Conference on Indonesia

Documents

Vol. I

New Delhi,
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PART I

MEMORANDUM

[NOTE.—This Memorandum is designed to give in brief outline a description of events in Indonesia leading up to the present situation. A selection of documents on the subject is appended.]

The Republic of Indonesia formally came into being on August 17, 1945, when, on the surrender of Japan, it issued a Declaration of Independence. The Republic soon came into collision with the Allied forces in Java and Sumatra which subsequently arrived with the object of liberating Allied prisoners, evacuating Japanese troops and re-establishing Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia. It became apparent that none of these objectives could be achieved, and that peace and order could not be restored in Indonesia, without cooperation with the Republic which was then in full control of the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura and enjoyed powerful support in other parts of the Netherlands East Indies.

2. There followed a period of protracted negotiations, under British auspices, which culminated in the conclusion, on March 29, 1947, of the *Linggadjati Agreement. In this Agreement the Government of the Netherlands recognised the Government of the Republic as exercising de facto authority over Java, Sumatra and Madura, and provision was made for the establishment of a federal State to be known as the United States of Indonesia. The Republic was to be one of the constituent units of the United States of Indonesia, which was to be associated with the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union owing allegiance to the Dutch Crown. It was stipulated that the parties would endeavor to establish the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union before January 1, 1949. By entering into this Agreement with the Republican Government, the Dutch accorded it de facto recognition. Similar recognition was subsequently accorded by certain other Governments, and two Governments are understood to have accorded de jure recognition to the Republic. Hopes that this Agreement would result in a settlement on the basis of the satisfaction of the political aspirations of the whole of the Indonesian people were not realised. Disputes arose between the Netherlands and the Republic on the interpretation of various Articles of the Agreement, and from time to time a breach of the peace appeared to be imminent. By July 1947, however, there remained only one major point of difference between the parties: namely, the policing of the territory controlled by the Republic. The Dutch proposed that this territory should have a joint Dutch-Indonesian police force, whereas the Republic insisted on having its own police in its territory.

3. While these discussions were proceeding the Dutch amassed strong military forces in Indonesia and, despite urgent appeals from other interested Powers to abstain from the use of force, launched a large-scale offensive against the Republic without warning at midnight on July 20/21, 1947. This occurred while a Republican delegation was still in Batavia for negotiations. Republican leaders who happened to be in Batavia were placed under restraint and prevented from communicating with their Government. These operations, described by the Dutch as ‘‘police action’’, were undertaken in disregard of Article XVII of the Linggadjati Agreement which provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration where direct consultation between the parties had failed. This action resulted in the denial to the Dutch by certain Governments of transit facilities for military aircraft and for military stores and personnel.

4. Pointing out that the outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia constituted a threat to world peace the Governments of India and Australia, in communications dated July 30, 1947, invited the Security Council to take immediate action under the Charter of the United Nations to put an end...
to the fighting. The Security Council in a *(Resolution) passed on August 1, called upon the parties to cease hostilities forthwith and to settle their dispute by peaceful means. They were to keep the Committee informed of progress made in this direction. By a *(Resolution) of August 25, the Council established a Commission consisting of the Consular Representatives of those members of the Security Council which had posts in Batavia (i.e. Australia, Belgium, China, France, the U.S. and the U.S.A.) to observe and report upon the implementation of the 'cease-fire' orders issued in pursuance of the Resolution of August 1. A further *(Resolution) of August 26, established a Committee of Good Offices consisting of three Members of the Council, one member of the Committee being chosen by each of the parties and the two so selected nominating the third. The Committee consisted of the representatives of Australia (nominated by the Republic), Belgium (nominated by the Netherlands) and the U.S.A. (selected by Australia and Belgium). These attempts did not lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities. Eventually, however, an uneasy stability was achieved, with the respective forces on either side of what is known as the Status Quo Line, marking their positions roughly as they stood on August 29, 1947.

5. Political discussions between the parties proceeded under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee and eventually, on January 17, 1948, a truce agreement (known as the "Renville Agreement") § was signed on board the USS Renville. Appended to it were two sets of "Principles" forming an agreed basis for a political settlement. Discussions as to the implementation of this Agreement continued, but at the same time the Dutch proceeded vigorously with the establishment of non-Republican States with the object of including them in the projected United States of Indonesia on an equal footing with the Republic. The Council informed representatives of these States at Bandung to discuss arrangements for the establishment of the proposed federal State, thus giving the Republican Government the impression that a deliberate attempt was being made to circumvent §. Additional causes of friction, other than political, arose from alleged breaches of the truce by the forces of the two parties and by the imposition of stringent control over the passage of goods and persons to and from Republican territory; these difficulties persisted throughout the period of negotiations.

6. In an effort to break the political deadlock, the United States and Australian representatives on the Committee, Mr. DuBois and Mr. Critchley, formulated proposals for an overall political agreement and for interim arrangements to be put into effect in Indonesia. These proposals did not receive the concurrence of the Belgian representative on the Committee but they were confidentially submitted by their authors to the Dutch and the Republican delegations as a basis for the revival of discussions. The Republic agreed that these proposals might be discussed, but the Dutch alleged that the substance of the proposals had improperly been published in the foreign press and, after consultation with the Hague, declined to continue political discussions under the auspices of the Committee. They refused also to allow the DuBois-Critchley proposals to be placed on the Committee's agenda. The effect of this decision was that from May 1948 onwards there were no formal political discussions under the Committee's aegis, although, as related below, direct conversations between the parties took place later.

7. In these circumstances, tension increased considerably; allegations of breaches of the truce multiplied and negotiations on economic issues, which continued through the Committee's organs, made no progress. In September 1948 Mr. Cochran, who had succeeded Mr. DuBois as the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices, submitted a fresh plan § which followed generally the DuBois-Critchley proposals. It was put forward with the object of persuading the Dutch to sit again in conference with the representatives of the United States. Amendments to the plan, those of the Dutch moreover insisted that, as a condition of the Cochran plan, the Republic should stipulate the recognition of the right to economic terms of the Renville Agreement, and on the other hand proposed that political matters should be discussed simultaneously with discussions of economic matters. While these exchanges were in progress, the Dutch called upon to face a Communist uprising was crushed by the Republic, which declared the rebels against the rebels.

8. Soon after, the Dutch Foreign Minister, on an exploratory visit to Java to determine whether a political solution could be found that would make possible the conclusion of a peace agreement with the Revolt leaders, was received by the Revolt leaders in their headquarters at the end of November 1948, a Special Delegation consisting of Dr. Sassen (Minister of Justice) and Mr. Neher (Royal Commissioner) with representatives of the Republic's provisional government. These discussions ended in failure early in February, when the Ministers returned to the Hague. The Revolt leaders agreed to suspend action until after the elections, as a result of which the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr. Spies, resigned with most of his cabinet. The Revolt leaders, in the meantime, continued their demands until the dissolution of the parliament early in May, when, after the elections had taken place, the Dutch Government offered to negotiate the peace of the Renville Agreement with a representative of the Dutch Republic.

9. The Committee of Good Offices, in its report of the other on the abortive discussions, said that, on December 17 in a letter to the Dutch Government, the Committee had expressed its belief that the Dutch would accept the Dutch demands without further delay and that negotiations should continue. The letter expressed the view that further discussions should be held between the parties.

10. In the event of a deadlock, it was suggested that the Dutch Government might be willing to consider the possibility of a truce with the Revolt leaders, as a basis for further discussions. The Dutch authorities, however, insisted that the Republic should first accept the Dutch demands without further delay, and that the Republic had already stated its objection to the letter of the Netherlands representative.

11. Finally, he appealed to the Dutch to accept the Dutch demands without further delay, and that the Republic had already stated its objection to the letter of the Netherlands representative. The Dutch authorities, however, insisted that the Republic should first accept the Dutch demands without further delay, and that the Republic had already stated its objection to the letter of the Netherlands representative. The Dutch authorities, however, insisted that the Republic should first accept the Dutch demands without further delay, and that the Republic had already stated its objection to the letter of the Netherlands representative. He could not therefore be said that in March 1948 Mr. Cochran the Dutch had fulfilled his part of the Agreement of the Committee of Good Offices of their revised terms. It is not clear whether the Dutch authorities were willing to consider the possibility of a truce with the Revolt leaders, as a basis for further discussions. The Dutch authorities, however, insisted that the Republic should first accept the Dutch demands without further delay, and that the Republic had already stated its objection to the letter of the Netherlands representative.

12. It could not therefore be said that in March 1948 Mr. Cochran the Dutch had fulfilled his part of the Agreement of the Committee of Good Offices of their revised terms. It is not clear whether the Dutch authorities were willing to consider the possibility of a truce with the Revolt leaders, as a basis for further discussions. The Dutch authorities, however, insisted that the Republic should first accept the Dutch demands without further delay, and that the Republic had already stated its objection to the letter of the Netherlands representative. He could not therefore be said that in March 1948 Mr. Cochran the Dutch had fulfilled his part of the Agreement of the Committee of Good Offices of their revised terms.
The Dutch moreover insisted that, as a condition precedent to the discussion of the Cochran plan, the Republic should ensure observance of the military and economic terms of the Renville Truce Agreement. The Republic on the other hand proposed that political discussions should proceed simultaneously with discussions of observance of the Truce Agreement. While these exchanges were in progress the Republican Government was called upon to face a Communist uprising within its own territory. This was crushed by the Republic, which declined Dutch offers of assistance against the rebels.

8. Soon after, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr. Stikker, paid a brief exploratory visit to Java to determine whether a "last effort" could usefully be made to break the political deadlock. Thereafter, towards the end of November 1945, a Special Delegation of the Netherlands Government consisting of Dr. Sassen (Minister for Overseas Territories), Dr. Stikker and Mr. Neher (Royal Commissioner in Indonesia) had discussions with representatives of the Republic and of other Indonesian groups. These discussions ended in failure early in December, when the Dutch Ministers returned to the Hague. The parties were unable to agree on the powers to be vested in the "Representative of the Crown in Indonesia during the interim period, and it was reported that they differed particularly on the Dutch requirement that the armed forces, both Dutch and Indonesian, of the United States of Indonesia, should be under overall Dutch control. The Republican representatives claimed that they had gone to the furthest limit possible in making concessions but were anxious that negotiations should continue. The Dutch, on the other hand, expressed the view that further discussion would be futile.

9. The Committee of Good Offices communicated to each party the report of the other on these abortive discussions. The Dutch, after some delay, replied on December 17 in a letter inviting the Committee to obtain the Republic's acceptance of their demands regarding the powers of the Representative of the Crown, and control of the armed forces, by 10 A.M. the next day. Replying to this letter, Mr. Cochran, the U.S. representative on the Committee, deplored what appeared to him to be the issue of an ultimatum and stated that the Republic could not be expected to accept the Dutch demands without further discussion; he pointed out that the Republic had already stated its objections to these demands and that the letter of the Netherlands representative ignored those objections. Finally, he appealed to the Dutch to resume negotiations. This appeal had no effect. At 11:30 P.M. on December 18, Mr. Cochran, who had arrived at Batavia to deliver his reply personally to the Netherlands representative, received a communication from the Netherlands representative to the address of the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, to the effect that the Dutch could no longer abide by the Renville Truce Agreement. The reason given for this decision was that the Republic had failed to prevent breaches of the truce. Mr. Cochran was not at that time Chairman of the Committee; the Chairman and the third member were, with the Committee's Secretariat, at Kalijurang in Republican territory. It could not therefore be said that in handing over this communication to Mr. Cochran the Dutch had fulfilled their obligation of notifying the Committee of Good Offices of their repudiation of the Truce Agreement. The Secretary-General of the Republican delegation was informed of the denunciation of the truce at 11:45 P.M. Mr. Cochran was not able to inform his colleagues of this development, or the Secretary-General of the Republican delegation to communicate with his Government, because communications were immediately disrupted. At midnight the Dutch launched a military offensive. In so doing they committed a breach of the Renville Agreement, which provided that the truce could only be denounced by either party after prior notification of its decision both to the Committee
of Good Offices and to the other party. The Secretary-General of the Republican delegation was himself arrested at 1 A.M. on December 19, though he was released on December 24.

10. It has been observed by the Committee of Good Offices that, even if due notice of the termination of the Truce Agreement had been given, a resumption of hostilities could not be justified because the Security Council’s “cease-fire” order of August 1, 1947, was still operative. Nevertheless, the manner in which the Dutch attack was carried out showed clearly that it had been carefully planned in advance. The Republican capital Jogjakarta was attacked from the air shortly after 6 A.M. on December 19, and the airfield captured. Airborne troops completed the seizure of the city in a few hours and Republican leaders including President Soekarno, Cabinet Ministers and the Commander-in-Chief, were taken prisoner. Operations proceeded simultaneously in Java and Sumatra and most of the major towns were soon in Dutch hands, the Republican forces resorting for the most part to guerrilla fighting and scoured earth tactics, against which the Dutch Commander-in-Chief had issued a stern warning. The two members of the Committee of Good Offices, and the Committee’s staff, who had been at Kaliurang were cut off until December 22, on which date they were evacuated to Batavia. They testified later to the ruthlessness of the Dutch offensive.

11. On December 24 the Security Council passed a Resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the release of the Republican leaders. (A proposal requiring the withdrawal of troops to the positions occupied by them on December 18 failed of adoption because it did not secure the necessary number of affirmative votes.) This Resolution was ignored by the Dutch and the Council had to repeat its demands on December 29. The representative of the Netherlands informed the Council that hostilities were expected to end in the next few days, though action against armed bands might be necessary even after that. Later reports indicate that fighting has in fact continued and that the Dutch troops in Sumatra only received an order announcing the completion of their operations two days after the date on which this was said to have occurred. By a Resolution adopted on December 29, the Security Council re-established the Consular Commission, charging this body with certain duties of observation and reporting which the Committee of Good Offices had in fact been discharging.

12. The Committee of Good Offices had under its control a corps of military observers who had been stationed on the Status Quo Line to supervise the implementation of the Truce Agreement. These officers were refused facilities by the Dutch after the outbreak of hostilities, on the ground that the truce had ended and that there was nothing for them to observe. (They were only able to resume their activities after the main phase of the operations was over.) This fact, together with the defiance by the Dutch of the Security Council’s directions for the stoppage of hostilities and the release of the Republican leaders, and their failure to grant a request of the Committee of Good Offices for facilities for a meeting with the Republican leaders, led the Committee to doubt whether it could usefully function any longer. There was a curious episode in regard to the detention of these leaders. The representative of the Netherlands informed the Security Council that all the Republican leaders were on the island of Banka where they enjoyed full freedom except that they could not leave the island. Under pressure from the Committee of Good Offices, however, the Dutch Authorities in Java stated that Dr. Hatta (Vice-President and Premier of the Republic) was on Banka with two other Ministers and that President Soekarno, Dr. Sjafrir and other personages were at Brastagi in Sumatra. The Committee was permitted to visit Dr. Hatta and his companions on Banka island on January 15 but at the time was not allowed to see the President and his party at Brastagi.

H. M. Queen Wilhelmina’s Radio Address

Planning for the creation of a Commonwealth, Surinam and Curacao.

A political unity which rests on a realization of the purpose for which it has been embodied, for instance, in which we could instantly agree, because freedom and justice for which we have fought in the course of our history.

I visualize, without anticipating the conference, that they will be directed by the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam to complete self-reliance and freedom of their internal affairs, but with the readiness. It is my opinion that such a co-operation can give the Kingdom and in their responsibility both internally an ample room for discrimination according to the individual citizens and the need of the situation will determine the policy of the

Declaration of Independence

Since independence is the right of this world is contrary to humanity. The struggle for Indonesia stage of glory in which the Indonesian an independent, united, sovereign, just.

With the blessing of God Almighty to lead a free national life, the Indonesian.

17th August, 1945.
13. The Dutch aggression had repercussions even outside Republican territory. The Government of the Dutch-sponsored States of Pasundan (West Java) and East Indonesia resigned, and it was reported that martial law had to be enforced in South Borneo. The Dutch, however, took early steps towards the formation of new Governments in the two States mentioned, and called a conference of so-called "Federalist" Indonesian groups to discuss the measures necessary for the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. They announced that the situation did not permit the completion of these arrangements by January 1, 1949 (the date laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement), but they promulgated the "B.I.O. Decree" to cover interim arrangements. They now hope to form a Provisional Federal Government in a month's time.

14. It would appear that the Dutch are prepared to treat with the Republic only on their own terms and not to deal with it as the symbol and champion of the aspirations for freedom of the Indonesian people.

H. M. Queen Wilhelmina's Radio Address of December 6, 1942, Outlining Plans for the creation of a Commonwealth of the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curaçao.

A political unity which rests on this foundation moves far towards a realization of the purpose for which the United Nations are fighting, as it has been embodied, for instance, in the Atlantic Charter, and with which we could instantly agree, because it contains our own conception of freedom and justice for which we have sacrificed blood and possessions in the course of our history.

I visualize, without anticipating the recommendations of the conference, that they will be directed towards a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curaçao will participate, with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance.

It is my opinion that such a combination of independence and collaboration can give the Kingdom and its parts the strength to carry fully their responsibility both internally and externally. This would leave no room for discrimination according to race or nationality; only the ability of the individual citizens and the needs of the various groups of the population will determine the policy of the government.

Declaration of Independence by the Indonesian Republic

Since independence is the right of every nation, any form of subjugation in this world is contrary to humanity and justice, and must be abolished. The struggle for Indonesian Independence has reached a stage of glory in which the Indonesian people are led to the gateway of an independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesian state.

With the blessing of God Almighty, and moved by the highest ideals to lead a free national life, the Indonesian people hereby declare their independence.

17th August, 1945.

SOEKARNO-HATTA.
Political Manifesto of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
(November 1, 1945)

It is two months now since we made clear in every possible way our desire to live as a free people. Today we are entering a new phase in our fight for freedom, and we are conscious that the eyes of the world are on us, with a view to ascertaining what our views and objectives are. It is therefore incumbent on us to afford the world every facility to study us and to realize that not only is our cause grounded on truth, justice and humanism, but also on common sense and sane thinking.

On March 9, 1942, the Dutch Government in Indonesia surrendered to the Japanese in Bandung after going through the farce of offering resistance to the invaders. As a result of that Dutch deflection, the unarmed Indonesian people were delivered to the tyrannical excesses of the Japanese militarists; and for a full three and a half years the Japanese worked their will on the population, subjecting the people to a type of pressure and oppression unknown in the last few decades of Dutch rule here. The Japanese looked upon Indonesians as mere cattle. Not a few Indonesians were sacrificed by them in the interest of Japanese aggression. Forced labour was imposed on the common people, while peasants were intimidated into handing over to the Japanese the fruits of their toil. The intelligence was bludgeoned into lying to and deceiving the people, and the entire population itself was obliged to conform to Japanese military discipline; it was made to drill and carry out orders with soldier-like precision. The Japanese are gone but the little military knowledge they infused into us remains, especially in our youth.

The Dutch must accept the responsibility for what happened. After centuries of so-called “training”, on March 9, 1942 the Dutch handed over 70 million people to the Japanese in a condition of military unpreparedness and intellectual backwardness.

Indonesians lacked the wherewithal with which to stand up to Japanese might and oppression and fell easy victims to Japanese propaganda. Not trusting us, the Dutch deliberately refrained from giving us military training; bent on keeping us ignorant, the Dutch denied education to the masses. As they groaned under Japanese excesses our people began to take stock of the Dutch and the consequences of Dutch rule. With sharper insight they were able to perceive how ineffective and valueless the Dutch administration had been. From that moment Indonesians were awakened to the true state of affairs and there was a sudden upsurge of nationalism far stronger and deeper than ever before. And that nationalism was heightened by Japanese propaganda directed towards Asiatism.

Tyrannical Japanese rule could neither curb nor stamp out the growth of Indonesian nationalism; in fact it was instrumental in fostering the growth of self-respect and patriotism among the masses, and in arousing the desire to be rid of the Japanese as well as all other forms of foreign domination. Millions of our people died while countless others millions bore every manner of suffering under the three and a half years of Japanese rule; for this, the Japanese are responsible but so too are the Dutch for having denied us the mental and material strength needed to stand up to the Japanese. Yet there is one point that must not be overlooked. Although the administration of Indonesia and the management of her industries were nominally Japanese, it was really the Indonesians who—because of the glaring inefficiency of the Japanese—carried out all the functions previously in Dutch hands. This factor is important because it gave us valuable training and self-confidence.

After having handed us bound hand and foot to the Japanese, the Dutch have not even a shadow of moral right to take the virtuous stand that we co-operated with the Japanese; all the more so because generally speaking, the Japanese have obtained a greater measure of co-operation from the Dutchmen and women in their employ than from the Indonesians. The Dutch wilfully ignore the anti-Japanese aspect of Indonesian nationalism.

Overly and overtly the Indonesians have sabotaged, uprisings and of other forms of nationalism fought for this with their lives. Yet others lived like hunted animals. Tasikmalaya, and Indramajoe, in Sukabumi were among other places. Other nationalists who adhered to national lines in order to strengthen national working with the Japanese. They were the goose-step and to shout out war cries because they served in the military as a profession.

The nationalists who worked with the Japanese in spite of their enforced presence in nationalist ideals which had for years been in abeyance. This is evidenced by the constitution of Indonesia and, although it was worked out under Japanese occupation, the entire document is oriented towards the end of attaining sovereignty for their nation. It carried every Indonesian along with it. In the beginning negotiations for their surrender on the principle of “sui juris” carried in San Francisco, was faced with the same problem as the Dutch, whom the United States stood opposed to the sovereignty over Indonesia.

Whenever they appeared at internal meetings, they demanded that they had never looked upon Indonesia as the Dutch colonies but as something that had to be respected and preserved. But for two months now the Dutch must accept the responsibility for what happened. The Indonesians are to have nothing to do with the Dutch for the time being. The Indonesians have never been a subject people. The Dutch want to continue their holding of the Dutch East Indies and the foisting of Dutch imperialism. Only by force can they achieve their aims. The Dutch are prepared to violate the Atlantic Charter; and it will result in endless bloodshed. By force and force alone can the Dutch keep what they have set up.

Nur have the Dutch any moral right to impose their old imperialist policies on the Indonesian people for their past sins or for their ignorance. The Indonesians being delivered to the Japanese is not punishment. Justice denies the Dutch any say in their national aspirations. People for the benefit of dependent peoples and of the world itself are not empowered to violate the Atlantic Charter.

There can be no doubt of the fact that there is a reasonable answer to offer for the difficulties which this makes their position all the more untenable. The Dutch, having other interests in this system, despite their proclamation that they were “Wilhelminas” in 1942. The Dutch know only ways of imposing their domination on us, but being able to utilize the Allied forces. They are Japanese, to crush the determination of the Indonesian people, and thereby make it possible for them to work once again. Be that as it may, the Dutch have until now been unable to change the type of government we have chosen.
Government of the Republic of Indonesia
November 1, 1945

Overtly and covertly the Indonesians resisted the Japanese, in the shape of sabotage, uprisings, and of other form of opposition. Thousands of nationalists fought for this with their lives. Others underwent tortures. Yet others lived like hunted animals. Witness what happened at Blitar Talsiwalaja, and Indramajoe, in Sumatra, in West-Borneo and in many places. Other nationalists who worked in the open along constitutional lines in order to strengthen national consciousness were forced into working with the Japanese. They had no option but to march and to goad the tinwork and to shout out war cries in the approved Japanese manner because they served in the regiments raised by the Japanese for their own purpose.

The nationalists who worked with the Japanese never for a minute, in spite of their enforced presence in the totalitarian camp, forsake the nationalist ideals which had for years and years been their guiding lights. This is evidenced by the constitution they framed for the Republic of Indonesia and, although it was worked out during the time of the Japanese occupation, the entire document is entirely democratic in form and spirit.

On the 17th of August 1945 the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed, and it marked the culmination of the political desire of the Indonesian people to attain sovereignty for their nation. Like an irresistible tidal wave, it carried every Indonesian along with it. Meanwhile the Japanese had begun negotiations for their surrender to the Allies. The world at large, especially those who had helped bring into being the United Nations at San Francisco, was faced with the question of Indonesian sovereignty as-a-vice the Dutch, whom the United Nations recognized as vested with sovereignty over Indonesia.

Whenever they appeared at international conferences the Dutch claimed that they had never looked upon Indonesia as a colony and that, consequently, the Indonesians had nothing but love and affection for the Dutch Government. But for a few months now the world has seen how determined the Indonesians are to have nothing to do with Dutch imperialism. In every possible way the Indonesians have manifested their desire to remain a sovereign people. The Dutch want to reimpose their rule on Indonesia, and the foisting of Dutch imperialism on us will be nothing else but a deliberate violation of the Atlantic Charter and of the United Nations' Charter; and it will result in endless bloodshed and sacrifice of life, for only by force and force alone can the Dutch try to pull down the government which we have set up.

Now have the Dutch any moral right to walk into Indonesia to resume their old imperialistic policies on the assumption that they bear no blame for their past sins or for their surrender which resulted in 70 million Indonesians being delivered to the tender mercies of Japanese militarism. Justice denies the Dutch any say in our affairs, and any sanctioning of their imperialistic aspirations will mean violation of the principles of justice and humanity. The San Francisco Charter places the responsibility for the welfare of dependent peoples on certain nations, but these nations themselves are not empowered to violate the basic principles of that Charter.

There can be no doubt of the fact that the Dutch have no logical or reasonable answer to offer for the difficulties they are faced with, and this makes their position all the more untenable. Up to now there is not any sign of the Dutch having otherwise than the realisation of the old colonial system, despite their proclamation of a statement made by Queen Wilhelmina in 1942. The Dutch know that they are unequal to the task of imposing their domination on us, but they are buoyed up by the hope of being able to utilize the Allied forces, which are here to disarm the Japanese, to crush the determination of the Indonesians to maintain their sovereignty, and thereby make it possible for the Dutch to colonize us all over again. Be that as it may, the Dutch will never be able to make us give up the type of government we have chosen for ourselves because the burning
flame of our patriotism will render null and void all Dutch designs on us. So long as the world can see no other way out of the present impasse except that of supporting the Dutch claim on Indonesia, and so long as such action leads to deprivation of the right of Indonesians to decide their own destiny, so long will Indonesia be unable to contribute of her material wealth to the enrichment of the world. Such a state of affairs will especially tell on those countries next door to us, chiefly Australia, the Philippines and the United States of America. America must need be affected because the Indonesians, with the rest of Asia, look forward to generous American assistance in the days to come in the task of reconstructing Indonesia and raising the living standards of her peoples. American credits and technical assistance to our country plus the purchase of Indonesia’s raw material are some forms of help we hope to secure.

In the task of perfecting our social and administrative structure we Indonesians see no necessity for the use of forcible measures. If, however, such force is ever used it will be by the Dutch because of their desire to impose themselves on us. We have no wish to impose our will on other races. All we want is a recognition of our independence and the opportunity to perfect our system of Government.

The political burden we have shouldered lays upon us the responsibility for the well-being of our country as well as an obligation to satisfy the world family of nations that we are discharging our duties in an efficient and just manner. We entertain no hatred for the Dutch or any other foreign peoples, and certainly none at all towards the Eurasians, the Ambonese and the Messadoese who are flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood. The logic of circumstances alone should make that evident, because we know and realize that the needs of our country and of our people call for technical, financial and educational assistance—just to mention three forms of help we shall require—from outside sources for many years to come. In this connection the Dutch enjoy a distinct advantage over others—they have been here and are familiar with conditions in Indonesia. Indonesian independence will necessarily entail a complete reorientation of political relations between us and the Dutch, but it will not affect Dutch capital or Dutch lives.

The incredible richness of our land gives ample promise of better living standards for our people in common with the rest of the world if only this great latent wealth of ours is properly exploited. In that task the peoples of all nations—most of all the United States, Australia and the Philippines—will find ample opportunity to help us with their money and skill.

However, both Indonesia and the world will be denied this chance of co-operation for our mutual benefit if opposition from the Dutch withholds recognition of our country or of the form of government we have chosen for ourselves. In such an event not only will we and the Dutch be losers, but also the world at large which is eagerly hoping for material and spiritual contributions from Indonesia towards satisfying world needs.

When the Republic of Indonesia is formally recognized we will accordingly take appropriate action regarding a number of important matters. All debts incurred by the Dutch East Indies government previous to the Japanese surrender and fairly chargeable to us, we will unhesitatingly take over. All property of foreigners will be handed over to them with one exception—we reserve the right to acquire at fair prices such property as shall be deemed necessary for the welfare of the country. In concert with our immediate neighbours and the rest of the world, we intend to take our place in the councils of the United Nations to further and implement the ideals contained in the San Francisco Charter. Our internal policy will be based on the sovereignty of the people, and we will put into practice all the steps necessary to bring home and evoke in the breasts of the Eurasian and European residents of our country the highest feeling of patriotism and democracy.

In a short while, we intend to prove ideals by calling a general election, in a principles laid down for our country. That such an election may result in far-reaching position of the present government and may be called for by the representatives.

Citizens and residents of Indonesia construction programme we plan to put calls for large creeds as well as small. States, Australia and the other count Dutchmen as well as other sections of the commit breaches of the regulations, will engage themselves in any legitimate for.

The Dutch government and the Dutch point where they have got to make up to Do they intend to follow blindly the lead capitalists and imperialists, itself and facing the youth of Holland on the risky Indonesia anew? Or have they the visit to changing conditions, and, through secure for themselves and their descendants, the great place they hold in trade and industry for themselves to live here and earn their

As soon as we obtain conditions favoring resources towards national and social re-endeavour to make it possible for our people to be the leaders, and to make themselves healthy in body and to all peoples of all social grades the best training. Side by side with plans for organisation, we must go beyond mere trade. Must in the fullness of time be a knowledge, especially with our near neighbour such as the Filipinos who spring from the soil and will make our full contribution to the possible when we exist as a free nation and not with the other peoples of the world.

BATAVIA,
November 1, 1945.

THE LINGGADJAAT.

Initialled on 15th November 1946 and Submitted to the Netherlands at The Hague.

Preamble.—The Netherlands Government-General for the Netherlands Republic of Indonesia, represented by us, on a sincere desire to assure good relations between Netherlands and Indonesia in new form offer the best guarantee for sound and friendly in the future and which make it possible to the relationship between the two peoples the respective parliaments:
In a short while, we intend to prove our adherence to the democratic ideals by calling a general election, in accordance with the constitutional principles laid down for our country. There is always the possibility that such an election may result in far reaching changes, both in the composition of the present government and in such constitutional changes as may be called for by the representatives of the people.

Citizens and residents of Indonesia will be the beneficiaries of the reconstruction programme we plan to put into operation. Such a scheme calls for large credits as well as manufactured goods from the United States, Australia, and the other countries commercially linked to us. Dutchmen as well as other sections of the population, provided they do not commit breaches of the regulations, will be guaranteed the opportunity to engage themselves in any legitimate form of work they desire.

The Dutch government and the Dutch people have now reached a point where they have got to make up their minds regarding Indonesia. Do they intend to follow blindly the lead given them by a small band of capitalists and imperialists, selfish and self-seeking, who are bent on sacrificing the youth of Holland on the gravy venture of trying to subjugate Indonesia anew? Or have they the vision and the ability to adjust themselves to changed conditions, and, through the way of peaceful discussion, secure for themselves and their descendants in this country the predominant place they hold in trade and industry, thereby also making it possible for themselves to live here and earn their livelihood in peace and security?

As soon as we obtain conditions favourable to the full contribution of our resources towards national and social reconstruction, we shall immediately endeavour to make it possible for our people to exercise all the rights vested in them—those very rights which are stressed by the United Nations. Not only will our people enjoy freedom of speech and of religion and freedom from want and from fear, but they will be given every incentive to make themselves healthy in body and progressive in mind by providing all peoples of all social grades the benefits of modern education and training. Side by side with plans for our internal advancement and well-being, we must go beyond mere trade relations with the outside world. There must in the fullness of time be an interchange of culture and of knowledge, especially with our near neighbours and more so with people such as the Filipinos who spring from a common racial stock. We can and will make our full contribution to world culture, but that will only be possible when we exist as a free nation on a footing of complete equality with the other peoples of the world.

Batavia,
November 1, 1945.

THE LINGGADJAATI AGREEMENT

Initiated on 15th November 1946 and Signed on 25th March 1947 by the Netherlands and Indonesian Delegations.

Preamble.—The Netherlands Government, represented by the Commissioner-General for the Netherlands Indies, and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by the Indonesian delegation, moved by a sincere desire to insure good relations between the peoples of The Netherlands and Indonesia in new forms of voluntary co-operation which offer the best guarantee for sound and strong development of both countries in the future and which make it possible to give a new foundation to the relationship between the two peoples; agree as follows and will submit this agreement at the shortest possible notice for the approval of the respective parliaments:
Article 1

The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising 'de facto' authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through mutual co-operation, in Republican territory. To this end, the necessary measures shall at once be taken in order that this inclusion shall be completed at the latest on the date mentioned in Article 12.

Article 2

The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic shall co-operate in the rapid formation of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia.

Article 3

The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies with the provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special relationship for such a territory to the United States of Indonesia and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article 4

The component parts of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the East, without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by democratic process that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be arranged otherwise.

Without derogation of the provisions of Article 3 and of the first paragraph of this Article, the United States of Indonesia may make special arrangements concerning the territory of its capital.

Article 5

The constitution of the United States of Indonesia shall be determined by a constituent assembly composed of the democratically nominated representatives of the Republic and of the other future partners of the United States of Indonesia to which the following paragraph of this article shall apply.

Both parties shall consult each other on the method of participation in this constituent assembly by the Republic of Indonesia, by the territories not under the authority of the Republic and by the groups of the population not, or insufficiently, represented with due observance of the responsibility of the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic, respectively.

Article 6

To promote the joint interests of The Netherlands and Indonesia, the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall co-operate in the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union by which the Kingdom of The Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao, shall be converted into the said Union consisting on the one hand of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia.

The foregoing paragraph does not exclude the possibility of a further arrangement of the relations between the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao.

Article 7

A. The Netherlands-Indonesian organs shall promote the joint interests of the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia.

B. These organs shall be formed by the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia respectively, by the parliaments of The Netherlands and by the parliament of the United States of Indonesia.

C. The joint interests shall be co-regulated, defence and, as far as necessary, an economic or cultural nature.

Article 8

The King (Queen) of the Netherlands shall be the Head of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The title shall be issued by the King (Queen) in the name of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

Article 9

In order to promote the interests of the Netherlands and of the King, a High Commissioner shall be appointed.

Article 10

Statutes of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union shall provide for certain provisions regarding:

A. Safeguarding of the rights of the peoples of the States of Indonesia, guarantees for the fulfillment of their rights, and protection of the people of the States of Indonesia;

B. Mutual exercise of civil rights by citizens of the States of Indonesia and the Netherlands;

C. Regulations containing provisios provided for by the United States of Indonesia for the protection of the people of the States of Indonesia;

D. Regulation of the manner and conditions of the possession of the States of Indonesia as long as the States of Indonesia are insufficiently, if at all, organized;

E. Safeguarding in both parts of the States of Indonesia, the rights and liberties referred to in the Statute on Organization.

Article 11

A. The Netherlands Government shall, by a conference of representatives of the Netherlands and the future United States of Indonesia, establish:

B. The Statutes of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

Article 12

The Netherlands Government and the Republic of Indonesia shall endeavour to establish the Netherlands-Indonesian Union by 1950.

Article 13

The Netherlands Government shall, in order to obtain the admission of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union to the United Nations Organization, take the necessary measures.
Government recognizes the Government as exercising 'de facto' authority over Java and the areas occupied by Allied or Netherlandic forces. In the end, the necessary measures shall at once be taken to ensure the United States of Indonesia.

The rapid formation of a sovereign democracy in the United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entity formed by the Netherlands, however, the territory, after due consultation with the United States of Indonesia, they can be regarded as a territory to the United States of Indonesia.

The United States of Indonesia shall be composed of the states of the Netherlands, Borneo, and the Philippines. Any territory to be decided by the States of Indonesia shall conduct each other on the method of participation by the Republic and the other future partner in the territory of the Republic and by the groups of territory, represented with due observance to the interests of the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Netherlands.

The Netherlands Government shall cooperate in the establishment of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, comprising the islands Indies, Surinam and Curaçao, shall continue to consist of the one hand on the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao, an independent State of Indonesia. The Netherlands Government shall forthwith take the necessary steps in order to obtain the admission of the United States of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization immediately after the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

Article 7
A. The Netherlands-Indonesian Union shall have its own organs to promote the joint interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia.
B. These organs shall be formed by the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia, and, if necessary, by the parliaments of those countries.
C. The joint interests shall be considered to be co-operation on foreign relations, defence and, as far as necessary, finance as well as subjects of an economic or cultural nature.

Article 8
The King (Queen) of the Netherlands shall be at the head of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Decrees and resolutions concerning the joint interests shall be issued by the organs of the Union in the King's (Queen's) name.

Article 9
In order to promote the interests of the United States of Indonesia in the Netherlands and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Indonesia, a High Commissioner shall be appointed by the respective Governments.

Article 10
Statutes of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union shall, furthermore, contain provisions regarding:
A. Safeguarding the rights of both parties towards one another and guarantees for the fulfilment of their mutual obligations.
B. Mutual exercise of civil rights by Netherlands and Indonesian citizens.
C. Regulations containing provisions in case of no agreement can be reached by the organs of the Union.
D. Regulation of the manner and conditions of the assistance to be given by the services of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia as long as the services of the latter are not, or are insufficiently, organized; and
E. Safeguarding in both parts of the Union of the fundamental human rights and liberties referred to in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

Article 11
A. The statutes of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union shall be drafted by a conference of representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the future United States of Indonesia.
B. The statutes shall come into effect after approval by the respective parliaments.

Article 12

Article 13
The Netherlands Government shall forthwith take the necessary steps in order to obtain the admission of the United States of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization immediately after the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.
Article 14

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia recognizes the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and the restitution of their goods as far as they are exercised or to be found in the territory over which it exercises de facto authority. A joint commission will be set up to effect this restoration and restitution.

Article 15

In order to reform the Government of the Indies in such a way that its composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia and to its projected constitutional structure, the Netherlands Government, pending the realization of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, shall forthwith initiate the necessary legal measures to adjust the constitutional and international position of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the new situation.

Article 16

Directly after the conclusion of this agreement, both parties shall proceed to reduce their armed forces. They will consult together concerning the extent and rate of this reduction and their co-operation in military matters.

Article 17

A. For the co-operation between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic contemplated in this agreement, an organization shall be called into existence of delegations to be appointed by each of the two Governments with a joint secretariat.

B. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall settle by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consultation in conference between these delegations. In that case a chairman of another nationality with a deciding vote shall be appointed by agreement between the delegations or, if such agreement cannot be reached, by the President of the International Court of Justice.

Article 18

This agreement shall be drawn up in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages. Both texts shall have equal authority.

India’s Complaint to Security Council, July 30, 1947.

I have the honour, on behalf of the Government of India, to draw the attention of the Security Council under Article 35(1) of the United Nations Charter to the situation in Indonesia.

During the last few days Dutch forces have embarked without warning on large scale military action against the Indonesian people. These attacks began without warning at a time when a delegation of the Indonesian Republican Government was actually at Batavia for negotiations with the Dutch authorities on the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement. In the opinion of the Government of India, this situation endangers the maintenance of international peace and security which is covered by Article 34 of the Charter. The Government of India therefore request the Security Council to take the necessary measures provided by the Charter to put an end to the present situation.

The Government of India earnestly hope that, in view of its urgency, the Council will consider this matter as soon as possible—Jawaharlal Nehru, Member for External Affairs, Government of India.

AUSTRALIA’S COMPLAINT TO

Under instructions from my Gov't to the attention of the Security Council in progress in Java and Sumatra by and of the Republic of Indonesia and muniques by their respective Army C.

The Australian Government con a breach of the peace under Article immediate action to restore interna

In order to prevent an aggravation Government proposes that the Security and without prejudice to the rights, concerned, shall call upon the Govern Republic of Indonesia to cease hostil ation in accordance with Article 17 of the Netherlands and the Government at Batavia on March 25, 1947.

In view of the urgent circumstances to call immediately a meeting of the Security Council and that the p be communicated to representatives with the notice of the meeting.

Security Council Resolution on

The Security Council noting with between the armed forces of the Nation calls upon the parties (a) to cease hostilities by arbitration or by other means in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter and (b) to inform the Council of the progress of the negotiations.

Security Council Resolutions on Ind

The Security Council requests have been submitted as a basis for the consideration of the matters referred to in the resolution of the Council of August 1, 1949, of “Cease-fire” orders and conditions of occupation or from which armed forces will be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. The Governments of the Netherlands and the Governments of the United Kingdom and France are authorized to assist in the fulfillment of their mission. The Security Council.

Second Resolution:

The Security Council resolves in order to assist in carrying out the mission referred to in the previous resolution, the Mission is composed of nine members, of which three are representatives of the United Nations and the other six are representatives of the Governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France.
AUSTRALIA'S COMPLAINT TO SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 30, 1947

Under instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to the attention of the Security Council the hostilities which are at present in progress in Java and Sumatra between armed forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia and which have been the subject of communications by their respective Army Commanders during the past ten days.

The Australian Government considers that these hostilities constitute a breach of the peace under Article 39 and urges that the Council take immediate action to restore international peace and security.

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation the Australian Government proposes that the Security Council, as a provisional measure, and without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned, should call upon the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith and to commence arbitration in accordance with Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement between the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia signed at Batavia on March 25, 1947.

In view of the urgent circumstances I am instructed to request you to call immediately a meeting of the Security Council for the consideration of this communication and that the provisional agenda, including this item, be communicated to representatives of the Security Council simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Security Council Resolution on Indonesia, dated August 1, 1947

The Security Council noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia calls upon the parties (a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) to settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement.

Security Council Resolutions on Indonesia, dated August 25 and 26, 1947

The Security Council requests Government Members of Council who have career Consular Representatives in Batavia to instruct them to prepare jointly for the information and guidance of the Security Council reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of August 1, 1947, such reports to cover the observance of “Cease-fire” orders and conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. The Security Council requests the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to grant the representatives referred to all facilities necessary for the effective fulfillment of their mission. The Security Council resolves to consider the matter.

Second Resolution:

The Security Council resolves to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with the Resolution of the Council of August 1. The Council expresses its readiness, if parties so request, to assist in settlement through a Committee of the Council consisting of the Members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third be designated by the two so selected.
Security Council Resolution on Indonesia, dated November 1, 1947

The Security Council,

Having received and taken note of the Report of the Consular Commission dated 14 October 1947, indicating that the Council's resolution of 1 August 1947, relating to the cessation of hostilities has not been fully effective;

Having taken note that according to the Report no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means of giving effect to that resolution;

Calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution, and, pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitement to activities which contravene that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property;

Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution;

Requests the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices;

Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices, and the Consular Commission that its resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as meaning that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947, is inconsistent with the Council resolution of August 1.

Should it appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, invites the parties to conclude between them as soon as possible the agreements referred to in its resolution of August 25, 1947.

THE 'RENVILLE' AGREEMENT

Truce Agreement signed on January 17, 1948 on board USS Renville

The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia referred to in this agreement as the parties hereby agree as follows:

1. That a stand-fast and cease-fire order be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties immediately upon the signing of this agreement and to be fully effective within forty-eight hours. This order will apply to the troops of both parties along the boundary lines of the areas described in the proclamation of the Netherlands Indies Government on August 29, 1947, which shall be called the Status Quo Line and in the areas specified in the following paragraph.

2. That in the first instance and for the time being demilitarized zones be established in general conformity with the above-mentioned Status Quo Line. These zones as a rule will comprise the territories between this Status Quo Line and on one side the line of the Netherlands forward positions and on the other side the line of the Republica forward positions, the average width of each of the zones being approximately the same.

3. That the establishment of the demilitarized zones in no way prejudices the rights, claims or positions of the parties under the resolutions of the Security Council of August 1, 25 and 26 and November 1, 1947.

4. That upon acceptance of the foregoing by both parties the Committee will place at the disposal of both parties its military assistants who will be instructed to assume in the first instance whether any incident occurs on either or both parties.

5. That pending a political settlement of the situation it is agreed that security zones will remain vested in the parties (the term civil police does not carry personnel in the capacity of civil police forces will be under civil control assistants will be available to advise the parties and to serve in such other parts as they may be required:

A. Call upon police of police office demilitarized zone to cooperate with the authorities in the zone. Police officers of or throughout the demilitarized zone will be accompanied by a military or a police office as the case may be.

B. Promote co-operation between

6. That trade and intercourse between the two countries as far as possible. Such restrictions as may be required

7. That this agreement shall include agreement as to the principle by the parties—

A. To prohibit sabotage, insincere activities of a similar nature, or any means at their command to hinder these agreements

B. To refrain from broadcasts or other activities which might encourage or aid in the agreement.

C. To initiate broadcasts and other activities which would encourage or aid in the agreement.

D. To provide full information to the military assistants of the Committee and to cease immediately the publication of any newspaper or any other publication unless by prior notification to the Committee and to cease immediately the publication of any newspaper or any other publication unless by prior notification to the Committee and to cease immediately the publication of any newspaper or any other publication unless by prior notification to the Committee.

E. To accept the principle of the

F. To accompany the Committee and to commence discussions and to proceed with the implementation of the Committee to enter into discussions with the Committee and to proceed with the implementation of the Committee.

8. That an acceptance of the for assistants will immediately conduct enter into discussions and to proceed with the implementation of the Committee.

If the enquiry established the fact that the matter would withdraw as quickly as possible days as set out in the following parag
On Indonesia, dated November 1, 1947

In none of the Report of the Consular Com-
mittee, indicating that the Council’s resolution
of the cessation of hostilities has not been fully
avoided by the report no attempt was made
to the aforesaid agreement with the other about the meas-
ure of concern for the up with each the Committee of Good Offices as to the
for the cease-fire resolution, and, for any activities or incitement to activities which
for the other purpose of taking appropriate measures for safe-
Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching
which will ensure the observance of the
commission, together with its military asso-
reference to the Committee of Good Offices
armed, the Committee of Good Offices, and
its resolution of August 1 should be inter-
the armed forces of either party by hostile
or territory not occupied by it on August 4,
Council resolution of August 1.

The withdrawals of armed forces be necessary,
between them as soon as possible the agree-
ment of August 29, 1947.

VILLÉ AGREEMENT
January 17, 1948 en board USS Renville
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Gov-
the Netherlands and the Gov-
referred to in this agreement as the
cease-fire order be issued separately and
immediately upon the signing of this agree-
within forty-eight hours. This order will
in the paper

and for the time being demilitarized zones

and, for the time being demilitarized zones

areas of the Netherlands Indies Government or
the line of the Netherlands forward posi-
to the same extent as the same extent as the line of the demilitarized zones to the same extent as the line of the demilitarized zones.

The foregoing by both parties the Commit-
both parties its military assistants who
will be instructed to assume in the first instance responsibility for deter-
moving whether any incident requires enquiry by the higher authorities of
or both parties.

5. That pending a political settlement the responsibility for the main-
tenance of law and order and of security of life and property in the demili-
tarized zones will remain vested in the civil police forces of the respective
parties (the term civil police does not exclude the temporary use of mili-
tary personnel in the capacity of civil police, it being understood that the
police forces will be under civil control). The Committee’s military
assistants will be available to advise the appropriate authorities of the
parties and to serve in such other proper capacities as may be requested;
among others they should:

A. Call upon pools of police officers established by each party in its
demilitarized zone to accompany the military assistants in their endeavours and moves throughout that demilitarized zone. Police officers of one party will not move into and through the demilitarized zone of the other party unless accompanied by a military assistant of the Committee of
Good Offices and a police officer of that party.

B. Promote co-operation between the two police forces.

6. That freedom of movement between all areas should be permitted
as far as possible. Such restrictions as may be necessary will be agreed
upon by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its represen-
tatives if required.

7. That this agreement shall include all the following points already
agreed to in principle by the parties:

A. To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals, and other
activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of
individuals and property, including destruction of property
of any kind and by whomsoever owned and to utilize every
means at their command to this end.

B. To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians.

C. To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all
troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the neces-

D. To provide full opportunity for observation by military and
civil assistants of the Committee of Good Offices.

E. To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational
Communique or any other information about military opera-
tions unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except
weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, num-
bnesses, and home addresses) who have been killed or have
died as a result of injuries received in action.

F. To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party
and to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid
and convenient implementation thereof, the release of prin-
table to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by
either party.

G. That on the acceptance of the foregoing, the Committee's military
assistants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether and
where, especially in West Java, elements of the Republican military forces
continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the
Netherlands forces. If the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces
these would withdraw as quickly as practicable and in any case within 21
days as set out in the following paragraph.
9. That all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone will, under the observation of military assistants of the Committee and with arms and warlike equipment, move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zones. Both parties undertake to facilitate a speedy and peaceful evacuation of the forces concerned.

10. This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and this agreement should therefore be terminated.

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

Raden Abdoolkadir Widjojoatmodjo, Chairman of the delegation.

For the Government of the Republic of Indonesia:

Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin, Chairman of the delegation.

The signatures appearing above were hereunto subscribed this 17th day of January, 1948 on board the USS Benville in the presence of the representatives of the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian question and the Committee Secretary, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed as witnesses.

Chairman: Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby (Australia).
Representatives: Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium).
Dr. Frank P. Graham (United States).
Secretary: Mr. T. G. Narayanan.

Principles Forming an Agreed Basis for the Political Discussions accepted at the Fourth Meeting on January 17, 1948, of the U.N. Committee of Good Offices.

The Committee of Good Offices has been informed by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia that the truce agreement having been signed, their Governments accept the following principles on which the political discussions will be based:

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggarjati Agreement.

2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggarjati Agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

3. It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been ensured.

4. That on the signing of the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.

5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the co-operation of both parties taking into consideration the interests of all the constituent parts of Indonesia.

6. That provision be made for a six-months, nor more than one year after the which time uncoerced and free discussion will proceed at the end of this period determination by the people of their sovereign States of Indonesia.

7. That a constitutional convention procedure to draft a constitution for the States of Indonesia.

8. It is understood that if, after six months, the agency to observe conditions at any time the sovereignty is transferred from the Government of the United States of Indonesia requests in serious consideration.

The following four principles are agreed:


10. Co-operation between the parties.

11. A sovereign State will be set up.

12. A union between the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Confirmed for the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

Raden Abdoolkadir Widjojoatmodjo, Chairman.

Confirmed for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia:

Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin, Chairman.

The representatives on the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian question, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed, confirm the following:

Chairman: Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby.
Representatives: Mr. Paul van Zeeland.
Dr. Frank P. Graham.
Secretary: Mr. T. G. Narayanan.

Six Additional Principles for the Negotiation submitted by the Committee on January 17, 1948.

The Committee of Good Offices is agreed that principles among others form a basis for the following settlement:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Kingdom with the Kingdom of the Netherlands transferred to the States of Indonesia. Prior to the transfer of the Kingdom of the Netherlands may be realized, states of the future United States of Indonesia will be sovereign and will ship with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The United States of Indonesia, at the head of which shall be the status of the Republic of Indonesia and the United States of Indonesia.
each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone by the other party's side of a demilitarized zone shall move peacefully to the territory on demilitarized zones. Both parties undertake to cease evacuation of the forces concerned until the demilitarized zones shall be considered binding unless one party Good Offices and the other party to it is not being observed by the other party will be terminated.

of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: Wiffjoostmodjo, Chairman of the Delegations of the Republic of Indonesia: D. T. G. Narayanan, Chairman of the delegation.

The following were hereunto subscribed this 1st day of January 1948 by the United Nations Security Council Committee on the Question and the Committee Secretary, who subscribed as witnesses.

Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby (Australia)
Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium)
Dr. Frank P. Graham (United States).

3. The Freedoms for the Political Discussions accepted on January 17, 1948, by the United Nations Committee of Good Offices has been informed by the delegations of the Netherlands and by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia that the agreement having been signed, their Governments have established the basis on which the political discussion will be held. The Committee of Good Offices be continuing the negotiations for the settlement of the question of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, based up the Linggadjati Agreement.

at neither party has the right to prevent the movements looking toward political organization with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement that each party will guarantee the freedom of publication at all times, provided that all steps be taken to include the advocacy of violence in decisions concerning changes in administration, the extension of the United States of Indonesia, and at a time when the security of such populations will have been ensured.

6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months, nor more than one year after the signing of the agreement, during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed; at the end of this period free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the United States of Indonesia.

7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.

8. It is understood that if, after signing the agreement referred to in Section 1, either party should ask the United Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the Government of the Netherlands to the Government of the United States of Indonesia, the other party will take this request into serious consideration.

The following four principles are taken from the Linggadjati Agreement:

9. Independence for the Indonesian peoples.
10. Co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.
11. A sovereign State on a federal basis under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic processes.
12. A union between the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the Netherlands:—

Confirmed for the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:—
Raden Abdoelkadir Wiffjoostmodjo, Chairman of the delegation.

Confirmed for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia:
Dr. Amir Sjahrilofendin, Chairman of the delegation.

The representatives on the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian question and the Committee Secretary, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed on this 17th day of January 1948 on board the USS Renville, testify that the above principles are agreed to as a basis for the political discussions.

Chairman: Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby (Australia).
Representations: Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium).
Secretary: Dr. Frank P. Graham (United States).

Six Additional Principles for the Negotiations toward a Political Settlement submitted by the Committee of Good Offices at the Fourth Meeting on January 17, 1948.

The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that the following principles among others form a basis for the negotiations toward a political settlement:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until after a stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia when created will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands Indonesian Union, at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a State within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia all States will be offered fair representation.

3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request. This request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.

4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or another state within the United States of Indonesia. Such plebiscite is to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices. Should either party in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above request the services of the Committee in this capacity, the parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.

5. Following the delimitation of the States in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened through democratic procedures to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various States in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.

6. Should either State decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.

Radio Address of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, delivered from the Hague, February 3, 1948, to the people of the United States and Great Britain.

To those who were our allies in the war I want to address a few words.

I want you to know that the peoples of our Commonwealth have reached a memorable goal.

A free federated Indonesia is about to take her place among the democratic nations of the world.

Seven years ago when Holland was under Nazi oppression, I announced to my countrymen the intention to establish a new relationship between the Netherlands and the other parts of our Commonwealth.

A year later, in the midst of the war, an outline of the new relationship was traced.

Today this partnership is a living reality rapidly taking final shape. The United States of Indonesia forming a Union with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Surinam and the Antilles.

In the darkest period of the war, the great President, my unforgettable friend, together with Britain's valiant champion of freedom, found a permanent expression for our common purpose which reached even beyond the immediate aim of each country's independence.

We were to make the world free from fear and free from want, to make it a place where man would be free to worship God in his own way and free to speak his mind.

It makes me happy that men in wisdom and the skill to create form to many people all the freedoms and the rights we fought together.

They have still a long way to go.

The common man is far from being parts of Indonesia where terrorists pillage and arson.

Indonesians and Dutch have to fig there, as in other places of the order that try to prevent the peoples I am confident that these obstinate peoples are determined to take of democratic self-government as we.

We know that in our days no rela unless it is based on mutual consent.

Therefore we encourage them an Colonialism is dead.

We do not disown our past and it.

But a nation must be strong enough.

We shall be strong enough.

What the peoples of the world no in close partnership based on equality.

It may well be that the solution pattern for solutions in wider parts of A group of peoples of no less than democracy as we understand it.

This is a great event.

Blessed with many riches of the can take a great share in the common.

In free association with the Netherlands a sovereign Indonesia will be able to which already before the war was united.

Providing Europe and America.

Indonesia will be able to make a real now being asked from the American.

Already the country is emerging from a Japanese occupation.

Passions and distrust are calmed.

The noble words of freedom and as Indonesian nationalists unite to be a group of islands.

By this common effort based on Charter a new Indonesia is arising.

Both peoples, Dutch and Indonesian, the United States of Indonesia, see their rightful place among the United

Such a day will be a hard-won m
It makes me happy that men in Indonesia and here have found the wisdom and the skill to create forms of government that will guarantee to many people all the freedoms and the rights for which you our allies and we fought together.

They have still a long way to go.

The common man is far from being free from fear and want in those parts of Indonesia where terrorists are still committing manslaughter, pillage and arson.

Indonesians and Dutch have to fight this common foe in full cooperation.

These, as in other places of the world, the powers of anarchy and disorder that try to prevent the peoples from recovering must be overcome.

I am confident that these obstacles will be overcome because the Indonesian peoples are determined to take up the responsibilities and obligations of democratic self-government as we understand it.

We know that in our day's no relationship between nations can be stable unless it is based on mutual consent and mutual effort.

Therefore we encourage them and we help them in their endeavor.

Colonialism is dead.

We do not disown our past and the proud achievement of bygone days.

But a nation must be strong enough to make a new beginning.

We shall be strong enough.

What the peoples of the world need now is a new way of living together in close partnership based on equality and mutual trust.

It may well be that the solution being reached in Indonesia will set a pattern for solutions in wider parts of Asia.

A group of peoples of no less than 70,000,000 has come to the side of democracy as we understand it.

This is a great event.

Blessed with many riches of the earth, United States of Indonesia can take a great share in the common fight against famine and need.

In free association with the Netherlands, Surinam and the Antilles, a sovereign Indonesia will be able to carry on her economic development which already before the war was unprecedented in Asia.

Providing Europe and America with her goods and raw materials, Indonesia will be able to make a real contribution to the tremendous efforts now being asked from the American people under the Marshall Plan.

Already the country is emerging from the confusion caused by the Japanese occupation.

Passions and distrust are calming down.

The noble words of freedom and patriotism resume their true meaning as Indonesian nationalists unite to build a federation through the far-flung group of islands.

By this common effort based on the same principles as the Atlantic Charter a new Indonesia is arising.

Both peoples, Dutch and Indonesian, look forward to the day when the United States of Indonesia, sponsored by the Netherlands, will take their rightful place among the United Nations.

Such a day will be a hard-won milestone on man's long road to liberty.
Security Council Resolution, dated February 28, 1948

The Security Council having considered the report of the Committee of Good Offices informing the Council of the steps taken by the Netherlands Government and the Republic of Indonesia to comply with the Council's resolution of 1, August 1947.

Notes with satisfaction the signing of the Truce Agreement by both parties and acceptance by both parties of certain principles as an agreed basis for the conclusion of a political settlement in Indonesia;

Commends the members of the Committee of Good Offices for the assistance they have given the two parties in their endeavours to settle their dispute by peaceful means and endorses their offer of continued good offices in the working out of a political settlement;

Maintains its offer of good offices contained in its resolution of August 25, 1947, and to this end requests both parties and the Committee of Good Offices to keep the Council informed about the progress of a political settlement in Indonesia.

Amendment to the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Passed by the Netherlands Legislature on August 20, 1948

A Fourteenth Chapter shall be added to the Constitution, as follows:

Special provisions relating to the transition to a new legal structure for the territories specified in section 1.

Section 207. — On the basis of the results of the joint consultations which have been and are still being held with and between representatives of the populations, for the territories specified in section 1, a new legal structure shall be established, within the framework of which these territories will promote their own interests independently and will be united on footing of equality to ensure the common interests and to give mutual assistance, due guarantees being furnished with regard to legal security, the fundamental human rights and freedoms and sound administration.

Section 208. — In preparing and establishing the new legal structure, the result of the joint consultations already held as it has been laid down in the following paragraphs of the present section shall be duly considered.

A Union shall be formed in which participate as equal states the Kingdom referred to in the fifth paragraph and the United States of Indonesia. If the results of the continued joint consultations give rise thereto, the Netherlands shall be substituted for this Kingdom.

3. The Crown of the Union shall be worn by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina, Princess of Orange-Nassau, and in case of succession by Her legitimate successors to the Crown of the Netherlands.

4. Without prejudice to what may further serve the realization of its aims, the Union shall, through its own organs, effect the cooperation between the participating states with regard to foreign relations, defence, and, in so far as this is necessary, finance, as well as with regard to subjects of an economic and cultural nature; it shall safeguard legal security, the fundamental human rights and freedoms and sound administration.

The Union as such shall participate in international intercourse.

5. The Netherlands, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles shall form a Kingdom whose Crown is worn by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina, Princess of Orange-Nassau, and in case of succession by Her legitimate successors to the Crown of the Netherlands.

Within the framework of the Union the Netherlands can maintain direct relations with the United States of Indonesia.

6. The United States of Indonesia, member states on a parity basis.

7. In so far as any part of Indonesia, States of Indonesia, the relations of the Kingdom referred to in the fifth paragraph shall be regulated separately, as far as possible in this chapter.

Section 209. — As far as the transition requires measures deviating from the chapters, they shall be enacted by law; they cannot pass a bill that effect unless it is supported by the votes. The resultant act cannot be retained in the first five divisions of the same chapter.

Section 210. — Subject to the provisions of the new legal structure shall be established by the procedure in each of the territories applicable, section 209 shall apply correspondingly.

2. It shall require the assent of the Princess of Orange-Nassau, or Her legal successors in the Netherlands, and shall be solemnly

EMERGENCY ACT

Passed by the Netherlands Legislature

We, Juliana, by the Grace of God, Queen of Orange-Nassau, etc., etc., etc.,

To all whom these presents shall come

Be it known:

Whereas We have considered the circumstances compel it, pending the provisions to be made on the basis of consultation relating to the administration of the new legal structure;

Having heard the Council of State;

We have approved and understood as We do

Section 1.

1. On a date prior to January 1, 1949, the Administration of Indonesia shall be provisionally measures — if necessary, contrary to the Royal Sub-Decrees of 26 March, 1947, 19 April, 1947, and 26 May, 1947.

2. Our provisional measures as referred to in section 1 shall not conflict with sections 208 and 209.

Section 2.

1. Within one month of the Act referred to in section 1, a Bill shall be introduced to confirm that measure. Confirmation, or without amendment. If the Act, the Sections referred to in the first paragraph are required as part of the Constitution.
Having considered the report of the Committee of the States of the steps taken by the Netherlands to comply with the Council's request of January 30, 1948, on the signing of the Truce Agreement by both parties of certain principles as an agreement on political settlement in Indonesia.

Resolves that the Committee of Good Offices for the two parties in their endeavour to settle the and endorse their offers of continued good offices.

Requests both parties and the Committee council informed about the progress of political negotiations.

Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Legislature on August 20, 1948

shall be added to the Constitution, as follow:

ing to the transition to a new legal structure in section 1.3.

The basis of the results of the joint consultations and which, held with and between representatives of the parties to section 1, a new legal structure is the framework of which these territories will be independent and will be united on its own interests and to give mutual assistance and, with regard to legal security, the fund freedoms and sound administration.

Having established the new legal structure, is already held as it has been laid down in the present section shall be duly considered in which participate as equal states the fifth paragraph and the United States of Indes.

The continued joint consultations give rise therafter, being substituted for this Kingdom.

Union shall be formed by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina, and in case of succession by His Crown of the Netherlands.

The enlargement of which affects the realization of objects of its own organs, affect the co-operation between the Kingdom and other States, defence and, finance, as well as with regard to subjects of same; it shall safeguard legal security, the fund freedoms and sound administration.

All shall participate in international intercourse.

Curacao and the Netherlands Antilles shall form a part of the Union the Netherlands.

of the Union the Netherlands can maintain the United States of Indonesia.

6. The United States of Indonesia shall be federally constructed from member states on a parity basis.

7. In so far as any part of the United States of Indonesia shall not form part of the United States of Indonesia, the relations of that territory with said States and with the Kingdom referred to in the fifth paragraph of the present article shall be regulated separately, as far as possible in accordance with the principles of this chapter.

Section 209.—As far as the transition to the new legal structure requires measures deviating from the regulations laid down in previous chapters, they shall be enacted by law; the Chambers of the States General cannot pass a bill to that effect unless by a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes. The resultant act cannot deviate from the regulations contained in the first five divisions of the second chapter and in the thirteenth chapter.

Section 210.—1. Subject to the provision of the second paragraph, the new legal structure shall be established by free acceptance, by democratic procedure in each of the territories specified in section 1; for the Netherlands, section 208 shall apply correspondingly.

2. It shall require the assent of Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina, Princess of Orange-Nassau, or Her legitimate successors to the Crown of the Netherlands, and shall be solemnly proclaimed.

EMERGENCY ACT, INDONESIA

(Passed by the Netherlands Legislature on October 30, 1948.)

We, Juliana, by the Grace of God, Queen of the Netherlands, Princess of Orange-Nassau, etc., etc., etc.

To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting!

Be it known:

Whereas We have considered that the extraordinary and pressing circumstances compel us to, pending the creation of a new legal structure, provisions be made on the basis of section 210 of the Netherlands Constitution relating to the administration in Indonesia in the interim period;

Having heard the Council of State and consulted the States-General.

We have approved and understood as We do by these presents:

Section 1

1. On a date prior to January 1, 1949, to be determined by Us, the Administration of Indonesia shall be conducted in accordance with provisional measures— if necessary contrary to the provisions of sections 62, sub 2, 63, 64 and 171 sub 2 of the Netherlands Constitution—to be adopted by Us, having heard the Council of State.

2. Our provisions as referred to in the previous paragraph shall not conflict with sections 208 and 209 of the Netherlands Constitution.

Section 2

1. Within one month of the adoption of a provisional measure as referred to in section 1, a Bill shall be submitted by Us to the States General to confirm that measure. Confirmation shall take place by enactment, with or without amendment. If the Act thus passed should be divergent from, the Sections referred to in the first paragraph of section 1, a majority for its adoption shall be required as prescribed in section 210 of the Netherlands Constitution.
2. If a Bill confirming a provisional measure as referred to in the previous paragraph is rejected by either Chamber of the States-General, or withdrawn by Us or not given the Royal Assent, Our Decree shall be revoked immediately. The Decree of Revocation shall also regulate the consequences resulting from the non-confirmation of the provisional measure.

3. The State-General shall be notified by Us of all provisional measures, upon their adoption.

Section 3

On the day on which a confirmatory Act as referred to in the first paragraph of section 2, comes into force, Our Decree, confirmed by that Act, shall lapse.

Section 4

1. The present Act, which may be referred to as “Emergency Act, Indonesia”, shall take effect on the day of its promulgation.

2. Our authority to adopt provisional measures as referred to in section 1 shall lapse on July 1, 1949. The provisional measures adopted prior to that date shall remain in force, without prejudice to the provisions of sections 2 and 3.

We instruct and order the present Act to be published in the Statute-Book and all Ministerial Departments, authorities, boards and officials concerned to observe its due implementation.

Given at The Hague, etc.

The Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs:

The Deputy Prime Minister, Minister without Portfolio:

The Minister of Overseas Territories:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs:

The Minister for the Interior:

The Minister for War:

The Minister of the Navy ad interim:

(Signatures not supplied).

ADMINISTRATION OF INDONESIA DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

Official Statement issued by the Netherlands Indies Government Information Service in Batavia, on December 19, 1948.

On December 7, 1942 the Netherlands have promised by mouth of Queen Wilhelmina the peoples of Indonesia a new regulation of their relationship to the Netherlands; a regulation, based on the principles of equality, voluntariness and alliance. As soon as circumstances after the Japanese capitulation permitted it, the Netherlands have made a start with the redemption of this pledge.

To this end extensive consultations were opened with representatives of all Indonesian peoples and groups of the population. During these consultations the outlines of a new government system were gradually developed and laid down in documents. The Republic too repeatedly recognised in the Linggadjati agreement as in the Rachwitu agreement the correctness and acceptability of this newly-projected government-system.

After this the Netherlands have made the speediest possible realisation of this pledge and which showed the thorough energetically entered upon this new cooperation.

On this road towards realization of this milestone has now been reached, etc., realization of the new system, based on the Decree “Administration in Indonesia the B.I.O.-decree. This decree aims for the whole of Indonesia, of which the wishes of the great majority for the period of transition, laid down as closely as possible the ultimate perfectly free and sovereign state will be the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

To a considerable extent this fact the entire internal administration organs, consisting of Indonesians, and their countrymen. These organs, which the latter, will be: Federal Government, Executive Body and the Council of Secretaries.

To these organs, which have been in their mutual relation guarantors, the administration to be practiced concerning Indonesia, pertaining to the Netherlans Legislative and the Government of both administration and legislation will be under the supervision.

As a result of the sovereignty attained during the period of transition of the independent United States of Indonesia, the regulation of which the execution of a restricted by the Indonesian Government organs representative of the Crown. This High Council in accordance with this responsibility the supreme command over all fighting to have the power to place them, commander. In principle, however, the disposal of the federal government safety, because this government in the hands.

As the actual establishment of the task of the Federal Government, regulation provides for the possibility previously mentioned, in proportion to the concerned, to enter upon their offices. In this regard, that the promulgation of January 1, 1949, fulfils a promise made to the Federal nationalists. The Netherlands express intention to practise the speech.

Because elections still have to be position of the Federal States since the Federal Government as mentioned in the period before that date.

A separate regulation provides for territories, whose representatives to the Federal structure.
After this the Netherlands have made many provisions, which aimed at the speediest possible realisation of the constitutional reform as agreed upon and which showed the thoroughness with which a new Netherlands, energetically entered upon this new course.

On this road towards realisation of constitutional reform an important milestone has now been reached, viz., the promulgation of the first regulation of the new system, based on Law and the Constitution, the Royal Decree "Administration in Indonesia during the period of transition", dated 11 July 1946. This decree aims at determining an administration for the whole of Indonesia, of which the Government is convinced that it meets the wishes of the great majority of the population. The regulation for the period of transition, laid down in this decree, aims at approaching as closely as possible the ultimate situation in which Indonesia as a perfectly free and sovereign state will be allied to the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

To a considerable extent this final stage is already reached by the fact that the entire internal administration is placed in the hands of organs, consisting of Indonesians, who have the confidence of their fellow-countrymen. These organs, which thus bear a purely Indonesian character, will be: Federal Government, Federal Council, Federal Representative Body and the Council of Secretaries of State.

To these organs, which have been elected along democratic lines and which in their mutual relation guarantee the democratic principle with regard to the administration to be practised, the execution of all powers concerning Indonesia, pertaining to the Crown, will be transferred to the Netherlands Legislature and the Governor-General. This means that both administration and legislation will be entirely in the hands of Indonesian organs.

As a result of the sovereignty of the Netherlands still being maintained during the period of transition until the moment of the establishment of the independent United States of Indonesia and of the responsibility resulting from it, the regulation contains provisions on the strength of which the execution of a restricted number of powers will take place by the Indonesian Government organs in co-operation with the High Representative of the Crown. This High Representative of the Crown will, in accordance with this responsibility, borne by the Netherlands, execute the supreme command over all fighting forces present in Indonesia and will have the power to place them, if necessary, under one supreme commander. In principle, however, he will leave the Federal forces at the disposal of the federal government for the maintenance of justice and safety, because this government in the first instance, is responsible for these.

As the actual establishment of the organs needed for the execution of the task of the Federal Government, of course, will take some time, the regulation provides for the possibility of a gradual transfer of the powers previously mentioned, in proportion to the capability of the federal organs concerned, to enter upon their offices. For right understanding, it may serve in this regard, that the promulgation of the B.I.O.-decree before January 1, 1946, fulfills a promise made by the Netherlands Government to the Federal nationalists. The Netherlands Government has the express intention to practise the speed the circumstances warrant.

Because elections still have to be held and also owing to the difficult position of the Federal States since the most recent developments, the Federal Government, as mentioned in the B.I.O.-decree cannot be established before that date.

A separate regulation provides for the possibility of including those territories, whose representatives so far have not co-operated in the Federal structure.
By promulgating the B.I.O.-decrees, the Netherlands substantially contribute to the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Indonesian peoples. The independence of Indonesia already realized to a great extent during the period of transition, will be completed by the establishment of the United States of Indonesia.

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**DUTCH 'POLICE ACTION'**

*Press Releases issued by the NEI Army Information Service*

**ORDER OF THE DAY.**

The Government has been compelled to draw the final conclusion from the sovereign rights and duties which it still exercises over Indonesia.

From you it is expected to execute the last act as now our patience has been exhausted by endless negotiations and no other way is left open.

At the finishing off of your task I appeal to you to act energetically, but above all to unfold at the same time the human qualities which adorn you.

Be conscious, that you are not so much soldiers as the bearers of right and security to a population, which has already groaned too long under terrorism and oppression. Revere its distress, do not make it worse. Keep from all actions that could not stand the test of the severest criticism.

Be determined but at the same time be humane and respect private properties.

I put all my confidence in your department.

May God lead you and protect you during the coming days.

*Batavia;*

18th of December 1948.

(Sd.) S. H. Spooren,

*The Lieutenant-General,*

*Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*

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**Warning!**

Armed Forces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands have crossed the Status Quo Lines. They are now advancing to make an end to the civil dissection, oppression and terrorism, to bring rights and security to you and to take away the last obstacles for the further realisation of the Eindhoven-Pact.

It is known to me that instructions exist for a scorched earth policy. The carrying out of this senseless and irresponsible policy will not be wise to prevent us reaching the object which is set to us, but will only hit the population. This cannot be tolerated.

Consequently, a serious warning is herewith directed to all, who are responsible and who will be guilty of these criminal actions, that without any hesitation a very severe punishment will be meted out.

(Sd.) S. H. Spooren,

*The Lieutenant-General,*

*Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*

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*Presscopy No. 10.*

*Batavia:*

The Army Information Service announced:

At eight o'clock on the evening of 28th July 1949, by road from Semarang marched the first soldiers of the Dutch forces. The barracks and offices proved to be still held unfinished letters. The new position is:

The electric power-station functioning.

The Dutch troops which have arrived their letters and postal parcels.

The distribution of newspapers.

The prices of victuals are exceedingly:

On Christmas extra distributions.

**Security Council Resolution on Indonesia**

The Security Council, noting with satisfaction in Indonesia and, having taken note of the Good Offices, calls upon the parties:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith.

(b) To enter into an immediate and urgent communication with the parties in an effort to reach a settlement of the political questions involved.

Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to hold consultations with the parties and to report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

**Security Council Resolution on Indonesia**

The Security Council, noting that the President of the Security Council has, on the recommendation of the Council, the adoption of the present resolution.

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**Royal promise of Indonesia's Independence**

*The Hague, January 6, 1949.*

Juliana of the Netherlands made the following promise:

As early as 1942 my mother expressed the hope that the Netherlands, after a common victory would be free and voluntarily in freedom, and on the basis of this happiness. Her words not only had a meaning.

In February 1945 my mother recalled the words of the late President, stating that a common effort...
The 'POLICE ACTION' used by the NEI Army Information Service

ORDER OF THE DAY.

The Army Information Service announces:

At eight o'clock on the evening of Tuesday the first troops which came by road from SEMARANG marched into Jogjakarta.

On the situation in Jogjakarta the following particulars can be given:

The arrival of the Dutch forces apparently was an absolute surprise. The barrack and offices proved to be barredly deserted, some type-writers still held unfinished letters. The town made a somewhat neglected impression.

The electric power-station functions, the water provision is bad.

The Dutch troops which have arrived at SOLO already are receiving their letters and postal parcels.

The distribution of newspapers as resumed as far as possible. The prices of veal are exceedingly high.

On Christmas extra distributions will be made.

Security Council Resolution on Indonesia of December 24, 1948

The Security Council, noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia and, having taken note of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices, calls upon the parties:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith,

(b) Immediately to release the President (Dr. Soekarno) and other political prisoners arrested since December 18.

instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegram on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since December 12, 1948, and to observe and report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

Security Council Resolution on Indonesia of December 28, 1948

The Security Council, noting that the Netherlands Government has not as far released the President of the Republic of Indonesia (Dr. Soekarno) and other political prisoners as required by the resolution of December 24, calls upon the Netherlands Government to free these political prisoners forthwith and report to the Security Council within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution.

Royal promise of Indonesia's Independence: Queen Juliana's Broadcast

The Hague, January 8, 1949.—In a radio-broadcast H. M. Queen Juliana of the Netherlands made the following statement:

As early as 1942 my mother expressed the hope that Indonesia and the Netherlands, after a common victory over the enemy, would co-operate voluntarily in freedom, and on the basis of equality, to regain peace and happiness. Her words not only held out prospects but also contained a pledge.

In February 1948 my mother repeated this promise. She then recalled the words of the late President Roosevelt, the great fighter for freedom, stating that a common effort, far from being restricted to the
aim of independence, should also be directed towards freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the freedom from fear and want.

A new form of co-operation, based upon mutual trust, would have to be developed in order to create a free and sovereign Indonesia, linked in an equal partnership with the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesia Union.

In concluding her address, she said “Both the Netherlands and Indonesia are longing for the day when United States of Indonesia will take their rightful place among the United Nations”.

From the beginning of my reign I have always striven for complete fulfilment of the promise given by my mother and to co-operate towards securing peace, happiness and prosperity for the peoples of Indonesia under a sovereign government of their own.

I have been happy to note that large parts of Indonesia were prepared to co-operate in achieving this purpose. In other parts unfortunately, certain elements, preferring violence and chaos to peaceful co-operation, proved to predominate over those who, there also, were willing to build a new constitutional order, in mutual understanding with the Netherlands. For this reason military action finally became inevitable. Its object was in no way to come back on the pledge which had been solemnly given by my mother and by the Netherlands people as a whole with regard to Indonesia.

Its object was solely to create the possibility of ensuring at long last law and order, prosperity, freedom, independence and sovereignty for Indonesia as a Federal State.

By the promulgation of the decree regarding the institution of the Government of Indonesia during a transitional period, an important step towards the establishment of Indonesia’s own government has now been taken.

I sincerely hope that within a few weeks the Indonesian Federal Government will be established which will shoulder responsibilities and perform duties which are inherent to the democratic system.

By virtue of its powers this Federal Government will, without delay, have to take further measures to prepare for a transition from the old to a new constitutional order and for the establishment of the latter.

As a part of these measures, it will—in agreement with the High Representative of the Crown—organize free elections in Indonesia as soon as circumstances permit. I hope that thus the sovereign United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands will then co-operate for the sound development of the two countries and for the benefit of world prosperity. Then the basis for a better and happier future, such as envisaged by my mother, will have been laid.

PART
REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

Introduction to the Fourth Interim Report

1. Despite the efforts of the members of the Committee, to find a basis for a settlement of the Indonesia Question, there has not been any development since the Third Interim Report was submitted to the Council in June. In point of fact, tension under the Committee’s auspices in Malaya and Indonesia has been heightened, with the Dutch and United States representing the Australian and United States representatives on the Committee’s report prior to the presentation of the United States of America, on 10 September, neither of the parties having expressed an intention for an overall settlement of their dispute.

2. The delay in reaching a political settlement has resulted in a number of consequences:

(a) A deterioration in the economic situation of the country, and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
(b) An increase in political difficulties and tension.
(c) An increase in political tensions and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
(d) An increasing strain on the Treasury and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country.

3. A deterioration in the economic situation of the country, and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country, have resulted in a number of consequences:

(a) An increase in political difficulties and tension.
(b) An increase in political difficulties and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
(c) An increasing strain on the Treasury and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
(d) An increase in political difficulties and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
should also be directed towards freedom of religious freedom from fear and want.

operation, based upon mutual trust, would help to create a free and sovereign Indonesia, in which the Netherlands and Indonesia

address, she said “Both the Netherlands and Indonesia need a day when the United States of Indonesia, a nation among the United Nations”.

of my reign I have always striven for compassion and mutual co-operation. The great desire of those who, for various reasons, are willing to be included in the mutual understanding with the Netherlands military action finally became inevitable. Some back on the pledge which had been solemnly declared by the Netherlands people as a whole with regard to the future of the Netherlands West Indies, but the possibility of ensuring a lasting freedom, independence and sovereignty is

within a few weeks the Indonesian Federation which will shoulder responsibilities inherent to the democratic system. In this Federal Government will, without delay prepare for a transition from the present to the establishment of the latter measures, it will—under the B younger the United States and will then co-operate for the United States and Indo-China for the betterment of the world.

PART II

REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Introduction to the Fourth Interim Report, dated Nov. 15, 1948

(Full Report printed separately)

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. Despite the efforts of the members of the Committee of Good Offices to find a basis for a settlement of the Indonesian dispute consistent with theenville agreements, there has been progress towards such a settlement since the Third Interim Report was presented to the Security Council in June. In point of fact, there have been no political negotiations under the Committee's auspices since the end of May. The Netherlands delegation has been reluctant to consider proposals put forward by the Australian and United States representatives on the Committee, and, prior to the presentation of the United States delegation's draft proposals on 10 September, neither of the parties had come forward with proposals for an overall settlement of their dispute.

2. The delay in reaching a political settlement has had four important consequences:

(a) A deterioration in the economic situation within the Republic, and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia as a whole;

(b) An increase in political difficulties within the Republic;

(c) An increase in political tension between the parties;

(d) An increasing strain on the truce, with the ever-present possibility of its general breakdown.

(a) A deterioration in the economic situation within the Republic, and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia as a whole. Since the Committee's Third Interim Report, there has been a serious and rapid economic deterioration within the Republic. The situation of the Indies trade is critical. The Netherlands authorities are reluctant to involve any action regarding applications for such permits which they consider might imply recognition of the Netherlands Indies regulations. These factors have brought normal trade to a standstill. Information gathered by the Committee in the course of visits to Republican-controlled territory in central Java and Sumatra, and from its military assistants stationed in the field, indicates that economic conditions in Republican areas are now critical. Shortages of transport and reconstruction equipment have been accentuated by the wearing out of existing equipment which cannot be replaced. Health services have been limited. Epidemics of diseases have occurred in areas of the large cities by the Status Quo Line or by sea, as well as in areas which previously depended on estate economy. Plantations and estates have been neglected and in some cases given over to local crops. Furthermore, the failure of the crops to reach a temporary understanding on the status of estates in Republican-controlled territory has prevented normal exploitation of estate produce in these areas. Continuation of the present conditions is likely not only to result in economic chaos within the Republic, but also seriously to delay the economic rehabilitation of the whole of Indonesia, whose products are highly important to world economic recovery.

(b) An increase in political difficulties within the Republic. The protracted delay in reaching a political settlement and the economic difficulties within the Republic have imposed a considerable strain on the
Republican administration at a time when it has been dealing with internal political difficulties. In addition, during this period, the Republic has been concerned that the Netherlands Government has proceeded with consultations with representatives of the non-Republican parts of Indonesia and has encouraged the political organization of areas under Netherlands control. The status of these areas remains to be decided under the terms of the B memiliki Agreement, and the Republic has expressed the fear that the Netherlands policy has been directed to the establishment of an Interim Federal Government for Indonesia without the participation of the Republic.

(c) An increase in political tension between the parties.—In the foregoing circumstances, there has been a marked increase in the political tension between the parties which has been accentuated by the events outlined in chapter III of this report, and by the general tendency of the press to play up minor incidents.

(d) An increasing strain on the truce, with the ever present possibility of its general breakdown.—At the time of the signing of the Truce Agreement, it was expected that a political settlement would follow within a short time. The truce has now been in force for ten months. This is an extremely long period for any truce to remain effective and, in this case, the regrettable lack of progress toward a political settlement and the deterioration in the economic conditions within the Republic have subjected the truce to an ever-increasing strain. The rising number of infringements of the Truce Agreement during this period is testimony to the relationship between the maintenance of the truce and successful progress in political negotiations. From time to time, there has been acute fear of a resumption of military action.

3. Throughout the period covered by this report, there has been a critically unstable situation in Indonesia, making an early settlement of the three-year-old dispute imperative.

4. Recently, the Netherlands Government has made a new approach. Direct talks between the Netherlands Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of the Republic took place at the beginning of November. Subsequently, on 22 November, an official Netherlands communiqué announced that, after an extensive and profound study of the account given by the Netherlands Foreign Minister regarding his discussions in Indonesia, the Netherlands Government had come to the conclusion that it might be possible to solve the differences existing between the Netherlands and the Republican Governments at short notice, on the basis of the pattern laid down by the Netherlands Government. Consequently, in order to attain a final solution, the Netherlands Cabinet appointed the Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr. Emanuel Sassen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. D. U. Stolker and the Royal Commissioner in Indonesia, Mr. L. Neher, to hold direct talks in Indonesia with both the Republican Government and the Federalists.

5. The members of the Committee have been informed by the three representatives of the Netherlands Government mentioned in paragraph 4, that, when these direct talks have yielded results, formal negotiations will take place under the Committee's auspices.

6. Whatever their outcome, the direct talks which are now commencing represent a serious and possibly final attempt of the parties to reach an overall settlement. The Committee will report to the Security Council immediately the results are known.

Special Report, dated December 12, 1948

1. The Committee of Good Offices herewith submits to the Security Council a special report dealing with the direct talks which have been recently held in Indonesia between representatives of the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. This special report has been prepared, in accordance with the introduction to the Fourth Interim Summits of the Direct talks were made in circumstances of the first and exploratory nature. November are set forth in Section D of the report.

2. Late in November, the Netherlands delegation consisting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Royal Commissioner in Indonesia both with the Federalists with a view to attaining a facilitated by five members of the States General, experts.

3. The Special Delegation flew to Batavia on 1 December. On 2 were carried on at Kaliurang between the representatives of the Republican Government. The Special Delegation met variously with members of the Bandung Federation of Provisional Federal Government in Indonesia, contacts between the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. On 9 December the Committee submitted a summary of the direct talks government.

(a) the Republican Government to the limit in offering concessions to the Netherlands';

(b) "...the instructions to be restricted to an investigation in principle accept Netherlands for a serious attempt to reach a solution for the Republic";

(c) "There is now strong evidence that the intended to form an Interim Government of the Republic before the end of the formal negotiations with the Committee of Good Offices, the Reniville Agreement, or the statements the Netherlands is the Security Council.'

The summary states that the direct talks and calls upon the Committee to take measures may be possible to prevail on the parties to consider reasonable terms of settlement.

5. Another letter from the Government states that "in addition to the period of the above talks, informal discussions of the two Governments concerning the new Agreement, with the results set out in the report."
The Netherlands Government has made a new appeal to the Netherlands Foreign Minister and the Committee's auspices.

In the Netherlands, the Committee have been informed by the Dutch Government, mentioned in paragraph 1, of the result of the direct talks which have been resumed by representatives of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. This special report has been prepared, in accordance with the undertaking in paragraph 6 of the introduction of the Fourth Interim Report, immediately after the results of the direct talks were made known to the Committee. The circumstances of the first and exploratory phase of these talks in early November are set forth in Section D of Chapter I of the Fourth Interim Report.

2. Late in November, the Netherlands Cabinet appointed a special delegation consisting of the Minister for Overseas Territories, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Royal Commissioner in Indonesia, to hold discussions in Indonesia both with the Republic and the Federalists with a view to arriving at a final solution. This delegation was assisted by five members of the States General as observers and by a number of experts.

3. The Special Delegation flew to Djakjakarta on 27 November and returned to Batavia on 1 December. On the intervening days, discussions were held at Kalimantan between the Special Delegation and representatives of the Republican Government. After its return to Batavia, the Special Delegation met variously with the High Representative of the Crown, members of the Bandung Federal Conference and officials of the Provisional Federal Government in Indonesia. There were also a number of contacts between the Netherlands Ministers and the representatives on the Committee of Good Offices. On 4 December, on the invitation of the Special Delegation, conveyed through the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Hatta, came to Batavia and held a final meeting with the Special Delegation in order to clarify certain points at issue. The Special Delegation left Batavia for The Hague on 5 December to report and to consult with the Netherlands Government.

4. On 9 December the Committee received from the Republican Delegation a summary of the direct talks. In the view of the Republican Government,

(a) the Republican Government "has shown its goodwill and gone to the limit in offering concessions towards the viewpoints of the Netherlands";

(b) "...the instructions to the Netherlands ministers were restricted to an investigation of whether the Republic would in principle accept Netherlands terms, and did not constitute a serious attempt to negotiate an agreement with the Republic";

(c) "There is now strong evidence that the Netherlands Government intends to form an Interim Federal Government without the Republic before the end of the year, and without further formal negotiations with the Republic under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices. Such a policy would ignore the Renville Agreement, the Committee of Good Offices and the statements the Netherlands Government has made before the Security Council."

The summary states that the direct talks between the parties have failed and calls upon the Committee of Good Offices to take whatever measures may be possible to prevail on the Netherlands Government to come to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The Republic reiterates its willingness to consider reasonable terms of settlement.

5. Another letter from the Republican Delegation dated 8 December states that "in addition to the informal talks" and "in the period of the above talks", informal discussions were held by the representatives of the two Governments concerning the implementation of the Truce Agreement, with the results set out in the letter and its annexes.
The Netherlands summary of the direct talks was received on 11 December 1948. The Netherlands Delegation emphasizes that:

(a) the informal discussions have made it clear that the Republican Government cannot exercise effective control over its armed forces and therefore that effective co-operation on the part of the Republic to combat infringements of the Truce cannot be expected;

(b) the Republican point of view regarding powers of the High Representative of the Crown and particularly regarding his control over the armed forces during the interim period is not only fundamentally irreconcilable with Netherlands sovereignty as formulated in the First of the Six Additional-rensville Principles, but would continue "the present intolerable situation of two opposing armies under separate command";

(c) the refusal to recognize Netherlands sovereignty during the interim period nullifies the acceptance by the Republic of the Draft Agreement submitted by the United States Delegation on 10 September 1948 as a basis for negotiations;

(d) the Netherlands Government must now proceed to the pronouncement of the decree setting up an interim federal government "drafted on the basis of the results of consultations with the representatives of the Federal territories."

The statement concludes that the "Netherlands Government regrets that negotiations under the auspices of the Committee at this stage are futile" in that the Republican Government does not "in fact recognize either the Truce or the Renvilles Principles, and a basis for agreement is fundamentally lacking."

7. The Fourth Interim Report made clear that there had been no political negotiations under the auspices of the Committee since the end of May 1948. The introduction to that report emphasized that the long continued delay in achieving a political settlement had had serious economic effects, had intensified both political and economic tensions between the parties and had resulted in an increasing strain on the Truce with the ever present possibility of a general breakdown. The collapse of the direct talks has served to aggravate the dangers in a situation which was already grave.

The setting up of an interim Federal Government by decree of the Government of the Netherlands, which is apparently to occur before 1 January 1949, will contribute further to the opinion of the Republic that the Netherlands Government has been proceeding unilaterally to establish ultimately a United States of Indonesia on its own terms and without the Republic. The formation of an Interim Federal Government now without the Republic will greatly complicate a negotiated settlement of the Indonesian dispute and could create serious unrest in Indonesia.

In the light of the statements made by the Netherlands Delegation that "negotiations under the auspices of the Committee at this stage are futile" and that there are "irreconcilable" positions of the parties on certain issues, the Committee does not foresee the possibility of bringing the parties together in bona fide negotiations.

The Committee has no confidence that even the presently unsatisfactory level of Truce enforcement can be maintained as the possibility of political agreement becomes more remote. The Committee can see in the present situation only intensification of the factors already making for further economic deterioration, general unrest and social upheaval. Widespread hostilities involving the conflict of organized armed groups on a large scale might be the outcome.

8. The Committee refers to its Special and Interim Reports as providing a fuller background for an understanding of the difficulties which have led to the present situation. The Committee calls particular attention to the estimate of the situation set forth in the Introduction to the Fourth Interim Report as supplemented by the present report.

Supplementary Report, December 1948

1. On 13 December 1948, the Un Committee of Good Offices, sent from the United States, the Australian and United States delegations, appointed the Special Committee of Good Offices to the Sec Council. While he was in Jakarta the Committee was addressed to him and signed by the United States.

Dear Mr. Cochran,

I received only this morning the report addressed to the Chairman of the GOC the GOC’s special report of December to analyse it fully. I am very sorry, the GOC notes reflect a basic misunderstanding; I am setting down very roughly and informally as I see them. Please feel free to show the GOC the official or to make any other comments which you feel will help to remove the unfortunate misunderstanding.

1. The responsible officials of the GOC can perhaps qualify or reservation the principle?

2. We recognize that by the first principle the Netherlands is to remain so long as the GOC is in an atmosphere of good relations.

3. A sovereign power may, entirely voluntarily subject the actual exercise of sovereignty to an exercise of restraint or limits.

4. The people of the Republic, as the peoples of Indonesia, have certain democratic and political principles to which they believe both the Netherlands and their own state that the GOC understands and accepts.

5. The Republic has offered many suggestions to the GOC to come to a fair and reasonable agreement, one that will come to a prosperous, peaceful and stable agreement.

The Committee also makes available to the GOC the Draft Agreement of 10 September 1948, the Australian and United States delegates attached as Appendix VI. The paper is for the purpose of completing the presentation of these papers have been so supplemented by the fourth interim report as to remove the misunderstanding.
A summary of the direct talks was received from the Netherlands Delegation emphasizes that:

1. Discussions have made clear that the Repulic cannot exercise effective control over its armed forces during the interin period.
2. The Netherlands Delegation submitted by the United States Delegation 1948 as a basis for negotiations.
4. The Netherlands Government is the successor to the Council of the Netherlands at this stage.
5. The acceptance by the Netherlands Delegation is not in fact reconcilable with the principles and a basis for agreement.

The Committee made clear that there had been no understanding that the reduction to that report emphasized that the appointment of the independent settlement had had serious effects on national political difficulties within the Netherlands.

The report made by the position of the Committee at this stage are not reconcilable positions of the parties on issues.

Supplementary Report, dated December 18, 1948

1. On 12 December 1948, the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices flew from Batavia to Yogyakarta and wants to maintain the acceptance by the Netherlands Delegation of the United States delegation of 9 June 1948, which is attached as Appendix VI. This paper is not currently on the agenda of the Committee, the Conference, or any organ thereof; it is included with the others for the purpose of completeness.

The circumstances surrounding the presentation of these papers have been detailed in Chapter I of the Fourth Interim Report.

The Committee as such has not endorsed the substantive provisions of any of these documents. They are furnished herewith for the purpose of making them readily accessible to the members of the Security Council so that the Council may be in a position fully to understand the meaning of these documents. The individual members thereof, and the parties, with a view to achieving a settlement of the dispute.

Dear Mr. Cochran,

I received only this morning the Netherlands note of December 12 addressed to the Chairman of the Good Offices Committee and attached to the GOC's special report of December 12. I have not had sufficient time to analyze it fully. I am very sorry, however, to find that the Netherlands note reflects a basic misunderstanding of the Republic's position. I am setting down very roughly and informally certain basic considerations as I see them. Please feel free to show this letter to any appropriate person official or to make any other confidential use of it which you feel will help to remove the unfortunate misunderstanding which has developed.

1. The responsible officials of the Republic accept fully and without reservation the principles of the B央行ville Agreement.
2. We recognize that by the first of the six Additional B央行ville Principles the Netherlands is to remain sovereign in Indonesia in the interim period.
3. A sovereign power may, entirely consistently with its sovereignty, voluntarily subject the actual exercise of its power to self-imposed restraints and limitations.
4. The people of the Republic, as well as those of other areas of Indonesia, have certain democratic and national aspirations which we believe both the Netherlands and ourselves recognize as entirely legitimate. These people take understandable pride in the fact that the Government of the Republic is in a very real sense a government and has exercised all the powers of a de facto government for over three years.
5. The Republic has offered many concessions in its sincere desire to become a party to a fair and reasonable agreement out of which would come a prosperous, peaceful and stable federal Indonesia, in a position to make a very real contribution to the restoration of the economic health.
of the world community and to the safety of democracy everywhere. Some of these concessions involve waiving benefits given to us under Renville. For example, the Republic is willing to accept postponement of the date for the transfer of sovereignty to a sovereign United States of Indonesia to a time considerably beyond that originally contemplated. We are willing to postpone elections in the interim government for a period of some six months and only then to have established the constituent assembly which would also conduct legislative functions. We feel that in all of these concessions in which we waive advantages accruing to us under Renville we give earnest of good faith and of our desire for harmony.

6. In return we ask the Netherlands to impose upon itself certain limitations on the exercise of its sovereign power of its own volition as a contribution to the mutual advantage of our two peoples. The nature of these limitations would be worked out and incorporated in our agreement.

The Netherlands would then give them effect in its own laws in the same manner in which it now directs its officials to carry on their functions in accordance with definite standards and by prescribed procedures.

7. Our informal talks with the Netherlands ministers have shown how close we have already come together on most of the fundamental issues. As you know, there remains certain gaps between us which had not yet been bridged. The differences of view-point related largely to the powers of the High Representative and the Federal Interim Government and to the problem of the armed forces. I am confident that an amicable arrangement on these questions can be worked out in continued negotiations.

8. We are fully prepared to recognize the High Representative has the right of veto over acts of the various organs of the Federal Interim Government. We ask only that definite standards be set forth or perhaps definite categories of acts given precise formulation to guide the High Representative in the exercise of his power of veto.

9. We are prepared further to concede that the High Representative be given emergency powers to act in a state of war, a state of siege or a state of insurrection. As part of an overall agreement we should be ready to stipulate that the High Representative be the ultimate judge of the necessity for the exercise of extraordinary powers under these circumstances. Again we ask only that definite standards be laid down to govern the High Representative’s decision.

10. When the High Representative has invoked his emergency powers, we are willing to be given authority to employ the federal forces and if it is evident to him that these forces are insufficient—also to employ the Netherlands forces as supplementary forces to the extent required for the protection of the public peace and security.

11. I cannot attempt here to lay down precise technical rules. I wish merely to emphasize my confidence that reasonable men can and must agree when the consequences of disagreement are so serious to both parties. It is my earnest hope that the appropriate Netherlands officials and my own people can be brought together speedily for the resumption of full negotiations in which both parties will have available the assistance of technical, political and legal advisers. I can make no complaint of lack of cordiality in the reception extended me by the Netherlands ministers in Batavia on December 4, when I went down for a brief, final discussion on the afternoon before the departure of the ministerial delegation for The Hague. I cannot in candor, nor do I wish to, withdraw any of the points which I made at that time. However, I cannot but feel that the necessity of formulating and giving expression of my ideas on the spur of the moment and on issues of really technical complexity without the assistance of my technical advisers may well have been the source of misunderstanding of my true position.

12. Difficulties remain. However, in view of the armed forces, and the vast public in direction of agreement, incorporation of the TNI as such in the momentary period, but only in principle, self-restrains and self-control to impose upon itself; but finds expression in the words which are our point, the United States of Indonesia.

13. I have sought to make my views clear that we are prepared to give full recognition to the right of the Netherlands to enter immediately into such agreement as to achieve a speedy agreement in recognition of the principles of its people in an interim period, in the United States of Indonesia.

Hon. H. Merle Cochran,
United States Representative on the Committee of Good Offices, Djakarta, Indonesia

It will be noted that Dr. Hatta authorized me to show this letter to any appropriate person at Kalimantan, to which the talks had been moved on 15 December for a reason.

EDWARD DE LA RUE
United States Representative at Kalimantan, to which the talks had been moved on 15 December for a reason.

The Netherlands Government has not shown the letter which the Vice-President sent to you on December 13, 1948.

The Netherlands Government has the interest of the views developed therein. While the Hatta, which he wrote without having had sufficient time to answer, was delivered on December 11. This means Dr. Hatta the Netherlands Government to revise the letter.

The Netherlands Government has noted the Republican report concerning the fact that the TNI bears witness to the fact that the government’s report concerning the fact that the Netherlands Government to revise the letter.

The Truce, no reference is made to
city and to the safety of democracy every actions involve waiving benefits given to it, the Republic is willing in the interest accept a postponement of the date for the trat United States of Indonesia to a time to finally contemplated. We are willing to p from government for a period of some six mont establish the constituent assembly which would actions. We feel that in all of these success stages acceding to us under Renville we give our desire for harmony.

ask the Netherlands to impose upon itself end of its sovereignty power of its own voluntarial advantage of our two peoples. This need be worked out and incorporated in our agree would then give them effect in its own laws at present directed its officials to carry on with definite standards and by prescribed

Talks with the Netherlands ministers have show come together on most of the fundamental main certain gaps between us which had results of view-point related largely to the

ative vis-a-vis the Federal Interim Government armed forces. I am confident that an an questions can be worked out in continued

prepared to recognize the High Representative acts of the various organs of the Federal It is only that definite standards be set forth or acts given precise formulation to guide the exercise of his power of veto.

Further to concede that the High Repre fearful to act in a state of war, a state of w part of an overall agreement we should be High Representative himself be the ultimate exercise of extraordinary powers under the ask only that definite standards be laid do executive's decision.

Representative has invoked his emergency p be given authority to employ the federal for that these forces are insufficient—also to s the supplementary forces to the extent requi public peace and security.

Following are down precise technical rules. 1 y confidence that reasonable men can and processes of disagreement are so serious to both hope that the appropriate Netherlands be brought together speedily for the resumption both parties will have available the assi and legal advisers. I can make no complai reception extended me by the Netherlandsember 4, when I went down for a brief ins before the departure of the ministerial delega not in candid, nor do I wish to with draw it at that time. However, I cannot but see t given expression of my ideas on the issues of really technical complexity without ul advisors may well have been the soundly true position.

12. Difficulties remain. However, even with the admittedly complex problem of the armed forces, and the command thereof, we have already moved far in direction of agreement. There is no intention of seeking the incorporation of the TMI as such in the federal army to be created.

13. I have sought to make my views clear. I think it is apparent that we are prepared to give full recognition to Netherlands sovereignty in the interim period not only in principle but in practice. The limited additional self-restraint and self-control which we ask the sovereign authority to impose upon itself is fully in accord with the manner in which sovereignty finds expression in the modern democratic states of Europe and America.

14. I ask your continued assistance as a member of the Committee of Good Offices in bringing about a resumption of negotiations. We stand ready to enter immediately into such negotiations and to do everything possible to reach a speedy agreement. The Republic is prepared to sacrifice much in recognition of the principle that by sacrificing some of that which pertains to it as a unit, it will find a fuller realization of the aspirations of its people in an interim government of all Indonesia, and finally, in the United States of Indonesia.

Sincerely yours,

MOHAMMAD HATTA,

Vice President and Prime Minister,

Republic of Indonesia.

The Hon. R. Merle Cochran,
United States Representative on the Committee of Good Offices, Djakarta.

It will be noted that Dr. Hatta authorized the United States representative to show this letter to any appropriate Netherlands official.

In the latter afternoon of 13 December 1948, the United States representative gave a copy of this letter to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation.

2. On 17 December 1948, the following telegram from the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation was received by the United States representative at Kalirang, to which the Headquarters of the Committee had been moved on 15 December for a regular three-week period:

Netherlands Delegation

Batavia, December 17, 1948.

No. 3894.

Palai Rijswijk.

Sir,

The Netherlands Government has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter which the Vice-President of the Republic, Dr. Hatta, addressed to you on December 13, 1948.

The Netherlands Government has taken cognizance with considerable interest of the views developed therein realizing that these are personal thoughts of Dr. Hatta, which he wrote down "very roughly and informally" without having had sufficient time to analyze the Netherlands Government's note of December 11. This means Dr. Hatta's letter by itself cannot induce the Netherlands Government to revise conclusions set down in its note of December 11.

The Netherlands Government has noted with regret that, although the Republican report concerning the informal discussions which took place at Kalirang bears witness to the fact that the Republic is well aware of the importance which the Netherlands Government attaches to the observance of the Truce, no reference is made to the violations of the Truce in
Dr. Hatta's letter. It has furthermore drawn the attention that Dr. Hatta refers on two occasions to misunderstandings which exist in his opinion. In its account of the informal discussions at Kaluungo to the Committee of Good Offices, the Republican Government has indicated some points which it considers essential and on which agreement with the Netherlands Government could not be obtained. The Republican Government also mentioned in the same report that as a consequence of the Republic's desire to achieve agreement with the Netherlands Government, the extreme limit of possible concessions had been reached and that these concessions were definitely unacceptable for the Netherlands Government, in order to reach a political agreement with the Republic with some prospect of success.

The Netherlands Government fails to see how there can exist any misunderstanding in this regard.

In his letter of December 13, Dr. Hatta refers several times to the opinions of the Government of the Republic, but nevertheless the contents of the letter are on a number of essential points not sufficiently formulated to constitute a starting point for effective discussions. The Republican Government is conversant with the draft decree on the Interim Government (the so-called “B.I.O. Decree”), the text of which is the result of consultations with prominent representatives of the federal territories. In order to make fruitful discussions possible it would have been indicated for the Republic clearly to state its acceptance at least of the basic principles of this decree mentioned below. Only in this way it would have been possible to determine with certainty that a basis had indeed been found for an agreement with the Republic.

The Netherlands Government cannot therefore derive from Dr. Hatta's letter alone a starting point for further discussions. Such discussions could only have a meaning if the existence of a firm basis would justify the conviction that agreement can indeed be reached. To its sincere regret the Netherlands Government so far has not been convinced of this and Dr. Hatta's letter has not created this conviction either. The Netherlands Government would as yet have resumed negotiations most willingly, provided it experienced, if Dr. Hatta instead of Dr. Haino to make a new effort to reach such agreement with the Republic in conformity with the stipulations of the B.I.O. Decree, concurs with:

(a) the incorporation of the Republic in the Federal organization on the same footing as the other federal areas,

(b) the regulation of the position of the High Representative of the Crown and the authority conferred upon him in the B.I.O. Decree,

(c) the articles concerning the federal forces, state of war and siege and state of insecurity;

and if the Republican Government would furthermore have declared its willingness to take forthwith the measures, which it knows that the Netherlands Government considers necessary for the effective termination of the violations of the Truce and especially for the evacuation of the infiltrants. In that case the Netherlands Government would have consulted with the Republic and the other federal territories concerning changes in the B.I.O. Decree on less essential points, after promulgation of the present text.

The Netherlands Government reiterates that it sincerely regrets that a binding declaration of this kind cannot be found in Dr. Hatta's letter. The Netherlands Government could only reconsider its point of view that continuation of negotiations is futile if a binding declaration as referred to above would forthwith be received by the Netherlands Government.

The Netherlands Government continues to consider immediate promulgation of the B.I.O. Decree necessary.
has furthermore drawn the attention that Dr. Hatta’s misunderstanding which exist in his informal discussions at Kailang to the Council of Ministers. The Government has indicated some points on which agreement with the Netherlands Government is reached. The Republican Government also mentioned the need for a new effort to bring about agreement with the Netherlands Government to make a new effort to reach a compromise with the Republic with some prospect of success because the Government fails to see how there can exist an agreement.

On 13 December, Dr. Hatta refers several times of the Republic, but nevertheless the number of essential points not sufficiently form a point for effective discussions. The Republic with the draft decree on the Internment Regulation,” the text of which is the result of the representatives of the federal territories. It has been indicated that its acceptance at least of the basic principle is possible. Only in this way it would have been possible that a basis had indeed been found for an agreement.

The Government cannot therefore derive from Dr. Hatta’s statement for further discussions. Such discussions the existence of a firm basis would justify the attempt to reach a compromise. To its sincere regret, so far has not been convinced of this by Dr. Hatta’s representatives of the federal territories. It has been indicated that the adoption of the Internment Regulation in conformity with the stipulated concurs with:

The position of the High Representative of the Netherlands Government in the Federal organization as the other federal areas;

The position of the High Representative of the Netherlands Government in the same capacity.

Concerning the federal forces, state of war and insecurity:

The Government would furthermore have declare that the Netherlands Government has been consulted with the federal territories concerning changes in the Buitenpos, after promulgation of the present text.

The Government reiterates that at sincere regret this kind of nature cannot be found in Dr. Hatta’s letter. It could only reconsider its point of view if such a binding declaration as required by the Netherlands Government.

The Government continues to consider immediate measures necessary.

It is absolutely essential that reply from the Republican Government to this letter be received at Batavia not later than 13 December 1948 10:00 hours Batavia time for relay to the Netherlands Government.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sd.) T. ELINK SCHUURMAN,

Acting Chairman.

The Honourable Mr. H. Cochran,
U.S. Representative on the Security Council’s Committee of Good Offices on the
Indonesian Question,

KAILANG.

3. On 17 December 1948, the United States representative prepared the following reply to the telegram from the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation of the same date:

KAILANG,

December 17, 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that today, 17 December 1948, I received from you a number of communications. Three of these were addressed to the Committee of Good Offices through its Chairman and two were addressed to me personally.

The first, your letter No. 2885 dated 16 December 1948, was received by the members of the Committee about 10:00 A.M., shortly after the arrival of the plane on which it was carried. This letter requested the members of the Committee to return to Batavia at the earliest opportunity, if possible, by “to-day’s” plane, in order to discuss a reply of the Netherlands Government to a letter from Dr. Hatta dated 13 December 1948. The members of the Committee began immediate preparations to comply with your request.

Shortly before 11:50 A.M., 17 December, the members of the Committee received your telegram of the same date addressed to the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices in which you requested the Committee to postpone its return to Batavia. You noted that the “Netherlands reply will be handed this morning to Mr. Cochran.” The Committee thereupon cancelled the arrangements already made.

About 12:50 P.M. on 17 December, the members of the Committee received your telegram addressed to the Chairman thereof in which you requested that the Committee’s plane remain in Jogyakarta overnight “in order that Col. Mayer may fly to Batavia early tomorrow morning with reply to letter from Netherlands Government which is now being telegraphed to Mr. Cochran.” At this point it was not feasible to countermand the orders for departure of the plane for Batavia but the pilot was instructed to return to Jogyakarta early Saturday morning. At 3:15 P.M. today I received your telegram of some 800 words in which you transmitted the reply of the Netherlands Government to the letter “which Vice-President of the Republic, Dr. Hatta, addressed to Mr. Cochran on 13 December 1948”.

At 5:00 P.M. on 17 December. I telegraphed you confirming the receipt of your telegram transmitting the Netherlands response. I informed you also that the plane assigned to the Good Offices Committee would make a special trip from Batavia to Jogyakarta early tomorrow morning and return to Batavia immediately after its arrival in order that you might have the answer at the earliest possible time. I informed you that I would go to Batavia on the plane and hand the answer to you personally.
At 9:45 p.m. on 17 December, I received the last in the series of telegrams. Your telegram reiterated that it was absolutely essential that the reply from the Republican Government be received in Batavia before Saturday, 18 December, at 10:00 a.m., Batavia time, for reasons connected with the Netherlands Government. The telegram stated that Colonel Mayer, apparently at your request, had approved the departure of the Committee of Good Offices plane at 5:00 a.m. Batavia time for arrival in Jogja at 7:00 a.m. Batavia time "in order to enable return before 10:00 Batavia time." You asked me to confirm receipt of the two cables addressed to me as well as the two addressed to the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices.

The Netherlands reply was received somewhat garbled in course of transmission. However, it is made clear that the letter of Dr. Hatta, dated 13 December was insufficient to cause the Netherlands Government to "reconsider its view that continuation of negotiations is futile". The note does set forth the conditions which, if they had been accepted in a declaration by Dr. Hatta, clearly binding on the Republican Government, would have caused the Netherlands Government to resume negotiations. Even the acceptance of these conditions, however, it is stated in effect, would not have been sufficient to prevent the promulgation of the decree setting up the interim government on the basis of the present text. If the Republican Government had accepted the conditions without modification of any kind, the Netherlands Government would have consulted with the Republic and the other federal territories concerning changes in the decree on less essential points, after promulgation of the present text.

It is then stated that the Netherlands Government can reconsider its decision that continuation of negotiations is futile only if a binding declaration of the nature referred to is forthwith received by the Netherlands Government. "For Netherlands Government is inordinately concerned to speed up the immediate promulgation of the decree necessary." After the quotation marks which mark the end of the reply you transmitted under instructions by the Netherlands Government, appears the statement "it is absolutely essential that reply from Republican Government to this letter be received in Batavia before Saturday 18 December 1948 10:00 hours Batavia time for relay to Netherlands Government."

I feel constrained to express my regrets that it was thought necessary to impose a time limit which allows, if taken literally, a total of less than eighteen hours, including the hours of night, for the making of copies, the delivery of the note to Dr. Hatta by the United States representative; consideration by Dr. Hatta; the necessary consultations with members of his government; the preparation of a considered reply; the trip from Kalurahan to Jogja and then the flight to Batavia. I cannot help but recall, by way of comparison, that I gave Dr. Hatta's letter to you at 4:30 p.m. on Monday, 13 December. The letter was answered only today, five days later, despite the fact that it asked only for a decision to resume negotiations. Your telegram was delivered to Dr. Hatta, after the making of copies, at 4:30 P.M. today. You will agree, I am sure that in such circumstances, I cannot in justice press Dr. Hatta for an immediate reply to a letter which calls not for a mere expression of willingness to resume negotiations but rather for a surrender to the position of your Government on every material point. The situation becomes even clearer when you recall, that Dr. Hatta, who in fact, has been under his physician's orders to do no work for two weeks, is in Kalurahan, apart from members of his government, whose assistance therefore cannot be immediately obtained.

I myself do not now have the opportunity, nor perhaps would it be consistent with my role as a good officer, to comment in detail on the substantive demands made in your telegram. As a matter of fact, in the four and one-half months that I have been present in Indonesia as the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices, neither I nor any other members of the Committee have had an opportunity to participate in a discussion of any of the points or in the conference of the opportunity to examine in any detail of the points or the conclusions in the statements made by the Special Report of the Committee of 2 December. I desire, therefore, to say at this time.

(1) Condition A requires that the Republican Government be in the federal organization in the areas. Does not this require still a federal organization where the presidential federal organization is the provisional federal organization? Does it not also require very beginning equal status, deep prioritization generally, with the responsibility of the Netherlands authority? That is reiterated in negotiations, particularly in

(2) Conditions B and C require the Netherlands as expressed in the draft High Representative and with written petition, as state of insurrection, covered the considerations set forth by the....

(3) There is an additional requirement effect that the Republican Government knows the measures which it knows is necessary for the effective to guarantee, especially for the evacuation of the Dutch without doubt existing evils in this case and locale, is known who have a council to this committee of Good Offices, has sought the Security Council on which both parties have established for the very purpose of mutual obligations of the parties under recommendation of the parties for which the policies have been such by both parties, be that the subject of unilateral demands! Which was refusal of the Committee of Good Offices! Both parties on the US and France on the other hand.

I have never hesitated to offer my help and within any possibility of furnishing the assistance, the assistance of my colleagues on the Committee, side the official meetings of the Committee, in the capacity of the Netherlands Government's representatives to the Resumption of negotiations, I can present to them on September 13. Dr. Hatta's letter of 13 December but the resolution of negotiations.
December, I received the last in the series of restatements that it was absolutely essential that the Government be received in Batavia by 10:00 a.m. Batavia time, for relay to the Netherlands. A telegram stated that Colonel Mayer, upon approval of the departure of the Committee of Four, Batavia time for arrival in Jogja at 7:00 to enable return before 10:00 Batavia time."

The cable was addressed to me as well as a citizen of the Committee of Good Offices. It is clear that the neutral of the Dutch-Government is not sufficient to cause the Netherlands Government that continuation of negotiations is futile.

The conditions, shall they have been accepted, clearly binding on the Republican Government, if accepted, the conditions without modification of Government would have consulted with the Dutch territories concerning changes in the de proclamations of the present text. If the Republican Government cannot reconsider negotiations is futile only if they have been accepted, they have been binding and transmitted under instruction, contains the necessary consultation with the Dutch territories concerning changes in the de proclamations of the present text.

I express my regret that I have had no opportunity to point out the errors of this document, for the making of copies: C. Hatta by the United States representatives; the necessary consultation with the Dutch territories concerning changes in the de proclamations of the present text. If I have been binding and transmitted under instruction, contains the necessary consultation with the Dutch territories concerning changes in the de proclamations of the present text.

I cannot help but agree, that I have been binding and transmitted under instruction, contains the necessary consultation with the Dutch territories concerning changes in the de proclamations of the present text. I cannot help but agree, that I have been binding and transmitted under instruction, contains the necessary consultation with the Dutch territories concerning changes in the de proclamations of the present text.

There are without doubt existing evils in this connection but their excuse, character and probable cure have led to considerable diversity of opinion. The Committee of Good Offices has sought to make available the services of its Security Committee on which both parties are represented and which are established for the purpose of supervising the enforcement of the mutual obligations of the parties under the Truce Agreement. Should not the recommendations for the better implementation of the Truce, which have been made by both parties, be thoroughly evaluated there rather than the subject of unilateral demands? Was that not the very function conferred on the Committee of Good Offices by the Truce Agreement signed by both parties on the USS Renville on 17 January 1946?

I have never hesitated to offer my personal efforts whenever there has been any possibility of furthering the objective of the Committee of Good Offices, namely, inducing the parties to resume negotiations. That was my objective during the long months and years, with the patient forebearance of my colleagues and the Committee, of which I have been a member, and in which I have been active for so many years, regardless of all other assistance I have been able to assist in. I have had an opportunity to participate in the discussion of any of these issues in the Committee of Good Offices or in the conference of the parties. No, I have been given the opportunity to examine in any detail or in full context the opposing positions of the parties in the recent direct talks except as presented in the statements made by the two parties which are appended to the Special Report of the Committee of Good Offices to the Security Council of 12 December. I desire, therefore, to raise a few questions which occur to me at this time.

(1) Condition A requires that the Republic agree to the incorporation of the Republic in the federal organization on the same footing as the other federal areas. Does this not require adherence without any negotiations at all to a federal organization where the Renville Principles contemplate that the provisional federal organization itself is to be the product of the political agreement? Does it not require the Republic to assume from the very beginning equal status, despite disparities in population, area and condition generally, with the territories which have been unilaterally established by Netherlands authority? I should like to have the clarification of negotiations, particularly in light of the Renville Principles.

(3) Conditions B and C require acceptance of the original position of the Netherlands as expressed in the draft decree with regard to the powers of the High Representative and with regard to the federal forces, state of war and siege, and state of insecurity. These conditions fail to take into account the considerations set forth by Dr. Hatta in his letter of 13 December. It is not my intention to endorse Dr. Hatta's position any more than it is to endorse that of the Netherlands Government. Surely, however, there are basic issues on which there can be an honest difference of opinion and which the parties should discuss before the Committee of Good Offices. Any other procedure is in contravention of the First of the Twelve Renville Principles, providing for the existence of the Committee of Good Offices to be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute. I must emphasize again, there have been no political negotiations whatsoever, in the Committee for a period of nearly seven months. Surely it cannot be said that the resources of the Committee have been exhausted.

(3) There is an additional requirement set forth in your telegram, to the effect that the Republican Government must declare its willingness to accept the measure which it knows that the Netherlands Government is necessary for the effective termination of the violations of the Truce and especially for the evacuation of the internees. There are without doubt existing evils in this connection but their excuse, character and probable cure have led to considerable diversity of opinion. The Committee of Good Offices has sought to make available the services of its Security Committee on which both parties are represented and which are established for the purpose of supervising the enforcement of the mutual obligations of the parties under the Truce Agreement. Should not the recommendations for the better implementation of the Truce, which have been made by both parties, be thoroughly evaluated there rather than the subject of unilateral demands? Was that not the very function conferred on the Committee of Good Offices by the Truce Agreement signed by both parties on the USS Renville on 17 January 1946?

I have never hesitated to offer my personal efforts whenever there has been any possibility of furthering the objective of the Committee of Good Offices, namely, inducing the parties to resume negotiations. That was my objective during the long months and years, with the patient forebearance of my colleagues and the Committee, of which I have been a member, and in which I have been active for so many years, regardless of all other assistance I have been able to assist in. I have had an opportunity to participate in the discussion of any of these issues in the Committee of Good Offices or in the conference of the parties. No, I have been given the opportunity to examine in any detail or in full context the opposing positions of the parties in the recent direct talks except as presented in the statements made by the two parties which are appended to the Special Report of the Committee of Good Offices to the Security Council of 12 December. I desire, therefore, to raise a few questions which occur to me at this time.

(1) Condition A requires that the Republic agree to the incorporation of the Republic in the federal organization on the same footing as the other federal areas. Does this not require adherence without any negotiations at all to a federal organization where the Renville Principles contemplate that the provisional federal organization itself is to be the product of the political agreement? Does it not require the Republic to assume from the very beginning equal status, despite disparities in population, area and condition generally, with the territories which have been unilaterally established by Netherlands authority? I should like to have the clarification of negotiations, particularly in light of the Renville Principles.

(3) Conditions B and C require acceptance of the original position of the Netherlands as expressed in the draft decree with regard to the powers of the High Representative and with regard to the federal forces, state of war and siege, and state of insecurity. These conditions fail to take into account the considerations set forth by Dr. Hatta in his letter of 13 December. It is not my intention to endorse Dr. Hatta's position any more than it is to endorse that of the Netherlands Government. Surely, however, there are basic issues on which there can be an honest difference of opinion and which the parties should discuss before the Committee of Good Offices. Any other procedure is in contravention of the First of the Twelve Renville Principles, providing for the existence of the Committee of Good Offices to be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute. I must emphasize again, there have been no political negotiations whatsoever, in the Committee for a period of nearly seven months. Surely it cannot be said that the resources of the Committee have been exhausted.
obligations as a member of the Committee of Good Offices, press Dr. Hatta to reply summarily on the conditions imposed by your telegram because it calls for a non-negotiated blanket assent which would preclude the possibility of bona fide negotiations, rather than effect their resumption.

I must again repeat the plea, constantly made and reiterated by all the members of the Committee for some months, that negotiations be resumed. The issues at stake are too tremendous for all concerned, the human values too incalculable, to permit any of us to relax our efforts at this crucial time.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. MERLE COCHRAN,
United States Representative,
Committee of Good Offices.

4. The United States representative delivered the reply in person to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation at 9-40 a.m.

5. At a special meeting of the Committee of Good Offices held in Kalirungan at 10 a.m. on 18 December 1948, the Deputy of the United States representative introduced the above three documents in the Committee as documents bearing on the status of the negotiations. The Committee decided to submit the documents with a statement of the attendant circumstances to the Secretary-General, pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 12 December 1948 in order to keep the members of the Security Council currently informed at a critical time.

Report dated December 19, 1948

Sir,

As reported in the Supplementary Report dated 18th December 1948 to the Special Report of the Committee of 12th December 1948, the text of which was telegraphed earlier to-day to the Security Council in Paris, the United States representative on the Committee proceeded to Batavia on Saturday, 18 December, for the purpose of handing to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation his reply to the latter's letter of 17th December. The Deputy Australi indicating representative travelled with him, while the Chairman of the week, the Australian representative, and the Belgian representative, together with the staff of the three delegations and part of the United Nations Secretariat attached to the Committee, remained in the Committee's current headquarters at Kalirungan in Republican territory.

2. At 11.30 p.m. on 18th December in Batavia, the United States representative was handed by the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, and intended for transmission to the Committee (Appendix I).

3. During the night of 18-19th December, telegraphic communications between Batavia and Kalirungan were suspended by the Netherlands authorities with effect from 12 o'clock midnight. Subsequently, the United Nations Secretariat in Batavia tried without success to transmit to the Committee in Kalirungan the letter referred to in paragraph 2 (Appendix I). The Netherlands authorities also declined permission for an indefinite period for the Committee's aircraft to fly from Batavia to Jogjakarta.

Appendix I to the Report of the Netherlands Delegation

No. 3888

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the letter of Good Offices from the Netherlands he Truce Agreement, a comprehensive to the latter.
The conditions imposed by your telegram were not met by the Committee for some months, that negotiations were too long and that the Australian representative delivered the reply in person of the Netherlands delegation at 9:40 A.M.

The meeting of the Committee of Good Offices held on 18 December 1948, the Deputy Australian representative was introduced to the Committee by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Committee and was informed of the status of the negotiations. The documents were submitted to the Committee for the purpose of handing them to the Committee and were handed to the Acting Chairman of the Committee.

The United States representative also informed the Acting Chairman of the Netherland delegation that the Netherlands forces had already commenced military operations against the Republic and had crossed the Status Quo Line into Republican territory. He stated that the Netherlands authorities would do everything possible to ensure the safety of the members of the Committee of Good Offices, their staffs and Secretariat in Republican territory, and that the Netherlands would be responsible for their evacuation when circumstances permitted.

I have the honour to refer to the numerous letters to the Committee of Good Offices from the Netherlands Delegation concerning violations of the Truce Agreement, a comprehensive list of which is appended, and furthermore to my letter of 11 and 16 December 1948 and the memorandum attached to the latter.

(Sd.), H. MERLE COCHRAN, (United States).

T. W. CUTTS, (Australia).

Appendix I to the Report dated December 19, 1948

Netherlands Delegation

Batavia, Dec. 18, 1948.

No. 8698

Palis Rijswijk.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the numerous letters to the Committee of Good Offices from the Netherlands Delegation concerning violations of the Truce Agreement, a comprehensive list of which is appended, and furthermore to my letter of 11 and 16 December 1948 and the memorandum attached to the latter.
From the above-mentioned documents and the evidence in support thereof submitted to your Committee it is abundantly clear that the Truce Agreement between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, signed on 17 January 1948 and the Truce Regulations are not being observed by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Netherlands Government is reluctantly compelled to notify your Committee, according to the provision of article 10 of the Truce Agreement, that for this reason the said agreement should be terminated and is considered as no longer binding as from Sunday, 19 December 1948, 00.00 hours Batavia Time.

The Republican Government has been informed accordingly.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sd.) T. ELINK SCHUURMAN,
Acting Chairman.

To the Chairman of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question,

KALIURANG.

APPENDIX II TO THE REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
DATED 19 DECEMBER 1948

MEMORANDUM

On December 11, 1948, the Netherlands Government informed the Committee of Good Offices that to its sincere regret it had reached the conclusion that in view of the attitude of the Republican Government, which does not in fact recognize the Truce Agreement nor the Principles for a political settlement which were signed on board the USS Renville on January 17, 1948, further negotiations and discussions either directly with the Republic or under the auspices of the Committee had become futile.

Even since the proclamation of the Republic in Indonesia on August 17, 1945, the Netherlands Government has patiently laboured to arrive at an agreement by which the Republic of Indonesia would become integrated in the proposed United States of Indonesia. By signing the agreement of Linggadjati and the Renville Principles, the Netherlands Government has given proof of its sincere desire to proceed as quickly as possible with the creation of a sovereign federal state in Indonesia.

The failure of the Republic to co-operate in the implementation of these agreements prevents the creation of the United States of Indonesia on the proposed date of January 1, 1949. As this date approaches, the internal conditions of Indonesia become more and more critical, as a consequence of acts of violence against Indonesian and Netherlands officials and private persons, and of infiltration by armed groups and because of the determined efforts made by organizations and individuals, acting under the direct or indirect responsibility of the Republican Government, to impede the political, social and economic organization of the territories outside factual Republican control.

The situation has now so far deteriorated that the Netherlands Government has been obliged to authorize the High Representative of the

Crown to take without any further necessary to re-establish conditions of Indonesia. The purpose of the act will be to create conditions in which Indonesia can freely decide on the manner themselves, without being constantly threatened by irresponsible elements.

Since the Netherlands communicated on December 11, 1948, a determined determination with which the Netherlands Government cordial and friendly relations with the Republic to revise its attitude. For this reason, the Government has great appreciation.

The Republican Premier and Vice-Premier received on December 14, 1948, reiterating that the Netherlands Government has never reconciled the Republican Government concerning some of the conditions discussed in Mr. Hatta’s letter. Below is the letter from the Republic concerning the basic issues, in dispute, in Mr. Hatta’s letter.

Republican Government confirmed its position that Mr. Hatta’s conditions are necessarily those of his Government.

While the Netherlands Governments communication, the departure of Representatives on an official visit to India was mentioned beyond doubt that the highest Representative entered into further discussions with the Premier of a so-called Presidential Council, responsible to the Chief of State, so pressed the fact that the Netherlands Government responsible for the state of affairs in the country, and that no reply can be expected, have taken no position, to which no intervention by the United States of America by non-intervention the use of friendly powers has no alternative but to carry out their responsibility for the state of affairs until it becomes indispensable to create conditions for the to take its place among the other nations independent nations, freely linked with the Indian Union.

The Netherlands Government wishes to the pledges which it has formally Indonesia and will not permit others to prevent the realization of the aspirations of the nation. The Netherlands Government only by following the course of action will these pledges can be fulfilled at the Netherlands Government sincerely friendly nations will understand and

BATAVIA,

December 19, 1948.
memorandum.

However, the Netherlands Government noted that the sinecure it rejected the attitude of the Committee of Good Offices. It was clear that the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices would be acting within the United States Government concerning some of the most essential points which were discussed in Mr. Hatta's letter.

Before this letter had been transmitted, the Republican Government confirmed that its desire to enter further discussions with the Netherlands. Dr. Hatta is the Premier of a so-called Presidential Cabinet. The Netherlands Government has received information that no reply can be expected, have placed the Netherlands Government in a position, where no intervention from the part of international organizations or of friendly powers can be of further assistance and where it has no other course but to carry out on the basis of its undiminished responsibility for the state of affairs in Indonesia, those measures which are indispensable to create conditions, which will enable Indonesia to take its place among the other nations of the world as a sovereign and independent nation, freely linked with the Netherlands in a Netherlands—Indonesian Union.

The Netherlands Government will not go back on, or revoke, any of the pledges which it has formally made with regard to the future of Indonesia, but it will not permit extremist or communist groups to prevent the realization of the aspiration of the vast majority of the Indonesian population. The Netherlands Government is deeply convinced that only by following the course of action on which it has now embarked, these pledges can be fulfilled at the earliest possible moment. The Netherlands Government sincerely hopes that the Governments of all friendly nations will understand and support this policy.

BATAVIA.

December 19, 1948.
Sir,

1. In reply to your telegram of 20th December, the Committee of Good Offices would first of all refer the members of the Security Council to the Committee's Special Report of 12 December, the Supplementary Report dated 18 December to the Special Report and the Committee's Report dated 19th December. These reports cover the more important events in Indonesia leading to the outbreak of hostilities between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia on 19 December 1948.

2. Despite frequent requests the Netherlands authorities have not yet provided the United States representative or the Deputy Australian representative, who are in Batavia, with any information regarding the welfare of the members of the Committee and their staff, and the United Nations Secretariat who were in Kaluran on 19 December. Nor have the Netherlands authorities provided means of communication between the two groups. The United States representative and the Deputy Australian representative are, therefore, once more constrained to forward this report on behalf of the Committee without referring to the members who are still in Kaluran.

3. On the evening of 20 December, the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation handed to the United States representative on the Committee's reply, dated 20 December, in the latter's letter of 17 December (vide Supplementary Report of 18 December). This reply is attached as Appendix I.

4. Further expressions of the Netherlands viewpoint are contained in the following documents:

(a) Radio speech made by the High Representative of the Crown on the morning of 19 December, a copy of which was handed to the United States representative on the same day (Appendix II).
(b) An Order of the Day, dated 18 December, issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Forces in Indonesia (Appendix III).

5. The Committee draws the attention of the Security Council to the following points which emerge from the foregoing and from the Committee's previous reports:

(a) In their repudiation of the Reville Truce Agreement, the Netherlands Government did not comply with the provisions of Article 10 of that Agreement.
(b) The Committee is not aware of any circumstances connected with the concentration of Republican forces or the manoeuvres of the Republican army which should have given rise to apprehensions and alarm, leading to precipitate action on the part of the Netherlands.
(c) The case of the Netherlands letter of 17 December to the United States representative (vide Supplementary Report of 18 December) and the requirement of a reply within a time limit which was impossible of fulfilment give to this letter some features of an ultimatum.
(d) Military operations of the nature carried out by the Netherlands forces must have involved considerable planning and it is difficult for the Committee not to conclude that plans for such operations were in progress during the exchange of correspondence referred to in the Committee's Special Report of 12 December and the Supplementary Report thereto of 18 December, and at the time the Netherlands authorities facilitated the transfer of the Committee's headquarters to Kaluran.
Telegram of 26th December, the Committee of (to refer the members of the Security Council to) the port of 12 December, the Supplementary Report and the Committee's Resolution. These reports cover the more important events of the outbreak of hostilities between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia on 19 December 1948. The Netherlands authorities have notified the Committee of the new representative or the Deputy Ambassador in Batavia, with any information regarding the Committee's visit and the Committee, who were in Kalimantan on 16 December. Netherlands, provided means of communication between States representative and the Deputy Commander; therefore, once more constrained to inform the Committee without referring to the matter in hand.

On 29 December, the Acting Chairman of the United States representative or 20 December, to the latter's letter of 17 December (port of 12 December). This reply is attached to the text of the Netherlands viewpoint are contained:

made by the High Representative of the Crown on 16 December, a copy of which was handed to the States representative on the same day (Special). The Day, dated 18 December, issued by the in-Chief of the Netherlands Forces in Indonesia (SIPPI) was the attention of the Security Council to emerge from the foregoing and from the Communication of the Committee on the North-Truce Agreement. The Government did not comply with the provisions of that Agreement.

is not aware of any circumstances connected with the action of the Republic forces on the maneuvers can arise which should have given rise to anticipated, leading to precipitate action on the islands.

Netherlands letter of 17 December to the United States Special Report of the requirement of a reply within a time limit impossible of fulfillment give to this letter an ultimatum.

tions of the nature carried out by the Netherlands Government have involved considerable planning at the initiative of the Committee not to conclude that plans were in progress during the exchange referred to in the Committee's Sp Report of 2 December and the Supplementary Report of 8 December. At the time the Netherlands representative facilitated the transfer of the Committee's mission to Kalimantan.

not only have the possibilities of negotiations under the auspices of the Committee not been exhausted, but they have not been adequately explored. There have been no negotiations under the auspices of the Committee since 23 July. The recent direct talks cannot be regarded as negotiations, as they took the form of Netherlands demands for the complete surrender of the Republic to the Netherlands position on all important issues.

In commencing military operations on 19 December, the Netherlands Government acted in violation of its obligations under the Renne Truce Agreement.

6. Upon receipt of your telegram, the Committee addressed a letter to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation, asking for "all relevant information regarding the military operations as well as the circumstances leading to the outbreak of hostilities, their nature and cause of the military situation are drawn from the official releases furnished by the Netherlands delegation in reply to this letter:"

(a) At 6:45 A.M. on 19 December, Dutch paratroopers landed near Jogjakarta and captured the airfield at Magawa. Airborne troops were then brought in and an advance made on Djokjakarta, resulting in the capture of the city early that afternoon. All important Republican leaders, including the President and the Vice-President and members of the Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, are in Dutch hands.

(b) On 19 December, Dutch troops crossed the Status Quo Line at Gombong (Central Java) and reached Kafangang near the same day.

(c) In advance following a landing on the north coast of Central Java, Netherlands troops have reached Tjepoe.

(c) Dutch troops have occupied Toeren, Bojoal, Pati, Toeban and Poone in Central Java.

(e) In East Sumatra, Dutch troops have entered the Asahan area in Central Sumatra, Dutch troops have crossed the Status Quo Line in several places. Solok, 25 kilometers southwest of force Singkarak has been occupied by Dutch troops.

7. In the absence of communication with Republican territory since the United States representative and the Deputy Australian representative left Kalimantan on 18 December, it has not been possible for them to obtain an authoritative Republican version of developments.

8. Following the outbreak of hostilities, curfew has been imposed in Batavia from midnight till dawn. Press correspondents are subject to strict political and military censorship and their dispatches on the military situation are restricted to reproduction of official Netherlands bulletins.

9. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Premiers and cabinets of the States of East Indonesia and Pasundan in Netherlands-controlled territory have tendered their resignations.

10. With one exception, all Republican officials in Batavia, including the Secretary General of the Republican delegation, have been placed under arrest. The office of the Republican delegation is under military guard and the Secretary General's papers, including those relating to the work of his delegation with the Committee of Good Offices, have been seized. There have also been arrests of Republican sympathizers in Batavia.

(Sd) H. MERLE COCHRAN,
(United States Representative).
(Sd) T. W. CUTTS,
(Deputy Australian Representative).

The President of the Security Council,
Appendix I to the Report, dated December 21, 1948
Netherlands Delegation.
No. 3960.
Batavia, December 20, 1948.
Palais Rijkswijk.

My dear Mr. Cochran,

The contents of your most important communication of December 17, 1948, were immediately cabled to my Government, in order to obtain their views on various points raised in your letter.

My Government has requested me to point out to you that the first visit of the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs and the subsequent visit of a Netherlands Government Delegation have clarified the position of parties concerning certain basic issues. To the great regret of the Netherlands Government these discussions broke down because at the very last moment Dr. Hatta had to admit that several of his statements were not endorsed by his Government. Therefore the only possibility for the Netherlands Government to resume negotiations was if it could obtain assurances that the Government of the Republic was willing to carry out the statements made by Dr. Hatta. Dr. Hatta’s letter of December 13, 1948, was a renewed expression in an informal and unofficial way, of his opinions on a number of basic issues. His assurances on these questions, as has been the case with previous statements of Dr. Hatta, were too vague and failed to clarify sufficiently the Republican Government’s position on essential issues under discussion and therefore could not be accepted by the Netherlands Government as a sufficient basis for resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices. The purpose of the letter which the Netherlands Government addressed to you on December 18, 1948, was to solicit an unambiguous declaration of the Republican Government, which could have easily been given, had it been willing to do so, as it was familiar with the questions involved. Moreover you are undoubtedly aware of the fact that because of geographical reasons and difficulties of communication it generally takes more time for me to consult the Netherlands Government in The Hague than it takes the Republican delegation and Dr. Hatta to consult their Government. I wish to emphasize this point especially since you mention in your letter that no sufficient time was available to obtain from the Republican Government the assurances which the Netherlands Government considered essential to resume negotiations.

To the letter of the Netherlands Government an earlier reply was requested than was originally intended in view of certain developments which had taken place after the dispatch of this letter. These most serious developments were:

(a) an almost hourly increase in the number of incidents making it imperative for the authorities to take stronger measures than had hitherto been employed to cope with this evil;

(b) the receipt of reports concerning a considerable increase in the number of troops stationed on the Republican side of the Status Quo Line so that an estimated 100,000 men were concentrated along this line. General manoeuvres of the Republican army were announced officially at that very moment as a result of which a still higher tension was created;

(c) the official communiqué of December 16, 1948 issued by the Republican radio in which inter alia explicitly the Republican position concerning the supreme authority over the armed forces during the interim period and the incorporation of the Republican army in the Dutch armed forces were stated in terms which denoted a clear intention to continue the fight, the same thing as in Dr. Hatta’s letter.

The only conclusion which the Netherlands Government were able to draw from these developments was that the Republican Government was not willing to do what it had earlier agreed to do.

From your letter it clearly appears that you endeavoured to convey the impression to the Netherlands Government that the Republicans should agree to a united front with the Dutch, a united front that was to form the basis of all negotiations. The conclusion was arrived at by you that certain vital issues had been settled in a manner to which the Netherlands Government had given no previous indication.

(d) the announcement that the officials, among whom is an official visit to India and a visit to the United Nations in New York were in the latter quarter of December, and you were trying to give serious consideration to the request for a farewell visit by the Netherlands Government to the United States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States has stated that the departure of prominent United States officials would lead to a unification of the views of the parties.

From your letter it clearly appears that the impression was sought to be conveyed that the Republican Government was prepared to accept such a united front on the basis of the principles that had previously been stated to the Netherlands Government, in the absence of new developments.

I. Condition A.—My Government is of the opinion that the Republic and the Netherlands should agree that the latter will send a mission to the United States to negotiate an agreement for the establishment of a united front, a united front which will be based on the principle that the United States will not interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic.

The condition that the Dutch Government shall have a privileged position in any organization that may be established is not a condition that the Republic will accept.

The condition that any organization that may be established shall have the power to impose sanctions in case of violation by any party of the agreements concluded is a condition that the Republic will accept.

The condition that the United States shall have the power to make recommendations to the parties is a condition that the Republic will accept.

The condition that the United States should have the power to make recommendations to the parties is a condition that the Republic will accept.

The condition that the United States should have the power to make recommendations to the parties is a condition that the Republic will accept.

During the informal talks the following points will be discussed:

(a) freedom of navigation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(b) freedom of transit in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(c) freedom of trade in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(d) freedom of investment in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(e) freedom of immigration in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(f) freedom of emigration in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(g) freedom of association in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(h) freedom of religion in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(i) freedom of education in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(j) freedom of speech in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(k) freedom of press in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(l) freedom of assembly in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(m) freedom of movement in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(n) freedom of property in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(o) freedom of enterprise in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(p) freedom of worship in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(q) freedom of contract in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(r) freedom of labor in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(s) freedom of business in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(t) freedom of occupation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(u) freedom of industry in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(v) freedom of agriculture in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(w) freedom of commerce in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(x) freedom of fisheries in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(y) freedom of mining in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(z) freedom of forestry in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(a) freedom of communications in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(b) freedom of transportation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(c) freedom of education in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(d) freedom of religion in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(e) freedom of worship in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(f) freedom of assembly in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(g) freedom of movement in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(h) freedom of property in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(i) freedom of enterprise in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(j) freedom of worship in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(k) freedom of contract in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(l) freedom of labor in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(m) freedom of business in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(o) freedom of industry in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(p) freedom of agriculture in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(r) freedom of fisheries in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(s) freedom of mining in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(t) freedom of forestry in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(u) freedom of communications in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(v) freedom of transportation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(w) freedom of education in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(x) freedom of religion in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(y) freedom of worship in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(z) freedom of assembly in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(a) freedom of movement in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(b) freedom of property in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(c) freedom of enterprise in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(d) freedom of worship in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(e) freedom of contract in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(f) freedom of labor in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(m) freedom of mining in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(n) freedom of forestry in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(o) freedom of communications in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(p) freedom of transportation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(r) freedom of religion in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(t) freedom of assembly in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(u) freedom of movement in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(v) freedom of property in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(z) freedom of labor in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(a) freedom of business in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(b) freedom of occupation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(f) freedom of fisheries in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

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(j) freedom of transportation in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(k) freedom of education in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(l) freedom of religion in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(m) freedom of worship in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(n) freedom of assembly in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(o) freedom of movement in the area of the Dutch East Indies;

(p) freedom of property in the area of the Dutch East Indies;
To the Report, dated December 21, 1948

Batavia, December 20,
Palais Rijswijk.

Your most important communication of December was cabled to my Government, in order to obtain a reply from your letter.

As requested by you to point out to you that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the sub-secretary of the Government have clarified the position of certain basic issues. To the great regret of me as well as many other nations, the discussions broke down because of the refusal of the Netherlands Government to make a decision on the proposed departure at the very moment when the most critical stage had been reached. I do not wish to express deep appreciation for the efforts which you have made, because the position of Dr. Hatta’s Government is far from being united. In fact, the only acceptable solution seems to be a compromise, which would have to be accepted by all parties involved.

From your letter it clearly appears that notwithstanding the unfavorable circumstances, you endeavored to bring the attention of the Netherlands Government to the situation of the Republic. At the request of my Government I wish to express in your letter the appreciation for the efforts which you have made, because the position of Dr. Hatta’s Government is far from being united. In fact, the only acceptable solution seems to be a compromise, which would have to be accepted by all parties involved.

I. Condition A.—My Government feels that the condition that the Republic should agree to incorporation in the federal organization on the same footing as the other federal areas is not in any way at variance with the Reville principles. How could the principle that “the status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia” be implemented otherwise? The suggestion that among members of the United States of Indonesia one should have a privileged position has never been brought forward. The condition, however, did not preclude that further consultations could have led to special provisions in the B.I.O.—decree with regard to the Republic. As a matter of fact an article to this end has been added to the decree and the Netherlands Government was prepared to grant special representation in the federal organs to the Republic along the lines proposed by you personally. The Republic Government was aware of this.

During the informal talks the provisionality of the federal organization has been discussed at length, as had been done before with the other federal territories, though nothing contained in the Reville Principles obliged the Netherlands Government to do this, the only relevant provisions therein being:

(1) that “the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia”. 
(2) that "in any provisional federal government prior to the ratification of the Constitution of the future United States of Indonesia all states will be offered fair representation..." The "fair representation" of the Republic in the provisional federal government has been discussed with the Republican representatives. They know the views of the Netherlands in this respect and no differences of opinion of any importance came to light. The condition sub (a) in the Netherlands Government's letter of December 16, 1948 did not in any way go back on these views. It was only the full co-operation in the provisional federal structure which was solicited.

I might add that my Government must take exception to the observation that Negara have been "unilaterally established" by Netherlands authority. In accordance with our constitutional regulations they are in fact legally recognised on a provisional basis in accordance with the wishes brought forward by the populations concerned.

II. Conditions B and C.—These conditions were the basic issues of the dispute. Ever since the Renville Principles were accepted by both parties, the negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices focussed on the practical consequences for the Republic of Netherlands sovereignty during the interim period. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government, Netherlands sovereignty implies that the High Representative in certain circumstances should have ultimate power to intervene or overrule while no "private armies" should exist. Otherwise, the Netherlands could not remain responsible for the situation nor fulfill its pledge to co-operate in the building up of the United States of Indonesia. The Netherlands considered further protracted negotiations before the Committee of Good Offices of no avail, if an agreement on these basic issues proved clearly impossible. Therefore members of the Netherlands Cabinet, with full consent of the members of the Committee of Good Offices, tried to clear up these points in direct and informal talks. My Government fails to understand why you personally and on behalf of the other members of the Committee of Good Offices repeatedly stress in your letter that formal discussions should have been resumed before the Committee of Good Offices. During the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in November, followed by the Cabinet Delegation in that same month, every member of the Committee of Good Offices informed the Netherlands Ministers more than once that the only chance of arriving at a solution was by direct and informal talks between the Ministers and Dr. Hatta. The Members of the Committee of Good Offices added that, when these discussions proved to be successful, the results would be formalised under the Committee of Good Offices' auspices. If, however, these discussions would lead to a breakdown, there would be no change for the Committee of Good Offices to bring the parties together.

Very much to the regret of the Netherlands, the differences could not be bridged in these informal discussions. In the light of this, no success could be expected of renewed formal negotiations. Consequently, only slight hope remained. However, the Netherlands in last effort decided to give the Republican Government the opportunity to agree on these points as yet. The issues were abundantly clear and it certainly was possible for them to state their position at short notice.

III. It should not be overlooked that the number of infringements of the Truce, murders, etc., was steadily increasing and that ample evidence showed the instructions to organise lands territory in the v would have been fully issued before the intolerable Truce violations had been expected to negotiate and always insisted that this be given priority. Hence November 3, 1948, refund. Therefore, no useful points were made in the Security Commission in that Commit advisable results. Though that the problem of the first, the Special Delegation for Foreign Affairs before, to a final solution, tried but this also did not lie part of the Republic to

In all sincerity, the Netherlands exhausted all possibilities.

In concluding I wish to reaffirm my examination whether any further missions with the Republic director of Good Offices on the basis of the exist no doubt in the mind of the Committee of Good Offices would - the situation in which to solve the difference in order to the certainty that the Netherlands are willing to co-operate to this end, government to resume its freedom of action or other delay the programme which the establishment of a sovereign status of the large majority of Indo


BATAVIA. NOTE.—Appendix II to the Radio speech of the High Commissioner, 19 December 1948. This is available in Indonesian.

Appendix III to the Report dated 15 December 1948 of the Netherlands Government reproduced as the text.

Report dated D. P. T. D.

1. At approximately 0640 Batacaho, members of the Committee of Good Offices from the direction of Mag
ample evidence showed that Republican authorities had issued instructions to organise widespread disturbances in Netherlands territory in the very near future. The Netherlands would have been fully justified in not discussing political issues before the intolerable situation with regard to the Truce violations had been improved. No power can be expected to negotiate under duress. The Netherlands have always insisted that discussion of the Truce violations be given priority. However, the Republic in its letter of November 3, 1948, refused to comply with this condition. Therefore, no useful purpose was served by discussing these matters in the Security Committee. Moreover, previous discussion in that Committee on the subject failed to produce tangible results. Though maintaining the Netherlands view that the problem of the Truce violations had to be solved first, the Special Delegation, as had done the Minister of Foreign Affairs before, in an effort to bring the parties nearer to a final solution, tried to overcome the political differences, but this also did not lead to any effective measures on the part of the Republic to stop infringements of the Truce.

In all sincerity, the Netherlands Government is convinced that it has exhausted all possibilities of reaching an equitable settlement.

In concluding I wish to re-affirm that my Government has most carefully examined whether any further possibility remained open to resume discussions with the Republic directly or under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices on the basis of the assurances given by Dr. Hatta. There exists no doubt in the mind of my Government that the members of the Committee of Good Offices would willingly have continued their patient efforts to solve the differences which have so far prevented a political settlement. The certainty that the Republican Government was unable or unwilling to co-operate to this end has finally forced the Netherlands Government to resume its freedom of action, and to carry out without further delay the programme which will lead in the shortest possible time to the establishment of a sovereign government, corresponding with the wishes of the large majority of Indonesians.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) T. ELINK SCHUURMAN,

The Honourable H. Morlo Cochran,

BATAVIA.

Note.—Appendix II—to the Report dated December 21, 1948.
Radio speech of the High Representative of the Crown, dated 19 December 1948. This is not being reproduced as the text is available in Indonesia.

Appendix III to the Report dated 21 December Order of the Day, dated 19 December 1948, read by the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Forces in Indonesia. This is not being reproduced as the text is available in Indonesia.

Report dated December 22, 1948

Sir,

1. At approximately 0640 Batavia time on Sunday, 19 December the members of the Committee of Good Offices were awakened by the sound of explosions from the direction of Maguwo Airport, Jogjakarta. Present at
Kaliurang, the Headquarters of the Committee, at the time, were the Australian Representative, the Belgian Representative and the Deputy of the United States Representative. After the Committee had made a survey of the situation, it held a special meeting at 0845 Batavia time and directed that the following telegrams be transmitted to the United States Representative, who had gone to Batavia the day before with the deputy of the Australian Representative:

"Most immediate stop Cochran, Hotel des Indes, Batavia and care United States Consul General Batavia stop Committee requests the following message be transmitted to the Security Council earliest stop quota 6 A.M. today Dutch began large scale bombing of Maguwo Airport. Jogjakarta Republican Capital stop Hatta reports bombing of parts of Jogjakarta itself and the dropping of paratroopers stop Committee calls for immediate meeting of Security Council for appropriate action stop unquote para Committee authorized Cochran and Cutts to supplement this message as they see fit and take other appropriate urgent action in Batavia on behalf of the Committee if communications with Committee in telegraphable stop have authorized special release to press of Committee's Supplementary Report of December 18 stop urgent maintenance of communications between Batavia and Jogjakarta stop Confirm receipt Stop TK Critchley Australia RH Herreman Belgium RE Lisle United States".

2. Every effort was made to have this telegram transmitted to Batavia. When the Batavian radio failed to answer, a general call was sent out to all stations, including ships at sea. A further attempt to have the message broadcasted by the Jogjakarta radio failed. Later efforts were made to transmit the message during that day, and on 20 and 21 December after the arrival of Netherlands forces. These efforts failed.

3. Late in the afternoon of 19 December, the Delegations and the Secretariat, at the direction of Republican military officials, re-arranged and consolidated their residence, in order to be in a concentrated area which could more readily be protected.

4. During the night 20-21 December, the Republican garrison withdrew. The members of the Republican Delegation remained.

5. At 1510 Batavia time, Monday, 20 December, the Netherlands forces arrived in Kaliurang. With the exception of the servants and Hotel employees most of whom had remained to serve the Delegations, the area appeared deserted. There were a number of shots fired by the advancing Netherlands forces and gunfire was heard intermittently during the days that followed. There were reports of fatal shootings of civilians. The shooting of an unarmed boy by an Ambonese soldier of the Netherlands Forces was personally witnessed by a member of the Secretariat staff and his young daughter.

6. Effective communications between Kaliurang and Jogjakarta were not re-established through Monday and Tuesday, 20 and 21 December.

7. About 0900 hours on Wednesday, 21 December, the three Delegations and the Secretariat staff were removed in convoy to Jogjakarta and late in the afternoon began, in three divisions, to fly to Batavia. The Republican Delegation, at last reports, remained in Kaliurang confined to restricted limits. Netherlands officers stated, however, that the Republican Delegation would be shortly removed to Jogjakarta.

8. Throughout 19-20-21 December numerous explosions were heard and large columns of smoke were witnessed at many points in the valley below Kaliurang. Some twelve houses in Kaliurang were burned down, before the arrival of the Netherlands forces. In Kaliurang, it was observed that most of the men were barefoot, and there were few or no workers to be seen.

9. On its return to Batavia, the Committee, which had been sent to the Security Council and the Deputy of the Australian, in the four day period during which the Committee at Kaliurang, on the one hand, were entirely broke down, and other actions taken, by the Dutch, for the Dutch-controlled territory, by the emergency situation that existed, was referred on them to act for the Committee at Kaliurang at its meeting.

Report dated December 9

Sir,

1. The Committee desires to inform the Committee's military observers in the course of complying with orders from military commanders in their area.

2. On 19 December, the Netherlands forces, under the direction of the Chairman of the Committee's Military observers, entered the Netherlands-controlled territory.

3. On 22 December the Committee's Council of State was officially informed by the Netherlands Forces in Chief that the High Command issued instructions that all of the Committee would be concentrated in Batavia. The Committee Council of State learned the same day that on 21 December the Netherlands commanders had issued orders to the Netherlands delegation.

"Sir,

Since the Government of the Netherlands, in Article 10 of the Treaty of Good Offices and the Truce Agreement is to preserve the status of the military situation as it is provided for in Article 4, 5, and 6, the Council of State have come to an end.

Instructions were therefore issued that they suggest to the Board of Senior Military Officers that the situation has terminated.

In this connection, it is noted that the Office for Senior Military Officers has been terminated.
The arrival of the Netherlands forces. During the ride down from Kalibaru, it was observed that most of the houses were closed and that there were few or no workers to be seen in the fields or along the road. A number of the bridges had been demolished.

9. On its return to Batavia, the Committee took note of the reports which had been sent to the Security Council by the United States Representative and the Deputy of the Australian Representative on 19-21 December. In the four day period during which communications between the Committee at Kalibaru, on the one hand, and Batavia and the outside world on the other, were entirely broken. It was noted that the reports made, and other actions taken, by the United States Representative, and the Deputy of the Australian Representative were fully authorized not only by the emergency situation that existed but by the express authority conferred on them to act for the Committee by the decision taken by the Committee at Kalibaru at its meetings of 19 December, 1948.


Batavia, 25 December 1948.

Sir,

1. The Committee desires to inform the Security Council that most of the Committee's military observers in Netherlands-controlled territory are in the course of complying with orders received from the Netherlands military commanders in their areas to proceed to Batavia.

2. On 21 December, the Netherlands Commander-in-Chief agreed with the Chairman of the Committee's Military Executive Board that the military observers should remain at their regularly assigned stations in Netherlands-controlled territory.

3. On 22 December the Chairman of the Committee's Military Executive Board was officially informed by a representative of the Netherlands Commander-in-Chief that the High Representative of the Crown had issued instructions that all of the Committee's military observers were to be concentrated in Batavia. The Chairman of the Military Executive Board learned the same day that orders to this effect had been issued to the Netherlands commanders in the field as early as 21 December.

4. On 22 December the United States representative made enquiries of the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation regarding these instructions. On 22 December 1945, the Chairman of the Committee received the following letter No. 3066, from the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation.

"Sir,

Since the Government of the Netherlands has, in accordance with Article 10 of the Truce Agreement, notified the Committee of Good Offices and the Republican delegation that the Truce Agreement is to be considered as no longer binding, the task of the military assistants of the Committee, as set forth in Article 4, 5a and 5b of said Agreement, has now come to an end.

Instructions were therefore issued to all territorial Commanders that they suggest to all military observers to report to the Board of Senior Military Observers at Batavia as their activities have terminated.

In this connection, it is noted that the Chairman of the Board of Senior Military Observers was verbally informed of this step beforehand.
With regard to suggestions that military observers should remain with the headquarters to which they were attached, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the demarcation lines and demilitarized zones no longer exist and the headquarters to which the various teams of military observers were attached have become mobile. Under the present circumstances it will be clear that the Netherlands military authorities are unable to accept any responsibility for military observers who move with these headquarters or by themselves in operational areas.

In view of the above it would be sincerely appreciated if the Committee of Good Offices would request the Board of Senior Military Observers to issue orders similar to the suggestions made by the Territorial Commanders, to the effect that all military observers return to Batavia in order to report to the Board.

5. After reading the foregoing letter, the Chairman of the Committee’s Military Executive Board reaffirmed the facts stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

6. The Truce Agreement of 17 January 1945 confer certain explicit functions on the military observers. In addition, the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947 requests that the services of military observers, mentioned first in the Resolution of 25 August 1947, be made available to the Committee of Good Offices. Therefore, the Committee feels an obligation to report immediately to the Council that this action, taken by Netherlands Military Command without reference to the Committee, will delay the Committee and consequently the Security Council of the services of the military observers in the field.

7. Although military observers in the field are obliged to conform with the directions of the Netherlands Military Commanders in their respective areas, the Committee is not complying with the request contained in the final paragraph of the letter quoted above, but is awaiting advice from the Security Council as to future functions of the Committee’s military assistants.

Report, dated December 26, 1948.

1. In its Special Report of 12 December 1948, the Committee of Good Offices warned the Security Council that “the collapse of the direct talks has served to aggravate the dangers in a situation which was already grave”.

The present Report is the sixth Report submitted by the Committee to the Security Council since 12 December. The five other Reports are:
(a) Supplementary Report dated 15 December to the Special Report of the Committee dated 12 December 1948.
(b) Report dated 19 December 1948.
(c) Report dated 21 December 1948.
(d) Report dated 22 December 1948.
(e) Report dated 23 December 1948.

2. Pursuant to the terms of the Security Council’s Resolution of 24 December 1948, requesting the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948, the Committee
(a) recapitulates in outline the chief events within its cognizance which have occurred since 12 December with reference to the Reports in which the complete data appear;

3. As reported in the Supplemental 13 December the United States represent given a letter addressed to him in the name of the United States representative in the United Nations, the Acting Chairman of the Council is in receipt of a report from the Acting Chairman of the United States, Dr. Haitz, on the events of 13 December, to the Acting Chairman of the United States representative in the United States representative’s telegram, have been

4. On Wednesday 15 December the United States representative in the United States representative’s telegram, have been

5. At 2115 hours on 13 December the United States representative pointed out that he was requested to call on the Acting Chairman at 2330 hours. He was received by the Acting Chairman of the United States representative’s telegram, have been

A. Outline of the

(b) summarizes the military operations
(c) analyzes some of the facts as to the

Truce and to the general role

7. The Committee returned to Batavia on December 1948.

8. At 0500 hours on 25 December the United States representative held a meeting in order to discuss the above resolution. The Committee held a meeting in order to discuss the above resolution. The Committee

9. The Committee returned to Batavia on December 1948.
military observers should remain which they were attached. I have
attention to the fact that the demar-
cated zones no longer exist and the
the various teams of military
have become mobile. Under the
will be clear that the Netherlands
able to accept any responsibility
move with these Headquarters or
areas.
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and request the Board of Senior
orders similar to the suggestions
commanders, to the effect that all
Batavia in order to report to
Chairman of the Committee’s
facts stated in paragraphs 2 and
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Commanders is their respective
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December 26, 1948.

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December to the Special Report
ember 1948.

Security Council’s Resolution of 24
Good Offices to report to the
events which have transpired
mittee
events within its cognizance
ember with reference to the
data appear;

(b) summarizes the military operations since 19 December 1948; and

c) analyses some of the facts as they appear in relationship to the
True and to the general role of the Committee of Good Offices.

A. Outline of Chief Events

3. As reported in the Supplementary Report dated 19 December, on
13 December the United States representative while in Jogjakarta was
given a letter addressed to him and signed by the Vice-President of the
Republic, Dr. Hatta, setting down certain basic considerations with reference
to the recent direct talks between the parties and asking for the assistance
of the United States representative as a member of the Committee
in bringing about a resumption of negotiations. In the late afternoon of
13 December, the United States representative gave a copy of this letter
in Batavia to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation (Supple-
mentary Report).

4. On Wednesday 15 December the Committee of Good Offices moved
to Kalimantan for a regular three week period. On 17 December a telegram
was received by the United States representative from the Acting Chairman of the
Netherlands Delegation acknowledging receipt of Dr. Hatta’s letter and stating that the continuation of the negotiations would be futile unless
a declaration accepting the Netherlands views and binding on the Republican
Government would be received forthwith by the Netherlands Government.
Dr. Hatta’s letter and the Netherlands Delegation’s telegram, together with the United States representative’s reply of 17 December to the Nether-
lands Delegation’s telegram, have been submitted to the Security Council
as documents bearing on the status of negotiations between the parties, with
a statement of the attendant circumstances (Supplementary Report).

5. At 2115 hours on 18 December the United States representative was
requested to call on the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation at
2200 hours. He was received by the Acting Chairman alone and was hand-
ed a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee. The United States
representative pointed out that he was not Chairman at that time. The
Acting Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation replied that the communi-
cation was destined for the Committee of Good Offices and contained the
notification of the termination of the Truce Agreement. The circumstances
surrounding the repudiation of the Truce Agreement by the Netherlands
Government have been fully reported to the Council in the Report dated
19 December.

6. The Committee also draws the attention of the Members of the
Security Council to the Committee’s Reports of 21, 22 and 23
December which cover the more important events in Indonesia as they
have occurred after the outbreak of hostilities between the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.

7. The Committee returned to Batavia on the evening of 22 December
1948.

8. At 0850 hours on 25 December 1948 the Committee Secretariat
received the official text of the resolution adopted by the Security Council
at its 392nd meeting on 24 December 1948. At 1000 hours the Committee
of Good Offices held a meeting in order to take the necessary steps to imple-
ment the above resolution. The Committee decided to send to the Parties
letters the texts of which are reproduced hereunder—
(a) Text of letter to the Netherlands Delegation:

No. GO/11100.

Hotel des Indes,
Batavia, N.E.I.
25 December 1948.

Sir,

We have the honour to confirm to you that the Committee of Good Offices is in receipt of the following telegram from the Security Council, the text of which was communicated to you by telephone at 0926 this morning by the Principal Secretary of the Committee for your official cognizance:

"The Security Council

Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia and having taken note of the report of the Committee of Good Offices,

Calls upon the parties

(a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December.

Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegram on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948 and to observe and report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above."

2. To enable the Committee of Good Offices to carry out the instructions given to it by the above Resolution, it requests immediate notice from you as to the steps which have been taken by your Government to implement the Resolution. It is requested that your Government also keep the Committee immediately, fully and currently informed of further steps taken by your Governments in compliance with the Resolution and that it be furnished with copies of the relevant orders issued to the appropriate authorities.

3. It will be further necessary for the Committee’s Military Observers to proceed to the areas where fighting has been in progress, including Jogjakarta. Instructions have been issued to the Committee’s Military Executive Board to make arrangements for the despatch of Military Observers to the field. The Committee trusts that instructions will be issued to the Netherlands Military Command to give full cooperation to the Military Executive Board and to the Committee’s Observers.

4. The Committee requests that the aircraft at the disposal of the Committee of Good Offices be permitted as heretofore to operate freely in Java and Sumatra.

5. The Committee’s Military Executive Board will consult with the military officials of your Government on the necessary details.

6. In order that the Republican Government may comply with the Resolution, it is requested that the President of the Republic and the Ministers of his Government be given all facilities to issue directions from Jogjakarta, or from such other centre as they may desire, to cease hostilities.

We have the honour to be, etc.,

(Sd.) R. HERREMAINS (Belgium)
Chairman.

(Sd.) H. MERLE COCHRAN (United States).

(Sd.) T. K. CEITCHLEY (Australia)

Mr. T. Elink Schuurman,
Acting Chairman,
Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Batavia.

(b) Text of letter to the Republic:

No. GO/11101.

Sir,

We have the honour to confirm to you that the Committee of Good Offices is in receipt of the following telegram from the Security Council, the text of which was communicated to you by the Principal Secretary of the Committee:

"The Security Council

Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia and having taken note of the report of the Committee of Good Offices,

Calls upon the parties

(a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December.

Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegram on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948 and to observe and report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above."

2. To enable the Committee of Good Offices to carry out the instructions given to it by the Resolution, it is requested that your Government also keep the Committee immediately, fully and currently informed of further steps taken by your Governments in compliance with the Resolution and that it be furnished with copies of the relevant orders issued to the appropriate authorities.

3. It will be further necessary for the Committee’s Military Observers to proceed to the areas where fighting has been in progress, including Jogjakarta. Instructions have been issued to the Committee’s Military Executive Board to make arrangements for the despatch of Military Observers to the field. The Committee trusts that instructions will be issued to the Netherlands Military Command to give full cooperation to the Military Executive Board and to the Committee’s Observers.

4. The Committee requests that the aircraft at the disposal of the Committee of Good Offices be permitted as heretofore to operate freely in Java and Sumatra.

5. In order that the Republican Government may comply with the Resolution, it is requested that the President of the Republic and the Ministers of his Government be given all facilities to issue directions from Jogjakarta, or from such other centre as they may desire, to cease hostilities.

We have the honour to be, etc.,

(Sd.) R.

(Sd.) H.

(Sd.) T.

Mr. R. SUDIJOYO,
Secy.-Gen.
Delegation of the
Republic of Indonesia.
The text of a letter to the Republican Delegation:

No. GO/1101.

Hotel des Indes,
Batavia, N.E.I.
25 December 1948.

Sir,

We have the honour to confirm to you that the Committee of Good Offices is in receipt of the following telegram from the Security Council:

"... the text which was communicated to you in person at 09.57 this morning by the Principal Secretary of the Committee for your official cognizance:—"

"... The Security Council

Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia and having taken note of the report of the Committee of Good Offices,

calls upon the parties

(a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and

(b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 12 December.

Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948 and to observe and report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above."

1. To enable the Committee of Good Offices to carry out the instructions given it by the Resolution, your Government is requested to keep the Committee immediately fully and currently informed of the steps taken by your Government in compliance with the Resolution and that the Committee be furnished with copies of the relevant orders issued to the appropriate authorities.

2. It will be further necessary for the Committee’s Military Observers to proceed to the areas where fighting has been in progress, including Jogjakarta. Instructions have been issued to the Committee’s Military Executive Board to make arrangements for the despatch of Military Observers to the field. The Committee trusts that instructions will be issued by your Government to give full co-operation to the Military Executive Board and the Committee’s Observers.

3. The Committee requests that the aircraft at the disposal of the Committee of Good Offices be permitted as heretofore to operate freely in Java and Sumatra.

4. In order that the Republican Government may comply with the Security Council’s Resolution, the Committee has requested the Netherlands authorities to give the Republic and the members of his Government all facilities to issue directions from Jogjakarta, or such other centre as the Republican Government may desire, to cease hostilities.

We have the honour to be, etc.

(Sd.) R. HERREMAN (Belgium),
Chairman.

(Sd.) H. MERLE COCHRAN (United States),
Chairman.

(Sd.) T. K. CRITCHLEY (Australia).

Mr. R. SUDJONO,
Secy.-General,
Delegation of the Republic
of Indonesia, Batavia.
9. The following replies were received late on the same day.

(a) Text of the Netherlands Delegation's reply:

Batavia, December 25, 1948.

No. 4000.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. GO/1100, dated December 25, 1948, the contents of which were immediately cabled to my Government at The Hague. As soon as instructions from Her Majesty’s Government have been received, I will inform your Committee accordingly.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Sd.) T. ELINK SCHUURMAN.

Acting Chairman.

(b) Text of the Republican Delegation's reply:

Djakarta, 25th December, 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Committee's letter of December 25th, forwarding the text of the recent Resolution of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question.

As you know, the President of the Republic and his Government are at present detained by the Netherlands authorities, as are the Chairman and other members of the Republican Delegation. I greatly regret that, consequently, I am unable at this stage to take any action following the Security Council's Resolution and the receipt of the Committee's letter.

I note that the Council has called upon the Netherlands Government to release immediately the President and other political prisoners and that the Committee of Good Offices has requested the Netherlands authorities to give facilities to the President and the members of his Government. I trust, therefore, I shall be able to convey the Committee's letter to the appropriate Republican authorities in the very near future.

I have the honour to be,

(Sd.) R. SUDJONO,

Secretary-General,

Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia.

B. Military Operations.

10. The following information is based primarily on official Netherland releases supplemented by such data as the Committee's Military Observers have been able to report.

At 23-30 hours on 18 December the Netherlands Government denounced the Truce, effective at midnight.

(a) Java—

On 19 December, Netherlands troops crossed the Status Quo Line during the early hours in a number of columns. Jogjakarta Airfield was rapidly captured by paratroopers beginning at approximately 06-40 hours and an airborne landing was started and by 15-00 hours the city itself had been taken. An amphibious landing was made on the north coast of Java by the Netherlands Marine Brigade. Netherlands columns from east of Benjoemas and south of Pekalongan advanced on Magelang and reached Poerworejo.

On 20 December, another Netherlands column crossed the Status Quo Line south-west of Semarang, operating in the direction of Magelang and from the east of Semarang a column advanced toward Koeoeoed where contact with the Republican Siiluwang resulted in the outskirs of T. Delanggco and Bitar were occupied.

On 22 December, a Netherlands column took airborne Nederlandse Parakaas, Magelang, Seka, also occupied by Netherlands taken the oil fields and in Delanggco and Bitar were.

On 23 December, the Netherlands Line on the eastern edge Balarajia. Moeck in Bal.

On 24 December, in Bantam, Serang and Djasinga. In and sweeping-up operations.

(b) Sumatra—

The military observers in Padang on 19 December that the Nel. Status Quo Line at dawn.

On 20 December, in the Padang

On 21 December, Netherlands forces North-east coast of Sum. area was occupied.

On 22 December, Bulukiting occupied.

On 23 December, Netherlands hit took Balige and then pro.

On 24 December, Pajakoenboedt has been reported in South Republican areas are on.

11. Individual members of the C. observed that Republican 21 December that the N. to avoid direct resistance so as to maint. Except for the determined resist. N. the resistance appears to be routed because of the destruct. expected that the Republican forces would the "scorched earth" policy as for West Sumatra. The most of the information available to the Republican resistance policy. However, reported considerable destruction. No indication of the Netherlands casualties amounting to 43 wounded.

C. Analysis.

12. Article 16 of the Truce Agreement, the Netherlands note of 18 December: 'This agreement shall be continued with the Committee that it considers the Truce by the other party and be terminated.'
The military observers in Padang were informed at 09:30 hours on 19 December that the Netherlands troops had crossed the Status Quo Line at dawn.

On 20 December, in the Padang area, the Netherlands troops occupied Solok.

On 21 December, Netherlands forces landed at Bagasiniapang on the North-east coast of Sumatra. The entire southern Asahan area was occupied.

On 22 December, Bukittinggi and Padang Panggang were occupied.

On 23 December, Netherlands hydroplanes landed at Lake Toba and took Balige and then proceeded to Sibarang-Borang.

On 24 December, Pajakoenboch was captured. No action, as yet, has been reported in South Sumatra. Operations in all other Republican areas are continuing.

11. Individual members of the Committee of Good Offices have been informed by high Republican sources that the Republican forces planned to avoid direct resistance so as to maintain their forces for guerrilla activities. Except for the determined resistance of the Siliwangi division units, to real organized resistance appears to have been encountered by the Netherlands forces. In a number of cases the columns have had to be re-routed because of the destruction of important bridges. It may be expected that the Republican forces will continue with the guerrilla warfare and a "scorched earth" policy as long as they are able to do so. Since most of the information available to the Committee is from official Netherlands releases, there is no way, at this time, of assessing the effects of the Republican resistance policy. However, Republican sources in Jogjakarta reported considerable destruction. Netherlands official sources announced that the Netherlands casualties amounted, up to 23 December, to 19 killed and 43 wounded.

C. Analysis.

12. Article 16 of the Truce Agreement of 17 January 1948, cited in the Netherlands note of 18 December 1948 reads as follows—

"This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the Truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated."
Analysis of the conditions precedent to a termination of the Truce Agreement there set forth as applied to the facts of the present case leads to the following conclusions:

(a) The requirement of Article 10 that notice be given to the Committee of Good Offices was not fulfilled. The letter signed by the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation dated 13 December 1945 addressed to the “Chairman of the Security Council’s Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, Kaliurang”, was handed in Batavia to the United States Representative at 23-30 hours Batavia time, 13 December. The letter was addressed to the Chairman of the Committee. It was not delivered to him. The Committee’s headquarters, as recognized in the address given on the letter had formally been transferred to Kaliurang for the current period on 15 December. The United States Representative, at the time away from the current headquarters of the Committee and not the Chairman of the week, was not authorized, either explicitly or implicitly, to receive notice on behalf of the Committee. Notice was not received by the Committee until approximately 10-30 hours on Wednesday, 22 December, when a letter from the United States representative was handed to the members of the Committee while they were in process of removal from Kaliurang to Jogjakarta, en route to Batavia. The United States representative had attempted vainly to transmit the notice earlier but the Netherlands telegraph office refused to receive messages addressed to Republican areas and Kaliurang was completely isolated. By the time, therefore, notice had been received, the Netherlands forces had been carrying on hostilities on the Republican side of the Status Quo Line for more than three days.

(b) Similarly, the requirement of Article 10 that notice be given to the other party was not fulfilled. Delivery to the Secretary-General of the Republican Delegation in Batavia was not the type of notice contemplated in Article 10, particularly, as by act of the Netherlands Government, communications with the Republican Government and Republican-controlled territory had been already cut off. It was thus physically impossible to convey the contents of the letter to the Republican Government. The Secretary-General, himself, was arrested shortly after 01-00 hours on 19 December.

(c) Even if delivery of the letter in question at 23-30 hours and 23-45 hours on 18 December, respectively had been sufficient to constitute notice, military action was instituted before the expiration of a reasonable time thereafter. As Article 10 does not expressly specify any period of time that must elapse after giving of the required notice before the notifying party can take action to the prejudice of the notified party, it requires by necessary implication a reasonable time. Military action was begun less than a half hour after the delivery of the second of the two notes above.

It is therefore the finding of the Committee of Good Offices that the facts establish that:

(a) No effective notice of termination of the Truce Agreement of 17 January 1945 was given by the Netherlands Government.

(b) The Netherlands forces crossed the Status Quo Line and initiated hostile military action against the Republic while the obligations of the Truce Agreement were still fully operative.

It should be noted that even if the Republic were not in full accordance with the provisions of Article 10, initiation of hostilities would nonetheless require the approval of the Security Council.

13. The letter dated 17 December 1945 from the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands Government to the Secretary-General of the Security Council shows that each of the committees of the Netherlands Delegation, including the element of urgency. The postponement was agreed to by the parties and the Security Council.

The evening of 10 o’clock the reply from the Republican Government was not made in Batavia where the plenipotentiary of the Republic dated 17 December 1945, 12-00 hours after 01-00 hours 17 December, to the Netherlands Government. The reply was telegraphed at 01-00 hours 17 December, to the Netherlands Government. The reply was telegraphed at 01-00 hours 17 December, to the Netherlands Government. The reply was telegraphed at 01-00 hours 17 December, to the Netherlands Government.

In his reply the United States representative could not “consistently with my obligations of Good Offices press Dr. Hai, to make it possible for the reply to be received in Batavia where the plenipotentiary of the Republic has been called for complete acceptance by the signing of a binding declaration of the entire Truce Agreement.” The promulgation of the basic conditions were accepted by the Republican Government would “consult with the Republican Government concerning latter changes in the decree.”

The reply of the United States representative could not “consistently with my obligations of Good Offices press Dr. Hai, to make it possible for the reply to be received in Batavia where the plenipotentiary of the Republic has been called for complete acceptance by the signing of a binding declaration of the entire Truce Agreement.” The promulgation of the basic conditions were accepted by the Republican Government would “consult with the Republican Government concerning latter changes in the decree.”

The Committee finds that, in light of the various communications of 17 and 18 December, constitutes an ultimatum for the surrender to the Netherlands forces of all Republican forces and an announcement of the intention to proceed with such a surrender, the Republican forces will not surrender and will continue to fight. The Committee further finds that the Republican forces will not surrender and will continue to fight.

14. The Committee draws attention to the Report of the Special Committee to the Security Council. These reports which have been adopted in the Committee on March 28, 1946, seven months and detail the efforts made to induce the parties to resume negotiations and the failure to do so.

The Committee further finds that the Republican forces will not surrender and will continue to fight.
It should be noted that even if the Truce Agreement had been terminated in full accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Truce and initiation of hostilities would nonetheless have been contrary to the cease fire resolution of the Security Council of 1 August 1947.

13. The letter dated 17 December from the United States representative to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation (Supplementary Report) shows that each of the communications received by the Committee or its members from the Netherlands Delegation on 17 December emphasized the element of urgency. The particular requests made in the communications received from time to time during the day differed, and, in some cases, conflicted with one another. All however indicated that time was of the essence. Finally, the telegram dated 17 December which transmitted the reply of the Netherlands Government to the letter of the Vice-President of the Republic dated 13 December emphasized "it is absolutely essential that the reply from the Republican Government . . . be received in Batavia before Saturday 18 December 1948, 10-00 hours, Batavia time, for relay to the Netherlands Government". The final telegram received late Friday evening re-emphasized the 10 o'clock deadline and stated that, in order to make it possible for the reply to be received in time, arrangements had been made in Batavia to have the plane assigned to the Committee of Good Offices to leave there for Jogjakarta at 05-00 hours, Batavia time, so that the telegram of 17 December, to which this immediate reply was required, called for complete acceptance by the Republic in the form of a binding declaration of the entire Netherlands position on the basic issues between the parties including those concerning the implementation of the Truce. It indicated likewise that whether or not these conditions were accepted the Decree setting up the Interim Federal Government would be promulgated on the basis of the previously prepared text. However, if all basic conditions were accepted by the Republic, the Netherlands Government would "consult with the Republic and other federal territories concerning later changes in the decree on less essential points".

In his reply the United States representative also emphasized that he could not "consistently with my obligations as a member of the Committee of Good Offices press Dr. Haita to reply summarily on the conditions imposed by your telegram because it calls for a non-negotiated blanket assent which would preclude the possibility of bona fide negotiations, rather than effect their resumption".

The reply of the United States representative further emphasized the factors which made it virtually physically impossible for the Vice-President of the Republic to prepare any reply of the character required at Kalijarang, not the seat of most Republican officials who would have to be consulted, on less than eighteen hours notice, including transmission time.

The Committee finds that, in light of the pattern of events established by the various communications of 17 December, the Netherlands reply to the Vice-President of the Republic, dated 16 December but received on 17 December, constitutes an ultimatum providing a choice only between surrender to the Netherlands position on every basic issue between the parties and an unnamed alternative. On 17 December the Committee, still unwilling to believe that one party would abandon entirely the processes of peaceful negotiations and agreement, was reluctant to believe that the unnamed alternative was submission to armed invasion. Events of 18-19 December have proven otherwise.

14. The Committee draws attention to Chapter I of the Fourth Interim Report and to the Special Reports that have been subsequently submitted to the Security Council. These reports make clear that there have been no political negotiations in the Committee of Good Offices for a period of seven months and detail the efforts made by the members of the Committee to induce the parties to resume negotiations. These efforts continued up to the day before the outbreak of hostilities.
The Committee welcomed efforts of the parties to reach agreement by direct conversations between themselves and hastened to facilitate the bringing together of the parties for that purpose. It was prepared to officiate finally, if called upon to do so, in the formalizing of an agreement, by whatever legitimate procedure it might have been obtained. However, the Committee cannot accept the view that where direct talks have failed, either party may thereafter refuse to negotiate further and thus prevent the issues separating the parties from being considered in their context in full negotiations before the Committee of Good Offices. On the contrary, the Committee finds in a failure of direct conversations merely an additional necessity for recourse to the techniques of the Committee for whatever assistance it can provide.

The recent Netherlands notes have laid great emphasis on violations of the Truce by the Government of the Republic. It is unquestionably the case that there have been large scale infiltrations and an undue number of incidents and disorders. Many of these have occurred in Netherland-controlled territory. Which of these can properly be called Truce violations will not be considered here. Nor will the Committee seek again to emphasize the fundamental principle set forth in the Introduction to the Fourth Interim which states that "the rising number of infringements of the Truce Agreement during this period is testimony to the relationship between the maintenance of the Truce and progress in political negotiations". It is unquestionably true that better implementation of the Truce was required. It was for that very reason that the Committee called on the parties to discuss the problems of implementation of the Truce in the Security Committee, which had been established for the purpose of supervising the enforcement of the mutual obligations of the parties under the Truce Agreement.

With truce violations, as with political negotiations, the Committee finds that its facilities for adjustment and reconciliation have not been exhausted, much less effectively utilized. It finds no legitimate basis on which a party could here forsake the forum of negotiations for that of armed force.

15. The Committee will exert its utmost efforts to carry out the functions conferred upon it in the Resolution of the Security Council of 24 December, namely, to observe and to report on observance by the parties of the cease-hostilities order. But, if fighting is to give way to negotiations, the Committee as a whole recognizes that certain inevitable difficulties must be overcome. The members of the Committee differ only in the relative weight they give to those difficulties, which are set forth in the following:

(a) Negotiations presuppose two parties, each unencumbered by the armed forces of the other and each prepared to move toward the reasonable viewpoint of the other.

(b) Politically, the people of one party, without whose support any agreement, even if achieved, may well be unenforceable, will be reluctant to accept as bona fide any negotiations in which again they start with an area under their control diminished as a result of the resort to armed force by the other.

(c) Practically, when a demarcation line no longer exists, it becomes virtually impossible to ascertain the position of the Republican forces, particularly in view of the capture by the Netherlands forces of the Republican High Command. As a result it may become necessary to observe any events of a military nature throughout the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura. This would be difficult enough in itself but the Committee sees no possibility of its observers being able to distinguish reliably local internal security measures by the Netherlands and hostilities between the parties.

Report dated December

1. Pursuant to the Resolution of the 392nd meeting on 24 December, the Committee sought to determine the extent of compliance by the parties with the Resolution and to clarify its provisions on the basis of events transpiring in Indonesia since 28 December.

2. At a meeting held on 26 December, the Committee decided to send to the parties a letter of the Security Council dated 24 December after:

"No. GO/1159."

Sir,

I have the honour to draw your attention to Resolution 1945 which confirmed the transmittal to the Committee of Good Offices of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 December.

We requested your Government "to proceed further and to inform the Committee of its views on the Resolution". We requested also that copies of the relevant orders issued to that effect be transmitted to us.

In your answer dated 25 December your letter had been received by the Committee, was informed as such whether Government had been received. It was made the subject of the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council with that paragraph of the Resolution which hostsilities forthwith and to the parties, political prisoners arrested since 28 December.

In your answer dated 28 December your letter had been received by the Committee, which were informed of the order of the Security Council dated 24 December:

(1) To your Government issues.

(2) If so, at what time or time.

(3) Are there any orders to cease-fire, as such with that paragraph of the Resolution which hostsilities forthwith and to the parties, political prisoners arrested since 28 December?

(4) Are there any orders to cease-fire, as such with that paragraph of the Resolution which hostsilities forthwith and to the parties, political prisoners arrested since 28 December?

(5) If so, which members of the military forces are covered by the orders carried out?

(6) If members of the groups, which are considered as the President, the Vice-President, the President, the Vice-President of the Republican delegations.

(7) To what extent do those members of the Republican delegations.

The Committee, since its return contact only with the Republican authorities, the Republican Delegation, tells resident it would appreciate knowing whether you..."
of the parties to reach agreement by 

1. Pursuant to the Resolution of the Security Council adopted at its 392nd meeting on 24 December, the Committee of Good Offices reports on the extent of compliance by the parties with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Resolution and supplements briefly its Report to the Security Council dated 26 December on events transpiring in Indonesia.

2. At a meeting held on 28 December, the Committee of Good Offices decided to send the parties enquiries on compliance with the Resolution of the Security Council dated 24 December. The texts are reproduced hereafter.

(a) Text of letter to the Netherlands delegation:

"No. GO/1159.

Hotel des Indes,

Batavia,

28 December 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to draw your attention to our letter of 25 December 1948 which confirmed the transmittal to you at 0956 on 25 December of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 December 1948.

We requested your Government "to keep the Committee immediately, fully and currently informed of the steps taken . . . in compliance with the Resolution". We requested also that the Committee be furnished with copies of the relevant orders issued to the appropriate authorities.

In your answer dated 25 December 1948, you replied that the contents of our letter had been cable to your Government at The Hague and that the Committee would be informed as soon as instructions from Her Majesty's Government had been received. It now becomes necessary for the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council on the compliance with that part of the Resolution which calls upon the parties (a) to cease hostilities forthwith and (b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 15 December. As the Committee has not yet received any information, we should appreciate your immediate answer to the following questions with reference to the situation as of 1700 to-day, 28 December:

(1) Has your Government issued any orders to cease hostilities?
(2) If so, at what time or times were such orders issued?
(3) Are there any orders to cease hostilities, now prepared or in preparation, scheduled for issuance during the next 24 hours?
(4) Have any orders been issued by your Government to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 15 December?
(5) If so, which members of the Cabinet and of the Republican delegation are covered by such orders, and to what extent have the orders been carried into effect?
(6) If members of the groups covered in question (4) have not been released, what is the place or places of detention of the President, the Vice-President, members of the Cabinet and of the Republican delegation?
(7) To what extent do those who have been released have freedom of movement or activity?

The Committee, since its return to Batavia, has been able to have contact only with two Republican advisers and the Secretary-General of the Republican Delegation, all resident in Batavia. Therefore, the Committee would appreciate knowing whether your Government has any objection to
personal contacts between the Committee's representatives and Republican officials, under detention or otherwise. These contacts would of course be limited to the performance of functions entrusted to the Committee by the Security Council.

As the report of the Committee of Good Offices must be transmitted to the Security Council at or about midnight tomorrow, it is requested that you furnish us with this data this evening before that hour. It is regretted that this request must be made with such urgency, but the nature of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council more than three days ago, permits of no delay.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sd.) H. MERLE COCHRAN,
Chairman

Mr. T. Elink Schuurman,
Acting Chairman,
Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Batavia."

(b) Text of letter to the Republican delegation:

Hotel des Indes,
Batavia, N.E.I.
23 December 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to draw your attention to our letter of 23 December 1948 which confirmed the transmission to you at 0937 on 25 December of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 December 1948.

We requested your Government "to keep the Committee immediately, fully and currently informed of the steps taken . . . in compliance with the Resolution". We requested also that the Committee be furnished with copies of the relevant orders issued to the appropriate authorities.

In your answer dated 25 December 1948, you replied that the President of the Republic and his Government, as well as the Chairman and other members of the Republican Delegation were detained by the Netherlands authorities and that consequently you were unable at that stage to take any action. It now becomes necessary for the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council on the compliance with that part of the Resolution which calls upon the parties (a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December.

We have addressed the following questions to the Netherlands Delegation with reference to the situation as of 1700 today, 28 December.

"(1) Has your Government issued any orders to cease hostilities?
(2) If so, at what time or times were such orders issued?
(3) Are there any orders to cease hostilities, now prepared or in preparation, scheduled for issuance during the next 24 hours?
(4) Have any orders been issued by your Government to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December?
(5) If so, which members of the Cabinet end of the Republican delegation are covered by such orders, and to what extent have the orders been carried into effect?"

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(6) If members of the groups or released, what is the plan for the President, the Vice-President and other Republican delega
tion

(7) To what extent do those in movement or activity?

The Committee, since its return contact only with two Republican advis

Republican Delegation, all resident in Batavia, would appreciate knowing whether actual personal contacts between the Committee officials, under detention or otherwise limited to the performance of functions of the Security Council.

Has the situation reported in your extent that you are now in a position to these questions?

As the report of the Committee to the Security Council at or about mid

furnish you with any data that you may have. It is regretted that this request must be met with this data tonight. I more than three days ago, permits of no delay.

Mr. R. Suárez,
Secretary-General,
Delegation of the Republic of Indor
Batavia."

3. The following replies were received of the same day:

(a) Text of the Republican Delegation:

Sir,

With reference to your letter dated 28th December 1948, Resolution of the Security Council outlined in my letter of 25th December, I contact either the RepublicanGov

As stated in my letter members of the Republican Delegation have been interned, but ever about them.
mittee's representatives and Republican
ise. These contacts would of course be
ions entrusted to the Committee by the
of Good Offices must be transmitted to
ning before that hour. It is regretted
such urgency, but the nature of the
Council, more than three days ago,
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Sd.) H. MERLE COCHRAN,
Chairman

Netherlands,

Republican delegation:
Hotel des Indes,
Batavia, N.E.I.
28 December 1948.

Attention to our letter of 28 December
to you at 0957 on 25 December of the
council on 24 December 1948.

to keep the Committee immediately,
steps taken . . . in compliance with
that the Committee be furnished with
the appropriate authorities.

1948, you replied that the President
as well as the Chairman and other
were detained by the Netherlands
were unable at that stage to take
for the Committee of Good Offices
compliance with that part of the
(a) to cease hostilities forthwith,
President and other political prisoners
questions to the Netherlands Delega
tion of 1700 today, 28 December.

any orders to cease hostilities?
were such orders issued?

as hostilities, now prepared or in
issuance during the next 24 hours?
by your Government to release the
prisoners arrested since 18
1948, and of the Republican drie
orders, and to what extent have

(6) If members of the groups covered in question (4) have not been
released, what is the place or places of detention of the
President, the Vice-President, members of the Cabinet and
of the Republican delegation?

(7) To what extent do those who have been released have freedom
of movement or activity ?

The Committee, since its return to Batavia, has been able to have
contact only with two Republican advisors and the Secretary-General of
the Republican Delegation, all resident in Batavia. Therefore, the Committee
would appreciate knowing whether your Government has any objection to
personal contacts between the Committee's representatives and Republican
officials, under detention or otherwise. These contacts would of course be
limited to the performance of functions entrusted to the Committee by the
Security Council.

Has the situation reported in your letter of 25 December changed to the
extent that you are now in a position to furnish any information in answer
to these questions?

As the report of the Committee of Good Offices must be transmitted to
the Security Council at or about midnight today, it is requested that you
furnish us with any data that you may have this evening before that hour.
It is regretted that this request must be made with such urgency, but the
nature of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council, more than three
days ago, permits of no delay.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Sd.) H. MERLE COCHRAN,
Chairman.

Mr. R. Sudjono,
Secretary-General,
Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia,
Batavia."

3. The following replies were received respectively at 26:30 and 22:30
of the same day:

(a) Text of the Republican Delegation's reply :

"Djakarta, 28th December 1948.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of to-day on the subject of the recent
Resolution of the Security Council, I regret that the position is still as
outlined in my letter of 25th December, 1948, and that I am unable to
contact either the Republican Government or the Republican Delegation.

As stated in my letter members of the Dutch Government and of the
Delegation have been interned, but I have been given no information what-
ever about them.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Sd.) R. SUDJONO,
Secretary-General,
Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia."
(b) Text of the Netherlands Delegation’s reply:

"No. 4100.

Batavia, December 28, 1948.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of December 28, 1948, No. GQ/1159, received at 18-04 hours to-day, I have the honour to inform you that the contents of that letter have immediately been cabled to The Hague.

Since there is no time to consult the Netherlands Government and to receive a reply before midnight to-day, I regret not to be able to give a final answer to the questions contained in your letter.

However, I am in a position to inform you as regards questions 4, 5 and 7, that so far the house arrest imposed upon 13 Republicans has been lifted as from noon December 24, 1948. These persons enjoy the same freedom of movement as any other inhabitant.

With regard to question 6, according to an official communiqué issued yesterday, the Indonesian Government, in view of its duty to restore as soon as possible law and order in Indonesia, has decided provisionally to assign residence to a number of Republican officials in mountain resorts outside Java.

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of your letter, the Netherlands Government is being consulted.

Finally, I must draw your attention to the fact that your official communication regarding the resolution adopted by the Security Council on December 24, 1948 was only transmitted to me in writing on December 26, 1948, at approximately 13-00 hours. You will no doubt agree that I cannot consider the communication transmitted to me by telephone on December 25, 1948 at 09-50 hours as bearing official character.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sd.) T. ELINK SCHRURMAN,

Acting Chairman.

To the Chairman,

Security Council’s

Committee of Good Offices

on the Indonesian Question,

BATAVIA."

4. No official communication had been received from either the Netherlands or the Republican delegations between the preparation of the report dated 26, December 1948 and the exchange of letters reproduced above.

5. Official Republican sources stated that thirteen Republican leaders and personalities in Batavia were released from house arrest at 1200 Batavia time, December 24. December, before the adoption of the Security Council’s Resolution of that date in Paris. Among those released were the Secretary-General of the Republican delegation and a personal adviser to the Republican President. According to the Secretary-General, a number of other Republicans accused of subversive activities are held incommunicado in Batavia.

6. The Committee remains, as at the time of its last Report dated 26 December, in contact with the Government of only one of the parties, the Netherlands.

7. Notwithstanding the request made to the Netherlands Government in its letter of 25 December (Report of 26 December), the Committee’s military observers have been concentrated in Batavia. With no authorization from the Netherlands authorities for the observers to return to the field, and with no permission given to the Committee has no facilities to obtain own representatives as to the military situation.


Arrangements have been made with the Committee will visit the Vice-President the delegation and the Minister of Defense.

The Committee will report fully on the report on any visits it may make to the Republic been informed by the Netherlands Delegation to the authorities competent.

Committee will be informed of their findings.

First Report of M.

The Committee of Good Offices received the first report from a team Soerabaya. In a report released on Netherlands (Belgium), Chairman), (United States), the Committee observes the field, the Committee believes the following points from that report military situation is possible.

(A) Destruction of roads, bridges taking place on a much greater scale lands military authorities. Hundred including many important ones, all relate to the destruction of bridges and rail roads in Central Java are still not only possible in convoy.

(B) The towns of Lamongan and damaged by fire and demolition and the local population or troops.

(C) In the former Netherlands we nearly all bridges have been destroyed mainly by fire and most are destroyed.

(D) The number of Netherlands insufficient to prevent roving bands from performing acts of sabotage and bridges Netherlands troops are also in order in towns and many Chinese m.

looting.
Batavia, December 28, 1948.

I have the honour to inform you that the Netherlands Government and to my regret not to be able to give a 4 in your letter.

The Committee will visit the Vice-President and the Chairman of the Republican delegation and the Minister of Education on Banka in Batavia, on January 15, 1949. The arrangements have been made with Netherland officials whereby the Committee will visit the Vice-President and the Chairman of the Republican delegation and the Minister of Education on Banka on January 15, 1949. The Committee will report fully on the following day to the Security Council on these arrangements and on the results of the trip.

The Committee has forwarded to the Netherlands Delegation a letter from the Secretary General of the Republican Delegation requesting that one or more of the three members of the delegation in Batavia with whom the Committee has contact may be permitted to accompany the Committee on any visits it may make to the Republican leaders. The Committee has been informed by the Netherlands Delegation that the request has been forwarded to the authorities competent to deal with matter and that the Committee will be informed of their decisions later.

First Report of Military Observers.

The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian question have received the first report from a team of military observers in the area of Soerabaya. In a report released on January 15 over the signatures of Heremans (Belgium), (Chairman), Critchley (Australia) and Iise (United States), the committee observe: "As this is the first report from the field, the Committee believes the Security Council will be interested in the following points from that report even before an analysis of the entire military situation is possible.

(A) Destruction of roads, bridges and property has been and still is taking place on a much greater scale than was anticipated by the Netherlands military authorities. Hundreds of bridges have been destroyed, including many important ones, all railroads are completely blocked owing to the destruction of bridges and railroad property, many of the main roads in Central Java are still not open and on those which are, travel is only possible in convoy.

(B) The towns of Lamongan and Bodjonegoro are reported to be badly damaged by fire and demolition and are practically uninhabited either by the local population or troops.

(C) In the former Netherlands demilitarised zone it was observed that nearly all bridges have been destroyed and a number of Kampung destroyed mainly by fire and most are deserted.

(D) The number of Netherlands troops in the newly occupied area is insufficient to prevent roving bands of guerrillas from moving freely and from performing acts of sabotage such as destruction of newly repaired bridges. Netherland troops are also insufficient to maintain law and order in towns and many Chinese merchants have suffered severely from looting.