Managing event places and viewer spaces: Security, surveillance and stakeholder interests at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa

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A thesis submitted to the University of Technology, Sydney in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DATE submitted: 18 July 2013
I, Simone Eisenhauer, certify that the work in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree except as fully acknowledged within the text. I also certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

Signature of Author
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following page pays a debt of gratitude to the people who have made the completion of this research project possible.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Associate Professor Daryl Adair and Professor Tracy Taylor of the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) for their active academic support, assistance and guidance throughout this journey. Despite your busy schedules, both of you have always found time to consult with, support and assist me throughout the four years I have been at UTS. To Daryl, thank you for your invaluable ideas, belief in and enthusiasm for my project. Tracy, your consultation while in Australia and overseas has been beyond belief at times and is something for which I am extremely grateful.

I would also like to thank my sponsors, the UTS and the Australian Centre for Event Management (ACEM), for their financial support and for giving me the opportunity to study in Australia. A special thank you goes to my colleague Ashlee Morgan, who has managed to provide me with great encouragement, feedback and companionship at the Abercrombie Hotel whenever I needed it. Also, a large debt of gratitude goes to Lorana Bartels, for her excellent and punctual editing services on this thesis. Another special thank you goes to Shaun Walsh who helped with mapping.

Special thanks go to my many flatmates who somehow coped with living with me throughout the years (Brooke, Russell, Wanda, Kirsten, Frances, Stuart, Jamie). On a more personal note, to my parents, Ellen Warner-Koenen and Rudolf Koenen, your ongoing support, despite me being located on the other side of the planet, has made the tyranny of distance a tad easier to deal with!

Finally, I would like to thank all the study respondents who gave up their own personal time to give their opinions, thoughts and feelings on the central topics of this research project.
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the security risk management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) in South Africa. Extending knowledge of how commercial interests intersect with security risk management of public urban spaces at sport mega-events, this study examines these concepts in a developing world context. Using a neoliberal theoretical lens and drawing on the concepts of Festivalisation and Disneyisation, the research contributes to academic scholarship in the areas of both sport and event management. This is achieved through a critical examination of security and commercialisation strategies in ‘public spaces’ at a sport mega-event, namely, public viewing areas (PVAs) and commercial restricted zones (CRZs).

The research problem was investigated by means of an inductive interpretive qualitative case study approach. The selected event was the 2010 FWC, and within this event an in-depth case study of Cape Town was selected for examination. Multiple sources of evidence included government, management, and media documentation. In addition, semi-structured interviews were drawn upon to generate a narrative of the roles and interests of three key stakeholders (the event owner, event sponsor and event host) in the process of strategically managing PVAs and CRZs.

The government’s policies, decisions, and actions associated with staging of the 2010 FWC reflected new and exemplary forms of neoliberal urban governance in concert with intensified levels of policing and securitisation. The measures taken to combat ambush marketing were of particular note. FIFA’s requirements on the host city facilitated decisions about public and private spaces that redefined public policies and rules. Intensification of spatial and social fragmentation and greater exclusion resulted; in other words, the evidence demonstrates the phenomenon of the ‘FIFA-isation’ of public space. Rhetoric from event owners and city authorities on the benefits of hosting the FWC claimed intended outcomes, which were the exact opposite of what eventuated.
As demonstrated by the example of South Africa and Cape Town in particular, inexperienced mega-event hosting developing nations and BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Korea) have not yet developed strong sensibilities of how to cope with the demands of trans-national organisations and multi-national corporations. This may be one reason why FIFA now invites developing countries and BRIICS to stage the FWC, as they tend to be more willing to accede to the organisation’s demands, owing to their desire to host the FWC in order to raise their global profile.

The conceptual outcomes of this thesis provide a significant contribution to the literature exploring security risk management and commercialisation at sport mega-events. While this exploratory study has produced sufficient evidence to justify the need for further research in this area of sport mega-events, it also highlights that the interface between security and commercialisation is complex and defies easy generalisation.
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Advance Passenger Processing (APP)
African National Congress (ANC)
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
Airline Liaison Officer (ALO)
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)
Breaking New Ground (BNG)
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Korea (BRIICS)
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
Cape Town Partnership (CTP)
Cape Town Tourism (CTT)
Celebrity Services Africa Events (CSAE)
Central Business District (CBD)
Central City Improvement District (CCID)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE)
City Improvement District (CID)
City of Cape Town (CoCT)
City of Cape Town Outdoor Advertisement and Signage By-law 10518 (OA & SB)
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Commercial Access Zone (CAS)
Commercial Restricted Zone (CRZ)
Community Policing Forum (CPF)
Consumer and Corporate Regulation Division (CCRD)
Dangerous and Disruptive Persons (DDP)
Decoration and Signage Master Plan (DSMP)
Department of Community Safety (DCS)
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ & CD)
Department of Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA)
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Outdoor Advertising and Signage By-law of 2009 (OA & SB)
Premier Soccer League (PSL)
Project Management Unit (PMU)

Promotion of Access to Information Act No 2 of 2000 (PAIA)
Provincial Government Western Cape (PGWC)
Provincial Joint Operation Centres (PROVJOC)
Public Safety Officers (PSOs)
Public Viewing Areas (PVAs)
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Republic of South Africa (RSA)
Rights Protection Program (RPP)
Security Industry Alliance (SIA)
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
South African Brewery (SAB)
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)
South African Football Association (SAFA)
South African Local Government Association (SALGA)
South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF)
South African Police Service (SAPS)
South African Revenue Services (SARS)
Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA)
Sport and Recreational and Provincial and Local Government
Portfolio Committees (SRPLGPCs)
Sports and Recreation Portfolio Committee and Education and Recreation
Select Committee (SRPCERSC)
Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC)

Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (TMA)
Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976 (TPA)
United Nations (UN)
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)
Venue Operation Centres (VOCs)
World Trade Organisation (WTO)
LIST OF MAIN SECURITY STAKEHOLDERS

Blatter, Joseph (Sepp) - President of FIFA
Boraine, Andrew - Chief Executive of the Cape Town Partnership
Cele, Bheki - SAPS National Commissioner
Cullen, Teral - CoCT’s 2010 World Cup Venue Manager
De Reuck, Lesley - 2010 Director of Operations, City of Cape Town
Green, David - CEO of the V&A Waterfront
Groenewald, Ben - Chairperson of the Inter-Departmental Planning Committee
Ho-Kim, Shameel - 2010 Project Co-ordinator: Operations, City of Cape Town
Jordaan, Danny - CEO of the Local Organising Committee
Khoza, Irvin - Chair of the Local Organising Committee
Mkhondo, Rich, Chief Spokesperson for the Local Organising Committee
Mthethwa, Nathi - South African Police Minister
Pruis, Andre - Deputy National Police Commissioner
Valcke, Jérôme - General Secretary of FIFA
Zille, Helen - Western Cape Premier
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a background to the study, an overview of the research problem under investigation, the aims and objectives of the thesis, delimitations of scale and scope, and an overview of the thesis structure. It begins with an overview of the genre of sport mega-events and a range of associated security and surveillance issues, each of which is critical to the problem under investigation. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, there is a substantial body of research that attempts to conceptualise crowd and audience management in sport event contexts, as well as locating surveillance and securitisation protocols within counter-terrorism theory. These theoretical approaches are all concerned with situating the politics of securitisation, together with practical applications that seek to minimise the risk of disturbance, harm or violence in event-specific public spaces. The present study is influenced by that extant literature, but has a particular focus on a single mega-event setting – the 2010 Football World Cup (FWC) in the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The purpose is to explore the security of themed ‘open’ spaces at the FWC, and, by doing so, evaluate concepts and principles relevant to how threats, dangers and risks were managed by the three main stakeholders, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the event host and the event sponsors. The thesis is therefore a study of structures, policies and strategies established to manage event-specific, themed ‘open’ spaces at the 2010 FWC, but with a particular interest in safeguarding stakeholder interests in these zones.

1.2 Background

Sport mega-events are high profile, globally visible and are typically prestigious. Mega-events have been defined by Roche as ‘short-term events with long-term consequences for the cities that stage them ... they are associated with creation of infrastructure, and event facilities often carrying long-term debts and always requiring long-term use programming’ (Roche, 1994, p. 1). The superlative description of ‘mega’ has been frequently applied to the four largest international events: the Summer and Winter
Olympic Games, the World-Expos, and the FWC (Heyne, 2006), although other events – such as the Rugby World Cup, and the Tour de France – might also be classified as ‘mega’.

The management of mega-events is extremely complex and multifaceted, and so the planning and operational aspects of these public spectacles have been studied in their own right (Emery, 2002). Characteristically, these mega-events attract claims of virtue and benefit by event organisers, the host government, and commercial supporters. Indeed, the size of sport mega-events, as well as the public enthusiasm to host and participate in them, has grown substantially over the past 20 years since the 1980s (Horne, 2007). However, while sport mega-events may offer a public relations spotlight in which to shine, especially via the extensive international media coverage they garner, their staging also involves many risks – economic, logistic, political, and so on (Appenzeller, 2005; Getz, 1997; Toohey, Taylor & Lee, 2003). The aspirations of event organisers and hosts may, therefore, be compromised by a range of confounding factors in terms of unintended and/or negative outcomes, such as crowd management problems, fan misbehaviour, and strident nationalism (Frosdick & Walley, 1997). A mega-event can also play host to common, everyday forms of crime, such as theft and drug dealing (Jennings & Lodge, 2009). Sport mega-events may even involve oppositional forces and become sites for political activism (e.g., ‘anti-event’ protests, strikes) in which dissent against an organisation (e.g., the International Olympic Committee (IOC)) or another event-related entity is expressed. Policies and practises in respect of event security are, of course, not simply politically neutral; they typically involve an exercise of power. The geographical/physical space of a mega-event may be normalised to suit organisers’ aspirations, or it can resisted/contested in some way by opponents of state sanctions.

From a security risk management perspective, terrorism is generally regarded as the most serious security issue, especially from the perspective of the Western media (Atkinson & Young, 2002, 2012; Cottrell, 2003). Dissidents have used sport events to make a political point through the strategic use of violence (e.g., the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in 1996 and the Olympic Games terrorist attack in Munich 1972). While such acts have been infrequent at sport events, they are nonetheless a potent concern for organisers. In a post 9/11 context, fear of terrorism-related activities
and associated public safety concerns has been magnified, while the costs associated with heightened security precautions at mega-events have escalated (Toohey, 2008; Toohey & Taylor, 2008). Risk management is thus a key part of event planning, with security and surveillance fundamental to this.

In terms of the proposed thesis, power over space and the regulation of conduct therein have major implications for our understanding of two particularly powerful stakeholder groups at a mega-event: the event owner, and its associated brand under which a mega-event is licensed (e.g., Olympic Games - IOC, FWC - FIFA), and the sport event sponsors (e.g., Visa - IOC, Adidas - FIFA). The sponsoring organisations provide commercial support to the brand owners and, in return, are provided with event-specific spaces in the staging city in which to promote their products and services. Both event owners and sponsors invest significant political and economic capital in the smooth running of a public spectacle, and have a great deal at stake in terms of outcome.

Commercial risks in event spaces, such as ambush marketing (definition see Section 1.5), have the capacity to dilute the reach and value of corporate sponsorship, ultimately jeopardising financial supporters’ return from a sport mega-event (Bean, 1995; McKelvey & Gladden, 2006). Not only does the securitisation of sponsorship rights at a sport mega-event constitute an important operational element in its own right, but it also is a key dimension in understanding the demand for, and dynamics of, organisers’ (in this case the designated host city’s), control of people in these ‘public event’ spaces.

Apropos of this aspect of mega event securitisation, the Economist (2008) posited that: ‘ambush marketers have replaced hooligans as the villains of sporting events’.

Recent research conducted by Burton and Chadwick (2009a) has highlighted how ambushing has changed over time from predominantly broadcast sponsorship campaigns and venue-surrounding advertising, to more off-site associative marketing and ever more sophisticated measures, such as using fans as promotional tools. Proactive anti-ambush marketing strategies, such as ‘controlled access sites’, ‘clean zones’ and ‘commercial restriction zones’ (hereafter referred to as CRZs) and associated by-laws, are becoming more critical with the rise of new media (Grady, Brown, Nurkin & Gillentine, 2011), as well as with the growth of online marketing in connection with social media (Santomier, Hogan & Kunz, 2011). Previous research has identified that
ambush marketers are becoming increasingly creative and innovative (Burton & Chadwick, 2008). Hence, research in this area of commercial risk and means of containment is particularly salient.

**Security at sport mega-events**

Since the early twentieth century, ‘security’ has been one of the biggest growth markets in the world (Siebel & Wehrheim, 2003). Security in sport is now big business and involves unprecedented expenditure. Schimmel (2006) has asserted that security issues are likely to carry more and more weight in the production of sports mega-events. Indeed, Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) have argued that sport is being used as a ‘laboratory’ for introducing new security systems, and that this has allowed heightened securitisation processes beyond the event for which they were originally conceived. Understanding the politics and practices of security is therefore not just about preparing for a mega-event, for it may encompass legacies thereafter. Mega events do make an impact in the social world. As Abrams has pointed out, an event ‘is a portentous outcome; it is a transformation device between past and future; it has eventuated from the past and signifies for the future’, as well as being an ‘indispensable prism through which social structure and process may be seen’ (Abrams, 1982, pp. 191-92). To host a mega-event however is a costly endeavour.

The reality of cost escalation is no more apparent than at the Olympic Games. Security expenditures in the pre-9/11 context rose from the Barcelona Games in 1992 (USD 66.2 million), through to Atlanta 1996 (USD 108.2 million), and Sydney 2000 (USD 179.6 million). The figure climbed to USD 1.5 billion in Athens 2004 - an exponential increase, but explicable in the context of a new post 9/11 security paradigm (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010). London 2012 security costs escalated on a monthly basis in the lead-up phase to the Olympics. According to Der Spiegel, six months prior to the event, costs were estimated to reach GBP 600 million, out of the Olympic budget of GBP 9.3 billion – in addition to an undetermined sum for anti-terrorism measures. Some 250 days before the Games had started, expenditure on security, including security guards, fencing and screening of personnel going in and out of the venues, was around GBP 250,000 per day (Der Spiegel, 2011). These escalating costs are one reason why it is important to evaluate the rationales for, and effectiveness of, sport-mega event security.
Yu, Klauser and Chan (2009) have pointed out that despite the growing importance and costs of security measures at sport mega-events, very few academic studies have provided critical accounts of the wider social and political implications of the immense security efforts surrounding these massive public spectacles. In particular, as these authors have noted, there is a need to produce a systematic, comparative body of analysis to understand urban developments that constitute a mega-event – their spatial and social contexts, their surveillance and management protocols, and the public policy directives that frame their securitisation. Such research foci are important because they allow an understanding of how security operations address different types of risks in the urban environment, as well as providing knowledge about how these operations originated and how, subsequently, they impacted on the use of, and access to, public spaces.

**Macro and micro-geographical shifts**

During the past decade, a macro-geographical shift has started to unfold as more sport mega-events are being hosted by developing and newly industrialised nations. For example, finalists for the 2004, 2008 and 2016 Olympic Summer Games included Cape Town and Buenos Aires, with Beijing winning the right to host the 2008 event and Rio de Janeiro the 2016 event. In 2010, Delhi hosted south Asia’s biggest-ever multi-sport event, the 85-nation Commonwealth Games. Furthermore, South Korea co-hosted the 2002 FWC, the RSA hosted the 2010 FWC, and Brazil will host the 2014 FWC Finals. Qatar, a small oil-rich, but under-developed Middle-Eastern country has won the bid to host the FWC in 2022.

Matheson and Baade (2003) and Haferburg and Steinbrink (2010), have independently suggested that there is a need to investigate whether the prevailing interpretations of sport mega-events apply to the same degree to nations in the developing and newly industrialised world. Since both developing and newly industrialised nations have started hosting sport mega-events, other event risks and threats may prevail (e.g., crime or strikes), and therefore security measures and risk priorities are deemed to vary according to nation, geopolitical circumstances and development status (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010).
While many sport mega-event host countries appear to have similar interests in optimising their own security measures, they have also frequently ceded to growing external demands by event owners (e.g., IOC, FIFA) to manage public order, and even to transform public spaces to suit the interests of these sport governing bodies. Sport stadia, which are typically characterised by ticketed venues, have become highly controlled and monitored in terms of spectator assembly, movement and conduct. These spaces have also been managed to be ‘brand exclusive’, with sponsor products and logos strategically located at event sites (Hall, 2001). Beyond this ticketed environment, where only those with appropriate passes are allowed entry, sport mega-events typically have a wider event precinct wherein greater public movement is allowed, albeit with certain regulations. Typically, the mega-event precinct also has rules about the use of space by event organisers. As set out in the original bid document, they are expected to support the needs of the event owner, such as the IOC or FIFA, and the sponsors who provide commercial support to the event brand, such as the Olympics and the FWC. These dual responsibilities, as well as the strategies deployed to pursue them, are of critical importance to this thesis.

As will be discussed in detail later in the thesis, sport mega-events have involved the transformation and privatisation of urban public spaces (e.g., along roads, around tourist sites and icons, and the skies above venues), including CRZs. Sport mega-events have also involved the creation of temporary spaces – public viewing areas (PVAs) – which are spectator spaces with huge TV screens, targeted towards fans who wish to view an event but who do not have a ticket for stadium entry. PVAs, as open-air spectator events with free admission, have become particularly attractive for international football tournament organisers and hosting cities in recent years.

However, the difficulty for mega-event managers is that public involvement and engagement in such a varied range of spatial fields bring increased challenges for those responsible for the surveillance of public behaviour, and the security and safety of fans, as well as the public relations narratives and images associated with the representation of these situational experiences. As Giulianiotti and Klauser (2011) note, exploring the urban environment of sport mega-events is critical to uncover the stipulations, requirements and effects of the event securitisation process. This process raises
questions about the power of the event owner and the capacity of sponsors to control/influence host city security and surveillance strategies, as well as urban designs, in their interests (Eick, 2011a).

In summary, this thesis focuses on the relationship between security, commercialisation and the politics that underpin the provision of public order and control of public spaces at a sport mega-event. As will be further explained, it explores the strategic management of public spaces at a particular sport mega-event, the 2010 FWC in the RSA, in relation to the three main stakeholders’ roles and interests. In doing so it looks at the organisers’ efforts to safeguard the brand and reputation of the event owner and, in the case of the City of Cape Town (CoCT), measures to protect the commercial interests of FWC sponsors while also aiming to meet local needs.

1.3 Statement of the problem

As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, a critical review of the existing literature on sport mega-event security indicates that there is a distinct and significant gap in terms of our conceptual understanding of temporarily sequestered public spaces and the mechanisms used to manage these environments. It is commonly assumed that the securitisation of public space at a sport mega-event is fundamentally about operational risk management objectives (e.g., pedestrian decongestion, curtailing disorder, preventing terrorism). However, this instrumental approach fails to appreciate that public environments at a sport mega-event require more than the management of patrons; it also involves the protection of stakeholder interests within the spatial confines of a public spectacle. For example, in the case of the Olympic Games and the FWC, this means safeguarding spaces dedicated to the global event owners, such as FIFA and the IOC, and the responsibility of the host (at the local level), such as an Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) or Local Organising Committee (LOC) for the FWC, to demarcate and manage event-branded, publicly accessible environments (e.g., CRZs) (Cornelissen, 2007; Haferburg, 2011; Yu et al., 2009). This responsibility includes, within these bounded public areas, the provision of spaces for the exclusive (or near exclusive) use of mega-event sponsors. This encapsulates the securitisation of sponsoring brands, including logos, signage and product placement. In summary,
researchers have not adequately conceptualised a very important aspect of the staging of sport mega-events – namely, the security management of public event spaces in the interests of the event organiser for the brand protection of event owners and event sponsors (Klauser, 2008a, 2011a).

There is well-developed literature on sport mega-events in terms of ‘place selling’ (Philo & Kearns, 1993), however, this scholarship has not adequately theorised the spatial dynamics and strategic processes of protecting the event brand (owners) and the event supporters (sponsors) in public spaces. This is a noteworthy research gap, given that, as discussed previously, mega-events not only involve an exercise of power but also have profoundly important public relations dimensions and, therefore, require very significant planning and operational protocols to effectively manage corporate risk.

**Developing nation context**

Matheson and Baade (2003), as well as Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), have suggested a binary categorisation of mega-event hosting nations, namely the Global North and Global South. However, this underestimates the intense differences and divisions that persist within semi-peripheral developing nations – either north or south. The nations of Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Korea, which combine advanced capitalist infrastructures with high levels of inequality, have been given the acronym (BRIICS) (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2009).

For this thesis, the categorisation of BRIICS is used, while other countries with a comparable lower Growth Domestic Product (GDP), such as the RSA, will be referred to as developing nations.

Mega-events in the developing world and in BRIICS present a relatively under-explored research opportunity marked, arguably, by significant contextual differences from those conducted in the developed world. This is because event host cities in developing and newly industrialised countries have often placed a lot of emphasis on re-inventing their national image in order to attract foreign capital investment, and to heighten their typically modest geopolitical position in the world community (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2004; Van der Westhuizen, 2004, 2007). Thus, the
economic and political importance attached to mega-events in these ‘new’ hosting regions highlights the significance for research to be conducted in that context.

While acknowledging recent research into the domain of mega-events in BRIICS and developing countries (Cornelissen, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011; Cornelissen & Maennig, 2010; Cornelissen & Swart, 2006), most scholars have concentrated on how security professionals and risk managers have operated events in major international Western cities, such as London, New York and Washington (Coaffee & Wood, 2006; Coaffee, Fussey & Moore, 2011). Since a number of developing nations and BRIICS have recently hosted or are about to host mega-events (South Korea – 2002 FWC and Brazil 2014 FWC respectively), there are new opportunities for scholarly investigation. A research agenda that moves scholarship beyond developed nations is therefore crucial. This means exploring the varying motives and responsibilities of an event owner and its sponsors, and the event host, each of which involve the introduction of event-specific security measures in host cities (whether in BRIICS or developing nation contexts) unfamiliar with staging major spectacles of global significance.

This thesis provides an opportunity to complement and extend the existing literature on sport mega-event security (Baasch, 2009; Bennett & Haggerty, 2011a; Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c, 2011; Berthoud, Pattaroni, Viot & Kaufmann, 2009; Eick, 2010b, 2011a, c; Haferburg, Golka & Selter, 2009; Hagemann, 2006, 2008, 2010; Klauser, 2008a, b, 2011a; Schulke, nda, ndb, 2006, 2008). The objective will be to analyse agencies involved in the creation or management of mega-event public spaces, their strategic goals and policy frameworks. In this study, the selection of context and focus are therefore especially important. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, the thesis is structured around the 2010 FWC in a developing world context (i.e., the RSA), and focuses on a single case in the most international city in the RSA, Cape Town.

Public space

Previous research in the area of security risk management has focused on the stadium as the critical site at mega-events (Sweaney, 2005). As mentioned previously, the management of non-ticketed event spaces in the public realm (i.e., official PVAs)
involves a wider, and in some respects, more complex, responsibility for organisers. Researchers who have pioneered this new field of interest include Eick (2010b, 2011), Haferburg et al. (2009), Hagemann (2008, 2010), and Klauser (2008a, b, 2011). PVAs are significant in a number of ways. First, they are places for the expression of popular cultures as they involve large assemblies of crowds. Second, they are sites where fans expect to experience enjoyment and feelings of security in a mass gathering. Third, they are places that contain symbolic and practical meaning for stakeholders and the community, for use of public space is negotiated and demarcated. It is a zone of assembly and a locus of control. This ultimately raises imperative questions about the power of event organisers and sponsors to manage/influence security measures, as well as urban policy developments in the context of a mega-event.

Ultimately, this thesis focuses on the structures, policies and strategic management of particular sport mega-event spaces in the urban environment – namely the FIFA Fan Fest (FFF), CoCT Fan Walk, municipal PVAs, and CRZs in the context of Cape Town. Event-driven security measures within these spaces are evaluated as a key part of the planning and staging processes at the 2010 FWC. In view of the vast urbanisation of mega-events (Klauser, 2008a), un-ticketed event spaces are particularly interesting, as they are more difficult to manage – audience numbers are less predictable than at stadia – and, given the emergent nature of PVAs, there is a lack of clarity about the protocols used to minimise risk of harm or injury to participants. Moreover, these environments have distinctive security and commercial protocols. Indeed, such spaces have become valuable for event owners and organisers as an extended marketing platform. Therefore, a combination of security management policies and commercial protocols in ‘open’ public spaces has driven the rationale for this thesis.

In summary, this study is conceptually novel in that it explores the risk and security management of public urban spaces at a sport mega-event in terms of commercial interests, and, as will be explained in Chapter 2, it does so in a developing nation context using a neoliberal theoretical lens. It will add much-needed depth to the academic scholarship in the areas of both sport and event management by exploring security and surveillance strategies directed towards specific security fields at a sport mega-event: PVAs and CRZs.
1.4 Research aim and objectives

In the context of this study, there are three key assumptions, which will become clearer in the wake of Chapters 2 and 3, but are foreshadowed here.

First, mega-event host cities (in this instance the case study site of Cape Town) promote themselves as a safe and welcoming place in order to attract international investment. This can be located within a neoliberal agenda, for taxpayer funds are required to stage a mega-event, and the economic benefits are expected to flow to the free market economy. In this regard, place-promotion is used to generate economic growth, based on attracting people (e.g., tourism) and capital (e.g., foreign investors) to a location (Alegi, 2007). Therefore, for host cities, mega-events are immensely influential in terms of neoliberal policies underpinning state sanctioning of urban development in and around event precincts (Burbank, Andranovich & Heying, 2002; Haferburg, 2011).

Second, the event owners (in this case FIFA) implement a security and surveillance assemblage as part of their own neoliberal agenda. For example, FWC brand promotion is used to enhance the status of the event in the global marketplace and optimise financial returns (such as by media rights) (Eick, 2011a). In addition to brand exposure, a key strategy for the event owner to enhance its profits is to protect the commercial interests of its sponsors and, in the context of the FWC, the display of logos and associated advertising in FIFA-approved public spaces. In this regard, Eick (2010b) has argued that the FWC is itself a ‘brand’ that serves as a major revenue earner; therefore, securing profits for FIFA at this four-yearly event is a prime objective.

Third, event sponsors use mega-events to optimise their brand image and product exposure (Brown, 2000; Cornwell et al., 2000), as well as brand recognition and loyalty (Alexandris, Tsaousi & James, 2007). To achieve these brand-related goals, value is drawn from the image of the sport property (in this case the FWC), in an effort to positively influence brand perceptions, and consequently consumers’ purchasing intentions (Farrelly, Quester & Burton, 2006). At a sport mega-event, the advertising and promotion go beyond the site itself, since the sponsor also uses broadcast and print media associated with the event. Indeed, Nicholls, Roslow and Laskey (2011) have asserted that the vast and dispersed masses in the external audience are more important
in a commercial sense – than the participants at the event. The promotional interests of sponsors are therefore a key aspect of the securitisation process at CRZs and PVAs. Indeed, as will be explained, sponsors seek what amounts to a monopoly in terms of marketing, advertising and merchandising (in this case at the FWC), and, in order to optimise the commercial value of this arrangement in public spaces, seek to minimise ‘unfair’ or ‘illegal’ competition from ambush marketing.

Keeping in mind the statement of the research problem outlined previously, together with the research assumptions discussed above, the key aim of this thesis is: To explore the security management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at the 2010 FWC.

The above aim is pursued in the context of PVAs and CRZs in Cape Town, with the following three objectives:

1. To assess the roles and interests of key stakeholders (the event owner, the event sponsors and the event host) in the process of strategically managing CRZs and PVAs.
2. To explore the structures, policies, and strategies that influenced urban security and risk management protocols at CRZs and PVAs.
3. To analyse structures, policies, and strategies to combat ambush marketing, while minimising public inconvenience, in CRZs and PVAs.

The conceptual outcomes of this thesis provide a significant contribution to the literature exploring security risk management and commercialisation at sport mega-events. While this exploratory study has produced sufficient evidence to justify the need for further research in this area of sport mega-events, it also highlights that the interface between security and commercialisation is complex and defies easy generalisation.

### 1.5 Definitions

For simplification reasons, the term ‘event owner’ is used throughout the thesis to refer generally to the governing authorities who own and manage a sport mega-event (in this
case, FIFA). The term ‘event organiser’ is used to refer to the designated host (in this case the RSA and as will be explained, CoCT) responsible and accountable for the successful organisation of the event. Also, there are many different levels of sponsorship (see Table 3.2). In this study, the term ‘sponsor’ is used in relation to all of FIFA’s commercial partners at the FWC.

To expand on initial classifications, a list of key terms used in the thesis is given below. As a potpourri of instruments and concepts exist as such, a clear conceptualisation of terms used to define concepts such as ambush marketing and security is vital.

Table 1.1: Definitions of key terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambush marketing</td>
<td>A form of associative marketing, used by a non-sponsor to capitalise on the awareness, attention, goodwill, and other benefits, produced by having a connection with an event/property, without that non-sponsor having an official or direct connection to that event/property (Burton &amp; Chadwick, 2009).</td>
<td>Intentional and unintentional claims to official sponsorship by a non-sponsor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business as usual</td>
<td>The typical execution of standard functional operations within an organisation, which forms a possible contrast to projects or programmes which might introduce change (Carroll, 2006).</td>
<td>The extent to which Cape Town’s formal and informal traders’ ordinary advertising procedures were influenced by FIFA’s Rights Protection Program (RPP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disneyisation</td>
<td>A sophisticated system of a post-Fordist consumer landscape, that is, an increasingly flexible, disorganised regime of capitalist accumulation. As a system, it is not reducible to any single product or theme, and thus its principles influence wide areas of global society. This notion indicates how mass culture is configured by economic interests and marketing strategies, with consumption as a goal and profit as an end (Bryman, 1999).</td>
<td>The extent to which, at the 2010 FWC, public urban spaces are used to display: theming, hybrid consumption, merchandising, performative labour and control and surveillance measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festivalisation of urban politics</td>
<td>The instrumentalisation of large-scale cultural and sports events to support image building and catalyse urban development in the developing world</td>
<td>The extent to which the mega-event hosting city is affected in terms of socio-political issues, the acceleration of security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Example</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Public law enforcement agencies, including local, state, and tribal police departments; sheriffs’ departments; and federal agencies. Also included are specialised policing agencies that have characteristics of both public law enforcement agencies and private security organisations.</td>
<td>The South African Police Service (SAPS), the South African National Defence Force, the Directorate of Special Operations, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service, the Department of Correctional Services and any other official law enforcement agency or service established by law, irrespective of whether such an agency or service resorts at national, provincial or local government level;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal governmentality</td>
<td>This transfers activities from the public realm to the market through direct privatisation, public/private partnerships, outsourcing, the creation of new and internal markets, and the establishment of conditions for competitive success (Clarke, 2004).</td>
<td>The extent to which security and commercial activities are relocated from the public realm to the market and FIFA, by means of direct privatisation, public/private partnerships, outsourcing, the creation of new and internal markets, and the establishment of conditions for competitive success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>The arrangements made to ensure that people keep the peace and obey the law.</td>
<td>The arrangements made to ensure that people in Cape Town keep the peace and obey the law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public space</td>
<td>Publicly owned and freely accessible spaces including main streets, open spaces and parks (Jones &amp; Newburn, 1998).</td>
<td>Publicly owned and freely accessible spaces in Cape Town, including main streets, open spaces (e.g., market places) where PVAs and CRZs were established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security</td>
<td>Both proprietary (corporate) security and contract security firms across the full spectrum of security services and technology.</td>
<td>A range of companies involved in the provision of daily security and security-related activities – such as guarding, armed response, private investigation, risk/security consultancy, manufacture and distribution of security equipment etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk/threat</td>
<td>The likelihood of the sport event not fulfilling its objectives (Allen et al., 2002).</td>
<td>The likelihood of the 2010 FWC event not fulfilling its economic objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security
This incorporates measures adopted by the government to maintain order, enforce the law, prevent and detect crime, and ensure a feeling of safety.

Surveillance
‘The collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered’ (Lyon, 2001, p. 2).

1.6 Delimitations of scope and scale

This section outlines the limitations and delimitations of this thesis. As Patton (1990, p. 162) has noted, ‘there are no perfect research designs. There are always trade-offs’. Hence, a discussion of every study’s limitations shows that the researcher recognises this reality and that they will make no presumptuous claims about generalisability or conclusiveness relative to what they have learned (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). It is important to note here that there is no intention in this qualitative study to generalise, however its approach may be transferable to other settings. In other words, there is no claim that the thesis findings hold for other FWC events. However, the thesis conclusions might be a useful source of information for event organisers and various security stakeholders in subsequent cases.

In terms of mega-event research, the FWC has been chosen as one of the most high profile sporting spectacles in the world (Schwarz, 2010). The RSA was selected because the thesis explores the staging of a mega-event in the context of a developing nation. Cape Town was chosen as the single case under investigation because of its distinctive CRZ and PVA arrangements, which included a 2.5 km long Fan Walk and several FIFA and municipal fan zones.

Within the FWC and CoCT frame, the focus is on carefully selected security stakeholders, not on the entire organisational task force at the 2010 event. Specifically, this includes the event owner (FIFA and its official sponsors), and the event
hosts/organisers (RSA government, and CoCT), excluding the LOC and private event organisers. The researcher is aware that this focus does not provide an exhaustive interpretation of all the factors and agents involved in the staging and securitisation of the 2010 FWC. However, the selection of these organisations was consistent with the study’s defined research objectives.

A limitation of this thesis is that the security risk assessments of stakeholders were not made publicly available; such information was ‘in confidence’ for strategic reasons. It remains unavailable. Likewise, the details of security and surveillance planning were also withheld from the public domain, again for strategic and operational reasons. This information, too, remains unavailable. Notwithstanding that caveat, this thesis drew upon publicly documented debates about risk, some of which featured in the RSA parliament, others in media releases by stakeholders, and still more in media reports. This diverse array of secondary sources provided baseline data about risk perceptions and security planning. Just as importantly, it provided information about the assumptions underlying security policy and its application in the key spaces under focus – PVAs and CRZs. Moreover, these limits were offset by the original nature of the research involving a sample of interviews with key stakeholders.

Finally, the research was conducted over a three-year period, taking into account the preparations leading up to the event and the FWC itself. It is not a systematic evaluation of the legacy of the FWC for CoCT specifically or the RSA generally.

1.7 Thesis structure

Chapter 1 has outlined the background of this thesis, the statement of the problem, and the purpose of the research. It also discussed the scale and scope of the study, as well as the consequent limitations of the research.

As Chapter 2 will illustrate, there is a significant gap in the research literature on security risk management for brand protection purposes at sport mega-events, which provides a rationale for the thesis. First, an overview of literature is provided pertaining to the genre of sport-mega-events, their security stakeholders and a range of associated
security and surveillance management issues. Second, a review of literature is provided relevant to urban development, ‘place selling’, and destination marketing in mega-event contexts. Then, literature on over-arching sponsorship program protection strategies used by event owners and organisers of sport mega-events is examined. Finally, the research gap is emphasised, and the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis is discussed.

Chapter 3 examines the commercialisation of FIFA. The particular focus here is on FIFA in the context of the research objectives of the thesis: neoliberalism and FIFA’s commercial strategies, which have spatial and security dimensions in two physical realms – PVAs and CRZs. FIFA and its World Cup brand are contextualised by analysing the origins and evolution of the FWC and changes to FIFA over time to illuminate its neoliberal mode of operation. Alongside this is a discussion of the literature that suggests some national and local variations of these trends that were evident at the 2010 FWC. The neoliberal interests of the event owner and event organiser are explored, especially in light of the threat of ambush marketing.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach underpinning the thesis, and thus signposts the assumptions and principles that underpin the research approach. It also describes the research design selected to investigate the aims and objectives outlined in Chapter 1, and the steps taken to collect data relevant to their investigation.

Chapter 5 presents the findings from primary and secondary data relating to securitisation strategies for the FIFA brand and rights protection for sponsors in Cape Town, with a particular focus on PVAs and CRZs. The findings provide a reading of some of the mechanisms through which FIFA and its tournament specifications prescribed the establishment of PVAs and CRZs, which underlined the business rationale associated with the two types of spatial enclosure.

Chapter 6 discusses how the thesis questions have been addressed. It therefore analyses the results of the research and their relevance to the existing literature on security risk management in the mega-event context.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the implications for researchers, event owners, sponsors, policymakers, and government bodies resulting from this research are discussed, and suggestions for future research put forward.

1.8 Summary

In summary, this thesis explores the security risk management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at the 2010 FWC in the RSA, and within this event an in-depth case study of Cape Town was selected for examination. Extending knowledge of key issues of corporate monopoly control over branding, security and their link to public spaces, this study examines these concepts at a sport mega-event in a developing world context by using a neoliberal theoretical lens.
Chapter 2: Literature review

The previous chapter highlighted the research aim: to explore the security management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at the 2010 FWC. It outlined the contextual focus of the study – the 2010 FWC in the RSA, Cape Town. The methodological approach is a single case study, with PVAs and CRZs as the specific spatial zones under examination. The next two chapters present a review of academic literature pertinent to these issues. Chapter 2 will demonstrate that the research objectives underpinning this thesis fill a discernible gap in that scholarship, particularly in respect of sport mega-events staged in developing nations. Subsequently, Chapter 3 will develop these aims in respect of the thesis context – the 2010 FWC in RSA and Cape Town. Chapter 3 then discusses the literature in respect of the two key spatial zones under consideration – PVAs and CRZs.

The following overarching four dimensions have been identified as influential in the security management process at sport mega-events:

a) general increase in commercialisation and commoditisation;
b) globalisation;
c) technologisation; and
d) mediatisation at sport mega-events globally.

2.1 Hosting sport mega-events
Professional sport is very much part of the entertainment business, and is dominated by media interests and commercial sponsors around the globe (Slack, 1998, 2005). Athletes are treated as commodities, football clubs have been listed on the stock market, sponsorship and broadcasting fees have sky-rocketed, and sport merchandising has become a major revenue earner. On a global scale, football is the most popular sport and is worth USD 12 billion per annum (Turner, Kellett, McDonald & Stavos 2010). Bourdieu, Dauncey and Hare (1998, pp. 17-18) have urged us to consider the various neoliberal stakeholders involved in the delivery of sport as an entertainment product:

Sport as spectacle hides the reality of a system of actors competing over commercial stakes ... sports industry managers who control television and
sponsoring rights, the managers of television channels competing for national broadcasting rights ... the bosses of major industrial companies such as Adidas or Coca-Cola competing with each other for exclusive rights to link their products with the sports event, and finally television producers.

Sport mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, the Super Bowl, and the FWC have the largest media profile of all. These events not only display athletic talent, but they also showcase the event owner’s brand, present a platform for exposure of event sponsors, and provide valuable publicity for host cities. The sport mega-event therefore provides numerous opportunities for stakeholders, but such occasions also involve managing risk. How benefits are optimised and unwanted outcomes minimised, is therefore a key consideration. Event security, stakeholder reputation, and the safeguarding of sponsors’ interests are among the most crucial managerial considerations.

There are a range of benefits commonly attributed to staging sport mega-events. The host government, commercial stakeholders and global sport organisations will often assert that mega-events promote nation building and social cohesion (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Chalip, 2006; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006b; Marivoet, 2006), shared ideology (Brauer & Brauer, 2007), global prestige (Alegi, 2008), and destination branding (Getz, 1997, 2005; Hall, 1992, 2006; Ritchie, 1984; Roche, 1994, 2006). Advocates also claim that event infrastructure development is a boon for economic growth (Baade & Matheson, 2004; Bramwell, 1997; Euchner, 1999; Degen, 2004; Higham & Ritchie, 2001) and urban regeneration (Hall, 2004; Jones, 2001), and that a mega-event will optimise tourism revenues (Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2010; Goodman & Stern, 1994; Higham & Hinch, 2002; Lee & Taylor, 2005; Ryan, Smee & Murphy, 1996).

There is a great deal of academic debate about the validity of many economic impact studies in terms of sporting events, and there is often disagreement about what factors are relevant and thus considered (Lee, 2001). This means that cost-benefit analyses often comprise differences of emphasis, interpretation and opinion in respect of the economic value of an event. For example, studies have often ignored the ‘substitution effect’ (Baade, 1996) which is when residents spend money on sport-mega events related events and merchandise they otherwise would have spent in other parts of the city; while some economic (or non-economic) costs such as those associated with traffic
congestion, vandalism, environmental degradation, and disruption of residents’ lifestyle are rarely included in such evaluations (Lee, 2001). Complexities have been identified in measuring the cost-benefit of marketing activities (Matheson & Baade, 2003) and unintended effects in the tourism sector (Lee & Taylor, 2005), such as the ‘crowding out effect’ – consumers who choose not to travel to a destination because, for example, a mega-event inflates the costs of flights and accommodation (Baade & Matheson, 2004). Especially challenging are attempts to measure long-term destination marketing effects, such as the influence of a ‘global’ city image in terms of attracting incoming investment (Gratton & Taylor, 2000). Critically, though, little of this uncertainty or imprecision has seriously diminished the demand by bidding nations and cities to host sport mega-events like the Olympic Games, Formula One races, or the FWC. If anything, the demand has grown in the 21st century as emerging economies, such as in the Middle East, East Asia and South America, have sought to ‘buy into’ the global spotlight that sport mega-events provide to hosts.

Sport mega-events are complex activities to plan for and deliver. The project management tasks associated with a world-class occasion like this are a challenge in themselves. The organisational interests and responsibilities of various event stakeholders are also a vital part of the managerial equation, particularly as they have both complementary and competing agendas in respect of benefiting from a mega-event. Stakeholders include both individual actors and corporations in respect of bringing a mega-event to fruition.

2.2 Event stakeholders: Owners, sponsors, organisers

Owners of major events must deal with a large number of stakeholders. There is an enormous body of literature in the area of stakeholder management of sport mega-events (e.g., Bird & Donaldson, 2009; Friedman, Parent & Mason, 2004; Getz, Andersson & Larson, 2007; Grady et al., 2010; Leopkey & Parent, 2009; Merrilees, Getz & O’Brien, 2005; Parent, 2008; Parent & Deephouse, 2007; Parent, Oliver & Séguin, 2009). Freeman (1984) first introduced the concept of stakeholder theory to organisation management and business ethics, and it has since been adopted in project and event management literature (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Stakeholders are
individuals, groups, or organisations that either have an impact on or are affected by an event owner’s policies, strategies or actions (Freeman, 1984). In a mega-event context, an event owner does not simply deal with one stakeholder, but rather multiple stakeholders, with interdependent relationships occurring among these stakeholders (Rowley, 1997). Consequently, the relationships between the event owner and its stakeholders are complex and multifaceted.

In terms of the present study, a key assumption to be drawn from stakeholder theory is that mega-event owners are bound to have conflicts with their multiple stakeholders. Therefore, understanding stakeholder relationships is vital in terms of ‘managing potential conflict stemming from divergent interests’ (Frooman, 1999, p. 193). A large range of security stakeholders with different control powers and interests is part of the security apparatus of sport mega-event. These stakeholders have a variety of needs and agendas, though they all anticipate specific benefits for their part in a sport mega-event (Parent, 2008). In terms of a mega-event such as the FWC, the government of the host nation and the organising committee will conceive a security plan to mitigate public order risks. Other national and international security stakeholders playing a part in the securitisation process include, for example, state, foreign and international police service, military services, suppliers of surveillance technology, private security companies, and anti-terrorism experts.

This thesis is concerned with stakeholder relationships at international, national and municipal levels. It stands to reason, therefore, that the study requires a theoretical lens through which to interpret relationships between globally connected stakeholders. The work of Jensen and Sandström (2011) is particularly salient for this thesis, because it does three things. First, it conceptualises stakeholder theory in terms of globalisation. Globalisation is the international manifestation of the shift to neoliberal policies associated with market-oriented reform. A neoliberal feature of globalisation has been the increased profile and power of international organisations, such as the UN and FIFA, the rapid expansion of multinational corporations, such as Coca-Cola and McDonalds, and the gradual diminution of the power of the nation state in the face of a globalised market economy. If Jensen and Sandström’s (2011) argument is applied to a mega-event security context, what becomes apparent is that the control of public space
is now less about nation states exercising territorial powers and more about working in
concert with global agencies, such as INTERPOL and international security companies
(Zajko & Béland, 2008). In short, internationally connected stakeholders are an
instrumental part of the global marketplace, and this alliance trend is mirrored in
organisational relationships at sport mega-events. This is consistent with the present
thesis, which examines relations between three globally connected stakeholders: an
event owner, event sponsors, and an event organiser.

Second, Jensen and Sandström underpin their theory of global stakeholders by utilising
‘narrative development’ (p. 474) as means of interpreting relationships. In essence, the
stories by or about global stakeholders are what shape our understanding of these
connections; indeed, a narrative approach allows texture and complexity to outsider
interpretations of stakeholder conduct, attitudes and behaviours. Jensen and Sandström
(2011, p. 485) have put it this way:

As we believe that globalization challenges stakeholder theory’s ability
to provide useful stories, part of the task for researchers is to provide critical
accounts that re-position large, global corporations in a different language game
that not only re-articulates their responsibilities in relation to globalization but
also the possibilities for their continuing existence and role in creating value.

This approach is supported by the work of Freeman (1994), who argues that a useful
story opens up rich conversations in which the voices of stakeholders can each be heard.
By analysing the role of/relationships between three mega-event stakeholders – the
event owner, the event sponsor, and the event organiser – this thesis aims to develop
‘useful stories’ (Jensen & Sandström, 2011, p. 485), whether good or bad tales, about
stakeholder conduct and relationships. Such stories are never intended to be the final
word; instead their purpose is to generate questions and puzzles as a means of
developing further conversations and analysis (Freeman, 1994, 1999, 2005; Freeman &
McVae, 2001).

Third, it is assumed that stakeholders’ moral values and normative judgments are key
determinants in decision making in respect of the self and in concert with others
(Reichart, 2003). This points us to the third aspect of Jensen and Sandström’s
presentation of stakeholder theory, which looks at the values and behaviours
underpinning global stakeholders. They point to two key variables: power and
responsibility, both of which have ethical and moral dimensions. Jensen and Sandström have argued that ‘globalization opens up new corridors of power’ (2011, p. 474). An important and related question, therefore, is whether stakeholders can understand, cooperate and work effectively with other groups – a litmus test for the exercise of power with responsibility.

Indeed, globalisation not only provides the prospect of influence for the powerful, but it also calls for a profound sense of responsibility. For example, democratic nation states (and by extension the international community) have a responsibility to protect people and communities from extreme violence, insecurity and human rights abuses (ICISS, 2001). Similarly, at a sport mega-event, security is the ultimate responsibility of the host nation. However, the securitisation process incorporates a multitude of public and private actors, and focuses on event spaces and places in complex ways. As Heath and Norman (2004) have pointed out, the responsibilities of multiple stakeholder groups have the capacity to generate multi-principle problems.

As the previous discussion has shown, the Jensen and Sandström approach is particularly useful to this thesis. It provides a framework within which to evaluate globally connected stakeholders, it utilises ‘narrative development’ as a means of interpreting their relationships, and it focuses on ethical and behavioural considerations in the form of two key themes – power and responsibility.

Event stakeholders are likely to have an array of interests and values. For example, Reichart (2003) suggested five categories of interest-based judgements addressing the stakeholder concerns that are central to tackle issues resolution: material (gain/loss of tangible benefits); political (power and influence); affiliative (human relationships and the need to belong); informational (knowledge-based); and symbolic (e.g., image creation and promotion). These categories are pertinent to the three key stakeholders in the present study. They also provide a useful approach to understanding priorities that influence event security and commercialisation plans, as discussed below.

First, the event owner aims to facilitate a successful spectacle or tournament and optimise their financial return from doing so (Eick, 2010b, 2011a), mainly through
sponsorship and broadcasting deals. Crucial to this is that the event runs smoothly for athletes, spectators, sponsors, and broadcasters (Parent, 2008). In the Olympic Games context, for example, the event owner’s power derives from its influence over the event host and its control over income deriving from broadcasting rights and marketing. The IOC has exclusive control of negotiations for Games broadcasting rights, merchandising, and sponsorship, all of which (similar to FIFA and the FWC) provide enormous revenue to the Olympic movement, but not to the event hosts (Malfas, Theodoraki & Houlihan, 2004). Also, at the Olympics, officially accredited media and commercial stakeholders liaise with the IOC, relying on this organisation to ensure that the event host provides suitable spaces for broadcasting, advertising and the sale of merchandise.

International sport organisations (in this case, FIFA), use sport mega-events (in this case, the FWC) to promote their product (in this case, football) to live spectators and virtual audiences. In doing so, they also seek to optimise brand awareness. In the case of the 2010 FWC, the event was conducted under FIFA rules and regulations, and showcased that organisation’s authority. The FWC was also an opportunity for FIFA to optimise brand awareness of football and promote its image as the game’s custodian (see Appendix A for FIFA Marketing Targets). Due to the strong commercial character of sport mega-events and the considerable stake held by event owners, the latter seek to maintain firm control over key aspects of the event (e.g., the location of competitions, the type of promotional activities, security and surveillance, and the regulation of international broadcast times). Commercial and security considerations taken into account by these organisations have therefore become prime determinants of the ways in which spatial and public order arrangements around events take place (Cornelissen, 2007, 2012).

Second, event sponsors aim to optimise their brand image and product exposure (Brown, 2000; Cornwell et al., 2000). Brand image can be defined as ‘how customers and others perceive the brand’, relating to the brand meaning that is generated (Aaker, 1996, p. 69). Enhancing brand image and awareness (Cunningham, 2009), as well as brand recognition and loyalty (Alexandris et al., 2007), are not only significant for monetary capital gain for host nations/cities, but also for corporate organisations generally. To achieve these brand-related goals, value is drawn from the image of the
sport property, in an effort to positively influence brand perceptions, and consequently consumers’ purchasing intentions (Farrelly et al., 2006).

As a commercial tool, sponsorship is used to access target markets, influence consumers’ purchasing intentions (especially brand loyalty) and in turn increase product consumption (Alexandris et al., 2007; Houlder, 2009). The objective of increasing product sales and market share is reiterated throughout the sponsorship literature. Sponsoring a sport event provides opportunities to introduce the consumer to new products, and allows for product sampling opportunities (Alexandris et al., 2007) and the development of sales and product leveraging (Houlder, 2009). The marketing literature stresses that an emotional connection should be developed between an event sponsor and consumer, thereby promoting customer affiliation towards a sponsor’s brand. Sponsoring a sport property presents the potential for a commercial entity to access the strong emotional connections fans already have towards a specific sport or team (Madrigal, 2000). In short, a sponsor that can create a sense of affinity or connectedness with a sports property can expect to increase the attachment of sport consumers to its brand (Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics, 2009). Sponsorship develops symbolic associations in the consumers’ consciousness, enhancing their awareness of the sponsor’s brand. Therefore, it has been recommended that companies sponsor events that portray high consumer participation, such as mega-events (Grohs & Reisinger, 2005).

At a sport mega-event, the advertising and promotion go beyond the site itself, since the sponsor also uses broadcast and print media associated with the event. Thus, the sponsor reaches two different types of audiences: those at the mega-event (locals and tourists), and the much larger number of people consuming the same event in a virtual sense via television broadcasts, the Internet, or reading about it in the press. Indeed, Nicholls, Roslow and Laskey (2011) have asserted that the vast and dispersed masses in the external audience are more important – in a commercial sense – than the participants at the event. However, the manner in which the event is presented to that audience is crucial, and part of that is not simply football matches or other forms of entertainment, but coverage of how fans at the spectacle are enjoying themselves, buying merchandise, and so on.
Corporate interests dominate not just the scheduling of events, but also their development, planning and regulation (Law, Harvey & Kemp, 2002; Whitson, 1998). In the Olympic Games context, Hiller (2000) has claimed that the most critical issue for aspiring ‘world-class’ cities is that event preparation meets the demands of the event owner and their associated key stakeholders – the media and sponsors. Hiller insists that the aspirations of the IOC and corporate sponsors are incompatible with any local development for the event hosts (other than the practicalities of event infrastructure). He concludes that the IOC’s prime interests are: the securitisation of the event (to operate the athletic program, public order and commercial returns); the performance requirements of athletes; the broadcasting needs of television networks; and the special transport and ticketing privileges given to sponsors and their VIP guests.

Third, event organisers (for the FWC, these are host governments) aim to create benefits, such as economic growth via infrastructure development (Baade & Matheson, 2004; Bramwell, 1997; Euchner, 1999; Degen, 2004; Higham & Ritchie, 2001), urban regeneration (Hall, 2004; Jones, 2001), and tourism revenues (Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2010; Goodman & Stern, 1994; Higham & Hinch, 2002; Lee & Taylor, 2005; Ryan, Smee & Murphy, 1996). Host nations and cities are also interested in symbolic and affiliative rewards, such as the reputation of being ‘world-class’ (Friedmann, 1986; Sassens, 1991, 1994, 2001), being a member of the global community, promotion of nation building and perceptions of social cohesion (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Chalip, 2006; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006b), shared ideology (Brauer & Brauer, 2007), global prestige (Alegi, 2008), and image creation (Getz, 1997, 2005; Hall, 1992, 2006; Ritchie, 1984; Roche, 1994), to name but a few.

Each of these stakeholders has different relationships of power and influence in the mega-event context, but they all have a common stake in protecting both their individual interests and their common objectives, as well as providing input into decision-making with respect to whether an issue is judged to be morally right or wrong. A key part of this is planning for and managing ‘open’ public spaces at sport mega-events.
In conceptualising these event zones, Wakefield (2003, p. 24) has pinpointed two contrasting types of public spaces: ‘open’ and ‘restricted’. For the purposes of this thesis, the official PVAs and CRZs can essentially be categorised as open spaces – publicly owned and freely accessible – including main streets, open spaces (e.g., market places) and parks (Jones & Newburn, 1998). This is consistent with Habermas’ (1990, p. 54) notion of what is required of a public event: ‘We call events public if they are accessible to all’, and the same is meant by ‘public places’. However, this does not mean that everyone can attend. Public events that require fees, such as entry to a stadium, are public but not accessible to all. In the case of PVAs and CRZs, the expectation is that the public are entitled to enter such spaces without the requirement of an entry fee.

Although Wakefield has suggested a binary distinction between open and closed spaces, and Habermas assumes unfettered civic engagement in public events, Eick (2010b) offers a variation on these ideas. Adopting a critical perspective, he argues that the creation of PVAs may be understood as either a temporary privatisation of public space or as the introduction of market proxies into public space. For Eick, therefore, these are hybrid zones, as well as environments within which both state authority and commercial power are wielded. Indeed, according to Lefebvre (1976), public space in the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (see Section 2.4) is often attached to retail spaces devoted to the purchase of goods and consumer experiences. Lefebvre (1976, p. 341) therefore concluded that ‘the production of space can be linked to the production of any particular type of merchandise’. Thus, PVAs and CRZs, while public spaces, can also be understood as retail spaces, in that they are designed for both fan experience and consumption, and these zones are restricted to officially designated commercial entities.

Siebel (2000, p. 45) has conceptualised four varieties of ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ in urban settings, namely:

- Legal: Public space is governed by public law, while private space is under the private authority of the proprietor – and the power to define who may use premises and for what purpose differs accordingly;
• Functional: The public space of squares and streets is devoted to market and political functions, the private spaces of business and home to production and reproduction;
• Social: ‘Frontstage’ (Goffman, 1973, p. 55) public space is the locale of stylised, reserved behaviour, and that of anonymity. Private space, in contrast, is ‘backstage’ (Goffman, 1973), a place of intimacy, emotionality, and ‘domesticated vital functions’ (Gleichmann, 1976, p. 321);
• Material/Symbolic: A broad repertoire of architectural and urban development elements signal the accessibility or exclusivity of spaces. Design, materials, and symbols heighten and spell out the legal, functional, and social differentiation of public and private spaces (Wagner, 1999).

The hybrid nature of space is significant to note in this context given the relationship between security/surveillance. Moreover, they show the complexities of power and meaning in spatial contexts. Indeed, the most striking message from these four ideal types is that urban spaces rarely exist in ‘pure form’, but rather, as Eick (2010b) suggested previously, in hybrid or ‘quasi-public’ forms.

The spatial characteristics of PVAs and CRZs are discussed more fully in Chapter 5, which elaborates on the hybrid public/private characteristics introduced here. The discussion now turns to research into the securitisation of event spaces which, as will be revealed, also has public/private characteristics.

2.3 Event security and surveillance
The literature on mega-event security has focused overwhelmingly on security at stadia and venues associated with sport activities. This is where the athletes perform and where ticket-holding spectators congregate. As indicated in Chapter 1, there are important reasons for this attention to security and surveillance in such spaces, with terrorism (e.g., Munich Olympics in 1972), hooliganism (European football championships) and safety issues (Hillsborough Stadium disaster) confronting sport organisers in the last 30 years (Jennings & Lodge, 2009; Klauser, 2008a). During this era, insecurity and instability were reflections of broader societal problems in many
countries. As Beck observed over 20 ago, ‘ours is an age unprecedented in its preoccupation with risk and its governance’ (1992, as cited in Jennings 2012, p. 11). With the millennium in prospect, Giddens (1999, p. 3) viewed this intense focus on risk as a function of anxiety, and asserted that ‘the idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the future’. While Giddens is a sociologist, not a soothsayer, his words were particularly prescient, given the events of 9/11 in the US just two years later.

The subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’ and concerns about further terrorist attacks (which transpired in other parts of the world, notably the UK and Indonesia), led to unprecedented levels of security and surveillance, as well as the installation of associated technologies. Notably, in many countries the protection of civil rights was confronted by a range of government-sanctioned anti-terrorism measures, which allowed for new levels of intrusion into the lives of people deemed ‘suspect’ (Amoore, 2007; Kreimer, 2004, Warren, 2002). In a context of fear and insecurity, it is not surprising that security and surveillance techniques, and associated strategies and responses, have escalated. Whether or not this intensification has had practical impact or been more effective in terms of reassuring anxious people that ‘something’ is being done to mitigate against risk – whatever that might actually be – is open to question.

Beck (2002), in an article entitled ‘The terrorist threat’ published just one year after 9/11, argued that contemporary risk assessments are real and imagined, and both are socially constructed. He pointed to the ubiquity of public discourses of fear and insecurity, which threatened to overwhelm policy makers in Western societies. Reassurance was not enough; the public wanted action and authorities needed to be ‘seen’ to respond. Beck reasoned that a ‘hidden’ but ‘central issue’ was the challenge for authorities ‘to feign control over the uncontrollable’ (2002, p. 41). Beck presented this as, at least in part, a triumph of artifice: ‘As [security] experts proliferate, governments attempt to simplify our images of the enemy’ (p. 45) and then justify their efforts ‘to create the fortress state by means of surveillance’ (p. 49).

In the context of this thesis, it is contended that the post-9/11 geopolitical environment has accentuated fear of terrorism-related activities and other security risks at public
events. Apprehension and insecurity have prompted sport organisations, governments and security firms to focus on developing increasingly complex and costly mega-event risk assessment, security management, and social control measures (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2009). Siebel and Wehrheim (2003) have put it this way: ‘fears resulting from insecurity are projected into public space, which can lead to excessive controls, which can indeed impair the publicness of urban spaces’. Continuing this theme, Boyle and Haggerty (2009c) have claimed that Western societies are moving from a ‘risk society’ to a ‘precautionary society’, with mega-events emerging as particularly fertile grounds for the articulation of precautionary thinking. Security planners are encouraged to conceive the future through a dystopian construction of worst-case scenarios that drive costly and questionable security measures (Clarke, 2006). Security risks are thought to proliferate, but in reality exceed the capacity for organisers to fully manage or even identify their impacts. This means that it is a public relations challenge to preserve the facade of total security (Haggerty cited in Molnar, 2009), while still providing realistic risk assessment and effective security measures.

In a practical sense, an overarching assessment of risk at a mega-event ought to be multi-faceted, taking into account an array of potential needs and issues (Jennings & Lodge, 2009). Two examples will suffice: health concerns, such as emergency medical care, managing outbreaks of disease, sanitation and garbage collection (Yancey, Fuhri, Pillay & Greenwald, 2008); and logistical needs, such as communications technology, supply chain networks, and traffic control systems (Davies, 2009). Jennings (2012) reminds us that, at a sport mega-event, the management of risk involves far more than just security. It involves various stakeholders and a vast array of responsibilities. For instance, in the case of the IOC, Jennings argues (2012, p. 1) that:

most political, financial and operational risks are shared between the IOC, national and/or metropolitan governments, the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG), National Olympic Committee (NOC) and the private sector (for example in the form of insurance, investment or sponsorship revenues from Olympic ‘partners’).

Jennings’ focus on stakeholders is consistent with the present thesis, where the event organiser, event sponsors and event host have a responsibility to forecast a variety of risks and their mitigation. However, in this study of the 2010 FWC, risk is examined in a very specific way: security management of two types of public space (PVAs and
CRZs) with particular goals – optimising public order and safeguarding sponsor interests within those zones. Of course, as explained in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6), one constraint of this thesis is that none of the 2010 FWC stakeholders made public their risk assessments, nor were the event organiser’s security strategies released. Thus, the researcher was obliged to rely on the (necessarily limited) data on the public record.

Until the FWC in 2006, the overwhelming attention of mega-event organisers was with securing stadia and corresponding CRZs. However, the rise of PVAs in Germany, and the concomitant rise of measures to monitor and manage such ‘open’ spaces, has meant a reconfiguration of policies underpinning crowd management and public safety in these contexts. While the 2006 FWC was a watershed in terms of the formal establishment of PVAs by FIFA, mega-event hosts have previously looked to secure sport stadia precincts as part of their overall public order strategy. For example, Taylor and Toohey (2011) have reported that organisers of the 2000 Sydney Olympics extended their security focus beyond sport stadia to surrounding precincts and streets.

In general terms, event owners and organisers tend to justify the territorial expansion of security as ‘matter of fact’, and portray the introduction of security measures in event spaces as a public benefit – being a sensible quest for patron safety and operational efficiency (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c). Critics, however, identify other agendas in these initiatives (e.g., Bernhard & Martin, 2011; Samatas, 2007). Most common are complaints about overly intrusive security protocols and excessive surveillance measures, both of which can compromise patron experiences at an event. Giulianotti (1999) used the case of football’s English Premier League (EPL) to examine how intensified security measures in sports have been connected with expanding police and social control agendas. He argued that the informal and ‘carnivalesque’ sociability of supporters has been systematically marginalised by the promotion of more sanitised forms of fan experience, both within stadia and in the surrounding urban fringes (Giulianotti, 2011). Measures introduced in the name of security therefore have the potential to compromise norms of public assembly, movement and expression in civil society. Security in that sense is not simply about ‘protecting’ the public in open spaces, but rather about targeting members of the general public and their capacity to engage in norms of public assembly.
Graham (2010) has examined the rise of ‘military urbanism’ in the world’s rapidly expanding metropolitan areas, a term that designates the spread of Western military techniques, security forces and militarised definitions/organisations into the monitoring and ordering of urban space, particularly in the context of the post-9/11 era. He found that the logics and techniques of military planners have influenced urban architectures and geographies of public space. One strategy, for example, is for portions of open space to be cut off and networked with the rest of the city through a multitude of access- or passage-points, with control mechanisms such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). What is emerging, argues Graham, is a temporally limited, security-related, form of ‘passage-point urbanism’ (2010, p. 158). Notably, the design of urban spaces and the management of crowds in a sport mega-event context shows some traces of such processes. Schimmel (2006) has also identified an intensified militarisation of urban space in sport events, whereby ‘security’ has become the justification for techniques that, as she puts it, compromise the quality of life for local residents. For example, in the London Olympics 2012 context, the Guardian reported that residents of a gated complex in east London feared that the introduction of high velocity anti-terrorism missiles would actually make them a target for terrorism (Booth, 2012). In this respect, Coaffee (2005, p. 448), and Coaffee and Wood (2006, p. 515-516) have raised a crucial question: ‘How do we reconcile legitimate intervention linked to military-style resilience ... with the maintenance of individual freedoms and rights to privacy in the urban environment?’

Some of these military style technologies at the 2006 FWC included: radio frequency identification (RFID) chips in the tickets, mobile finger print scanners, and extensive networks of CCTV surveillance. DNA samples taken from alleged hooligans from nations outside the RSA and other personal data were accumulated, and this information was shared by FIFA, the police, INTERPOL and secret services (Eick et al., nd). In examining such occurrences, Norris and Armstrong (1999, p. 222-223), drawing on Foucault’s work, developed the concept of the ‘super-panopticon’, which refers to the proliferation of digital surveillance systems comprising of ‘a marriage of cameras, computers and databases’. Samatas (2005) has revealed that such surveillance dynamics were an integral part of the security apparatus of the 2004 Olympics in Greece. While such technologies may prevent or deter unruly or criminal behaviour, they can also have
unintended negative impacts (Taylor & Toohey, 2006). For example, the omnipresence of security and surveillance measures can have the effect of either reassuring or alarming the public (Mackin, 2009). Similarly, saturation surveillance and security may help some to feel a sense of confidence in engaging with a mega-event, while for others there can be a sense of unease, with such measures viewed as heavy-handed, intrusive, authoritarian and a diminishing of personal freedoms in public space (Samatas, 2007, 2011a, b).

It is important to acknowledge recent and emerging public order policies at mega-events. At the 2006 FWC, for example, inexpensive, low key security strategies were devised, founded on the principle of positively engaging those who assemble within public spaces, rather than pathologising as inherently problematic (Stott & Pearson, 2006). Baasch (2009) has noted that, at the 2006 FWC, identity checks and public surveillance increased in public spaces, but policing was low profile and dispersed in order to avoid an impression that authorities were ‘in the face’ of fans. The overarching philosophy was for police officials to engage with any incidents of public nuisance in a de-escalating manner, and to work closely with fan advisors to avoid serious breaches of the peace (Baasch, 2009). These fan advisors formed part of Germany’s ‘Nationale Konzept für Sport und Sicherheit’ (‘National Concept for Sport and Safety/Security’), which combined initiatives at various levels to ensure a common approach to prevent fan violence. As McMichael (2012) has pointed out, policing measures at the 2006 FWC were constrained by ‘proportionality’, as planners aimed to keep the spectacle of sport in the spotlight, with security as an assurance (or warning) in the background. It has been argued that this strategy was particularly important in the German FWC context. There is evidence that ‘in your face’ anti-hooliganism deterrence measures can be counterproductive, producing the phenomenon known as ‘Lüchow-Dannenberg Syndrome’, which means military-style policing and resistance to such authority regressing into protracted civil conflict (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2011).

Many have noted the irony in all this: state-sanctioned, mega-event security and surveillance operations are overwhelmingly paid for via state funds, yet many taxpaying citizens are marginalised or isolated from aspects of the event itself (Newton, 2009; Olds, 2010). There is typically a ‘development’ rhetoric associated with mega-events;
namely, that public expenditure will create new sport facilities and traffic infrastructure, and also revamp urban spaces in and around the event precinct. However, as argued through the literature presented here, there are winners and losers in the ‘cleaning’ of open spaces: the winners are the event organiser and host, both wishing to convey to the world the aesthetically alluring leisure spaces, each themed with the brand decor of the event; the losers are many poor and marginalised communities who do not fit the image-making priorities (creation of a positive brand or reputation) of the event planners, and are thus relocated to spaces beyond the event zone (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), 2004). Security and development agendas are not always treated as equal, with research finding that security and commercial concerns typically trump the needs of civil society in a mega-event context (Stern & Öjendal, 2010). To that extent, it has been argued by many researchers that development agendas are ‘securitised’; subordinated to Western anti-terrorist, security agendas, without fostering development that meets the needs of civil society – especially those who are economically disadvantaged and politically weak (e.g., Beall, Goodfellow & Putzel, 2006; Davis, 1992b; Duffield, 2001, 2007; Luckham, 2009; Willett, 2005).

Furthermore, scholars have argued that mega-events function as test sites for increasingly complex high-tech security preparations and surveillance devices that are relevant to national security generally (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c; Klauser, 2008a). Indeed, Boyle and Haggerty (2009b), Eick (2011) and Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) have suggested that public authorities use the pretext of sport mega-events’ potential security problems to pioneer often controversial or expensive surveillance system technology. Notably, sport mega-events have been a catalytic function for CCTV networks (Samatas, 2007, 2011a, b). As Haggerty has put it in an interview: ‘These are being conceived as almost military type operations, in terms of the control of space, the flow of people, the use of documents and the control of documents’ (as cited in Weinberg, 2009). Surveillance technology is now influential in managing crowds and monitoring potential threats at mega-events on a world-wide basis (Church-Sanders, nd).

The market for security and surveillance equipment has grown significantly post-9/11, and is also manifest in the staging of sport mega-events. Commercial operators –
moving from country to country and event to event – meet with security governance stakeholders to offer the latest products, equipment and methodologies (Samatas 2007). According to Boyle and Haggerty (2009c), sport mega-events are therefore ideal opportunities for countries to seize an opportunity to re-calibrate their security and surveillance capabilities and resources. This highlights the moral/ethical debate which, as mentioned previously, is a substantive part of stakeholder theory, when researchers provide moral/philosophical guidelines for organisational operations and management given the impact of commercial operators installing/recommending security systems.

Intriguingly, then, there tends to be little concerted or well-organised opposition to this type of state-sponsored authority over public space. Boyle and Haggerty (2009b), as well as Bennett and Haggerty (2011c) have claimed that the balance of public attitudes tends to be on the security side of the equation, with citizens typically more tolerant of intrusive security measures under the (often illusory) impression that such innovations will be temporary. Haferburg (2003) has concluded that the general public is inclined to tolerate new security conditions as a necessary part of putting on a world-class event.

The transformation of public spaces into temporary private spaces, such as PVAs and CRZs, at sport mega-events, not only raises questions about the politics, power and pragmatics of security measures, but it also prompts us to think about the ways in which these spaces are commodified and safeguarded to suit the interests of key stakeholders. Thus, the next section addresses literature relevant to urban development, place selling, and destination marketing in mega-event contexts. A review of this literature suggests three themes relevant to this thesis context: i) ‘world cities’ and global image; ii) mediatisation; and iii) challenges for developing nations in hosting sport mega-events.

2.4 ‘World-cities’, media and global image
The business-friendly policies and practices pursued by entrepreneurial urban governments ought to be understood in relation to the influence and flow of global capital. The geographical scale and scope of neoliberal governmentality include municipal, national, and even supranational stakeholders (Leitner, et al., 2007b). Mega-events are key occasions for municipal governments to lure foreign investments and
develop infrastructure. Global/world cities that stage mega-events do so with the intent of positioning themselves as ‘players’ on the international sport/cultural stage, and seek to derive the commercial benefits in terms of tourism and investment, as well as reaping more intangible ‘feel good’ factors and a sense of local pride among citizens (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a; Graham & Marvin, 2001; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002).

‘World-cities’
The concept of the ‘world-city’ (Friedmann, 1986; Sassens 1991, 1994, 2001) involves cities competing against each other on a global scale to attract investment from multinational corporations, public agencies, media, sport and leisure corporations, and tourists (Harvey, 1989). These ‘world-cities’ are at the forefront of global neoliberalisation (Peck & Tickell, 2002), wherein the ambitions of political and commercial leaders coalesce in urban planning and investment in development (Leitner et al., 2007b). The neoliberal city is underpinned by governments either funding or subsidising economic stimulus projects delivered by the private sector. This merging of public-private interests to engage in ‘place-competition’ (Judd & Simpson, 2003; Kearns & Philo, 1993; Rowe & McGuirk, 1999) is part of a neoliberal push by elected officials and entrepreneurs to compete as partners against rival world-cities for investment, commercial revenue, and global status (Duckworth et al., 1987; Florida, 2002). As Brenner and Theodore (2002b, p. 375) have put it:

> cities have become strategic targets for an increasingly broad range of neoliberal policy experiments, institutional innovations, and politico-ideological projects.

This may be understood as the ‘ascendancy of a pro-growth ideology’ that views place-promotion as necessary ‘to generate economic growth in a fiercely competitive global market’, based on attracting people (i.e. tourism) and capital (i.e. foreign investors) to a location (Alegi, 2007, p. 328). As mentioned in Section 2.1, mega-events serve as an ideal tool to attain these goals.

Bernhard and Martin (2011) have argued that since ‘world-class’ cities strive to portray themselves as safe and secure, sophisticated security and surveillance measures at sport mega-events relate more to their symbolic capital for the host nation (i.e. protection of world-class status), rather than reflecting actual security risk assessments. This is
because mega-events allow host cities to show off sophisticated and often extravagant security measures as a way of demonstrating their capacity to be part an exclusive ‘club’ of nations that have hosted an event of global importance. The securitisation of such an event is part of a reputational cachet showcasing the power, resources and skills of the host as manager of a world-class spectacle. Given this argument, ‘security’ has emerged as a crucial selling point in terms of ‘world-city’ place branding (Coaffee & Wood, 2006). Boyle and Haggerty (2011) have deftly argued that in a mega-event context, the business interests and security politics of a world-city coalesce. In their study of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, where they focused on the city’s Project Civil City initiative, Boyle and Haggerty revealed how the staging of this sport mega-event promoted new forms of neoliberal urban development in concert with intensified levels of policing and securitisation. Crucially, in this case, promises by event organisers that development would bring benefits to the residents of the city were largely unrealised. Instead, civil society was compromised by the mega-event, with the colonising impact of Olympic-themed public spaces either fragmenting or excluding existing communities.

Whether or not sport mega-events bring much touted economic and social benefits is debatable. However, mega-events are given support by what Eick (2010b, 2011) has called ‘new forms of local boosterism’. In a similar vein, Schimmel (1995) has claimed that image-marketing campaigns are designed to legitimate plans for infrastructure development in the context of a mega-event, with urban developers arguing that taxpayer-funded, commercially-delivered projects will be for the betterment of the ‘community-as-a-whole’. To both Eick and Schimmel, therefore, the boosters’ inflated assertions about the inherent benefits flowing from a sport mega-event serve as propaganda to further their own interests. Once a host city has won the bid, boosters are less concerned about drumming up support; their prime concern is to mitigate against negative publicity associated with a range of complex factors, such as the vagaries of infrastructure development, security and urban regeneration plans, relocation of communities and businesses from an event precinct, and similar event-specific edicts. Throughout all this, the role of the media, as either supporter or opponent of an event host, is critical; thus, much is done to assure the public that any reforms are in their
‘best interests’. Accordingly, the next section focuses on the process whereby perceptions of risks and consequent security measures are shaped by the media.

**Media**

Not only are media reports important for the legitimisation of security measures, but also television images project a certain image or brand. The global media footprint is steadily increasing, not only in respect of the increased size of sport media audiences, channels and tools, but also with regard to the expanding capacity of the media to broadcast and present experiences from a range of spaces before, during, and after a mega-event takes place. According to Manzenreiter (2007, p. 18), media broadcasting companies ‘do not only sell sports to the viewers, but also sport audiences as customers to the consumer industry’. Because the media provides a global window into the event, there are both potential benefits and risks with this exposure. The mediatisation of a mega-event therefore means that security measures are developed, at least in part, to suit the media gaze (Roche, 2003; Rowe, 2003). Indeed, as Bajc (2007) has deftly put it, the desire to represent an impression of ‘total security’ has contributed to security itself having become part of the mediated spectacle of mega-events. In that respect, security measures are increasingly fashioned for public acceptance through mass media sanction (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c).

Some scholars have critiqued ‘risk discourses’ propagated by the media, concluding that the media itself has helped to legitimise substantial increases in surveillance, tightened control over public spaces, and other ‘precautionary’ security measures (Baasch, 2009; Yu et al., 2007). For example, at the 2006 FWC, heightened security measures in PVAs in Hamburg’s inner-city area were presented by official organisers to the local and national media with the argument that the additional ‘precautions’ were necessary in a venue that was not ticketed (Baasch, 2009). In this respect, Bennett and Haggerty (2011c) have argued that if something is ‘securitised’, it does not automatically mean that there was a substantive security risk. Rather, it means that an organisation or individual with authority decided that ‘something’ posed a security threat. As Fussey and Coaffee (2011, p. 3324) have pointed out in the context of the Olympics, security risks are not ‘exogenously defined, but are selectively and socially constructed’. In addition, they involve a range of stakeholders, from within government, police and
commercial institutions. Indeed, as Law et al. (2002) have noted, corporate interests are now highly influential – sometimes even dominant – in the planning, implementation, and regulation of public event spaces, including urban design and the embedded security and high-tech surveillance measures. Thus, corporate security becomes more prominent in the management of sport mega-event spaces.

During planning for sport mega-events, host cities typically legitimise increased security investments and public order reforms as a much needed embrace of urban modernisation, and, in terms of civil society, as a benefit to law-abiding, respectable citizens (Manzo, 2012). This is, of course, not just about how ‘insiders’ see themselves; it is as much about how ‘outsiders’ see them and the spaces they occupy – particularly as a mega-event invites the world to view the host city through the lens of the media. This strategy is therefore an exercise in public relations, in the creation of positive perceptions through the artifice of secure, themed spaces and happy, compliant event patrons. This not only involves promoting an aesthetically pleasing spectacle, but it also means addressing elements of the local environment that, at least to the event owner and organiser, are displeasing (particularly in respect of reputation to outsiders). Mayer (2007, p. 94) has put it this way: ‘urban place images have become as important as the measures to keep the downtowns and event spaces clean and free of “undesirables” and “dangerous elements” (such as youth, the homeless, beggars, prostitutes and other potential “disrupters”)’.

**Developing nations**

For developing nations, mega-events are arguably a riskier proposition than for industrialised countries. Matheson and Baade (2003) have argued that in developing nations, the start-up costs for the event infrastructure are likely to be higher than for developed nations. Moreover, since leisure and entertainment are luxury goods, the demand for attendance at the event itself, as well as post-event facilities, will likely be lower because a smaller proportion of the population has the necessary discretionary income. By and large, industrialised nations also tend to be able to attract larger numbers of fans to mega-events than developing nations due to perceived insecurities among tourists about an undeveloped destination (Matheson & Baade, 2003). Given these risks, underdeveloped countries therefore depend on foreign aid for their mega-
event including investment for infrastructure development, the importation of knowledge, labour, sporting goods and equipment, and multi-national sponsorship.

Redeker (2008) has asserted that sport provides an alluring platform for developing nations to project themselves as emerging ‘actors’ on the international stage. According to Matheson and Baade (2003), developing countries have taken the view that mega-events may help them to achieve political or foreign policy goals, and that staging a world-class event is likely to result in increased international investment in the local economy (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004; Nauright, 2004). Thus, they bid for events that are perceived to be able to provide a range of either tangible or symbolic rewards, such as: economic stimulus, diplomatic currency, and the reputation of being a ‘world-class’ member of the global community (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991, 1994, 2001). There have also been less convincing claims that, in the developing world, sport mega-events can be used to address social issues, such as inequality, deprivation and crime (Davies, 2002; Gratton & Henry, 2001).

There is a fundamental point in the foregoing discussion about public policy priorities. As Andranovich, Burbank and Heying (2001, p. 127) have argued, somewhat acerbically, it is the wrong priority for developing nations to be ‘providing festivals when people need bread’. In the Olympic Games context, Hiller (2000) has claimed that the most critical issue for developing ‘world cities’ is that the funding and political energies are not directed towards development, but towards the event preparation demanded by sponsors’ requirements. He contends that the IOC and corporate sponsorships are incompatible with development for the underprivileged, and that those goals are in fact radically opposed to the latter’s interests. Instead of community development outcomes, resources are poured into security and surveillance resources to monitor and control the general population. At the event itself, the requirements of elite sport and high performance athletes, together with the special privileges given to sponsors and their guests characterise the hierarchy of a mega-event.

As mentioned previously, sponsors are key stakeholders at sport mega-events. For the event owner and event organiser, therefore, the needs of sponsors are a major responsibility. The spatial and visual dimensions of that relationship are crucial: how do
the event owner and the event organiser allow sponsors to showcase their products and services, while at the same time protecting them from the prospect of commercial competitors using the spectacle as a way of associating their own products and services? This takes us into the complex domain of ambush marketing.

2.5 Securing commercial space: Ambush marketing

Sponsorship program protection strategies are increasingly used by organisers of sport mega-events (Portela, 2010). The growing areas of concern to sponsors include: ambush by association, personnel ambush, timeline ambush, and on-site ambush (Samuels, 2012). Our interest here is principally with on-site ambush, and the protection of commercial interests in public urban spaces during sport-mega events.

The world-wide growth in sponsorship expenditure has been accompanied by a parallel growth in the practice of ambush marketing (Burton & Chadwick, 2008; Golder & Burnett, 2007). For example, global sponsorship value for the FWC increased from USD 2 billion in 1984 to over USD 20 billion in 2006 (Sharma, 2010). Corporations such as Coca-Cola, Adidas, and Sony paid in excess of USD 350 million to FIFA to sponsor the 2010 FWC (Watal, 2010). According to FIFA, there was little need for active rights protection measures during the first six decades of the FWC, but the rise of event piracy in the early 1990s saw rights protected as official trademarks came under increasing attack by ambush marketers. In 1989, Sandler and Shani published the first scientific article on the subject of ambush marketing, which they defined as ‘a planned effort (campaign) by an organisation to associate themselves with an event in order to gain at least some of the recognition and benefits that are associated with being an official sponsor’ (1989, p. 11). In 1994, FIFA documented 258 infringements across 39 nations. This number increased in 1998, when FIFA’s newly-created Rights Protection Program (RPP) patrols helped to identify 773 cases in 47 countries. This more than doubled to 1,884 instances in 94 countries in 2002, and rose at a similar rate to reach 3,300 cases by the time the 2006 FWC came around (FIFA, 2009b). However, these statistics should be viewed in context: an increase in the patrolling and policing of ambushing led to an increase in the detection of such practices.
Ambush marketing is not a legal concept per se, but is rather a popular label loosely applied to attempts by non-sponsors to benefit from official sponsorship by another company (Crow & Hock, 2003; Dickson, 2007). Many scholars (Crow & Hoek, 2003; Grady, McKelvey & Bernthal, 2010; Hoek & Gendall, 2002; McKelvey & Grady, 2008) have conceded that there is vagueness, uncertainty and confusion around the concept of ambush marketing, and it is one of the most controversial topics in sport marketing law. On the one hand, ambushing has been described as ‘parasite marketing’ by the IOC (Payne, 1993, p. 4); Mandel, Marketing Counsel at the Coca-Cola Company, even views it as ‘stealing’ and ‘thievery’ (quoted in Gardiner et al, 2006, p. 459). As Coca-Cola is a regular sponsor of the Olympics and FWC, it is unsurprising that Mandel’s attitude is so strongly against the practice of ambush marketing. Glengarry (2007), on the other hand, has described ambushing as ‘parallel marketing’, while Thorpe et al. (2009) view it as a carte blanche sport marketer’s paradise. In short, those within marketing generally, and sport marketing in particular, are divided about the legitimacy of ambushing: is it fair game to bend the rules, or is it poor form? Or even criminal? In fact, many jurisdictions (e.g., UK and Australia) have enacted criminal laws to deal with ambush marketing (see section 2.6.4) event though there is ongoing debate about whether ambush marketing should be criminal. Mega-event organisers and sponsors almost make it mandatory for host jurisdictions to pass ambush marketing and related protection laws.

Spoor & Fisher Partners is the law firm tasked by FIFA to enforce its ambush protection policy. According to Dean, a senior legal representative, the company dissects ambush marketing into two main types: association and intrusion. First, an unauthorised marketer tries to associate themselves with an event by using the event’s authorised trademarks, or by producing similar insignia to convey the impression of being an official event sponsor. Such practices have conventionally been disallowed on the basis of trade mark infringement, passing off the reputation of an official sponsor, and misleading and deceptive conduct (Dean, 2000, 2010). The second type of ambush marketing may occur subtly, by way of intrusion, in which case an ambush marketer exploits the media blitz surrounding an event (for example, the FWC) to give its own brand publicity without infringing on trademarks or misrepresenting itself as an official sponsor (Dean, 2000, 2010). While ambush marketing by association involves
deception of the public, intrusion does not (Du Toit, 2006). The burden of proof is therefore considerably higher in respect of intrusion.

While ambush marketing has been generally associated with major sport events, it is in fact manifested outside of an event context as well. For example, the Quebec-based home improvement chain ‘Rona’ ambushed an advertisement in the ‘Nano-chromatic’ campaign for the iPod Nano by placing a banner under it showing the paint dripping from the iPods falling into paint cans, advertising its paint recycling services (Minato, 2012).

Although ambush marketing has many critics, it has become something of reality in a highly competitive mega-event marketplace, consistent with what Crow and Hoek (2003, p. 9) have described as ‘commercial pragmatism’. Notwithstanding this Realpolitik, Schmitz (2005, p. 208) has insisted that ‘the appeal to large corporations of the world-wide exposure that results from sponsorship of the Olympic Games [or similar mega-events] will never be diminished by market imperfections such as ambushers to the point of threatening the budgets of event organizers’. Indeed, on that score Louw (2012, p. 668) asserts that, rather than a defence from competitors, RPPs are principally about enforcing market saturation:

the true object of event organisers’ aggressive anti-ambushing rights protection programmes appears to be the monopolistic pursuit of market control, in the interests of maximising the potential commercial value of events with a clear profit motive.

Séguin, Ellis, Scass and Parent (2008, p. 99), in their study of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, found ‘little direct evidence of harm caused by ambush marketing, which could not be sufficiently resolved by the less aggressive and unobjectionable brand protection and education strategies’. They claimed that the IOC should not be able to use its negotiating power to impose legislation ‘without unquestionable proof of damage’ (p. 101). Not surprisingly, though, neither the IOC nor its multinational sponsors share that perspective.

In view of the increasing sophistication of ambush marketers and the financial magnitude of sponsorship deals, event owners and event organisers face considerable pressure to develop strategies to protect commercial partners at an event, and to
optimise opportunities for these sponsors to showcase their logos and trademarks in the form of marketing. The target of such initiatives is direct competitors, such as major credit card, sport apparel, or soft drink companies. However, in an event context, local businesses risk becoming collateral damage; although they pose no genuine commercial threat to sponsors of mega-events, their commercial operations are constrained to the point that expectations of ‘business as usual’ end up being hollow promises. Patrons of an event also have to comply with anti-ambushing regulations, some of which seem ridiculously pedantic (Scherer, Sam & Batty, 2005). A case in point was a woman attending the Wimbledon tennis tournament in 2006: she had two pots of yoghurt confiscated by authorities because spectators were ‘banned ... from bringing into the ground food or drink not manufactured by the firms which pay tens of millions of pounds to sponsor the tournament’ (Newling & Gill, 2006). Surprisingly, event sponsors and indeed event owners generally fail to comprehend that this type of forensic and intrusive ‘brand protection’ can in fact be counterproductive in terms of brand public relations (McKelvey & Grady, 2004). The dominant response is interventionist, legalistic, and uncompromising.

Various strategies have been employed by event organisers against ambushing, such as formal warnings (e.g., legal letters), public relations and/or media programs (e.g., ‘name and shame’ responses) (Burton & Chadwick, 2009a) and court cases (see Payne, 1998; Shani & Sandler, 1999). While a range of anti-ambushing strategies have been suggested (Meenaghan 1994, 1996; Hoek & Gendall, 2002; Townley et al., 1998), ‘these strategies have yet to be meaningfully tested or explored, save those involving legal or legislative protection’ (Burton & Chadwick, 2008, p. 5). Indeed, Burton and Chadwick (2009a) have explored anti-ambush strategies used by event organisers from an historical angle, noting a paradigm shift over time from reactive anti-ambush strategies to more proactive methods. Given this tactical shift (McKelvey & Grady, 2008), it is relevant to analyse proactive counter-ambush marketing strategies: contractual agreements, pre-event education, on-site policing and national anti-ambush legislation.
2.6 Proactive strategies

2.6.1 Contractual agreements

Proactive measures focus on anticipating, deterring and preventing ambush campaigns (Burton & Chadwick, 2009b). One of the most common proactive strategies comprises contractual agreements, such as government guarantees and agreements among corporate parties. Host cities support the event owner and its sponsors by passing targeted legislation: this works to the advantage of these stakeholders, but compromises local businesses for which the event was supposed to provide commercial opportunities. Grady et al. have described this as ‘the manipulation of governments by sport organisations that make enactment of event-specific legislation “a cost of doing business” in exchange for hosting the event’ (Grady et al., 2010, p. 149).

Before countries have even been announced as an event host, they have to sign contracts to give the event owner the right to control all commercial activity in and around the event venue and other commercially demarcated physical space (Dowse & Rafferty, 1995). These contracts, when used in conjunction with event-driven legislation, have fuelled tensions: between the needs of event owners to deliver ambush marketing-free spaces to their official sponsors, and the impact this can have on local businesses and event patrons (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). Historically, national governments have not shown much resistance during the bid process when negotiating legislative requirements (Grady et al., 2010); thus, regulation imposed on the host city is hardly ever contested.

Germany represented an exception because it adopted a rather pro freedom of speech approach. In a significant decision, the German Federal Court of Justice ruled that FIFA and its licensed national partners were not entitled to exclusive use of the ‘Fussball WM 2006’ and ‘WM 2006’ trade mark. Therefore, the terms were only partially protected because they were lacking in the necessary distinctive character required to gain trade mark registration and were descriptive references to the event (Hambach & Gericke, 2006). If FIFA had contractually reserved its right to control and inspect the quality of the licensed products and services, the Court might have been more inclined to approve of the fulfilment of the indication of origin requirement (Lundgren, 2010).
As such, the German case becomes significant because what it is really saying is the ‘descriptive references to the event’ cannot be exclusively owned by the event owners and are beyond commercial ownership in the sense it has been used by previous event hosting jurisdictions. Thus, this illustrates that there are divergent ways such as pressure is ultimately applied in practice, but the requirement for something proactive to deal with ambush marketing is part of the security equation that can make the difference between hosting a mega-event or missing out. This has to be dealt with during the bidding process in most cases, but is an essential ingredient of security in relation brand protection.

2.6.2 Pre-event education and public relations

Another proactive anti-ambush measure refers to pre-event education and public relations initiatives designed to ensure that consumers, non-sponsors, and other sponsoring companies engaged in the marketplace understand the differences between official sponsors and ambush marketers, as well as appreciating the legal rights of the sponsors and event owners. A well-developed strategy is to set up a sponsorship rights protection committee to provide a single point of contact, with marketing, legal issues, law enforcement, and public officials available to field inquiries (Johnson, 2008). The next stage of this strategy is for local businesses to be informed prior to the event (preferably within six months), which has proven to be a successful way of engaging local stakeholders (Johnson, 2008). Measures include posting the ‘rules’ on ambush marketing on the official event website, producing and disseminating video news releases to the media (McKelvey & Grady, 2008), and conducting sponsor brand protection workshops (Wall, 2001). With this threshold well established, the advertising and communications industry is more likely to be ‘on message’. The rights holder is also better positioned to legally defend their rights if they are able to show evidence of an infringement, notwithstanding a concerted educational effort on the part of the plaintiff (Cooper, 2008).

Golder and Burnett (2007) have made several recommendations. First, they have argued that it is vital to communicate new IP legislation and the licensing regime to local entities, and that relevant local authorities assist with their monitoring and enforcement.
Second, they have urged care to ensure that permits in CRZs are not given to ambush marketers. Third, they have recommended that host broadcasters be informed about the IP legislation, to make them aware of the dangers of the media being used unwittingly for ambush activity. For example, if there are numerous people wearing t-shirts with logos of a non-sponsor in a public space, then television cameras ought not to focus on this section of the crowd. Fourth, authorities should proceed swiftly in the case of vendors/distributors of materials contrary to state and national IP by-laws.

There are, however, limitations to these preventative measures. First, the media typically has little, if any, vested interest in protecting the sponsorship rights of event organisers (McKelvey & Grady, 2008), nor is it required to do so. Second, research has indicated that the public is largely uninformed about or unaware of how sponsors are classified and protected against ambushing (Sandler & Shani, 1989; Shani & Sandler, 1998). Indeed, surveys about the impact of ambush marketing upon consumer recall suggest that most people do not care about ambush marketing (Lyberger & McCarthy, 2001; Shani & Sandler, 1998), and many do not even regard ambush marketing as unethical (Shani & Sandler, 1998). Third, it may be optimistic to expect that companies which understand the legal ambiguities of ambush marketing will be convinced to ‘play ball’ because of the pleas of event owners and event organisers, or the commercial rights of event sponsors. Therefore, many major event stakeholders are either not aware, are not interested or do not want to conform to ambush marketing protection strategies.

2.6.3 On-site policing

Perhaps no sponsorship program protection strategy has been more proactive than on-site policing of event spaces (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). This tactic has also been the most aggressive and controversial form of anti-ambushing. Scherer, Sam and Batty (2005, p. 31) found that, at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the host city used numerous tools and strategies to effectively create a hermetically sealed brand/consumption sporting environment: a legally enforced local product community/brand cocoon in which everyone drinks the same beverages and eats the same food while under the surveillance of brand protection hit squads and marketing representatives.
As a result a number of specific initiatives were undertaken, for example, leading up to the event, Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) compelled the National Australia Bank to remove Olympic Rings on display in its branches or face legal consequences (Tollhurst, 2000).

The 2004 Athens Olympics were even more intrusive in terms of on-site policing: local businesses were subject to daily surveillance and the threat of legal action for transgressions, delivered by a policing network that involved state authorities and representatives of the event organiser. They even encouraged Olympic spectators to document and report evidence of any ambushing activities (Scherer, Sam & Batty, 2005).

Eick (2010) has noted that excessive surveillance and control, or at least perceptions about such measures, can detract from a host city’s efforts to project openness, tolerance, democracy, and respect for human rights. Also, excessive security sometimes sits uneasily with branding messages that emphasise inclusiveness and mass participation, such as that promoted in London 2012: ‘Our Games will be for everyone’. Indeed, at Beijing, a range of Olympic sponsors complained that stringent security transformed the event into the ‘no fun Games’ (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c). Boyle and Haggerty argue that security authorities ‘must avoid depicting a situation that would be perceived by citizens as being “too great” of a security spectacle’ (2009c, p. 264). This is because, if security becomes too egregious, it stops being reassuring, and instead gives the impression of either: (a) the prospect of actual danger, or (b) a needlessly authoritarian host. While this argument by Boyle and Haggerty relates to public order security practices, security activity related to ambush marketing fuses with public order to potentially create a ‘too egregious(ly)’ controlled event that risks becoming too authoritarian.

Despite the fact that on-site policing may successfully protect official sponsors, it can run the risk of not only drawing negative publicity to official sponsors and the event itself, but may also alienate fans and consumers (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). In fact, by treating fans as potential accomplices to ambush marketing, it is increasingly likely that sport mega-events will lose some of their appeal. Scherer et al. (2005) argue that
disaffected patrons may even resort to resistance if they consider policing to be heavy-handed. And, in terms of ambushing, some may cultivate a desire to transgress the rules and control measures designed to protect the sponsors’ interest. This reminds us of the challenge for event owners: they are expected to defend their sponsors; however, depending on how this is pursued, there could be some risk of a backlash. Consumers are used to making choices, and although many of them appreciate the support of sponsors at an event, some object to being constrained in terms of what they can eat, wear or say – especially if it could amount to legal action against them (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). Moreover, a system based on forfeiture (i.e., of goods) is unlikely to be well received by fans, thus for dissatisfaction and dissent (Johnson, 2008). In short, if a balance between sponsor protection and fan engagement is not handled diplomatically, then popular feelings of support for a mega-event might be compromised (Baasch, 2010).

In view of all this, law enforcement and ambush marketing control officers need a proper briefing on appropriate strategies for policing and enforcement prior to the event. During the event, police and other law enforcement agencies are predominantly concerned with public order, crowding, traffic, and so on. Therefore, event organisers need to set up a special anti-ambushing task team or ‘buy the time of officers’ to undertake this role (Johnson, 2008, p. 219). So-called ‘brand protection units’ have been employed at some events to eliminate extraneous advertising and to monitor any ambush marketing activities. These include outsourced private investigators who need to follow a code of practice – a so-called Investigation Code. Johnson (2008) argues that giving them the power of arrest in conjunction with street bail is an effective way of removing street traders and ‘ticket touts’ (a British term for a scalper, someone who engages in ticket resale for more than the face value of the ticket), without requiring excessive police resources. However, the scope of anti-ambushing can never be complete. Event patrons carry mobile phones and, as a consequence, are able to receive advertising pitches from non-sponsoring organisations. Some major events have actually banned the carrying of mobile devices, though that is not a popular move and unlikely to be accepted as a general policy (Church-Sanders, nd).
2.6.4 National anti-ambushing laws

Brand owners face considerable challenges when staging mega-events in countries with less developed trade mark protection legislation. Therefore, organisations like FIFA and the IOC have been proactive in countering that problem: they require bidding nations to promulgate special national anti-ambushing laws, in addition to the contractual arrangements such as the host city agreement (Grady et al., 2010; Lines & Heshka, 2010). Indeed, Ellis, Scassa and Séguin (2011) have concluded that there has been a trend towards the use of counter-ambush marketing legislation as crucial for brand protection. The primary goal of such legislation is to render under-regulated laws on trademark protection in a host country, broadly described as having the capacity for ambush marketing (Séguin et al., 2008).

From a host country’s point of view, there can be benefit from putting in place laws that deal comprehensively with ambush marketing. National or local sponsorship protection legislation implemented prior to an event bid can be regarded as important for trying to ‘secure’ a mega-event, but also for special occasions beyond that (Dean, 2010; Lines & Heshka, 2010; McKelvey & Longley, 2011). Beginning with the 2000 Sydney Olympics, New Zealand, China, England, the RSA and Canada (see Appendix B) have each introduced anti-ambushing legislation in the context of a mega-event. The RSA and New Zealand approaches were unusual, as the legislation passed was aimed at addressing the problem of ambush marketing on a one size fits all rule, rather than on an event-by-event basis (Cornelius, 2007; Longdin, 2008). Of particular relevance to this thesis, the RSA government enacted wide-ranging counter-ambush marketing legislation on a national level that represented some of the most stringent commercial protection in the world (Johnson, 2008). By contrast, the failure by the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) to secure co-hosting rights to the 2003 Rugby World Cup presents an example where legislation was provided specifically in relation to the bidding for and hosting of major events. In announcing their decision to make the Australian Rugby Football Union the only World Cup hosts, the International Rugby Board (IRB) announced that the NZRFU had been unable to guarantee ‘clean’ stadia. Ultimately, the NZRFU’s bid for hosting rights foundered in part because of the IRB’s determination to close promotion ambiguities that rivals of official sponsors might exploit (Crow & Hoek, 2003).
A comparable situation arose in 2003, when the Indian cricket team came close to boycotting the ICC Champions Trophy tournament. Players expressed unease that personal advertising and endorsement contracts they had entered into would conflict with the ICC anti-ambush regulations, designed to ensure official sponsors had exclusive promotional rights during the event (Reuters, 2002).

Broad ranging anti-ambushing protection can, of course, be very controversial (see Fraser, 2005a, b; Brook, 2006) as it seeks to make illegal a variety of activities that would otherwise be deemed legal under existing IP regulations (McKelvey & Longley, 2011). Such legislative intervention raises public policy concerns, in that it has the potential to impinge on the commercial freedoms of local businesses (Grady et al., 2010; Longdin, 2008). It could even be used to block non-sponsors from basic business communications; at its most extreme, non-sponsoring companies could be operating in a climate of commercial censorship. When examining event-specific legislation from Beijing, Vancouver and London, Grady et al. (2010, p. 144) have suggested that this ‘one-sided process’ does not achieve a fair balance of all stakeholders’ interests. Indeed, the legal director of the UK’s Institute of Practitioners in Advertising has concluded on the Guardian’s website:

This sort of legislation is insulting. It is specific and unprecedented protection for a small group of internationally based, predominately non-UK companies to the detriment of all other businesses’ (Marriner, 2005).

Ellis and Séguin (2010) found that the power of the *Olympics and Paralympics Marks Act* 2006 seemed to lie mainly in its role as a deterrent for small local businesses in Vancouver. This is because they did not have access to sophisticated legal advice, nor the necessary financial resources to take their grievances to court. Further, Séguin, Ellis, Scass and Parent state in the 2010 Vancouver context that while ‘the ostensible purpose of legislation is to protect a country’s citizens from harm ... it can be argued that in seeking to protect the sponsorship rights of certain companies (i.e. legislation in place of proper brand protection), the government is, in fact, causing more harm than good’ (2008, p. 100).

Moreover, while the enactment of national ambush marketing legislation may seem like an obvious risk management tool benefiting official sponsors, it conversely has the
potential for negative impact not only on official sponsors’ but on the event owner’s brand as well (Grady et al., 2010). Séguin and Reilly (2008, p. 71) found that major sponsors of the Olympic Games were less worried about ambushing and more concerned about sponsorship clutter ‘that the Olympic movement itself has created’. An overemphasis on revenue generation can lead, as in the case of the Olympics, to an abundance of sponsors, all competing for marketing space and time (Grady et al., 2010).

At the same time as event organisers seek to introduce stricter controls over the actions, activities, and behaviour of non-sponsors and fans, there is a need to find a balance between the responsibilities of event organisers and the needs of official sponsors, as well as the civil rights of fans and the commercial needs of local businesses (Burton & Chadwick, 2009a; McKelvey & Grady, 2008).

In summary, there has been limited research linking security management and commercial interests in PVAs and CRZs at sport mega-events from the event owners’ perspective. Measures to safeguard brand reputation have been considered by Klauser (2008a, 2011a, b) and Eick (2010b, 2011a, b) in the Euro 2008 and 2006 FWC contexts. Other researchers have mainly focussed on urban development and city marketing in the context of event security (e.g., Cornelissen, 2009, 2011; Golka & Selter, 2010; Haferburg et al., 2009; Schulke, 2006a, b, 2007a, b, 2008a, b). Elsewhere, the ambush marketing literature has to a large extent overlooked stakeholder relationships, with event owners pressuring event managers and host governments to implement special laws to govern sponsors’ interests in PVAs and CRZs.

Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the conceptual relationships between security risk management in public spaces at a sport mega-event, which will be further explored and developed throughout the thesis.

Pivotal to this thesis is literature that addresses the relationship between security politics and commercial interests in the urban environment. It will be shown that only Eick (2010b; 2011a, b, c) and Klauser (2008a, b; 2011a) have critiqued security policies and commercial protections within PVAs and CRZs from a neoliberal perspective.
As has been discussed, there is scholarship that addresses security measures at sport mega-events, as well as scholarship that deals with sponsorship protection strategies. However, it has been less common for researchers to combine both event security and the safeguarding of brand and commercial interests in the same study. In recent years, the range of mega-event spaces has grown, both to accommodate a wider range of fans and to extend the capacity of sponsors to market their products (see Section 3.3). A key concern of this thesis is mega-event strategies to sequester dedicated public spaces over which event owners and organisers assume spatial control. As will be discussed, the transformation of public spaces into temporary private spaces in the forms of PVAs and CRZs raises important questions about the power to control/influence themed event zones, and the extent to which the associated security measures impact upon the host city. Therefore, as represented in Figure 2.1, literature encompassing three domains – event management, urban development and the commercialisation of public space – forms the basis of this study. Hence, the following literature review explores the relationships between security politics, urban policy and commercial interests at a sport mega-event, each of which can be understood as a function of neoliberal ideology.

Figure 2.1: Conceptualising security risk management in event spaces

Event stakeholders
- Event security and surveillance
- Disneyisation of urban spaces

Neoliberalism
- Festivalisation of urban space and world cities
- Global image and media

PVAs and CRZs

Security of event brand, sponsors’ commercial interests, and event

Proactive sponsorship program protection strategies:
- Contractual agreements
- Pre-event education
- On-site policing
- National anti-
2.7 Research gaps and theoretical framework

The previous sections have demonstrated that there are gaps in our conceptual understanding of security and its management at sport mega-events. Three distinct areas of investigation are of particular relevance to this thesis. First, the conceptualisation of ‘open’ public spaces, namely PVAs and CRZs, both of which present event owners, event managers and host cities with security challenges and opportunities. Second, the commercial use of PVAs and CRZs by the event owner and event sponsors, which involves a combination of rights protection legislation and security protocols underpinning anti-ambushing, while being influenced by power dimensions and inter- and intra-organisational politics. Although there has been an abundance of research on the quest to limit ambushing, little of this has addressed the protection of commercial interests in PVAs and CRZs, nor the security measures underpinning that process. Third, although there has been a volume of scholarship about sport mega-events in the developed world, there has been little research into their application in developing world contexts. As this thesis will show, the RSA had special challenges in terms of managing the FWC: the interest here is how CoCT conceived, managed and secured PVAs and CRZs to suit the interests of a range of stakeholders.

Pivotal to this thesis is literature that addresses the relationship between security politics and commercial interests in the urban environment. This includes studies of economic impacts of sport mega-events, particularly in relation to urban regeneration and gentrification, and in terms of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989) and ‘place selling’ (Kearns & Philo, 1993). Imaging a city through the organisation of a mega-event, is therefore a mechanism for attracting mobile capital and people in a period of intense inter-urban competition and urban entrepreneurialism in which neoliberalism has become one of the key frameworks by which the experience of urban development is understood (Hall, 2006).

The overarching theoretical perspective of critical neoliberalism, together with theorisations of event security, space and commercialisation, are deployed to explore the aforementioned identified research gaps. As will be further explained, and as befitting the complexities surrounding this research topic, the thesis draws on conceptual approaches from more than one discipline. The use of this approach is
consistent with the argument of Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), who have contended that research into security management at mega-events should integrate insights from sociology and urban studies, in order to understand the interweaving of power relationships among event stakeholders, and the logistics and politics of sequestering event spaces. Research into issues of security, surveillance, and control at individual sport mega-events has drawn predominantly on the human geography, urban sociology and criminology literature: this has featured in studies of sport mega-events in North America (Bennett & Haggerty, 2011a; Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c, 2011; Molnar & Snider, 2011) and Europe (Baasch, 2009, 2011; Coaffee et al., 2011; Floridis, 2004; Fussey & Coaffee, 2011; Klauser, 2008a, b, 20011a, b; Samatas, 2007, 2011a, b), as well as a smaller, but growing, body of scholarship on sport events (of various sizes) in the developing world (see e.g. Alegi, 2004, 2007, 2008; Cornelissen, 2011; Matheson & Baade, 2003; McRoskey, 2010). From these approaches, the present study invokes a combination of critiques from critical sociology, urban geography, and (event) management. A neoliberal research paradigm, complemented by the concepts of Festivalisation and Disneyisation, provide the theoretical apparatus to evaluate and interpret power relationships among mega-event stakeholders, and the logistics and politics of sequestering PVAs and CRZs at the 2010 FWC.

2.7.1 Neoliberalism: A critical approach

This section begins by evaluating the ideology underpinning neoliberalism and its intended impact in market economies. It then discusses how neoliberalism has become an important public policy dimension in developing nations, global sport organisations, and sport mega-events, each of which are integral to this thesis. This will provide a foundation from which a neoliberal framework can be conceptualised for the purposes of this thesis. Thereafter, two key neoliberal approaches – Festivalisation and Disneyisation – are discussed in terms of their theoretical contribution to the study.

Hall (2011) cautions that there are varieties of and nuances about neoliberalism, which means that its shape and impact will depend on context. He talks about neoliberalism as multifaceted and plural, rather than monolithic and singular. Typically, though, neoliberalism favours government support for industry, the privatisation of state-owned
industries and land, the outsourcing of public services and government agencies, and the replacement of ‘passive’ welfare with ‘workfarist’ social policies (Leitner, Sheppard, Sziarto & Maringanti, 2007b, p. 1). Neoliberalism has its philosophical roots in a particular view of a society underpinned by an assumption of achievement: successful individualism, workplace performance, and the benefits of personal wealth derived thereof. It is a recipe about success, but not necessarily a recipe for success. This is because neoliberal society relies upon winners; losers have only ‘themselves to blame’ for not making good with the opportunities presented by a free market. In order to achieve this laissez-faire vision of society, individuals are expected to become responsible entrepreneurs, able and fend for themselves, rather than ‘wasteful’ recipients of welfare support (Rose, 1999). As Manzenreiter (2007, p. 19) has pointed out, under neoliberalism, ‘sport is no longer viewed as part of a welfare policy pursued by the state’, with the aim to make sport available to all.

There is broad consensus among critics about the main assumptions underlying neoliberalism and the set of aspirations underpinning its function in market economies. For Jessop (2002), neoliberalism is a set of political discourses that give primacy to individual freedom and market forces, combined with the erosion of collective representation (e.g., trade unions) and the welfare state. McChesney (1997) sees neoliberalism as a logical outcome of laissez-faire capitalism. He refers to it as ‘the politics and processes whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximise their personal profit’ (1999, p. 7). This ‘permission’ is not simply a function of the competitive marketplace, but stems from government itself, which, rather than seeking to equalise wealth (such as through a proportional taxation system or the provision of social welfare), is expected to facilitate the creation of wealth among those who are best placed to realise that goal – capitalised entrepreneurs and investors. Ferguson (2010, p. 170) has described this as ‘allow[ing] the state itself to be “run like a business”’. Hackworth (2007, p. 9) concludes that neoliberalism is, in effect, ‘an ideological rejection of egalitarian liberalism in general and the Keynesian welfare state in particular’. In a similar vein, Ferguson (2010, p. 170) has argued that neoliberalism has become the name for a set of highly interested public policies that have vastly enriched the holders of capital, while leading to increasing inequality,
insecurity, loss of public services, and a general deterioration of quality of life for the poor and working classes.

The concept of neoliberalism has been supplemented by scholarly work on the notion of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991). According to Rose (1999), governmentality has two main forms under neoliberalism. First, neoliberalism views the market economy as the inner regulator of the state, rather than the state as external regulator of the market economy (Lemke, 2001). Thus, governmentality assumes that the state is an instrument for, rather than a regulator of, free enterprise. Second, neoliberal ‘governmentality’ entails a particular kind of spatiality: government at a distance (Rose, 1999, p. 49). Leitner et al. expand on this notion:

Neoliberal governmental technologies are indirect: setting targets and monitoring outcomes; transforming the ethos of governance from bureaucracy to business; giving agencies autonomy to act as long as they are accountable; and creating calculable spaces to monitor outcomes (Leitner et al., 2007b, pp. 3-4).

In terms of governmentality, therefore, neoliberalism seeks to impose market discipline over the state; politicians are expected to facilitate entrepreneurial opportunities, rather than over-regulating the economy. This is commonly achieved by pushing policy mechanisms such as lowering taxes on businesses and the wealthy, shrinking or dismantling public institutions, and subjecting public services to the logic of markets through public/private partnerships or outright privatisation. Indeed, according to Clarke (2004), neoliberal governmentality situates human activity within an economic calculus. It relocates activities from the public realm to the market by means of direct privatisation, public/private partnerships, and outsourcing for competitive success. It is therefore important to appreciate that governments are key actors, not merely tacit observers, in a neoliberal paradigm. As Peck and Tickell (2007) have explained, only in a rhetorical sense do advocates of neoliberalism argue for a ‘lesser’ state role in a market economy. In practice, the neoliberal cause is firmly underpinned by governments sympathetic to the promotion of free market economic activities, the outsourcing of a range of government agencies to private providers, and a diminution of social welfare spending.
2.7.2 Neoliberalism in developing nations

Hall (2011, p. 12) points out that although neoliberal ideology stems from Western, industrialised nations, its influence has become global and, therefore, an emerging feature of developing economies:

Neoliberalism is ... critical to contemporary geopolitics. Structural adjustment programmes have forced the ‘developing world’ to set market forces free, and open their economies to free trade and foreign investment, while promoting the ‘liberal’ virtues of elections, multi-party politics, the rule of law and ‘good governance’.

Intergovernmental, international institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have been instrumental in the spread of neoliberalism to the developing world. They have provided loans to developing nations with what appears to be virtuous intent: to allow them to build infrastructure and develop a stronger economic base. However, acceptance of this funding comes with expectations of repayment, which many recipients are unable to meet. There is also pressure from these global funding bodies for developing countries to adopt free market principles (e.g., by removing tariffs), allow unfettered foreign investment, privatise state enterprises, and outsource the running of public utilities (Bond, 2004; Williams & Taylor, 2000). As Fine (2009, p. 886) has put it succinctly, ‘development economics’ has become synonymous with neoliberal ideology in underdeveloped countries. Harris and Seid (2000, p.10) have argued that

this ‘globalizing’ process has led to the increasing integration of the developing countries into the global capitalist economy not as equal players but as captive markets’ and the source of cheap human and natural resources for the transnational corporations.

The RSA has hardly been immune, as a developing nation, from this transition to neoliberalism under development economics. The RSA government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), was once avowedly socialist, but in the Realpolitik of holding government for the first time, started to alter its position in the mid-1990s. According to Narsiah (2002, p. 4), one important explanation for this shift is that ‘multilateral institutions such as the World Bank brought ... power to bear on the ANC, thus converting the organisation to neoliberal orthodoxy’. This suggests that, as with the previous discussion, the RSA was quite typical in terms of experiencing the neoliberal impact of global financial institutions. In terms of economic policy, the so-called
Government of National Unity soon adopted a range of measures consistent with a neoliberal agenda, such as fiscal austerity, tariff reduction, and privatisation of public utilities (Carmody, 2002). The RSA was telling the world it was ‘open for business’, with the stated goal of ‘be[ing] competitive in the global economy’ (Murray, 1997, p. 5). This is in concert with Debord (1983), who has argued that ruling elites can maintain control over people by sponsoring popular sources of pleasure and excitement and, in the process, divert them from oppositional thoughts and feelings.

2.7.3 Neoliberalism and global sport organisations
The impact of neoliberalism on sport is hardly new. It has boosters and opponents. In 1998, Bourdieu, Dauncey and Hare (1998, p. 19) observed acerbically that ‘the neoliberal rot has already infected’ sport, with ‘many people ... playing at running a private enterprise for purposes of speculation, high profits and salaries, while retaining the protection offered by being in the public service’. In this view, organisations like FIFA, which are on the surface Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), act much like free market enterprises, yet enjoy tax-free status and are supported by governments in the ‘public interest’. Indeed, as Eick (2010b) found in his study of the 2006 FWC, international sport organisations took over the control rights of public space from the local governments during this mega-event.

According to Manzenreiter (2007), the social benefits of sport depend largely on the degree of national wealth (and its spread) and whether government policies actually promote sport across communities. His research into developing countries has shown that governments, as well as NGOs involved in the administration of sport, have mainly been unsuccessful in making sport a universal public good. Instead, disparities of wealth and opportunity pervade sport cultures in poor countries. This is exacerbated by the commercial interests that try to dominate sport development in such environments. In fact, Manzenreiter (2007) has further claimed that it is the media and their commercial clients that make a decision on the scheduling and production of major events, and not the governing bodies.
As mentioned previously, the connections between sports and power have been advocated by neo-Marxist scholars, such as Brohm and Fraser (1978) and Debord (1983), who have argued that ruling elites can maintain control over people by sponsoring popular sources of pleasure and excitement and, in the process, divert them from oppositional thoughts and feelings. When sports serve this function, event owners can market their brands to effectively establish ideological outposts in the minds of people (Gramsci, 1971). These outposts then serve as ‘relay’ or ‘delivery’ points, through which communications supportive of neoliberal policies are conveyed (Coakely, 2011). For instance, if FWC fans are repeatedly exposed to positive messages about FIFA’s grassroots developmental aid work, they are less likely to raise questions or object when FIFA violates environmental laws, or when the marginalised population is evicted from event spaces. Thus, advocates of neoliberalism have continuously linked their interests successfully with sports, to the point that most fans have come to take them for granted as a part of the overall sport experience (Hall, 2006).

2.7.4 Neoliberalism and sport mega-events

Neoliberal urban governance debates have centred on the capacity of mega-event security to set off and to facilitate public policies and developments, motivated by a range of interests and agencies, on a global, national and local scale (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2011). According to Hall (2006), hosting mega-events is a mechanism for attracting mobile capital and people (consumers) in a period when neoliberalism has become one of the major frameworks by which urban development is understood. Neoliberalism not only exists between cities, but also among corporations and organisations. As will become clear later in this study, the FWC is a catalyst for competition – not only among football stars, but also among the many private and public contenders – for the multiple tenders and profits that flow to neoliberal stakeholders at sport mega-events.

According to Manzenreiter (2007, p. 19), the globalisation and commercialisation of sport ‘would have been impossible without the neoliberal project’. Neoliberal political agencies provided ‘the regulatory framework that enabled cross border transactions, the deregulation of national economies and the unravelling of welfare state mechanisms’.
When studying regional security, Buzan (1981, p. 187) has stated that security is a relational phenomenon: ‘Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded’. Thus, security must be studied in a wider context, as it is interdependent with the security of other states. Buzan notes: ‘Domestic insecurities may or may not dominate the national security agenda, but external threats will almost always comprise a major element of the national security problem’ (1981, p. 187). Buzan’s argument raises the possibility that the securitisation process at sport mega-events goes beyond concerns for the safety of participants and infrastructure.

Indeed, Van der Westhuizen (2004, p. 1278) has warned that ““mega-events” profound security and surveillance protocols may have purposes beyond the confines of a sporting or cultural festival’. In a comparison of the security and political contexts underpinning the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the 1998 Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth Games, he found contrasting experiences, and concluded that international attention from a mega-event can promote democratisation in a country (as seen in the Republic of Korea in 1988), but it ‘can also become the catalyst for state-sponsored restrictions on civil and political liberties’ (2004, p. 1278), as transpired in Malaysia in 1998 (see also Silk, 2002). The latter impact is especially likely where people are tightly monitored and controlled, with the help of new security and surveillance technologies promoted by corporate and military industries. As a result, civil liberties such as the right to privacy may be at stake (Ball & Webster, 2003).

Various forms, effects and impacts of trans-scalar collaboration in security governance have been acknowledged both from a general perspective (i.e. Power, 2007) and from the viewpoint of mega-event securitisation specifically (Boyle, 2011; Klauser, 2008a; Samatas, 2007). These studies have shown how global security players are influencing local governments and urban spaces by reproducing the previously tested manuals of security systems (Klauser, 2011c). In the mega-event context, security techniques, technologies and policies are ‘ramped up’, in order to provide an intense level of ‘protection’ for a global event, where the stakes are magnified by the boosters. This is now an international endeavour, involving global private security companies and
INTERPOL, while at the local level combining state police and private security personnel (Samatas, 2007).

Such approaches to the securitisation of space at sport mega-events are increasingly influenced by the pressure that neoliberal globalisation exerts on governments via market forces (Ericson & Doyle, 1999). In that respect, transnational security companies often see their role in securitising an event as a gateway to broader influence within domestic markets, and particularly within the developing world (Boyle, 2011). Security companies strategically use mega-events to display their products and services (Klauser, 2008b; Eick, 2010b). In other words, a sport mega-event creates a range of major business opportunities for companies that provide security-related services, such as technology, personnel and consultancy (Klauser, 2011c). Boyle (2011, p. 169) has described this as the ‘mega-event security development nexus’, which links governments, sporting bodies and the security industry. As a consequence, commercial suppliers and non-governmental actors have replaced the state as the key players in mass sports (Manzenreiter, 2007).

Neoliberal governments are therefore ‘in the business’ of security, with coalitions of private and state providers a feature of mega-events. There is also external pressure on event hosts to maximise security for event spaces (notwithstanding actual risk assessments) because this is more likely to reassure prospective tourists and sponsors that the spectacle will be trouble-free. Thus, as more and more international neoliberal security agencies want to get involved with mega-events for various reasons, there is the potential for conflict over the use of urban space.

In order to evaluate and interpret power relationships among mega-event stakeholders, and the logistics and politics of sequestering PVAs and CRZs at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town, Häussermann and Siebel’s (1993) approach of Festivalisation of urban politics is analysed in the section below.
2.7.5 Neoliberal spaces: Festivalisation

From a critical neoliberalism perspective, sport mega-events can be used as a political instrument to conceive or legitimise urban development strategies (Hall, 2006). This may occur in sport event locations ranging from advanced industrial nations to developing countries. However, the impact of associated urban development is potentially disproportionately high in developing world cities that are unfamiliar with hosting sport mega-events, and which undertake – as part of the bid process – to create stadia, infrastructure, event precincts and associated themed public spaces in order to ‘transform’ an urban environment into a ‘showcase’ for visitors and global audiences (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). These types of urban spaces and places are ‘spectacularised’: they become the outward face of the mega-event and the window through which patrons and viewers experience it (Bélanger, 2000, 2009; Ponzini, 2012). This presupposes aesthetically pleasing festive spaces; theatres of sport beyond the playing fields. Critically, though, these zones are branded, themed, secured, monitored and commercialised to suit the varied, yet confluent, interests of the dominant mega-event stakeholders. In the process, the associated environment is typically transformed in order to both draw a curtain and then set the stage for a global media spotlight to shine. What was once public space and civil society becomes event space and a ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord, 1983, p. 1).

Häussermann and Siebel (1993) have called this phenomenon the ‘Festivalisation of urban politics’, which describes government and entrepreneurial support for large-scale cultural and sport events ‘to support image building and catalyse associated urban development’ (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011, p. 15). In this respect, ‘development’ has a particular salience: it means to ‘clean up’ an event precinct and to rid this environment of ‘unwanted’ objects and people (i.e. residents). Rather than meeting the needs of civil society and citizens, the festivalised mega-event reconfigures urban spaces to satisfy the aspirations of public and commercial authorities. Locals must ‘fit in’ with the festivalised urban agenda; the spaces they once occupied are now under the imprimatur of event organisers. It is important to acknowledge that Festivalisation only becomes a possibility with the realisation of the ‘world-class’ city: global in outlook, investor-‘friendly’ and the national hub for business, as well as being a site with political profile and cultural cachet, and a destination favoured by tourists.
It has been argued that the more of these boxes that can be ticked, the more likely a city is to be taken seriously as a site for mega-events, the selection of which is driven overwhelmingly by neoliberal ideology and associated interests (Kruger & Heath, 2012; Yu, Wang & Seo, 2012).

The scale, scope and impact of Festivalisation depend fundamentally on context. Baasch (2009), in her study of the 2006 FWC in Hamburg, found that this city did not need to be Festivalised, because the required local urban infrastructure was already well established. As a consequence, there was no need to spatially transform or reconfigure the event environs. This meant there was little disruption to civil society and local residents were more likely to be engaged with the event itself. By contrast, Steinbrink et al. (2011) found considerable evidence of Festivalisation in the context of the 2010 FWC in the RSA. By analysing the transferability and extension of the hypothesis of Festivalisation to the developing world, they discovered the forced removal of residents from event precincts in major cities, constraints to informal trade, and the marginalisation of many residents on the urban fringes; the latter had limited access to transportation (the focus of which was in the event hub). These contrasting case studies indicate that the economic status of a host city is a significant driver of the nature, scope and scale of Festivalised development strategies in a mega-event context.

At its core, Festivalisation can be understood as an instrument that, depending on context, can be used to drive urban restructuring as a by-product of staging a mega-event. Neoliberal cities with an entrepreneurial agenda may strategically use an event bid to put forward major developments, but not necessarily with widespread public consultation. Under a Festivalised model, a successful bidder is then ‘obliged’ to deliver on its infrastructure promises, which can enable the fast-tracking of urban projects – irrespective of any local opposition. The host city can safely argue that it has to comply with the event owner’s expectations, as promised in the bid document submitted years earlier (Steinbrink et al., 2011).

What Bélanger (2000) has termed the ‘spectacularisation of urban spaces’ now occurs in ways that accord with neoliberal urbanism, the commercialisation of urban space, and new crime policies (Eick, 2011a). The model of Disneyisation, proposed by the British
sociologist Bryman (2000, 2004), provides important impetus for the analysis of change towards more controlled commercialised mega-event spaces.

### 2.7.6 Neoliberal spaces: Disneyisation

In discussing urban transformation, Bryman (1999, 2004) has listed four trends (theming, hybrid consumption, merchandising and performative/emotional labour) as emblematic of Disney theme parks and their application to urban contexts.

First, in an event context, Disneyised theming consists of the construction and application of a narrative to specified locations. Typically, the source of the theme is external to the object to which it is applied, with the intention of creating playful, experience-oriented destinations, rather than simply placeless, consumer outlets. Theming can also be found in other experience sectors, such as hotels and shopping malls (Bryman, 2004). According to Sorkin (1992b, c), themed spaces are contrived, inauthentic and inherently banal. However, Fainstein (1994) has challenged this view, arguing that a sense of alienation or engagement is more a matter of taste. What looks like a distastefully commercial environment to one person may look appealing and worthy of consumption to another (Christopherson, 1994).

While theming is intended to increase mass appeal, the second aspect of hybrid or dedifferentiated consumption offers convenience, by providing patrons with various event products in the same space. When spaces encompass a combination of entertainment and shopping, they become a destination more often visited. This serves a twofold purpose: to create an attractive destination and to entice people to stay and spend money. As Bryman (2004, pp. 57-85) has put it:

> With hybrid consumption systems, forms of consumption are brought together in new and often imaginative ways. With hybrid consumption, the general principle is getting people to stay longer. Essentially, the more consumption items that are fused, the longer people will stay in the venue to which they have been attracted in the first place. In the extreme, the aim is to create a destination, somewhere that people will go to as a significant venue that will keep them there for some time.
While theming and hybrid consumption emphasise the concepts of ‘destination’ and ‘experience’, Bryman’s third category – ‘merchandising’ – is underpinned by the principle of ‘synergy’; that is, reinforcement of the event’s visibility by providing patrons with the opportunity to purchase items that connect them with the event. However, this also constrains choice, because, in Disneyised event spaces, only the official brands and sponsor merchandise are available for consumption. Bryman (2004, p. 79) has explained that ‘the key principle behind merchandising is a simple one of extracting further revenue from an image that has already attracted people’. Pens, shirts, mugs, posters, and toys are a few examples of items that can be merchandised and found at major events.

Bryman’s fourth principle of Disneyisation is the establishment of emotional attachment by workers to their company (in this case, the event organiser). What a Disneyised event is seeking is the ‘act of expressing socially desired emotions during service transactions’ (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993, pp. 88-89). In that respect, workers are packaged (perhaps even themed) to meet the expectations of their employer, but the crucial step is for them to identify with and believe in the company. If loyalty can be developed, this creates a motivational paradigm that is likely to lead to improved staff performance. Happy workers display a positive disposition to customers, thereby leaving a welcoming impression and rapport that encourages consumption. As Bryman (2004, p. 104-105) has put it:

> Emotional labour refers to employment situations in which workers as part of their work roles need to convey emotions and preferably to appear as though those emotions are deeply held. Organizations seek to motivate employees by raising their commitment to a firm or a team, so that they become emotionally tied to it. As a result, they are expected to commit themselves, not just to their jobs, but to the organization and all that it represents.

Since 1986, the Disney Institute has offered university-style leadership classes to teach customer service, and for students to ‘experience the business behind the magic’. This pedagogical model is not only delivered at ‘Disney Destinations’, but also at locations across the US and in more than 45 countries around the world. The Disney website draws on the experiences of business leaders who have taken their course and informed prospective students: ‘Like them, you will find your organization has more in common with Disney than you ever imagined’ (Disney Institute, nda). Zukin has deftly
summarised why a Disneyisation approach is significant in the context of a sport mega-event, and therefore why it is pertinent to the exploration undertaken in this thesis. Specifically, he suggested that:

Disney World is not only important because it confirms and consolidates the significance of cultural power – the power to impose a vision – for social control. It is important because it offers a model of privatization and globalization; it manages social diversity; it imposes a frame of meaning on the city, a frame that earlier in history came from other forms of public culture (1995, p. 77).

These Disneyisation trends are considered alongside with the previously detailed political and commercial agendas of event owners, organisers and sponsors. The use of the FWC to build a better reputation and stimulate brand awareness of Cape Town as a ‘world-class’ destination and the profit-maximisation agendas of event owners and sponsors, will be examined in this thesis’ investigation of CRZs and PVAs at a mega-event.

2.8 Summary

This chapter has demonstrated that the research objectives underpinning this thesis seek to fill a distinct gap in the scholarship, particularly in respect of sport mega-events organised in developing nations. Pivotal to this thesis is the literature that deals with the relationship between security politics and commercial interests in the urban setting. A key approach in terms of this thesis is the strategy of sequestering dedicated public spaces over which event owners, sponsors and organisers assume spatial control. As a result, the literature encompassing three domains – event management, urban development and the commercialisation of public space – forms the basis of this study.

The overarching theoretical perspective of critical neoliberalism, together with theorisations of event security, space, and commercialisation, are deployed to explore the aforementioned identified research gap. Drawing on these approaches, the present study invokes a combination of critiques from critical sociology, urban geography, and (event) management. The neoliberal research paradigm, complemented by the concepts of Festivalisation of urban politics and Disneyisation, provides the theoretical apparatus
to evaluate and interpret power relationships among mega-event stakeholders, and the logistics and politics of sequestering PVAs and CRZs at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town.

The following chapter will develop the research objectives in respect of the thesis context – the 2010 FWC in RSA and CoCT. It then discusses the literature in respect of the two key spatial zones in focus – PVAs and CRZs.
Chapter 3: Research context

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines FIFA in respect of the thesis research objectives: neoliberalism and FIFA’s commercial strategies, which have spatial and security dimensions in two physical realms – PVAs and CRZs. FIFA is one of the strongest international non-government organisations (INGO) in the world, by virtue of its transnational practices and impacts, through its economic Offshore Financial Centre (OFC) status, and its NPO profile. With regards to the former, it is usually a small, low-tax jurisdiction concentrating on providing corporate and commercial services to non-resident offshore companies, and for the investment of offshore funds. FIFA and its commercial spatial strategies, comprising PVAs and CRZs, are examined as examples of the immense power that NPOs can gain over public urban spaces world-wide. The chapter begins by discussing FIFA and its World Cup brand, as well as its neoliberal mode of operation. It then explores the commercial interests of the FWC owner and its commercial partners, as well as those of local businesses within CRZ spatial zones. Subsequently, the territorial spaces under investigation are presented: PVAs and CRZs. They are consistent with FIFA’s neoliberal agenda, featuring security measures to protect its brand and its sponsors’ rights. Table 3.1 provides a summary of approaches used by researchers to evaluate FIFA and the FWC mega-event.

Table 3.1: Summary of key research critiquing FIFA’s profit-driven governance

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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cornelissen</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Explored the political economy of the 2010 FWC as defined by the major commercial, corporate and political forces.</td>
<td>Due to the major influence of commercial actors that hold proprietorship over the most profitable aspects of the event, the 2010 FWC was unlikely to capitalise on the gains – for South African football and society – that were generally</td>
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<td>Author</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darby</td>
<td>1997,</td>
<td>Drew upon the discourse on globalisation and development in order to</td>
<td>It is crucial to understand the evolution and development of FIFA in relation to broader globalisation processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000a, b</td>
<td>theorise Africa’s relationship with FIFA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darby</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Examined how the FWC, and more specifically the political debate</td>
<td>Africa’s place at the FWC can be read as a reflection of broader developed and developing world power relations.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>surrounding the distribution of places for the tournament, have</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>come to represent one of the key arenas in which Africa’s quest for</td>
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<td>global football equity has manifested itself.</td>
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<td>Eick</td>
<td>2010b/</td>
<td>Critically assessed FIFA’s neoliberalist event agenda. The 2006 FWC</td>
<td>FIFA, since the early 20th century, has increasingly embraced neo-liberalism as a ‘neocommunitarian entrepreneur’. Commercial considerations became increasingly intertwined with (FIFA-imposed) security measures in public spaces at the 2006 FWC.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2011a, b</td>
<td>was used as an example to illustrate the neo-liberalisation of</td>
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<td>sports in general, and the securitisation of profits by surveillance</td>
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<td>means in particular.</td>
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<td>Eisenberg</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Analysed the means used by FIFA officials in attempting to</td>
<td>FIFA’s football development policy has given a new long-term globalisation boost to the transnational football community. It enforces values and standards, and regulates the current activities of the national associations in the interest of all parties.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>establish a transnational football community. The development of</td>
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<td>FIFA was placed in the general context of world history,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>concentrating on the period after 1945.</td>
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<td>Kaufmann</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Assessed the organisational structure and internal governance</td>
<td>FIFA has monopoly control over international football. Challenges include subpar corporate governance, leadership and transparency. These challenges in part undermine the development objectives of host countries.</td>
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<td>mechanisms of FIFA.</td>
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<td>Pielke</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Drawing on literature in international relations, examined how</td>
<td>Any successful reform will require the successful and simultaneous application of multiple mechanisms of accountability. The FIFA case study has broader implications for understanding mechanisms</td>
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<td>FIFA can be held accountable. Considered the experience in</td>
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<td>reforming the IOC, which provided one model for how</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pieth</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Discussed the corporate requirements and specific risks linked to key decisions of FIFA bodies and elections into FIFA sub-entities.</td>
<td>Despite NPO status, FIFA is in fact a potent <em>corporate entity</em>. FIFA embraces both quasi-public and quasi-business roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schult Herzenberg</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Explored a range of situations where conflicts of interests are apparent and might lead to corruption. Six case studies reported on controversial aspects of the 2010 FWC. Reflected on the link between mega-events and public interest and questioned the role and responsibilities of the host governments.</td>
<td>Cases of corruption in contracts and tenders of the mega-projects involved in the preparation of the tournament reflected the limited capacity of the state in preventing the conflict of interests. A general lack of transparency and accountability was found in the mega-event context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugden &amp; Tomlinson</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Adopted an ethnographic and investigative approach, informed by themes and debates which lie at the core of the study of globalisation and development, i.e. notions of agency-structure, domination and resistance, the national (and regional) versus the global, and issues of power.</td>
<td>FIFA has served as a forum for developing nations’ resistance. At the same time, it has aided and abetted neo-colonialist forms of economic and cultural exploitation.</td>
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### 3.2 FIFA’s neoliberal agenda

FIFA was founded in 1904 by delegates from seven European football associations. The intention of the 1904 meeting was to create an umbrella organisation to formalise playing standards and the rules of the game, along with the aim of organising an international tournament in the future. In fact, Article 9 of FIFA’s ‘Laws of the Games’ stipulated that FIFA alone was give the right to do so (FIFA, nde). Since then, as is demonstrated in the following sections, it has developed from what has been described as an ‘old boy’s network’ (Salter, 1996, p. 1) or a ‘gentlemen’s club’ (Pieth, 2011, p. 5) into an international corporate entity with global reach and significant revenue inflows.
(Homburg, 2008; Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998). In short, FIFA has commercialised its operations on a global scale, notwithstanding that – in legal and taxation terms – it is classified as a NPO.

For the first 50 years of its existence, FIFA remained an insular body whose primary aim was to oversee the development of the game’s European division (Darby, 2000b). This was despite the strong performances of South American players and administrators, who had elevated the status of that continent within the world of football. After the Second World War, geopolitics had transformed international relations, which in turn affected the administration of football at the global level. During the 1950s and 1960s, more than 100 former colonies, break-away territories and a wide variety of other political communities became independent nation states. There was now considerably more potential for enlisting new member states under FIFA’s remit (Darby, 2000b). Ironically, some of these newly proclaimed countries discovered that it was easier to become a member of FIFA than of the United Nations (UN) (FIFA, 2004a). Nowadays, FIFA’s rules affirm that the state in question must have previously been recognised by the UN. With 208 football member associations, FIFA is currently one of the largest registered NPOs world-wide (Eick, 2010b; Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998).

FIFA’s NPO status

Given that every NPO has specific national characteristics in accordance with its historic background and place of registration, it is not surprising that there is no universally accepted definition of the NPO sector (Defourny, 2001). Thus, NPOs are varied in structure and focus but consist of pertinent common characteristics: they can be usefully described as formal (professionalised) self-governing societal organisations which claim to work for the promotion of a public good at the national/international level (Martens, 2002; Trudeau & Veronis, 2009; Eick, 2010a). Also, a crucial characteristic of all NPOs is that they cannot distribute profits to their members, directors, or a set of “owners”. Furthermore, they must involve some sort of voluntary contribution in time either through volunteers and/or from financial contributions (Defourny, 2001). According to Narver and Slater (1990), the baseline objective for
NPOs is survival, which means earning revenues sufficient to cover long-run expenses and/or otherwise satisfying all key constituencies in the long run.

NPOs can be categorised as being part of the ‘third sector’, belonging neither to the traditional private for-profit sector, nor to the public sector. International organisations like the European Union (EU) or the Council of Europe consider sports governing bodies such as FIFA to be quasi-public entities. Therefore, they are bound by basic notions like the rule of law, the separation of powers, transparency and democracy (Pieth, 2011). On the other hand, as mentioned previously, FIFA is in fact a powerful quasi-corporate entity where particular governance measures developed in the corporate world should apply. Thus, it can be suggested that FIFA embraces both quasi-public and quasi-business roles (Pieth, 2011).

FIFA has described itself as ‘an international non-governmental, non-profit organisation in the form of an association according to Swiss law’ (FIFA, 2011b, p. 60). This means, in revenue terms, that it is tax-exempted world-wide and allowed to reinvest its surpluses. Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) have noted that FIFA’s political and fiscal autonomy is emphasised by the locality of its headquarters in Switzerland, an international centre for OFC dealing.

Eisenberg’s (2006, p. 61) definition of an INGO suggests that FIFA has (or at least should have) a sense of responsibility to its members and stakeholders, but beyond that to the global community:

International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operate independently of governments and pursue cultural, humanitarian and developmental aims; second, they contribute to implementing universal standard values, principles and activities with the help of an official elite.

In her historical analysis of FIFA’s football development policies, Eisenberg (2010) has claimed that these policies have given a new long-term globalisation boost to the transnational football community. This is primarily important because it enforces values and standards, and regulates the current activities of the national member associations in the interest of all parties.
In view of this, according to FIFA, it ‘has sought, often very successfully, to reconcile two apparently contrasting aims of economic policy: the financial notion of “profit maximisation” and the ethical consideration of fair distribution of profits to all members’ (FIFA, 2004a, p. 250), despite the ‘non-distribution constraint’ mentioned previously that prevents or limits officers or directors from distributing the net earnings amongst themselves. However, Swiss Law (Circular letter no. 12) requires the class of beneficiaries to be open; as a consequence, distributions must not be restricted, for instance, to members of a certain family, association or profession.

FIFA makes payments towards the travel and other expenses of qualifying teams for the FWC (FIFA, 2011b) and also to development programs in member countries. It also makes an annual contribution towards the operating costs of its member federations (FIFA, 2011c). According to FIFA’s financial report for the period of 2007 to 2010, a total of USD 794 million (or 26% of FIFA’s total expenditure) was spent on the ‘FAP’, ‘Goal’ and ‘Win in’ football development programs (FIFA, 2011b). However, Louw (2012, p. 653) concludes that ‘the expenses related to such efforts appear to be a mere drop in the ocean in terms of the organisation’s revenues’. Thus, some scholars (Jennings, 2006; Louw, 2012; Pieth, 2011) have suggested that FIFA’s non-profit credentials are suspect.

**Commercialisation**

In the 1960s, FIFA’s management structure was forced to change due to new forms of marketing, as well as financial risks. As a result, marketing was centralised (Pieth, 2011), and FIFA’s dependency gradually shifted from a significant reliance upon the financial success of competitions (Homburg, 2008), such as the FWC and Intercontinental Club, to major marketing contracts involving annual payments by sponsors (Pieth, 2011). The influx of television broadcasting revenue and lucrative advertising deals improved FIFA’s economic position (FIFA, 2004a). For example, in the mid-1970s, FIFA officials picked up modern marketing techniques from their first sponsorship partner, ‘Coca-Cola’. Correspondence between the two parties demonstrated that working with Coca-Cola provided FIFA with information on strategic use of public relations, mass communication and event management techniques (FIFA, 2004a), all of which allowed better monetisation of the FIFA brand.
Since the 1980s, the FWC has attracted substantial media interest and a number of commercial partners, both of which have been the organisation’s main streams of revenue. In 2001, FIFA was facing a financial crisis stemming from the insolvency of its main marketing partner for the 2002 and 2006 FWCs, the International Sport and Leisure (ISL) agency. ISL had been responsible for attracting commercial sponsors to events, but subsequently appropriated much of the income that should have been directed to FIFA. Compounding matters, ISL was also poorly managed and soon in a precarious financial position. With ISL facing bankruptcy, FIFA anticipated expensive and time-consuming renegotiations of every individual sponsor contract entered into by their fallen marketing agency. As a result, it was in FIFA’s interest to help ISL survive its financial troubles. Nevertheless, the rescue operation did not succeed, and ISL went bankrupt with a USD 300 million debt (Staun, 2006). Finally, FIFA and the administrator of the bankrupt ISL estates came to an agreement regarding the settlement of claims resulting from the bankruptcy. FIFA’s President Blatter claimed that FIFA lost ‘only’ USD 42-46 million on the ISL bankruptcy. This was a seemingly small amount, when contrasted with the USD 340 million loss predicted in a letter to the members of the Executive Committee in January 2002 (Staun, 2006). Despite this, Pieth (2011) stated that this event turned out to be a crucial turning point with regard to improved corporate governance, because the restructuring strategy required bookkeeping, auditing and financial reporting to be conducted on a professional basis. Following the ISL incident, FIFA decided to handle the marketing program for all FIFA events through an in-house marketing structure, FIFA Marketing AG (FIFA, 2002).

Since the early 1990s, FIFA has largely followed a strategy to promote and spread the sport of football to new markets, by locating the FWC beyond Europe where it had traditionally been hosted. With the exception of France in 1996 and Germany 2006, the other host nations have been and will be: US (1994), Japan/South Korea (2002); 2010 RSA (2010); Russia (2018); Qatar (2022).

From the 2003–2006 budgeting period onwards, internationally accepted accounting standards (International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) have been introduced to FIFA, and professional external auditors retained (Pieth, 2011). In 2007–2010, FIFA
recorded an overall surplus of USD 631 million (FIFA, 2011b). This is based on total revenue of USD 4.189 billion (including other revenue streams besides the FWC) and total expenditure of USD 3.558 billion. About USD 2.448 billion came from the sale of television rights, USD 1.097 billion was attributed to the sale of marketing rights (compared with USD 40.2 million in 1990: Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006), the sale of hospitality rights generated USD 120 million, and licensing rights accounted for USD 71 million. This brief overview indicates that the driving forces underpinning FIFA’s profit strategy are the sale of corporate sponsorships and broadcasting rights, both of which provide the material base for the FWC.

With regards to sponsorship, after the 2006 FWC, FIFA re-organised its sponsorship scheme to include three different levels of commitment (see Table 3.2). While these three categories are intended to allow differentiation between sponsorships, in order to promote other FIFA events besides the FWC, this new scheme unwittingly makes it easier to ambush events. This is because the complexity and fluidity of the sponsorship arrangements make it more difficult for consumers to understand who is, and who is not, an official sponsor (Shani & Sandler, 1998). As the selection of sponsors shows, FIFA only allowed one official sponsor from each market segment thus preventing direct competitors from becoming official sponsors of the FWC. FIFA Partners enjoy significantly more media exposure than the other levels of sponsorship, including ‘over 450 match days and tens of thousands of hours of live television broadcasts projected during the Rights Period [2007 – 2014]’ (FIFA, nda).

Table 3.2: FIFA’s sponsorship scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of program</th>
<th>2010 FWC context</th>
<th>Summary of rights granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIFA Partner</td>
<td>Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates, Hyundai KIA Motors, Sony, and VISA</td>
<td>‘[A] person to which FIFA grants the most comprehensive package of available marketing rights’ (2010 CoCT FWC By-Law, 2009, p. 17). This is the highest level of support. It includes global rights and is not limited to a particular competition. The rights include the use of the official marks, exposure in and around the stadium, in all FIFA publications and on its website. It also includes membership of the FWC sponsor recognition program and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
hospitality opportunities. Finally, it gives preferential access to broadcast advertising alongside the FWC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FWC Sponsors</strong></th>
<th>Budweiser, Castrol, Continental, McDonalds, MTN, Mahindra Satyam, Seara, and Yingli Solar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'[A] person to which FIFA grants the second most comprehensive package of available marketing rights' (2010 <em>CoCT FWC By-Law</em>, 2009, p. 17). The rights are limited to the FWC, but they remain global. They include category exclusivity, brand association, select marketing assets and secondary media exposure.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>National Supporters</strong></th>
<th>BP South Africa, FNB, Neo Africa, Prasa, Shanduka-Aggreko, and Telkom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'[A] a person to which FIFA grants a package of specified marketing rights, such rights to be exercisable only in the Republic of South Africa’ (2010 <em>CoCT FWC By-Law</em>, 2009, p. 17). This allows ‘local’ companies to promote an association with the FWC, but only within the host country. This includes category exclusivity, association, local marketing programs and domestic media exposure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from Johnson (2008, p. 6)

Major sponsoring companies’ involvement with the FWC not only deepened the commercial character of the event, but also has given a more prominent role to those corporations in determining aspects such as branding or imaging parameters (Nash & Johnstone, 2011). Cornelissen (2010) has stated that FWC branding regulations are rigidly imposed on hosts, determining how far they may go in linking local promotional or community campaigns to the event or FIFA brand. Also, she notes that sponsorship agreements between an association, such as FIFA, and external corporations can further constrict the ability of host cities to present their destination in specific ways or source investments from other corporations. If the host city’s interests were to conflict with the interests of the FIFA partner or sponsor the latter would decide.

Moreover, as Black (2007) has suggested, international sporting authorities use iconic images of the host country to legitimise their mission as sponsors for promotional purposes. In the case of the 2010 FWC in the RSA, Black has claimed that FIFA benefited from linking itself to South African icons like Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, in order to cover allegations of its corrupt practices.
**Political characteristics**

Given that FIFA has more member associations than the UN or the Catholic Church (FIFA, 2011b), it is clear that it is a powerful global organisation. According to Brauer and Haywood (2010), non-state sovereign organisations (NSOs) such as FIFA are non-territorial, trans-boundary organisations but nonetheless have legitimate avenues from which to derive rule-making and rule-enforcing authority. On his website, Kaufmann (2010) has argued that FIFA has become more hierarchically organised over the years. Holding a monopoly over the sport allows the organisation to ‘wield inordinate political and market power’. When this is coupled with what he describes as an ‘outmoded and autocratic internal governance structure’ (Kaufmann, 2010), tensions are not surprising. FIFA has no term limits for executive members, and significant decisions are made by very small committees.

Tensions have arisen, too, from the relationships between FIFA and the confederations in each football continent (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998), which were mainly formed after the Second World War (see Table 3.3). FIFA’s inspectors enable the organisation to gain a close and immediate impression of any development in sport politics, and thus try to influence matters in a pragmatic fashion and, where necessary, threaten any association with sanctions or even suspension.

**Table 3.3: Global football confederations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confederation</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Year founded</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol</td>
<td>CONMEBOL</td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Football Confederation</td>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union des Associations Européennes de Football</td>
<td>UEFA</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confédération Africaine de Football</td>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football</td>
<td>CONCACAF</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania Football Confederation</td>
<td>OFC</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The confederations act on behalf of their own regional interests and attempt to push through agendas by using block voting and building inter-confederation alliances. European countries make up 68% of all the teams in the world and finance the organisation disproportionately. However, FIFA’s constitution guarantees each member nation a vote, which means that the European football countries have no more voting power than members from the developing countries who, should they choose, can make up a voting block. As African memberships have expanded, their political influence has grown concomitantly. This was certainly not always the case.

Darby’s (2000b) research can be usefully drawn upon to show that FIFA’s core European members have attempted to monopolise power and resources within the game of football, not least by vigorously seeking to neglect the developing world, such as by blocking African attempts to procure a seat on the Executive Committee and the organisation of a continental confederation. This is because they wanted to retain power and keep the competition between bidding nations to a minimum and in their own favour. Darby made the salient point that Africa’s struggle for an adequate say in the governance of world football can be viewed as ‘Eurocentric bias’ (2005, p. 883) and ‘as a reflection of the broader power relationship between African nations and their counterparts in Western Europe’ (2003, p. 19).

However, with the growth in African membership, Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) believe that FIFA serves as a forum for resistance, by the Third World, to First World domination or hegemony. The same is proposed by Darby (2002, pp. 168-9):

in the absence of an opportunity to seriously challenge the first world in, for example, the political, economic or military sphere, football and its associated institutional and competition structures represents one of the few institutions in which Africa can realistically hope to resist Western hegemony.

In fact, hosting the 2010 FWC in the RSA may be regarded as the culmination of African efforts to mitigate Western domination over world football (Lee, 2004). In this sense, the global development of FIFA and Africa’s place within it correlates with Maguire’s (1994) view of globalisation processes as being multi-directional, involving a series of power balances and occurring in a relatively autonomous fashion (Darby, 2002).
The power struggle between European and African nations could be observed in the 2006 FWC bidding contest, where the RSA was the favourite for hosting long before the selection. However, following the controversial selection of the 2006 FWC host, Germany, FIFA had decided on a temporary policy for determining the hosts of future competitions. The questionable vote of New Zealand’s FIFA delegate, Charlie Dempsey, who abstained from FIFA’s final round of voting for the 2006 FWC, saw the competition being awarded to Germany rather than the RSA; this ultimately caused FIFA to re-consider the selection policy (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 2000). The six world confederations, including Africa, decided to take turns in providing bids. This system was used only for the selection of the 2010 and 2014 FWCs, partially in response to criticisms about geopolitical inequality and the controversial vote. In September 2007, the rotation system came under review, and a new system was proposed, which abolished the continental rotation policy and renders only the last two FWC host confederations ineligible for bidding (NYTimes.com, 2007).

In addition to being ‘deeply politicized and highly elitist’ (Black & Van der Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1196), international sports associations have been charged as corrupt because of the high demands they place on countries to court them. While FIFA is increasingly involved in the local affairs of hosts, it faces little accountability; the combination of influence over domestic decisions with gentle treatment by the hosting national press has earned it the label of an ‘iron fist in a kid glove’ (Davies, 2009, p. 36). The case study of FIFA by Jennings (2010) aptly demonstrates the absence of transparency and accountability within the NPO as a cultivator of unrestrained nepotism and favouritism, as well as the various conflicts of interest that permeate the organisation.

Security
In view of the above, Eick (2010b) has suggested that not only do sponsors have a voice in the matter of how the tournament is portrayed and marketed in the media, but they also directly influence a country’s/city’s security policies and urban development. Eick (2010b) has noted that security officials even policed the food brands sold at the PVAs
during the 2006 FWC. Thus, FIFA and its sponsors have certain powers to influence security operations and policing techniques within the host cities’ themed event spaces.

FIFA is under pressure to satisfy the demands of its sponsors and television broadcasters and to ensure its own financial return from the FWC. It has thus developed the power to define and delegate risks. FIFA sets the pre-conditions for security regulation and oversees their implementation (Eick, 2011a; Steinbrink et al., 2010). Eick has criticised FIFA’s policies and argued that FIFA’s rules and regulations unduly exploit the host environment with what he characterises as ‘the FIFA world cup ... neoliberal cash-machine’ (2011a, p. 88). Herein, security is not simply about the management of public spaces and orderly conduct, it is about safeguarding the event and its precincts to showcase the FIFA brand, FWC sponsors, and provide commercial returns to both.

Eick has averred that, in the context of the 2006 FWC, security functions previously regarded as the domain of the state have been privatised and outsourced, and these shifts in governance and the resulting proliferation of market opportunities are closely connected to the growth of the private security industry (Eick, 2006). Eick (2011a, p. 97) has also stated that the FWC may be understood as a ‘catalyst for a neostatist security strategy: with an increasing number of actors being enrolled into the socio-technical network of video surveillance and, in particular, into public transport networks, coopted by the police’.

In summary, FIFA demands that host nations/cities have the ability to secure and manage the FWC as a global mega-event. From a logistical and pragmatic point of view, it is interested in a peaceful, safe and secure event, but outsources the risks involved in pursuing this. FIFA relies on the host to use security apparatus and resources as it sees fit: volunteers, police, military, and private security guards. Ultimately, FIFA is most interested in the result, rather than the means of achieving it. A safe and secure event assists the brand integrity of both FIFA and the FWC, and the commercial interests of sponsors (Eick, 2010b, 2011a). As Alegi (2008, p. 398) has put it, FIFA governs a global business of ‘shifting alliances of marketing companies, media networks, multinational corporations and opportunist technocrats’.
3.2.1 The world media event: The FIFA World Cup (FWC)

The original idea to have a competition with the world’s strongest national football teams was initiated by Frenchman Jules Rimet in the 1920s. Ultimately, the FWC began in 1930 in Uruguay and, like the Olympic Games, is held every four years at a site predetermined by FIFA after a bidding process. From 1930 onwards, FIFA has cultivated its key product, the FWC. The name has changed over time, but the exclusivity of the tournament has remained its major asset (Pieth, 2011). Amongst the various competitions organised by FIFA, the FWC is by far the most financially significant (Homburg, 2008).

For FIFA, a substantial source of income derives from its sale of FWC broadcasting rights. The resources made available for the communication systems, the enormous media centres, and the amounts paid by national broadcasting systems to televise the event provide ample evidence for this. For example, in 1990, the sale of FWC television rights were estimated to amount to USD 65.7 million (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). Twelve years later television rights (this time excluding the US) for the 2002 and 2006 FWCs were sold for USD 1.97 billion. This was a six-fold increase on the USD 310 million paid by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) for the three tournaments held in the 1990s (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). In respect of the 2010 FWC event, the sale of broadcasting rights contributed a total of more than USD 2.4 billion to FIFA’s revenue stream (FIFA, 2011b).

The new approach introduced by FIFA for subsequent FWC tournaments required broadcast rights to be sold on a multiple and regional, rather than singular and global, basis (Cornelissen, 2010). Consequently, more companies were formally licensed by FIFA to broadcast the 2010 FWC. In addition to the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), other television enterprises that served regions like the Caribbean or Asia were entitled to cover the 2010 FWC in the RSA (Cornelissen, 2010).

However, the production of the broadcast signal is now done by solely one group, Host Broadcast Services (HBS), a company set up to manage the broadcasting of all FWCs (Cornelissen, 2010). HBS is owned by a Swiss-based sport marketing firm, Infront Sport and Media, with connections to FIFA, and which was a joint venture with a
Japanese company to sell football broadcast rights (except for the FWC) throughout Asia (Manzenreiter & Horne, 2007).

The development of a global media, the international economics of the television industry, and media-related forms of sponsorship have been crucial to FIFA’s expansion (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998). Transnational companies have also helped finance FIFA’s initiatives in the Third World. FIFA’s neoliberal expansion into the public realm, visualised through spectacular images of thousands of peaceful, football-watching fans in the media, are becoming increasingly valuable for FIFA when selling sponsorship (Eick, 2011a).

Thus, the FWC has turned into big business in terms of global audiences, profits and spectacular surveillance and security (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c; Eick, 2011a; FIFA, 2003). As Maguire (2000) has stated, modern sport is bound up in a global network of interdependency chains that are marked by global flows and uneven power relations. As demonstrated throughout the previous sections, these power relations can be observed in the governance of world football, as well as in the planning and operational stages of a sport-mega event. Not only has the FWC expanded into other global markets, such as Asia and Africa, but also on a micro-level, FIFA’s rules and regulation have now expanded beyond the stadia into the host cities’ public spaces via the concepts of PVAs and CRZs (Rowe & Baker, 2012), consequently influencing urban development and security politics.

Every major international football match gains a lot of media attention, hence any negative broadcasted event such as football disorders or riots can dramatically impact on the image of a destination and its people, as well as on the event brand and its marketing messages. Public order problems and security issues therefore have the potential to impact on economic legacies as well reflect negatively on the integrity of the event brand.

**The RSA**

Cornelissen (2004, 2012) has written extensively about the potential political power of the RSA hosting the 2010 FWC. Historically, football was played mainly by the ‘black’
population, compared with rugby or cricket, which are regarded as mainly ‘white’
sports. Alegi (2004) has stated that football has constituted a vital part of black and
coloured social networks during the Apartheid years. In view of this, PVAs at the 2010
FWC had the potential to link to all spheres of post-Apartheid society in a shared public
space; hence, the choice of the PVAs’ locations was a crucial component of the event
organisers’ planning strategy (Haferburg et al. 2009).

According to Venter et al. (2012), little research has been conducted to investigate the
potential impact of mega-events on the entrepreneurial performance of the informal
sector. In view of a national unemployment rate of approximately 25.2%, the informal
trading sector offers the only form of employment for many households (Statistics
South Africa, 2010) which represent the ‘poorest of our rural and urban poor’ (Devey et
al., 2006, p. 1). With about 27% of the domestic labour force, it is the largest
component of the national economy but structurally disconnected from the primary and
global ones. The Human Sciences Research Council approximated that the informal
trader economy contributes only 7% to the GDP (IRIN, 2010) and is ‘incapable of self
generated growth and development’ (Devey et al., 2006, p. 1; Wyatt, 2010). Given the
relative size of this sector in the RSA economic landscapes and in the developing world,
it is important to consider how a mega-event may help shape the entrepreneurial
potential of informal sector contributors. In concert with Venters’ et al. (2012), the
notion of the mega-event is considered to be a chance event (Bouchikhi, 1993) for
entrepreneurs, since the awarding thereof might have been unanticipated.

Klauser (2011b) has examined the mediating mechanisms through which the PVA
standards were transferred from the 2006 FWC in Germany to EURO 2008 in
Austria/Switzerland. PVAs must be understood as a previously tested and ‘exemplified’
solution to the problem of how to deal with security and branding in the context of the
increased density and diversity of the event city (Klauser, 2011a). In many respects,
planning concepts for PVAs in the 2010 FWC context differed from the ones in the
2006 FWC context. Variations, especially concerning the security architecture, urban
fragmentation, and the availability of infrastructure, required a distinct method for
PVAs in South African metropolises (Haferburg et al., 2009). For example, there were
fewer and smaller stadia in the RSA than Germany, so fewer tickets were offered.
Accessibility was found to be an essential requirement for the success of public viewing in Germany. However, the infrastructure surrounding stadia in the RSA did not correspond to European levels, and the security situation seemed more difficult to manage (Schulke, ndb). In fact, Roberts (2010) found in his study on Durban in the 2010 FWC context, that city planners and other event stakeholders had to write a new book on how to host an event of this magnitude in a developing country.

In the 2006 FWC context, Baasch (2009) observed that prior to the event, both the German economy and the German Association of Cities criticised the strict sponsorship rights protection measures planned by FIFA, which banned local products in PVAs. Only after intervention by the German Organising Committee, did FIFA eventually allow the sale of non-sponsor products in these spaces. As this study will show, this is a contrast to the 2010 FWC, where there were extensive/significant commercial restrictions within FIFA-accredited PVAs and CRZs (Haferburg et al., 2009).

**Cape Town**

Cape Town has ‘world-class’ ambitions and fits into the world city concept, including an outward-focused service economy, the creation of tightly networked business hubs connected to other world cities via high-tech transportation and telecommunication systems, and the development of world-class facilities to cater to a trans-national elite (McDonald, 2008). Moreover, one of CoCT’s place branding strategies is directed to raising its global profile as a leading events destination, as its (unsuccessful) bids for the summer Olympic Games in 2004 and the 2006 FWC have illustrated.

For Castells (1994, 1996, 2000), the new global economy and the emerging informational society have created a new spatial form – ‘mega-event cities’ – which form the nodes of the global economy and are bound together through electronic communications to create what he calls the ‘network society’. Specialised public transit systems more closely integrate a ‘world’ city into global markets, thereby making the city more attractive for business activities (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The resulting ‘premium network spaces’ are ‘geared to the logistical and exchange demands of foreign direct investors, tourist spaces or socioeconomically affluent groups’ (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 100) as the Cape Town example illustrates.
Cape Town is a complex city with profound economic and social contrasts. The urban design of the city can be described as an attempt to create a modern Western city on the tip of Africa, with a view to making it an attractive destination for European immigrants and tourists. The central business district (CBD) is situated in the City Bowl (geographically not in the City’s centre) and the suburbs along the coast and the mountain slopes are still predominantly white residential areas, whereas most ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ neighbourhoods are on the Cape Flats (Haferburg et al., 2009) and are characterised by poverty, crime and violence. Public transport into the CBD is often unsafe and also expensive. As a result, access to the city’s economic opportunities and recreational facilities is limited for many inhabitants of the townships (Rospabe & Selod, 2007).

The security industry in the RSA is the most rapidly growing industry in the country in terms of job creation and new businesses being founded in the private sector (Security Industry Alliance (SIA), 2009). As a percentage of GDP, the nation has the largest private security sector in the world (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007). Private spending rose by a factor of 400 between 1996 and 2009. Private security in the RSA is now worth R14 billion (USD 1.9 billion) a year, with 300,000 registered guards (The Economist, 2009). The sector’s security officers outnumber the police by ratios of between 3:1 and 7:1 (Van der Spuy & Lever, 2010).

Policing and security in Cape Town is driven by the ‘entrepreneurial’ agenda of the global network of cities (Samara 2010a, b). Public policing, not only in Cape Town but also in many other major cities around the world, has undergone a process of neoliberal reform: many of the security functions previously regarded as the domain of the state have been privatised and outsourced. A more fragmented and defensive micro-geography of secured spaces is apparent, and this has been reinforced by the emergence of an often heavily armed private security sector, which has mushroomed in the post-Apartheid period, substantially outnumbering the police (Taljaard, 2008).

Cape Town’s current policing strategy has been questioned by several scholars. For example,

as crime is framed as a security threat because of the danger it is thought to pose to market-led growth, urban governance in the townships increasingly takes on
the character of a what Davis (1992b, p. 161) describes as ‘containment strategy’ (Samara, 2010a, p. 197).

Jensen has stated that the neoliberal trend appears to be that security in upper- and middle-class Cape Town is becoming the overriding priority for the government’s agendas (Jensen, 2010), and thus encourages unequal provision of security services (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008). Since the security provision was already fragmented in the Apartheid era, Samara (2010a, p. 197) has suggested that ‘current approaches to urban renewal risk exacerbating social instability by reproducing aggressive forms of policing associated with the repressive Apartheid regime’. As stated by Haskins (2007, p. 7), ‘safety and security has been one of the priority areas in Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) for the past five years and will feature as a priority in the next IDP (2007/8-2011/12)’. In recent years, the mobilisation of the corporate community into a strong overarching forum gave the South African business community considerable muscle in policy debates and in determining the operational activities of the public security sector (Van der Spuy & Lever, 2010).

‘Fortified enclaves’ are characteristic of Cape Town; these are ‘privatized, enclosed and monitored spaces of residence, consumption, leisure and work’ (Caldeira, 1999, p. 114), designed to isolate their occupants from crime and therefore minimise their insecurity. These segregated ‘worlds’ are an elaborate system of sophisticated surveillance technology, heavy iron gates and bars on windows, round-the-clock private security, barbed wire, roadblocks and checkpoints which demarcate the boundaries of the area and cut it off from the rest of the city. They incorporate large employment bases, as well as most of the retail and cultural apparatus of traditional urban cores (Davis, 2006). This urban form follows the precepts of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) (Christopherson, 1994) and has been variously depicted as the ‘private city’ (Goldberger, 1996), ‘fortress city’ (Davis, 1992ab) and ‘splintering metropolis’ (Graham & Marvin, 2001). Based on Davis’ (1992ab, p. 155) account of the ‘fortified city’, Cape Town’s elite residents are obsessed with security; this obsession has transformed the region into a fortress, thereby placing the city ‘on the hard edge of postmodernity’.
Notwithstanding the variety of forms they take, the emergence of fortified enclaves is widely seen to transform cities from open spaces of free circulation to more fractured and fragmented archipelago-like localities, thereby fundamentally changing the character of urban social life (Rodgers, 2004). According to Genis (2007), they are among the socio-spatial expressions of this global trend towards the privatisation and commoditisation of urban space, governance and provision of urban services. What Harvey (2003, p. 1) has termed the ‘right to the city’ becomes conditional on such attributes as wealth, social class, or residency in a particular area. As Caldeira (1999, p. 114) has explained:

in a city of walls and enclaves …, public space undergoes a deep transformation. Felt as more dangerous, fractured by the new voids and enclaves, broken in its old alignments, … public space … is increasingly abandoned to those who do not have a chance of living, working and shopping in the new private, internalized and fortified enclaves. As … spaces … are enclosed and turned inside, the outside space is left for those who cannot afford to go in.

It could be argued that the holistic security management strategies within fortified enclaves could inform security stakeholders on successful local governance on the whole – including the management of other forms of public sites, such as streets, market squares, CRZs and PVAs. In fact, mega-event host cities have demonstrated the fragmentation of modern urban spaces and places into a variety of sealed and ‘tightly controlled enclaves’ that are devised by high-tech surveillance and guarded by a vast number of public-private security personnel (Klauser, 2008a, 2010).

In order to defend the city from disorder and disruption, organised business has been proactive in influencing the state’s social control measures, through the combination of social crime prevention and urban renewal projects via City Improvement Districts (CIDs). Samara (2010a, p. 651) has stated that within the CID model, ‘the language of economic growth and investment is at the same time a language of security, narrowly tailored to refer to securing certain processes and populations in certain places and excluding others from these same places’. She has also noted (2010b) that the geographic area now bound by the CID in Cape Town continues to be defined by practices and structures of racial governance, as the poor and homeless are prevented from utilising the city’s public spaces. Moreover, scholars such as Samara (2010b), and Abrahamsen and Williams (2007), discovered that within the CIDs, there has been a
clear shift towards a hybridisation of security governance (public/private partnerships), concurrent with the ‘revitalisation’ and *de facto* privatization of public spaces in Cape Town’s CBD.

Generally, visible poverty, petty crime and drug users have become the targets of increasing surveillance and repression since the 1990s (Davis, 1992a). In tracing the rise of nuisance over the last decades, Beckett and Herbert (2008, p. 9) have argued that ‘civility laws have significantly expanded local governments’ capacities to regulate urban residents and spaces’. The civility laws, referred to as by-laws throughout the thesis, have become a widespread practice for urban cities and municipalities in an effort to link urban renewal and the regulation of disorder (Beckett & Herbert, 2008; Coleman, 2004; Gibson, 2004). Beckett and Herbert (2008, p. 6) have suggested that these developments are important as:

> they enhance and extend the segregative effects of architectural modes of exclusion as well as the ‘civility’ laws, undermine constitutional rights and due process, disperse and extend state surveillance throughout the urban environment, and contribute to the expansion of modernist institutions of control.

These trends have also been relevant to the RSA context. Over the past decade, Cape Town has focused in particular on addressing ‘crime and grime’, through the deployment of visible policing, the enforcement of by-laws, the cleaning of streets, and the management of informal traders, the homeless and street children. Central to contemporary law enforcement in the CBD is attention to ‘quality of life’ which incorporates a heavily contested municipal by-law regarding ‘nuisances’ (CoCT, 2007). As its defenders in the CoCT often point out, the poor and non-white population are not meant to be singled out in the by-law regulations. Nonetheless, in practice, this is exactly who is targeted, mainly when behaviours such as begging, lying, sitting and sleeping in public are mentioned. The main function of the Metro Police includes traffic policing, By-law enforcement and crime prevention. However, they do not investigate cases after arrests, as this is the function of the Detective Service of SAPS. This By-law gives the Metro Police significant discretion to move along people living on the street, with no need for justification beyond the authority vested in them by the property owners of the Central City Improvement District (CCID), a power that in a sense far exceeds the power of the public police (Shearing & Stenning, 1983).
While state police remained the primary enforcement agency with the power to impose By-laws and criminal laws, in totality the number of people working in private security is bigger than the volume of soldiers in the army. What is more, private security a prominent and normative mode of public order maintenance in the RSA. While there is a clear distinction between public and private policing in terms of the enforcement of most laws and By-laws Berg (2007) scholars have observed a blurring of a clear distinction between what the private sector and the state is responsible for, largely because of the increasing similarities with the state police in terms of crime prevention and control activities, appearance and influence. Although only focusing on the FWC security stakeholders in this thesis, it is important to note that when we consider the changing landscape of policing in the RSA and many other countries, it is no longer sufficient to simply engage with the range of policing entities in isolation from one another, since an increasingly integrated and diverse range of entities may connect with each other in these roles (Law Commission of Canada, 2006).

### 3.3 Spaces under investigation: Public viewing areas (PVAs) and Commercial Restricted Zones (CRZs)

The securitisation of public urban spaces at international sport mega-events has become highly politicised. Klauser (2008b, p. 62) has argued that security politics during the 2006 FWC served to ‘select, classify, separate, differentiate, mark, arrange and control specific categories of space’. The purposes of security and surveillance procedures, their scope, impact and the risk management objectives for the event owner, the national government, the hosting city and security personnel, cannot be comprehended without ‘referring to the territories concerned and created by their spatial deployment and performance’ (Klauser, 2008b, p. 62).

Hagemann (2008, 2010) has suggested that the weight is shifting from the actual event site (the sports arena) to the hosting cities where an event takes place. Inner city areas and event precincts have been developed and themed to become an important component of the event footprint. Eick (2011a, p. 91) has claimed that FIFA is ‘seeping deeper into neoliberalising cities’. Three strategies FIFA uses support this claim. First, FIFA has extended its event footprint since 2002 from the stadia in the host cities to the
CRZs that surround them. Second, in 2006, FIFA extended its event footprint to PVAs in inner-city public spaces. Third, since 2010, these two phenomena are not exclusive to the mega-event hosting nation, but seven international ‘world cities’ staged official PVAs outside the borders of RSA (see Chapter 6 for discussion). This gives FIFA and the sponsors a larger platform to display their brands and enhance sponsors’ commercial footprint.

3.3.1 PVAs

Invention

PVAs in football are not new. In the mid-1960s, ‘[i]n many countries loudspeakers transmitted [football] commentaries into complete suburbs and villages, and television viewers gathered to watch the matches in public squares’ (FIFA, 2004a, p. 263). However, the commercialised type of themed sport consumption zones that first appeared at the 2002 FWC in South Korea and Japan constituted a new ‘culture of viewing’, a combination of the two established types of experience of visiting a stadium and watching TV (Schulke, 2006, p. 20).

During the 2006 FWC in Germany, public viewing was declared to be an official, integral part of the tournament. People unable to attend the spectacle ‘live’ were spatially accommodated and provided with a visual spectacle of the direct telecast of games via giant television screens and loudspeakers. The main characteristics were the new, technologically sophisticated LED-walls that are easy to set up and dismantle, and which also transfer something of the stadium atmosphere to a large crowd elsewhere. Public viewing simply means the television broadcasting of sporting events in public places. Giving ticketless fans the chance to watch the matches is, however, only one of the purposes of PVAs.

The invention of the term PVA goes back to the German sports sociologist and former Coordinator of the Sports Minister Conference of the German Provinces, Hans-Jürgen Schulke (Schulke, 2006b). The underlying goal and assumptions of the PVA concept were described as a spatial strategy to control public order, since too many fans would have been left without tickets (there were only three million tickets and 50 million
requests). Moreover, German cities realised that they could not gain any positive image effect through the broadcasting of matches in the stadia alone, due to the sterilisation and standardisation of design and advertisement (Schulke, 2007b).

FIFA was at first uncertain as to whether this concept would appropriately complement the FWC brand (Schulke, 2006b). FIFA questioned whether the population would take up these spaces; it also expressed concerns about security issues, the spectre of hooligan violence, and whether broadcasting and loudspeaker technology were adequate for the task at hand (Schulke, 2006b). FIFA also questioned the PVA concept as a threat to the image of the whole event – ‘the worst case scenario would be vacant places with FIFA badges, used by some drunks who throw beer bottles at the video screens’ (Schulke, 2007b, p. 40). FIFA was also concerned about the commercial exclusivity of official sponsors ‘that needed to be protected at all costs’ [translated by author] (Schulke, 2006b). Accordingly, FIFA initially had reservations about the PVA concept (Schulke, 2007b).

It was only after the idea of the ‘World Cup in the market place’ was clearly outlined by the German cities, and the consequent offer from ‘Sportfive’ (competing with FIFA partner Infront) to implement and finance PVAs in the host cities, that FIFA became more serious in its negotiations and finally accepted the new football mediating model (Schulke, 2007b). In 2004, the FIFA Fan Fest (FFF) concept was jointly developed by FIFA and its partners and the German host cities. Approximately 9.5 million people visited the ‘FIFA Fan Mile’ in Berlin over the duration of the tournament (Berlin Tourism Marketing, 2006). It exceeded FIFA’s expectations, with President Blatter praising the PVAs as if they were his own invention (Schulke, 2006b).

Although FIFA did not invent the PVA concept per se, it recognised the marketing potential of these themed open spaces (Schulke, 2007b). Some commentators have still been critical of the power that FIFA has been able to wield in PVAs. Eick (2010b) has stated that FIFA’s (transient) occupation of public urban space during the 2006 FWC was an attempt to glean exclusive rights for ground-advertisement space for official sponsors beyond the confines of the stadium. Cornelissen (2009) concurred, noting that PVAs were a strategic extension of the already extensive tournament, broadening the
economic base of FIFA and its sponsors. The event owner, FIFA, profits from the ‘fan city’ in multiple ways: as a themed extension of the event area, as stage and backdrop, as experience and consumption area, and also as a result of advertising media and sponsor display (Hagemann, 2008). Indeed, PVAs helped push forward FIFA’s power to materially and symbolically produce its own, commercially themed urban environment (Klauser, 2008a). However, the various types of PVAs, each with their own rules pertaining to security and commercialisation, have not been the subject of detailed consideration.

Schulke (2008b, p. 10) has stated that the basic spatial idea of PVAs is the ‘market place ... amalgam of education and adventure vacation’. Further, he noted that 2006 was the first time that ‘cultural behaviour has interspersed itself in a variety of ways, idea-rich and without resistance’ [translated by author]. Schulke (2007a, p. 15) described public viewing as ‘the third dimension of watching sport events beside the stadiums and the TV at home’, elsewhere noting that ‘The open area offers chances to organize your own big party outside the every-day-life and the rituals within a stadium’ (p. 13). Moreover, he pointed to a:

[s]ymbiosis of fan and flaneur (‘Flan’), who is on one hand full of patience and enthusiasm for top-level sport and in the same moment able to find distance to the event and to enjoy it like a gourmet and a global citizen (p. 14).

Unlike the fortified stadium, PVAs are event-specific, temporary locations or ‘sports cities’. PVAs ultimately gain greater significance as technological developments to make them more economical, flexible, short-term and experience-intensive increase (Schulke, 2007a).

Haferburg et al. (2008) have classified four different PVAs in the 2006 FWC context. First, the FFF occupied the most prominent place next to the stadium: it was in the CBD in proximity to transportation and an iconic sight. This was one of the few places in which host cities could present their historical and regional profile (Schulke, 2008). Second, the official municipal PVAs are normally in a closed space, such as a (non-playing) stadium or entertainment centre. The third category consists of other formal (local) PVAs, such as commercial events in shopping malls. Finally the fourth category consists of informal places where public viewing takes place (e.g., a spontaneous crowd
of people gathered around a TV on the street). In each of these cases, all PVAs were public, meaning no general restriction of access. The size of crowd also varied from a handful of spectators in a pub to tens of thousands of fans at bigger locations.

Bob and Swart (2010, p. 86) have stated that research on PVAs is ‘almost non-existent’, which is unsurprising, given that they are a relatively new phenomenon. However, the composition of PVAs and their roles as part of the logic of the entire event have slowly been gaining scholarly attention (e.g., Baasch, 2009; Berthoud, Pattaroni, Viot & Kaufmann, 2009; Bob & Swart, 2010; Eick, 2010b, 2011; Haferburg et al., 2009; Hagemann, 2008, 2010; Klauser, 2008a, b, 2010, 2011a, b, c, d; Lauss & Szigetvari, 2010; Schulke, nda, b, 2006a, b, 2008).

While these spaces of ‘virtual fandom’ (Weed, 2007) can be tailored to specific marketing or tourism planning objectives (Haferburg, 2011; Hagemann, 2010), they can also encourage a ‘feel-good effect’ for residents (Allmers & Maennig, 2008, 2009; Du Plessis & Maennig, 2010; Maennig & Du Plessis, 2007; Maennig & Porsche, 2008), contribute to a ‘peaceful atmosphere’ (Schulke, 2006b), and revitalise urban public spaces (Golka & Selter, 2010; Haferburg, et al., 2009). So, notwithstanding the critical perspectives of both Eick and Cornelissen (discussed above), some scholars have also pointed to virtues and benefits associated with PVAs – particularly in respect of the fan experience and creating a sense of community engagement with an event. These contrasting themes are further elaborated upon below.

**Commercialisation**

Hagemann (2010) has noted that, in the Euro 2008 context, PVAs transformed inner-city public spaces into areas of leisure and consumption, displaying a massive array of gastronomic, entertainment, merchandising products and advertising. She stated that the temporary brand worlds, designed in the corporate style of big companies, as product showrooms or theme parks, took this commercialisation of urban space to another level (Hagemann, 2010). In a similar vein, Klauser (2011a, p. 6) has claimed that PVAs and CRZs at the 2008 Euro served to provisionally ‘re-territorialize particularly attractive parts’ of the host cities in the interests of visibility and branding for the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and its commercial partners. This new
urban dimension can be described by two complementary developments. First, through the urbanisation of large football tournaments – the event uses public spaces in the city. Second, the ‘spectacularisation’ of urban spaces – the city tries to draw out even larger uses of the event (Bélanger, 2000; Hagemann, 2008, 2010).

PVAs have been envisioned as a place to serve the fans’ expectations, desires and pleasures (Lauss & Szigetvari, 2010). As Cornelissen (2009) has pointed out, PVAs comprise temporary zones in which sentiments of shared enjoyment and heightened emotive experiences may arise; hence, social interaction is produced. However, in the case of PVAs, the main purpose for visitation was not self-evident. Bob and Swart (2010) found in their study on the female experiences and perceptions of PVAs, that various factors lured crowds, such as watching a particular match, being part of the experience/atmosphere and socialising with other fans. In view of this, Klauser (2011a) has stated that fans – consumers – are sharing a fleeting entertainment experience, and are thus united more by a shared product preference – football – than anything else.

Spatial differentiations on the basis of PVAs have not only corresponded to functional differences and to different security standards, but also to different degrees of commercialisation between the inside and outside of these spaces (Klauser, 2008a). At the FWC 2006, fences around PVAs not only separated specific risk spaces, but also marked the spatial limits of FIFA’s sphere of influence pertaining to marketing within the urban environment. The fence was a way of guaranteeing exclusive rights to the official sponsors, and gate controllers refused entry to some people who were violating FIFA’s rules, while granting access to others who complied. However, while fences clearly demarcated the commercial interests in the PVAs, the adjacent spaces were also under FIFA’s control, albeit not visually demarcated as such.

**Revitalisation of the urban environment**

Using concepts of social and spatial capital, Haferburg et al. (2009) study on urban revitalisation and activation of urban culture through PVAs found that the interchange and mobilisation of all groups of citizens and visitors were critical success factors of PVAs in Berlin during the 2006 FWC. The city set up a patchwork of 20 different PVAs across the city. While PVAs represented interventions into public space (restricting its
normal use), they created new local spaces, affecting people’s usual movements and habits within those spaces. The location and design of PVAs had direct and immediate effects on the surrounding public space. Golka and Selter (2010) agreed in their study on PVAs in Berlin that the Festivalisation of urban space created a platform for socio-spatial activity that had the potential to catalyse and enhance sustainable FWC impulses in urban spaces that had previously been under-developed and neglected. However, Schulke (2008b, p. 10) has warned against over-regulating and over-commercialising PVAs. Difficult access, expensive food and beverages, restrictive TV and marketing rights, multi-class companies with logos, and VIP areas could make the ‘so far unstrained experience difficult to manage’ [translated by author].

The academic literature reveals that there are some crucial aspects that need to be taken into account when planning PVAs, such as costs, commercialisation, purpose and security. From the host city’s point of view, Maennig and Du Plessis (2007) found that the tremendous start-up investments for establishing PVAs could be prohibitive, and the host city might not immediately benefit from this expenditure. Requirements around security, safety and surveillance can become costly for the staging cities, especially in developing countries (Cornelissen, 2009). For example, German hosting cities for the 2006 FWC were confronted with substantial costs for fencing, CCTV, safety personnel, cleaning, and entrance regulation. For the 2011 Women’s FWC, Frankfurt poured approximately USD 13.175000 into PVAs as part of its destination marketing (The Local Europe, 2011).

Research on fan behaviour and experiences in the 2008 Euro context indicates that PVAs typically do not serve as a post-match venue. As Berthoud et al. (2009, p. 13) put it, ‘remaining [post-match] inside a space that was physically separated by fences from the rest of the city (and symbolically from the rest of the world) did not suit them [fans]’. Instead a place or space where publicity is strengthened (e.g., monuments, streets) or a venue that is an integrated part of the city (e.g., pub, home) is preferred by fans. Berthoud et al. (2009) claimed that the majority of fans left the Euro 2008 PVAs directly after the final whistle blow. Thus, the movement of fans has shown that not only PVAs themselves need to be highly securitised, but also the adjacent and surrounding public spaces require appropriate crowd and pedestrian management.
Indeed, Haferburg et al. (2009, p. 195) have affirmed that ‘the location and the design of PVAs had direct and immediate effects on the surrounding public space, thus influencing the wider urban fabric’. Therefore, another challenge in policing PVAs in Europe was spontaneous street parties post-match.

**Security**

The German newspaper *Der Spiegel* (2006) wrote in the 2006 FWC context that security authorities wanted to create PVAs as high safety events. Maennig and Porsche (2008, p. 18) have described the associated security measures as ‘far-reaching’. Hagemann (2010) and Klauser (2008a) have claimed that PVAs at the 2006 FWC and EURO 2008 were in many ways treated like stadia in terms of crowd management, security and surveillance. They described a type of provisional temporary stadia in city centres, which meant not only the co-option of the arena as a (non-playing) fan space, but also the deployment of security measures consistent with the stadium’s distinctive spatial characteristics (Hagemann, 2010). In other words, the event footprint, including security architecture for fortification purposes, as well as control patterns (e.g., perimeter fences, access control, CCTV), hiring of international and private security companies and public-private security forces, was expanded into the public sphere of mega-event hosting cities in Europe. Thus, PVAs constituted a powerful example of the increasing expansion of security regimes in public space (Klauser, 2008a). According to Klauser (2008b, p. 61):

> Closely monitored by CCTV cameras, thousands of private security agents and police forces, this pre-defined fan zone – as the territorial framework for the concentration of fans on specific, and clearly separated, parts of the city centre – both materially and symbolically allowed the regulation of social life during the World Cup.

Eick (2010b, p. 292) has even claimed that at every FWC there is in fact a ‘spatialised suspension of democracy’. He notes that this is because FIFA forces the host nation and respective cities to accept all branding conditions and commercialisation rules. However, Eick’s claim, at least in terms of the way it is presented here, may not be supported. First, FIFA has never forced a nation-state to stage an event. In fact, nations have competed against each other to host the prestigious spectacle. Second, PVAs are only a temporary form of urban development and no citizen is forced to participate. Nevertheless, Eick has made a valid point in that if the political representation of a
citizen is to be found in their use of public space, what is found in the PVA is its opposite - a place in which a citizen is stripped of his or her political and economic rights, such as no protests or third party advertising allowed at the event. Thus, PVAs can be understood as the spatial foci of security politics within the inner-cities where different norms, values and rules apply (Klauser, 2008a).

On the other hand, PVA founder and sport sociologist Schulke has claimed that public viewing ‘is more democratic, because everyone can gather on the open market place without restrictions’ (Schulke, ndb, p.2). German criminologist Feltes has concurred, stating that the ‘the World Cup has been democratized by public viewing’ (2006, p. 9).

Notably, Baasch (2009) found that in Hamburg, accessibility to public spaces (or publicly accessible spaces) was only impacted negatively to a small extent. For example, when calling for a ban on begging by the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, political opposition, and critics effectively opposed it.

While PVAs can create new images of spaces in people’s minds as well as have the potential trigger the physical and social mobilisation of people, thus re-activating and re-vitalising public spaces, they can also exclude people through excessive controls, insufficient capacity, exclusive localisation and design (Haferburg et al., 2009). It is under such conditions that a business-oriented international organisation takes over the control rights of public space from the respective local governments during the event (Eick, 2010b). However, previous research has neglected the complexity of PVAs and has failed to differentiate between various types of PVAs which comprise of different ‘match’ rules. Thus, Table 3.4 presents a summary of previous research on PVAs in the international football context.

Table 3.4: Research on PVAs in the international football context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Context/Focus</th>
<th>Outcome/Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baasch</td>
<td>2009/2011</td>
<td>2006 FWC; Links between mega-events, security and urban development.</td>
<td>No ‘Festivalisation of urban politics’ effect on Hamburg. However, attempts by various local actors were made to take advantage of the dynamics of the event for the enforcement of policies and legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berthoud</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Euro 2008; Investigation</td>
<td>The movement of fans showed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pattaroni, Viot &amp; Kaufmann</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of how Geneva reorganised itself at different levels in order to host the event as well as how the city was used by the supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob &amp; Swart</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010 FWC</td>
<td>Studied women’s behaviour and experience in the PVAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eick</td>
<td>2010b</td>
<td>2006 FWC</td>
<td>Investigated PVAs and security rings from a neoliberal perspective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haferburg, Golka &amp; Selter</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010 FWC</td>
<td>Applied concepts of social and spatial capital; Investigation of socio-spatial integration potential of PVAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagemann</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Euro 2008 in Zurich; PVAs and urban development and commercialisation.</td>
<td>The ‘state of emergency/state of exception’ as a key phrase in the multilayered discourses around the mega-event and its instrumentalisation for a city's political and spatial reconfiguration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klauser</td>
<td>2008a</td>
<td>2006 FWC</td>
<td>PVAs, security rings and city centre; Investigation of alliances between security politics and business interests FIFA’s efforts to impose the exclusivity of its sponsors within the urban environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klauser</td>
<td>2008b</td>
<td>2006 FWC</td>
<td>Evaluated PVAs and security rings from a ‘surveillance studies’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
provide control and order in and around PVAs.

Klauser 2011a Euro 2008; Explored the PVAs’ and security rings’ ‘interpretative flexibility’ for business and security purposes. PVAs re-territorialise particularly attractive parts of the city for sponsors and brands.

Klauser 2011b Euro 2008; Explored mediating mechanisms in the reproduction of best practices for security and branding in PVAs. PVAs must be understood as a previously tested and ‘exemplified’ solution to the problem of how to deal with security and branding in the event city.

Klauser 2011c Euro 2008; Investigated commonalities and specificities in mega-event securitisation. The PVA concept is an example of a globally calibrated best practise template in security governance at sport mega-events as the concept has become a bid requirement for both the FWC and the Euro events.

Lauss & Szigetvari 2010 2006 FWC and Euro 2008; Mediating mechanisms through which the PVA standards were transferred. ‘Fun’ was not just a mean for gathering purposes but also a specific management principle by which public order was maintained.

Schnitzer & Stickdorn 2012 Euro 2008; Investigated key success factors when organising PVAs. General level of safety is perceived as basic factor by visitors of PVAs.

Schulke 2008a 2006 FWC; History and planning of PVAs. Purpose of PVAs is public order security. Spatial basic idea of PVAs is the market place in an amalgam of education and adventure vacation.

Schulke 2008b Euro 2008; History and planning of PVAs. Biggest dangers to a successful event lie in over-regulating and commercialisation of PVAs.

### 3.3.2 CRZs

The other defined space under investigation refers to what McKelvey and Grady (2008) have categorised as an on-site policing tactic: the establishment of ‘clean zones’, ‘exclusion zones’ or as they are called here, commercial restricted zones (CRZs). Over the years these spaces have fuelled tension between free enterprise, the rights of fans,
and the needs of event organisers to deliver ambush marketing-free spaces to their official sponsors (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). CRZs are subject to a variety of special regulation and policing methods, as competition is restricted to those businesses legally authorised to sell and advertise. They are hybrid mega-event spaces in the public urban environment through which spectators and fans arrive and depart, but also a place where local residents live and work. Today the concept of CRZs is an integral compliance measure of the participation agreements for hosting mega-events (Dickson, 2007; McCann, 2012). CRZs are established on an individual basis between the host city authorities and the event owner.

In 2002, FIFA first established CRZs and consequently extended its sovereignty to the host cities’ public spaces. Since 2006, its realm also included ‘other official sites’ (FIFA, 2006, p. 39) including PVAs. Not only can CRZs be found around stadia - ‘security rings’ - but they also have extended far beyond the stadia and the inner-city. In the Euro 2008 context, Klauser (2008a, 2011a) found that UEFA created a patchwork of CRZs across event hosting cities for official partners’ advertising and merchandise to be displayed. Further, ‘security rings’ were established up to several hundred metres around the stadium and, depending on the city, the compound area was closed to the general public for the whole duration of the event (Klauser, 2011a). In 2006, Detroit adopted a 300-mile CRZ for Super Bowl XL (McCann, 2012). In the New Zealand context, Longdin (2008) found that the country’s Major Event Management Act 2007 not only allowed ‘clean’ urban spaces to be temporarily privatised but also permitted this for ‘clean transport routes’ and ‘clean periods’. ‘Clean’ in this context means free of third party advertisement unless it has been provided by the event owner or a license from the government was obtained. As these examples illustrate, CRZs are a common feature at sport mega-events.

Advocates have claimed that CRZs raise the reliability and authenticity of commercial activities around the FWC for consumers, and also protect official sponsors from ambush marketing (McCann, 2012). Further, CRZs are said to empower the event owner to control the intensity and appropriateness of commercial activities. In fact, the NFL does not want Super Bowl attendees to be bombarded with too many advertising messages, since there would be confusion as to who were the main sponsors. Also, they
want to prevent public conduct that is offensive or inappropriate (McCann, 2012). The same holds true for FIFA and the FWC. By requiring FIFA’s permission to advertise in a CRZ, the event owner can reject less reputable or suitable promoters. Following this argument, FIFA claims control over the aesthetics in the urban environment by setting a specific norm in accordance with its strategic goals. It also provides the event owner and its commercial supporters with a branding platform. Notably, CRZs may provide a safer experience for event attendees in terms of crowd management. A reduction in the sheer number of promoters and signs may provide more physical space for those in attendance and better access for law enforcement to ensure safety (McCann, 2012).

Although regulations establishing CRZs are publicly positioned by event organisers as a means of controlling excessive commercialism and providing for public safety, the underlying purpose is nevertheless to protect event owners and their official sponsors from ambush marketing by unauthorised businesses (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). Thus, it is argued that host cities are transformed into oligopolised advertising spaces that are tightly controlled and monitored by high-tech surveillance technology and a variety of public and private security personnel (Eick, 2011a; Klauser, 2010).

On the other hand, there are some conflicting issues with this preventative brand and rights protection concept. For example, CRZs limit competition when local businesses are denied permission from the event owner or the respective host city. A decrease in competition implicates two core issues of antitrust law: fewer choices and higher prices for consumers (McCann, 2012). Also, CRZs not only impact street vendors but also long-standing local restaurants and retail stores in the event zone. In January 2013, a federal judge granted a temporary restraining order to sharply reducing the boundaries of the clean zone set up by New Orleans for the Super Bowl game. The judge ruled that the restrictions may result in an infringement of plaintiffs' rights of free speech. Thus, there may be infringement upon the constitutional and commercial freedoms of national and local business communities (Longdin, 2008).

Furthermore, CRZs may undermine a key rationale for a city hosting a sport mega-event: to generate economic revenue from local businesses. The FWC attracts advertising by multinational corporations. Local companies, by contrast, may not be
able to connect their business to the event, especially if those local companies sell items that compete with items sold by official sponsors (McCann, 2012). In addition, there are issues of implementation and enforcement. There seems to be considerable room for subjective interpretation of where CRZs actually start and finish (Dickson, 2007), since there are typically no fences or other visible demarcations. This can cause confusion among shop owners, street traders and residents, who may be situated in a CRZ without being aware of it, and accidentally impinge on the event-driven commercial regulation. While brand protection units can provide on-site protection, infringements that take place in locations outside the CRZs may go undetected (McCann, 2012). Finally, CRZs could simply be deemed an unnecessary spatial zone because existing laws may already forbid the sale of counterfeit merchandise and ambush marketing practices (McCann, 2012).

Research into the securitisation process of CRZs is slowly emerging, focusing mainly on the Olympics (Dickson, 2007; Longdin, 2008; McKlevy & Grady, 2008). However, it has yet to provide an in-depth insight into the commercialisation and securitisation of different types of CRZs. So far, the security ring has only been addressed in the international football context (Eick, 2010b, 2011; Hageman, 2010; Klauser, 2008a, b, 2011a). Research in the sport mega-event security field has yet to produce a systematic differentiated approach to various types of PVAs and CRZs, as economic interests, power relations and securitisation processes may differ in accordance with their leadership and location.

3.4 Summary

This chapter has examined FIFA in respect of the thesis research objectives: neoliberalism and FIFA’s commercial strategies, which have spatial and security dimensions in two physical realms – PVAs and CRZs. FIFA and its commercial spatial strategies were examined as examples of the immense power that NPOs can gain over public urban spaces world-wide.

FIFA and its commercial supporters control and commercialise public urban spaces with the assistance of the contractual pre-conditions agreed upon in the bidding contest.
On the one hand, these are meant to protect the visitor from fake merchandise and confusion about who the real sponsors are, as well as protecting them from physical harm as spectators. On the other hand, these zones restrict commercial freedom and may cause confusion among the public about the scope and scale of CRZs. What seems obvious is that without security measures in respect of public order and the use of space, these highly controlled zones would not create an efficient platform where event-specific consumption, branding and marketing take place.

Chapter 4 describes the research design selected to investigate the central research aim and subsidiary objectives as outlined in Chapter 1, and to collect data relevant to the investigation of the issues raised in this chapter.
Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 provided a critique of the literature relating to sport mega-events, drawing upon the areas of security and surveillance studies, urban geography, and event management. It was emphasised that although the mega-event literature is vast, there has been little research into ‘open’ public spaces at mega-event precincts, notably PVAs and CRZs. Just as significantly, the RSA context presents a salient research opportunity because sport mega-events are relatively new in developing world and BRIICS contexts. This chapter presents the research design used to address the following thesis objectives. It discusses data creation and collection methods, as well as the strategies used to interrogate and analyse that information.

First, the chapter positions the study in the context of a research paradigm, in order to provide a philosophical basis for the investigative approach. Second, it describes the research design, methods of data collection, and protocols for data evaluation. Third, it explains how the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 were investigated by particular data collection and evaluation methods. Fourth, the chapter discusses the position of the author in the research, acknowledging the issue of bias, and it highlights the ethical considerations taken into account. This provides a platform from which the thesis findings can be outlined and evaluated in Chapter 5.

4.2 Research paradigm

Within sports management literature, Amis and Silk (2004, p. 355) have urged researchers ‘to reflect on … the philosophical and political positions attached to sport management’. This is a call for researchers to clarify their position in the scholarly process, and to articulate relevant underlying assumptions in a research enterprise. The term ‘paradigm’ is typically defined as a philosophical and theoretical framework that underpins scientific inquiry (Kuhn, 1970). From that perspective, developing a research paradigm consisting of ontological and epistemological orientations is crucial, as it
estimates the theoretical foundations for a research focus and provides an explanation for the chosen methodology. A paradigm is a ‘world view’, a general perspective, a way of breaking down and interpreting the complexity of the ‘real world’ (Patton, 1990, p. 37). According to Williams (1998), the term paradigm encompasses three key dimensions: first, philosophical beliefs about the world we live in; second, social debates about how a researcher should position themselves in their investigation; and third, technical discussions about the appropriateness of methods deployed to actually conduct research. Paradigms can be understood as a combination of ontological and epistemological positions.

Ontology may be understood as a branch of philosophy which deals with the order and structure of reality in the broadest sense possible ... That branch of philosophy (a) which inquires about the reality status of a thing ... (b) which inquires about what sort of reality (or quality of illusion) things possess ... and (c) which inquires about those other realities or reality, upon which what we call reality and/or illusion depend (Angeles 1981, quoted in Knight, 1996, p. 162).

In simple terms, ontology defines beliefs about the nature of reality. To the realist/objectivist, the social world is tangible, real and external to individual perceptions. By contrast, the constructionist contends that individuals create meaning in the social world; thus, there are numerous rather than singular realities (Williams, 1998). For example, depending on the context, a laugh can be interpreted as cynical or approving, or – within a sporting context – singing and cheering fans can be interpreted as joyful or confrontational.

In social science research, there is a classical epistemological distinction between quantitative/empirical research and qualitative/interpretive research. This thesis is located in the latter body of inquiry, but even within qualitative scholarship there are ontological differences. Positivist social research assumes that reality is objectively given and that it can be described by discrete properties that are independent of observers and their methods. By contrast, the constructivist social research position assumes that human and environmental phenomena are in a constant state of change, influenced and shaped by multiple ‘social actors’ or ‘external realities’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 24). Further, a constructivist believes that there is no single,
overarching valid method, but instead multiple methods for qualitative social science research.

This thesis is situated within the interpretive paradigm, which is a subset of constructivism. Subjective interpretation is the basis for knowledge claims, which can only ever be inconclusive and provisional (Byrne, 2001a). As Williams has put it: ‘The interpretivist researcher views the world as a socio-psychological construct where there are multiple realities forming an interconnected whole that can be understood as these multiple realities’ (Williams, 1998, p. 6). In a similar vein, Denzin and Lincoln (2008, p. 35) have averred: ‘[T]here is no single interpretative truth’. Further, the social interpreter typically investigates first and then develops theory to explain the phenomenon under investigation. This grounded method can be time-consuming, with patterns emerging slowly, but it allows the research actors and their data to comprehensively inform the study (Tucker, Powell & Meyer, 1995).

A qualitative approach was chosen as it allows for in-depth understanding of opinions, attitudes and behaviour (Moore, 2000). Maykut and Morehouse (1994) have emphasised that qualitative research is primarily exploratory in purpose, and interpretive in relation to its findings. Indeed, qualitative research involves a commitment to ‘the meanings that research subjects attach to social phenomena’; and this is ‘an attempt by the researcher ... to understand what is happening and why it is happening’ (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 1997, p. 72). In a similar vein, Jankowisz (2000) has contended that qualitative research seeks to discover how people understand certain phenomena, which in turn guide their ideas and behaviours.

Qualitative research nonetheless has recognised limitations (Saunders et al., 1997; Walle, 1997). The relatively small sample size of participants may leave it susceptible to claims that findings are unrepresentative of the wider population (Jones, 1997). As will be made clear, though, the purpose of this study was not to generalise, but rather to establish how mega-event stakeholders secured public spaces to suit a combination of interests – those of the event owner, the event manager, commercial sponsors, and the CoCT – in a particular context, the 2010 FWC.
4.3 Research design

The choice of research design must be appropriate to the subject under investigation (Patton, 1990). Research design has been referred to as ‘a master plan specifying the methods and procedures’ (Zikmund, 2003, p. 42) of a study, and the ‘detailed plan which you will use to guide and focus your research’ (Hussey & Hussey, 1997, p. 114). Nevertheless, since there is an abundance of meta-theoretical and methodological options available, scholars need to be careful not to reduce their work to merely a choice about method. Thus, this study follows the argument of Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 491) that placing method as the driving force in research ignores the ‘wider and deeper context’ of knowledge, and reduces social research to a technique. In the present study, not all of the potentially important variables were known or could be identified in advance. Hence, a research design that allowed for an emergence of themes within a given research range was critical.

The qualitative research design was shaped by the literature review conducted in Chapter 2, and its over-riding desire to equip the researcher with a system and process to conduct the investigation. In this study, the literature review has informed how the global sport mega-event environment is interpreted within the security policy context.

Figure 4.1 below provides a visual conceptualisation of the research design for this study. It indicates linkages, inter-relationships, and theoretical influences between the various literatures, concepts and methods.
Figure 4.1.: Research design

The study began with the researcher’s personal interest in the subject of security management at sport events, the phenomenon to be studied. The interest in this topic derived from the researcher’s 2006 FWC PVA attendance and from her general research interest into risk management issues at sport events, especially as explored in a Master’s thesis entitled ‘Sports Events and Risk Management in New Zealand: How safe is safe enough?’. The next stage was a comprehensive literature review, which
identified specific gaps in the current understanding of security, public space and commercial interests at sport mega-events. The research objectives were developed to address those gaps in conceptualisation. As indicated above, an interpretive/constructivist approach was selected. Due to the study’s exploratory nature, this involved the use of qualitative research methods: document analysis; and semi-structured interviews via e-mail and Skype with key security stakeholders in Cape Town. The intent was to capture arguments and debates from a broad archival canvas.

The analysis included what might usefully be labelled as: (1) ‘governmental’; (2) ‘managerial’; and (3) ‘journalistic’ sources of public discourse. These categories of data were significant to this study because the research focuses on the views of selected stakeholders, each with different positions of authority, influence and ‘voice’ in debates about the security field. A case study approach was pertinent, since this method can be used to glean specific, in-depth insights (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) on the securitisation of FWC-themed public spaces. The research is conducted through a single case study of a unique context – the staging of a sport mega-event by a developing nation.

4.4 Case study

According to Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg (1991, p. 336), the case study ‘is a method that relies on the examination of a single instance of a phenomenon to explore, often in rich detail, the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of a problem’. Garson (2010, p. 4) argues that the limited number of cases may be regarded as a strength of this research approach as ‘it has the capability of uncovering causal paths and mechanisms, and through richness of detail, identifying causal influences and interaction effects which might not be treated as operationalized variables in a statistical study’. In a similar vein, Flyvberg (2006) has suggested that the context-specific knowledge that results from case study research is of more value than a search for universal truths and predictive generalisations, particularly when making theoretical contributions in a specialised field.

Yin (2009) suggested that there are several types of case study research and these can be differentiated as: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive case studies. Each of
these categories can either be used to investigate single or multiple cases, and cases can either be investigated in a longitudinal setting, in order to discover and explain changes within cases over time, or they can be studied in a comparative setting, in order to discover and explain differences between incidents. The present study uses the exploratory case study, as opposed to explanatory or descriptive cases. Stebbins (2001, p. 6) has explained that researchers adopt this approach to ‘explore when they have little or no scientific knowledge about the group, process, activity, or situation they want to examine’.

Choosing a case study for its unique properties gives the researcher the opportunity to glean specific insights into a particular research problem (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003). Ragin (1992, p. 225) has explained that single-case studies have many dimensions as they ‘are multiple in most research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways’. Chetty (1996) and Yin (2009) have both asserted that case study research enables the application of theories in context. Moreover, case study research aims to provide transferability of methodology and theory, meaning that researchers can undertake follow-up case analysis to establish broader trends.

4.4.1 Case selection

The case chosen for this study was selected using purposive sampling (also referred to as non-probability sampling), a technique that involves an explicit rationale for the selection of cases (Patton, 2002; Teddlie & Yu, 2007). According to Teddlie and Yu (2007, p. 80), this sampling method is used ‘when the researcher wants to (a) select a purposive sample that represents a broader group of cases as closely as possible or (b) set up comparisons among different types of cases’. Further, it is crucial to select an appropriate research site because case studies must ‘locate the global in the local’ (Hamel, Dafour & Fortin, 1993, p. v).

The 2010 FWC in the RSA was chosen for the following reasons. First, a number of developing and newly industrialised countries have recently hosted or are about to host mega-events, yet there is a distinct lack of analysis into mega-events in the context of
the developing world, and in Africa especially (Cornelissen, 2004). According to Sassens (2006), there is also a relative lack of studies on urban city centres in both the developing world and BRIICS contexts.

Second, the FWC is one of the most celebrated and commercially valuable sporting spectacles in the world (Schwarz, 2010), with the largest cumulative television audience. In all, 32 teams took part at the 2010 FWC, matches were played in ten stadia in nine host cities, and approximately 20,000 journalists and 5,000 photographers were accredited for the event (Jackson, 2010).

Third, as the RSA’s sport landscape has broadened, it has also become more controlled. Sport entities have been challenged to comply with the requirements of newly promulgated legislation (e.g., Safety at Sport and Recreation Events Bill, 2009). Results of an investigation conducted by Burger, Roets, Goslin and Kluka (2009) suggested widespread indifference to, or disapproval of, safety regulations in the context of major sport events in the RSA. The authors concluded that there is insufficient knowledge about newly imposed safety regulations. This is a problem commonly found in sport governance in developing nations.

In the South African 2010 FWC context, one in-depth case study was selected: namely, Cape Town. It is a city known as the preferred home for the affluent white South African population. In the Apartheid era, the large white population of Cape Town emphasised the fragmented construction of urban space more than any other South African city (Chidester, 2000; Western, 1981). Haferburg has pointed to Cape Town’s unique reputation as being the most segregated city after Apartheid, with the legacy of having been the nation’s ‘preferential labour area’ (2003, p. 69) for the people categorised as ‘coloured’. Also, Cape Town is one of the largest and economically most significant locations on the African continent. It is, however, also the least safe of the four largest cities in the RSA in terms of crime (Donson, 2008). While Cape Town is in many ways unique, ‘the challenges it faces and the vision for urban development being pursued by local economic and political élites are not’ (Samara, 2010a, p. 198). Thus, while this case is distinctive, with many unique properties, it also has characteristics that are relevant beyond that context.
In summary, case studies can be used for comparison and/or to provide a framework for data collection (Maenamara, 1999) while ‘utilizing a variety of sources of data’ (Keddie, 2006, p. 20). In addition, as detailed below, a variety of data sources were used to enhance internal validity, including: official documents; data from interviews; and media articles.

4.5 Case study research methods

In order to investigate security management strategies for commercialisation purposes at urban spaces at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town, the research was designed to gather and analyse data on securitisation policies, protocols and interventions. This involved a collection of data from various documents and semi-structured interviews. As Yin (2009) has pointed out, obtaining data from more than one source allows for richer data, and has the potential to create stronger and more trustworthy findings. Table 4.1 lists the two primary data collection stages, defines the overall purpose, and details each method.

Table 4.1: Outline and purposes of key case study methods

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Method</th>
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<tr>
<td>Data collection I:</td>
<td>To identify relevant 2010 FWC security stakeholders and responsible</td>
<td>Collection and analysis of ‘governmental’ documents produced by the RSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>organisations from whom secondary data could be collected;</td>
<td>government authorities: parliamentary debates, ministerial speeches and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary sources</td>
<td>To identify 2010 FWC security policies, structures</td>
<td>media releases (i, ii, iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Pre-event</td>
<td>and underpinned plans, such as By-laws, national, provincial and</td>
<td>Collection and analysis of ‘managerial’ documents produced by FIFA and</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) During the event</td>
<td>municipal security plans;</td>
<td>other key security stakeholders, such as the South African Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Post-event</td>
<td>To analyse interests and relationships from different stakeholders</td>
<td>Service (SAPS) and Interpol; publicly available texts, such as vision</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>towards 2010 FWC security policies;</td>
<td>statements, annual</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To discover how security measures at PVAs and CRZs were planned;</td>
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Data Collection II: Interviews (iii)

- To better understand how 2010 FWC security policies underpinned plans;
- To evaluate interests and relationships from different stakeholders towards 2010 FWC security policies;
- To discover how security measures at PVAs/CRZs were operationalised;
- To assess impacts on security policies that can be attributed to the establishment of PVAs/CRZs.
- Four 2010 FWC security stakeholder interviews by e-mail and two by Skype

4.5.1 Data collection I: Documents

Trawling through archives and document analysis is especially important at the beginning of an investigation when the researcher is ‘trying to gather data that will inform succeeding stages of a research project’ (Walker, 1985, p. 64). Archives can include material from an array of authors: governments, organisations and individuals. In these respects, primary documents can be either ‘official’, such as memos, minutes and reports, or ‘personal’, such as letters and diaries (Schumacher & McMillan, 1993, p. 434). This correspondence may not be readily available as source material; it can be kept in private hands or provided to archival repositories years past their date of currency. However, modern archives also include an abundance of data produced ‘on the record’: public speeches, official reports, media releases, and newspaper articles (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 277). Access to such contemporary materials is more
convenient than ever because of the relatively recent availability of primary data posted to the Internet.

In terms of documentary sources, the study targets particular types of secondary data for analysis:

(1) Collection of ‘governmental’ documents produced by the RSA government, the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (PGWC) and CoCT: minutes of parliamentary debates, ministerial speeches, media releases, legislative documents, promotional and representational materials produced by CoCT and Cape Town Partnership (CTP).

(2) Collection of ‘managerial’ documents produced by FIFA, the Local Organising Committee (LOC) and South African Police Service (SAPS), as well as other key security stakeholders, such as Interpol: publicly available texts, such as vision statements, annual reports, contracts, policy documents, and safety-related publications, where issues were brought up for discussion.

(3) Collection of ‘journalistic’ documents produced by the local, national and international media. Media representations included online media articles about security and surveillance issues, podcasts, magazines and related media bulletins.

Certainly, a key advantage in reading the parliamentary debates of recent years is that many countries, including the RSA, provide online transcripts via the Internet and make them searchable via database protocols (Ward & Vedel, 2006). This has made the investigation of contemporary political debate much easier than in the past, when researchers relied solely on hardcopy records and indexes (Every & Augoustinos, 2007). Therefore, the South African ‘Hansard’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group) was regularly accessed, which provided a verbatim commentary from politicians in parliament about planning issues related to the 2010 FWC. Other types of online government materials (e.g., policy documents, official reports and media releases) were collected for the case study. Despite this data being of secondary nature, what is unique about this thesis is not the actual data used but the way it is presented. As mentioned previously, the findings are consistent with a ‘narrative development’ approach, (Jensen & Sandström, 2011, p. 474) as means of interpreting relationships between
stakeholders. The two key variables: power and responsibility, both of which have ethical and moral dimensions are incorporated in the analysis.

In order to better understand the nature of security at the urban spaces under investigation, it was important to understand the legislative context. To that end, the first data set included policy documents that shaped the context of the securitisation process. The author began by looking at the South African situation and collecting pieces of legislation pertaining to urban spaces, security, advertising and events. Event-driven legislation and contracts, such as the 2010 CoCT FWC By-law and Host City Agreement, were then collected.

Media documents were particularly valuable for this study, as they provided assessments of security issues, as well as planned and unfolding safety precautions. While media analysis can be a powerful tool for looking back and reflect on an event, it also can provide valuable insights into what is likely to be on the public agenda in the future (Cutlip, Center & Broom, 1985). The underlying principle of this method is that media coverage does two seemingly contradictory things at once: it both influences and reflects public opinion. In a democratic setting like the RSA, the media thus correlates to a large degree with public opinion and, consequently, can be used as a barometer of societal attitudes (Macnamara, 1999).

The media collection period began about one year before the 2010 FWC (24 June 2009), with the beginning of the Confederation Cup regarded as an organisational test run for the tournament, and concluded one year after the event ended (24 June 2011), in order to be able to consider possible subsequent effects. The data were targeted and retrieved through the Internet news filter with the widest reach – Google Alert. Once a day, a summary with links to relevant news stories, as well as government and industry reports, was sent to the author’s email account. While collecting articles, a press file was developed that was electronically stored, containing all retrieved material in historical order. The collection and analysis included different texts, such as articles, interviews and commentaries. Short updates were not included, because they contained too little information. The chosen keywords comprised ‘World Cup’, ‘2010’ and ‘security’ and were sent by email once a day, with a maximum of 10 articles. Due to the
researcher’s language proficiency, only English and German-based sources were included. Approximately 4,300 links to news websites were received, of which 227 articles were included in the analysis.

The key criteria for choosing information sources were:
1) published between June 2009 and June 2011;
2) selected sources covered news articles that were considerably longer than just a news update;
3) content consisted partly or entirely of security and safety issues;
4) security issues were concerned with public spaces within the event footprint (not including airport or stadium security); and
5) items focused on South Africa and/or Cape Town.

The following international online newspaper companies were manually filtered: The Guardian.co.uk, The Hindu, Sydney Morning Herald, The Times.co.uk, Associated Press, Reuters, The Daily Mail, Spiegel.de, Un News Centre, Fox News, Focus.de, USA Today, The Times of India, Sportbild.bild.de, Sportbusiness.com, FIFA.com, The Canadian Press, Nytimes.com, AllAfrica.com, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the Daily Star. South African online news media channels included: South Africa 2010 Website, Engineering News, South Africa Info Website, News 24, South Africa: The Good News, Times Live, IOL.co.za, Cape Town Business News, Cape Argus, Mail &Guardian.co.za and BuaNews.co.za. Moreover, national and local newspapers (22 articles) - with a special focus on Cape Town - were collected in the RSA during the 2010 FWC tournament. This information was supplemented by Internet transcripts and podcasts of relevant news radio and television programs.

Local community newspapers collected during the tournament, and national and international e-newspapers were prime sources for locating reports about the securitisation process of the PVAs and CRZs at the 2010 FWC. These sources provided information from interviews with government delegates, official comments by bureaucrats, and observations by journalists. Newspapers, press bulletins and media transcripts proved to be particularly useful when seeking verbatim data, such as a direct quote from the South African Minister of Police. This archive provided statements ‘on
the record’ that may not appear in other primary source contexts. Additionally, each of these media seek comments from key event stakeholders about what transpires at closed forums, such as meetings of cabinet or the LOC, where committee minutes are not disclosed publicly (Killenberg, 2007). Newspapers, radio and television, therefore, were easily accessible public repositories for comments by government authorities, and for brief announcements about security policy initiatives.

While hardcopy documents and e-text data via the Internet were fundamental public resources, there was also an effort made to create an alternative repository of data, both private and anonymous. This was accomplished via targeted interviews with key individuals in positions of expertise, who were given an opportunity to comment ‘off the record’.

4.5.2 Data collection II: Interviews

Interview data are useful not only of itself, but also as a significant supplement to existing primary source materials, notably documentary archives. Interviews offer an opportunity to follow up documentary evidence by ‘investigating underlying motives’ (Robson, 2001, p. 229) that may be absent from the written record.

As one of many qualitative data collection methods, interviewing provides the most direct, research-focused interaction between researcher and participant (Kvale, 1996; Stroh, 2000; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). It is presumed that this ability to speak freely rather than ‘on the record’ might unearth opinions hitherto concealed - a ‘silence’ in public discourse. In a social constructionist sense, therefore, a goal of interview research is to try to capture perspectives that do not appear on the public record. This means, of course, an assumption that there are views being withheld from public debate for a variety of reasons, whether because of organisational sensitivities or the need for diplomacy (McDonald, 2004). This is consistent with Foucault’s (1978) observations on the need to interrogate silences in official or dominant discourses.

Interviews are a particularly useful tool for researchers who wish to ask questions that cannot be structured easily into a questionnaire format. Burns (2000) argues that
interviews also allow for greater depth and quality of responses to questions than is usually possible in a survey format, where quantitative measures (e.g., ticking different boxes) are typically employed to scope and scale interviewee responses. Burns has emphasised that qualitative interviews also permit flexibility between researcher and respondent, with interviewees able to offer direct answers to questions and offer perspectives about the line of questioning itself (the latter of which is not possible in tick-box survey formats).

Qualitative interviews, whether conducted in face-to-face or electronic formats (e.g., telephone or Internet) are hardly problem-free. One concern is that interviews gather data which are limited to and by the participants’ perceptions of past actions, and such recollections will inevitably be incomplete and distorted by individual biases (Babbie, 2010). There are, however, also limitations of this kind with respect to documentary records, such as personal memoirs. The interview is thus not singularly flawed as a method of data gathering. Indeed, Polit and Hungler (1997) have asserted that the integrity of self-reported data from qualitative interviews can be enhanced through follow-up questions that seek to either clarify existing response data, or probe to seek further information. Documentary data cannot be interrogated in this reflexive way.

There are limitations associated with garnering testimony from individuals who were part of managerial processes at a mega event (Parent & Deephouse, 2007). Event hosts sometimes seek to mitigate against negative publicity by requiring confidentiality clauses among managerial staff; this obviates against any subsequent testimony to researchers, even if provided with the promise of anonymity and confidentiality. There is also the logistical problem, outside of that legalistic frame, of people moving quickly on from one event management environment to another, therefore proving to be difficult to track down for research purposes.

As will be explained in the next section, a semi-structured interview approach was used in the present study, with reflexive probing of interviewee responses thereafter. It was important in this exploratory study to uncover new and emerging topics. Moving on to lines of inquiry that emerged during the interview process created a new dialogue between researcher and informant – this reflexivity is important in itself as a source of
information (Mason, 2002).

**Interview method**

As researchers consider using qualitative interviewing for their research, they are increasingly likely to use Internet media, such as email and instant messaging (IM), instead of, or in combination with, more traditional forms, like face-to-face and telephone interviews (Kazmer & Xie, 2008, p. 257). Although it is most common to conduct interviews orally on a face-to-face basis, the present study employed an interview method that offered two alternatives to interview participants: a Skype phone call or a private e-mail interview. For logistical and economic reasons, it was not possible for the researcher to travel to the RSA to interview stakeholders in the pre and post-event phases. The choice of researcher-led correspondence via private e-mail and Skype was consistent with the research goal of accessing perspectives that are not voiced publicly and, therefore, have not been a routine part of the discursive ‘mainstream’.

In the last decade, computer-mediated communication (CMC), the electronic information exchange using computers via communication links, such as e-mail and online chatting, has become an integral part of work and living. Methods vary: instant messaging software allows for Internet-based discussion in ‘real time’, while blogs, wikis and e-mail facilitate asynchronous Internet-based communication (Markham, 2005). While the e-mail interview is asynchronous and semi-private (Mann & Stewart, 2002), it provides ‘ready-made’ text for analysis. It also eliminates the need to purchase audiotapes and other expensive data transcription equipment, and travel costs (Meho, 2006; Seymour, 2001). The interviews in the present study were conducted by private e-mail and Skype phone calls.

There are, of course, debates about the utility or otherwise of e-mail-based research. James and Busher (2006) have provided a useful summary of competing positions, having constructed a table (Table 4.2.) of what they regard as the pros and cons of e-interviewing. Generally, e-mail interviews work best when the interviewer and participant are both comfortable communicating via e-mail (Young, Persichitte & Tharp, 1998).
Table 4.2: Participant views of taking part in email-based research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants control when they respond (convenient to individual circumstances)</td>
<td>Participants may be slow and uneven in responding, producing communication hiatus (uneven research flow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More thoughtful and reflective answers (time to think through responses)</td>
<td>Email an ‘impersonal’, rather dry means of conveying sensitive information (disconnectedness between interviewer and interviewee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to focus on one question at a given time, with an opportunity to return later to revise before sending response (facilitates clarity of expression)</td>
<td>Longwinded and sometimes clumsy process of email exchange to clarify the intent and meaning of questions (too much time spent clarifying rather than answering questions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to skip difficult or complex questions and return later (allows for in depth rather than knee-jerk responses made after appropriate personal reflection and contemplation)</td>
<td>Longwinded and sometimes clumsy process of email exchange to clarify the intent and meaning of answers (too much time spent clarifying rather than understanding answers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from: James & Busher, 2006, p. 407

The alternative proposed interview type was interviewing on Skype. Skype provides an integrated interface for voice service, instant messaging and file sharing at low cost. According to Booth (2010), internet voice and video calling have demonstrated a dramatic rise in quality in the past several years. The improving telecommunications infrastructure, increasing bandwidth and processing capacity, and more accessible audiovisual technology have set the stage for widespread adoption of so-called web calling by computer users, of which Skype has been the most successful.

Some challenges of this research tool may be that participants are affected by international time differences, as well as by technical disturbances. Also, some may be unfamiliar with the technology and/or do not have the adequate software and/or equipment, such as headphones, camera and ‘Splitcam’. Due to a lack of technical skills the interviewees experience negative emotion. This may unable them to establish effective connections with the researcher and the related focus of study interest. In Table 4.3, Saumure and Given (2010) summarise the opportunities and challenges researchers may face in using online interviews via Skype. These circumstances were considered when conducting the interviews via Skype.
Table 4.3: Advantages and challenges of Skype as research tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is inexpensive.</td>
<td>There may be time lags in the conversation, which can break the flow of an interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is geographically flexible.</td>
<td>When using Skype video, researchers must ensure that interviewer and interviewee can readily see non-verbal cues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is user-friendly and easy to install/use.</td>
<td>In audio-only mode, non-verbal communication is lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has an instant messaging function, which is useful for managing data collection problems and sharing information among participants.</td>
<td>The technology itself can fail, resulting in disconnection problems, such as loss of data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of audio-recording, as the researcher can easily record computer-to-computer conversations and computer-to-telephone conversations.</td>
<td>Ethical and technical issues may need to be managed, to ensure that individuals’ rights are respected and that everyone feels comfortable participating in the study.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from Saumure & Given (2010, p. 2)

The literature on telephone/Skype interviews demonstrates conflicting advice about whether the researcher or the participant should select the medium for the interview. For example, Shuy’s (2002) methodological review of telephone interviewing implies that the researcher should be the one to choose whether to use the telephone for interviews. On the other hand, Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) have recommended allowing respondents to select the medium (e-mail or Skype), which in their experience increased participation rates. However, Kazmer and Xie (2008) have stated that scheduling can be fairly complicated, particularly when the medium is synchronous, in which case two primary factors come into play: time zones (e.g., there are eight hours’ difference between the RSA and Australia) and local scheduling conflicts. E-mail interviewing is not generally affected by these scheduling problems, because researchers can send interview questions and participants can return their answers when convenient.

Upon consideration of the relevant factors, participants were allowed to choose their medium of preference. The researcher followed the advice of Kazmer and Xie (2008), by acknowledging the possibilities of obtaining data in various formats and, further, prepared a set of guidelines prior to the interviews to ensure the consistency of data management and analysis. The researcher also ensured that respondents were provided
with enough time to respond. This may have improved the quality of the interview data, and also decreased the amount of work required to reorganise the data in the future.

**Participant selection**

According to recommendations by prominent authors in the field (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; George & McKeown, 1985; Yin, 2009), respondent selection in the present study was based on two factors: feasibility within the security field and sample variation in crucial categories. Feasibility within the security field was largely determined by the stakeholders’ willingness to participate in the study and them being in a position to provide the required information. With regard to the second factor, crucial categories were defined based on Parent’s (2008) typology, discussed below.

Mays and Pope (1995) have acknowledged that through purposeful, non-probability and snowball sampling, the researcher is deliberately allowed to include a wide range of types of informants and also to select key informants with access to significant sources of knowledge. Schumacher and McMillan (2001, p. 427) have defined such key informants as ‘persons considered to be influential, prominent, and well informed in an organisation or a community’. However, Smith (2006) has cautioned that gaining access to interview targets can be logistically difficult; furthermore, some people in positions of responsibility and influence are unwilling to be interviewed – even with the promise of anonymity.

The targeted participants were deemed to be in a strategic position to comment on questions of security and surveillance at PVAs and CRZs in Cape Town. Their involvement ranged from being CoS contracted event organisers, Cape Town Partnership planner, SAPS representatives, and member of the Inter-Departmental Planning Committee. Through purposeful sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994), several key event security/surveillance stakeholder representatives who had the most knowledge relating to security at PVAs and CRZs in the case under investigation were targeted. Media articles and official event documents were scanned to identify potential participants. Interviewee stakeholders were grouped according to the following categories: LOC members (e.g., national, site, and security representatives), sport organisations (e.g., FIFA, South African Football Association (SAFA)), community
members (e.g., SAPS), governments (e.g., federal, provincial, municipal), media, and delegation representatives. These stakeholder groups were selected based on Parent’s (2008) research pertaining to major sport event stakeholders. A notable constraint was the unavailability of many key stakeholders. While archival material was, for the most part, used to identify important interviewees, it also served as supporting documentation in case interviewees were not available, or willing, to participate in the project.

After receiving approval from the UTS Ethics Committee and identifying a list of key event organisers on CoCT’s website, the security stakeholders were recruited through a formal e-mail from the researcher (Appendix C). Gaining access to participants goes beyond identifying and selecting a sample to study. It requires the researcher to present his/her intentions and negotiate with participants the willingness to trust and be open with them during the interview process (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). To gain initial access to the participants, the researcher explained that her study was approved by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) Ethics Committee. The security stakeholders were informed that their involvement in the study was anonymous and confidential and that the findings of this study could lead to a better understanding of security and surveillance measures in sport mega-events.

The researcher identified 28 representatives from FWC management, who were asked to contact the researcher to set up an interview. Only one stakeholder replied to the first letter; the rest only responded after follow-up e-mails. The six security stakeholders who were interested in participating in the study replied to the researcher's e-mail and requested additional information. Proper ethical protocols and record keeping were essential to the interviewing process. Thompson (1978) insists that when a researcher explains the purpose of a project to an interviewee, not only its immediate object, but also the potential value of the information to wider scholarship should be made clear. Hence, each interviewee was provided with an ‘informed consent’ letter (Appendix D). Then, in an e-mail, a timeline was suggested for returning the answers and requests made for a Skype or e-mail interview. If the participant agreed to be interviewed, the interview was conducted via e-mail or Skype. Though most of the security stakeholders (n=4) requested e-mail interviews, two preferred Skype interviews. The interviews were semi-structured and the questions were open-ended (see Appendix E).
4.6 Analysing the data

The aim of data analysis is to make primary data ‘readable’ and understandable for subsequent scrutiny. This is done by coding and categorising patterns in the data, and eventually identifying key themes. Qualitative data analysis is ongoing; therefore, the researcher consistently coded, and recoded, while engaging in reflexivity (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). Qualitative data analysis was an ongoing process of discovery, involving a high level of familiarity with the data and continuous examination and interpretation (Biddle et al., 2001; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). To achieve a high level of familiarity with the data, the researcher read and re-read the memos, notes and summaries. In this study, the document content became the primary unit of analysis. After trawling through documentary materials and creating an archive, and classifying and interpreting the gathered information, emerging concepts, themes and sub-themes were identified; in turn, these were shaped by coding the data, as explained below. In line with the interpretive paradigm underpinning this research, the themes of this research were not completely imposed by a pre-defined matrix derived from the review of the literature (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

Schiellerup (2008, p. 163) has written that ‘in recent years a lot of reflexive attention has been brought to bear on the production of social scientific knowledge’. However, she emphasises, ‘one aspect of the research process that has received little reflexive attention is the nitty gritty of qualitative data analysis and writing up. This remains a bit of a black box’. To many scholars, these research practices appear to be more of a craft than a scientific activity. This does not mean an absence of process; rather, the activity is more experiential and intuitive than arbitrary and formulaic (Barbour, 2007; Hammersley, 2004).

The subsequent strategies were used to make primary data ‘readable’ for research scrutiny. The study used a systematic process of scouring archival documents and media articles, as mentioned in section 4.5.1. This centered on qualitative coding, the process of organising data by naming segments of text or speech ‘with a label that simultaneously categorizes, summarizes, and accounts’ for targeted content in primary materials (Charmaz, 2006, p. 43). This meant a strategy to interrogate archival sources, in order to garner the information most relevant to the research project.
Codes were organised around themes identified as pivotal to the thesis goals. These were applied manually while ‘pawing’ through and ‘marking’ copies of hardcopy documents and printed versions of e-documents (e.g., e-mails and documents located on the Internet), using different coloured felt highlighters and particular coloured tags to identify key themes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 88). This manual coding is not a scientific exercise in the way that it engages systematic approaches, such as with computer software that undertakes content analysis of digital e-texts, thereby seeking quantitative feedback about the use of key terms or expressions. However, it is forensic in the sense of identifying particular themes from within the body of primary material. Furthermore, this approach was appropriate to the goals of the study, something that Welsh (2002) dwells upon in her discussion of the need or otherwise for content analysis software in qualitative research. Welsh has argued:

Because the electronic coding process is quick (compared to cutting and pasting pieces of text manually) it is possible that more coding will take place in a study which makes use of software than one that uses only manual methods, and it is not necessarily the case that this additional coding contributes much to an understanding of the data. Instead it may [merely] make the researcher feel as though she or he is being more rigorous and transparent than would be the case using manual methods, and hence data are interpreted more confidently (Welsh, 2002, p. 24).

The present study sought data to both illustrate and illuminate key perspectives about the securitisation of the 2010 FWC. This approach highlights text in the form of opinion, argument and claims to knowledge - viewpoints that in turn shape dominant societal norms and understandings. Accordingly, a manual interpretive coding system was intended to pinpoint text that best illustrated key themes in the study. In the findings, the researcher embedded publicly available quotes from articles and reports, as well as from interview participants, to ‘tell a story’, and thus build up a convincing argument by combining and supporting claims with quotes.

The textual materials were analysed in terms of the textual messages (written and visual), what they convey and images that they conjure (Mason, 1996). They were treated as the product of human activity and the researcher examined why they were produced, their funding sources, and their intended audience.
In terms of the thesis objectives data were organised in three domains: structure; policies; and strategies. The roles, responsibility, and interests of the three stakeholders were located in respect of these characteristics. In doing so, a clearer picture of urban development at the FWC/CoCT emerged, as well as of FIFA’s branding functions and image campaigns.

Analysis of structures polices and strategies for evidence of control and security was undertaken within a neoliberal critique; and associated concepts of Disneyisation and Festivalisation.

4.6.1 Challenges

First, documents may contain an author bias, whereby scholars may well produce different – even competing – readings of the same primary materials, and these provisional findings can be further influenced by the discovery of new archival data. Primary sources are open to multiple interpretations (Thies, 2002), and it is therefore necessary to consider the author and their purpose in preparing the materials during the research process.

Second, a singular and literal reading of a text may deceive the reader, largely because deception was the intention of the author (Herzog & Herzog, 2003). This relates to the rhetoric of dialogue; what is being hidden may be as important, though less tangible, than what is being said with text or speech (LaCapra, 2004). This is a common problem, for example, when ‘reading’ official policy pronouncements from governments. As a group of British academics from the University of Leicester has explained:

The most important thing to remember is that … governmental sources must be understood in terms of their function in the policy-making process. When considering extracts from parliamentary debates, for example, the reader ought to be aware of the intentions behind the parliamentary exchanges. Politicians are not necessarily looking to convey factual information. Instead they may be trying to discredit their opponents or disguise embarrassing policy difficulties and reversals (Department of History, 2001, p. 30).

Third, while some primary sources are principally sources of information, such as maps, diagrams and spreadsheets, most primary materials are explicit sources of opinion. In
this study, this ranges from various policy documents of governments and sport agencies through to media stories about security and surveillance at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town.

4.7 Potential bias

There is no such thing as value-free inquiry, and in qualitative research this premise is presented with clarity. Such clarity permits the value commitments of researchers to be transparent (Lincoln & Denzin, 2000, p. 367).

Lincoln and Denzin’s statement above acknowledges that qualitative researchers openly recognise the potentially biased interpretations of their findings and try to deal with them accordingly. Similarly, Janesick (1998) and Cheek et al. (2004) explain that qualitative research is ideologically driven, and therefore value-free or bias-free design is impossible to achieve. Further, Mays and Pope (1995) state that qualitative research is often criticised for being strongly subject to researcher bias, and for lacking reproducibility and generalisability. The investigator is the ‘instrument through which data is collected’ (Rew, Bechtel & Sapp, 1993, p. 300), processed, and analysed. Consequently, qualitative researchers are often accused of a biased view of the world and of their participants, which is understandable, given the inseparable nature of the researcher and his or her research. Rew et al. (1993) have asserted the self as an instrument in the data collection and analysis process, and listed the following as attributes needed by qualitative researchers to alleviate bias: appropriateness, authenticity, credibility, intuitiveness, receptivity, reciprocity, and sensitivity. These attributes have been considered continuously throughout the data collection and analysis processes.

Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 428) have argued that even where there are shared theoretical backgrounds, ‘it is still unlikely that a researcher could write a case study from a colleague’s field notes that would be plausibly similar to the original’. It therefore comes down to the qualitative researcher’s ability to be sensitive to the data and being able to make appropriate decisions which convince the reader of the legitimacy of his or her work (Cheek et al., 2004; Patton, 2002). Researchers do not lose credibility when acknowledging potential bias in their studies – so long as they and their
performances are trustworthy (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Golafshani, 2003; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). It is therefore important to articulate subjective choices within a research project transparently to secure credibility.

The qualitative researcher’s challenge is to show that the personal interest every researcher possesses will not make the study problematic in terms of trustworthiness. Marshall and Rossman (1999) have noted that if direct experience stimulates the initial curiosity, the researcher must link that curiosity to general research questions. In the present case, the researcher acknowledges her individual bias stems from previous experience of being in the audience at PVAs and CRZs during the 2006 and 2010 FWC events. Informal interactions with security stakeholders at these venues undoubtedly left an impression, which sparked the initial research interest. That said, in the subsequent interview phase, the researcher took every effort to ensure that her views, beliefs and assumptions were not imposed upon interview respondents. For example, the themes derived from the analysis of the data were reviewed and verified by the interviewees in an attempt to minimise elements of researcher-imposed bias.

The literature shows that there are several areas where bias can affect results in conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews. These issues are based largely around reliability, validity and generalisation (Saunders et al., 1997). Even though it was intended to minimise potential external threats to the validity of the data, the conditions and nature of this project were likely to introduce biases and limitations.

First, there may be a lack of standardisation in semi-structured interviews, which might have led to unreliability (Easterby-Smith, Braiden & Ashton, 1991; Robson, 1993). Semi-structured interviews mean that there could be variations in the way questions are asked, which might have introduced interviewer bias (Saunders et al., 1997). The potential for interviewer bias was taken into account during analysis of the data. Also, the interviews were clearly structured. This meant that, as the validity and reliability of data depended to a significant extent on the design and structure of questions (Veal, 2006), projective, non-projective and open-ended questions were phrased sensitively (Gummesson, 2000). This format provided flexibility and participant control, while
still allowing the researcher to reconnect with the original research questions (Fontana & Frey, 2003).

Related to interviewer bias is issue of response bias (Saunders et al., 1997). The researcher was limited to the data that respondents were willing to convey, which constrained the range of data sets and thus the results (Jankowicz, 2000). This tends to be treated as an error factor, especially when respondents may decide to give incorrect answers (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). However, this bias is impossible to remove and taints most interviews of this nature. The study topic also may have introduced bias, since it may be regarded as sensitive by some respondents; the data may have also been biased by the decisions of those who chose not to participate. For example, respondents who did not comply with legal requirements might have been relatively sensitive to this topic and thus might have decided to give evasive or incomplete answers.

4.8 Ethical issues

Ethical issues are of great importance in social science research since it deals with sentient creatures. This section outlines the researcher's ethical responsibilities to the participants and the university that sponsored the study. As with most research projects, this study carried with it the potential for harm to the participants. According to Christians (2003), breach of privacy poses the greatest threat to the well-being of participants in a study. In order to reduce the risk to participants in this study, the researcher maintained the confidentiality and anonymity of participants. Pseudonyms replaced the names of the participants and no identifying information regarding the location of the security stakeholders interviewed will be released. The research participants need to be openly informed and protected by any means, and contributors to research should never be disadvantaged or hurt.

In order to secure an ethically responsible research process, Bouma (2000) has suggested that specific consideration should be given to three major issues, namely, (1) gaining appropriate informed consent, (2) respecting individual privacy and confidentiality, and (3) ensuring the research is stored in a safe environment.
First, to secure informed consent from participants, they must be fully aware of the research purpose and processes, any potential risk or harm, the potential benefits of the research project, and the purpose(s) for which the information generated will be used. Furthermore, the researcher has to secure voluntary participation and allow the questioning of issues raised by the interviewee within the research process (De Vaus, 2002; Glesne, 1999). For this research, in accordance with UTS ethics regulations, informed consent forms (Appendix D) were signed by all respondents. The consent form detailed the purpose of the research study, a description of the research study, the expected time commitment for participants, an explanation of the use of audio equipment during interviews, and a description of the potential risks to participants, including the risk of loss of confidentiality.

Second, individual privacy and confidentiality are of particular importance for this project because of the peculiar characteristics of the research setting. Due to the sensitive topic of ‘security’, interviewees’ responses could result in conflict, distress or harm. Therefore, during the interview transcription process, all identifying attributes were removed.

Third, with regards to secure safety of data, paper and electronic file folders were used to manage the data collected in this study. The paper folders were stored in a locked filing cabinet. The electronic folders were stored on a password-secured external hard drive, and eventually stored in a locked cabinet.

4.9 Summary

This chapter has outlined the philosophical framework that was used to guide and shape the qualitative research design and methods. Given the need for interpretive researchers to clearly explain their methodology and methods, there were concerted efforts to address issues of researcher subjectivity and bias (Decrop 1999). This thesis employs a qualitative case study approach to try to understand a specific social real-world phenomenon: key tensions pertaining to security associated with staging a sport mega-event in developing nations. Because PVAs and CRZs and the role they play in the promotional and security strategies of the event owner and its sponsors are an under-

researched area, this thesis research is necessarily exploratory. The 2010 FWC in the RSA was chosen for various reasons, as outlined previously. In this context, one in-depth case study was utilised: Cape Town.

The study made use of four data sets: governmental, managerial and journalistic documents, as well as semi-structured interviews via e-mail and Skype, to generate an account of the relationship between the event organiser and security measures and the subsequent impact of those strategies. Further, this chapter presented the sampling strategies and techniques used for the data collection process and noted the method of data analysis. The chapter concluded by acknowledging potential bias and ethical issues. Chapter 5 presents the central research findings and outcomes derived from the study.
Chapter 5: Findings

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the empirical investigation into securitisation and control strategies for sponsoring brands and rights protection in urban spaces at the 2010 FWC in the RSA. This study focused on the use of PVAs and CRZs for branding and marketing purposes by FIFA and its official sponsors, and the management of themed public spaces towards those goals. The findings not only underline the business rationale associated with these two types of spatial enclosure, but they also provide insights into the mechanisms through which FIFA prescribed the establishment of PVAs and CRZs.

As outlined in the previous chapter, data were gathered through interviews with key security stakeholders in Cape Town: four key security stakeholder interviews by e-mail and two by Skype, and publicly accessible sources, namely, a collection of ‘governmental’, ‘managerial’ and ‘journalistic’ documents. This information enabled evaluation of the spatial dynamics of security; the roles and responsibilities of security actors; and measures to protect the interests of the FWC brand and its sponsors in PVAs and CRZs. The findings give voice to the stakeholders and locate these narratives within a broader security governance framework and commercialisation agendas.

Stakeholder relationships at international, national and municipal levels epitomise globalisation (Jensen & Sandström, 2011). The control of public space is represented in organisational relationships at the FWC. The findings demonstrate complex relations between three globally connected stakeholders: an event owner, event sponsors, and an event organiser.

The findings are consistent with a ‘narrative development’ approach, (Jensen & Sandström, 2011, p. 474) as means of interpreting relationships between stakeholders. The two key variables: power and responsibility, both of which have ethical and moral dimensions are incorporated in the analysis.
This chapter firstly presents an overview of the governance structures that were established for the 2010 FWC as background information on organisational planning authorities. As will become evident, some of these organisations were important to the three stakeholders under focus in terms of planning and implementing security policy and commercial protection. This is followed by a section on policies, including legislation and regulation. The implementation strategies are initially presented in their spatial context, and then in terms of the role of the media in showcasing the FWC in the interests of the key stakeholders. The final section outlines critical compliance and resistance strategies associated with FIFA’s commercial agenda.

5.2 FWC governance structures

Government preparations for the 2010 FWC were coordinated through three main structures: the 2010 Inter-ministerial Committee (IMC), the 2010 Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), and the 2010 Project Management Unit (PMU) within the Department of Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA). The LOC brought the South African Football Association (SAFA), the government and representatives of business and labour under a single organisational umbrella. The host city forum brought together the government and the LOC in terms of managing the host cities (Davies, 2009; South African Tourism, 2010). Formal control over security was achieved through the development of the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS), and the coordinating body of the National Joint Operational Centre (NATJOC). The NATJOINTS structure was established as a permanent feature of major events: it was reactivated during local government elections in May 2011, with SAPS and SANDF using a similar FWC zoning system (SAPA, 2011). With regards to the national safety and security strategy, NATJOINTS used the same approach of securing the 2011 Local Government Elections as was followed during the 2010 FWC (SAPS, 2011).

While SAPS was the lead department of NATJOINTS, it liaised closely with FIFA and the LOC, as well as with other police centres that were linked to operations (Provincial Government Western Cape (PGWC), 2011b; SAPS, 2010b). Regarding the NATJOINTS and LOC Security Directorate’s roles in the operational plan for the FWC,
a clear distinction was made between the national security plan and the event safety plans. NATJOINTS took charge of the national security plan, while LOC was responsible for event security (Groenewald, 2007). Below is a summary of the 2010 FWC South African governance structure.

Table 5.1: 2010 FWC South African governance structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body</th>
<th>Characteristics and tasks</th>
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| IMC                                       | • Comprised heads of RSA ministries  
• Chaired by Deputy State President  
• Reported on a monthly basis to the South African President  
• Delivered government guarantees                                                                                                                           |
| TCC                                       | • Comprised senior officials from the departments whose ministers sat on the IMC  
• Chaired by Deputy Minister of Finance  
• Responsible for guarantees, government investments and legacies                                                                                          |
| 2010 PMU                                  | • Fell under the Minister of Sports and Recreation  
• Chaired by a General Director  
• Coordinated all 2010 FWC preparations                                                                                                                                 |
| FWC 2010 Organising Committee - LOC       | • Comprised 19 board members, 13 of whom were drawn from the fields of business, sport and labour;  
• Five Cabinet Ministers and one Deputy Cabinet Minister  
• NPO status  
• Responsible for event safety plan                                                                                                                         |
| Host City Forum                           | • Joint government and LOC structure  
• Chaired by Minister of Provincial and Local Government  
• Managed all aspects of host cities’ preparations                                                                                                                                 |
| NATJOINTS                                 | • Mandated by Cabinet  
• Consisted of SAPS, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), Metro Police, intelligence agencies and several representatives of various government departments  
• Reported to a Directors General Committee comprising of the National Commissioner of the SAPS, and the Chief of the SANDF, as well as the Directors General of the intelligence agencies and other government departments  
• Responsible for national safety and security plan and related operations                                                                                       |

According to the Chairperson, the Planning Committee was required to encompass certain legislation and regulation into the 2010 FWC safety and security plan:

- 17 Government Guarantees submitted during the bid process;
- The Organising Association Agreement (OAA) between FIFA and the LOC;
- The Host City Agreement between FIFA and the nine Host Cities.
- The Stadium Users’ Agreement;
- The FIFA regulations (available on the FIFA Website);
- *2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts* (no. 11 and 12. of 2006); and
- Regulations promulgated in terms of the mentioned Acts, such as By-laws (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 23 June).

The security for all PVAs and CRZs was handled by the decentralised planning committees in the host cities. According to the Chairperson of the Planning Committee, they were required to comply with the guidelines set in the general safety and security plan and other documents referred to as ‘supra’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 23 June). The data analysis identified the key agreements, contracts and legislation for the safety and security plan pertaining to the governance of public urban spaces. These included:

a) OAA;
b) Guarantees;
c) *2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts* (no. 11 and 12. of 2006);
d) Host City Agreement; and
e) *2010 FWC By-law(s).*

**Organising Association Agreement (OAA)**

The OAA formed the contractural framework and it dictated FIFA’s requirements. The OAA was an umbrella agreement that was rather wide in scope and application, requiring the LOC to be fully responsible for general security and personal protection (Jordaan, 2009). A critical requirement was for the LOC to guarantee that FIFA and its sponsors bore no responsibility regarding security operations and associated risks. Clause 23.1.5 of the OAA stated:

> OC/SAFA shall guarantee that no responsibility regarding security ‘can be apportioned’ to FIFA and that the government provides FIFA with identical guarantees; this provision also requires an indemnity for FIFA and its commercial partners (Jordaan, 2009, p. 5).

In addition, clause 23.2 declared that ‘all costs associated with security measures shall be borne by the OC/SAFA and/or the government’ (Jordaan, 2009, p. 5). Hence FIFA
made no financial contribution to the securitisation efforts that were required to protect the FWC and its commercial sponsors. FIFA had effectively outsourced responsibility for the planning and implementation of security at the FWC and also its cost. The indemnity provided to FIFA and its commercial affiliates not only related to security, but also ‘to all proceedings, claims, and related costs (including professional advisor fees) which may be incurred or suffered by or threatened by others against FIFA in relation to the organisation and staging of the 2010 FWC’ (Jordaan, 2009, p. 7). In other words, a plaintiff could sue FIFA, but the host government would be liable as the defendant, and thus liable to pay damages. This was merely one of 17 FWC guarantees that indemnified FIFA against all lawsuits (Government Information and Communication Service (GCIS), 2009b). This security disclaimer also gives authority to host cities to deploy public police to act as the primary enforcement agency serving the event organiser’s interests, under either event specific By-laws or conventional criminal law.

Guarantees

All responsibilities of the LOC and the RSA government were in accordance with the 17 guarantees to FIFA that were agreed to prior to the event (see Appendix F). These guarantees were manifested in the so-called Bid Book. In preparing the FWC bid, the national government and 2010 FWC Bid Committee received little, if any, input from the city governments, which were ultimately responsible for hosting the games and leveraging the FWC to achieve growth (Doherty et al., 2010). The Mail and Guardian launched a legal battle to obtain information relating to FWC tenders, eventually obtaining a copy of the 17 guarantees. It reported that one guarantee was that police officers and other ‘peace officials’ were to be adequately provided by host cities in order to enforce the protection of the marketing rights, broadcast rights, marks and other intellectual property (IP) rights of FIFA and its commercial partners (Tolsi, 2010b). A key focus of much of the IP protection effort was, unsurprisingly, to prevent ambush marketing and efforts by non-FIFA brands to gain market presence and attention (Appleton, nd). While the guarantees did not overtly stipulate the management of PVAs and CRZS, they did establish overarching rules, such as security and branding rights at the FWC.
On 9 July 2003, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ & CD) signed a guarantee to FIFA, ensuring that all justice-related requirements for hosting the 2010 FWC tournament would be provided, including the development of a 2010 FWC Administration of Justice Operational Plan, in order to fast-track the judicial process during the event (Maseko, 2010). Special World Cup Courts were set up to expeditiously handle crimes, including ambush marketing cases committed during the tournament, especially where foreigners were involved (CTP, 2010e). Although Fischer, one of FIFA’s spokespersons, said that these ‘extraordinary measures’ (DOJ & CD, 2010, p. 4) had not been a FIFA requirement, they were deemed a ‘commendable’ scheme of the DOJ & CD (Faull, 2010). FIFA thus welcomed this initiative, since a one-week delay in court proceedings related to ambush marketing activities during the tournament could have been damaging for FIFA’s sponsors. In effect, the DOJ & CD offered and created a free ‘FIFA-ised’ space within existing court districts for dedicated event-related cases to be heard.

2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts of 2006

Some of the FWC guarantees compelled the South African Parliament to pass new laws. The two most relevant pieces of legislation that were consolidated into an Act of Parliament in September 2006 were Special Measures Acts: the 2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Act (nos. 11 & 12 of 2006). These gave ‘effect to the OAA between FIFA and SAFA and to the guarantees issued by the [South African] Government to FIFA for hosting and staging of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa’ (2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Bill, B13–2006, 2006). These two Acts were brief and specifically dealt with additional measures related to FIFA’s guarantees (Sports & Recreation Portfolio Committee & Education & Recreation Select Committee (SRPCERSC), 2006). They governed issues such as alcohol, PVAs, CRZs, health, safety and security. For example, FIFA required that all competition venues (stadiums) for the 2010 FWC be renamed during the event to suit the commercial interests of FIFA’s sponsoring partners (SRPCERSC, 2006). However, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) had not been consulted prior to the Special Measures Bill being introduced. Thus, the possibility of opposition to the measures was not provided: ‘Inputs had been made, but these were mainly ignored’ (Sport & Recreational & Provincial & Local Government Portfolio Committees (SRPLGPCs),
2006). At the same meeting, ANC MP, Komphela, stated that the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy had not been considered. He argued that nothing has been done for marginalised communities (SRPLGPCs, 2006). The overarching point, therefore, is that key local stakeholders were neither consulted about, nor able to contribute towards, parliamentary guarantees in respect of the 2010 FWC.

Host City Agreement and 2010 CoCT FWC By-law

Another important piece of FWC-event legislation passed was the 2010 FWC By-law (hereafter 2010 CoCT By-law) enacted in each host city. In the case of the CoCT, the by-law demonstrated a clear connection between the securitisation of FIFA’s commercial interests and the politics of safety and security in public spaces at the FWC. All host city by-laws had to comply with the two Special Measure Acts and existing provincial and municipal by-laws. The FIFA Regulation (previously called FIFA guidelines) had to be incorporated into the host city by-laws as well (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 23 June) and these stipulated all branding conditions and commercialisation interests. These legislative changes for the commercialisation of public urban spaces did not only apply to the official sponsors, but also could be used against their competitors. If a conflict arose between the existing municipal by-laws and the event by-law, the provisions of the latter prevailed (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 19).

According to the former Provincial 2010 FWC coordinator, it was originally planned to have one national 2010 FWC By-law, but during the planning phase it was decided that passing a single piece of legislation through National Parliament would be too time-consuming (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 2 May). Thus, each host city passed their own similar by-laws at different times (ABN digital, 2010).

While the 2010 CoCT By-law was enacted as part of the Host City Agreement, the specific provisions operated during the ‘term’ (Final Draw: 13 November 2009 to 12 December 2009; and FWC: 21 April 2010 to 19 July 2010), to regulate advertising and special events, such as PVAs; administer CRZs; administer, manage and maintain order in public open spaces; adopt appropriate traffic guidance, management and control measures; and regulate street trading (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 19). The stipulated
time frame formalised control beyond the necessary restrictions to ensure the efficient hosting of the FWC.

Initially, the wide-ranging 2010 CoCT By-law was not accepted by CoCT, which described it as ‘vague and embarrassing’ (Powell, 2010). DA councillor Jesperson said the 2010 CoCT By-law was ‘superficial and incomplete’ (Powell, 2010). Further, she noted that ‘aspects of the by-law would be impossible to enforce’ (Powell, 2010). One aspect reported was that, according to DA councillor Frank Raymond, CoCT ‘seek legal opinion before accepting the bylaw and pointed out that, in some sections, there were blank spaces instead of information’. Another aspect, according to DA councillor Owen Kinahan, was that the businesses denied advertising rights in the event zone would claim compensation from CoCT (Powell, 2010). What new reforms in particular were negotiated to offset these difficulties could not be answered through relevant sources. As a result, CoCT amended it slightly, as the only city to host a 2010 FWC match in the RSA. Evidence presented later in this chapter demonstrates that requirements by FIFA around city beautification and CRZs were also re-negotiated by CoCT.

After the RSA successfully won the bid to host the 2010 FWC, the nine designated host cities were obliged to sign the Host City Agreement with FIFA and the LOC, which comprised the legal obligations required to stage the tournament. CoCT was obliged to implement FIFA’s Rights Protection Program (RPP), with support from national and provincial governments (GCIS, 2009b). All host cities were legally obligated to provide a free space in the city centre for the FFF, and enact legislation, such as the 2010 CoCT By-law, to fully implement the safety and security operations, in order to support SAPS. The Host City Forum, which consisted of senior representatives of all nine 2010 FWC host cities, brought together the LOC and the national government in managing the host cities’ groundwork (GCIS, 2009b).

CoCT worked in conjunction with SAPS and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) to develop a safety and security strategy that complied with the requirements of both FIFA and the LOC. CoCT and the PGWC formed a joint management structure to ensure that the tournament was delivered as a joint initiative by both spheres of government (CoCT, 2008a). In terms of jurisdiction, the PGWC managed the FanJols (provincial PVAs)
outside the host city, while CoCT managed the security of PVAs (FFF, Fan Walk and four municipal PVAs) and CRZs (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 2 May). Below is a visual representation of the relationships between key authorities and their legal obligations.

**Figure 5.1: 2010 national linkages: Cape Town**

In summary, the event-driven organisational structures and legal requirements described above were only temporary measures enacted for the FWC event in Cape Town. Most importantly, the 2010 *CoCT By-law* was introduced on FIFA’s behalf to ensure that in CRZs and other event venues, FIFA’s brand and its sponsors’ rights were carefully protected. As is shown later, this led to the establishment of special police units which patrolled ‘FIFA-ised’ spaces in Cape Town to minimise public disorder, preserve the aesthetics of these themed zones, and safeguard the commercial interests of FWC sponsors.
FIFA’s RPP

FIFA aimed to eliminate ambush marketing activities in public urban spaces by implementing a comprehensive RPP. This was developed by the commercial legal department of FIFA and was established to protect FIFA’s trademarks and commercial affiliates from event piracy activities, such as ambush marketing, IP infringements (patents, copyrights and marks), media rights, unauthorised trading around venues, and illegal ticket selling (Portela, 2010). Provisions of the RPP were in force from May 2006 to December 2010, with the aim of protecting FIFA’s global branding rights to the 2010 FWC event and all its sponsors’ rights (Marsland, 2006). On its website, FIFA gives the following reasons for its implementation:

In the world of football, fair play is a principle that has an important role to play both on and off the pitch. The beautiful game's incredible success story, particularly in terms of the FIFA World Cup, not only attracts fans and official partners, but also the ambush marketing activities of companies seeking to secure themselves a slice of the rewards illicitly without offering any financial support in return. This jeopardises the viability of FIFA events which are crucial to the development of global football (FIFA, ndc).

The data analysis yielded two broad overarching categories pertaining to counter-ambush marketing strategies: 1. Content-based; and 2. spatially-based (see Table 5.2). The content-based category featured regulations manifested in national laws and codes, and were therefore were unambiguously defined. The spatially-based approaches were realised in the form of PVAs and CRZs, and, as is explained later, in some instances they were not clearly defined (for example, there were no fences around CRZs) or were demarcated in a rather ad hoc fashion by the negotiating parties (FIFA, the LOC and the respective host city). The security, control and surveillance strategies and their spatial dimensions were manifest in the FFF, Fan Walk, municipal PVAs and CRZs in Cape Town.
Table 5.2: Protection of commercial interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>FWC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content-based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Spatially-based</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of ambush marketing</td>
<td></td>
<td>PVAs and CRZs (physical space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party advertisement allowed</td>
<td></td>
<td>No form of competitive advertisement allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No application to host city authorities necessary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Application for an event-specific consent/licence is necessary to erect or maintain any sign or conduct advertisement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Short-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardised terms</td>
<td></td>
<td>Variable terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National laws and Codes of Conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td>2010 <em>FWC By-laws</em> and Host City Agreement: Enforced by various municipalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next sections introduce these two counter-ambush marketing strategies that FIFA and its sponsors had at their disposal.

### 5.3 Permanent content-based legislation

FIFA was able to draw on a panoply of legal provisions, both under statute and the common law to ensure protection of its trademarks and copyrights through national and international brand protection, protection against passing off and misleading and deceptive conduct, contractual terms, and anti-trust laws (Lines & Heshka, 2010; Watal, 2010). FIFA’s rights protection panel, working with South African local law enforcement authorities, customs officials and external legal advisers, used these legislative tools to combat ambush marketing (Dean, 2010).

The RPP strategy encompassed the following key pieces of legislation and guidelines, as well as the common law action of “passing off”:

i)  *Merchandise Marks Act (MMA) 17 of 1941*, section 15;

ii) *CoCT Outdoor Advertisement and Signage By-law 10518 (OA & SB)* of 2009,

iii) *Trade Marks Act (TMA) 194 of 1993*
iv)  *Designs Act* 195 of 1993  
v)  *Copyright Act* 98 of 1978  
vi)  *Trade Practices Act (TPA)* 76 of 1976, section 9(d)  
vii) Advertising Standards Authority’s Sponsorship Code, Article 11.

In this section, the first two pieces of legislation are analysed in detail, since they arguably present FIFA’s most important protection against ambush marketing. The *MMA* protects an event’s trademark far in excess of what is available under the *TMA*, passing off or *TPA* (Watal, 2010). The *OA & SB* of 2009 was amended in particular terms for the 2010 FWC. After discussing each legal protection mechanism available to FIFA in the 2010 FWC context, the potency and limitations of these measures are discussed. For further details on other RPP legal strategies available to FIFA and their various dimensions, please refer to Appendix G.

### 5.3.1 *Merchandise Marks Act (MMA) 17 of 1941*

The *MMA*, which was a legacy of the RSA hosting the international Cricket World Cup in 2003, was amended to protect the commercial rights of FIFA and its sponsors for the 2010 FWC (Murphy, 2009a). Specifically, the legislation made trademark infringement not merely a civil, but criminal, offence. This protective legislation addressed ambush marketing by intrusion, as well as association (see Section 2.5) (*MMA* 17 of 1941 s 15 A). The significant aspect of the *Amendment Act* was the insertion of section 15A (17 of 1941). The *MMA* allowed major sporting events to be designated ‘protected events’ (Nurton, 2010). It outlawed the use of any brand in relation to a designated event in a manner calculated to achieve publicity for that trade mark, and thereby derive special promotional benefit from the event without the event organiser’s prior consent (Litt, 2005). Section 15A(2) of the *MMA* also gave the Minister of Trade and Industry the legal right, by notice in the official Government Gazette, to prohibit the use of any trademark in connection with any trade, business, profession, occupation, or event, or in connection with a trade mark, mark or trade description applied to goods or services.

Any person who contravenes the provisions of section 15A commits a criminal offence and may be liable to a fine of R60,000 or up to three years’ imprisonment for a first
offence, or a fine of R100.000 or up to five years’ imprisonment for a subsequent
offence. In addition, if a person is convicted of an offence in this regard, the court may
order confiscation of all the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed
(MMA 17 of 1941, s 15A (2)). In other words, this national legislation makes ambush
marketing a criminal offence.

The Minister of Trade and Industry designated the 2010 FWC by notice 683 of 25 May
2006 under section 15A as a ‘protected event’, meaning that the provisions of the MMA
were in force from the date of publication of the notice until six months after the date on
which the tournament commenced (Blignaut, 2009; Cornelius, 2007). The justification
of this long-term commitment of over four years was made on the basis that the FWC
was in the public interest: it was assumed to enhance the economy and create
opportunities for national and local businesses (Dean, 2007). However, according to
Doherty et al. (2010), CoCT government representatives and business executives were
sceptical of FIFA’s operating rules and restrictions, which could impede on
development. Moreover, Schult Herzenberg (2010, p. 206) has argued that ‘power [was]
disproportionately allocated in favour of FIFA and corporate entities to the detriment of
host governments and their citizens’. This is because (over)spending was identified as a
related and salient public interest issue at the 2010 FWC.

Overall, this event-specific legislation, in effect, broadened the concept of ambush
marketing, since it essentially allowed FIFA to redefine what activities could constitute
ambush marketing at the 2010 FWC, depending on the language used in the legislation
and related By-laws (Grady et al., 2010).

A legal problem for FIFA was requirement to show that the offending marketer
intended that the use of his/her trademark would attract publicity from the event, and as
a result cause them to derive special promotional benefit. The effect of this condition
was that the casual spectator or fan at an event who, for example, wore an outfit bearing
a trademark of a competitor of the official sponsor, though without the requisite
commercial intention, would not be guilty of being in breach of section 15A.
Another significant amendment to the MMA was the declaration of 85 FIFA marks to be ‘prohibited marks’ under section 15(1). These included ‘2010’, ‘twenty ten’, words describing the event venues, mascots and logos of all previous FWCs, and various combinations of the words ‘FIFA’, ‘WC’, ‘SA’, and ‘Soccer’. Any use of the ‘prohibited marks’ in connection with 2010 FWC, other than their use by FIFA, was made an offence punishable by a fine or a prison term. The prohibition expired six months after the start of the event and did not apply to the media, ‘providing the reporting is … not imbued with unscrupulous business enterprising’ (South African Government, 2007, p. 3).

Despite the restrictive nature of this legislation, it was still possible for ambushes to occur. For example, although a rival company’s marketing campaign might detract from and dilute a sponsor’s message, unless the campaign directly infringed a specified protected mark, a sponsor or event organiser had no legal right to block the offending advertising (Heshka, 2010). This can be illustrated at the 2010 FWC by FIFA’s failure to include the Vuvuzela as part of the MMA, thereby presenting international companies, such as Nestle and Carling, with an iconic piece of merchandise to use in their advertising (Lines & Heshka, 2010). As FIFA (p. 14) stated: ‘FIFA recognises that vuvuzelas are a typical football object in South Africa, widely used by fans at matches to support their teams. Vuvuzelas will be allowed inside the stadium although they should comply with safety regulations and not be commercially branded’.

### 5.3.2 Outdoor Advertising & Signage By-law (OA & SB) of 2009

The outdoor advertising industry is one of the most regulated and complex industries in the RSA. These laws are largely legacies of Apartheid legislation which did not recognise commercial free speech (Ad Outpost, nd). The Constitution and Bill of Rights of the RSA guarantee commercial free speech and render invalid any law in contravention of this right. According to Murphy (2009b), it remained necessary to interpret rules in such a way as to limit commercial/advertising rights only to the extent necessary where fundamental rights are an issue. The administrative justice provisions in the Bill of Rights must be utilised to ensure a fair hearing in city tribunals, and also provide the opportunity to challenge unreasonable decisions in the courts, by way of
review. Thus, many advertising laws were considered invalid by South African courts. As a result, it has been relatively difficult to prohibit unfettered marketing (Murphy, 2009b).

In 2009, and with reference to the 2010 FWC, the CoCT updated the OA & SB. Although CoCT had previously allowed third party advertising, the reworked version controlled all outdoor advertising, such as shop signs, posters and billboards ‘more efficiently’ (CoCT, 2009c) while providing greater clarity on this issue (Pollack, 2009c). Back-lit billboards and theatre posters could now be approved without stringent regulations (CoCT, 2009c). The OA & SB defined the areas of maximum control, such as scenic and natural areas; rural areas; and sensitive urban conservation areas, such as the Long Street architectural heritage area in Cape Town. Other defined areas included urban commercial spaces of partial control and minimum control, such as industrial regions. CoCT claimed that this permanent By-law aimed to strike a balance between outdoor advertising opportunities and economic development, on the one hand, and the visual, tourist, traffic safety, environmental and heritage interests, on the other hand (Pollack, 2009c). According to the Chairperson of the Planning and Environment Portfolio Committee (PEPCO), ‘besides allowing for greater flexibility, the By-law also balances the freedom of expression with the conservation of the metropole’s rich natural and cultural heritage’ (CoCT, 2009c).

While this statement clearly illustrates the sensitivity of advertising in certain spaces, it is even more intriguing that CoCT was considering the illumination of Table Mountain with branding for the 2010 FWC, especially as Table Mountain is a national heritage site (McKune, 2009). Further, newspapers reported that CoCT’s signage department erected FWC banners in contravention of its own OA & SB. CoCT attorney Stewart admitted:

Certain banners may have been erected prior to a full approval being granted. The signage department has informed the 2010 Event Marketing Office ... and has reminded it of the necessity of obtaining approval in terms of the By-law before any signs may be erected (in McKune, 2009).

As this statement shows, ‘greater flexibility’ of outdoor advertising opportunities and economic development was provided for FIFA and its sponsors without any formal approval by CoCT. Thus, CoCT had to adapt to FIFA’s standards, fast-tracking
advertising in public spaces, therefore bypassing its own laws in order to exclude other third party advertising companies.

**Summary**

Thus far, the findings have presented strategies to counter ambush marketing only in relation to legalities based on their message contents. While the stakeholders held certain powers over the event organisation, FIFA remained the main organiser setting the agenda under which the LOC, the RSA government and CoCT operated. At the same time, the complete indemnity of FIFA and its commercial affiliates had to be ensured.

The existing legislation (*TMA, Designs Act & Copyright Act, Counterfeit Goods Act, MMA*, and *TPA*) was supplemented by the *Special Measures Acts* and the 2010 *CoCT By-law* (FIFA, 2010c) to protect the interests of FIFA and its sponsors and all other ‘commercial partners’. The amended *MMA* and *OA & SB* undoubtedly strengthened the RSA’s and Cape Town’s event bidding process, and provided greater rights to the event owners and their sponsors. This increased the intangible value to any prospective sponsors through an in-built protection of exclusivity (Dickson, 2007). Admittedly, these legal measures were also beneficial for consumers and fans, since they were less likely to be misled by false and confusing commercial claims and unfair advertising practices (Blackshaw, 2011).

As mentioned previously, the data analysis yielded one content-based; and one spatially-based strategy that served to protect FIFA’s and its sponsors’ brands and rights. The spatially-based approaches were realised in the form of PVAs and CRZs, and, as is illustrated in the next sections, in some instances these strategies are complex and defy easy conceptualisation.

**5.4 FIFA-ised spaces – Cape Town**

In this section, the security, surveillance and operational policing strategies pertaining to the spatial dimensions of PVAs and CRZs are revealed. The first path of inquiry involved examination of the national and Capetonian security, surveillance and
operational policing strategies that applied to FIFA-ised spaces declared as ‘hot spots’. These hot spots were located throughout Cape Town’s Central Business District (CBD) and adjacent districts. Second, Cape Town’s security, surveillance and control mechanisms for PVAs and CRZs were scoped in relation to their objectives, design and technological features. Third, specific spatial organisation and policies and their operational components were interrogated to uncover how the security and control policies of urban spaces were applied.

In terms of the security strategies pertaining to PVAs, the focus presented here is on the larger PVAs, such as the official FFF, the ‘Host City Fan Walk’ and four other municipal PVAs in Cape Town. Within FIFA’s spatial framework, these temporary privatised urban spaces were organised hierarchically in relation to security, control and surveillance, especially in relation to commercial aspects such as ambush marketing.

5.4.1 Security, surveillance, ‘hotspots’ and target groups

Security in the RSA and Cape Town

SAPS had a budget of about R1.3 billion (equivalent to USD 146 million) (GCIS, 2010a) to address safety and security at the FWC. This is similar to the 2000 Sydney Olympics budget (USD 179.6 million), but only about one-eighth of the security budget of the 2004 Athens Olympics and 2006 Turin Olympic Winter Games, and less than 5% of the security expenses at the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Cornelissen, 2011). In this respect, it is interesting to note that FIFA President Blatter announced before the event that security ‘would rival that seen at the Beijing Olympic Games’ (DawnMedia.com, 2009). Approximately R640 million was allocated for the deployment of 41,000–44,000 officers (FIFA, 2009a; South Africa: The Good News, 2010b). Some R665 million was spent on procuring special security equipment, such as crowd management equipment and associated body armour. This expenditure was comparatively low, considering other costs for hosting the 2010 FWC: R11.7 billion invested in 10 stadia and R13 billion to upgrade infrastructure, while ports of entry received R3.5 billion for renovations, and R1.5 billion was invested in broadcast technology (GCIS, 2010a). As Pruix, the Deputy National Police Commissioner remarked, ‘a World Cup is a dream for every police chief – I can ask for anything, and I get it!’ (Shrey, 2008). Why this
acceleration in security development took place well before the FWC is embedded in the three statements below, which highlight the pressure for both the RSA and CoCT to conform to FIFA’s security requirements. The PGWC stated:

Although changes in government over the five years brought differences in policies and priorities, the international commitment made to delivering an excellent World Cup enabled the project to be ‘ring-fenced’. No one wanted fingers to be pointed at political parties or leaders, so the project was given due priority and proudly acknowledged by all as successful in the end (PGWC, 2011a, p. 193).

One of the Fan Walk organisers interviewed stated:

I think that a lot of money was spent maybe ..., they spent a little bit too much. But then again we had to prepare for the worst. You know it was our first World Cup. There was a lot of pressure on us as a country. Anything could have gone wrong (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

Similarly, it was noted that:

The FIFA World Cup must deliver at least USD 2.7 bn. It’s the cash cow for FIFA. If we fail, Africa will probably have to wait another hundred years. We aim to give FIFA comfort (Financial Times London, 2004 in Haferburg & Steinbrink, 2010, p. 17).

The national security plan was based on techniques honed during the 2002 World Earth Summit held in the RSA (GCIS, 2010a; Hein, 2009; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009a), while some aspects of the 2006 FWC security plan were used for the purposes of preparing the RSA’s integrated security strategy (Burger, 2007). FIFA invested and funded security planning initiatives, such as a meeting of police liaison officers from all participating countries. Their task was to support the SAPS and INTERPOL during the FWC. As Interpol Secretary General Noble emphasised,

It is expected that law enforcement will care about and understand the importance of security at such a global event. What is novel for this competition is that FIFA also appreciates and understands that the success of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on the field will be greatly enhanced through law enforcement ensuring a safe and secure environment off the field (INTERPOL, 2010).

Moreover, Noble praised FIFA for its close collaboration with the SAPS and INTERPOL ahead of the 2010 FWC, which he considered a ‘model and blueprint respectively of international co-operation for future FIFA and other international sport events’ (INTERPOL, 2010).
According to CoCT’s safety and security plan, an additional seven fire engines; seven law enforcement vehicles; seven traffic motorcycles; 124 fire fighters; 35 traffic officers; 21 disaster-management officers and 180 law-enforcement officers were acquired (Whiteley & Gurney, 2009). More than 440 jobs were created as part of CoCT’s safety and security plan (Pollack, 2009a). Approximately 2,500 people were trained in crowd management and the overall safety and security plan involved 3,600 existing police officers throughout the Western Cape Province. Some 1,200 new SAPS members were trained in basic policing, firearm usage and first level crowd management (PGWC, 2011b).

The NATJOC was mirrored by the creation of the 24-hour Provincial Joint Operation Centres (PROVJOC) in each province where tournament matches were played. In the Western Cape, the PROVJOC was based at what was called the Police ‘War Room’, in Harrington Street in Cape Town’s CBD. Representatives from CoCT, PGWC, SAPS, EMS, Social Services, Traffic Services, Metro Police and the SANDF were accommodated together in this one venue. The PROVJOC coordinated with the Venue Operation Centres (VOCs) and mobile command centres that were set up at the Green Point stadium, and each site along the event footprint across the province, including all PVA sites (NDMC, nd).

Moreover, the VOCs had representatives from CoCT Law Enforcement, EMS, South African Health Military Services, CoCT Traffic Services, Metro Police Services, SAPS, CoCT Fire and Rescue, CoCT Disaster and Risk Management Services, Event Management, Event Security Services and other agencies (FIFA 2010 Grand Parade Fan Park Emergency and Contingency Plan, p. 6). The VOCs fed into SAPS in the PROVJOC, which in turn fed into the NATJOC.

In Cape Town, the Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) (not onsite at the event venues) and the VOCs (onsite at each event venue), were equipped with extensive surveillance intelligence equipment and security staff representatives from all sectors. The VOCs reported to the JOCs, which commanded all of Cape Town’s security forces. According to a senior member of the SAPS National Operational Response Services, the enforcing and implementation process functioned as follows:
The moment something happened it was reported to JOC immediately, then it was looked at with surveillance and if it was a threat it was acted upon accordingly. I think we had sufficient security, SAPS, Traffic, and Metro police supported by private security. So the moment something was seen, our response rate was very fast (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 19 May).

**Surveillance in Cape Town**

Media reports indicated that new security and surveillance technologies and other innovations were acquired: state-of-the-art information and communication military technology, a fleet of 40 helicopters, crowd-control equipment, crime scene trainers, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and robotic planes, 10 water cannons, 85 Personal Vision Assistants (electronic magnification systems) with high-quality colour capabilities, 100 BMWs for highway patrol and up-to-date body armour. Moreover, 300 mobile cameras were attached to vehicles, lamp posts and clothing, from which images were to be sent to central control points, namely, four mobile command centres featuring high-tech monitoring equipment (Fisher, 2008; GCIS, 2009a; Mthethwa, 2010a; U.S. Commercial Service, 2008). According to the U.S. Commercial Service (2008), SAPS were procuring high-tech security equipment that was linked to Global Information Systems (GIS) and satellites. These included: a command vehicle; downlink equipment, mobile police station; push-to-talk radios and CCTV.

The 2010 FWC CoCT safety and security plan described expansion of the CCTV coverage with the aim of reducing crime and securing tourist ‘hot spots’, and reducing overcrowding. Traffic problems were monitored from the air, and electronic signs on major roads were continuously updated to keep the public informed (CoCT, 2008a; PGWC, 2011b, p. 75). For example, 27 additional Pan-tilt and Zoom CCTV cameras were installed in the CBD and Green Point areas at a cost of R10 million. This brought the total number of CCTV cameras installed to 280 in the CBD (where the FFF and CRZs were located), including the stadium precinct, with its far-reaching exclusion zone (EZ) (see Figure 5.6.) (CoCT, 2010a). In September 2009, there had been only 84 cameras in the CBD. In other words, the CoCT installed 196 cameras nine months prior to the FWC. The surrounding common area and the pedestrian route (Fan Walk) were monitored through 14 CCTV cameras in each space (Pollack, 2009a). This illustrates
the hierarchical order of surveillance by the organisers, with a clear prioritising of the stadium and its precinct and the FFF within the surrounding CRZ.

‘Hot spots’

Cape Town’s high rate of crime and high levels of fear of crime might have been the single biggest obstacle faced by organisers ahead of the 2010 FWC tournament. Football-related security risks, such as terrorism, hooliganism and over-crowding represented additional challenges.

The policing strategy detailed the security arrangements for particular spaces – ‘hot spots’ – such as the stadia, practice venues, FIFA headquarters, PVAs, media centres, hotels, public transport, air- and seaports, main routes, popular tourist attractions, official and public accommodation, restaurants, bars, event centres, shopping complexes, routes and red light areas (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008; GCIS, 2009a). After particular spaces were identified, high density/visibility operations were conducted in order to exclude and/or limit entrance/movement. According to a senior member of the SAPS National Operational Response Services, crime prevention operations in identified spaces began three months prior to the event (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 19 May). Notably, these spaces were mostly surrounded by CRZs and thus FIFA’s RPP was in operation.

Assistant Chief Constable Holt warned fans not to stray ‘off the beaten track’, saying that they should be safe if they stayed within the well-policed tourist areas (Gibson, 2010b). FIFA stated prior to the event that ‘as long as people attending the 2010 FWC (FIFA family and spectators) keep within certain boundaries, they should not encounter any trouble’ (FIFA, 2004b, p.70). In fact, the Secretary General of FIFA, Valcke, said that the security challenge had put FIFA under ‘so much pressure’, and that FIFA could only control security arrangements in the FWC ‘zones’ (Blitz, 2010). Then, he said, it was down to the common sense of fans to avoid dangerous areas, as people should in any no-go areas around the world’ (Blitz, 2010). Interestingly, according to Krog (2009), some key event spaces and routes had previously been regarded as no-go areas by the CoCT itself.
According to SAPS spokesman Naidoo, ‘We have managed to allocate more than the required capacity for the tournament… So there is going to be high visibility of police officers during 2010’. According to Pedrocelli (2010), the ‘visibility of police officers has proven to be the most effective strategy to combat crime’. While the high visibility of police could have given the impression of looming danger, Cartwright argued that this did not happen because there was no blatant display of weapons, the uniformed officers (of various kinds) were in small groups (not one mass), and they strolled, rather than marched or hurried, and engaged informally with passers-by (Cartwright, 2010).

Nevertheless, ‘invisible’ police forces were declared the most significant strategies in monitoring the crowds and reporting any disorderly behaviour or action (SAPS, 2010b). According to a Chairperson of the Planning Committee, the invisibility of police, such as spotters for monitoring and reporting, was considered one of the success factors for security risk management at PVAs (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 23 May). Yet ‘invisible’ policing was not the universal experience. A representative of the event company contracted to manage the FFF stated that SAPS, in collaboration with other coefficient labours, appeared ‘sometimes too present’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). He also remarked: ‘SAPS got involved too much I think. They were even taking care of toilet paper at the public toilets. So yes [sigh] definitely visible policing’.

Prior to the event, Amnesty International raised concerns about the safety and security of South Africans, particularly those living in poorer neighbourhoods where effective policing and crime prevention was already a serious challenge (Amnesty International, 2010). Since SAPS were primarily responsible for patrolling the event zones and sections, SAPS officials acknowledged that normal police operations, particularly in the host cities and their surrounding areas, might be affected during the period of the tournament (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008).

The Department of Community Safety (DCS) was given a civil oversight role in ensuring that police stations had their community safety plans in place (PGWC, 2011b). The purpose was to prevent the possibility of an outcry from the community, should anything drastic happen during the FWC, where the public could have blamed SAPS for being too focused on the host cities and the event, and not focusing enough on the
provinces on the margins of the CoCT (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008). This underscores the fragmentation of country-wide security during the FWC. While event security was maximised, this left townships and non-hosting cities with minimal security. Cape Town was therefore typical in respect of this trend.

‘Soft’ approach: Very important persons (VIPs), media and tourists
CoCT’s policing plan provided an integrated intelligence capability, information technology security, and control of particular people, such as the protection of VIPs and international tourists (Barnes, 2010a), as well as policing ‘undesirable’ persons (e.g., hooligans or ambush marketers) (Burger, 2007). A ‘soft’ approach was used to control VIPs and tourists, while a zero-tolerance approach was suggested by SAPS for persons who disturbed FIFA’s commercial interests.

At the launch of the dedicated 2010 FWC courts on 3 June 2010, Justice Minister Radebe stated: ‘Let me reassure you that all law-abiding citizens and visitors alike need not worry because of the stringent measures we will apply to ensure safety and security of both citizens and visitors coming here to watch this football spectacle’ (PGWC, 2010). With regards to the soft approach, the policing strategy’s key elements emphasised the necessity of ‘being people-friendly’ and ‘not being confrontational’ within FIFA’s event footprint (Pollack, 2009b). This was confirmed by the Director of the event company contracted to manage the Fan Walk in Cape Town, which comprised issues of safety and security as well as services and utilities:

The police were contacting people very friendly and accommodating. They were not intimidating. For example, on the day of the quarterfinal, people were walking around with beer bottles that weren’t decantered. Instead of confiscating the alcohol, they offered fans to decanter the bottles and drink it at a venue (pub). There was a sense of control when law enforcement was standing around. They didn’t have to make any impulsive decisions, nor be proactive. They only had to be present. SAPS played the largest part, but it was the VOC together who decided (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

SAPS’ National Commissioner stated that police would be told to exercise discretion around crimes such as drinking in public:

Rather than apprehend people, we might advise them where to do it. We are not going to war over things that are not a security risk or a danger to people. They would advise you that you can’t do it, but why not do it inside the bar or in a fan fest (in Gibson, 2010a).
Another policing strategy was used to enhance welcoming attitude of security personnel, and to improve their knowledge about common questions tourists might ask. The SAPS Good Ambassador Campaign was mainly aimed at instilling the spirit of good ambassadorship by ‘showing positive attitude, extending a warm and proudly South African welcome to all our visitors’ (Mthethwa, 2010b). This went hand in hand with Cape Town’s Ambassador Program and the training of Public Safety Officers (PSOs) and other security stakeholders to assist visitors. The 240 PSOs were trained in a one-day program and were provided with information to answer common questions visitors to Cape Town’s inner-city might have (CTP, 2010a).

Under the volunteer program, 15,000 people were recruited for the FWC and were present in all areas, including security and FIFA’s RPP patrol team (Ho-Kim, 2010; LOC, 2008c). In view of this, Jordaan (CEO of the LOC) wanted to enhance nation branding and building, and suggested research into ‘90 minutes patriots’ (LOC, 2008c), a classical expression of the view that sport functions as a substitute for political nationalism. Volunteers were presumed to be motivated by raising commitment both to the FWC and their country. While these were SAPS’ initiatives, Mthethwa (2010b) stated that ‘in essence they are campaigns to make all South Africans great ambassadors’. Thus, an important feature of the FWC’s security strategy was its all-inclusiveness at the community level.

In an effort to boost customer service prior to the 2010 FWC, the Federated Hospitality Association of Southern Africa (FEDHASA) employed the Disney Institute to deliver hospitality training to approximately 15,000 of the country’s front-line service workers, including SAPS and other security personnel. This training, which was delivered across nine provinces over 34 days, focused on Disney’s ‘best practices’ as they relate to quality service, leadership and people management (Disney Institute, ndb). According to Dungan, Chief Executive Officer of FEDHASA, ‘all of the training was designed to be fun in nature, to help get workers excited about representing their country to millions of visitors’ (Disney Institute, ndb).

James, Vice President of the Disney Institute, stated that ‘by sharing this concept with workers of all levels throughout South Africa, we helped give them the tools they need
to provide Disney-style service excellence to visitors for the World Cup and beyond’ (PGWC, 2011a, p. 1). He commented that the presentations focused on setting a vision, defining a common purpose and ‘getting to know the customers and their needs’, while providing a glance into the Disney organisation that is built around ‘magical moments’.

According to Cartwright at the University of Cape Town’s Centre for Criminology, the commercial and aesthetic dimensions of FIFA-ised spaces have become crucial in the securitisation process:

The visible security was unintimidating and reassuring: large numbers of police strolling about in small friendly groups, ambulances and fire-engines in the background on stand-by with their staff ready to engage in conversation with the public; also the attractive design and lay-out of the Fan Walk and the presence of identifiable City-trained volunteers and a variety of entertainers contributed to the atmosphere of relaxed safety (Cartwright, 2011, pers. comm., 21 May).

Thus, the FIFA-ised spaces in Cape Town created both the perception and the experience of a safe, secure and pleasant environment. This was achieved through visible policing, but a non-aggressive appearance by these security personnel. The picture below of the ‘friendly and confident’ looking officer was found in FIFA’s RPP brochure produced for the South African population. Tellingly, this document also explained the regulations FIFA imposes with respect to the security of FWC brands and sponsor rights. In this respect, spatial control of behaviour and commercial interests was embedded in the friendly-looking persona in SAPS uniform. As Chief of Police Pruis stated prior to the event, the ‘officers will be on duty numerous, but not too present in order to not to disturb the celebration’… ‘Even in South Africa, the party atmosphere has priority’ (Shrey, 2008). These soft policing measures are in significant contrast to the zero-tolerance approach against crime in South African generally. Moreover, as we will see, soft policing was not the experience for marginalised groups in Cape Town’s population, such as the homeless, street children and informal traders.
Zero-tolerance approach: Hooligans, homeless and informal traders

Colonel Naidoo described the policing approach towards hooligans as one of zero-tolerance: ‘We’re going to have a no-nonsense approach as far as that is concerned’ (in Cole, 2010). As SAPS reported in an article on the guardian.co.uk website, ‘fans would be welcomed to a fiesta but warned they would face a zero tolerance approach if they stepped out of line’ (Gibson, 2010a). Cele, SAPS’ National Commissioner, added that:

zero tolerance is an international phenomenon of policing. Show me any security agency that tolerates nonsense or crime. Nobody does. Anybody who gets out of the framework of law will be dealt with (Cele, quoted in Gibson, 2010a).

Further, the Home Affairs Minister announced that hooligans would not be able to come to the RSA during the tournament (The Hindu, 2009). In support of this objective, the media reported that the Department of Home Affairs had implemented a trio of measures including the Movement Control System at airports (computerised system for monitoring movements of excise goods under suspension of excise duty), in 34 air and land ports of entry, the Advance Passenger Processing (APP) system, and the
deployment of Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) at eight strategic international hubs abroad (Maseko, 2010). Moreover, INTERPOL, in conjunction with the SAPS, established a database where those involved in organised crime and hooliganism were recorded – the INTERPOL Dangerous and Disruptive Persons (DDP) database (FourFourTwo, 2010; Omar, 2007).

According to section 30(1) of the 2010 CoCT By-law on street trading, no person under the age of 16 years shall engage in the business of street trading in or near a public place. Van Blerk (2011) found in his 2010 study of Cape Town that street children reported an increase in the number of arrests, and lamented the use of the ‘morphine touch’ machine, whereby spot checks and fingerprint readings enabled police to identify young people who had committed crimes for which they had not yet been tried. This regularly resulted in street children being held in cells for several days, thereby reducing the number of homeless people on the street. With the help of increased security personnel, ‘block kids’ were increasingly moved out of Cape Town’s CBD and relocated to an area which ‘was more hidden’ from the FWC precinct (Van Blerk, 2011, p. 34), and eventually they were moved to outskirts of the city. In discussing these removal tactics with Van Blerk, one respondent said that ‘the securities come at 2 am and wake us up. They take our blankets and throw water on us so we have to move; if they find us they do the same again so we have to be hidden’ (p. 34).

Another target group identified in the 2010 CoCT By-law were the homeless. A councillor in Ellis Park in Johannesburg explained:

We need to remove these people, allocate them somewhere else…In the city we only need people who are able to pay…You can’t deal with 2010 if you still have these people in the street’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2009, p. 208).

The Station Commissioner of the Sea Point Police Station in Cape Town had raised concerns about the 2010 CoCT By-law, stating that there was no integrated strategy to deal with the homeless because ‘these people posed a grave public relations risk’ (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008, p. 7). Indeed, the UN issued a complaint on behalf of the 20,000 people removed from the Joe Slovo settlement in Cape Town, which had been called an ‘eyesore’ by FWC organisers (Zirin, 2010).
While Jordaan promised no evictions, newspaper reports and academic studies (e.g., Cronjé, Van Wyk & Botha, 2010) have suggested otherwise. In Cape Town, about 600 homeless and street children were moved to a ‘relocation’ or ‘transit camp’ in Blikkiesdorp, 30 km from the city centre (Webb, 2010). Blikkiesdorp, also known as ‘Tin Can Town’, was established in 2008, and was described by people affected as an apartheid-style camp designed as ‘temporary emergency accommodation’ for use of a period of about seven years (Webb, 2010). The homeless moved before the 2010 FWC said in a newspaper interview that ‘they were better off living under a bridge than in the temporary relocation area’ (Mama, 2012). This was because of the lack of basic services, such as health, transport and police (Mama, 2012). Since preparations for the FWC began in Cape Town, it has grown to hold more than 4,000 inhabitants in 1,500 one-roomed corrugated iron structures (IRIN, 2012). ‘Happy Valley’ is another relocation camp in the same vicinity, inhabited by 3,000 people (IRIN 2012).

Reflecting on this juxtaposition, the South African newspaper The Star stated that ‘the festivities were mostly enjoyed by the moneyed classes as the poor majority looked on’ (Delonno, 2010). Shack dweller Nbabankulu had a similar view: ‘the corporate, elite nature of the tournament had done little to change the dispossessed’s view of the world. The poor have had no access to the World Cup or to the people from other countries …’ (Tolsi, 2010a, p. 12). Mkhondo, chief spokesperson for the LOC, was very open about this inequity, stating ‘that an event is never intended to benefit people who cannot afford it’ (CBC Radio, 2010).

However, the mayoral committee member for safety and security, JP Smith, said that he had been ‘mortified’ by what he described as some of the ‘simplistic reporting’ on CoCT initiatives to re-integrate street people into communities. ‘Gossip-mongering’ would have it that there was ‘some kind of concentration-camp’ where street people were dumped, while such a place ‘simply (did) not exist’ (Smook, 2010). In fact, CoCT was the only city that had developed a plan for providing emergency housing to homeless people, he said. ‘I am more than slightly annoyed by this’ (Smook, 2010). In keeping with these sentiments, CoCT hosted the Homeless World Cup in 2007, while the Street World Cup also took place in Durban as a precursor to the 2010 FWC. So there were polarised perspectives about who the FWC was for, and the treatment of
impoveryed people who had lived in the vicinity of the event precinct (Van Blerk, 2011).

One of the strategies that was deployed to engage marginalised people in Cape Town’s inner-city during the FWC comprised the so-called ‘2010 Viewing Evenings’. This part of the CCID Social Development strategy offered ‘special viewing evenings’ that were hosted in Precinct 4 for the Central City’s homeless and destitute. It was stated in the executive summary report of CTP that:

Ensuring that these individuals, who are an integral part of the Central City, felt part of the World Cup at a place of safety (and within one block of the FIFA Fan Fest), more than 1,200 individuals gathered at the Centre to watch 22 games, enjoy a hot meal and participate in the gees (spirit) of the event (CTP, 2010a, p. 8).

By using words like ‘integral’, ‘felt part of’, ‘safety’ and ‘spirit’ a feeling of care and affiliation was transmitted.

FIFA’s RPP strategic ‘business as usual concept’ (explained in detail in Section 5.4.3) did not apply to street traders. In this regard, Valcke stated firmly: ‘You have to respect the rights of others. We can send people to jail if they try and profit from the World Cup when they have no right to do so’ (in Panja & Cohen, 2010). Officially, car guards were no longer allowed to do their job of watching cars by the side of the road, and no one was allowed to sell anything within the CRZs. Informal traders were especially vulnerable to the effects of the 2010 CoCT By-law. Advocacy organisation Streetnet International estimates that more than 100,000 traders lost their income streams during the event, as a result of being forcibly removed from these zones (Wyatt, 2010). Robinson, a former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has affirmed that the move by FIFA to set up EZs near the stadia was a profound human rights issue, and would need to be addressed at future events, such as the FWC in Brazil (in Independent Online, 2010).

Hawkers had to change their normal way of doing business and, according to IRIN (2010), in 2008, local authorities in all host cities started relocating informal traders away from traditional vending areas in close proximity to stadia and the FFF. This is confirmed by the Lawyers for Human Rights, who had been monitoring the
implementation of these By-laws nationwide. They were concerned about the potential for abuse of these By-laws by municipal officials and, in particular, by SAPS and Metro Police. From what they had observed in certain municipalities, these By-laws were being used to ‘clean the streets’ of street traders and homeless people (Du Plessis & Van Garderen, 2010). Thus, the alignment of spatial ‘cleansing’ and securitisation of sponsors’ rights coalesced through the enforcement of the By-law.

According to Venter et al.’s (2012) study on 312 informal traders from the broader Johannesburg metropolitan area, a fair degree (58%) of traders were aware of the event-driven By-law. In terms of associated issues of formalities, legitimacy and ambush marketing, traders were found by and large to infringe IP and pass off protections, their knowledge of the various legislative provisions notwithstanding.

Despite all this, FIFA stated that informal street traders would be ‘integrated around operational areas including the Fan Miles and Fan Fests and will be able to trade in these areas’ (FIFA, 2010c, p. 11). Moreover, through FIFA’s partnering company, Headline Leisure Management, approximately 3,700 community members were trained in providing catering services for fans. FIFA (2010c) claimed that the 2010 FWC offered a wide range of opportunities for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the RSA’s Government’s ‘Fly the Flag’, ‘Football Fridays’ and ‘Diski Dance’ campaigns were designed to offer any South African business the opportunity to get involved in the 2010 FWC, thereby leveraging the event for employees and suppliers, and generating revenue (Goldman, 2010).

Recent research has found significant gaps between policy and practice in terms of these promises from FIFA and the RSA Government. According to Cartwright (2010), one member of the Metro Law Enforcement interviewed was an informal trading specialist, looking out for unlicensed street traders along the Fan Walk, and fake goods. She showed Cartwright her fines book: ‘R2000 fine for either offence, administered by a FIFA Court. Unlicensed or fake goods are confiscated, but released on payment of R650 after payment of the fine’. The removal of street children, the homeless and informal traders again illustrated the connection between security and commerce and how important brand management in this context has become.
In summary, the event spaces under FIFA’s auspice were explicitly designed to conform to FIFA’s regulations and were policed and controlled by a range of security providers. Particular spaces – ‘hot spots’ – in conjunction with visible policing can be identified as the key strategy in this context. Particular people within these spaces – homeless, hawkers (potential ambush marketers) and street children, criminals and hooligans – were targeted with zero-tolerance approaches in the designated hot spots. VIPs, tourists and residents who did ‘not step out of line’ enjoyed ‘relaxed’ and ‘informative’ safety. In practical application, this saw a balancing between displaying ‘maximum security’ to the ‘disorderly’, and promoting the carnivalesque image of the tournament to middle-class residents, tourists and the international media.

The previous section has broadly investigated Cape Town’s inner-city legal and commercial dynamics in respect of the FWC. The next sections address the key event spaces under consideration in this thesis – the FFF, Fan Walk, municipal PVAs and CRZs. The findings presented examine how the security and control policies of urban spaces were applied. Particular attention is placed on regulations and operations pertaining to control and surveillance for public order and commercial purposes.

5.4.2 FIFA Fan Fest (FFF)

At the 2010 FWC, the phenomenon of FFFs was not exclusive to the host nation: beyond that, official FFFs were staged in seven international cities: Berlin, London, Mexico City, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, and Sydney. The main criteria to be a ‘chosen city’, which automatically translated into a ‘world-class’ status, were the passion and popularity of football in the country and the demographic characteristics of the population, both of which were expected to underpin the local assembly of big crowds (FIFA, 2010b). However, in spite of the FFF concept expanding internationally, the FFF attendance more than halved in 2010, compared to Germany 2006. During June/July 2006, more than 18 million fans gathered at the 12 FFFs in Germany alone (FIFA, 2009c) compared with only five million fans at FFFs world-wide in 2010 (GCIS, 2010b; Naidu & Philp, 2010). This seems surprising, given the considerable increase in public viewing at the FWCs and UEFA Championship, compared with previous years (Geese, Zeughardt & Gerhard, 2006). Germany may have been an exception, though, as
it had perfect weather, a successful performance by the German team, an affluent catchment population, and easy access to the PVAs.

**Objectives**

At the 2010 FWC, local organisers argued that the biggest success stories came from the PVAs. For example, President Zuma said ‘our fan parks were so huge that they resembled mini-stadiums, which had not happened in other host countries’ (The Presidency, 2010). FIFA President, Blatter, stated:

> The public viewing events became a symbol of the power and charisma of football, the picture of the millions of fans from all over the world celebrating at public places across the entire country (RSA) was the image that went around the globe (2010 FWC Organising Committee South Africa, 2008, p. 65).

In the RSA, there was one official FFF in each host city, other than Johannesburg, which had two (CoCT, 2006a). However, unlike in Germany, the attendance at FFFs generally suffered from cold weather, and the games were televised on Nat TV (National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC), nd). Still, FIFA claimed it was very satisfied with the overall number of visitors per day across all 10 FFF venues (PGWC, 2011a). According to Namibia Sport (2010), the best attended FFFs were the three mostly sunny coastal sites of Durban, Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay/Port Elizabeth, which saw 741,533, 557,483 and 276,742 visitors respectively over 25 operational days. Fan numbers were measured and calculated based on helicopters taking video-footage (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

At the outset, CoCT stated that ‘the official Fan Parks shall be the primary official public viewing event in relation to the 2010 FIFA World Cup’ (CoCT, 2008f, slide 9). The CoCT business plan stated that the FFF was intended ‘to ensure that non-ticket holding international visitors have access’ to the 2010 FWC (CoCT, 2006b, p. 47). Haber, Director of Media and Marketing for World Sport, and a member of the consortium that ran the FFF, commented:

> The Cape Town FIFA Fan Fest would, without doubt, be the ‘iconic Fan Fest’ of the entire 2010 FIFA World Cup, situated as it was on the Grand Parade, with the historic images of City Hall and Table Mountain in its picture-perfect backdrop (CTP, 2010c).
The main aim of the FFF was to provide a ‘safe and secure football event for international visitors’ (De Reuck, 2008a, slide 6). An official project update on the organisation of the event stated that the target audiences for the FFF were the soccer fans, families, supporter clubs, local foreign communities, company staff members, and corporate VIPs (Haber, 2010). However, in FIFA’s media FAQ guide also stated:

We believe that all South Africans of all backgrounds will be caught up in the event and attend the FIFA Fan Fest in large numbers, similarly, they provide a safe, recognised and exciting environment for visitors who have limited comparable alternatives. We therefore believe that the FIFA Fan Fest will be a cultural melting pot (FIFA, 2010b, p. 2).

However, rather than a melting pot, the FFF in Cape Town was dominated by middle-class patrons, most of whom were locals. In a case study on the female experience in PVAs by Bob and Swart (2010), it was found that the majority of FFF attendees were host city locals (close to 80%). This was confirmed by a FFF event organiser interviewed for this thesis, who reported that not many international fans attended the FFF on the Grand Parade in Cape Town ‘except when the Netherlands played and the Dutch fans were present. We had many people from suburbs and townships’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). Steinberg (Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2010) observed that, in Cape Town, ‘the middle class had, through the World Cup, rediscovered their city bowl’ (p. 2) and did so ‘by moving from bubbles of guarded security to other bubbles of security’ (p. 3). He added that these people had entered public spaces where they would normally feel unsafe. Similar accounts were provided by Haferburg (2011), who claimed that intra-urban fragmentation was not overcome by the event crowds, as the PVAs ‘reflected the differentiation of various zones of prosperity as well as the historical allocation of population groups across the urban landscape’ (p. 341).

The researcher’s personal observation at the FFF in Cape Town confirms Steinberg’s and Haferburg’s claims. Not only was the FFF visibly policed, but there was little evidence of working-class citizens, and noticeably poor patrons. Compared to the municipal PVAs on the fringes of the city, the FFF featured Cape Town’s (mainly white) middle-class, as well as football supporters from abroad. Thus, the FFF embraced the tenets of inclusiveness in its urban design, but there was minimal uptake up by Cape Town’s less affluent citizens.
Design and technological features

The official Cape Town FFF was situated on the Grand Parade in front of the City Hall, and the Castle, close to the main railway station with a view of the Table Mountain. The Grand Parade is Cape Town’s oldest public space and one of its most well-known heritage sites - Nelson Mandela made his famous first public address there following his release from prison in February 1990. The fenced FFF was surrounded by these historic sites, while an enormous 74 sqm screen, one of the biggest structures ever to be erected in the RSA (CTP, 2010g), provided a football-specific viewing space. These structural elements veiled views of the gritty neighbourhood and any third party advertisements surrounding the event precinct.

Moreover, the Grand Parade was newly upgraded by CoCT at a cost of some R22 million (CoCT, 2009b) (see Table 5.3 for a summary of costs). The entire area was resurfaced with paving stones that matched the colour of City Hall, while a double row of trees (stone pines) was planted around the perimeter, with lighting masts installed (CTP, 2009a).

Table 5.3: CoCT’s summary of costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stadium (all inclusive)</td>
<td>R 3,327,965,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>R 273,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Practice Venues: Athlone Stadium, Bellville Stadium, Swartklip Sport Complex and Blue Down Stadium</td>
<td>R 356,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Viewing (30%)</td>
<td>R 113,175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Communication Technology included: Floodlighting, CCTV System, MATV Systems, sound reinforcement, VA Systems, access control systems, ticketing systems and video screens and camera’s</td>
<td>Tbc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CoCT (2006, slide 34)

FFFs were themed with the FIFA brand and sponsors’ commercial messages. The logos of FIFA’s corporate partners adorned the advertising boards surrounding the FFF, which consisted of two main areas: reserved area and general area. The reserved area was exclusively for sponsor advertising and sales of FIFA merchandise, including the
Official FWC shop. It was the prime area around, in front, and behind any giant screen
and main stage of the FFF, in particular the main screen, and within line of sight of the
screens and stages as determined by FIFA. The general area was defined as the
remaining area of the FFF. In this space, it was possible for other CoCT entities (third
party exhibitors) to establish a modest on-site presence, so long as their products and
services did not compromise those of FWC sponsors (FIFA, 2009d). Cape Town also
had the opportunity to develop additional on-site branding (i.e. promoting tourism),
albeit under FIFA’s supervision (FIFA, 2009d).

The FFF could safely host up to 25,000 people (CoCT, 2009b; Keepile, 2010; PGWC,
2011b). The goal was to enhance fans’ experience through the consumption of
entertainment, food, beverages, and merchandise. This was pursued by offering a range
of hybrid consumption activities: watching live match broadcasts, laser light displays,
an interactive activity zone, popular local bands, entertainers and DJs, food and
refreshment stalls, art and crafts, and branded merchandise at the official FIFA Fan
Store (News24, 2010).

Official reports claimed that the FFF would provide an opportunity for small businesses
and for promoting local artisans (Cape Town Business News, 2009). Ho-Kim, the co-
ordinator of the FFF and municipal PVA, reported that the FFF ‘would definitely have a
Cape Town flavour’ (Barnes, 2009). Despite FIFA’s RPP, the host cities, such as Cape
Town, were able to include areas within these spaces for vendors offering traditional
African handicrafts, food and beverages, and local (non-competitive) companies were
able to promote themselves within the FFF (FIFA, 2010b). However, in practice, only a
handful of traders and artists were observed (see Figure 5.3).
Cape Town Tourism (CTT) provided gratis advertising for one of FIFA’s sponsors on its website:

Lager, fruit ale and Coca-Cola will be on sale. Visitors will not receive disposable cups at the Fan Fest but will have to buy an official commemorative 500ml cup that they will keep. The initial cost, including 500ml of beer is R27. Thereafter, every 500ml refill will cost R18. Coca-Cola is sold in 500ml plastic bottles (CTT, nd).

The FFF Information Guide stated under ‘Dos’: to ‘come early to ensure you enjoy the entertainment and sponsor activities available onsite prior to games’, and to ‘bring cash to take advantage of the food, beverage and merchandise available’. Under ‘Important Things to Know’, it was stated that the FFFs were safe and secure (FIFA, 2010a), demonstrating the interplay between consumption and security.

Within the FFF fenced-off area, other sections were demarcated as being ‘special’, such as a dedicated meet and greet area, dedicated drop-off and pick up areas, private and group hospitality areas, a catering service area and beer area (Haber, 2010). Further, the FFF organisers planned to provide different levels of hospitality, such as ‘private’ (exclusive pre-event cocktail reception), ‘tribune club’ (reserved match viewing seat
and food/drink voucher on the FFF main area covered grandstand – see figure above), ‘super fan club’ (reserved match viewing seat on a big screen and food and drink voucher in the City Concert Hall) and ‘castle’ (private lounges and function facilities with private parking) (Haber, 2010). In practice, few businesses signed up for this opportunity. According to the Operations Director of the event company contracted to organise the FFF, ‘We tried to target businesses to whom cooperative functions at the stadium was too expensive. Hence, we wanted to offer them something. However, it wasn’t demanded much’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May).

**Organisational structure**

Safety and security in and around the FFF was controlled by the following key stakeholders:

- CP Event Security, a private security company, which was contracted to supply a total of 210 security officers experienced in special events. Their roles included helping with access control and searches, exits, and walking about the FFF (Cartwright, 2010).

- World Sport, a Capetonian event organiser, which managed the logistics, including security around the FFF (Barnes, 2009).

- SAPS, which were responsible for minimising crime and gang activity and enforced visible policing in and around the event area (FIFA 2010 Grand Parade Fan Park Emergency and Contingency Plan, 2010). SAPS officers were trained to identify perceived attempts at ambush marketing alongside other crowd control measures (CTP, 2009b).

- The CoCT Traffic Services, which was responsible for controlling traffic flow in and around the FFF space and ‘manning road closures for the duration of the Grand Parade Fan Park’ (FIFA 2010 Grand Parade Fan Park Emergency and Contingency Plan, 2010, p. 6).

- Metro Police Services was to ‘deploy police vehicles and mounted police to assist with traffic services’ and to help with ‘ordinary’ law enforcement in the area (FIFA 2010 Grand Parade Fan Park Emergency and Contingency Plan, 2010, p. 6). They were empowered to enforce the RPP, including provisions relating to the 2010 event-driven By-law (Du Plessis & Van Garderen, 2010).
• The FFF Contingency Plan, which required CCID-supplied officers on the route to assist whenever they were needed.

• CoCT Disaster Management unit, which deployed its officers and volunteers to give support to the medical team and communications, monitored crowd behaviour, and assisted with evacuation procedures.

• Other private security companies:
  • Bolt Security, which carried out most of the entry searches;
  • DC Security, which involved one man observing the entry and searches (from the inside); and
  • Usania Security, which consisted of three men near the exit between the toilets (Cartwright, 2010).

Policies
An event manual compiled and distributed by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2009b) outlined how to run a FFF. For simple crowd management, the location of the FFF had to be ‘sufficiently far from the Match Venue’ (FIFA, 2009d). This was to ensure that the spectators going to the match venue and the Fan Park did not merge, thus minimising ‘traffic congestion on match days’ (FIFA, 2009d). FIFA also prepared a document entitled General Public Viewing Guidelines, which were underscored by FIFA’s RPP. Special advertising guidelines also applied to a 100m radius around the FFF (see FIFA, 2009d). Table 5.4 shows a summary of the 2010 FWC PVAs’ terms of cooperation in relation to television and marketing rights for the three PVAs under investigation. It demonstrates the exclusiveness of competitor branding at the highly mediated FFF.
Table 5.4: 2010 PVAs’ terms of cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Municipal PVAs and Fan Walk</th>
<th>FFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV rights</td>
<td>Yes, free SABC feed</td>
<td>Yes, free SABC feed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big screen advertising</td>
<td>Yes, but not during match feed and build-up</td>
<td>Yes, but not during match feed and build-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA affiliates</td>
<td>Yes, can participate</td>
<td>Only FIFA affiliates to participate as sponsors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic package for FIFA affiliates</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes, but basic recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, non-competitor suppliers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, first and last rights to FIFA partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local competitor suppliers</td>
<td>Yes – no branding</td>
<td>No sponsor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-competitor sponsor</td>
<td>Yes – with branding</td>
<td>Yes, first and last rights to FIFA partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party exhibitors</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from the CoCT (2009d, slides 7 and 9)

The partnership of FFF security and commercialisation was apparent in the Prohibited and Restricted lists which have been listed in the official 2010 FWC Fan Guide. Intriguingly, weapons were listed in the same category as sponsors’ illegal beverages. Not only was there a zero-tolerance approach to any non-sponsoring brands, but also to people who carried the brands. Private security checked bags for the following items that were not allowed to be taken into any of the fan venues:

- aerosol cans, bottles, cans, cups, vacuum flasks, or any beverage containers other than official FIFA containers or sponsors’ products,
- glass, weapons, flagpoles, banner poles, laser pointing devices, pyrotechnics, sticks, poles, or umbrellas longer than 40 cm,
- food and beverages (CTT, 2010; FIFA, 2010a).

Despite private security exercising this task, the roles of the public police as the primary ‘enforcement’ agent with ‘formal’ authority to charge people for breaches of the various criminal laws, By-laws and instigate proceedings for ambush marketing violations need to be remembered.
There was some contention in respect of the policy governing liquor policing in PVAs, with event organisers and executive officers expressing divergent views. The Operational Commander for the Safety and Security Directorate of the OC, Rhode, said that ‘as it stands, people in fan parks will not be able to drink because of legislation governing public drinking’ (Benjamin, 2008). However, at the same time, a police spokesman said his force was determined to be flexible in its policing, and thus had decided to turn a blind eye to fans who were drinking alcohol outdoors, even though that was against the law (Thaindian News, 2009). In the end, liquor consumption was allowed within temporarily privatised demarcated event spaces only, such as PVAs, but not in other non-fenced public spaces.

South African Brewery (SAB), a sponsor of the RSA national team Bafana Bafana, was given a contract to serve beer at official fan parks after the FIFA sponsor Budweiser declined to exercise its pouring rights because it wanted to concentrate on its beer presence inside stadia (Bleby, 2010; Sport Industry Awards South Africa, 2010). However, FIFA’s exclusive contract with Budweiser meant that SAB could not overtly brand the beer it served in FIFA’s space (Bowers, 2010; FIFA, 2009d). Accordingly, SAB provided the beverage, but it was unbranded when provided to customers.

Another spatial control mechanism was introduced in early 2010 for all PVAs. The Public Viewing Areas Liquor Control Policy was drafted by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), setting the framework in which the trading of liquor was controlled during the event. This policy was greeted by a public outcry, especially from the hospitality industry. They were critical of a requirement for existing liquor licence holders to obtain a costly special licence during the event; the draft policy’s wording required venues hosting ‘any public viewing event’ where matches are broadcast ‘to the general public or otherwise’ to obtain a special licence. According to Goldman (2012, pers. comm., 4 September), ‘widespread confusion and fear may have reduced the number of pubs and schools and other non-commercial public viewing areas from really getting involved’. Ntuli, the Deputy Director-General of the Consumer and Corporate Regulation Division (CCRD) at the DTI, said that ‘the policy was not intended to stifle business but was intended to maintain security and control the trading of liquor during the World Cup’ (DTI, 2010b). The DTI then explained that this policy would only
require a special licence in respect of commercial public viewing events (i.e., those that charged an admission fee or similar surcharge) (Louw, 2012). At the FFFs, the municipalities and host cities were told to apply FIFA’s endorsed liquor policy as well as pay a fee for the special liquor licence, plus a levy of 2% of turnover (Goldman, 2010). In the end, though, bars and restaurants did not need to obtain a special licence, and the policy did not become part of the Host City agreement. In other words, no liquor control policy was implemented in Cape Town, and no PVA organiser, including FFF, Fan Walk and municipal PVAs, had to ‘pay any percentage of alcohol sales to FIFA’ (De Reuck, 2012, pers. comm., 11 September). Nevertheless, PVAs examined in this study (Fan Walk, FFF and municipal PVAs), the sale and consumption of liquor, as well as the opening and closing of the liquor premises, were monitored by security forces and a ‘zero-tolerance policy for intoxicated spectators’ was to be applied (DTI, 2010a, p. 12).

**Security operations – Cape Town FFF**

Groenewald (2010), Chairperson of the Inter Departmental Planning Committee within the Government Security Structure whose role was to coordinate safety and security for the 2010 FWC, highlighted in his post-FWC presentation on event security that the FFFs had ‘the same standard of security as FWC stadia’ (p. 34). To enter the FFF, visitors needed to pass through security check points (as depicted above) positioned in Darling Street and at the corner of Buitenkant and Longmarket Streets. The Chairperson of the Planning Committee stated that at the security check points, standardised access control was administered, including checking bags for items that were included in the *Prohibited and Restricted* lists (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 23 June).
At the FFF in Cape Town, where entrance was limited to 25,000 fans, Bob and Swart (2010) observed spectator frustration outside the perimeter when the FFF was closed due to this limited capacity. However, the Operations Director of the event company contracted to organise the FFF described the process as follows:

Every time we were full to capacity we communicated on radio to trains, and to buses that people should look for alternatives to watch the games at, for example, municipal PVAs. These structures were used on a daily basis and it was very successful (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May).

Children under the age of 14 had to be accompanied by an adult, and during the event social workers assisted with tagging children with a plastic/temporary tag in the FFF and municipal PVAs, for ‘easy identification purposes’ (PGWC, 2011ab; see Figure 5.5) and to ‘safeguard children’ (Department of Social Development, nd). Altogether, 6,249 children were tagged in PVAs in the Western Cape Province (PGWC, 2011b). During the FWC in Cape Town, 21 children were deemed to be neglected (street children: 13; begging: 2; neglected children: 2; abused children: 2; assaulted children: 1; substance abuse: 1). Tagging kids under the age of 14 will remain a legacy project at forthcoming major events in Cape Town (Department of Social Development, nd, p. 4).
Within FIFA event spaces, there was enforcement of the requirement that: ‘no person shall use abusive or otherwise objectionable language or behave in an abusive, objectionable or disorderly manner’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 20-21). According to Bond (2010), a Durban police superintendent responded to the question: ‘What if I say ‘Viva Argentina!’ in the fan park?’ ‘No problem’, the police officer answered. Bond then asked: ‘What if I say ‘Phansi FIFA phansi! [Down with FIFA!]’? ‘Then you’re wrong. You can’t say Phansi FIFA phansi’, the SAPS officer replied. These comments indicate that policing public behaviour was not simply about social norms; instead, it reflected FIFA’s brand protection strategy and the deployment of police in this commercial space. The fact that people were unable to openly criticise FIFA indicates just how far organisers and police were prepared to pander to the sensitivities of the event owners.

While in Cape Town, the researcher observed that the FFFs and municipal PVAs were intensively policed, with large numbers of officers visible on duty. However, according to one of the FFF organisers, the officers did not have a great deal of crime to deal with: ‘The only challenge I think we really had was people illegally handing out flyers or other marketing material’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). ‘A handful of lost children (all reunited with their families); a few minor injuries when people tripped and fell, and one pedestrian knocked over by a scooter driver after jaywalking when she should not have’ (CTP, 2010b).
Indeed, despite the large crowds, there were only a small number of incidents reported in Cape Town’s CBD and surrounding areas. According to the Department of Health (2011), a total of 779 patients were treated at the FFF, of whom 40 had to be transferred to hospital. According to Straus, Head of FIFA Business Development and New Media, no incidents of violence had previously been reported in any of the FFFs world-wide (Sport 24, 2010). In the RSA, in the 1.5 km radius around the FFFs, 1,712 incidents were reported to the police. Inside the various FFFs, 76 incidents were reported to police, representing 0.005% of those in attendance (The Brunei Times, 2010). However, this level of crime reported in the official statistics was contested in the media and on Internet sites. As one blogger wrote in response to a community newspaper article in the Tygerburger:

“I find your statistic very interesting, stating that there has been no violence whatsoever in fan parks in South Africa. I work as a doctor in an emergency unit in Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa and have worked on many nights during matches. I have treated one man who was stabbed in the heart during one of the Bafana Bafana matches and many others who attended fan parks during that time. Possibly your reporting only covered fan parks in heavily touristy areas, as I assure you that the reality in the majority of South Africa has been far from violence free during this period. I would be very interested to find out where you acquired your statistics from (Hunter, 2010).

It is therefore very difficult to ascertain the extent of injuries and incidents in the various PVAs from this combination of official and unofficial information.

In summary, brand and rights protection security patrols in all three PVA types and CRZs included: the Metro Police and SAPS, sponsor protection guards, tracing teams, environmental control officers, private security, Commercial Activation Personnel, volunteers, the RPP venue teams and possibly others too. This public-private network of security personnel meant that security aimed at public order and commercial policing were used in combination, even though they were answerable to different employers. Perhaps most importantly, the FFF had the same standard of security as FWC stadia. To enter the FFF, visitors needed to pass through security check points where standardised access control was administered, including checking bags for items that were included in the Prohibited and Restricted lists. Children had to be accompanied by an adult and, during the event, social workers assisted with tagging children.
5.4.3 Host City Cape Town Fan Walk

Objectives

The main aim of the Host City Cape Town Fan Walk (hereafter called the Fan Walk) was ‘to provide a safe and secure walking passageway’ from the major transportation hub at the Cape Town Station, through Riebeek Street and Somerset Road and under the newly raised Green Point traffic circle, all the way to the new Green Point Stadium (CTP, 2010a, p. 9). Initially, the Fan Walk was conceptualised as a back-up to the shuttle service. However, after two matches it ‘became a destination in its own right’ (CTP, 2010b, p. 3). It was funded entirely by the CoCT (CTP, 2010a). Therefore, it was regarded as the strategy that ensured that Cape Town’s Central City hosted a truly ‘urban’ FWC, and indeed the only one of its kind in the RSA (CTP, 2010b).

In the Fan Walk information brochure for CBD stakeholders, the CoCT stated that ‘it will not be possible for ticket holders to drive to the stadium’ on match days (CTP, 2010d). However, ‘approximately 8,000 members of the FIFA family will be transported directly to the Stadium. No one else will be allowed to take their vehicles into the Stadium surrounds’ (Green Point & De Waterkant, 2010). Fans were meant to reach the stadium either by using the shuttle service from the main transport hub in Hertzog Boulevard outside the Civic Centre, or walk from the CBD via the Fan Walk.

CTP was contracted by CoCT to animate and activate the CBD outside of the official FIFA zones (CTP, 2010b). In the executive summary of the report to the CTP (2010a, p. 2), five key objectives were set to be achieved with the Fan Walk concept:

1. Enhance citizen and business participation;
2. Contribute towards a unique and authentic Cape Town experience for visitors;
3. Contribute to a well-organised, efficient, safe and successful event;
4. Enhance business branding and marketing of Cape Town on a global level; and
5. Leave a lasting economic, social and cultural legacy (emphases added/in original).

According to its promoters, the Fan Walk had the potential to re-connect and re-engage CoCT’s citizens and visitors by turning a previously divided area into a new contact zone, and to achieve ‘citizen activation in the CBD’ (CTP, 2010a, p. 2). CTP’s strategy
towards citizen activation was modified in early 2010, and included goal-oriented projects such as formal meetings with and presentations for various stakeholders, such as property managers and business owners; events to promote soccer; and educating the public through information brochures such as *The Cape Town Central City during the 2010 FIFA World Cup* (CTP, 2010a; Koblitz, 2010). This brochure was ‘FIFA-approved’ (the first-ever of its kind approved for distribution outside a FIFA agency), and CTP was complimented by FIFA’s RPP department on its ‘initiative to keep businesses informed’ (CTP, 2010b, p. 6).

Approximately 30,000 to 35,000 people were expected to walk the route on match days in Cape Town (Green Point & De Waterkant, 2010). The City’s Transport Team was tasked to ensure that at least one-fifth to one-quarter of all stadium-goers reached their destination on foot (PGWC, 2011a). On the slowest day of the 2010 FWC – a rainy Italy vs. Paraguay match on 14 June – 38,220 pedestrians used the Fan Walk – more than 50% of the capacity of the Stadium. On its fullest day (July 3: quarter final match between Germany and Argentina), it was estimated that approximately 153,000 fans used this space and most of the match ticket holders made their way on foot to the stadium (PGWC, 2011a). An estimated total of 580,000 people availed themselves of the Fan Walk on the eight match days (PGWC, 2011b).

The second objective of the Fan Walk organisers was to create an opportunity for Capetonians ‘to come together in a central area and mix with international visitors and fans’ (CoCT, 2006b, p. 47), while creating a ‘unique and authentic Cape Town experience’ (CTP, 2010a, p. 8). The intention of the organisers was to encourage people to walk, by providing entertainment along a decorative route, as well as a number of vendor kiosks to complement existing retail outlets and restaurants along the way.

Official organisers reported that thousands without match tickets walked with ticket-holding fans, ‘just to be part of the fun – a true experience of social cohesion’ (CTP, 2010a, p. 9). However, in addition to tourists, local patrons at the Fan Walk were mainly white middle-class Capetonians. These people had rarely come to this region of the City in the past: ‘many travelled here for the first time in years, if not decades. In some instances they were using public transport for the first time in their lives’ (PGWC,
There seem to have been few ‘undesirables’. Cartwright (2010) observed two men, with tiny Vetus Schola (private security company) notices on their GP uniforms, removing two poorly dressed – possibly homeless – men from the Fan Walk, but, beyond that, noticed nothing.

The third goal referred to a well-organised, efficient, safe and successful event. In light of this, the initial plan was to provide easily accessible information to visitors by establishing 17 information kiosks throughout the CBD (CTP, 2010b). However, this number was eventually reduced to six kiosks, due to budget constraints. Consequently, information to visitors could not be provided comprehensively. Moreover, the CTP advertised the Fan Walk as a way of participating at the FWC ‘without necessarily having to spend a cent’ (CTP, 2010b, p. 5). Hence, in many other local government information brochures, the space was depicted as a hybrid consumption experience – part of Cape Town’s entrepreneurial strategy.

The fourth objective related to the enhancement of business branding and the marketing of Cape Town on a global level in order to attract international investment. The former mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, who advised Johannesburg about crime prevention in the lead up to the 2010 FWC, stated this: ‘Run SA’s cities “like a business” and investors will flood in’ (My Pressportal, 2010). The Fan Walk provided ‘an opportunity to brand and market Cape Town as a city of heritage and culture’ (CoCT, 2006b, p. 46). Initially, CTP wanted to create a ‘Big Apple’ type of identity for the area. However, time constraints did not allow the project ‘Brand Central City’ to progress. Consequently, it was agreed instead to support CoCT’s Ready to welcome the world campaign, as well as Cape Town Tourism’s Live it! Love it! Louder campaign, and the CTRU’s Beyond the 90 minutes campaign.

The Fan Walk was not a one-time World Cup affair: ‘It’s a route that is here to stay and is now an integral part of the Cape Town experience’ (CTP, 2010b, p. 5). Between July and September 2010, the ‘Fan Walk’ route had re-occurred twice. ‘But above all else, the Fan Walk has created an important venue for social cohesion’ (CTP, 2010b, p. 5).
**Design and technological features**

Initially, the Fan Walk was named ‘Fan Mile’, but CoCT had to change names before the event, as the term ‘Fan Mile’ in the context of the FWC is a trade mark that belongs to FIFA (CTP, 2010b).

Under the slogans *Walk this way to the time of your life* and *No ticket? No problem!*, the 2.5 km Fan Walk not only connected different fan sites, fan attractions, and sponsors’ installations, but also provided four entertainment areas with four stages, while mobile carnival characters and street performers entertained the crowds in between. The emphasis was on happy, moving people. According to the Director of the event company that coordinated and managed the Fan Walk, LED screens were not installed due to safety reasons (stagnation of moving crowds) (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

CoCT’s Heritage Department put heritage information boards in place along the Fan Walk (Boraine, 2010). They claimed that ‘very little FIFA branding’ meant that the Cape Town character of the walk remained evident. With this in mind, along the stretch, ‘FIFA-approved’ (FIFA’s logo) drinking water stand pipes were installed (PGWC, 2011a) which served a functional as much as commercial purpose.

CoCT originally planned to develop specific events during the FWC, to be held along the Fan Walk and other ‘common purpose’ areas, such as malls or squares shared by retailers and the leisure industry. However, due to a lack of co-operation between various stakeholders, the usage of various public spaces was unclear even a week before the event (CTP, 2010a). As Koblitz (2010), explained:

> really right up until the week of the World Cup, there was no clarity on how a number of public spaces in the Central City would be used during the World Cup, so it was extremely difficult to plan activities on those spaces.

**Organisational structure**

After studying the Berlin Fan Mile and the inner-city fan experience in Cologne, the idea of a Fan Walk was incorporated into CoCT’s 2010 planning process (CTP, 2010b). At the same time, CTP and the Executive Directorate for Service Integration at CoCT
formed a management team for the Fan Walk. Security stakeholders in the Fan Walk Work Stream included:

- The CIDS that worked together with CoCT’s Transport Team, and brought ‘experience in dealing with communications to stakeholders along the route’ (CTP, 2010b, p. 4);
- The sculpting committee, responsible for the planning: CoCT and CTP had formed this committee 18 months before the event (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May);
- The event organiser, Celebrity Services Africa Events (CSAE), whose responsibilities were ‘to create the entertainment for the crowd and to create areas so that there was no movement of people’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May);

Other security personnel included SAPS, Metro Police Metro Traffic, Metro Law Enforcement, private security (Pro-events, Vetus Schola contracted by Green Point CID, GP security), and Metro Ambulance (Cartwright, 2010).

**Policies**

Since the Fan Walk was located in a CRZ, the 2010 *CoCT By-law*, as well as FIFA’s RPP, were in operation. There was no list of any forbidden items within this space, as it was not fenced and no PVA manual was followed.

Both an event consultant (Maxpro) and a Geographic Information System (GIS) specialist were hired to assist with the commercial planning of the Fan Walk. This project management team was in charge of drafting a ‘business as usual’ audit in terms of the RPP, to be conducted six months prior to the commencement of the tournament, and to ensure that no ambush marketing took place along the event footprint in the six months leading up to the event. This document also protected the rights of businesses en route, insofar as their usual sponsors and advertisers were concerned (CTP, 2010c).

According to the CoCT (2010b), existing businesses in the CRZs were allowed to continue with normal commercial activities, but had to apply for a licence. However, they were not allowed to display the branding of any competing non-sponsors in and outside their establishments. In addition, if an area-based application was not accepted by the municipality, there was no financial compensation available (ABN digital, 2010).
The concept meant that business owners or traders in the CRZs were not allowed to ‘extend’ their branding – pre-, during and post-event – if this was in competition with a FIFA sponsor; other than that, a ‘business as usual principle’ (i.e. normal business/commercial activities) would be allowed (unless otherwise stated by the LOC’s Safety and Security Department). This raised issues of how business owners determined what ‘extend’ might imply. The answer to this question was rather complicated. CoCT announced that businesses situated in CRZs did not need to spend money and time altering existing signage. However, no additional branded elements from non-sponsors were to be put in place (Van Dyk, 2010). Moreover, businesses were forbidden from ‘renting out their properties or structures to companies which engage in ambush marketing activities by using building wraps, banners and billboards’ (CTP, 2009b).

Not only were the ‘business as usual’ rules in CRZs rather confusing in their application, but they also were implemented with little notice. A week before the final draw for the 2010 FWC, a number of businesses along Somerset Road in Green Point complained they were ‘still in the dark’ about how the FWC would affect their businesses (Booysen, 2009). The People’s Post reported that some business owners were confused about the CRZs, and wondered why neither FIFA nor the CoCT had adequately informed and/or consulted with them (Booysen, 2009).

One of the consistent findings in Doherty et al.’s (2010) study with formal, kiosk and street retailers was the lack of any coordinated marketing strategy or outside assistance from Cape Town public officials or other key stakeholders. For instance, CoCT provided no marketing, financial, or logistical assistance to any formal retailer along St. George’s Mall in the city centre. The only recorded support was window and register signage provided by VISA, a major sponsor of the tournament (Doherty et al., 2010). In addition, Doherty et al. found that street hawkers were not well informed about where they could trade, the type and amount of penalty that could be imposed for trading in restricted areas, and how to appeal any fine they received. A number of street hawkers noted they were ticketed for hawking, resulting in what they perceived to be exorbitant fines (R2000 compared to the typical R250). Also, their good were confiscated, which they did not know how to challenge in court (Doherty et al., 2010).
Du Plessis and Van Garderen (2010) have argued that in all the RSA host cities there was a distinct lack of information from municipalities on how the By-laws around the CRZs were to be interpreted and enforced. From this point of view, it can be inferred that the short-term CRZ concept appeared rather confusing to many local residents and business stakeholders.

On the other hand, the CTP stated that ‘the fear of FIFA insofar as what business owners perceived they could, or could not do, was overcome by citizen information before citizen activation’ (CTP, 2010a, p. 3). Information relating to businesses and residents in the CBD was planned to be distributed ‘on a regular basis by hand, via email and by fax, and all updates were available on the 2010 FWC webpage’ (CTP, 2010d). From November 2008, the CTP hosted quarterly information meetings – the 2010 Central City Partners Forum – for all CBD stakeholders (CTP, 2010d). FIFA also claimed on its website that:

The steps taken to prevent rights infringements begin years before a tournament and one of the most important measures is the education of the security and customs authorities in the host nation. FIFA also organises regular information seminars for local companies which discuss issues such as commercial restriction zones and opportunities for informal traders (FIFA, ndc).

In fact, FIFA wanted to leave a legacy for the RSA’s brand and rights protection initiatives and security measures respectively. As a FIFA lawyer reported:

For South Africa, we did lots of training and education because it’s a young country without a lot of IP legislation or experience for an event like this within the authorities or in the business community. So we took it upon ourselves to actually invest in that area and leave a legacy behind. We have organized lots of seminars, workshops, meetings with local businesses, local arts and crafts people, the businesses around the stadiums that will be affected, and we tried to help them learn as much as they could about our specific rules and put out this idea of brand and rights protection. The best strategy to avoid infringement is preventive work, which we never have enough time to do, but especially here in South Africa, we invested a lot early ... And it was actually the first time we did this (Portela, 2010).

CoCT announced that it placed great emphasis on a large and transparent licensing regime. This was meant to open the doors for everyone to be aware of the scope of the licences granted and for traders to become legitimate business partners with the 2010 FWC, rather than feeling locked out of the process. According to the Fan Walk
organiser, the kiosk vendors had to sign contracts that stipulated what they had to conform to and what they could and could not sell (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May). Altogether, 51 new vending opportunities were created in the planning of the Fan Walk route, and these were allowed to trade in the EZ where such trade is usually prohibited (CTP, 2010c). The selection of the 51 new vendors was handled as part of the city’s overall vendor search for the event period, with final product selection being done hand-in-hand with Van Dyk of the RPP and the event organiser’s vendor supervisor (CTP, 2010c).

While the Executive Summary Report compiled by the CTP emphasised the event organiser’s ability to use imaginative and innovative signage to enable local traders to operate, this statement was subsequently contradicted:

Basically we didn’t, we use clever signage. We only used FIFA’s official branding and merchandise. All these vendors were from previously disadvantaged backgrounds. It wasn’t a commercial option, the kiosks. It was really just for social adjustments. So what we did was we offered 51 stores with food and snacks, merchandise, and arts and craft. Once we had established that composition we wanted to break even basically (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

Initially, FIFA wanted to declare the whole route as an EZ, meaning no business would be allowed on match days, but negotiations by CoCT prevented this. De Reuck stated:

It was part of a huge fight with FIFA to say if we were to extend that further it would have meant that all those businesses down the line would have had to somehow close up their business names and so forth. But as it stands at the moment FIFA does not have a problem with the businesses along this stretch (CTP, 2010e).

As a result, CTP (2010b, p. 3) announced:

It is due to the negotiated efforts of the City of Cape Town that these zones were greatly tempered and downscaled, allowing most of the City to simply conduct life in a ‘business as usual’ fashion.

Thus, responsible authorities in Cape Town seemed pleased with the negotiated outcome with FIFA. Established businesses would be able to trade ‘as usual’. However, FIFA’s RPP strategic ‘business as usual’ concept did not apply to the most vulnerable members of the population, the informal and street traders; instead, the 2010 FWC By-law applied, which gave power to the relevant authorities to exclude, relocate and evict people. Moreover, along the Fan Walk route, only local formal businesses profited.
Informal traders were relocated and kiosk vendors did not make any profit from selling non-profit goods.

**Security operations**

The CBD saw a massive influx of supplementary SAPS officers from other regions throughout the country (CTP, 2010b). No vehicles, traffic lights or intersections were allowed in this defined space on match days, both for security reasons and in order to allow better access to local shops and restaurants (CTP, 2010b). The Fan Walk was not permanently fenced off. Before and after games played in Cape Town, flexible road barriers and check points for traffic and crowd management were erected along these corridors. Tri-color signs managed the moveable fences along the route (Carwright, 2010). The Fan Walk was heavily monitored by private security staff, as well as by a small number of overseeing security specialists from national and international police forces (Pollack, 2009a). Even the contracted waste management company staff from *Solid Waste* were instructed to pick up litter and check bins for bombs (Cartwright, 2010). The controller in the VOC for the Fan Walk (situated at City Hall, together with the VOC for the Fan Fest), could zoom in on any section of the Fan Walk and could relay messages to any of the security partners along the route, and vice versa (Cartwright, 2010).

Safety and security had been planned since 2006, and a security plan was already in place before the CSAE was appointed:

> a significant plan was already in place covering deployment of SAPS, Metro police, volunteers as well as additions to the 24/7 Public Safety Officer programme run by both the CCID and the Green Point CID. To this the event organiser [CSAE] in turn added a complement of 90 private security personnel along the Fan Walk route, as well as a ‘Lost and Found’ unit manned by a qualified social worker at St Andrew’s Square to deal with lost children (CTP, 2010b, p. 11).

Three weeks before the tournament, a private security company called Pro-events was sub-contracted by CoCT to conduct security checks on both stalls and stall-holders. Approximately 66 personnel were deployed, and they were advised to be customer-friendly and respectful. In matters of illegal trading, they were told to get in touch with the Metro Law Enforcement (Cartwright, 2010).
Other security operations in relation to ambush marketing activities are described in Section 5.4.6, for the Fan Walk was located in a CRZ. The next section presents the findings in relation to another type of PVA researched in accordance with the thesis research objectives: four municipal PVAs located in Cape Town suburbs.

5.4.4 Municipal PVAs

Vygeskraal Stadium, Athlone (with a capacity of 2,500 indoors), Bellville Velodrome, Bellville (with a capacity of 6,000 indoors), Swartklip Sport Complex, Mitchells Plain (with a capacity of 30,000 outdoors and 6,000 indoors), and OR Tambo, Khayelitsha (with a capacity of 2,500 outdoors and 2,500 indoors) were the chosen sites to stage municipal PVAs (see Figure 5.6). The four PVAs attracted a total of 219,000 people over their 13 days of operation (PGWC, 2011b).

Objectives

According to CoCT (2010d), municipal PVAs were aimed at the less wealthy, rather than the affluent target group of the FFF. As De Rueck (2008a) put it, the municipal PVAs served the role of ‘providing broad access to Cape Town’s marginalised community’. It was also emphasised in the media that:

These outdoor viewing areas offer many locals unable to afford match tickets the opportunity to be part of the festive experience. At the same time, they offer an opportunity to showcase our unique and diverse arts and culture to the international community (Moodley, 2010).

One of the objectives stated in CoCT’s business plan was to ‘alleviate some of the transport and visitor impact concerns within the CoCT by reducing the need to travel to the City to experience the atmosphere’ (CoCT, 2006b, p. 47). During the event, CoCT continuously encouraged residents to utilise the four municipal PVAs near them, as the FFF tended to fill up very quickly (CoCT, 2010d).

Design and technological features

The decision as to where the fenced PVAs were to be located was widely disputed. In large part, it ‘depended on SAPS’ ability to guard the event’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009c). According to a different source, though, the choice of PVA venues was
based ‘on the number of people that can be attracted, offering maximum advertising reach for the companies involved, the City has motivated’ (von Ulmenstein, 2010). Cullen, CoCT’s 2010 FWC Venue Manager, stated:

some of the factors that had to be considered in identifying these sites were concerns around security, disaster management, transport and congestion, accessibility and the projected demand on utilities (as cited in Moodley, 2010).

PVAs were meant to be themed (arts and culture) and were planned to be open only on Cape Town match days, all Bafana Bafana match days, and for the play-off matches (Haferburg et al., 2009). The venues were open from 11:00 until 23:00 on these days (CoCT, 2008a).

There was a clear distinction between the various PVAs, with regards to the design of the entertainment. This highlighted segregated consumer markets. Professional and international entertainment acts performed in the FFFs, while the municipal PVAs only hosted local, community-based performances (CoCT, 2010c).

**Organisational structure**

According to DTI (2009), which was assisting with the development of municipal PVAs, these spaces were to be established and managed by the provinces and/or municipalities, and anticipated a modest 1,000 people in attendance.

In May 2008, CoCT intended to construct 29 non-stadium facilities, however cost considerations eventually brought the number of PVAs down to around six (Bateman, 2008). Another factor impacting on the number of PVAs was the provision of adequate healthcare to the public. Therefore, Fuhri, National Director of EMS and Disaster Management, expressed that his ‘biggest concern was consolidating a policy, mainly with police, around public viewing areas which, in addition to the FIFA-licensed fan parks, would dramatically increase public gatherings on any match day’ (in Bateman, 2008, p. 346). According to Bateman (2008, p. 346): ‘We’re trying to keep them (PVA numbers) down’.

Although the district commissioner had to approve PVAs (DTI, 2009), the number of these venues was restricted by the National Planning Committee (Anonymous, 2011,
pers. comm., 23 June). In October 2009, ‘it was agreed, based on health, safety and ‘other considerations’, that it would be ideal if PVAs were limited to around one per district for the 46 districts’ (DTI, 2009, slide 10). This was despite members of the SRPLGPCs expressing concerns that nothing was being done to take the event to rural areas in the RSA (SRPLGPCs, 2006).

In 2010, two months before the tournament’s commencement, sites for the PVAs had still not been designated by the city managers. ‘Fan parks will be a source of pain’, said Gauteng Health Minister, Quedani Mahlangu (Mail & Guardian, 2010a). Fuhri stated that the delay in designating sites for locations made it difficult to assign adequate numbers of healthcare personnel (Kahn, 2010). Another consequence of this delay was that SAPS was not able to plan safety and security arrangements, as the capacity, structure and location of PVAs were unknown. A few weeks later, the four PVAs ultimately selected were listed on CTT’s website. These PVAs were then incorporated into the wider host city security plans (Rehbock, 2009). Full details of the municipal PVAs then needed to be communicated to the respective Metro Police Departments and the SAPS, to enable contingency planning (Kempen, 2010).

**Policies**

In 2008, a working team was established to advance the co-ordinated implementation of PVAs. In early January 2009, the working team, based on input from national government departments, and the provinces and host cities, developed a set of guidelines for PVAs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2009b) addressing the following areas: legislation, executive decisions, site requirements, coordination of PVAs, safety and security matters, health and disaster management, broadcast and other ICT requirements, and relationships with 2010 FWC commercial affiliates (DTI, 2009). FIFA’s public viewing guidelines were taken in account, as well as the same Prohibited and Restricted lists about items banned from the event spaces.

Initially, the municipalities had budget constraints and were thus keen to sign up non-FIFA sponsors. Non-sponsors could sell their products and display their brands without restrictions, so long as they did not ambush the FIFA event. Official sponsors were allowed to participate, however the exclusive conditions of CRZs would not apply in
the municipal PVAs. However, if requested by FIFA, an exhibitor needed to provide, prior to the granting of any local sponsorship rights, all relevant information on the third party sponsor, and needed to put the proposed rights in writing to FIFA for its prior approval. FIFA retained the final decision as to whether a third party was considered ‘local’ and/or ‘non-competitive’ and whether the rights proposed to be granted were ‘local’ rights relating to a commercial public viewing event (DTI, 2009). Cross-promotions and co-branding with official sponsors were possible, but the third party could not be a competitor of any official sponsor, they could not be directly associated with the brand, and the FIFA sponsor always needed to retain primary rights of exposure and be the dominant form of promotion. Thus, members of the SRPLGPCs (2006) questioned the overall local entrepreneur involvement, as FIFA’s partners had acquired those exclusive rights and were naturally preferred (DTI, 2009).

Ultimately, vendors from the local community were allowed to sell their produce (PGWC, 2011a). None of the municipal PVAs had franchise food stalls, and this benefited community entrepreneurs directly (PGWC, 2011a). Still, PVA organisers had to consult with SABC in terms of exact broadcasting locations, particularly where non-sponsors would be present (DTI, 2009).

**Security operations**

About 250 security personnel policed the PVAs (PGWC, 2011a). The following key stakeholders were responsible for security at the municipal PVAs:

- The municipalities, in this case PGWC, had to accept responsibility for all aspects, such as access control, and had to arrange support in terms of fire, health and emergency services, and security (PGWC, 2011a);
- SAPS tasks were confined to investigation of any serious crime at PVAs (PGWC, 2011a); and
- The Metro Police and private security officers recruited by the PGWC had to ensure the maintenance of public order and the prevention of crime at PVAs (PGWC, 2011a).

In summary, therefore, in the 2010 FWC context, PVAs may be classified into two general categories: commercial and non-commercial PVAs. A PVA was considered
commercial if a venue owner or exhibitor staged the PVA for commercial purposes (e.g., by charging an admission fee, attaching a sponsor to it, or exploiting any other rights of association with the event). In this case, a request for a FIFA commercial public viewing licence was required to be submitted, and a fee was charged (2010 FWC Organising Committee South Africa, 2008). With regards to the latter category, if an owner of a restaurant/hotel/bar possessed a valid SABC licence for the venue, and he or she was not intending to charge admission, or had no sponsorship activities, permission was automatically granted (ABN digital, 2010). All revenues generated by licence fees were donated to the Official Campaign ‘20 Centres for 2010’ which aim was to create 20 Football for Hope Centres to promote public health, education and football in disadvantaged communities across Africa (see FIFA, ndd). However, only one of the five Centres promised by FIFA has been created in the RSA – Khayelitsha, Cape Town. It remains the only such complex up and running in the RSA to the date of writing this thesis (Radnedge, 2012).

5.4.5 Timeline of the security planning process of PVAs

The table below was developed to present an overview of the timeline of the planning process, in order to understand the long-term commitment of international, national and local authorities for the efficient and secure operation of PVAs. It demonstrates some clear concerns pertaining to the entire PVA planning process over a six year duration.

Table 5.5: Timeline of the planning process of PVAs in relation to security issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>The OAA was signed by SAFA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>The RSA won the 2010 FWC bid by beating Morocco 14-10 votes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>FIFA signed the OAA Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>Host City Agreement signed between CoCT and FIFA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts (no. 11/12) passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>Idea of a ‘Fan Mile’ in Cape Town was pitched by CoCT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>CoCT 2010 FWC spokesman Pieter Cronjé revealed potential PVAs plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>FIFA published guidelines for PVAs on its website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>National Safety and Security Plan was submitted to FIFA and was approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>The Host City Fan Walk Work Stream was formed, incorporating Host City Operations Team Members, City Departments, the CCID, as well as the Green Point CID (GP CID) and other parties that would play vital roles in the operation of the Fan Walk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Jackie Selebi was replaced by Bheki Cele as National Commissioner of the SAPS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>CoCT unveiled its safety and security plan for the tournament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>First meeting between National Commissioner of SAPS, Bheki Cele, and INTERPOL Secretary General, Ronald K. Noble, where they discussed security arrangements for the 2010 FWC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>SSREB was approved with amendments. Guidelines for setting up PVAs were developed. In addition to the nine host cities, Berlin, London, Paris, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Sydney were unveiled by FIFA as locations for the FFFs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of January 2010</td>
<td>Johannesburg and Cape Town were awarded the tenders for their official PVAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>Nathi Mthethwa (Minister of Safety and Security) was appointed to the board of the 2010 LOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid March 2010</td>
<td>‘We still have no idea where any public viewing areas will be in non-host cities’ Peter Fuhri, the Department’s head of 2010 planning told members of Parliament's Health Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End March 2010</td>
<td>The 10 official FFFs were announced on FIFA’s website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End April</td>
<td>National Security Plan was implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>SAPS unveiled a wide-ranging security project for the 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FWC in the RSA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid May 2010</td>
<td>NATJOC of the RSA’s security forces became fully operational. Municipal PVA locations were determined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Act (6/2006): Amendment to the 2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Safety and Security Regulations, 2009 (Gazette No. 33261 – Regulation 495) was passed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.6 CRZs

In Cape Town, there were two different kinds of CRZs: Controlled Access Sites (CAS) and Exclusion Zones (EZ). These two event spaces and viewer places are described below (see Appendix H for general prohibitions).

Objectives

Commercially driven preconditions of spatial control in the form of CAS and EZ operated under the terms of the 2010 CoCT By-law (2009) and existing city By-laws. The purposes were to:

i) regulate advertising;

ii) regulate special events and the management of neatness of public open spaces;

iii) adopt appropriate traffic management procedures; and

iv) regulate street trading.

These objectives illustrate the purpose of the regulations in light of the broader themes covered in the CRZs and the list of media legacies.

Design and technological features

To the general public, CAS were mainly ‘invisibly’ demarcated spaces: they had no fences or barriers. However, in some cases, depending on the nature of the CAS and the event being held, fences were erected and access control was established through accreditation and ticketing (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 25). CAS consisted of the
following areas: the Green Point stadium, the FFF, the municipal PVAs, anywhere where there was an officially declared FIFA event, accreditation centres, official training sites, team hotels, the official hotels for the FIFA delegation and the Fan Walk (CoCT, 2009e; CTP, 2010e), as well as ‘any other area within the area of jurisdiction of the City, designated or demarcated by the City by notice in the press as a Controlled Access Site’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 16).

Nowhere in the publicly available documents or reports on Cape Town have these various spaces been further outlined or explained. Thus, the public and many businesses were mainly unaware if they had entered a CAS or were located in one. After searching intensively for any official documents (using keywords in Google: CAS, Cape Town, RPP), it was discovered through a random, unrelated Google search that the V&A Waterfront (exact boundaries unknown), one of the RSA’s most popular tourist attractions, which provided visitors with various forms of entertainment, was also located in a CAS (see Figure 5.6). It was not fenced off and attracted up to 100,000 people daily (PGWC, 2011b). This meant that FIFA’s RPP was in operation and prohibited the activation of any brand outside of FIFA’s ‘business as usual’ concept.

According to Green, CEO of the V&A Waterfront,

the V&A Waterfront has always been geared for large visitorship and the additional security and safety measures we put in place – like our roving ambassadors and additional security personnel – enhanced the welcoming environment of the property for both local and international visitors (CTP, 2010f).

He further highlighted: ‘we set out to be a safe fun family destination for all and have certainly achieved this’ (CTP, 2010f).

An EZ meant ‘the controlled zone situated immediately outside the outer perimeter of the stadium, as designated or demarcated by the City’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 16). No other trade of any nature was allowed in this invisible zone. According to Plato (2010), Executive Mayor of CoCT, this area was not fenced, but access was monitored and controlled on match days. The Host City Agreement (2006, p. 17) stated:

The Host City shall ensure that any entity which usually operates commercial or non-commercial activities within the Exclusion Zone refrains from the operation of the relevant facilities on Match days, unless agreed in advance by FIFA in
writing, and that no permits or licenses for commercial activities of any kind will be granted by the Host City for use within the Exclusion Zone on Match days.

Further, the Host City Agreement (2006, p. 18) emphasised that ‘FIFA shall be authorized, to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations, by the Host City to cover any and all signage and advertising in the Exclusion Zone’.

As can be seen in Figure 5.6, the four municipal PVAs were spread around Cape Town’s CBD. Two main CRZs were operational in the central city: the EZ around the stadium (illustrated in blue) in the Green Point area, which went up to the curb of Somerset Road and ended before the businesses, while the other major CRZ (CAS) was demarcated around the FFF (illustrated in green) and fell within the CCID’s Precinct Four. The restrictions took effect from 20 May 2010 and applied until 16 July 2010. The 2.5 km long Fan Walk connecting the FFF and the transport hub to the stadium is illustrated in red, which was declared to fall within the CAS (CTP, 2010e). The V&A Waterfront fell within a CAS as well (illustrated in black), while the media accreditation centre was at the International Convention Centre (illustrated in purple). CoCT advertised its urban city centre as:

No matter where you are in Cape Town, you will be blessed with a number of events relating to the FIFA World Cup and of course, the V&A Waterfront is at the helm of the activity (Cape Town Magazine, 2010).

Further CRZs around other ‘declared’ sites were demarcated by the City Manager as stipulated in the 2010 CoCT By-law, however no public documentation on their locations was available. The space illustrated in black is Cape Town’s CBD with its main transport hub; the train station and the road that connects the CBD to the airport - the N2 - are marked in orange. According to the 2010 CoCT By-law (2009, p. 19), any public advertising media was prohibited

in or immediately outside or surrounding main train stations; within a radius of the central business district of the area of jurisdiction of the City demarcated by the City Manager in consultation with FIFA; and to the extent the City has jurisdiction, on the principal routes from the airport and main train stations to the central business district of the area of jurisdiction of the City and to the stadium.
Here, the provisions of the *MMA* were in force from the date of publication of the notice until a date six months after the date on which the tournament commenced (Blignaut, 2009; Cornelius, 2007).

**Figure 5.6: Event spaces in Cape Town**
As the second map illustrates, FIFA’s two main venues – the Stadium and the FFF – lie within a few square kilometres of each other. Thus, the entire central city fell either within CRZs or was under the provision of the MMA. Therefore, CTP (2010b, p. 11) stated that CoCT had to ensure that:

the event footprint was extremely safe. There were thus enormous demands placed on the City: not only in terms of safety and security, but also in terms of beautification and creating a ‘user friendly’ environment for visitors, and with the City stretched to the limit in terms of both capacity and budget, CTP and CCID contributed resources wherever possible.

Moreover, the CRZ referred to the airspace restrictions enforced over stadia during the tournament, which served as a dual security measure against the ‘possibility of the utilization of aircraft for ambush marketing and terrorist attacks’ (NATJOINTS, 2008, p. 47). FIFA’s influence over the security measures was declared to be ‘invisible but nonetheless demarcated’ (CTP, 2009b). In other words, although such FIFA-ised spaces could not be seen with the naked eye, one would feel FIFA’s authority if not complying with the spatial restrictions. As the previous statement illustrates, FIFA was able to pursue its stated mission of ‘ensuring maximum return on investment for sponsors’ (FIFA, ndb) by controlling and monitoring the security measures in the event spaces.

**Host City Decoration Program**

FIFA not only established the commercial regulations for the FFFs, but it also set the pre-conditions for the inner-city urban design. FIFA provided the official 2010 FWC branding materials, such as flags and signs, with a total of more than 50,000 sqm coverage (Namibia Sport, 2010). For example, FIFA’s contracting company for flagging reported that:

All flags must be evaluated and properly installed in the stadiums, host cities, airports, training areas and in all venues of the event. There are different kinds of flags used, such as advertising flags and also the nation flags of the participating teams (Fahnen24, 2009).

The Host City Agreement gave CoCT the right to offer advertising and marketing opportunities to FIFA’s commercial affiliates at market-related rates. In cooperation with FIFA and LOC, a Host City Decoration Program was introduced, including the Cape Town 2010 Host City Decoration and Signage Masterplan (DSMP). Its purpose was to identify key locations throughout the city available for ‘beautification’,

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decoration and commercial advertising opportunities – including the host city itself (CoCT, 2010e; Host City Agreement, 2006, p. 14).

Whilst the branding did not receive positive feedback from all quarters (PGWC, 2011a), CoCT was obliged to grant FIFA sponsors ‘the right to acquire at fair market value the branding opportunities incorporated into the Host City Decoration Program’ (Host City Agreement, 2006, p. 15). In other words, CoCT had to provide FIFA and official sponsors the right of first refusal in respect of all public advertising media. The CEO of the V&A Waterfront stated that they ‘partnered with some big brands in football such as Coca-Cola, Adidas and MTN to ensure an interactive offering which is tailored for fans in search of World Cup celebrations in a safe and secure environment’ (Mohale, 2010).

Moreover, 70 sites, including bridges and visitor attractions, were identified and set out in packages for potential third party advertisers to bid on (Krog, 2009). The 2010 CoCT By-law became an important instrument in making such advertising legitimate. According to De Reuck, CoCT had engaged in long discussions with the FIFA legal team about city beautification, particularly around construction during the event:

In the first draft of the by-law, FIFA wanted us to stop all building in the city during that period. Obviously that’s not going to happen. They also asked us to enforce that major construction sites are beautified. Now we’ve softened that in saying that the City will go to businesses and ask and advise them to do it (CTP, 2010e).

Moreover, Western Cape Premier, Zille, said: ‘I should have flexed my muscle in response to FIFA’s demands a long time ago. They are not a colonial power’ (Raborife, 2010).

Multinational sponsoring brands designed interactive concepts for visitors; these dominated the public space in the inner-city through the set-up of two CRZs, V&A Waterfront and Long Street. These concepts included the following: Adidas launched its ‘Be a movie star’ interactive football game which had a Lionel Messi avatar, a 50m observation wheel – ‘The Wheel of Excellence’, Adidas Football experience at Victoria Wharf Shopping Centre, MTN Fan Zone in Clock Tower Square, which had capacity for up to 500 football fans, Quay Four: Spectator Zone, Hyundai Spectator Zone, and the Lookout: VIP rooftop marquee (Cape Town Magazine, 2010; CTT, 2010), and a
12m high Coca-Cola Crateman: ‘a frame made entirely from used Coke crates to raise awareness of the importance of recycling’ (Mohale, 2010).

At the V&A Waterfront, four dedicated ‘Spectator Zones’ were established. Scattered around the property at various access points, these zones ‘transformed our most prime sites into football action hubs’ (Mohale, 2010). According to Mohale (2010), the Marketing Executive at the V&A Waterfront, ‘these four “Zones” are accessible touch points for visitors to catch all the live action amidst the excitement of fellow football fans and live entertainment’.

Despite these restrictive FIFA and host city regulations, Cape Town Tourism (CTT) was able to implement a ‘Cape Town Welcomes You’ City Decoration Campaign. The visual identity of the campaign was based on a rainbow palette to reinforce the idea of Cape Town as part of the rainbow nation and a rainbow city in its own right. The PGWC expressed that the city branding did not receive positive feedback from all quarters. However, CTT regarded it as imperative to proactively deal with FIFA’s RPP from an early stage to avoid the risk of having no branding at all besides FIFA sponsored flags on protocol routes (PGWC, 2011a, p. 190).

Organisational structure

The CRZs were defined by the host cities, FIFA, the LOC, and their respective authorities (FIFA, 2010c). In Cape Town, the City Manager may, by placing a notice in the press, designate an area as a CRZ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 20). The City Manager also had the power to:

restrict the general access to and use of any public open space in order to protect a public open space, to reduce vandalism or the destruction of City property at any public open space and to develop or undertake any activity which it reasonably considers necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this By-law in preparation for the Competition’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 22).

Both types of CRZs fell under the same organisational schemes and were obliged to follow the same rules and legislation. For example, ‘both included private property located therein’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 20). FIFA and the host city respectively had the power to demarcate even private property within these sites. This could allow for exclusive advertising restrictions to apply to private as well as public property.
According to a representative of the event company contracted to organise the FFF, a government department, the 2010 FWC Commercial Activation Team, was responsible for the protection of the official sponsors (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). In Cape Town, ambush marketing policing was governed by the so-called Inner City By-law Enforcement Team (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

**Policies**

De Reuck emphasised that ambush marketing, in particular, would be strictly controlled (CTP, 2010e) at the FWC. As presented above, those who wished to advertise or promote commercial activity in any way connected to the FWC, whether it was selling football-themed t-shirts, the parading of branded cars, or advertising items through banners or signs, was first required to receive approval from FIFA and then obtain a licence from the government. A fee for the licence was raised as well (ABN digital, 2010).

A clear connection between FIFA’s commercial interests and security politics was found in the 2010 CoCT By-law section referring to CRZs. De Reuck (2008b) stated that advertisement regulation, ambush marketing and unlawful advertising were managed and safety ensured through regulating the design, construction, placement, maintenance, and the removal and impoundment of offending signs at CRZs. These restrictions had the purpose of ‘avoiding uncontrolled distribution or vending which may disturb spectator flows, commercial and operational activities, and traffic as well as safety and security’ (FIFA, 2010c; Ho-Kim, 2010; Van Dyk, 2010). Van Dyk, who was in charge of the RPP in Cape Town, concurred and stated that ‘apart from safeguarding FIFA and their sponsors’ interests, the 2010 CoCT By-law also provides for unhindered spectator flows, as well as for safety and security’ (CoCT, 2010b).

Any political or religious demonstrations were prohibited within 10 kilometres of stadia (Bond, nd). This was in order to prevent social tensions from shaping media coverage of the event, which would disturb FIFA’s and its sponsors’ branding messages. As the 2010 CoCT By-law confirms this: ‘No person may undertake any event or a special event which will or may be used for the purposes of the Competition unless specifically authorised by the City Manager’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 22).
The main focus of the public place and city beautification part of the 2010 CoCT By-law was aimed at policing and regulating ‘nuisance’ behaviours in public spaces. A brief sample of the vague language of the By-law (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 21) used indicates how this process worked. For example:

no person shall at a special event cause or commit a nuisance; use abusive or otherwise objectionable language or behave in an abusive, objectionable or disorderly manner towards any other user; hamper, disturb, obstruct or harass any other person; or smoke, eat, drink or sleep where these activities are forbidden.

It therefore appears that the regulation of ‘nuisance’ behaviour went hand-in-hand with the production of ‘clean’ spaces and the world-class images that CoCT was attempting to portray.

The last main section of the 2010 CoCT By-law related to street trading. It was stipulated in section 26(1) in relation to the conduct of street traders in general and during the course of trading that a street trader shall not ‘occupy any part of a public place with his or her property or goods, except to the extent approved by the City Manager’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 24).

A street trader was also obliged to ensure that the place of trading was kept clean. For example, subsections 27(d) and (e) state that street traders must ‘ensure that no smoke, fumes or other substance causes air pollution’, as well as ‘ensuring that no odour, or noise emanating from his or her activities causes a nuisance of any kind’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 24). This clearly highlights FIFA’s concern about the aesthetics of the event footprint in public spaces.

Further, the 2010 CoCT By-law gave authorised officials search and seizure powers across the city on public roads and in respect of contraventions on street trading:

An authorised official may in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977) and subject to any other applicable legislation, search, remove or impound any goods, property, container, structure, materials, substance, shelter, tent [or] vehicle of any nature whatsoever, whether or not unattended’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 25).
Here, it should be noted that policies, unlike legislation, do not need to go through a democratic process of consultation and adoption by a provincial or national parliament. As a security informant put it:

some By-laws had a lot of public participation, others not. Implementation depended on how well the issues had been communicated ahead of time to the public. All By-laws were advertised and time given for responses which were then considered by the portfolio committees of the CoCT. Comments were made; some were incorporated and some not (as normally happens) (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 2 May).

This is in contrast to a publicly available statement that De Reuck gave:

The process we followed in regard to the By-law included an entire public private participation. We received a huge number of comments from many companies and businesses – including CTP and the V&A Waterfront – and I would say 98% of those comments could be accommodated in some way or another (CTP, 2010e).

Small and medium enterprise (SME) owners interviewed in Yeoville, Ellispark, Betrams and Mellville complained that FIFA’s strict protection of its commercial interests hampered their chances of doing business at the event. All these service providers had to go through a strict vetting process and pay FIFA for the rights to provide such services (Cronjé, et al., 2010). Moreover, research by the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) revealed that despite the fact that 92% of SMEs indicated that the tournament as a whole was successful, only 14% indicated that the tournament contributed in a significant way to their individual success (Lamprecht, 2010, p. 3). Again, survey participants overwhelmingly blamed FIFA’s policy for the fact that SMEs did not profit from the event as might have been expected.

McMichael (2012) has asserted that the RSA government voluntarily established an overarching legislative zone for FIFA that, ironically, limited the government’s ability to reap anticipated gains from tax income. These ‘tax-free bubbles’ for income and value-added tax, centred in stadia, security rings, CRZs and PVAs, meant that the government recouped nothing from goods sold at any event venues (Riegel, 2010). Already in 2005, the Director-General of the French Football Federation had warned the RSA not to agree to a blanket acceptance of all FIFA’s rules and conditions, and instead to ensure that the country would derive sufficient economic benefit from the event (Sports and Recreation Portfolio Committee, 2005).
Before the tournament had ended, FIFA had publicly declared profits of USD 3 billion in tax-free revenue, while the national government only managed to break even on its R33 billion of tournament spending (McMichael, 2012). FIFA, said it spent USD 1.298 billion on the FWC in the RSA and also gave USD 100 million to the FWC Legacy Trust, a fund that supports grassroots soccer projects (Associated Press, 2012). This is in addition to the R700-million already given to SAFA in the build-up to the event for preparation purposes (R450-million) and for the construction of SAFA House (R150-million). In addition, SAFA was given R40-million for football development projects and a further R70-million for investment in a fleet of buses and cars to enable the 52 regional structures of the association to transport their teams (BuaNews, 2012).

*The Economist* (2010) reported that FIFA’s profits for the 2006 event were quite phenomenal and that even more was expected for the 2010 event:

> South Africans… are grumbling about the eye-wateringly large amounts of money that FIFA, the world football body that is the monopoly organiser of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, is poised to make, even though South Africa is bearing most of the cost. FIFA is responsible only for the prize money paid to the teams along with the cost of their travel and preparation, which amounted to just $279 m in Germany, where the tournament last took place, in 2006. This week FIFA said it would contribute an extra $100 m to the South Africans to ensure that all the facilities are ready in time. Yet the event’s main direct benefits, from television and marketing rights, all go to FIFA. According to Citi, the research arm of Citibank, FIFA’s profit in Germany came to $1.8 billion, equivalent to 0.7% of South Africa’s GDP.

FIFA reported it made a USD 631 million profit from the 2007-10 World Cup cycle and earned income of USD 3.65 billion from 2010 FWC contracts (Associated Press, 2012).

In November 2012, the ‘2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report’ was released, nearly 2.5 years after the tournament. The RSA spent more than USD 3 billion on the 2010 FWC. In the absence of any final definitive figures on how much the RSA earned overall, the report noted that, in return, an ‘intangible legacy’ of pride and unity among South Africans was gained, and had changed the country’s image as undeveloped, crime-ridden and dangerous in the eyes of the rest of the world (Associated Press, 2012). ‘The World Cup in South Africa was a huge, huge financial success for Africa, for South Africa and for FIFA’, Blatter claimed in 2011, as the world body published its own financial report (Associated Press, 2012).
Security operations

Priority spaces for security operations included the stadium and CRZs, as well as the Fan Walk along the V&A Waterfront and Somerset Roads, the FFF and municipal PVAs. At the V&A Waterfront, the security presence was increased by 50% on match days and 25% on non-match days. This included employing additional full-time security personnel and a review and update of the positioning of 1000+ CCTV cameras in all common areas (Mohale, 2010).

However, as detailed earlier in this chapter, other sites, such as official training sites, team hotels, and the official hotels for the FIFA delegation, were declared hot spots and likewise fell into CRZs. The brand patrols extended to spaces beyond CRZs. CoCT (2010b) reported:

There won’t be any physical barriers or fences to mark the zones, but a team of about 50 people will patrol these areas. Their task will be to look out for ambush marketing, counterfeit goods, illegal ticket selling and unauthorised informal trading in and around the zones.

One of FIFA’s lawyers stated:

We have local teams protecting the matches, rights protection on site teams because of the specific problem of ambush via intrusion. So in the cities, around the stadium, even in the stadium … (Portela, 2010).

FIFA stated that ‘these zones’ (PVAs and CRZs) would be under ‘the special attention of safety and security authorities, who may need to implement some special measures’ (2010c, p. 18). Free merchandise, such as caps, t-shirts and pens, was distributed only by official sponsors throughout the city. On a daily basis, merchandise patrols monitored new businesses which had opened up, and reviewed any counterfeit products or non-sanctioned flyers that were handed out. A senior member of the SAPS National Operational Response Services reported that they also checked the vendors’ products (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 19 May). Spectators were monitored for banners, t-shirts, and other items that might have infringed the exclusive commercial rights of sponsors (Accelerate Cape Town, 2008; Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). Spot checks were also conducted at flea/informal markets, where goods were confiscated and perpetrators arrested (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 19 May).
Moreover, authorised officials in respect of public open spaces may instruct any person to leave if the authorised official reasonably believes that the person is contravening any provision of this by-law; and such person fails to immediately terminate such contravention upon the instruction of that authorised official (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p. 25).

Authorised officials included the Metro Police and SAPS, who were empowered to enforce the RPP, including provisions relating to the 2010 CoCT By-law (Du Plessis & Van Garderen, 2010). This led to the establishment of special police units under the direction of FIFA officials, who patrolled stadia, PVAs and CRZs for evidence of ambush marketing. One Fan Walk organisers emphasised the importance of FIFA involvement in the on-site policing operations:

With regards to branding in the EZs we were consulting consistently with FIFA. We set pre-meetings up with all merchandisers and with the vendors as well. The kiosks vendors had to sign contracts which stipulated what they had to conform to and what they could and couldn’t sell. On each event we had health inspectors monitoring the food and we had merchandise inspectors monitoring counterfeiters. And then of course, all our staff was briefed on marketing (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

According to a representative of the event company contracted to organise the FFF, there were authorised personnel (called sponsor protection guards) who were responsible for safeguarding the commercial interests of the official sponsors (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). The control, management and response to infringements, such as shipments of contraband/counterfeit goods arriving in the RSA, were followed up by tracing teams (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 19 May). Since the OA & SB of 2009 contained stricter enforcement provisions and penalties (CoCT, 2009c; Pollack, 2009c), CoCT appointed an additional 13 environmental control officers to enforce this By-law, assisted by the Metro Police, law enforcement and traffic services (CoCT, 2009c).

While the Fan Walk event organiser stated that the securitisation of sponsors’ rights accounted for ‘a big part of the overall security of the event’, FIFA itself was very strict on it:

But largely when the events happened... there were like 20 FIFA people running around looking at it but they were comfortable with us managing that...‘We did brief our private security on these issues but they would report it to the
commercial activation people. In addition, all other security staff was briefed on ambush marketing (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

Furthermore, RPP venue teams were appointed and trained to oversee, manage and police the CRZs. According to Ho-Kim (2010), Project Co-ordinator: Operations, CoCT, they consisted of the following personnel:

- FIFA Team, including one RPP Venue Manager;
- Police authorities (SAPS and Law Enforcement) – approx. 38 officers (initially eight members from SAPS and/or Metro Police) (CTP, 2009b);
- Volunteers – 10 RPP volunteers;
- A host city representative, i.e., one RPP Coordinator; and
- The RPP Venue Team.

The main tasks included providing local support to the RPP in the preparation and set-up of the RPP On-site Strategy; liaison with relevant municipal and local officials and entities; liaison with local businesses and stakeholders; and participation in the on-site patrols (Van Dyk, 2010). The RPP Venue Teams also worked in close liaison with entities such as South African Revenue Services (SARS) officers, public prosecutors and local lawyers, who actively operated in each host city for the duration of the tournament, with a special emphasis on match days and were always on the look-out for ambush marketing (CTP, 2009b). As noted above, volunteers were also responsible for ensuring that FIFA and its sponsors’ marketing rights were not infringed upon. According to Nakueira and Berg (2010), most volunteers interviewed confirmed that they would report any criminal incident (ambush marketing included) to SAPS, which would then take action.

In summary, brand and rights protection security patrols included: the Metro Police and SAPS, sponsor protection guards, tracing teams, environmental control officers, private security, commercial activation people, law enforcement, volunteers and RPP venue teams. This public-private network of security personnel meant that security aimed at public order and commercial policing became progressively intertwined.

The above sections outlined the spatialities, partnerships and arrangements in security governance for brand and rights protection purposes at the 2010 FWC. Next, the
findings of the brands and rights protection media strategies are reported, as well as control mechanisms that led to the prospect of representational media bias at the FWC.

5.5 Media

‘Journalistic’ documents produced by local, national and international media: online newspapers, magazines, and related media bulletins elicited rich secondary data. As highlighted in the next paragraphs, FIFA, in cooperation with the South African government, influenced and even partly controlled international, national and local media. The following findings demonstrate how FIFA, the RSA and Cape Town implemented certain control measures to secure their common interests of ideal brand images being portrayed via the media, as well as protecting their commercial rights. Specifically, they:

- over-emphasised security legacies;
- exaggerated ‘fun’ security for all ‘civilised’ patrons in the RSA;
- implemented PR programs for media representatives;
- introduced restrictive spatial and other media accreditation terms; and
- evidenced lack of transparency into the 2010 FWC organisation processes.

Over-emphasis of security legacies

The RSA and CoCT governments saturated the domestic media with claims that high expenditure on security and surveillance equipment, technologies and resources would leave an important legacy in terms of the state’s efforts to tackle high rates of violent crime (McMichael, 2012). The national police spokesperson, Senior Superintendent Naidoo, asserted that, in the context of the FWC: ‘We are preparing ourselves for a worst-case scenario or any eventuality … although we have the framework in place, we must deal with issues as they present themselves’ (Flak, 2009). Skills development and training opportunities, improved communication channels, cooperative governance, and public and private sector partnerships, as well as local community involvement, were identified as urgent and necessary, and would provide a ‘true legacy’ of the 2010 FWC (PGWC, 2011b). According to Police Minister Mthethwa (2010b), ‘Our security plans consist of achieving better policing, efficient criminal justice system and involvement of
various local and international partners. This must leave a lasting security legacy that must guarantee further attraction of visitors post the tournament’.

However, there was concern in the media leading up to the event with regards to safety and security strategies focusing on tourists, spectators and sponsor security; it was difficult to see how these strategies were relevant to the policing and security needs of the broad RSA community (Bob & Swart, 2011; Swart, Bob & Turco, 2010). In Cape Town, Boraine (CTP) argued that it was crucial to continue the visible policing measures employed during the 2010 FWC after the event and to ‘turn the exception of one month into the norm’ (CTP, 2011a). However, he was disappointed because:

People came into our towns and they saw the SAPS patrolling everywhere. But, the day after the World Cup, they went back to their bases. The Central City Improvement District security is still in place, but it is not the same security we had during the World Cup. Then Metrorail went back to how they had always been. It’s not good enough (CTP, 2011a).

Exaggerated ‘fun’, security for all and ‘civilised’ patrons in the RSA

The safety of all patrons in the RSA was continuously affirmed as a goal. SAPS claimed that ‘South Africa will host the safest and most secure FIFA World Cup’ (Mthethwa, 2010b). According to Mthethwa (2010b), ‘Police will be everywhere, ready for any eventuality. This is the epitome of our security plan; we will cover every corner because we do not have any no-go areas’. Both comments seem overenthusiastic and not fully accurate, as the foci of patrolling in Cape Town were the identified hot spots, as previously outlined.

The national and international media helped to communicate preventative security measures. For example, the Guardian reported: ‘The government today warned travelling England fans that any misbehaviour at the World Cup could impact on the country’s bid to host the 2018 tournament, and advised potential troublemakers that they would face the ‘full force of local policing laws’ (Gibson, 2010a).

British Assistant Chief Constable Holt attempted to quell fears that SAPS might be overly aggressive in their approach, but warned that they employed different tactics and
equipment, including water cannons (Gibson, 2010b). In this respect, Colonel Naidoo stated in a BBC report:

It’s prison not a place that I think a foreigner would want to be in. It’s not one of the most fantastic places. You see very little light in the day and obviously you see no light at night so the longer you stay there the more you regret having committed the offence you committed, to actually to get into the holding cell. The cells, which hold anything from two to 20 prisoners, have just one toilet and it's in full view of everyone (Cole, 2010).

Furthermore, for the ‘law abiding’, the South African media reassured potential visitors that there would be ample security, and they should expect a safe and pleasurable experience as tourists. For example, the picture titled ‘Sun, surf and safety’ by the Sunday Times below implied that pleasurable experiences could be combined with security monitoring in public spaces. Security guards were represented not only as a source of protection but also as helping to provide visitor pleasure, reassurance and comfort.

**Figure 5.7: Sun, surf and safety**

![Image](image.png)

Laganparsad, 2010a, p. 5

**PR program for media representatives**

The Western media highlighted and arguably over-emphasised insecurities in the context of tourism in RSA. In the months leading up to the 2010 FWC, international media organisations, notably in the Netherlands, UK and Germany, reported at length a wide range of presumed threats to the tournament, one of which stood out among all: various forms of criminality – both local- and foreign-originated – ranging from petty
crimes, murder, rapes and car hijacking, to internationally organised crimes, including human trafficking and drug smuggling (Anderson, 2010; Baasch, 2010; BBC, 2009; Smith, 2009). Hammett’s (2011, p. 63) media analysis of the English press findings asserted that the ‘broadsheet press demonstrated a more nuanced socio-historical and political engagement with the RSA as an emergent democracy, the tabloid press on the other hand continued to mobilise discourses of Africa’. Concerns in the media prior to the event were not necessarily unjustified. As a chief responsible officer from SAPS stated:

the initial belief was that South Africa could not host an international event of this magnitude. This was a real concern especially after speaking to a police officer from Germany, who confirmed that everything had been in place a year before the event, while at the same period we were probably only 50% prepared (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May).

Burger, a security and crime researcher at the ISS, stated that fans would have to be cautious, especially in the streets around the stadia. ‘Street muggings in fact account for more than 60 per cent of thefts involving violence. I have, for example, advised Dutch fans to take off their very recognisable orange jerseys on leaving the stadium’ (Burger, 2010). This advice seems surprising, since the stadia surroundings were highly secured in respect of the requirements for CRZs.

The broader point, though, is that the ‘international media needed to be convinced that their perception of the RSA, and of Cape Town, was not entirely accurate’ (PGWC, 2011a, p. 99). As a result, Blatter continued to affirm that he had no doubts about the RSA’s hosting ability before the tournament: ‘Plan A is South Africa, Plan B is South Africa, Plan C is South Africa and Plan D is South Africa’ (ABC News, 2008; Guardian.co.uk, 2008; Qwelane, 2008). There were no contractual provisions for moving the tournament, according to the LOC. Critical voices in the media often speculated that Australia and Germany were considered potential hosts if Plan A failed (Newin, 2010).

In Cape Town, ‘Welcome Services’ focused largely on ensuring that media representatives enjoyed a ‘safe and informative time’, visiting diverse parts of Cape Town and the Western Cape beyond the traditional locations and tourism highlights (PGWC, 2011a). To do this, CTT employed three international PR consultants to
manage Cape Town’s image in three of the key source markets where negative reporting and ‘Afro-pessimism’ were most prevalent as mentioned above (PGWC, 2011a).

**Restrictive spatial and other media accreditation terms**

According to one South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF) member, Louw, FIFA’s media restrictions were meant to safeguard ‘its rights, brand name, profit-making and status of the games, and the rights of sponsoring companies, including broadcasters’ exclusive rights’ (Da Silva, 2010). As one of FIFA’s lawyers pointed out: ‘We don’t want to let branded stuff get into the stands and get TV exposure worldwide. That’s the most terrible kind of ambush’ (Portela, 2010). The stakes were high: television coverage of the 2010 FWC reached over 3.2 billion people around the world, or 46.4% of the global population, based on viewers watching a minimum of over one minute of coverage. This represented an 8% rise in the number of viewers recorded during the 2006 FWC (FIFA, 2011a).

According to the PGWC (2011a), the FFF in Cape Town was extensively covered by the media over and above any other PVA. Overall, more than 5,200 accredited media members reported from the FFFs in the RSA (Namibia Sport, 2010). By concentrating on the securitised FFF coverage, FIFA optimised the chance that beautified and sanitised images were shown. As mentioned previously, the highly controlled environment and the selected target market (middle-class patrons and international visitors) were less likely to attract disorder or have a negative appearance. The CTP stated that ‘much of the electronic media coverage was broadcast live during peak consumer times’ (CTP, 2010b. p. 7), such as drive times and news programming. All stakeholders under investigation benefited from these globally broadcasted images of cheering masses in front of FIFA and sponsor logos with the glorious Table Mountain in the background representing Cape Town.

FIFA was keen to associate the FWC brand with Africa’s iconic personalities via media coverage. Nelson Mandela’s grandson stated that the former South African president was put under ‘extreme pressure’ by FIFA to attend the final game of the FWC (Paul, 2010). Ultimately, Mandela was too weak and fragile due to illness to attend. Moreover,
at the globally mediated event, the 2010 FIFA Ballon d’Or Gala in Zurich, Archbishop Desmond Tutu was honoured about half a year after the FWC had ended with the prestigious FIFA Presidential Award (FIFA, 2011d).

FIFA’s media restrictions were at the centre of a major row between the SANEF and FIFA. One point of contention was FIFA’s prohibition on newspapers preparing video packages for their websites. Newspapers were not allowed to publish pictures on their mobile platforms, and no newspaper agency was allowed to sell its papers within the security-rings around the stadia (a radius of approximately 800m) (Moodie, 2010). South African cartoonist Zapiro expressed his feelings on this matter in the following picture.

Figure 5.8: FIFA press freedom cartoon

According to Da Silva (2010),

Local journalists have accused world football governing body FIFA of acting as a bunch of ‘bullies’ and ‘dictators’ with a neo-colonialist mentality, following what analysts see as ‘unreasonable’ media restrictions on the 2010 FIFA World Cup coverage.
Journalists earning FIFA accreditation had to pledge not to print anything that ‘negatively affects the public standing of the Local Organizing Committee or FIFA’, or they could be punished by summary withdrawal of accreditation (Bond, 2010). As a consequence, journalists spoke to Da Silva on condition of anonymity for fear of victimisation. Many journalists were silent, scared that FIFA would deny them accreditation if they were to speak out against these restrictions (Da Silva, 2010). SANEF attempted to negotiate with FIFA on this matter. SANEF member Louw said:

We are also proposing to members that they append to their applications a letter saying that reporters and photographers regard the assurances they have been given as indicating that they have full freedom to report in the traditional way on games and all associated events related to the games (Da Silva, 2010).

However, the restrictions were not negotiable and South African journalists who questioned the motivations or impacts of the 2010 FWC were dubbed unpatriotic, with the government ‘dismissing calls for reflection as examples of Afro-pessimism or worse’ (Alegi, 2008, p. 328). SABC was the official broadcast partner of FIFA for the 2010 FWC, and to a certain extent, represented the ultimate booster for the event. SABC’s spokesperson Kganyago reported that the national broadcaster had refused to screen a critical documentary: ‘Our job is obviously to promote the World Cup and fighting anything that can be perceived as negative is not in our interest’, (Bond, 2010). Therefore, the critical documentary ‘Fahrenheit 2010’, about relocation of poor people and cases of corruption, was banned from being broadcast before the 2010 FWC. As Cornelissen (2010) has pointed out, SABC’s well established and loyal domestic viewer markets could have helped engender a good-natured and sociable environment for the FWC as a whole, and might have led to positive evaluations of the event by the host population. While the LOC (2008a) ensured the public that no media organisation would be marginalised, the government, as the primary source of information about the event, enjoyed the ability to set the public discourse, by using the media, especially in poorer and rural areas with little capacity to publish alternative views (Cornelissen, 2010).

Carlson (2009) has suggested that, in the 2010 RSA context, South African newspaper stories relied primarily on government and other official sources, such as FIFA and the LOC, and as a whole were therefore biased in presenting overwhelmingly positive coverage. Although the RSA print media is vibrant and at times critical, such as the
South African Mail & Guardian, there was little interest among media outlets for harsh criticism of FIFA and the RSA government media restrictions. South African journalists also had a significant stake in the country’s success in hosting the 2010 FWC, and thus their ‘boosterism’ was not surprising (Carlson, 2010). The three statements below illustrate the close liaison between FIFA and the media, as well as the latter’s cheerleading mentality.

The media was expected to be supportive of the event but would be uncomfortable with being told what to do. Now that FIFA was available to talk to the media, the media should talk to FIFA before launching any stories (SRPCERSC, 2006).

While extensive criticism has been levered towards FIFA’s ‘draconian’ demands, its non-negotiable deadlines were often the very catalyst required to transcend the usual lethargy (CTP, 2010a, p. 3).

It’s been a spectacular success. Everything according to plan, smooth as silk; South Africa successfully rebranded; no unpleasant surprises, and plenty of pleasant ones….What we saw was just how united and racially healed South Africa really is (Carlin, 2010, p. 15).

Further, Jordaan said that the official FWC sponsors had paid R2.8 billion to sponsor the FWC in 2006, and this increased to R3.2 billion for the 2010 FWC: ‘Rather than look for discounts due to lower expectations in the RSA, the companies had been prepared to pay more’ (LOC, 2008b). Of course, this income went to FIFA, not the South African government or local event organisers, who picked up the bill to host the FWC.

Prior to the 2010 FWC, Blatter stated: ‘I am still the development officer of Africa’ (LOC, 2008b, slide 44). On the other hand, an official reply to a social movement request in Durban was ‘we are an independent country and except for the stadium precinct, FIFA have no role in running the city’ (Bond, 2010). This shows how divided opinions were with regards to FIFA’s power influencing politics in public urban spaces on a national and local level. The South African authorities denied FIFA’s strong influence in the media. As Komphela (ANC) commented in relation to the design and public display legislation:

We were not afraid of FIFA; FIFA has never dictated to us. What we had is a mutual agreement and we wanted our people on the ground to be able to say that we had a grand occasion where all of us benefitted. I think it is pleasing for our
country to have taken that bold step and take care of our people (Proceedings at Joint Sitting, 2010).

This may have had something to do with the national government’s political ambitions, since the FWC signalled an opportunity to lobby for funds and fast-track projects. Van der Merwe (2008) has pointed out that the FWC represented one of the most spectacular platforms for the affirmation of the ‘African Renaissance’. Further, he stated that the FWC would give ascendency to the recognition of the new president as a leader on the African continent. ‘The new president will have a role to play in managing these expectations, and will use the event to build trust and accrue political capital for the remainder of his or her tenure’ (Van der Merwe, 2008, p. 34). Thus, any reporting on how FIFA was ‘taking over’ the country was dismissed.

After reportedly unsuccessful efforts by the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit in the Law Faculty at the University of Cape Town to access 2010 FWC documentation in terms of the *Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)*, No 2 of 2000 (Oxtoby, 2010), the newspaper *Mail & Guardian* obtained a copy of the *Bid Book*, as well as a court order from the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg to obtain access to the LOC’s tender awards. The court ruled that refusing access to these records would enable the organiser of this event to keep from the public eye documents which may disclose evidence of corruption, graft and incompetence in the organisation of the World Cup, or which may disclose that there has been no such malfeasance (Pillay, 2010).

In summary, media images and mediated texts provided evidence of the FWC’s effects on Cape Town’s urban space. Positive media coverage and visual documentation of an incident-free FWC was intended to benefit FIFA and its sponsors, as well as the RSA and its host cities, in many ways. Therefore, controlled media images from the FIFA-isled spaces helped to present FIFA, its sponsors and Cape Town in a favourable light. The strategy encompassed an over-emphasis on security legacies to the public; exaggeration of ‘fun’ security for all ‘civilised’ patrons in the RSA; implementation of a PR program for media representatives; introduction of restrictive spatial and other media accreditation terms into the 2010 FWC organisation processes. FIFA’s media restrictions in particular were meant to enhance FIFA’s profit-making mentality by protecting commercial rights and brand names through extensive coverage of the FFF on the Grand Parade in Cape Town.
5.6 RPP compliance and resistance

According to FIFA and event organisers, there was general voluntary compliance with the brand and rights securitisation process in the RSA and Cape Town, as the following statements illustrate. First, FIFA lawyer, Portela (2010), pointed out:

"we’ve had a lot of success in South Africa because the malls, businesses, shops, small companies – they’re all getting involved with the soccer promotion and campaigns, but they are complying with our rules."

The Operations Director of the event company contracted to organise the FFF responded to the question of how they dealt with 2010 CoCT By-law in conjunction with the public and businesses as follows:

"Yes, that was difficult. We had to go the businesses and distribute flyers and explain what will happen. Road closure or can’t advertise a certain way. We had strategies in place to convince the public. No one really took us to court. Everybody was very cooperative. There were always strategies in place to deal with resistance (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May)."

Importantly, this Skype interviewee responded to this issue with cynicism. In other words, it sounded like it was astonishing that everybody was cooperative, even ‘naive’ and ‘stupid’, and complied so easily while losing out on business opportunities.

In the case of the 2010 FWC in the RSA, only a few marketers carried out promotional campaigns without official consent in urban spaces. As FIFA’s brand and rights protection lawyer Portela (2010) pointed out:

"We’ve had less infringement in South Africa than we ever expected in these last months. We’ve only had a couple of things leading up to the event that we’ve taken to court. We try to be positive and use a soft approach and contact the infringer, especially with small and local businesses."

That said, in the four year period leading up to the 2010 event, FIFA lawyers had filed 2,519 cases globally against parties it accused of ‘ambush marketing’; by way of comparison, 3,200 infringement cases were filed in the lead-up to the 2006 event (The Economic Times, 2010). In the RSA, even before the tournament had begun, SAPS investigated an extraordinary 50,000 incidents of ambush marketing well beyond stadium areas (Bond, 2010). In Cape Town, the only incident in public space reported in the media was that the Table Mountain was a site of ambush marketing six months
before the tournament. A projection of four faces spreading a 2010 FWC message was seen projected onto the iconic mountain (Posterscope South Africa, 2009).

Law Professor Cornelius (2007) wrote that, prior to the event, attorneys acting for FIFA had reportedly sent out a total of almost 50 warning letters to South African companies in relation to claims for infringement of IP rights. Moreover, Kelbrick (2008) pointed out that, for example, FIFA’s tactics were to threaten litigation in respect of every reference to its events, and that the organisation ‘singles out smaller concerns with few financial or legal resources to defend themselves’. FIFA’s concern about ambush and the resulting constraints on local businesses led to much discussion and anger and a diversion of local police reserves to enforce FIFA’s RPP (Beeld, 2010).

As mentioned previously, Vuvuzeala was a term that was not ‘owned’ by FIFA in the raft of commercial protection laws and By-laws adopted for the 2010 FWC. This is a crucial point, because it was either an omission by FIFA that was not reflected in public law reforms for the FWC, or a site of public resistance to private rights of FIFA covering so many other areas of commercial ‘ownership’. Vuvuzelas were a crucial local and highly public cultural artefact immune from commercial regulation. Their popularity can be regarded, at least in part, as a symbol of resistance.

There was, however, some resistance to the monopolistic branding by FIFA. Some Cape Town residents reacted to what they called ‘FIFA’s draconian branding rules and its mafia-like control of the country’s public spaces’ (Irish, 2010). For example, a Cape Town-based artist produced ‘Fick Fufa’, ‘MAFIFA’ and ‘Feefa 2,010 Whirld Cup’ t-shirts to express growing resentment at ‘FIFA’s draconian enforcement of its iron marketing rules’ (Irish, 2010). In addition, protests were initiated after one trader was prosecuted for making key-chains depicting a football, a Vuvuzela and 2010. The story was published throughout the RSA by the Mail & Guardian.
Comments in the international and national media also criticised ‘The holy FIFA empire’ (Zapiro, 2010). South African cartoonist Zapiro produced comical sketches throughout the event, giving a critical perspective on the FWC. With his cartoon, ‘The Holy FIFA Empire’, he showed Blatter controlling the whole world, while calling the Roman emperors, the rulers of the British Empire and Genghis Kahn amateurs (see picture below).
In addition, Gaffney (2010b), in his article on FIFA’s way of managing events like these, looked ahead at the 2014 FWC in Brazil:

South Africans really were wonderful hosts, spending public money freely so that the Swiss-based monolith could rake in a record profit. It won’t take long for FIFA to count their US$3.3 billion in revenues (for the month); it will take South Africa many decades to pay off the party.

In Cape Town, renovations to the main transport hubs and the FFF location – Grand Parade – where traders had done business for decades meant that hawkers ‘were relocated, some several times’ (IRIN, 2010). They were told by CoCT to leave the area from the beginning of May 2010 until the end of the tournament (with the last match in Cape Town taking place on 29 June 2010). However, dismantling procedures took longer than expected. In an article by Barnes (2010b) on 13 July (two weeks later), the City’s mayoral committee member for economic development and tourism could not give an exact date for the move, but warned traders to be patient: ‘It will take us a while to dismantle the fan fest stage and to clear and clean up, but the traders will be moved back to their original trading areas soon’.

The representative of the event company contracted to organise the FFF stated that, initially, informal traders were supposed to move somewhere outside the event footprint (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). As a result, the national traders’ unions in Cape Town protested and demanded formal employment opportunities and a stop to relocation (IRIN, 2010). Only a couple of weeks prior to the event, CoCT and the event organiser World Sport managed to accommodate some of the informal traders, moving most of those who traded at the Grand Parade to a site adjacent site to the FFF. They did so by closing off more roads (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). Muller, Chairperson of the Grand Parade United Traders Association, noted: ‘They engaged us rather late, but CoCT did engage us in good faith here, and the alternate site is adjacent to the fan fest so we’re happy with that’ (IRIN, 2010). Nevertheless, without the previous resistance of the Union, informal traders in Cape Town would have been displaced without any opportunity to profit from the influx of tourists.

Another event of resistance related to security and commercial measures in public spaces in Cape Town during the 2010 FWC occurred when security stewards went on strike because the company Stallion Security did not pay their wages in full. A zero-
tolerance approach was in evidence when ‘SAPS fired a stun grenade and rubber bullets’ to disperse a demonstration (Mail & Guardian, 2010b). In some cases, employees were not paid at all (Libcom, 2010). South Africa’s Mail & Guardian described it as a ‘World Cup security shambles’ – ‘a failure by organisers to learn the lessons of a similar fiasco around last year’s Confederations Cup’ (Smith, 2010b). The image of exploited stadium stewards facing the full force of state security (Cape Town’s riot police force fired tear gas and rubber bullets at hundreds of security guards (Smith, 2010b) was clearly the last one that the government wished relayed by the international media. Union head, Abrahamse, stated in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel:

Sometimes people are working more than 18 hours a day, for which they get 190 rand, about €20. They were promised much more. This is exploitation. It is almost like during apartheid...most of the workers are day labourers who didn’t even read their contracts. Those are people who live in shacks. Almost every steward in Cape Town comes from Khayelitsha, the second largest township in the country. People here are desperately searching for work; they would have signed anything (Grossekathöfer, 2010).

The Mail & Guardian reported that the government spent an additional R100-million to cover the salaries of the striking guards (Hoffman, Pillay & Van Wyk, 2010). Mthethwa subsequently claimed that he pursued remuneration from the LOC. This may prove difficult as, under hosting agreements, the LOC had no permanent legal status, while Mthethwa was himself on the board of directors for the expired committee (McMichael, 2012). On the other hand, an investigative journalist from the Mail & Guardian, Basson, said that the LOC should not have been blamed for the strikes, but rather that the fault lay with SAPS for appointing Mti, who was involved in tender scandals when head of security for the 2010 FWC (ISS, 2010).

When the private security guards went on strike at the Green Point Stadium, none of the PVAs (FFF and Fan Walk) were affected since, fortuitously, all three event venues had different private security companies (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 20 May). Furthermore, the South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union general secretary Mahlangu stated that the LOC had been ‘casual’ about security for the tournament, ‘which means many of these guys are not properly trained and there has been no real vetting of them for criminal records’. Mahlangu added that ‘This is a criminal offence’ (Basson & Tolsi, 2010, p. 3), for FIFA’s safety guidelines explicitly stipulated that
stewards should have experience of securing football matches. In fact, a SAPS representative identified the occurrence of the strikes as the primary threat to the FWC event because police cadets were deployed without any experience in crowd management. Nevertheless, they received security clearance, a primary requirement for this duty: ‘Fortunately no serious incidents occurred as most students were unfamiliar with the environment should an emergency have occurred, despite their briefing’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 19 May).

In summary, despite bad press for FIFA in the planning and implementation stage relating to ‘draconian’ advertisement laws (Hyde, 2010) and rough on-site policing tactics (Laganparsad, 2010b), the RSA government and the High Court supported FIFA by not only acknowledging FIFA’s existing rights but also by introducing new rules (e.g., prohibited trademarks and By-laws). Hence, a very strong determination by the RSA government and by Cape Town was observed to please FIFA. Also, Cape Town’s residents and business owners did not show much resistance and major ambush marketing attempts did not take place. As it was mentioned before ‘everybody was very cooperative’ (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May) and nobody seemed to question FIFA’s tactics. This may seem surprising, since businesses were denied advertising rights and street traders were denied the opportunity to conduct their business in the CRZs. According to Cornelissen (2012, p. 330-331), the protests and demonstrations witnessed during the FWC ‘were part of a much larger and on-going series of contestations among social and political groups’.

5.7 Summary

This chapter presented findings on the structures, polices and strategies used to provide security and protection for brands and commercial rights at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town.

The success of FIFA’s RPP depended on two major strategies: First, FIFA attaches importance to sufficient protection from ambush marketing activities being available under the laws of the host country and respected cities. While neither SAFA, the RSA government, the host cities nor other third parties were entitled to undertake any
marketing program, FIFA required specific legislation to be passed at all relevant governmental levels to protect its brand and its sponsors’ rights.

Second, the RPP depended on the implementation of PVAs and CRZs. The spatially-based strategies served the event owner and its sponsors as an extended marketing platform. It also meant that not only the commercial rules applied to these spaces, but also FIFA’s strict security requirements applied as well, hence ‘ensuring the event footprint was extremely safe’ (CTP, 2010a, p. 11). Thus, in order to control and monitor design, public order, nuisance behaviour, and social movements more efficiently, and to protect against ambush marketing and unauthorised commercial activities, the 2010 CoCT By-law CRZs were passed in Cape Town. CRZs surrounding FIFA’s event venues (i.e. stadium, FFF, PVAs and tourist sites) impacted on individuals and entrepreneurs in Cape Town’s inner-city, and included prohibitions or restrictions on advertising and trading.

While regulations pertaining to content were very clearly outlined in national legislation and CoCT legislation, the spatially-based strategies were not as easy to understand, since they were only introduced at short notice and not visibly demarcated. Many stakeholders were not adequately informed about the application process and the CRZ meanings. It was not only difficult to know where they began/ended, but also the short-term notice made an application for the maintenance of a sign almost impossible – which consequently led to a feeling of uncertainty in civil society. The Capetonian population perceived the ‘business as usual’ regulations in CRZs as rather confusing and draconian. This consequently led to a temporary ‘Fear of FIFA’ state. In the Cape Town context, advertising was already strictly controlled through the OA & SB. The 2010 CoCT By-law added a further layer of control on FIFA’s behalf over Cape Town’s urban spaces through exclusionary policing methods (brand police) and beautification strategies, which sought to defend order, maintain positive images, and protect commercial rights.

The event spaces under FIFA’s auspice were policed and controlled by a range of security providers. Hot spots, in conjunction with visible policing, were identified as one of the key strategies in this research context which demonstrated the fragmented
security approach. The findings indicated that a ‘soft’ policing approach was used to control VIPs and tourists in the ‘FIFA-ised’ spaces, while a zero-tolerance approach was utilised for hooligans, protesters, informal traders, the homeless/street children and ambush marketers.

Large crowds were directed towards, into and out of the FIFA-ised spaces. They were concentrated, apportioned and re-distributed to various parts of the inner-city by means of the interconnected spaces. Unauthorised persons, forbidden objects and unwanted behaviour were filtered using different security strategies. Visual control through security personnel, biometric control by CCTV, and automatic face tracking were some of the more common operational measures.

The media strategy encompassed an over-emphasis on security legacies to the public, an exaggeration of ‘fun’ security for all ‘civilised’ patrons in the RSA, implementation of a PR program for media representatives, introduction of restrictive spatial, and other media accreditation terms into the 2010 FWC organisation processes. FIFA’s media restrictions in particular were meant to enhance FIFA’s profit-making mentality, by protecting commercial rights and brand names through extensive coverage of the FFF on the Grand Parade in Cape Town. Thus, considerable care was taken to ensure that every feature of the FWC reflected a positive view of the FIFA brand, its sponsors, Cape Town and the RSA respectively.

FIFA-ised spaces served a dual process for the host city. On the one hand, Cape Town was able to show off the extent of its preparations in a ‘fun and safe place’ through high media visibility. Also, Cape Town’s stringent legal framework pertaining to outdoor advertising, as well as its commitment to please the commercial interests of the event owner and sponsors, strengthened its future event bidding and marketing process. On the other hand, Cape Town needed to ‘FIFA-ise’ in order to be an attractive host. It had to not only acknowledge FIFA’s existing rights, but also needed to introduce new policies, which gave short shrift to public consultation. Cape Town was complicit in the local economy having limited prospects for ‘business as usual’. The next chapter positions the study within the scholarly literature on security risk management and the commercialisation of spaces at sport mega-events.
Chapter 6: Discussion

6.1. Introduction

This chapter builds on the findings presented in Chapter 5 by responding to the research aim and objectives outlined in Chapter 1. It does so by evaluating PVAs and CRZs at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town and applying a neoliberal conceptual framework, together with associated theories of Festivalisation and Disneyisation, to this analysis. The overarching thesis aim was to explore the security risk management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at a sport mega-event. That aim was derived from a review of literature (Chapter 2), which ascertained that research into the securitisation of zoned public spaces at sport mega-events is an under-developed area of scholarship – particularly in developing nation contexts. The latter meant the selection of the RSA was all the more pertinent, and the choice of Cape Town – an aspirational ‘world-class’ city – a salient case study.

Just as importantly, the review of literature also established that the securitisation of public spatial zones at mega-events – PVAs and CRZs – fulfils varying functions. Herein the focus became security risk management and the commercial organisation of public space in respect of three key stakeholders – the event owner, the event sponsors and the event host. The review of literature also revealed that few researchers have made an explicit connection between security policy and the commercial objectives and responsibilities of mega-event stakeholders. Previous scholarship has focused mostly on security in respect of threats to public order, terrorism, crime, and so on. Moreover, the ambush marketing literature, while extensive, has primarily focused on actions in stadia and event precincts; PVAs and CRZs are a relatively new, publicly accessible commercial extension to mega-event spaces. The research objectives developed as a consequence of the review of literature are as follows:
1. To assess the roles and interests of key stakeholders (the event owner, the event sponsors and the event host) in the process of strategically managing CRZs and PVAs.

2. To explore the structures, policies, and strategies that influenced urban security and risk management protocols at CRZs and PVAs.

3. To analyse structures, policies, and strategies to combat ambush marketing, while minimising public inconvenience, in CRZs and PVAs.

Stemming from these objectives, security risk management and the commercial organisation of PVAs and CRZs were the key areas of focus. Figure 6.1 graphically depicts how these domains were explored conceptually and structurally.

Figure 6.1: Security risk management and commercial organisation of PVAs and CRZs

Based on the research aim and objectives, this chapter starts by analysing stakeholders’ roles and interests in the securitisation process at PVAs and CRZs. This is followed by
an evaluation of the structures, policies, and strategies that influenced urban security policies and politics. Subsequently, the chapter examines security measures pertaining to ambush marketing in respect of PVAs and CRZs. Finally, the overall findings of the thesis are evaluated in light of the original aim and objectives, together with suggestions for further research.

6.2 FIFA-isation of public spaces

Chapter 5 argued that FIFA, as the 2010 FWC event owner, epitomised a neoliberal stakeholder strategy by outsourcing the cost of, and responsibility for, staging the event. This included public order and spatial security measures, as well as controls over the commercial purposes of PVAs and CRZs. Concurrently, FIFA gleaned substantial revenue from broadcasting contracts and official sponsorships. The host country and, in the case of this thesis, the CoCT government, relied upon public/private partnerships in staging and securing the FWC, thereby taking on a neoliberal form of governmentality in order to realise its own expectations from the event, as well as those of FIFA. This chapter now discusses each of these key elements: (i) privatisation; (ii) public/private partnerships; (iii) outsourcing; and (iv) creation of new and internal markets; underpinning this process, and what they reveal about the FIFA-isation of CRZs and PVAs in Cape Town’s FWC.

6.2.1 Privatisation

As Chapter 5 demonstrated, temporary privatisation of public spaces took place as a consequence of FIFA insisting upon a *de facto* occupation of public spaces in Cape Town - notably the physical environments of PVAs and CRZs. FIFA’s colonisation of these spaces extended its FWC marketing and sponsorship platform. This was manifest in the legal measures deployed, whether by FIFA in respect of ambush marketing, or by CoCT in the context of street traders. As the findings indicated, the commercial purposes of PVAs and CRZs were established by FIFA from the very start (Guarantees, Host City Agreement and By-law). This highlights FIFA’s immense power in the bid agreement: although it was negotiated with the RSA government, municipal governments and civil society were obliged to submit to higher level arrangements if
they wanted to host the FWC. Neither the RSA government nor, in the case of Cape Town the CoCT, adequately informed or consulted citizens and/or local businesses about planned securitisation and commercial restriction measures for public spaces at the FWC (i.e. CoCT’s OA & SB).

For Sennett (1977) the polarity between and complementarity of publicness and privateness are the most important characteristics of urban life. Through the morphological characteristics and organisation of space, defining some places as private and others as public, individuals know which places are open and accessible not only for them but also for the presence of others. Thus, Siebel’s (2000) categorisation of the polarity between public and private spaces can be applied to better understand how ‘open’ urban spaces were constructed during the 2010 FWC in Cape Town.

Table 6.1: Public/private dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>FFF &amp; municipal PVAs</th>
<th>CRZs (Fan Walk)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Public/private</td>
<td>Public/private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Public/private</td>
<td>Public/private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material/Symbolic</td>
<td>private</td>
<td>public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PVAs and CRZs were legally public/private spaces. Both zones were governed by public law (i.e. TMP, MMA and Code of Advertisement), while at the same time they were under the private authority of FIFA, via the RPP, which had the power to define who may use these premises and for what purposes. The municipality governed by public law was not entirely replaced by FIFA’s RPP, as all 2010 FWC By-laws still had to comply with national municipal By-laws. But public planning was subjugated by private planning through FIFA, while public administration was partly replaced by private management (i.e. contracted event organisers). Moreover, whereas people moving in PVAs and CRZs had previously been merely citizens in civil society, they now became customers of an entertainment provider, the FWC, in FIFA-ised spaces.
The enforcement of these laws was not restricted merely to SAPS and the Metro Police; it applied also to private security and specialised sponsor protection teams (e.g., FIFA’s RPP venue teams) concentrating on ambush marketing and other commercial behaviour deemed illegal. Suspected ambush marketers, when observed by private security officers, were referred to an enforcement authority. Thus, while private security detected relevant breaches of the By-laws, it lacked the power to enforce these laws themselves. Therefore, they devolved the formalities, including any suspects in custody, to the public police for official processing, potentially in the World Cup Courts or other public agencies that adopted FIFA’s overarching mandate. The MMA provided for the establishment of a temporary enforcement army, which meant outsourcing this power and responsibility to many private security companies. These powers exceeded those given to any group other than SAPS. Such confluences of public and private interests were made possible in the context of the FWC because, under a neoliberalising global framework, both NPOs (in this case FIFA) and the state (in this case CoCT) did more than merely serve NGOs and taxpayers respectively. Rather, the mega-event became a vehicle for FIFA’s acquisition of global capital (through sponsors and broadcasters), while CoCT used theming of public spaces as a strategy to showcase itself as a ‘world city’ for tourists and investors.

Cape Town’s FFF and CRZs were interdependent with the FWC urban environment: the spaces had to be located in the inner-city and be accessible by transport. Therefore, these two FIFA-ised spaces were privatised to the extent that no third party advertising was allowed (economic monopoly), and patrons were not permitted to voice dissent towards FIFA (political monopoly). Both spaces were public/private in their functionality as they were publically accessible but controlled (with the support of the state) to suit the commercial interests of the event owner and FWC sponsors. The FFF in Cape Town was the commercial equivalent of a shopping mall. The spaces therein were rented out and all ‘tenants’ were obliged to follow FIFA’s rules. This precluded the involvement of the bulk of local small business – small traders and hawkers, who were deemed ‘undesirable’. Indeed, many of them were ‘relocated’ in the lead up to the FWC, which compromised their capacity to engage in ‘business as usual’. The FFF is an example of what Schlosser (2011) has called a themed sport space, presenting illusions about openness and access by offering a tightly branded commercial
environment for public consumption. Central ownership allowed FIFA greater control over who was allowed to rent out FFF spaces, whereas a fragmented vetting system (Dijkstra, 2000) could have compromised the spatial standardisation and commercial homogenisation so critical to the FIFA-isation process.

The material and symbolic characteristics of the FFF, other PVAs and the CRZs varied somewhat. PVAs were visibly demarcated (by a fence) while CRZs were mainly ‘invisible’ demarcated spaces and places to the public no fences or barriers. However, in some cases fences were erected and access control was established through accreditation and ticketing. In Cape Town, spatial differentiations on the basis of PVAs not only corresponded to legal and functional differences and to different security standards, but also to different degrees of commercialisation between inside and outside; something that Klauser (2008a) has emphasised previously in the context of the 2006 FWC. In the present study it is important to differentiate between fenced and non-fenced spaces as the former in particular signals the exclusivity of zones through visual territorialisation. As Wagner (1999) has pointed out, design, materials, and symbols heighten and spell out the legal, functional, and social differentiation of public and private spaces. Fences around PVAs not only separated specific event spaces, but they also marked the spatial limits of FIFA’s sphere of influence in respect of brand and marketing rights within the urban environment.

6.2.2 Public/private partnerships

In Chapter 5 it was argued that policing consisted of private security, national and international police forces as well as FIFA security experts. These findings can be compared to what scholars such as Samara (2010b) and Abrahamsen and Williams (2007) discovered within the organisation of the CID in Cape Town: a clear shift towards a hybridisation of security governance (public/private partnerships), concurrent with the revitalisation and de facto privatisation of public spaces. CoCT and most of the security personnel had communicated and worked with other local security agencies previously, and so the public was familiar with the interplay between private and public security officers in Cape Town. The CID model was underpinned by a ‘hot-spots’ policing strategy (Duffield, 2001; Willett, 2005). Since the spaces (PVAs and CRZs)
were only temporary in nature, the emphasis was not on long-term urban redevelopment but on services, such as cleanliness and order. FIFA, of course, had outsourced local security responsibility to RSA and, in this case, the CoCT, so it in effect relied on the CID model to monitor and manage FWC public spaces in Cape Town. Many of the private security firms were employed only a week or two before the event, and there were disagreements among public/private stakeholders about lines of responsibility, and there was – if anything – a pragmatic rather than legalistic approaching to ‘policing’. This demonstrates an uneven and ad hoc nature of some of the security services and their roles in commercial protection within FIFA-ised spaces.

Private/public security forces learned about new tactics and techniques used by ambush marketers and the strategies they ought to rely upon to detect them. In doing so, police and other national security forces developed an understanding of ‘global best practice’ is respect of anti-ambushing at a mega-event. The NATJOINTS has been established as a permanent feature of major events: it was reactivated during local government elections in May 2011, with the SAPS and SANDF using a similar zoning system to the FWC (SAPA, 2011). FIFA and its security partners appreciated and understood that the success of the 2010 FWC ‘on the field will be greatly enhanced through law enforcement ensuring a safe and secure environment off the field’ (INTERPOL, 2010c). Indeed, FIFA was praised for its close collaboration with SAPS and INTERPOL ahead of the 2010 FWC, which INTERPOL considered a ‘model and blueprint respectively of international co-operation for future FIFA and other international sport events’ (INTERPOL, 2010c). Thus, FIFA was more involved and took greater initiatives towards security in this FWC than at Germany in 2006.

6.2.3 Outsourcing

FIFA’s influence on national and local legislation was both temporary and permanent. The RSA and the hosting cities were required to pass temporary laws in order to be able to protect FIFA’s brand and the commercial rights of its sponsors. FIFA acted as a ‘shadow municipal agency’, with its own jurisdiction and no accountability to local residents – despite enormous influence over decisions affecting the domestic economy. All costs associated with security measures were borne by the LOC and/or the
government. Hence, FIFA made no financial contribution to the securitisation efforts that were required to operationalise the event and safeguard the FWC brand, FIFA’s reputation as an event owner, and the sponsors’ commercial interests.

The 2010 FWC security planning and implementation was achieved through FIFA outsourcing such responsibilities. One of the critical requirements the LOC had to guarantee was that no responsibility regarding security could be ‘apportioned’ to FIFA and its sponsors (Joordan, 2009). On the other hand, FIFA had considerable say and influence over 2010 FWC security planning and implementation. This tactic reflected FIFA’s neoliberal agenda, and epitomised the unequal relationship between the event owner and the event host. Authority was hierarchically structured, with FIFA at the apex, but responsibility for the implementation of the event owner’s product was devolved to the event organiser (CoCT), which took the financial and operational risks in putting on the event. In doing so, CoCT was something of a FWC franchisee, though very much a temporary vendor. CoCT was itself part of this neoliberal paradigm: it used a combination of public/private security and policing within FWC ‘open’ spaces, and did so (in part) by outsourcing responsibility to private agents – private security companies, both local and international. CoCT also outsourced service training of FWC personnel to the Disney Corporation: this global entertainment company was hired to provide an American customer service model to cater to the needs of FWC tourists and fans.

At the 2010 FWC, the event host therefore became something of a ‘middle man’ in a neoliberal process: FIFA (an NPO) optimised its revenue by ensuring that entrepreneurial interests (TV and sponsors) were front and centre in the event spaces. In turn, this provided FIFA with substantial income streams, while the event hosts assumed the financial cost of staging the spectacle and associated operational risks.

6.2.4 Creation of new markets and internal markets

As reflected in Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ (1992) and Boyle and Haggerty’s (2009c) ‘Precautionary Society’, FIFA strategically voiced its fears about illegal commercial activities at the FWC, based on the ambiguous spectre of ambush marketing. FIFA
engaged the media to discuss its concerns, while FIFA lawyers and consultants were prompted to provide expert opinions about the need to securitise FWC commercial rights in CRZs and PVAs. Subsequently, FIFA’s RPP was a major part of the organisation and management of the tournament.

As Fussey and Coaffee (2011) have previously argued in the Olympic context, security risks are not exogenously defined, but are selectively and socially constructed. In a similar vein, Bennett and Haggerty (2011c) have suggested that if something is ‘securitised’ it does not automatically mean that the subject matter is materially important or critical for survival. Rather, it means that a powerful organisation or individual has decided that ‘something’ is a security threat. Economic risks at the 2010 FWC followed the same principles, as they were created in accordance with a fear campaign orchestrated by FIFA. In accordance with Louw’s (2012, p. 668) argument, FIFA’s aggressive RPP can be interpreted as a ‘monopolistic pursuit of market control, in the interests of maximising the potential commercial value’. It is technically an NPO, but this does not mean that profit is not of prime interest. It merely means that the profits cannot be directed towards an owner or shareholders. FIFA has other purposes for its revenue, a controversial subject that has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Eick, 2010b, 2011a; Jennings, 2010; Tomlinson, 2000).

The commercial policing of the FWC became more efficient when FIFA combined public order security discourses with its stated need for sponsor protection in event spaces. The FWC security strategies and the deployment of public/private security staff by the LOC operated to meet these twin goals. In Cape Town this created new demand for ambush marketing security consultants and lawyers, including FIFA’s newly established RPP legal department and brand protection teams. Leander (2005) has previously stated that the mobilisation of insecurity and fear are open to the construction of new security ‘problems’ and the marketing of new ‘solutions’. In the case of Cape Town, not only was the threat of ambush marketing pitched as a major ‘concern’, one which ‘required’ substantive legislating and policing on the part of the host city to safeguard FWC branding and sponsors, but also to try to facilitate a ‘business as usual’ mantra for locals. While FIFA restricted competition in terms of marketing and business within the event footprint, its risk averse attitudes to public order and commercial
protections provided a boon for security suppliers and copyright lawyers. Also, of course, from the perspective of FWC sponsors, the more they paid, the more exclusivity they expected and event-specific protections to achieve that.

For the 2010 FWC, there was demand for security on behalf of the RSA government, Cape Town authorities and the Capetonian population by the order of FIFA (‘security’ was one of the 17 bid Guarantees). This demand for security services was met by multiple suppliers (see Section 6.2.2). The 2010 FWC put the RSA and Cape Town on the world football stage and in the global media spotlight, which provided RSA with a rationale to access security markets world-wide and, using the FWC as a backdrop, substantially increased its surveillance equipment, weapons capability, and related policing resources. The FWC thus provided an opportunity for RSA to strategically improve its capacity to monitor and secure public spaces in the wake of this event. Moreover, as the next section demonstrates, although CoCT was required to comply with an apoply of FIFA directives, it had its own strategic interests in terms of playing the role of FWV event host.

6.3 Host city’s neoliberal role and interests

For the FWC, Cape Town was conceptualised as a ‘world-class’ city, a place where tourists could enjoy a captivating natural environment and where businesses could invest with confidence. Cape Town followed what Alegi has called ‘a pro-growth ideology’, wherein place-promotion was necessary ‘to generate economic growth in a fiercely competitive global market’, based on attracting people (i.e. tourism) and capital (i.e. foreign investors) to its shores (Alegi, 2007, p. 328). For Cape Town, the 2010 FWC was a global marketing tool to pursue those goals.

As has been shown, both the RSA government and CoCT worked assiduously to portray a safe and exciting destination image for tourists (particularly football fans), while also assuring investors that the Cape and the country were both ‘open for business’. This was done, of course, in concert with FIFA. The RSA’s national IP and competition legislation, which included provisions for ambush marketing, accorded with FIFA’s commercial expectations. RSA was thus attractive to FIFA as a host nation because it
already had anti-ambush marketing laws in place (Dean, 2010), and, moreover, was prepared to extend these to accommodate the FWC event.

In order to address the research objectives relating to FWC stakeholder interests and their socio-spatial consequences for public spaces in Cape Town, Häussermann and Siebel’s (1993) Festivalisation theory was adapted to this thesis. This concept provides a frame by which to discuss the implications of the findings presented in Chapter 5.

6.3.1 Festivalisation

Häussermann and Siebel’s (1993) concept of the Festivalisation of urban spaces at sport mega-events was reflected at the 2010 FWC. The following three key aspects will be discussed here: socio-political issues; acceleration of security development; and constraints on public participation.

Socio-political issues

In the 2010 FWC context, Festivalisation strategies were evident when considering constraints in the management of public spaces in inner-city Cape Town and its outer fringes. This involved unequal and spatially fragmented provision of security services, with a strong emphasis on the inner-city FFF and CRZ but comparatively little attention with respect to the municipal PVAs, which were surveilled and policed with scant local resources. Security was focused and targeted on ‘hot spots’ – the FFF and CRZs in Cape Town’s CBD and around the stadium. This was done to meet the security expectations of FIFA and its sponsors, as well as to mollify apprehensions among tourists and affluent, white locals who resided in security-intensive gated communities. While the FFF and CRZs were highly policed and monitored by CCTV, non-hosting cities and townships in the Western Cape Province remained less policed and monitored. SAPS admitted that normal police operations, particularly in the FWC host cities and their surrounding areas, might be ‘affected’ during the period of the tournament (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008).

Security was not only fragmented spatially, but also in accordance to specific groups of people. In the media, many South Africans were concerned that safety and security
strategies focused on tourist safety to a greater extent than that of the citizens of the RSA (Bob & Swart, 2011; Swart et al., 2010). As the Guarantees and OAA indicated, FIFA-ised spaces were socio-spatial security fields that were ordered hierarchically to secure the needs of the FIFA Family, sponsors, corporate entities, VIPs and tourists. Securitisation in this context produced a form of social ordering based on power relations. While very modest FFF crime statistics were reported in the media, crime statistics for the four municipal PVAs were not made public. A few sceptical voices were raised, stating that these latter spaces had a range of unreported problems. Differential crime rates – assuming they existed – could be related to the participation of different demographic groups (FFF – middle-class and municipal PVAs – marginalised communities). A more logical explanation may be that security and surveillance operations focused expressly on FFFs, not the municipal PVAs.

In terms of commercial interests, controversial By-laws and CIDCs were integrated in Cape Town’s security apparatus prior to the FWC. Thus, Cape Town displayed some of the features that Soja (1989) has attributed to ‘postmodern urbanism’, and which in the 2010 FWC context can be referred to as social polarisation, inequality and exclusion. These features were intensified during the event through the 2010 CoCT By-law. FIFA and CoCT were confident that security could only be assured within ‘certain boundaries’ (FIFA, 2004b, p.70). Consequently, spaces in between and around identified ‘hot spots’ were less protected from ambush marketing and other illegal activities, which presented a challenge to authorities. This made PVAs, and especially the FFF and CRZs more important as commercially intensive public spaces.

Hence, at the FWC, the Festivalisation of urban spaces can be interpreted as a combination of global and local stakeholder power, both of which served different neoliberal interests. The Festivalisation of FWC themed spaces in Cape Town involved the expansion of municipal By-laws targeting the urban poor and the informal economy, aggressive enforcement by ‘brand’ police, the privatisation of security, and the de facto privatisation of public space. Taken together, this all contributed to spatial fragmentation and a fortification of the spaces between Cape Town’s rich and poor (Beckett & Herbert, 2006; Caldeira, 2000; Wacquant, 2002).
Acceleration of security development

Hiller (2000) has argued that at sport mega-events, the key stakeholders – tournament owners, corporate sponsors and local organisers – are obsessed with security measures to safeguard their respective interests and assets. In terms of the 2010 FWC, considerable care was taken to ensure that every feature of the mega-event reflected a positive view of the FIFA brand and its sponsors, including the use of, and reliance on, security technology to safeguard the tournament and fan spaces. Blatter announced beforehand that security ‘would rival that seen at the Beijing Olympic Games’ (DawnMedia.com, 2009). The RSA placed the same importance on security technology. The RSA government was pitching its own ‘product’: spectacular security (Boyle & Haggerty, 2005). In the media, technology was portrayed as an instrument to achieve a maximal level of dominance over South African cities. Each piece of equipment was depicted as state of the art and beyond reproach in effectiveness and operation, ‘world-class’ and ‘cutting-edge’ (McMichael, 2012).

In the case of RSA, and the context of Cape Town specifically, there was a determination to fast-track touted urban securitisation strategies. As the leading security official in the city put it: ‘A World Cup is a dream for every police chief’, … ‘I can ask for anything, and I get it!’ (Shrey, 2008). There was, nonetheless, urgency in bringing to fruition security planning and associated technologies and apparatus. As the PGWC (2011a, p. 193) put it: ‘No one wanted fingers to be pointed at political parties or leaders, so the project was given due priority and proudly acknowledged by all as successful in the end’. As with the 2006 FWC in Germany (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010) the 2010 event was defacto a test site or ‘laboratory’ for complex high-tech surveillance applications: unmanned vehicles, drones, mobile fingerprint identification systems, RFID.

While the fast track measures were ultimately meant to serve the securitisation of the FWC, SAPS and public security agencies also used the FWC to develop or restock military arsenals. This was also an opportunity to experiment with the containment and modification of public urban spaces to suit post-event aspirations of reconfigured state security and social control measures therein. According to the Minister of Police, Mthethwa, ‘the resources, the re-skilling of police, expertise and international best
practices acquired’ during the FWC ‘are serving as an enormous arsenal in our fight against crime’ (Gov.za, 2010b). Security training and associated employment increased, while key international partnership networks were established (e.g., with INTERPOL and FWC participating countries). Thus, the FWC provided a basis for what might be termed a neoliberalising of urban security in Cape Town. It allowed increased state authority by extending the public/private security forces (440 jobs were created in Cape Town) and technology systems (196 cameras within nine months prior the event) in the inner-city. Surveillance technology, which was accelerated by CoCT authorities, was touted as a measure that would allow the city’s police to keep pace with ‘world class’ security developments. This was also an opportunity for CoCT to demonstrate to citizens its latest surveillance capacities and security resources – both as a deterrent to potential felons or dissidents, and as a display of state power. New security technologies and equipment were flagged in the media and made public through pre-event testing.

Greater security presence and new technological security measures (e.g., ‘morphine touch’ machine) led to an increase in the number of arrests, and the relocation of street children and the homeless to outskirts of the city (Van Blerk, 2011). These security measures are evidence of the Festivalisation of urban spaces in the context of a mega-event, and, from a social control perspective, are an example of what Debord (1983, p. 1) has acerbically described as a ‘society of the spectacle’. In this case, CoCT used the FWC as a neoliberal instrument to legitimise the development of its security capabilities during the event, but with an eye on their normalisation thereafter.

**Public participation**

Neoliberal cities with an entrepreneurial agenda may strategically use a mega-event to put forward major developments, but not always with widespread public consultation. Under a Festivalised model, CoCT was ‘obliged’ to deliver on its infrastructure promises irrespective of any local opposition. Throughout the event planning process, local stakeholders were neither consulted, nor able to contribute towards, parliamentary guarantees in respect of the 2010 FWC. The local community demanded that CoCT honour its commitment to the BEE policy, which was aimed at generating business for SMEs, and black entrepreneurs more generally (Ngonyama, 2010). However, the ANC MP, Komphela, stated that the BEE policy had not been seriously considered and
nothing had been done for marginalised communities (SRPLGPCs, 2006). In fact, one interviewee who was responsible for organising the four municipal PVAs stated that not all FIFA-driven By-laws offered a platform for public consultation in the lead up the FWC.

This lack of community involvement in decision-making is reflective of the Festivalisation of space in a mega-event setting. Urban security and commercialisation imperatives were inherent in every dimension of planning and operation of the 2010 FWC in Cape Town. This reflected the ideology of neoliberalism, where FIFA and the CoCT combined to regulate commercial opportunities and the scope of ‘business as usual’ at the FWC. Only carefully selected individuals (sponsors and approved businesses) were offered the chance to become engaged entrepreneurs at this event (Rose, 1999). Disempowerment was reflected most poignantly by forced removals of informal traders and hawkers, which was particularly painful in Cape Town because of the memory of Apartheid evictions. The local preferences and needs of the less powerful and marginalised in Cape Town were not sought after nor valued by the FWC planners (Newton, 2009). The securitisation of FIFA-ised spaces worked to exclude or strictly regulate the urban poor, who faced geographic, economic and social obstacles in joining the hub of activity in the FFF and Fan Walk. Overall, then, Cape Town displayed (classed and racialised) social boundaries and (commercialised) spatial boundaries during the FWC (see also above: Haferburg (2011) under heading ‘socio-political issues’). Not only was this a legacy of displacement within the context of the FWC, but also the local community inherited the content and enforcement practices associated with this regime that subsists well after the matches and the time frames for their operation have ceased.

A key justification by RSA and CoCT for providing public funding of the FWC was that this global event was ‘in the public interest’. That argument included a major economic rationale: there was a strong expectation that the FWC would create opportunities for national and local businesses (Dean, 2007). However, as this research has shown, the RSA government failed to deliver on its trickle-down promises of commercial engagement: informal traders were negatively affected by the government’s displacement strategies and commercially restrictive tactics (Desay & Vahed, 2010;
Van Der Westhuizen, 2007). Instead, taxpayer-funded FWC infrastructure (R 113,175,000) – in this case PVAs and CRZs – served as a platform for advertising by corporate sponsors.

Critical responses against FIFA’s RPP from government officials, such as Western Cape Premier Zille, were evident, as in this lament: ‘I should have flexed my muscle in response to FIFA’s demands a long time ago. They are not a colonial power’ (Raborife, 2010). There were three isolated issues re-negotiated by CoCT: to abrogate FIFA’s plan to enclose the Fan Walk with an EZ; the proposed 2010 CoCT By-law; and requirements around city beautification. However, these achievements had minimal impact on the overall dominance of FIFA’s negotiating position and prowess. As Figure 5.6 has graphically illustrated, almost the entire CBD fell either within CRZs or was under the provision of the MMA. These spaces were fortified in order ‘to be safe’ but also beautified according to aesthetic standards established by FIFA (CTP, 2010b). It appears that CoCT accepted this power asymmetry as unavoidable, and chose the ‘play it safe’ approach by ceding to FIFAs demands. Indeed, in terms of the bid agreement, both the RSA and Cape Town were virtually compelled to ‘FIFA-ise’.

The RSA government had been cautioned about the power of FIFA by other governments and sporting bodies, and given this advice far in advance. The Director-General of the French Football Federation warned the RSA not to agree to a blanket acceptance of all FIFA’s rules and conditions on the assumption that the country would derive sufficient economic benefit from the event (Sports and Recreation Portfolio Committee, 2005). The RSA government was informed about FIFA’s RPP and related security issues, but chose to accept FIFA’s requirements rather than challenge them. Whereas Germany adopted a moderate approach to copyright of FIFA terms, as with the ‘Fussball WM 2006’ and ‘WM 2006’ High Court decisions, the RSA imposed stringent provisions against any form of ambush marketing by non-sponsors, mainly expressed in the provisions of the amended MMA of 1941, the temporary 2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts nos. 11 & 12 (2006) and, in the COCT context, the OA & SB (2009). While the amended MMA and OA & SB undoubtedly strengthened the RSA’s and Cape Town’s event bidding process, they also provided greater rights to FIFA and its sponsors. The RSA, perhaps given its position as a developing nation, negotiated
from a position of weakness, agreeing to a very unequal power relationship that FIFA exploited.

As Bond (2010) has put it, the RSA is more economically and politically vulnerable than advanced Western countries and has not yet developed a strong sensibility of how to cope with the demands of transnational organisations and multi-national corporations. This may also be a reason why FIFA now invites developing countries to stage the FWC; they lack experience in dealing with corporate entities and therefore accede to demands in their desperation to host the event in order to become ‘world-class’. As Rose (2010, p. 207) has pointed out, ‘it was a tricky situation for the South African government: hosting the World Cup necessitated getting into bed with FIFA’.

In the years leading up to the 2010 FWC, there were a range of protests about socio-economic conditions and government policy in the RSA, including the commercialisation of municipal services, rising poverty, inequality and conditions in the country’s slums (Freedom of Expression Institute and Centre for Sociological Research, 2009). According to Bond (2011), this reflected the distorted character of ‘growth’ that the RSA witnessed after introducing neoliberal macro and micro economic policies. The growing anger also reflected some specific catalysts: the FWC’s gentrification of inner-city access by informal traders and the displacement of shack dwellers Cronjé et al. (2010) and Cornelissen (2012) In other words, uneven planning, operation and implementation of security measures in public urban spaces pertaining to the protection of the event owner’s brand and sponsors’ rights led to dissatisfaction in civil society, causing organised disobedience against political authorities.

Cape Town evidenced public opposition to the regulation that governed public spaces - PVAs and CRZs. As the findings demonstrated, informal traders were moved outside the event footprint (Anonymous, 2011, pers. comm., 25 May). As a result, the national traders’ unions in Cape Town protested and demanded formal employment opportunities and a stop to re-location (IRIN, 2010). Only a couple of weeks prior to the event, CoCT and the FFF event logistics organiser, World Sport, managed to accommodate some of the informal traders, moving most of those who traded at the Grand Parade to a site adjacent site to the FFF. Nevertheless, without the previous
resistance of the Union, informal traders in Cape Town would have been displaced without any realistic opportunity to trade tourists. This opposition by the marginalised and less affluent population reacted against the ‘clean’ urban environment that governments want to produce with their Festivalisation tactics.

6.4 Strategising public space

This thesis has focused on the spatiality of security in public spaces, notably PVAs and CRZs. The measures that were implemented for the purposes of safeguarding FIFA’s brand and sponsors’ rights in Cape Town are now canvassed. It can be argued that CoCT had to re-think its security structure with regards to its objectives, organisation, operation, legal changes and technology. As per Boyle and Haggerty’s (2009c) observations on mega-events, CoCT also needed to think beyond the event to ‘re-rationalise’ the spaces for other users or consumers post-2010.

The FIFA-isation of Cape Town’s PVAs and CRZs was similar to the main tenets of Disneyisation. The commercial and aesthetic dimensions of public spaces, as well as their control and surveillance, were crucial for the protection of the FIFA brand and its sponsors’ rights. The success of FIFA’s RPP depended on two major strategies: First, sufficient protection under the laws of the host country and respective cities from ambush marketing activities. As part of the contractual agreement between FIFA and the RSA government, specific legislation was passed at all relevant governmental levels to protect FIFA’s brand and its sponsors’ rights. Second, the RPP depended on the implementation of PVAs and CRZs. These spatially based strategies served the interests of the event owner and its sponsors, with the host city being reconfigured into an extended marketing platform which, at the same time, required context-specific public security and anti-ambushing measures.
6.4.1 Structure and policies

By-law and policing

Consistent with a Festivalisation strategy, inner-city public spaces were ‘beautified’, strictly controlled and standardised to suit the aesthetic expectations and commercial requirements of the event owner, sponsors and the CoCT. This included the requirement that people who wanted to use such spaces had to meet behavioural standards (nuisance, public disorder and ambushing) as regulated in the 2010 CoCT By-law. To some degree, this shaped how public space could be utilised and by whom. Through the vaguely and ambiguously worded ban on ‘nuisance behaviours’ in the 2010 CoCT By-law, police could selectively target both individuals and groups seen as ‘problematic’ in respect of the ‘world-class’ image that the city wanted to convey to tourists and the international media. Thus, an unspoken and unofficial form of social vetting became a prominent part of Cape Town’s security modus operandi both before and during the FWC. In many respects, the 2010 CoCT By-law was used to ‘clean the streets’ of street traders and homeless people (Du Plessis & Van Garderen, 2010). Thus, the alignment of beautification and securitisation of public spaces was underpinned by this By-law.

In order to control and monitor public order, nuisance behaviour, and crowd movements more efficiently, and to protect against ambush marketing and unauthorised commercial activities, CRZs were erected under the 2010 CoCT By-law. CRZs surrounding FIFA’s event venues impacted on local residents and businesses in relation to the scope and nature of advertising, trading and surveillance. FIFA was determined to exercise penalties for transgressions. As General Secretary of FIFA Valcke stated: ‘You have to respect the rights of others. We can send people to jail if they try and profit from the World Cup when they have no right to do so’ (in Hennigan, 2010).

As the findings illustrated, the 2010 CoCT By-law (2009, p. 20) deftly combined the safety aspect of patrons in PVAs and CRZs, as well as advertisement rights in such spaces. This By-law was advertised in workshops and presentations as a form of event protection for FIFA and their sponsors from commercial piracy. Additionally, and indeed crucially, ‘the by-law also provides for unhindered spectator flows, as well as for safety and security’ (CoCT, 2010b). The consumer protection regulations were therefore packaged together with public safety and security discourses, with overarching
argument that these measures were there for both the good of the event and for the well-being of FWC patrons. FIFA’s RPP strategic ‘business as usual concept’ did not assist the particularly vulnerable population group of informal traders, which meant that more than 100,000 traders lost much of their income streams during the event (Wyatt, 2010).

The study has shown that during a mega-event, the CBD presented highly regulated spaces that were expected to be aesthetically pleasing, orderly, zones of consumption, and places of fan engagement. The PVAs and CRZs supplanted what was previously civil society in these areas. While FIFA and Cape Town could not necessarily control who showed up in the middle of the CBD, they did their utmost to ensure that there was no ‘unwanted’ patron behaviour or ambushing of sponsors. In these FIFA-ised public spaces, free speech was limited and alternative points of view seriously constrained. Although advertised as a marketplace, any kind of anti-FWC or anti-FIFA protest, or the distribution of any type of flyers and newspapers was not allowed. Moreover, the positive messages received by television and media audiences were made more likely through FIFA’s strict accreditation process and rules. FIFA-sanctioned journalists who reported from the FWC were accredited on the proviso that they were not critical of FIFA and did not publish negative stories about the event (Da Silva, 2010). As SANEF member, Louw, stated: FIFA’s media restrictions were meant to safeguard ‘its rights, brand name, profit-making and status of the games, and the rights of sponsoring companies, including broadcasters’ exclusive rights’ (Da Silva, 2010). Fundamental rights to assembly and speech were thus compromised in Cape Town, with the event host acceding to the extraordinary social control demands of the event owner.

6.4.2 Commercial strategies

While FIFA wanted to market its product (the FWC) to new consumers, the aim of the RSA and Cape Town was to promote their image as ‘world-class’ and their destination as attractive to tourists. At least in part, FIFA and the RSA pursued this objective by utilising strategies similar to those adopted by Disney theme parks. While FIFA concentrated on theming, merchandising, and hybrid (fan) consumption, the RSA and Cape Town sought to realise these goals by focusing on service provision via Disneyised emotional/performative labour.
**Theming**

As the findings indicated, CoCT not only had to provide FIFA and official sponsors with the right of first refusal to all public advertising media, but also the City’s usual advertising regulations were either suspended or had to be adapted to FIFA’s standards. This included fast-tracking advertising in public spaces in order to exclude third-party advertising companies bypassing CoCT laws. Two controversial pieces of legislation placed prior to the event were the two 2010 *FWC Special Measures Acts* and the 2010 *CoCT By-law*. However, SALGA had not been consulted prior to the Special Measures Bill being introduced. Both pieces of legislation illustrated the interplay of commercial interests and security and provided evidence of how FIFA was able to bypass national and local legislation (i.e. the BEE policy had not been considered) as part of its RPP. This highlights the extent to which FIFA’s regulations (2010 *CoCT By-law*) disturbed CoCT’s usual urban planning initiatives.

The CRZs and FFF offered FIFA and its sponsors a platform for brand theming and commercial promotion by offering exclusively branded environments. All types of PVAs, including the Fan Walk and the V&A Waterfront located in a CAS, encompassed a variety of themes, such as ‘South Africa Day’ and ‘Family Day’. This was meant to benefit Cape Town’s ambitions to reintroduce citizens to the CBD and strategically promote these spaces as tourist destinations. Interactive activity zones were provided by sponsors. These initiatives are an example of Howell’s (2005) argument that sport-themed spaces are a cross between retail stores and visitor attractions, where sales are considered secondary to brand experiences. Different spectator zones around the site of the V&A Waterfront and within the FFF showed how FIFA-ised zones might be further fragmented, not only by territory but also by modes of production, consumption, and accumulation.

As mentioned previously, new spatial security measures were introduced by FIFA with little public consultation; this included strict controls over FWC marketing materials. Cape Town and other host cities made their most historic and iconic squares available for both FIFA and its sponsors’ branding messages. As part of the Host City Decoration Program, FIFA not only established the commercial regulations for the FFFs, but also it set the pre-conditions for the standardised inner-city urban design in CRZs. The themed
event spaces represented Cape Town as a coherent space aiming to produce value-added experiences for FIFA Family members, VIPs, sponsors, media representatives and fans.

For host cities, a negative outcome of FIFA-isation could be claims of inauthenticity. Under FIFA’s model, entire city centres were decorated with official 2010 FWC branding materials; to that extent the television viewer may find it difficult to recognise unique elements of the city in which the event takes place. In cultural geography this is known as placelessness or sameness, whereas the obverse is placefulness (Sorkin, 1992a; Bale, 1993b). This poses a promotional problem for the host city in terms of conveying its ‘world-class’ image via global media coverage. For local policymakers, PVAs were understood, and eagerly put into effect, as a means for city advertising and place selling (Philo & Kearns, 1993) in Cape Town. However, CoCT had a late involvement in FIFA’s RPP planning process. Thus a short-term and rather ad hoc marketing strategy was developed by CTT that mainstreamed the promotion of Cape Town to be largely synonymous with that of other South African cities (Theme: Rainbow palette).

**Merchandise and hybrid consumption**

Myriad forms of fan consumption and the sale of FIFA and its sponsors’ merchandise took place extensively, not only at the FFF but in CAS situated PVAs, such as the V&A Waterfront and the Fan Walk, but also and in many other parts of Cape Town. Also, free samples of merchandise were distributed by sponsors. Visitors could watch live FWC matches, buy merchandise and local arts and crafts and consume various forms of entertainment. In the EZ and FFF, only FIFA and the FWC official sponsors were assured of exclusive marketing and selling rights. In the CAS, established businesses and informal traders had to apply for trading licences. This decreased the number of traders and local businesses since short-term planning of the CAS ratio by CoCT and FIFA made it difficult for hawkers to apply on time. It is highly questionable whether they were trying to ‘ambush’ FIFA’s sponsors; it seems more likely that they were simply trying to earn money under the promise of ‘business as usual’. Therefore, in practice FIFA-ised spaces offered a limited choice for consumers as they could only eat and drink what was approved of by FIFA and the respective authorities.
Emotional/performative labour

As mentioned previously, SAPS frontline staff attended Disney workshops. Furthermore, Cape Town’s ‘Ambassador Campaign’ was mainly aimed at instilling the spirit of good ambassadorship, ‘showing positive attitude, and extending a warm and proudly South African welcome to all our visitors’. Specific rules and regulation were also passed on to employees. This task required a form of monitoring to ensure that service procedures and norms were met. FIFA monitored the behaviour of employees by having its own staff present in security operations, such as in the RPP patrol team and VOCs.

In the 2010 RSA context, the public was instructed via the media to show their best face. Thus, it can be suggested that Disneyised ideas of emotional/performative labour were transferred to the public: displaying a positive attitude to visitors and the media would leave an optimistic impression and establish a good rapport with visitors and enhance the FWC image. Hence, the South African public was de facto ‘employed’ for the event in order to portray a positive image of the FWC specifically, and indirectly in support of FIFA, its sponsors, the RSA, and Cape Town. This accords with Baasch (2010) and Steinbrink’s (2010) argument that ‘public enthusiasm’ is a key ingredient for an event’s success.

In order to provide all of the above, security and surveillance were essential. The next section will analyse how FIFA and Cape Town operated their neoliberal strategies for the purposes of brand and rights protection and place selling. The focus is with two spatial zones and associated security and surveillance strategies: PVAs and CRZs.

6.4.3 Zero-tolerance and ‘soft’-approach

In the FFF, a zero-tolerance policing approach was found to apply to any non-sponsoring brands, and also to anyone who carried such items or markers thereof. A zero-tolerance approach was also observed through media warnings, albeit for different reasons, towards so-called ‘hooligans’, informal traders without a licence, street children, and the homeless. While there was no law as such ‘against’ street children or the homeless, the main focus of the ‘public place and city beautification’ part of the
2010 CoCT By-law was aimed at policing and regulating ‘nuisance’ behaviours in public spaces, inter alia to target such minority groups.

Cape Town’s CBD was tightly controlled and monitored by merchandise patrols and sponsor protection guards. On a daily basis, merchandise patrols surveilled new businesses that opened up, and looked for counterfeit products and flyers. However, it proved to be difficult to control the distribution of flyers since the CRZ area covered almost the entire city centre. Moreover, FIFA’s RPP tactics were extensively criticised, for they singled out SMEs with few financial or legal resources to defend themselves against any charges (Kelbrick, 2008). FIFA’s concern about ambush marketing, the diversion of local police reserves to enforce FIFA’s RPP, and the resulting constraints on local businesses led to much discussion and anger (Beeld, 2010). This was reflected in local media - mostly by non-accredited sources - with titles like ‘FIFA’s draconian branding rules and its mafia-like control of the country’s public spaces’ (Irish, 2010).

FIFA-ised spaces in Cape Town represented both the reality and the perception of a safe, secure and pleasant environment. This was achieved through visible policing, but just as importantly by a non-aggressive approach by armed security personnel (Cartwright, 2010). A ‘soft hand’ approach by SAPS and the ambassadors was applied to promote feelings of inclusiveness and participation, particularly among the city’s tourism and consumption sectors.

These ‘soft hand’ approaches, which were used to engage patrons with capital (mainly tourists and middle-class whites), was in significant contrast to the zero-tolerance approach against the RSA’s most vulnerable population, namely the (overwhelmingly black) homeless, street children and informal traders. In accordance to Lyon (2003), the policing techniques as social sorting proposes that the FWC security measures for branding purposes is not simply a contemporary threat to individual freedoms, but that, more insidiously, it is a powerful means of creating and reinforcing long-term social differences.
6.4.4 Media

The findings showed that the media was enmeshed in the FWC stage production beyond the playing fields by broadcasting fan activities and experiences from FIFA-ised spaces. Since the FFF enjoyed significant protection from third party advertisers, this enabled FIFA to ensure that its brand and the rights of its sponsors were adequately portrayed and protected in the media. Thus, the media provided images and narrative of FIFA-ised spaces. Moreover, to prevent social tensions from shaping media coverage of the event, and thus disturb branding messages within FIFA-ised spaces, no protests were allowed within 10 kilometres of stadia (Bond, nd).

FIFA also influenced the media coverage in that images during match broadcasting breaks excluded anything unsightly, such as Cape Town’s slums and townships. Images of people living without electricity or running water in the shadow of gleaming new stadia was not something the RSA government, FIFA and its sponsors wanted to reveal to the international community. They were interested in conveying an impression of a modern, entrepreneurial, ‘world-class’ city.

Media, attention not only impacts upon the image of the hosting city/nation, but also on the ‘brandscape’ (Klingmann, 2010) of the event owner and its sponsors. In the context of event urbanism, the usage of the ‘natural urban environment’ as advertising space was a particularly attractive element of Cape Town. This natural beauty, combined with ‘happy faces’ alongside sponsors’ logos, were mediated to global television audiences. As Eick has observed, spaces in the public realm, visualised through spectacular media images of thousands of peaceful, football-watching fans in PVAs and the inner-cities, are becoming increasingly valuable for event organisers when selling sponsorship (Eick, 2011a).

The globalisation of the media has provided increased commercial impact for major sports events (Hall, 2006). Such developments have meant that the ‘market reach’ of a mega-event has dramatically increased over the past decades. At the same time, a spatial expansion of commercialisation in the public realm, as evidenced here in PVAs and CRZs, provided FWC sponsors with an even larger platform to communicate their marketing and branding messages to the global community.
6.5 Public viewing areas

Although PVAs and CRZs were temporary spaces, their security legacies persist: new surveillance technology and CPTED measures are now part of Cape Town’s security apparatus. Therefore, as suggested by Hagemann (2010) and Klauser (2008a), the urban environmental model has been extended from the playing field to urban inner-city spaces that constitute the event precinct. In the 2010 FWC context, Cape Town’s entire CBD fell either within CRZs or was under the provision of the MMA, which ensured a geographically extensive event footprint. Thus there were enormous compliance demands placed on the City; not only in terms of safety and security, but also in terms of beautification and creating a ‘user friendly’ environment for visitors (CTP, 2010b, p. 11).

Both FIFA and CoCT used the urban space as a marketing platform to illustrate their respective interests. However, the FFF, CRZs, Fan Walk and municipal PVAs encompassed diverse objectives and meanings. They offered different commercial opportunities and featured varying security provisions for FIFA, the host city, sponsors and non-sponsors. The Fan Walk channelled the masses throughout the city’s main places, while the municipal PVAs acted more as a containment strategy for fans on the fringes of the City, who possessed comparatively little capital. The ring-fenced FFF added another key event besides the match in the stadium. Thus, the geography of controls through PVAs and CRZs was central to FIFA’s interests, and reinforced geographical and social fragmentation during the event. This was in contrast to statements from city authorities that the event was intended to bring social cohesion and a sense of shared experience for locals.

6.5.1 FFF

The FFF celebration was held in a place of historic relevance in terms of residential segregation and racial oppression. The Grand Parade is Cape Town’s oldest public space and one of its most well-known heritage sites: Nelson Mandela made his famous first public address following his release from prison in February 1990.
The FFF represented an exclusive branded environment for FIFA and its sponsors. As the findings illustrated, the media covered the FFF more extensively than any other PVA (PGWC, 2011). This gave FIFA four advantages:

1) to display the FIFA brand and its sponsors’ logos and advertising without any third party competition;
2) to prevent televised images of ambush marketing incidents from being broadcast to a global audience;
3) to make large crowds more likely at the event given that it was located in the CBD near to public transport and hotels;
4) allowed increased World Cup and sponsors’ brand media coverage during match breaks.

The FFF also presented ‘place selling’ opportunities for Cape Town:
1) increased the chances of displaying the RSA’s affluent society (rather than the marginalised population) and enhanced the modern image of the Rainbow Nation;
2) iconic Table Mountain in the background (theming) presented the city’s uniqueness and its ‘wow’ factor; and

The FFF could host up to 25,000 people (CoCT, 2009b), which was relatively small compared to the previous FFF in Berlin (one million). FIFA did not expect a huge attendance in the RSA context, but half-empty fan spaces would have thrown a bad light on impressions of public support. So the smaller size suited the tourist projections. Importantly, the FFF in Cape Town was not, as Sorkin (1992c, p. 224) has suggested in another context, ‘physically and culturally isolated’, surrounded by ‘an undisciplined periphery’. It was located in the CBD: an ‘undisciplined periphery’ was not evident in the immediate environment because this area had been effectively FIFA-ised. The ‘undisciplined’ had been relocated to adjacent townships, while municipal PVAs catered for poorer residents on the fringes of Cape Town.

There was no admission cost in FFFs, but there was a set target audience comprising international soccer fans, family groups, supporter clubs, company staff members, and corporate VIPs (Haber, 2010; De Reuck, 2008a). The enticement of these groups acted
as a *de facto* device to encourage visitors from social groups that FIFA was most comfortable about identifying with. Although the FFF was advertised as cultural melting pot for Capetonians, the FFF was particularly keen that the local (largely white) middle-classes took part. This was something novel for many of them; engaging in a public event away from their privatised, highly securities, gated communities. In practice, only Cape Town’s middle-class and international tourists were able to afford the prices of food and beverages in the FFF, or indeed the inflated transport fees to the CBD. Thus, the FFF *de facto* engaged people who suited the ‘image’ of the FWC and modern Cape Town, and such audiences were little threat to security or public order. The following illustration gives a visual impression of interlocking target audiences in the three different entertainment spaces.

**Figure 6.2 Target audiences**

Any marginalised community members, such as street children and the homeless, were less likely to travel to and be part of the FFF. Given the information provided in Van Blerk, (2011) and Zirin (2010), the 2010 Viewing Evenings for Cape Town’s homeless a few blocks from the FFF appeared to be public relations exercises. These functions
were also designed to placate negative public opinion in respect of the removal of the homeless, informal traders and street children from the FFF zone. These evenings could also be seen as a ‘containment strategy’ (Davis, 1992b) to keep the ‘unwanted’ (those who possessed comparatively little economic and social capital) away from the themed zones of consumption. While the FFF broadened the potential for public experience by giving more people access to the event, people were lured to specific PVA spaces in accordance with their level of social and economic capital.

Upon entering the FFF, visitors were immediately incorporated into the standardised area. Access to FFFs was subject to sporadic spot checks and ID controls of suspect and unwanted individuals and brands. At the point of entry, rules applied to the visitors’ clothing in that competitive brands were not allowed to be displayed or worn. FIFA required the FFF to be in the CBD next to public modes of transportation. It was divided into different thematic fields, which merged into one another. Basic entry to the FFF was free, but paid entry provided access to better vantage points which separated paying customers from the ordinary fan.

When inside the FFF, risks of disorder were minimised by visible policing but also by physical barriers that limited patron movement. While the high visibility of police could have given the impression of looming danger, there was no blatant display of weapons, the uniformed officers (of various kinds) were in small groups (not one mass), and they strolled, rather than marched or hurried, and engaged informally with passers-by (Cartwright, 2010).

Many of the security strategies embedded in the public viewing areas were developed in accordance to Disney’s principles. For example, the patrolling around PVAs and CRZs on match days was a counter measure to manage public order, but this also allowed the deployment of traders’ checks. ‘Invisible’ police forces were declared the most significant strategy in terms of monitoring crowds and reporting any disorderly behaviour or problematic movement of people (SAPS, 2010). Even the contracted waste management company personnel were instructed to pick up litter and check bins for bombs (Cartwright, 2010). The in/visibility of police, such as spotters for monitoring and reporting was one of the success factors of security risk management at the PVAs.
This was also underpinned by CCTV surveillance measures, with security staff able to liaise with those on the ground in respect of public order, crowding, or ambushing issues.

Like the Disney theme park, commercial profit ultimately underlies the environment that FIFA seeks to establish at the FWC. As the findings indicated, the partnership of FFF security, control and commercialisation coalesced under the *Prohibited and Restricted* lists. Intriguingly, weapons were listed in the same risk category as the beverages of non-sponsors. This had the purpose of highlighting the seriousness of ambushing ‘crime’, with visitors persuaded to believe that the prohibition of beverage containers by non-sponsors was a rule for their own safety.

The expansion of the FFF concept to seven non-hosting international ‘world-class’ cities shows the willingness of major international city governments to engage with the FWC, but also to comply with FIFA’s regulations pertaining to marketing and security within those zones. It also highlights FIFA’s strategy of extending the reach of its brand and sponsors to non-hosting cities.

### 6.5.2 Fan Walk and CRZs

The Fan Walk and V&A Waterfront, located in a CAS, had the goal of re-introducing the inner-city to residents, while positively influencing a secure sense of civic engagement (i.e. social awareness, common identity) (CTP, 2010a). The Fan Walk was crucial to CoCT’s goal of citizen activation, since it connected different fan sites, fan attractions, and sponsors’ installations. Therefore, the V&A Waterfront and the Fan Walk served three general purposes: to create varied experience zones within the city; to entice people to stay longer in these settings, and to spend on officially sanctioned food, beverages and merchandise therein. For CoCT, the Fan Walk and the V&A Waterfront were also a means for place selling and marketing of the city as a tourist destination, such strategies being a well-established practice at mega events (cf Philo & Kearns, 1993).
Despite being subject to comprehensive security and surveillance monitoring, neither the FFF nor the fence-free PVAs (Fan Walk and V&A Waterfront) in the inner-city were actually cut off from the urban environment. Indeed, the Fan Walk was used to connect the various FIFA-ised spaces in the inner hub of Cape Town, the CRZ. In that sense the Fan Walk acted as a channel that connected pedestrian points within the urban environment, which were also monitored as security ‘hot spots’. This has been described as ‘passage-point urbanism’ (Graham, 2010; Klauser, 2011d), whereby portions of event space are networked with others through a multitude of access- or passage-points, each with crowd management and security protocols.

During the 2010 FWC, Cape Town came to resemble an agglomeration of football theme parks, a life space composed of ‘FIFA Worlds’. Radiating from a strong centre, the transport hub, the inner-city was arranged in thematic fields that flowed into one another. These included the virtually invisible spatial enclosures in the form of CRZs, as well as the highly visible FFF and Fan Walk in the inner-city. In a similar vein to Disney’s theme parks (Sorkin, 1992c), the spaces were divided into different ‘worlds’, each devised to lift aesthetic appeal and diversify the emotional and physical experience of people. Event organisers used these spatial mechanisms to emphasise certain themes and brands, and to legitimise the elimination of undesirable features. Musical performances and interactive games were promoted by sponsors to animate fans to actively interact and participate in the vision of a peaceful, internationalised, consumer community. Such devices were also used in the 2006 FWC and EURO 2008 (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2011).

CRZs surrounding FIFA’s event venues, as well as Cape Town’s main transport routes, team hotels and media centres, presented a commercially branded FWC aesthetic. A sufficient radius around the FFF was chosen to seal off the park from its immediate environment, one rationale being that the public would, as Bryman (2004, p. 137) has discussed in respect of Disneyisation, not ‘see the world they live in while they’re in the park’. The fenced FFF was surrounded by the City Hall and the Castle with a view of the Table Mountain, while an enormous 74 sqm screen, one of the biggest structures ever to be erected in the RSA (CTP, 2010g), provided football-specific viewing space.
These structural elements veiled views of the gritty neighbourhood and any third party advertising surrounding the event precinct.

The CRZs were variously defined by CoCT, FIFA, the LOC, and ‘respective authorities’ (FIFA, 2010c). FIFA wanted to declare the whole Fan Walk route as an EZ – meaning no business allowed on match days. However, CoCT opposed this, arguing that non-ambushing locals had been promised the opportunity to conduct business with FWC patrons. However, despite the CoCT negotiating efforts, the CRZs were structured very much as FIFA wanted, which created resentment among local traders. Within a CAS, local businesses had to comply with FIFA’s ‘business as usual’ principle. Hence, neither new marketing opportunities nor commercial property development could be realised.

FIFA reported that it made a USD 631 million profit from the 2007-10 World Cup cycle and earned income of USD 3.65 billion from 2010 FWC contracts, while the RSA spent more than USD 3 billion on the 2010 FWC (in the absence of any final definitive figures on how much the RSA earned overall) (Associated Press, 2012). As Matheson and Baade (2003) have pointed out, the FWC event is a primary source of financial revenues for FIFA, and so site selection is shaped, at least in part, by a desire to optimise profit (FIFA’s NPO status is irrelevant to that goal). However, the CRZs did not deliver on the claim that the city hosting the FWC would generate money from local businesses in the form of increased tax revenue from sales. The RSA and Cape Town could hardly derive the revenues FIFA was able to garner through its commercial control over FIFA-ised spaces.

FIFA’s various controlled spaces (FFF, Fan Walk, CRZs) were subject to different risks, rules, regulations and authorities. As the findings have shown, there was a distinct lack of information provision from CoCT on how the By-laws around the CRZs were to be interpreted and enforced (Booysen, 2009). The introduction on short notice of spatial based strategies, inadequate information about the application process and the boundaries of the CRZs, together with widespread uncertainty over the PVA’s Liquor Control Policy, fuelled public feelings of uncertainty. The resulting ‘Fear of FIFA’ (CTP, 2010a, p. 3) generated a perception that local rights were subjugated to FIFA’s
commercial priorities. From this point of view, it can be inferred that the short-term CRZ concept appeared rather confusing to many local residents and business stakeholders, which reinforces literature that has reported on vagueness, uncertainty and confusion around the concept of ambush marketing (Crow & Hoek, 2003; Grady, McKelvey & Bernthal, 2010; Hoek & Gendall, 2002; McKelvey & Grady, 2008).

According to CoCT, municipal PVAs were ‘aimed at providing broad access to the communities of Cape Town’ (De Reuck, 2008, slide 8). Thus, the ‘island’ locations and the high transport expenses between them made it look more like a containment strategy for those on the fringes. The municipal PVAs spread across Cape Town can be regarded as physically and socially isolated since they were too far away from the CBD, thus not adequately integrated into the inner Cape Town’s CBD event footprint.

6.5.3 Municipal PVAs

PVAs had the potential to benefit local traders and businesses, as well as offer the population on the fringes of the city a chance to feel part of the FWC and its associated assumptions of a feel-good effect. While at first sight it appears to be a generous gesture to set up PVAs near the townships, it also had the effect of encouraging these local residents to stay among their fringe groups and away from the stadium and CBD. CoCT authorities did not seek an upgrading of transport infrastructure between the CBD and townships, nor did they argue for a reduction of public transport fees for people on these fringes to travel into the city centre (Steinbrick, et al., 2011). CoCT used what Davis (1992b, p. 161) has described as ‘containment strategy’, which was meant to keep ‘unwanted’ non-consumers who possessed comparatively little capital away from the FFF and CRZ spaces. This argument is supported by the research of Haferburg (2011, p. 341) who has argued that:

intra-urban fragmentation was not bridged by the World Cup – the very distinct crowds in most of the PVAs reflected the differentiation of various zones of prosperity as well as the historical allocation of population groups across the urban landscape.

The entertainment program also reflected this social differentiation, for it featured contrasting consumer markets. Professional and international acts performed in the
FFFs, while the municipal PVAs hosted community-based acts (CoCT, 2010c). Thus, the geography of control through PVAs reinforced existing class and racial inequalities in respect of Cape Towns’ geography - with the outer townships dominated by poor blacks. During the event, CoCT continuously encouraged residents in the townships to utilise the four municipal PVAs near them, as ‘the FFF tended to fill up very quickly’ (CoCT, 2010d). This also kept many poor blacks away from the hub of the event – the FFF and Fan Walk (Samara, 2008). Thus, the ‘island’ locations and the high transport expenses appear to be a containment strategy. The municipal PVAs spread across Cape Town can be regarded as physically and socially isolated since they were too far away from the CBD, and thus not adequately integrated into the inner Cape Town’s CBD event footprint.

In summary, the creation of CRZs across inner-city Cape Town was an initiative of the event owner, FIFA, but agreed to by the event host, RSA, and CoCT. While FIFA’s agenda was driven by global corporate interests, local authorities aimed at place-selling, image making, positive tourism experiences, and trying to facilitate some commercial opportunities for Cape Town businesses and traders. The latter’s attempts to do so were caught somewhat uncomfortably between FIFA’s efforts to enhance exclusive branding in re-territorialised CRZs and the FFF in a FWC-themed city. Differences in social policy and event strategy existed between the three spatial zones examined in this thesis, namely: the FFF, Fan Walk and municipal PVAs.

The various PVAs that were designed to attract certain target groups of people reflected Capetonian segregated society pertaining to local geography, class and race and a hierarchal order of urban space. While public order security and safety measures were a key risk management requirement, they also had a role of providing FIFA, its sponsors and the media with exclusive spaces for branding, commercial advertising, merchandising, and broadcasting. The overwhelmingly favourable print and broadcast coverage from within the FFF and Fan Walk was an invaluable part of the promotion of the FWC. Of course, for accredited media, their ‘role’, as FIFA saw it, was to act as enthusiastic publicists. Blatter, FIFA’s president, later proclaimed that the 2010 FWC ‘turned out to be the most successful World Cup of all time – and for all participants’ (Blatter, 2011). The ring master had brought the FIFA circus to town and, after several
years of planning on the part of FWC stakeholders, the tournament had kicked plenty of goals and not been red carded. The FIFA-ised spaces evaluated in this thesis played a key part in the neoliberal triumph of the FWC as a global mega-event.

The key outcomes deriving from the research conducted are summarised in the next and final Chapter.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Contributions of this study

This study investigated how the security management of public urban spaces intersects with commercial imperatives at sport mega-events, in this case the FIFA World Cup. A key focus of previous research has been public order/safety and risk management at mega-events from the perspective of anti-hooliganism, anti-terrorism and crime reduction, as well as measures to safeguard patrons from overcrowding and movement bottlenecks, while ensuring that fans have comfortable and enjoyable experiences in themed spaces. Another focus of previous research has been on rights protection policies and anti-ambushing at sport mega-events relating to a range of events spaces, from stadia through to CRZs and PVAs. However, there has been comparatively little research into links between these two research foci: this is limiting because, as this thesis demonstrated, security strategies in public spaces straddle both order/risk/safety and stakeholder brand and commercial interests within those zones. Rather than them being separate, siloed areas of planning and operation, they are in fact interweaved and enmeshed.

Previous scholarship has concentrated on the FWC or the Olympics in developed world contexts; this thesis has sought to understand the organisation of a sport mega-event in a developing world context, where there are arguably greater resource and infrastructure challenges, as well as the problem of limited local experience in terms of event management. The thesis adopted a single case study approach, with Cape Town the best choice in RSA because of its aspirational status of being a ‘world-class’ city, which involved a commitment to place selling on a global scale, and also because it was a site for a combination of FIFA spaces (FFF and CRZ) and municipal PVAs (under the auspices of local authorities).

Stakeholder interests were a key to this study: the global and local nature of the FWC required an understanding of different agendas and relationships between three of these – FIFA (the event owner), FWC sponsors (event supporters) and CoCT (event host). Here the thesis drew upon the work of Jensen and Sandström (2011) about evaluating
stakeholders that interact on a global scale. As the thesis demonstrated, management of public space at the 2010 FWC involved the host nation and CoCT working in concert with event owners and sponsors to meet the latter stakeholders’ expectations of brand and commercial protection. Moreover, in a security risk management sense, this also involved the FWC stakeholders engaging with global agencies, such as INTERPOL and international security companies (Zajko & Béland, 2008). In applying the Jensen and Sandström stakeholder approach, a narrative approach to data collection was deployed. This involved interviewing security stakeholders at Cape Town, as well as quoting from media sources that provided verbatim commentaries from individuals speaking on behalf of the three event stakeholder groups. Chapter 5 indicated that FIFA exuded considerable power, as the event owner, and its principal responsibility appeared to be the FWC brand, FIFA sponsors, and the global image of the game of football. The host – RSA – was comparatively powerless, and indeed, as the case study of Cape Town evinced, the needs of the local community (especially in terms of FWC business opportunities) were subordinated to those of FIFA and sponsors. What made the power-responsibility pendulum all the more interesting, is that in an effort to appear ‘world-class’, CoCT’s inner-city spaces were reconfigured; and, as a consequence of this obsession with a modern, advanced and developed image, many people who normally reside in such spaces, or who operated there commercially, were either obliged to leave, or their presence made problematic. This was an exercise of power to conform with global neoliberal interests rather than the needs and priorities of locals with little capital.

This study applied a neoliberal theoretical lens to a study of public spaces and stakeholder conduct at the 2010 FWC, and drew on related concepts of Festivalisation and Disneyisation. By applying the theory of Festivalisation to this event, it was ascertained that CoCT was ‘obliged’ to deliver on its infrastructure promises irrespective of any local opposition. Throughout the event planning process, local stakeholders were neither adequately consulted, nor able to effectively contribute towards, parliamentary guarantees in respect of the 2010 FWC. This lack of community influence over decision-making can be understood as an outcome of neoliberalism, where a spectacle economy was controlled through FIFA’s commercial influence over the FWC. In festivalised public spaces, only sponsors were offered a genuine chance to be fully fledged entrepreneurs. By comparison, street traders were moved outside of the
CRZ, while local businesses within that zone were constrained in terms of their commercial operation.

By applying the theory of Disneyisation, the thesis adapted a theme park model to a sport mega-event, in the process providing an innovative way of understanding the global impact of Western-style theming and service delivery. Indeed, ‘FWC’ environments and their retail components were staffed by locals trained by the Disney Corporation. Just as importantly, these themed spaces were highly regulated to suit the commercial interests of FIFA and its stakeholders; that required a raft of legislation at national and city levels. This meant that Disneyisation was underpinned by Festivalisation.

Finally, by focusing on PVAs and CRZs this thesis has widened the research spectrum around space and place in mega-event research. These zones appear to be on the rise at global events, such as at music concerts, church celebrations and major sport events, so ongoing study is needed. The environments are attractive to event owners because they extend the ‘brandscape’ of a mega-spectacle, but unlike ticketed and seated venues (i.e. stadia) these are potentially more difficult spaces to monitor and securitise.

The public/private security networks observed at mega-events are a paradigmatic example of the ongoing transformations of the security field under conditions of globalisation. While Cornelissen (2011) argues that glocal institutional arrangements deriving from mega-events are always temporary in nature (except accumulated knowledge and freshly piloted surveillance practices), Eick observes that the new laws extend executive power and sophisticated surveillance systems ‘to secure the profitability of a global neo-liberal order’ (p. 98). Therefore, most scholars agree that key implications of mega-event security include the accommodation of mega-event security amidst shifting national security arrangements. Thus, this study considered and analysed the role of business interests of three main event stakeholders as factors shaping the development and application of security and surveillance practices.
7.2 Limitations

In terms of sport mega-event research, the 2010 FWC in the RSA was chosen as one of the most high profile sporting spectacles in the world (Schwarz, 2010). Other mega-events, such as the Olympic Games that also have an extensive commercial rights protection program would have been equally relevant. Indeed, both FIFA and the IOC are similar organisations in terms of their global scope and NPO status, as well as their neoliberal engagement with sponsors and host nations, and their commitment to profit optimisation during the FWC and Olympic Games respectively (Edwards, 2012; Vanwynsberghe, Sørbø & Wyle, 2012) The choice of the 2010 FWC and as a consequence its RSA location may not be representative of sport mega-events generally; this was a developing nations context. Given the case study method conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships cannot be drawn widely. Cape Town was chosen as the single case to investigate because of its distinctive CRZ and PVA arrangements. It was beyond the study’s capacity to assess all nine hosting South African cities.

Moreover, the research focus was on strategically selected security stakeholders (event owner, event sponsors, and event host), not on the entire organisational task force at the 2010 event. It is acknowledged that this focus does not provide an exhaustive interpretation of all the factors and agents involved in the staging and securitisation of the 2010 FWC. However, the selection of these organisations was consistent with the study’s defined research objectives.

A case study of a single city (Cape Town) in the RSA was used to explore security management at only one specific sport mega-event. As such the management of the FFF, Fan Walk, municipal PVAs and CRZs that fell under different authorities situated in Cape Town were investigated with the express aim of understanding links between the processes of securitisation and commercialisation in zoned public spaces. It is acknowledged that there are other important event spaces that were not included into this analysis, such as sport stadia, and training venues.

For logistical and economic reasons, it was not possible for the researcher to travel to the RSA after the event to interview security stakeholders face-to face. Personnel and organisation movement meant that contacting people to interview after the FWC was
problematic. This limitation was reflected in the number of potential interview respondents identified in the document analysis. In particular, when trying to investigate the operation, logistics and management of the PVAs, the researcher experienced barriers to data gathering: (i) many of the people involved in managing and monitoring PVAs had moved onto other roles and were difficult to track down for comment; and (ii) those who were tracked down provided very limited information (some were reluctant to comment; others provided minimal comment). Therefore, the descriptive information was provided by a range of people with different interests and agendas. The subjectivity of their comments and observations, and potential lack of full disclosure is an acknowledged limitation. Also, much of the interview data collected was retrospective recollections of past events which in itself has inherent limitations.

Another constraint of this thesis is that none of the 2010 FWC stakeholders made public their risk assessments, nor were the event organiser’s security plans released. This is consistent with intelligence protocols underpinning the operationalisation of security, but until that information is released one day (assuming that an embargo is lifted), researchers are obliged to rely on the (necessarily limited) data on the public record.

In view of this, FIFA’s strict media 2010 FWC accreditation regulations helped to create a climate of censorship in which journalists that questioned the motivations or impacts of the 2010 FWC were dubbed unpatriotic, with the government ‘dismissing calls for reflection as examples of Afro-pessimism or worse’ (Alegi, 2008, p. 328). In view of this, alternative views of the PVA and CRZS concepts were limited since the media adopted a boosterish, rather than critical, position.

Finally, the research was conducted over a three-year period, taking into account the preparations leading up to the event and the FWC itself. It was not a systematic evaluation of the legacy of the FWC for CoCT specifically or RSA generally.

### 7.3 Future research

Event researchers, urban and security planners, and governments are gradually becoming more aware of the interplay between security management and the
commercial organisations of sport mega-events. However, as this thesis has argued, our understanding of that phenomenon is still relatively immature. The findings of the present study provide a basis for recommendations in respect of future research.

**Comparative analysis**

The use of the single case study enabled in-depth analysis of a host city and mega-event. However, as Klauser (2011c) has emphasised, a key aim for future research into sport mega-event securitisation should be to undertake comparative investigations into how different types of events, in different cultural contexts, both resemble and vary from each other. In terms of the present study, one approach could be to explore the concept of FIFA-isation at the FWC in Brazil 2014. This is a BRIICS context, so different to RSA, but the relationship between stakeholders and the aspirations of the FWC hosts would be expected to have some key similarities (as well as differences) to the study presented here. Will Rio de Janeiro, for example, FIFA-ise its inner-city spaces, PVAs and CRZs as Cape Town did, or will a new context allow for substantive changes (Gaffney, 2010a, b; Reis & Da Costa, 2012)?

The present thesis could be used as a basis for a comparative study of other mega-events in the BRIICS and developing world to assess security policies and commercial organisation of public spaces. For example, the South African security measures are being promoted as a template for other countries in the Global South, with organisers from the RSA LOC consulting with their Brazilian counterparts on the 2014 FWC committee (Wilson, 2010). Also, FIFA’s ‘General World Cup Law’ has been extensively debated by Brazilian Government authorities with regards to altering existing national law in a number of areas: stricter copyright protection and enforcement, ownership of all event-related images and broadcast rights and a reversal of current policy of providing half-price soccer match tickets to students and seniors. Furthermore, Brazil also acceded to FIFA’s insistence that alcohol be served at the FWC, whereas liquor has not been available at Brazilian football for many years. The method and findings of the present thesis could be adapted to provide follow up research on sport mega-events in BRIICS and developing nations.
Longitudinal studies

Much has been written about the legacies of sport mega-events (e.g., Cashman, 2005; Cornelissen, 2007; Cornelissen, Bob, & Swart, 2011; Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2010; Gold & Gold, 2008; Hall, 1998, Preuss, 2007ab). However, early theoretical developments (e.g., Coaffee et al., 2011; Giulianiotti & Klauser, 2010) have been directed towards so called ‘security legacies’. The ‘impact’ is caused by a short-term impulse, and ‘legacy’ is meant to have a long-term effect (Preuss, 2007b). A focus of this study was to capture the year before the 2010 FWC through to one year post-event period; it did not pursue data pertaining to security management or the commercialisation of space after this timeframe. Therefore, it would be of value for future research to evaluate how the FWC has changed the host city’s security structures and entrepreneurial agendas – especially in event spaces that have remained, such as the Fan Walk in Cape Town.

Longitudinal development studies are needed in order to assess permanent impacts as well as ‘the readjustments to normality or the adaptation to changed conditions caused by the event’ (Hiller, 1998, p. 51). While sport mega-events have been shown to impact on security politics and public spaces, it is not clear how durable the newly established relationships among security stakeholders are. As INTERPOL has noted, (their) ‘global tools will play an important role in supporting the security arrangements across South Africa, not only during this important sporting event, but for many years to come’ (INTERPOL, 2009). This statement suggests that a lasting change in security governance can be achieved through FIFA-isation, and future research ought to assess this. Further research into surveillance measures including technological intelligence gathering and how this impacts on the spaces and their legacies is thus a key area for further inquiry. In the Cape Town context, it would be valuable to know what impact the 196 cameras that the CoCT installed within nine months had on crime and perception of crime in terms of human rights, and risk and safety perceptions.

Future studies could investigate if the lessons learned and recommendations made about security legacies are effectively captured and form part of a knowledge transfer process to other event organisers.
Ethnographic studies

This study focussed on purposely selected security stakeholders, not on the entire organisational task force at the 2010 event. That limited focus could not provide a detailed micro- or meso-analysis of stakeholder relationships at the 2010 FWC. It would be a valuable extension to this research if a broader ethnographic study could evaluate and local business traders’, informal traders’ and citizen’s experiences of the 2010 FWC in Cape Town. Indeed, the commercial rights of local businesses (cf McKlevy & Grady, 2008) during a mega-event need further investigation. How can By-laws be shaped to protect the interests of event sponsors without unnecessarily impeding the capacity of local traders to conduct (non-ambushing) business? Also, there are questions about the scale, scope and nature of policing of public spaces, including the deployment of a combination of public and private authorities. There is also a balance between adequate levels of security and over-protection. As the findings indicated, the 2010 FWC deployed what might be termed ‘saturation’ security in public spaces, but this was combined with a ‘soft’ policing strategy, which de-emphasised conflict. This was a different model to the 2006 FWC, which although deploying the latter strategy had a much lower level of overt policing in public spaces. There is also the delicate question of how the image of a sport mega-event is impacted by the volume and style of security.

Taking a qualitative perspective, future research could examine case studies of selected project sites in divided societies. An ethnographic approach including focus groups, observations, diaries and in-depth interviews would be useful. Indeed, a closer focus on critical and self-reflective observational research would be helpful to prevent reification of stakeholder views, and to generate analyses of what works, what does not work, and why. How the municipalities dealt with ‘business as usual’ application and what sort of test they applied could be examined in future research studies in order understand practical implications for future events. Survey-based questionnaires and post-project evaluations could be implemented to complement qualitative approaches.

7.4 Conclusion

Security risk management at mega-events has attracted growing research attention in the past decade; however, the conceptualisation of securitisation of public urban spaces for
commercialisation purposes is still relatively immature. This study has conceptualised securitisation strategies and their consequences, in consideration of how security efforts intersected with business interests. The imposed logic of security risk management and commercialisation was presented in relation to the three main stakeholders. Neoliberalisation, as related to the securitisation of profits by means of spatial control and surveillance of public spaces, was evidenced in the FIFA-isation of public space.

The FIFA-isation concept, was found to be a complex set of interrelationships between re-commercialisation and re-securitisation of public spaces into PVAs and CRZs; and the event owner’s and host city’s roles and interests in the securitisation process (research objective 1). Framing the event owner’s and host city’s interests and roles within a neoliberal philosophy highlighted the process of Disneyisation of urban spaces during the FWC. The intersection of FIFA’s business practices, and the world/global-city approach that underpinned Cape Town’s urban entrepreneurial development strategy resulted in controls and restrictions on public spaces. The analysis provided here established that FIFA imposed conditions on the RSA prompting behaviour that were perhaps not in the general public’s best interests.

This work demonstrated that for FIFA security involved the establishment of a state sanctioned policies and legislation that shield its brand and protects the interests of its corporate partners and sponsors. This in turn acted to enhance the FIFA brand, sell broadcasting rights, attract sponsorship, and sell merchandise. FIFA was only peripherally interested in security capacity building in the host nation. On the other hand, the host city of Cape Town emphasised how the above measures could assist in re-inventing its national image in order to attract foreign capital investment and to heighten its geopolitical position in the world community.

FIFA-ised spaces bring together commercial and aesthetic dimensions in the securitisation process of sport mega-events. Mega-event security is complex and involves diverse strategies and tactics: humanware (i.e. management of event participants), software and hardware (i.e. commercial law and surveillance technology). The creation of a ‘clean environment’ was identified as one of the most crucial strategies for FIFA’s branding and rights protection purposes. These spaces provided
for the enactment of security measures but at the same time performed a dual function in that they were a platform for commercial activities.

PVAs and CRZs were used to control disparate groups, interests and needs. These sport event spaces also linked security purposes and the meaning of these zones for business. The securitisation process provides an opportunity for multiple theming/branding, place selling and security agendas. PVAs can create new images of spaces in people’s minds, as well as trigger the mobilisation of people. Through re-activating and re-vitalising public spaces, PVAs can also exclude people through excessive controls, insufficient capacity, exclusive localisation and design (Haferburg et al., 2009), through regulation that concerns social movements and zero-tolerance By-laws.

This thesis has argued that the production of space cannot be separated from the production of social relations. The designation and operation of PVAs and CRZs and their rules (By-laws) at Cape Town illustrated how security measures were embedded in specific spaces in order to enhance aesthetics, consumption, branding and feelings of safety. These urban spaces were geographically and politically interdependent. The FIFA-ised spaces are the expression of processes involving a range of actors (not just FIFA), guided by common goals, whilst also pursuing their own individual agendas and projects.

In conclusion, the concept of FIFA-isation is an entrepreneurial process in which responsibility is outsourced, public space is restrictively themed (only certain marks, icons, symbols and behaviours are allowed), and increasingly homogenised (through beautification strategies and By-laws). FIFA-isation is achieved through a temporarily privatised urban space that is monitored and managed by socially embedded control mechanisms and high-tech surveillance technology, and policed by public/private security forces figured by economic interests and marketing strategies. In other words, FIFA-isation is the commercialisation of public urban space, and encompasses neoliberal policies and their associated actions that benefit the event owner’s and host nation/city’s entrepreneurial interests. In the case of the 2010 FWC, power was disproportionately ceded to FIFA and corporate entities. An apposite metaphor for this relationship, was described twenty years ago by Osborne and Gaebler (1993, p. 25),
namely, the RSA was ‘rowing’ (delivering security and providing spaces) while FIFA was ‘steering’, (setting the policy agenda). FIFA’s monopoly power invoked decisions in its commercial interest without much in the way of local resistance or even much debate. Thus, FIFA was governing at a distance under a neoliberal paradigm.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A:

FIFA’s marketing targets

• Define sponsor rights packages and effectively deliver these rights while adding further value in order to ensure maximum return on investment for the sponsors;

• Promote FIFA events to fuel fan excitement and increase the value for host nations, host cities, member associations, FIFA, the sponsors and other key stakeholders;

• Manage premium hospitality at FIFA events delivering a unique guest experience;

• Develop innovative and tailor-made marketing programmes to enhance the fan experience at FIFA events;

• Manage the brand identity for FIFA and FIFA events, ensuring a consistent and aspirational brand image; and

• Position FIFA Marketing as best in class in the sports marketing and sponsorship field.

(FIFA, ndf)
## Appendix B:

### Global anti-ambushing legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Anti-ambushing legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games</td>
<td><em>Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Protection Act 1996</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing</td>
<td><em>Protection of Olympic Symbols Relations 2002</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003 Cricket World Cup 2010 FWC</td>
<td><em>Merchandise Marks Act 1941</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>EURO 2004</td>
<td><em>Law Decree 86</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006 Winter Olympics in Turin</td>
<td><em>Law Decree 167</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>FIFA U-17 Women’s Football WC 2008</td>
<td><em>Major Events Management Act of 2007 (MEMA)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rowing World Championships 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011 Rugby World Cup 2015 ICC Cricket WC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver</td>
<td><em>2007 Olympic and Paralympics Marks Act</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td><em>The Olympic Act (Law 12,035/09 of October 1, 2009)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C:

Formal letter to interview participants

Dear x,

My name is Simone, and I am a PhD candidate in my second year at the University of Technology in Sydney. X referred me to you. As the [responsibility] you are a vital contact in my area of research.

My research interests are event driven security measures at the FIFA World Cup 2010. My specific foci are security and surveillance strategies in relation to the public viewing areas (PVAs) in Cape Town (such as the Fan Park and Fan Walk and the municipal PVAs) as well as the Commercial Restriction Zones. I am interested in the planning, operation and legacies of the security measures pertaining to public order and ambush marketing.

Since the Metro Police, SAPS and all the other security stakeholders did a sensational job in terms of the overall security and safety of the event I was wondering if you are able to provide me with some internal information relative to what I am seeking and/or any additional contacts in the Cape Town region. Also, I would like to ask you a couple of questions via Skype or email if possible.

Any help would be very much appreciated. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Kind Regards
Simone
Appendix D:
Consent form

I ____________________ (participant's name) agree to participate in the research project: Managing Event Places and Viewer Spaces: Security, Surveillance and Public Order at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, UTS Human Research Ethics Committee approval reference number: 2010-169A, being conducted by Simone Eisenhauer, of the University of Technology Sydney, Australia, for her degree Doctor of Philosophy. Contact details: SimoneIngeburg.Eisenhauer@student.uts.edu.au

I understand that the purpose of this doctoral dissertation research study is to explore security risk management issues at public viewing areas (PVAs) during the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa. The study intends to produce knowledge of security, surveillance and commercial interests within urban event spaces that will assist future planners and organisers of mega-events. Note that at the completion of the study a summary of the results will be mailed to you. Upon receiving those results, you may contact the researcher to provide feedback on the results of the study.

I understand that my participation in this research involves an email or Skype interview and that I will be asked to respond to questions about the management of PVAs at the 2010 World Cup. The interview should take between 40-50 minutes. The researcher will ask open-ended questions during the interview. During the one-on-one interview via Skype, you will be audio-taped. The purpose of the audio-taping is to provide a transcription of the information discussed in the interview and to assure the accuracy of the reporting of that information. Interview summaries will be sent to respondents for verification, and it is anticipated that clarification or follow-up questions may be needed following the initial interview. The involvement of individuals in the research will be kept confidential, and the anonymity of participants preserved via the use of pseudonyms and similar strategies to de-identify.
I am aware that I can contact Simone Eisenhauer, her supervisor Associate Professor Daryl Adair, or the UTS Ethics Committee Officer if I have any concerns about the research. I also understand that I am free to withdraw my participation from this research project at any time I wish, without consequences, and without giving a reason. I agree that Simone Eisenhauer has answered all my questions fully and clearly. I agree that the research data gathered from this project may be published in a form that does not identify me in any way. This may include a thesis, media articles, conference papers and/or book. Further, should any publication be sought, a copy of documents will be sent to participants prior to publication. I understand that data will be archived for five years and then destroyed.

Signature (participant)  ____/____/____

Signature (researcher or delegate)  ____/____/____

NOTE:
This study has been approved by the University of Technology, Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints or reservations about any aspect of your participation in this research which you cannot resolve with the researcher, you may contact the Ethics Committee through the Research Ethics Officer (ph: +61 2 9514 9772 Research.Ethics@uts.edu.au) and quote the UTS HREC reference number. Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated fully.
Associate Professor Daryl Adair can be reached on + 61 2 9514 5498 or Daryl.Adair@uts.edu.au
Ms Racheal Laughery can be reached on + 61 2 9514 9772 or Research.Ethics@uts.edu.au
Ms Simone Eisenhauer can be reached on SimoneIngeburg.Eisenhauer@student.uts.edu.au
Appendix E:
Interview questions

Introductory questions:
What is your position? How long have you been working for in this position?

Where you involved in the planning stage of the World Cup? If so, how?

Planning stage:
How would you describe the planning phase pertaining to security at public viewing areas (PVAs)?

For example, with regards to:
Legal tools (specific licenses, policies, health and safety standards, and by-laws)
Technological tools (surveillance technology, databases),
Financial resources (budget for security),
Security operation of access control and other spatial policing measures
Use of ‘best practices templates, standard security solutions and/or manuals

Please describe how the actors-network was structured. For example, public-private partnerships and international collaboration among various security stakeholders such as government bodies, military, police, private security and their connections to commercial stakeholders such as sponsors.

Implementation stage:
Please describe the policing strategies pertaining to security at PVAs and CRZs preventative (e.g. surveillance measures and technologies, additional security personnel, access control)
engaging (e.g. education)
repressive (e.g. evictions, media control)

Are you aware of any differences in security risk management strategies at PVAs in Cape Town? If so, describe, please.
Did you actually have to implement your risk management plans?

**Legacy stage:**

Are you aware of any security legacies deriving from the former PVAs, and how have the areas changed after the event?

In your opinion, what are the standards generally needed for effective security risk management at PVAs?
Appendix F:
Guarantees by government department

• Entry and exit permits by the Ministry of Home Affairs
• Media centre(s) by the Ministry of Communications
• Work permits by the Ministry of Home Affairs
• Transport by the Ministry of Transport
• Customs duties and taxes by the Ministry of Finance
• Immigration, customs and check-in procedures by the Ministry of Home Affairs
• Other taxes, duties and levies by the Ministry of Finance
• Pricing policy by the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
• Safety and security by the Ministry of Safety and Security
• FIFA’s ownership of media and marketing rights by the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Trade and Industry
• Bank and foreign-exchange operations by the Ministry of Finance
• Exploitation of marketing rights by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
• Telecommunications and information technology by the Ministry of Communications
• Indemnity by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development
• International Broadcast Centre by the Ministry of Communications
• National anthems and flags by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Medical care by the Ministry of Health
## Appendix G:
### FIFA’s legal RPP strategies in the 2010 FWC context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act/Guideline</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Limitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (South Africa)** | • Protects proprietors of trademarks against erosion and diminution of their rights through offending use by infringers  
• Trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer | • To establish a likelihood of substantial economic detriment to a trade mark is difficult to proof in court of short notice (World Patent and Trademark News, 2003)  
• FIFA’s good will and unregistered marks were not protected by the TMA (Kelbricks, 2008)  
• FIFA’s trademarks lack distinctiveness, and are in fairly common public use (Watal, 2010)  
• Disclaimer vastly constrained FIFA’s monopoly over the words (Watal, 2010)  
• Limitation on the right to the freedom of expression (Murphy, 2009b) |
| **Designs Act 195 of 1993 and Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (South Africa)** | • Any use of the design is infringing regardless of whether or not it was in the course of trade  
• It is not necessary to prove that the mark has been used as a trade mark | • Design must be new  
• No criminal law enforcement possible  
• No protection against false associations that form the main ammunition of unauthorised traders (Litt, 2005)  
• Exceptions in relation to ambush marketing, such as news reporting, criticism and review, and incidental inclusion (Johnson, 2008) |
| **Trade Practices Act** | • Protects sponsored events | • For large companies |
76 of 1976 section 9(d) (South Africa) and prohibits unauthorised third parties from making, or publishing any false or misleading statements that imply a connection with FIFA or the FWC (marketing by association)
- In October 2001, the TPA was amended to include a specific prohibition on ambush marketing in respect of sponsored events
- Unfair trade practices are prevented under the criminal law
- Engaging in ambush marketing is an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment

punishments are minor when weighed against the benefits to be extracted from gained publicity (Du Toit, 2006b)
- Fails to tackle situations where marketers manage to exploit the publicity value of an event, without making false or misleading statements (Du Toit, 2006a).
- The mere threat of civil and criminal punishments has the potential to abolish individual and commercial speech that would otherwise be well within legal boundaries (Grady et al., 2010)
- The civil law remedies can usually only be enforced after the event has occurred, resulting in relief being granted many months later (Du Toit, 2006b)

Advertising Standards Authority’s (ASA) Sponsorship Code, article 11 (South Africa)
- Clause 11.1, headed ‘Ambush marketing’, lists a number of ambush strategies which are not acceptable and prohibited under this Code (e.g., media strategies, usage of athletes/sports persons, sponsors ambushing sponsors and event ‘airspace’)
- If in contravention, the ASA orders that such advertising be withdrawn (Thompson, 2007).
- The ASA may advise businesses of their rights and obligations and the possible consequences of certain actions (Murphy, 2009a).

- The ASA’s function is generally not to enforce the law
| **Common law action of passing off (misappropriation)** | **Can be used in conjunction with, or as an alternative to, an action for the infringement of a registered trade mark (Johnson, 2008)**<br>**Allows FIFA to protect the FWC against the misrepresentation of its goods, services, or commercial property as having some association or affiliation with an outside party when no such link exists (Townley et al., 1998).** | **Limited right of protection as it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case (Watal, 2010).**<br>**Difficult to quantify the loss which may not be directly tangible or may not be identifiable until a much later date (Litt, 2005).**<br>**Passing off remedies can be expensive and risky to pursue (Jeremiah, 1997; Burton & Chadwick, 2008).** |
Appendix H:

2010 FWC CoCT By-law: Chapter 3 – provincial provisions: controlled access sites

Designation of Controlled Access Sites and Exclusion Zones

10(1) The City Manager may, by notice in the press, designate an area, as a Controlled Access Site.

(2) The City Manager may, by notice in the press, designate an area as an Exclusion Zone.

General prohibition applicable to Controlled Access Sites

11. No person shall—

(a) smoke, eat, drink or sleep in any Controlled Access Site where these activities are forbidden;

(b) interfere with any works being carried out, including but not limited to, installation of equipment, plant or infrastructure located within or upon a Controlled Access Site;

(c) remove any object or part thereof or any fixture, fitting or equipment from a Controlled Access Site;

(d) bring any animal except guide dogs or animals assisting authorised officials in the execution of their duties into any Controlled Access Site;

(e) use abusive or otherwise objectionable language or behave in an abusive, objectionable or disorderly manner in a Controlled Access Site;

(f) hamper, disturb, obstruct or harass any person using or entering any Controlled Access Site;

(g) damage or indirectly cause damage to any part of a Controlled Access Site or its contents or equipment;

(h) spill or drop any substance that may cause danger or harm to any user of a Controlled Access Site;

(i) commit any act of vandalism including but not limited to painting, defacing or marking any part of any Controlled Access Site;

(j) lie, sit, stand, congregate or walk, in a manner that otherwise causes an obstruction of any nature whatsoever, within any Controlled Access Site;
(k) tout or solicit a driver of a motor vehicle who parks a motor vehicle at a Controlled Access Site for the purpose of or under pretext of looking after or watching over the motor vehicle;

(l) urinate, excrete or commit an act of public indecency within any Controlled Access Site;

(m) deposit or leave or cause to be left any object which may endanger or cause harm to or be a nuisance to any user of a Controlled Access Site;

(n) carry, brandish or otherwise display or use within a Controlled Access Site any weapon, traditional weapon or any other object that may cause harm; or

(o) throw any object, of any nature whatsoever, within or onto a Controlled Access Site.

**Exclusion Zone**

12. Subject to section 5, no person shall conduct business activities on a match day in the Exclusion Zone except with the approval of the City Manager granted specifically with regard to the Competition, provided that this prohibition shall not apply to persons who, in respect of their normal business activities, may lawfully conduct a business located on private property at the date of commencement of this By-law.