to assist in the preparation of the documents to the Faculty Committee.

Semi-structured interviews with students and academics enabled the necessary flexibility (Bryman, 2001, p. 110). I used a set of open-ended questions and drew on publicly available local examples to illustrate the idea of social-moral impacts. The interviews with the academics are more free ranging and individual, reflecting consideration of both the review process and student comments. In the case of the final interview with the course director the interview ranges across input from all sources including that of the academic mentioned by students as most likely to address the topic. All the interviews with students were recorded digitally with transcripts stored digitally and backed up into two separate and secure storage areas.

2.5 (c) Data Analysis and Synthesis: toward a worthwhile argument related to the literature

My notes, observations and reflections on the curriculum review process were considered along with the formal minutes and emerging documentation for the report to the Faculty Committee. This consideration was a testing and lengthy experience as a multitude of perspectives were in play: political, ethical, educational, institutional — and at several levels: individual, school or faculty, student, academic, and researcher. Some of these considerations took on greater significance and some faded — according to the research objective of sensing the salience of social-moral issues in the EMBA program.

While striving to keep an open mind, I was nevertheless consciously alert to the bias

throughout of identifying occasions where considerations informed by the literature review might emerge, for example: (a) where it appeared that conversations might have foreclosed deeper discussion on political and moral issues related to social-moral impacts (Jones, et al) (b) where assumptions regarding the controlling roles of management or where assumptions of employees as means were left unexamined (eg, Parker), (c) where economics might be seen as more salient relative to ethical-moral considerations (Ghoshal, Grey, and latterly in retrospect, Rich and Ulrich) (d) where public roles of a management education are openly discussed (Khurana, et al). Massey likens research to finding and slotting in pieces to fit into a giant jigsaw puzzle (Massey, 1999, p. 61). While helpful in describing something about the process involved the obvious limitation with this metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle (which Massey alludes to) is that there is no box cover to see what it would look like when finished. There is a clear tension here between finding exactly what one is looking for (self-fulfilling) and being open to new and potentially relevant information. This risk and tension is especially relevant when considering the formative influence of my own background (Section 1.7). This leads also into ethical considerations in the research.

2.5 (d) Ethical considerations

Requests for observer standing in the review process and for interviews were formally undertaken in accord with the Universities Ethical Research standards. Informed consent agreement and acceptance conditions were adhered to. Those formalities are of course important and were respected. Nevertheless, I was also deeply aware that I was 'using' people as resources for my research ends. It was vital then to ensure that I demonstrated respect for them as individuals, which I tried to do, for example, by suggesting space toward the end of each interview for respondents to add observations on the topic and/or the process itself. I was equally anxious to ensure that my questions were not 'loaded' in such a way as to provoke or challenge respondents' personal or private worldviews (Mason, 2002, p. 79). This was sensitive territory, of course, given the topic and the educational situation, and influenced the decision to draw primarily on items that were already in the public arena and in most cases conspicuously so (eg front page news items about plant closures, shifting jobs offshore, etc). I made the assumption that selecting such items would be reasonably safe as they were likely to have been engaged in, or aware of discussion and commentary around these (social-moral impact) topics.

2.5 (e) Issues of trustworthiness: a resonating alternative

Lewis and Richie argue that where concepts of reliability and validity are developed in the

natural sciences the very different epistemological basis of qualitative evidence means that there are real concerns about whether the same concepts have any value in determining the quality or sustainability of qualitative evidence (Lewis & Richie, 2003, p. 270). For this reason Lewis and Richie point to writers who discuss concerns about reliability in other terms, such as 'confirmability' or 'trustworthiness' or 'consistency' or 'dependability' (2003, p. 271). Just as there is extensive debate around "what features of the qualitative data might be expected to be consistent, dependable or replicable" (p. 272) there is also related and equally extensive debate around the ideas of 'triangulation' being "the use of different methods and sources to check the integrity of, or extend, inferences drawn from the data" (Richie, 2003, p. 46). Guba and Lincoln suggest nevertheless that "validity cannot be dismissed simply because it points to a question that has to be answered in one way or another: Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality, trustworthy, related to the way others construct social worlds) that I may trust myself in acting on their implications?" (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 205). Rather than set out those debates here I choose to follow as rigorous a line of enquiry with as much flexibility as the problematic objectives and trustworthiness permits. Thus notions of replication were never a consideration. I could not imagine the merit of trying to replicate a unique time and place: this was not a policy inspired research requiring an extensive data-base to justify generalisations. This was problem-driven research (Flyvbjerg, 2004). Trustworthy results, however, were uppermost. The extent to which others might look at the same data and understand how I arrived at my conclusions was the best that could be expected. And even then what would that prove? I was troubled by this expectation for repeatability and proof.

Guba and Lincoln offer a way forward which is consistent with my objectives. Rather than "a form of rigour that is borrowed from positivism about the application of method, there is a second form of rigour that argues for both a community consent and a form of rigour — as defensible reasoning, plausible alongside some other reality that is known to author and reader — in ascribing salience to one interpretation over another" (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 205). This is closer to my objectives but, while agreeing with the notion of defensible reasoning, ideas of community consent are troublesome. Why consent? What form of consent? What of differences in interpretation? Would such differences mean an absence of consent? And why, to ask O'Neill's question, consent after the event? In the absence of stated intentions how does *post-hoc* consent add trust? (O'Neill, 2003).

Schwandt argues for an approach that addresses the concerns for trustworthiness in ways that avoid positivist needs for replication. This approach is also consonant with much that the dissertation seeks to address. Schwandt (1996) proposes:

a framework that transforms professional social inquiry into a form of practical philosophy, characterized by 'aesthetic, prudential and moral considerations' ... When social inquiry becomes the practice of a form of *practical philosophy* — a deep questioning about how we shall get on in the world and what we conceive to be the potentials and limits of human knowledge and functioning – then we have some preliminary understanding of what entirely different criteria might be for judging social inquiry (Schwandt, 1996, in Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 206).

Schwandt proposes three criteria:

First, he argues, we should search for a social inquiry that 'generates knowledge that complements or supplements rather than displacing lay probing of social problems,' a form of knowledge for which we do not yet have the *content*, but form which we might seek to understand the aims of practice from a variety of perspectives, or with different lenses. Second, he proposes, a 'social inquiry as practical philosophy' that has as its aim 'enhancing or cultivating *critical intelligence* in parties to the research encounter', *critical intelligence* being defined as 'the capacity to engage in moral critique'. And finally, a third way in which we might judge social inquiry as practical philosophy: We might make judgments about the social inquirer-as-practical-philosopher. He or she might be 'evaluated on the success to which his or her reports of the inquiry enable the training of calibration of human judgment or 'the capacity for *practical wisdom*' (ibid; some emphasis added to those already in Schwandt).

Several aspects of Schwandt's position are clearly central to the research interests in this dissertation: notions of exploring unknown *content* (relating here to ill-defined social-moral concepts), understanding *critical intelligence* as a capacity to engage in moral critique, and finally ideas of practical wisdom (addressed via Aristotle as *phronesis*). Schwandt provides something of an *imprimatur* to the research methodology adopted here.

Just as important is due awareness of the need for considerable reflexivity about the influence of my experiences on the research topic over many years. Accordingly a major discipline throughout the analysis was endeavouring to revisit all sources and reflections many times to ensure not only accuracy but also credibility and trustworthiness. The data selected for inclusion needed to be accurately recorded and verifiable but the rest was a personal responsibility around reflexive interpretation and an account that would warrant a participant's trust. Whether participants would agree with my interpretations was thankfully not an expectation or part of the informed consent. Which moves finally to the

limitations and back to *phronesis*.

2.5 (f) Limitations of the Study

A *phronesis* approach to research is “problem-driven, not methodologically driven” (Flyvbjerg, 2004). I was and am, therefore, aware of the personal bias in considering this educative project. While drawing from a bounded site in both physical and temporal terms the case nevertheless serves to illuminate ideas about tensions concerning moral judgment that will be central to what follows in Part B. For the purposes of this research the case study serves as an opportunity to seek a broader awareness of the complexities I perceive to be inherent in the problem. To that extent the case study serves an instrumental purpose.

2.6 Conclusion

The *focus* of the research is always *inside* the MBA. The fieldwork was conducted with MBA students and academics about the content of the MBA curriculum. The research *concerns* however are *beyond* the MBA. In the first instance the concerns that attracted me to this research emerged from experiences *outside* the academy (addressed in 1.7). The questions which emerged from these experiences looked to the academy for some answers. The largely *unstated premise* to the argument has been that education in management would have a formative influence on graduates and that formative influence would be reflected in graduates’ decisions. As highlighted in the opening chapter’s references to the 2008 GEC, the impacts of those decisions would be (and are) experienced through employees, families, communities, locally, globally.

This fieldwork was conducted with personal concerns about the formative influence of addressing and not addressing social-moral impacts in the curriculum. Pivotal to that influence is the salience of moral concepts in the curriculum. If they are conspicuously salient then it would be reasonable to assume that graduates are prepared to recognise and address the moral dimension in their roles. If not salient then it would surely be equally formative in indicating that the moral dimension is not relevant to the role of manager or leader. There is also no small irony in reconsidering the relevance of Thiele’s definition of *phronesis* as “an intellectual and moral virtue that develops out of experience” (Thiele, 2006, p.188). What were the prospects for *phronesis*-oriented experiences in management education?

Before moving to the empirical research a summative, interim comment seems called for. To a large extent the chapter ends as it began in that personal and increasingly shared concerns

(about the formative question of salience/relevance) express what Denzin and Lincoln started out with in describing the direction of their 'eighth moment' in the evolution of qualitative research; except in this research the focus has shifted from concerns expressed outside about the MBA to concerns inside the MBA as to what happens beyond the classroom, the institution, to go beyond the nation: "It is necessary to think beyond the nation, or the local group as the focus of inquiry" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. xvi). The 2008 GEC is but the latest demonstration of the need to not only extend the focus of inquiry beyond the nation but to also the need to not lose sight of the lives of individuals involved – managers, educators, employed, unemployed, individuals within families and communities, locally and globally. The case that follows will assist in bringing just a little of these dimensions into view, albeit a view limited by the boundaries of one educational institution. The case will therefore serve as a means to illustrate the kinds of fiduciary tensions that in my view are at the heart of these educative concerns.

Chapter 3: A Case Study on the *salience* of social-moral impacts of management decisions in an EMBA program.

3.1 Introduction

The aims of the case study are set out in the methodology chapter. The empirical research questions revolve around the *salience* in an Executive Masters of Business (EMBA) of ideas on *moral impacts* in management decision-making and practice. This question is explored in this chapter through a case study of one EMBA program at an Australian university. Two phases of the case study are then described: observations from the curriculum review process and interviews with students and academics. Themes and issues emerging from the results are addressed and the chapter closes in anticipation of drawing findings from the literature and the case together for consideration of pedagogical responses.

It is important to emphasise that the case study approach adopted here draws on Flyvbjerg's *phronetic* social research, which privileges context as a means to illustrate normative values and power dimensions in social issues (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2004, 2006). The focus in this chapter is primarily on understanding the public-social problems involved via an exploration of one bounded case. That understanding foregrounds political and values-based nuances.

I approach this case study deeply aware of my own political and moral leanings and how they may not only influence my selections but how they differ from others'. My leanings can be summed up as primarily liberal in political terms and as a practical-idealist in outlook. I am aware that what I discern in the case is doubtless different from what others might consider salient. There are also likely prejudices of which I am unaware and thus the selection of salient materials would no doubt be different in other hands. Accordingly what is presented here can be one view only — but a view nevertheless that is mindful of alternatives and thus a view that does not presume to generalise.

3.2 Background

Ideas in the foreground of this case typically concern commonplace organisational decisions involving 'restructuring', seen in outsourcing, off-shoring, and downsizing (ie redundancy). Especially significant, although understated, is the salience for me of ideas about "avoiding causing undeserved harm" (Kekes, 1990) to individuals and communities, locally and

globally. By salient I suggest that ideas of gender and the environment have become clearly and increasingly prominent over the last few decades. The primary focus then is on seeking to sense how relevant and prominent (salient) are ideas around considering the social-personal *impacts* of management decisions on individuals and communities, locally and internationally. That salience might be formally addressed in the curriculum and/or informally as in discussions both inside and outside classes; ideally both. Accordingly, an opportunity to consider both the formal and informal domains was afforded through undertaking a case study at an Australian university over the period 2003-4.

There are two major phases to this empirical work. The first consists of observing a review of the EMBA curriculum and the second a series of semi-structured interviews with self-selecting students and two leading academics teaching in the EMBA. The interviews followed and were informed by the observations of the curriculum review process. The curriculum review process is outlined first followed by the interviews with students and senior academics. An analysis is then presented on how the outcomes of this case study relate to the forthcoming literature review (Chapter 4) and what might be the implications for pedagogies in management education.

3.3 First phase: The EMBA curriculum review

In what follows I sketch firstly the initial phases of establishing the review and then draw on some of the significant developments leading to a report being presented and approved by the Faculty Academic Committee (FAC). Given the objective of discerning the *salience* of social-moral impacts within the EMBA I am being selective in choosing to focus on only those events that relate directly to that objective. This discernment is a matter of personal interpretation and relies on:

- Written notes in observing nine curriculum review meetings over seven months
- Personal reflections following each review meeting
- Documentation and presentation the report to the FAC
- Transcripts of interviews with five students and two academics engaged in the EMBA

The initial phases are selected so as to illustrate some of the early difficulties in addressing ideas of social-moral impact. I draw specifically on the earliest experience as in my view it influences the entire review process. Secondly I draw on some of the issues regarding learning goals, and finally the process and outcomes toward agreeing on the recommendations to the FAC.

(i) The Curriculum Review meetings: a visceral experience influencing the fieldwork

The curriculum review process was established to consider the effectiveness of the EMBA program. The task and terms of reference for the review process were recorded from the first meeting as follows:

The task of this sub-committee is to review the Executive MBA (EMBA) degree as an integral part of the review process of (all) postgraduate programs offered by the Faculty. The objective of this process is to ensure that the programs embrace the Faculty's strategic intent/vision and mission; and comply or exceed the university's performance and quality objectives for the delivery of postgraduate education. In addition to the regular review cycle the aim of the Faculty is to seek accreditation for this and other MBA courses by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB).

Terms of reference of the subcommittee:

- 1. To articulate learning goals for the EMBA*
- 2. To examine the structure of the EMBA in relation to these goals and to recommend change where appropriate*
- 3. To review subject syllabi to eliminate any topic overlay*
- 4. To seek advice from the Schools of the Faculty in relation to the possible contribution of the EMBA.*

I entered the research field by joining the curriculum review process for their second meeting. A total of nine meetings took place between July 2003 and February 2004. Participants included three senior academics engaged in teaching the EMBA program, three completing EMBA students who had been invited by the Course Director to participate and finally the Course Director who also teaches the capstone subject in the program.

The first meeting served as what would prove to be a prescient experience for the remainder of the review process. After being asked by the Course Director, 'Dr. Jim'⁴⁰ (hereafter Dr. Jim), to introduce myself I summed up my educational research interests in terms of "seeking to understanding the role and significance of social impacts of management decisions in the EMBA". At this statement one of the completing students replied loudly (with her back to me and facing her colleagues) and although I could not see her expression in what seemed (to me at least) like mocking tones: "Social impacts!! Whatever ... Must be

⁴⁰ Dr. Jim (Course Director) and Professor Jones (a leading academic in the EMBA program) are pseudonyms.

the next new thing?" At which all in attendance laughed. There followed an intriguing and (to me) lengthy silence ended only by the Course Director turning to the agenda for the meeting. Many silent questions raised at that time remained for a good part of the review process and well into the interview phases: Why was this particular student so seemingly dismissive if not mocking? Was this just a nervous ice-breaker to a relatively new group of people with varying degrees and kinds of authority? Why (to me) the apparently long silence? Was this too the nervous response to what others also considered a vague idea (ie idea of 'social impacts)? Why did the academics remain silent? Were they too aware of the authority differences and anxious not to impose a perspective at this formative stage of the review? Was I also being a little overly sensitive about the vagueness of the concept of 'social-impacts' and a little too quick to judge what might be no more than a humorous commentary on fads and fashions in management-speak?

No doubt these factors and more besides were at play but this first meeting presented what seemed a very awkward moment and one that was to be experienced in different ways on many occasions throughout the fieldwork. I felt that others saw me as an "uninvited outsider". With an educational research agenda of a normative nature and being from a Faculty of Education this 'outsider' sense was unquestionably a fact but there was also a sense (imagined perhaps) that my research interests were different in focus from those participating in the review. This uneasiness continued throughout the review and again into the interview phase. It was at times an awkward sense — especially as my topic sounded potentially *moralistic*, a view I was perhaps excessively concerned to avoid and perhaps also a view that was inescapable. There was some modest relief to this tension only after the interviews were completed and I was able to reflect on the empirical experience alongside the outcomes of the literature review. That is now more than three years after the initial experience. While those reflections are expressed reflexively in the methodology chapter it is important in what follows to place this awkwardness as a visceral dimension and backdrop to this fieldwork.

This awkwardness may also have been due to the normative sound of social-moral impacts language on the one hand and a sense of the uncertain complexities of what might be involved on the other. Reactions to normative language are indeed an area of interest in assessing notions of salience here. How would ideas of 'uncomfortable' or 'awkward' be assessed? I did not have answers but as the meetings progressed my notes recorded mixed and often unchallenged references to the 'soft stuff', the 'warm and fuzzies', and mostly in what seemed, at least to me, in dismissive ways.

On the other hand the complexities of just what may be involved from, for example, a global perspective on social impacts was far from clear. Indeed as is referenced later, while ideas on the ethics of globalisation are relatively commonplace, the idea of global ethics is not. Distinctions between traditions (secular and religious) over what constitutes an ethical framework are so marked that finding common ground is deeply problematic (Sullivan, 2007). It may well have been an awareness of these distinctions and problematic issues that contributed to the awkwardness in discussion. Specific sensitivities around global ethics were not, however, articulated during the curriculum meetings.

(ii) Learning goals

Discussion of learning goals occupied a major part of the review process. By the fourth meeting those goals were being finalised and possible subjects were being allocated to those goals. This was predictably an internally politically charged process as School interests (or more particularly the senior academics within those schools) became increasingly prominent. Director Dr. Jim however insisted that those school-based concerns be considered only after goals and structure were agreed. By the fifth meeting a set of overarching learning objectives had been established together with some secondary learning goals. They read as follows (with the relevant ones highlighted):

Four generic learning goals:

- 1. A capacity to lead in an executive role in an organisation*
- 2. A capacity to apply knowledge in a novel and dynamic environment through a conceptual understanding of relevant disciplines*
- 3. A capacity to adapt and innovate to solve problems*
- 4. Capacity to critically analyse and question knowledge claims in a range of disciplines*

Three learning goals:

- 5. Ethical and legal responsibilities in organisations and society*
- 6. Group and individual dynamics in organisations*
- 7. Information technologies as they influence organisations and management decisions and processes.*

A structure for the EMBA began to emerge at this point with subjects being formed against the above objectives and goals in a hierarchical framework. That hierarchy was depicted as a pyramid, with *Foundations* including subjects on Applied Leadership followed by five *Disciplines* (Economics, Accounting, Finance, Marketing, Supply Chain Management) then *Applications and Integration* subjects: People and Knowledge Management, Treasury and Risk

Management, then *Communication and Execution* subjects: Law and Governance, Change Management and finally a *Capstone* Global Strategic Thinking.

There is in this process a clear determination to arrive at a coherent outcome — one that would resonate with prospective employers, students on the one hand and an academic community on the other (this latter being a mix of the FAC and prospectively the AACSB). It is instructive to reflect on the kind of thinking brought to bear on this construction. Beyond the obvious ‘foundations to capstone’ hierarchy with its inherent suggestions of an unproblematic structure and completion there is the nomination of disciplines and subjects to fit this structure. Clearly some disciplines or subjects are deemed foundational while others are seen as add-ons. Why leadership at base? What kinds of leadership are so privileged? This was not disputed or problematised. Why and how are the separate disciplines built on an apparently agreed leadership base? Are there no conflicts of outlooks (epistemological, moral) between the disciplines let alone with ideas on leadership? If debates within the review process mirrored such concerns then it was not obvious. I do not recall, nor did I note, specific discussion throughout the nine meetings about contests over theory and practice, about knowledge claims. What stand out are discussions about the efficacy and/or engagement of specific teachers. Some seemed to be considered more effective than others although the grounds for these distinctions were at best vague. This seems an all too convenient process in accommodating disciplinary ‘buy-in’.

Discussions of pedagogy during the review were largely left to questions of learning goals and objectives. Discussion about how those goals related to each other centred on the overall framework of the pyramid. A final set of learning goals was developed and cross checked against the above pyramid. The relevant learning goal for our interests was recorded as “*Understanding the interrelationships between corporate governance, organisational processes and business ethics*”.

It is important to note that this latter statement is a reflection of an aspiration toward developing a deeper understanding of concepts that were at that time still quite ambiguous. It was no surprise then to see ‘Law and Governance’ as a joint effort between those disciplines to address this territory. Business Ethics warranted recognition but was seen only as it related to law and governance.

(iii) Toward the recommendations for the Faculty Academic Committee (FAC)

A schematic was finally developed by the subcommittee to present to the FAC. This depicted an integrated and dynamic view of the new EMBA curriculum. For my purposes this schematic included 'Social Responsibilities' as one of four 'key linking building blocks' shaping the curriculum (the others were: 'Global Perspective; Leadership Skills and Understanding what works and what doesn't'). Just how those blocks were to be reflected in the subjects was a matter for the Course Director.

Indeed the pivotal influence of the Course Director (Dr. Jim) in arriving at this final report to the FAC cannot be underplayed. There were many discussions between Dr. Jim and myself preceding and following most review meetings and we shared many areas of common interest, even if at times we too struggled to give expression to distinctions around some of the central concepts under discussion. This is borne out in the interview that follows.

The role of the AACSB in this entire review process was — despite many comments by committee members to the contrary — a major influence on how the final presentation was made to the FAC. Indeed the final report was presented in a fashion that clearly acknowledged the review as being essential to putting in place the structure which was consistent with AACSB standards.

3.3 (a) Analysis of Curriculum Review Process

Cervero and Wilson have written on the politics relating to the curriculum review process (Cervero & Wilson, 2006). They offer a set of guidelines that in their terms "pulls the political out of the hallway and the ethical out of the mythical" (2006, p.104). So it is illuminating to consider how some of the guidelines in their planning framework relate to the experience of the EMBA curriculum review. There are a total of 16 guidelines situated under four major steps, with those steps listed as follows:

- Negotiating the Program's Needs-Assessment
- Negotiating the Program's Educational, Management and Political Objectives
- Negotiating the Program's Instructional Design and Implementation
- Negotiating the Program's Administrative Organization and Operation

(Cervero and Wilson, p. 105)

Cervero and Wilson emphasise that they are not suggesting that curriculum planning adheres to this linear order nor do they argue in support of the logic behind each step. Rather, they propose the guidelines from their experience in witnessing numerous cases of

how planners confront the largely political challenges of sitting at a planning table (p. 105). I draw on just a couple of the guidelines to illustrate some of the issues at stake in the review process. Some are clear and evident from the discussions and documentation while others are my interpretation after the event.

There are four guidelines under the first heading of “Negotiating the Program’s Needs Assessment”:

1. Decide Whose Interests Matter and Assess Their Needs
2. Connect Stakeholders’ Needs to the Historical and Social Context
3. Anticipate How Power Relations Frame the Needs-Assessment
4. Democratically Negotiate Needs

As Director for the EMBA and as Chair of the Review Process Dr. Jim made it plain from the outset that there were several clear groups whose interests must be met: The Faculty’s strategic needs, graduates’ practical needs, and the University’s reputation. Indeed the early documentation shaping the agenda was explicit in drawing the attention of committee members to the terms of reference. The only exception not made explicit by Dr. Jim was the Faculty interest in gaining AACSB accreditation. Dr. Jim felt that this would be an unnecessary distraction from the overarching ambitions about positioning the EMBA in the educational market. This reference to the market and matters of reputation are addressed again in the interview with Dr. Jim.

The stakeholders in the review were most conspicuously the various Schools or disciplines within the Faculty (for example, management, marketing and economics-accounting) and to a lesser extent the students. Despite the efforts of the Director it became evident as the review progressed that there was a deep proprietary interest in the subject makeup. Not only were there school interests to be represented fairly in the curriculum but more to the point it became obvious that specific subjects were the domain of senior academics who enjoy substantial financial gains from teaching their subjects in the EMBA. When one subject appeared to be less relevant in a future EMBA curriculum a presentation to the committee was arranged by the senior academic involved. The gist of the presentation was a clear power play along the lines of if you don’t include this subject I (as Head of School) will withdraw support for this EMBA — in which case (the implication being) you will lose traction in the market. Indeed (the threat continued) we will set up an alternative program and compete to win students interested in our discipline. Accordingly, it was difficult at times to avoid the conclusion that school interests (and the personal interests of specific

academics) and not necessarily student interests were clearly the currency.⁴¹ No doubt the Director would be offended by this observation but the evidence overwhelmingly pointed to subjects being selected with key stakeholder power in play. This illustrates one aspect of the politics of what was deemed salient.

Whether the 'Historical and Social Context' was addressed is a moot point with each stakeholder. From the above account several of the Schools attest that their interests were recognised — albeit I would argue from a perspective of representation. Students as stakeholders seemed to express their needs in terms of 'latest thinking' and 'networking', views reinforced by the four student participants to the review process. Should the social context not also represent what might reasonably be anticipated as current and future needs? For example, and drawing on my educative-formative problem, how prominent were ideas of 'social-moral impacts' in the thinking needed for future student needs? If team selections were used as a metaphor for which subjects were selected for the EMBA selection then it would have to be said that 'Social Responsibility' finally got a jersey but just where they were to play and what role was needed was very unclear. Was 'Social Responsibility' to be the rubric that embraces social-personal-moral impacts of business decisions? If so, then this was at best implicit in discussions. Social Responsibility made it all the way into the FAC hearing but at no stage did anyone ask exactly what Social Responsibility would be doing. Social Responsibility may well take the field but don't ask who wears the jersey or what they are to do — a super numeral player quite possibly seen to be letting the side down through lack of a clear role; that is, not prominent, not salient — yet.

Of equal significance to my educative concerns is an educational question which was important in discussions. Just what kind(s) of knowledge was being offered in the EMBA? What is this an education *for*? While the latter question was on one level answered in the terms of reference and the eventual learning goals such a response begs for more as the findings are explored further. In the meantime, to return to the former question, what kind(s) of knowledge was being offered in the EMBA? Familiar ideas about *Mode 1* and *Mode 2* knowledge emerge. Maggi Savin-Baden has recently drawn on and extended ideas of these modes of knowledge and it is useful at this point in the case study to reflect on their

⁴¹ Teaching in the EMBA program was considered by this university as above base load teaching and thus warranted a premium payment to the academics involved. By Australian university standards this was a substantial premium. This was promoted by the Director in terms that only the very best lecturers would justify a place on the EMBA program. The power-play of self-interest on both reputational and remunerative terms was sadly evident according to unsolicited committee member comments before and after this academic's presentation. My field notes recorded an uncharitable reference to Churchillian ego. It serves no useful purpose to guess the discipline involved.

relevance for the problematic (Savin-Baden, 2008). *Mode 1* knowledge is “propositional knowledge that is produced within academe separate from its use, and the academy is considered the traditional environment for the generation of *Mode 1* knowledge. *Mode 2* knowledge is knowledge that transcends disciplines and is produced in, and validated through, the world of work. Knowing in this mode demands the integration of skills and abilities in order to *act in a particular context*” (Savin-Baden, 2008, p. 96, emphasis added). The world of work is thus a clear marker in these two forms of knowledge and it was readily apparent throughout the review process that the world of work was central to the EMBA learning agenda. Extensive field visits to leading organisations was a distinguishing hallmark of the EMBA program and its success was to be retained in developing any new program.

While *Mode 2* knowledge is important in itself knowledge is not exhausted in these two modes. Savin-Baden draws initially on Ronald Barnett’s work (Barnett, 2004) to open additional forms of knowledge that to varying degrees acknowledge the influence of *uncertainty*. Contexts of uncertainty have an increasing bearing on reflections about the salience of social-personal impacts but for the moment it is useful to present Savin-Baden’s depictions of other modes of knowledge:

Mode 3: Knowing in and with uncertainty, a sense of recognising epistemological gaps that increase uncertainty.

Mode 4: Disregarded knowledge, spaces in which uncertainty and gaps are recognised along with the realisation of the relative importance of gaps between different knowledge and different knowledge hierarchies.

Mode 5: Holding diverse knowledges with uncertainties. (p. 97)

While the document that went to the FAC included a schematic of the EMBA structure there was at best implicit reference to uncertainty as a context for decision-making. For example there is frequent reference to ‘dynamic’ and ‘strategic’ which imply ideas of action being taken amid uncertainty. There is, however, a connection between these two words and the mixed notion of a “*blue print* of business and interpersonal relations” (emphasis added) as foundational to the structure. Is a blue print a means of providing guidance in uncertainty? How does a blue print provide guidance in interpersonal relations? The architectural metaphor is a useful means of communication but, even accepting the summary limitations of schematics and metaphors, it is not clear to me how ideas of relationships and uncertainty meet in a blue print. Perhaps it is stretching the metaphor too far to imagine how it might embrace what may seem obvious to others. Nevertheless, the idea of

uncertainty as a central concern for knowledge is one that I am anxious to foreground in considering curriculum design and content. In addition, linking uncertainty to three other modes of knowledge (as does Savin-Baden above) serves to emphasise that centrality.

In summary I draw the following themes from the curriculum review process:

1. The language of *social-person-moral impacts* presented problems in understanding what was to be considered. It was clear from the outset that committee members were to a degree uncomfortable discussing normative concepts. Addressing distinctions as to what *social-personal impacts* might mean for ideas of globalised ethics, for example, would have accentuated and compounded such problems. Discomfort with normative notions and dismissive comments about social-impacts characterised the review from the outset.
2. Political influence was a persistent and major factor in addressing the design and content of the EMBA curriculum. Despite the best intentions of the Course Director the eventual design directly reflected the influence of schools and disciplines, with in some cases the apparent personal interest of senior academics seeming to trump design objectives. An inward looking political frame was an inescapable feature of the review process.
3. Beyond the central importance of *Mode 2*, work-based knowledge, there was nominal discussion about the significance of uncertainty in considering knowledge content in the EMBA. Other kinds of knowledge in addressing actions amid uncertainty were not a feature of the review.

3.4 Second phase: The Interviews with EMBA Students and Academics

3.4 (a) Student Interviews

Five students self-selected from a cohort of 24. All were at the midway point of the EMBA program having studied the same core subjects to this point and having a similar program of studies ahead. To qualify for entry to the EMBA students must have at least 10 years work experience and already be moving toward senior executive roles. The five students who were interviewed were approximately the same age, around early to late 30s with experience across public and private sectors. Each student volunteered after hearing an outline of my research goals. I was careful not to be too precise in this presentation as I was anxious to avoid projecting any preconceived ideas beyond the broad rubric of “social impacts of business decisions”. During the presentation I nominated a number of examples of social impacts from mainstream media — and mostly in terms used by the media: redundancies, job losses to China, outsourcing. I indicated too that there was a rising public interest in corporate behaviour and that my research was seeking to understand how such

issues are addressed in management education. After about a five minute presentation (offered to me by Dr. Jim during a class break) I asked for volunteers, indicating that I would be seeking one face-to-face interview which I anticipated might last for approximately 30 minutes. The five students who volunteered could reasonably be expected, therefore, to have a positive interest in the topic and/or a curiosity about the research process. I used a semi-structured approach with each interview.

What follows is a selection from the interview transcripts with these five students. That selection process needs to be seen as my interpretation of what is significant in approaching my educative problem. In making these selections I am aware that I am not doing justice to the breadth of views of each student. I have not explored with individual students their backgrounds or their views on matters beyond their EMBA studies. As a result, while focused on the problem, their comments and responses are at best one piece in any larger context. With no reference to personal histories, cultural background, work experience or lives beyond the workplace there is little of the whole person represented in the interviews. Accordingly both extracts from 30 minute transcripts and related analysis and comments are mere snapshots of each respondent. I am thus acutely aware of taking a licence in piecing together these extracts. John Schostak's penetrating depiction of the interview as an interview, a means to gain a view of another's life experiences, served to highlight just how much more there could be to what I have selected here (Schostak, 2006).

The focus of the questions ran from general comments about the EMBA at this halfway mark in their studies through to specific questions about the extent to which key ideas for my formative-educative concerns are central to discussions in class and between students. Those questions canvassed the same points made in the presentation to students above, looking at the extent to which discussion took place around the impacts of, for example, downsizing, outsourcing, restructuring as organisational practices. At the beginning of each taped interview I indicated to each respondent that I would at the end of my questions stop recording for a couple of minutes to enable the student to reflect briefly about the subjects discussed, and to feel free to add to what had been canvassed or to make any other comment about the topic or the interview process. When ready the recording device was started again and these reflections and summary comments included. This provision for personal reflection at the end of my questions proved an advantage in most of the interviews, not least with these students. A number of the selected transcripts incorporate these 'end of interview' reflections.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

All students interviewed indicated that ethical or moral issues or moral conflicts had not been discussed in class by the halfway mark of their EMBA studies. More specifically, questions about the social impacts on individuals and communities of decisions which are related to off-shoring, downsizing, and outsourcing had not been raised, with one student only recalling a short discussion in managerial economics (where such decisions were addressed from the point of finding 'cheap labour').

All students emphasised that the focus throughout the first half of their studies was on 'the maths' and 'financials' as they relate to 'the bottom line' and 'shareholder value'. Important distinctions between shareholder and stakeholder approaches had not been addressed at this halfway mark. Those distinctions were anticipated in the coursework with 'Professor Jones' whose subject was in the management stream.

The following is typical of the exchanges with students. I have included the questions and retained most of the responses to illustrate the kinds of reasoning that became evident throughout almost all the student interviews.

Interviewer—Do these sorts of (social/moral impact) questions come up in class?

Student – Absolutely not.

Interviewer – What do you mean “absolutely not”?

Student – The very first subject that we did was about strategy and management and leadership and it very much focused on you as a leader and how your particular style can impact on people. But if you are doing a finance subject or accounting then the decisions that you make are very much based on the bottom line. How does an organisation become profitable, how do you restructure an organisation to return back to the shareholder the most that you can and that sometimes means getting rid of people? We don't talk about the impact on the people losing their jobs nor would I expect to. It was all about the organisation and profits and I am a bit of a capitalist.

None of the five students interviewed expressed any concern with this financial emphasis and almost all anticipated that attention to moral and social issues was likely to be addressed in a specific management class (taught by 'Professor Jones'⁴², interviewed in this

⁴² Hereafter Professor Jones

case study). There was a mixed view about the relevance of that shift but in the main students appeared to welcome the prospect of engaging with another agenda.

Conversations about the salience (or evident absence) of moral questions in class developed along strikingly similar lines with each of the five students. Accordingly I do not repeat those responses here save to illustrate both some typical accounts on the one hand and how some students had quite different perspectives of the kind of salience on the other.

Engagements with three students (with the fictitious names of Anthony, Beth and Cameron) follow.

Anthony:

Interviewer – and it doesn't surprise you that these topics don't come up during finance and accounting? Where would it come up? Let us think about something topical - the recent announcement (mentioned the loss of 450 Australian technical jobs to India) - would that sort of contemporary issue come up in a class?

Anthony - No, because I think the way that the MBA is structured is very much about thinking like a corporate does or like a public listed company and that is very much what it is – how to get the most out of (the company) – so the impact on Australians to outsource to India and the effect on unemployment – no I would not expect it to come up. But having said that you can understand that maybe it should because what (names organisation) is doing and I can understand why they are doing it but it does have implications for me because having an issue with unemployed then having to fork out more for me. That is what I think.

So the impact of job losses for Anthony is personal — more taxes for unemployment welfare.⁴³

Interviewer: ... How has this EMBA enabled you as a future leader to recognise and address issues or decisions that you can't control or that is just going to happen, for example, decisions that don't come across with a little tag on it saying this an economic decision, a finance decision or a management decision so ...

Anthony – (interrupting) ... I look at our CEO and what he is judged on ..., so for him to come in and say that this has a social impact – he would look like an absolute idiot. It is all

⁴³ The word 'unemployment' was used by the student in this response. It was not a word I used but was clearly implied in the question relating to the "loss of jobs in Australia".

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

very good to say that it is more than just changing the leaders because there is always someone else that they have to report to and if you are a shareholder in an organisation in an institution all you are interested in is your return on your investment. The only reason why the environmental impact (for example) comes into it is that there is a huge fine involved with it. That is why (names employer) responded to it. Otherwise why would you care? You have to put it into your annual report so if you don't have to do something like that no one will give a damn.

While discussing his organisation and not the EMBA program Anthony sees social impacts as not only idiotic but a concern only if a fine was in prospect. For Anthony there is more than a clear disconnect between the role of leaders and social impacts — it would be stupid to even consider a connection. What was Anthony thinking when he volunteered to be interviewed? Was this an opportunity to put a starry eyed researcher in their place? Was this a kind of sport for Anthony? He was, it turns out, merely warming to the subject. ...

Interviewer: has this MBA had any effect on your decisions as far as people are concerned?

Anthony – No – I don't think that we have spent a lot of time on that. It was earlier on and it was how do you get the most out of people, not the decisions that you make every day and how that impacts on others directly and more importantly the impact on the environment around you socially. They did not touch on it. They did not present it very well and WOW that might be a different way of looking at something. That is the problem with the MBA, I have learnt stuff – I have learnt to do something, but it has not made me sit back and really review the way I manage things or think about the decisions I make about the impact on the social side. It is very much about the bottom line.

...

I was talking to a friend who works for (a major retail chain) who is also doing this course and our cultures are very similar, 'dog eat dog'. It is very much about the bottom line. If you come in showing a 3% growth (they will say), "3% is crap! Where is the 25%? I don't care how you do it and who you kill to do it". That is very much our culture and if you stay in those types of organisations for a long time it very much influences your decision-making and who you become and so the only other way that you would get a different perspective on something is that if you go to a different organisation with a different culture and it takes you a good while to settle in. That is the only way other than talking to friends that you would actually see this. Maybe there could be a very analytical way of talking about it. If you said to me "will that affect someone" and I would say "tell me how, tell me the dollar figures" what does it

mean in the long run. If this person is sad for a few minutes, then who cares.

Bottom line performance full stop. Get over anything else that gets in the way. Indeed when decisions are called for Anthony sees a simple formula and one that appears to him to be so obvious as to be almost unworthy of discussion — unless a fine, legal action or negative publicity is in prospect again. No conflation of ethics with legal considerations for Anthony — ethics is an unnecessary complication.

....

Interviewer - if I said hypothetically "we have been under pressure as an organisation now with our margin for six months what are our options, what are your options?"

Anthony – you either drive growth or you get rid of people.

Interviewer – I am not necessarily arguing about getting rid of people ... is there a way to do that (address this problem)? What is the (employer's name) way?

Anthony – We tend to try to push people out by trying to make them think it is their decision. So we will move people around and saying this is a very good move for you and crossing our fingers that they will go. It is not that we care how it will affect them, nobody thinks that through, it is because we don't want any legal action – we don't care about the moral, the impact on self-esteem or the impact it has on colleagues. They try and make it your decision. We have people who have been under-performing for years and very rarely will we take the steps to get of them but it is not because we feel for them it is all about negative publicity.

Beth:

Beth had a different and more favourable view of the relevance of exploring the social impacts of decisions. At the same time, however, there were no such insights on offer at this midway point through their MBA. In responding to questions about exploring social consequences of management decisions this student commented as follows. It should be noted that Beth conflates ideas from her employer's practices and her studies.

Beth: I think the consequences have been forgotten a bit as far as the people are concerned. The focus is very much around making the business more financially secure and people's lives have somewhat been forgotten. What has been forgotten also is the longer term view of (names employer) because it is so short term driven, not what we are doing about the long term.

Interviewer – obviously those are issues at (names employer) but have they been brought up

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

in the MBA –

Beth – No

Interviewer – Talking about the social impact and downsizing etc. Have they been discussed?

Beth – No, not yet.

Interviewer – You are anticipating it – where do you anticipate it coming up?

Beth – I think it will probably be coming up in (names the management subject taught by Professor Jones).

Interviewer - Has there been discussion in class when it comes up?

Beth – a little bit but I think the focus has been more on the financial and making sure we really understand how to read and interpret the financials.

....

Interviewer – I mentioned in opening that I wanted to canvas some ideas around management decisions and perhaps avoiding causing undeserved harm – so what comes to mind when you hear ideas about “avoiding causing undeserved harm”?

Beth – It does have a relevance – it is a hard one because at the end of the day you are making decisions that have a huge impact on people’s lives and it may be through no fault of their own and it not deserving with what is going to happen but we have responsibilities to running the company. Yes it is, it is a difficult one.

In contrast to Anthony, Beth sees the relevance of moral issues in decision-making. She can see the scale of those impacts (a “huge impact on people’s lives, through no fault of their own”) and then qualifies it with the ‘but’ of responsibilities to the company. This suggests that Beth sees some grey between what Anthony might see as a black and white issue. However, at this midway point in her studies Beth seems a little concerned at what may or may not be covered in the balance of the program. The maths and financials provide a good grounding but ideas about harm are matters she is not sure about. Beth does not dispute maths and finance as foundational, in fact that grounding was the motivation to undertake

the EMBA.

Interviewer – what comes to mind about this EMBA at this mid point? - has it helped you to recognise and address decisions that will have human consequences over the long term? Has the EMBA prepared you to recognise and address this?

Beth – Not a great deal at this point in time. I have done the course because of the financial side and so am interested in taking it in and getting the maths right and making sure I understand it.

Interviewer – do you think these questions are relevant to be grappling with? Let's get past the maths. Do you think it is a long term issue?

Beth - it is relevant and I am assuming we will cover that. (I think) we have an ethics subject? I think we do (names Professor Jones' management subject)? I assume it will be covered there. I know we have done the maths to start with and that is good grounding.

Interviewer – so the expectation is that you will be covering that in (management subject). And if you don't?

Beth – I will be disappointed.

.....

Interviewer – would you expect thoughts like this to come up in the forthcoming (management) area that (Professor Jones) is going to address or would you expect to see it somewhere else or would you not expect to see it all.

Beth – I think we are doing (names another management subject). I expect it will be in that. It would be probably be how to incent(ivise) - I don't know whether we will cover (issues concerning) doing harm. It will be how to get the most out of your employees rather than looking after people.

....

Interviewer – Any point you would like to make about the interview – has it triggered any thoughts?

Beth – If you are trying to angle for looking after human beings in your organisation more

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

than getting them to work as hard as they can, I think you are going to need a long term CEO or long term management. It is so transitory nowadays. We used to work for that organisation for 20 to 40 years. Now you get five years or three years and then "see you!" I think the approach that you are asking about is going to need a big mindset change in the world.

For Beth, then, concerns about avoiding causing undeserved harm are important but from her experience of work and studies they are not the concerns of contemporary business and call for a "big mindset change". In other words, social-impacts might be salient but seemingly salient for Beth, not for business generally. Whether such social impacts are salient in her EMBA is a matter of what happens in the management subject taught by Professor Jones. Professor Jones has much to say about such salience in his subject.

Cameron:

A third student (Cameron) attributed the absence of moral and ethical discussions to inadequate preparation at the outset of the EMBA program. In particular this student felt that there was a place for moral and ethical perspectives in the opening leadership subject.

Cameron: We have had very little exposure to other areas of leadership training such as ethics.

Interviewer – What happens in the classroom about topics that pick within the debate on Telstra, IBM etc?

Cameron – Fairly limited, I would have to say generally no.

....

Interviewer – Where would you anticipate then that something like this might come up?

Cameron – (Names two management subjects, one taught by Professor Jones). I think any of the (management) courses are going to inherently look in that direction because that is their turf. I brought this up when I was talking to (the course director Dr. Jim – interviewed later). From my perspective (names a business model/philosophy) is a business strategy, it is not a people-organisation touchy, feely, people ethics thing. How do you do business properly? And at the end of the day it should affect your bottom line. If it is positioned strategically correctly I think there are a lot of people who sit on the capitalist financial results side say that is a touchy feely thing throw it into managing people discussion. In fact (Course Director, Dr. Jim) ended up suggesting that maybe we should locate (the above model/philosophy) inside

that curriculum and won't you take a look at this curriculum which I did and I spoke to (consultant involved with the above model/philosophy) and I said we need to not allow that. We need to push it so it is properly placed.

Cameron twice makes reference to the “touchy, feely, people ethics thing”. In one sense this dismissive tone is typical of most discussions throughout the course of the review and these interviews. However, as Cameron uses them the dismissive words are not intended as irrelevant. Quite the opposite. Cameron sees them as relevant, but only as it affects the bottom line. He sees the ethical dimension as part of a business model. In other words, this approach looks like part of the Business Case for Business Ethics. Indeed Cameron sees such a case as vital to the EMBA program and has suggested as much to the Course Director, Dr. Jim.

Interviewer – Where would ‘properly placed’ be?

Cameron – right at the beginning, and my proposal for (Dr. Jim) is that I or (names a consultant) would go to the opening session of the course and give a 1/2 day seminar on (the named model/philosophy) because I think that any cohort, once they have been talked at, they constantly talk about it and oh boy there is something missing ethically, or there is a courage-ethics issue or there is a vision-reality issue. I think that if they were taught that up front then that is just going to improve their understanding, contextualise everything from then on.

Interviewer – Do you think you need to be a qualified ethicist, moral philosopher to be able to engage with this stuff.

Cameron – No because I think it is really common sense.... I think a lot of people come in with lots of expectations and no discussion happened about what those shared expectations might be and as a consequence all the expectations have fallen away and been discounted except for the piece of paper at the end.

Cameron is quite critical of how the EMBA is unfolding. Expectations of incorporating an ethical dimension to the business model have not eventuated and he seems resigned now to the credential approach. There was a strong note of disappointment to Cameron’s comments accentuated by his view that the ethical dimension was a matter of common sense and yet was not addressed. So for Cameron the ethical aspect was in one sense similar to Beth’s view in that ethics are salient for them both. For Cameron though, unlike Beth, he sees the

ethical dimension as part of a business case. Whether for Cameron the ethical is common practice was left unexplored but there was a clear sense from his approach to Dr. Jim that he believed it should be.

The following summary comments relate to the five students interviewed and not the cohort, except where students expressed views relating to the course as a whole.

1. The numbers and financials are the clear grounding for the first half of the EMBA. This must surely be a formative experience in itself as to what the university considers to constitute 'grounding' in advanced management education.
2. Focusing on matters beyond the financials is considered to be utterly irrelevant by some students whereas others expect to engage with other stakeholder interests.
3. Normative issues have generally not been discussed formally up to the halfway mark of the EMBA, and if discussed at all, in an informal setting (eg over coffee). This is another way of indicating normative salience.
4. Normative issues are anticipated, however, in the management stream subject (taught by Professor Jones).

3.4 (b) Interviews with Academics: Professor Jones and Dr. Jim

Professor Jones

This is the academic almost all students anticipated would address moral and ethical issues. Professor Jones teaches a mainstream management subject. The interview with Professor Jones took place after the student interviews and so the questions were intended to explore both student expectations and the Professor's own views about the salience of moral issues in the EMBA, and in the Professor's own management related subject. I avail of extended extracts from the interview to do justice to the insights offered by this highly experienced educator.

Professor Jones: (in response to a broad opening question about the role of social-impact issues in management education) In a recent address the President of the Academy of Management was highly critical of how we as management academics approach – or avoid - our public and ethical responsibilities, suggesting that “if you don't talk to the students or get involved in industries, and just write, it might help your conscience but you are not being really effective (in addressing public responsibilities)”. So it is an unusual management educator that can do both in a way that has a moral integrity to it and has an appeal and interest to it (for

students). It certainly is possible and I think that some of our teachings in sustainability - also I like to think that the teaching that I do in (names own subject) might fit that too and certainly in a less spectacular way.

...

Following a discussion on shareholder versus stakeholder models of business Professor Jones then canvassed the contemporary dominance of ideas on shareholder value in business and management education and practice, concluding:

... (Shareholder value approach to business) is simplistic, it is crude, it is brutal.

...

I don't know if you interview student (named) he is all ROI, ROI, etc but it is what is bred into them.

Interviewer – So what does an EMBA do for them?

Professor Jones – It does give them a wider and more detailed information and it does make them think a little bit more but I don't think it would move them out of their present mindset. I think it extends their minds just a little and makes them a little bit more sensitive and reflective but not a substantial change. That would make them insecure. Not that I wouldn't do it but they wouldn't be interested in going there.

This holds some interesting insights into how Professor Jones sees his role, the role of the EMBA and the limited prospects of student learning. His belief that there is not much change brought about through their program is doubtless based on decades of experienced teaching. What does this suggest for the prospects of changing mindsets? Not much it would seem. Perhaps the following comments on student insecurity and their lack of interest in being insecure are related to the learning limitations. It might also signal conservative expectations and perhaps even Professor Jones' own unwillingness to engage in the insecure experiences of students. What might this suggest? I do not presume to speculate about Professor Jones' teaching philosophy but there may be something worth noting in his representation of student reactions to normative issues and insecurity. Savin-Baden provides useful insights here in her discussion on the importance for academics to find some 'space' for reflection and renewal — specifically around the kinds of knowledge amid uncertainty (Savin-Baden, 2008).

I sensed an opportunity to try a larger question, imagining that Professor Jones would have

views on the role of the university — specifically in management education. Could his somewhat conservative outlook on student learning have been the result too of his experience across several universities in several continents?

...

Interviewer ... what do you see is the role of a University education in management in terms of its contribution to society? You could say these are idealistic questions but they remain nevertheless.

Professor Jones – It is one of the dilemmas in business and management education. They are not easily resolvable – so good luck in your thesis! I think it is feasible to take them where they can be opened out a little, and broaden their frame of reference and make them a little more comparative, a little more reflective; and I think all that can work especially with mature students who are counter-balancing only two years at (this university) when they have had 20 years of intensive education in industrial training in their jobs. To try to imagine that you could suddenly transform them – it just doesn't work like that. If you do confront them then they switch off and ignore you and they would not wish to be taught that, you know, they would not pay their (substantial fee course) for it. So..... It is a dilemma for contemporary university.

Again this is an intriguing insight. The prospect of changing mindsets inside two years of study is limited in the extreme when confronted with 20 years of industrial training. Not only the obvious time differences but clearly different learning agendas and pedagogies — in other words, two years of trying to open minds to become a little more reflective and so on versus what borders on indoctrination, “intensive industrial training”, presumably where an open mind is not what is needed. Going back to the previous discussion on modes of knowledge, what is being canvassed here looks like *Mode 1* knowledge but not university-based but work-based. But for Professor Jones the challenge does not stop there, now the two versus 20 years leads into that area of insecurity again, because to consider ideas of transformation would be “sudden” and would “confront” with the result that they “switch off and ignore you”. Does this mean that Barnett’s *Mode 3* knowledge (Barnett in Savin-Baden, 2008, p. 96), where uncertainty enters the scene, is simply rejected? More, Professor Jones says they “would not wish to be taught that” and “would not pay for it”. This opens additional elements. What do they wish to be taught? Who are ‘they’? Students? Industry? What are they ‘prepared’ to pay for? Only that which fits their world? It would seem that Professor Jones sees major hurdles in addressing almost anything that challenges contemporary thinking on management, which taking what has been said so far means

anything that makes students (industry?) feel insecure. Does this sound like an education to preserve the *status quo*? And if so why bother using the word 'education'? It is more like a process to perhaps make a few prods at the edges but not so as to seriously disturb the already entrenched views gained through 'intensive industrial training'. This raises serious questions as to the role of a university generally. Is its role to open minds to unexplored areas or to secure the *status quo*? There was something going on here that is a foretaste of a strong theme emerging in the literature review: the pervasive influence in management education and practice of quite particular (and as will be seen, limited, if not narrow) ways of thinking about business. This includes the reductionist thinking embodied in shareholder value. If this influence (discussed below) persists what does this mean for what students may expect of an EMBA?

It is a question of relevance, ie the integrity in a society and economy that is increasingly unsympathetic to critical and radical perspectives. Not so much in Europe, there is still this high intellectual tradition in Europe even amongst, particularly amongst academics obviously but even amongst the industrialists. Whereas Britain and Australia follow very much more the American model⁴⁴.

So does this mean that following the American model of business means focusing on business and not a relationship between society and the economy? Can this be so in 21st century Australia? And it would seem by implication from Professor Jones' earlier remarks that Australian students expect to be taught the American model of business and (by implication) that ideas that integrate society with the economy would be resisted. The observations just tumble from Professor Jones at this point (and with mounting animation):

It has been a very alien experience for me watching our students become more and more materialistic and careeristic and you know I think that the thrust of your research is right and calls for a more moral basis to management are appropriate - but how to do it? (quite a pause) That worries me. (Another long pause). For example I have just launched the EMBA in (names a management stream subject that includes corporate and business ethics) and I think that it would have had a much better chance if I had just called it (nominates a bland title) rather than adding business ethics. This (adding the name business ethics) would give it the kiss of death I think. I incorporate business ethics in all of my subjects and I suspect a lot of my colleagues do to but when you put it in the title ...

⁴⁴ Connecting again to the model of business reflected in discussions about origins of the GFC (Chapter 1 and following).

These comments emerged more than 30 minutes into the interview. Professor Jones seemed to become increasingly frustrated if not a little annoyed at this point. Perhaps as much with the line of questions and how long the interview was taking as much as how the questions led Professor Jones back to frustrations in teaching. The “thrust of (my) research” may not have been as clear at the beginning as it was now. But Professor Jones’ expression of concern about “how to do it” was palpable. This expression of concern was without doubt one of the most compelling experiences in the many months of fieldwork. An expression of worry about not engaging as effectively with what Professor Jones believes to be the role of the university? It certainly felt that way, as he asked “but how to do it?” with quite some animation (leaning forward over the coffee table, fist now clenched). And then what seemed to me a long pause followed by “(and) that worries me”. I sensed here some deeper frustrations — and I can only begin to speculate: frustrations about how to take students into uncertain territory, where they might well feel insecure, but territory which addresses society’s views and interests? Are these questions of pedagogical expertise (moving students into areas where their knowledge is and/or identities are exposed, where they may feel less secure) as well as questions expected of a university?

.... Can organisations be a major influence for good? (Professor Jones recalled participation in a past project involving industrialists) ... what I was amazed at was their (the industrialists) intelligence and their sense of moral duty: not just to their companies but to making it a good society and, you know, I think those instincts are there and they have been denied and suppressed by current management practices but they are there and they need to be re-established and nurtured.

Here was hope based on personal experience of others instincts. Here too was a statement about the crushing influence of current management practices. It was also clear that this was hope about the prospect of nurturing, a synonym for education. How, one wonders, would nurturing toward what makes for a ‘good society’ be again legitimised? The ancient and ongoing contests of ideas over what constitutes a good society and how such societies might be created were not, however, subjects to the fore for now. Rather, the questions were raised again — this time by Professor Jones.

Themes emerging from the interview with Professor Jones:

1. His view that there is an entrenched resistance to normative issues, and in Professor Jones’ judgment, based largely on extensive formation into reductionist industrial

practices which privilege shareholder value over other interests. In Professor Jones' view this reductionist position on shareholder value (what he called the "American model") is "simplistic, crude and brutal". Resistance to normative issues over this shareholder perspective is in Professor Jones' view characteristic of Australian business students, but even more generally, a view characteristic of following the "American model".

2. A reluctance seemingly shared between this teacher and his students to move into insecure territory, which seems to be territory that might challenge the certainties of the *status quo*. This could be seen as a conservative view of the kinds of knowledge to be taught. Is this an attempt to avoid facing uncertainty? Surely not, as this would constitute championing *Modes 1-2* knowledge when *Modes 3-5* are arguably more what is needed for 'supercomplexity' (Barnett, 2004; Savin-Baden, 2008).
3. What is taught is a matter of what students/industry are interested in. It is not a matter of what the Professor feels they should learn — or what a university ought to be engaged in — but what students are prepared to pay for, while avoiding what they resist. This too is a highly disturbing view of the role of a university. Here is a fundamental view of the university that relates to what Khurana called 'market-logic' (Khurana, 2007).
4. A disconnection between the views of most students interviewed (admittedly only five from a cohort of 24) about interest in or anticipation of normative issues and what Professor Jones thinks is not only a general lack of interest on the part of students but resistance to engagement in normative matters.
5. Pedagogical frustrations and related tensions about how to move to a more moral basis in management.
6. Hope that management education and practice may again nurture moral instincts towards good societies.

Interview with EMBA Course Director Dr. Jim

The final interview was with the EMBA Course Director, Dr. Jim. He has extensive experience in both industry management and as a management academic. Dr. Jim has been involved throughout the case study, having agreed from the outset to my participation and having encouraged my attendance through the curriculum review process up to recommendations to the Academic Board. At the time of the interview some five EMBA students (midway through their program) had been interviewed and a further three to four completing EMBA students were observers in the curriculum review process. I had been engaged on this case study through some eight to nine months during which time I had

varying but regular contact with Dr. Jim. At the time of this interview there is a reasonable degree of shared familiarity around the still loosely named topic of “social impacts and management education”. As with Professor Jones I have reproduced extensive extracts to do justice to the thrust of Dr. Jim’s views.

Course Director: Dr. Jim

In response to a broad opening question about the dominance of the shareholder value model of business and increasingly topical public questions (post Enron) of corporate social responsibility Dr. Jim made the following long but telling observation:

... I find for instance in the finance industry that this (shareholder value) mindset is very apparent and that also has a consequence is reflected on the ethics, the moral attitudes for a lot of educators (such that) “real managers do finance”, real educators don’t talk about gender issues because these waffly things are done by peripheral people, you know and ethics and even people who are charged with the responsibility in my program of talking about ethics, shareholders and stakeholders, people who are eminently qualified are bloody apologists for what they are teaching. Before they start talking about it they actually apologise and they say of course that is what it is supposed to be and start taking a backward step and half of my MBAs take these people, you know who I am talking about, down the path where they actually say we are struggling with this and actually dealing with this and the academic then goes on a free ride, doesn’t contribute anything but acts like a facilitator but is very uneasy in this sort of stuff and one of the heavy criticisms that I encountered over the last three or four weeks, which you have probably noticed, is that I get a little bit despondent at times where as a result of this review process at great personal risk to myself and that is how it is – it comes with the territory – I and the committee have decided that certain subjects should emerge and I in turn have decided that that sort of subject should be handled by (names two academics) and I am under considerable pressure from the people upstairs because the answer is to you “why have you got that wanky stuff in it, MBAs won’t tolerate this” and there is a total disconnect between these academics and what is really happening. In other words real men don’t talk about ethics, morality and social responsibility because that is something soft - they might talk about in the Public Service. But (to my mind) this is fundamental to business because ... why do I feel so strongly towards this is because (refers to own family business experience) when you screw it up and do something dicey you not only jeopardise the business but (also) the family (because it) is dependant on the business. This to me has always been at the forefront of my mind so my opening lecture is “people, do you know what the vision statement of our business is?” and nobody ever gets it right and I say “it is very simple, it is dedicated to the third generation, what does that mean?” and a lot of people pick

up on it straight away and say “it is for the long haul and not the short haul”....

Dr. Jim’s frustrations are palpable: from (i) academics who apologise to students for raising issues about the way it is “supposed to be” (referring in this instance to both gender and sustainability issues) to (ii) the closed views of students from certain industries (he names the finance industry) and (iii) the push-back from Faculty leaders about the irrelevance of “soft stuff” (ethics, morality and social responsibility) — in the latter case because the students “won’t tolerate” it. Here are notions of what may or may not be acceptable in the so-called “real world”, that is, practical issues not ideals of what it *should* be like.

So the debate between shareholders and stakeholders is certainly meant to be a very important issue but a significant number of academics are not equipped to handle that issue. ...

What of this gloss that academics (at least in this EMBA program) are not equipped to handle debates about contests of values? This seems an extraordinary comment in almost any context, let alone one that has university postgraduate education at its core. What is being implied, however, is a little more understandable when Dr. Jim adds:

The only challenge for people like (names the two academics above) is to cast that value system in the terminology that business people understand; so it is a challenge on both sides.

This gloss implies that academics need to cast their language in terms that business people understand if they are to engage effectively in debates about plural values. This may be fair but one unacceptable implication from this gloss is the kind of thinking that Professor Jones complained about, the reductionist shareholder-value view. Starting from what people already know and believe is hardly revolutionary (it is after all one of Aristotle’s fundamentals in rhetoric and ethics) but to insist that specific academics (with subject matter that may challenge some contemporary views) are not equipped to handle student push-back simply beggars belief. Is Dr. Jim suggesting that student power (especially purchasing power) trumps alternative learning objectives? If not, then exactly what is Dr. Jim suggesting?

...

Interviewer – Can I get into some specifics because I am conscious in the interviews that I have had with the students when I have raised these issues and I have tried to encourage them to say whether and where (social impact issues) have been discussed. For example I have said

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

if you haven't gone through and talked about the business models of stakeholder versus shareholder have you discussed questions like Telstra, IBM, recent illustration of moving 450 jobs off shore and I don't want to get into whether that has happened but has it been discussed and almost everybody says "no".

Dr. Jim – Well that must have been before they go to my subject which is (names a strategic management subject) and I assure you that we debated that quite strongly.

Interviewer – When does that happen?

Dr. Jim – That is the last subject. The last subject is very structured. However, I have to confess that students going into the subject differ from others in other subject offers ie knowledge that they have not to date addressed.

So, it seems that Dr. Jim becomes the 'teacher of last resort' when it comes to debates about the salience of these social impact issues. Based on Dr. Jim's account so far it should be noted that the social impact rubric now includes: stakeholder interests, corporate social responsibility, gender issues, sustainability and ethics. And this pressure on Dr. Jim to deliver — on top of the capstone subject to be taught — becomes problematic.

Interviewer – then I asked (EMBA students) questions such as: if it hasn't come up why hasn't it come up? They respond: "because most of the emphasis is on getting the numbers right - the maths - and they would anticipate that it will come up in (Professor Jones' management stream subject)". That is the one subject they usually talk about (ie making meaningful sense of their lives). So how would you expect them to address an example like that – or when it comes to your (post-grad business) class what does it look like, what do you do with them that enables that type of discussion to take place?

Dr. Jim: I want my students as future CEOs to be informed about both sides of the equation. It ultimately comes back to your personal value structure. I can aspire in my EMBA that I want my students to be the next generation of CEOs who have social responsibility and show the way ... but I am also a realist.

Presumably being 'a realist' means being practical in the sense of what is achievable, thus not taking on issues that are justified simply by being what 'ought' to be. If this is what Dr. Jim means by being a realist then it echoes the comments by the two academics he

complained about at the outset — their inability to engage with what should be. In sum, it sounds as if there is less chance that his MBA students will be informed by both sides of the equation (again presumably financial-economic on one side balanced by a social side). The tensions inherent in that interim summary statement became a little clearer when Dr. Jim expanded:

....

Dr. Jim – Lets just tie this together. The mindset of the kind of generation of the people that are about to retire says that the issue that you and I are discussing at the present time doesn't really fit into a management school. I am telling you what the norm is. I am surprised that you weren't aware of that. Have you interviewed (refers to Head of Graduate Studies Unit)? – Why don't you do that? Then you will know exactly what I am talking about.

Dr. Jim is annoyed with my not having interviewed the Head of the Graduate Studies Unit, believing that would have illustrated the source of much of his frustration, which he glosses as generational thinking within management academics. So, is there some kind of generational politics in play?

Interviewer – Had I interviewed (the Head of Graduate Studies), what would you imagine he might say?

Dr. Jim – He would use the words- if he trusted you- that this social responsibility is a wanky thing and all the soft stuff is not really what the students are interested in.

(... long pause ...)

But to come back to your question “why does my subject come last”? The powers that be (I am assuming here that Dr. Jim is referring in particular to this same Head of the Graduate Studies Unit) say that this type of thing (social impacts/responsibility) is not what the target market is looking for.

There is no discussion about how this conclusion is verified; but a summative conclusion was offered which is instructive for what follows:

... My subject comes last so that I can pull it all together and cover areas that others have not addressed.

This need to pull together the missing elements for the final capstone subject (delivered by this Director) reinforces an over-riding concern of the Course Director. And yet in so doing

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

another dimension is exposed:

...

But (in relation to this question of why my subject comes last) you must remember: We have a large number of people in the class so, with all due respect, we can't have an intellectual debate around social responsibility.

This seems to be a telling shift in viewpoint from the Director. Now he positions social responsibility as an *intellectual* (as opposed to a practical) topic. By implication of his deferential aside, it may be imputed that it would be unrealistic to engage in a debate with large numbers of (these/previous) EMBA students about anything (intellectual) other than practical matters. Does this point to the age-old 'theory versus practice' divide? Or is this a matter of numbers? Again, surely such simplistic dichotomies are now a matter of historical amusement? On what is offered through this single glimpse of one director's views about a suite of offerings to EMBA students it would seem that debates over facts-values/theory-practice do not look as though they happen — again, at least in this particular EMBA course. This might explain the source of deep frustration for Dr. Jim if he is trying to cover all that has been missed (or avoided) by other academics — especially as he dreams about what he hopes — that his future CEO graduates emerge with a balance between financial-economic and social sides of an equation. What a complex mixture of issues emerges.

In relation to further questions about student responses to, and or interest in, social responsibility versus the dominant shareholder value model of business:

The students are not squeaky clean because the average age of my MBAs is 40 years old, they are so biased, it changes from cohort to cohort but all of them are guilty of it, this stereotype and "this is how it is done around here". They are middle or senior managers, they have adopted these norms and values to get where they are, and then when all of a sudden when you are confronted with it and saying but this is not the way forward this is when they express to you that we haven't discussed this yet and that is where we fail. Now I have said to them that this is not the way forward more informed discussions needs to be around this particular subject (corporate social responsibility), more informed the better at this particular point. They haven't got the answers either. They need somebody to lead them down the path, not somebody who sits back in an interview process saying what do you think about it. They would say this is what we think but YOU tell us ... What I am saying is that the fault doesn't lie with the academics solely, we need to be educating them (the MBA students) ... but they (the MBA students) need to be convinced that it is an important issue. While everybody says

it is not an important issue, while the academics say it is not an important issue, certainly Captains of Industry are not going to say it is an important issue it won't be an important issue. (That is) until the day when we see ourselves in court with enormous litigation "how in the hell did we get here?"

So it appears that for issues to be brought into this EMBA course they need to have been discussed by 'Captains of Industry' and deemed by them to be important. It is 'Captains of Industry' who need to be convinced of the merits of an issue before it can be presented to a class of future leaders. Who are these 'Captains of Industry'? What process leads to recognition and consensus? Clearly these and related questions were beyond the scope of the interview but the point had been made: legitimacy for academic study comes from the world of practice and more specifically from some kind of elite practitioners; and a 'You (should) tell us' view of education. It would seem, too, that at least as far as Dr. Jim is concerned these 'Captains of Industry' legitimise concepts and problems, with the latter determined by actions in court.

Interviewer ... I am simply saying the context that you will be making decisions that will impact on other's lives. To what extent is that a discussion that takes place in the class room if at all? How is it discussed?

Dr. Jim – The short answer is that it is not.

...

Interviewer – Your point being is that you have tried to discuss this and your students are rejecting it. Why? Because you are saying that they don't see the connection between a business discussion and its impact on people? They see business as something different? Is it uncomfortable?

Dr. Jim – It is very uncomfortable. This is what real business people won't talk about. They just talk about the bottom line and number sheet. We (management academics) are perpetuating this. The first half of this course is about accounting and finance and one bottom line.

The emphasis once again is on how uncomfortable it is to raise questions beyond the financial bottom line. But now there is an acknowledgement by Dr. Jim that academics are perpetuating this through the course structure. Once again the reference to *real* people, and by implication, successful people, that is, those who focus on real issues, namely financial

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

issues. As the interview draws to a close Dr. Jim makes an ambiguous reference to people and CEO's 'big picture' as follows:

Dr. Jim. ... The big picture doesn't mean a disconnect (with people and society). A lot of our CEOs use the excuse that they see the big picture as having no engagement (with people or with society) at any level; to a certain extent this is what happens in our organisation; (in other words) "I am a good Dean and keep a distance from you and so I don't want to be beholden to you".

Interviewer – (confused by this comment) What are you saying? The big picture hasn't got people in it?

Dr. Jim – That is exactly right.

INTERVIEW ENDS

At the conclusion of the interview I was still not sure what Dr. Jim meant by the observation about the 'big picture'. I thought that it might be clarified upon listening to the recording. By then however it was too late — the opportunity had passed to revisit these remarks. The remark remains ambiguous as to who is being referred to. I suspect Dr. Jim was suggesting that *people in general* don't feature in the 'big pictures' of either CEOs or Deans. Such an interpretation is consistent with earlier parts of the interview referring to the views of the Head of the Graduate Unit and other senior academics. It could also be implied from the references made both to his 'Captains of Industry' and the financial concerns of so-called *real people*. If this is a reasonable interpretation of Dr. Jim's remarks then the implications are disturbing. However, by this final stage of the field work the remark (or more accurately my interpretation) was not surprising. Dismissive and awkward references to the social factor (people in general, impacts on people in particular) were a hallmark of the earlier curriculum review process. Subsequent interviews with students clearly had the *financials/math's and not people as the foundation* at the halfway mark of the EMBA course. Professor Jones reported that there was problematic resistance to discussing ideas of social impacts and that he believed students did "not want to go there", and while troubled by this, he did not take them into such discussions. Throughout the interview with Dr. Jim above it was clear that this people dimension is considered 'soft' and not the domain of so-called *real people*. Who says? Seemingly a consensus comprising of EMBA students, some elusive body called 'Captains of Industry', and academic "powers that be". A formidable opposition generating clearly evident frustrations for Dr. Jim.

But to conclude that people generally are not central to an EMBA course of study would appear to be a complete nonsense. After all, the foundation to the EMBA curriculum is 'Applied Leadership' and one of the application subjects is named 'People and Knowledge Management'. People are defined by both subjects. Glib nostrums follow: (a) there can be no leaders without followers and (b) ideas of managing people are axiomatic for any organisation. Why then this nonsensical conclusion that people are not central? One possibility is that the people in the two subjects refer to *people as resources*. In such a case people are a collective of skills, capabilities and talents *managed* by leaders to achieve organisational goals. If viewed as a resource to be managed then the conclusion might suggest that people *qua* individual human beings, not simply resources, are not in the leaders' 'big picture'. People as human beings would constitute the 'soft stuff' — flesh and blood, feelings, histories, plans and dreams; individuals with families, living in communities. Vulnerable. Fragile. People *being* human. If people are viewed as resources just like knowledge, to be managed, then they are to be applied to organisational purposes. But what about people as the followers of leaders, as Human Resources, or even Human Capital? This is still about means to achieve organisational ends. Managers and leaders do that work. Are managers and leaders not people? This line of thinking does not make the conclusion any easier to accept. Disturbing still, but perhaps a fraction more understandable.

Themes emerging from the interview with Dr. Jim:

1. Faculty politics were central to Dr. Jim's approach to the review. From the composition of the review panel to the presentation to the Faculty Committee Dr. Jim was mindful of addressing, but clearly not always accepting, vested interests.
2. While seeking to engage with ideas that might be included under the rubric of 'social responsibility' Dr. Jim was frustrated by what he saw as the apologetic impractical idealism of several academics. This frustration included concerns about addressing ethical questions in the curriculum. If not addressed in Professor Jones' class then he would have to pick it up in the Capstone class, that is, at the end of the EMBA program. The end result risks leaving questions of ethics as largely irrelevant and thus a formative experience for students.
3. 'Captains of Industry' have a significant bearing on what is salient for the curriculum.
4. The emphasis on maths/financials reflects the prevailing view for Dr. Jim that the people side of business is problematic as being 'soft', not the concern for 'real' business people. This seemingly incredible view was however reflected in the notion that people

were not in the 'big picture' of the EMBA. The maths and financials were what the "powers that be" (that is CEO's and Faculty leaders) wanted. Dr. Jim was at pains to reject such a conclusion but his political realist outlook seemed the governing value, which meant that 'the market' ruled, where that market comprised CEO's, Captains of Industry, and Faculty leaders.

3.5 Summary of analysis

This case illuminates some major tensions concerning the problematic nature of moral salience in management education and practice at this university.

Some of the key themes emerging from the case include:

1. Terms regarding the social impact and responsibility of management decisions are "fuzzy, unhelpful and challenge the *status quo* (of management education)". This seems especially to be the case when considered in the light of the dominant status of the 'shareholder value model of business/shareholder primacy' as opposed to a 'stakeholder model of business'. Ideas of 'social responsibility' do emerge as context for the EMBA framework in the curriculum review process but because of the ambiguity of the concepts just where best to locate them within the EMBA curriculum proves difficult. 'Social responsibility' as a definitive concept governing or framing business management was scarcely mentioned in any of the interviews. By contrast there was mounting — if still ambivalent - mention of it in the curriculum review process. This perhaps suggests an emerging if unclear relevance.
2. Financial orientation dominates the EMBA pedagogy at this university. This is an unequivocal outcome reflected by both EMBA students in the interviews and confirmed by students participating in the curriculum review process. However, it is important to recall both Dr. Jim's remarks on this: "We (management academics) are perpetuating this (domination)" and Professor Jones: "We follow the American model".
3. There are mixed signals over the salience of social impacts in management. Attention to social impacts was anticipated by most students (as part of a management stream subject) and yet there was evident ambivalence (if not mild aversion) by teaching staff along the lines that "it is very uncomfortable (addressing people over numbers)" and "there are no people in the 'bigger picture'".
4. Faculty politics between Course Director and Faculty leaders was conspicuous, especially over the dominant financial orientation. Khurana's 'market-logic' appears to be a hallmark of this Australian university's outlook. Indeed Dr. Jim admonished

me for not being in tune with this logic within the Faculty and especially from Faculty leaders.

5. Much the same could be concluded from remarks about the absence of market demands for social responsibility (the 'Captains of Industry' decree as to what was important). In so doing questions of academic leadership are raised as to what kinds of leadership are exercised by business schools in addressing matters of public responsibility? Not much influence and leadership here; mostly response to what 'industry' calls for. This is a very disturbing outcome suggesting another example of market-logic as *de rigueur* for (this) business school(s). Since when is leadership following the calls of industry leaders? It would seem to be an appeasing strategy for one influential constituency.
6. There is evidence of equating 'social impacts' with 'business ethics'. Coming to grips with meanings and distinctions between these two concepts will be an important question for the literature review and subsequent reflections.
7. Notions of concern to 'avoid causing undeserved harm' were quite alien to discourses on management throughout the review process and especially in the interviews. This was to some extent not surprising as the word 'harm' is a loaded concept and ideas of *avoiding* causing *undeserved* harm are also not in common parlance. Nevertheless, it is important to note the difficulties such a concept presented to those asked.
8. There was no reference in any interview to either public concerns or the public domain regarding ideas of social-impacts or moral accountability. A specific question to that end was not asked so in one sense this outcome should be expected. On the other hand the examples offered to illustrate the ideas of social-moral impacts (eg Telstra, IBM, etc) were very much in the public domain at the time as were previous examples of major industry figures in Australia (eg the principals involved in the James Hardie case). Perhaps I was expecting too much here but it seemed in giving the above examples that it might solicit some discussion about 'management in the public domain'. That expectation remained unfulfilled.
9. The consistent reference by students and teachers alike as to where discussion on social impacts would likely occur was unequivocal in terms of seeing it within a quite specific management stream subject – as taught by Professor Jones.
10. Collective abstracts (strategic perspectives on people, employees, and organisations) were prominent with *almost no reference to individuals when speaking of social-moral impacts*. This is precisely Todorov's concern (Todorov, 2003).
11. Not one reference was recorded or noted on anything pertaining to "civic or

professional standards” throughout the approximate 25 hours of recorded interviews and notes taken in observing the curriculum review process⁴⁵. Perhaps the semi-structured nature of the interview process contributed to this absence but this does not account for the extensive period noted in the review process. Even when the AACSB standards were mentioned in that review process there was no explicit reference to ethical standards or civic expectations. In other words management as a profession (in the sense of a civic good) would likely not be salient.

12. The AACSB influence was a dominant sub-text to deliberations despite the expressed intentions of those engaged in the curriculum review process. The final report of recommendations was pitched specifically with the AACSB accreditation in mind.

3.6 Conclusion

While Dr. Jim struggles to get ideas such as ‘corporate social responsibility’ addressed in the class and the EMBA curriculum it seems to be a different although related matter to the evident difficulties of “seeing people in the bigger picture” of business discourse. From one perspective this suggests that ideas such as ‘corporate social responsibility’ are perhaps yet another collective abstract that challenges the dominant shareholder model of business. That is, such abstracts remove individuals from the picture (Todorov, 2003). Dr. Jim’s last remarks, however, seem to go further and by referring to the notion of people (as individual employees or as members of the public, that is, outside the organisation) may be not only different, but even confronting, in the sense of being “very uncomfortable”. This acknowledgement seems quite remarkable. The implication seems to be that people (individual employees at least) are unwelcome distractions from bottom line thinking, and as such distractions are something to be avoided. Can such a myopic and distorted view be so readily generalised as Dr. Jim implies? It would at best seem to give expression to Dr. Jim’s considerable personal frustrations in addressing larger topics — frustrations with students, ‘Captains of Industry’ and university administration alike. At worst, Dr. Jim’s frustrations may point to seemingly systemic difficulties in leading students, industry leaders and his university into different agendas.

It is important to note Dr. Jim’s experience with his seniors concerning the market forces argument. The AACSB accreditation is seen by his seniors as an essential to the marketplace.

⁴⁵ Reference to 25 hours of recorded interviews and notes calls for some clarification. Recorded interviews with 5 students and 2 academics accounted for approximately 5 hours. The remaining 20 hours is a minimal estimate of the note taking time (as opposed to time in recording interviews) involved in meetings with the Curriculum review committee and the Course Director. Time taken in analysis and reflection during and since the interviews and meetings is beyond simple calculation.

This is a telling reference supporting Rakesh Khurana's account of the progressive distortion of the (US) MBA curriculum objectives over the last 50 years (Khurana, 2007). Khurana's insight on market-logic serves also as a prescient commentary on what seems to be at the heart of the problem of moral accountability in management education in this case study. Professor Jones's remarks on how Australia follows the US model of business are an experienced testimony to that view. An interim conclusion is that market-logic and the absence of people as human beings, not just as resources, seems to dominate what Dr. Jim and too many influential others (inside and outside the academy) see as the bigger picture for management education.

The case offers sobering confirmation of a deeply disturbing problem. Political and moral issues abound within this particular educational setting. Market-logic appears to be the dominant political ideology for industry and the academy alike at this institution. The market — together with some notion of an anonymous collective called 'Captains of Industry' — seems to determine what is taught. Discussion of moral impacts of business decisions is not only avoided — as it would be uncomfortable — but it appears to be considered largely irrelevant; again, for this institution and at least indirectly by industry. People as resources (and thus "costs to be controlled" [Cascio, 2002]) appear to be a dominant prism.

The case helps to illuminate several themes of my educative concerns – some of which will be addressed in the literature review to follow. Those broadly relate to the difficulties of integrating an ethical-moral dimension as wholly salient for the MBA. Other themes from the case lead to considering a Kantian response in Part B. These will be concerned with ways to develop and cultivate the ethical dimension. In the meantime will be helpful to pause briefly to consider broader questions emerging from the case and posed in introducing my educative concerns about formation in addressing moral impacts in management education. What is this university-based management education actually *for*? And for whom? Some of the answers illustrated in this case study demand attention: just what is the role of *universities* in management education? Why *management* education? Why *management education*? An education *for* management? Why management? Why education and not *training*? Are graduates aware of the assumptions underpinning the evident uncritical givenness of management? More importantly, how have graduates been prepared to challenge, explore and argue for responses to questions of the moral impacts of management (beyond even a vague notion of a cumulative social impact)? To what extent as management educators have we *engaged with broader publics* (that is beyond 'the market' of employers) to

ask these kinds of fundamental questions? If the moral dimension is all but silent at this university what kinds of judgements are publicly defensible when considering social-moral impacts (ie not just legal or organisational) of management decisions? Responses to these questions are inconclusively muted when seen through the case study of this one university. For the larger purpose of public wellbeing it is time to pause. Not least to consider what can and, given the seeming ambiguity about the public role of a university⁴⁶, relatedly, what *ought* to be done. Before this last question can be meaningfully considered (along with others about the role of universities in management education) the management studies literature needs to be addressed. But rather than addressed broadly the focus now shifts to a more specific perspective: what does the management studies literature say about *integrating* the ethical-moral dimension into the MBA curriculum? From the opening chapter and now illustrated through this one case study that there are educative problems with ethical-moral questions is obvious. So it will be important to develop some understanding of the issues, challenges and obstacles associated with addressing moral questions in management education. At the conclusion of the next chapter a clearer picture will emerge as to what those issues, challenges and obstacles are; more significantly for my project, to consider what an appropriate response would call for.

⁴⁶ Section 1.5

Chapter 4. A critical review of the Management Studies literature on *integrating* the ethical-moral dimension in the MBA

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 introduced some of the pressures being exerted on management education in regard to questions of culpability for the consequences of corporate collapses. These questions were prominent at the end of last century and into the first decade of this century (i.e. *inter alia* post the so-called Enron period of 2001-3), and most recently about impacts on the real economy (jobs, individual and community wellbeing, local and clearly global) from institutional failures associated with the 2008 GEC. Something of the fiduciary⁴⁷ tensions experienced by management education in responding to those pressures are evident in that discussion. The case study too has amply illustrated those tensions and surfaced examples that help make those tensions concrete. Based on both the outcomes of the case study and depictions of the pressures on management education in Chapter 1 in this chapter I develop a more nuanced understanding of those pressures and tensions. This is undertaken through a review of the literature, drawing on management studies broadly and the related fields of Management Learning, Critical Management Studies (CMS), Business Ethics, and recent attempts to integrate an ethical-moral dimension through Ethical Economics.

The primary question guiding this critical review of the management learning literature is how do educators *integrate* the ethical-moral dimension of management into the MBA? Implicit in this is not only what may be meant by *the ethical-moral dimension*⁴⁷ but also the question of what kinds of difficulties or obstacles are experienced in integration? I strive to find a balance in responding to the questions guiding the review (Section 4.2). I canvass a range of relevant fields to assist our understanding of the issues, obstacles and challenges in this definitive dimension. At the same time I select what I hope are seminal contributions that will result in a deeper appreciation of what might assist in addressing the issues, obstacles and challenges. What follows reflects that balancing effort. The early sections of the chapter could broadly be described as following a canvassing approach (4.3) while later sections are increasingly mixed with more selective approaches in response to specific

⁴⁷ Fiduciary relationship n. where one person places complete confidence in another in regard to a particular transaction or one's general affairs or business. The relationship is not necessarily formally or legally established as in a declaration of trust, but can be one of *moral or personal responsibility*, due to the superior knowledge and training of the fiduciary as compared to the one whose affairs the fiduciary is handling (emphasis added). [www.http://dictionary.law.com](http://dictionary.law.com). As for example between teacher and student at any level (WPJ).

questions. The objective remains the same throughout: to better understand from the management studies literature what is problematic in this educative project so as to develop a relevant response. That response (Part B) is shaped in other words by what follows in this chapter and builds on those of the previous chapters.

The review raises new questions concerning accountability and legitimacy — of both corporate management (Lodge & Wilson, 2006) and management education. Moldoveanu and Martin depict the MBA as a “successful North American-originated cultural artefact and socio-economic phenomenon that has gained world wide acceptance ... a number of vehement critiques of the MBA have emerged ... that raise questions about its economic, intellectual, practical, moral, and ‘all-things-considered’ value” (Moldoveanu & Martin, 2008, p. 3). A review of these critiques, some more vehement than others, is considered in what follows. I do not, however, try to balance the review with literature that celebrates the MBA. I want to better understand what is problematic in integrating moral and ethical issues in management education, for as addressed in Chapter 1, it is clear that there are major problems, and problems that are of rising public concern. What follows, however, serves to seek ways to address the moral impacts for management education. I am seeking to understand questions of integration informed by a cross-section of perspectives. This range is necessary to consider what might be done to educate for greater moral responsibility in management practice. The literature illustrates that this is a shared aspiration of many management scholars.

No one field of management studies does justice to the complexity of the issues involved in critically reviewing the literature on the challenges and obstacles involved in integrating an ethical-moral dimension into the MBA. I have drawn on an extensive reading to inform my research, but as previously indicated rather than comprehensively canvass those fields I have largely adopted a selective strategy where I draw on key texts to illustrate the complexity of the issues involved in the problem. To that end the literature on ethical integration in the MBA is viewed across five fields: the management studies field broadly and four variously but loosely defined sub-fields. With the possible exception of the Critical Management Studies (CMS) field, depicting texts as being part of various fields might suggest discreet boundaries. Where CMS has a set of clearly articulated commitments (outlined below) most of what has been selected could readily engage across several fields. What all share is a deep engagement with management education, with some being more critical of management practice (e.g. Parker). In other words there are porous boundaries between fields but all are engaged in management education and learning, and all relate to

varying degrees around the integration of the ethical dimension. I provide here a brief outline firstly of each field and then consider a number of the principal contributors and contributions influencing each field.

The first field is a general sketch of key tensions with the MBA seen broadly through management studies generally, tensions that may best be understood through some crucial historical background. The second is from the management learning literature. The third field (and the most prominent in this review) covers a broad range of internal views about the effectiveness of and obstacles faced by the CMS community in integrating an ethical dimension in the MBA. The fourth is a subfield of CMS and focuses on Business Ethics, drawing on the recent work of Jones, Parker and ten Bos, not least as these authors critique the role of Norman Bowie's work on the relevance of Kant in Business Ethics textbooks and academic literature. The final selection is taken from recent endeavours to integrate ethics specifically with economics.

This review necessarily engages with historical contexts of the iconic and problematic standing of the US MBA. Doing so enables insights into tensions in addressing ethical and moral issues in management education. Here the recent work of Rakesh Khurana is especially valuable. It is now readily recognised that the US experience with the MBA has been transferred globally through, inter alia, the accreditation process (such as AACSB) and shared business outlooks. For example, British economist John Kay refers to the American business model as one such dominant outlook: "an amalgam of unrestrained pursuit of self-interest, market fundamentalism and minimal state intervention" (Kay in Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007, p. 215).

CMS/E has emerged strongly as a subfield within management studies, gaining increasing attention through the works of Chris Grey and most conspicuously through publication by the late Sumantra Ghoshal in the internationally influential management academy journal on management learning (*Academy of Management Learning and Education - AMLE*). The largest section of this review is taken up with the CMS literature as it relates to ethics broadly, but specifically inside management education. This educational focus excludes a significant body of literature that is critical of management and organisational practice. Nevertheless I start broadly by drawing on a series of evaluations by CMS scholars as to how effective these scholars view their collective efforts in relation to their shared critical commitment. This provides some telling insights for what follows. While the CMS literature on ethics, let alone Business Ethics, is hardly representative of both vast fields, for my

purposes I have chosen to consider one work that I judge to open the range and kinds of problems that the introduction and case study would suggest is warranted (Jones, et al, 2005). These authors afford highly valuable insights of the limiting outlooks on ethics adopted in management studies broadly, and management learning in particular. Their critique leads eventually to opening a deeper Kantian exploration of the educative-formative problem.

The various literature fields addressed in this chapter enable some appreciation of the complexity of the problems at hand and the obstacles to deeper engagement. In the end I argue that following the complexity path enables me to discern issues warranting closer attention, more particularly those regarding practical moral judgment amid uncertainty. Finding a diversity of views on what is pertinent to management education would be the equivalent of a truism in almost any review of academic literature. However in the case of the educative problem being followed thorough management studies I conclude that in one vital respect – relating to the public roles of a university – championing this very diversity may perversely be contributing to what is problematic. I do not intend to disparage diversity per se but rather to highlight what might be underplayed in championing ‘polyphony’ (Clegg, et al, 2006). Both practical/moral judgment and pedagogical issues of formation in practical/moral judgment emerge as prominent themes. I close with major concerns – shared by many within management studies - about the extent to which integration of the ethical-moral dimension has been addressed in management education, and what will be needed for greater impact. In the sense of addressing fiduciary tensions in management education those concerns help to shape the Kantian response that constitutes Part B.

4.2 Questions framing the critical review of the management literature

The following questions guide the selection and review of literature on integrating the ethical dimension in management education. Each question is viewed from the intersecting perspectives of applied educational and moral philosophy toward business management practice. In other words, postgraduate business management education is the central focus, undertaken on the one hand from the joint perspectives of an applied educational philosophy and on the other toward management practice. Questions guiding the literature review include the following:

1. What do educators regard as ‘ethical-moral dimensions in management’? How are ethical-moral dimensions manifested from the management educator’s view?
2. How do management educators ‘integrate’ (sometimes expressed as ‘inculcate’ or ‘sensitise’) ethical-moral dimensions of management in the MBA? What are the distinctions between these descriptors of the ethical dimensions of management?

3. How do management educators (both in selected fields of BE, CMS/E, and management studies more broadly) address morally sensitive issues in the MBA?
4. What problems do management educators in these fields (and more broadly) experience in addressing morally sensitive issues in the MBA?

Such a broad range of questions are at best directional but, for this dissertation, some are beyond the scope chosen. For example, I do not address the rich literature covering the historical origins and development of moral/public tensions in management education (although I do draw considerably on some aspects via the recent works of Khurana). Nor do I address cultural distinctions in moral concepts, the breadth of moral and political philosophies across cultures. Important as each is in understanding the issues involved I have chosen a far more limited but still hopefully fecund range of sensitivities with which to consider what is problematic in integrating an ethical-moral dimension in management education.

I use the work of Ghoshal to illustrate systemic difficulties with key ethical assumptions in management theory and draw on Clegg and Ross-Smith's insights regarding the need for pluralist approaches in management learning. The prominent management learning literature offering critiques of ethical/sensitive matters in management education can itself be broadly divided into three overlapping groups: (i) those that take as their centre of interest specific pedagogical approaches to business ethics and moral sensitivities, for example Sims (2002); Benn & Bubna-Litic (2004); (ii) critiques of management theory as ideology, typically in postgraduate education, for example, Alvesson and Willmott (1996); French and Grey (1996); Burgoyne and Reynolds (1997); Parker (1998a, 1998b, 2002); Parker, et al (2007); Hardy and Palmer (2000); Kelemen and Peltonen (1999); Roberts (2001); Grey (2003, 2004, 2005); Jones, et al (2005); Ghoshal (2005) and Wray-Bliss (forthcoming); and (iii) those with a mix of interests that centre on management learning more broadly, for example, Pfeffer and Fong (2002); Mintzberg (2004); Garten (2002); Morgan (2006), Clegg and Ross-Smith (2003); Clegg et al (2006); and Khurana (2007).

The above categorisation merely points to a broad literature, but in order to follow the review questions, the focus in this dissertation primarily draws on the second and third groupings. At the same time, and mindful of the pedagogical critiques in the first group, I eventually argue (in Chapter 7) for an additional pedagogical perspective (an Amartya Sen-based *capabilities* approach). I argue that this capabilities pedagogy offers more synergies with the normative claims in this dissertation about formation in practical judgment for

management education and practice. There is, however, a great deal to accomplish before arriving at that capabilities approach.

There is a vast literature on business ethics. For my purposes this literature serves as a mere backdrop and is not the primary focus of this review. Because I am interested in how ideas of a sensitive moral nature are integrated in management programs — as classroom content and/or through discussion — a different literature is relevant, a reasonably definable section within the larger field of ‘management studies’. This section of management studies literature is selected as pertinent to the previously mentioned critical review questions guiding this dissertation, although as mentioned, my selections are not representative of the Business Ethics field as a whole. Management studies literature may well refer to mainstream business ethics texts but again the latter are of secondary interest, that is, only to the extent of the critical review questions. Midway through the chapter the final review question becomes more prominent, i.e. what problems do management educators experience in addressing morally sensitive issues? Informed in part by the experience of the academics in the case study (both through the curriculum review and the interviews) I seek here to better understand from the literature the kinds of problems being experienced by management educators in addressing moral issues. This moves the review into more specific considerations about obstacles to engagement, with a focus on what CMS scholars and others consider needs to be addressed for more effective engagement. These views towards the second half of this chapter constitute important reflections about what has gone before and what has been learned will be needed for deeper, more effective impact. With those review questions in mind it will assist the objectives here by starting broadly before engaging with the sub-fields of management studies.

4.3 The ethical dimension in management education: a broad view

Ken Starkey and Nick Tiratsoo have added their voices to a rising chorus of disenchantment if not disillusionment with the current MBA’s ability to tackle an integrated approach to ethics in management. They are, *inter alia*, critical of the accreditation influence (eg AACSB) as being in effect a source of inertia in reforming curricula. Starkey and Tiratsoo illustrate their point through reference to one of the key standards to be met and sustained in order to gain and retain accreditation (Standard 15). This standard sets out an extensive range of programs that are expected to be covered but there is little or no guidance from AACSB as to interpretation and/or practice in meeting the standard. Starkey and Tiratsoo regard the result as having so little merit and direction as to add to integration problems through

inertia (Starkey & Tiratsoo, 2007, pp. 100-2).

Starkey and Tiratsoo argue that business schools need to change direction, indeed to “go against the flow”, that is against the view in which universities see market responsiveness as their most fundamental strategy. In their view “it is time for the business school to define what it stands for in a new way that will position it centrally in the evolving world of knowledge ... with new links between business school and society” (2007, pp. 211-2). Their view of this new link is the university as the *agora*, the ancient term to describe “a centre of political, commercial, social and philosophical activity, and ... a seat of justice”(pp. 211-2). They contrast the democratic flavour of the *agora* with the *campus*, a term that “reflects the academy’s location as a distant, sterile place, separate from the rest of the world ... because society is now talking back in a louder and more demanding voice than ever before” (pp.211-2). Such a view (of the university as an *agora*) is necessary to “reflect on and develop new management expertise, and simultaneously build the social capital and trust between partners ... The business school will have to re-imagine itself”(p. 211-2).

The list of graduate capabilities includes “personal competence (self awareness, self-regulation and motivation) but also social competence (empathy, awareness of others’ feelings, needs and concerns, social skills and adeptness in relating to others)” (2007, p. 216). This capabilities list highlights a further dimension that becomes of greater interest in the pedagogical chapter (Chapter 7).

What clearly emerges from Starkey and Tiratsoo’s argument is that there is a pressing need for business schools to change their direction and to engage most comprehensively with the world not as an isolated campus but as an *agora*. In addition there are indications here concerning a justification for a suite of graduate personal and social capabilities. These ideas on both the place of the public in relation to the university and specific graduate capabilities is of interest in Chapter 7.

Martin Parker has been an effective critic of management theory, practice and education (Parker, 1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2007). Parker is especially effective in his critique of seemingly embedded assumptions about how management serves to celebrate management as *the* way to organise (Parker, 2007, p. 168). The etymology of the word ‘management’ reflects the gradual move from its roots in the handling and training of horses (*maneggiarre*) through to managing and training people (presumably so as to control) eventually via management techniques and technologies (p. 168). Management education is complicit in perpetuating

many of these assumptions (p. 168). Much as Ghoshal argues that economics has developed into a form of fundamentalism, Parker suggests the same process for managerialism. Here the pursuit of scientific certainty in management practice has licensed a pervasive ideology of technological efficiency that has “damaged democracy, legitimated inequality and exported injustice” (Parker, 2002, p. 15). Parker argues for a far more prominent role for moral and political philosophy in management learning and practice, seeking to emphasise the need for a public engagement about matters of organisation, not simply for fostering understanding but in order to change practices as they impact on people. He advocates the need for greater use of imagination in confronting an oppressive conformity to the *status quo* in seeing management as the only way we organise ourselves (2002, p. 211-12). His is a call for a radical rethink of what we have allowed to happen in the name of management. It is a public call as much as it is a call to management educators. Parker’s influence will be clearly evident in sharpening my reflections on the empirical phase of this educative-formative problem.⁴⁸

We need also to gauge what I consider to be problematic here in a larger historical context. Why and how has this formative problem emerged? What can we learn from looking at the history of the business school and its relationship with the broader community regarding its public roles? A recent work on this subject from Rakesh Khurana assists in placing these questions in context. It also serves to sharpen the questions in this review and for reflections on the fieldwork. I turn next to Khurana.

4.4 An historical context on professionalising management: Rakesh Khurana

Understanding endeavours in America over some 125 years to make management a profession are at the heart of Khurana’s research on management education. In “Management as a Profession” Khurana et al describe the notion of a profession: “our criteria for calling an occupation a *bona fide* profession are as follows:

1. A common body of knowledge resting on a well-developed, widely accepted theoretical base;
2. A system for certifying that individuals possess such knowledge before being licensed or otherwise allowed to practice;
3. A commitment to use specialised knowledge for the public good, and a renunciation of the goal of profit maximisation, in return for professional autonomy and monopoly power;
4. A code of ethics, with provisions for monitoring individual compliance with the code

⁴⁸ Some of which is covered in Chapter 8.

and a system of sanctions for enforcing it.

In comparing management with the more traditional professions of law and medicine along these criteria, it is inevitably found to be wanting. This shortcoming has a direct bearing on society's ability to demand and obtain responsible conduct from executives, as well as on management's ability to maintain the public trust required for the optimal functioning of our economic institutions" (Khurana et al, 2005, pp. 45-46).

Central to Khurana's argument regarding the legitimacy afforded to management studies in business schools is the public role of the university: "an institution viewed as dedicated to the public good". To Khurana that legitimacy is both social and moral (Khurana, 2007, p. 3). Due to the rise and dominance of agency theory and market logic over the last 10-15 years the sources of social and moral legitimacy and authority in the business school has become "largely invisible": "Business schools have evolved over the century and a quarter of their existence into their own intellectual and institutional *antithesis*, in a process of development that is, as yet, little understood and generating consequences that we are only now beginning to comprehend and reckon with" (Khurana, 2007, p. 7, emphasis added). To illuminate this process of development, its consequences, and the significance of both for how we think about the role and purpose of business education today Khurana describes his approach to two subjects of fundamental importance (to his project): "(i) the concept of professionalism in sociology; and (ii) the significance of how institutions arise and develop for our understanding of their nature and function in the present" (2007, p. 8).

Khurana (2007) provides a useful account of the influence Michael Jensen's agency theory has had over the shareholder-stakeholder models (see Khurana p. 317). Jensen's agency theory "thoroughly repudiated professionalism" (p. 324) ... and "relationships are a nexus of contracts between individuals", with the "relationship between say a manager and an employee — say the agency theorists — being different in content but not in form from any transactional relationship in the market" (p. 325), ie a commodity to be traded. A resource. Was the business school now a "highly sophisticated trade school"? Was it now "unrelated to the mission of the university — ie to preserve, create and transmit knowledge to advance public good?" (p. 331).

"Such questions would begin to force themselves on both business schools and the public with increasing insistence as the economic boom years of the 1990s gave way, at the beginning of the new century, to a wave of corporate scandals in which shareholders, employees, and the public generally reaped some of the more bitter fruits of the intellectual

and social revolution in business schools in the 1970s and 1980s" (p. 331).

As to whether educators have an influence on student values Khurana draws on telling research from the Aspen Institute, claiming:

As business school teachers, we inevitably do teach values, whether we are aware of so doing or not. The 2003 Aspen Institute survey that followed a large contingent of MBA students from the time they entered business school to the time they graduated found that students' values changed during the process. In the course of their two years of study in an MBA program, students' views of the legitimate claims on the corporation of shareholders and other constituents such as employees, customers, and the larger community shifted toward a higher valuation of the rights and claims of shareholders relative to those of others. Such views have a direct bearing on questions of ethics and values in business, because any meaningful discussion of the ethical responsibilities of business requires prior agreement about to what or to whom business is 'responsible' in the first place. However, too many business schools persist in the illusion that, just because a subject is presented in the 'value-free' language of social science, the instruction given is, indeed, value-free. Such an illusion could arise only after business schools had abandoned the idea that they were preparing students for such a normatively bound occupational category as a profession. (pp. 370-1)

Why does the professionalisation project in business schools matter? Khurana's answer is:

rooted in the idea of institutions as mechanisms for the establishment of social order, and in a conception of the utility of particular types of institutions for particular forms of order making in the contemporary world. Professions are a vital but under-recognised part of the social and economic order. They have inherent qualities that are distinct from those of other order-creating institutions such as markets and bureaucracy, and when they are compromised or corrupted, society as a whole is harmed. (p. 372)

However with the emerging dominance of agency theory and its related focus on shareholder value "market logic has taken over business schools"(p. 379). This is a very significant statement so it warrants backtracking briefly to see how, according to Khurana, this shift and influence of market logic unfolds in business schools.

It is instructive to read in Khurana (p. 109) of the aspirations of the early founders of the US business schools such as Tuck (founded in 1900): for example, the founders intended to put business education on a par with the preparation for the traditional professions where “the courses are designed to prepare men for those more modern forms of business which have become so exacting as to require the same quality of academic training as the older professions” (p. 110).

Equally it is instructive to read (pp. 182-3) of concerns expressed at a US-based Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) meeting in 1933 that what was being taught in university business schools was being used not to create real value but to *evade public accountability* (as in regulation)... and again in a 1934 AACSB meeting lamenting that the “emphasis has been on turning out business technicians” ... closing with the prescient question: “have we not been too much a reflection of the state of mind of the business community?” (emphasis added).

Khurana traces an extraordinary story: the decline post-war of the AACSB, the rise and influence of the Ford Foundation and in its wake the demise of general management, culminating most recently strongly in favour of what Khurana calls “the investor model of business” (also known as “shareholder primacy”) and the related impact on business schools of the dominance of market logic. Khurana closes with the clearly evident but unstated abandonment of the professionalisation of the management project — one that was seeking social and moral legitimacy within universities through the latter’s inherent commitment to fostering public wellbeing. There is no small irony in the subsequent return to the dominant influence of the AACSB — albeit this time not so much as fostering professional commitment to societal wellbeing but as an accrediting agency for international universities seeking recognition as a marketing dimension to the market logic. That is, US accreditation of internationally located business schools conforming to US views of the role of business schools. The case study highlighted this influence of the ‘real world’ (ie market logic) for business schools⁴⁹.

4.5 Selections from the Management Learning literature

Something of the current problematic state on integrating an ethical-moral dimension into management education has been sketched. For my purposes though Ghoshal looms as a

⁴⁹ Most notably the interviews with both Professor Jones and the EMBA Course Director Dr. Jim (section 3.4(b)).

seminal contributor to analytical reflections on questioning the salience of moral considerations in management education. In a controversial AMLE article (2004) Ghoshal poses a number of awkward questions about the major theoretical underpinnings to management theory as taught in the MBA. Ghoshal posits that in several crucial ways management theory is simply “bad theory” and as such must contribute to poor practice. There is a compelling challenge for example to the key economic assumption of utility maximisation underpinning much management thinking – the roots of which for Ghoshal leads to poor practice. Drawing on Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, Ghoshal exposes the convenient fiction that we are all singularly and myopically focused on maximising our satisfactions. The convenience is in building a straight-forward mathematical model of individual satisfaction. The fiction is that such satisfaction is one-dimensional. As Ben-Ner and Putterman explain, utility satisfaction takes into account at least three perspectives: self, others (family, friends, community), and process (as in perceptions of fairness) (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 1998, p. 7). The point Ghoshal emphasises is that considerations of near-others and questions of fairness are not easily modelled — if at all. Accordingly, two vital and value-laden dimensions are absent in mainstream economic assumptions. Utility thus becomes a one-dimensional economic standard, an unquestioned matter of maximisation, and a straightforward calculation. Poor practice results when impacts on others and attention to fair process are equally absent in one-dimensional utility maximising decisions.

Clegg and Ross-Smith (2003) point to the engineering roots of the MBA (via Robert Locke) and suggest that such a values-neutral approach is inappropriate in organisational settings. In addition, they confirm the significance of adopting a pluralist approach to management thinking and learning. A series of tensions have emerged in the management learning literature generally about the implications for teaching bad, scientific theory (Ghoshal), adopting an engineering, values-neutral approach (Clegg and Ross-Smith), the need to move beyond the campus outlook to a more public (the *agora*) role (Starkey and Tiratsoo) and the critiques of Moldoveanu and Martin relating to the need for a radical departure from the *know what* to the tacit *know how* approach to developing graduates’ thinking skills. Finally there is the passionate argument from Khurana that the logic of the market has trumped the social service role of universities in management education. I summarise these various aspects with the phrase “fiduciary tensions”. This modest rubric is intended to convey the view that there appears to be serious disconnections between public expectations of management education and what universities have been drawn towards in satisfying market demands. A tension expressed openly by the above authors; a tension revealed in the case study and a tension that one senses is again being exposed in raw human terms

through ongoing impacts from the 2008 GEC (noted in Chapter 1).

There is, however, a body of scholars committed to ideals inherent in the above critique. The Critical Management Studies community define themselves by a common commitment. It is to that field I turn next to consider their response to the above tensions.

4.6 Critical Management Studies/Education (CMS/E)

The CMS community has by definition been deeply engaged with the issues at the centre of my concerns with management education. There is evidence of my concerns writ large throughout this literature. Accordingly I want to take a stepwise approach in advancing an understanding of what is at issue here. There are four sub-headings under which I want to address the CMS literature on related issues of integrating (and the obstacles to integrating) an ethical-moral dimension in management education. Firstly it is essential to position this community in terms of how they define their joint interests (4.6.1). On these terms I next consider several recent evaluations from within this CMS community of how well they believe they are (or more accurately are not) meeting their common commitments. This section includes what in these scholars view needs to be addressed for fuller realisation of those commitments (4.6.2). This is a long section so I pause midway to take stock and to reflect briefly on some of the questions emerging. Thirdly (4.6.3), informed by the foregoing, I consider one text that in my judgement has a major bearing on both illustrating the issues at hand and in shaping what follows through Part B, viz Jones et al (2005) *For Business Ethics*. Finally I will draw some conclusions on what this CMS literature has to say about the issues, challenges and obstacles of integrating an ethical-moral dimension in management education.

4.6.1 What defines the CMS identity and its concerns?

Some of the founding academics involved in developing the CMS/E community of scholars have recently defined their common interests in the following terms:

Critical management studies (CMS) offers a range of alternatives to mainstream management theory with a view to *radically* transforming management practice. The common core is *deep scepticism* regarding *the moral defensibility and the social and ecological sustainability* of prevailing conceptions and forms of management and organization. CMS's *motivating concern* is neither the personal failures of individual managers nor the poor management of specific firms, but the *social injustice* and *environmental destructiveness* of the broader social and economic systems that these managers and firms serve and reproduce. (Adler, Forbes, & Willmott, 2007 emphasis

added)

While not explicitly focused here on management education the reference is implicit in wanting to radically transform practice – i.e. presumably in part through influencing management studies curriculum. In what follows I refer back to the above depiction by these CMS scholars to describe their field. This is important to my purpose in seeing how these scholars then judge their efforts. At the same time it is necessary to consider their depiction through the prism of my educative project. This prism provides a better position to make some judgments about how a hopefully representative view of CMS sees the dominant research question shaping this literature view. In other words, how do CMS management educators integrate a ethical-moral dimension into the MBA? The limitation is that what follows is a personal interpretation of what is representative of (i) the CMS field and (ii) how that field views my integration interests. With just a few exceptions (e.g. Grey, Jones et al,) I do not consider management textbooks written by CMS scholars⁵⁰, Nor have I surveyed textbooks proscribed or recommended in MBA programs. Finding critical alternatives to mainstream views of management is not at issue here. Of greater interest and value to my educative project is Grey's challenge to understand why stronger, more complex ethical and political takes on mainstream views of business and management have been resisted by students. Following Ghoshal (2005) and Khurana (2007) we can add faculty to Grey's question. Ghoshal and Khurana have separately offered some penetrating insights about the sources of some of that resistance (relating inter alia to scientific legitimacy). In this next section I want to consider how — after some 15 plus years since its inception and 10 years since AoM recognition — influential members of the CMS community view their efforts and, given their shared commitment, what they in turn consider will be needed to deliver more effectively on those justice-based commitments.

4.6.2 CMS and ethics generally (in management education)

CMS has been conspicuously concerned about ethical and moral issues in management from its recognition through the Academy of Management (AoM) in 1998. The AoM domain statement for CMS expresses its interests in these terms:

The Critical Management Studies Division is a forum within the Academy for the expression of views *critical of unethical management practices and exploitative social order*. Our premise is that structural features of contemporary society, such as the profit imperative, patriarchy, racial inequality, and ecological irresponsibility often turn organizations into *instruments of domination and exploitation*. Driven by a shared desire to

⁵⁰ For example: Clegg et al (2008), Linstead (2003), Linstead, Fulop and Lilley (2004) , Grint (2005). I close however selecting one book in the Business Ethics and two in the Ethical Economics sections.

change this situation, we aim in our research, teaching, and practice to develop critical interpretations of management and society and to generate radical alternatives. Academy of Management website: www.aomonline.org/cms (emphasis added)

In this largest section on the CMS literature I look to several leading scholars for insights on some of the relevant contributions and tensions within CMS regarding views of ethics generally in management education. It is important to stress once again that this educative focus excludes a great deal of the CMS literature (including textbooks) that looks to critique organisational and management practice per se. What is needed here is some deeper appreciation of the kinds of obstacles facing CMS scholars in addressing moral issues in management education. This understanding will then point toward what may be done to foster deeper engagement. Here I consider, inter alia, Adler et al (2007), Grey (2005), Roberts (2001), Jones et al (2005), Cooke (2008) and Wray-Bliss (forthcoming). As previously indicated I close this CMS review by focusing on Jones et al (2005) and then some concluding remarks about what may be gleaned through this section of the review.

Briefly expanding on their summative description of the field Adler, Forbes and Willmott describe CMS in the following terms:

CMS has consistently raised the concerns about *the de-moralized state of management research* (see Anthony, 1986) - concerns that are aired sporadically, and perhaps increasingly, by mainstream scholars. CMS has anticipated but also radicalizes the sentiments expressed recently by Ghoshal (2005): Academic research related to the conduct of business and management has had some very significant and negative influences on the practice of management ... by propagating ideologically inspired *amoral* theories, business schools have actively freed their students from any sense of moral responsibility (p. 176). CMS radicalizes such sentiments by pointing to how prevailing structures of domination produce a systemic corrosion of moral responsibility when any concern for people or for the environment requires justification in terms of its contribution to profitable growth. (Adler et al, 2007, emphasis added)

In what follows I seek to sketch some of the above generalisations in more specific terms — especially being mindful of terms relating to problems of integrating an ethical-moral dimension into the MBA. I start with Pheffer's summative critique and follow with a selection of increasingly prescient insights of Grey (05). Recent summations of CMS to the

problematic via Adler, Forbes and Willmott close this opening section. It is then possible to consider further some of the systemic issues emerging from the literature on problems of integrating the ethical into management education.

In 2004 Pfeffer and Fong questioned the merits of the MBA in terms of its value and *efficaciousness* (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). Christopher Grey added to a resultant debate in the Academy of Management's journal, *Academy of Management Learning and Education* (AMLE). Grey's approach was to suggest that Critical Management Studies/Education (CMS/E) could illustrate difficulties which Pfeffer and Fong had initially outlined, and that CMS/E is an improvement on Pfeffer and Fong's call to "model business schools on professional schools" such as engineering (Grey, 2004)⁵¹.

Grey says that CME is that body of educational practice arising from a research tradition known as critical management studies. CME stands for an overtly politicised version of management studies. In prescient terms Grey summarises his case thus:

Business schools need to do some very hard thinking about the future, if there is to be a future. The old models of morally and politically neutral management techniques, grounded on scientific knowledge and yielding reliable and effective techniques have had a long run. Criticisms of management education persist and are perhaps intensifying. ... The traditional model is forever attacked from inside and out for its lack of relevance to the real world. In that real world, we find companies more than ever judged in moral and political terms (think of Enron) and managers who deal with issues whose complexity completely defies the abstractions and nostrums of management science, and the fraudulent promise of control they carry. (p. 184)

Grey concludes "CME points to the need for managers to connect to a wider set of public duties" (p. 185). What those duties are and just why managers need to address them are left tantalisingly inexplicit in this article. In his "little book on studying organisations" (Grey, 2005) Grey goes further than the AMLE article. Drawing on Weber's distinctions between instrumental and substantive rationality Grey makes two arguments, that management education (1) is little more than an elaborate process of legitimising the status of management and (2) perpetuates a technical and ideological rationality of management

⁵¹ It will be recalled from Chapter 1 (footnote 11) that Khurana and Nohria (08) have recently issued a similar call in the wake of the 2008 GEC.

(2005, p. 120). Indeed Grey is scathing of mainstream management education (especially the MBA) in *neutralising the political and ethical dimensions of management* in the name of the dominant and reductionist ideology of efficiency (pp. 125-6, emphasis added). Drawing on previous work (Fournier & Grey, 2000) Grey claims that efforts to naturalise efficiency and power deny the legitimacy of the ethical and political dimensions (p. 127), and view the consequences (of organisational decisions) only through the narrow calculus of a one-sided notion of efficiency (p. 137).

Of seminal significance for my educative problem is Grey's contention that in his experience *the vast majority of post-graduate management students are not interested in the complexities of the political and moral dimensions* and are far more interested in credentials and in the technical-rationality issues of power and control (p. 124, emphasis added). These insights were manifested to some degree in the case study. Such insights also raise deeply problematic questions in the context of learning as well as the content of management education (p. 132). By context Grey is anxious to ensure a more secure grounding in the 'whys' of organisation rather than a *fixation* (my term and emphasis) for the technical 'hows' of managing. Focusing on the 'whys' enables (inter alia) questions about organisational purpose, and more specifically questions of the implications of focusing on efficiency alone. In addition focusing on the 'whys' of organisation would legitimise questions around who benefits/loses/is affected by its operations. In both cases these are enquires of major, but in Grey's view, largely unquestioned political and moral significance.

Grey draws attention to what could reasonably now be summed as *systemic problems* in management education. He describes mainstream management education in terms that may be described as an *induction* — an orientation in thinking, a mindset. This induction has several features. Firstly it is an induction into an ideology of efficiency and control, arguably devoid of human qualities. Secondly, it is an induction that legitimises this ideology. And thirdly, it is an induction that is all but silent about its claims for legitimacy. A strong parallel with Freire's concerns about pedagogical interests is evident in Grey's critique here (Freire, 1996).

Abiding concerns motivate Grey's account of this induction. His analysis is an important polemic in challenging an arguably myopic view about the direction of management studies. But to see it exclusively in such terms would be not only mistaken but also patronising. For the purposes of responding to the questions guiding this dissertation it is vital to recognise that Grey is equally fervent about taking organisational and management

studies to centre stage in management education, simply because of the role that organisations play in making good lives (p. 121).

Drawing on Robert Locke (Locke, 1996), Grey reminds us that the origins of these systemic problems go back to the Wharton School of Management, home of the earliest endeavours to make management *scientific*. A requirement deemed necessary for respectability in university qualifications. I agree with Grey that focusing on questioning the context and content of management and organisational studies would yield important questions of political and moral significance. I also want to add that these concerns about avoiding complexity as well as political/moral issues pose similarly problematic questions for pedagogical approaches in management education. Drawing on earlier quotes the question is, is this simply a matter of 'sensitising' or 'inculcating' moral and ethical matters? Such questions are all the more relevant in light of Grey's insights.

Before moving to what other CMS scholars make of the difficulties and obstacles involved in addressing moral and ethical issues in management education it is highly instructive to consider how Adler, Forbes and Willmott depict their own and other CMS scholars efforts in meeting the goals of that community (addressed in 4.6.1). This is a notable contribution for my purpose as Hugh Willmott is, together with Adler and Christopher Grey, among those who influenced the early development of the CMS community.

Adler et al summarise those efforts as being difficult (to say the least) in that

CMS proponents come up against the assumption that business schools are training grounds for a business elite and that the content of research and teaching in these settings is - and must inevitably be - dominated by the demands of corporate clients. This assumption is reinforced by the AACSB and other accrediting processes, which push towards homogenization in curricula between professors within a college and among departments across universities. Understood in these terms, *CMS is a misfit, if not an oxymoron*. (Adler, et al, 2007, p. 151, emphasis added)

The authors go on to describe differences between US and UK efforts to incorporate an ethical or moral dimension into the MBA but keep returning to the same confronting oxymoronic conclusion. From here the authors focus on the kinds of problems they encounter in the CMS literature that contribute to this conclusion. They identify the largely

negative and utopian nature of the CMS critique and systemic-generational difficulties in approaches to materialism-agency debates within and between CMS scholars, in other words between inter alia Marxist and postmodernist/poststructuralist streams and agendas.

In proposing ways forward the authors suggest, inter alia, greater engagement with mainstream management literature and the world outside the academy. Their primary recommendation is toward *developing deeper public engagement* along lines of public dialogue that “stimulate public reflection ... on current issues” (pp. 156-7, emphasis added).

After almost 40 pages summarising and critiquing the efforts of the CMS community (for the community of scholars making up the Academy of Management) such a recommendation is hardly a ringing endorsement. It sounds more as if the authors are now trumpeters in the public square, blowing what they hope is a clarion call to their colleagues to think again, to change direction and quickly. For it seems (to me) that the authors are all but convinced that failure to respond to the call will render the CMS community increasingly redundant to its own radical purpose (of transforming management practice by confronting amoral theories), and that such a response is needed to “help CMS to fulfil its promise”(p. 157). Perhaps I am reading too much into the authors’ conclusion. Nevertheless it is clear that the authors — including two of its earliest proponents — have themselves concluded that all is not well if the CMS is to be judged by their own *raison d’être*.

The significance of this conclusion from these CMS scholars is that it underlines the systemic difficulties educators have in addressing what is problematic in integrating the ethical-moral dimension in management education. Others within the CMS community share concerns about what is problematic here. For example, lamenting scholarly fixation with critique rather than tackling the consequences of “pernicious managerialism” Bill Cooke felt compelled to invite CMS participants at a recent AoM meeting to “identify ways forward rather than merely critique” (Cooke, 2008). Ann Cunliffe endorses this concern and argues that in order to do so it will be important for the CMS community to recognise that a distinguishing characteristic of CMS studies is about “offering *different ways in thinking* about taken-for-granted practices, structures, and processes (in management)” (Cunliffe, 2008, emphasis and bracket added). Both Cooke and Cunliffe seem then to share the conclusion of Adler et al that the CMS community need to get beyond internal critiques in order to engage more with external management practices. Echoing Khurana, Adler et al nominate the frustrations for CMS proponents is how business schools have become *training* schools for elites. Yet there is little suggestion as to what ought to be done than a commendable call for

deeper engagement with public problems. A brief pause will help to keep the pedagogical questions in focus through the rest of this review.

At this midpoint in the literature review it will be useful to reflect briefly on what can be taken from this review so far and what this might mean for what is ahead. I am mindful of the fourth question behind the review: what problems do management educators experience in addressing morally sensitive issues? This helps to keep to the fore the thematic frustrations and related fiduciary tensions in engaging management students in moral-ethical issues expressed to date by, inter alia, Grey and Ghoshal (and illustrated by Dr. Jim and Professor Jones in the case study). Given these frustrations and tensions the review questions begin to embrace related pedagogical questions which in turn serve to sharpen the focus on what follows: now rather than what has been done, what might be done to connect management education to the CMS agenda? Why should a CMS agenda be at all relevant to management students? How might management students be effectively engaged on moral and ethical issues? What would 'effective' look like and who would make such a judgment and how? To what extent would that engagement be consistent with public expectations of university-based management education? Following comments about public concerns of management education in Chapter 1 these questions (and more) are increasingly on the public agenda and call for considered responses. I return to these questions at the close of this chapter but for what follows I want now to briefly consider the relevance to those questions for the CMS literature. To do so I have selected three approaches. One approach to these questions relates to a specific practical initiative (Roberts, 2001), a second questions the merits of being *against* management (Clegg et al, 2006), and the third serves as a broad indicator of fruitful directions that in the end are consistent with the thrust of my project (Wray-Bliss, forthcoming). Each mark important signposts to developments in the second part of this dissertation.

One contemporary example of how organizational practice could lead to different ways of thinking in management education comes from John Roberts' (2001) work on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), now a familiar concept in business though still much misunderstood. Those misunderstandings are not however the interest here. CSR by its name connotes ethical and responsible behaviour and while correct in a literal sense Roberts powerfully illustrates how a narcissistic perspective can perversely create unethical behaviour. Roberts' focus is corporate behaviour but his critique would apply equally in my view to ethics generally and individual moral behaviour. Roberts illustrates that at the base of much CSR is not a concern out of responsibility for the vulnerability of others but a

concern for self (as individual or as organization). Thus an 'ethics of narcissus'. While offering a valuable critique of contemporary practice this is not however the primary issue of relevance here.

A principal merit for my purposes in this example from Roberts is Aristotle's pedagogical approach to learning ethical behaviour, viz to "start with what is known or familiar" (Aristotle, 1976, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 1, para. 1095). Working from the familiar opens exploratory learning opportunities⁵². By taking the known or familiar (i.e. notions of CSR) Roberts proceeds to illustrate just how distorted practice becomes when these ideas or notions are not explored for their assumptions. In Roberts' example asking questions of CSR opens onto questions of moral agency, responsibilities and motivation. The same line of enquiry that Roberts undertakes here would be relevant with issues of agency and motivation at the individual level, (in my experience) matters of considerable interest for management students, as a wide variety of issues, conflicts and tensions emerge, all warranting careful consideration for their individual practice.

Stewart Clegg and his colleagues ask the question raised above of just why CMS might even be relevant given what they perceive is a discernable attitude within CMS of being *against* management (Clegg, et. al, 2006). Grey was of the same mind in his work (2005) and it will be raised again (in different ways) by Wray-Bliss (below). Clegg et al argue that even after decades of radical critiques of management, and despite the dismantling of the theoretical and practical scaffoldings, a persistent Marxist view prevails in much of the CMS literature, reflected in concerns about inter alia unreflective organizational practices and issues of power or hegemony. The authors instead champion a position that neither merely rails against nor is uncritical of management practice. In particular and relevant for my purposes they argue for a polyphonic view of management, being both critical and for management.

While acknowledging polyphony as an admirable educative means to evenhanded reasonableness in redressing totalising influences (within much CMS literature) there remains for me a significant concern here. What might be formative outcomes for management practice of possessing a diverse (and presumably situation sensitive and bounded) range of perspectives? Appealing and essential as such diversity is per se in fostering alternative frames, practice situations under conditions of uncertainty and pressure may challenge the practitioner where "more politically and ethically responsible ways" (Clegg et al, *ibid*, p. 22) may be unclear and quite probably in conflict. The authors aver that

⁵² Discussed in Chapter 7.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

'translation' will be a vital capability in such situations. This embraces a broad range of ethical and contextual sensitivities that "never results in a final text ... it is always a 'provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languages' "(Benjamin, 1982, p. 75 in Clegg et al, *ibid*, p. 21). While 'translation' might seem then to lead to merits of dialogue, nevertheless questions of judgment will at some stage be called for if decisions are to be made, let alone defended. How might a presumably evenhanded polyphony address stressful situations of practice calling for morally accountable judgments? For example, when boards and shareholders call for short-term cost-cutting measures; when executive bonuses are linked to operational business goals? Are frames of equal value politically and ethically in such circumstances? Under any circumstances? Such implicitly universalising, anti-relativist assumptions in these questions would by definition be anathema to polyphonic approaches. Would more dominant voices or frames emerge to influence decision-making? What might internal and external political pressures do to influence a practitioner's considerations and judgments? How does the practitioner decide which frames will be perhaps more salient than others? And what of the scrutiny posed of these judgments outside practice? An appeal to 'bounded rationality' (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002)? These hypothetical questions around practical judgments and related public scrutiny introduce concerns central to my interests in how management education prepares graduates for tensions in contemporary management practice. I return to this concern in the conclusion as it points to questions of judgment in the second half of this dissertation, and pedagogical questions in particular i.e. towards what Beckett and Hager (2002) call judgments in situations of 'hot action' (Chapter 7).

Edward Wray-Bliss (forthcoming) offers a valuable line of response to questions of relevance to what is problematic in management education here. In the forthcoming *Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies* Wray-Bliss provides an overview of scholarly engagement with ethics broadly. Wray-Bliss sees conflicting issues of trust for ethics as essentially undermining CMS's efforts. These conflicts lead to a mistrust that has "contributed to a neglect of individual's relationships with ethics" (p. 3). He illustrates how several critical traditions (Marxism, Critical Theory, Postmodernism, Feminism and Postcolonialism) have sought to counter ideas of ethical universalism but in so doing have instead "highlighted their individual sectional interests and strategic exclusions" (*ibid*).

Wray-Bliss here offers insights that give some important direction to earlier criticisms (and reflected in most of the selections above). At the same time his critique anticipates ideas that will be central to the second half of this dissertation. If according to the scholars discussed in

this section CMS struggles to deliver more effectively with its self-defined purpose to change amoral management practices then Wray-Bliss challenges his CMS colleagues toward, inter alia, working at the following three related specifics:

- (i) A deeper engagement with *public* problems in organisations and management. Not merely internal theoretical debates but issues that impact public wellbeing. Thus
- (ii) Where issues of *humanity* are central, and even more specifically by
- (iii) Focusing in particular on *harms* to singular *individuals*.

Above all Wray-Bliss urges the CMS community not to lose sight of Kant's 'moral dignity' of individuals, be they managers or managed. This is a call which

"promotes a closer, 'proximate' encounter with those singular, concrete, individuals who occupy the organizational position of manager. There is, in the very interest in these individuals *as* individuals, the possibility for the *recognition* of their humanity, ... to seek to embody our responsibility to not deny their 'excruciating' strivings for moral dignity" (p. 18, emphasis in original).

The three specifics above collectively offer a clear 'ethical direction' for CMS scholars (p. 17). Following that direction means needing to "explore ways to bring together the violence of critique – the naming, problematising, pathologising desire of the critic ... as an attempt to meet one's responsibilities to wider others – with the ethical responsibility to represent and respect the singular humanity of ... *this* manager and *these* organizational subjects who may be implicated in or affected by morally questionable practice" (p. 26, emphasis in original).

Wray-Bliss is signaling here that CMS stands at a crossroad. I believe he offers a persuasive lead for public relevance in calling for this ethical direction. Continuing down the same road of internal contests in theorising anti-management perspectives risks assigning CMS to further irrelevance for the *public* purposes of management scholarship. Against merely adding perspectives this is a call to renew and commit to an ethical direction that focuses on what is *shared* — and ironically, in stark contrast to much of the debate within the literature — this is a call advocating a *universal* value: concern to address management practices that harm *the moral dignity of the individual*. My support for this direction is reflected in much that makes Kant distinctive in Part B of this dissertation.

The final consideration in this CMS section is with Business Ethics per se. As previously stated CMS does not represent the vast field of Business Ethics. However, in addition to what has been presented above the work of Jones, et al (2005) is chosen to illustrate a breadth of critique that is not only productive but also serves to highlight one of the major

difficulties inherent in the field and that relates to the view of Immanuel Kant. In what follows Jones et al demonstrate major limitations in depicting Kant. I seek in Part B to build on their work.

4.6.3 CMS and Business Ethics: Jones et al

As a strategic move into the complexities of ethical integration, Jones, Parker and ten Bos subject the field of Business Ethics to a revealing critique. These authors highlight a range of 'foreclosures' in Business Ethics, that is, questionable and premature closure of discussion and academic debate on political, ethical and philosophical issues for management education and management practice. The foreclosures identified by Jones et al serve as major signposts for discussion throughout and beyond the critical review of the management learning literature. They also point to major issues with the contemporary interpretation of Kant in management and business ethics.

Jones, Parker and ten Bos argue that the field of Business Ethics presents major problems for management educators and practitioners alike. The authors question the conventional approach to business ethics in postgraduate management programs, claiming that in its current form "it is at best window dressing and at worst a calculated lie" (Jones, Parker, & ten Bos, 2005, p. 1). Their critique serves as a comprehensive response to the questions guiding this literature review and as such warrants a detailed analysis. In undertaking this review I address aspects of Business Ethics identified by Jones et al as major problems. Those critiques address (i) foreclosures of political and moral philosophy, (ii) inherent distortions in a popular Kantian approach to Business Ethics, (iii) abstract theories in textbooks and finally (iv) concerns over values. Jones et al identify major problems with what they refer to as the "common sense" approach to Business Ethics as a field of study. Here "common sense" refers to the "ways that most business ethicists, most of the time, think, write and practice business ethics" (p. 10). In the common sense approach, business is treated in a celebratory positive light, as if it is basically unproblematic, being a 'sort of science' comprising mainly psychology and economics. In effect business is treated as an applied science resting on increasingly scientific understanding of people and markets (p. 10).

Ethics presents similar 'common sense' problems for "when we claim that something is 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong', 'moral' or 'immoral' we are making some very firm assertions about other people's behaviour. To condemn or praise someone else's actions is one of the most powerful things we can do with language, and that others can do to us" (p.

13). And yet as the authors put it, “neither philosophers nor ordinary human beings have come up with any sort of law that seems to apply to everyone, all of the time, in all places” (p. 15). The result say Jones et al is that “in the moral domain there is always the shadow of freedom, and this will involve difference, disruption and unrest” (p. 15).

Jones et al suggest that problems identified with common sense Business Ethics can be seen as a broad range of what they call ‘foreclosures’, and to illustrate the importance of their critique in support of my thesis each warrants a brief introduction.

(i) Foreclosing philosophy: Jones et al claim that common sense Business Ethics is almost silent in matters of philosophy. They maintain that the field of study is dominated instead by isolated individuals: an ancient Greek (Aristotle), a late 18th century German (Kant) and two 19th century Englishmen (Bentham and Mill), with almost no mention of 20th century philosophy (p. 3). As such, the authors claim that contemporary business challenges and questions are not pursued in sufficient depth.

(ii) Foreclosing society: the almost exclusive focus in common sense Business Ethics is individualism, ignoring or playing down the role of society (p. 4). The authors claim that individual action always takes place in relation to social structures such as organisations and economies and as such there is a need to not only understand but perhaps also criticise such structures.

(iii) Foreclosing ‘the ethical’: common sense Business Ethics far too often rests on a very narrow definition of what counts as ‘the ethical’(p. 5), leaving many items untreated. Examples of topics of importance to practice that are not tackled include ideas behind the contract of employment, issues of poverty and equity, and most notably for my purpose shareholder-stakeholder conflicts. Indeed the authors express the view that the narrowness of business ethics suggests something quite sinister about the ethics of the business ethics literature, asking “what is it that business ethics is leaving in the shadows?” (p. 5).

(iv) Foreclosing the meaning of ‘ethics’: in the authors’ view there is a tendency to assume that once a definition of ethics is provided that is the end of it. They challenge this view and claim that there is a great deal to be gained by recognising that business ethics means “quite a lot of quite different things” (p. 6), about different ways of imagining ethics itself, and perhaps it is more about relationships with others and with difference more

generally.

(v) Foreclosing politics: common sense Business Ethics tends to not only deny the role of politics (p. 6), it avoids politics in assuming an acceptance of the status quo (p. 7). Accordingly, matters concerning the likes of Enron and Arthur Anderson leave untouched important questions about the salience of codes of conduct and statements of social responsibility — renowned characteristics of both organisations. Yet wide acceptance of such codes and statements would appear to be unproblematic.

(vi) Foreclosing the goal of ethics: In Jones et al's view it would seem that the goal of ethics in common sense Business Ethics is as a technology for the reduction of undecidability (p. 8). It is as if all that is needed is to "know the right rules in order to do the right thing" (p. 8). Jones et al claim that ethics always involves a certain dislocation from common sense, with stimulation to that end being provided by philosophers usually ignored in the common sense Business Ethics field, for example Levinas⁵³ and Derrida.

Important as the above is in developing a more comprehensive understanding of what may well be contributing to the problematic Jones et al in addition offer a revealing and for my purposes wholly influential critique of Norman Bowie's work on Kant. It is to that work I turn next.

4.6.3 (a) Bowie's distortions of Kantian ethics exacerbates foreclosure problems

Jones et al single out Norman Bowie, a Kantian scholar they consider highly influential in the Business Ethics field, as a primary source responsible in their view for generating serious distortions in Kantian ethics per se: "this latter-day Kantian is responsible for a set of serious misunderstandings of Kant"(p. 41). Their critique of Bowie centers on problems created by Bowie's conflation of Kant's practical and theoretical philosophies. Jones et al argue that Kant made this a vital distinction in these terms: "Practical philosophy is concerned with **values** such as freedom, morality and beauty. Theoretical philosophy is concerned with

⁵³ Jones et al devote considerable space in this and later works to the contributions of Emanuel Levinas, who they see as offering great relevance for ethics (Jones, et al, 2005, p.73). While hardly disputing Levinas' influence for many I feel that Kant has more to offer than has been recognised by Jones et al here. As signalled this will be a different Kant to the commonplace view. Nevertheless I am loath also to engage with Levinas for the simple reason that was made in reference above to Roberts' (2001) work, ie the educational importance of starting with the known and familiar. While even the reconceptualised Kant developed in Part B will and does present significant challenges to management students it is of a different scale to the obstacles of a discourse that *starts and stays* with an unfamiliar 'Other'. In my experience first, second and third person is sufficient to nudge discussion toward Levinas' direction without necessarily using 'the Other'. This will be demonstrated via Darwall's Kantian *second-person* standpoint in Part B (Section 5.5.1).

facts and the determinate, law-like relationships pertaining to them. From this it follows that various human activities such as chemistry and economics are excluded from the domain of morality since they are motivated primarily by an understanding of how things work in the real world – merely a technical matter”. Business in these terms could be nothing if not a technical matter and thus not a matter for morality (p. 42). Bowie does not address this distinction and in the view of Jones et al he highlights some aspects of Kant while playing down or ignoring others. The result is that Bowie writes for those who have an interest in the more technical aspects of Kantian morality than in its more ‘practically moral’ aspects. (p. 43). In other words claim Jones et al, Bowie encourages us to blur the boundaries between them in order to bring ‘business’ and ‘ethics’ together (p. 43).

Arguing almost exclusively from Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* Bowie focuses on three formulations of the categorical imperatives. Supported by the distinguished Kantian scholar Allen Wood, Jones et al argue that Bowie largely ignored Kant’s later *Metaphysics of Morals*. In this more mature work Kant is very much interested in ends, “not in the utilitarian sense, but in ends that are derived from a formal principle, which tells us which ends are objectively worth pursuing and hence give rise to a rational desire for them” (Wood, 2002, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* by Immanuel Kant, p. 13 cited in Jones et al, p. 44).

According to Jones et al “Kant takes motive as a key element in deciding about the moral worthiness of a particular act but — and this is very important — he never suggests that we are able to perfectly know our own motives. This is what makes Kantian ethics much more difficult than Bowie suggests. You have an ethical duty to gain self-knowledge but you should not think that this self-knowledge is easily obtained. You are not transparent to yourself” (p. 49). Further “self-knowledge is instead a duty that we can never fully abide by, and what is needed is a permanent enquiry into the relationship between moral perfection and our own actions. Again and again, Kant emphasises the difficulty of this requirement. The image that Kant tries to convey is one of a struggling heart” (p. 50).

Jones et al make a strong case to return to this deeper understanding of Kant, one they argue recognises morality as far more of a daily ‘struggle of the heart’. “The only thing that an individual can do is to know his or her own heart as best they can and to try to come to grips with the eternal struggle that takes place within it. Ethics is painful, not only because it urges you to consider the darker aspects of your moral disposition but also because it is intrinsically related to a restriction and constraint of the self” (p.51). They continue: “To act

out of duty is to act out of freedom. Freedom of the will is the only principle underlying moral laws and duties ensuing from them. Habit, tradition and culture merely open the door to a huge diversity of different justifications, so freedom must be independent of such contexts. Kant describes this as an inner freedom that grounds all virtue ... The very fact that morality in daily life is a struggle indicates that social contexts are indeed a very important influence. But influence is not synonymous with determination. In other words, you may be influenced by your friends and by society but this should not imply that they determine the kind of actions that you are going to undertake. If there is one central theme in Kantian ethics, then it is this: never become a plaything of fortune!" (p. 51) Before drawing directly from Kant Jones et al emphasise what will become increasingly important for my purposes here. They draw attention to Kant's notion of maturity from his essay "What is Enlightenment?". This is Kant's view that Enlightenment is a form of escape from dependency. As Jones et al put it: "He (Kant) rails against what he calls 'self-imposed tutelage', a phrase that is now typically translated as 'self-incurred minority'. When he calls us to 'have courage to make use of your own understanding' he realises that this is a difficult challenge, but this challenge is central to the ethical struggle:

It is so comfortable to be a minor! If I have a book that understands for me; a spiritual advisor who has a conscience for me, and so forth, I need not trouble myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay; others will readily undertake the irksome business for me"(Kant, cited in Jones et al, 2005, pp. 51-2).

Jones et al continue: "Kantian ethics demands that one should always resist coercion and arbitrariness, inclination and determination — even by textbooks! But one aspect of this resistance is a willingness to acknowledge that other values always influence you. This kind of self-knowledge, an understanding of your own weakness, is essential if we are to combat our otherwise irrational tendencies. So while Kant undoubtedly tries to lift ethics and morality up to a rationalised and ideal sphere, he is never oblivious to daily complexities" (p. 52).

Drawing their reflections on Kant to a close Jones et al conclude: "What we may infer from this is that Kantian ethics is not really interested in the social control of individual behaviour. More precisely, the Kantian experiment is more about how enlightened people try to reason and find direction in their lives"(p. 52). Finally, "Our point is that his primary intention is totally at odds with what business ethicists are typically after. Kant is always oriented towards autonomous individuals and never towards controlling collective

behaviour”(p.52).

This excursion on Kant has been a more than useful reminder that Kant offers extraordinary insights into the issues at the heart of this dissertation. Much like the CMS literature per se, the full potential of those insights has not been realised (Wray-Bliss). Kant shapes Part B of this dissertation, in opening what Jones et al claim is missing in Business Ethics and in Bowie’s treatment of Kant. I endeavour to illustrate what addressing these missing aspects might mean for attending to the fiduciary tensions seen through the earlier case but now as a frustration in much of the recent CMS literature.

Efforts to openly integrate an ethical-moral dimension in management is addressed via recent English translations of two German works. It is to those works I turn next before closing the literature review on what may be gleaned from this undertaking and what it might mean for future developments.

4.7 Ethical Economics

Arthur Rich (1910-1992) and Peter Ulrich have quite independently approached the objective of integrating ethics with economics. They have done so in strikingly similar ways and in ways that are wholly instructive for this educative project. Despite extensive publications in German both Rich and Ulrich have only recently been published in English and both in the fourth editions of their established works (Rich, 2006; Ulrich, 2008). For this problem it is instructive to note the similarities of their independent approaches and at the same time note the distinctiveness of their approach. Despite the fact that both authors’ works emerged some years after the empirical research was completed for this dissertation, I have nevertheless drawn on their insights in analysing that fieldwork and I signal in what follows just how relevant their influence is for my project. Their work resonates significantly with the approach I developed from conclusions of both this literature review and the empirical research. That work constitutes the second, practice-oriented half of this dissertation.

As mentioned these authors have much in common in their extensive work. At the same time it is useful to see not only what they have in common but what distinguishes their work from what has been addressed thus far. First, both Rich and Ulrich are highly critical of the economistic approach that has been the hallmark of much of the critique in the literature so far, and for almost always the same reasons, that is the human-societal price paid for seeking a scientific, so-called values neutral approach to efficiency in economics. This is what Ghoshal called ‘economic fundamentalism’ (Ghoshal, 2004).

Second, and this is significant for what follows, they both quite explicitly start from much the same place, a place that is at best implicit as a starting point in all the previous works consulted to date. For Rich, the starting point is what he calls “the horizon of general human experience” in which ideas of *trust*, *hope* and *love* are grounds that are vital to human experience. The notion of horizon suggests always being approached but never arrived at. Nevertheless it is not a matter of arriving for Rich. It is the *common experience* of what marks our humanity that constitutes that journey: the utter necessity of trust and hope for human existence, and thus a primary concern for what fosters and what undermines both, and how both are constitutive of human love. Ulrich starts with what he calls “the service of life” to overcome the *coercive* logic of the market. In both cases it is human experience and concerns for human *justice* that constitutes both the start and end points, not institutional or market efficiency. Indeed, for both Rich and Ulrich the economy serves as a civilising context for our human wellbeing⁵⁴, not the other way round, in which humans become the means to achieve the economy’s or institution’s goals.

Third, both also have politics (and especially reasoning in public) as a defining part of the picture serving public wellbeing. Ulrich argues that in his view the academic tradition of political-economy that held these two dimensions together, has gone the reductionist way of pure economism (Ulrich, 2008, p. 2). Fourth, Kant shapes much of their work and in ways that resonate with Parker, Grey and Jones et al’s calls to open management and Business Ethics to far wider philosophical considerations. Finally, where Ulrich offers a very comprehensive picture of ethical economic integration Rich’s is distinctive for another reason that is important for the problem in this dissertation. According to Enderle, Rich is unique in pioneering an ethical framework to critique global economic systems, work that is vital for global economic literacy. In introducing Rich’s work in English Enderle says:

As ethical issues in business and economics are widely discussed in public and in many business ethics textbooks, they focus on the ethical responsibilities of individual actors and business organisations, while the economic system in which they operate is taken for granted ... Such a limited view may be understandable as long as one is only interested in problems within a well-established business environment. .

However, when business transcends the usual environment and goes global, it would be naive and also very costly to assume that the economic system in the foreign country is the same or of no concern. Despite globalisation, there are

⁵⁴ While both Rich and Ulrich independently focus on human wellbeing, neither is anthropocentric. Both situate human wellbeing in a thoroughly interdependent ecological relationship with life on the planet.

considerable differences in how the economic system works between the United States, Europe, Japan, economies in transition, and developing countries. As a prominent example, take the People's Republic of China that claims to be a 'socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics'. To really understand the ethical challenges of business, one has no choice but to address the ethics of economic systems. (Enderle in Rich, 2006, p. xix)

In both Rich and Ulrich the human *qua* individual human is both the starting and endpoint to the critique of economic systems. So too are Kantian ideas of justice-based action-guiding principles, which in many respects characterise Ulrich's work and shape Rich's contribution.⁵⁵ Beyond ideas drawn from Kant, Ulrich and Rich's work has helped to underscore the focus on individual and societal wellbeing. Their humanistic works help to sharpen questions emerging from the empirical phase — not in time for the research *per se* but in informing my analysis of that research.

4.8 Themes and a brief for Part B

A number of themes and related questions have emerged from reviewing the literature on integrating the ethical dimension in the MBA. A deep concern about economism is common to the literature, in the sense that it pervades management theory and practice. According to Ghoshal economistic thinking has reached fundamentalist ideological proportions and this means that not only bad but wrong theory is being taught in management. Parker links this same economistic thinking to now unchallenged and entrenched managerialism, where assumptions about management are almost beyond question. Both Ghoshal and Parker express concerns that management education is assuming too much about the role of management. Management's very existence, let alone theory, needs to be subjected to critical scrutiny. What do we expect of management? What options are there to achieve broader public agreement about expectations of management as a way of achieving outcomes of value to multiple stakeholders? What needs to be done to address the influence of economism in management education?

Assumptions of management have also reached the point where questions of professional education have been abandoned in favour of what Khurana et al call *market-logic*. An economistic view of efficiency and market-logic would seem to be linked. But those links might set up part of the problem: the market here is what employers want from their

⁵⁵ Rich's 2006 work comprises two volumes. The first is a theological, revelatory grounding for a justice-based Economic Ethics which Enderle (as editor) describes as being at the same time, humanistic and universal. The second volume focuses on concrete economic systems and their problems.

graduates, not necessarily what a broader public might assume graduates need to understand as public responsibilities. Khurana has brought a telling historical story to enable a deeper understanding of the price being paid in following market-logic.

The CMS community sees the integration of sensitive moral and ethical issues in the MBA curriculum as their defining purpose. And yet a selection of leading CMS scholars experience considerable difficulty making such ideas relevant to many MBA students. The systemic nature of these difficulties is such that the CMS community is now issuing an increasingly urgent sounding call for deeper engagement with public problems as essential to realising their defining purpose. What then is to be made of this call for deeper public engagement? Is it so that management academics develop a closer understanding of the so-called real world concerns of management practitioners, or of the impacts of management practitioners on the broader world? What seems clear from the selection of literature reviewed is that CMS is now at a crossroad. Clegg et al's (2006) call for broader more diverse perspectives that are not simply against management would be a welcome move. This needs to be balanced by questions about how diverse perspectives are translated under practice conditions. Far from criticizing a move to greater polyphony it does nevertheless call into question issues of decision-making under pressure. Wray-Bliss however addresses the crossroad with calls for a more 'ethical direction', one which he urges would keep singular individuals in sight, and more particularly the Kant notion of 'moral dignity'. This direction is I believe to be welcomed as it would orient the CMS community toward the practical problems faced by managers and managed alike in avoiding causing harm through practice.

The political dimension of ethical concerns has emerged strongly across much of the literature. More specifically the role of reasoning in public emerged strongly, especially via Jones, et al, Grey, Parker and the integrative works of Rich and Ulrich. It would seem obvious now that any notion of the ethical also carries political dimensions (Bunge, 2009).

Is the very notion of 'integration' part of the problem or might there be alternative perspectives to the need for integration? Varying degrees of ideas on integration were evident throughout the literature: from the commonplace stand alone field with no obvious integration (Ghoshal's critique of the pervasively influential Chicago School of neo-classical economics) through to highly sophisticated endeavours at integrating moral and political dimensions with global economic systems (Rich). What is hoped for in 'integration'? In whose interests? Where is the best place to start? Is integration a question of curriculum design or are there other ways to think of integrating the ethical dimension into

management education? What factors would enable some insights into a better understanding of the issues involved in integration?

There appears to be little conspicuous space for specifically cultivating ethical/moral judgment in the curriculum. Much is expected, it would seem, of Business Ethics and yet it is clear from the critique of Jones et al that Business Ethics does not have anything like the breadth or depth needed to engage with moral judgments or reflection in complex situations. It might not quite be said that “we don’t do (moral/ethical) judgment” but it might generously be concluded from the works assessed here that any attention given to cultivating moral judgment appears to be at best on the lean side.

Social impact concepts generally appear to be ill-defined and thus not well understood. There are many apparently related concepts (Corporate Social Responsibility; public accountability; sustainability) but those relationships and distinctions seem at best ambiguous. It would seem that ideas of public accountability are seen predominantly in legal or regulative terms, not moral. Without question this is a major outcome. What is clear is that legal accountability and ethics are often conflated. How then do these themes shape the questions for the empirical phase?

In sum, the themes that have emerged are shared to varying degrees. However, all have the amoral market-logic of economicism firmly in view, that is economics as a pervasive ideology that is focused on achieving efficiencies, seemingly without question. Consequently there are strongly held views about the need to question the degree of this economicism hold on management — in what is being taught and how it is evaluated. Politics emerges strongly in considering moral impacts of management, especially in the sense of a public role for reasoning on matters that affect people, ie matters of a moral nature. There appear to be multiple expressions of what might be termed ‘social impacts’ and in most cases there is ambiguity in the meaning of such terms.

After reflecting on the literature review and the case study something of a pedagogical brief emerges to approach my formative-educative concerns. In the broadest sense this brief calls for both philosophical and practical dimensions to address moral accountability in management education. A dynamic of eight interacting aspects can be broadly discerned, with each focusing attention on fiduciary tensions of public trust in management education. These then would help to shape a pedagogical response. Those aspects and their fiduciary-based tensions are:

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

1. *Moral*, especially fiduciary tensions of higher education to educate for public wellbeing, however that may be defined.
2. *Moral vocabulary*, finding ways to discuss moral issues while aware of resistance to such territory.
3. *Public-political*, as in the tensions of reasoning in public, a hallmark of public-moral accountability.
4. *Metaphysical*, especially in framing discussion on moral accountability around ideals of justice but challenged by contemporary anti-metaphysical philosophers such as Rorty to avoid claiming metaphysical foundations.
5. *Philosophical*, in addressing *phronesis*, that is ideas of practical judgment / wisdom.
6. *Practical*, especially practitioner demands versus apologists for idealistic approaches.
7. *Pedagogical*, ways to approach social-moral issues that move between what 'ought to be' and 'what is' and in ways deemed by educators as relevant for management education and practice.
8. *Critical*, an arguably but questionable defining higher education capability to question and explore implicit assumptions of management theory, practice, and education.

In Part B I have developed a response that to varying degrees strives to meet the above brief. It is drawn from Kant and is Kantian. I present however a quite different Kant to the established image of an arid formalist. There is much more to Kant than this sadly commonplace image. This 'larger' Kant sees anthropology and experience as the territory of application of his *a priori* principles. I will present a case that sees a unity between his *a priori* metaphysics and his philosophy of experience. Together Kant's moral anthropology will enable a far deeper exploration of what I believe will assist educators approach the formative issues at the base of my and others concerns.

4.9 Conclusion

Ideas of integrating the ethical dimension into the MBA are not only difficult but have been difficult for some time and appear not to be getting any easier. The efforts by the CMS community to expose and redress the *amoral* nature of much management theory is by their own assessment in urgent need of renewal. Specifically it is seen as requiring greater public engagement. Recent calls (eg. Adler, 2007; Cooke, 2008; Wray-Bliss, forthcoming) from the CMS community is in line with the attention in the public sphere of questions regarding the role of business schools. Witnessing daily the mounting human consequences of the 2008 GEC, and in the wake of previous periodic collapses in confidence of corporate performance over the last decade or so, means for me that Khurana has clearly identified the systemic nature of this formative problematic, that is, consequences of business schools abandoning

the professionalisation project in favour of *amoral* market-logic. If, as I believe, the case study of just one university served to illustrate and this review of the management studies literature now points to, ie that Khurana is indeed right about this abandonment, then it represents a very disturbing development on several fronts. First and most significantly, it suggests that business schools are at serious risk of losing or exposing their social and moral authority and thus leaving public expectations unrealised. Second, this would be compounded by the formative experience of graduates who would leave their postgraduate university experience believing that responding to market-logic is the dominant if not sole expectation in their practice. Public questions of moral accountability in management education would be ours to answer – not our graduates.

The management studies literature was reviewed before the 2008 GEC became a reality. Since the review public questions of management education have become more conspicuous and demanding⁵⁶. Academic responses to previous public concerns were only beginning to emerge (eg the July 2007 issue of *Principles for Responsible Management Education - PRME*⁵⁷) while broader academic commitments from management education to those now inescapable questions has not yet been clearly articulated. This represents an extraordinary opportunity for institutions of management education to lead to renew public trust in university-based education. I believe Wray-Bliss (forthcoming) offers the kind of lead that will I hope strike a resonating cord not only within the CMS community but with

⁵⁶ See footnotes 11, 13 and 14 in Chapter 1.

⁵⁷ *The Economist* (25 July, 2007) reported that a consortium of the UN Global Compact and 60 leading American and European Universities released a statement committing participating universities to 'The Principles for *Responsible* Management Education' (emphasis added). The principles relate to academic activities toward promoting and enabling *global social and sustainability responsibilities*. The statement includes endorsements from both the Academy of Management (AoM) and the AACSB. www.unprme.org

The very title of the statement is a highly significant acknowledgement of the problem that is at the heart of this dissertation – with the qualifying '*responsible*' clearly and provocatively intended to say a great deal to a wide range of audiences. The statement represents encouraging indications that these 60 universities acknowledge their public responsibilities for fostering the kinds of capabilities that are consistent with the thesis of this dissertation. It is worth noting, however, that words and phrases that are characteristic of the second part of the dissertation, such as 'moral accountability' and 'publicly accountable', are at best implicit in the statement. Whether the principles captured in the statement are sufficiently exhaustive as to warrant the definitive '*the*' will no doubt be a minor part of a hopefully much larger and critically more important debate around the explicit purpose of the statement. This dissertation contributes constructively to that purpose on at least two counts. Firstly, by arguing for both stronger language and frameworks regarding the responsibility of universities to prepare management graduates for *intelligent* accountability. Secondly, while ample latitude as to how such preparation is conceived and delivered would be a defining hallmark for any university, this dissertation may also be seen as arguing for and developing one specific, hopefully coherent and integrated framework of pedagogical concepts to those same ends. Unfolding raw human impacts on individuals, families, communities and economies worldwide from the 2008 GEC would only seem to heighten the need and urgency for similar responses.

Moral Accountability in the MBA: a Kantian response to a public problem

management studies and crucially a broader public alike: a balance between retaining a critical outlook on harm caused through management and organisational practices while (re)committing research (and education) to an ironically *universal* value and orientation: to Kant's *moral dignity in the individual* – as a manager as much as a subject managed. A deeper, indeed, more 'intelligent' (O'Neill, 2003) public scrutiny of management education might also stimulate a move in this ethical direction and begin a process of urgent renewal to regain public trust. The unfolding "economic and social wreckage" (Trood, 2008, p. 124) from the 2008 GEC only exacerbate public tensions with management education – tensions that were already clearly evident in the case and the literature. What would a publicly persuasive response to these systemic issues and tensions look like? How would such a response meet the brief that has emerged from this research? These are the questions I set out to address in Part B.

**PART B: A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO A FORMATIVE-
PUBLIC PROBLEM IN THE MBA**

Chapter 5: A Kantian response to the formative-public problem: Kant's two-part moral anthropology — Part One, a modest metaphysics of justice

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter closed summarising the outcomes from the literature and the case study, identifying a number of tensions in the problem of addressing ethical-moral dimension in management education. In addressing those tensions I anticipated the case for looking to Kant to open deeper understanding of the philosophical and practical issues involved in the problematic. Kant's little-explored moral anthropology addresses both the philosophical and practical needs of what is problematic here, offering useful theoretical structures and concepts. Kant's moral anthropology comprises two parts, the more familiar metaphysics of justice and a far lesser known empirical part. In this chapter I address the first part and do so by describing a number of distinctive Kantian features, which I am calling 'points of discernment'. These distinctive features of Kant's metaphysics will be described through considering the *scope*, *mode* and *content* of that metaphysics. The second part of Kant's moral anthropology will be addressed in Chapter 6 and a pedagogical approach based on the two-parts is developed in Chapter 7. First the case is made here for the relevance of Kant's metaphysics of justice. Making this case necessitates addressing commonplace misgivings about metaphysics per se. I draw on the works of two Kantian scholars (Korner and Flikschuh) to illustrate that what Kant offers is a *modest* metaphysics and in so doing hopefully allay some of those misgivings. Concerns for justice are central here. Kant's metaphysics of justice serves as a propaedeutic to address the problematic of moral accountability in the MBA.

5.2 A Kantian metaphysics of justice — a propaedeutic for moral accountability

The dominant feature of Kant's metaphysics needs to be addressed first. This is a *modest* metaphysics that will in subsequent sections be developed further into distinctive concepts. When seen together these concepts (described as points of discernment) will assist in understanding and approaching ideas in moral accountability. Some essential preliminaries need to be addressed, most conspicuously the very idea of metaphysics.

5.2.1 Why metaphysics?

Why metaphysics? What kind of metaphysics? What does metaphysics have to do with moral accountability? How is metaphysics different from and ideally better than already established theories of moral behaviour? Why metaphysics now, after it has been roundly

dismissed by anti-foundationalists such as Rorty, Quine, Sellars, and pragmatists such as Dewey (Honderich on Rorty, 1995, P. 779)? These are some of the leading questions guiding the following discussion. The responses to these questions and others are important in constructing my overall position of defending a Kantian metaphysics of justice in moral accountability and management education.

Metaphysics is typically viewed as the expression of absolute first principles (Craig, 2005, pp 656-9). However, I draw on Katrina Flikschuh (2000), and Stephan Korner (1984) to develop an alternative, modest and more accessible perspective — one that seeks to foster deeper understanding but without the necessity of being absolute, nor the necessity of seeking to find first principles in the traditional sense. I expand on this alternative below.

To establish the merits of this alternative for my purpose of addressing moral accountability it is firstly necessary to draw out a number of important distinctions. I then need to establish a bridge to the critical value of this alternative in approaching moral accountability. The common link between these immediate needs is the recent work of Kantian scholar, Katrina Flikschuh, who serves to open important new ideas between Kant's moral and political philosophy, with implications for considerations of moral accountability.

I here draw principally on two works in which Flikschuh challenged the long-standing views of metaphysics. Her challenge grew largely out of dissatisfaction with the contemporary liberal philosophy views of justice, and in particular global justice. In Flikschuh's view much of contemporary liberal philosophy of justice was grounded in John Rawls, whom she claims, conflated political and economic assumptions in his own philosophy of justice so as to render it ineffective for global issues (Rawls, 1971, 2005). Given the status of Rawls' philosophy over the latter stages of the last century these are very controversial claims. Flikschuh draws attention to Rawls' two principles of justice as fairness. In her view

Rawls' specifications of his first principle of justice, which is concerned with the equal standing of individuals as citizens, broadly coincide with what he characterises as his Kantian conception of the moral person. However, the second principle, which is concerned with distributive justice, is premised on an account of free agency and of the rationality of individual choice that is deeply un-Kantian. While the moral conception of the person as free and equal adopts a broadly Kantian view of reasonableness and public deliberation, at least within the confines of the individual state, the account of economic freedom that drives the difference principle accepts

Moral Accountability and the MBA: A Kantian response to a public problem

the motivational assumptions of standard economic theory, which are ‘Hobbesian’ in their basic orientation. The tension between these two motivational aspects of Rawls theory – one moral the other self-interested – has often been noticed. The question here is whether a Kantian conception of moral freedom can sustain Hobbesian assumptions about economic freedom. I believe the answer is ‘no’. (ibid, P.s 3-4)

Flikschuh’s critique of Rawls’ principles of justice illustrates an important point for the kind of metaphysics developed here. ‘If Kantian moral freedom is incompatible with, say, Hobbesian assumptions about the individual rationality of political and economic choice, one should ask what makes it so. If aspects of two different theories cannot be combined at will, this suggests that each forms part of a wider theoretical framework which constrains it in certain respects such that it cannot, without distortion, be lifted from that framework.’ (ibid, P. 5). Questions of theoretical compatibility enables valuable insights into what would be compatible for global justice and for my purpose, how those ideas might address questions on moral accountability. I argue that Kantian conceptions of justice will not only be compatible they will also provide the kind of metaphysical framework to enable an exploration of issues that I believe is needed in management education. Thematic variations on Kantian compatibility in this regard can be found in the work of a number of recent Kantian scholars — from Hannah Arendt (1989), through Stephen Korner (1984), Allen Wood (1999; 2005; 2008), Susan Neiman (1997), J. B. Schneewind (1998), Karl Ameriks (2003; 2006) and, significantly for what follows, principally Onora O’Neill (1989; 1996; 2003; 2000), Stephen Darwall (2006a; 2006b; 2007), and to a lesser extent John O’Neill (2007). I then link these Flikschuh contributions on Kantian metaphysics to implications for management education on moral accountability.

A number of important distinctions between traditional and prospective metaphysics can be identified in thinking about one of the primary issues defining what is problematic in moral accountability, that is, the relative absence of theory on this matter.⁵⁸ What would it take to develop a theory that could make some considerable inroads here? This is the very question that warrants careful thought — a question I now turn to in some depth. I firstly consider the approaches to metaphysics of both Flikschuh and her predecessor Stephan Korner and then proceed to construct one Kantian approach to moral accountability, availing of Flikschuh’s structure with thematic content drawn from the Kantian scholars mentioned

⁵⁸ I have indicated previously that while not dismissive of theory I do not wish to construct a theory of moral accountability, favouring instead an exploration of the issues. I am however interested in other’s theories of moral accountability.

above.

Flikschuh's (2000b) work on global justice points to the need to develop better understanding of such concepts because, she says, philosophers remain deeply suspicious, preferring to stay "on the philosophical surface" in their search for practical solutions to political problems (2000b, p. 487). In much the same way I claim through my review of the management studies literature and illuminate in my case study that moral accountability presents similar problems to and a similar response from management educators, that is staying on the surface is similar to Jones et al's claims to 'foreclosure of philosophical discussion' with regard to business ethics. Flikschuh's work is thus attractive because, as she seeks to move discussions forward by exploring the merits of metaphysics in getting below the surface, I too am keen to explore a similar approach for management educators and management practitioners in understanding the demands of moral accountability. Before undertaking that work it is useful to consider Korner's work and how it is relevant to my purpose here.

5.2.1 (a) Korner: immanent metaphysics

Korner distinguishes between immanent and transcendent metaphysics, claiming the former as essential to communication. He then moves to a notion that is central to his argument, that of immanent metaphysics as a 'categorical framework'. Given the role that I am claiming for Kant's modest metaphysics it will be important to establish a sound basis for that case. To that end I draw extensively from his *Metaphysics: structure and function* (1984) and subsequently from Flikschuh. Korner claims that most people would agree that what they experience is partly a *public* world of intersubjectively given particulars with intersubjectively ascertainable attributes, partly a *private* world which cannot be experienced by anybody else; and that what they experience may differ from the world as it exists in itself; that is independently of anyone's experience of it (1984, p. 1, emphasis added). He then suggests that the public world is the subject matter of commonsense thinking, as well as of the sciences and the humanities. It is, he says, the sphere of human actions, of practicabilities and hence, of practical attitudes, prudence and morality. It (the public world) also constitutes the main theme for one of the two branches of metaphysics, which in some accord with tradition are called 'immanent', as distinguished from its other branch, which may be called 'transcendent' (1984, p. 1). Korner continues by claiming that "a person's immanent metaphysics comprises the principles to which every proposition about the public must conform if it is to be acceptable. These principles are thus less general than the principles of his logic, to which not only propositions about the public world, but every

proposition whatever must conform" (1984, p.1), and that "the principles of a person's immanent metaphysics define the borders between his private and his public world. They also indicate the manner in which what is subjectively given in perception is interpreted as intersubjective or, to put it more emphatically, in which intersubjectivity is conferred" (1984, p. 1).

It will be this public world or immanent metaphysics that will be important in the realm of moral accountability. Korner's notion of public here will be valuable in understanding the kinds of scrutiny that can be expected, that is, seeking to understand what principles and propositions are being considered by the decision maker, and of course, equally those affected and concerned about impacts of those decisions. Korner maintains that "the purpose is not to expound and to defend a particular system of immanent or transcendent metaphysics but to inquire into the common structure and function of such systems, whether explicitly formulated eg by philosophers, scientists, or only implicitly accepted. Such an enquiry appears no less worthwhile than are more familiar inquiries into the common structure and function of ... scientific theories or legal systems. It resembles them in method and should, if properly executed, counteract the tendency toward an intolerant metaphysical dogmatism without supporting a boundless pluralism" (1984, p. 2). The enquiry then being undertaken is to understand how individuals are thinking.

Central to Korner's thinking is that:

the organisation of a person's beliefs about the public world involves, *inter alia*, a differentiation of his experience into particular and attributes; a deductive organisation of the judgments by which he assigns or refuses attributes to particulars; a method of conferring intersubjectivity on what is subjectively given; a classification of intersubjective particulars into maximal kinds; a ranking or stratification of beliefs into classes of different epistemic strength. As a result of this organisation of his beliefs about the public world of his experience, a person accepts a more or less definite system of logically and nonlogically 'necessary' or supreme principles which together constitute his 'categorical framework'. This notion is intended to replace the less precise notion of an immanent metaphysics. (1984, p. 2)

Korner summarises his endeavours by claiming that the function of categorical frameworks consists chiefly in providing their acceptors with criteria of 'meaningfulness', as opposed to mere linguistic intelligibility, of 'coherence' as opposed to mere logical consistency, of 'explanatory power' as opposed to mere descriptive or prognostic effectiveness (p. 3). The

concepts, meaningfulness, coherence and explanatory power are vital to pedagogical objectives that are the subject of discussion through this second part of the dissertation. Those same concepts are especially relevant in this chapter, in approaching Kant's metaphysics of justice.

5.2.1 (b) Flikschuh: indispensable metaphysics

Flikschuh subsequently adapts Korner's approach while retaining his primary intentions. Here, too, I draw extracts from Flikschuh so as to do justice to her reasoning in establishing this framework, a framework which is increasingly important to my overall purposes here. Flikschuh maintains that "the alternative way of characterising metaphysics is to say that it deals with human beings' *ultimate presuppositions* about the structure of empirical reality as they perceive it" (2000b, p.488, emphasis added). Further, that "reference to persons' presuppositions about the ultimate structure of reality as the subject of metaphysical inquiry constitutes a modification of the absolute truth claims associated with more traditional approaches. In so far as persons' presuppositions about the structure of reality may differ from what reality is like absolutely, some proponents of the alternative view purport thereby to avoid the foundationalist commitments of more traditional approaches,"(p. 489. Flikschuh muses that whether or not they do may be debatable.

Flikschuh then suggests that:

on at least some versions of the alternative approach, metaphysical presuppositions and beliefs can and do change, it remains a condition of a person's ultimate presuppositions qualifying as *metaphysical* presuppositions that they hold them sincerely, that they regard them as indispensable to all their other beliefs about the world, and that they are therefore willing and able to defend them with a relatively high degree of reasoned tenacity. The important difference is that the alternative account resists the conventional equation of metaphysical commitments with claims to knowledge of reality transcending truths (p.489, emphasis in original).

The potential such ideas have for questions of public scrutiny is immediately obvious. For my purposes it is vital to point out that Flikschuh says that ideas of ultimate presuppositions "do not mean that the alternative view conceives of metaphysics as ontology. The alternative approach adopts a deliberately *anthropocentric* viewpoint, conceiving of metaphysics as relating to persons' presuppositions and beliefs about the world. If Plato is a representative of rationalist metaphysics and Aristotle a proponent of ontology, Kant comes closest to the more modest conception of metaphysics just sketched" (p.489, emphasis added).

Flikschuh says “the question is not whether one can avoid making metaphysical assumptions, but how many one makes, and whether or not one chooses to render explicit which ones one does make, and why?”(p. 490). Flikschuh then gives emphasis to a dimension that becomes increasingly important to my thinking here. She says that “a more positive line of defence is to say not that metaphysical presuppositions are unavoidable, but that they are *indispensable*. Here the thought is not that however much one may seek to avoid them one cannot in the end resist committing oneself to some assumptions rather than others. The positive line of defence endorses the value of metaphysics in relation to substantive theorising about global justice. Instead of minimising and keeping as inconspicuous as possible the role of metaphysics, the positive approach sets out to identify and to render explicit systematic relations between the individual presuppositions and beliefs that inform a person’s substantive theorising. According to the positive defence, a substantive theory’s underlying metaphysical framework — its underlying system of ultimate presuppositions and beliefs — shapes and constrains what can coherently be proposed at the substantive level. Here, identifying and rendering explicit one’s metaphysical commitments is an essential preliminary to substantive theory building” (p. 490, emphasis added)

Flikschuh’s argument is that this modest form of metaphysics is *indispensable* to developing an underlying framework of presuppositions and beliefs. It is also this construction that I believe is needed to progressively move to a more nuanced understanding of moral accountability. Outcomes from the literature review and the case study clearly illustrated the difficulties experienced by educators and students alike in addressing moral issues, not least difficulties in the use of concepts such as ‘moral-impacts’ and ‘social responsibility’. Recognising individual metaphysics as a framework of presuppositions and beliefs may assist in designing pedagogical approaches to draw out those presuppositions and beliefs. Doing so would likely lead to discussions about such frameworks, including how they might influence decisions in matters of moral concern and issues of justice. In other words, recognising frameworks may not be just indispensable for the individual student but perhaps more importantly also arguably indispensable for educators as well, in facilitating and cultivating a capacity for discernment, for seeing things differently. This would be appropriate propaedeutic work for moral accountability. I further support and develop Flikschuh’s case by subsequently linking this modest metaphysics to other Kantian studies, more specifically that of Alan Wood on the relationship between the humanity formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative and the under-explored anthropology, Onora O’Neill on

individual and institutional obligations, and Stephen Darwall on accountability per se. But before addressing Kantian themes I first need to develop a better understanding of the merits of a metaphysics of justice and its links to moral accountability.

5.2.2 Why a metaphysics of justice?

Why justice? What has justice to do with moral accountability? I argue that at the base of moral accountability is a concern for justice or, in the dominant view of John Rawls, justice is seen as *fairness* (Werhane, et al. 2004). Still wider, notions of justice are often linked to ideas of human rights, or moral rights (Werhane et al, 2004). More to the point, personal moral accountability addresses concerns to avoid situations which lead to injustice or call for an account from those whom affected parties and others might charge have been agents of injustice. While there is clearly a broad range of concepts involved here, for my purpose I focus on developing ideas of justice, not as human rights or as moral rights or as fairness alone or together, and I focus in Chapter 7 on linking ideas on justice to moral accountability and management education, specifically, management education for management practice. I firstly address ideas on the kind of accountability that informs these ideas of justice. I turn next to the distinctive characteristics of Kant's metaphysics that are relevant to the problematic. I will address these characteristics through ideas of the scope, mode and content of Kant's now modest metaphysics of justice. I also refer to these various characteristics as 'points of discernment' for the role they might play in judgments and decisions, matters which will be of increasing concern throughout this second part of the dissertation.

5.3 Scope of Kant's metaphysics of justice: cosmopolitan and intelligent

In this section the scope of Kant's metaphysics of justice will be addressed. In that regard I consider two critical characteristics, namely Kant's cosmopolitan outlook (as opposed to a local or state view) and the crucial notion of *intelligent* accountability developed by Kant scholar Onora O'Neill.

5.3.1 Justice and intelligent accountability

In developing a metaphysical framework of moral accountability it is necessary to gain some understanding of justice in the context of moral accountability. To that end I draw on recent ideas of O'Neill who has argued for what she calls '*intelligent* accountability', a view that is directed towards restoring and fostering trust in society's institutions and professions. In the 2002 BBC Reith lectures entitled *A Question of Trust* O'Neill highlights what she calls a 'climate of suspicion' that has grown across the world in the wake of institutional and

professional malfeasance. In this 'crisis of trust' there has been a clamour for greater accountability and transparency in the form of more controls, legislation and governance. This response, she claims, is the very antithesis of what is needed if restoring trust within society is to be a conscious objective. With societal trust as a major goal, intelligent accountability would seek to inform those affected of the intentions behind proposed actions and decisions. In so doing, the decision makers would be arguing a case that would be considered by those affected as *reasonable* and *followable*. While for the moment holding to the ideas behind the links between developing societal trust and accountability I need to defer the Kantian roots of this approach and in particular, defer until a later section (5.4.2), discussion on the public aspect of intelligent accountability.

5.3.2 *Cosmopolitan justice*

Unlike the situation in the early to mid 1990s it is no longer controversial to acknowledge economic globalisation as a fundamental reality for management practice. The impact of challenges to the dominance of United States and Japanese economies from sustained, spectacular growth in China and India together with economic and political expansion of the European Union are sufficient to underline this contemporary reality. So while mindful of Trood's previous sober misgivings (Trood, 2008, p. 124)⁵⁹ for my purposes I accept economic globalisation as a given in terms of management practice.

However, as Trood has indicated (op. cit) this context of economic globalisation points to controversial philosophical and practical challenges, for it means that the relevant aspect of justice for moral accountability in this context is its *cosmopolitan* scope. This scope is controversial but not simply for the economic reasons usually cited as the givens of globalisation. It is controversial in that the cosmopolitan dimension of justice challenges one of John Rawls' two defining principles of justice.⁶⁰ Addressing Rawls' Hobbesian economic principle means identifying it as in conflict with Rawls' Kantian political principle the consequences of which hold out questions that take us past global protocols (eg UN-based initiatives) and into demanding yet still ill-defined moral issues. In contrast to Rawls Kant's political sphere is cosmopolitan (Flikschuh, 2000a, p.9). Kant's concern is for people beyond state boundaries. A state orientation presents obvious difficulties when decisions made locally impact globally as is implicit in economic globalisation.

⁵⁹ Outlined in Chapter 1.

⁶⁰ Rawls' two defining principles of justice as fairness relate firstly to the equal standing of individuals as citizens and secondly to distributive justice. According to Flikschuh the first is moral and the second is economic and political (and Hobbesian), with both incompatible (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 3-5).

5.3.3 A Kantian metaphysics of justice.

Having so far argued for a metaphysics of justice my next step is to justify the selection of a Kantian *categorical framework* towards moral accountability. This I do by illustrating the relevance of Kantian justice undertaken principally by Kantian scholars Onora O'Neill (critical in turn of Rawls' localised as opposed to cosmopolitan justice), Allen Wood, Robert Louden (2002; 2006; 2007), Stephen Darwall, Susan Neiman, Katrin Flikschuh and G. Felicitas Munzel (1999; 2003; forthcoming). In so doing I also illustrate how these contemporary Kantian scholars have drawn on Kant's broader, under-recognised work to counter some of the widespread views of formalism and universalism in dismissing Kant's moral and political philosophy. I then argue in the next section that a Kantian metaphysics of justice in turn enables access to some of the complex range of ideas on moral accountability. This requires in the next chapter a justification of how this Kantian metaphysics opens deeper insights into reconceptualising management education as preparation for moral accountability.

What follows may also be seen as an attempt to sketch something of the *mode* and *content* of a modest Kantian metaphysics of justice and accountability, recalling the already mentioned, and definitively Kantian, cosmopolitan *scope* of this metaphysics addressed in this section.

5.4 Mode of Kant's metaphysics of justice: action-guiding principles and public reasoning

In this section the influence of O'Neill's Kantian scholarship continues in addressing the *mode* of Kant's metaphysics of justice. This will develop ideas on intelligent accountability, primarily seeing the role to be played by her ideas of action-guiding principles, especially in terms of public reasoning. Both action-guiding principles and public reasoning are foundational for understanding and addressing issues of moral-public accountability.

5.4.1 Kantian-based action-guiding principles of justice

I believe O'Neill offers vital ideas on what Kant's metaphysics of justice might look like when viewed from both institutional and, equally provocatively, an individual manager's perspective. O'Neill approaches Kant's moral and political philosophy with a determination to find bridges between ideas of justice and ideas of virtue. In her judgment — which will be telling for what follows regarding the significance of Kant for both individuals and institutions — justice and virtue have, to our collective cost, been separated for too long. For many, ideas of justice are universal, while ideas of virtue are particular. Here, at least on the surface, there is Kant's call for a universal perspective together with Aristotle's insistence on

starting with particulars. The suggestion of course is that these starting points, universal justice and virtue-based particularism, are incompatible. O'Neill illustrates, however, that Kant had both in mind and such a position is not incoherent. What is interesting is that her argument is theoretical and unlike those of Wood, Louden, Wilson and Munzel it does not incorporate Kant's anthropology. For the moment, O'Neill's theoretical argument has, I submit, much to offer in addressing ideas of justice and moral accountability. I argue later that this potential is enhanced when coupled with Kant's anthropology.

I draw initially from O'Neill's *Towards Justice and Virtue* (O'Neill, 1996). Here O'Neill develops ideas that draw inspiration from, and are critical of, both Kant and Aristotle. O'Neill bridges between the insights and the criticism of both. Kant offers insights into the universal essentials of justice, thus leaving particulars aside. Kant's universalism of justice is expressed in terms of the categorical imperative, which while being expressed through a number of formulations is summed up by O'Neill as an obligation to avoid being the agent of injustice. While expressed negatively I believe such expressions serve exactly as Kant intended, that is, as regulating principles, or in O'Neill terms, *action-guiding* principles. At the same time O'Neill recognises the importance of Aristotle's focus on virtue, taking action that recognises the particulars of situations, but also in ways that avoid causing injury. When considered together, that is, from both the universal obligation to avoid injustice and the obligation to practice virtue O'Neill's *action-guiding principles* are expressed from both the individual and institutional as follows:

Obligations of justice: rejection of injury

- Rejection of *direct* injury to others: no systematic or gratuitous violence, coercion, etc
- Rejection of *indirect* injury:
 - (a) Rejection of damage to the social fabric: no systematic or gratuitous deceit, fraud, incitement to hatred, etc
 - (b) Rejection of damage to the material basis of life: no systematic or gratuitous damage to natural or man-made environments

Obligations of virtue: rejection of indifference and neglect

- Rejection of *direct* indifference to others: sympathy, beneficence, love, help, care and concern, solidarity, acts of rescue, etc
- Rejection of *indirect* indifference to others:
 - (a) Rejection of indifference to the social fabric: selective care and support for social life and culture, expressed in toleration, participation, loyalty, social reform, etc

- (b) Rejection of indifference to the material basis of life: selective care and concern for natural and man-made environments, expressed in cultivation, preservation and conservation, etc. (O'Neill, 1996, p. 205)

Rather than see management and institutions as separate I argue that while there are differences it is the common idea about *mode* that warrants our interest in O'Neill's ideas. The first and clear characteristic of this approach is O'Neill's insistence on *obligations before rights*. Realising rights rests on first establishing the institutional foundations. Given the sustained dominance of 'rights talk' across so many global aspects (Glendon, 1991; Donnelly, 2003), O'Neill's inversion is an important insight towards realising those rights and placing the onus on institutional leaders to establish necessary and enabling frameworks. But frameworks alone are, of course, insufficient. O'Neill also cautions that "the most that we aimed for is to work towards constitutions and institutions, practices and activities which are good enough embodiments of justice for that time and place, and towards characters and practices, ways of acting and of feeling, relationships and communities, that are good enough embodiments of certain social virtues for that time and place" (O'Neill, 1996, p. 205).

The second characteristic of O'Neill's approach is the negative origins — that there are *obligations to avoid*. This again is a powerful reminder that describing fully what justice looks like in theory is not as *engaging* as identifying actions to be avoided. The operative word is "engaging" and one that resonates from a pedagogical perspective. For example, inviting students to list or construct dimensions of justice is relatively dry and not as confronting or emancipating as inviting them to identify occasions of injustice, and to illustrate why they are claiming such occasions as evidence of injustice. Here Judith Shklar's (1990) work runs in parallel with that of O'Neill, especially when linked to injustice caused through O'Neill's "indifference". Invitations to consider contemporary examples of indifference and neglect related to ideas of injustice have in my experience triggered animated discussion, occasioning ample opportunity for further exploration.

There is still, however, the need to recognise the public nature of moral scrutiny. How might these ideas stand up in public? Are there specific challenges that make public scrutiny different to what has been discussed to date? The next section addresses some of the unique requirements and justification for that public scrutiny and builds on O'Neill's work.

5.4.2 Justice-oriented public reasoning and deliberation: intelligent accountability

Highly visible cases of corporate malfeasance during the early 2000s remind us of the often public nature of calls for greater moral accountability. As outlined in the introduction to this dissertation it is far less the legal and governance and far more the moral issues that captured public attention concerning those affected by executive excesses or neglect. In Australia cases such as James Hardie and charges of evading compensation to asbestosis victims, together with the financial costs to the community through collapses of HIH and OneTel occupied headlines for years. More recently the example of TriStar brought to public attention an extraordinarily callous (not illegal) attitude by management toward employees.⁶¹ A common feature in all such cases was the prominent scrutiny through the media and public meetings of the decision-making inside these organisations, and in particular seeking out evidence of concern for the impacts on individuals and communities during those decisions. That open scrutiny and analysis has been well documented through mostly academic and government publications concerned with regulation, compliance and governance⁶²

How might that scrutiny have been different? Beyond the immorality of the decisions taken, how might such decisions have been different if public scrutiny — other than legal — had been anticipated? O'Neill's arguments for trust-building *intelligent* accountability are especially pertinent here. In particular, ideas about fostering trust through active enquiry (O'Neill, 2002, p. 94). Such open enquiry is not a response to greater transparency for as O'Neill points out calls for more transparency have only exacerbated the problem. What are

⁶¹ During 2006-7 executives of TriStar — an Australian based company manufacturing car-parts — in an increasingly commonplace decision, decided to outsource supplies to China. Being so commonplace at this time the decision was not of itself attention grabbing. What attracted public opprobrium was that TriStar executives also decided that, following the move to China, offering redundancy to local Australian workers would be more expensive than leaving them with no work to do. TriStar executives believed that after months of turning up to work but not having work to do these same workers would eventually resign, and at a much lower cost to the company. This TriStar attitude initially attracted public attention when applied to a 60-year-old employee diagnosed with terminal cancer. TriStar executives had decided that as this employee's illness meant that death was imminent they would not offer redundancy, but simply wait till he died, thus saving the company accordingly. National media focused attention on the fact that the TriStar executives (including the Chairman of their board) claimed that there was nothing illegal in what they were doing — with either the terminally ill employee or other workers. Moral issues were evidently not salient — except in the public mind. A Commonwealth government minister, Joe Hockey, was dispatched amid a flurry of headlines to draw TriStar's executives attention to their additional responsibilities: "I emphasised that they had not only a legal but a moral obligation to their employees". Hon Joe Hockey MP, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations. Source: www.mediacentre.dewr.gov.au/mediacentre/AllReleases/2007/March.

⁶² See Justin O'Brien (O'Brien, 2007), and the Australian Government's Corporations and Market Advisory Committee Report on *The Social Responsibility of Corporations* (CAMAC 2006).

needed are reasons that are *followable* and *reasonable* in ways that warrant trust. Thus reasons offered in advance, followed by accounts after the event serve to underline or challenge the reasonableness of the trust granted in the first place.⁶³ Progressively, with growing trust there is less justification to impose rules of governance and formal accountability, thus enabling the institution to do its work, knowing that it has earned an interim trust.

Indeed it is John O'Neill's recent work (O'Neill, 2007)⁶⁴ on public deliberations over environmental concerns, which demonstrates the sort of public enquiry that may well be suited here. O'Neill draws on both Kant and Arendt to argue for the importance of public deliberation in contested issues. Indeed O'Neill's views on recognising the place for *dissensus* along with consensus in public deliberation are relevant (O'Neill, 2007, p. 183, emphasis added). Without dissensus there is the risk that in seeking consensus contrary voices may be marginalised if not ignored, thus undermining trust, which in the case of dissensus would be trust *refused*, still to be earned (Manson and O'Neill, 2007).

Ideas of public scrutiny may sound appealing from the perspective of those potentially affected by management decisions, yet there has been little said so far as to what might reasonably be anticipated by management beyond calls for justice and greater trust. There are however potentially more disruptive insights to be considered. These go to on the one hand a recent development of Kant's ideas on autonomy and authority and on the other to what Kantian scholar Allen Wood considers to be the most important (to Kant) formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

5.5 Content of Kant's metaphysics of justice: second-person standpoint and the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative

This section is disruptive to settled notions of authority and related assumptions. Beyond the *scope* and *mode* of Kant's metaphysics is its *content*. Two distinctive, and wholly Kantian notions here, are his Categorical Imperative and his Enlightenment concerns for autonomy, reflected in this instance by Stephen Darwall's ideas on what he calls the second-person standpoint. Both will have profound implications for moral accountability and more particularly for the pedagogical response developed in Chapter 7.

⁶³ See reference to granting and refusing consent in Manson & O'Neill footnote in this chapter.

⁶⁴ To my knowledge unrelated to Onora O'Neill – as if it mattered.

5.5.1 The second-person standpoint and moral authority

To date the merits of the usual first and third person ideas on moral philosophy have been implicitly assumed. Stephen Darwall's recent work puts this assumption under the spotlight, asserting that there are important historical roots to justify revisiting Kant on ideas of accountability. Darwall claims that it is the under-recognised second-person standpoint that is *unique to moral accountability*. These are powerful reminders but at the base of the second-person standpoint ('you') is the Kantian recognition of the equal dignity of each for their reasoning capability. Darwall's claim that is clearly relevant for my purpose is that there is a second-person *authority* to make claims and demands each on the other to give reasonable, followable reasons for decisions and actions. By its nature Darwall insists that those reasons would need to reflect a respect for the inherent dignity for the reasoning capability of the other, which in turn calls for avoiding injustice.

This 'you-me' relationship has quite profound implications for management thinking in that it questions conventional ideas of management authority. What emerges from Darwall's explorations has the potential to make previous arguments for authority more compelling in the sense that it underlines the power of individuals as equals to demand reasonable and followable reasons — before, during and after management decisions and actions (Darwall 2004; 2006; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2007). Orthodox ideas of management authority would, under the second-person standpoint, stand in need of scrutiny if not also the prospect of being reconceptualised. That is, the essence of this second-person standpoint is that the equal moral authority of the individual *trumps* traditional positional authority invoked by management. The implications for organisational practices are enormous, posing the prospect of dysfunction. If the second-person authority to demand and expect reasonable and followable answers trumps traditional positional authority how would everyday decisions be made? It would be clearly impossible for an organisation to function with consultation needed for every decision. Something more practical would need to be agreed.

For example, the prospect of multiple tensions in understanding the implications of the related concept of *informed consent* would I believe come to the fore as a key matter for consideration by management academics and practitioners alike (Manson and O'Neill, 2007). Developing these tensions is beyond the scope of this dissertation⁶⁵ so it must suffice

⁶⁵ Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill (2007) address tensions of *informed consent* in the highly contested field of bioethics. Many of their insights relate not so much to consent per se as to the demands of the informed or information side of the concept, that is what the authors call *transactions* in gaining, granting and sustaining consent. Some of the ideas, tensions and challenges inherent in the bioethical context would seem (at least superficially) to be relevant to the problematic of moral accountability of

to sketch some implications. Ideas around informed consent and second-person authority can be reasonably anticipated as challenging conventional presuppositions of the power historically invested in orthodox, agency-based management. Such challenges can be readily imagined, for example, at times when management has an assumed prerogative in making decisions that, while expressed as being in the overall interest of the organisation, nevertheless impacts in multiple ways on people and communities. Those so affected would, under second-person authority, be in a position to make claims and demands for reasons about how their multiple concerns are being or have been addressed. As has been previously mentioned such situations could go beyond ideas of legal entitlements to moral considerations about processes regarding fairness, identity and dignity. Orthodox presuppositions and prerogatives of management may be distinctly less assured from a second-person standpoint. Sophisticated ideas of informed consent (as per Manson and O'Neill, 2007) would be a fascinating development over the claimed prerogative of management authority. The second-person moral authority demands no less than deep consideration of consented agreement.

What does all this mean for management education? Are there situations unique to management practice that make ideas on public deliberation and scrutiny problematic? In the next chapter I argue that there are practice situations that, while not unique to management, nevertheless call for careful consideration. In addition, I suggest that the foregoing considerations point to underlining a distinctively Kantian perspective for management education. Firstly, however, the significance of Kant's anthropological work in this overall endeavour must be understood. Then both the metaphysics and anthropological aspects must be drawn together to address specific implications and opportunities for management education. I argue that the second part of Kant's moral anthropology (what Holly Wilson calls his *philosophy of experience*⁶⁶) offers both a grounding and a direction to

management practice, especially when viewed under Darwall's *second-person authority*. Manson and O'Neill make the vital point — and it would seem in common with the kinds of social management contexts discussed here — that *granting* or *refusing* trust is central to transactions over informed consent and accountability (pp. 160-182, emphasis added). The question remains as to what grounds constitute intelligently granting or refusing trust? Exploring the terms and contexts of inherent reciprocity and sustainability of second-person authority to demand reasonable reasons (and evidence) would seem to be essential in responding to questions of *intelligent trust*.

⁶⁶ Wilson is among those who are mystified by the extraordinary absence of (Anglo) scholarly focus on Kant's works beyond the three critiques and the *Groundwork*. Wilson speculates that this absence may represent a prejudice on the part of philosophers "favouring conceptual philosophy over philosophy that points to experience and helps to clarify that experience (wisdom)" (Wilson, 2006, p 2). Wilson also makes the interesting aside that Kant's pedagogical intentions were clear in that he never taught his critiques yet he taught his moral anthropology for twenty-three years. I sense however that Wilson may not do justice to Makkreel's works on the significant shift in Kant's thinking that takes place (according to Makkreel) in the *Third Critique* in Kant (Makkreel, 1994, 2001,

our educational focus. That grounding highlights natural dispositions that both foster and inhibit our reasoning and the direction is towards transforming the world towards just, cosmopolitan societies. In terms of content there is still the powerful if not radical notion of Kant's humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

5.5.2 The humanity formulation of Kant's categorical imperative.

Kant is noted for developing the *categorical imperative* of moral philosophy, the idea that there are fundamental, absolute formal demands on our choice of maxims or principles on which to act. (Bunnin and Yu, 2004, p. 10). Discussion of Kant's three primary formulations of the categorical imperative are limited here to the second, the humanity version which, according to Allen Wood, is central to Kant's purpose and his favoured *a priori* moral principle (Wood, 1999; 2006; 2007).

From an historical perspective it is sufficient here to note that the categorical imperative and related ideas of moral and political philosophy grew out of Kant's *critical* approach to traditional metaphysics, a critical approach that arguably shaped the legacy of the Enlightenment (Beiser, 1987; Schneewind, 1997). At the risk of glossing over a vast literature the history of the Enlightenment is largely one of the gradual emergence and growing dominance of concerns to find alternatives to obedience to state and religion as grounds for authority. While recent scholarship on the Enlightenment argues for plural and competing notions of the Enlightenment (Hunter, 2001; Israel, 2001; 2006b; 2006a) there is nonetheless agreement on key defining concepts. It is broadly accepted that Kant's groundbreaking influence in this shift of concerns is in developing and championing a coherent and revolutionary notion of autonomy, or self-governance, not obedience to church or state, as the primary to moral authority (Schneewind, 1997).

As indicated above, Kant's categorical imperative moved through three major expressions (and two additional variations) from (i) maxims as universal law through (ii) humanity as an end in itself to (iii) autonomy and the realm of ends. There are of course competing schools of thought as to which if any Kant gave greatest emphasis in later works on moral and political philosophy. For my purposes it is Allen Wood's extensive arguments for the prominence of second expression in Kant's later *Metaphysics of Morality*, the familiar humanity principle that demands a deeper understanding. The humanity formulation of the categorical imperative (hereafter HF) has profound and I argue under-explored implications

2008).

for justice and moral accountability, particularly in management and organisational contexts, and thus of major importance to management educators:

Humanity as End in Itself: So act that you use⁶⁷ humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never *merely* as means. *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals* (G, para. 4:429, 1785, emphasis added)

The relevance of this expression for a metaphysics of justice is that (according to Wood et al) Kant favours this principle for its application to moral matters. This can be seen in Kant's much later *Metaphysics of Morals* (MM, 1797) where abstract formulae and maxims that so dominated the *Groundwork* are replaced by expansion of duties of right derived almost wholly from the HF (Wood, 1999, p. 139). For example three duties of respect for others are grounded on "the dignity in others" (MM 6: p. 462 in Wood, 1999, p. 140). In Wood's judgment "what HF fundamentally demands of our actions is that they *express* proper respect or reverence for the worth of humanity" (Wood, 1999, p. 141, emphasis in original). In a recent expansion on Kant's humanity as an end in itself Wood says:

I think a more immediate conclusion from the fact that humanity is an end in itself is that human beings should never be treated in a manner that degrades or humiliates them, should not be treated as inferior in status to others, or made subject to the arbitrary will of others, or be deprived of control over their own lives, or excluded from participation in the collective life of the human society to which they belong. (Wood, 2007b, p. 8)

Two aspects of Kant's work here need to be emphasised. Firstly, the word "merely" in the original formulation is clearly vital. Kant is not saying that people should not be used as means — indeed there is much in his last works wherein being used as a means is essential to developing trustworthy relationships and republican governments. The key factor in the HF is 'always as ends', that is, being worthy of respect for possessing inherent dignity as reasoning beings. Wood is adamant that it is essential to be clear about Kant's intentions here. Kant sets the dignity of our humanity in our reasoning *capability*, not in reason per se. He sees our freedom and autonomy in this reasoning capability, with the *a priori* HF serving

⁶⁷ The Wood translation (2002) is 'use' humanity, while the Abbot (2005) translation is 'treats' humanity. Both imply an instrumental sense for they are juxtaposed with 'ends'.

as a *regulative principle* guiding our reasoning. At the same time, it is not yet apparent how this reasoning capability and an understanding of the *a priori* need translates into either individual let alone organisational practice. Wood's recent expansion on Kant's fundamental insight sets out what may be reasonably anticipated to be some of the practice-based expectations. Some of these expectations are likely to be provocative for institutional practice and thus warrant deeper consideration. Some point to the kinds of questions that are of concern in the next chapter when examining public reasoning of moral accountability.

Secondly, Kant makes it clear in four examples illustrating the application of the HF principle that there is always space for judgment of particulars. Kant's critics almost always overlook this space for judgment but Wood makes the vital point that Kant always requires an *intermediate premise* in seeking to illustrate the application of the principle and in so doing recognises the influence of everyday life "stored up in folklore, literature, and religion. This knowledge is what we must use to guide our judgments about how the dignity of humanity should be respected in action" (Wood, p. 154). In other words context (including time and place) presents an intermediate premise for the application of the HF. Accordingly, and again contrary to widespread misrepresentations of his philosophy, Kant places context, and thus the essential need for judgment of particulars, at the centre of his work in applying *a priori* principles of morality and justice.

I am suggesting at this point that Kant offers a compelling, attractive and challenging approach to justice and to how we view and treat each other. It is compelling in the sense that there is a universal dimension that demands attention. Using people as a means alone is unacceptable. Respect for the dignity of individuals is thus an *inescapable* demand in Kant's view. Kant's metaphysics of justice through the HF is at the same time attractive for the recognition of, indeed equally inescapable need for, judgment of particulars. In so doing this space for judgment enables us to see Kant's metaphysics not as a formula delivering exact solutions to problems but as "a framework within which problems can be raised and discussed" (Wood, 1999, p. 155). Kant's metaphysics of justice is challenging in finding practical ways to respect the inherent dignity of individuals as ends in themselves amid the myriad ways in which management and organisations use people as a means to management and organisational ends. How might we proceed from here? Kant may well offer some clear direction in terms of the HF framework but more specific guidelines seem to be needed without jeopardising the space for judgment. For this the grossly under-recognised role of Kant's anthropology must be considered.

5.6 Conclusion to the first part of Kant's moral anthropology

Before moving to the second experiential part of Kant's moral anthropology it is important to summarise this first part and in particular in terms of how it has advanced the approach to the problematic. I am claiming that Kant's moral anthropology offers under-explored theoretical structures and concepts to approach the problematic. Further, that for the sake of clarity and to redress the incredibly ignored experience-oriented works (at least in English), Kant's moral anthropology needs to be seen in two related parts: a metaphysics of justice and an experiential approach to cultivating moral aspects of character. This first part has opened a broad range of aspects from which to consider Kant's metaphysics of justice. These were identified as various points of discernment (outlined within the *scope, mode* and *content* of Kant's metaphysics). Together those points of discernment illustrated the richness of Kant's modest metaphysics of justice. When considered in the light of the problematic those points of discernment also enable a propaedeutic for moral accountability. So what may be expected of the second part of Kant's moral anthropology? The second part of Kant's moral anthropology opens important practical dimensions that I argue are essential for public reasoning and judgment, issues at the heart of the problematic. Just how Kant's experiential philosophies inform that quest is the question to be addressed in the next chapter; after which attention returns to the pedagogical implications for management education (in Chapter 7).

Chapter 6: A Kantian response to the formative-public problem: Kant's two-part moral anthropology — Part Two, Anthropology-Philosophy of Experience

6.1 Introduction

It is essential to the overall approach to the problematic to see the relevance of the second part of Kant's moral anthropology. This involves a movement from Kant's modest metaphysics of justice in the previous chapter to a focus here on Kant's work in the experiential and embodied dimensions. This second part draws increasingly on the significant redirection in Kant's thinking expressed through his *Third Critique* (of the power of judgment). Indeed according to Makkreel (2001), "it is important to underscore a general shift that occurs in Kant's late work: he moves from impersonal, academic philosophy (*Philosophie nach dem Schulbegriff*) to worldly philosophy (*Philosophie nach dem Weltbegriff*), where the individual subject must learn to orient himself or herself in the human world" (p. 107). This shift allows a deeper appreciation of the role of experience in Kant's whole critical approach to develop. What is surprising however — because it is so opposed to popular views — is how Kant's critical project becomes more animated through the role he develops for imagination. That Kant created such a role for imagination marks a turning point in the relevance of his ideas for management education and in particular for management education. This is especially so when coupled with Kant's ideas on provisional politics. Just how this is so becomes evident when considering Kant's anthropology and the kinds of judgments relevant for moral accountability and, in the next chapter, for ideas on cultivating a capacity for those judgments.

In this second part of Kant's moral anthropology the liberating influence of not only the anthropological, historical and cultural studies becomes more evident. So too does the animating influence of his distinctly different *Third Critique* (of the *Power of Judgment*). Kant's first two critiques (*Critique of Pure Reason* on metaphysics and *The Critique of Practical Reason* on morality) were grounded in rationality, its limits on what we may know and its implications for morality, on what we ought to do. The *Third Critique* is different in not only addressing questions of what we may hope for but also includes aesthetic and teleological questions that legitimise sensibility rather than just reason and the understanding. Indeed the first two critiques and the early *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals* are typically what

is thought of as Kant's major works; where in all three cases he is anxious to downplay the role of sensibility, focusing on drawing the boundaries for reason and understanding. However, by this *Third Critique* he finds a place not just for sensibility but a unique and in the end, a vital place, one that emerges in large part through his anthropology and works in history, culture and education.

In gaining some understanding of this second part to Kant's moral anthropology (and bearing in mind the problematic), I firstly consider what Rudolf Makkreel calls the reflective orientation in Kant's later works. At first blush this might look like a similar orientation to that outlined in the first part as the justification for a modest metaphysics. This reflective orientation is, however, not based only in reason and a priori principles, it is about linking imagination and reflective judgment for empirical matters, and it is the empirical that distinguishes the two parts of Kant's moral anthropology. Some understanding of that anthropology is then developed through reference to two Kantian scholars who have drawn attention to this unrecognised domain of Kant's work, namely Allen Wood and Robert Louden. The distinctive power of the imagination is then brought to light in the section that deals with Kant's notion of philosophising from 'what is' to 'what ought to be'. As has been signalled, Kant attributes a vital creative power to the role of the imagination and the implications this has for the pedagogical chapter to follow becomes evident here. Similarly, it is important to see how Kant's works relate to an Enlightenment agenda. I draw on the unique contribution of Felicitas Munzel here in seeing Kant's whole critical project as educative, and more specifically toward cultivating character. This draws together the stands above into a stronger whole which, in the following chapter, open options to illustrate how Kant's work might be seen in a specifically pedagogical light and through the prism of the problematic of this dissertation.

6.2 Reflective Orientation

When comparing the shift in Kant's thinking over the course of the three Critiques, Makkreel says that:

unlike the first two critiques, which ground the metaphysical systems of natural science and morals, the *Third Critique* has no specific metaphysical application. It deals with the harmony of the cognitive faculties and examines the conditions for the systemisation of all knowledge. The work turns from the doctrinal claims of *determinate* judgment in the first two Critiques to a *reflective* mode of judgment whose function is interpretative rather than legislative. (Makkreel, 1990, p.3,

emphasis added)

This clearly marks a distinctive shift and opens an interpretative agenda, based on particulars of empirical experience. There is also a difference in the kind of judgment between the first two and the third critique. Makkreel describes the differences:

Whereas *determinate* judgments are defined as proceeding from given universals (concepts) to particulars, *reflective* judgments attempt to find universals (ideas) for given particulars. In the former case, judgment is controlled by the pure concepts of either the understanding or reason. The reflective judgment, however, is more free from external control and allows the imagination to create its own ideas for organising experience. (Makkreel, 1990, p. 3, emphasis added)

Makkreel adds to the distinctiveness of reflective judgment by emphasising its adaptive nature and its relation to public understanding through the concept of *sensus communis*: "it is adaptive to the particular contents of experience and articulates order through the mutual adjustment of parts and wholes. Normal, aesthetic, and teleological ideas present types or models that provide indeterminate and revisable guidelines for interpretation ... with reflective judgment serving more for 'orientation' (p. 154, emphasis added) ... seen (inter alia) in the teleological orientation that interprets culture on the basis of common sense or the *sensus communis*" (p. 156). What is important in this orientation is that "common sense can orient the judgment of the individual to the larger perspective of the community and thus provide the basis for what Kant calls an enlarged mode of thought or interpretation" (p. 157). There is, however, a distinction between what we normally consider common sense and the idea of *sensus communis*: "this is not the sense as the common or vulgar understanding but the common sense as *sensus communis*, a communal sense that accounts for universal agreement. The *sensus communis* uses reflective judgment to abstract from the private empirical aspects of our subjective representations in order to generate what might be called a communal or intersubjective perspective" (p. 158). This is the orientation for the public sphere and debate that is discussed below in considering Kant's provisional politics.

While highlighting the importance for Kant of a reflective orientation to the *sensus communis* Makkreel also adds a development on reflective judgment that is central to what follows in the next chapter. It is the notion of reflective judgment as *intersecting* the critical determinate judgment of the two first critiques and the empirical, experiential world. While Makkreel makes the point of intersection about matters of history the same can be made about

seemingly any question of interpretation: “What is required for the interpretation (of history) is an intersection of determinate and reflective judgments, not an integration that would dissolve the differences. To keep the interpretative critical we must preserve a sense of the difference between the reason that authenticates norms and the reflection that brings them to bear on the actual world” (p. 169). The relevance of this distinction is especially pertinent when considered as here in the public sphere “... the goal of hermeneutics should reflect the Kantian ideal of enlarged thought in which we expand our common perspective through imagination and interpretation while maintaining our critical bearings” (p. 171). The relevance of that interpretative intersection is borne out in the next chapter through the pedagogical application of reflective judgment. At this point, however, there is a need to expand on the importance and content of Kant’s anthropology per se. Allen Wood and Robert Louden are the two Kantian scholars who have done most to foreground the importance of Kant’s anthropology (in English).

6.3 Kant’s anthropology

A distinctive characteristic of Allan Wood’s approach to Kant is the prominence he gives to Kant’s anthropology.⁶⁸ Where many critics of Kant point to the abstract formalism of Kant’s moral philosophy (incorrectly in Wood’s view) by focusing on the first formulation of the categorical imperative —Wood highlights the background of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology to underline the *empirical* and *teleological* direction in his late, mature moral and political work (Wood, 1999; 2006; 2008, emphasis added). Wood makes the point that while Kant differentiated anthropology from metaphysics in both the *Groundwork* and the much later *Metaphysics of Morals*⁶⁹, it is not until this later work that the empirical and teleological

⁶⁸Allen Wood is one of a small and growing number of Kantian scholars who share this view. Wood cites Robert Louden (2002), *Kant’s Impure Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and G. F. Munzel, (1999), ‘Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The “Critical” Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgement’. Chicago, Chicago University Press (in Wood, 1999, p. 343). Holly Wilson can be added to this list: H. Wilson, (2006).

Student notes of Kant’s lectures on anthropology only emerged in English in 1997. Scholarly attention to English translations of Kant’s anthropological works have been conspicuously absent until quite recently. The most prolific publishing house of Kant’s works in English is Cambridge University Press (CUP) and yet a collection of Kant’s works in Anthropology, History and Education, the 17th in the series of publications on Kant since the early 1990s, was released by CUP in 2008. Why this is so is to say the least intriguing — and remains a tantalising question. In what follows each of the above scholars has collectively influenced my thinking on Kant to a considerable degree. In their view Kant’s anthropology promises to have a transforming influence in correcting long-standing and (in a view I now share) seriously distorted pictures of Kant. For example, from Hegel’s charge that Kant’s philosophy is “contentless and empty” (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, in J. Dunne, [1997] Indiana: University of Notre Dame, p.217) to Kant as the “ethereal rigorist” (John Christian Laursen in Munzel, op cit., back cover) and Kant as the “incurable formalist” (Dunne, op. cit. p. 218)

⁶⁹12 years between publications, the *Groundwork* in 1785 and the *Metaphysics* in 1797.

becomes more prominent and relevant.

There are elements in Kant's anthropology and Third Critique that have important application for my thesis. Three themes can be drawn from Kant's approach to anthropology — dangers of egoism, the merits of developing local, informal knowledge (*Weltkenntnis*) of human behaviour and a cosmopolitan destiny for the human species. These three themes have served to illustrate key aspects that Kant focuses on concerning the hindrances, inclinations and desires that define our species. Indeed there is a case here that Kant has focused on what he sees as given, that is the 'is' of humanity as a species. In other words, we can now see Kant setting an all too human context for posing the regulative 'ought' of his a priori moral principles. By placing his empirical and teleological anthropology alongside the metaphysical moral begin a more coherent, fuller picture of Kant's project can be seen. Given the longevity of his popular anthropological lectures every semester alongside his more scholarly moral and political philosophy series Louden et al have suggested recently that Kant may well have had this 'is'/'ought' structure in mind over that time (Jacobs, 2003). It might also serve to underline the thinking behind his two-tiered approach as well: first the principles that inform 'ought' then the empirical context that provide the 'is', with the tension being an educational agenda to cultivate character, which strives toward 'the ought' through reflective judgment. Kant's ideas on character are sketched shortly.

A more nuanced, embodied and less formal view of Kantian moral metaphysics emerges here — one providing a human, anthropological context for exercising the a priori moral principles of the categorical imperative, and in particular, following Wood his favoured humanity formulation of that imperative. The position so far has been primarily toward comprehending Kantian moral philosophy through his moral and anthropological works. Wood especially has clarified Kant's moral philosophy across his works, especially in light of Kant's most mature moral work, the subject of development over 30 years, his *Metaphysics of Morals*. Wood and Louden's focus on Kant's anthropology has assisted in starkly contrasting the still surprisingly widespread view that Kant's moral philosophy is formalistically arid. Given the persistence of such widespread views there is quite some way yet to go re-reading Kant so as to do justice to his insights in moral and political philosophy. More immediately, however, a better understanding of what Kant's moral principles look like for individual practice needs to be developed, especially when decisions are subject to public scrutiny. To that end some distinctive characteristics of practice must be considered

Jacobs, Brian (ed), (2003), *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

as well as what those characteristics say about how making judgments is learnt — in this case moral judgments at work.

6.4 Kant's 'is' versus 'ought': opening a mediating role for the creative power of imagination and motivation

This section is about philosophising — about 'what we could become' and the politics of justice (Neiman, 1997). I support O'Neill and especially Susan Neiman in seeing 'the ought' as a regulative principle that becomes especially relevant in the light of Kant's 'is' in his anthropology. This section also bridges into the creative and mediating role of the imagination (Kneller, 2007) and to the vital role for the problematic of Kant's politics.

Neiman presents Kant as saying that human reason is driven to seek the Unconditioned, the thoroughgoing intelligibility of the world *as a whole* (1997, p. 202, emphasis added). Neiman also links this drive to Kant's ideas about maturity, or 'coming of age'. "Coming of age requires not abandoning, but redirecting this search: from dogmatic metaphysics to empirical science, from a theodicy that affirms the social order to a political program that transforms it. It requires in short the recognition that reason's function is not constitutive but *regulative*" (1997, p. 202, emphasis added). In Kant's view:

philosophy was correctly driven by the search for the *Unconditioned*, which is inseparable from reason itself; it simply needs orientation in doing so. Providing that orientation should be the (twofold) task of a regulative notion of philosophy. The first involves a self-knowledge that explores what we are and have been, seeking limits and boundaries through a critique of previous attempts at philosophy and (thereby) of reason itself. The second explores what we could become by maintaining, validating, and expanding our notions of the possible. Its task is thereby to uphold a vision of the reasonable itself — as a goal that, like every idea, we should never claim to possess not cease to desire. (Neiman, 1997, p. 202, emphasis in original)

Kant holds that it is only the recognition that there is a gap between the needs of reason and the demands of nature that creates the possibility that the two might be brought closer together. We might say that it is this possibility that provides the form of every regulative principle of reason. Kant's point is not simply that it is impossible to know that the needs of reason and the demands of nature coincide but that it is fatal to assume it (Neiman, 203). Accepting the legitimacy of regulative principles requires not only the acknowledgement of

a disharmony between reason and the world that all out efforts have been directed to ignoring: it requires the still more difficult acknowledgement of absolute freedom in the face of this disharmony. Hence, Kant describes the obstacles of enlightenment as a lack not of understanding but of resolution and courage. Again Neiman captures this well:

Reason's drive towards constitutive principles is just the drive towards a certainty independent of ourselves and our will: therein lies the seduction of objectivity. Every coming of age involves giving up certainty, and dependence provides protection. Every coming of age involves abandoning the illusion that the capacity to make demands on the world provides a guarantee that those demands can be fulfilled. In the realm of reason, this illusion is called transcendental. But one must be wary of metaphor. Kant's appeal to reason to come of age is not, like so many such appeals, a call to abandon youthful ideals. It is rather a call to abandon a youthful *belief in their easy fulfilment*: in the knowledge that reason's demands will be clearer, its steps surer, its opportunities for satisfaction greater for having arrived at a true estimation of its powers. (Neiman, p. 204, emphasis added)

The focus on Kant's 'what ought to be' serves as a compelling question for what we too might strive for in education. Of course, as Neiman's comments underline, such striving is easily dismissed as idealistic and naive. Kant knew this well, and recognised the need to argue for ways to illustrate the potential of such questions without succumbing to easy dismissal. Kant's efforts to stimulate those ideas are reflected in his later works. Again, we benefit from revisiting his *Third Critique*, and what Kneller has recently called 'the transforming role of imagination' in Kant's work.

6.4.1 The mediating, transforming role of creative imagination

Kneller's *Power of Imagination* (2007) opened an area of Kantian scholarship highly pertinent to my project. Indeed in many respects it is Kneller's emphasis on what she perceives as Kant's realisation of the power of imagination that serves to give this Kantian pedagogy a more embodied, and I argue, more powerful edge. As is argued in the next chapter there is a need in higher education to recognise the embodied nature of learning, especially in the complex situations that are described there as the 'hot action' in management practice. For my purposes it is this need for the role of the emotional and volitional alongside the reasoning aspects that gives a distinctive edge to a management learning agenda.

So far, however, in exploring the two-parts of Kantian philosophy I have drawn attention to the anthropological, worldly domain of his moral anthropology. I have not as yet done

sufficient justice to Kant's understanding (in his *Third Critique*) of the motivational aspects of our being. Kneller's recent work clarifies how Kant recognises the importance of this so-far missing element. As Kneller (2007) points out, such an emphasis on sensibility serves to offset a prominent and influential interpretation representing Kant as favouring "the primacy of the practical". Indeed O'Neill is one of the central influences in fostering this view. Her work has shaped much of the first part of this chapter and indeed dissertation. What led Kant to shift from the modest regulative metaphysics of reason to matters of aesthetic and teleological judgment in the *Third Critique* is a story in itself and beyond the scope of this dissertation. Understanding that shift has been the subject of scholarly debate for the last 25 years, especially John Zammito's *The Genesis of Kant's Third Critique*⁷⁰ (Kneller, 2007, p. 7). Kant's lectures on anthropology and later political, historical and cultural essays merely add background to debates on the origins of complex developments in Kant's thinking. So rather than explore those developments, the focus is on the outcomes of those developments and the implications they hold for the problematic of this dissertation.

To that end then I next summarise the outcomes of Kant's thinking in the *Third Critique of Judgment*, and given the complexities, limit these primarily to Kant's position as it relates to the problematic. The relevance of Kant's related anthropological and political/historical works are then addressed in the last sections of this chapter, jointly preparing the way to consider the pedagogical proposal for the problematic in the next chapter.

Kneller best describes those developments in the following terms:

In the *Third Critique* Kant theorises a new sort of relationship between imagination and understanding ... in which the imagination is seen as capable of operating independently of its function of processing the material of sensation into the products of experience via concepts of *a priori*. ... the result is a certain kind of feeling... an awareness in us of our cognitive (including moral) operations. Kant's theory highlights the fact that the power of imagination produces a 'feeling for life', making us aware of ourselves via a pleasure that 'forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging'. This complex notion of the imagination's functioning is the essence of reflective aesthetic judgment, and takes as its object the feeling of pleasure and pain. As such the power of imagination takes on a central role in the mediation of the theoretical and the practical *a priori*. (Kneller, 2007, pp. 3-4)

⁷⁰Zammito, (1992)

Again, Kneller depicts the role of imagination for Kant in the *Third Critique* as follows:

The notion of imaginative independence serves Kant's larger purpose of describing a mediating faculty between the 'is' of nature and the 'ought to be' of morality. (p. 11) ... and that the key to this reading is Kant's conception of the 'transformative' power of imagination (p.13) ... as grounds for rational *hope* for bringing about a just world. (p. 14). In so doing Kneller adds, here is 'the possibility of a Kantian ethics less hostile to imagination and sensibility' (as in the first two Critiques). (p.15, emphasis added).

Kneller sums up her own interpretation of the place of this *Third Critique* in Kant's *oeuvre* as being better understood as an attempt at a comprehensive account of nature (as known by rational, embodied beings) and of morality (as practised by rational agents) mediated by a freely reflecting imagination. The unification of these accounts (she argues) is accomplished not by placing one under the jurisdiction of the other, as is suggested by primacy of the practical accounts. Rather, the two domains are mediated and, in this sense only, 'united', by reflective aesthetic judgment and the value of hope to which it gives rise (p. 15-16), that is, for social transformation towards a just, ethical commonwealth. This reminds us in effect of a crucial outcome behind the shift in Kant's thinking from reason to ends, that "Reason can regulate but never, by itself, create" (p. 34).

Thus we see the power of the mediating role in this transformative sense, that is the relevance of hope in the creation of a just global society — as final human purpose. After the essential emphasis on the *a priori* grounds and limitations in theoretical and practical reasoning Kant realised through the *Third Critique* that the *a priori* in both cases is regulative, not constitutive. More is needed; aesthetic judgment by the time of the *Third Critique* calls on imagination, motivation, and hope. Munzel might add that imagination, motivation and hope are among the very elements behind Kant's pedagogical aspirations of his Critical project as a whole. Kneller has, more than usefully, drawn attention to (what she sees as) the now pivotal mediating role the imagination plays in Kant's project — through an essential creative and motivating power. But how to exercise that hope? What might hope in action look like? Is it possible to conceive of these ideals in practical terms? This is the political dimension of Kant's work that warrants careful attention, especially as it relates to advancing understanding of what can be done in addressing the educative problem. Kant's unique provisional politics offer valuable practical insights.

6.5 Kant's provisional politics

Elisabeth Ellis has recently identified a vitally important and largely missed dimension to Kant's politics (Ellis, 2004; 2005; Ellis, 2008; Ellis, Forthcoming). Kant's provisional politics have a significant influence on ideas for approaching the problematic and especially in considering pedagogical implications. In Ellis' view "from his early essay on enlightenment through his late political works, Kant develops an original theory of political transition that accounts for that part of political change driven by the concrete effects of common political ideals" (2005, p. x). Kantian political theory "takes the provisional nature of political institutions seriously, focusing less on ideal outcomes than on the places where citizens gain the capacities needed to bring the promise of democratic freedom closer to reality" (2005, p. 2). Kant concerns himself "less with the strictures of ideal justice than with the institutions that might promote human progress. A politics of transition to republican government, as opposed to the ideal construction of a perfect republic in thought, would be a contribution to the mediation between the norms that express Kantian freedom and the practices that exemplify human nature" (2005, p. 3). Kant's principle of 'provisional right' "recommends that existing institutions be judged according to whether they are consistent with the continued possibility of progress, rather than by direct comparison with some set of ideal norms" (2005, p. 9). In my judgment what is so powerful is that Ellis draws attention to how Kant sees the normative and the empirical as *a united whole*. In other words he is depicting what might be called a form of *practical-idealism*. In my view the notion of practical-idealism overcomes the usual endemic arguments between the so-called 'real world' and 'ideal world' politics. To side with the so-called 'real world' risks pragmatic expediency, a means also of protecting the *status quo*. To side with the 'ideal world' is to risk justifying utopian extremes. Kant's practical-idealism (my term) is the political equivalent of the tensions between 'what is' and 'what ought to be', where one informs and demands of the other without either being lost through polemic argument. But this depiction of practical-idealism does not yet recognise the role of the public sphere.

Central to Kant's political theory is his dynamic view of the public sphere. For Kant, the "public sphere works slowly, with the effects of any one argument being felt long after any particular advocate identifies them" (Ellis, 2005, p. 12). For Ellis, there is an ancillary advantage in this Kantian view of the public sphere, in that the "arguers may submit their judgment entirely to reason by their own lights: thus they are spared potentially agonising decisions between what they identify as reasonable and what is unreasonable but attractive in its short term effects" (2005, p. 12). According to Ellis it is Kant's concept of the public

sphere as a motor of progress towards an ideal state that is among his most important contributions to modern political theory, where the most original aspects of his writing deal not with the ideal state per se but with the transition from the current, imperfect 'provisional' state towards political perfection, that is, transition via the mechanism of publicity, the conditions for the gradual approximation of that state in practice. In moving gradually towards the just state Kant is interested in the power of public reason as the driving force behind concrete institutional change (2005, p. 13). Ellis traces Kant's development of the role of the public sphere from his early first Critique (1781) through to the concept of 'provisional right' in the *Rechtslehre* (1797) to his revision of his early concept of the public sphere finally as the judging public in *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) (2005, p.13).

For the purposes of the problematic, Kant's notion of the dynamic role of the 'judging public' is vital.⁷¹ The judging public will take its time in reasoning and judging what is needed to make gradual approximations towards a just state. Justice is central to those reasoning concerns and will be central to the judgments made about the actors involved, individuals and institutions alike in making transitions from 'what is' to 'what ought to be'. Kant's notion of transitions via the 'judging public' provides a plausible case for practical idealism, doing what is necessary but not expedient. Doing what will advance justice without expecting perfection: gradual approximations and via arguments in the public sphere. Here then is Kant's public role of accountability for questions of justice. As powerful as the insight of the public sphere is, it is nevertheless somewhat daunting to imagine just what it would take for effective public reasoning and argument. Kant, however, sees education as essential to enlightenment (individually and across societies) and I turn next to Munzel's insights to understand what Kant is aiming at.

6.6 Cultivating character

Munzel provides a valuable insight into Kant's *oeuvre* by arguing that Kant's entire critical project has a clear, but once again, under-recognised, educative agenda. More, that this agenda is wholly consistent with those who champion Enlightenment ideals. That educational agenda aims to develop capabilities that would see individuals not only realise their individual freedom but also in doing so bring about what Kant perceives as our end

⁷¹Ellis notes the Kantian origins of public reasoning in John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas (Ellis, 2005, p.11 and note 1, p. 202) as well as Kant's public sphere in contemporary deliberative democratic theory, such as Gutman and Thompson (ibid, note 2, p. 202). Ellis also distinguishes Kant's 'provisional right' as uniquely powerful, and not represented to the level of significance that affords ideas of practical transitions in Rawls, Habermas or deliberative democratic theory (2004; 2005; forthcoming).

purpose as rational embodied humans (or in Ellis' depiction above, transitions towards a just state). To realise that end Kant believed we need to develop a number of disciplines that constitute 'character'. These are disciplines for making judgments — what Munzel calls the critical link of morality, anthropology and reflective judgment (Munzel, 1999; 2003; 2006; forthcoming).

Munzel identifies as Kant's own pedagogical principle (as stated in his 1765-66 "Announcement" of his lectures): that his students were "to learn not thoughts, but how to think" (Munzel, 1999, p. 264), by which Kant means to learn how to think for oneself, to philosophise, and that means to acquire 'practical wisdom', because without practical wisdom 'science' would be the learning objective (1999, p. 265). Munzel draws on Paulsen in claiming that Kant was concerned to avoid seeing 'science' as the objective of learning, because according to Kant science is:

a dangerous possession and to have a tendency to make one conceited, rude, and inhuman. Now it is just the task of the academic teacher to guard against this, to guard against the student becoming a mere 'cyclopes', someone equipped only with one eye, seeing only from a single standpoint, that of his speciality. The task of philosophy is to furnish a second eye to the scientifically instructed (student), which shall cause (the student) to see his object from the standpoint of others The second eye is thus the self-knowledge of human reason, without which we can have no proper estimate of the extent of our knowledge. (Paulsen, in Munzel, 1999, p. 265)

Munzel shows that for Kant developing this second eye is ultimately a question of formation or cultivation of character, a central preoccupation of Enlightenment education. The 'method' is a two-stage process in the cultivation of moral judgment, steps that Kant explicitly relates to the beautiful and the sublime respectively (Munzel, 1999, p. 308). More specifically Kant's educational objective is the cultivation of moral judgment (p. 308), which he sees as a two-stage process: to occupy the power of judgment with exercises that allow the student to "feel their own cognitive powers". These exercises entail reflecting on examples of moral actions and sharpening the ability to discern what pertains to the "needs of humanity" and what to "justice" or whether the action is ... commensurate with the moral law (by which Kant means his categorical imperative) (p. 309, comments added). Munzel emphasises that the resulting benefit, "indeed the turnabout in one's stance ... is illustrated by Kant with an analogy in the course of a naturalist's investigation. Where the latter proves to reveal 'purposiveness' one 'finally finds one's object of inquiry 'dear' (or loveable). Just so

the student comes to the point of 'gladly entertaining themselves with such judgments'. Munzel adds that this emphasis on entertainment was consistent with Basedow's⁷² basic pedagogical principle that learning is not to be arduous, but achieved as much as possible by praxis, preferably in play (p.309). Here the students "have been allowed to feel (... be conscious of) the enlarged use of their cognitive powers ... become aware of having learned to enjoy the expansion of their cognitive faculty beyond natural instincts ... to become aware of and to appreciate their own inherent ground of freedom, here realised in judgments that are themselves purposive" (p.309). This then is the aesthetic means to cultivate moral judgment, which "goes hand in hand with the cultivation of our cognitive powers of discernment" (p. 310). Munzel also highlights that by so cultivating through discernment and aesthetic means Kant is striving to foster a sense of independence in thinking that avoids judgment based on "perceived advantages and disadvantages, which would reduce the entire affair to mere pragmatic prescriptions, the kind of rule-following that Kant had spoken out against in *What is Enlightenment?* and that would effectively bypass the formation of character altogether" (p. 311). Discernment and an aesthetic sense are essential to fostering moral judgment, which Kant considers foundational to character. This then is Kant's educational means to enlightened autonomy for individuals, which for Kant is also the means for communities to make practical graduations to a just cosmopolitan society, or what he elsewhere calls an ethical commonwealth.⁷³

This completes the second part of Kant's two-part moral anthropology. Before proceeding to considering the pedagogical approach it serves that end to assess what has been covered to date and how that informs the needs of the pedagogical approach in the next chapter.

6.7 An evaluation of Kant's moral anthropology for the formative problem

After reflecting on the literature review and the case study something of a pedagogical brief emerged to approach the problematic. In the broadest sense the brief called for both philosophical and practical dimensions to address moral accountability in management education. A dynamic of eight interacting aspects was identified, with each focusing attention on fiduciary tensions of public trust in management education. Those aspects and their fiduciary-based tensions were as follows:

1. *Moral*, especially fiduciary tensions of higher education to educate for public wellbeing,

⁷² Johann Basedow was an early source of Kant's inspiration on Enlightenment education, with Kant giving "sustained and enthusiastic support" to Basedow's educational institution, the Philanthropin, founded in 1774 (Munzel, 1999, p. 266).

⁷³ For an extended discussion on Kant's notion of an ethical commonwealth see Rossi, (2005).

however that may be defined.

2. *Moral vocabulary*, finding ways to discuss moral issues while aware of resistance to such territory.
3. *Public-political*, as in the tensions of reasoning in public, a hallmark of public-moral accountability.
4. *Metaphysical*, especially in framing discussion on moral accountability around ideals of justice but challenged by contemporary anti-metaphysical philosophers such as Rorty to avoid claiming metaphysical foundations.
5. *Philosophical*, in addressing *phronesis*, that is ideas of practical judgment / wisdom.
6. *Practical*, especially practitioner demands versus apologists for idealistic approaches.
7. *Pedagogical*, ways to approach social-moral issues that move between what 'ought to be' and 'what is' and in ways deemed by educators as relevant for management education and practice.
8. *Critical*, an arguably but questionable defining higher education capability to question and explore implicit assumptions of management theory, practice, and education.

In responding to that brief I have explored the potential contribution of Kant's moral anthropology in these two chapters. Kant's moral anthropology was presented as two parts to a whole: a metaphysics of justice and a grounded philosophy of experience. Chapter 5 considered Kant's metaphysics of justice and in this chapter Kant's empirically grounded anthropology was considered. It is crucial at this point to make some evaluation of Kant against the brief to consider implications for the final of the three Kant chapters: a Kantian-based pedagogical response to the formative issues for moral accountability in management education. So, what has emerged from Kant's two-part moral anthropology?

The challenge of the first part of Kant's moral anthropology was to address stereotypical views of Kant's metaphysics. Rather than a rigid formalism a more modest metaphysics of justice served as a conceptual framework in which to consider important and defining elements of Kant's first two critical works and early metaphysics of morals. I depicted these elements as 'points of discernment' and they included Kant's cosmopolitan outlook, his regulative action-guiding principles and his preferred formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the humanity formulation.

In the second part several important aspects of Kant's largely neglected philosophy of experience warranted attention. Ideas on Kant's reflective judgment emerged as a prominent consideration. This judgment is one of empirical particulars and stands in contrast to the

action-guiding principles of judgment in the first half of Kant's moral anthropology. Of relevance for the problematic were areas of application of reflective judgment. Firstly reflective judgment serves as an orientation, a way of looking, but with specific aspects in sight: ways to cultivate reflective judgment for character which were deemed essential to realise the merits of Kant's provisional politics. This kind of politics justifies the role of the public sphere as a forum for moving gradually toward the just state. It is a politics that I characterised as practical-idealism and one that is in stark contrast to the expedient at one end and utopian unrealism at the other. Realising a just state under these terms calls for imagination and much was made of Kant's notion of the creative power of imagination in realising hopes for a just state.

Intersecting the two parts is the role of reflective moral judgment and as Munzel has highlighted this is Kant's educative ambition, to cultivate that reflective judgment for the particulars of moving toward a just state. When both parts of Kant's moral anthropology are seen as fostering an educative ambition it alters expectations as to what might be realised if Kant was reconsidered in specific applications. Just how well this might be executed depends on the expectations of university education. Those expectations are very high but in my view remain largely unrealised. In the next chapter I seek to illustrate what Kant has to offer in addressing these educative concerns.

What has emerged from both parts is a suite of concepts and structures which I see as parts of a larger whole, that is, elements in Kant's critical project, *an educative project*. Just how relevant those concepts and structures are in working toward addressing these formative concerns with management education is the subject of the next chapter. The pedagogical focus there centres on developing graduate *capabilities*, but of a specifically reflective and embodied kind. By so doing, major questions emerge for management education, questions that are discussed in the final chapter.

Chapter 7: A Kantian response to the formative-public problem: the pedagogical approach

7.1 Introduction

The preceding two chapters developed a Kantian response to my formative-educative concerns about moral accountability in *theoretical* terms. This illustrated something of the richness of the (intersecting) two-part approach of Kant's moral anthropology, namely a modest metaphysics of justice (intersecting through reflective moral judgment) with a philosophy of experience. The first part of that moral anthropology was dominated by Kant's *a priori* reasoning drawing mainly on his first two critiques. The first critique was of *pure reason*, responding to Kant's question regarding the limits of knowledge, 'what may we know?' The second critique was of *practical reason* plus his metaphysics of morals, both responding to Kant's question of 'what ought I do?' The second part of that moral anthropology was grounded in his philosophy of experience, Kant's question of 'what is?' — what is our experience of the world? That second part of his moral anthropology has only recently been recognised as having been missed or ignored in the dominant secondary (English) literature on Kant. That second part is drawn not only from his anthropology lectures and essays in history and politics but also, and significantly, on the distinctive *Third Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Arguably, all in this second part of his moral anthropology is related, *inter alia*, and in various ways (especially as seen through aesthetics and teleology) to reflective moral judgment. Both parts are linked through reflective moral judgment and it was argued that for the purposes of the problem here such judgment might readily be seen to be oriented toward Onora O'Neill's ideas of *intelligent* accountability. That orientation is maintained in this chapter, but now with a *pedagogical* focus.

The pedagogical focus here is one that seeks to offer a Kantian-based response to my educative-formative problem. The last two chapters set out Kant's two-part moral anthropology in response to the kind of brief called for by what I see as problematic with moral accountability in management education. What is needed now are ways to open up ideas for addressing this problem, not a comprehensive theory to address moral accountability *per se*. What is needed here then is to set out how a Kantian pedagogy (based on Kant's moral anthropology) would address what I have argued throughout is an increasingly serious public concern for educative-formative issues in addressing moral accountability in management education. What is offered in this chapter by no means constitutes *the* Kantian response, as there is thankfully no such beast. There are Kantian

responses plural. The response I have developed here has at its heart the Kantian task of fostering and cultivating capability for intelligent accountability. This chapter develops ideas focusing on some key pedagogical implications of Kant's moral anthropology, with my educative concerns now seen within a far more specific context. That problematic context means above all keeping the fiduciary tensions in management education clearly visible. In other words what follows is a response to addressing those fiduciary tensions about public-moral accountability in management education. It means reinforcing the public role of universities and in turn the justice-based framework developed in the previous chapters. Here the focus is on cultivating justice-based *capabilities* — specifically capabilities for publicly scrutinised reflective moral judgment. And in this regard I draw on ideas about the role of reflective judgment and the influence, inter alia, of Arendt's Kantian views on the importance of public scrutiny. It is important to keep in mind the animating, creative role Kant developed for imagination in reflective judgment (in the *Third Critique*) as Kant's teleological outlook has a formative influence on how judgment capabilities can be seen within management education.

The pedagogy developed here is oriented towards the cultivation of reflective moral judgment for what O'Neill calls *intelligent* accountability, a Kantian-based approach to public-moral accountability, where the scrutiny often is public, that is, in public spaces. Accordingly, while ideas around intelligent accountability (in public spaces) serve as the pedagogical focus, the dominant pedagogical theme recognises the limits to an education *for* judgment. Thus, much that follows looks to ideas on *cultivating* reflective moral judgments relevant for management education — in the sense that *cultivating* recognises the limits of what may be achieved in education for judgment.

To that end I revisit Kant's two-part moral anthropology from the perspective of the pedagogical challenge, but now seen as ways to cultivate specific capabilities in practical judgment. This starts with recognising the uniqueness of university-based learning. While reference to Kant by the scholars I draw on is limited I take the liberty for the moment of imagining that it is consistent with Kant's views of education for what he would call maturity. To that end I draw on the work of Bowden and Marton to illustrate the importance of discernment for judgment (Bowden & Marton, 2004) together with the related role of embodied experience in finding meaning (in that learning) (Johnson, 2007). Then I recall the central role of intelligent accountability as judgment for the public sphere where I introduce *justice*-based capabilities as a foundational premise (developed to be specifically focused on management) (Walker, 2006). The focus then shifts to what might be distinctive about

learning for management *practice*. Here I consider Beckett and Hager (2002) for what would assist in learning to make judgments in practice: that is in 'hot action' (ie acknowledging multiple complexities of practice, including public scrutiny).

In a similar vein to the merits of the conceptual framework for the metaphysical part of Kant's moral anthropology, I consider here ideas on the kinds of *language* that may facilitate reflection. Munzel's scholarship on Kantian education recalls the need for these ideas about cultivation for reflective judgment for formation in *character*. Finally I reconsider Kant's teleological ideas to see a specific role for imagination in an education for intelligent accountability in *public* spaces. I argue that the foregoing serves to address the fiduciary problem of public-moral accountability in management education. It is an argument offered in the belief that this Kantian approach might assist in reconceptualising a public role of faculty in management education as *preparing* management graduates for *intelligent* (ie uniquely Kantian-based moral and public) accountability. Each of these accentuated terms is sketched in what follows. The sum of these sketches constitutes both pedagogical response and further challenge to the fiduciary problem of moral accountability in management education, as in some cases it is not a matter of ameliorating those tensions but accentuating them.

7.2 University learning: discernment and meaning

Bowden and Marton (Bowden & Marton, 2004) advocate a view of learning at university which can best be understood by comparison with other views of learning. They identified six conceptions of adult learning. For my purpose Bowden and Marton provide a vital contribution to what follows and so on the following page reproduce their table of these learning conceptions together with some extended extracts from their description of the supporting study and analysis is warranted. Following Bowden and Marton's description of the study I liken their advocated position of learning to what I believe would be consistent with Kant's view of learning for maturity, and thus link the Bowden and Marton view of learning to the pedagogical approach to the problem of formation in moral accountability.

Learning as ...

A ... increasing one's knowledge

B ... memorising and reproducing

C ... applying

Learning as primarily reproducing

D ... understanding

E ... seeing something in a different way

F ... changing as a person

Learning as primarily seeking meaning

Figure 7.1 Summary of six conceptions of learning (from Marton, Beaty & Dall'Alba, 1993, emphasis added) in Bowden, J. and Marton, F. (2004), p 71.

Bowden and Marton's work (2004) is vital to what follows in this and the concluding chapter. They describe the study and the associated table (figure 7.1) as follows:

(The study was based on) twenty-nine students who enrolled in a Social Science foundation course at the Open University in 1980 ... (and they were) selected for study over a wide range of aspects of their experiences as students. They were interviewed up to seven times throughout their enrolment and over six years for some. In each interview the students reflected on their own learning and their progress as learners. That aspect of each interview formed the basis for a thorough analysis of how these students conceptualised learning overall.

For the first group of conceptions (A), the focus is on the act of learning itself ... students refer to acquiring facts and information. For the second group (B) a different idea of learning emerges where learning is seen as memorising and reproducing. For the third group the focus is on application in addition to getting the knowledge and storing it. In this view, learning is no longer confined to study situations, as the learner becomes prepared to consider the new acquisitions in other, as yet unspecified, contexts. These three conceptions make up the first group of conceptions.

The next group of students ... have broadened their horizons with respect to learning;

they stand back from the knowledge they are acquiring, or memorising, or applying and reflect over it. They see learning as understanding (D). The consumption metaphor so dominant in the first two conceptions is replaced by more of a visualisation metaphor, in which learning has the character of looking at things, seeing things in a new light, taking a view and having insight. Learning is now centred on the learner — who examines things critically or considers arguments ... tossed around or viewed from different angles.

The fifth conception (E) takes understanding a stage further: not only does the new knowledge act as a catalyst for taking a perspective or view, but it actually makes the world appear in a different way: ... being able to look at things, from all sides, and see that what is right for one person is not right for another.

From their studies they found a sixth conception: 'I suppose it's what lights you ... it's something personal and it's something that's continuous. Once it starts it carries on and it might lead to other things. It might be like a root that has other branches coming off it ... you should be doing it (that is, learning) for the exam but for the person before and for the person afterwards'. ... This is learning as changing as a person (F), the most extensive way of understanding learning in that it embraces the learner not only as the agent of knowledge acquisition, retention and application, and not merely as the beneficiary of learning, but also as the ultimate recipient of the effects of learning ... While there is a focus on the meaning of what is learned present in the last three conceptions, meaning is not stressed at all in the first three. The first three conceptions corresponds to the *surface* approach to learning; the second group corresponds to the *deep* approach to learning. There are distinct parallels between this second group of approaches to learning and Boyer's scholarship of integration — stepping back, looking for connections and fitting one's own ideas into larger intellectual patterns.

The fifth conception, 'learning as seeing something *in a different way*' and to some extent also the sixth conception (in which the fifth is included), 'learning as changing as a person', resemble the view of learning advocated here.

(Bowden & Marton, 2004, pp. 69-71, emphasis added)

This extensive passage is intended to both foreground the complexities of learning in higher education and to draw on the researchers' conclusions. I wholly support their advocacy of

the fifth conception as 'learning to see in a different way', as part of 'seeking meaning' as this conception privileges ideas on discernment and judgment, concepts that have already been identified as crucial to Kant's moral anthropology.⁷⁴ Munzel's depiction of how Kant viewed the cultivation of reflective judgment⁷⁵ as being consistent with the development of maturity is central here, that is, the capacity to, inter alia, not only think for oneself but also from the standpoint of others. Thinking from the standpoint of others is vacuous if it does not mean seeing but also striving to understand differences in those views. The case study illustration of students being largely unaware of distinctions between stakeholder and shareholder views when halfway through their EMBA studies is a telling case in point. Without those basic distinctions and an understanding of their significance what prospect is there for notions of accountability to a public beyond shareholders? What then is needed to foster that capacity to see, let alone understand, if not appreciate, those differences? Bowden and Marton develop a comprehensive approach to the importance of *discerning variations* of a phenomenon, and, crucially for the purposes of this section, they argue the importance of *experiences* designed to enable students to recognise and explore those variations. Bowden and Marton argue:

Students need to develop the skill of *discerning* the relevant aspects of a situation. To do so, they need to experience each situation in a way that emphasises their relatedness and their differences. They need opportunities to compare them, to try out problem definition and solution in one situation, which they found worked in another and look for explanations as to why it might not have worked in the new situation. They need to *experience* the failure of the solution to work in a different situation as part of their learning.

It is important for students to have way of investigating these kinds of situation demonstrated to them ... the observation of both the kinds of difficulty other students have and the kinds of strategy they use to deal with them are of immense importance, as well as the realisation that other students are having such difficulties.

... Finally, it would be helpful for many students, if not all, to see some of the *consequences of the failure to discern* the relevant aspects (of a situation) ... and that students have the opportunity to try out their own solutions and see them fail and that failure in this sense be celebrated as a positive aspect of learning by the

⁷⁴ 'Points of discernment' was my rubric for addressing multiple aspects in the first part of Kant's moral anthropology (section 5.2.1). Judgment was central to both parts of the moral anthropology and to the intersection between both parts as highlighted by Makkreel (section 6.4).

⁷⁵Section 6.6

academic teachers and through the structure of the experience and the assessment.
(Bowden and Marton, 2004, pp. 124-125, emphasis added)

These passages are vital to illustrate the Kantian connections to (a) seeing/discerning (variations and perspectives) and (b) *praxis/experience* (of those perspectives). In what follows (in Section 7.4) it is clear that the experiences Bowden and Marton are advocating are more than cognitive (toward developing conceptual and propositional knowledge), they are *embodied*, rich with ideas around feeling failure and celebrating the significance of learning through failure; more about 'knowing' and even more specifically 'knowing what it is like' (to find meaning in situated experiences) than accumulating conceptual and propositional knowledge. Such an experiential approach to learning seems at this point to be a long way from those EMBA students who state that the first half of their course was about 'learning the maths'. Was 'failure' for these students confined to getting the numbers wrong, not applying the formula in the correct mandated manner? What did 'successful' learning look like for these students? According to what was gleaned from the case study it would take a leap of imagination to envisage at the halfway mark of their studies that they had moved into Bowden and Marton's notions of learning as ways of seeking meaning. The case study gave expression to concerns about the kinds of learning being advanced — differences and variations perhaps but not it seemed with people involved let alone affected.

Bowden and Martin also draw attention to a related concern about higher education that is relevant for my project, and that is the degree of commitment by academics and employers in supporting ideas of generic skills as desirable goals of university education (p. 97).

As Bowden and Masters (1993) have argued that concept (of generic skills) needs to be rooted in content, that is, educational goals such as communication or problem-solving ability necessarily must be related to communicating something or to solving some particular kind of problem ... Bowden and Masters use the term 'generic capacity' to refer to those more general abilities that are developed through the integration of discipline knowledge, learning and practical (workplace) experience, and which enable individuals to deal with novel situation. ... the idea that generic capacities can be developed independently and applied to the professional situations (as is often claimed for generic skills) is unfounded and that, rather, they develop through experience of the professional field to which they are meant to relate.
(Bowden and Marton, 2004, p. 97)

Once again this is vital background to pedagogical ideas developed in the remainder of this chapter. Not just experience, not just variations, not simply generic skills, but workplace embodied experience, facing novel situations. I argue that those novel situations are also likely to be pressured situations, calling for decisions that may be scrutinised publicly. Stephenson (1992) uses the term 'capability' to refer to the ability of professionals to take "effective and appropriate action within unfamiliar and changing circumstances" (Stephenson in Bowden and Marton, p. 97). While retaining Stephenson's notion of capability as relevant for the pedagogy of management practice there is an additional qualification to that capability which relates directly to this formative-educative problem. It is the defining base of *justice* that needs to be incorporated here, of the kind developed over the last two chapters. Walker has important views relevant to the pedagogical quest here.

7.3 Justice-based capabilities

Melanie Walker introduces important correctives to widespread views about the contemporary role of university education (Walker, 2006). Walker's contribution may be seen as a response to what Robert Loudon has recently called *Brotstudium* (education for economic purposes). In asking "education for what?" Loudon recalls the inspiration that was behind the Enlightenment. He depicts this as being a response to the question along the lines of an education toward "the intellectual, civic, and moral transformation of human beings, while the utilitarian and pragmatic dimensions of Enlightenment education — which were of secondary importance for Enlightenment thinkers — have now achieved dominance" (Louden, 2007, pp. 148-50).

Walker argues instead that beyond skills development *universities have a public role* in addressing issues of justice through developing *justice-promoting capabilities* in graduates. This is posited in support of the question she poses, "where is higher education's contribution to an equitable, just and humane democracy?" (2006, p. 18). Walker's response advances the supporting view of Michael Worton, Vice-Provost of University College, London who believes that "universities have a duty to reach out and address the world's problems, to 'make a difference' and 'to make sure that all its students are learning what it means to be a global citizen'". For Walker the key issue at stake in the capabilities approach is to ask what it is that human beings require in order to live a richly human life, where a life of human dignity is a matter for public policy (2006, p. 18). Her work builds principally on that of Amartya Sen (1993) and Martha Nussbaum who together have formulated the micro notion of individual *capabilities* as a far broader view of human development, and as an alternative to assessing economic development beyond macro measures of growth in

production and output (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993).

Walker specifies justice-based human flourishing capabilities such as *respect, dignity and recognition* and she links them to Arendt's ideas of *responsible citizenship and judgment* (p.127). The justice-based capabilities approach proffered by Walker "offers a vision of what ought to be in teaching and learning in higher education, providing a normative framework to orient educational development in universities"(p. 142). With specific reference to capabilities to be developed by higher education Walker's ideal list turns on many of the concepts developed in the previous two chapters:

Practical reason: ... having capacity for good judgment

Resilience: ... having aspirations and hopes for a good future

Knowledge and imagination: being able to use critical thinking and imagination to comprehend multiple perspectives and form impartial judgments

Respect, dignity and recognition: respect for oneself and for and from others, being treated with dignity, not being diminished or devalued ... being able to debate and persuade.

Emotional integrity: able to develop emotions for imagination, understanding, empathy, awareness and discernment. (pp. 128-9)

The 'good' in the above capabilities for judgment and in the future is that which enables human flourishing and just lives, ideas for which Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is the primary source (Aristotle, 2002). Beyond that ancient source of wisdom, it is equally obvious that many key concepts from Kant's moral anthropology as outlined in the two previous chapters (with more from Arendt in this chapter) are consistent with the directions being championed by Sen, Nussbaum, Arendt and Walker above.

For my purposes Walker offers a strong endorsement of the view that universities have normative responsibilities beyond the development of economic and instrumental skills, and that those responsibilities are toward the cultivation of specific justice-based capabilities. What has not yet emerged, however, are questions of how such cultivation might take place especially given the central role of judgment. For example, the kind of judgment that is at the centre of my attention is most characteristically needed in complex situations, that is where there are competing perspectives and often where decisions are called for under pressure. In other words what kinds of pedagogical approaches would foster the development of the kinds of reflective judgment called for in complex situations? The next section seeks to address just such situations, which Paul Hager and David Beckett refer to as situations of 'hot action'.

As Leslie Thiele describes the views of some who share a common conviction⁷⁶, “the cultivation of judgment should displace the formulation of theory as the foremost occupation of moral and political philosophers” (Thiele, 2006, p. 2). The cultivation of judgment is, however, the responsibility of not just moral and political philosophers. The whole thrust of the argument in this dissertation is that such cultivation is also the role of university-educators. With the complexity presented by unprecedented and accelerating globalization (with global consequences), the judgments of managers and leaders in practice across all organisations demand new thinking on the part of management educators. In my view that thinking is toward developing graduate capabilities in, inter alia, moral reflective judgment.

7.4 Kantian ideas in management education: reflective judgment in situations of ‘hot action’.

David Beckett and Paul Hager (Beckett & Hager, 2002) offer distinctive and relevant guidance in learning for practice — in particular work-based learning. In what follows I draw on their work to illustrate how ideas of learning are related to practice. This relationship clarifies how work-based learning informs reflective judgment and, for my purposes in particular, moral reflection.

Beckett and Hager approach learning from a workplace perspective, drawing on Donald Schon’s metaphor of the *swampland* (as opposed to the analytical *highground*) as being more representative of the learning challenges facing educators and practitioners alike. Beckett and Hager’s workplace focus culminates in a nuanced argument favouring the cultivation of practical reflective judgment. Their work thus has a great deal to offer in understanding how the Kantian emphasis on reflective moral judgment may be addressed in a management education aimed at workplace practice. The links between Kant’s two-part moral anthropology and Beckett and Hager’s workplace focus yield, I believe, a deeper understanding of what might be involved in cultivating reflective judgment. First I outline Beckett and Hager’s depiction of practical judgment and then I move to make the links with Kant’s reflective judgment, a link that can also be seen to advance Beckett and Hager’s insights.

Beckett and Hager develop an account of practice-based learning that focuses on practical judgment, which they argue has six key features. They argue that these six features “sharply distinguish practice-based informal learning from formal learning” (2002, p. 185). Together

⁷⁶Thiele notes Ronald Beiner, John Dewey, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hannah Arendt. (Thiele, 2006, p.2)

Beckett and Hager describe the kind of learning that is needed in recognition of these six features as '*organic learning*'. Organic learning is intended to replace the 'cognitivist' model of learning, where what is significant learning is defined by the exercise of rationality (p. 21).

Before proceeding it is worth noting that had it not been for the second-part of Kant's moral anthropology with its emphasis on *embodied experience*, Kant would have been confined to the kind of rationality that Beckett and Hager critique.

The six major features of practical judgment at work are as follows:

1. Judgments are *holistic*
2. Judgments are *contextual*
3. Judgments *denote*
4. Judgments are *defeasible*
5. Judgments include *problem identification*
6. Judgments are *socially shaped*. (2002, p. 21)

Beckett and Hager claim that practical judgments are *holistic* in two senses:

- (i) Practical judgments at work are not simply rational, but are highly integrative — that is the cognitive, practical, ethical, moral, attitudinal, emotional, and volitional (p. 21). In addition, since practical judgments at work "usually involve changing the wider world in some way, as against merely changing mental and attitudinal states ... the embodiment of the judger should not be overlooked ... so the rightness of a judgment will rarely involve notions of truth and falsity alone. Rather intellectual, practical and moral virtues will all figure in considerations of rightness"(p. 21).
- (ii) "Workplace practical judgments often involve a series of intermediate judgments prior to the final judgment". Beckett and Hager illustrate these intermediate judgments through an example of a doctor's diagnosis of a patient's condition. The doctor will have arrived at many intermediate judgments before making the final diagnosis, for example, the significance of symptoms, previous history, and kinds of tests called for. In each case there will be a kind of 'feedforward' dialectic in play, changing goals and actions depending on these intermediate judgments (p. 186).

Judgments are *contextual* in the sense that there are on the one hand unique situations that define the occasion, calling for judgments that are sensitive to those contexts. On the other hand because situations are apt to change more or less rapidly practitioners need to be flexible rather than dogmatic about their judgments (p. 186)

The engagement of judgment with things other than the contents of minds — that is, with the wider world — is what Beckett and Hager mean when they say judgments *denote* (p. 187). These are judgments that have consequences, which mean suffering, for better or worse, the consequences of those actions.

By *defeasible* Beckett and Hager mean that because judgments are often made over time in pursuit of goals they provide feedback which indicates the need for adjustments, calling for judgments about the extent to which actions have been satisfactory or effective in a given context. “Notions of satisfaction and effectiveness are relative, so judgments are defeasible because further understanding or information might require a change of judgment” (p. 187).

Beckett and Hager argue that “one of the less desirable artefacts of much formal education is that students are encouraged to view the world of practice as one in which there are ready-made problems with neat solutions” (p. 188). By contrast of course in practice the challenge is to “first *work out what the problem is* ... so that a significant part of developing workplace practical judgment is learning to correctly identify and respond to problems as a relatively autonomous practitioner” (p. 188). At the same time practitioners are almost invariably part of a community of practice, which means that judgments have inherently *social and political dimensions*, shaping and influencing the judgments made.

Beckett and Hager’s account of the characteristics of practical judgments develop considerably an appreciation for the complexity of decision-making. This complexity is exacerbated under conditions of pressure, situations which call for judgments in ‘*hot action*’, and situations which Beckett and Hager demonstrate through case studies are characteristic of many workplace practices. Beckett and Hager’s account of practical judgment extends considerably the understanding of the judgments called for in practice. Their account of the features of organic learning also informs my considerations of reflective moral judgment by offering insights about the significant nuances involved — especially in situations of pressurised ‘*hot action*’. There is, however, one aspect of their account that for my purposes warrants further consideration.

Beckett and Hager point to, and go beyond, the relevance of Aristotle’s *phronesis* (practical wisdom) in practical judgment. Aristotle’s view of practical wisdom is knowledge or reasoning of the *rightness* of an action (p. 173, emphasis added), and in Beckett and Hager’s view *phronesis* is a version of ‘know how’, that is ‘knowing what to do in practice’. They

suggest however that when seeking to develop a deeper understanding of *phronesis* we “run up against the problem of a diversity of interpretations” (p. 173). They avail of Noel’s explorations that “if *phronesis* is thought of as responding to the question ‘what should I do in this situation?’, three main interpretations are evident. The first focuses on acting rationally in the situation. The second interpretation is concerned with ideas about ... perceptions and insight, while the third focuses on the ethical dimensions whereby the aim is to respond in a morally correct way.” (p. 173)

Before closing on the role of *phronesis* in judgment it is useful to recall for the pedagogical objectives in this chapter the little recognised role that *phronesis* has in learning. Fleischacker draws attention to the pleasure of learning *phronesis*, which he attributes to the pleasures in learning from the fruits of our judgments — successes and failures alike. Indeed Fleischacker argues for creating *phronesis learning experiences* that have as their educative objective experiencing the pleasures involved in learning to exercise practical judgment. (pp. 91-119). Fleischacker’s emphasis on the pleasure to be derived from learning *phronesis* underlines the importance Beckett and Hager attribute to embodied learning experiences.

Before closing there is an additional aspect to this embodied experience that warrants emphasis. This aspect reminds us from Chapter 6 of the little understood role of embodied experiences has for Kant. Here I want to link that experience to learning and also as Bowden and Marton have illustrated (in 7.2), to learning as *finding meaning*. Both Nuzzo and Johnson separately have drawn on Kant for deeper understanding of embodied experience. However, they do so in opposing ways. Consistent with the approach developed in Chapter 6 Nuzzo (2008) focuses on Kant’s *a priori* conditions of sensibility (which she calls ‘ideal embodiment’) while Johnson (2007), ironically contrasting with the thrust of this second half of this dissertation, sees Kant’s approach to reason and feeling as antithetical to the need for making embodied, “*visceral connections to lived experience*” (Johnson, p. 263, emphasis added), that is, visceral connections “to ourselves, to other people, and to the world” (p. 282). I value Johnson’s rich notion of finding meaning in embodied visceral connections. This serves as a reminder of the need to move beyond understanding knowledge as conceptual and propositional. Imagination, feeling of qualities, sensory patterns, movements, changes, and emotional contours are central to Johnson’s view of knowing through embodied experience (p.70). Meaning is not limited to those bodily engagements but for Johnson it always starts with and leads back to them. Meaning depends on our experiencing and assessing the qualities of situations (ibid). At the same time Johnson’s view of Kant stands in contrast to that developed through the last two chapters.

That learning, despite these richer notions, still needs to be able stand before a scrutinising broader public. Practical judgments are a fine objective, but who scrutinises them and how? This takes the discussion toward what I claim are vitally important ideas of learning for scrutiny in the public sphere.

Kant's two-part approach to moral anthropology illustrates the merits of a metaphysics of justice in offering action-guiding regulative principles. Where *phronesis* offers a sense of the rightness of the decision, it would be difficult nevertheless to defend a sense of rightness in a public forum questioning decision-making. A Kantian response, however, would articulate action-guiding principles, drawing for example on O'Neill's (Kant inspired) principles of obligations to avoid actions which cause undeserved harm, etc. So much for principles, but we still don't know how these ideas would translate when a particular issue or decision is scrutinised in public.

Where *phronesis* specifies the particulars of the situation and how those particulars inform the sense of rightness it may again be difficult to articulate let alone persuade a public of how those particulars inform this or future decisions. The Kantian response developed in this chapter, however, seeks to give expression to the need for an *intelligent* account, that is to express the commitment to earning and sustaining public trust (in the institution, in this situation). In so doing the Kantian response openly acknowledges the need for stating clear *intentions*, together with the need for reasonable and followable accounts before and after the event, specifically a preparedness to acknowledge mistakes and what has/had been learned — again, in the interest of earning and sustaining critical trust. At the base of this Kantian response is what Wilson calls a *teleological wisdom* — a commitment to work towards Kant's cosmopolitan society or reason's 'ought'. The Kantian response seeks to engage the public and in so doing seeks to develop a shared sense of reflective moral judgment — one that acknowledges the contested nature of the issue as essential to such a cosmopolitan society, or what Kant calls elsewhere an 'ethical commonwealth'. Such an acknowledgement is an expression of Kant's anthropological '*unsociable-sociability*', which "plays a central role in Kant's theory of human nature — (which Kant described in these terms): 'the characteristic of his species is this: that nature implanted in it the seeds of discord, and willed that man's own reason bring concord'. This is the realisation of the individual's relationship to the whole of humanity ..." (Kant in Wilson, 2006, p. 44).

This account illustrates how Kant's two-part moral anthropology extends Aristotle's

phronesis. Kant's reflective moral judgment adds elements of direction, content, scope and mode arguably missing in Aristotle. When Kant's reflective moral judgment informs Beckett and Hager's work on organic learning a far richer offering emerges to develop a pedagogical approach to management learning in situations of 'hot action' — situations characterised by complexity and uncertainty calling increasingly for public accounts. This is an offering that moves management pedagogy closer to cultivating reflective moral judgment for *intelligent* accountability. There are, however, still important pedagogical questions as to how reflective moral judgment may be developed. I follow these in the final sections.

7.5 Arendt's ideas on narrative as relevant for public, reflective judgment.

The focus so far has been on the merits of Kant's two-part moral anthropology in addressing concerns about publicly accounting for the impacts of management decisions. Ideas about the kind of organic learning that characterises work-place decisions have been addressed and to a limited extent how those decisions might be expressed in a public forum has been anticipated. Still to be considered are ways to foster that learning, and in particular learning for public reflective judgment. There are two stages in that learning approach, the first concerning reflective judgment and the second the role of the public in that judgment. The first stage draws on ideas around the role of narrative in reflective judgment while the second stage highlights more specific ideas on reasoning and reflective judgments in public. Both are linked by O'Neill's ideas on *intelligent* accountability.

In what follows I argue for an approach that is fully consistent with Kant's moral anthropology — and in particular one that recognises the central role of the public sphere. I draw on Hannah Arendt's Kantian studies in political judgment (Arendt, 1968; 1989) and on Maria Pia Lara's work on narrative as a means to cultivate reflective judgment (Lara, 2007). Arendt's important and unfinished work on thinking-willing-judgment is touched upon.⁷⁷ The combination of both scholars' works helps illustrate how reflective moral judgment can be fostered through narrative. In turn this focus also emphasises foregrounding the public sphere and public reasoning in fostering reflective moral judgment for *intelligent* accountability.

⁷⁷ Hannah Arendt (1906 -1975) died just before starting the final book of her projected trilogy on thinking-willing-judgment. Arendt scholars have thus speculated as to its likely content. Max Deutscher has recently added insights through an arresting projection of Arendt's earlier extensive works, giving emphasis to the role of myth and metaphor in her Kantian inspired ideas of judgment. (Deutscher, 2007)

7.5.1 Narrative and the cultivation of reflective judgment

Maria Pia Lara claims that it took some 20 years for the phenomena of the mass murders perpetrated against the Jews during the Second World War to become widely known. She claims that this process was triggered by the way stories about concrete people entered into the realm of public consciousness (Lara, 2007, p. 6), demonstrating how films and books progressively captured attention — in Germany as well as the rest of the world.⁷⁸ Lara's focus is the power of reflective judgment and her work highlights the merit of finding concrete illustrations and a language with which to explore situations warranting moral judgment. Finding the language to use in moral situations is a source of major fiduciary tension described in the management studies literature. It is a tension that both students and academics found awkward in the Australian case study. Exploring the language and ways to describe or name moral situations is wholly relevant when considering ways to cultivate reflective moral judgment. The same may be said too of Bowden and Marton's call to provide students with experiences that enable them to discern different perspectives, and for Beckett and Hager's embodied reflection on judgments needed in pressured 'hot situations'. These ideas draw both on Arendt's Kantian-based work on imagination and are developed through Arendt's narrative for public debate.

Like Kneller and Makkreel, Lara also emphasises the important role of *imagination* for practical judgment. Her focus is imagination in narrative — in that imagination discloses details of situations — especially situations that depict moral issues (2007, p. 2) Lara's focus is specifically on evil, which she defines broadly within a paradigm of cruelty, as any violation to the integrity of human being. Her work has much relevance to the educative problem when Kekes' notion of the undeserved harm that we can do to each other is included as a violation to human integrity. Wood's depiction of human dignity as an end in itself is sufficient to recognise the kinds of harms that warrant consideration: "...a more immediate conclusion from the fact that humanity is an end in itself is that human beings should never be treated in a manner that *degrades* or *humiliates* them, should not be *treated as inferior* in status to others, or made *subject to the arbitrary will* of others, or be *deprived of control* over their own lives, or *excluded* from participation in the collective life of the human society to which they belong". (Wood, 2007b, p. 8, emphasis added). I return to Wood's account of harm in the final chapter.

⁷⁸ In addition to Arendt's *Eichmann* Lara illustrates this development through, for example, the 1978 TV miniseries entitled *Holocaust* which focused on the fictionalised (but accurately grounded) story of the Weiss family, drawing audiences of over 220 million, 15 million of whom were from West Germany (p. 6). See also Arendt (2006). More generally, the use of narrative to cultivate ethical awareness and deliberation has been a major focus for Martha Nussbaum (1990, 1997)

For Lara our judgments are moral “if we are able to see what is wrong, what is cruel, or why actions like those should not happen”(2007, p. 2). Our capacity to understand those situations is often a function of telling stories and for Lara, “a story begins its journey into our consciousness when it is placed in the *public world*, and where, after capturing popular attention, it can be *debated*”(p. 2, emphasis added). Many of those stories reach public media and open accounts that might otherwise not be known. Many of the headline-grabbing news stories of corporate collapses included the perspectives of individuals involved (eg individuals suffering from asbestos poisoning at the hands of James Hardie Industries, whistleblowers in Enron, the trials of individual executives held to legal account⁷⁹). According to Lara “stories allow us to understand something in a way that is morally filtered. How does a story affect our understanding of the world? This happens, first, when we realise that the story’s expressive-disclosive nature makes it deserving of our attention. It must be a powerful description that depicts the deed with clarity. By highlighting the dimension of a moral wrong committed by a perpetrator against another human being, we get a notion of what is morally at stake”(p. 3). But it is not just the stories that Lara thinks important for reflective moral judgment. In her view stories open debates, and importantly in public. Debates are essential. But why? What kind of debate? With whom? Through debate the premises of our moral assessments can begin to be constructed. Indeed public debates help us focus on the potential stories that better convey the truth — historical truth. These debates shape our public consciousness about how things happened and why such actions are possible at all. Thus without the public sphere and its spaces of debate, dialogue, and disclosure, we would be unable to exercise judgments. Without stories, we cannot create a space for collective self-examination and self-reflection. But again what is to be gained, why is such self-examination and self-reflection necessary? First it is necessary to clarify what Lara means by reflective judgment and then to see its place in public debate.

Lara’s central argument focuses on the way reflective judgments can help us notice things we could not otherwise see. In keeping with Kant’s distinctions of reflective judgment in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (Kant, 2000, p. 15), Lara says that “most philosophers focus on *determinant* judgments which subsume the particular under a general rule. *Reflective* judgments on the other hand, derive the rule from the particular. One can understand ‘the

⁷⁹ Further examples can be drawn from the 2008 GEC: publicly televised interviews with the CEOs of the three ratings agencies about their complicity in the GFC; the CEOs of the ‘Detroit Three’ (Ford, GM and Chrysler) over their inability to comprehend the gravity of the situation by using private jets to travel to Congressional hearings seeking funding to stave off bankruptcy; and finally, in the wake of the Bernie Madoff fraud (US\$50b, the largest in history), public admissions of culpable performance from the chief of the SEC.

universal' through the particular"(Lara, 2007, n12 p. 184). This:

presupposes that only the particular can serve as an example to begin the process of understanding the way certain narratives can disclose hidden dimensions about the cruelty between humans. It is for this reason that stories prove to be fruitful examples of particular actions. Only by finding expressive and original ways to describe those actions can we provide a general concept to describe a historical atrocity. This is what happened when Hannah Arendt used the term *totalitarianism* to describe the state's power to annihilate entire groups of citizens... In so doing she produced a reflective judgment (2007, p. 10).

Similarly Raphael Lemkin coined the word *genocide* as a hybrid derived from *geno*, meaning 'race' or 'tribe', and the Latin derivate *cide*, from *caedere*, meaning 'to kill'. (Lara, 2007, p. 11)

Lara's account of the role of stories is vital here. It highlights the need to find a *language* to name what is morally wrong and the need to open up debate on interpreting and naming the stories. Lemkin's use of *genocide* and Arendt's use of *totalitarianism* are dramatic examples that illustrate the power of naming what is morally wrong in ways that enable us to *see things differently* — a primary educative objective. Lara also offers insights into the importance of reflective moral judgment in narratives. Sharon Anderson-Gold also finds that Kant's reflective judgment has a two-fold function — to name a situation (in terms of 'moral signs') and to bring that so-named situation to public debate (Anderson-Gold, 2001, p. 21). In the same fashion that Lara considers narrative as a licence to name situations so as to reveal their moral content, so too Anderson-Gold argues for 'moral signs'. But why bring these ideas to public debate? In so doing Anderson-Gold claims that this is a necessary part of Kant's entire critical project, which only emerged strongly in his last works (post-1793 when Kant was almost 70), most notably the *Religion within the boundaries of Mere Reason*. These teleological social claims are also evident in Kant's works on history, culture and politics. In these works Kant progressively underlines the species-wide purposiveness of judgment, namely an individual's social obligation to work towards an ethical commonwealth as the highest good. This appears to be a radical development in Kant's critical project — one that calls for some understanding and scrutiny in the light of what was originally seen as a matter of individual enlightenment to the now potential implications for our educational goals. There is in prospect a Kantian connection between our educational goals and a broader public responsibility.

7.5.2 Public reasoning and judging in public

Finally I return to the pivotal role here of public reasoning, or *reasoning in public*. It is pivotal in relation to issues of trust and more specifically O'Neill's notion of *intelligent accountability*, at and beyond both the institutional and individual level. To that end I draw out Rossi's provocative Kantian interpretations on the role of public reasoning in a globalised, postmodern world (Rossi, 2005). I conclude that Rossi, along with Anderson-Gold and other Kantian scholars in working on Kant's extraordinary broad range of works, offer exceptional and pertinent challenges to how we might in turn reconceptualise the role of public reasoning in management and management education. I believe that such a reconceptualisation in the light of the preceding Kantian two-part framework recognises that reasoning in public needs to move to the foreground of management education if both the institution of management education and the institutions' managers who operate globally are to earn and sustain public trust. Communities need such trust to operate effectively and without undue burdens. O'Neill's *intelligent accountability* calls for just such public trust, a trust that enables effective operation without undue or unreasonable burdens (O'Neill, 2003). It is, therefore, to appreciating the role of and what may be involved in public reasoning that I finally return. This return assists the case for seeing how relevant and more prominent reasoning publicly is as a pedagogical capability in management education.

7.6 Towards an ethical commonwealth

Rossi has taken Kant's ideas on reasoning in public as a primary characteristic of Kant's critical project. Rossi draws on Kant's late works on religion, history and politics together with anthropology to develop a case for what he calls *the social authority of reason* in Kant's critical project. Rossi starts with Onora O'Neill:

... Kant has grounded the authority of reason in considerations about the conditions for its having universal scope. Reasoning is a matter of following patterns of thought or adopting principles of action that all others can follow or adopt. If we aspire to reach only local and like-minded audiences there will be shared assumptions enough from which to reason. But the reasoning undertaken will be no more than a private use of reason, and its conclusions will be comprehensible among the (at least partially) like minded. *If we seek to reach beyond restricted circles, with shared authorities, or shared assumption that can carry the burden of conditioned reasoning, we have to use principles of thought and action that all members of a wider, potentially diverse and specified plurality can follow.* (O'Neill in Rossi, 2005, pp. 147-8,

emphasis in original)

Rossi explores the contemporary relevance of Kant's arguments championing the merits and means of creating an 'ethical commonwealth'. Public reason, or more specifically, reasoning in public, plays a pivotal role in Kant's approach. In a succinct and, for my purposes, provocative passage Rossi maintains:

Engagement in the public use of reason ... requires a threefold commitment from its participants. The first articulates the hope that the exercise of mutual freedom makes possible. It is the commitment to work together to make agreement possible. The second articulates one's autonomy as one that bears no special privilege in a realm constituted by mutual acknowledgement of freedom. It is the commitment to let one's own position and the interests that shape it be fully subject to argumentative analysis, challenge and criticism by others, thus rendering them open to possible qualification and revision. The third articulates the intent to an inclusively universal social union. It is the commitment to persevere in the mutual effort of deliberation to make agreement possible even when none has yet emerged. These commitments are no more than an articulation of the conditions that make deliberation about the terms of our living with one another *morally intelligible* in the light of the interest of reason and of the *two facts* (freedom and nature) that frame our human circumstances. (Rossi, 2005, pp. 169-170)

Kantian *hope* in creating what he called 'an ethical commonwealth' is at the base of this commitment to public argument. Ideas on an ethical commonwealth, and the role of public argument are related to a unique Kantian aspiration or *hope*. The Kantian notion of an ethical commonwealth emerges in his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* as the social goal to curb if not redress our innate capacity for causing undeserved harm (evil). Kant sees this ethical commonwealth as an essential aspiration toward creating perpetual peace. Kant's idea of an ethical commonwealth is a species orientation (as opposed to an individual aspiration) and has attracted considerable recent attention from Kantian scholars interested in the role of his anthropology in his moral and political works (Wood 1999; Anderson-Gold 2001; Rossi 2005; Wood 2008). It is worth remembering that in one of Kant's famous four questions⁸⁰ he specifically asked 'What may we hope?' His response was this aspiration

⁸⁰ At the age of almost 70 Kant wrote "... The plan I prescribed for myself a long time ago calls for an examination of the field of pure philosophy with a view to solving three problems: (1) What can I know? (metaphysics). (2) What ought I to do? (moral philosophy). (3) What may I hope? (philosophy of religion). A fourth question ought to follow, finally: What is man? (anthropology, a subject on

toward an ethical commonwealth and while Rossi is speculating above about the content he is on safe ground in placing these three commitments in the realm of Kant's reasoning in public and it is to that form of reasoning that I turn next.

Kant's ideas of reasoning in public have a significant role to play in learning for moral accountability. Public trust in institutions and individuals acting in ways that impact on others and communities is in many respects dependent on demonstrating in public that concerns about those impacts have been anticipated and addressed. While this goes to the heart of O'Neill's intelligent accountability Rossi's ideas on public argumentation take that concept further. At first blush Rossi's ideas on these three commitments look in total to be hopelessly idealistic. Before dismissing these three commitments, however, it is important to consider how Rossi develops and justifies the Kantian idea of public reasoning through argument. Rossi argues that there is a social grounding in Kant's ideas on reason, that is that a large part of the authority of reason is social and not just private. Rossi draws on Kant's *unsociable-sociability* to illustrate this point. This awkward looking concept is Kant's term for the conflicts in our competing inclinations — one sociable the other unsociable. Wilson describes Kant's concept in these terms: "Nature has arranged human beings such that there will be conflicts in their natures. These conflicts propel human beings to resolve the problem" (Wilson, 2006, p. 106), in other words, socially. As natural beings we compete (unsociable) for property, position, wealth, fame and so on but are confronted with the need to engage socially to secure our wishes. We learn to develop a kind of prudence in working through others to achieve our own ends. Such is Kant's notion of unsociable-sociability, and in many respects it serves as a limiting horizon to our experience. Kant also extends that horizon through his hopes for an ethical commonwealth, arguing that we need to recognise that our freedom enables us to pursue both the narrower, closer self-interested agenda of objectives and at the same time a global, cosmopolitan agenda of ends — this ethical commonwealth.

Kantian *hope* is a unique idealistic-looking concept and emerges late in his writing. In Howard Caygill's view it is central to the whole of Kant's work (Caygill, 1995, p. 229). Kantian hope draws together threads from a great deal of his work across moral anthropology and politics. It is therefore necessary to understand what such hope is about and why it becomes so important to Kant's mature work (his 1793 *Religion within the*

which I have lectured for over twenty years.)" Letter to Carl Friedrich Staudlin, May 4, 1793 (Kant, 1999, p. 458)

Boundaries of Mere Reason). In so doing the relevance it has when considering education generally and my educative project in particular is revealed.

Kantian hope resides in seeking a realm of ends, an ethical commonwealth, where there is a commitment beyond individual freedom to a larger common good — respecting individual freedom for all without coercing others to our view of freedom (Rossi). This Kantian hope in an ethical commonwealth via public reasoning can be seen through the works of Wood, Rossi and Wilson. Indeed it is worth noting that both Rossi and Wood independently see recent political events in Northern Ireland and South Africa in the last decade — especially the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission — as not just rare events but also evidence of what public reasoning in this Kantian mode can achieve. In Wood's view these achievements (in Northern Ireland and South Africa) offer both hope and inspiration (Wood, 2007). It is beyond the scope of this work to address the nuances behind these claims but it is nevertheless worth drawing out a couple of Rossi's ideas on the characteristics of the public argument to see how these claims stand up in South Africa and Northern Ireland, and more importantly to consider whether this informs my purposes here.

Rossi argues that in the kind of public reasoning Kant sees as essential to develop an ethical commonwealth there are three defining features. These are that such reasoning be *noncoercive*, *universal* and *inclusive*. The *noncoercive* nature of public reasoning is distinguished from the legal coercion necessary for the state, the *universal* is necessary from a cosmopolitan perspective and the *inclusive* dimension is required to offset the domination of partial interests. Kant emphasises that in pointing to the merits of public reasoning he is not being naïve about the ease of implementation or our readiness to embrace such reasoning. He is, however, equally keen to ensure that we see the basis of hope in aspiring to an ethical commonwealth. He is especially keen to pose the negative proposition that realising an ethical commonwealth or perpetual peace will never happen without such hope. This hope refers back to Kant's provisional politics discussed previously via Ellis.

Rossi concludes: "Kantian hope is not an empty velleity but a *disposition to persevere* in conduct befitting our moral freedom. Anything else is unworthy of our vocation as free beings" (Rossi, 2005, p. 172, emphasis added). Finally, it is worth pausing to consider just how what has gone before is consistent with Melanie Walker's call for what she refers to as justice-based capabilities for higher education (Walker 2006). In line with critiques offered of university education in the literature review Melanie Walker argues that universities are at risk of losing sight of their social role. In keeping with Beckett and Hager (2002), Bowden

and Marton et al (2004), Walker points to the need for an embodied approach to education so as to foster a more humanistic over a purely cognitive orientation — but a humanistic approach that is inspired by concerns that have been at the centre of this dissertation, that is concerns to educate to develop *justice*-oriented capabilities. More specifically these are capabilities in championing justice in part by understanding injustice and being committed to avoiding being an agent of injustice. Developing such capabilities is worthy of the public role of higher education.

7.7 Two illustrations of cultivating reflective moral judgment for intelligent accountability

In the two examples that follow I seek to illustrate many of the ideas drawn from this and the previous two chapters. This will be undertaken from the pedagogical perspective of addressing the formative-public problem I have focused on in management education. It will be evident in the two examples that there is a clear overlap in the objective of cultivating reflective moral judgment for intelligent accountability, but the approach is different in each case. The first example takes an event in the daily press and uses some of the dimensions of the Kantian moral-anthropology framework to draw out “points of discernment” as a vehicle to facilitate class discussion and to cultivate visceral experiences and reflection. The second example is an experiential approach to the same pedagogical objectives toward cultivating reflective moral judgment – under some limited scrutiny. In this instance the example draws on recent history of an Australian organisation and the most senior executive addressing the complex and inherently competing imperatives of the stakeholders affected by a globalised view of management. These two examples are not intended to be exemplars of what intelligent accountability looks like in management practice. Indeed there are limitations evident especially in the second example where an attitude toward being intelligently accountability had serious personal downsides for the principal involved. Rather, the following examples serve to illustrate an educative-formative agenda in action: one seeking to cultivate a capability in intelligent accountability through experiential exercises such as these. Some ideas about the implications of both examples for management education are sketched in the concluding chapter.

Example 1: Tri-Star.

Consider the earlier **TriStar** situation (Section 5.4.2). It would be appropriate to recap some of the details via a series of handout and clips of media reports of developments in the case over several days and weeks. It would be essential for credibility to ensure a diversity of

press views, especially including those of mainstream financial press.

1. This TriStar story could be told, explored experientially and interpreted from diverse perspectives – directly and indirectly, ie within and beyond TriStar. For example *directly*: a long-term employee presenting to work over several months but consistently not receiving any duties (thus weighing up a mix of options and motivations); a family member of such an employee; a union delegate; a senior executive of TriStar (balancing short-term costs and rights over long-term survival); *indirectly*: media representative (striving for an emotional issue as well as meeting the public role for information); member(s) of the general public (concerned for example about longer term consequences, individual options, government policy). Accordingly the same context could be described in myriad ways, each with the potential for conflicting interpretations.

2. As described by Lara (Lara, 2007) and inspired by Kant and Arendt, we could as a class search for reflective judgments – i.e. specifically vocabulary to describe and *name* what is happening at TriStar. In so doing we could consider Kant's metaphysics of justice via various *points for discernment*. In this fashion we would be seeking to develop a richer understanding of the context in which management decisions were taken. Creating significant leaning experiences (Fink, 2003) is at the centre of this pedagogy in that hopefully *visceral* experiences are useful in stimulating reflections about what is meaningful for individuals through those experiences (Johnson, 2007). Much that will be meaningful will come from considering the *qualia* of those experiences (ibid, page 70), that is, relating an individual's aesthetic senses, feelings, emotions from the experience to other events. In Johnson's view

“meaning is grounded in bodily experiences; it arises from our feelings of qualities, sensory patterns, movements, changes, and emotional contours. Meaning is not limited only to those engagements, but it always starts with and leads back to them. Meaning depends on our experiencing and assessing the qualities of situations.” (ibid)

Johnson's work on making aesthetic sense of experience is based on Dewey and James' pragmatic notion of experiential *knowing* as opposed to garnering propositional, context independent knowledge⁸¹. Some/all/none of the above *points for discernment* may yield/trigger language to facilitate more extensive classroom discussion and the deeper

⁸¹ A future project will look at extending Johnson's 2007 work on the aesthetics of experience in seeking meaning in situations to Nuzzo's conditions of embodied learning through Kant (Nuzzo, 2008) along with Munzel's forthcoming work on the pedagogical roots of Kant's critical project. The joint interest is exploring further the pedagogical implications (possibilities and limitations) of embodied (aesthetic and visceral) experience in cultivating intelligent accountability.

individual reflection toward “visceral connections with oneself, others, and the world” (ibid, page 282). Such experiences call for some facilitation on the part of the educator, covering for example the following.

- *Second-person standpoint*: for example, shop-floor employees may justifiably insist on /demand hearing, considering and responding to executives reasoning re redundancy options.
- *Cosmopolitan outlook*: local employees, plus new employees in China, justice-based implications (similarities, tensions) for both.
- *Action-guiding principles* re obligations to avoid causing injustice could be viewed from both shop-floor employees and executives.
- *Public reasoning*: executives being questioned by media, in front of concerned others – before, during, after key events. The vital experience here of engaging with contested perspectives, but not simply seeking to understand the contested nature of such debates but with a view of earning broader community trust for ongoing operations in some form (the UK notion of a “licence to operate”).
- Imagine this contested public reasoning from the perspective of *intelligent accountability* – ie executive stated intentions and action-guiding principles leading to decisions; as well as an account re mistakes acknowledged, learning experiences following decisions informing renewed intentions.
- Examine the *philosophising* potential of “is” and “ought” and implications for developing individual capabilities: ie exploring TriStar alongside examples of contemporary management practice (“is”) in relation to what concerned others might consider to be reasonable and defensible under an “ought” perspective.

3. Each class member could research and adopt the role of an individual executive and ask what decisions are called for and how might they be made and justified in public. This would be done with a view to cultivating reflective judgment, knowing that such judgments would not only be viewed and challenged *in public* but also that the individual will be giving expression to their own action-guiding principles of managing and leading.

To what extent have students been able to consider Kant’s call for an ‘*enlarged mentality*’, addressed perhaps through the experience championed through Arendt’s related idea of training the imagination to “*go visiting*”?

(i) From the perspective of the public sphere the individual would be encouraged to view this experience of giving an account as an expression of their own character, the *ethos* of Aristotle’s rhetoric (Garver, 1994, 2004, 2006).

(ii) This exploration of *ethos* in the public sphere could be cultivated further through re-enacting contests for persuasive argument.

4. Similar embodied experiences, ie drawing on imagination, volition, emotions, reason, and ethos could be conceived in “*hot-action*” (Beckett and Hager 2002), time pressured, and frequently stressful decision-making situations.
5. Exploring ideas of *injustice* and whether and how this TriStar story may or may not illustrate examples of indifference and or neglect (O’Neill, 1996; Shklar, 1990). What kinds of indifference? Whose voices are privileged, ignored, absent, with what consequences? What would indicate that TriStar executives had taken into account these other voices in ways that are not indifferent or neglectful? Who would make such assessments and how?
6. Depending on student level (undergraduate/postgraduate) the above experiences would provide extensive opportunities to specifically explore moral assumptions embedded in this TriStar story and related back to “conventional management theory” (ie as typically depicted in prescribed textbooks for mainstream MBA programs). Such texts are often US based texts adapted to provide local examples (for example, Carlopio and Andrewartha, 2008). Management theories and related practices – for example, on authority, leadership, decision-making, conflict – could be explored in terms of the *scope*, *content* and *modes* of publicly scrutinized moral accountability developed through this chapter.
7. As mentioned, the educator here is in a largely facilitative role, drawing out in Socratic fashion assumptions and presuppositions, seeking to foster and cultivate individual capabilities for embodied moral reflection in a range of publicly scrutinized management and leadership contexts and contests. The same facilitative plus additional roles will be called for in the next example.

Example 2: The case of Wil Quinane⁸²: an experiential approach towards cultivating moral reflection for *intelligent* accountability.

1. **Background:** An Australian clothing manufacturing company (‘Kookaburra’) is seen as an icon brand of Australian manufacturing, with a history of some 80 years operations.

⁸² This case is developed from actual events, and draws on an extensive personal interview with the principal, the Managing Director of the Australian based company – here referred to as Wil Quinane. Many of the facts are available on the public record but for the sake of privacy the names of the Managing Director, the company, its products and location are withheld. This interview forms an integral part of the research for this dissertation. It also plays a major part in my approach to enabling students to learn (through the kinds of class-room experiences described here) some of the defining dimensions, tensions and largely unchallenged assumptions of management (the latter addressed in Chapter 8).

The situation depicted here is familiar to most business/management students and so meets Aristotle’s belief that learning ethical-moral perspectives needs to ‘start with the known and familiar’ (Aristotle, 1996). This is however new experience for some international students (especially SEAsian) and so presents a valuable learning experience in illustrating for many largely unchallenged assumptions enacted in class – notably where cost cutting strategies (so-called) equate automatically to redundancy (cf. Cascio, 2002). In addition, events of the still unfolding 2008 GEC add crucial – again, and following Johnson (2007), a visceral - poignancy to this experience.

In late 1999 Kookaburra was acquired by US based consumer goods corporation 'Mistel'. In early 2000 Mistel instructed the Australian company to find a 20% reduction to its manufacturing cost within 18 months. After extensive analysis the Managing Director of Kookaburra, Wil Quinane, decided that the only viable option was to close three Australian plants and shift manufacturing to China⁸³.

2. **Twin-Rivers plant:** The largest of these plants was the factory at Twin-Rivers, Victoria. It was decided that Twin-Rivers would be the first to close, with Wil Quinane to make the announcement to staff at the Twin-Rivers factory. At Twin-Rivers there was some 80 staff with an average of 20 years service. Being a plant in a rural setting many members of staff were family with a long history of employment with Kookaburra. According to Wil staff treated each other "like family". Significantly for what follows Wil said that while not especially anti-union there was little support for the union at Kookaburra with staff preferring to handle any industrial issues in-house. Although plant closures and shifting manufacturing to China were increasingly commonplace in the early 2000s in Australia there had been no indication of such a move inside Kookaburra. This would be a shock to Kookaburra staff. It is no small aside that Twin-Rivers was where Wil Quinane was born and raised. His father still lives there.
3. **Announcement:** Following some months of preparation Wil travelled with two senior executives of Kookaburra to Twin-Rivers and at around 0730 made the announcement to assembled staff. Staff did not know that Wil had arrived until the announcement was about to be made. The plant manager did not know of Kookaburra's situation let alone the decision until the previous evening.

On Wil's account he opened the announcement along the following lines: "I have bad news; due to pressures on manufacturing costs this plant will have to close in three months; ... and *it's not your fault*". Wil went on to describe the arrangements that had been made for individuals and indicated that he and his executives would meet with each individual to explain their entitlements. He indicated that he would be returning over the course of the

⁸³ Ten years later this looks like a dress rehearsal to events with Australia's Pacific Brands company in early 2009, with the principal difference being the public outcry over what appeared to be management arrogance in rewarding executives with substantial salary rises and bonuses just months prior to reducing a 8000 strong workforce by 1850. The public outrage related as much to management's perceived arrogance as to the timing as the redundancies took place just as the impacts of the 2008 GEC were beginning to be felt in the broader economy. Accordingly, engaging with the events here depicted as 'Kookaburra' will resonate with management students for many years to come. As the rest of this example will illustrate robust debate around diverse motivations, roles and impacts is assured.

three months to ensure that appropriate measures were in place, but that there could be no guarantees of future work within Kookaburra as other plants were also to close. He also suggested that employees take the rest of the day off, go home and discuss the decision with their families.

4. **On the day of closure:** Wil and the plant manager cooked breakfast for staff and took staff and their families to lunch. He said that it was a quite day where *staff treated the closure like a funeral wake*. At various times through the morning and especially over lunch some of the history of the plant and some of the larger-than-life characters were recalled. According to Wil there was throughout the day no sign of anger or any indication of aggression, just a sense of quite resignation.
5. **River Times advertisement:** Three days after the closure Kookaburra employees placed an advertisement in the local paper, *The River Times*, thanking Wil Quinane and Kookaburra for the manner in which they were treated; in Wil's terms this was an expression of their view that they used on the day of the closure: they were able to "*leave with dignity*".
6. **Impact on Wil:** After 2 more plant closures Wil suffered a nervous breakdown. He said that one morning he walked the steps to the office but was simply unable to enter – he could go on no longer. He knew he was ill. After some time he was paid out by Mistel but due to health reasons was unable to work for 2 years. He spent this time "painting the home". For Wil one of the most distressing aspects of the experience was that he could not recall receiving an offer of support from Mistel during plant closures. Nor did he ask for any. He described the Mistel approach as "*management by Excel spreadsheet – which is no fucking management at all!*". According to Wil his wife still blames this Mistel approach for his poor health and the stress brought on the family. He has since recovered health and has returned to work but as an independent contractor, claiming that he will not go onto anyone else's payroll.

Pedagogical considerations:

In line with Beckett and Hager's view of *organic* embodied learning in 'hot action' the above is intended as background to create an intense learning experience for students. From the beginning of the semester students are aware that 2 or 3 "significant learning experiences" (Fink 2003) would be created to enable them to explore multiple dimensions of managing and leading. To this point in the semester (around week 5 of 14) those dimensions have been

largely experienced as both emotional and intellectual. There has to this point been little in the way of role-plays under pressure.

An overarching pedagogical goal here is to enable students to experience first hand the role of judgment, especially in pressured situations, and the public scrutiny that can reasonably be expected of such judgment. This is in other words a context for experiencing and considering ideas of the scrutiny that comes with moral accountability, under pressure and in public. This is the kind of visceral experience that is central to embodied learning.

There are three steps of engagement:

Step 1: Recreate the day to announce plant closure:

The above background is used with a view to *enact roles* in announcing the Twin-Rivers plant closure – but *without using Wil Quinane’s actual experience* (that account comes after student role-plays and debriefing of those roles; Wil’s experience becomes an essential part of the case). After sketching the background and affirming that this is based in fact, students self-select the following roles: MD, 2 execs, workers, several members of workers family, union delegate, media representative – all these roles replicate the actual experience. Students are invited to use their imaginations to arrive at positions/roles leading up to the day of announcement. Students have not been at this point made aware of Wil Quinane. They know only that there is an MD to make an announcement to 80 staff with an average of 20 years service. Considerable class time is spent preparing (with individuals preparing alone at first and then grouped separately depending on roles, eg executives, workers and family members, media), enacting and debriefing their experiences of the announcement – in their individual roles and collectively.

Step 2: Wil Quinane:

Wil’s account is then presented (as sketched above and supported by images of Twin-Rivers township, the Kookaburra factory, and quotes from Wil Quinane – again as above).

Step 3: Debrief comparisons

Wil’s account is then explored alongside the earlier class experience; both experiences (ie their own plus the reactions to Wil) become vehicles for discussion over several weeks during the semester. This Wil Quinane experience happens after previous classes exploring “kinds of thinking” (see below) and Arendt on moral judgment. The Wil Quinane experience prepares the ground to explore O’Neill’s Kantian action-guiding principles for

intelligent accountability plus instances of Shklar's injustice through indifference and neglect.

This experience highlights key elements of a Kantian based approach to cultivating intelligent accountability:

1. Enables students to personally experience the emotional / volitional / imagination / visceral / intellectual dimensions of practice-based learning, ie the *organic-embodied* judgments as per Beckett and Hager's 'hot action'. Crucially, this experience affords an opportunity to recognise how each individual's experience was unique to them yet had some common elements – eg how issues of personal identity (often job related) were central to those affected – for all, pressures on decision-making, experiences of having decisions scrutinised – in public, etc. Further, that these experiences are not only impossible to model as a purely rational process but to do so would be wrong as it would not do justice to what is involved, impacts on individuals, locally, globally (Ghoshal). Importantly the experiences question the merit of polyphonic perspectives alone. Multiple perspectives are vital, especially the capacity to 'think from the standpoint of others'. But under pressure which views prevail? Students recognise that more will be needed. This serves as a means to illustrate the place of *phronesis*. This latter point is needed to offset commonplace expectations that there are rational models to follow in arriving at management decisions and that emotion is not an acceptable dimension in decision-making.
2. Enables reflections on moral, action-guiding *principles* informing decisions. This creates opportunities for students to consider how they might develop their own "philosophy of managing and leading" where Kantian action-guiding principles are explored. It is a dominant theme of the semester that students avail of this unique opportunity to consider a personal philosophy of managing and leading as a 'work-in-progress'.
3. Personal, hopefully visceral experiences of the essential concepts: *undeserved harms* (Kekes) and the nature of *moral impacts* of decisions on employees *and* Wil Quinane.
4. Evaluation of experience of moral scrutiny *in public* (Arendt, 1963; 1968; 1989; 1990; 2003; Fink, 2003; Garver, 1994; 2004; 2006)
5. Evaluation of *kinds of thinking* exhibited in management decision-making (and daily life). This approach is useful in illustrating the notion of 'undeserved harm' and the role of *phronesis*.

- a. *Reductionist thinking*: The dangers of avoiding complexity by choosing only one dimension of a problem. The prominence of this kind of thinking in market-logic (Khurana, 2007) and Wil's reference to Mistel's approach as "management by excel spreadsheet"). This reductionist outlook was described by Professor Jones in the case study as "simplistic, crude, brutal". Much time is spent identifying the prevalence of reductionist thinking in management-speak and everyday conversation. For example, when used to complete a sentence that starts, "at the end of the day, it's all about ..." Here, complexity is avoided when just one aspect is used to describe the issue at hand: at the end of the day it's all about ... 'shareholder value', 'productivity', 'efficiency', 'transparency', 'freedom', 'democracy', 'our way of life', 'the sacred book', and so on. What is missing here is recognition of complexity through the use of 'and' to link issues and to avoid undertaking actions on one dimension alone with a result that risks being 'simplistic, crude and brutal'. Yet adding 'and' will not be enough. More will be needed, and that will come after seeing the dangers at the other extreme.
 - b. *Techne: skills/craft only – amoral*. Seen in a previous classroom experience where hypothetical instructions to make someone redundant were followed without question. Enabled discussion of Arendt's "banality of evil" and causing "undeserved harm" through the absence of judgment; skills only were being used – simply following orders.
 - c. *Pluralist - Phronesis*: practical wisdom in avoiding causing *undeserved harm* (Kekes, 1990; 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2001).
6. Strongly felt experiential grounds to engage students in thinking through many factors including crucially ideas about 'principles guiding actions' – moving towards students thinking about ideas of a public pledge to the office of manager and leader, the option of a semester-ending pledge that is of their own creation in addressing intelligent accountability (see Chapter 8). Further, to have the opportunity to consider and critique Wil's approach. While clearly committed to respecting the dignity of each individual there is at the same time some considerable difficulty in seeing how plant closure was the only option presented to employees and how Wil saw this. Did Wil have a sense of his own role as seeking to avoid causing undeserved harm? Was his statement "it's not your fault" enough? We explore what pressures might have been in play with Wil and this decision. What did students make of Wil's assessment of Mistel's dehumanised spreadsheet as the dominant factor in making decisions? These are palpable fact-based

and future tensions that become a wholly justified, arguably inescapable, educative and formative agenda for exploration. At the same time Wil himself was affected by his actions and the cost was with his health and impacts on relationships within his family. The example affords an exploration into the multiple aspects of intelligent accountability. Students welcome the opportunity to reflect on and discuss the limitations of Wil's approach and to think how they have reacted in the role and in hearing Wil's account. Having engaged deeply in this experience students begin to have something of a hopefully visceral understanding of 'what it is like' to be ... some knowledge of what it is like to be an executive under conditions of uncertainty and intense performance and emotional pressure, a shop-floor employee concerned about personal identity and future opportunities, a member of a family – aware of other families - involved, a union representative torn between social and community impacts alongside national industrial and political agendas. All experienced under conditions that are intense, uncertain, deeply emotional and formative – not separated in convenient and comfortable settings, but face-to-face, singularly and together personal, increasingly in public, or accessible in public ways (via media of all kinds).

7. Opens a learning agenda exploring past and current experiences of *injustice* through *indifference and neglect* (Onora O'Neill, Judith Shklar). Many issues here involving evaluations of Mistel, Kookaburra, Wil Quinane, together with a critique of the account from Wil alongside student's own assumptions, decisions, past and vicarious experiences.
8. It is important to recall Professor Jones' comment in the case study that "students don't want to go there (ie into this kind of territory)" and that "they won't thank you for taking them there". Further, Professor Jones' view that he worries about the moral dimension and how to do it. Here is an example of what Professor Jones knew or anticipated might be in store in opening up an agenda such as this. And it prompts additional questions beyond the scope of this dissertation: What capabilities does facilitating these kinds of experiences call for from an educator? How are educators prepared for and equipped to deal with these kinds of experiences? Do these experiences explain in part why in the case study the Course Director (Dr. Jim) was annoyed with those academics who 'apologised' for their social-oriented agenda (described by the Head of Faculty as 'wanky') and were seen by Dr. Jim as letting classroom events unfold in largely uncritical ways? The formative influence on management students of addressing, shirking or avoiding such questions becomes increasingly apparent the more

reflections on these Kantian examples are considered.

Perhaps then the above is one way to engage students in difficult, contested moral territory. The questions are very difficult but having vicariously experienced these issues themselves, and evaluating the experiences of Wil Quinane et al, these questions are now inescapable. Students recognise through this experience that ideas of moral accountability are increasingly inevitable and thus warrant if not demand close personal attention – it is their future. Such questions have been raised through this hopefully visceral experience quite specifically in order to *cultivate moral reflection for intelligent accountability*. The vast majority of students who have participated in this experience over the last five years have reported strong and positive formative impacts for them in drawing attention to the need for them to carefully consider their own ways to address similar issues. Inviting students to find links between this case and contemporary events is one that students also respond to well, not least those raw events in the daily press (and for increasing numbers, personal if not vicarious experiences) unfolding from the 2008 GEC.

7.8 Conclusion

In this Kantian response to my formative problem the focus has been on developing specific graduate capabilities (not competencies). These are justice-based capabilities in discernment and practical judgment (as developed through Walker, plus Bowden and Marton). Developing those capabilities called for a much more demanding approach to learning (and thus teaching), a *deep* approach that enabled students to not only think for themselves and make judgments but more importantly to be able to see in different ways, notably but not only, from the standpoint of others. Such a capability is Kant's foundational Enlightenment notion of *maturity*, surely an *unstated premise* to university education, especially but not only postgraduate education. The kind of learning that fosters such capability was a great deal more than cognitive (propositional and conceptual) knowledge. It called for what Beckett and Hager termed *embodied, organic* learning, especially the kind of learning needed to make practical judgments in pressured situations of uncertainty, what they called situations of 'hot action'. Embodied organic learning of this kind was essentially derived through intense experiences that resonate with practice. This was not learning removed from action and in abstract terms but, to use Schon's metaphor, learning to navigate through *swampland* (confusing, difficult, uncomfortable, uncertain).

The management studies literature and the case study highlighted the difficulties of finding language with which to approach and understand the kinds of decisions that impact on

people. Moral language proved awkward with too many cases of the whole issue of moral impacts being avoided so as to not get into confronting situations. Lara's approach to narratives enabled opportunities to experience, name and debate the moral dimension. This served as an important way to open out for discussion issues of harm, with a view to learning from the discussion and the experiences of debating harm. Those debates are increasingly public so a fundamental Kantian notion of the public sphere became the focus of how to address issues of moral accountability for judgments in public spaces. O'Neill's intelligent accountability emerged here as central to the Kantian response. Intelligent accountability has public trust as its fundamental motivation, a notion that is consistent with Kant's hopes for moving gradually towards an ethical commonwealth where individuals enjoy respect for their individual dignity. This Kantian-based response privileges individual autonomy and prizes intersubjective, second person accountability on a global scale. This has been a response inspired not by Kant's metaphysics but by Kant's practical-idealism embodied in his moral anthropology. What such a response might mean for management education is for others to consider. In anticipation, however, I propose some thoughts in the final chapter. For now, my ambition remains the same, — to have illustrated through this second part of the dissertation something of the richness of what Kant has to offer in practical terms: hope in and for practical-idealism.

Chapter 8: Conclusion: a radical alternative to management education

8.1 Introduction

What conclusions can be drawn from this work? Before doing so it would serve to briefly retrace the journey to this point. For that journey represents in many respects a series of conclusions that have progressively led to the proposed Kantian response. Accordingly the next few paragraphs briefly retrace what I found problematic in terms of interim conclusions. The Kantian response per se is then sketched and supported by an exhibit as part of this chapter. The chapter closes with a conclusion that looks to some implications and questions for management learning. My concern is that the questions and implications may not be sufficiently radical.

At the core of this dissertation have been concerns about the extent to which management education has addressed sensitive moral issues. The context of those concerns revolved around mounting public critiques about whether business schools are preparing graduates (typically via the MBA) to make decisions fully aware and accepting of the moral consequences of those decisions. It became apparent from the outset that these concerns could be represented as comprising a series of 'fiduciary tensions' for management educators, where fiduciary represents ideas around public trust. In other words, do business schools warrant public trust that graduates are emerging with the requisite capacity to not only make informed decisions but be accountable for the moral impacts of their decisions? I was able to illustrate through the case study some manifestations of serious fiduciary tensions, most notably the frustrations and difficulties expressed and observed with Professor Jones and Dr. Jim. These broader public concerns were accentuated through the course of the literature review resulting in the need to question not just the difficulties in teaching but even the *salience* of moral issues in management education, and specifically the MBA.

From both the case study and the literature I concluded that the salience of moral issues (or more accurately the absence of such salience, perhaps even avoidance) was indeed a major problem. While some management educators struggle to address moral issues most (according to Khurana) business schools have abandoned any prospect of seeing management as a professional formation with commensurate commitments to public wellbeing. In other words, it could be concluded that despite some struggles moral issues

appear not to be salient because the moral agenda normally associated with professional formation has been abandoned and is not the educational agenda of business schools. Even those CMS scholars openly committed to redressing what they see as the amoral basis of much management theory and practice appear to have concluded that their efforts have been far from effective and that a deeper engagement with a broader public is essential if their ideals are to be approached. Wray-Bliss (forthcoming) provided some direction that deeper public engagement might take and the kind of engagements that might redress the problems for CMS scholars.

In response to those fiduciary tensions and in order to avoid leaving the problem simply more exposed, I sought to find a way to make some inroads into the problem. By the end of the case study and upon reflecting on key conclusions from the literature review I redefined the problem in terms of pedagogical questions that were at the heart of the broader public critique addressed in the opening chapter. That critique was to a large degree about concerns for accountability, but not of the usual legal or governance accountability. These were now clearly justifiable concerns about *moral* accountability. More specifically, as illustrated in the case study and when accentuated by conclusions to the literature review, these questions were characterised by concerns about the extent to which management education was preparing graduates for moral accountability — and accounting for their decisions increasingly under broader public scrutiny.

By this stage an amalgam of intersecting issues accentuated the complexity of developing such a response. Public concerns for justice were perceived to be at the base of the accountability call and when examined this concern manifested links and tensions of its own: justice for whom, what kind of justice, on what scale, how would such justice be viewed by those affected and implicated, how would conflicts in perspectives of justice be addressed; what might the role of universities be in such instances when it is clear that there are already serious and rising public questions about the complicity of management education in not preparing management graduates in such matters?


While not representative of the whole field Jones, Parker and ten Bos's exposé of Business Ethics proved a turning point in how such complexities and tensions might be addressed. Their CMS based critique of the Business Ethics field as a series of *foreclosures* identified the rich prospect of engaging with Immanuel Kant in thinking about ways to respond to the problem. Jones et al clearly considered Kant as vital in informing ideas on ethics for business and management and were highly critical of the prominence of Bowie's version of Kant's

Exhibit 1: A Kantian response to formative problems in approaches to MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY inside the MBA:

A practical-idealist KANTIAN PEDAGOGY preparing graduates with a distinctive capability for


INTELLIGENT ACCOUNTABILITY (ie moral accountability in public judging)

Principal sources are in brackets; arrows depict *intersecting* dynamics (Makkreel)



**Exhibit 1: A Kantian response to formative problems in approaches to MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY inside the MBA:
 A practical-idealist KANTIAN PEDAGOGY preparing graduates with a distinctive capability for
 INTELLIGENT ACCOUNTABILITY (ie moral accountability in public judging)**

Principal sources are in brackets; arrows depict *intersecting* dynamics (Makkreel)



Four main sections make up the exhibit:

1. Kant's metaphysics of justice. Here the various dimensions and points of discernment are set out, covering issues of the *scope, mode* and *content* of the conceptual and (*a priori*) embodied framework with which to consider issues of justice. The *a priori* embodied dimension is vital here (via Nuzzo, 2005, 2008).
2. Kant's empirical work or philosophy of experience. Here the crucial matter of an *orientation* captures the need for imagination and interpretation in cultivating character and moving towards Kant's notion of provisional right, the interim practical gradualism toward ideals of a civil commonwealth, ie Kant's practical-idealist vision.
3. The intersection of the two parts of Kant's moral anthropology depicting the objective of cultivating reflective moral judgment for *intelligent* accountability
4. The pedagogical base illustrating the argument for developing graduate justice-based capabilities through *experiential embodied learning*, especially in coming to use terms that are charged with visceral meaning for moral content. Here the work of Lara is vital in seeing narratives as a way to open ideas into reflective judgment through naming moral concepts for particulars. This naming process is part of a broader role in opening moral concepts to public debate and scrutiny, the forum needed to account for decisions, seeing public scrutiny as concerns for issues of justice and respect that are essential to Kant's hopes for realising a civil commonwealth through public reasoning and judging in public.

8.2 A Kantian pedagogy for intelligent accountability?

In the previous chapter I included two classroom-based examples of a Kantian approach to moral accountability. Those examples were of an approach within one broad management subject. But there is more to consider if a Kantian approach was to be viewed across the MBA curriculum, and it is to that purpose that the rest of this chapter turns. I begin with a point of departure with the pervasive influence (in this dissertation) of Khurana and then move to further developments. I will pose questions I believe are now inescapable for management educators and close with what I hope is a worthy and radical Kantian view oriented to restoring public trust in our uniquely privileged public roles as university-based educators.

Khurana is the latest in the line of scholars drawing attention to the problem that is at the centre of this dissertation. His critique highlights the extent of the problem in that by his

lights (and mine) too many business schools have abandoned a professionalising mission for management and have sided seemingly exclusively with market-logic. The cost is, as Khurana puts it, the *legitimacy* of that university education. I share Khurana's deepest concerns about the consequences of such a loss and the implications of a seemingly entrenched view that market-logic is the dominant if not sole determinant of curricula.

My point of departure is with Khurana's pedagogical route to restoring a *civic* base for professionalism. I argue for an allied although far more public and explicitly formative approach: reconceptualising management education as, necessarily, *preparation for moral accountability in public*. Drawing on both the literature review and the case study herein I champion moral accountability *to* individuals *for* impacts of management decisions (as opposed to accounting *to* abstract collectives such as employees) (Todorov, 2003). My position is wholly in accord with the orientation to an 'ethical direction' urged by Wray-Bliss (forthcoming), where Kant's concern for 'moral dignity' of the individual is central. Bliss-Wray's orientation is directed at identifying issues of harm in practice, concerns I have described variously via Kekes and O'Neill as avoiding causing underserved harm.

I also avoid privileging either management or leadership as a moral basis for professionalism believing that moral accountability trumps both. Above all, I focus pedagogical attention on O'Neill's Kantian *intelligent* accountability in responding to *public demand* for moral accountability (O'Neill, 2003). Such public demand for moral accountability is I believe an expression of the much-understated although insistent community role in Khurana's *markets-institutions-community* mix. Intelligent accountability aims at fostering essential trustworthiness in society and stands in stark contrast to a legalistic approach to accountability, which O'Neill (2003) argues simply serves to undermine trust within society. I also argue for cultivating Kant's *reflective moral judgment* to approach moral accountability (Munzel, forthcoming).⁸⁶ Such cultivation calls for engaging with a modest metaphysics to enable discourse on these matters (Flikschuh, 2000a; 2000b)

⁸⁶ The rise of self-interest as *the* unquestioned premise in the dominant Lockean-Rousseauian based western education is a major theme in Munzel's forthcoming work. Munzel shows (inter alia) how Kant's *oeuvre* set out to challenge that premise, and with an educational, formative intent. Without using those same terms I have argued here that something of this self-interest dynamic may be evident in unquestioned assumptions in management education – seen most explicitly in Ghoshal's pivotal critique of economic assumptions in management theory (Ghoshal, 2005). In other words something of this dynamic may be seen in striving to understand the tensions within management education in addressing moral accountability. Munzel's argument about the rise of self-interest and the dependency on law as a guardian for humanity could see some parallel in the relative absence of a moral discourse and the conflation of legal and ethical in management education, leaving the educational agenda as predominantly focused on the accumulation and assessment of knowledge, as *techné*. I will explore this relationship in future work (drawing on Munzel, forthcoming).

and, not least, ideals of hope in a shared future (Louden, 2007).

Just as we hold the image of a Prime Minister or President personally writing to the families of those who have lost their lives in battle, I believe that Darwall's Kantian second-person standpoint demands no less, indeed and in some respects crucially *more*, of managers and leaders in matters of moral accountability for the impacts of major management decisions on individuals, families and communities. (Darwall, 2006a; 2006b; 2007). Out of respect if not *reverence* for *individual* human dignity I believe as university-based educators we have a civic and cosmopolitan responsibility to prepare our graduates for such intelligent accountability (Timmermann, 2007). If not, then in light of both Khurana's (2007) and Ghoshal's critiques (2003; 2005), coupled now with broadly supporting evidence presented in the case study, the literature review, and contemporary raw events such as the 2008 GEC, we need to ask: what is this management education actually *for* and in *whose interests* (Louden, 2007)? In my view a publicly scrutinised account is called for. One response, a Kantian one, is proposed here as a credible, comprehensive although deeply challenging, option. But why *greater* demands on managers and leaders than those of a Prime Minister or a President? This is surely hyperbole carried to incredulity? Therein lies for me, the salutary rub of the Kantian second-person standpoint and inherent challenges to management's seemingly unquestioned moral authority. The second-person standpoint of *equal moral authority* opens issues of *informed consent*, consent that can be granted, refused, withdrawn (Manson & O'Neill, 2007; O'Neill, 2002). *Imagine consent and authority negotiated under the terms of intelligent accountability, shaped by the second-person standpoint.* Accordingly there would be a great deal more at stake than responding with a letter to those affected after a decision had been made. Second-person moral authority under intelligent accountability would change the way organisational decisions would be both considered and executed.

I have argued for a Kantian pedagogy toward preparing management graduates to account publicly for the moral impacts of their decisions. This Kantian two-part moral anthropology consists of a justice-based metaphysical framework to inform and facilitate discussions involved in cultivating reflective moral judgment. In light of increased academic attention across many disciplines (including management) over the last 30-40 years in rightly championing diversity and plurality, these Kantian concepts pose a telling alternative insight about the pivotal public question of whether championing such diversity has been at the cost of remembering and consolidating what we humans hold in common as a species (Rossi, 2005; Wray-Bliss (forthcoming)). In my judgment an imbalance of this kind is all too evident in the tensions of the MBA curriculum. At mid-2007 the AoM learning community

continues to pose a scientific response (Shareef, 2007) to systemic moral problematics so powerfully articulated by Ghoshal in 2005. Is this ongoing search for scientific certainty (necessarily amoral in the sense of Weberian values neutrality) an illustration of the problematic that is at the centre of this dissertation, that is, one of the difficulties within the academy toward enabling an inclusive, cosmopolitan and thus mutually accountable moral outlook as opposed to a merely critical instrumentalist/commodifying outlook? It is hoped that the Kantian concepts and the 'is' to 'ought' capabilities-orientation offered herein points the way to what Kant so presciently called attention to, namely that the role of the *educator as the most important role of all in a global, cosmopolitan society* — the cultivation of reflective moral judgment, essential to Kantian ideas of character and hope, or more minimally, education for intelligent moral accountability.

8.3 Challenges and questions will define public relevance

Before returning to the formative-public problem I end with more questions of management education:

- *How do we respond to public calls to account for how we have shaped future leaders to publicly account for their moral decisions?*
- *Will championing the need to respect diverse perspectives be sufficient?*
- *How do we account for how we have met our public responsibilities in preparing our graduates to account publicly for how they have respected the dignity of those individuals affected by their decisions as managers/leaders?*
- *On what grounds might such a public discern what constitutes a reasonable account?*
- *How might developing ideas of informed consent be relevant for intelligent accountability – especially as those ideas challenge management authority?*
- *As we acknowledge the pledges⁸⁷ to public good-wellbeing of professions — eg justice for lawyers, health for medical practitioners, etc — what might a pledge to public wellbeing look like for management practitioners? Who would oversee? And how? In the absence of a pledge to public wellbeing what grounds do management practitioners have for fostering public trust in their actions? How do these ideas translate into practice for management academics? Is there a notional or public commitment to fostering wellbeing that is toward a public good or is furthering knowledge per se sufficient?*
- *What moral authority is publicly invested in management educators? Does moral authority differ from scholastic-epistemic-research-based authority and if so how? Who might judge?*

⁸⁷ Addressed briefly in footnote 89.

For management educators I believe that these are among our most urgent and inescapable questions. In line with Stewart Clegg's observation these are the kinds of questions that can no longer be 'shirked' by management educators.⁸⁸ These questions illustrate some of the tensions evidenced in the case study where there was both a failure to address ethical issues (Professor Jones' professed difficulties) and where some actively worked against incorporating ethical and moral issues (recall Dr. Jim's account of faculty leaders influence about ethical/moral issues not being of interest to practicing managers and thus not to be addressed).

I also believe that a contemporary Kantian moral anthropology offers management educators a comprehensive, responsible and remarkably fecund option to explore in response to such questions. Appreciating Kant's critical project as an evolving but purposeful whole invites us to see our larger vocation⁸⁹ as one of cultivating recognition of joint moral obligations in creating a cosmopolitan ethical commonwealth. This is a hope-based aspiration worthy of any educator. It is also in my view a now urgent public call for management educators to reconsider the public, moral and cosmopolitan dimensions of our vocation — to reconceptualise management education as cultivating intelligent accountability in management: as an essential capability in higher education. Creating an ethical commonwealth demands no less and much more.

I hope that a deeper recognition of Kant's critical project may stand as a defining, liberating and galvanising opening into seeing our vocational purpose as management educators in cultivating commitment and capabilities to advancing a cosmopolitan, public commonwealth sense of moral accountability in management practice — and beyond. Such a response would be consistent with the call from Wray-Bliss (forthcoming) for a more 'ethical direction' in management studies (ie via research and education) – a direction that is focused on and committed to Kant's notion of singular, individual 'moral dignity'. From that standpoint there are however the humbling questions of imagination and courage. It would be a truism to end simply that humanity deserves no less; but it is accounting for the

⁸⁸ Stewart Clegg's unpublished but personally confirmed remark in opening (along with co-convenor Carl Rhodes) an international conference on management ethics at the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) in December 2005. See papers presented at that conference in Clegg & Rhodes, 2006.

⁸⁹ In future work I will link this notion of 'vocation' to, inter alia, historical questions about the relevance of 'pledges' and 'offices'. The intention is to develop a deeper understanding of these terms with a view to engaging management students and academics in exploring and perhaps reconceptualising the trust-building role and limitations of a public pledge to upholding human dignity (pointed to on p. 216). For historical background to presuppositions in notions of 'offices' and 'pledges' see especially Condren (2006) and also Hunter (2001).

human failure of courage and imagination that worries me — in myself particularly. Such failure would be most conspicuous now in leaving this idea with the completion of the dissertation — that is knowing that really there can be no going back — what to knowledge transfer? to *techne*? I am acutely aware of the worst, an entrenched *status quo*, but am emboldened by the courage and inspiration of Kant — and in our own day by Felicitas Munzel and perhaps just a handful of Kantian scholars turning to Kant as philosopher-educator.

At the beginning of the 21st century Kant's *paideia* looks radical. As a critique of modernity it is radical. As I have argued here it serves, however, as an inspiring source to reconceptualise management education: an education that seeks to cultivate reflective moral judgment for intelligent accountability; with this reflective moral judgment as a defining capability of higher education in management. This would be a capability focused on fostering both trust and humanity over the unquestioned post-Enlightenment premise of self-interest as natural law and artificial law as the moral guardian for humanity. Kant shows that we are capable of more than such a Lockean-Rousseauian view. We are back to courage and imagination — embodied, finite human qualities beyond the solely rational. Now it seems humanity as a species will need all these qualities — and in abundance. Humanity has its own needs. Education as argued here has a purpose beyond *techne*, beyond being valued merely as a *Brotstudium* (Louden, 2007, p. 148), and contrary to Moldoveanu and Martin, more toward *phronesis* and less than as a kind of tacit logic defining *poiesis* (2008, p.73).

I have presented and illustrated a Kantian argument that education is charged with such a purpose. It calls for educators to 'think institutionally', ie to think about the purposes of the institution of higher education and to see their own role as stewards toward the public goods delivered institutionally (Hecl, 2008). There are cognitive and emotional attachments to this inter-generational stewardship (ibid, p. 4). I have especially presented an argument that much public, global wellbeing depends on the formation of future managers and leaders through management education. Respect for such an educative, formation process would be at distinct odds to those who recently expressed the view that the educational mission of management education is a matter of *designing a process to produce* managers and leaders *equipped with a unique, integrated logic*. While agreeing with those in CMS that an understanding of the global complexities facing managers and leaders calls for distinctly and qualitatively different approaches to the contemporary dominant North American MBA, I side with those championing a far more embodied and less rationally dependent,

logic-based approach (as most recently expressed for example in Moldoveanu and Martin, 2008).

Throughout the course of this dissertation I have progressively argued that Immanuel Kant's moral anthropology provides much to sustain practical hopes for realising ideals of cosmopolitan justice through management education. In my view, Kant offers an unprecedented, exceptionally rich, mature, empirically grounded and inspiring vision of what humanity can be. Despite wholly justifiable rejection of Kant's culturally shaped early outlook on gender and race, there is in the light of his late, revised thinking a sustainable view that he championed ideas of hopes for liberty, freedom and accountability. This is a view that also readily acknowledges a propensity to romanticise in ideals — to be 'other worldly'. The romantic inclination in turn calls for a major qualification on Kant. *If we accept Kant's account of the metaphysical limitations of our reasoning, then the moral imperatives demanded in the inherent dignity and authority of each individual, and the prospects of our imaginative capabilities enable insights into an extraordinary inspiring approach to the problematic at the heart of this dissertation. I share Kant's practical-idealist approach. The hyphen marks a distinctive outlook, it seeks to avoid the dual risks of merely expedient pragmatism and potentially fundamentalist utopianism. A liberal form of gradual radicalism perhaps.*

8.4 But is 'management' key to the formative problem?

In that light I want to close with concerns for the largely unchallenged assumptions behind management studies per se: the assumption that management is *the* way to organise. This is Parker's view and it is one that I have wrestled with throughout this work — mostly implicitly. At the end of the dissertation I suspect that a major source of the fiduciary tensions is the unstated premise in management studies and practice that management is uniquely placed to provide answers. If not by management how else? There is an arrogance in posing the question. Management has provided and continues to provide many solutions to multitudinous organisational problems. But now it seems to me it also is the source of many problems, and they are nasty endemic problems. There is a persistent theme in the management studies literature and certainly a matching sense in the Australian case study that management verges on dehumanising and depersonalising in gaining effective results, efficiently. I have come to ridicule the contemptuous presumptions of humans as resources or assets or anything that detracts from seeing an individual as possessing an innate dignity. Why is it so hard to challenge this assumption about humans as resources? Wood's account of human dignity resonates here:

...a more immediate conclusion from the fact that humanity is an end in itself is that human beings should never be treated in a manner that *degrades* or *humiliates* them, should not be *treated as inferior* in status to others, or made *subject to the arbitrary will* of others, or be *deprived of control* over their own lives, or *excluded* from participation in the collective life of the human society to which they belong. (Wood, 2007, p. 8, emphasis added)

Wood's definition of dignity presents major challenges to conventional thinking in management as it holds out questions on authority to take decisions that are at the heart of my formative problem. I return to those questions below. In the meantime the earlier question of why it is difficult to challenge assumptions about humans as resources remains. Perhaps Kant provides one answer in his awkward *unsocial-sociability*, his notion that we are competitive by nature and would happily dominate to gain control over others but recognise that those unsociable motivations need to be tempered by being sociable. Management thinking does not seem to want to pose such questions presumably so as to avoid the obvious answer. Awareness of this innate tendency ought alone to be sufficient to justify moral-public accountability. But the related question is how might that awareness be developed? This is part of a larger and quite different and still relevant account: the ancient educative argument favouring liberal arts, as a means to understanding our fragile, complex, dignified and human capabilities, for celebrating our creative imaginations and for alerting us to the undeserved harm we cause. In my view a *deep* engagement with the liberal arts — not a perfunctory gloss — would help to cultivate Kant's equally foundational notion of maturity, a foundational premise to this dissertation. The educative objective would be to cultivate quite specific capabilities: for questioning and advancing human and natural connectivity and social justice. Such an objective would, by its Kantian roots, call for celebrating embodied sensibility as vital to us, indeed as an *a priori* condition for critical reasoning, and would set a deeply experiential — hopefully visceral — educative agenda as means to those ends. Within management education that would see ideas of *embodied* formation as a public, fiduciary warrant and accountability.

What would an embodied formation in maturity look like in management education? Perhaps one way to start is asking what might an embodied maturity make of management? Not much I suspect. An embodied maturity (so-called) might see management as arbitrary in imposing its will; careless and arrogantly dangerous in demanding and expecting control over just what is needed to achieve its objectives, that is, resources, and sole power to determine how resources are defined and used. Wood's concerns come alive in such a

depiction. As does Hobbes' *Leviathan* loom large (Skinner, 2008). Perhaps that depiction of the *Leviathan* could be the name for this kind of arrogance. Those expectations might be a little more modest if as previously mentioned O'Neill's and Manson's ideas of informed consent were a normal part of daily life (Manson & O'Neill, 2007; O'Neill, 2002). Not consent to the *Leviathan* but consent that may be refused and withdrawn and a consent that is always conditional upon respect for, if not a mature reverence for, human dignity and fragile existence. Idealist? Sure! So what would advance that agenda to also meeting more practical concerns?

The management studies literature continues to point strongly to a view that public trust in management education is misplaced, if that trust is for an education that is focused on delivering graduates with a keen awareness of the moral impacts of their business decisions. Recent work on the future of the MBA from Moldoveanu and Martin, and Ulrich are specifically based on redressing that lacuna (Moldoveanu & Martin, 2008; Ulrich, 2008). Moldoveanu and Martin's focus is toward designing an integrated thinking curriculum while Ulrich's is intent on integrating ethics with economics. Both seek to redress the ethical component in comprehensive ways, and both draw to varying degrees on Kant in shaping the public role of ethical reasoning: Moldoveanu and Martin avail of Kant's categorical imperative as a part of the public role of judgment and Ulrich draws on an extensive Kantian influence into discourse ethics. Neither approach explicitly emphasises Kant's empirical philosophy.

Khurana is more explicit in arguing that public legitimacy of universities has long been abandoned by business schools. And yet an implicit fiduciary role along such lines is one of the most precious privileges historically afforded universities. I hope to have presented a more comprehensive Kantian approach to the fiduciary problem, that is, one that seeks to restore and warrant that public trust. I hope too that this Kantian approach is seen as also raising many implicit questions about current and future leadership in management education. Cultivating an embodied capability for reflective moral judgment, specifically for *intelligent* (ie public-moral) accountability, creates in my view a fiduciary-charged pedagogical agenda distinctively worthy of *university* education. The idea of committing to a significantly different form of university education for practice is expressed in recent work of the Carnegie Foundation. After extensive research into education for the traditional professions Sullivan and Rosin argue for a shift in focus to preparing graduates' capacity for practical reasoning, a focus that clearly resonates with the Kantian direction of this dissertation. The practical reasoning agenda that Sullivan and Rosin champion

could be said to be about re-grounding the ideals of the Enlightenment. This agenda grounds the meaning of critical rationality in human purposes that are wider and deeper than criticism, in part inherited and partly constructed in emerging social relationships. Thus the practical reasoning agenda resonates with the progressive aspirations of the Enlightenment project. Unlike the critical thinking agenda, however, practical reasoning values embodied responsiveness and responsibility over the detached critical expert. (Sullivan & Rosin, 2008, pp. 104-105)

This focus is the same as for Beckett and Hager's 'hot action': ideas of organic - embodied learning. While wholly agreeing with the direction that Sullivan and Rosin take I don't believe it goes far enough. Practical reason would seem to be essential but preliminary to discernment and judgment, and it is the decisions taken that will be scrutinised, not just the reasoning, but the grounds and the options. As Bowden and Marton have shown, those decisions will be a function of what the student discerns; it will be about seeing things differently. Those differences define my response to this problematic: seeing *individuals* in communities, locally and globally. Seeing beyond practice, to being accountable for the impacts of practice, in intelligently accountable ways motivated by respect for individual dignity, and in so doing help build and warrant trust and respect in return.

8.5 Conclusion: *celebrate* the formative problem via a radical approach

Rather than seek to ease fiduciary tensions I believe that recognition of this formative problem ought to be an occasion for educators to celebrate, for it justifies opening concerns of neglect and indifference to broader scrutiny than the academy. More importantly it also opens opportunities for the academy to *lead* and explicitly — and publicly — shape educational offerings-experiences that commit to dignify the individual within communities and not merely follow the dictates of an amoral market. It could open an opportunity to restore public faith and trust in the dual mission of a university. To that end what I have offered through this dissertation is but one option — yet I hope it is more: a radical option in having little to do with conventional ideas on management or with education for conventional management. It is radical in questioning assumptions of management authority. It is radical in championing Kantian notions of the second-person standpoint and in foregrounding contestable notions of conditional consent for decisions impacting on the lives of people, communities, locally, globally. I am proposing a Kantian *paideia*: an education to cultivate *intelligent* accountability for practice in the *conviction* that such

pedagogical aspirations help to expose a problematic gap in management education. A Kantian *paideia* would be an education committed to the practical-idealism of Kant's civil commonwealth. A Kantian *paideia* would be as radical as Kant's critique of modernity.⁹⁰ Hope in Kantian *paideia* in reconceptualising education for *organisational practice*? Not management? Who would have thought? Kant, Munzel and Loudon are not alone. So, to ask Flyvbjerg's final *phronesis*-based question: what is to be done?⁹¹ Kant's Socratic answers instead are larger questions about what we might need to learn: *What may I know?* (our limitations) *What ought I to do?* (our responsibilities to each other) *What may we hope for?* (the public politics of practical-idealism toward a civil commonwealth) *What is the human being?* (moral anthropology)(Kant, 1999, p. 458, bracketed comments added). As previously argued exploring those questions would be a good place to start. Thankfully for management educators, there is much to do, for it would seem that a radical reconceptualisation is justified.

Which returns to the question posed in the introduction: does this reconceptualisation challenge the business faculty? I hope that through further publication the Kantian position proposed here will lead to others seriously considering ideas of reconceptualisation. It is not acceptance of this Kantian position that is important; what is at issue is the account provided to justify to a broader public that the academy explicitly acknowledges that it too accepts responsibility for preparing graduates to be morally accountable. Failure to respond in reasonable and followable terms warrants the withdrawal of public trust in the institution. What then might a global public demand in reply look like? I am firmly convinced that Kant was and is right: the business faculty needs to be held to public account — a little too much like the faculty of theology needed to. Kant too may inform and ideally, practically shape a response; it needs to be an informed response and one that fully — not simply a pragmatic short-term means — seeks to (re)earn and retain public trust. One university, one faculty, one school at a time. Such a response will take courage, vision and resolve: surely the hallmarks of a university serving the needs of an ecologically, socially, economically, and morally fragile and connected civil commonwealth. My sense is that this is a deeply shared aspiration on the part of great numbers of academics in the faculties of business and management. My Kantian-based hope sustains the conviction that some will want to take a lead in creating a different approach to learning what it means to serve a broader, increasingly more demanding group of stakeholders.

⁹⁰ Munzel, finds a virtual fourth critique embedded within Kant's critical project, an anthropological one, grounding a "*paideia* for humanity" (Munzel, forthcoming).

⁹¹ Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 145.

Would not a Kantian approach merely add to existing difficulties in addressing ethical moral questions in the MBA? Doubtless it would. A vital difference, however is, that doing so would be justified by the university openly acclaiming it's own role: preparing graduates for that intelligent accountability. Developing intelligent accountability would see an alignment of interests: (i) the university fulfilling its public role; (ii) individual graduates' career-interest where a developed capability here would be a public mark of mature practice and (iii) emerging interests for 'enlightened shareholder-value'.⁹² Cultivating mature reflective moral judgment would move beyond self-interest, to *enlightened* self-interest by championing the distinction of discerning the standpoint of others. Such efforts on the part of the graduate and the educator hold out prospects of deepening and broadening trust. Cultivating *intelligent* accountability would be a wholly worthy expression of the academic vocation and a mark of leadership in committing to public ideals in education – with management education championing and epitomising, not compromising, those educative ideals. We seek to learn educative lessons from the origins and impacts of economic crises, not least the consuming 2008 GEC. There is inspiration and educational accord with an 'enlightened' outlook in management education. Such a view reminds us as educators of what we share and what we might hope for. In this dissertation that has been represented by Kant's provisional, practical-idealism, striving always toward the horizon of a hope for an ethical commonwealth. Cultivating capabilities for *intelligent* accountability in management education would seem to be a practical ideal worthy of hope in education. It is a hope that I believe is implicitly and in some cases openly shared by many within management education. But it is also one for which we too are publicly accountable: as public stewards, for cultivating *intelligent* accountability. For me that is enough to make sense of what I do, what I care about and owe to others, and might reasonably, if not passionately, strive for. Yet that means there is much to be done, and that finite existence rears once again. I hope to have demonstrated that the Kant in this dissertation offers a rich and comprehensive way to fulfil both those public expectations and approach practical-idealist aspirations.

⁹² 'Enlightened shareholder value' champions a broader stakeholder and longer-term view of economic returns. It is a view advocated by Michael Jensen and a view that has been, inter alia, taken up in recommendations by the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee (CAMAC, 2006) in successfully influencing Australian Government considerations re changes to Corporate regulations. A similar position was taken in the UK in their approach to the 2006 Company Law Reform Bill (www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-030.pdf). The rationale is opposed to further regulation but open to pressures on institutions to change organisational behaviour. In other words such a view resonates with O'Neill's calls for *intelligent* accountability over regulation.

Works cited

- Adler, P., Forbes, L. I., & Willmott, H. (2007). Critical Management Studies. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 1:1, 119-179.
- Alvesson, M. & Skoldberg, K. (1999). *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Researchers*. London: Sage.
- Ameriks, K. (2003). *Interpreting Kant's Critiques*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ameriks, K. (2006). *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson-Gold. (2001). *Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*. Albany: State University of New York.
- Arendt, H. (1968). *Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought*. New York: Penguin.
- Arendt, H. (1989). *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Arendt, H. (2006). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin.
- Aristotle. (1976). *Nicomachean Ethics* (J.A.K.Thompson, Trans.) London: Penguin.
- Aristotle. (1995). *Politics*. London: Penguin.
- Barnett, R. (2004). Learning for an unknown future. *Higher Education Research and Development*, 23(3), 247-260.
- Bauman, Z. (1993) *Postmodern Ethics* Oxford: Blackwell
- Bassey, M. (1999). *Case Study Research in Educational Settings*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Beckett, D. & Hager, P. (2002). *Life, Work and Learning: Practice in Postmodernity*. London: Routledge.
- Beiser, F. (1987). *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Bennett, M. & Gibson, J. M. (2006). *A Field Guide to Good Decisions: Values in Action*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Beyond Grey Pinstripes. Retrieved 27 June 2008
www.aspeninstitute.com/beyondgreypinstripes
- Block, P. (2008). *Community: The Structure of Belonging*. San-Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
- Bowden, J., & Marton, F. (2004). *The University of Learning: Beyond Quality and Competence*. London: RoutledgeFalmer.

- Bryman, A. (2001). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bunge, M. (2009). *Political Philosophy: Fact, Fiction and Vision*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick
- CAMAC. (2006). The social responsibility of corporations.
- Carlopio, J., & Andrewartha, G. *Developing Management Skills*. (4th ed). Pearson Education: Sydney
- Carspecken, P. F. (1996). *Critical Ethnography in Educational Research*. London: Routledge.
- Cascio, W. (2002). *Responsible Restructuring: Creative and Profitable Alternatives to Layoffs*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
- Caterino, B. & Schram, S. (2006). Introduction: Reframing the Debate. In B. Caterino & S. Schram (eds), *Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method*. New York: New York University Press.
- Caygill, H. (1995). *A Kant Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cervero, R. & Wilson, A. (2006). *Working the Planning Table: Negotiating Democratically for Adult, Continuing, and Workplace Education*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Chambers, T. (2005). The Special Role of Higher Education in Society: As a Public Good for the Public Good, in *Higher Education for the Public Good: Emerging Voices from a National Movement*. Kezar, A. et al (eds). San Francisco: Jossey Bass
- Clark, W. (2006). *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Clegg, S. (1989). *Frameworks of Power*. London: Sage.
- Clegg, S. (2003). Strange Fruit Hanging from the Knowledge Tree: Or, Carry on Carping. *Management Learning*, 34(3), 375-378.
- Clegg, S., Courpasson, D., & Phillips, N. (2006). *Power and Organizations*. London: Sage.
- Clegg, S., Hardy, C., & Nord, W. (eds). (1996). *Handbook of Organisational Studies*. London: Sage.
- Clegg, S. & Haugaard, M. (eds). (2009). *The Sage Handbook of Power*. London: Sage Publications.
- Clegg, S. & Rhodes, C. (eds). (2006). *Management Ethics*. London: Routledge.
- Clegg, S. & Ross-Smith, A. (2003). Revising the Boundaries: Management Education and Learning in a Postpositivist World. *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 2(1), 85-98.
- Coady, C. A. J. (ed.). (2006). *What's Wrong with Moralism?* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Condren, C. (2006). *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England: The Presumptions of Oaths and Offices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooke, B. (2008). If Critical Management Studies is Your Problem ...*Organization*, 15(6),

912-914

- Cooper, G. (2008). *The Origin of Financial Crises: Central Banks, Credit Bubbles and the Efficient Market Fallacy*. New York: Vintage.
- Craig, E. (2005). Metaphysics. In E. Craig (ed.), *The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Creswell, J. (2007). *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
- Cunliffe, A. (2008). Will You Still Need Me ... When I'm 64? The Future of CMS. *Organization*, 15(6), 936-938
- Darwall, S. (2006a). *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Darwall, S. (2006b). Why Kant needs the Second-Person Standpoint. *University of Essex 2006 Conference "The History of the Transcendental Turn"*.
- Darwall, S. (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 2*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (2005a). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (eds) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (2005b). Preface. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Deutscher, M. (2007). *Judgment after Arendt*. London: Ashgate.
- Donnelly, J. (2003). *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (2nd ed.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Dunn, J. (2005). *Democracy: A History*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Dunne, J. (1997). *Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame.
- Economist Intelligence Unit* (2008). Which MBA. Retrieved 30 May 2008, www.mba.eiu.com
- Edwards, M. (2004). *Civil Society*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Economist*. Stand on Principle. Retrieved 30 July, 2007, www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9426830&CFID=38273843&CFTOKEN=95429744
- Economist*. Insidious MBAs. www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12724353. Last accessed 22nd December 2008
- Economist*. Drastic Times, 8th January, 2009
- Ellis, E. (2004). Provisionalism in the study of politics. In I. Shapiro, R. Smith, & T.

- Masoud (eds), *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellis, E. (2005). *Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ellis, E. (ed.). (forthcoming). *Kant's Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ellis, E. (2008). *Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy Context*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fallis, G. (2007) *Multiversities, Ideas and Democracy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press
- Financial Times*, (2008), Blame it on Harvard: Is the MBA culture responsible for the financial crisis? October 21, 2008.
- Financial Times*, (2008), Editorial: The Return of the 'Real Economy'. December 30, 2008
- Fink, D. (2003). *Creating Significant Learning Experiences*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Fleischacker, S. (1999). *A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Flikschuh, K. (2000a). *Kant and Modern Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flikschuh, K. (2000b). Metaphysics and the Boundaries of Justice. *Global Society*, 14(4), 487-505.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). *Rationality and Power*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). *Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2004). Phronetic Planning Research: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections. *Planning Theory & Practice*, 5(3), 283-306.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 12(2), 219-245.
- Ford, M. P. (2002). *Beyond the Modern University: Toward a Constructive Postmodern University*. Westport: Praeger.
- Freebody, P. (2003). *Qualitative Research in Education: Interaction and Practice*. London: Sage Publications.
- Freire, P. (1996). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: Penguin
- Gallop, G. (2007). Accountability essential to ensure growth is not at any cost. *The Australian*, 12th Sept. 2007, p. 35.
- Garver, E. (1994). *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Garver, E. (2004) *For the Sake of Argument*. Chicago: Chicago University Press

- Garver, E. (2006) *Confronting Aristotle's Ethics*. Chicago: Chicago University Press
- Ghoshal, S. (2003). B-Schools Share the Blame for Enron: Teaching brutal theories leads naturally to management brutality. *Business Ethics*, 17(3), 4.
- Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practice. *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 4(1), 75-91.
- Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R. (eds), (2002), *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox*, Cambridge: The MIT Press
- Glendon, M. A. (1991). *Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse*. New York: Free Press.
- Grafton, A. (2006). The Nutty Professors. *The New Yorker*.
- Greenwood, D. & Levin, M. (2000). Reconstructing the Relationships between Universities and Society through Action Research. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Grey, C. (2003). Debating Forbidden Knowledge: Editorial Introduction. *Management Learning*, 34(3), 349-351.
- Grey, C. (2004). Reinventing Business Schools: The Contribution of Critical Management Education. *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 3(2), 178-186.
- Grey, C. (2005). *Studying Organizations*. London: Sage.
- Guyer, P. (2006). *Kant*. London: Routledge.
- Haigh, G. (2006). *Asbestos House: the secret history of James Hardie Industries*. Melbourne: Scribe.
- Hawken, P. (2007). *Blessed Unrest*. New York: Viking.
- Hecló, H. (2008). *On Thinking Institutionally*. Boulder: Paradigm
- Heifetz, R. (1994). *Leadership without Easy Answers*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Henry, K. (2008) Towards a tax and transfer system of human scale.
<http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/speeches/01.htm>.
 Last accessed 30th November, 2008.
- Hunter, I. (2001). *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Israel, J. (2001). *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Israel, J. (2006a). *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Israel, J. (2006b). Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment? *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 67(3), 523-545.

- Jacobs, B. & Kain, P. (2003). Introduction. In B. Jacobs & P. Kain (eds), *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, M. (2007). *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Jones, C., Parker, M., & ten Bos, R. (2005). *For Business Ethics*. London: Routledge.
- Kant, I. (1979). *The Conflict of the Faculties* (M. Gregor, Trans.). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Kant, I. (1991). An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? In H. S. Reiss (ed.), *Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (1996). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In M. Gregor & A. Wood (eds), *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2002) *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals* (A. Wood, Trans.) New Haven: Yale University Press
- Kant, I. (2005) *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals* (Abbot, Trans.) Denis, L. (ed), Ontario: Broadview
- Kant, I. (1999). *Correspondence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2000). *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (P. Guyer & E. Matthews, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.
- Kekes, J. (1990). *Facing Evil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kekes, J. (1993). *The Morality of Pluralism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kekes, J. (2000). *Pluralism in Philosophy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kelemen, M. & Peltonen, T. (2001) Ethics, morality and the subject: the contribution of Zygmunt Bauman and Michael Foucault to 'postmodern' business ethics *Scandinavian Journal of Management*. 17, 151-166.
- Kennett, J. (2008). *Taking care of yourself after retrenchment or financial loss*. www.beyondblue.org.au. Last accessed 20th December, 2008
- Khurana, R. (2007). *From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management Education*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Khurana, R., Nohria, N., & Penrice, D. (2005). Management as a Profession. In L. Lorsch, L. Berlowitz, & A. Zelleke (Eds.), *Restoring Trust in American Business*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Khurana, R. & Nohria, N. (2008) It's time to make management a true profession, *Harvard Business Review*, Vol 86(10), pp 70-78.
- Kneller, J. (2007). *Kant and the Power of Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Koehn, D. (1994). *The Ground of Professional Ethics*. London: Routledge.
- Korner, S. (1984). *Metaphysics: its structure and function*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lara, M. P. (2007). *Narrating Evil: A Postmetaphysical Theory of Reflective Judgment*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lewis, J. & Richie, J. (2003). Generalising from Qualitative Research. In J. Richie & J. Lewis (eds), *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: Sage Publications.
- Lodge, G. & Wilson, C. (2006). *A Corporate Solution to Global Poverty*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Louden, R. (2002). *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Louden, R. (2003). The Second Part of Morals. In B. Jacobs & P. Kain (eds), *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Louden, R. (2006). Applying Kant's Ethics: The Role of Anthropology. In G. Bird (ed.), *A Companion to Kant*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Louden, R. (2007). *The World We Want: How and Why the Ideals of the Enlightenment Still Elude Us*. New York: Oxford University.
- M'Gonigle, M. & Starke, J. (2006). *Planet U: Sustaining the World, Reinventing the University*. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers.
- Makkreel, R. A. (1994). *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Makkreel, R. A. (2001). Reflective Judgment, Orientation and the Priorities of Justice. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 27, 105.
- Marton, F., Beaty, E., & Dall'Alba, G. (1993). Conceptions of learning. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 19, 277-300.
- Manson, N. & O'Neill, O. (2007). *Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mason, J. (2002). *Qualitative Researching* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
- Mintzberg, H. (2004). *Managers not MBAs*. San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler.
- Moldoveanu, M. & Martin, R. (2008). *The Future of the MBA: Designing the Thinker of the Future*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Morgan, G. (2006). *Images of Organizations*. London: Sage
- Munzel, G. F. (1999). *Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Munzel, G. F. (2003). Kant on moral education, or "enlightenment" and the liberal arts.

The Review of Metaphysics, 57(1), 31-43.

Munzel, G. F. (2006). Kant, Hegel, and the Rise of Pedagogical Science. In R. Curren (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Education*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Munzel, G. F. (forthcoming). *Kant's Critique of Modernity: Towards Education for Freedom*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Neiman, S. (1997). *Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (1997) *Cultivating Humanity* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press

Nussbaum, M. & Sen, A. (eds). (1993). *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nuzzo, A. (2005) *Kant and the Unity of Reason*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Nuzzo, A. (2008). *Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press

O'Brien, J. (2007). *Redesigning Financial Regulation: The Politics of Enforcement*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

O'Neill, J. (2007). *Markets, Deliberation and Environment*. London: Routledge.

O'Neill, O. (1989). *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, O. (1996). *Towards Justice and Virtue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, O. (2000). *Bounds of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, O. (2002). *Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, O. (2003). *A Question of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Otteson, J. (2006). *Actual Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Owen, N. (2003). *HIH Royal Commission: The Failure of HIH Insurance*.

<http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/> Last accessed 20th January 2009.

Parker, M. (1998a). Against Ethics. In M. Parker (ed.), *Ethics & Organizations*. London: Sage.

Parker, M. (ed.). (1998b). *Ethics & Organizations*. London: Sage.

Parker, M. (2002). *Against Management*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Parker, M., Fournier, V., Reedy, P. (2007) *The Dictionary of Alternatives*, London: Zed Books.

Pfeffer, J. & Fong, C. (2002). The End of Business Schools? Less Success Than Meets the Eye. *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 1(1), 78-96.

Phillips, D. (2006). *Quality of Life: Concept, Policy and Practice*. London: Routledge.

Polanyi, M. (1983). *The Tacit Dimension*. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

- Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rawls, J. (2005). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Reich, R. (2007). *Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and Everyday Life*. New York: Knoph.
- Rich, A. (2006). *Business and Economic Ethics: The Ethics of Economic Systems* (4th ed.). Leuven: Peeters.
- Roberts, J. (2001). Corporate Governance and the Ethics of Narcissus, *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Vol 11(1), 1-13
- Robinson, V. (1993). *Problem-based Methodology: Research for the Improvement of Practice*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Rorty, R. (1979). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rosenthal, S. & Buchholz, R. (2000). *Rethinking Business Ethics: A Pragmatic Approach*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rossi, P. (2005). *The Social Authority of Reason*. Albany: State University of New York.
- Salter, M. (2008). *Innovation Corrupted: The Origins and Legacy of Enron's Collapse*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- Savin-Baden, M. (2008). *Learning Spaces: Creating Opportunities for Knowledge Creation in Academic Life*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Savitz, A. (2006). *The Triple Bottom Line*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Schneewind, J. B. (1998). *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schostak, J. (2006). *Interviewing and Representation in Qualitative Research*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Scruton, R. (2007). *The Palgrave-Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought* (3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Sen, A. (1993). Capability and Well-Being. In M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (eds), *Quality of Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shareef, R. (2007). Want Better Business Theories? Maybe Karl Popper Has the Answer. *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 6(2), 272-280.
- Shklar, J. (1990). *The Face of Injustice*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Skinner, Q. (2008). *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Slattery, L. (2007). University has inherited a higher role. *The Australian Financial Review*. July 2nd 2007.
- Stake, R. (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research*. London: Sage.
- Stake, R. (2005). Qualitative Case Studies. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (eds), *The Sage*

- Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (3rd ed.). London: Sage.
- Starkey, K. & Tiratsoo, N. (2007). *The Business School and the Bottom Line*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sullivan, W. M. (2005). *Work and Integrity: The Crisis and Promise of Professionalism in America* (2nd ed). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Sullivan, W. M. (2007). Ethical Universalism and Particularism: A Comparison of Outlooks. In W. Sullivan & W. Kymlicka (eds), *The Globalization of Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sullivan, W. M. & Rosin, M. (2008). *A New Agenda for Higher Education: Shaping a Life of the Mind for Practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Taylor, C. (2007). *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Thiele, L. P. (2006). *The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thomas, G. (2007). *Education and Theory: Strangers in paradigms*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Timmermann, J. (2007). *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Todorov, T. (2002). *Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Todorov, T. (2003). *Hope and Memory: Reflections on the Twentieth Century*. New York: Atlantic.
- Trood, R. (2008). *The Emerging Global Order*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Ulrich, P. (2008). *Integrative Economic Ethics: Foundations of a Civilized Market Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vetlesen, A. J. (1994). *Perception, Empathy and Judgment: An Inquiry into the Preconditions of Moral Performance*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Vetlesen, A. J. (1997). *Proximity: An Ethics*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- Vetlesen, A. J. (2005). *Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Villa, D. (2001). *Socratic Citizenship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Walker, M. (2006). *Higher Education Pedagogies: A Capabilities Approach*. Maidenhead: SRHE and Open University Press.
- Wilson, H. (2006). *Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Wood, A. W. (1999). *Kant's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Wood, A. W. (2005). *Kant*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Wood, A. W. (2006). Kant's Formulations of the Moral Law. In G. Bird (ed.), *A Companion to Kant*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wood, A. W. (2007). *Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends*. Paper presented at the Conference on Dignity and Law, Cape Town.
- Wood, A. W. (2008). *Kantian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woodruff, P. (2001). *Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wray-Bliss, E. (forthcoming). Ethics. In M. Alvesson, H. Willmott, & T. Bridgman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yankelovich, D. (2006). *Profit with Honor: the New Stage of Market Capitalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Yin, R. (1994). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage.
- Zammito, J. (1992). *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.