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1949.

Government of India
Ministry of External Affairs

1 ANZ Branch.

Pres.
Serial.
Nos. (1) (4)

Subject.

Note on Political Situation in Indonesia prepared by Mr. P.R.S. Kamu.

Previous References:

Later References:

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Mr. P.R.S. Mani, until lately Press Attache in Batavia has been detailed temporarily to work with us.  
2. Mr. Mani should bring the documents prepared on the occasion of the Indonesian Conference last January up to date. We have to be in readiness with documentation for the next session of the General Assembly when this matter is almost certain to be discussed and also for a possible reconvening of the Conference on Indonesia in the future.

(C.S. Jha)  
Joint Secretary (S)  
7.6.49.

A review on the political situation in Indonesia from January 20th, 1949 up to is put up. Two lists of important documents are also placed below.

J.S.(S).

P.R.S. Mani  
18/6/49

Then shortened the not mentioned  
more discussion with Mr. Mani.

Add:  
21/7/49

A copy for reference.
The note on the political situation in Indonesia has been cyclostyled and a copy is put up at slip 'K'.

Ministry of External Affairs.

Please see list of documents at slip 'I' to be added to Vols. I & II of 'Conference on Indonesia'. The documents at Nos. 10, 13, 17, 20 and 31 of the list are not available with us and these may be asked for from the T.C.G., Batavia. Draft X.L. submitted.

For present information, the Consul General has not furnished all the documents asked for in S.No.(1) to complete our set of documents listed at slip 'I' below. We may remind him as in the draft put up for approval.

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D.5497-IANZ/49. (4)

For present information, may await receipt of further documents from Batavia - cf. 'A' of the FR.

12/10/49
List of documents on Indonesia.
(in continuation of Vols. I & II of "Conference on Indonesia")

1. Netherlands Prime Minister's statement at Batavia dated 20.1.49.
4. Summary Record of the four private sessions of the Conference on Indonesia held on 20th, 21st and 22nd January 1949.
5. Proceedings of the final Plenary session of the Conference on Indonesia held on 23.1.49.
6. The three Resolutions adopted by the Conference on Indonesia.
7. Letter from the Chairman of the Conference on Indonesia to the President of the Security Council dated 23.1.49.
10. Netherlands Prime Minister's statement at Amsterdam on 22.1.49.
13. Official statement at the Hague on 1.2.49 - No change in fundamental policy.
14. Letter from Dr. Beel, the Netherlands High Representative in Indonesia to the B.F.O. dated 31.1.49.
15. Telegram from the Chairman of the B.F.O. to Dr. Hatta dated 3.2.49 and Dr. Hatta's reply to B.F.O. dated 3.2.49.
16. UNCI letter to the Netherlands Delegation dated 2.2.49.
17. Dr. Stikker's statement dated 4.2.49.
18. Netherlands Memorandum given to UNCI on 27.2.49 - explaining the policy of the Netherlands Government.
20. Republican Delegation's Letter dated 29.3.49 to the Security Council regarding the directive of 23.3.49.
22. Letters dated 26th February 1949 from the High Representative of the Crown addressed to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Chairman of the Assembly, for Federal Consultation and the Chairman of the UNCI concerning a Round Table Conference on the Indonesian question.
23. Letter dated 1.3.49 from the Chairman of the B.F.O. to the High Representative of the Crown in reply to his invitation of 26.2.49 to participate in the R.T.C.
24. Dr. Soekarno's letter to Dr. Beel dated 4.3.49 in reply to his invitation of 26.2.49 to participate in the R.T.C.
25. UNCI's invitations for talks at Batavia and its acceptance by the delegations of the Netherlands and the Republic.
26.....
26. Letter dated 29th March 1949 from Dr. Maramis, the Republican Foreign Minister (Request for financial aid from the Republic of Indonesia).

27. Letter dated 11th April 1949 from Mr. G. Tambu, Acting Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.


30. Republican Delegation's un-delivered letter dated 26.4.49 to UNCI.

31. Dr. Drees Broadcast of 30th April 1949.

32. Dr. Beel's broadcast of 30th April 1949.

33. "van-Royen - Rum statements", dated 7.5.49

34. UNCI military report dated 19.5.49.

35. Statement dated 12.5.49 by the Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories.
List of U.N.C.I. Reports

1. Report dated 24.1.49 by the C.G.O.
2. Report dated 25.1.49 by the C.G.O.
4. -do- dated 15.2.49
5. -do- dated 1.3.49.
7. UNCI Supplementary Report dated 7.3.49 to the Report of 1.3.49.
8. UNCI Second supplementary Report dated 10.3.49 to the Commission's report of 1.3.49.
9. UNCI third supplementary Report dated 11.3.49 to the Commission's report of 1.3.49.
10. UNCI report on an informal visit to Jogjakarta on 21.3.49 by the Commission's Deputy Representatives.
11. Telegram dated 23.3.49 from the President of the Security Council to the Chairman of the Commission requesting a report from the Commission on alleged damages in the city of Jogjakarta.
12. Telegram dated 23.3.49 from the President of the Security Council to the Chairman of the Commission giving the sense of the Security Council on questions raised in the Commission's report of 1.3.49.
13. UNCI report dated 26.3.49 on the alleged damage in the city of Jogjakarta.
14. UNCI - Report dated 30.3.49 on visit of MILEX BOARD to East Java.
15. UNCI - Four- th compilation of Military Observers team reports dated 31.3.49.
16. UNCI Report dated 22.4.49.
17. UNCI Report dated 9.5.49.
A Review of Events

(In continuation of the Memorandum in Volume I of "Conference on Indonesia" and up to the "van Aoyen-
amum statements" of May 7th 1949)

Besides having serious repercussions in Indonesia itself, the second Dutch aggression on the Indonesian Republic aroused great resentment all over the world. In Asia particularly, the resentment was so great that it compelled the Asian countries recently emerged from colonial domination to take steps and devise ways of exercising their active sympathy towards the Indonesian Republic.

2. The Conference on Indonesia held in New Delhi on 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd January 1949, was a direct consequence of the new situation created in Indonesia as a result of the Dutch military action. Shortly after this military action was institute the Prime Minister of Burma, Thakin Nu, proposed that the Prime Minister of India should call a conference of Asian Nations to discuss the matter so that a united effort could be made to assist the Indonesian Republic. The Security Council was considering the Indonesian question concurrently but soon it became apparent that the Netherlands Government was not prepared to carry out even the mild recommendations of the Security Council. Accordingly, 20 countries which were regarded as being specially interested in the Indonesian question were invited to a Conference at ministerial level in New Delhi. The Governments of Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen nominated delegates while China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam were represented by observers. The Prime Minister of India presided over the Conference. The only country which declined the invitation was Turkey.

3. A unique feature of the Conference was that the participating/-
participating countries unanimously condemned the Dutch action. The Conference itself aroused great enthusiasm in all parts of Asia and much interest throughout the world. In Indonesia, it appears to have greatly raised the morale of the nationalist guerrillas opposing the Dutch armed forces as well as the hopes of the Indonesian leaders.

4. Three resolutions were passed by the Conference and forwarded to the President of the Security Council. The first one recommended to the Security Council the immediate release of the members of the Republican Government, other Republican leaders and all political prisoners; the restoration of the Republican Government within the Residency of Jogjakarta with all facilities for communication and freedom of consultation; the return to the Republican Government not later than 15th March 1949, of such areas as was held by it on December 18, 1948; the immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops from the Residency of Jogjakarta and their progressive withdrawal from former Republican areas; the immediate removal of restrictions imposed by the Netherlands Government on the trade of the Republic and pending the formation of an interim government, the Republic to be afforded all facilities for communication with the world. The resolution also recommended the formation of an interim government by 15th March 1949 with Republican representatives on it and with full powers of government including control over the armed forces, than the completion of elections for a Constituent Assembly by October 1, 1949, and the complete transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950. The resolution further recommended that the Security Council should take effective action under the wide powers conferred upon it by the Charter if either party to the dispute failed to comply with the recommendations of the Security Council and that the Security Council be pleased to report to the U.N. General Assembly meeting in April 1949 of the measures taken or recommended.
recommended by the Council in the solution of the Indonesian problem.

5. A second resolution recommended to the participating Governments that they keep in close touch on the Indonesian question both through normal diplomatic channels and though their representatives at the Headquarters of the United Nations.

6. There was considerable discussion on the proposal for establishing a permanent consultative machinery. Since the proposal did not command general agreement, it was dropped. In a third resolution, it was recommended to the participating Governments that they consult among themselves to find ways and means of achieving cooperation in matters of common interest.

7. Five days after the final plenary session of the New Delhi Conference (January 23), the Security Council which had been discussing Indonesia for some days on January 28 passed a resolution which called upon both the Netherlands Government and the Republican authorities to effect an immediate cease-fire. The Netherlands Government was asked to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested since 17th December, 1948, (the second Dutch police action was on 19th December, 1948) in the Republic and facilitate the immediate return of the Republican Government with its officials to Jogjakarta. The Council recommended that negotiations be undertaken at the earliest by both parties with the assistance of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia towards establishing a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date. The Security Council further stipulated that the Interim Federal Government be established not later than 15th March, 1949 that elections for a Constituent Assembly be completed by 1st October, 1949, and the transfer of sovereignty to the United/Nation.
United States of Indonesia take place at the earliest date and in any case not later than 1st July, 1950. The United Nations Committee of Good Offices was redesignated as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia and fresh directives were issued to it.

8. The Security Council's resolution fell short of the New Delhi recommendations mainly in that the resolution did not make any provision for the withdrawal of Dutch forces and extended the date for the transfer of sovereignty by another 6 months. Although international reaction to the resolution was not unfavourable, the Emergency Republican Administration rejected it.

9. Meanwhile, the military and political situation in Indonesia deteriorated considerably. Both guerilla activity and lawlessness increased in the territory that the Dutch had occupied by the recent military action. Subversive activities against Dutch military and civil rule increased even in areas known as 'Federal' territory (which did not form part of Republican territory on December 19, 1948). There was sabotage to the permanent way; travel along the high-roads became dangerous; and all Dutch-owned estates were subjected to lightning attacks. The armed challenge to Dutch authority began to grow.

10. The Dutch High Representative of the Crown at Batavia set in motion his own plans which appeared to by-pass the resolution of the Security Council. The B.F.O. (Federal Consultative Committee) which is a body composed of Dutch sponsored non republican political organization decided to contact the Republican leaders at Bengka for the purpose of forming a Federal Interim Government. In a letter on February 1 to the Chairman of the B.F.O., the High Representative of the Crown, while stating that he would allow President Soekarno, Dr. Hatta and their colleagues freedom of/......
of consultation, defined them as "authorities of the Republic the status and form of which will be determined by the will of the people as per free and equal Member States within the framework of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia". When this was transmitted to her, the Republican Premier, Dr. Hatta explained to the Chairman of the B.F.O. that (a) The Dutch did not recognise President Soekarno and other leaders as members of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (b) In refusing to restore the authority of the Government of the Republic and in failing to comply with the direction to set free immediately and unconditionally the Republican leaders and political prisoners, the Netherlands Government was ignoring the Security Council's resolution.

11. A B.F.O. delegation which went to Bengka on February 7 explained the viewpoint of the High Representative of the Crown. But the Republican leaders reaffirmed their stand as previously stated by Dr. Hatta.

12. Meanwhile, the Dutch informally announced their new plan (the Buell Plan referred to later) to the Chairman of the B.F.O. When the U.N.C.I. made enquiries on this reported plan the Netherlands Government replied that "such proposals if any, will be announced at the appropriate time through official channels". The plan itself envisaged accelerated transfer of sovereignty by April or May 1949. The Federal Army, the composition of the Government and the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union were points left undecided. Although the republicans considered this plan as yet another attempt to by-pass the Security Council, both Soekarno and Hatta, agreed to meet the F.O. on the level of discussions between fellow Indonesians.
13. The U.N.C.I. which was to have reported to the Security Council on 15th February now postponed the same to Ist March in the hope that the Netherlands Government might meanwhile comply with the recommendations of the Security Council. However, on March 1, the U.N.C.I. reported that "despite the additional time thus provided for the Government of the Netherlands to adjust itself politically and otherwise to the requirements of the Resolution, not only have the parties reached no agreement on a interim federal government but there have been no negotiations at all under the Resolution". The Commission further reported that "the Netherlands Government has not complied with the basic pre-requisites of further action under the Resolution."

14. However, on February 27th the Netherlands Government presented a Memorandum to the U.N.C.I. containing the Dutch plan for accelerated transfer of sovereignty. Known as the HEEL Plan which envisaged an accelerated transfer of sovereignty subsequent to a Round Table Conference on March the 12th to which were invited the B.F.O., Republican representatives, minority representatives and others. The U.N.C.I. was also invited so that it "could render assistance to achieve positive results". The Memorandum re-emphasised the Netherlands' fundamental objection to certain parts of the Security Council's resolution of January 28th and added that the Netherlands would carry out the Resolution to the extent to which it was compatible with their responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Indonesia. The Memorandum also laid stress that efforts should be directed to achieve the unconditional transfer of sovereignty by May Ist 1949. The term "unconditional" was later qualified in the same Memorandum to the effect that by May the 1st, agreements should have been
been reached in regard to the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, and in regard to financial, economic and military matters. The restrictions on the liberty of movement of the Republican leaders were to be lifted but no mention was made in the Memorandum of the return of the Republican Government to Yogjakarta.

15. On February 28th, the Republican delegation in a letter to the U.N.C.I. referred to the Netherlands Government's invitation and pointing out that it implied circumvention of the Security Council, declared that the Republican Government would "never cooperate in any action evading implementation of the Security Council's resolution."

16. The position during this period was aptly described by the U.N.C.I. in a report dated March the 1st when they said: "it will be apparent that a basic factor in the present political deadlock in Indonesia, is the refusal of the Netherlands Government to permit the re-establishment of the Republican Government at Yogjakarta". The U.N.C.I. also reported that in its opinion while no cessation of hostilities had been achieved, "active warfare, both guerilla and on a more organized basis, is continuing to a variable extent in different areas" and that "large areas of the country still remained in a generally chaotic condition".

17. The vacillating attitude of the Dutch continued. Although Dr. Koets, the Chief of Dr. Beel's Cabinet, explained to President Soekarno at Bengka that "the purpose of the Round Table Conference is the advanced transfer of sovereignty, real, complete and unconditional. President Soekarno in his letter of March the 4th expressed inability to assume the "heavy responsibility" which participation in the Round Table Conference was bound to involve unless the Republican Government was restored to Yogjakarta as "such responsibility" can only be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia/"....
Indonesia fully exercising its authority in its territory in Jogjakarta."

18. The Security Council was once again (March the 10th) seized of the Indonesia question. The Beul plan and the subsequent invitation to the U.N.C.I. to attend the Round Table Conference at the Hague as well as U.N.C.I. report of March the 1st were before it. During the nearly two weeks when the Indonesian question continued to be discussed much diplomatic activity was evinced in Lake Success and on March 23rd the Security Council passed a Canadian formula directing preliminary talks in Indonesia to consult on:

(a) the restoration of the Republican authority in Jogjakarta;

and (b) the organization of a Round Table Conference at the Hague aimed at creating an independent Indonesian Federation.

19. The Canadian sponsored directive of the Security Council was regarded as a set back. However, the Dutch Government at the Hague were quick to accept this decision of the Security Council of March the 23rd. It was announced that Dr. van Royen will arrive at Batavia to head the Netherlands delegation for talks with the Republicans under the auspices of the U.N.C.I. On the basis of the decision of March the 23rd of the Security Council, the U.N.C.I. issued invitations to both the Netherlands and Republican delegations for talks under its auspices which was accepted. The Republican delegation committed itself to discuss initially only the practical details of restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta.

20. In the meantime, after consulting the representatives of the Governments which took part in the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, India and Australia asked for the inclusion of the Indonesian question in the agenda of the 2nd part of the Third Session of the General Assembly in New York in April 1949/......
1949. The Assembly admitted the question on the agenda but in view of the reported agreement between the Dutch and the Republican delegation in Batavia, it was decided not to proceed with the discussion of the subject in the assembly but postpone it to the fourth session of the assembly, scheduled to meet in September 1949.

21. The Security Council's directive of January 23 was most disappointing to the countries which participated in the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia. It was felt by them that further steps, if any, should be taken and an informal meeting amongst them should take place. The Government of India took the initiative in convening such a meeting. Accordingly, the diplomatic representatives in New Delhi of their countries met on April 13, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of India.

22. After some discussion, the informal conference recommended to their respective Governments that in the event of no agreement being reached in Batavia between the Republic and the Dutch in the course of meetings held under the Security Council's directive of March 23, each member Government should instruct its delegation to the current session of the U.N. Assembly to condemn the deliberate failure of the Dutch to comply with the Security Council's resolution of January 28. The informal conference also suggested to each of the participating Governments to examine actively the question of recommending to the Security Council that economic sanctions be applied against the Dutch and that all transit facilities by land, sea, or air be denied to the Dutch in or over its territory.

23. They also discussed a letter from the Foreign Minister of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia seeking financial assistance from the countries participating in the conference on Indonesia in order to rehabilitate the

Republic/.......

Republic when it is restored to Jogjakarta. The Australian Representative also presented a memorandum on this subject from his Government. It was decided to circulate both the documents to the respective Governments for eliciting their views.

24. Soon after the arrival of Dr. van Hoven, formal meetings between the Dutch and Republican delegations commenced in Batavia from April the 14th. Informal talks also took place between van Hoven and the Republican Premier Dr. Hatta and Dr. Roem, the leader of the Republican delegation. The Republicans maintained their stand that the talks should be restricted only to working out the details regarding the return and it was reported that van Hoven was wandng of the Republic to Jogjakarta. Not much progress was made on a new formula. A deadlock had been reached and Dr. Roem was not prepared to make any binding commitments on general cease fire and attending the Round Table Conference at the Hague prior to the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta. However, he and the Republican delegation clinched the issue by threatening to resign their mandate. Meanwhile, the U.S. member on the U.N.C.I was reported to be actively engaged behind the scenes to enable the parties to reach a compromise.

25. In an effort to arrive at an understanding, Dr. Roem, the leader of the Republican Delegation wrote on April 26th to the U.N.C.I. expressing their preparedness for formal discussions on April 28th. The letter pointed out that the cessation of guerilla warfare was not conditional upon the restoration of the Republic at Jogjakarta but that such restoration was necessary to discharge responsibilities under the Security Council Resolution of January 28th. The letter indicated the Republican delegation's preparedness to discuss the details of the cease fire and the Round Table Conference, but re-emphasised that no binding commitments with regard to either could be made till the Republic was restored to Jogjakarta.
26. Showing a further spirit of compromise the Republican delegation gave the personal assurances of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta to the effect that in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of January 28th they favoured the issuance of a cease fire order to the Republican armed forces, that they would cooperate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order and that they would participate in the Round Table Conference at the Hague with a view to accelerate the transfer to real and complete sovereignty to the Indonesian people. President Soekarno and Premier Hatta also undertook to urge the Republican Government to adopt such a policy as soon as it was restored at Jogjakarta.

27. Dutch Intransigence continued even after this last concession and van Royen made it clear to Room that only Jogjakarta city and its environs would be restored in accordance with the March 23rd directive and not the whole of Jogjakarta Residency. This proved to be the only bone of contention between the parties at this stage.

28. The next day, on May 4th, the Republican delegation, unable to accept the Dutch terms, decided to return the mandate to Dr. Hatta, but the U.S. member, Merle Cochran prevailed upon them to delay it till the evening by which time van Royen indicated his willingness to return the whole of the Jogjakarta Residency to the Republican Government.

29. Thus an agreement was reached at the preliminary conference. On May 7th, both the Netherlands and the Republican delegations met under the auspices of the U.N.C.I. and the Chairman of the two delegations outlined the agreement reached in the informal Conferences held so far. Dr. Room, the Chairman of the Republican delegation stated that he was authorised by President Soekarno and Vice President/......
President Hatta to give their personal assurances that they favoured, in conformity with the Security Council Resolution of January 28th and its directive of March the 23rd:

(a) the issuance of a cease fire order to their guerilla forces;

(b) cooperation in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order;

(c) participation in a Round Table Conference at the Hague with a view to accelerate the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

They also undertook to urge the adoption of such a policy by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible after its restoration at Jogjakarta.

30. Dr. van Royen, Chairman of the Netherlands delegation, stated that in view of the undertakings announced by Dr. Room, he was authorised by his Government to agree to the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta. He also agreed to the setting up of one or more joint committees:

(1) to make the necessary investigations and preparations preliminary to such return;

(2) to study and advise on the measures to be taken in order to effect the cessation of guerilla warfare and cooperation in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order.

31. Van Royen further stated:

(1) The Netherlands Government agrees that the Republican Government shall be free and facilitated to exercise its proper functions in an area consisting of the Residency of Jogjakarta and steps be taken in the light of the Security Council directive of March the 23rd.

(2) The Netherlands reaffirms its willingness to ensure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations and to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since December the 17th 1948 in the Republic of Indonesia.

(3) Without prejudice to the right of self-determination of the Indonesian peoples as recognised by the linggadjati and Aenewille principles,
the Netherlands Government will refrain from the establishment of and recognition of Nagaras or Daerahs (State and Areas) in territory under Republican control prior to December 19th, 1945, and from the extension of Nagaras and Daerahs affecting the State territory.

(4) The Netherlands Government favours the existence of the Republic as a State to take its place in the United States of Indonesia. When a provisional representative body for the whole of Indonesia is to be established and it consequently becomes necessary to return the number of representatives from the Republic to the State body, this number will be one half of the total membership exclusive of the republican representation. That is, the Republic will have one third of the seats in this provisional republican body.

(5) The Netherlands Government is fully prepared to do its utmost so that a Round Table Conference takes place immediately after the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta and at the Round Table Conference, discussions will take place as to the way in which to accelerate the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in accordance with the Renville Principles.

(6) In the light of the necessary cooperation in the restoration of peace and maintenance of law and order the Netherlands Government agrees that in all those areas outside the Residency of Jogjakarta where the civil, police and other officials of the Government of Indonesia are not operating at present the Republican civil, police and other officials who were still operating will remain in function. The Netherlands Government also assured that reasonable facilities will be given to the Republican Government to communicate and consult all persons in Indonesia including their officials.

Both Dr. van Aoyen an. Dr. Koem then gave the assurance that each party on its part will carry out the agreement in fairness and loyalty.
Ministry of External Affairs,
IANZ Branch.


To
India, Batavia.

Government of India would be grateful for copies of the following documents:

1. Official statement at the Hague on 1.2.49 - No change in fundamental policy.
2. Statement made by Dr. William Drees, the Netherlands Prime Minister at Amsterdam dated 22.1.49.
3. Dr. Stikker's statement dated 4.2.49.
5. Dr. Drees broadcast of 30.4.49.

Issue of the above has been authorised.

A.S. (IANZ).
No. CGB-4(1162)/49

Indian Consulate General,
P.O. Box No. 178,
Batavia.


To

The Secretary to the Govt. of India,
Ministry of External Affairs,
New Delhi.

Sir,

In reference to correspondence resting with your No. D-2386-IANZ/49 dated the 5th October 1949, I have the honour to forward herewith statements that have been called for.

Yours faithfully,

(Dr. S.C. Alagappan)
Consul General for India in Indonesia.

Enclos:

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Statement of Prime Minister Dr. W. Drees.

Prime Minister Dr. W. Drees made the following statement at Kemajoran-January 20, 1949—before his departure to the Netherlands.

When I left Schiphol I have postulated that the first part of my visit, whereby I was accompanied by Mrs. Eliaan and De Pont, was, to discuss the whole situation under the new circumstances with the Government in Indonesia, as it has been a custom in the crucial moments of in the development of the Indonesian problem, that the High Commissioner of the Crown came to Holland, or Ministers went to Indonesia, in order to gain the most possible agreement about the essential line of conduct, which will be followed.

Following I have added, that the most important purposes upon which we have to keep an eye were:

1. the quick formation of an Indonesian Interim Government.
2. the acceleration of the preparations for the formation of the sovereign States of Indonesia, to which the Netherlands will transfer their sovereignty.
3. for the furtherance hereof to organize free elections.

Mr. Jhr. Dr. Michiels van Verduyten had gone earlier to Batavia, at the request of the Netherlands Government, in particular in view of the international aspects of the Indonesian issue.

The work-method to be followed was, as I have also foreseen in advance, discussions successively with the High Commissioner of the Crown, the Pre-Federal Government, and the representatives of the States of the Federal Consultations, with whom we are in cooperation. All these discussions have been passed in an uncommon good sphere. Naturally contacts have taken place with the members of the Commission of Good Offices, Consuls-General of the foreign countries, and others. It has always been the intention to discuss at the consultation, how, by whom, and based on which foundation, contact would be sought with the Republican leaders. A contact, which was naturally regarded as indispensable for an endeavor to bring the settlement of the Indonesian issue closer by.

The discussions with the representatives of the federal states were delayed due to the cabinet-formations in East-Indonesia and Pasundan, which hower ever in view of the desirable consultation, were accelerated, by which in a short space of time all meetings with regard to those matters were held.

From the rest it is to be noted, that properly we have had contact with much more persons than mentioned in the publications.

Our presence had contributed to the information given by the Netherlands Government to the Security Council regarding the points, which I had meant as the most important purposes,
quick formation of the interim-government term, within the elections will be held term, within the sovereignty will be transferred to the United States of Indonesia.

Beside it is delighting, that the Federal Consultation, wherein as it is known and as it is obvious, are to be found number of nuances, in its own meetings unanimously has taken a resolution on the interim-government, wherein it is stated, that counsel will also be taken with the representatives of the not-represented territories, whereby naturally in the first place place has been thought of the Republican leaders.

/ political.

The wish of the Federal Consultation was, entirely in line with our opinion, that the discussions first of all will be carried on mutually between the Indonesians. It is known, that on the side of the Federal Consultation there are also representatives, who sympathize with the Republic. After all apart from political judgement nobody can undervalue the significance of the Republic, independently upon the situation, which has existed after the action, for the settlement of the Indonesian problem. The Republic is regarded by many in Indonesia as well as in other parts of the world as a symbol of the struggle for freedom and the Republic has also many leaders, whose co-operation cannot be missed for the upbuilding of Indonesia. The question, whether an agreement can be reached at with the Republican leaders, on foundations of Federalism and Democracy, will now, as it is said, in the first place be investigated by the Indonesians.

Naturally we were in need to make also contact with the Republicans. After an orientation talk with Prof. Supamo, Mr. Michiels Verdunen and I had an important discussion with Mr. Sjaehir. A discussion, wherein from both sides clearly has been proved the goodwill to try as yet to reach a result, that will make possible the cooperation between all Indonesians and of the Indonesians with the Dutch. I shall be pleased to have a talk with Mr. Hatta, but there are still objections to it for the time being.

Summing up I think I can state here, that we have advanced some steps further, first of all consisting of the positive promises with regard to the Interim-Government, elections, and the date of the formation of the sovereign states of Indonesia, and besides could lead to a new consultation in above mentioned sense between all parties, involved in this matter.

It would be very beneficial for a fertile consultation, if internationally some repose would enter with regard to this problem.
Radio-speech of Prime-minister Dr. W. Drees.

The Hague, April 30 (A.M.P.).

The Prime-minister, Dr. W. Drees, said today in a radio-speech on occasion of the birthday of H.M. the Queen among other things: "Now the Queen accomplishes for already eight months the heavy, but difficult task, which made her say: "Who am I, that I am allowed to do this".

The prime-minister continued: "These were months of great difficulties and full of anxiety. But before I make a further mention of it allow me first of all on behalf of the Dutch people to express the wish, that, whatever the state-difficulties may be, let us hope that this 40th birthday in the happy circle of the Royal Family will be a day full of joy and undisturbed and let us also hope that this may also be the case with the celebration of the 12½ anniversary of wedding-feast of the Queen and the Prince in the forthcoming year."

"The realisation of the Netherlands relations to the overseas territories, for which the Netherlands principally have bound themselves in the Revision of the Constitution, has also been proved difficult. Not with respect to Suriname and the Antillean. We may assume that the development into independency, which has already made a good progress, will find its decision along normal ways within a short space of time. This will be still profitable for the territories, which are generally strongly bound to the crown; this fact was proved by their attitude towards the Crown during the war-time and during the visit of H.M. Princes Juliana."

"Holland knows, that, even if it is misunderstood in the world, which means to undertake hopeless endeavours, to restore the old colonial relations. The Netherlands will redeem the Royal pledge, that also Indonesia will be able to decide its own way, whereby the cooperation with the Netherlands will take place, based on equal footing. The Netherlands don't want to keep their sons in Indonesia to be under arms. The Netherlands also understand that many parents, wives and fiancées are hankering after the return of those who were absent since a long time and exposed to many dangers. We are aiming at, nothing else, than to obtain a transition, which leads to the realisation of the freedom for all Indonesian nations, and attended with order and legal security. Let us hope that the endeavours which are again undertaken in order to reach a settlement, finally will ended in a good result and let us also hope that in the near future it will be proved, that the cooperation in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the crown of the House of Orange will be beneficial to both nations."

I have taken this opportunity of this first celebration of the 30th of April as a Queen's birthday to remind you our task, which has been proposed by the Queen Juliana. She herself is a living model of that task and duty-fulfilment. As earlier Orange-kings, who preceded our people in the struggle against the Spanish and French domination, she with her mother, now Princess Wilhelmina, and Prince Bernhard, has been an example in the struggle for our liberation. At present she is again a model and as mother, a task, as she said, as important as for a queen and for any other woman and also as a queen. Let us hope that she will be blessed in her family and in her royal task!"
The Hague, February 5 (ANP). Replying the debates in the Second Chamber on Saturday minister dr. D.U. Stikker stated: "When the Security Council exceeds too far the limits of its competency, then it is the duty of the small countries not to bow to this policy, but resolutely to defend their sphere". He said, that nothing will be neglected to make the Netherlands standpoint towards Indonesia.

"We will reach nothing by using eye-flaps, which will prevent us to see to the left or to the right. It would be wrong to withdraw ourselves with hurted feelings from the United Nations".

In connection with the public opinion in America about Indonesia, minister Stikker said, that the Americans are inclined to set more value to the informations from American sources than those originated from the Netherlands. However this does not mean that we are to cease giving information. It was impossible to form directly an idea of the Netherlands action in Indonesia, in the United States.

He further stated, that the "the Netherlands people have not so much experience in the foreign policy. In connection herewith he reminded the Netherlands policy of neutrality, which resulted that the people did not indulge in problems regarding these matters. The interest increased by the League of Nations and the liquidation of this League was a great disappointment for the Dutch.

The minister said, that again the opinion prevails, to return to the policy of neutrality. The war proved that this was no longer possible and at present we feel our lack of political experience. Therefore it was not a wonder, that the international happenings made the Dutch people surprise, since the Dutch people regard the community of nations to much from the legal point of view and undervalue the power of the political considerations, by which the outside world itself allowed to be lead.

After the League of Nations soon it became possible, that the game of the political powers asserted themselves in the United Nations.

Hereafter a comment was given by the minister on other aspects of the foreign policy.
Ministry of External Affairs,
DEPARTMENT/ OFFICE
IANZ Branch.

1. Date of despatch

2. List of enclosures


To

The Consul-General for India in Indonesia,
Batavia.

Subject:- Documents on Indonesia.

Sir,

I am directed to refer to the correspondence resting with your letter No. CGE-4(1162)/49, dated the 3rd November, 1949, and to request that the remaining documents may also kindly be expedited - cf. this Ministry's Express letter No. D.2386-IANZ/49, dated 7th July, 1949.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

U.S. (IANZ).

S. S. (Large).
From

K. M. Kannampilly, Esq.,
Consul-in-Charge,
Indian Consulate-General,
Batavia.

To

R. N. Saelore, Esq., M.A., M.D., D.Litt.,
Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of External Affairs,
New Delhi.

Subject: Documents on Indonesia.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter No. D. 5044-IANZ/49 dated 17th November, 1949, and to state such of the documents as were forthcoming were forwarded to you under this office No. GGB-4 (1162)/49 dated November 3, 1949. It is regretted that items 1, 2 and 4 of the documents listed in

Ministry's Express Letter No. D. 2386-IANZ/49 dated 7th July, 1949 are not obtainable locally. Efforts are, however, being made to secure them, and will be duly forwarded to the Ministry, if any is received.

Yours faithfully,

K. M. Kannampilly
Consul-in-Charge.

Copy Right Vests In The National Archives Of India,
GOVT. OF INDIA
Ministry of External Affairs,
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE
IANZ Branch.

X. Letter
Draft


To

India, Batavia.

Reference this Ministry's Express letter of even number dated 7th July 1949. Documents regarding Indonesia.

2. Please expedite.

ISSUE OF THE ABOVE HAS BEEN AUTHORISED.

A.S. (IANZ).

Copy Right vests in the National Archives of India.
EXPRESSION LETTER.

FROM: INDIA BATAVIA

TO: FOREIGN NEW DELHI.

No. CGB-4(1027)/49. Dated the 12 October, 1949.


2. Head of Far Eastern Affairs again reminded for expediting despatch of the required documents.

(Dr. S.G. Alagappan)
Consul General for India in Indonesia.

Ministry of External Affairs.