# Politics and ethnicity: A study of the role of state security interests in the maintenance of Aboriginal difference in Taiwan

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A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Humanities and Social Sciences

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## **CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORSHIP/ORIGINALITY**

I certify that the work in this thesis has neither been previously submitted for a degree, nor submitted as part of requirements for a degree except as fully acknowledged within the text.

I also certify that the thesis was written by me. Any help that I received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis has been acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all sources of information and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

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#### Dedicated to:

my mother and my father

the memory of my grandmother, Constance Howland (1919-2003)

and the memory of Lai Hung-yen (1934-2004).

## **Preface**

A few years ago I attended a party thrown by Taiwan's de facto consulate in Sydney at what is now called the Sofitel Wentworth Sydney hotel. It was a celebration of the 10th of October, or "Double Ten," the national day of the Republic of China. It was noisy and well attended — mostly overseas Taiwanese and local businesspeople. Various dignitaries, including the garishly dressed head of the consulate, spoke on stage but no one seemed to listen to them, preferring to talk with their companions rather loudly; the speeches were drowned out despite a microphone being used. Formalities over, two white Australian musicians performed a rendition of *New York*, *New York*, but the lyrics had been altered throughout: "I wanna be a part of it/Taipei, Taipei" is still lodged in my mind. I turned my attention to a screen on the stage. It was showing images of Taiwan: the geography, people, architecture, schools, food, various cultural goings-on. And as the barely watched slide show progressed, it appeared that fully one quarter to one third of the slides depicted Taiwan's *Aboriginal* people and culture.

It strikes me now that this familiar state appropriation of indigenous culture contains a delicious irony in the case of Taiwan. As with indigenous peoples elsewhere, for hundreds of years Taiwan's Aborigines were subject to profound intervention that killed countless thousands, changed community power configurations and deliberately destroyed "traditional" material and spiritual culture. This process entered what could have been its final phase when the Japanese secured – somewhat precariously – the most remote and best-defended Aboriginal territories on the island in the first decades of the twentieth century. But with the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists having tried so hard, for various reasons, to assimilate indigenous culture and Aboriginal identity out of existence since that time, here in Sydney were unofficial representatives of Taiwan's government, none of whom was Aboriginal, now employing that same culture to visually define its national identity before international witnesses in a battle against political assimilation by China. Taiwan's Aboriginal culture, seemingly so weak in the face of assimilationist policy, had in a sense assimilated the state - and it didn't even have to try. The question that follows is how the presence of an ethnic minority so vulnerable can endure and, after a time, be so powerful.

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# A note on Romanisation, Chinese characters and abbreviations

Place names and the names of authors of Chinese-language works whose English names are not available are written using the bastardised Wade-Giles system of Romanisation peculiar to Taiwan. Terms and expressions are written in italics in Hanyu Pinyin. To compensate for this clash of Romanisation systems, Chinese-language references are accompanied by a corresponding English title or translation, together with the title in Hanyu Pinyin and the title and the name of the author(s) in Chinese characters.

The characters for all Chinese- and Japanese-language names, places, terms and organisations are listed in Appendix C.

Some of the more frequently used sources are abbreviated in the footnotes after the first reference. For convenience, a list of these precedes the references at the back of the thesis.

### **Abstract**

This thesis analyses the conflicting relationship between Kuomintang (KMT) security measures and assimilation policies in relation to Taiwan's Aboriginal population from 1945 to the beginning of the modern Aboriginal movement. I refer to the social anthropological model of ethnicity in examining the impact of these policies on Aboriginal leaders and expressions of Aboriginality. New evidence is presented showing that expressions of pan-Aboriginality prior to the 228 Incident existed, but that in the main, Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident reflected a growing identification with Han Taiwanese in the face of an unpopular administration. I provide the first comprehensive analysis of this involvement, together with the impact of the security census that followed it, which involved replacing the emerging dialectic of ascription between Han Taiwanese and Aborigines with a remote form of assimilationist control.

Primary sources of data included newspapers on microfiche between 1945 and 1952, which produced more than one thousand items relating to Aboriginal affairs, and which filled a sizable gap in research on this period. Extensive use was also made of archived material on the 228 Incident and the White Terror, while fieldwork and interviews were conducted in the Aboriginal townships of eight counties.

I conclude that Aboriginality was sustained and shaped by the incompatible policy requirements of a martial-law era administration. Factors causing the failure of assimilationist policies include the presence of Christian denominations in Aboriginal communities — which nourished Aboriginality so that they could survive — and the KMT's own appropriation of Aboriginality. From this I conclude that sustained and forcible uses of categorisation in the context of an Aboriginal population are more capable of reinforcing and creating ethnic boundaries than destroying them.

# Chapter One

# Introduction: Ethnicity, Aboriginality and Taiwan

No adequate assessment of the Aboriginal predicament can be made so long as the historical dimension is lacking; it is the absence of information on background which has made it easy for intelligent persons in each successive generation to accept the stereotype of an incompetent group.<sup>1</sup>

In 1982, as Taiwan approached the end of martial law, the charismatic Aboriginal musician and activist Kimbo (Hu Te-fu) organised a concert in the heart of Taipei to voice criticism of government policies targeting Aboriginal people. The following year, three Aboriginal students at National Taiwan University – Yijang Baluar, Ivan Nokan and Bawan Nokan – launched a handmade periodical entitled *Gaoshanqing*, which warned Aboriginal readers that they faced "racial annihilation" (*zhongzu miewang*) and therefore should join a movement to defend indigenous cultures. Although both actions attracted the close attention of the police and security agencies, leading to threats and inducements to stop any campaign activities, the momentum for change among Aboriginal intellectuals, clergy and non-Aboriginal supporters outside of the Kuomintang (KMT) grew, leading to the establishment of the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines at the end of 1984. This group would be at the forefront of Aboriginal activism for some time.<sup>2</sup>

See C.D. Rowley (1972): The destruction of Aboriginal society. Sydney: Penguin, p.9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Hu Te-fu (2000): "Yuanzhuminzu yundong zaiqi" (The Aboriginal movement rises again). *The Left*, 4, page numbers not shown; and Yijang Baluar (1994): "Taiwan Yuanzhumin yundong fazhan

Ten years later, *Gaoshanqing* co-founder Yijang Baluar argued in a review of these events and the Aboriginal movement in general that the activism at that time was unconnected to any of the previous efforts of activists to further the interests of their communities.<sup>3</sup> In other commentary, the influential Aboriginal writer and academic Sun Ta-chuan, for example, has placed little emphasis on pan-Aboriginal political or cultural activism prior to the 1980s, concentrating more on the present, prospects for the future, community experiences and the difficulties in a unitary Aboriginal approach to effecting change.<sup>4</sup>

When I started this project, this emphasis on the present and the immediate past dominated the literature. It focused on an Aboriginal activism that had gained enough momentum to withstand KMT attempts to silence it. But there seemed to be another silence that made no sense. Given the violence and instability that came with hundreds of years of colonial rule in Aboriginal lands, surely this new activism did not emerge in a vacuum of political and ethnic consciousness?

There have been descriptions of the political and cultural lives of Aboriginal communities and elites before the new wave of activism, but they are fragmentary, though in some cases there have been reasonably detailed descriptions of individuals and groups who came to a bad end after attempting to champion Aboriginal rights in a manner that offended the KMT. The impression that this body of research leaves is that the period prior to the 1980s is peripheral to an understanding of Aboriginal identity

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luxian zhi chubu tantao" (A preliminary investigation into the course of development of the Taiwan Aboriginal movement). *Taiwan Indigenous Voice Bimonthly*, 4, pp.22-23. One source told me that Hu Te-fu and current Public Television Service executive producer Dianav Jenror (Tung Chun-ching), a Paiwan tribesman and former legislative aide, also had a role to play in the production of *Gaoshanqing*. Yijang (1994), *op. cit.*, p.22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See, for example, Sun Ta-chuan (1991): Jiujiu jiu yici (Have one drink – and make it last). Taipei: Chang Laoshi; Sun Ta-chuan (1996): "Fan Yuanzhumin yishi yu Taiwan zuqun wentide hudong" (The interaction between pan-Aboriginal consciousness and Taiwan's ethnic problems). Taiwan Indigenous Voice Bimonthly, 12, 91-106; Sun Ta-chuan (2000): Jiafeng zhongde zuqun jiangou: Taiwan Yuanzhumin yuyan, wenhua yu zhengzhi (Ethnic construction in the cracks: Taiwan Aboriginal languages, cultures and politics). Taipei: Unitas.

and political activity, and notable only for a gradual erosion of "traditional" ways and the socioeconomic struggle of Aboriginal people to adapt to a forcibly imposed culture.

The English-language books on national identity in Taiwan by Christopher Hughes and Alan Wachman, for example, are even more sporadic in their treatment of the subject — they do not locate Aboriginal people within their discussions of identity other than as ineffectual fringe dwellers. Hughes acknowledges Aboriginal people over the course of a page, while Wachman includes a paragraph on the issue. While this is perhaps reflects the day-to-day political impact of Aboriginal society, I do not think it does quite enough justice to the presence of Aborigines in ethnic and nationalist discourse. The issue is significant because of the regular appropriation of the Aboriginal presence by all sides of politics from the beginning of KMT rule. Some examples of this on the Taiwan-independence end of the political spectrum are the incorporation of Aborigines in the 1940s by Han dissidents such as Thomas Liao as part of a racial justification for the "Formosan race" seceding from China, and then more recently as part of a revamped cultural argument for staying separate from China.

This thesis explores the political actions and circumstances of Aboriginal people from 1945 up until the time when the modern Aboriginal movement began. It examines this earlier period in relation to these questions:

- How was Aboriginality expressed before the concept became a legitimate part of the national debate?
  - How did Aboriginality develop during the heyday of martial law?

<sup>5</sup> See Christopher Hughes (2000): Taiwan and Chinese nationalism: national identity and status in international society. London: Routledge; and Alan M. Wachman (1994): Taiwan: national identity and democratization. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Huang Fu-san, Weng Chia-yin & Mrs. Farrington (eds)(1998b): Taiwan archives in the British Public Record Office (V). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History Preparatory Office, Academia Sinica, p.266; and Huang Fu-san, Weng Chia-yin & Mrs. Farrington (eds)(1998d): Taiwan archives in the British Public Record Office (VII). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History Preparatory Office, Academia Sinica, p.47. However, one scholar has argued that Aborigines were an "interlude" in a discourse of pioneering and colonisation and otherwise excluded by the thoroughgoing Hancentrism of the early

- Was there substantial Aboriginal resistance to assimilationist policies, given that Aboriginal villages came under the closest scrutiny from security forces and KMT commissars?
- What was the relationship between these powerful agencies and changes in Aboriginal identity?

The answers to these questions indicate that the failure of the KMT's assimilationist policies can be traced to this early period. I argue that assimilationist policies implemented on the back of punitive security mechanisms are as critical to an understanding of the ethnic construction of Aboriginal people as they are to the destruction of cultural expressions. Analysis of the actions and experiences of Aboriginal leaders and communities between the arrival of the KMT in 1945 and the early 1970s will show that the KMT failed to conceptualise the process by which Aborigines would lose their ethnic identities, and instead created or maintained an environment in which Aboriginal activism would eventually have an impact. I will focus on the February 28 Incident of 1947 (the "228 Incident"), the period of political repression known as the "White Terror," the activities and ideas of early Aboriginal activists and the early presence of Christian missionaries and churches to show that the activism that started in the 1980s was not operating out of an ethnic vacuum. The processes of ethnic boundary formation and retention were not disrupted but fortified by the actions of the new authorities. This introductory chapter outlines my theoretical position and concludes with a description of the research method and a summary of chapters.

## **Ethnicity**

#### The dialectic of ascription

The starting point for this research is Richard Jenkins' defense and revision of the social anthropological model of ethnicity, which draws from the theoretical shift by Fredrik Barth away from reified structures such as "tribe" and toward a broader conception of social organisation and the social construction of ethnic boundaries, particularly as a function of interaction across those boundaries.<sup>7</sup>

According to this approach, two distinct but interlocking processes constitute ethnicity. The first is interior ascription, or identification within the group, and the second is exterior ascription, or categorisation across boundaries. The two processes constitute a dialectic in which the genesis (or ethnogenesis), maintenance and decline of ethnicity proceeds. By the nature of this system, an ethnic group must also be self-aware to some degree.<sup>8</sup>

#### Jenkins argues that:

Ethnicity may, for example, be strengthened or generated as a response to categorisation; similarly, an aspect of one group's ethnicity may be, indeed is likely to be, the categories with which it labels other groups or collectivities. In each of these cases the absolute centrality of power relationships – a centrality which many ethnicity theorists have been reluctant to include in their analyses – must be acknowledged.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Richard Jenkins (1997): Rethinking ethnicity: arguments and explorations. London: Sage; and Fredrik Barth (ed.)(1969a): Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference. London: Allen & Unwin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, p.61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> ibid., p.23.

Ethnicity can also be situational, segmentary and hierarchical, though not necessarily, can vary locally and temporally and, despite a tendency for members of ethnic groups to be impressed by the seeming primordiality of their identity, is "always socially constructed, in the first instance and in every other" in the "articulation of purported cultural similarity and difference." 10 But across all of this Jenkins stresses that "analysis of ethnicity should focus on power as well as on authority, and on the manner in which different modes of domination are implicated in the social construction of ethnic and

other identities."11

John and Jean Comaroff point out that "ethnic affiliation may originate in an attribution of collective identity to them on the part of others." This is particularly important to note in the case of politically and linguistically separate indigenous communities, because the delay between that first categorisation and the acceptance of its scope in the form of group identification by the communities themselves can be considerable – in the cases of Taiwan and Australia, this time lapse amounts to hundreds of years. It is an extreme temporal example of how "ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy,"<sup>13</sup> and how, until the political economy is extended to the most remote and/or unruly areas, key ethnic ascriptions can be one-directional and irrelevant to the day-to-day existence

of the categorised.

Ascription and assimilation

Assimilationist policy is one of the most overt expressions of power in ethnic relations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, p.40, p.47, p.50 and pp.74-75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, p.73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff (1992): Ethnography and the historical imagination. Boulder: Westview Press, p.53. Emphasis in original.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p.54.

and therefore the modes of domination evident within that policy are of the utmost interest. Jenkins says that for the identity of individuals psychosis is one consequence of this.<sup>14</sup> More generally, however, it is the weakening and collapse of boundaries between a dominated and dominating group that self-declared assimilationist policies attempt to bring about. The destruction of ethnic identification, however, turns out to be rather more difficult than simply eradicating any particular set of cultural expressions of that identification.

I hope to account for the failure of assimilationist policies in Taiwan in terms of these ascriptive structures. The basic problem for assimilationists is that their agenda, even if sweetened by a degree of pedagogical zeal, benevolence or pity, remains almost entirely based on a framework of inequality and coercion, and thus frequently struggles to avoid being associated with even the most blatant expressions of racism, such as stereotyping, legal and informal racial discrimination, land theft, forced migration, murder, abductions and other acts of violence.

All of these acts contribute to the creation, reshaping or reinforcing of ethnic boundaries through both moderating the categorisations of the dominant ethnic group and inducing a wide and enduring range of responses in the ethnic group(s) targeted for assimilation. The latter responses include not only new or amended categorisations of the dominant by the dominated, but also revisions to or creations of group identification within that group.

The paradox is quite simple: The assimilationist by his most basic of actions generates greater complexity in the ascriptive relationship between groups, an effect considerably enhanced by the conspicuous use of power. In so doing the assimilationist is almost certain to delay or ruin the goal of eliminating group differences. My research shows

<sup>14</sup> ibid..

how KMT assimilationist policy inadvertently did just this and in so doing fortified local and pan-Aboriginal ethnicity.

Writing on the Australian Aboriginal experience, Rowley summed this phenomenon up using a term that he may not have meant to use in the context of external ascription, but which is fortuitous nonetheless:

[W]hile the goal of "assimilation" expressed the best intentions, the special laws introduced to bring it about through tuition and control inevitably set the "native" apart in a special *category* of wardship: the greater the effort towards assimilation, the more rigidly defined the differences in status become.<sup>15</sup>

But if the state turns to less coercive methods to control or pacify a subject population, such as appropriating indigenous images and identities, the consequences are no less unpredictable, as Barry Morris argues:

The state, through its attempts to control the construction of Aboriginality, has also provided an arena in which such ideological constructions can be contested.<sup>16</sup>

There is a problem with the concept of assimilation, however, and this is that it readily confuses two distinct processes: *programmatic* assimilation, which involves ideology, policy and execution of policy, and *experiential* assimilation, which involves the psychosocial reality – the nitty-gritty of social change as it is lived – of the assimilating person or community. The relationship between these two is, perhaps, a dialectic analogous to the ethnic dialectic of interior and exterior ascription; the main difference between them being that programmatic assimilation is transparently political and

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<sup>15</sup> Rowley, op. cit., p.20. Emphasis mine.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Barry Morris (1988): "The politics of identity: From Aborigines to the first Australian." In: Jeremy R. Beckett (ed.): *Past and present: The construction of Aboriginality*. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, p.17.

forward-looking, whereas assimilation as an experience is keenly felt as a function of the past reflected in the present.

#### 'Cultural stuff'

Donald Handelman's criticisms of Barth insisted that the role of "cultural stuff" should not be underemphasised, nor the role of the group in generating ethnic features be exaggerated, in accounting for variations in social organisation, ethnic strength and intensity, territoriality and different manifestations of ethnic identification.<sup>17</sup> All of these resonate with Aboriginal groups because of the differential effect of assimilation – as policy and as lived experience – across and within Aboriginal communities, and especially in regard to cultural expressions.

Jenkins argues for a greater emphasis on the role of culture in boundary strength, arguing that "boundaries, and the interactions across them, are intimately and indissolubly bound up with the cultural contents of ethnicity." This "cultural stuff," as Barth called it – and a term that Jenkins employs to refer to language, value systems, myths, custom, arts and crafts, and so on – is thus critical in determining differences between ascriptions; it also allows a distinction to be made between different "allotropes" of ethnicity, such as nationalism and racism. Cultural stuff is not deterministic of ethnic boundaries, but it is relevant to charting them and how they are maintained or created. Jenkins offers a middle way between the poles of culture-centric and boundary-centric theorising. Indeed, Jenkins argues, boundary maintenance generates shared culture rather than the other way around. Any assimilationist's attempt to destroy culture is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See Don Handelman (1977): "The organization of ethnicity." Ethnic Groups, 1, 187-200.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., pp.121-122.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See Fredrik Barth (1969b): "Introduction." In: Fredrik Barth (ed.): Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference. London: Allen & Unwin, p.15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.12.

therefore bound to fail if ethnic boundaries are not weakened, and especially if new boundaries are formed as the result of state policy.

If culture exists across boundaries, that is to say, if it is shared or if cultural differences are unnoticed, then culture in these instances exists without reference to boundaries. Culture is therefore not inherently oppositional, and for this reason can be constructed in such a way that either does or does not entail a potential conflict or the need to defend a boundary. Because certain cultural expressions appeal to spiritual and emotional parts of the human being, however, the challenge for the assimilationist is to remove or modify such critical cultural differences without generating opposition – and durable, combative cultural expressions – in the process.

## **Aboriginality**

The extensive anthropological and historical literature built around the Australian Aboriginal experience provides some valuable theoretical and empirical tools for working out how the historical experience of their Taiwanese counterparts can be framed.<sup>21</sup> The two groupings of indigenous peoples are unrelated in ethnolinguistic terms, yet their relationships with colonial administrations, their similar absolute number and size as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> My use of the term "Aborigine" is of course strictly in the context of an English-language thesis. The English word itself is rarely used by ordinary Aboriginal people in Taiwan, but this is equally the case with other English words such as "indigenous." I prefer the use of "Aborigine" in this thesis because it avoids certain ambiguities that the expression "indigenous people" contains. The most important of these involves waves of Han immigration and the argument that some Han groups are more "Taiwanese" than others by virtue of the amount of time their families have been in Taiwan. The term "indigenous" therefore could be used to refer to Han or Aboriginal groups depending on the context. But "Aboriginal" cannot. It is a generic, value-neutral expression, and indeed is a more literal translation of the Chinese yuanzhumin ("original inhabitants") than "indigenous people(s)."

The term "Aborigine" and its variants have, in certain quarters, taken on a sense of backwardness or primitiveness to the extent that using them can be interpreted as insulting or insensitive — or just archaic. However, the history of the use of these English terms in Taiwan cannot be contested, and as an Australian I am most aware that the term is also used with pride or, at least, without stigma by Australian Aborigines. It is with this understanding that I employ the term. It also serves as a panindigenous category in relation to other ethnic categories (viz. Mainlanders, Hakka, Hoklo), which the terms "indigenous" or "indigenous people" themselves simply cannot do.

proportion of the total population, and their gradual but inconsistent embrace of pan-Aboriginality provide interesting points of comparison and contrast. That these groups were subjected to similar colonial practices under "Eastern" and "Western" regimes points to shared and hence *generalisable* features of Aboriginal identity.

On this point I concur with the argument that anthropology – a product and tool of colonialism before becoming institutionalised and eventually one of colonialism's sternest commentators – "appears to have no history beside [a small number of outstanding scholars] and outside the West," or so it would seem from a Western vantage point.

In Taiwan's case, the extensive activities of professional anthropologists – first Japanese, then Chinese, with a handful of Westerners thrown in – has produced a body of research both invaluable and laden with colonial values. This represents another similarity between the Australian and Taiwanese Aboriginal experiences: the research performed in and *on* Aboriginal communities continued to be transparently colonial at a time when the "postcolonial" era of anthropology was said to have taken over.<sup>23</sup> I therefore make use of the Australian anthropological and historical literature in discussing a wider meaning of Aboriginality as an ethnicity and its relationship to assimilationist policies, nationalism and the state.

Authenticity and the definition of an Aborigine

The issue of authenticity is an important one in the Australian literature and is closely tied to the sensitive debate of how to define an Aborigine, an Aboriginal community or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu (1999): "Anthropology in colonial contexts." In: Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu (eds): *Anthropology and colonialism in Asia and Oceania*. Richmond, England: Curzon Press, p.3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, p.8.

Aboriginality is an ascription that begins with – and cannot be separated from – the presence of a colonising power. It is steeped in the memory and rhetoric of coercion, prejudice, violence and loss of land and other natural resources. In the first instance it is an imposed identity that Aboriginal people adopt and adapt, even if not all Aborigines choose to identify with the resulting pan-Aboriginal ascriptions, or support the political actions fed by them.<sup>25</sup>

Jeremy Beckett argues that the ongoing cultural construction that characterises Aboriginality, beginning with the arrival of the coloniser, does not render that culture — or any ethnic group — inauthentic.<sup>26</sup> Its power is largely derived from its "assumption of continuity"<sup>27</sup> that is primarily but not exclusively based in descent. Such an assumption is powerfully ascriptive and has allowed Aborigines as much as any other ethnic group to endure substantial loss of "traditional" culture while maintaining strong identification as Aboriginal people.

But consistent with the dialectic of ascription, Aboriginality is something that can also be constructed by non-Aboriginal individuals and institutions, thus raising the spectre of inauthenticity in which no issue — such as high-stakes claims to land and natural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See Gillian K. Cowlishaw (1986): "Aborigines and anthropologists." Australian Aboriginal Studies, 1986(1), 2-12; and Gillian Cowlishaw (1993): "Introduction: Representing racial issues." Oceania, 63(3), 183-194. "Writing history about Aborigines," states Lenore Coltheart, "is, necessarily, the imposition of an alien explanatory framework on Aboriginal experience and Aboriginal understanding." See Coltheart, Lenore (1988): "The moment of Aboriginal history." In: Jeremy R. Beckett (ed): Past and present: The construction of Aboriginality. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, Ch 11. Out of respect for Coltheart and others who share this point of view, I concur that there will be a number of questions that will remain unanswered in the course of this thesis with regard to Aboriginal experience and understanding. But it is, if anything, less troubling to be in the position of imposing an alien explanatory framework on both the colonised Aboriginal people and the colonising Han state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See Robert Tonkinson (1989): "Aboriginal ethnicity and nation-building within Australia." In: Michael C. Howard (ed.): *Ethnicity and nation-building in the Pacific*. Tokyo: United Nations University, pp.136-140.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See Jeremy Beckett (1988a): "Introduction." In: Jeremy R. Beckett (ed.): *Past and present: The construction of Aboriginality*. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, p.1. <sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, p.2.

resources – can be resolved by a non-Aboriginal judiciary without the judgement being called into question on this basis.

Non-Aboriginal constructions of Aboriginality are acts that are sometimes polemical, as when persons identifying as Aborigines are dismissed as inauthentic by non-Aborigines, and at other times analytical (and possibly also hostile, or appropriative), as with the writings and policies of non-Aboriginal activists, nationalists, government agencies, politicians and academics.<sup>28</sup>

The practice of history, in particular, might tend to locate an essentialised, undisturbed Aboriginal community as truly beyond reach, thereby fortifying an attack on Aboriginality as a modern fiction:

History, as a discourse which deploys temporality as a marker of difference, has been the means by which Europeans have constructed Aborigines in terms of an absence or lack – they were either of another time or were even timeless, and so were not of our time, that is, modernity.<sup>29</sup>

Yet the practice of history, complete with any disagreeable ascriptions, can also precipitate political change by presenting matters of evidence before the wider community that can be acted upon for the benefit of Aboriginal people.<sup>30</sup>

What is important to recognise, whatever the intent or level of sophistication of the act, is that *categorisation is inevitable*. The interesting question is not, therefore, whether categorisation occurs or whether it is inherently oppressive, but rather what the

<sup>30</sup> See Richard Broome (1996): "Historians, Aborigines and Australia: Writing the national past." In: Bain Attwood (ed.): *In the age of Mabo: History, Aborigines and Australia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See John Morton (1996): "Aboriginality, Mabo and the republic: Indigenising Australia." In: Bain Attwood (ed.): *In the age of Mabo: History, Aborigines and Australia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, Ch. 8. <sup>29</sup> See Bain Attwood (1996): "Introduction: The past as future: Aborigines, Australia and the (dis)course of history." In: Bain Attwood (ed.): *In the age of Mabo: History, Aborigines and Australia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, p.viii.

relationship is between different forms of categorisation and group identification, and what effects such relationships have on the boundaries between them.<sup>31</sup> When Aboriginality, which boasts certain unique ethnic features, is subject to assimilative processes, the question becomes more interesting still.

The authenticity debate, for its part, appears to refer to a gap between ethnic ascriptions so large that certain forms of tension result. These tensions can only be eased by the ascriptions increasing in similarity. Thus, if Aboriginal people react to a claim of inauthenticity by asking for better understanding of modern Aboriginal culture, for example, then they are seeking an increasing correspondence between interior and exterior ascriptions and a relieving of attendant tensions. This ascriptive tension is not limited to the boundary between Aborigines and non-Aborigines: it exists among Aborigines themselves, as different generations display the loss of certain traditions, training and languages. Yet it should be clear from this that the presence of a debate on authenticity, or even the degree of ferocity of the debate, is not a given.

From a purely assimilationist point of view, whether or not this gap between the interior and exterior construction of an Aborigine exists is beside the point: what the assimilator ultimately demands is that such construction no longer be possible, regardless of the source. In this respect, the ideal assimilationist is not enamoured with the question of "authenticity" – usually framed with reference to the survival or not of "traditional" culture or physical appearance. Rather, he requires that these ascriptions, and thus the accompanying debate, should simply be made to cease to exist for the reason that Aboriginality is an unmodern and unmodernisable identity. It is perfectly plausible for an assimilationist to recognise in its entirety the group identification that an Aboriginal community might possess, just as it is possible for a self-described, non-

Ch. 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See Gillian Cowlishaw (1988): "The materials for identity construction." In: Jeremy R. Beckett (ed.): Past and present: The construction of Aboriginality. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, p.89.

Aboriginal supporter of Aboriginal rights to have a construction of Aboriginality that has little overlap with Aboriginal self-definitions. In short, assimilation is a normative agenda that has no necessary correspondence to assessments of authenticity, which are empirical claims — no matter how well or poorly formulated, and despite the fact that both frequently serve the most conspicuously racist and colonial of interests.

However, when authenticity becomes a key element in debate over Aboriginal policy, entitlements and autonomy, history then becomes the battleground as contending parties look to the past to validate their claims in the courts or the media. The problem with this is that the history in question is mostly limited to Aboriginal contact with the coloniser, and that pan-Aboriginality, as an "artifact of the colonial encounter," is inseparable from the ascriptions of the coloniser.

Beckett refers to one key element of Aboriginal authenticity as "the past in the present." This is the dilemma in which Aboriginal people face down both "the attribution of unchanging essences" and "the reproach of inauthenticity." Yet in Taiwan, where Aboriginal people under KMT rule were quickly and officially categorised as Aborigines (*shandi tongbao*) as well as citizens, the potential problem of perceived inauthenticity has not proven, even today, to be fertile ground for political or social exploitation to the extent that it has in other countries. This may be due to bloodlines being "uninterrupted" in so many more cases and the fact that ROC law privileges paternity over ethnicity – the status of the father remains key in dictating not only the place of origin of a child (Taiwan or "mainland China"), but also whether the child is listed as Aboriginal or not. In this way, Aboriginal descent was indirectly given the imprimatur of the bureaucracy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See Jeremy Beckett (1989): "Aboriginality in a nation-state: The Australian case." In: Michael C. Howard (ed.): *Ethnicity and nation-building in the Pacific*. Tokyo: United Nations University, p.118. <sup>33</sup> Beckett (1988a), op. cit., p.6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See Jeremy Beckett (1988b): "The past in the present; the present in the past: Constructing a national Aboriginality." In: Jeremy R. Beckett (ed.): *Past and present: The construction of Aboriginality*. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, pp.194-195.

Extensive debate of Aboriginal authenticity is therefore not as practical a problem in Taiwan as it is in Australia, even if there are interesting questions to be posed at a theoretical level. There are exceptions to this claim, though they are not significant in terms of the ground this thesis covers.

#### Taiwan Aboriginal nomenclature and demographics

The task of defining Aboriginal people in Taiwan for this thesis is therefore not so complex, even if the history of this process is. The period my research covers is one in which the KMT was only beginning to introduce mechanisms to generate "inauthenticity" among communities that in many cases had never seen substantial interaction with Han society. Aborigines are identified here as those classified into nine groups by the Ministry of the Interior from 1954: people marked as Aboriginal in their personal identification papers, and therefore belonging to one of nine ethnolinguistic groups: the Atayal, Saisiat, Bunun, Tsao (Tsou), Paiwan, Rukai, Amis, Beinan (Puyuma) and the Yami (Tao).

This definition for an Aboriginal person is of course not the same as one might have used during the period of Dutch rule, when indigenous peoples populated all of Taiwan and when there was no sensible political distinction between Aborigines to be made other than at the level of the local "tribe" or coalitions thereof. The ethnolinguistic categories of the last one hundred years, as the creations of anthropologists and linguists, have not all stood the test of time: Some have been renamed in accordance with linguistic sensibilities, while others have split into smaller groups for political reasons. Most of those that remain are vulnerable to similar changes.

The large number of names used to categorize and distinguish Taiwan's Aboriginal people in the past and the present warrants a brief introduction, as does the current distribution of ethnolinguistic groups.

The history of Han-Aboriginal relations unfolds most intriguingly when examining the names chosen by settlers and colonial administrators to distinguish Aboriginal people from one another and from the Han as a whole. The act of naming people outside one's own group is, of course, the most fundamental act of dialectical ascription, and the fuzziness, hostility and outright inaccuracy of some of these terms proved in some cases to be so durable over time that the terms came to serve as an important component of both local Aboriginal and – eventually – pan-Aboriginal identity.

The following is a summary of the most significant pan-Aboriginal names and categorisations.

#### (i) fan, shengfan, shoufan, huan-a

The word fan, (huan in Hoklo) usually translated as "savage," came into regular use as a term for Taiwan's Aborigines during the reign of the Koxinga mini-dynasty in the second half of the seventeenth century. As the Qing era progressed, this concept was divided into shengfan ("raw savages" – referring to Aboriginal communities whose ways of life remained largely intact because of remoteness or a willingness to defend their territory from the Han) and shoufan (usually translated as "cooked savages," but probably better expressed as "matured savages," referring to Aboriginal communities that absorbed a degree of Han cultural influence and often fell under Chinese administration). Variations on this comparative assessment of Aboriginal "savagery" extended to geography, equating the shengfan with the mountains and the shoufan with the plains, as well as to regions (north, south, east and west) according to extremely loose descriptions of both geographic location and cultural traits. Under the Japanese, the word was retained, but the grass radical was added to the Kanji, apparently

rendering the term more respectful. The KMT abolished official use of either term soon after arrival in Taiwan (except in place names), judging them to be demeaning.<sup>35</sup> The Hoklo pronunciation (*huan-a*) is used to this day as a racist insult.

#### (ii) pingpu, pingpuzu, pepohoan

These are the loose names for the "plains Aborigines" and loosely synonymous with shoufan (pepohoan was used in Western languages until the twentieth century and derives from the Hoklo reading of pingpufan). The word pingpu came to be associated with highly assimilated or extinct plains Aboriginal communities. The Kanji for pingpuzu was officially applied to shoufan as a whole by the Japanese governorgeneral's office in 1935, a recognition that barely survived the KMT's arrival twelve years later. Since then, the term has continued to be used in historical research on extinct Aboriginal communities as well as to denote plains communities that retain an identity or cultural practices different to the Han.<sup>36</sup>

#### (iii) Gaoshazu (Takasagozoku)

Takasago (*Gaosha* in Chinese) is a city in Hyogo Prefecture (formerly Banshu Province in part) in Japan. The name was later used for Taiwan by the incoming Japanese administration because of purported geographical similarities. It was officially applied to *shengfan* (hence *Takasagozoku*, or *Gaoshazu*) by the governor-general's office in 1935, and as such was the first name to unambiguously identify Aboriginal people with the land of Taiwan as a whole.<sup>37</sup>

#### (iv) Kaoshan, Gaoshanzu

This term appears to be a corruption of the Japanese characters, retaining the character for "high" and adding the similar-sounding syllable shan, meaning "mountain."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Lin Chiang-i (2003): "Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu guanfang rendingde huigu yu zhanwang" (The official identification of Taiwan Aboriginal peoples: a look back and a look forward). In: Pan Chao-cheng, Liu I-chang and Shih Cheng-feng (eds): *Taiwan pingpuzu* (The *pingpu* peoples of Taiwan). Taipei: Avanguard, pp.166-169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> *ibid.*, pp.175-176. <sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, p.169 and pp.175-176.

Occasionally the word compatriot (tongbao) would be added to it. The KMT had removed what it considered to be an offensive Japanese name for Taiwan and Taiwan's Aborigines, but replacing it with a term that no longer retained the sense of unity with the land of Taiwan as a whole. Consequently, Aborigines were essentialised as mountain-dwellers.

#### (v) Taiwanzu

Taiwanzu (the Taiwanese people) was a name covering all of Taiwan's Aborigines proposed by a number of Aboriginal delegates (see Chapter Three), and as such would have been a more fitting successor to Takasagozoku, not only because of its use of the land of Taiwan as a referent, but also because it would have been the first name for all Aboriginal people in history to have been chosen by Aborigines themselves. The campaign seems not to have progressed very far.

#### (vi) shanbao

The concept of *shanbao* ("mountain compatriot") replaced the expression *Gaoshanzu* as part of KMT attempts to signify active inclusion of Aboriginal people in the larger polity. As with previous state-imposed names, it was hailed by the government as a respectful and inclusive designation, though it retained the geographical essentialism of its predecessor. Legally, in February 1954 the term *shandi tongbao* ("mountain area compatriots") was restricted to Aborigines that were mountain-dwellers, and excluded both unassimilated plains-dwelling Aborigines as well as the semi-assimilated *pingpu* Aborigines. <sup>38</sup> In October 1956 this was amended so that those defined as *Gaoshanzu* (i.e. *Gaoshazu*) under the Japanese but who lived in the plains would now be called *pingdi shanbao* ("plains area mountain compatriots"), also requiring the inelegant renaming of *shandi tongbao* as *shandi shanbao* ("mountain area mountain compatriots") to distinguish the two. <sup>39</sup> Meanwhile, the expressions *shandiren* ("mountain person/people") and *shanbao* were used by ordinary people to describe Aborigines.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> See Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee (1998), op. cit., pp.121-122.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, pp.122-123.

Today, *shandiren* remains in casual use among both Han and Aboriginal people, though it is not considered respectful in most contexts.

#### (vii) Penglaizu

Penglai is an old Chinese word for a mystical, utopian island. It seems that its use as a name for all of Taiwan's Aboriginal people was devised by members of the Young People's Alliance for the Struggle for Salvation of the Penglai Nation, a small group of Aboriginal student activists, which the KMT later accused of sedition and whose members were subsequently jailed. Nationalist security forces claimed that communist agents were responsible for the term (see Chapter Six).

#### (viii) Xianzhumin, zaozhumin

The term *xianzhumin* ("first inhabitants") was most recently used in the early 1990s by political and academic opponents of Aboriginal activists. They considered that the term *yuanzhumin* was objectionable because it carried a sense of indigeneity that was thought disrespectful toward Chinese claims of sovereignty over Taiwan – or parts of Taiwan at least. When Aboriginal activists were campaigning for the use of *yuanzhumin*, these opponents suggested *xianzhumin* or *zaozhumin* ("early inhabitants") instead as a compromise. Needless to say, the terms were rejected by the activists, who saw them as an attempt to rhetorically deny the special, primal connection they claimed existed between Aboriginal people and their lands. However, the term *xianzhumin* was also used much earlier in academic writings. One article from 1954 advocated its use over the contemptuous *fan*, the alien *gaoshazu* and the derivative and essentialising *gaoshanzu*, 40 but the use of *shanbao* prevailed.

#### (ix) Yuanzhumin, yuanzhuminzu

The present-day use of the term *yuanzhumin* ("original inhabitants") was first suggested in the early 1980s by Fan Hsun-lu, a Han activist for Aboriginal people (later a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> See Chou Hsien-wen (1954): "Taiwan zhi xianzhumin" (Taiwan's original inhabitants). *Taiwan Bank Journal*, 7(1), p.220.

Democratic Progressive Party legislator, she is now a senior official in the education ministry). At Later, activists added the word zu ("people(s)," or "nation(s)") to emphasize community unity and strength and to bolster the call for rights and resources that should flow to each ethnolinguistic group. After years of campaigning, the term became official in 1994 through a constitutional amendment, becoming the first-ever pan-Aboriginal self-appellation to be recognised by the state. The first executive-level Aboriginal bureaucracy followed soon after in 1996, adopting the same term in its title. For legislative elections, however, Aborigines remain divided into two electorates, pingdi (plains area) and shandi (mountain area), though this distinction may dissolve with the revision of the electoral system for the next legislative election. As I show in Chapter Five, the ill-fated Aboriginal leader Kao I-sheng used yuanzhumin in the late 1940s as part of his frustrated attempts to foster pan-Aboriginal sentiment and activism, but it was not taken up by the broader Aboriginal community at the time.

#### (x) ethnolinguistic sub-categories

Japanese anthropologists had a vital role to play in the Japanese authorities' classifications for Aboriginal people. They were also the first to conduct comprehensive research on the linguistic, cultural and physical features of the Aboriginal "groups." Their classifications differed over time according to the researcher, but government designations only underwent one change in the fifty years of Japanese rule. The original distribution ignored the *pingpuzu* and divided the *shengfan* into nine groups of (roughly from north to south) Atayal, Saisiat, Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan, Tsarisen, Puyuma, Ami and Yami. A second period from 1912 combined the Paiwan, the Tsarisien and the Puyuma under the name "Paiwan" to leave seven groups. After 1945, Chinese government and anthropologist classifications made little change to these groups, apart from redividing the "Paiwan" into Paiwan, Rukai and Puyuma/Beinan. When the interior ministry announced the official names for Aboriginal "groups" in 1954, the final nine groups, which would remain unchanged for several decades, were Atayal, Saisiat, Bunun, Tsao,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See Yijang (1994), op. cit., p.24. <sup>42</sup> Lin Chiang-i, op. cit., pp.168-176.

Paiwan, Rukai, Beinan, Ami and Yami. Although these categories are remarkably similar to the original Japanese classifications, they did not and do not betray the linguistic and cultural diversity that existed and exists within them. As ascriptions, they stand somewhere between the local identities of Aboriginal people and the modern conception of a unitary indigenous population. It is also important to point out that these names did not correspond with the boundaries of "tribal" authority, with perhaps the exception of the Beinan, whose communities had for a time acted under the authority of a single ruler.

The Atayal (including the Truku, now classified separately) occupy the north of Taiwan as far south as Nantou and Hualien counties (See Figure 3.1). The culturally similar Saisiat live in the hills of Miaoli County as well as in the southern mountains of Hsinchu County. The Bunun occupy the centre and south of Nantou County, southern Hualien County and northern Taitung and Kaohsiung counties. The Tsao (Tsou) live in the Alishan area of Chiayi County and the township of Sanmin in Kaohsiung County, with a small number of tribespeople also living in southern Nantou County. The Thao of Sun Moon Lake were also categorised as Tsao or Tsou until very recently. The Paiwan occupy the south of the island, spread across Pingtung and Taitung counties. The Rukai lie mostly in Pingtung County's Wutai Township and Kaohsiung County's Maolin Township, though one community of migrants now lives just outside the western fringe of Taitung City, while another lives in a plains reservation in Pingtung County's Machia Township. The Beinan live in Taitung City and Peinan Township in Taitung County. The Ami (Amis) straddle the plains and coast of Hualien and Taitung counties, and have a small pocket of tribespeople living on the east coast of Pingtung County. The Yami (Tao) live on the island of Lanyu (Orchid Island) off the southern Taitung coast.

This brief summary does not include the Aboriginal communities consisting of migrant workers and their families that formed in major cities and elsewhere following the rapid

<sup>43</sup> ibid., p.176.

industrialisation of Taiwan in the second half of the twentieth century. Nor does it include a small number of communities forcibly moved to make way for major infrastructure projects. Finally, it should be said that most Aboriginal communities, despite the use of "mountain" in their official designation, had by the 1960s been moved to plains areas on the edge of mountain townships that were and are adjacent to Han Taiwanese communities. Much of the mountainous interior coloured blue in Figure 3.1 now has no permanent settlement.

Table 1.1 shows the increase in the Aboriginal population since near the beginning of Japanese rule. It is noteworthy that the Aboriginal percentage of the total population fell dramatically until the late 1940s, when Taiwan saw a massive increase in the population because of refugees from the Chinese civil war. Since that time, the Aboriginal population has more than doubled while remaining remarkably stable as a proportion of the total population.

Year	Aboriginal population	% total population
1915	132,279	3.7
1925	136,706	3.3
1935	150,502	2.8
1945	167,561	2.5
1955	185,264	2.0
1960	210,701	2.0
2004	449,592	2.0

Table 1.1: Aboriginal population of Taiwan in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population for selected years.<sup>44</sup>

Table 1.2 shows the most recent number of Aboriginal people according to ethnolinguistic classification. The Amis (Ami) are easily the largest group, followed by

<sup>44</sup> See Sun Te-hsiung (1961): "Taiwan shandi zhi renkou" (The population of Taiwan's mountain area). *Taiwan Yinhang jikan* (Taiwan Bank Periodical), 12(4), p.4; data from the Council of Indigenous

the Atayal (not counting the recently seceded Truku) and the Paiwan. It is important to note that this figure includes a sizable number of Aboriginal people not classified on an ethnolinguistic basis; this table therefore serves more as an indicator of the relative size of each group. For smaller groups, such as the Tao (Yami) for example, the relative size in Table 1.2 is deceptive because of the considerable shortfall of ethnolinguistic registrations in that area. The Tao's home township of Lanyu had a population of 3,094 in 2005, of which only 10 percent were Han Taiwanese, and this does not include Tao tribespeople resident outside of Lanyu.<sup>45</sup>

Recognised	Population
ethnic group	(June 2004)
Total	449,592
Amis	117,017
Atayal	64,235
Paiwan	55,014
Bunun	36,256
Truku	15,096
Rukai	7,518
Tsou	5,473
Saisiat	4,664
Beinan	4,316
Tao (Yami)	679
Kavalan	626
Thao	520
Unregistered	138,178

Table 1.2: Present-day population of official Taiwan Aboriginal ethnic groups.<sup>46</sup>

The main target of the authenticity debate in Taiwan today is still not as much the line between Han and Aborigine as between Han and pingpu and between Aborigine and pingpu. This debate seems to stem from concerns over the redistribution of resources

Peoples at www.apc.gov.tw/upload/govinfo/aps\_/9306/aprp5g01.htm; and from the Ministry of the Interior at www.moi.gov.tw/stat/month/m1-01.xls.

<sup>45</sup> See Lanyu Township Office data at lanyu.taitung.gov.tw/know/know\_a5.htm.

and government funding to those *pingpu* descendents who have only recently begun to enunciate an ethnic identity after decades of silence and a virtual cessation of categorisation phenomena from the government and the public. An even larger number of people, possibly well over half of Taiwan's population, may have Aboriginal ancestry owing to the virtual absence of Han women on the island in the first generations of Han settlement, but this plays little to no role in generating new ethnic identification, and even then the identification is more likely to be appropriated by Taiwanese nationalist activists than anyone else.

This debate was reflected in the recent official recognition of the Thao and Kavalan peoples. To a lesser extent there has been debate over the authenticity of boundaries between or within recognised Aboriginal groups, a debate that accompanied the recent official recognition of the Truku people, formerly a grouping under the Atayal, and a move that was not without controversy within the Aboriginal community.

Consequently, the issue of "half caste" Aboriginality is not of concern here, though arguably it is relevant to discussions of the circumstances of the highly assimilated *pingpu* communities, both in 1945 and today. But because these *pingpu* "groups" at the outset of KMT rule were already considered Han Chinese (with some exceptions, which will be noted later) and mostly did not publicly identify as indigenous groups, the *pingpu* story must be put aside in this thesis.<sup>47</sup>

Is Aboriginality a special ethnicity?

Beckett states that Aboriginality is a special form of ethnicity because it claims prior

<sup>46</sup> See Council of Indigenous Peoples data at www.apc.gov.tw/upload/govinfo/aps\_/9306/aprp5g01.htm. <sup>47</sup> For a discussion of pingpu ethnic identification and activism, see Shih Cheng-feng (2003): "Pingpu shenfen rentong" (The status and identity of the *pingpu*). In: Pan Chao-cheng, Liu I-chang and Shih Cheng-feng (eds): *Taiwan pingpuzu* (The *pingpu* peoples of Taiwan). Taipei: Avanguard, pp.43-60.

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occupancy or sovereignty and, unlike other ethnic groups, cannot claim a homeland outside that state. Its distinctiveness is enhanced by its *unauthorised* nature: "ultimate or even dominant ethnic configurations" are impossible to arrive at because no individual, agency, community or court, Aboriginal or colonial, has the capacity to impose them. This fact reflects and lends itself to considerable cultural variability across Aboriginal groups, yet also provides space for aggressive claims of inauthenticity from both within and without.

Because these groupings of people must negotiate with the governments that have power over them, as Sally Weaver argues, this unauthorised nature, together with unique demands that are "not ... satisfied by the racial/poverty/immigrant policy approaches of liberal democracies," results in unconventional policy paradigms that further "affirm their unique ethnicity, the essence of which *is* their relationship with the nation-state."

Similarly, Beckett suggests that Aboriginal identity is *dependent* on the cultural and genetic (or physical) ascriptions of the coloniser. He also agrees that many of the world's indigenous peoples could be seen by states with substantial histories of immigration as simply another substitutable ethnicity in the service of nation-building.<sup>50</sup> But in seeing itself as unique, Aboriginal ethnicity defies this assumption and elevates itself above the implied civic contract signed by minority ethnic groups in immigrant societies and maintains this sense of separateness by referring to a history, intimately tied to the present, of bloody dispossession and atrocity.

Aboriginality is also "special" in terms of its heterogeneity and its need to moderate hegemonic components of self-ascription. As a political agenda, pan-Aboriginality

<sup>48</sup> Beckett (1988a), op. cit., pp.5-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See Sally M. Weaver (1984): "Struggles of the nation-state to define Aboriginal ethnicity: Canada and Australia." In: Gerald L. Gold (ed.): *Minorities and mother country imagery*. St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, p.209. Emphasis in original.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Beckett (1988a), op. cit., p.5.

claims to represent all Aborigines to some degree, but there are local ethnic boundaries that cannot be crossed carelessly without denigrating local Aboriginal identification and attracting displeasure from those communities. Indeed, local difference is enhanced by this meeting of difference:

Aboriginality as a melting-pot of collective traditions and militantism is undetachable from individual creations (art, literature, etc.) but also from conflicts of interest, which seem to promote the identity of local groups when they are placed in opposition to one another.<sup>51</sup>

The specialness of Aboriginality is crucial in understanding both the resistance of pan-Aboriginality to attack from assimilationist policy and its relative weakness in political mobilisation and "nationalisation."

#### Racism and assimilation

Racism, according to Jenkins, is when "an ethnic group dominates, or attempts to dominate, another set of people and, in the course of so doing, seeks to impose upon those people a categorical identity that is primarily defined by reference to their purported inherent and immutable differences from, and/or inferiority to, the dominating group."52

Interestingly, however, Jenkins chooses to include a claim of immutable difference in his definition, which would seem to disqualify assimilation as a racist agenda because assimilationist policy projects the idea that there is no indigenous difference that cannot

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See Barbara Glowczewski (1998): "All one but different': Aboriginality: National identity versus local diversification in Australia." In: Jürg Wassmann (ed.): Pacific answers to Western hegemony: Cultural practices of identity construction. Oxford: Berg, p.335. Jenkins, op. cit., pp.23-24.

and should not be eliminated via *change*, rather than murder, segregation or expulsion. The racism in the most spectacular acts of genocide attaches immutability to the body, which must be destroyed and not allowed contact with the pure, whereas with assimilation the offender is as much culture as the body – the objects of assimilation are assumed to be able to convert to the new culture because of the superior nature of the imposing culture. In practice, of course, racist sentiment on the ground tends to subvert the assumption of convertibility, and it could be argued that a belief in the immutability of difference is in any case not inconsistent with popular assumptions that Aboriginality – both cultural and "physical" – can be bred out after a number of generations.

The Taiwanese Aboriginal experience is, like Australia, an interesting example of settler-indigenous relations in which paternal inclusiveness rather than homicidal repulsion informed and continues to inform the attitude of a colonial *administration*, even if that more benign attitude is not always shared by the ordinary people living on the frontier inhabited by settler and Aborigine.

What is different about the two experiences, however, is the rapid adoption by the KMT of a cultural rather than biological approach to assimilationist policy. In this regard the KMT seems to have turned away from initial hints of a discourse on the need to "breed out" Aborigines through a formal policy of miscegenation, opting instead for the fuzzy but apparently sincere dogma that the benevolent and civilised elements of Chinese culture would themselves modernise and assimilate Aborigines in conjunction with a strategy of forced cultural attrition. In this respect, the KMT effectively bypassed what had been an overtly racial conception of the state's relationship with indigenous minorities and adopted a cultural stance instead. It is tempting to argue that this was in part linked to the pragmatism that security imperatives spawned. In contrast, the Australian experience saw many decades devoted to implementing theories

of segregation and racial dilution, before turning to a similar, cultural application of assimilation.<sup>53</sup>

A fascinating example of the KMT's lack of concern for such issues is its response to Aboriginal women leaving their communities to marry Han Taiwanese or seek work. This became of such concern to some Aboriginal communities that the government had to intervene; Aboriginal calls for assistance were met with government attempts to keep the women in those villages and thus keep the communities orderly.<sup>54</sup> A hardline policy of racial assimilation would surely have been encouraging the opposite trend.

The social Darwinism that informed much of the treatment of Australian Aborigines by their white neighbours and administrators was not replicated in Taiwan; references to Aboriginal inferiority were initially made by the government in terms of "fallen Chinese" or "backwardness" but these were not buttressed by the comforting, self-fulfilling prophecies of racial theory. 55 Locally, contempt for or fear of Aborigines was more a product of the memory of frontier conflict than a popularised version of the literati's treatises on race. It appears, too, that although race consciousness and Western racial theory had a wider audience among intellectuals at the dawn of modern China, 56 in 1945 the handling of Taiwan's Aborigines, though markedly colonial, was not accompanied by rationalisation in terms of a coherent Chinese philosophical or scientific tradition, let alone a Darwinian discourse, and notwithstanding the oft-stated belief in political and academic circles that Taiwan's Aborigines would die out.

<sup>53</sup> Rowley, op. cit.; and Russell McGregor (1999): "Wards, words and citizens: A.P. Elkin and Paul Hasluck on assimilation." Oceania, 69(4), 243-259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> See Yuan-chang (1953): "Shandi guniang zhongshen dashi" (Important, lifelong matters for mountain area girls). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 22 December 1953, p.4.

<sup>55</sup> See Michael Banton (1998): Racial theories. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> See Frank Dikötter (1992): The discourse of race in modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

## The assimilationist agenda

At this point I should clarify my use of the terms "assimilation" and "acculturation." As I mentioned earlier, "assimilation" is an ambiguous term that can refer to either a programme of policies or techniques that acts to make the target group identify with the dominant group in ethnic terms, or it can refer to this process as it is experienced by the target group — or more broadly, to any participant in a process of ethnic change, regardless of which side of the power divide he or she inhabits. This thesis uses both senses of the term depending on the context (which should be clear), particularly the former in the context of coercive and punitive policies relating to education and other areas usually described by a state using less offensive terms such as "development," "modernisation" or the broad and even more ambiguous concept of "integration."

I use the term "acculturation" in the sense discussed by John Shepherd, which refers to the more common phenomenon of ethnic groups co-opting characteristics of other groups but without a corresponding change in identity. Shepherd urges anthropologists to carefully distinguish between the two,<sup>57</sup> but I would argue that at any given moment the distinction between the experiential processes of assimilation and acculturation is fuzzy at best. Indeed, this thesis demonstrates that the variable effectiveness of assimilationist policies – policies that promote a new ethnic identity – inevitably results in phenomena of acculturation.

I also argue that policies do not have to invoke the ideal of assimilation to be assimilationist in *intent* or *effect*. At the outset it should be said that there was no explicit package of KMT policies that could be placed in a box and stamped with the words "programme of assimilation." However, policies that attempt – through coercion or enticements – not merely to improve the material welfare of subjects but also to eliminate ethnic differences and promote ethnic identification with the state are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> See John R. Shepherd (2000): "Rethinking sinicization: processes of acculturation and assimilation." Paper presented at the Third International Conference on Sinology, Academia Sinica, 29 June-1 July, 2000

manifestly assimilationist in character, regardless of the level of skill or insight with which they are drawn up. Even where good intentions are on display and a sense of compassion informs ethnic relations, policies which in the end disseminate the majority's culture at the expense of minority identification are no less part of an assimilationist process, and it is this process I refer to as an "agenda" or "programme."

Two examples should make this point clear. The first is the overwhelming presence of the term "backwardness" (*luohou*) in government and popular descriptions of not only Aboriginal disease and poverty, but also of the very cultural building blocks that distinguished Aboriginal people from Han Taiwanese, the state and each other.

The second is government policy itself – and how regulations were manipulated when implemented on the ground. Inspection of the 1951, 1952, 1958 and 1964 provincial government regulations for teachers of Aboriginal children reveals that only the Japanese language was explicitly banned in the classroom. Yet every Aboriginal (and non-Mainlander Taiwanese) person I have spoken to in regard to his or her educational experience can relate incidents of physical punishment and humiliation meted out to children who uttered words in their indigenous tongue in the presence of a teacher or other official.

Complementing this enforcement of state culture, provincial government records make precious little reference to Aboriginal culture other than the need to accommodate the communication gap through occasional use of Japanese materials and broadcasts. It is not until 1984 that the "completeness" and "purity" of Aboriginal culture is considered worth "preserving."

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, pp.340-343.

See Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee (ed.)(1998): Taiwan Yuanzhumin shiliao huibian disanji: Taiwan sheng zhengfu gongbaozhong youguan Yuanzhumin fagui zhengling huibian (1) (A collection of historical materials on Taiwan's Aborigines, vol. 3: A collection of public announcements of the Taiwan Provincial Government regarding Aboriginal laws and decrees). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.166, p.175, p.179 and p.330.

In general, however, the simplicity of the assimilationist ideal – eradicating ethnic difference by diluting and eventually absorbing it – is rather more impressive than the assimilationist's ability to appreciate the complexity of the process, let alone his response to policy failure.

C.D. Rowley, in his groundbreaking discussion of frontier relations in Australia, was almost amused by the uncomfortable fact that, despite the widespread application of assimilationist policy in that country at the time, such policies had long before been shown to be anachronistic, and that an understanding of what "assimilation" was trying to achieve in practical terms was as elusive as ever.

This goal has not been clearly defined. It has obviously implied equality – in housing, health, and education facilities, in civil rights, and in employment. But no precise goals, eventual or interim, have been set. Nor have governments been prepared to require the community at large, and vested interests in the status quo, to concede racial equality ... The emphasis until now ... has been on the training of the Aboriginal.<sup>60</sup>

Rowley mocked such attempts at social engineering, as well as government ignorance of the importance of land in the process and the less than enthusiastic funding of assimilationist policies that were, in any case, of dubious merit. Eventually, he argued, with social problems increasing instead of decreasing, and little money available to throw at them, policymakers settled for the formula of "tuition before equality." Subsequent drift in strategy, featuring "ad hoc policies, with low priorities," was then rationalised by the state as the result of stubborn residue within Aboriginal culture rather than the outcome of "arbitrary and pointless interference with their lives."

Rowley's assessment of assimilation is quite suitable for understanding the mechanisms

<sup>60</sup> Rowley, op. cit., pp.2-3. Emphasis in original.

<sup>61</sup> ibid., p.4.

used by the KMT on Aboriginal communities. The primary message transmitted to Aboriginal people in KMT propaganda was its mission in *educating* Aboriginal people – not just how to speak Chinese, how to sew dresses, sing Nationalist songs and use Chinese names, but how to *be* Chinese. It was as if by *believing* oneself to be Chinese one's enduring physical differences and residual cultural markers could be usurped. The KMT therefore worked to emphasise the cultural nature of what it was enforcing; in tandem with this, it warned the Han Taiwanese public that traditional, racially flavoured insults such as "savage" were no longer acceptable, and that Aborigines would be referred to using terms it deemed suitable for a loose group of people being brought into – or brought *back* into, as Aborigines were told – the fold of Chinese civilisation. The irony, of course, is that these new terms would themselves be attacked decades later for perpetuating ideas of Aboriginal inferiority. 62

Beckett says that with a newly cultural basis for assimilation, intervention in Aboriginal lives became more ferocious.<sup>63</sup> Certainly, in Taiwan, with security matters under control and a limited amount of money finally trickling down to the level of Aboriginal administration in the mid-1950s, intervention was pervasive and coercive – if inconsistent – in application. It is important to note, however, that these processes were lent tremendous credibility in Aboriginal communities by the fact that Aboriginal people were legally citizens of the Republic of China at the moment the KMT assumed power, and even if they were not specifically named in the ROC Constitution as indigenous people, they were nonetheless nominally subject to the same laws and more or less enjoyed the same rights – even if these rights and laws were weakened by autocracy, corruption and the legal relativism accompanying martial law. They did not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> See Yijang Baluar (1993): "Women weishenme xuanze 'Taiwan yuanzhuminzu' zheige chenghu?" (Why do we choose the appellation "Taiwan Aboriginal people"?). In: Chang Mao-kuei et al.: Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (Ethnic relations and national identity). Hsintien: Chang Yung-fa Foundation Institute for National Policy Research, pp.187-190; and Huang Ying-kuei, Chiang Pin, Chen Mao-tai, Shih Lei and Chu Hai-yuan (1993): "Zunzhong yuanzhuminde zicheng" (Respect Aboriginal self-appellation). In: Chang Mao-kuei, et al.: Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong (Ethnic relations and national identity). Hsintien: Chang Yung-fa Foundation Institute for National Policy Research, pp.191-197.

<sup>63</sup> Beckett (1988b), op. cit., p.201.

begin to suffer the Australian Aborigine's indignity of being in a constitutional no man's land in which voting rights, free movement, the owning of property and even choice of marriage partner were forbidden or curtailed on the whim of provincial governments and the "protectors" of Aborigines in their employ.<sup>64</sup>

One latter-day similarity between Taiwan and Australia, however, has notable ramifications for ethnic identification. Positive (as opposed to punitive) incentives for Aboriginal people to assimilate – such as scholarships, training, reasonably well-paid jobs and a sense of professional achievement in the larger community – deterred a good number of the best and brightest in Aboriginal communities from maintaining an "oppositional culture." This generates increasingly efficient networks of patronage, but it should be pointed out that practical limits to the provision of incentives open up new potential for resentment and division in Aboriginal communities, 66 though this appears to have been offset in Taiwan's case by a much more aggressive inclusion of Aborigines in the police force, the army and local government, including guaranteed mayoral and sub-mayoral elected posts in thirty Aboriginal townships. 67

Liah Greenfeld states that national identity is fundamentally a matter of dignity, <sup>68</sup> and thus fundamentally not a matter of rationality. This psychological element is crucial. If Greenfeld's claim is correct, the assimilator's primary task is to ensure that nation-oriented dignity is inculcated in the targets of assimilation, either by *introducing* the sensation to those who have not felt it or have lost it, or by *replacing* any prior dignity that threatens to obstruct the assimilative process, including dignity derived from non-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> See Marcia Langton (2001): "The nations of Australia." Speech delivered 20 May 2001 at the Capitol Theatre, Sydney. Broadcast on Radio National (Australia), 21 February 2001. Text last available at www.abc.net.au/rn/deakin/docs/langton.doc on 5 March 2005.

<sup>65</sup> Cowlishaw (1988), op. cit., pp.102-103. See also Morris, op. cit..

<sup>66</sup> Cowlishaw (1988), op. cit., p.103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Cf. Gillian Cowlishaw (1994): "Policing the races." Social Analysis, 36, 71-92, which discusses the ethnic and political ramifications of black communities being policed by white men.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> See Liah Greenfeld (1992): *Nationalism: five roads to modernity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p.487.

national sources. This is a daunting task, though rarely admitted as such by the assimilator, and programmes of assimilation tread especially delicate ground in the latter instance, in which callous denigration and wanton destruction of belief systems and their representations in material culture threaten to alienate, dispirit and enrage the target. The greatest danger for the assimilator is the subsequent development of dignity based in oppositional processes.

In the case of the KMT, assimilationist policies attempted to co-opt one or more expressions of "dignity" – including that engendered by the Japanese – and channel it in another direction, all the while guarding against the development of a third form, namely pan-Aboriginal identity. The KMT sought to consolidate the personal dignity of Aboriginal people who would be attracted to it by emphasising their value or worthiness as national subjects or citizens rather than as members of local or ethnic communities, fostering the Chinese national point of view while simultaneously dousing Aboriginal expressions of political and cultural dignity.

In general, the coloniser's generation of Aboriginality upon contact with indigenous people results in the need to confront *two* distinct ethnic identities: local Aboriginality, as expressed in differences between local Aboriginal communities and the coloniser, and pan-Aboriginality, as expressed in identification with some or all other Aboriginal groups and the activism that sometimes follows this. In other words, the first target is the pre-existing ethnic identity among Aboriginal groups; but in attempting to destroy this, the nation-state creates the space for pan-Aboriginal identity, and in the end, the possibility emerges that neither will be destroyed.

## Aboriginality and pan-Aboriginality

The distinction between Aboriginality and pan-Aboriginality should be noted here. The two concepts seem to overlap depending on the context. Pan-Aboriginality seems to refer to identification with the entire Aboriginal population within a state, or even across state borders. But there is a case to be made that pan-Aboriginality need only extend a very short distance before such group identification begins to invoke Aboriginal "essences" and other cultural claims. On the other hand, Aboriginality refers to any of a variety of ethnic identifications for an Aboriginal person or community, or even all Aborigines, and is ambiguous without reference to a dialectical partner. Pan-Aboriginality, however, is explicitly a discourse that *acts* to unite disparate communities at an ethnic level, a political move that is potentially empowering, yet potentially repulsive if expressions of pan-Aboriginality infringe upon local Aboriginal sensibilities.

## Pan-Aboriginality is not a nationalism

Jenkins argues that racism and nationalism are ideologies, or bodies of political knowledge, as opposed to the ethnic groups that staff these ideologies. But ethnicism—an ethnic ideology—may not be coextensive with nationalism or racism.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, the dilemma facing indigenous communities may provide insight into what Jenkins calls a neglected area of concern: those "ethnic ideologies which are neither racist nor nationalist in their primary orientation,"<sup>70</sup> but which tend to veer towards one or both of these ideologies on occasion. If this is the case, Aboriginal identity may be a useful example of an ethnic identity that is able to interact with the ideologies that surround it, but which is ultimately unable to conform to them. The "nationalist" or "racist" manifestations of Aboriginal political activity would simply represent frustrated or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, p.87.

pragmatic attempts to defend that which is held dear, rather than point to serious engagement with these ideologies.

Jenkins further argues that, "The collective project need not be independence, secession, or any of the other political goals ... under the sign of nationalism. It may [instead] be cultural preservation and promotion ... or the creation of a particular kind of society."

I argue that Aboriginal activism is a precious example of such a project, and when framed as "nationalism" it carries a paradox – its instrumentalism ideally leads to its own demise, and therefore it cannot be regarded as nationalist.

Beckett and Tonkinson, however, argue that Aboriginality does satisfy the conditions for a national group.<sup>72</sup> Jeff Archer, likewise, sees in politically expressed Aboriginality the same "characteristic contradictions of nationalism," including the employment of a reconstructed past, the invoking of "anti-materialistic spiritual superiority" and the use of modernistic legalisms to combat legalisms wielded by the coloniser.<sup>73</sup>

I am not convinced by this. There are seven problems that suggest "Aboriginal nationalism" is not what it appears to be. These are the appropriation of Aboriginality by the state and non-Aboriginal citizens; the futility of a strictly nationalist agenda; the absence of an indigenous high culture; Aboriginal indifference toward socioeconomic mobility; differing conceptions of the homeland; the oppositional and coalitional nature of pan-Aboriginalism; and, ultimately, the devolutionary nature of pan-Aboriginalism.

The first of these problems, the appropriation of Aboriginality – either by the state or the non-Aboriginal citizenry – usually serves the purpose of revising the dominant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, p.163.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Beckett (1988b), op. cit.; and Robert Tonkinson (1998): "National identity: Australia after Mabo." In: Jürg Wassmann (ed.): *Pacific answers to Western hegemony: Cultural practices of identity construction*. Oxford: Berg, Ch. 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> See Jeff Archer (1991): "Ambiguity in political ideology: Aboriginality as nationalism." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 2(2), p.163.

national identity, an example of which I described in the preface. The interesting thing about such appropriation, from an ascriptive point of view, is that Aboriginal people are categorised even as that categorisation is embraced by the colonising group as part of its own group identification. In the cases of Taiwan and Australia, both immigrant societies undergoing prominent debate on issues of national identity, Aboriginal culture has been used to denote indisputable, primordial Australia-ness or Taiwan-ness to the wider nation. Aboriginal culture and people are said to be intrinsic to the national story. Their accommodation may even be redemptive because of the injection of ancient spiritual wisdom into a troubled materialistic culture, <sup>74</sup> or the inculcation of environmental awareness and ecological balance — said to be an essential part of "traditional" Aboriginal society — at a time of rapid despoilment in Australia and Taiwan. The problem with this is that Aboriginal "nationalists" are generally neither able nor necessarily willing to oppose this appropriation of identification, which is something that a functional nationalism demands of its practitioners.

In addition, even as settler states appropriate Aboriginal iconography and culture, they struggle to do the same with Aboriginal *descent*, an impotence that irritates "the nationalism of the settler society." This impotence is most keenly felt by civic nationalisms easily offended by indigenous communities who refuse to be likened to — or be portrayed as equal in status to — minority settler groups on the basis of this descent and the privileges it affords. In Taiwan's case, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Three, certain Nationalist writers attempted to co-opt Aboriginal descent by tracing it

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> See Andrew Lattas (1991): "Nationalism, aesthetic redemption and Aboriginality." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 2(3), 307-324; and Andrew Lattas (1992): "Primitivism, nationalism and individualism in Australian popular culture." In: Bain Attwood and John Arnold (eds): *Power, Knowledge and Aborigines*. Bundoora, Victoria: La Trobe University Press, pp.45-58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> It should be said that the discourse *opposing* Aboriginality as a spiritual nutrient for the nation is much more advanced and sophisticated in Australia than Taiwan; see Andrew Lattas (1997): "Aborigines and contemporary nationalism: Primordiality and the cultural politics of otherness." In: Gillian Cowlishaw and Barry Morris (eds): *Race matters: Indigenous Australians and 'our' society*. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, Ch. 12. See also Ian Bartholomew (2003): "Hunting down Aboriginal pride." *Taipei Times*, 5 January 2003, p.18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Beckett (1989), op. cit., p.118.

back to China and labelling Aborigines as "fallen Chinese," a position that was not shared by everyone, and especially not pro-KMT Han Taiwanese such as Lien Chentung, who preferred to place the Han at a considerable racial distance from Taiwan's "savages."

The second problem is that "Aboriginal nationalism" cannot deliver what nationalism promises:

Nations that become nation states move on from imagined communities to political institutions, and national struggle becomes objectified in official history. The nations of the Fourth World, however, have not become nation states and are unlikely to do so. Encapsulated as the internal colonies of nation-states, the cultural struggle remains vital and for long periods may be all that they have. [Australian] Aborigines, like native Americans and others, face the unending task of resisting attempts, on the one hand to cut them off from their "heritage," and on the other to bury them within it as "a thing from the past."

Archer argues that Aboriginality as a nationalist ideology is "permanently frozen in the pre-independence stage of colonial nationalism," and is energised by the "simple dichotomy between colonised and coloniser." Faced with the grim reality of ongoing disadvantage and discrimination, Aboriginality must make the best of a bad lot. Caught in a permanent cultural and political struggle against both the majority culture *and* the prison of a past threatening to deauthenticate the ethnic present, it becomes a "hegemonic project attempting to forge a common sense view of a sub-state nationalism."

Michael Hechter defines nationalism broadly as "collective action designed to render the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Beckett (1988b), op. cit., p.212.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> ibid..

boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit,"<sup>80</sup> which at first glance could include pan-Aboriginality if Aboriginal people were to secure a system of limited sovereignty. Even within this wider definition, however, it remains the case that the "governance unit" is territorially defined, a binding together that Hechter points out has enjoyed a broad consensus in the scholarly literature.<sup>81</sup> Despite Hechter's provision for typologies of nationalism other than the main forms he describes,<sup>82</sup> pan-Aboriginality from the very beginning differs in terms of the meaning of the "collective" that acts and the meaning of "congruence" between Aboriginal people and the unit that governs them.

The third problem is the absence of a "high culture" in Aboriginal society. One of Ernest Gellner's famous arguments describes the "nation" as a sociopolitical development that required industrialisation to flourish, resulting in a dedicated high culture – namely, "standardised, literacy- and education-based systems of communication" – across an entire polity, and often at the expense of a wide range of low cultures. The nation-state came to be the guardian and mass propagator of that high culture, because this culture "cannot dispense with a political infrastructure."

Like Australian Aborigines, Taiwan's indigenous communities had no written languages, relying instead on oral and material transmission of knowledge. Admittedly, the lack of a common mother tongue and universal illiteracy did not distinguish Aborigines from certain groups of Chinese from previous centuries. But for the Chinese, a highly centralised high culture and bureaucratic network could tap into the mass of illiteracy for self-renewal. In contrast, indigenous communities with no high culture eventually must use *linguae françae* that have few or no roots in indigenous culture.

<sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, p.168.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> See Michael Hechter (2000): Containing nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, p.15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> ibid.. p.7.

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*, pp15-17.

Later waves of migrants in settler societies have generally belonged to systems built with high culture, thus providing a ready canvas for the transfer of nationalist ideas, the facilitation of universal education and acceptance of national iconography. In addition, these groups rarely develop a national claim upon the host state. The situation is different when nationalist discourse makes contact with Aboriginal communities. Lacking the rich pool of similarly structured systems of high culture that help the composition of a national history, indigenous communities must rely on components of the high culture of the state to communicate with one another and formulate national ideas. Without an indigenous high culture, they struggle to find common "authoritative and normative styles of communication," and are profoundly reliant on the same high culture that they intermittently oppose but which perpetually challenges their identity.

This leads to a fourth problem that hampers any claim of pan-Aboriginality to nationalism: it does not demand a greater degree of mobility within the nation-state. For Gellner, universal education with a high degree of generic training and capacity for retraining, the elevation of the written word, the demotion of context-based meaning in communication, and the imperative of "exo-socialisation" — the ability to communicate with an increased number of people outside old boundaries — are necessary elements in the inculcation of nationalism. But in settler societies all of these elements are under the direct control of the coloniser, not Aboriginal people. The first taste of these procedures is necessarily in the context of assimilationist policy. By the time pan-Aboriginality begins an activist phase, and no matter how oppositional it may be, this ethnicism is irrevocably steeped in the psychology of the coloniser.

Aboriginal people have largely been *prevented* from excelling in any of these elements at any given time. Educational resources, though available, were scarce, crude or overly

83 See Ernest Gellner (1983): Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.54 and p.51.

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, p.50.

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, p.38.

specialised. Advancing to high school and university would mean the most gifted Aboriginal students would leave behind ethnic segregation but arrive in learning environments in which they were uncompetitive and easily dispirited in the company of Han Taiwanese or White Australians. All of this combines to obstruct the process of "exo-socialisation."

It is therefore in the interest of the assimilationist enterprise that disadvantaged groups are actively encouraged to obtain a mobility comparable to the rest of society. The use of "affirmative action," often denounced by those suspicious of the institutionalisation of ethnic privilege, therefore has a *nationalist* and perhaps an *assimilationist* imperative. It is not surprising, therefore, to note that "affirmative action" in Taiwan did not encounter significant opposition until *after* democratisation, when the balance of expressions of nationalism shifted more to the general public and away from the grip of KMT political control.

The fifth problem involves the "homeland." Anthony Smith argues that the acquisition of a homeland is a precondition of the nation because only the homeland can provide the nation with infrastructural security ("economic autarchy"), a symbolic base for the inculcation of fraternity and cohesion and an active political base to mobilise the citizenry for nation-building. <sup>86</sup> Together these conditions provide for the development of a "deep, *horizontal* comradeship." <sup>87</sup>

But when settlers arrive in a new territory, and especially when they begin to encroach on Aboriginal land, a pioneer discourse serves as a precursor for a nationalist discourse that devalues or denigrates indigenous people, a perspective with a legal manifestation in Australia known as *terra nullius*. In an era of nationalism, Aborigines are encouraged to

<sup>86</sup> See Anthony D. Smith (1986): The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.163.

<sup>87</sup> See Benedict Anderson (1991): Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso, p.7.

share in this de-emphasising of theft, murder and other less pleasant forms of frontier conflict, and are instead encouraged to look at the entire country as equally possessed by all. Indeed, many may choose to do so. However, this does not apply to Aboriginal people in relation to other *Aboriginal* land and how other Aboriginal communities relate to that land. There may exist horizontal comradeship between Aboriginal people in some sense, but this does not extend to the crucial element of land, which, it seems to me, is a most obvious violation of the nationalist merging of nation and state.

The sixth problem goes to the heart of Aboriginality. John Stanton suggests there is a fundamental dissonance between pan-Aboriginality and nationalism in that pan-Aboriginality is a coalition held together more by its difference to a more powerful ethnic group or state than by what is supposedly common to Aboriginal people as a whole.

Aboriginality is not a concept that necessarily implies similarity. Rather, it is based on the recognition of a shared range of common experience which unites all Aborigines and identifies them as such in contrast to all other persons.<sup>88</sup>

Pan-Aboriginality is therefore given meaning only because of the ubiquitous physical or administrative presence of the non-Aborigine. Stanton adds that:

Dissonance may occur between the nature of local particularist loyalties and broader themes of common identification, particularly when the patterns of local diversity are ignored or overwhelmed by the imposition of government policies.<sup>89</sup>

The atomisation of nations that is demanded by crude nationalist reasoning cannot

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> See John Stanton (1990): "Autonomy and dependency: the experience at Mount Margaret." In: Robert Tonkinson and Michael Howard (eds): Going it alone? Prospects for Aboriginal autonomy: Essays in honour of Ronald and Catherine Berndt. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, p.230.

<sup>89</sup> ibid..

tolerate this state of affairs. Nor does such thinking sit well with David Turner's assessment of Australian Aboriginal societies as "variants of the ward principle, albeit wards invested with the power to grant citizenship." Such a localised concept of citizenship is no less political than the state's. Earlier, Turner rejects the "extremes of assimilation and separate development" and opts for the "middle ground" in his discussion of Aboriginal affairs in Australia. Turner seems to have a rather dismal opinion of such nationalism because its expression would likely harm the interests of Aboriginal people who reside in this "middle ground." Indeed, he states that the concept of "nation," like "band," "clan" and "tribe," derives from terms used for the "primitive forebears" of the pioneers and social scientists who choose to apply terms to societies beyond their comprehension.

Turner then turns to the paradox of Aboriginal government, a paradox at the heart of the idea of Aboriginal nationalism and which applies equally to Taiwan:

By constituting jurisdictions on an Aboriginal basis we create an Aboriginal ethnicity that Aboriginal culture would deny.<sup>93</sup>

The final problem is the resulting *devolutionary* nature of pan-Aboriginality. Archer suggests that the consequences of a *successful* nationalist campaign might include the very death of Aboriginality:

Australian Aborigines ... have a perpetual struggle to resist their colonialisation and to preserve their own myths ... And, as with other nationalist groups, if they should achieve independent political status, it is likely that internal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> See David Turner (1990): "Aboriginal development in theoretical perspective: from the heavens down or the ground up." In: Robert Tonkinson and Michael Howard (eds): Going it alone? Prospects for Aboriginal autonomy: Essays in honour of Ronald and Catherine Berndt. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, p.156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> *ibid.*, p.150.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> ibid., p.156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, p.159.

divisions would surface. In short, Aboriginality might not survive its own success.<sup>94</sup>

Under ideal circumstances, therefore, this ethnicism is a transient creature, seeking to strengthen forces of localisation in Aboriginal communities that ultimately render pan-Aboriginalism redundant, a phenomenon already taking shape in Australia:

The current attitude on this issue [native title to land] ... insists on the importance of this moment of Australian history where Aborigines consolidate their Aboriginality not as a political ideology but as a force of local cohesion, region by region. Beyond common tendencies, localization means an identity stigmatization which is reproduced in two ways: first, through the continuity with the local ancestral heritage — such as renewing ceremonies, creating cultural festivals or reconstituting local history; secondly, the creation of new social structures, such as tribal or family corporations, having the aim to resettle on their land or to negotiate their participation in the development of towns or national parks, women's groups, refugees, etc. 95

I argue that nationalism – and its unceasing appeal to fate and destiny – is not a coherent ideology in which such transience can be framed, even if Aboriginality must adapt to and sometimes adopt nationalist tactics and rhetoric. On this point I depart from the suggestion that Aboriginality as a tool of resistance or negotiation in dealings with the nationalist agendas of other ethnic or civic structures is necessarily a nationalist phenomenon. But even if it appears to be so, I argue that it is a mock nationalism at best: playing along with the game to secure the desired result. Unfortunately for Aboriginal people, the game is difficult to play at the best of times, and every now and then, perhaps without any warning, the state changes the rules.

<sup>94</sup> Archer, op. cit., p.166.

<sup>95</sup> Glowczewski, op. cit., p.350.

Nor can Aboriginality be tied down by assuming it must embrace the "rationalist programme of future democratisation and liberty." Theorists such as Will Kymlicka have laboured to find space for an Aboriginality that satisfies both individual liberty and communitarian responsibility, hence paving the way for a compatible place within a nationalist framework. But as we will see in the case of Taiwan, Aboriginality can be intimately tied to a regime with a truncated appreciation of democracy, an intimacy that is reflected to this day in the support Taiwan's Aboriginal people give to political parties that rigorously exploit hostility and indifference toward democratic institutions. It is also reflected in the ubiquitous vote-buying of Aboriginal politics.

Despite Archer's description of Aboriginality as a "permanently frozen nationalism," there is something more to Aboriginality than can be represented by a term akin to paralysis or ossification. Aboriginality is different to other ethnic identifications in that it cannot play the game of national destiny for the same prize that other struggling groups do. Though pragmatically adopting the same tactics and rhetoric, other enduring and conspicuous elements of this ethnicism mitigate against a functional, post-independence national identity. Aboriginality may well be frozen within a nationalist system, as Archer suggests, ironically achieving in this ostensible failure, this state of suspension, a modern analogue of its fabled timelessness and changelessness – not in terms of "traditional" culture, but in terms of the *durability of its boundaries*. But it is this durability that has the potential to lend tremendous strength to Aboriginality as an ethnicism, to the potential for future cultural production, and therefore to the agendas of Aboriginal activists trapped and dispirited within a prison of nationalist discourse.

Pan-Aboriginality violates a key requirement of nationalist thought: it does not award itself eternity as a single people, because mobilization in the service of local

<sup>96</sup> Archer, op. cit., p.163.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> See, for example, Will Kymlicka (1995): Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights. New York: Clarendon Press.

empowerment is a means and *not* the end; indeed, pan-Aboriginality is an ethnicism via coalition that fulfils itself by providing a defense against encroachment from the coloniser and maximising the resources that can be obtained from the coloniser, and then, in the unlikely event that this threat and this incentive ends, by existing no more.

### Aberration as fact or ascription

It is also possible to link the two forms of boundary collapse (individual and group) and hypothesise a connection between the damage to ethnic identification and the higher frequency of certain aberrant phenomena in indigenous communities. The self-image of members of a minority can interact with exclusion and discrimination in a "vicious circle of cumulative decay and disadvantage." The result is an ethnic group that seems burdened with aberrations so severe that the viability of the community is threatened.

Some of these apparently aberrant forms are intimately linked with both categorisation and group identification – and therefore pose a more complex problem. In Australia, Marcia Langton denounces the categorisation of the "drunken Aborigine," a stereotypical mixture of cultural and racial projections, as an enduring example of the "pattern of colonisation and the situating of Aboriginal men and women as mendicants and whores during the frontier days." Such a pattern has proved to be so powerful that "impressionistic and insubstantial" notions have "enable[d] the sociological or anthropological notions about degeneration, or more recently deprivation and social pathology, to remain intact." Langton has made similar comments about the misrepresentation of urban Aborigines by researchers. And Cowlishaw reminds us

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., pp.60-61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> See Marcia Langton (1997): "Rum, seduction and death: 'Aboriginality' and alcohol." In: Gillian Cowlishaw and Barry Morris (eds): *Race matters: Indigenous Australians and "our" society*. Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, p.93.

ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> See Marcia Langton (1981): "Urbanizing Aborigines: The social scientists' great deception." Social

that public (open air) drinking by Australian Aborigines can become a political act simply by virtue of the hostile response of the dominant ethnic group to it; such defiance represents only the "outer edge" of a mostly hidden world of cultural difference.<sup>102</sup>

In Taiwan, the Amis activist, administrator and Presbyterian minister Isak Afo has made a similar point, though crucially he alleges that the stereotype has travelled beyond the non-Aboriginal public and has been adopted by members of the Aboriginal elite themselves in order to enhance their superior personal credentials within both the Han community *and* the Aboriginal community.<sup>103</sup>

There is advantage to be had in the dominant ethnicity's categorisation of aberrance, in that group identification is invoked by the realignment of aberrant behaviour as a form of resistance. The key issue here is that aberration, however it is accounted for and whoever accounts for it, remains a powerful tool of categorisation and identification and in this respect entrenches perceptions of difference. Indeed, if sufficiently powerful, hostility to such perceived or actual Aboriginal difference "confirms and reactivates the oppositional nature of Aboriginal culture," whether expressed in the form of direct action, or in the subtler guise of a "highly developed humour which reinterprets events which threaten to engulf Aborigines' lives." 105

John Morton is not impressed by what he views as the tendency by Cowlishaw and others to romanticise oppositional behaviour of Aboriginal people to the point of

Alternatives, 2(2), 16-22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Cowlishaw (1993), op. cit., p.187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> See Isak Afo (tr. Martin Williams)(2000): "Exploitative mythologies used to destroy Aborigines' sense of self." *Taipei Times*, 6 January 2000, p.9.

<sup>104</sup> Cowlishaw (1988), op. cit., p.98.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> See Gillian Cowlishaw (1987): "Colour, culture and the Aboriginalists." *Man*, 22, p.234. Elsewhere, she defines "oppositional culture" broadly as "the active protection and recreation of this arena of [dignity independent of the judgements of the wider society] which is grounded in knowledge of a different history from that which the white community knows and celebrates"; see Cowlishaw (1993), *op. cit.*, p.185.

valourising conduct that is transparently destructive, thereby applying a reverse, negative essentialism to Aborigines who are comfortable interacting with White society. 106 With regard to Australia, where children in a number of remote Aboriginal communities suffer brain damage from petrol-sniffing, where domestic violence in Aboriginal communities is a relatively serious problem, and where the "oppositional behaviour" of many Aboriginal men leads them to lives of incarceration at rates dramatically higher than other Australian ethnic groups, Morton's point has a harsh but sober quality to it. It is entirely reasonable that certain forms or rates of behaviour perceived to be ethnic in nature can be so physically or psychologically harmful to members of that group that community solidarity and identification can be threatened and especially if alternative identities offer greater security. I do not wish to enter the debate about what ought or ought not be "valourised"; my point is simply that aberration - however it is defined, produced and accounted for - is a powerful source of ascription that must be taken into account for its impact on boundary maintenance. 107 In the eyes of the KMT, Aboriginal "backwardness" (luohou) and "naivete" (danchun), together with all of the aberrant behaviour said to result from these afflictions, play a crucial role not only as the objects of assimilationist policy, but also as factors to be considered in accounting for and punishing political dissidence and other crimes relating to national security.

## Complexity of the dialectic on the ground

Ascriptions are not held or applied evenly within or across groups, nor across time, pointing to a bewildering complex of relationships that span the individual to the local

<sup>106</sup> See John Morton (1998): "Essentially black, essentially Australian, essentially opposed: Australian anthropology and its uses of Aboriginal identity." In: Jürg Wassmann (ed.): *Pacific answers to Western hegemony: Cultural practices of identity construction*. Oxford: Berg, Ch. 15.

Morton goes on to argue that essentialism is not a problem in itself. It is, rather, the inconsistent or unrecognised use of essentialism that should be of concern; *ibid.*, p.375.

to the national (and with indigenous groups, famously, to the international), with institutional variables particularly conspicuous, and each group with or potentially with its own dissenters. There is, therefore, a difficulty in talking of an ascription as inherently belonging to or being generated uniformly by an ethnic group, either in the context of categorisation or group identification. Empirical analysis is mandatory to understand the strength and type of ethnic ascriptions on the ground.

These dialectical phenomena can occur simultaneously and with different potential "others" for the same "self," depending on the individual and the point of reference, thus leading to a complicated and daunting mixture of potential ascriptions. In terms of self-definition, a person could be Aboriginal, as well as a citizen of the Republic of China, or of a future Taiwanese state, or (say) a Paiwan Aborigine, or a resident of the Santimen community, or a resident of the revitalised, traditional Jiuhaocha village way up in the mountains, or a Christian, or an atheist. Then there are Aboriginal relations between groups and individuals, with the Han population as a whole, with the Hoklo ethnic group, with the Hakka, with Mainlanders, with missionaries, and crucially with the state – all of these are dichotomies or potential dichotomies with their own features and potential for change. The implications that this complexity has for the strength of pan-Aboriginality are worthy of discussion.

Weaver's division of private ethnicity and public ethnicity is similar but not identical to the dialectic of ascription and thus offers further complexity. This division points to the *performance* component of ethnicity, and reminds us of the instability and variability of the *individual* person as an ethnic being. The distinction between private ethnicity (behavioural, situational, valid in the eyes of the performers themselves and distanced from the state though vulnerable to it) and public ethnicity (political, generalised, symbolic, coercive and portentous) also points to the different *types* of ascriptions within a group compared with those from outside. Weaver, however, looks at public

ethnicity not merely as the locus of exterior ascriptions but more broadly as a "contest of power between aboriginal political movements and the federal government." This seems to depict the clash of categorisations as one between "outside" and "inside," but the "inside," as a pan-Aboriginal group identification, still risks rebuttal at the community level.

Francis Peters-Little reminds us of the ease with which the supposedly basic unit of modern Aboriginal society - the "community," a term that I use loosely in this thesis can itself be subject to powerful ascription by the rest of society. She argues that this essentialisation (or, less politely, ignorance) of Aboriginal leadership, family networks, ambitions, divisions and other *local* diversity within or across Aboriginal communities is closely linked to continuing government intervention in Aboriginal lives. For Peters-Little, the challenge for Aboriginal people is to foster self-definition and hence an Aboriginal conception of self-determination; consequently "self-analysis and courage must be applied when and if we are to understand current hierarchical structures and notions of representativeness amongst the Aboriginal population." <sup>109</sup>

Thus, the range of ascriptive phenomena within a group and between a group and the rest of the population of a state, and even groups outside the state, offers considerable space for diversification in ethnic identity, so much so that the mere engagement of such a group by the state, let alone in the context of attempted assimilation, seems to carry with it tremendous unpredictability. But even if the state reasons that fine-tuned policy, careful implementation and the transformative power of its cultural superiority can overcome such complexity, there is still one major obstacle that must be dealt with intransigent or disruptive Aboriginal elite figures.

108 Weaver, op. cit., pp.184-185.

<sup>109</sup> See Frances Peters-Little (2000): The community game: Aboriginal self-definition at the local level. Canberra: AIATSIS Native Title Research Unit, p.18.

A major problem confronting those targeted by assimilationist policy is that hostile categorisations of Aboriginal people are more or less beyond the reach of even the most empowered and educated individual Aborigines who might wish to change them. The idea that ethnic identity is to a significant degree the product of strategising individuals<sup>110</sup> is problematic not so much because of the "materialist, individualist and narrowly instrumentalist" overtones, as Jenkins writes,<sup>111</sup> but rather – in Taiwan's case – because the gulf in power means strategising individuals or institutions outside the group can have as much as, if not more, impact on the group's *internal* ascriptions as those within them. This is not to say that decisions cannot be made within indigenous groups or strategies devised to improve personal fortunes or the fortunes of a group. What is said here is that the extent to which *individuals* make decisions that bear on the *scope*, *distribution*, *and strength or weakness of boundaries* depends on which side of a boundary those individuals exert influence.

The gap in power is increased by the dominant ethnic group when it suppresses, appropriates or destroys those intellectuals and other activists who attempt to close this gap, sometimes with assistance from rival Aborigines, and, in Taiwan's case, all the while as other Aboriginal elites do the state's bidding and are rewarded for it. In such circumstances, the employment of political and other terror is a variable that should not be taken lightly, 112 and the available response for many Aborigines as a result is little more than a disconnected passivity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Barth (1969b), op. cit.. For an application of this argument in the case of Taiwan's Aborigines, see Henrietta Harrison (2001): "Changing nationalities, changing ethnicities: Taiwan indigenous villages in the years after 1946." In: David Faure (ed.): In search of the hunters and their tribes: studies in the history and culture of the Taiwan indigenous people. Taipei: Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Ch. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> See Jeremy Beckett (1992): "Book review [of Erich Kolig (1989): Dreamtime politics: Religion, world view and utopian thought in Australian Aboriginal society]." Oceania, 62(3), p.235.

The Aboriginal can do little more than play out his role in relation to this administrative tradition. To breach this cycle requires some knowledge of how it developed.<sup>113</sup>

This thesis pays special attention to the circumstances in which terror was applied to the Aboriginal elites who were developing the knowledge to break this cycle, to their misfortune.

In discussing the influence of Aboriginal elites on pan-Aboriginality, Delmos Jones and Jacquetta Hill-Burnett argue that these elite figures are the engine room and flag-bearers for its production. Their weakness in the face of a colonial government, however, is said to divest Aboriginal people of sufficient power to formulate their own Aboriginality, leaving the "average" Aboriginal person without a public spokesperson and vulnerable to having his or her identity mapped out by "experts and authorities and mediated by institutions of the state system."

Given that some degree of Aboriginal identity is nurtured by an oppositional culture, it is perhaps a little excessive to say that "their own Aboriginality" cannot be produced even under the most oppressive conditions. The better question is what happens to Aboriginality when elite figures are targeted for destruction, ostracisation or appropriation. I therefore focus on the "intervention" of a state actively co-opting or aggressing against these figures. This is consistent with a fundamental concern of ethnicity research. It "should focus on power as well as on authority, and on the manner in which different modes of domination are implicated in the social construction of

<sup>113</sup> Rowley, op. cit., p.4.

See Delmos J. Jones and Jacquetta Hill-Burnett (1982): "The political context of ethnogenesis: An Australian example." In: Michael C. Howard (ed): Aboriginal power in Australian society. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, pp.214-246.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Morris, op. cit., p.64.

## Internal colonialism and welfare colonialism

When governments attempt to bring Aborigines into line with their own ascriptions, a colonial relationship is effected. 117 But the curious thing about "internal colonialism" 118 and its apparent indigenous corollary, "welfare colonialism," 119 is that assimilation or integration are stated or covert goals, whereas with traditional colonialism the prime motivation was economic or military and required the clear maintenance of distance between the coloniser and the colonised. 120 It is therefore important not to bind these terms too tightly. With internal and welfare colonialism, a government, even a democratic government, can be colonial (toward Aborigines, say, though the state is loath to admit this) and at the same time not colonial (towards its "own" ethnic group and possibly other ethnic groups). In Taiwan's case, however, the situation is muddied by the fact that the KMT, originally welcomed as the rightful rulers of Taiwan in 1945, also ruled the Han Taiwanese in a colonial manner, thereby cementing the nationalisation of a Taiwan-based ethnicity that had been incubating for decades under Japanese rule. 121 This suggests that there existed in Taiwan two distinctive forms of ethnic domination – among the Han, and between Han and Aborigine – and poses the interesting question of how the relationship between these "colonised" groups might develop in this environment.

<sup>116</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.73.

<sup>117</sup> Beckett (1988b), op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> See Michael Hechter (1975): Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966. Berkeley: University of California Press.

<sup>119</sup> See Robert Paine (ed.)(1977): The White Arctic: anthropological essays on tutelage and ethnicity. Toronto: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Beckett (1989), op. cit., p.120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> See various essays in Chang Mao-kuei et al. (1993): *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong* (Ethnic relations and national identity). Hsintien: Chang Yung-fa Foundation Institute for National Policy Research. See also Chang Mau-kuei (2000): "On the origins and transformation of Taiwanese national identity." *China Perspectives*, 28, 51-70.

Eventually, however, when assimilationist policy is acknowledged to have failed, it is withdrawn and replaced with "integrationist" ideology. In this scenario, Aboriginal difference is recognised, even celebrated, but only to the extent that it is politically and economically palatable to the state – that is, those forms that are "given complementary expression within the state."122

Meanwhile, those elements that continue to be frowned upon remain targets for interventionist policies. And subtly intervene these policies can, for the state exerts ideological control over "the extent and scope of pluralist practices" and "domesticates [social differences] in controlling the domains in which they can be 'legitimately expressed."123 But even state recognition of enduring cultural distinctiveness risks rendering Aboriginal poverty or other disadvantage as exotic, and thus incomparable to other forms of destitution. 124 This itself would constitute a reification that further distances the Aboriginal community from the non-Aboriginal community, and has implications with regard to the provision of welfare.

This thesis, however, focuses on a time in Taiwan well before the political rhetoric of multiculturalism begins to emerge. What is of interest, however, is that certain characteristics of "welfare colonialism" seem to have existed throughout the martial-law era in some form. The conflict between security interests, assimilationist policy and indeed political reform produced a strange admixture of both overt assimilationism and welfare colonialism, in which certain political, cultural and economic activities were greatly curtailed and policies enforced with violence or threats if necessary, even as Aboriginal communities were provided with a solid network of quite genuine political enfranchisement where processes of negotiation with Aboriginal elites were usually

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> Morris, *op. cit.*, p.71. <sup>123</sup> *ibid.*, pp.67-68.

<sup>124</sup> See Jeremy Beckett (1988c): "Aboriginality, citizenship and nation state." Social Analysis, 24, p.12.

more effective than coercive methods.

Thus, while aiming to wound and destroy Aboriginal culture and identification, the KMT had from the very beginning fostered an Aboriginal community that was, as Beckett said about Australian Aborigines, dependent but culturally legitimate "in terms that the state cannot wrest from it."125

But if characteristics of welfare colonialism were apparent in Taiwan as early as the 1940s, one of these that did not have a substantial role to play in the case of Taiwan's Aborigines until the country's democratisation was the "image of moral rectitude in the world at large,"126 which acts as a supernational overseer to various degrees and can serve as a political weapon. While it is true that journalists visiting the country as guests of the KMT regime were treated to the hospitality of Aboriginal people as part of statearranged "fact finding" tours, these interviews seemed to have been largely limited to "professional Aborigines" such as the famed Chief Mao of Sun Moon Lake. 127 It would not be until the 1980s, however, that Aboriginal activists could begin to utilise the "politics of embarrassment" with these journalists' successors and world bodies such as the International Labor Organisation and the United Nations, who would have greater access to uglier truths.

<sup>125</sup> ibid., p.17.

ibid., p.14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> Mao seems to have been wheeled out for a range of foreign dignitaries and celebrities over the years, including actor Charlton Heston and the King of Sudan (see english.maoshouse.com/history3.htm (cached version)). A picture of Mao also featured in the hagiography of Chiang Kai-shek and other key KMT figures written by W.G. Goddard, a right-wing Australian official and author, though Mao is misidentified as "chief" of the "Tsou tribe" and is not mentioned in the text; see W.G. Goddard (1966): Formosa: A study in Chinese history. Place of publication not shown: Michigan State University Press, p.62.
<sup>128</sup> Beckett (1988c), op. cit., p.15.

# Taiwan's Aborigines and the state

Before proceeding with a select history of KMT control of Aboriginal lives, it is appropriate to touch on a less direct method of control funded by the state and which, for a significant period, has served to justify state policies.

## Aborigines and the anthropologists

One telling feature of the first decades of postwar anthropological work on Taiwan's Aboriginal communities is the invisibility in the literature of the KMT and the changes wrought by assimilation in favour of capturing the residue of "traditional society" – a snapshot of what was thought to be quite unblemished, pre-contact Aboriginal cultures, despite the influence of Japanese rule on those cultures. The data had to be collated and analysed before what was thought to be the inevitable demise and disappearance of Aboriginal people. Power relations between Aboriginal societies and the KMT at that time were not of apparent concern, even though from late 1945 the KMT administration was in most cases (that is, in those locations where there was little to no mingling of Aboriginal and Han communities) the new and predominant "other" in the dialectical relationship of group identity and categorisation. Consequently, accounts of the relationship between the Chinese state and Aboriginal communities from that period must instead be sought from oral history and government documents, especially those drawn up by security agencies and administrative agencies dealing with Aboriginal affairs.

Although anthropological research on the impact of KMT policy would have been almost impossible because of the political situation – indeed, it was precisely *because* of security restrictions that essentialist research could endure – it is also important to recall

<sup>129</sup> Beckett (1988b), op. cit., p.201; and Langton (1981), op. cit., p.19.

that interethnic power relations were of little theoretical interest to Taiwan's anthropologists at the time anyway. Operating under the assumption that "(n)ative cultures were intricate, exotic and delicate edifices which could not change," the anthropology of the era was compromised by the same problems that affected earlier Australian research:

One was the narrow focus on "traditional Aboriginal society" which allowed anthropology to collaborate in the erasure of colonial relations from scrutiny. The second was the dominant conservatism which led academic anthropology to ignore or even support the aggressive assimilationism which was the real threat to Aboriginal culture.<sup>132</sup>

Besides, the concept of "tribe," which was largely the focus of that research, did not come under sustained attack until the 1960s when Fredrik Barth launched a paradigm shift from the study of "tribal society" to the social constructionist emphasis on the "ethnic group."<sup>133</sup>

Despite this apparent disciplinary strait-jacket imposed on them at the time, Fred Chiu is merciless in his description of the first wave of refugee anthropologists who settled in Taiwan after 1949 and who found that there was a small but rich garden of "stagnated" culture to study. From the Aborigines, Chiu suggests, Wei Hwei-lin and his colleagues at the newly renamed National Taiwan University could, at a time of extreme tension and threat of communist invasion, salvage a sense of continuity as torch-bearers for a genuine Chinese *academe* and as members of an advanced civilisation. Chiu also

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Attwood, op. cit., p.xiii.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> See Gillian Cowlishaw (1992): "Studying Aborigines: Changing canons in anthropology and history." In: Bain Attwood and John Arnold (eds): *Power, Knowledge and Aborigines*. Bundoora, Victoria: La Trobe University Press, p.25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> *ibid.*, pp.20-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> See Fred Y.L. Chiu (1999): "Nationalist anthropology in Taiwan 1945-1996: A reflexive survey." In: Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu (eds): Anthropology and colonialism in Asia and Oceania.
Richmond, England: Curzon Press, Ch. 4.

accuses (unnamed) researchers of historicising Aborigines to the extent that they could be linked to a romanticised Chinese past, thereby rendering assimilationist policy as not only natural, but *obligatory*. Such alleged sentiment is remarkably similar to the political line of propaganda issued to Aborigines by Pai Chung-hsi, the minister of defence, during the 228 Incident some years earlier, a speech I discuss in Chapter Five.

But the research appeal of Aboriginal culture eventually began to dry up, and KMT-era anthropology turned toward Han Taiwanese society and overseas Chinese as "test tubes or laboratories for the study of Chinese culture," reflecting once more the political line of the KMT and indeed of Western governments – a line largely accepted by Western social scientists studying in Taiwan. The Aborigines, meanwhile:

... fell from being the big treasure for ethnological researchers, to being surrogates for Chinese history, to being laboratories [sic] guinea pig for social experiment and then all the way down to being the locus of social problems, sources of a deviant population ... only to be resurrected as specimens in the state-run cultural mortuary called the "cultural village."

It would be decades before the processes of cultural change wrought by assimilationist policies themselves became the subject of research, <sup>138</sup> research highlighting what Fred Chiu glumly refers to as "social problems" in the preceding quote. An appreciation of the power relations between the social scientist and the Aborigine as a scientific object had to wait even longer, until the 1970s, even as liberal academics – "self-conscious Han chauvinists and statists," in Chiu's words – debated how Aborigines should best be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> *ibid.*, pp.99-100. For an example of Wei's political philosophy in regard to minorities, see Wei Hwei-lin (1945): "Ruhe queli sanminzhuyide bianjiang minzu zhengce" (How to entrench the frontier nationality policy of the Three Principles of the People). *Frontier Affairs*, 4(1), 2-4. *ibid.*, p.100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> *ibid*..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> See for example, Huang Ying-kuei (1975): "Cong xianxingde shandi zhengce tan shehui kexuede yingyong wenti" (A discussion of practical sociological problems in relation to current mountain area policy). *Man and Culture*, 5, 26-28; and Hsu Mutsu (1976): "Taiwan Gaoshanzude qingshaonian wenti" (The problems of juveniles among the Kaoshan people of Taiwan). *Man and Society*, 3(6), 28-30.

assimilated. 139 In the interim, Aboriginal people were seen as capable vehicles for the formulation of an idealised, "authentic" past, but incapable of qualifying for study as contemporary human beings. Aboriginal culture was, for a critical period, rendered as priceless if dying or dead, and worthless if alive.

Yet cultural essentialism can be vital for identification as an Aborigine; indeed, a commentator on Japanese colonialism in Taiwan argues it is "crucial for some forms of organized struggle."140 One prominent Australian Aboriginal writer has argued that "Aboriginal thought does strongly incline towards the essentialist position." Andrew Lattas also argues that attacking Aboriginal use of cultural essentialism is a political act that can delegitimise the right of Aborigines to hold the dominant culture accountable for past aggression as well as denying an autonomous world view. 142

Essentialism aside, there were other crucial factors at play in Aboriginal societies at the time, including the use of terror, violence and executions, which were never addressed by the anthropologists, nor anyone else. In almost all of the establishment literature involving Taiwan Aboriginal-Han relations of the immediate postwar period, there is what Cowlishaw would call a "remarkable gap":

One could read the earlier ethnographic literature on Australian Aborigines without discovering that a policeman's hand had ever been laid on an Aboriginal body ... as yet little ethnographic and analytical work has emerged to chart the social consequences of such experiences, and the systematic effects of intrusive state practices.143

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> Chiu, op. cit., pp.100-101.

<sup>140</sup> See Leo T.S. Ching (2001): Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the politics of identity formation. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> See Mudrooroo Nyoongah (1992): "Self-determining our Aboriginality, a response to 'Discourses on Aboriginality and the politics of identity in urban Australia." Oceania, 63(2), 156-157.

<sup>142</sup> See Andrew Lattas (1993): "Essentialism, memory and resistance: Aboriginality and the politics of authenticity." Oceania, 63(3), 240-267.

It is this gap, between 1945 and the onset of the Aboriginal movement some decades later, that my research will address. Informed by anthropological conceptions of ethnicity, but historical in method, this thesis charts coercive forms of KMT rule over Aboriginal people and in particular the impact of security agencies and their methods.

State security and assimilation

With assimilationist policy applied on the back of the military's security agencies and KMT branch offices, the Taiwan Aboriginal experience, like other indigenous experiences, offers the most literal of examples of the "absolute centrality of power relationships" <sup>144</sup> in ethnic relations.

Unexpectedly, Australia provides one fine example of how important this factor can be in the context of a foreign threat. Beckett tells how national security considerations led the federal government to pay particular attention to Torres Strait Islanders with ties to Japanese pearl divers and restive Aborigines elsewhere along Australia's northern coast in the 1930s. These were "full blood" groups that had been expected to die out and so did not previously fall under the assimilation policy; now they were brought within the fold of "half caste" Aborigines being prepared for citizenship for fear of foreign interference. 145

What Taiwan offers, on a much larger scale as a proportion of the Aboriginal population, is a picture of conflict between national security interests and the assimilationist goal of eradicating Aboriginality, even though both were being executed by the same or related agencies.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> See Gillian Cowlishaw (2001): "Introduction." *Oceania*, 71(3), p.170.
 <sup>144</sup> Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p.23.
 <sup>145</sup> Beckett (1988c), *op. cit.*, p.9.

Assimilationist policy is about enacting change through direct and coercive means. But distancing effects in colonial-style policy paradoxically defeat the would-be inclusiveness in assimilationist policy: the two, despite being regular brothers in arms, are utterly incompatible. As Gerald Sider argues, while indisputably destructive, state power cannot but generate complex and unharnessable forces that lead to cultural differentiation.

The peculiar intimacy between dominators and dominated – from above, an intimacy that comes packaged with brutality and contempt; from below, an intimacy riven with ambiguity – seems particularly important to the historically unfolding process of domination and resistance ... It is in trying to unravel the interwoven paradoxes and ambiguities of this intimacy that we can most clearly see what seems to be the fundamental *cultural* contradiction of the process of domination by Europeans over native Americans: between domination as a form of incorporation, of bonding together, and simultaneously domination as a form of creating distance, difference, and otherness.<sup>146</sup>

Or, as Beckett wryly states: "One should not ... conclude that the state is in full control of the situation." Sider makes another point with regard to the American frontier that is useful in understanding the failure of assimilationist policy in Taiwan.

The primary guarantee of Indian autonomy was not colonial policy, nor even simply the armed assertiveness of native peoples, but the expression of this assertiveness in a context where different sectors of the white political and economic elite sought to use Indians in different and largely incompatible ways.<sup>148</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> See Gerald Sider (1987): "Why parrots learn to talk, and why they can't: Domination, deception, and self-deception in Indian-White relations." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 29(1), p.11. <sup>147</sup> Beckett (1988c), op. cit., p.3.

Taiwan's Aborigines under the KMT were of course never armed to this extent, even if they were allowed the special use of hunting weaponry. But the broader incompatibility of policy with the political and economic environment in which policy is implemented is to be noted, because it is in this context that indigenous peoples could find "substantial room for negotiation, maneuver, and also specialization, that is, the opportunity for a partial autonomy, based upon a capacity to maneuver between interests they were forced to serve."149

In Taiwan this was reflected in new, specialised forms of Aboriginal collective action that were similarly "developed and reinforced in the cauldrons of colonial domination." <sup>150</sup> Military examples of this are the network of plains Aborigines that manned guard stations dividing Aboriginal and Han territory in the government's employ (the so-called ai troops), 151 Aboriginal soldiers in the Japanese army and, arguably, the mobilisations that took place during the 228 Incident.

In general, the combination of colonialism and assimilation suffers from what Sider frames as an overwhelming contradiction: such domination "cannot both create and incorporate the other as an other,"152 which is to say that the state cannot absorb a group's identity when it has generated an environment that maintains differences between it and indigenous communities. All that remains to do is to describe this changing environment, and to verify that the "central symbolic issue remains social organisation itself,"153 that is to say, the contest between a state attempting to "harness emergent differentiation" and indigenous groups attempting to "develop and redevelop autonomy."154

<sup>148</sup> Sider, op. cit., p.17.

ibid., pp.17-18. ibid., p.17.

<sup>151</sup> See John Robert Shepherd (1993/1995): Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier 1600-1800. Taipei: SMC Publishing.

<sup>152</sup> Sider, op. cit., p.22.

<sup>153</sup> ibid., p.23.

<sup>154</sup> ibid., p.22.

In addition, Sider argues that there is no clear-cut domination/resistance dialectic because resistance co-exists with collusion, 155 and that neither road leads to success for Aboriginal people in the context of partial autonomy, anyway. 156 Worse for assimilationists, given that such policy is predicated on the existence of a problem that has to be solved, Beckett argues that the state's subsequent intervention in Aboriginal affairs can be difficult to wind back, leading to a dilemma in which "the state is an

integral part of the problem it is supposed to be solving."157

Even as the state set out to damage Aboriginal culture and social structures, it will be shown that the KMT security apparatus provided a relatively impermeable physical boundary within which these changes were to take place. Regardless of the damage inflicted on these cultures, the resulting mixture of administrative culture and decaying and oppositional "traditional" culture generated new and enduring cultural circumstances

that could be no less powerful in buttressing Aboriginal ethnic boundaries.

The phenomenon of hierarchical identity makes matters still more complex and impinges on the ability of nationalism to account for the range of expressions of Aboriginality the hierarchy of identities allows people to be more than one thing at the same time, and for Aborigines this is particularly so, undercutting the kind of exclusivity that more fervent expressions of nationalism demand.

#### Religion

The spiritual history of the surviving Aboriginal communities in Taiwan is notable for a

<sup>155</sup> *ibid.*, p.3. <sup>156</sup> *ibid.*, p.18.

<sup>157</sup> Beckett (1988c), op. cit., p.4.

rapid and widespread conversion to Christianity, starting from the twilight years of the Japanese era. The process was launched by Presbyterian missionaries before they were joined by other denominations, particularly the Roman Catholic Church after China came under Communist Party control. Religion, and the important realm of symbolism it introduces and inculcates, seems to have had an ethnically galvanising effect on its worshippers, in that Aboriginality co-opted religious icons and practices in a way that separated them not only from a Han population largely indifferent toward Christianity, but also from Han Taiwanese Christians.

This is a vital consideration given that one of the greatest and earliest victims of assimilation policy - and missionary zeal, ironically - was the range of Aboriginal material culture that could provide imagery and symbolism for future ethnic mobilisation. In some places material and other culture survived, of course, but it should also be pointed out that, apart from some images and songs pertaining to the Aboriginal movement, there are no genuinely pan-Aboriginal symbols or motifs that can be said to belong to all the Aboriginal communities of Taiwan as a generic and exclusive Aboriginal image, though some have been attempted. Most people can recognise items of Aboriginal culture, a situation that has been enhanced in recent decades as Taiwan's governments, national and local, and private firms appropriate Aboriginal culture for domestic and international tourism, but little of it extends beyond one or two Aboriginal ethnolinguistic groups, and is therefore only useful as a distinction from Han Taiwanese culture. So there is not even a tangible set of shared symbols<sup>158</sup> for all Aborigines, merely sets of different symbols - with at best a degree of overlap between individual communities or ethnolinguistic groups - that are recognisable as Aboriginal. In the face of this lack, Christianity provided a kind of spiritual and material lingua franca, further distinguishing Aboriginal people from Han Taiwanese and eventually supporting the Aboriginal movement of the 1980s, while also introducing competing networks of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> See A.P. Cohen (1985): The symbolic construction of community. New York: Tavistock.

missionaries from different denominations that would place constraints on the representativeness of that movement.

## Method

When I started this project, I assumed that most data would be gathered in interviews with Aboriginal people in their communities. However, it became clear that there was much more documentation available on the questions of interest than expected. I therefore concentrated on written sources, and supplemented them where necessary or possible with interviews in communities of particular interest.

I spent three months at the National Central Library in Taipei and other libraries searching microfiche copies of newspapers dating from 1945 to 1952, and recovered more than one thousand stories, essays, news features and government announcements relating to Aboriginal people and issues. A portion of this data is analysed in Chapter Three, Chapter Four and Chapter Five. I also consulted archive materials released in book form by the Academia Sinica, the Academia Historica and the Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee on the 228 Incident and the White Terror era. These materials are analysed in Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

My emphasis on documentation has two benefits. First, it allows for a comprehensive assessment of data from the early KMT era on Aboriginal issues that has not been attempted before. Second, it allows the research questions to be addressed in a wider context than would have been possible if only a small number of communities had been chosen for intensive fieldwork.

I travelled to Aboriginal communities in Ilan, Hualien, Taitung, Pingtung, Chiayi,

Hsinchu, Taoyuan and Taipei counties to collect interview data or other materials. Some of the interviews were taped and transcribed. I was mindful of the fact that some Aboriginal communities are still scarred by discord and the residue of colonial terror dating back to 1945 and sometimes even earlier. The questions I wished to ask – and occasionally did ask – that touched on these tensions were not always comfortably answered in such an environment. By concentrating on the documentation, I felt I could identify a much smaller but more relevant pool of informants.

Fieldwork for this research project was approved by the Human Ethics Research Committee of the University of Technology, Sydney (see Appendix A for a copy of the consent form). I encountered no difficulties of an ethical nature in this project, though a number of interviewees were intimidated by the thought of signing a record of interview and were more willing to talk off the record. Under these circumstances an unsigned form was left with the interviewee in case further contact with me or my supervisors was required, while the interviewee was also assured that material given in confidence would not be used if it was judged prejudicial to his or her interests. There is a dilemma here: within the guidelines it is difficult to adopt a style of questioning characteristic of the judiciary or the media, therefore certain topics — complicity with acts of persecution, for example — could not be raised in some cases. Nor could I probe interviewees who I suspected were giving me false information on sensitive matters. <sup>159</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> Another point of interest was the discovery of the existence of a lengthy diary formerly in the custody of its author – a key figure in some of the events described below – but which was now being stored elsewhere, apparently without that person's knowledge. Despite the tremendous research value that this account was expected to have, it was considered that accessing the information would, under UTS ethics guidelines, constitute unreasonable intrusion into the privacy of that person and that person's family.

## The argument

This thesis is interested in how the KMT's administration of Aboriginal communities influenced Aboriginal ethnicity, and argues that security mechanisms and policies frustrated the state's assimilationist policies. Chapter Two provides a brief historical introduction to relations between Aboriginal communities and the settlers and colonial powers that gradually encroached on their lands from the late sixteenth century. The Japanese era (1895-1945) is discussed with regard to the dramatic changes in Aboriginal communities and the emergence of a nascent Aboriginality that would find fuller expression after the arrival of the KMT.

In Chapter Three, the first year and a half of the relationship between the KMT and Aboriginal people is discussed. I argue that this period, though beset with increasing tension because of KMT misrule and corruption, offers new evidence of how Aboriginal elite figures dealt with their new status as Chinese citizens and how they communicated with officials to better the lot of their communities. This period is also crucial for framing the beginnings of the Nationalists' pan-Aboriginal discourse, as represented in a relatively free media environment, government policy, and the embrace of Aboriginal elite figures by the media and the government.

Chapter Four discusses the role of Aboriginal communities and individuals in the 228 Incident, a watershed in Taiwan's history and one that is more commonly discussed in terms of worsening relations between Han ethnic groups – and as the most powerful historical reference point for Taiwanese nationalists. I show that Aboriginal participation in the 228 Incident was not only widespread and impacted on how local conflict played out, but also that this participation – whether attacking government forces or protecting government officers and civilians – sought not only to protect Aboriginal communities but also to defend Han Taiwanese from Nationalist forces.

Chapter Five describes the aftermath of the 228 Incident and the security census known as *qingxiang* and how these related to Aboriginal communities and KMT policy. I show that the Nationalist response to events failed to adequately distinguish between the variety of Aboriginal responses to the 228 Incident, and in so doing reinforced pan-Aboriginal ethnic categorisation at the expense of assimilationist policy. I argue that substantial identification with the broader "Taiwanese" public becomes apparent for the first time during the 228 Incident. This identification, however, was crippled by KMT security practices in a lengthy process starting with the *qingxiang* campaign, which would largely replace it with a forcible dialectic of ascription with the party-state.

Chapter Six covers Aboriginal experiences of the "White Terror" and describes attempts by Aboriginal groups and individuals to assert themselves in political and cultural ways that were considered incompatible with KMT interests. These were linked – regardless of the facts of the matter – to communist infiltration, leading in some cases to executions, torture and lengthy terms of imprisonment, and in other cases to long-term surveillance and other indirect forms of punishment. The paradoxical impact of control over Aboriginal political and cultural expression on ethnic boundary strength and assimilationist policies is discussed.

Chapter Seven discusses two expressions of ethnic resistance that could not be linked to communist intrigue. The first is Christianity, the spectacular Aboriginal conversion to which the KMT had hoped would assist in the process of modernising and assimilating Aborigines. Instead, for the sake of their survival, the churches and missions championed the continuing viability of a distinctive Aboriginal society. The second is latter-era political dissidence and cultural activity associated with nativisation, which took shape as the spectre of communist infiltration receded. Some of these forms of expression were suppressed or punished, but other forms of expression could be found

within the Aboriginal political structures that the KMT had itself cultivated. Key policy decisions – or policy *indecision* – in this period point to a dying regard for the efficacy of assimilationism, even if certain Aboriginal cultural expressions remained problematic for the authorities. This chapter concludes as the Aboriginal movement of the 1980s takes up the challenge of Aboriginal dignity and autonomy in an increasingly dynamic environment of localisation and democratisation. This renaissance of Aboriginal activism cannot be separated from the events that preceded it, and the limits it encountered cannot be understood without an appraisal of ethnic change and the consolidation of an Aboriginal political culture in the days of martial law.

In Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, the clash of national security and assimilationist policy described in the preceding chapters is judged to be critical to an understanding of the durability of Aboriginal ethnicity in Taiwan, even as cultural practices suffered tremendous damage at the hands of the punitive educational policies of church and state.

In short, this thesis focuses on the historical experience of Aborigines under early KMT rule and will depict this history in terms of the development of Aboriginal ethnicity and pan-Aboriginal ethnicity in a security environment in which a substantial degree of intervention was not able to achieve the kind of assimilation desired, instead contributing in a fundamental way to the drawing up of new ethnic boundaries between Aborigine and different Han groups, and between Aborigines themselves. This is a good example of the "unintended consequences" of government action referred to by both Jenkins and Beckett when an attempt is made to transform ethnicity.<sup>160</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.72; Beckett (1988a), op. cit., p.3; and Beckett (1989), op. cit., p.122.

# **Chapter Two**

# Early history, Japanese rule and the origins of Aboriginality

This chapter briefly describes the historical background of Taiwan's Aboriginal people and, in particular, the dramatic social and administrative changes that took place under Japanese rule. Although expressions of pan-Aboriginality arguably commenced as early as the seventeenth century, it is the late Japanese period that ushers in the development of pan-Aboriginal consciousness. The period saw a new generation of Aboriginal leaders – who would later pose a threat to the KMT's assimilationist policies – receive a colonial Japanese education, gain substantial experience in administration and consolidate authority over a more diverse range of Aboriginal people.

# Prehistory, European rule, Koxinga and the Qing

Taiwan's Aboriginal communities belong to the Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) family of languages, but their geographical origins remain open to conjecture. As we shall see in the following chapters, politics and science have been regular bedfellows in charting the history of Aboriginal migration. Anthropological, archaeological and linguistic evidence have been the main tools for drawing up theories of Aboriginal migration and interaction in the absence of written histories. Considerable effort has been spent on surveys and theory by scholars from Taiwan, Japan, Europe, Australia

#### and the United States.1

The presence of speakers of Austronesian languages on Taiwan has been dated to as early as 4,000 B.C., but these communities are thought to have merged with or expelled resident Palaeolithic cultures. Over succeeding millennia, these communities underwent "indigenous processes of ethnogenesis and cultural development, as well as the absorption of influences from outside Taiwan," including trade and waves of migration.<sup>2</sup>

John Shepherd warns however that by the time of substantial Chinese migration to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As examples of these large bodies of work, for lingustics, see Raleigh Ferrell (1966): "The Formosan tribes: A preliminary linguistic, archaelogical and cultural synthesis." Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, 21, 97-130; Raleigh Ferrell (1969): Taiwan Aboriginal groups: Problems in cultural and linguistic classification (Monograph No.17). Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica; Li Jenkuei (1975); "Taiwan tuzhu yuyande yanjiu ziliao yu wenti" (Research resources and problems involving Taiwan's native languages). Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, 40, 51-84; and Margaret M.Y. Sung (1989): "The languages of the Taiwan Aborigines." In: Kuang-chou Li, Kwang-chih Chang, Arthur P. Wolf and Alexander Chien-chung Yin (eds): Anthropological studies of the Taiwan area: Accomplishments and prospects. Taipei: Department of Anthropology, National Taiwan University, pp.37-58. On Aboriginal anthropology, see Liu Pin-hsiung (1975): "Riben xueren zhi gaoshanzu yanjiu" (Research on the Kaoshan People by Japanese scholars). Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, 40, 5-17; Wei Hwei-lin (1965): "Taiwan tuzhu shehuide buluo zuzhi yu quanwei zhidu" (Tribal organization and authority system of the Formosan Aboriginal societies). Bulletin of the Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, 25/26, 71-92; Chen Chi-lu (1989): "The development of anthropology in Taiwan during the past four decades." In: Kuang-chou Li, Kwang-chih Chang, Arthur P. Wolf and Alexander Chienchung Yin (eds): Anthropological studies of the Taiwan area: Accomplishments and prospects. Taipei: Department of Anthropology, National Taiwan University, pp.1-14; and the extensive bibliography in Huang Ying-kuei (ed.)(1983): Guangfu yilai Taiwan diqu chuban renleixue lunzhu mulu (Bibliography of Anthropological Works Published in Taiwan, 1945-1982). Taipei: Han Studies Research Data and Service Center. For the debate on origins, see Chou, op. cit.; The Eighties Weekly (1985): "Taiwan shi Nandaoyuzude qiyuandi? - Fang kaogu xuezhe Zhang Guangzhi xiansheng" (Is Taiwan the dispersal point for the Austronesian language group? An interview with archaeologist Mr. Chang Kuang-chih). The Eighties Weekly, 13, 36-40; Peter Bellwood (1991): "The Austronesian dispersal and the origin of languages." Scientific American, 265, 70-75; and Hsu Mutsu (1997): "Austronesian dispersal: A theoretical review." In: Renleixue zai Taiwande fazhan xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (Collected papers from an academic conference on the development of anthropology in Taiwan). Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, no page numbers shown. For prehistory, see Liu I-chang (1988): "Shiqian shidai Taiwan yu Huanan guanxi chutan" (An initial investigation into the relationship between prehistoric Taiwan and southern China). In: Chang Yen-hsien (ed.): Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji (Collected papers on the history of the maritime development of China, vol. 3). Taipei: Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, pp.1-27. Ferrell (1969), op. cit., also deals with archeological issues.

In later chapters I will discuss political uses of this theme from just before retrocession to the White Terror. For an examination of contemporary political applications of Austronesian origins, including those of Aboriginal activists, see Michael Stainton (1999): "The politics of Taiwan Aboriginal origins." In: Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.): *Taiwan: A new history*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Ch.2.

<sup>2</sup> Shepherd, op. cit., p.28.

Taiwan, the twenty or so ethnolinguistic groups that constituted Aboriginal society were "based on cultural and linguistic similarities among villages as ... perceived by ethnographers; they were *not* social entities or political units." Political authority was vested in individual villages or "temporary village alliances" and had little or nothing to do with the shared cultural and linguistic features of ethnological classification.

Although trade had already commenced between Chinese merchants from the southeast of China and the Aborigines of the southwest Taiwan plains – with piracy and a Chinese punitive expedition providing additional written sources of data<sup>5</sup> – Dutch and Spanish accounts in the seventeenth century mark the beginning of the written history of Aboriginal people.<sup>6</sup> The history of Taiwan in this area was largely one of relations between a mercantile Dutch administration and surrounding Aboriginal villages, with the presence of Chinese and a few Japanese along the coast limited to piracy, trade or indentured labour.<sup>7</sup>

Retreating from a failed attempt to take Macau from the Portuguese, the Dutch government-sanctioned East India Company made its way to the Pescadores (Penghu). From there they set up base in southwest Taiwan in 1624 after receiving permission from the Ming court – despite the Chinese having no authority over Taiwan – to trade there providing they abandoned the Pescadores. The Dutch motivation was trade, but its exploitation of the Tainan area required military infrastructure and Protestant missionaries, who would communicate with and sometimes convert neighbouring Aboriginal tribes.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> ibid., p.30. Emphasis in original.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p.32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p.35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See, for example, W.M. Campbell (1903/1992): Formosa under the Dutch. Taipei: SMC Publishing; and James W. Davidson (1903/1992): The island of Formosa, past and present. Taipei: SMC Publishing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Shepherd, op. cit., p.27 and p.29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, pp.49-50.

The Dutch therefore had to learn to deal with a diverse and mutually hostile Aboriginal population in addition to the interests of Chinese traders within their domain. Various military campaigns directed at recalcitrant villages, often in coalition with other Aboriginal villages, as well as pleas by some villages for protection, allowed the Dutch to secure control. This control was ratified in an extraordinary council of delegates from forty-four villages – known as the *landdag*. James Kaim Ang agrees with Dutch scholar Ernst van Veen that the *landdag* was probably the first manifestation of Benedict Anderson's "imagined community" among Taiwan's Aborigines. However, although the villages in question – or at least their leaders – may have imagined themselves in a new way in relation to their erstwhile Aboriginal rivals, this development has no bearing on the imagining of today's Aboriginal population. Like the Christianity brought to Taiwan on the back of the Dutch East India Company by missionaries such as Georgius Candidius and Robertus Junius, the imagining potential of the *landdag* would have died sometime after the expulsion of the Dutch and certainly with the extinction of the villages that were signatories to it.

In the northeast, the Spanish occupied Keelung in 1626 and similar patterns of relations with Aboriginal groups ensued. They were expelled by the Dutch in 1642, however, allowing the Dutch to secure the northern and western coasts.

The moribund Ming Dynasty took its refuge in Taiwan in 1661 under former pirate Koxinga. The Dutch surrendered and were expelled from the southwest and then again in the north in 1668, resulting in the first Chinese administration on Taiwan. The brief reign of Koxinga (he died in 1662) and his descendants eventually capitulated to the Qing navy and Taiwan came under mainland control in 1683.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, pp.53-55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Kaim Ang (1996): "Lishi jiyi yu lishi shishi: Yuanzhumin shi yanjiude yige changshi" (Between legend and historical fact: a tentative study of the Taiwanese Aborigines in early modern history). Taiwan Historical Research, 3(1), p.25.

<sup>11</sup> ibid., pp.91-104

Up to this time the various administrations had substantively dealt only with plains-dwelling Aboriginal villages, and these villages underwent substantial acculturation and eventually assimilation in over two centuries of economic and social transformation. Other mountain-dwelling tribes did not fall under such control, remaining quite free of Han military and administrative influence. Under the Qing, the plains villages were allowed to collect rent from Han settlers as part of a fluctuating land policy. This policy attempted to keep the peace between Chinese and the "civilised" (*shoufan*) Aborigines within the boundaries of Qing control, as well as prevent settlers from encroaching on the territory of the "uncivilised" (*shengfan*, mostly mountain-dwelling) Aborigines. <sup>12</sup>

The borders marking the beginning of the territory of the "uncivilised" Aborigine, though frequently breached in the commission of raids and local trade, represented the administrative and civilisational limit of the Chinese empire. They were manned by "civilised" Aborigines, known as the *ai*, who were also employed by the Qing to crush major Han uprisings and assorted Aboriginal troublemakers.<sup>13</sup>

The increasing volume of Chinese settlers disrupted and marginalised these "civilised" Aboriginal villages, despite the special military role of "civilised" Aboriginal men in the administration. The deleterious effects of this process, including outright molestation, led some villages or village subgroups to migrate further into the mountains and live uneasily near the "uncivilised" villages.<sup>14</sup> Others migrated much further afield, such as

12 ibid., p.305.

<sup>13</sup> ibid., p.309.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p.2 and pp.13-14; Michael Stuart Stainton (1995): *Return our land: counterhegemonic Presbyterian Aboriginality in Taiwan*. Unpublished Masters thesis, Graduate Programme in Social Anthropology, York University, p.82; and Ferrell (1969), *op. cit.*, p.4, each dispute the received wisdom of this "displacement scenario," retained by many today (including some Aboriginal activists): that mountain-dwelling Aborigines were merely those that were forced from their villages in the plains into increasingly difficult and remote terrain by encroaching Chinese settlement. This line, most powerfully rejected by Shepherd, was pointedly used by defence minister Pai Chung-hsi himself after the 228 Incident as an "explanation" for the degree of backwardness suffered by mountain Aborigines in comparison with the Chinese, newly anointed as their kin. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

from the west coast to the Puli basin and the Lanyang basin. The remainder stayed and slowly merged with Han society, some with genuine enthusiasm at the prospect of new status and financial opportunity.<sup>15</sup>

A new international threat on the back of mainland China's subjugation to European imperial expansion resulted in the need to secure greater revenue. This resulted in the removal of fiscal benefits for the "civilised" Aborigines and an erosion of the economic distinction from neighbouring Chinese. The combination of all these pressures culminated in the staggered extinction of these "civilised" Aboriginal communities and almost all of their languages, leaving behind meagre traces of cultural residue and barely remembered identities for late twentieth-century activists to pick through.

These "civilised" Aborigines are collectively referred to as pingpu (of the plains) or pingpuzu (peoples of the plains). With their demise, the surviving "uncivilised" Aboriginal villages - divided roughly evenly between the mountainous interior and northeast coast of Taiwan and the valley and shore running between Hualien and Taitung on the east coast – were the next to encounter expanding Chinese claims to land and commercial interests, such as camphor.<sup>16</sup>

Throughout this period, however, the government had no control over most of the area inhabited by the "uncivilised" Aborigines. This changed when the Japanese launched an attack on the Paiwan Aboriginal communities of Mutan in 1874 when Peking refused to intervene after the slaughter of Japanese subjects shipwrecked nearby. The Japanese eventually withdrew after many months, and the Chinese attempt to consolidate its revised claim of sovereignty in the area in 1875 resulted in the massacre of an Aboriginal village and the subsequent massacre of hundreds of the Chinese troops by tribesmen.<sup>17</sup>

Shepherd, op. cit, p.391.
 Davidson, op. cit., pp.397-443.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, pp.123-169.

Whatever increased attention the provincial authorities now paid to these matters was of little consequence, for in 1895 China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki after defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War.

## Transformation in the Japanese era

Four phases of administration

Wang Sung-shan argues that Aboriginal administration under the Japanese can be divided into four phases. <sup>18</sup> The first phase, which lasted until 1902, was characterised by frequent clashes between Japanese forces and Han rebels. During this time of instability, little attention could be paid to Aboriginal administration. Most interaction with Aboriginal people therefore took the form of appeasement where possible. Aboriginal leaders or other representatives would be entertained in Taipei and sometimes even in Japan, while government researchers entered mountain areas to collect information on Aboriginal social and economic circumstances. In the second phase, less punitive action was required against the Han Taiwanese and thus more could be applied to uncooperative Aboriginal villages. This policy included the strengthening and expansion of the *aiyong* boundary separating "uncivilised" Aborigines from the rest of Taiwan. <sup>19</sup>

The third phase commenced in 1910 with the implementation of the "Five-Year Plan for Work in Savage Regulation" (*lifan gongzuo wunian jihua*). The plan's main aim was to disarm the Aborigines and control their territory, bringing them under the effective

<sup>9</sup> ibid.. At its peak, this boundary had 1,898 manned stations; see Yang Pi-chuan (ed.)(1997): Taiwan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See Wang Sung-shan (1990): Alishan Zou zude lishi yu zhengzhi (History and politics of the Tsou people of Alishan). Panchiao: Taohsiang, p.80. Wang's discussion concurs with Fijii Shizue (1997): Rizhi shiqi Taiwan zongdufu lifan zhengce (The "savage regulation policy" of the Taiwan governorgeneral's office in the Japanese era). Taipei: Wenyingtang.

jurisdiction of a state for the first time. Headhunting, like many other cultural practices, was banned. The final phase started in 1915 and lasted until the Wushe Uprising in 1930. Policies included a basic education programme in Aboriginal villages, encouraging occasional visits to Han areas, providing incentives for Aboriginal enterprises, revising bartering systems and provision of medical facilities. Most of these policies were introduced and supervised by Japanese police stationed in the villages.<sup>20</sup>

#### The Wushe Uprising

Then came a blow to the viability of Japan's policies on Aborigines. The slaughter of more than one hundred and thirty Japanese police, senior officials and civilians, including women and children, in the Atayal village of Wushe ("Musha" in Japanese), was a turning point for the administration of Aboriginal districts. The protagonists and their leaders withdrew to a network of caves after a carefully planned and pitilessly executed attack. Fired on with cannons and finally subjected to poison gas raids by aircraft, most of the attackers and their families committed suicide. Those from the offending villages who survived became the targets of a Japanese extermination campaign employing Aborigines from rival villages as bounty hunters.<sup>21</sup>

The uprising was significant not so much because of the violence – it was one of many hundreds of bloody incidents in which the Japanese struggled to maintain control over

lishi cidian (A historical dictionary of Taiwan). Taipei: Chienwei, p.4. <sup>20</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> There is a substantial literature on the Wushe Uprising and its implications for Japanese rule in Taiwan which cannot be addressed here. For eyewitness accounts and a study of the complexities of Japanese-Aboriginal family ties in the time surrounding the uprising, see Yabu Syat, Hsu Shih-kai and Shih Cheng-feng (eds)(2001): Wushe shijian: Taiwanrende jiti jiyi (The Wushe Incident: a collective account from Taiwanese people). Taipei: Avanguard; Teng Hsiang-yang (1998a): Wushe shijian (The Wushe Incident). Taipei: Yushan; and Teng Hsiang-yang (1998b): Wuzhong yunshen (Heavy mist and thick cloud). Taipei: Yushan.

volatile Aborigines, especially in the north<sup>22</sup> – as much as the fact that the village had been a model of success for Aboriginal policy. Key participants in the uprising were Aboriginal policemen who had been trained by the Japanese; others had Japanese wives.

This apparent failure of Aboriginal policy led to the introduction of the "General Principles for Policies on Savage Regulation" (*lifan zhengce dawang*). Colonial control shifted from the ideology of "military subjugation or economic servitude" to imperialization, and in so doing, the "aborigines were no longer the savage heathen waiting to be assimilated" by the superiority of Japanese civilisation and culture; instead, "they were now imperial subjects acculturated within the Japanese national polity." Soon, the provincial government moved to entrench personal loyalty to the emperor as the main plank of its education programme and the *kominka* (imperialisation) movement, and with this the designation of Aborigines changed from "savages" of various degrees of acculturation to *Takasagozoku* (*gaoshazu* in Mandarin), a term which essentialised Aborigines as a single race and explicitly tied them to Taiwan as a civilised people-in-the-making. 24

This is the first pan-Aboriginal name to be applied by a coloniser that sought to relieve Aborigines of ascriptions implying the isolation and timelessness of savagery. But this project was never far away from rising Japanese militarism and the eventual need of the government to secure human resources for war in the Pacific.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Wen Chi (ed.)(1957/1999a): *Taiwan fanzheng zhi (yi)* (A record of Taiwan savage administration, vol. 1). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee; and Wen Chi (ed.)(1957/1999b): *Taiwan fanzheng zhi (er)* (A record of Taiwan savage administration, vol. 2). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ching, op. cit., pp.152-153.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, p.153. Missionary Inosuke Inoue claims to have been the first person to suggest replacing shengfan with gaoshazu or even local tribal names (in 1925); see Inosuke Inoue (tr. Reiko Ishii)(1997): Shangdi zai bianzhi = Tominun utof (God is weaving = Tominun utof). Tainan City: Jenkuang, pp.6-7 and p.29.

# Foundations of pan-Aboriginal identity

As I will show in succeeding chapters, a number of Aboriginal people benefited from Japanese education and influence to the extent that they began to replace "traditional" structures of tribal authority. It was these individuals who would later champion Aboriginal interests using novel pan-Aboriginal ideas and rhetoric. But this process was overshadowed at the time by the general success of Japanese language inculcation and the imperialisation of Aborigines that this policy served.

The government claimed that eighty percent of Aboriginal children were attending language school, even if decades of rule had only produced eighteen high school graduates by its own admission.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, Japanese became the Aboriginal *lingua franca*, and would serve an important role in subsequent identification with Han Taiwanese in the face of KMT misrule.

World War II prompted the Japanese to recruit soldiers from the Aboriginal population, a process that benefited from the cultivation of *yamatodamashi* ("Japanese spirit") in the young men in particular. The units of Aborigines were called Takasago Giyutai (Takasago volunteer squads) and were sent throughout the Pacific theatre. Most of the members would never return, but many who did return retained *yamatodamashi* even after expression of the concept became untenable under KMT rule.<sup>26</sup>

Huang Chih-huei argues that this process of indoctrination was not incompatible with certain "traditional" cultural practices and that this made Aborigines very good converts:

<sup>25</sup> See E. Patricia Tsurumi (1977): *Japanese colonial education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp.234-235.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See Chih-huei Huang (1998): "The 'Yamatodamashi' of the Austronesians: the Takasago-Giyutai of Taiwan during the Pacific War." Paper presented at the 14th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Williamsburg, Virginia, 26 July-1 August.

The Takasago were influenced by the special education policy of "Japanization" ... But in their tribal traditions, the emphasis on obedience to authority, service for public and tribal security, self-sacrifice even to the point of giving up one's life were all compatible with the tenets of the Yamatodamashi. Further, the spirit to persevere and survive in adverse circumstances was cultivated among the Takasago in their mountainous habitats, and in many tribes youths were required to pass an endurance test as an initiation rite. As a result, they could easily assimilate the Yamatodamashi and put it into practice.<sup>27</sup>

Another change to Aboriginal society under Japanese administration involved forced mergings and relocation of whole communities, which, at least in the case of Atayal villages, may have made Aborigines more susceptible to diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. This forced migration of groups into larger villages – and the accompanying disruption to chieftain authority – contributed to aberrant physical and social phenomena that would endure for decades and which would obstruct the assimilationist practices of the KMT.

In the main, the "uncivilised" Aborigines remained segregated from the bulk of the Han Taiwanese population, especially on the western side of the island. Under the Japanese, however, this equilibrium was maintained for the first time by the authorities on — literally — both sides of the fence, thereby decreasing opportunities for Han-Aboriginal conflict. Although there are examples of trade and violence between mountain and plains villages to be found during the later period of Japanese rule (often involving *pingpu* tribespeople as intermediaries, as was the case during the Qing era), the previous, more complex pattern of Han-Aboriginal interaction was curtailed.

<sup>27</sup> ibid., page number not shown.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See Fann Yen-chiou (1998): "Jibing, bianyuan zuqun yu wenminghuade shenti" (Disease, marginal indigenous society and civilized body: a case study of I-lan Taiyal in 1895-1945). *Taiwan Historical Research*, 5(1), pp.141-175.

The period of Japanese rule is a complex and violent time in relation to Aboriginal administration. Recent translations of Japanese government documents into Chinese have enhanced understanding of the difficulties in local governance and the bloody scale of conflict, including the use of tribal groups to subdue other Aborigines, but this history cannot be discussed in detail here.<sup>29</sup> Suffice it to say that the Japanese precipitated considerable change in Aboriginal society; punishing the recalcitrant and empowering or educating a new generation of Aboriginal leaders was a key feature of this transformation.

## **Conclusions**

By the end of the Japanese era, there was no evidence to suggest that Aboriginal ethnic identification extended further than individual ethnolinguistic groups, though that in itself constituted a significant change. In the latter part of Japanese rule, devotion to the Japanese Emperor was encouraged by the authorities and embraced by a portion of the Aboriginal population, and powerful feelings of pride and self-respect and equality were engendered by it, even if the Japanese administration was less than egalitarian in its treatment of Aboriginal people. But there is no sense that identification with Aboriginal people as a whole had developed from these positive qualities. In the end, the Japanese period provides a classic example of state ascriptions laying the foundations for the group identification of a subjugated minority.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> For an example of such material, see Wang Hsueh-hsin (trans., ed.)(2003a): Riju shiqi Zhu Miao diqu Yuanzhumin shiliao huibian yu yanjiu, diyice (A collection of historical documents and research on the Aborigines of the Hsinchu-Miaoli area in the era of Japanese rule, vol.1). Nantou: Taiwan Historica; Wang Hsueh-hsin (trans., ed.)(2003b): Riju shiqi Zhu Miao diqu Yuanzhumin shiliao huibian yu yanjiu, di'erce (A collection of historical documents and research on the Aborigines of the Hsinchu-Miaoli area in the era of Japanese rule, vol.2). Nantou: Taiwan Historica; and Wang Hsueh-hsin (trans., ed.)(2003c): Riju shiqi Zhu Miao diqu Yuanzhumin shiliao huibian yu yanjiu, disance (A collection of historical documents and research on the Aborigines of the Hsinchu-Miaoli area in the era of Japanese rule, vol.3). Nantou: Taiwan Historica.

Leo Ching argues in the context of Japanese rule in Taiwan that the colonial process, and not any pre-existing identity, is the primary determinant of cultural difference as a discourse:

[C]ultural and political identities, be they metropolitan or colonial, do not exist prior to the processes of colonialism. Rather, colonialism constructs and constricts, structures and deconstructs, the ways contradictory and contestatory colonial identities are imagined and represented. In other words, it is not the essentialized differences and similarities between the Taiwanese and the Japanese ... that substantiated Japanese colonialism. Instead, the historical conditions of Japanese colonialism have enabled and produced various discourses of cultural difference and sameness in the socially transformative projects of the colonizer and the colonized. ... Japanese or Japaneseness, Taiwanese or Taiwaneseness, aborigines or aboriginality, and Chinese or Chineseness as embodied compartmentalized national, racial, or cultural categories - do not exist outside the temporality and spatiality of colonial modernity, but instead are enabled by it.30

Ching emphasises the curious situation in which this coloniser lost a war, lost its territory and therefore "avoided the agonizing procedures of decolonisation." The KMT would declare that decolonisation was now its responsibility, but instead of assisting in this process, it embraced the same system of relations with Aboriginal society. The most pressing problem for the KMT, however, would be the effect of its venal, colonial-style administration on the Han population that had enthusiastically welcomed its arrival. Before this situation degenerated into infamous islandwide violence in 1947, there were sixteen months in which Aboriginal communities had unprecedented access to the rest of a wounded but stable Taiwanese population – now equipped with a lingua franca and rising expectations.

<sup>30</sup> Ching, op. cit., p.11.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p.12.

# **Chapter Three**

# Aborigines and the 'Glorious Recovery'

Before beginning an account of the first fifteen months of KMT-Aboriginal relations, it is useful to examine some of the commentary that was published in China relating to the expected recovery of Taiwan and how it should be administered. The range of opinions expressed at that time indicate that there was not a consensus on how to go about this in regard to Aboriginal administration, though at first there was agreement that Aborigines were not Han Chinese.

# China's initial Aboriginal discourse

In a famous essay written in 1943 entitled "China's fate," Chiang Kai-shek reversed an earlier position and said that Taiwan was now one of the essential frontier territories for the defence of the Chinese nation, and that any attempt to separate these territories would damage national security. Chiang's subsequent comments praising the pioneering efforts of early Chinese settlers and the "recovery" of Taiwan from the Dutch by Koxinga, a half-Japanese pirate who inherited the authority of the moribund Ming court, appealed to strong nationalist sentiment even if their accuracy and coherence bore little scrutiny. Chiang said China's history was one of ceaseless assimilation of other clans

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Ralph C. Croizier (1977): Koxinga and Chinese nationalism: History, myth and the hero. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University East Asian Research Center. A similar process seems to have applied to both the Wushe Uprising and – less prominently – the Mutan Incident.

or tribes (zongzu), but he did not mention Taiwan's Aborigines.<sup>2</sup>

At least as early as 1942, such sentiments were published in newspapers across China. A newspaper article by Hsu Hsing-min published on June 17, 1942, which advocated the recovery of Taiwan, reported that the Japanese were eradicating the Chinese heritage of Taiwanese through a movement to turn them into imperial subjects (the *huangminhua yundong*, or *kominka* movement). Intriguingly, this article then co-opts the famous Aboriginal uprising at Wushe – in which there was no substantial Han Taiwanese participation and which pitted neighbouring Aboriginal tribesmen against one another – as an example of the courage and ambition "coursing through the veins of men and women of the Chinese people."<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, in April 1943, the ill-fated Taiwanese KMT official and publisher Sung Fei-ju attributed the Wushe Uprising to the heroism of the "people of Taiwan" (*Taiwan minzhong*) even after clearly distinguishing between Han Taiwanese and Aborigines as rightful claimants to Taiwanese sovereignty.<sup>4</sup> The Wushe Uprising was too significant an event and too attractive a rhetorical opportunity, it seems, to have been left unclaimed in the service of Taiwan's reunification.

Such confusion might lead one to think that these writers were initially rather flexible in their attitude toward the national or ethnic status of Aborigines. Other newspaper articles, however, do not lend weight to this. A Chungking newspaper editorial dated January 7, 1943, implied that, on national terms, the "150,000 Malay natives (turen)" were to be distinguished from the Japanese interlopers and from the remaining Min and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Chang Jui-cheng (ed.)(1990b): Kangzhan shiqi shoufu Taiwan zhi zhongyao yanlun (Selected important documents on recovering Taiwan, 1937-1945). Taipei: Kuomintang Party History Committee, pp.6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, pp.48-49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p.89. Sung Fei-ju was highly critical of subsequent KMT rule in Taiwan and was executed in the wake of the 228 Incident. Even in this early article, Sung was warning of misperceptions and unfair treatment of Han Taiwanese by mainland officials resulting from Taiwan's period under Japanese rule.

Yueh Chinese. The latter, whose "languages, customs and habits are exactly the same as those in the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung," had "simple political demands – they want to return to the fold of China, the land of their parents."<sup>5</sup>

This national distinction between Aborigines and Han Taiwanese was maintained in other writings, notably in Taiwanese KMT official Liu Chi-kuang's appraisal of the Chiang Kai-shek essay. Liu stated that the sheer number of Han Taiwanese, excluding the "native savages" (tuzhu shengfan), was reason enough for Taiwan to remain part of China. Similarly, a Kwangsi Daily editorial dated September 5, 1943, pointedly omitted Taiwan's "more than 200,000 wild savages" (shengfan) from the count of Taiwan's "Chinese compatriots."

More explicitly, the Sung Fei-ju article mentioned above said that the Han nation was the proper master of Taiwan, and that "Taiwanese were the national vanguard of the Han nation." The "native savages" could only move into the mountains to make way for this vanguard.<sup>8</sup> No mention was made of the western plains Aborigines who more or less held their ground and were eventually assimilated – and these were presumably included in the count of Taiwanese in the *Kwangsi Daily* editorial.

A similar theory was put forward by Huang Chao-chin, later mayor of Taipei City and a long-time provincial assembly speaker. In an article on August 30, 1943, he likened Taiwan's Aborigines to the Malay people, adding that they originally possessed some level of culture. Due to Chinese settlement, however, and to the fact that their culture was at a low level to begin with, they "could not compete with the Han people, and so over time fled and lived in the mountains where they turned into wild men." The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, pp.61-63. The "Yueh Chinese" probably refers to Taiwan's Hakka communities, who mostly came from Kwangtung Province.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p.109.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> ibid., p.121.

*ibid.*, p.88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, p.114.

"Taiwanese" were then said to have protected their "bloodlines, customs and habits of the Han people" from Japanese attempts at assimilation.<sup>10</sup>

#### The Taiwan Investigative Committee

Amid growing interest in the media, and anticipating the return of Taiwan to China in the event of victory over Japan, Chiang Kai-shek established the Taiwan Investigative Committee on April 17, 1944. The committee was headed by former Fukien and Chekiang Governor Chen Yi, who was later appointed as chief executive of Taiwan Province. It was responsible for drawing up administrative plans and appointing personnel for a new Taiwanese provincial authority, and included a number of prominent Taiwanese consultants, including the ill-fated military officer Li Yu-pang and key postwar political figures such as Li Wan-chu, Yu Mi-chien and Huang Chao-chin. 11

Only a small number of references to Aboriginal matters could be located in a compilation relating to this committee's activities, suggesting that Aboriginal issues had a very low priority on the committee agenda. However, these limited references offer extra insight into the KMT administration's early ideas on Aboriginal affairs, and particularly the national status of Aboriginal people.

At a committee symposium on July 13, 1944, committee member Shen Chung-chiu assessed the national composition of the population of Taiwan. His comment reflected the sentiment expressed in newspaper articles described earlier, placing emphasis on the Chineseness of the Taiwanese, while refusing to recognise the cultural and territorial

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, pp.116-117.

See Chang Jui-cheng (ed.)(1990a): Guangfu Taiwan zhi chouhua yu shouxiang jieshou (Plan on recovering Taiwan, receiving Japanese surrender and taking over Taiwan). Taipei: Kuomintang Party History Committee, p.44; and Lai Tse-han (ed.)(1994): Ererba shijian yanjiu baogao (Research report on the 228 Incident). Taipei: Shihpao Wenhua, p.3. A chronology of the committee's activities is at Chang Jui-cheng (1990a), op. cit., pp.44-52.

integrity of the Austronesians, at least compared to the Tibetans, the Hui and the Mongolians.

Taiwan presently has three peoples (minzu), the first are the savages (fanren) and the second are the Japanese, though the numbers of both are small. The third are the Taiwanese (Taiwanren) who are greatest in number. The so-called Taiwanese are in fact people from Fukien and Kwangtung ... therefore the Taiwanese nation is the same as that in all the other provinces, and entirely different to the nations with special characteristics in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet.<sup>12</sup>

Another committee member, Lin Chung, backed the idea that Aboriginal people and Japanese people were in a separate category to Han Taiwanese, putting the population of the "savage people/race" (fanzu) at 150,000. The Taiwanese were described, exclusive of Aboriginal people, as having a particularly strong national consciousness (minzu sixiang) under the Japanese, and that this was another reason why Taiwan should be regarded as a "province of the interior" in contrast to outlying, minority-populated regions. However, Lin argued, local circumstances might require special administrative measures in the short term.<sup>13</sup>

The following week, another Taiwanese committee member, Hsieh Nan-kuang, delivered a report on a research trip to the outlying provinces of Kansu and Tsinghai and the then-Mongolian nationality provinces of Ninghsia, Chahar and Suiyuan in western China. There, he said, nationalities policy (*minzu zhengce*) was broadly correct on paper but not being implemented adequately because differences in local politics, economics, customs and "levels of culture" were not being taken into account. Thus, "nothing has been achieved after many years of work." He implied that nationalities policy in Taiwan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Chang Jui-cheng (1990a), op. cit., p.60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p.62. This is the same Lin Chung who was in charge of the government broadcasting facility in Taipei during the 228 Incident. He will appear again in Chapter Five.

would suffer a similar fate if this warning was not heeded.<sup>14</sup> Curiously, Hsieh's argument appears to have been angled more toward the need to accommodate the expectations of Han Taiwanese - acknowledging the administrative, political and cultural preferences developed after decades under the Japanese - rather than Aborigines. However, it is suggested in a later article that Aboriginal people may also have been referred to in these comments.

In October 1944, the committee produced a draft outline for the administrative transfer of Taiwan, which was succeeded by a final version on March 14, 1945. In addition to the general measures to be introduced uniformly throughout Taiwan, Clause 18 in both versions stated that the "savage people/race" would be cultivated so that they could achieve self-determination (zijue) and autonomy (zizhi).15

By early 1945, however, there is evidence that administrative interests had begun to encroach upon such rhetoric. The chair of a February 27 conference on Taiwan's administrative boundaries, Hsia Tao-sheng, argued that no part of Taiwan should be designated "savage territory" (fandi) - presumably he meant a unified Aboriginal territory – and that if Aboriginal administrative areas had to be established, they should be established only at the county level. 16 A draft plan for police administration also downplayed the status of Aboriginal areas, stating that "matters relating to the Savage Race are to be returned to local administrative organs to handle, making every effort to reduce discriminatory measures. However, local conditions may be considered in increasing police power and returning command to local administrative officers."<sup>17</sup>

ibid., pp.68-69.
 ibid., pp.86-96 (the draft version) and pp.109-119 (the final version).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p.106.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, p.173.

#### Later commentary

Newspaper articles in the six months before "retrocession" (guangfu, or the "glorious recovery") continued to assert that Taiwan's Aborigines were nationally distinct from Han Taiwanese, but focused more on how Aborigines were to be dealt with in more direct terms following a change in administration. One writer, Ju Shao, included the call to "liberate the minority Savage race (shaoshu fanzu), and have them feel no terror toward the Han race" among his list of goals.<sup>18</sup>

In a lengthy essay entitled "On the principles of rebuilding Taiwan's political system" by Wu Chien-hua, a more detailed perspective on Aboriginal administration emerged.

There was no political organisation under Japanese rule and they continuously treated [Aborigines] in an inhumane way. Education was equivalent to slavery, their rule was entirely reliant on military force and year by year they reduced the areas in which [Aboriginal communities] lived to limit their ability to survive. After we take over the administration, [Aboriginal people] ought to be cultivated according to the principle in the Fourth Clause of the National Reconstruction Platform so that they will be able to gradually exercise greater self-determination and autonomy, and so that [Aboriginal administration] might become similar to the *baojia* system in other counties, cities and urban and rural townships. If the Savages (fanmin) can be thus governed, the smooth governance of Taiwan may be anticipated.<sup>19</sup>

Wu argued that lessons had to be learned from the perennial disputes between the Japanese authorities and Aboriginal communities. Paramount among these was the need to end the ubiquitous presence of police, and let public servants inherit the bulk of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Chang Jui-cheng (1990b), op. cit., p.273.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, pp.292-293.

"cultivational" duties. Thus, the "culturally backward Savages" would benefit from the profound virtue of the Chinese nation's ability to civilise all around it, in contrast to the deficient Japanese attempt to do the same.<sup>20</sup>

As the day of retrocession approached, the view of Hsieh Nan-kuang was guarded but optimistic. From his newspaper article published in the *Taiwan Minshengpao* on October 7, two and a half weeks before the KMT took power, it can be assumed that his earlier criticism of nationalities policy also had Taiwan's Aborigines in mind. In this new article, Hsieh welcomed national differences in Taiwan, and – quite extraordinarily – he embraced the idea that Taiwan's resident Japanese could contribute to the new society.

Taiwan has Han people, untamed savages and Japanese: many kinds of people all mixed together. This truly is an opportunity for us to implement the Principle of Nationalism. Each people (minzu) should be free and equal and peacefully coexist. If we are able to acheive success in Taiwan, we could then lead all of the nations of the Orient to come together and bring about peaceful coexistence, secure freedom and equality, and strive together for the advancement of mankind. This, then, would be the finest testing ground for the Three Principles of the People.<sup>21</sup>

Soon after the KMT arrived, the great majority of Japanese were instead repatriated. But what is important here is the egalitarian flavour of Hsieh's article, and his apparent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> ibid., pp.295-296. Interestingly, Wu was one who had recommended that armed forces be substantially reduced throughout Taiwan and restricted to purely military duties, because the alternative was seen as an impediment to "national consciousness and culture." Yet this very reduction has been cited elsewhere as one of the main reasons for the 228 Incident extending throughout Taiwan and festering before order was officially and ferociously restored; see Tse-han Lai, Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou (1991): A tragic beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Perhaps Wu feared that the KMT would be as incompetent and corrupt as it turned out to be in generating so much anger so quickly after its assumption of power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Chang Jui-cheng (1990b), op. cit, pp.320-321. This article also warned that it would be unfortunate for mainland officials bearing ill will to be appointed to posts in Taiwan, suggesting Hsieh already had felt considerable trepidation regarding personnel recruited to date. These were prescient words, indeed.

belief that Sun Yat-sen's doctrine did not necessarily entail assimilation to the extent that it would obliterate the identities of other nationalities.

Hsieh may have been in a minority among his Taiwanese colleagues. Another key Taiwanese KMT figure, Lien Chen-tung (son of Taiwanese historian Lien Heng, and father of Lien Chan, former ROC vice president and failed KMT candidate in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections), was more triumphal and hierarchical in an article published in the *Taiwan Minshengpao* on October 7. In this piece, which was more representative of the tone of other writers, the glory of Taiwan's recovery was framed within the heroism of the first Chinese settlers, while Aborigines played a very different rhetorical role.

Before, Taiwan was a barren island in the ocean. Our ancestors courageously crossed the sea and opened up this land. With plough in hand, and knife and rifle strapped to the belt, they did battle with wild savages and ferocious beasts, and toiled to open up the mountains and forests. Their goal was to carve out a new land for the nation, to create an eternal foundation for posterity.<sup>22</sup>

Lien then goes on to praise a Taiwanese official from the Qing dynasty for his work in combating ferocious "untamed savages" (shengfan).<sup>23</sup>

## 'Retrocession'

World War II had an extensive impact on Aboriginal society, with thousands of tribesmen killed in the Pacific. Survivors returned to find Taiwan suffering from the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> ibid., p.324.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, p.326.

aftermath of American bombing raids and the collapse of services. The poverty in mountain areas was made worse by remoteness and shockingly high rates of malaria and tuberculosis for which, in most places, there were few medicines or other treatment available. Yet, initially, there was a sense that things would eventually improve. When it became clear that the Japanese would leave Taiwan, that power would be handed to the Chinese Nationalists and that Aboriginal people were to be welcomed into the Republic of China as new citizens, Aboriginal leaders mobilised around the island to prepare for the new administration.

#### Initial meetings with KMT officials

Newspaper reports on the first days of the new administration offer a surprisingly large volume of written and pictorial detail of Aboriginal representatives who travelled to Taipei to meet the new government and the press, though there is no explanation as to how these delegates came to be chosen nor by whom. On October 28, only a few days after the resumption of Chinese rule, Governor Chen Yi met eight representatives from the Aboriginal areas of Tungshih, Hsinkao (probably present-day Hsin'i Township) and Nengkao (probably present-day Jen'ai Township) in greater Taichung (see Figure 3.1). They were accompanied by a Han Taiwanese, Yang Hui-chuan, and KMT provincial committee member Hsieh Tung-min, who would later be provincial governor and vice president.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945a): "Gaoshazu daibiao jinye Chen zhangguan zhijing" (Delegates of the Takasago people presented to Governor Chen to pay their compliments). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 28 October 1945, p.2; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945b): "Chen zhangguan yanjian Gaoshanzu daibiao" (Governor Chen continues to receive delegates of the Kaoshan people). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 October 1945, p.2. "Chieftain" Jotaro Yuuki features in a photograph on page 3 of the *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* on 29 October 1945, while the other delegates are pictured on page 2. The full names of the other seven representatives were provided only in a Japanese language version of the story, and home communities and Chinese names of the representatives were not provided. There is also a photograph of the group meeting Chen Yi in the Japanese section of the newspaper at *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945d): "Xin Taiwan jianshe *ni* xieli, Gaoshanzu daibiao chicheng *wo* pili" (Delegates of the Kaoshan people offer sincere opinions in contributing to the construction of a new Taiwan). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 October 1945, p.4. The photographs featured in these sources were of poor quality on the microfilm I




Figure 3.1: Map of Taiwan's cities, counties and Aboriginal townships. Dedicated Aboriginal townships are numbered and in blue; green areas denote non-Aboriginal townships with significant Aboriginal populations.

The representatives requested that a delegation of Aborigines be permitted to travel to Nanking to visit the central authorities and pay their respects, that they be allowed to adopt Chinese names, and that they be afforded "equal opportunities" with regard to cultural, educational and other matters. In return, Chen Yi asked the representatives to note five points. First, Aborigines were now citizens of the Republic of China and would therefore enjoy the same rights as all others; second, their cultural and living standards were to be raised; third, they should dispense with certain customs; fourth, they should be law-abiding and develop into good citizens; and fifth, they should come together for the sake of the country and help build a new Taiwan. The meeting was concluded with three exclamations of "Long live the Republic of China."

The Taiwan Provincial Executive Administrative Office had commandeered a Japanese language daily newspaper and renamed it *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, now a Chinese language daily with a Japanese language supplement. This newspaper ran a number of stories and editorials in both languages on October 29 in response to the arrival of the Aboriginal representatives. The Chinese language editorial praised the delegates and expressed a warm welcome, saying that the Kaoshan people (*gaoshanzu*) were the first people to come to Taiwan and were "our old brothers" (*womende laodage*), but that since it was the Han people who had opened up and brought culture to Taiwan, then both they *and* the Han were now Taiwan's masters. It dismissed as "malicious propaganda" an unattributed contention that "the Kaoshan people were not the same as Han people and should therefore receive differential treatment under the Chinese government," instead claiming that the representatives' treatment in Taipei would serve to both illustrate the feasibility of "integration" (*ronghe*) and to counter the "provocations of third parties," though the offending parties were not identified.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945c): "Shelun: huanying Gaoshanzu daibiao" (Editorial: Welcome to the delegates of the Kaoshan people). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 October 1945, p.2.
<sup>26</sup> ibid..

The editorial stated that the recovery of Taiwan also represented a homecoming for Aboriginal people, in that it restored their sovereign status (*zhurende diwei*) which was also now enjoyed by China's various other minority peoples.<sup>27</sup> This was said to be based on Sun Yat-sen's principle of nationalism which, domestically speaking, entailed equality between all peoples. The sacrifice of Aboriginal youth in war was also recognised and it was predicted that Chen Yi would offer generous support to alleviate these problems and to "improve" Aboriginal culture and living conditions.<sup>28</sup>

Further, as an illustration of the equal status Aboriginal people now possessed, the editorial lauded future Aboriginal political aspirations — even floating the in-principle possibility of an Aboriginal person becoming governor of Taiwan Province. But it also warned Aboriginal people against disobeying Chinese law and coming under the influence of undesirable elements, and urged representatives to encourage respect for the law within their communities.<sup>29</sup>

For the first time, then, the greater number of Aboriginal people came under the effective sovereignty of China, and there was an immediate emphasis placed on inclusivity and constructive relations between Han Chinese and Aboriginal people generally in the media.

Two weeks later, on November 5, the Executive Administrative Office received another Aboriginal delegation, this time from mountain areas near Kaohsiung. These Aborigines were accompanied by Police Bureau chief Hu Fu-hsiang, while Chen Yi was represented by another official. The delegation requested that rectifying the poorer educational standards of Aborigines be given priority, that more land be allocated for agricultural purposes, and, most interestingly, that restrictions be lifted to allow Aborigines to

ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> *ibid*..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> ibid..

freely travel into the plains. The response was non-committal but supportive, and the delegation was asked to be patient, particularly in regard to restrictions on mobility and location of their dwellings. The delegation then met the press before returning home.<sup>30</sup>

The next day, a delegation of twenty-three Aborigines from the Chienshih area in Hsinchu County, accompanied by military official Liu Chi-kuang, called on Chen Yi and informed him that local Aborigines were willing to take complete responsibility for security in the area and to return abandoned Japanese weapons to the government. They also asked for Mandarin to be taught across their communities and for improvements to be made to health and economic infrastructure. Chen Yi's response was similar to before, urging respect for the law and assuring the Aborigines that they would receive equal treatment.<sup>31</sup>

Possibly among this group from Chienshih was Dr Lin Jui-chang, who would go on to become a provincial assemblyman and eventually be executed for sedition in 1954. In the first weeks of retrocession, however, the Atayal physician's activities remain somewhat unclear; his first mention in the provincial press comes two weeks later, when he led a delegation to meet Hsinchu County officials on November 14. Accompanied by an Aboriginal police officer stationed in the Saisiat Aboriginal area of Tatungho, Lin extended the greetings of Aboriginal people to the new authorities and raised a series of issues which local Aborigines wished to be addressed as part of their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945e): "Xiwang zhengfu youxian shijiao" ([We] hope the government will give [us] precedence in education). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 6 November 1945, p.3. Four of the five Aborigines in this group were identified by both their communities and their Japanese names: Hiroshi Ota from the "Wachiawa" community, Masaharu Inada from the "Lijungkangmachia community," Ichiro Shimada from the "Paiwan" community and another person with an obscured name from the "Sahsieh" community. It is not clear at this time which communities these are or what these individuals came to be known as in Chinese. A group picture is also featured in this source.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945f): "Zhudong jun Gaoshanzu daibiao zuo jinye Chen zhangguan zhijing" (Delegates of the Kaoshan people from Chutung Shire presented to Governor Chen to pay their compliments). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 November 1945, p.3. The delegation is said to have been led by one Masahiro Mura. A photograph of this sizable group is included in the reference. There is also a report of weapons left by the Japanese turning up in Wulai Township at the end of 1945; see Chang Jui-cheng (1990a): *op. cit.*, p.266.

contribution to building a new Taiwan. These included dispatching personnel to inform Aboriginal people of democratic processes and ensuring that Aborigines would be treated equally in the provision of cultural and educational opportunities.<sup>32</sup>

On November 22, Lin Jui-chang and fellow Aborigines Jintaro Iha and Chang Ching-chang led around fifty Aboriginal people to meet the new administration in Hsinchu and request equal access to education. They asked in particular that police no longer serve as teachers, that more teachers be appointed and compulsory education be introduced, and that they have the same class textbooks as those used by non-Aborigines.<sup>33</sup>

Lin Jui-chang had also begun to consolidate the commercial achievements of local Aborigines under the new government. In December, Lin applied to the authorities to endorse a firm that planted and harvested bamboo and traded in other mountain produce. The Kaoshan Association Corporation is referred to as a predominantly Aboriginal organisation in this report, though its fate is unclear.<sup>34</sup> It is quite possible that Lin's actions were meant to counter the coopting of the company by the government, a fate which a significant number of other businesses operating under the Japanese experienced after Chen Yi introduced policies nationalising industry as part of his "necessary state socialism."

Lin was also notable for attempting to have lands returned to his fellow Atayal tribesmen that had been taken away from them during the Japanese era, arguing that the "Glorious Recovery" would be meaningless if Aboriginal people couldn't also recover

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945g): "Xinzhu lingxun" (Hsinchu news brief). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 17 November 1945, p.3. The two men are referred to by their Japanese names, Saburou Hino (Lin) and Masatsugu Yoshinaga.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945h): "Gaoshanzu tongbao xiwang pingdeng jiaoyu" (Kaoshan compatriots hope for equality in education). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 25 November 1945, p.3. Lin's Japanese name is used here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945i): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 24 December 1945, p.3. Lin's Japanese name is used here.

See George H. Kerr (1965): Formosa betrayed. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ch.6.

what was theirs. It is not clear if his initial campaign met with any sympathy, but Lin would play a calming role in the 228 Incident before moving on to higher office and continuing with his campaign.<sup>36</sup>

In adjacent Taoyuan, government officials travelled three hours on foot into the Atayal Aboriginal community of Chiaopanshan on November 16 at the invitation and under the escort of "Kaoshanyako," an Atayal woman.<sup>37</sup> One of the female officials addressed local Aborigines through translators, assuring them that they were now citizens of the Republic of China and that they would receive equal treatment, that great effort would be made for their cultural and educational betterment, and that they would be entitled to opportunites for travel and business in towns all over Taiwan and mainland China. She also pointed to the importance of obeying government orders, studying the Chinese language, Chinese customs and the "peaceful and magnanimous Chinese character" as well as eradicating undesirable Aboriginal customs. The visit concluded with a performance of song and dance by local female students and a dinner accompanied by two local dignitaries, Ichiro Utsugi, an Aboriginal doctor, and Sadao Tamaki, a local forestry manager.<sup>38</sup>

Officials also made a visit on November 23 to Taipei County's Wulai District, which contained the northernmost Aboriginal communities and which was later awarded

<sup>36</sup> See Lin Chao-chen (1993): "Lin Ruichang yunan 40 zai, Yuanzhumin juhui zhuidiao" (On the fortieth anniversary of Lin Jui-chang's demise, Aborigines gather to commemorate). China Times, 4 October 1993, p.4; and Chen Su-chen (1994a): Wushi niandai baise kongbu shounan huiyilu: Taiyazu Lin Zhaoming de gaobai (A memoir of suffering in the White Terror of the 1950s: The testament of Atayal tribesman Lin Chao-ming). Unpublished manuscript, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> This is in all likelihood the Aboriginal woman later known by the Chinese name Li Yueh-chiao, whose intervention during the gang rape of a mainland Chinese woman during the 228 Incident earned her considerable exposure and subsequent participation in KMT bodies relating to women's affairs. The name "Kaoshanyako" appears not to be a Japanese name but rather a Chinese transliteration of her Aboriginal name.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> See Ko Yun-i (1945): "Fangwen Jiaobanshan Gaoshanzu jixing" (A record of interview of the Kaoshan people of Chiaopanshan). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 21 November 1945, p.3. Utsugi, who was later known as Kao Chi-shun, is pictured together with Lin Jui-chang at Masegseg C. Tung (ed.)(1996): *Gaosha chunqiu – Taiwan Yuanzhumin zhi wenhua yishu* (The exquisite heritage – the culture and arts of Taiwan Aborigines). Taipei: Lihung, pp.58-59.

township status. As elsewhere, a concert was held in their honour and officials informed their Aboriginal audience that they now enjoyed equal status in the Republic of China.<sup>39</sup>

These are many more examples of officials at every level of seniority visiting Aboriginal areas around Taiwan and Aboriginal leaders visiting them in turn. It is not clear to what extent these visits were stage-managed by KMT officials; the tone and repetition of some of the reports and the obeisance apparently displayed by Aborigines in some cases point to this taking place. However, it is also clear that certain Aboriginal leaders were attempting to communicate with the administration with specific ambitions in mind. What is also of considerable interest is the fact that Chen Yi met so many Aborigines so soon after his arrival. With transportation and other communications infrastructure still in ruins across the island from American bombing raids, it is notable that Aboriginal leaders from the more remote areas were able to make their journeys to Taipei and elsewhere in reasonably efficient fashion. This points to quite a sophisticated operation, and some planning must have been involved. Who was responsible for this, however, is not clear and requires further research.

Lai Hung-yen, a Paiwan tribesman from Taitung County who will feature later in this story, recalls that the outgoing Japanese administrators had warned members of his community that the Chinese authorities would shoot people at whim. When the new authorities entered his district in very remote southern Taitung County, upwards of one thousand Aboriginal people met them in one village, as they were required to do. Lai says the assembled tribespeople were confused and amused by the strange language and even stranger attire of the officials. The police toted guns, however, and perhaps mindful of the Japanese officials' warnings, the assembled people were frightened by them.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945j): "Xue weiyuan shicha Wulai" (Committee member Hsueh [Jenyang] inspects Wulai). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 27 November 1945, p.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> See Kuan Hsiao-jung (1994): "Paiwan zu 'Taiwan zongtongde gushi': Yuanzhumin gongheguo – qingtian, hongri, mandi lü" (The story of a Paiwan president of Taiwan: an Aboriginal republic – blue

But there are no reports of serious conflict between local communities and KMT officials or soldiers. The potential for such conflict was enormous, as it was elsewhere in Taiwan. However, the remoteness of Aboriginal villages would have protected them in most cases from the disappointments and tensions that began to brew in Han Taiwanese areas from the first day the soldiers came ashore. There were some startling exceptions to this in the following year, as we shall see below, but by and large it appears that the KMT administrators and Aboriginal communities managed to get along reasonably well, given the state of disrepair. This was, no doubt, reinforced by the hope Aboriginal people would have felt after hearing rhetoric promising material improvements in their lives.

# The beginning of administrative action

In this section I outline the first attempts by the KMT authorities to come to terms with Aboriginal administration. There is, in fact, a wealth of material in the provincial newspapers at that time dealing with developments in Aboriginal administration, and only a small portion of it can be discussed here. What I wish to demonstrate is that despite the KMT's overwhelming record of corruption and poor management in the time leading to the 228 Incident, and despite the obvious lack of financial interest in supporting a destitute minority group, there was nonetheless considerable and reasonably constructive contact made between officials and local communities. This is a fact which is of considerable importance in assessing the subsequent involvement of Aboriginal communities in the 228 Incident.

The Chinese authorities inherited their Aboriginal administrative responsibilities from

the Office for the Regulation of Savages in the former Governor's Office. This work was largely taken over by a department of the executive authority's Bureau of Civil Affairs.<sup>41</sup>

In the name of "equality" and in "the spirit of the Three Principles of the People," the decision to divide Aboriginal administration between counties and not administer Aborigines as a separate jurisdiction altogether was made no later than December 1945, though as mentioned before, this preference was mooted as early as February of the same year.<sup>42</sup>

An executive committee was formed to discuss Aboriginal policy,<sup>43</sup> and on February 19, 1946, four months after resumption of Chinese rule, Chen Yi sent three inspection teams into the mountains around Taiwan in conjunction with county government officials to formally assess the circumstances facing Aboriginal communities. Each team consisted of officials from various departments within the executive administrative office, such as civil affairs, agriculture and forestry, education, police, finance and health. Relief supplies such as salt, salted fish and matches were also sent with them for measured distribution among Aboriginal households.<sup>44</sup> Various reports from around Taiwan tell of a warm welcome issued to the official visitors.<sup>45</sup>

Propaganda was also disseminated in the mountains by special teams who showed

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947a): "Shandi xingzheng zhi guoqu yu xianzai" (The past and present of mountain area administration). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 14 January 1947, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945k): "Xian zhi huafen jike guiding" (County system divisions to be made official). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 18 December 1945, p.2; and Chang Jui-cheng (1990a): op. cit., p.106.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947a), op. cit.

See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946a): "Gongshu zuzhi kaochatuan xuanwei Gaoshanzu tongbao" (Executive Office organises inspection teams to guide Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 21 February 1946, p.3. The names of each team's members and their office are included in the report.
 For example, for Hualien County, see Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946b): "Gaoshanzu kaochatuan disanzu

dao Hualian" (The third team Kaoshan people inspection team reaches Hualien). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 22 February 1946, p.3; and for Taipei County and Taichung County (Nantou), see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946c): "Xuanwei Gaoshanzu tongbao kaochatuan yi fan Taibei" (Inspection teams guiding Kaoshan compatriots have returned to Taipei). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 10 March 1946, p.2.

films, played gramophone records, and issued leaflets, slogans and other publications.<sup>46</sup>

One by one, Taiwan's counties also established their own mountain administration offices and appointed mountain area supervisors. Gradually, township administrative offices were established in each dedicated Aboriginal township (*shandi xiang*); all township heads were Aboriginal and initially were appointed by higher authorities. Deputy heads were mostly Chinese and had administrative skills and institutional connections and imperatives the Aboriginal township head usually lacked. Township public schools, clinics, police stations and mountain produce cooperatives were also set up. Villages were provided with branches or subunits of these bodies, with their heads elected by local residents. Township councils were also elected and these, initially at least, frequently consisted of Aborigines with "chieftain" status, though their abilities were considered limited. All were considered part of the process of making Aboriginal townships "autonomous" within a wider programme of administrative decentralisation; in practice, therefore, this was not a programme of ethnic autonomy but of local autonomy, with small but significant changes to suit Aboriginal requirements.<sup>47</sup>

A conference for around thirty provincial and county officials responsible for Aboriginal administration was held on September 6 and 7, 1946.<sup>48</sup> On December 16, Chen Yi's administration submitted reports from its various departments to the provincial consultative council; within the civil affairs and education reports were summaries of policies implemented relating to Aboriginal affairs.<sup>49</sup>

46 Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947a), op. cit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947a), op. cit.; Wei Pei-te (1947a): "Taiwande Gaoshanzu" (The Kaoshan people of Taiwan). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 15 January 1947, p.4; and Wei Pei-te (1947b): "Taiwan Gaoshanzu (xuwan)" (The Kaoshan people of Taiwan, (conclusion)). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 16 January 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946d): "Shandi xingzheng gongzuo minzhengchu kaihui jiantao" (Bureau of Civil Affairs seminar discusses mountain area administrative work). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 August 1946, p.5; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946e): "Quansheng minzheng huiyi ding benyue jiuri kaishi" (Provincewide civil affairs conference set to start on the ninth of this month). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 September 1946, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946f): "Minzhengchu gongzuo baogao" (Work report of the Bureau of Civil Affairs). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 16 December 1946, p.5.

The administrative structures, as described in media accounts of the day, provide little information about the competence of those who worked within them. It can be assumed, however, that the administrative carpetbagging that was occurring across Taiwan at the time<sup>50</sup> was not as significant an issue in the mountains, not only because the inconvenience and unhealthy environment was repellent to most public servants, but also because infrastructure was too damaged or underdeveloped for any opportunists to properly capitalise on natural resources. Han Taiwanese industries, especially in the plains, would have proven far more accessible and lucrative targets, with a far more exploitable workforce.

Late in October, a political group known as the Taiwan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government was convened in Taipei. This association was notable for its heavy concentration of *banshan* Taiwanese (*banshan* were Han Taiwanese with significant links to the KMT in China who returned to take up posts or wield other influence in Taiwan<sup>51</sup>), as well as for being the only Taiwanese political association to avoid massive recrimination in the wake of the 228 Incident.<sup>52</sup> The association included the aims of "advancing mountain area culture, assisting Kaoshan compatriots in improving their lives and having [Han] youth enter mountain areas to work and study" on a "new life" programme for re-Sinicising Taiwan.<sup>53</sup>

Elementary schools (guomin xuexiao) were gradually established throughout Aboriginal townships, or else renamed to replace their Japanese predecessors. One junior high school in eastern Taipei County (present-day Ilan County) was set up with a

<sup>50</sup> Kerr (1965), op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See J. Bruce Jacobs (1990): "Taiwanese and the Chinese nationalists, 1937-1945: The origins of Taiwan's 'half-mountain people' (banshan ren)." Modern China, 16(1), 84-118.

<sup>52</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.266.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzj): "Taiwan xianzheng xiejinhui zuo juxing chengli dahui" (Taiwan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government held inauguration ceremony yesterday). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 28 October 1946, p.4.

predominantly Aboriginal student body. The Sanhsing Agricultural and Vocational Junior Middle School was the first Aboriginal high school and was hoped to become a foundation for developing future Aboriginal cadres. This school was located in Sanhsing Township and bordered the Atayal Aboriginal townships of Nan'ao and Taiping, relying on those townships in addition to Wulai Township near Taipei City for its pupils. The school received a healthy degree of coverage in the provincial press on the strength of its uniqueness; there was even an extended report on a delegation of pupils travelling to Taipei to address a function celebrating Chiang Kai-shek's birthday.<sup>54</sup>

For adults, "citizen training" involved a general education programme held over a month for two hours each day, and was delivered by local school principals, teachers and administrative office staff. Lectures on the Three Principles of the People, Mandarin Chinese, Chinese history, music and local autonomy were the main activities. It is not clear how widely or successfully this first programme of indoctrination was, but where it was applied, the content of textbooks was to be simplified for Aboriginal consumption, together with provision of phonetic symbols and Japanese accompanying the main text.<sup>55</sup>

At a more advanced level, agricultural courses and offices for training party cadres were set up in each county.<sup>56</sup> Added benefits suggested by an educational inspection group

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946g): "Jiaohua Gaoshanzu" (Educate the Kaoshan people). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 3 May 1946, p.6; *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946h): "Wei peiyu Gaoshan qingnian teshe chuji zhongxue" (A special junior high school will be established for the education of Kaoshan youth). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 14 September 1946, p.5; *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946i): "Shengshi canyihui jin zhaokai lianxi huiyi shangtan Jieshiguan xianjin shiyi" (Provincial and city councils today convene a joint conference to discuss the matter of money bestowed by [Chiang] Kai-shek House). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 24 October 1946, p.5; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947b): "Jiushu bofa mianfen jizhu gaoshan xuesheng" (Aid agency distributes flour to assist Kaoshan students). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 18 January 1947, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946j): "Taolun shandi gongmin xunlian, gongxunhui zuo juxing huiyi" (Civics training committee convened a conference yesterday to discuss civics training for mountain areas). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 5 December 1946, p.4; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946k): "Zhankai shandi gongmin xunlian" (Develop civics training in mountain areas). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 21 December 1946, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Wei Pei-te (1947b), op. cit..

included increased funding for Aboriginal schools, increased salaries for Han Taiwanese teachers in Aboriginal areas, dedicated classes for Aboriginal students in teaching colleges in Hualien and Taitung and extra places for Aboriginal students generally.<sup>57</sup>

# Other local contact and relief operations

In Taitung County, the newly appointed mayor, Hsieh Chen (a mainlander), inspected Aboriginal communities from February 13, 1946, bringing with him handouts of essential items for those in need to express the authorities' goodwill. Li Wei-chen, a provincial KMT official travelled to Taitung County a few weeks later and was welcomed by an Aboriginal delegation consisting of at least eleven people from four locations led by one Chen Chi-tsung. Apart from the standard requests that Aborigines respect the law, learn Chinese and so on, Li also asked the delegation to inculcate faith in the Three Principles of the People in their communities and eradicate unwelcome customs. In view of impending food shortages in the area, Li also promoted rationing and an increase in production as a way of maintaining public order. Section 259

In early April 1946 it was reported that the Taitung County government would retain and financially boost existing organisations facilitating Aboriginal trade. Merchants from outside Aboriginal areas were still deemed a threat to public order, however, and entry

°′ ibid.

<sup>58</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zc): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 24 February 1946, p.3.

p.3.
<sup>59</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zd): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 March 1946, p.3. Chen Chi-tsung might in fact refer to the half-Aboriginal future mayor of Taitung County, Chen Chen-tsung. The other representatives were Chih Po-yen, Wang Kuo-yuan, Lo Fu-yuan, "Reverend Chen," Chen Sung-shou and Ku Jen-kuang from the Peinan community; Ta Chien-tsan from the Malan community; Nan Ching-ching and Chen Tien-ting from the Chulu community; and one other delegate, whose name and origin were obscured on the page. All would have been Beinan Aborigines except the Malan delegate who may have been an Amis Aborigine. All of these communities were within "plains" administrative areas; no delegates from dedicated Aboriginal townships appear to have attended the meeting.

restrictions were to be applied.<sup>60</sup>

By August 1946, Li Wei-chen was working for the KMT's Hualien County branch, drumming up membership throughout rural areas. In that capacity he inspected local Aboriginal communities, opening local branches and organising classes for those intending to join the party. Twenty "brilliant Aboriginal leaders" were cited as KMT members in one report.61

Four Aboriginal representatives from an unidentified location in southern Kaohsiung County met Chen Kung-ta, Chen Yi's deputy at the Garrison Command, as well as other military and government officials on March 9 in Pingtung City. 62 In April, relief supplies of specially made clothes were delivered to Santi and Wutai townships personally by section chiefs in the county government. Food, clothes and matches were distributed among other Aboriginal communities in Kaohsiung County by both county government and provincial officials.<sup>63</sup>

Provincial civil affairs head Chou I-o, visited Hsinchu County's Wufeng Township on June 28, 1946.<sup>64</sup> And in Taipei County, the Aboriginal communities of Wulai, Taiping and Nan'ao were supplied with clothing or medicine by the county government or other agencies during July 1946 and then again in September and November. But as late as November, more than half of the Aboriginal population in the area were assessed as suffering from malaria, and medical supplies and facilities were still described as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zf): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 1 April 1946, p.3. 61 See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946ze): "Hualian dangwu gongzuodui shenru Gaoshanzu diqu gongzuo"

<sup>(</sup>Hualien party affairs work team goes deep into the Kaoshan people's territory to work). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 17 August 1946, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zj): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 15 March 1946,

p.3.

63 See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zg): "Jiuji Gaoshanzu tongbao" (Bringing relief to Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 27 April 1946, p.3. Santi Township, also known as Santimen Township, is written as "Santimeng" in this article.

<sup>64</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zn): "Minzhengchu Zhou chuzhang fangwen Gaoshan tongbao" (Bureau director Chou meets Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 3 July 1946, p.4.

Meanwhile, moves were being made to increase the Aboriginal presence in local government and education. The Ilan area saw five Aborigines from Nan'ao Township participate in a study conference for hundreds of local government representatives on March 23.66 In Hualien County, administrative offices for three Aboriginal townships were established on May 15, 1946 and, as elsewhere, those appointed as township heads were required to be Aborigines. The cultural affairs director for each administrative office was also required to be head of the township central elementary school, with village heads serving as heads of their respective elementary school branches. This, according to the head of the county government's civil affairs bureau, was to ensure the unity of governance and education.67 In October 1946 the government reported that school facilities had been installed across most of Taiwan's Aboriginal areas.68

In Taitung County, six months after the provincial administration sent in its inspection teams, the county government dispatched its own teams into mountain areas populated by Bunun and Paiwan Aborigines on September 18, similarly delivering relief items such as cloth, salt, milk and matches. Headed by Taitung County's head of police, Wu Puhsing, police inspector Nan Hsin-yen and other officials, the nine-strong group spent two weeks in these areas before presenting their findings at a general meeting of county

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zh): "Gaoshan tongbao xuyao shiyan yu yiyao, yi shefa yuanyuan yunwang" (Kaoshan compatriots need salt and medicine, necessitating the sourcing of materials to be sent to them). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 3 August 1946, p.5; *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zi): "Jiuji fenshu fenfa xianweipin" (Relief division distributes clothes). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 6 September 1946, p.5; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947d): "Jiuji Gaoshan tongbao" (Bringing relief to Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 14 January 1947, p.5.

<sup>66</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zk): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 28 March 1946, p. 3.

p.3.
<sup>67</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zl): "Hualian Gaoshan tongbao jin jun yizhu shanjiao gengzhong shoulie" (Hualien's Kaoshan compatriots recently moving to foothills to cultivate and hunt). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 October 1946, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zm): "Bensheng shandi guomin xuexiao xian yi daliang sheli" (A great number of the province's mountain area public schools have been set up). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 12 October 1946, p.5.

officials on October 5. The county set up its mountain supervisory office thereafter.<sup>69</sup>

The following month, Aboriginal representation was beginning to push for reform as part of broader *county* interests by October 1946. Aboriginal representative Lo Mai is listed with county council speaker Chen Chen-tsung, provincial consultative council member Cheng Pin-tsung and other local representatives on a petition sent to Chen Yi in Taipei asking for funding for infrastructure and public works. This might not seem too significant a development given that Taitung County's population at the time was evenly divided between Aborigines and Taiwanese, yet it was unprecedented for Aborigines to be reported as acting in tandem with Taiwanese at the local level when lobbying the provincial executive authority.<sup>70</sup>

In Taichung County's Hsinkao District, the Bunun communities of present-day Hsin'i Township and the Thao community of Sun Moon Lake received somewhat belated visits from the district head in January 1947, who lectured township heads, Aboriginal elders and locals on the nature of democratic government. He also delivered relief supplies.<sup>71</sup>

On February 10, 1947, training of Aboriginal youth for positions in Aboriginal administrative work begain in Taitung under the personal direction of mayor Hsieh Chen. Students had been selected from Taitung's Aboriginal townships by Ku Mingche, an official with the mountain area supervisory office.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zo): "Taidong xian zuzhi shandi kaochatuan" (Taitung County forms mountain area inspection team). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 23 September 1946, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zp): "Qingqiu Jialulan zhu gang" (Request for a port to be built at Chialulan [Fukang]). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 24 October 1946, p.5. It is not clear at this time who Lo Mai was or to which community he belonged.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947h): "Quzhang weiwen Gaoshan tongbao" (District head consoles Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 26 January 1947, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947e): "Taidong ban qingnian xunlianban peiyang Gaoshan gongzuo ganbu" (Taitung forms a youth training unit to cultivate cadres working among Kaoshan people). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 16 February 1947, p.5. Fifteen trainees were from Chinshan (Chinfeng) Township, eleven from Tajen Township, ten from Yenping Township, fifteen from Haituan Township and eight from assorted non-Aboriginal townships.

Given the constructive relationship developing between the Taitung County government and Aboriginal communities, it should not be surprising therefore that Hsieh Chen was quoted as saying in late 1946 that Aborigines were passionate about Taiwan's reconstruction and that they were not ferocious as was commonly imagined. This was an unusual remark relating to the Aboriginal character from a senior government official; previous comments in other jurisdictions had rarely failed to invoke or imply the shortest of temporal distances between the current Aboriginal way of thinking and outright savagery. In addition, the newspaper writer who made these comments opined that the Aborigines he encountered while touring eastern Taiwan were pure and cherishable.<sup>73</sup>

The same reporter went on to describe other interactions between Aborigines on the east coast and the authorities. Apart from the ubiquitous song-and-dance welcoming ceremony, witnessed in four locations along the east coast, and a report on an agricultural school with an Aboriginal enrolment of ninety percent, <sup>74</sup> a chieftain from Chuoshui River is reported as approaching an inspection tour group and requesting for his community more opportunities to study and find work, a stabilising of living conditions and implementation of health measures. <sup>75</sup> The fact that Aborigines were making these requests was in itself considered by the reporter to demonstrate some progress in Aboriginal people. A visit to Hsiulin Township in northern Hualien County was also recorded, in which clean streets, tidy accommodation, Christian faith and the ownership of gramophones and sewing machines were cited as progress in the civilising of Aboriginal people (although no mention is made of severe health problems in this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> See Yuan Cheng-fa (1946a): "Dong Tai kaochatuan: kaocha riji" (Eastern Taiwan inspection team: an inspection diary). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 13 December 1946, p.5.
<sup>74</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> See Yuan Cheng-fa (1946b): "Dong Tai kaochatuan: suixing suoji" (Eastern Taiwan inspection team: some impressions while travelling). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 15 December 1946, p.4. The location of Chuoshui River is ambiguous, being the former name of up-river Lanyang River in Ilan County and similar to the former name (Tachuoshui River) of present-day Hoping River which straddles the Ilan County-Hualien County border.

reported elsewhere<sup>76</sup>). Here too it was considered that those Aborigines still dwelling in the mountains should be moved down to the plains as soon as possible, not only for their material benefit, but also for the benefit of the forests, the frequent burning of which for hunting purposes was considered a threat to logging and the water supply.<sup>77</sup>

On November 24, 1946, Hualien County government and party officials together with young Aboriginal representatives from throughout the county convened a conference in the village of Ichang, just to the south of Hualien City. This meeting was attended by quite a large number of people – around 320 – and discussed the government's Aboriginal policies. It issued eight resolutions for consideration by the government. Another meeting at around the same time and in the same place brought together Amis representatives from Taiwan's east coast.<sup>78</sup>

The first resolution from the former conference is among the most noteworthy: it called for the *two* Aboriginal peoples – the Amis and the Kaoshan – to be referred to collectively as the "Taiwanese people" (*Taiwanzu*), a term pointedly not including Han Taiwanese settlers and their descendants. The request to identify Aborigines collectively as a "Taiwanese" ethnic group was also being made by Dr. Lin Jui-chang from the Atayal people, <sup>79</sup> but there is at this time no evidence of a connection between the two campaigns. This important development indicates that the broad range of Aboriginal sentiment that existed in Hualien favoured reclassification from an arbitrary topographical characteristic (mountains) to a geographical and political entity (Taiwan) as a whole, thus intensifying a claim to indigenous status in that polity. The claim that

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Wei Pei-te (1947b), op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Yuan Cheng-fa (1946b), op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zq): "Hualian Gaoshan tongbao dahui taolun tigao wenhua gailiang fengsu, qing fenpei tudi ji weisheng shebei" (Conference of Hualien Kaoshan compatriots discusses raising cultural standards and improving customs, asks for land and health facilities to be allocated). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 1 December 1946, p.5; and Wei Pei-te (1947b), *op. cit.*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> See Walis Nogan (1992): "Duili yu wajie: lishi xianyingxiade Taiwan Yuanzhumin 'zhengming' husheng" (Opposition and collapse: a history of the Taiwan Aborigines' "correct our names" appeal). *Isle Margin*, 5, 20-29.

two indigenous peoples were in existence appears to have been generated by the presence of the numerous Amis Aborigines in Hualien County, almost entirely plains dwellers, who no doubt considered the tag of "mountain people" unacceptable. A more appropriate name for Aboriginal people as a whole therefore needed to extend beyond crude topographical terms; "Taiwan" must have been seen as providing that function.

In a sense, the use of "Taiwanese people" as a name for Taiwan's Aborigines marked a return to the old Japanese name for the island of Taiwan – Takasago – and for its Aboriginal inhabitants – the Takasagozoku. The term was later semantically altered from its Kanji original into the similar-sounding Chinese characters of gaoshan. Nevertheless, for years afterwards the former term persisted as a synonym for Aborigines. The floating of "Taiwanzu," however, apparently marks the first time that Aboriginal people attempted to take control of a pan-ethnic title.

Other resolutions at the conference included requests that the government issue a Japanese-language weekly journal aimed at an Aboriginal readership; that remedial Chinese language classes be provided with teachers conversant in Chinese and Japanese; that a "new life movement" be instituted to improve Aboriginal practices; that clinics be set up in all mountain areas to combat malaria; that land be allocated for development of agricultural enterprises; and that party officials be sent into mountain areas to lecture on the Three Principles of the People and KMT history.<sup>80</sup>

This advanced degree of consultation with the Hualien County government continued on

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were rendered virtually illiterate under the Chinese when Chen Yi banned Japanese publications, including the Japanese component of bilingual newspapers. The impact of this impractical, ideologically inspired policy on Aborigines and mountain area administration seems to have stirred up enough trouble for the administration to respond by publishing a weekly bulletin in Japanese for Aborigines, a temporary measure which seems not to have been applied to similarly affected Han Taiwanese. See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zr): "Shandi jumin fuyin: minchu kanxing zhongriwen tongxun" (Good News for mountain area residents: Civil Affairs Bureau to publish Chinese-Japanese language bulletin). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 24 November 1946, p.4.

January 6, 1947, when a meeting between officials and around seventy Aboriginal representatives from across Hualien was convened to discuss the economic difficulties besetting Aboriginal communities. Convenor and Aboriginal county councillor Lin Lisheng argued that Aborigines in eastern Taiwan should form a cooperative and set up factories to make better use of their human and natural resources and to consolidate living standards. The representatives in turn urged that agricultural and aquacultural schools for Aboriginal students be established, motorised boats be purchased and that a number of buildings – presumably occupied illegally by the KMT, though there are no details – be returned to Amis communities.<sup>81</sup>

Finally, just before the outbreak of the 228 Incident, Taipei County mayor Lu Kuihsiang visited the Aboriginal community at Hanhsi in Taiping Township (presently Tatung Township) near Ilan in mid-February, apparently at the request of the community, to attend an opening ceremony for recently completed work by local people on irrigation infrastructure.<sup>82</sup>

All of this evidence therefore suggests that parts of the new administration made some effort to engage with Aboriginal communities and their leaders. Again, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these meetings were stage-managed or promotional without access to independent accounts, but I argue that there are enough media reports of problematic elements within the administration and sufficient instances in which Aboriginal delegates seem to have had a genuine voice to allow us to conclude that the reporting prior to the 228 Incident was reliable and that the portrayal of Aboriginal-KMT relations as constructive and forward-looking was not a distortion. This is reinforced by the subsequent tour of Governor Chen Yi to certain Aboriginal locations

<sup>81</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947f): "Fazhan shandi jingji" (Develop the economy of the mountain areas). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 10 January 1947, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947g): "Shandi nianlai xianzhu jinbu, xuyao zuguo lequ wuyong" (Mountain areas have improved noticeably in a year, need the ancestral country to "dance to the music"). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 26 February 1947, p.4.

and, despite the government's distaste for a range of Aboriginal customs, the reemergence of certain cultural activities which were embraced by the provincial media. These events will now be outlined.

#### Chen Yi at Sun Moon Lake, Alishan and Mutan

Four months before the 228 Incident, Chen Yi set out on an inspection tour of the western side of Taiwan, visiting several Aboriginal communities and meeting a number of Aboriginal representatives along the way. On October 3, 1946, Chen went to Sun Moon Lake, and the next day he inspected both the local Aboriginal community and the lake's hydroelectric facilities that had been damaged during the war and which were undergoing repairs. Chen first visited the Shuishe community and observed a performance of singing and dancing. An unidentified chieftain (probably Mao Hsinhsiao, the same "chief' discussed in later chapters) then complained that the Japanese had tricked them into believing they would receive electric lighting and adequate housing. The chieftain then asked for assistance in improving their living conditions and relieving them of land taxes.83

One newspaper report ran Chen's reply verbatim. He reminded the Aborigines that unlike under the Japanese, they were now free and that all peoples in the Republic of China were to be treated equally. Chen said that his Aboriginal "brothers" would gradually see material improvement in their lives, and that their specific request for electric infrastructure would be considered. He stated that no tax exemptions were possible by law but that other assistance might be considered for those in need. He encouraged them to work in nearby factories to alleviate their poverty, but added that

<sup>83</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzk): "Chen zhangguan shicha Riyuetan, canguan Gaoshan tongbao wudao" (Governor Chen inspects Sun Moon Lake, watches Kaoshan compatriots dance). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 6 October 1946, p.5.

this required them to first study Mandarin. Apart from improving prospects for work, he said, acquiring Mandarin would also allow them to become authentic citizens of China. He described a future in which Aborigines and Chinese lived and worked together, and one in which Aborigines could travel to the mainland identifying themselves not as Kaoshan but as people from "such-and-such a place" in China. The Aborigines, he concluded with an assimilationist flourish, would indeed be awakened to the honour of being Chinese citizens. <sup>84</sup> Before departing, Chen presented the Aborigines with gifts of "Ancestral Country" label cigarettes and "Fragrant" label wine. <sup>85</sup>

The next day, Chen Yi travelled to Kaohsiung and Pingtung cities. In Pingtung City, Chen Yi's visitors included a delegation of Aborigines led by the Kaohsiung County councillor Kui Shun-i, a Paiwan Aborigine who would go on to be elected mayor of Santi Township (later Santimen Township). So On October 9, Chen Yi was in Taiwan's southernmost tip, and his tour included a trip to Aboriginal communities in Mutan Township. Several dozen young men and women from the community performed dances and songs for the visitors, with one newspaper report describing them as "descendants of the heroes" of the Mutan Incident of 1874.

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87 See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzp), op. cit.; and Li (1946), op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzl): "Zhengfu yi pingdeng yuanze duidai Gaoshan tongbao" (Government treats Kaoshan compatriots on the basis of equality). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 6 October 1946, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzk), op. cit.. Pictures of Chen Yi on this visit to Sun Moon Lake are available at Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzl), op. cit.; Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzm): Untitled photograph. Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 6 October 1946, p.4; and Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzn): "Chen zhangguan zai Riyuetan" (Governor Chen at Sun Moon Lake). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 7 October 1946, p.5.

p.5.

86 See Li Tan-chou (1946): "Gaoxiong Eluanbi qulai" (Through Kaohsiung and Oluanpi). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 12 October 1946, p.5. For a photograph of the meeting, see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzo): Untitled photograph (no.5). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 20 October 1946, p.6. See also *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzp): "Shicha Eluanbi jiejian Gaoshan tongbao" (Inspecting Oluanpi and receiving Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 10 October 1946, p.5.

# Renewal of cultural expression

Some of the more significant parts of Aboriginal life presented in the provincial media were what readers would have seen as innocuous cultural exotica: dancing, singing and other rituals lacking the overt violence against Han Taiwanese that frontier and tribal conflict necessitated. The paradox facing assimilationists was that such diluted and selective cultural expressions were used to signify that KMT-Aboriginal relations were on a steady course. They also served as evidence of their sagacity and tolerance compared with the culturally repressive Japanese, who forbade significant Aboriginal rituals.

On July 19, harvest festival ceremonies and celebrations commenced in Taitung, with mayor Hsieh Chen and senior officials attending at least one segment at the Malan Public School in Taitung City.<sup>88</sup> On October 22, 1946, seven Hualien County Aborigines led by Lo Ching-chun performed native songs for radio broadcast.<sup>89</sup>

Then, in October 1946, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, Soong Mei-ling, travelled to Taiwan to participate in first anniversary celebrations for the recovery of Taiwan from Japan. During a sports carnival attended and addressed by Chiang, a performance of dancing was put on by thirty-five Aborigines from Taitung County under the patronage of Han delegation heads Cheng Pin-tsung and Chiang Yuan-sheng.<sup>90</sup>

In mid-February 1947, the "Patriotic Song and Dance Troupe" from the Taroko Aboriginal village of Tungmen in Hualien County performed in Taipei. This group of

<sup>50</sup> For a photograph of the troupe, see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zu): Untitled photo extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 26 October 1946, p.5.

See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zs): "Taidong qingzhu fengnian tekai Gaoshan wuhui" (Taitung celebrates a bumper year, stages a Kaoshan dance especially). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 27 July 1946, p.5.
 See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zt): "Gaoshan tongbao jinwan bochang minyao" (Kaoshan compatriots to broadcast performance of folk songs tonight). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 22 October 1946, p.5.

around forty men and women was interviewed by a reporter who said with some enthusiasm that had he not been told the group was Aboriginal, they would have been mistaken for Han Taiwanese (benshengren) with their hairstyles, suits, shoes, makeup and light skin. In short, they had "progressed so that they were about the same as us." Their performance on February 17 started with a rendition of the national anthem, followed by "traditional" dances in costume with some songs in Mandarin. There were also two dramatic sketches, the first depicting the "savage" custom of headhunting in the process of acquiring a bride, and the second depicting "honourable" Aboriginal slaughter of Japanese forces, exacted after Japanese soldiers insulted and molested Aboriginal women. The reporter argued that the performance ought not be judged by "modern artistic standards" but rather be seen as a valuable portrayal of "Mankind's primitive sentiments and spiritual characteristics" and as an artistically primitive reflection of social forms of the time. 91

Chen Yi's tour of Aboriginal communities and the media's coverage of Aboriginal cultural and political activities lend weight to the proposition that the government and the media were reasonably inclusive of Aborigines in terms of developing a national discourse. The impression I have after looking through this material is that a sense of optimism did exist, and that, despite the instability of the era and the markedly assimilationist rhetoric expressed by officials and commentators, there was a genuine sense that Aboriginal people had been embraced by the new regime and would be able to improve their lot and even prosper. Further evidence for this sense of optimism can be gleaned from the activities of Kao I-sheng and his fellow Tsou tribesmen during this period, and from the fact that their activities were reported in such detail. We now go back in time to look more closely at Kao's story and see how the events described above played out in one particular area.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947i): "Yuanshi yishu yuanshi wu, Gaoshan shaonü xianshen zi" (Performance by young Kaoshan ladies encapsulates primitive art and primitive dance). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 18 February 1947, p.4.

### Kao I-sheng and the Tsou in the media

An editorial written in mid-November 1945 said the sheer novelty of Aboriginal participation in the restored Chinese polity of Taiwan reflected the enthusiasm with which all Taiwanese people had embraced political life and their emancipation from Japanese rule:

Even our Kaoshan compatriots, hitherto regarded by the Japanese as uncivilised and confined to mountain areas, travelled with considerable perseverance between Taipei and Alishan to talk of "strategies" and to pass on "ideas."

This editorial appeared in the wake of Governor Chen Yi receiving another crucial Aboriginal figure, Kao I-sheng, sometime after November 9, 1945. Like Lin Jui-chang, Kao I-sheng was an aspiring Aboriginal leader, and his story and the fate of his family and the Tsou communities of Alishan are of central importance in analysing Aboriginal-KMT relations, and will play a prominent role in this and later chapters. The following section deals specifically with Kao's initial dealings with the new Chinese administration.

At the time of "retrocession," Kao was the top administrator for the Tsou Aboriginal communities, having been appointed by the Japanese. He was not of chieftain stock, however, and his attainment of power owed more to the Japanese and Han Taiwanese in the Chiayi area than to any influence his family might have had among the Tsou. His father was an outsider who had a policing job in Leyeh Village, where Kao was born.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946l): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 11 January 1946, p.3.

His father died in a fishing accident in 1918, and the young boy came under the wing of a Japanese official who helped him to attend high school, where he excelled. He graduated to the Tainan Normal College, where he was exposed to new political ideas and creative influences. Eventually he became the top policeman, teacher and administrator for the area and continued to cultivate connections not only with the Japanese and the Han Taiwanese, but also foreign visitors and missionaries as well. Sao was fortunate to avoid being sent to the war in the Pacific, but other Tsou tribesmen were not so fortunate, and Kao was responsible for collecting their ashes from Kaohsiung.

A review of newspaper materials from 1945 to 1954 indicate that of all the Aboriginal figures throughout Taiwan, Kao I-sheng was the most publicly assertive in his dealings with the KMT administration and the non-Aboriginal world. This is particularly the case in the period immediately following the handover. Following Chen Yi's meetings with various Aboriginal representatives in Taipei in late 1945, newspaper reporters began to display interest in covering Aboriginal affairs, meeting Aboriginal people and travelling into previously restricted mountain areas to explore Aboriginal living conditions and culture.

Kao I-sheng makes his first appearance in the Chinese-language media on October 28, 1945, only days after the transfer of power. Accompanied by other tribesmen, he is reported to have approached the Chiayi Preparatory Office on October 24, asking that Alishan's Aboriginal youth be granted the opportunity to assist in the reconstruction of Taiwan and join the Three Principles of the People Youth Corps. The Preparatory

<sup>94</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994b), op. cit., pp.14-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> See Chen Su-chen (1994b): "Gao Yishengde beijing ziliao" (Background information on Kao I-sheng). *Taiwan Literature*, 2, 11-15; and Presbyterian Church of Formosa Committee on History (ed.)(1965/1995, 3rd ed.): *Taiwan jidu zhanglao jiaohui bainianshi* (A centennial history of the Presbyterian Church of Formosa). Taipei: Presbyterian Church of Formosa, p.458. Chen Su-chen (personal communication, 18 September, 2001) has shown me a publication by a Russian linguist who visited Alishan to study Tsouic in about 1933. Kao is thought to have hosted him.

Office concurred, and in return requested that the Aborigines take on responsibility for security in the mountain areas, which was greeted with enthusiasm.<sup>95</sup>

Kao I-sheng then commenced a weapons collection programme as part of these duties. His co-organiser was reported to be An Meng-chuan (a frequent collaborator who would later suffer terribly for his activities), and all of the Tsou villages were called upon to assist in rounding up Japanese armaments left behind in the mountains and delivering them to the new authorities. It was following the commencement of this programme that Kao made his trip north to Taipei to meet Chen Yi, probably for the first time. 96 No record of the content of their meeting could be located, however.

On December 12, 1945, a Tsou troupe travelled to Chiayi Middle School to participate in a concert promoting civilian-military concord and met other groups who had joined the programme. The following week, on December 17, a provincial KMT delegation under the direction of section leader Li Wei-chen, who was mentioned above, travelled to Tapang Village to distribute propaganda among the Aboriginal community. The delegation brought copies of *Three Principles of the People*, portraits of Sun Yat-sen, KMT and ROC flags, written slogans, music for the national anthem, and sundry goods to distribute among the people. That evening a concert was held to celebrate their arrival. Se

By January 1946, reports began to emerge of small numbers of mountain-dwelling

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945m): "Alishan Gaoshanzu xiwang ru qingniantuan" (Kaoshan people of Alishan hope to join youth corps). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 28 October 1945, p.3. Kao I-sheng is referred to here by his Japanese name, Kazuo Yata.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945n): "Alishan Gaoshanzu tongbao shouxian kaishi wuqi jiaochu yundong" (Kaoshan compatriots of Alishan commence weapons-handover drive). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 12 November 1945, p.3. Like Kao I-sheng, An Meng-chuan is referred to by his Japanese name, Takeshi Yasui.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945o): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 14 December 1945, p.3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945p): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 25 December 1945, p.3. The characters for Tapang are written in an earlier form here.

Aborigines, including the Tsou, being allowed to travel to plains areas to barter foodstuffs and game in return for textiles or clothing, <sup>99</sup> of which they were in dire need. On January 19, the Tainan County government sent an official into the Aboriginal communities of Alishan to investigate Aboriginal customs. <sup>100</sup>

It was then reported on March 1 that Chiayi authorities had decided to lift prior restrictions associated with administrative boundaries in the Alishan area in order to "elevate the political and social status of the Kaoshan people." To this end, the Alishan area was awarded township status in line with that of administrations in plains areas, and Kao I-sheng, a "visionary (*xianjuezhe*) of the Kaoshan people," was appointed mayor. Classrooms used for tutelage under the Japanese were upgraded to public school status, Nationalist "land to the tiller" philosophies were expounded, and young Aboriginal veterans from the Japanese army were encouraged to open up land for cultivation. <sup>101</sup>

On March 9, Kao I-sheng travelled to Chiayi to meet Tainan County mayor Yuan Kuochin to express the gratitude of Alishan's Aborigines to him and to the Executive Administration Office, and to pledge general support for the government.<sup>102</sup>

Severe damage to mountain infrastructure, forests and timber supplies in the Alishan area was reported to have occurred because of fires which continued from around March until at least May. Aboriginal hunting practices were held responsible, and the lighting of uncontrolled fires by Aborigines was described as a major disruption to public

p.3.

See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946m): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 21 January 1946, p.3

<sup>102</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (19460): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 18 March 1946, p.3. Kao's Japanese name is used again here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946l): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 11 January 1946, p.3.

p.3.

See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946n): "Gaoshan tongbao diwei tigao" (Status of Kaoshan compatriots is raised). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 1 March 1946, p.3. Kao's Japanese name is used here. In these early reports, the township is called "Alishan" and not "Wufeng."

security in mountain areas that required urgent attention. 103

Nevertheless, the Tainan County government pressed on with a programme of "local autonomy," convening a committee for its implementation on May 28. Chaired by the head of the Department of Autonomy Matters, the committee was comprised of representatives from various Tainan County government departments, including police, health, education and natural resources. It resolved that health clinics, language facilities and a co-operative be established in Wufeng Township, and the newspaper article reporting these matters emphasised mayor Yuan Kuo-chin's keen interest in these issues.<sup>104</sup>

The launch of the Wufeng Township Office was reported on June 20, 1946. The newspaper report hailed the introduction of "civilisation" and "democracy" to Aboriginal areas, reporting also that the Wufeng Cooperative would set up a branch in Chiayi City through which mountain produce could be sold. Teachers and capable public servants would be dispatched to Wufeng; the former would also assist in public security. Restrictions on entry into mountain areas were to be administered by the administrative office, but Aborigines themselves would be free to move between the mountains and plains districts. <sup>105</sup>

Mayor Yuan Kuo-chin and attendant officials from the county government spent three days in Wufeng Township from August 6. Yuan stayed in the Aboriginal village of Tapang, and attended a concert in his honour organised by Kao I-sheng which saw the participation of five hundred Aborigines.<sup>106</sup> The performances were described in one

<sup>103</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946p): "Alishan senlin pinpin fahuo" (Fires continue to break out in Alishan's forests). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 6 May 1946, p.6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946q): "Cujin Gaoshan tongbao zizhi" (Promote autonomy for Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 3 June 1946, p.5. It is at this time that the name Wufeng Township begins to be used.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946r): "Alishan sheli xianggongsuo" (Township office established in Alishan). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 20 June 1946, p.5.

<sup>106</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946s): "Tainan xian xianzhang shicha Alishan" (Tainan County mayor

report as a "spectacular exhibition of costumes both ancient and contemporary, Chinese and foreign." Yuan told the audience that Kaoshan compatriots were now Chinese, that the mountain areas were now part of China, and that all should possess a "Chinese person's spirit of peace, humanity and equality" and note the importance of education, productivity and trade. <sup>107</sup> Yuan also presided over the opening ceremony of the local women's association. Leaving the Aboriginal community, he then inspected areas elsewhere in the township inhabited by non-Aboriginal labourers and other groups. <sup>108</sup>

On September 1, Tainan County officials, Kao I-sheng and the heads of Wufeng Township's five Aboriginal villages attended a ceremony in Wufeng marking the foundation of the local public school network. An education committee was also formed, and the village heads brought with them three requests: First, that Taiwanese people not look down on Aboriginal people and that Aboriginal people be treated equally and with respect; second, that emphasis be placed on the acquisition of written and spoken Mandarin and that the culture of the "ancestral country" be inculcated in them; and third, that public servants and teachers provide their own food (the newspaper report selected the second of these requests for its subhead). They also reiterated their support for the government. In the evening, a concert was held. 109

A number of managers had been elected to the education committee, and judging by their surnames it would appear most of these were not Aboriginal, but one of the deputy managers is listed as An Meng-chuan, who had close ties to Kao I-sheng, and would later co-author the proposal for Aboriginal autonomy discussed in Chapter Five.<sup>110</sup>

inspects Alishan). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 13 August 1946, p.5.

110 ibid. An is again listed by his Japanese name in this article, whereas Kao I-sheng is not.

See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946t): "Tainan xianzhang Yuan Guoqin shicha gaoshanqu" (Tainan Mayor Yuan Kuo-chin inpsects mountain district). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 23 August 1946, p.5.
 Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946s), op. cit..

See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946u): "Tainan gaoshan diqu jiji xingxue" (Tainan's mountain district active in promotion of schooling). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 9 September 1946, p.5.

In early October, as mentioned earlier, Chen Yi and top provincial officials visited Alishan by train to inspect forestry infrastructure. During his return trip to Chiayi on October 7, Chen alighted at Shihtzulu Station and was welcomed by two hundred Tsou Aborigines led by Kao I-sheng. There is little material on this next meeting between Chen and Kao; all that is reported is Chen's request that the Aborigines protect the forests and stop burning them (for hunting purposes). The Aborigines presented Chen with a banner featuring the words "The winds of benevolence widely reside," and in turn Chen gave the group 20,000 *yuan* in cash before departing. 111

One senses here that the relationship between county and provincial authorities and the Tsou communities and Kao I-sheng in particular was more substantial than elsewhere. This is suggested not only by the consistent coverage by provincial newspapers of these activities, despite the fact that the Tsou were a small and relatively isolated group of communities compared to other areas, but also by frequent reference to Kao I-sheng himself and his credentials. It is tempting to speculate that foundations were being laid by Kao I-sheng and/or Chinese officials for the Tsou to act as a model Aboriginal community in the eyes of the media.

# Kao I-sheng and the rice dumpling murders

Until this time, Kao I-sheng's activities had seemingly been restricted to pursuing the interests of his own communities. This in itself points to a growing pan-ethnic sentiment among a group of villages that had not harboured such ideas in the past. However, the consequences leading from a bizarre double murder case in Taipei four

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946v): "Chen zhangguan shicha Jianan dazhen, dui ci da gongcheng ji gan xingqu" (Governor Chen inspects the Chiayi-Tainan embankment, shows considerable interest in this large engineering project). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 9 October 1946, p.5. Kao I-sheng is mistakenly described in the report as a "village head" by the name of Kao I-shan. Kao's alma mater is also mistakenly called a university.

months before the 228 Incident strongly suggest that Kao I-sheng was, by this time at the very latest, looking well beyond the boundaries of individual communities in conceptualising Aboriginal interests.

The case involved the killing of two Han Taiwanese children who lived in Sanchung, a satellite community to the west of Taipei City on the far side of the Tanshui River. Rice dumpling peddlers Chen Tu-chi and fourteen-year-old Hsueh Wen-shan had been reported missing on October 21. The body of Chen Tu-chi was discovered on October 26 on the banks of the Tanshui River, and on October 29 the body of Hsueh Wen-shan was dug up by dogs, also on the banks of the Tanshui. Hsueh's head and fingers on both hands had been cut off and were not with the body.

On October 30, police arrested two young Aboriginal factory employees, Asao Kikuta and Terunobu Kazuki, for the murder of Hsueh on October 19, and then two more young Aboriginal factory workers, Masayoshi Motozawa and Katsuichi Okayama, for the murder of Chen on October 21. An accompanying newspaper report identifies these youths as originating from Wutai Township in Kaohsiung County, and were therefore Rukai tribesmen (Wutai is in present-day Pingtung County; the other detainees are implied to have come from there as well). The report claimed that such behaviour was traditionally required of those entering manhood by this Aboriginal tribe when seeking wives; the skull was said to be used ordinarily for libation purposes and that such "barbaric practices" were rarely seen after Japanese attempts to civilise the Aborigines. Only Terunobu Kazuki managed to evade immediate arrest and return to Wutai; Hsueh's head was reported to have been buried back in Taipei by the suspects

<sup>112</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946w): "Gaoshan gongyuan exi wei chu, zhansha mai rouzong xiaohaizi" (Evil customs of Kaoshan workers yet to be eradicated after decapitation of children selling meat rice dumplings). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 November 1946, p.4.

<sup>113</sup> Described in the report as Paiwan Aborigines, Wutai Township's communities were later classified as Rukai Aborigines and therefore distinguished from the Paiwan communities that live to the south of Wutai. The different characters used for "Paiwan" here reflect the considerable variance that existed in sinicising Aboriginal names before standardisation by academia and the government.

because it was difficult to carry, while the fingers were used as a substitute for ritualistic purposes. The report also indicated that the arrest of Kazuki took place in his own community after he fled there and was carried out by local Aboriginal police at the behest of the Aboriginal township head, named also as a local chieftain. The four other Aborigines arrested in Taipei for their involvement included three surnamed Tashiro, Kishino and Kameyama (see Figure 3.2).<sup>114</sup>

The text of the Taipei District Court's sentence was published in provincial newspapers in early January, 1947. Asao Kikuta (see Figure 3.3) and Terunobu Kazuki were sentenced to death for murder; Takanao Kamiyama and Yoshio Matsuoka were sentenced to ten months in jail for destroying evidence. Renkichi Tanaka, Shiro Mori and Kouichi Shiono were also sentenced to four months in jail for destroying evidence, with the lesser sentence taking into account their being under eighteen years of age. The death sentence for Kikuta was upheld despite being under eighteen. It is notable that most of the defendants declared their innocence before the magistrate, but the magistrate relied on confessions furnished by police to overrule their protests. Such judicial practice was commonplace under the KMT: recalcitrant defendants were routinely tortured, threatened or tricked into confessing during interrogation by police or prosecutors and then ignored by magistrates if they challenged those confessions in court. The safety of the magistrate's decisions and the reliability of facts as reported therefore cannot be assumed. 116

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946x): "Sharen jizu shi yong" (Ancestor worship through killing indicates heroism). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 November 1946, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947c): "Gaoshanzu shasi mai zong xiaofan an zhuyao fan ge chu sixing" (Chief villains sentenced to death in the case of Kaoshan people killing young vendors selling rice dumplings). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 2 January 1947, p.3.

<sup>116</sup> Asao Kikuta (born 1928) is now known as Sha Chao-fu. I was unable to locate the fate of the Wutai youths in subsequent newspaper reports, but I managed to locate Sha, who is apparently the only surviving member of the group that was arrested. The group appealed the sentences, and each was quashed except for his and Terunobu Kazuki's death sentences, which were commuted to life imprisonment. The two defendants then appealed the sentences to a higher appellate court in Nanking, which fifteen months later reduced them to ten years' jail for Kazuki (later known as Tien Hsu-chao) and seven and a half years for Sha. Sha says he served around six years of the sentence and was released early, along with seven other Aborigines jailed for other crimes. Tien Hsu-chao was released a few years later. This was probably because of good behaviour in prison; Sha also claims to have had a calming effect on

This rather sensational case received detailed coverage in the Taipei press, and must have made an impression on non-Aborigines who read it, perhaps reinforcing ideas about the savage and unchanging nature of Aboriginal people, particularly in regard to headhunting.

But of primary interest is the reaction of the press to the incident and the subsequent intervention of Kao I-sheng. A newspaper report dated November 20, 1946, lauded the chivalry of Tsou Aborigines who, in response to the news of the murders, contributed a total of 3,000 *yuan* to the families of the victims as consolation money despite widespread poverty within their own communities and despite the fact that no one from their distant home was involved. Village heads Kao Ta-jung (Tapang Village), Tang Shou-jen (Leyeh Village), Yang Chao-fu (Lichia Village), Kao Cheng-i (Shanmei Village) and Cheng Cheng-i (Laichi Village) collected the money, which was then passed on to Kao I-sheng, who as township mayor transferred the cash to Tainan County officials for dispatch to Taipei. 117

the rowdier prisoners. Earlier, during the 228 Incident, some of the prison's staff fled, allowing prisoners to escape, but Sha belonged to a group of inmates who chose not to do so. While appealing his decisions, Sha received sympathetic assistance from a Japanese employee of the local court, who helped him draft and polish the appeal documents.

As to the rice dumpling murders, Sha claims he was innocent of murder. Tien apparently wanted him to get involved, but Sha refused, though he did see "a lot of blood" from the body of the boy Tien supposedly killed before being shown the mutilated body inside the factory (presumably the workplace of the Wutai youths). Sha also said he didn't know why Tien killed the child, but confirmed the removal of the fingers and the head. Sha also claims that the other child was killed by four of the other eight Wutai youths for reasons unknown. He denied that the killings had anything to do with traditional Rukai practices or impressing a prospective romantic partner, as the newspaper alleged.

Sha, who is from a chieftain's family, says he was later elected to deputy chairman of the Wutai Township Representative Council (this is still to be verified); interviews with Sha Chao-fu, 19 August, 2001, and 22 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946y): "Gaoshan tongbaode yiju" (The chivalry of Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 20 November 1946, p.4.



Figure 3.2: Scan of a story in the November 7, 1946, edition of the *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* on the rice dumpling murders, including photographs of Rukai Aboriginal suspects. The photograph caption states that Sha Chao-fu is in the lower picture, along with the other chief suspects.




Figure 3.3: Mr. Sha Chao-fu at his residence in Pingtung County. Photograph taken on August 19, 2001.

It is not clear from the report who instigated the collection. Though it is possible that the administration engineered this Aboriginal philanthropy in an attempt to ward off ethnic tension, it is quite likely that Kao I-sheng was himself responsible, given his growing ties within the Chinese political establishment and his apparent desire to advance his community's welfare through increased interaction with Han society. The significance of such an action lies in Kao acting on behalf of Aborigines generally to mend possible damage inflicted on public and official perceptions of the Aboriginal capacity to function in a modern, civilised world. There can be few other explanations for why Kao and the Tsou community would effectively accept a certain degree of responsibility for acts committed in faraway Taipei by Aborigines from an equally distant community with which they had negligible linguistic, social or historical ties. As will be argued in Chapter Five, there is strong evidence to suggest that at around this time Kao I-sheng had already begun to direct his concerns toward pan-Aboriginal administrative issues and the viability of a pan-Aboriginal elite. The response of the Tsou community to the murders in Taipei being engineered by Kao would have been entirely consistent with such a direction.

It is also tantalising to consider Kao's involvement in this matter in light of the myth of Wu Feng, an infamous parable of a Han "interpreter" (tongshi) who sacrificed his life to shame Aborigines – the Tsou people, specifically – into giving up the practice of headhunting. The story ended up receiving so much currency that a cult developed around it which has endured to this day; as late as the 1980s this myth was taught as fact to elementary school children in history textbooks. One can only speculate that

<sup>118</sup> The Wu Feng saga has its own extensive literature. For an example of how he was valourised at the time, see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1948a): "Huainian pingmin yingxiong Wu Feng" (In memory of Wu Feng, hero of the common man). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 24 September 1948, p.2. This is an interesting editorial because it reverts to the use of the word "savage" at a time when the authorities were stressing that Aboriginal people were all compatriots; clearly, this inclusiveness was not retroactive. The first attack on the credibility of the tradition was launched by Chen Chi-nan (1980): "Yize niezaode shenhua - "Wu Feng" (A fabricated myth - "Wu Feng"). *Minshengpao*, 28 July 1980, p.7. Another study was published by Kaim Ang (1986): "Wu Feng chuanshuo yange kao" (A study of the evolution of the Wu Feng legend). *The Taiwan Folkways*, 36(1), 39-56. For analysis by Tsou authors, see Pasuya Poicenu (Pu Chung-cheng)(1999): *Yuanzhuminde shenhua yu wenxue* (Aboriginal myths and literature). Taipei:

Kao, who would have been intimately familiar with the story and the weight it placed on the shoulders of educated men like himself, sensed that a considerable service for Aboriginal people as a whole could be performed by the Tsou people making amends for the killings.

# The developing assimilationist discourse

Kao I-sheng's intervention may also have been provoked by resulting mass media reaction to the murders. Prior to his intervention, the rice dumpling murders provoked a strongly worded editorial in the *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, which since retrocession had been a daily newspaper under the management of the influential "banshan" Han Taiwanese Li Wan-chu. The newspaper can therefore be assumed to have followed a natively informed but pro-KMT line and, tellingly, was the only newspaper not to be shut down in the wake of the 228 Incident. Prior to the publication of this editorial, dissemination of assimilationist ideas in the media was haphazard and more often expressed in idealistic terms than concrete goals. Equality, inclusiveness or even the need to "not look upon them as a different race" were typical slogans in the context of implementing remedial measures for a poverty-stricken Aboriginal population. This editorial, however, was the most detailed exposition of assimilationist methods to date in relation to the Aboriginal character and practical Aboriginal needs – certainly, it seems the most detailed in the period before the 228 Incident – and, for these reasons, is worthy of closer attention.

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Taiyuan, Ch.9; and Wang Ming-hui (1987): "Cong Tang jun dao Wu Feng – wo you hua yao shuo" (From Mr. Tang [Ying-shen] to Wu Feng – I have something to say). *Tsou Adoana*, 4, 22-24. The Aboriginal movement was also given a boost by the second killing of Wu Feng – a statue this time – at the hands of Aboriginal activists in front of the Chiayi Railway Station in 1988.

<sup>119</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946z): "Pingdeng daiyu Gaoshanzu, ying zhidao shi zhi tonghua" (Treating Kaoshan people equally means they should be guided along the path of assimilation). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 8 August 1946, p.4. These were the words of Chou I-o, head of civil affairs in Chen Yi's administration; they seem to suggest that the important thing to focus on was how Aborigines were treated, rather than making sense of their origins.

Entitled "How to remould [gaizao] the Kaoshan people," the editorial first derides Japanese discrimination against Aborigines, then states that under the KMT government Aborigines received citizenship, equal rights and freedom from unequal treatment. It then made these points:

- 1. Development of the Aboriginal intellect and their liberation from inequality required specific policies and efficient implementation,
- 2. Aboriginal cultural development was not identical in all cases, but much of Aboriginal society retained the primitive structure of a savage tribe with a chieftain at the helm and which continued with primitive practices,
- 3. The Aboriginal character was ferocious and fond of conflict, and the primitive concept of murder as an honourable act remained ingrained even among civilised Aborigines and here the rice dumpling murders were offered here as vivid proof,
- 4. Remoulding their millenia-old, backward social forms into a modern society was going to be very difficult,
- 5. Apart from administrative and educational policies, a more fundamental plan was required to hasten Aboriginal progress: the selection and cultivation of younger Aborigines to prise open the suspicious and closed nature of Aboriginal society and bring about cultural improvement from within. Such elite Aborigines should attend universities in mainland China in preparation for this process,
- 6. The current lifestyle and culture of Aboriginal people was backward because of their migration into the mountains, so remoulding their lives and culture required liberation from the mountains and resettlement in the plains, as well as adopting plains customs, ways of thinking and language, and eradication of culturally specific practices such as dress, tattooing and murder. Increased contact with plains people would accelerate their cultural improvement,
  - 7. Agricultural plots should be established on public land for Aboriginal use and

the process of civilising them, and

8. Mountains were the obstacle for Aboriginal cultural development; now,

China's ocean and the mainland would eliminate this obstacle. 120

The topography-and-culture thesis is hardly spelled out in a convincing manner, as the

identification of topography as a barrier to cultural progress merely appears to be

arbitrary code for remoteness from Chinese culture; the majority of east coast

Aborigines, for example, did not live in mountain areas and probably never had, though

it was this group that the editorial was probably referring to as more civilised. Nor is the

potentially embarrassing cultural status of mountain-dwelling Han Taiwanese

considered.

However, the theoretically troubling issue of why strict mountain entry restrictions

ought to be imposed when Aborigines were in greater need of contact with Chinese

culture is not discussed in the editorial, a fascinating problem considering that elsewhere

the antagonist for any postwar conflict between Aborigines and Chinese was regularly

admitted to be Chinese people of "poor character" and from whom Aborigines had to be

protected.

As part of a lengthy and candid article on Aboriginal history and current trends written

in January 1947, reporter Wei Pei-te outlined the reasons for restrictions on entry into

Aboriginal areas. "Temporary" restrictions were considered appropriate because

cultural backwardness and naivete rendered Aboriginal people highly vulnerable to

deceit, particularly by dishonest merchants and Chinese men seeking to seduce

Aboriginal women. Worse still, these incidents would then risk enraging Aboriginal

communities as a whole. 121

<sup>120</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946za): "Shelun: Ruhe gaizao Gaoshanzu" (How to remould the Kaoshan people). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 6 November 1946, p.2.

<sup>121</sup> Wei Pei-te (1947b), op. cit..

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Wei's article said that entry restrictions were one of four general administrative approaches currently adopted by the government. The others were expunging the effects of Japanese assimilation, improving Aboriginal living standards, and realising equality and autonomy for Aboriginal people. As with the editorial, the Japanese treatment of Aboriginal people was excoriated as colonial enslavement and economic exploitation.

With regard to improving Aboriginal living standards, Wei said that diet, animal husbandry practices, high child mortality rates and widespread malaria reflected the pure but naive Aboriginal character. The main task at hand was therefore to encourage Aborigines to move to plains areas to facilitate delivery of needed assistance and educate Aborigines to properly manage their affairs as part of a broader assimilationist imperative. Methods of encouragement included establishing new agricultural facilities and other infrastructure at the foot of mountains whose convenient location and potential work opportunities would eventually induce the migration of whole communities. 122

Wei's article contains a rather sobering assessment of the dire health and educational difficulties faced by Aborigines. Severe shortages of penicillin were reported in malaria-affected Hsiulin Township, for example, and the general educational environment was poor for a range of reasons.

Much of this argument seems consistent with an assimilationist programme, except with regard to entry restrictions, where the argument becomes rather blurry. It was surely imagined that the time would come when a segregated yet assimilated Aboriginal

ibid. There is an amusing moment in Wei's article where he lets the mountains-as-cultural-hindrance thesis get the better of him: he insists that Amis Aborigines wore relatively orderly clothing (read: they were relatively civilised) because they had migrated from the mountains much earlier than other

Aboriginal groups.

population would no longer require protection in the form of territorial segregation, and that local interactive forces would eventually take over from government programmes in completing the civilising of Aboriginal people. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the KMT envisaged a permanent exclusion zone for the protection of Aboriginal people. Such permanence would have contradicted the nationalist mission of liberating Aboriginal people from savagery. Yet despite the supposedly temporary nature of such restrictions, no formal criteria or measure for determining the appropriate time to lift these restrictions seems to have existed.

Consistent with Rowley's observation in Chapter One, it seems that without such a timetable, little attempt was made to define the ultimate fate of Aboriginal people. It remains unclear if the desired result of assimilation was to leave some residue of Aboriginal culture, identity or community for the sake of national diversity or the edification of the international community, or whether Aboriginal existence had to be ended in its entirety.

For some, complete assimilation – the entire disappearance of the Aboriginal person and community – was the explicit goal. One unclearly attributed newspaper article written in January 1947 hoped that "mountain areas would be rendered culturally, linguistically and economically indistinguishable from plains areas." It is also in this article that support for intermarriage as a eugenic strategy makes its first appearance in the context of Taiwan, with "racial mixing" purporting to form a "new cell in the regeneration of the Chinese nation." Such an argument conceded racial difference in Aborigines, and, furthermore, a difference that had to be extinguished partly through breeding strategies. When coupled with arguments implying that Aboriginal people were either already Chinese, or could become Chinese on the strength of civilisation through education alone, we are left with the delightfully confused picture of assimilationists struggling

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947a), op. cit..

over the origin and nature of Aboriginal difference as well as what would be required to remove it.

Intermarriage does not seem to have been promoted as a policy, and indeed such ideas disregarded concerns about the degree of community hostility felt toward Han men making away with Aboriginal women, resulting in the loss of potential brides for male Aborigines. In Chapter Five, however, we will see that intermarriage found brief support for security reasons at a ministerial level in the wake of the 228 Incident.

But there is a paradox here: the equal treatment glowingly afforded to Aborigines was not afforded to them as Aborigines. That is to say, the newly received entitlements of Aborigines did not derive from their being Aboriginal but from their fresh status as citizens of the Republic of China. The problem of how this equality and assimilative process could be consistent with increasingly specialised administrative and political treatment of Aboriginal people, rarely if ever publicly addressed throughout the martial law era, is of concern to us in analysing subsequent tension between nationalism and national security interests.

Yet the public debate about the character of Aborigines and their need of assimilation, accelerated if not triggered by the rice dumpling murders, was not uniform. On the eve of the 228 Incident, a somewhat dissenting opinion on the rice dumpling murders was voiced. An article on Aboriginal living conditions by provincial civil affairs official Huang Chao-ta went to considerable lengths to dispel public "misconceptions" about Aboriginal people as bow-and-arrow touting savages resembling "primitives from wild African tribes in the movies." He went on to describe Aborigines as honourable, enthusiastic and gracious people no longer inclined to indulge in such behaviours; they were also diligent pupils of the Three Principles of the People, and that some Aborigines even claimed themselves to be "Han people." The rice dumpling murders

were aberrations, insisted Huang: they were the acts of bad individuals and not representative of Aboriginal people.<sup>124</sup>

In general, however, on the eve of the 228 Incident it is clear that momentum was building for a more wide-ranging programme of assimilation. We have seen that certain Aboriginal leaders were asserting themselves on behalf of their communities and enjoying some public attention, but the extent of their influence seems to have been reasonably limited, despite a degree of media exposure. The same can probably be said for Aboriginal representatives at a provincial and national level, and it is these individuals who will be briefly discussed in the next section.

## Provincial and national representation

Nominees for the Taiwan Provincial Senate<sup>125</sup> were announced on March 30, 1946. No Aboriginal names appear to be included on this list, apart from the half-Aboriginal Chen Chen-tsung from Taitung County, who appears to have identified as Taiwanese and who was defeated by the only other candidate for the Taitung seat, Cheng Pin-tsung.<sup>126</sup> Also in August, a number of Han Taiwanese provincial and county politicians, businessmen and other elite figures travelled to Shanghai and Nanking as part of a "goodwill delegation" (*zhijingtuan*), led by the veteran elite figure Lin Hsien-tang; this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> See Huang Chao-ta (1947): "Shandi guilai" (The mountain areas return). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 18 January 1947, p.4. Huang's office is not identified in the article, but is indicated in a separate report preceding Huang's dispatch to the mountain areas by Chen Yi; see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zb): "Jiuji Hengchun nanmin" (Providing relief to the victims in Hengchun). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 24 August 1946, p.5.

This body has also been translated as the Taiwan Provincial People's Political Council. For a study on the senate/council, see Woody Cheng (1985): Taiwan sheng canyihui shi yanjiu – bianqian shidailide yige guodu xingdaiyi jigou (yijiusiliu – yijiuwuyi) (Native elites and representative organ in a radical political change: a historical study of the Taiwan Provincial People's Political Council (1946-1951)). Taipei: Huashih.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzb): "Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu gonggao" (Public notice from the Taiwan Provincial Executive Administration Office). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 1 April 1946, p.1. Chen would later become speaker of the Taitung County Council.

group did not include any Aboriginal representatives. 127

But in October 1946, the central government in Nanking decreed that Taiwan would have eighteen representatives in the National Assembly, and apart from one pre-existing representative, all would be elected by the Taiwan Provincial Senate. The central government also stated that one seat for an Aboriginal representative would be reserved among the seventeen available, and that each county would nominate one Aboriginal candidate for that seat.<sup>128</sup>

The election had two dominant candidates for the Aboriginal seat, 61-year-old Beinan tribesman and physician Nan Chih-hsin and Paiwan tribesman Hua Ching-chi, with the former marginally defeating the latter by 11 votes to 9. In the race for the Taitung County seat, the half-Aboriginal Chen Chen-tsung was once again defeated by Cheng Pin-tsung, by 27 votes to 1.<sup>129</sup> The following month, Chen Yi hosted a farewell party for the National Assembly representatives including Nan Chih-hsin; one newspaper reported that Nan indicated to Chen Yi – who could speak Japanese – that he could not speak Mandarin but was honoured nonetheless to be representing his province. This is the first reported meeting of the two men, who both would figure prominently in different ways during the 228 Incident.

Nan Chih-hsin and the other National Assembly representatives left for Nanking on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzc): "Renshi zuguo jiaqiang lianxi, Taiwan zhijingtuan ming fei Hu" (To know the ancestral country and strengthen ties, Taiwan's goodwill delegation flies to Shanghai tomorrow). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 26 August 1946, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzd): "Guoda bensheng daibiao xuanju wenti, zhongyang yi dianshi yaodian" (The central government has wired measures relating to problems associated with the election of this province's representatives to the National Assembly). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 22 October 1946, p.5.

<sup>129</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zze): "Guoda daibiao xuanju jieguo: Li Wanju deng dangxuan" (Results of the election for National Assembly representatives are in: Li Wan-chu, others elected). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 1 November 1946, p.4; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzf): "Bensheng Guoda daibiao dangxuanren fabiao tanhua" (This province's representatives elected to the National Assembly speak). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 2 November 1946, p.4.

<sup>130</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzg): "Zhangguan zhaodai Guoda daibiao, zuo zai binguan juxing

chahui" (Governor entertains National Assembly representatives, holds tea party at the [Taipei] Guesthouse yesterday). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 November 1946, p.4.

November 7 to attend the assembly that would enact the Constitution of the Republic of China. <sup>131</sup> A reporter sent with the group sent back regular updates on their activities; his gossipy reports recall how Nan fell ill soon after the group's special luncheon with Chiang Kai-shek. Nan did not appear in the group photograph taken after the luncheon, and the others joked that Nan was finding it difficult being near important people. <sup>132</sup>

Nan's activities while in Nanking do not appear to have been extensive. He was elected onto the Qualifications Review Committee, it is said, because he was the oldest of the Taiwanese representatives. Presumably the committee's workload was not particularly onerous. One source, however, says there was a widespread rumour at the time that Nan left Nanking early because he had been disgusted by the spectacle of Chiang Kai-shek buying the votes of the Taiwanese delegates, and had refused to take part in the proceedings. 134

Nan Chih-hsin (1886-1959) was the first trained Aboriginal physician. After graduating in Taipei in 1909, he returned to Taitung where he worked for many years in the hospital system and as an administrator. In the late 1930s Nan opened his own clinic, where his work included research into malaria, acariasis and dermatosis. He also provided free care for the poor. His career as a local representative also began at this time, serving around ten years before and during World War II as a county councillor. Years later, after his retirement from politics, Nan continued to assist with the opening

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zzh): "Guoda daibiao zuowu jin Jing" (National Assembly representatives reached Nanking yesterday afternoon). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 8 November 1946, p.4.. The representatives' group photo on the same page features the balding Nan Chih-hsin at the rear, towering over everyone else.

<sup>132</sup> See Ling Chou (1946a): "Taiwan daibiaotuan" (Taiwan's team of representatives). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 16 November 1946, p.4; Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzi): "Jiang zhuxi yu Taiwan Guoda daibiao heying" (Group photograph of Chairman Chiang and Taiwan's National Assembly representatives). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 17 December 1946, p.2; and Ling Chou (1946b): "Taiwan daibiaotuan" (Taiwan's team of representatives). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 23 December 1946, p.4. The December 23 report states that Nan was "too polite" to appear in the photo. However, another photograph of the group can be seen at Wang Ho-sheng (ed.)(2001): Taidong xian shi: renwu pian (A history of Taitung County: people). Taitung: Taitung County Government, p.145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

of hospitals and was instrumental in the graduation of a new generation of Aboriginal doctors.<sup>135</sup> His extensive connections across various ethnic groups, his status as national assemblyman and the respect he commanded in Taitung would lead him to play a vital role in pacifying Aborigines during the 228 Incident, as we shall see in Chapter Four.

# **Security and Aborigines**

In this final section of the chapter, we look at the beginning of the Aboriginal relationship with the KMT in terms of security and public order. This is important because it provides an essential background to how Aboriginal areas responded to the violence and collapse of formal policing during the 228 Incident. After describing the recruitment of Aboriginal police, I discuss security problems involving Aboriginal communities that gave the authorities cause for concern, and which also serve as background to a relatively flexible approach to policing that may have been necessary to keep Aboriginal areas stable.

#### The recruitment of Aboriginal police

From the outset the government made it clear that Aborigines were entitled to equal access to education and training, including training programmes for a career in policing. In mid-November 1945, a week after introducing Aborigines from Kaohsiung to Chen Yi, the Executive Administration Office's police bureau chief, Hu Fu-hsiang, made a public address to the people of Taiwan in which he announced policing principles that would be applied and who could join the police force. The speech included special reference to Aborigines whom, he said, had been discriminated against by the Japanese

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Wang Ho-sheng, op. cit., pp.42-45.

and had been denied opportunities for education. He announced that those Aborigines with an elementary school education (under either the Chinese or Japanese systems) could qualify for police training, a prerequisite lower than the minimum imposed on non-Aboriginal applicants. Those already in possession of credentials for police work were also granted access to the programmes. This use of Aborigines employed by the Japanese was an essential move given their local knowledge and experience, and probably just as importantly, given the dearth of suitable personnel from the mainland. Hu Fu-hsiang would later acknowledge the special role police traditionally played in mountain areas under the Japanese and therefore stress the continuing intimate relationship between administrators and police in the mountains. 137

The first batch of Aboriginal police recruits, numbering 152, completed training in May 1946. Chen Yi presented prizes and addressed the graduation ceremony, reminding the graduates of their new responsibilities, including venerating the teachings of Sun Yat-sen and the principle of national equality (*minzu pingdeng*), striving to guide, assist and cultivate their fellows and helping to realise a democratic polity. The ceremony also included an address by an Aboriginal graduate, Chen Cheng-kung, whose home township was not noted.<sup>138</sup>

Pre-228 Incident threats to security

In late December 1945 there were reports of unrepatriated Japanese officials attempting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945q): "Jinhoude Taiwan jingzheng" (Police administration in Taiwan from now on). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 14 November 1945, p.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zv): "Jingwu shangdai jixu nuli, wuqiu dadao you an bi po" (Police administration requires continuing hard work, goals have been met but still cases to be cracked). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 November 1946, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zw): "Sheng jingcha xunliansuo Gaoshanzu xuesheng ming jiexun" (Kaoshan students complete training tomorrow at provincial police training center). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 5 May 1946, p.6; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zx): "Gaoshanzu jingxun jieye, Chen zhangguan qinlin xunhua" (Police training for Kaoshan [students] completed, Governor Chen attends to make personal address). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 7 May 1946, p.6.

to incite Aborigines to commit rebellious acts. A former Chiayi-based official named Takaichi Oki was alleged to have colluded with another Japanese, one Lieutenant Kishimoto, to rise up against the government. The latter official was specifically referred to as entering the Alishan, Tapang and Shamichi (the latter location is unclear) communities with large numbers of weapons and ammunition. No reference is made to the reaction of the Tsou Aborigines or that of Kao I-sheng personally, but it is probable that Kao I-sheng's weapons collection programme referred to above related to this matter in part.

By October 1946, strict measures had been introduced regulating entry of non-Aboriginal people into the thirty Aboriginal townships, including mandatory application procedures for bona fide visitors with witnesses' signatures, registration at police stations and township administrative offices, and a ban on carrying of weapons or prohibited goods. Even ranking officials were required to carry documents and register with the appropriate county government.<sup>140</sup>

Such measures were usually justified on the basis of the vulnerability of Aboriginal people to deceit and Aboriginal resources to exploitation by "plains people." Anecdotally, there is scattered evidence to illustrate examples of such deceit. The previous newspaper report also alleges Aboriginal requests for protection from this kind of threat, though it remains unclear to what extent such requests were made and how widespread they were.

<sup>139</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1945r): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 22 December 1945, p.3; and *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zy): "Qitu shanhuo Gaoshanzu, Chong Duoheyi beidai" (Takaichi Oki arrested after attempting to incite Kaoshan people). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 18 January

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> See Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zz): "Pingdi renmin jinru shandi ying dai gai guan xianfu zhengshu" (Plains people entering mountain areas must per regulations carry papers from county governments). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 11 October 1946, p.5. For more details of the regulations as they were introduced, see Hsueh Yueh-shun (ed.)(1998): Taiwan sheng zhengfu dang'an shiliao huibian: Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu shiqi er (A collection of Taiwan Provincial Government historical files: the second period of the Taiwan Province Executive Administration Office). Hsintien: Academia Historica, pp.118-147.

Because not all Aboriginal communities were located inside dedicated townships, the potential for conflict was occasionally realised. In particular, one incident in August 1946, which preceded the imposition of the updated entry restrictions, must have crystallised any concerns the KMT had been harbouring over Aboriginal administration. On August 15 an army deserter accompanied by three demobbed soldiers – all of unstated ethnicity, although it is implied they are mainlanders – entered the Farmers Association office in the coastal village of Tahsi in eastern Taimali Township, slaughtering one of its employees and forcing the other to hand over cash and clothing. Four suspects were arrested in Taitung City the following night (see Figure 3.4).<sup>141</sup>

Taimali Township runs along the southern coast of Taitung County and is mostly a narrow strip of land separating the Pacific Ocean from adjacent Aboriginal townships. It therefore had a heavy Paiwan population, though it was not a dedicated Aboriginal township. When news of the arrests reached the area, the reaction of local Aborigines was incendiary:

Upon hearing that the robbers had been arrested, the Kaoshan compatriots of the area, being of turbulent disposition as a group, gathered in Tahsi Village. Around six hundred savages armed with deadly machetes had spontaneously arrived from seven different communities (she) in an attempt to hack the suspects to death and so vent their fury. Later they convened a meeting and decided to demand that the government carry out the execution of the four suspects there and then in Tahsi Village, otherwise they would take direct action.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1946zza): "Daxi cun nonghui qiangsha an, renfan yi yi fayuan banli" (Suspects in Tahsi Village Agricultural Cooperative robbery-murder case taken to court for processing). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 5 November 1946, p.4. That the victims had Japanese names – Rou Murayoshi and Shigemitsu Haruyama – suggests they were Aboriginal; the latter victim is also listed under the katakana "native name" of "Hime."

<sup>142</sup> ibid.. There is no explanation for the three-month delay in reporting the story.




Figure 3.4: Scan of a story in the November 5, 1946, edition of the *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* on the Tahsi Village incident.

A confrontation with the government was avoided after the county government's mountain area inspection unit (*shandi shichatuan*) entered into negotiations with the tribesmen. This unit claimed to have been operating smoothly in the area for six months, and this factor was cited in its success in convincing local Aborigines not to act outside the law. As compensation, the unit negotiators offered to appeal to higher authorities to have the execution moved to Taitung, presumably so that Aborigines could witness it or at least be convinced that it had been completed. One source also claimed that the family of the victim was paid 800 *yuan* as compensation for the killing.

This incident is a compelling prelude to the violence of the 228 Incident in precisely the same area a mere six months later. It is not clear why it took two months for the provincial newspapers to run this story, but it should be pointed out that it ran only two days before the story of the rice dumpling murders in Taipei broke – suggesting that both stories may have had an impact on the editorial writers and officials responsible for Aboriginal affairs.

Another piece of evidence suggests that Taitung had other tensions brewing in the lead-up to the 228 Incident. Taiwan provincial senator Ma Yu-yueh asked a question in the senate relating to an incident in Taitung County in which an Aboriginal person was shot dead by a soldier, and was told that because the Japanese had not left the area at the time (the date of the incident is not stated) martial law was still in effect. An Aboriginal person allegedly ignored a soldier's order to halt – presumably he did not understand the command – and was shot for not complying. The official told Ma that the soldier was doing his duty and would not be punished. 145 Ma, who hailed from Hualien County and frequently asked questions relating to Aboriginal welfare, later asked a question relating

<sup>143</sup> *ibid*..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> See Taiwan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (ed.)(1992): *Taiwan sheng canyihui youguan ererba shijian ziliao dang'an huibian* (A collection of files of information from the Taiwan Provincial Senate relating to the 228 Incident). Place of publication not shown: Taiwan Provincial Assembly Secretariat, p.32.

to the quality of training for police stationed in mountain areas. 146

A less grave matter surfaces in an agenda for a mountain administration conference that was to have been hosted by the Hualien County government in late February, 1947. It was reported that a problem had emerged in which non-Aboriginal workers authorised to work in Aboriginal areas were setting up illegal businesses and distributing alcohol. This trend, it was promised, would be stamped out, and entry restrictions on plains dwellers would be maintained. A continued emphasis on entry restrictions at this time was also apparent elsewhere, such as Taichung County's three Aboriginal townships. A townships. A townships.

It is difficult to assess the overall level of tension in mountain areas as the 228 Incident approached. Certainly, there are scattered stories of theft, and there is a report of the government-appointed head of Chiaopan Township selling medicines and other items meant for an ailing local population for personal profit. This source also claims that the new regime – which had made many promises and had listened to the communities, but which was staffed by disreputable or inept officials – alienated Aborigines with its empty rhetoric and forced them to revert to old practices such as hunting. Another source describing the experiences of Atayal communities mentions corruption in the period prior to the 228 Incident.

There is also a report of the military forcing Amis tribesmen to become soldiers at the time of retrocession. Tribesmen from other communities, including Atayal villages, were

<sup>146</sup> *ibid.*, p.71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947j): "Hualian shandi shizheng gangling" (Program for mountain area governance in Hualien). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 3 February 1947, p.5.

governance in Hualien). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 3 February 1947, p.5.

148 See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947k): "Taizhong tuijin shandi xingzheng bo shiye fei liushierwan" (620,000 [yuan] in operating costs allocated to mountain area administration in Taichung). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 13 February 1947, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994a), op. cit., p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> See Masaru Nakamura and Hung Chin-chu (1997): Shanshen qingyao: Taiyazu nüxing chouzai silaiwode yi sheng (Distant feelings deep in the mountains: the life of Chouzaisilaiwo, an Atayal woman). Taipei: Shihpao wenhua, p.82 (n.37).

attracted to the promised salary at at time of high unemployment and poverty. Some of these men were sent to the mainland to fight in the civil war. One tribesman was captured by the communists and was not able to return to Taiwan until 1988.<sup>151</sup>

The final account of tension involving Aboriginal people and the authorities is quite apocryphal. In Hualien, an Amis Aboriginal driver was so incensed with the conduct of the newly arrived Nationalist soldiers who had mistreated his passengers and commandeered both his vehicle and his services as driver that he is said to have deliberately driven his bus off a cliff, killing himself and everyone on board. The story is impossible to verify, but its currency points to genuine feelings of anger in Hualien County at that time.<sup>152</sup>

## **Conclusions**

Before "retrocession," Chinese commentators and officials agreed that Taiwan's Aborigines were not Han Chinese. Immediately after the KMT arrived in Taiwan, however, the media and officials began to speak of Aborigines as part of the Han. Numerous Aboriginal leaders and other delegates met the new governor, Chen Yi, straight after his arrival, suggesting reasonably sophisticated means of communication and organisation were already in place across Aboriginal villages, despite the poverty and disease that enveloped them.

Relations with the government were quite cordial, and activists such as Lin Jui-chang

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> See Lyiking Yuma (1999): Huigui lishi zhenxiang: Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu bainian koushu lishi (Returning to the truth of history: Taiwan Aboriginal oral history across a century). Taipei: Aboriginal Historical Resources Research Society, pp.40-84.

<sup>152</sup> The story is referred to in at least two accounts of the period. See Chung I-jen (1993): Xinsuan liushi nian (shang) (Sixty years of bitterness, part 1). Taipei: Avanguard, pp.411-412; and Li Ao (ed.)(1989b): Ererba yanjiu xuji (A further collection of 228 research). Taipei: Li Ao, p.330.

took the opportunity to campaign for the return of land to the Atayal in Hsinchu County and the use of a new ethnic designation for all Aboriginal people. The campaign was not successful, possibly because it contradicted the government's new rhetoric on equality. To this end, the government began to send officials into Aboriginal communities to tell the villagers that the Republic of China considered Aboriginal people to be a valued and equal part of the Chinese state.

It also determined that Aboriginal townships would be guaranteed an elected Aboriginal mayor, and that villages would elect representatives to township councils. Improving educational facilities was a main priority on paper, and this was something Aboriginal leaders also supported. Resources were extremely limited if they were available at all.

This period is also significant for the activities of another Aboriginal elite figure, Wufeng mayor Kao I-sheng. Kao's advocacy for the Tsou people was generously covered by the press, and this advocacy extended to Aboriginal people as a whole in the wake of the rice dumpling murders. This evolving, positive Aboriginal identity constituted the firming of a new ethnic boundary between Aborigines as one group and the Han. Paradoxically, this was reinforced by news media and government reification of Aboriginality using negative ascriptions that suggested assimilation was vital for Aboriginal welfare and the nation. The election of Nan Chih-hsin to the National Assembly as a loose representative for all Aborigines also contributed to the development of this new ethnic category.

However, security problems and mismanagement in certain Aboriginal villages pointed to considerable potential for unrest, and these, together with constructive government-Aboriginal relations in other locations, help explain the patterns of Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident, to which we now turn.

## **Chapter Four**

## Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident

…他在平地生活, …便可以養成一種 正確的道德觀念: 即殺人是罪惡。

If [the Aborigine] were to live in the plains ... then he could cultivate a proper moral concept, which is this: killing is evil.1

This hypothesis appeared in the same editorial that was discussed in the previous chapter urging accelerated assimilation of Aboriginal communities. The specific killing that prompted it was probably the rice dumpling murders, but the flavour of the article seems to want to impress on the reader that Aboriginal people were still capable of fearless savagery and remained proficient in the most backward cultural practice of all headhunting.

About four months later, any sense that could have been made of this comment in terms of the civilising potential of Chinese culture was lost, as military reinforcements from China massacred tens of thousands of civilians in Taiwan's most infamous and impactful event in modern times.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946za), op. cit..

On February 27, government agents assaulted a female peddler of black market goods and shot dead a bystander during an ensuing confrontation with passers-by. The situation deteriorated the next day when officials fired on a crowd demanding punishment for the agents, leading to retaliation against officials, government facilities and mainlander civilians. The situation degenerated further as radio broadcasts and angry Han Taiwanese spread news of the disorder and encouraged local people to rise up against the KMT authorities. In response to the violence and anarchy, Han Taiwanese elite figures across the island set up "disposal committees" to manage the situation and restore order. However, Governor Chen Yi ordered in reinforcements from China and these were responsible for the deaths of countless thousands of civilians as they brought Taiwan under control.

In both English- and Chinese-language studies of the 228 Incident, the Aboriginal role, if not ignored altogether, is dealt with in a cursory manner or in a way that focuses on a specific theater of conflict. In this chapter I integrate the available material from all Aboriginal communities to provide a more balanced assessment of the relationship between Aborigines and the KMT regime at that time, and indeed more generally between the Han Taiwanese, mainlanders and Aboriginal communities, as well as across Aboriginal communities, at this key moment.

Chang Yen-hsien, now president of the Academia Historica, and Chen Su-chen, an educator and freelance researcher, have produced groundbreaking work on Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident, though their published research on this topic has concentrated mostly on the Tsou communities in the Alishan area, which united to bring about the most dramatic of all Aboriginal interventions against the government.<sup>3</sup> There

Yen-yu and Hu Hui-ling (eds): Ererba xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (1991) (Collection of papers from the 228 academic conference in 1991). Taipei: Independence Evening Post, pp.27-75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For the work of Chang and his colleagues that includes Aboriginal material, see Chang Yen-hsien (ed.)(1995): *Jiayun pingye ererba* (228 in the fields of Chiayi and Yunlin). Taipei: Wu San-lien

is, however, much more to this story. Details of the extent of Aboriginal involvement have trickled out over the last two decades courtesy of the occasional release of government documents, detailed accounts or snatches of memory in oral histories and in the efforts of local historians. These are the sources that provide most of the information for the following account; they are supplemented by my fieldwork where there were important questions to be followed up and where informants were willing to delve into the unpleasantness of recent history.

This chapter argues that Aboriginal intervention during the 228 Incident was largely a function of the growing relationship between Aboriginal communities and adjacent Han Taiwanese communities rather than any awakening pan-Aboriginal identity. The 228 Incident also serves to highlight the transition in power structures within Aboriginal communities up until that time, and serves as a turning point in understanding changes in power structures in the years that followed.

This survey is extensive and detailed. However, many interesting questions remain unanswered, and in some cases will probably never be answered, while access to the most sensitive and privileged information required more resources than were available for this project. There were also obstacles which made solving certain puzzles rather difficult or inappropriate. One of these was the reluctance of some people to recall events that involved personal tragedy or brought back the fear that permeated Taiwan at the time. Others – especially some who exercised authority – proved to be unwilling to discuss matters candidly or be challenged on the details of their experiences, perhaps for fear of being placed in an unflattering light. Another obstacle was the age of some of the informants, which meant that many details in their accounts were hazy at best. A

Historical Foundation; Chang Yen-hsien, Wang I-shih, Kao Shu-yuan and Wang Chao-wen (eds)(1994): Jiayi beihui ererba (228 in Chiayi and along the Tropic of Cancer). Taipei: Independence Evening Post; and Chang Yen-hsien, Wang I-shih, Kao Shu-yuan and Wang Chao-wen (eds)(1995): Zhuluo shancheng ererba (228 in Chulo and Shancheng). Taipei: Wu San-lien Historical Foundation. For Chen Su-chen, see in particular the series of articles on Kao I-sheng and the Tsou communities of Alishan in Issue 2 of the journal Taiwan Literature.

number of my elderly informants also died before I could check important details and follow up on matters of interest.

It is important to say at the outset that analysis of early KMT history deals with sources or individual allegations that are often unverifiable or unreliable. This is why I have attempted to bolster knowledge of these events with alternative accounts wherever possible, and especially where the only written source is a KMT intelligence document or newspaper reports published under the scrutiny of the party's intelligence services. Some accounts of events and the people responsible for them require further research and should be treated as provisional.

The detail provided in this summary is extensive for three reasons. First, it is necessary to provide a sense of the scope of Aboriginal intervention. Second, much of this source material has not been included in English- or Chinese-language historical analyses before. Finally, it is necessary to emphasise the connectedness of Aboriginal people to this momentous historical event and its aftermath, something that is barely recognised in key histories of the 228 Incident, a deficiency especially apparent in English-language accounts.<sup>4</sup>

It is clear from the material presented below that the Aboriginal role constitutes an indispensible element in the analysis of the 228 Incident. It is not surprising, however, that the Aboriginal component of this turning point in Taiwan's history has, to date, been ignored, downplayed or not recognised within the highly volatile, Hancentric debate on Taiwan's history, given that the Aboriginal role in the disturbances raises troubling political questions for both sides of the quite crude Taiwan-nationalist versus

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The English-language account of the 228 Incident to most clearly render Aborigines invisible is Lai et al., op. cit.. Henrietta Harrison's recent study is a welcome exception to this rule, though her account focuses on only two incidents of Aboriginal involvement; see Henrietta Harrison (2001): "Changing nationalities, changing ethnicities: Taiwan indigenous villages in the years after 1946." In: David Faure (ed.): In search of the hunters and their tribes: studies in the history and culture of the Taiwan indigenous people. Taipei: Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines, Ch.4.

China-nationalist cleavage. The importance of the Aboriginal role in the 228 Incident is reflected not just in the violence that occurred in some centres, but also where there was considerable potential for violence, as well as in an occasional calming role.

The material is therefore organised according to the type of engagement. First, I discuss Aboriginal intervention which directly acted against the Chen Yi regime and the Chinese Nationalist military. That is followed by examples of intervention where Aboriginal individuals or groups acted in concert with the Nationalist administration. Finally, examples of aborted mobilisation and non-involvement are outlined before proceeding to a discussion of the findings.

### Aboriginal intervention opposing the government

Attacks in Taipei by Atayal Aborigines

We begin this survey with the involvement of Aboriginal youths in the city where the disturbances started. The earliest reference to Aboriginal involvement in Taipei dates to March 3, when propaganda sheets appeared on the streets exhorting students, workers and the "masses" to rise up against the KMT. These also stated that Aboriginal soldiers who had served in the Japanese army had joined the cause.<sup>5</sup>

A number of students from various secondary and tertiary institutions across Taipei formed a militia consisting of four units. One of the unit leaders, Yeh Chi-tung, claimed in later years that Chen Shui-mu, an Aboriginal student said to be from Wulai Township in Taipei County and studying at the Taipei Normal College, said that his Aboriginal classmates could call on their families in the mountains to join the resistance. A

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Lin Te-lung and Chen Fang-ming (eds)(1992): Ererba guanfang jimi shiliao (Official secret

resolution was passed by the college's student organising committee on March 4 to send a representative to Hsintien (an administrative region that included Wulai at the time) to seek Aboriginal support.<sup>6</sup> Hopes for a "powerful force" of Aboriginal tribesmen that would support the student militias led to a plan in which the "Aboriginal compatriots" (xianzhumin tongbao) would combine with a militia unit in Hsintien - also the headquarters of the student militia - and attack a military installation in Chingwei (present-day Chingmei, which is halfway between Taipei City and Hsintien) before launching an attack on the city proper. In addition to this, a government report claims that Taipei's "disposal committee," formed by respected and influential members of the community to restore order to the metropolis but later branded by the KMT as subversive, sent messengers to each county and city to solicit support from "workers, students, hoodlums and Aborigines."8

But on the evening of March 4, the expected Aboriginal contingent from Wulai did not arrive and, on their own, the students were only able to cut off power to the military installation, whereafter the forces stationed there responded with strafing gunfire. A planned attack on nearby Machangting was also aborted after the failure of the Chingwei operation. Another account contradicts this, however, saying that a number of Aborigines did arrive from Wulai on the evening of March 4, but that two militia units failed to meet them; the group waited until 4am before leaving. Later, just before reinforcements from mainland China arrived, a number of Aborigines were ordered to return home in light of the deteriorating situation. 10 Su Yu-peng, another student and a

historical materials for the 228 Incident). Taipei: Independence Evening Post, p.34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Wang Chien-sheng, Chen Wan-chen and Chen Yung-chuan (1990): Yijiusiqi Taiwan ererba geming (Taiwan's 228 revolution in 1947). Taipei: Avanguard, p.170.

See Wei Yung-chu and Li Hsuan-feng (eds)(1994): Ererba shijian wenxian bulu (A supplementary record of documents on the 228 Incident). Nantou City: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.65 and p.60. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as TWS III.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1993b): Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji (si) (A selection of 228 Incident documentation, vol. 4). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, pp.444-445. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as AS IV. TWS III, op. cit., p.60.

<sup>10</sup> See Tai Kuo-hui and Yeh Yun-yun (1992): Aizeng er-erba: shenhua yu shishi, jiekai lishi zhi mi (Loving and hating 228: myths and historical fact and the unlocking of history's secret). Taipei: Yuanliu,

future member of communist organisations, recalls that students were divided into three, not four, groups that were centred on the campuses of Chienkuo Middle School, Taipei Normal College and National Taiwan University, and that it was the last of these that attempted to draw Wulai's Aborigines into the conflict at Chingwei. They had agreed to meet at 1.30am to attack Chingwei's ammunition dump, and waited until between 2am and 3am before deciding to call off the mission.<sup>11</sup>

Yet another source says that a military facility near Hsintien was indeed taken over by Aborigines. 12 Though there is dispute over the extent to which Wulai's Aborigines intervened in the disturbances over this period, there is no disputing that a number of tribesmen expressed interest in doing so.<sup>13</sup>

Chen Shui-mu, meanwhile, was reported to have accompanied Yeh Chi-tung to Taichung in central Taiwan in a bid to join the "27 Unit," - a key militia which will be discussed below - and the same name indeed emerges in a government list of suspects in the Taichung area, It is claimed that Chen Shui-mu later became known as Chen Chin-mu<sup>14</sup> (this was probably not the Chen Chin-mu who commanded the second of four militia units in Taipei together with the deputy commander of the student militia organisation, Kuo Hsiu-tsung<sup>15</sup>). Kuo Hsiu-tsung's widow, Lin Chih-chieh, has said that the future

p.265.

11 See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1999a): Jieyan shiqi Taibei diqu zhengzhi anjian koushu lishi, diyi ji (Communist insurrections in northern Taiwan: Legal cases during the White Terror period, vol. 1). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, pp.171-172.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History Oral History Editing Committee (ed.)(1993): Koushu lishi si: ererba shijian zhuanhao zhi er (Oral History, no. 4: second special issue on the 228 Incident). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, p.125 (this reference is hereafter abbreviated as KS4); and Li Ao and Chen Ching-chen (1997): Ni buzhidaode ererba (The 228 Incident you didn't know). Hsichih: The Journalist magazine, p.165.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See also Yeh Yun-yun (1987): "Ererba shijian lishi jianzhengren fangtan zhi yi: sanwei xinwen gongzuozhede huiyi" (Interviews with witnesses to the history of the 228 Incident, part 1: recollections of three members of the news media). Taiwan yu shijie, 39, p.11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.60.

<sup>15</sup> ibid. A person identically named Chen Shui-mu is also listed as having been executed in Taipei on November 29, 1950, but sources state that this victim originated in Kaohsiung City in the south of the island. See TWS III, op. cit., p.684; and Li Ao (ed.)(1991b): Anquanju jimi wenjian linian banli fei'an huibian (xiace) (Secret documents from the National Security Bureau: a collection of "Bandit" cases handled over the years, part 2). Taipei: Li Ao, pp.93-105.

communist operative, who would later be executed, was indeed involved in rallying Aborigines from Wulai to attack military installations and seize weapons in preparation for a protracted campaign against the government.<sup>16</sup>

One report suggests that the military in Taipei was aware of attempts to involve Aborigines in the conflict as early as March 3.<sup>17</sup> The Taiwan Garrison Command report of the February 28 Incident also includes a reference to "thugs" inciting Aborigines to enter the city from the direction of Hsintien on March 8 and attempting to "attack government offices and capture public servants and school personnel." In the end, however, whatever Aboriginal presence there was in Taipei seems to have been largely the activities of students and did not have the support of the nearest community in Wulai. Evidence for this will be presented in the second half of this chapter.

By the end of the week, mobilisation of students and others became more difficult in Taipei, with many moving south through Taiwan to find new opportunities for resistance. Then, at 6am on March 9, reinforcements from mainland China landed in Keelung, reaching Taipei later in the day. Martial law was declared in Taipei City, the disposal committee was dissolved, its demands ignored and many of its members arrested or killed. The liquidation of suspected troublemakers and random killing of civilians, especially local elite figures, then began in earnest. With this the possibility of substantial Aboriginal involvement in the disturbances in Taipei ended.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Lan Po-chou (ed.)(1998): Wushi niandai baise kongbu Taibei diqu anjian diaocha yu yanjiu (An investigation and research into cases in the White Terror of the 1950s in the Taipei area). Taipei City Government Documents Committee, p.144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1997b): *Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji (liu)* (A selection of 228 Incident documentation, vol. 6). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, p.709. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as AS VI.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See Wei Yung-chu (ed.)(1992): Ererba shijian wenxian xulu (A further record of documents on the 228 Incident). Nantou City: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.399. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as TWS II. The material on p.399 appears to be based at least in part on material in an undated report entitled Taiwan baodong jingguo cuoyao (Synopsis of intelligence reports on the progress of the Taiwan rebellion) which reported on events up to March 10. See AS IV, op. cit., p.453.

<sup>19</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.66.

#### Unrest in Miaoli County

A military report says that the security census of the entire island which followed the 228 Incident resulted in three arrests in the Aboriginal township of Ta'an (now Tai'an Township), though whether the detainees were Aboriginal or other people who had fled into the mountains is not stated.<sup>20</sup> It is not clear if the arrests were related to a report of "Miaoli savages" and "untamed savages" attacking government troops in the village of Kungssuliao in Houlung Township on March 6 and again in conjunction with Han Taiwanese on March 7.<sup>21</sup> These alleged attacks are of special interest because Houlung is a seaside township and a considerable distance from the home communities of the "Miaoli savages," who would have been Atayal or Saisiat tribesmen. The report also states that Aboriginal participation in the latter attack was at the invitation of the Taiwanese "hoodlums" involved.

#### Mobilisation and resistance in Taichung City

In 1947, Taichung County included present-day Taichung, Nantou and Changhua counties. Taichung City was the initial focus of unrest, until local militia retreated inland to the Puli-Sun Moon Lake area to battle the military on more suitable terrain. Taichung is also notable for the conspicuous involvement of communists in the violence, headed by the famed woman leftist Hsieh Hsueh-hung, whose activities were based there.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.277-278.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1993a): *Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji (san)* (A selection of 228 Incident documentation, vol. 3). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, pp.191-193. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as AS III. Originally a "rural township" (*xiang*), Houlung was later upgraded to "urban township" (*zhen*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Chen Fang-ming (1994): Xie Xuehong pingzhuan (A critical biography of Hsieh Hsueh-hung). Taipei: Chienwei.

At least one hundred tribesmen from the town of Wushe in Jen'ai Township (in present-day Nantou County), the site of the massacre in 1930, may have been summoned to participate in a demonstration in Taichung City allegedly organised by Hsieh. They are later reported to have opened fire on police and taken over a police station, then attacking army barracks and stealing equipment and uniforms from the air force.<sup>23</sup> These tribesmen were said to have been recently demobbed from the Japanese army. They started out by motor vehicle from Puli, an inland town nestled in a plain adjacent to Aboriginal areas, passing through Tsaotun Township before arriving in Taichung City where they engaged the military.<sup>24</sup> These eyewitness accounts are supported by Ho Han-wen, a former Control Yuan official and co-author of the original government report on the 228 Incident, who wrote in a later article that numerous Aborigines from around Puli converged on Taichung City, which contributed to Taichung becoming a key centre of the conflict.<sup>25</sup> A March 6 dispatch by the Acting British Consul, G.M. Tingle, also refers to a "persistent report that [the Formosans] were assisted in gaining control of the city by armed aborigines from the mountains."

A commentator in China, Jiang Shunxing, claimed that Taichung City's barracks and airport hangars were occupied by a force including armed Aboriginal fighters.<sup>27</sup> Two independent sources agree that a number of Aborigines had attacked the city's old Culture Building, which had been converted into a supplies depot for an aviation factory. The first source says the *fanzaibing* ("savage-soldiers") had been preparing to attack the depot using fire hoses filled with petrol, which when ignited could serve as

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee 228 Incident Document Compilation Unit (ed.)(1991): *Ererba shijian wenxian jilu* (A compilation of documents on the 228 Incident). Taichung City: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.109. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as TWS I.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See Chen Fang-ming (ed.)(1989): Ererba shijian xueshu lunwenji: Taiwanren guoshang shijiande lishi huigu (A collection of scholarly essays on the 228 Incident: a look back at the history of the incident that killed a country for the Taiwanese). Taipei: Avanguard, p.252.

<sup>26</sup> TWS III, op. cit., pp.525-526.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.133; and Li Ao (1989b), op. cit., p.150.

flamethrowers. These Aborigines were also said to have threatened Chen Yi and proclaimed support for Hsieh Hsueh-hung.<sup>28</sup> The second source, later to become a militia commander, says that before he joined the "27 Unit" (see below), he participated in a siege on the Culture Building. After hearing word of civilian massacres in Kaohsiung, this source, a Kaohsiung native, attempted to mobilise a group to assist the civilian militia there, but thought few of them were brave enough to hold up against gunfire. Recalling that the attack on the Culture Building was heroically conducted by a so-called Black Dress Unit (*heiyi budui*), seemingly referring to a band of Aborigines from the Puli area, he travelled to Puli and secured an agreement from Aborigines he met there to go to Kaohsiung and fight troops under the command of General Peng Mengchi. The plan was disrupted by a chance encounter with Hsieh Hsueh-hung, who invited him to join the 27 Unit instead.<sup>29</sup>

The Taiwan Garrison Command's general report on the 228 Incident supports the possibility that more than one hundred Aborigines from Wushe were incited by the "traitourous party" – the Chinese Communist Party – to plunder and kill in Taichung.<sup>30</sup> Another document summarising intelligence reports up until March 10 stated that on March 3, more than two hundred sabre-wielding Aborigines from Wushe arrived in Taichung to cause trouble before returning to the mountains.<sup>31</sup> A March 12 report sent to Chiang Kai-shek also mentions two hundred Aborigines entering the city from the mountains.<sup>32</sup> A more recent appraisal of the 228 Incident also accepts that over one hundred Wushe Aborigines took part in the fighting.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.44. Although fanzai, or huan-a in the Hoklo language, may have been used here as a derogatory expression for Taiwanese youths "being used by the Communist Party."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See Lan Po-chou (1997): Gaoxiong xian ererba ji wushi niandai baise kongbu minzhong shi (228 in Kaohsiung County and a people's history of the White Terror in the 1950s). Fengshan City: Kaohsiung County Government, pp.324-325.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.453.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.457.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.71.

<sup>33</sup> Wang et al. (1990), op. cit., p.336.

It is certainly fair to say that rumours of Taichung being occupied (zhanju) by Aborigines on March 3, as reported by the Central News Agency,<sup>34</sup> or on March 4, as claimed in both a broadcast by an occupied radio station in Taipei and a sceptical report dated March 6 to Chiang Kai-shek from Chen Yi, were exaggerations.<sup>35</sup> The rumour resurfaced, however, on March 8 in a report to Chiang Kai-shek from the Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau.<sup>36</sup>

More curious is a March 9 report referring to more than one hundred Japanese soldiers participating in the fighting - they had supposedly been hiding in Aboriginal areas since the end of the war. These "Japanese" were most likely Aborigines who, dressed in their Japanese army uniforms and speaking the only language comprehensible to both Han Taiwanese and Aborigines, would have appeared Japanese to people not familiar with the area.<sup>37</sup> However, the March 12 report to Chiang Kai-shek also mentioned over thirty Japanese participating in the disturbances in addition to Aborigines.<sup>38</sup> Concern over rogue Japanese remaining in the mountains would persist for some time; the fear of a phantom Japanese force living in the mountains is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

There is some stronger evidence, however, of a small number of unrepatriated Japanese individuals participating in the disturbances in Taichung County and elsewhere. In the case of Taichung County, a military police report dated April 5 listing ringleaders in Taichung makes specific mention of two men with Japanese names, one of whom also

34 Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.45.

<sup>35</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1992b): Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji (er) (A selection of 228 Incident documentation, vol. 2). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, p.83. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as AS II.

ibid., p.112. Lai et al., op. cit., identify the author, Chang Chen, as the bureau director, which appears to be incorrect. Yeh Hsiu-feng is referred to as bureau director in documents sent to Chiang at around the same time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1992a): Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji (yi) (A selection of 228 Incident documentation, vol. 1). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, p.270. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as AS I. TWS II, op. cit., p.71.

had the Chinese name Hsieh Hsing-chi (the Japanese name for Hsieh was Kouki Hirai; his accomplice was Kazuto Mori). They were alleged to have ordered a Han Taiwanese named Chen A-yuan to "liaise with and guide [or "lure"] three hundred Aborigines into Taichung to take part in the battle and create a state of terror." "Hsieh" is also listed as the commander of this Aboriginal unit.<sup>39</sup> These "Japanese" may also have been those described in a confidential report dated March 31, which stated that the 27 Unit included three hundred Aborigines under the command of two Japanese.<sup>40</sup> The origin of these Aborigines is not, however, stated in these sources. This figure of three hundred Aborigines is higher than the other reported estimates, but it is simply impossible to weigh up the precision of these reports on the information available.

Although the bulk of evidence pointing to Aboriginal involvement in disturbances in Taichung refers to those tribesmen arriving from the Wushe and Puli areas in present-day Nantou County, there is some evidence to suggest that Aborigines from Hoping Township to the north also participated, and may have been mistaken for Aborigines from Wushe in earlier intelligence reports. A list of suspects issued by the Taichung County government on June 18, 1947, includes two names of interest – Sung Chun-lan and Liu Kuang-tsan. Sung is listed as a deputy township mayor, and Liu was a finance official in the Tungshih District administration, of which Hoping Township was part. In that list, both men were accused of "leading more than fifty [Aborigines] into Taichung to plunder military equipment and incite the masterminds of the rebellion." An earlier list dated June 7 places the residences of both men outside Hoping Township: Sung in Tungshih Township and Liu in Tunghsiao Township (the latter is in neighbouring Hsinchu County), but both are said to have led more than eighty Aborigines to Taichung to pillage an air force supplies depot. Sung is listed as commander, and Liu his deputy. 42

<sup>39</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.120, p.127 and p.132.

<sup>12</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.188.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.204 and p.206.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1997a): Ererba shijian ziliao xuanji (wu) (A selection of 228 Incident documentation, vol. 5). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, p.550. This reference is hereafter abbreviated as AS V.

The Executive Yuan report agrees that a "people's militia" (minjun) from Tungshih included Aborigines. 43

There is also a reference to a number of Atayal tribesmen from Hoping Township acting as guards at seized storage facilities. Two tribesmen, Liu Chao-ming and Lin Chiangwen, were named as the offenders.<sup>44</sup>

Chen Shui-mu, whom we last saw leaving Taipei to get involved in the action in Taichung, resurfaces in the April 5 military police report mentioned above. In that report, Chen was allegedly "incited" by a Taiwanese, Chen Tseng, who was also responsible for various other attacks on mainlanders, including robbery. Chen Shui-mu is identified in the report by the nickname Chingfan, possibly translatable as "young savage," which lends weight to the possibility that this was the same person active in Taipei. 45 His fate from this point on is not clear.

All of the Aboriginal people referred to so far in the Taichung conflict are said to have moved into the city after the onset of the 228 Incident. However, as with Taipei, there were Aboriginal people in the city prior to the outbreak of violence as well. The bulk of these were probably students, and one source indicates that a number of them were most eager to join the drive for greater local autonomy and confront the military.

A number of students from the Tsou communities of Alishan Township (then called Wufeng Township, and not to be confused with Wufeng Township in Hsinchu County) studying in Taichung are said to have approached Chung I-jen, their Han Taiwanese

<sup>44</sup> See Lu Shun-an (ed.)(1994a): *Taizhong xian xiangtu shiliao* (Local historical materials in Taichung County). Nantou City: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Lai (1993), op. cit., p.95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.127. The same report includes reference to another "hoodlum" incited by Chen Tseng, one Chen Sheng-fan. The latter characters of this name make up the popular – and derogatory – expression "untamed savage." It is possible that this person was Aboriginal, or at least an assimilated plains Aborigine; he is listed, however, as a resident of Shalu Township to the west of Taichung City, which was well away from Aboriginal areas.

elementary school supervisor in Alishan, for advice. The male and female students

complained that their principal at Taichung Normal College had refused to allow them to

take part in the mobilisations triggered by the disturbances. The students, cursing and

seething with anger, had confronted the principal and threatened to attack him. 46 Their

complaint to Chung, who would go on to lead the 27 Unit, is memorable for the hint of

nascent identification with local Han people:

"Sir, we're Taiwanese [Taiwanren] too. Why can't we get involved?"<sup>47</sup>

Finally, in a fascinating anecdote written by a mainlander who was in the Taichung area

at that time, an Aboriginal sense of responsibility for the welfare of the larger

community is apparent. A number of Aborigines are said to have stood guard on an

overnight train service from Taichung to the Hsinchu area. The origin of the Aborigines

is not stated. They were said to have been "patrolling back and forth, wearing ethnic

[minzu] dress with machetes at their waists. Husky and gallant, they enhanced the

solemn mood in the carriage."48

Battle in Nantou: The Aboriginal role in the 27 Unit

Present-day Nantou County contains two Aboriginal townships – Jen'ai and Hsinyi.

Most of the evidence of Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident in the Taichung area

relates to Aborigines originally from the town of Wushe, where the Jen'ai Township

office is located.

<sup>46</sup> TWS I. op. cit., p.402. This threat is not included in Chung's memoir (see next footnote), but is included in Chung's much shorter interview with the authors of TWS I.

See Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., pp.461-462; and TWS I, op. cit., p.402.

<sup>48</sup> See Chen Fang-ming (ed.)(1991): Taiwan zhanhou shi ziliaoxuan – ererba shijian zhuanji (A selection of postwar historical materials for Taiwan: special edition for the 228 Incident). Taipei:

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One eyewitness claims that mainlander civilians in Puli were beaten, and that many fled into the mountains, although it is not clear if they reached as far as the Aboriginal settlements in the area. The same eyewitness claims that Wushe's Aborigines did not come down from the mountains at all, but that two Aborigines on an improvised Wushe peacekeeping committee, Yen Chin-lung and Tung Tu-kuan, were arrested by the military.<sup>49</sup> The former claim goes against the bulk of evidence collected here; the latter claim is yet to be verified.

Another eyewitness claims to have taken part in a rescue mission of a mainlander schoolteacher based in the town of Yuanlin in present-day Changhua County. The teacher had been seized in the Puli area on February 28 by Wushe Aborigines whilst on a trip observing Aboriginal lifestyles and cultural practices. The eyewitness claimed that because of Hsieh Hsueh-hung's propaganda, Aborigines from the Wushe area had begun to seize and kill mainlanders. The teacher was recovered on March 6, and somewhat emaciated, he reported that local Aborigines had buried alive (unidentified) people whom they had abducted.<sup>50</sup> The claim that Wushe Aborigines acted specifically at the behest of Hsieh Hsueh-hung is questionable, however, for reasons discussed below. The assertion that mainlanders were buried alive by Aborigines is also unique to this source and awaits verification.

But the most significant event in the Nantou area was a prolonged armed resistance by the militia known as the "27 Unit," which for a time prevented the military from regaining control of the area. This loosely structured unit consisted of a number of smaller militia originating from different areas and walks of life.<sup>51</sup> It was named after what its founders considered to be the true starting date of the 228 Incident – February 27 – rather than what the KMT administration had "falsely referred to" as the trigger:

February 28 Peace Day Promotion Committee, p.477.

<sup>49</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> TWS I, op. cit., pp.120-121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Chen I-shen, op. cit., p.33.

protests by local "thugs" on the following day.<sup>52</sup>

In forming the 27 Unit, commander Chung I-jen wanted a "backbone" of Aborigines from Wushe, because they had a reputation for bravery and martial prowess, particularly in light of their service in World War II.<sup>53</sup> An added attraction accompanying the recruiting of Aborigines was the weapons left behind in mountain areas following the withdrawal of the Japanese, and Chung wanted to locate these to bolster the unit's armaments.

Chung travelled to Puli on March 4 to solicit support from Liao Te-tsung, the administrator of Nengkao District, which at that time included Wushe and Puli. Chung stressed the importance of an Aboriginal presence in the unit, but Liao said that he had already sent a group of youths to Taichung to assist (their ethnicity was not specified), which Liao considered sufficient for the moment. Chung did not press for further Aboriginal participation and returned to Taichung.<sup>54</sup>

In Taichung, Chung discovered that this "Puli Unit" had received orders to return to Puli, which would weaken a siege on a local army barracks that was under way. Chung offered its members the choice to stay and fight or return home, and the first to elect to stay were the Puli Unit commander (originally from Taipei) and "six or seven" Aboriginal youths.<sup>55</sup> The 27 Unit was thus formally established, with an initial force of several hundred. The seven Aboriginal youths present, who were said to have had battle experience in the forests of Malaya, were purposely spread across the unit's five divisions.<sup>56</sup> Aboriginal members of the 27 Unit also acted as bodyguards to Chung I-jen and other commanders.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.480.

<sup>53</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.403 and Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.468.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.405 and Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., pp.472-474.

<sup>55</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., pp.478-479.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, pp.479-480.

<sup>57</sup> ibid., p.501. Two of the commanders, Huang Hsin-ching and Wu Chin-tsan, are named at one point in

By March 7, a number of separate militia around Taichung and elsewhere had begun to liaise with the 27 Unit command. That morning, Chung received "five or six" militia who had arrived in Taichung to report for duty; among them were Aborigines who had served in the Japanese army. Chung also records a visit at this time from a "Tungshih Brigade," half of which was Aboriginal. The brigade's leader was surnamed Liu – possibly the aforementioned Liu Kuang-tsan – which lends a little weight to evidence of a militia with significant Aboriginal participation entering Taichung from the Tungshih area. <sup>58</sup>

Around noon on March 7, Chung set out again for Puli, having had no news from there or Wushe for some days. He ordered that two of the four guards accompanying him be Aborigines from the Nengkao District.<sup>59</sup> Leaving the city, the group spotted two locals harrassing a young woman, and one of the Aboriginal guards, former Japanese army sergeant Liu Chia-pin, disciplined the pair.<sup>60</sup>

On arrival in Puli, Chung discovered that Nengkao District administrator Liao Te-tsung was not in his office. He spoke instead with two other individuals who had called the Puli Unit back. Chung implored them not to obstruct Wushe Aborigines from participating in the unit's efforts, saying that despite residual fearfulness in Wushe over the killings that followed the Wushe Uprising, it was possible that the Aborigines would cooperate if the district administrator gave his approval.<sup>61</sup>

Chung's memoirs (p.4) as Aboriginal though this is inconsistent with information on those men provided elsewhere in his memoirs. Chung may merely have been referring to their places of abode.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> *ibid*., pp.492-493.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, p.513.

<sup>60</sup> ibid., p.514.

<sup>61</sup> ibid., p.517.

#### The 27 Unit and Wushe

Chung and his men arrived in Wushe in the evening and stayed at the home of Liu Chiapin. The next morning the group was woken by an older man demanding to know why they had entered Wushe, insisting that Liao Te-tsung had ordered them not to listen to "communists." Chung denied they were communists, and said that oppression by Chinese soldiers and officials had led them, as Taiwanese, to rise up. Chung noted that the suspicious reaction of the growing number of onlookers was in marked contrast to the enthusiasm the 27 Unit experienced when travelling through non-Aboriginal areas. Accounts of KMT violence failed to arouse anger or sympathy among the Aborigines, and the ensuing "chatter" among them merely resulted in "naive" questions and suggestions. 62 Chung attributed this response to their "born simplicity and straightforwardness, innocent way of thinking, on top of 'brainwashing' by the district administrator, as well as the shadow of the 'Wushe Uprising' of 1930." He also reasoned that the Chen Yi regime's "tyranny" had not touched mountain areas, so an impassioned response was unlikely.<sup>63</sup> Chung therefore ordered his Aboriginal guards, Liu Chia-pin and Ma Hsi, to remain in Wushe and - through their own contacts and without Liao Te-tsung's knowledge - recruit individual Aboriginal tribesmen, particularly demobbed soldiers, then report to him with as many recruits as possible within three days. Chung returned to Taichung, thinking of how Liao Te-tsung had spoiled his plan to amass Aboriginal tribesmen against the government, and lamenting the fact that his unit's links to Hsieh Hsueh-hung, a suspected communist, was causing problems that would lead to cleavage of the resistance.<sup>64</sup>

It is difficult to reconcile the militancy of the Aborigines in Taichung City with the uninterest of the Wushe villagers. It is possible that the Taichung combatants came from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, pp.517-519. <sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, p.519.

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, pp.519-520 and p.548.

different villages in the area and that those remaining in Wushe were the individuals who had simply refused to be involved. However, what this lack of consistency does point to is an absence of pan-Aboriginal identity as a force for mobilisation. Involvement in the violence seems to have resulted more from connections of varying strength to non-Aboriginal people who opposed the government.

#### The retreat to Puli

After a brief trip south to Chiayi to learn more of the situation there, Chung considered that retreat into the hills was the only option to avoid carnage in Taichung City, now that better-trained reinforcements from China were making their way south from Taipei. Military equipment was ordered to be hidden in caves during the withdrawal, and Tsou Aborigines from Leyeh and Tapang villages in the Alishan region were specifically given this task, to be carried out at night and with the strictest secrecy. This is one of only four references to Tsou participation in anti-government activity in Taichung in Chung's memoir, but in this case – together with a summary in an appendix — Chung implies that links between the 27 Unit and Aboriginal figures extended beyond those students studying in Taichung. But it is not clear whether the Tsou contingent was part of the 27 Unit from its inception or whether, for example, it returned with Chung from Chiayi, where the so-called Tsou Unit had joined a siege trapping KMT forces inside the local airport (see below).

With this, the "three to four thousand"-member 27 Unit began its retreat to Puli on the afternoon of March 12. That night, Chung's sleep was interrupted by the appearance of three young Tsou women asking for instructions. The "sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds" were his students when he was head teacher at Leyeh Elementary School in the Alishan

66 ibid., p.666.

<sup>65</sup> ibid., p.551. Tapang is written in reverse as "Pangta."

area, and were now students at the Taichung Normal College. They had joined a 27 Unit forerunner in Taichung, the Defense of Democracy Unit, and were members of the nursing team (it is not clear, however, whether these were the same students mentioned earlier who had threatened that college's principal). The three girls were Kao Chu-hua, the highly capable daughter of Kao I-sheng (see below); Fang Mei-ying, the younger sister of village official Fang I-chung, who would be executed in 1954 with Kao I-sheng; and Wang Yu-lan, the fiancee of Tsou tribesman and future Wufeng Township mayor Chuang Yeh-chiu. The girls had followed the unit into Puli but were now unsure of the role they should play. Chung said they could not stay with the unit and had to return to their mountain villages; the girls were reluctant to leave but finally agreed. The next morning (March 13), Chung returned to Taichung to assess the situation there, but first escorted the girls to Tsaotun and gave them money before giving them to a colleague who took them to Changhua City, south of Taichung. From there, the girls headed home.

In a short interview preceding the publication of his memoirs, Chung identifies the group differently as Kao Hsi-mei, Wang Yu-lan and Peng Su-ying.<sup>69</sup> The reason for the discrepancy is not clear, but a published interview with Kao Chu-hua suggests that the names in Chung's more detailed account are correct. Kao Chu-hua's interview also indicates that her role in the Defense of Democracy Unit was to care for prisoners detained by the rebels – notably mainlanders and Han Taiwanese women married to mainlanders. In her account, the three girls were accompanied to Puli by Wang's fiance, Chuang Yeh-chiu, and the following day, en route to Alishan, the four stopped in the town of Chuchi, where Kao ran into a Truku Aborigine who hid in terror after spotting Chuang. A former employee of Kao's father and now a soldier, the Truku tribesman claimed to have seen Chuang "hacking at" government soldiers with a sabre during

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<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, pp.556-557.

<sup>69</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.406.

ibid., p.558. Kao Chu-hua's photograph is on p.552.

fighting at Taichung's airport.<sup>70</sup> Chuang Yeh-chiu is not mentioned at all in Chung's memoirs, nor is Chung referred to in Kao Chu-hua's interview. However, Chuang and Wang Yu-lan have been suggested by another source as possible liaison figures between the 27 Unit and the Tsou community in Alishan.<sup>71</sup>

With Taichung under army control, Chung discovered that the 27 Unit's membership was causing concern. City residents were now thinking that unrepatriated Japanese soldiers had appeared out of nowhere to fight the government; others considered the unit to be a communist militia. Chung thought that Aboriginal members of the unit were difficult to distinguish from Japanese, and the fact that there were so many of them had caused this misunderstanding. Indeed, Chung continued to nourish this perception, thinking it would intimidate the government.<sup>72</sup> Even Han Taiwanese, it would seem, were unable to distinguish between Aborigines and Japanese when Japanese uniforms were being worn.<sup>73</sup> Rumours of Japanese leading Wushe Aborigines had reached as far as Ilan County at the time.<sup>74</sup>

Travelling back to Puli once more, Chung thought it was still possible to counter the "propaganda" given to the Aborigines by Liao Te-tsung, but the activities of Hsieh Hsueh-hung might have already made that task impossible. Later, Chung heard that Hsieh had personally travelled to Wushe to recruit Aborigines at around this time, and he considered this to have irrevocably damaged his battle strategy, as Aborigines were thoroughly opposed to communists. Indeed, to them, "seeing [Hsieh] would have been like seeing an evil spirit."<sup>75</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Chang Yen-hsien et al. (1995), op. cit., pp.156-157.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Chang Yen-hsien et al. (1994), *op. cit.*, p.61. <sup>72</sup> Chung I-ien (1993), *op. cit.*, pp.559-560.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> See also Chang Yen-hsien et al. (1995), op. cit., p.88 and p.290, for two examples of this in the context of the disturbances in Chiayi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Inoue, op. cit., pp.256-257.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., pp.569-570.

On March 15, Chung went to Wushe accompanied by tribesman Liu Chia-pin, again seeking to convince Aboriginal elders that the 27 Unit was not a communist militia and to overturn their opposition to involvement with it. He talked with three elders who seemed sympathetic and who recommended he speak to elders in neighbouring communities and come up with a concrete plan. They insisted, however, that if district administrator Liao Te-tsung learned of this development, it would be necessary for the tribesmen to join the unit individually rather than as a community force. They also said that Hsieh Hsueh-hung did not strike them as "red" — of a communist persuasion — when she visited the day before. They also said to the day before returning to Puli, but in the end it proved too difficult to communicate with the locals and overcome the warnings they had received from Liao Te-tsung and his associates. Later, Chung would rue spending so much time liaising with Wushe's Aborigines.

An account of Hsieh Hsueh-hung's trip to Wushe is provided by Ku Jui-yun, a deputy of the 27 Unit who later fled to China. His memoir is notable for sparking a bitter exchange with Chung I-jen over mistaken recollections or invention of detail regarding the activities of the 27 Unit.<sup>79</sup> It is not possible to address this debate here; it should be noted, however, that Ku's account was attacked in considerable detail by Chung and therefore invites caution. Ku states that Hsieh and her entourage (including Ku) travelled by bus to Wushe on March 14,<sup>80</sup> seeking Aboriginal permission for her to withdraw that part of the unit under her influence to the mountains around Wushe. If this could not be obtained, she hoped to at least gain enough Aboriginal support to avoid creating

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> *ibid.*, p.575.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> *ibid.*, p.576; and see Chung I-jen (1995): *Xinsuan liushi nian (xia)* (Sixty years of bitterness, part 2). Taipei: Avanguard, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.605.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, pp.657-671. This appendix item is a lengthy letter of rebuke and contestation of Ku Jui-yun's account, and is included only in the revised edition of the book.

In a separate interview, Ku (under his mainland Chinese name, Chou Ming) states that Hsieh and the others went to Wushe on March 13. See Ho Hsun (1987): "Ererba lishi jianzhengren fangtan zhi er: Zhou Ming xiansheng tan ererba" (Interviews with witnesses to the history of the 228 Incident, part 2: Mr. Zhou Ming speaks about 228). Taiwan yu shijie, 39, p.16.

two fronts. Ku claims that the mayor of Jen'ai Township (Kao Tsung-i, who is not named in his account) expressed sympathy for her position, but that his community was still mindful of the consequences of the Wushe Uprising and feared a similar disaster should the area be occupied by the military. He would not, however, obstruct individual tribesmen from joining the unit should they wish to do so. Thus, that evening ten youths left for Puli to join the conflict, where they are said to have fought bravely.<sup>81</sup> Elsewhere, under Ku's orders, three Wushe youths are said to have detained a Han Taiwanese who had been spreading rumours that the 27 Unit was a communist militia.<sup>82</sup>

A recent history of Wushe's Aboriginal communities also provides information on the reaction of Aborigines there and elsewhere in Jen'ai Township to the 228 Incident. In addition to mentioning Hsieh Hsueh-hung's attempt to recruit local tribesmen, Teng Hsiang-yang's study states that a group of tribesmen from Wanta, a village downriver to the south, arrived in Wushe preparing for combat. With the Wushe Uprising invoked as a deterrant, they were talked out of entering the conflict by mayor Kao Tsung-i, who was a Bunun tribesman, and Hiroshi Shimoyama, a half-Japanese, half-Atayal tribesman and later advisor to the provincial government's department for agriculture and forests. Thus it was that only a small number of tribesmen eventually went down to Puli to take part in the fighting; this account strengthens the hypothesis that for Aborigines in Wushe the issue of whether or not the 27 Unit had communist connections was marginal compared to the local elites' overriding fear of local communities being decimated once more – by the Chinese.<sup>83</sup>

But even if the Wushe Aborigines had been more disposed to fighting the government, it is not clear that close cooperation would have been welcomed by all of the Han Taiwanese participants. After the 27 Unit retreated to Puli from Taichung, there was

82 ibid., pp.78-79.

<sup>81</sup> Ku Jui-yun (1990): Taizhongde fenglei (Tempest in Taichung). Taipei: Renjian, pp.70-71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Teng Hsiang-yang (1998b): Wuzhong yunshen (Heavy mist and thick cloud). Taipei: Yushan, pp.54-55.

disagreement over whether to retreat to the Wushe area, or take up positions along the road from Tsaotun to Puli, thereby defending Puli and allowing for escape via two other roads to Changhua and Chiayi. This source also cites concerns that, despite the level of Aboriginal support shown so far, the presence of the entire 27 Unit in Wushe might not be well received by the Aborigines, with cultural and linguistic differences potentially contributing to the problem.<sup>84</sup> The second strategy was chosen, and this resulted in a bloody clash on March 16 between part of the 27 Unit, including Aboriginal fighters, 85 and KMT troops at Wuniunan Bridge (also known as Wuniulan Bridge), where the latter suffered more than two hundred casualties on account of being trapped in lower, narrower terrain. 86 The 27 Unit then withdrew and disbanded. At the time of its demise, by Chung I-jen's estimation, the unit had seen involvement of two to three hundred Aborigines and pingpuzai, the descendants of largely assimilated plains-dwelling Aborigines in the area.87

A summary of events by the KMT army's 21st Division, a regiment of which was responsible for pursuing the 27 Unit, cited a report from Taichung City mayor Huang Ko-li stating that heavily armed Aborigines of a "fierce disposition" from the Puli area were escalating the conflict after being incited by rebels. It was later decided that the city government would dispatch officials to Aboriginal areas for "guidance" purposes (xuandao).88 It was also alleged that more than one hundred Aborigines took part in clashes with government troops in the Puli area around this time. 89 This claim is lent weight in Chung I-jen's memoirs: Even at a late stage, a small but steady flow of

84 TWS I, op. cit., pp.628-629.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Lan Po-chou (1997), op. cit., p.327. Chinese commentator Jiang Shunxing would appear to be referring to this battle when he states that three hundred tribesmen joined the fighting. See Li Ao (1989b), op. cit., p.154. This is very likely a considerable exaggeration of the true number of Aborigines involved; to this end it should be borne in mind that Jiang's study, written in 1984, and republished here, concluded in a typically polemical and absurd fashion: the disturbances were an "anti-Chiang [Kaishek] and anti-American patriotic movement" (p.157).

<sup>86</sup> Wang et al. (1990), op. cit., p.343.

<sup>87</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.666.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> AS I, op. cit., p.203.

<sup>89</sup> ibid., pp.205-206.

Aboriginal tribesmen had been arriving in Puli wanting to join the unit,<sup>90</sup> though a good number of these are said to have been sent back to Wushe by Liao Te-tsung's or his colleagues.<sup>91</sup> Yang Ko-huang, Hsieh Hsueh-hung's romantic partner and fellow dissident at this time, confirms that by March 14 a flow of Aborigines from surrounding areas were arriving in Puli to enlist in the people's militia.<sup>92</sup>

By March 17, troops had taken control of Puli, and the last substantial armed resistance ended. There is no clear record of Aborigines being among the many who were subsequently killed during consolidation of army control in Puli. Hsieh Hsueh-hung, meanwhile, had disappeared. Not seen since her trip to Wushe, she and Yang Ko-huang would later turn up in Hong Kong and move on to China, where, after serving on several committees, she would suffer political persecution during the anti-rightist movement and then again in the Cultural Revolution, during which she died.<sup>93</sup>

On March 17, Chung I-jen fled Puli. One of the last of the unit members to see him off was tribesman Liu Chia-pin, whose subsequent movements are unclear. A report from a unit of the 21st Division charged with implementing pacification measures suggested that "treacherous thugs" had fled into mountainous areas east of Puli and near Alishan. A summary of events written in April by the army unit that fought the 27 Unit specifically refers to these people fleeing in the direction of Wushe. Moreover, concern had been expressed by one report that Puli, which had been identified as an area in which armed rebels were recruiting fighters, was the "area of the savages" (fanjie). The military report mentioned earlier also makes explicit mention of troublemakers taking refuge in Wushe, where they were said to have commenced "underground"

90 Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.581.

<sup>91</sup> Chung I-jen (1995), op. cit., p.5.

<sup>92</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1991), op. cit., p.328.

<sup>93</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1994), op. cit.; and Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., pp.580-581.

<sup>94</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.583.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.290.

<sup>96</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.257-258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.457.

activity." On March 18, the military broadcast a Japanese-language message to Aborigines in the Puli area, exhorting them to take no notice of rumours nor shelter thugs, but rather to gather their resources to capture them and expect a reward for doing so. 99

### Clashes at Sun Moon Lake

Before the 27 Unit disbanded, the area around Sun Moon Lake in the south of what was then Taichung County also became the scene of minor clashes between troops from the west and unit members arriving from Puli to the north. While it is claimed that some Aborigines from the Wushe area participated in the 27 Unit's activities here, <sup>100</sup> the question that remains unanswered is the extent to which the Thao people, a semi-assimilated Aboriginal community on the shores of Sun Moon Lake, became involved in the conflict. The Thao do not receive any direct mention in government or other available documents on the 228 Incident, yet this location was strategically significant because of the hydroelectric facilities located there (including two power stations), and, as we shall see in the next chapter, because Sun Moon Lake was the site of the post-228 Incident conference between Aboriginal representatives and Pai Chung-hsi, the ROC minister of defence. Chung I-jen mentions around a dozen youths from Yuchih (the non-Aboriginal township which includes Sun Moon Lake) arriving in Puli to join the 27 Unit, but their ethnicity is not specified. <sup>101</sup>

Huang Po-hu and Hsu Kun-hou, two Han Taiwanese based in Shuilikeng, a townshipsized area adjacent to Sun Moon Lake, are also said to have "lured Aborigines into

<sup>98</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (19471): Untitled news extract. *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 21 March 1947,

p.2. Ku Jui-yun (1990), op. cit., p.81. Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.581.

coming out and rendering assistance" to the rebels in Taichung City. Huang was the local KMT party secretary, and Hsu the head of the local agricultural cooperative, and together they served as leader and deputy leader of the local "volunteers unit" which was involved in the disturbances. Again, which Aborigines these men were alleged to have "lured" is not stated, but such Aborigines might have consisted not only of those from the Wushe area, but also of Thao Aborigines from nearby Sun Moon Lake and the hitherto unimplicated Bunun communities resident in southern present-day Nantou County, to the east of Sun Moon Lake.

Teng Hsiang-yang's study on the Wushe area also states that a five-man contingent which took part in the Sun Moon Lake conflict withdrew to Puli and continued to Wushe, attacking a local police station at the hamlet of Meihsi on the way. Chen Ming-chung, a Han Taiwanese 27 Unit commander at Sun Moon Lake, was the head of this group. Chen's account indicates that his companions were all Aboriginal, that they participated in the ambush at Wuniunan Bridge and that it was from there that they retreated to Puli and Wushe.

After arriving in Wushe, Chen was sheltered by Jen'ai Township mayor Kao Tsung-i, a fellow alumnus of Taichung Agricultural College. Chen stayed at Kao's living quarters for over a month, with several locals and officials keeping the matter secret and passing on misinformation to the authorities. This led to futile military and police sweeps in the surrounding mountains for a fictional band of fifty to sixty men. In Chen's account, the non-Aboriginal deputy mayor, Liu Chin-kun, coveted Kao's job and informed on him, but Chen left before he could be apprehended. Kao's home, meanwhile, was searched and a supply of bullets belonging to Chen was discovered. Kao was not sent to jail, but "suffered harrassment from intelligence personnel on many occasions"

<sup>102</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.133; and Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.100.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Teng Hsiang-yang (1998b), op. cit., p.55.
 <sup>104</sup> Lan Po-chou (1997), op. cit., p.327.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Teng Hsiang-yang (1998b), op. cit., p.55.

thereafter.<sup>106</sup> Chang Hsin-han, a doctor in Wushe of unspecified ethnicity, also treated a bullet wound that Chen had received at the Wuniuman Bridge ambush and was later held in prison but released.<sup>107</sup>

# The Tsou mobilisation in Chiayi

The extent of Aboriginal involvement in the greater Taichung area has not received much attention in analyses of the 228 Incident despite this evidence. The most spectacular and most publicised involvement of Aboriginal people in the 228 Incident occurred to the south in Chiayi City and surrounding areas, and this involvement is much more closely linked in the literature with the overall fate of the early Aboriginal political elites and their agendas. The so-called "Tsou Unit" is reasonably well remembered for its brief incursion into Chiayi and solid performance against a heavily armed opponent before returning home to await its fate.

The circumstances under which the Tsou Unit agreed to intervene in the disturbances in Chiayi remain complex and unclear. Violence broke out in the Chiayi area on March 2, and a clerk at the Three Principles of the People Youth Association, Lu Ping-chin, rang Wufeng Township (now Alishan Township) on around March 5 to request that the Tsou Aboriginal communities dispatch fifty to sixty tribesmen to assist in keeping the peace in Chiayi City. Lu, in his capacity as a consultative councillor, had been in Wufeng with a senior provincial official inspecting local affairs when the disturbances started, and had only just returned to Chiayi. The two would would therefore most likely have been in touch with Wufeng Township mayor Kao I-sheng and other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Lan Po-chou (1997), op. cit., pp.327-328.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> *ibid.*, p.328.

Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.107. The second character of Lu's name is written with the fire radical instead of the metal radical in many sources because the latter is a non-standard character.

<sup>109</sup> See Chang Yen-hsien, Wang I-shih, Kao Shu-yuan and Wang Chao-wen (eds)(1996): Jiayi yi qian

community figures while up in the mountains; it would appear, however, that Lu was not aware of developments in Taipei and Chiayi until he returned.

The secretary of the Three Principles of the People Youth Association, Li Hsiao-fang, states that Lu called Tang Shou-jen, a Tsou tribesman and former Japanese army officer, and *not* Kao I-sheng. Li was already quite familiar with Tang, and told him that the association would cover their costs and that the assistance asked of the Aborigines involved peacekeeping and nothing else. Notwithstanding this, Lu would later be executed for his involvement in the 228 Incident on March 25; one source states Lu was killed specifically for inviting the Tsou Unit to participate. 111

It is not clear, however, when the Tsou community was first made aware of the disturbances, nor by whom. Chung I-jen implies that one of the first persons to do so was a young Aboriginal woman working as a telephone operator in the Chiayi City police headquarters; she is said to have regularly telephoned the community with updates on the situation.<sup>112</sup>

Kao I-sheng's decision to send a unit down to Chiayi was a reluctant one. Chung I-jen argues that Kao I-sheng and the various Tsou communities not only faced little threat from troops, but also that government corruption had not affected mountain areas, and therefore that Kao was not inclined to involve his community in the conflict. One tribesman has also speculated that Chuang Yeh-chiu, the Tsou tribesman mentioned earlier who allegedly engaged in hand-to-hand combat in Taichung, lobbied Kao I-sheng and Tang Shou-jen to attack, saying that Taichung and Chiayi had risen up against the

ererba (228 in front of the Chiayi railway station). Taipei: Wu San-lien Historical Foundation, p.241.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> See Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History Oral History Editing Committee (ed.)(1992): Koushu lishi san: ererba shijian zhuanhao (Oral History, no. 3: special issue on the 228 Incident). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, p.24 (this reference is hereafter abbreviated as KS3); and Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.234.

<sup>111</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.314; and Chang et al. (1996), op. cit..

<sup>112</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.507.

government.<sup>114</sup> Another tribesmen involved in the Tsou Unit, Wu I-te, reports that a Taiwanese doctor surnamed Huang from the non-Aboriginal township of Chuchi had urged Kao to send tribesmen to Chiayi to drive out the mainlanders.<sup>115</sup> It is most likely that this doctor was Lin Li, who regularly came to Wufeng Township to see patients; researcher Chen Su-chen states that the doctor made a number of visits to the township office at this time, asking that Kao intervene in the conflict.<sup>116</sup>

In various interviews, however, Wu has not addressed an allegation by Kao's daughter, Kao Chu-hua, that he and Tang Shou-jen had often clashed with Kao. Wu and Tang are said to have firmly supported military intervention, so much so that Wu is alleged to have torn Kao's clothing in anger for opposing involvement. Wu does mention Kao's reluctance to participate, however, and states that Kao only acted after sending Tang Shou-jen in "plains-people clothes" (Han Taiwanese or possibly Western dress) to Chiayi and telephoning Kao to report on the situation. Chen Su-chen argues that as the situation deteriorated, Tsou tribesmen staying in Chiayi returned to Wufeng with accounts of what was happening there. This then prompted Han Taiwanese with business in the mountains to "incite" Tang Shou-jen and a number of other Tsou youths into travelling to Chiayi to assess the situation for themselves.

Kao is then said to have received pressure from the various Tsou communities to act, as well as from Tang Shou-jen, who had now returned from Chiayi. <sup>120</sup> Kao then convened a meeting with community elders and officials, where it was decided to form a unit of tribesmen with battle experience in World War II to keep the peace. <sup>121</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.103.

<sup>115</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994c): "Gao Yisheng yu Tsou zuren canyu ererba shijian shimo" (How Kao I-sheng and Tsou tribespeople took part in the 228 Incident). *Taiwan Literature*, 2, p.16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.421; and Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.157.

<sup>118</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> *ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.149; and KS3, op. cit., p.94.

One Tsou tribesman reports that they had been told that "evil outsiders" had arrived in the area, and that they, the "mountain people," were to join together with the "plains people" to repel the intruders. This comment provides an interesting example of a growing commonality felt by at least some Aborigines toward Han Taiwanese. Other sources state that the tribesmen had no idea why they were getting involved, or even what the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party were; they had merely been following orders when they went down the mountain. 123

Chung I-jen also argues that Tang Shou-jen despised (mainland) Chinese because of his experiences during the war and was very concerned with their conduct in Chiayi. <sup>124</sup> So, notwithstanding claims by Li Hsiao-fang, Chen Su-chen and others that the Aborigines were meant to be a peacekeeping force, it seems that the people best placed to pressure Kao into deploying the unit were precisely those most willing and able to participate in armed conflict. Tang Shou-jen, for his part, was no diplomat; unlike Kao, he did not spend years carefully cultivating a network of Han Taiwanese friends and associates and quelling disputes between Taiwanese and Aborigines. For Tang, the operation may not have been so much an opportunity to develop goodwill with Han Taiwanese neighbours as a chance to exert authority and possibly exact revenge over an enemy, regardless of the circumstances.

Thus, the pleas for assistance from Lu and other city councillors prevailed. On March 5, a force of perhaps around two hundred tribesmen gathered for the journey. The Tsou Unit was dispatched to Chiayi under Kao I-sheng's authority, with Tang Shou-jen acting as its commander.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.52.

<sup>123</sup> ibid., p.61; and KS3, op. cit., p.108.

<sup>124</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.39.

Wu I-te says the group departed on March 2, which seems unfeasibly early. See KS3, op. cit., p.94.

The precise number of Tsou participants is impossible to verify; estimates range from as low as fifty to sixty to a total of several hundred. 126 The important point is that regardless of the size of the unit, it included participants from each Tsou community. One segment of the Tsou Unit gathered in Leveh travelled on foot, passing through nearby Shihchuo before reaching the Alishan railway line at Fenchihu. 127 They travelled by train to Chuchi, where they waited, still holding misgivings about the affair, According to a student participant in the subsequent Shuishang Airport siege, the Tsou community did not trust the KMT or mainlanders, yet they were also concerned that the "Taiwanese" might deceive them as well. They therefore waited at Chuchi, some fifteen kilometres from Chiayi City, to assess the situation before proceeding. The Chiayi disposal committee then sent a delegation of three or four students considered more able to gain the confidence of the tribesmen to bring them to Chiayi. Tang Shou-jen then met with the civilian militia tied to the Three Principles of the People Youth Association, with whom the Tsou Unit would keep close contact.<sup>128</sup> One Han Taiwanese source, whose militia based in Fenchihu had followed the Tsou Unit into the city, seems convinced that this group first went to Taichung to acquire weapons. 129 Though possible, this seems unlikely, as such a diversion is not mentioned elsewhere and would have taken some time. More likely is the possibility that weapons were brought by others into the Chiayi theatre from Taichung and then distributed to tribesmen. Another report points to tribesmen, armed only with machetes, overrunning machine gun posts upon arrival in Chiayi. 130

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<sup>126</sup> See Hsu Hsueh-chi (1993): "Taiwan guangfu chuqide minbian: yi Jiayi saner shijian wei li" (Mass unrest in the early period of retrocession in Taiwan: the case of the March 2 Incident in Chiayi). In: Lai Tse-han (ed.): Taiwan guangfu chuqi lishi (A history of the early period of retrocession in Taiwan). Taipei: Sun Yat-Sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, p.214, (n.31). One government report at the time puts the figure at 300, "including Japanese." See Chang Yen-hsien (ed.)(2002b): Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (er) – guojia anquanju dang'an (A collection of files on the 228 Incident, vol. 2: files from the National Security Bureau). Hsintien: Academia Historica, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., pp.29-31. Chen Su-chen argues however that this group walked from the Tapang-Tefuyeh area to the train station at Shihtzulu to the east before embarking. Seminar presented by Chen Su-chen to the Association for Taiwan Indigenous People's Policies, 11 July, 2000.

ibid.. Chung I-jen instead says that most of this group proceeded to Peimen Station, closer to Chiayi City, before disembarking. See KS3, op. cit., p.37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., pp.206-207.

<sup>130</sup> Chang (1995), op. cit., pp.287-288.

A second group of Tsou tribesmen set out on foot to Chukou, a village at the base of the mountains which now lies on the main road to Alishan. There they took a few weapons from a police station and then split into two.<sup>131</sup> The older and youngest tribesmen returned to the mountains while around forty tribesmen with military training or battle experience continued by motor vehicle to Chiayi City via Wanchiao to the northeast.<sup>132</sup> This group is alleged by other participants to have spent two days patrolling and providing military training to high school students in Chiayi City before continuing to Shuishang Airport to join a standoff with KMT troops trapped inside. Other tribesmen may have remained in Chukou to await news from Chiayi City.<sup>133</sup>

A number of important sources – including, surprisingly, the comprehensive analysis by oral history stalwart and co-editor of the Executive Yuan's 228 Incident report, Hsu Hsueh-chi<sup>134</sup> – do not acknowledge that different routes were taken by two groups of the Tsou Unit, preferring to opt for a description of either one of the two routes. Chen Su-chen does acknowledge it, however, in a collection of articles on Kao I-sheng and the Tsou community.<sup>135</sup>

Chiayi City had been without functional government since March 2 and its disposal committee was convened on March 3. On March 4, the city came under artillery fire by a division of troops from the east. Chung I-jen's memoirs include hearsay that this division was driven away from the city by the Tsou Unit. There is dispute over when and where the two halves of the Tsou Unit arrived in Chiayi (recall that, according

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> Today, Chukou lies on a provincial highway and is the last town one passes through before driving into the Alishan mountains. In 1947, there was no such road from Chukou to Alishan; the most convenient form of transport into Alishan was on the Japanese-built railway to the north. That railway now largely serves the tourist market.

<sup>132</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.94 and p.108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., pp.53-54 and p.62; and KS3, op. cit., p.108. One participant says only eight tribesmen continued to Chiayi from Chukou.

<sup>134</sup> Hsu Hsueh-chi (1993), op. cit..

<sup>135</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.491.

to the Executive Yuan's report on the 228 Incident, Tang Shou-jen was not asked for support until March 5), but even if this repulse did not take place, at some point the Tsou brigade that arrived from Chukou joined an attack on that same division's camp at Hungmaopi. Tang's group may well have attacked it earlier. Regardless, troops had already deserted the camp by the time the tribesmen from Chukou arrived and found that nearly all weapons left behind had been destroyed. The soldiers returned the next morning, forcing the lingering tribesmen to flee toward Chiayi. Mostly armed with only machetes, hunting rifles, bows and arrows, some tribesmen had now acquired a small supply of ammunition, including grenades. Chung I-jen and others, however, state that although the retreating soldiers had blown up the ammunition depot, at this point the unit nonetheless discovered heavy weapons – possibly mortars and anti-aircraft guns – which were brought back to supplement the short supply of weapons in the city.

The presence of the Tsou Unit here and elsewhere fortified and dominated the combined civilian militia.<sup>141</sup> Indeed, only the Tsou Unit resembled a disciplined fighting force.<sup>142</sup> The intervention of the Aborigines in Chiayi was even included in a report dated March 6 by acting British consul G.M. Tingle.<sup>143</sup>

While in Chiayi, a detachment of tribesmen guarded key facilities and patrolled the streets under the command of Tapang Village head Fang I-chung.<sup>144</sup> Food was supplied

There are a number of sources that state this. See, for example, Chang (1995), op. cit., pp.330-331. Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.57.

<sup>144</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> KS3, op. cit., pp.108-109. Wu I-te contends that the Chukou group went directly to Hungmaopi; see *ibid.*, p.94.

ibid., p.91; and KS3, op. cit., pp.108-110. Wu I-te states that the Tsou Unit had collected a large number of guns and hunting rifles from police stations before arriving in Chiayi. See KS3, op. cit., p.94; and TWS I, op. cit., p.149. Chung I-jen argues at length that the Tsou tribesmen had access to stockpiles of weapons and other items left in the mountains by the Japanese. See KS3, op. cit., pp.38-39. Other tribesmen recall that they were poorly equipped when they left the mountains.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.508 and p.530; Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.92, p.113 and p.169; KS3, op. cit., p.104; and TWS I, op. cit., p.624.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.525. Chiayi is referred to in the document by its Japanese name of Kagi.

to the tribesmen there, as elsewhere, by local male and female high school students. 145 One member of this detachment says that his patrol consisted of eight tribesmen and ten Taiwanese. Tang Shou-jen and his men were also seen in Chiayi City by a local driver, who noted their Japanese uniforms and Tang's military cap and sabre. 146 One eyewitness reports that when locals spotted the tribesmen, they would run up to them and shake their hands, praising them with the words "mountain compatriots" or "mountain brothers" (gaoshan tongbao). 147

Shuishang Airport was the place of retreat for the military, mainlander government officials and mainlander civilians in and around Chiayi City when unrest extended to the area. One of the student militia leaders estimates the number of Aboriginal fighters at Shuishang Airport at around one hundred. 148 Tsou tribesmen were also spread among other civilian militia at the scene. 149

In Chung I-jen's account, Tang Shou-jen is identified as the on-site commander of all civilian militia surrounding the airport, including Han Taiwanese. After the troops began firing at the militia, and possibly after the Tsou Unit had fired mortar shells back into the airport, Tang ordered that the attack on the airport cease temporarily and that militia members retire to trenches. The idea was to force a surrender by cutting off water and power, as well as blocking the road leading from the airport to the army base. 150 Two eyewitnesses report that tribesmen fired shells towards the airport from the hamlet of Fantsaikou some three to four kilometres away, but the shells fell well short of their target. Some shells are said to have damaged a three-storey military hospital lying between the airport and Fantsaikou.<sup>151</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.57; KS3, op. cit., p.94; and Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.309.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.113 and p.269.

ibid., p.240.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> *ibid.*, p.32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> *ibid.*, p.54.

<sup>150</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.508 and pp.537-538; and Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.113 and p.182.

Chang et al. (1996), op. cit., p.308, and Chang Yen-hsien (1995), op. cit., p.331.

During the siege, a number of Tsou Unit members camped at the scene, sleeping in their trenches, while those patrolling Chiayi City slept at the Yingkuang Dormitory, a premises acquired earlier by Kao I-sheng to act as a hostel for Aborigines who had matters to attend to in the city. This premises is said to have been rented to them by Pan Mu-chih, deputy speaker of the Chiayi City Consultative Council, who himself would be executed in the wake of the Incident. 153

One eyewitness claims that tribesmen at the airport expressed anger at one point about the lack of food, and stormed into the city, asking "Who are we fighting for to have to starve to death like this?" After being provided with food and a large amount of alcohol the tribesmen returned to the airport, where they resumed their posts. 154

Chuang Yeh-chiu is also said to have participated in this siege. Kao Ying-hui, one of Kao I-sheng's sons, recalls a photograph featuring a gun-toting Chuang and others yelling triumphal slogans near the airport. The photograph, said to have been widely seen in the Tsou community, later disappeared and no record remains of it.<sup>155</sup>

Some days into the siege, the Chiayi disposal committee decided to hold negotiations with the besieged troops and the mayor of Chiayi City – a mainlander – who was sheltering with them. In Chung I-jen's account, that decision was made by the committee after lobbying by provincial senator Liu Chuan-lai and his brother Liu Chuan-neng whose father Liu Kuo knew Kao I-sheng well. The first brother also personally told the Tsou Unit to initiate a ceasefire, while the latter may also have dealt

155 *ibid.*, pp.176-177.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.32, p.36 and p.240. The hostel would later be taken over by the government in the wake of Kao I-sheng's execution.
<sup>153</sup> Chang et al. (1996), op. cit., p.209 and p.256; and Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.232.

Chang et al. (1996), op. cit., p.209 and p.256; and Lai 1se-nan (1994), op. cit., p.232.

Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.309. This eyewitness account is rather at odds with other descriptions of the general discipline displayed by the tribesmen during the Chiavi disturbances.

directly with the tribesmen.<sup>156</sup> Li Hsiao-fang, another of the civilian leaders, also says that Tang Shou-jen was incited by elements from Taichung into attacking the troops with mortars, and that on two occasions he and clerk Lu Ping-chin attempted to persuade the Tsou Unit to go home.<sup>157</sup>

The siege had come within days of forcing the troops to surrender, but the influence of the Liu brothers and moderates on the disposal committee only resulted in the capture and eventual killing of the mediators that were sent in. Local luminaries and Mandarin speakers, these mediators and others would later be publicly executed in front of Chiayi Railway Station. Chung reports that on that same day, he faced a livid Tang Shou-jen at the disposal committee's headquarters. Tang was furious about the ceasefire, and it is suggested that Tang felt the Tsou Unit had been tricked by the disposal committee, but Chung does not report the ensuing conversation. Although Chung maintained that the siege should be relaunched, his conversation with Tang was heated. Thereafter, Chung returned to Taichung, promising to find reinforcements. But none came.

In addition, on March 10, one of the civilian militia, fearing a worsening of the situation elsewhere in Taiwan, elected to return to Tainan in the south. Its leader, the same student who brought the Tsou tribesmen from Chuchi to Chiayi City, went to the airport and, under fire from the soldiers inside the compound, informed Tang Shou-jen of their intention to move out. Tang acknowledged the increasingly perilous situation, and ordered a group of tribesmen to cover them as they departed. <sup>161</sup>

At this juncture Tang is alleged to have made a telephone call to Kao I-sheng to report on the situation. Wu I-te states that Kao ordered the Tsou Unit to pull out, and Tang

156 Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.59 and p.77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.24; and Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., pp.539-544.

<sup>159</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.61.

<sup>160</sup> Chung I-jen (1993), op. cit., p.544.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.37.

obeyed the order. <sup>162</sup> That night – probably the early hours of March 11 – the Tsou Unit ignored pleas to stay, withdrew from Chiayi and returned to the mountains. <sup>163</sup> The tribesmen moved some heavy weaponry they had acquired – including machine guns and mortars or even anti-aircraft guns <sup>164</sup> – to Peimen Railway Station on the other side of Chiayi City, and a train was commandeered for an overnight trip back into the mountains. Some tribesmen also returned by foot or possibly motor vehicle. <sup>165</sup> All linked up at Fenchihu the next day and walked back to their communities with heavy weapons in tow. <sup>166</sup> Another source claims that some tribesmen at Hungmaopi returned to the mountains via Chukou. <sup>167</sup> Yet another says that a number remained in Chiayi for a few more days before returning. <sup>168</sup> Remarkably, despite being only lightly armed, no serious injuries were suffered by any tribesmen during the conflict.

With the departure of the Tsou Unit, the military broke out of the airport, took control of Chiayi, and over the succeeding weeks imprisoned or executed those involved with the disposal committee as well as many others with no record of involvement whatsoever. The Executive Yuan report effectively considers that in removing the Tsou Unit, the disposal committee eased the possibility of pitch battles breaking out in the streets, but also lost its best "gambling chip" that might have lessened the bloodshed that followed. 169

At around this time, a Han Taiwanese school principal, Chen Ching-yuan, was arrested by troops and wrongly accused of allowing his school to be used by Aborigines as living quarters during the conflict. The teacher was interrogated and tortured but later released.

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<sup>162</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.108 and p.172 (n.321). See also KS3, op. cit., p.95 and p.104.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.77.

<sup>165</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.110.

<sup>166</sup> Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.210.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> *ibid.*, p.62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.108; and Hsu Hsueh-chi (1993), op. cit. p.181.

This suggests that troops were aware of Aboriginal involvement in the siege. 170

When the Tsou Unit returned to Leyeh, a number of tribesmen were waiting to greet them; these men had been instructed to guard the only feasible entry for troops into the area and protect the Tsou communities from possible attack while the rest were away. Some then remained in Leyeh to guard the weapons brought from Chiayi and stand sentinel, fearing that government troops would attack Aboriginal areas at any moment. A battle footing was adopted, with the entry into the area covered by heavy weapons. Weapons were also distributed to other people throughout Leyeh and elsewhere whom Kao I-sheng considered trustworthy.

At this time it is also claimed that adult tribesmen underwent a military training programme lasting six months using the seized weapons, and with Tang Shou-jen at the helm.<sup>174</sup>

One Han Taiwanese participant also reports that he was part of a group of over twenty Taiwanese who fled to Tapang with the tribesmen.<sup>175</sup> One Tsou participant confirms that Taiwanese accompanied the unit into the mountains.<sup>176</sup> Researcher Chen Su-chen says that a sizable number of youths and students made their way to Alishan at this time to find sanctuary, and that their influence resulted in the tribesmen adopting a war footing in their own communities.<sup>177</sup>

172 Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.159. This principal also lost two of his sons over the course of the 228 Incident, and another son would later be executed for involvement in a communist organisation targeting Aboriginal communities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> *ibid.*, p.63.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.104; and TWS I, op. cit., p.150. Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.17, argues that Tang Shou-jen was responsible for weapon allocation at this point, and that the weapons were primarily located in Leyeh.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> ibid., p.241.

<sup>176</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.110.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994d): "Gaoshan zheren qi wei: Yuanzhumin zai baise kongbu shidaide yimu beiju" (The sage is dead: tragedy for Aborigines during the White Terror era). *Taiwan Literature*, 2, p.6; and Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.17.

How this situation was defused will be discussed in the next chapter. For now it should be noted that although the actions of the Tsou Unit had a complex background, the ultimate point of the exercise was to protect *Han civilians* in the Chiayi area from KMT troops, and for as long as the Tsou Unit was active, this is precisely what was achieved. Why this should have so moved the Aborigines to action is a problem that has not been stressed clearly enough in other works on the subject. Given that the Tsou Unit operated as a military unit might be expected to – political problems were left to the commanders to resolve – it can only be assumed that it was identification with Han Taiwanese in the face of mainlander hostility that resulted in the unit being formed and deployed.

# Sanctuary for a mainlander

Before the Tsou Unit went to Chiayi, the mayor of Tainan County, Yuan Kuo-chin (a mainlander), contacted Kao I-sheng and asked for a safe haven. Kao agreed, and on March 3 the mayor, the KMT's county commissar, the finance and police section heads and other mainlander county government officials left their posts and passed through Tapu Township, adjacent to the Tsengwen Dam, before arriving at Shanmei, the downriver extremity of the Tsou community at that time, where they were collected by tribesmen sent by Kao I-sheng. Other sources say that Kao sent three tribesmen to Tapu and even as far as the seat of the county government in Hsinying to collect the officials and bring them to Tapang. Pesearcher Chen Su-chen argues that the Tsou tribesmen met a contingent of some thirty to forty armed officials, of whom only Yuan and seven or eight others were allowed to enter Wufeng Township; the remainder were

<sup>179</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.422; and Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.178.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.64; and Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.112. The mayor of Hsinying says Yuan and the others left on the morning of March 3. See KS3, op. cit., p.158. This is supported by another eyewitness, whose conference with Yuan that morning was cancelled; see *ibid.*, p.171.

disarmed and escorted back to Hsinying by tribesmen. 180

The exact amount of time spent by these officials in Tapang is not clear; different sources mention from one day to one week.<sup>181</sup> The mayor of Hsinying reports that Yuan and his officials did not return to Hsinying until as late as mid-March.<sup>182</sup> At the latest, Yuan must have returned to Hsinying by March 22 to greet the pacification inspection tour led by the ROC defence minister, General Pai Chung-hsi.<sup>183</sup>

Of most interest here is the probability that Kao I-sheng agreed to shelter Yuan and his entourage well before he had been pressured into sending the Tsou Unit into Chiayi. This matter also disallows a strictly ethnic interpretation of Tsou hostility toward the government. Consistent with the deployment of the Tsou Unit, the sheltering of Yuan and his colleagues was representative of a desire for maintaining stability and keeping people out of harm's way.

#### Flamethrowers in Pingtung

Pingtung County has eight Aboriginal townships which mostly line the eastern, mountainous border of Pingtung with Taitung County. Pingtung City, due east of Kaohsiung City, is much closer to the mountains. Efforts by the mayor of Kaohsiung County, which at that time included present-day Pingtung County, to prevent Aborigines from participating in anti-government violence in urban areas did not extend to Pingtung. The Taiwan Garrison Command's appraisal of the 228 Incident briefly refers to an Aboriginal presence in the disturbances in Pingtung City.<sup>184</sup> For a time the

<sup>180</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994c), op. cit., p.16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Chang et al. (1994), op. cit., p.82; and TWS I, op. cit., p.422.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.814.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.412.

city was not under government control, and like Chiayi, police and military units were forced to withdraw to the airport. One eyewitness said that "traitorous party thugs" (jiandang baotu) were responsible for stirring up the Aborigines, while former KMT investigator Ho Han-wen wrote that on the afternoon of March 5, "nearby Aborigines" entered the city to assist in the fighting, after which the military police were forced to withdraw to the airport. That assistance seems to have included joining locals in cutting the water supply to military police fixtures and then immolating them with fire hoses filled with petrol. The daughter of Yeh Chiu-mu (Han Taiwanese), a proreform faction leader and the deputy speaker of Pingtung City Council at the time of the conflict, has also confirmed this, saying that Aboriginal youths came down from the mountains to assist. In none of these sources, however, is it made clear which communities provided the fighters.

Another source implies that it was only after Aboriginal assistance arrived that military police were attacked, though this is not argued to be the case elsewhere. The Executive Yuan report cites the then Pingtung City mayor as saying that the *imminent arrival* of several hundred Aborigines was partly the reason why he, the police and the military police abandoned the military police headquarters in the city and retreated to the airport. 190

At least two Han Taiwanese resident in Pingtung City were later charged with bringing Aborigines into the conflict. The names of merchants Liu Po-huan and Yeh Ching-san appear on an August 2 military police list of ringleaders for the Tainan-Kaohsiung area, while Yeh, the younger brother of deputy council speaker Yeh Chiu-mu, was accused of

<sup>185</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.129.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>186</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., p.254.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> See Teng Kung-chao (ed.)(1991): *Ererba shijian ziliaoji* (A collection of data on the 228 Incident). Panchiao: Taohsiang, p.165.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.454; and Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.191; and TWS II, op. cit., pp.501-502.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.130.

inciting several hundred Aborigines to fight government forces. Liu was named as both head of the rebels' warfare unit and as Aboriginal liaison officer. Originally from Taipei, Liu was probably not Aboriginal, but it is intriguing that the position of "Aboriginal liaison officer" should be specifically named, because it implies a concerted effort or intention to recruit a sizable Aboriginal force. This is not an insignificant point, given the relatively large Aboriginal population along the mountains near Pingtung City. A report written some years later by a former government investigator points to Wushantou (probably Wutoushan) and Tawushan – the highest peaks in the area – as the region from which tribesmen came into the city, 192 but despite all of this evidence, no information has come to light that pinpoints the origin(s) of these tribesmen.

On one trip to the area, I collected data from a number of former Aboriginal officials who had a degree of knowledge of events at the time, but none could identify participants in the Pingtung attacks. Lin Pao-teh, an Aboriginal student in Tainan at the time, doubts that anyone from the Machia-Santimen region was involved, <sup>193</sup> a sentiment backed up by Kui Kan, later an Aboriginal liaison officer with the security agencies, who said that former Santimen Township mayor Kui Shun-i, just back from an aborted conference in Taipei, and the latter's influential father, village chief Kui Chi-lung, went so far as to prevent tribesmen from leaving the community. <sup>194</sup> Retired Aboriginal policeman Chen O-an also doubted that anyone from these communities nearest to Pingtung City was involved in the violence. <sup>195</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.117; and Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.187 (n.493).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., p.255.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> Interview with Lin Pao-teh, 19 August, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> Interview with Kui Kan, 18 August, 2001. Kui Chi-lung was a local powerbroker under the Japanese; his newly minted Chinese name apparently had its origin in a trip he made to Keelung (Chilung) to welcome ashore the new KMT regime.

<sup>195</sup> Interview with Chen O-an, 18 August, 2001.

## The death of a schoolteacher and hatred of mainlanders

The Paiwan people are the southernmost Aboriginal ethnolinguistic group on mainland Taiwan and are almost entirely located in Pingtung County to the west and Taitung County to the east. The Paiwan dominate two of Taitung County's Aboriginal townships, Chinfeng (formerly known as Chinlun, then Chinshan) and Tajen. The narrow coastal townships of Taimali and Tawu also contain a significant number of Paiwan Aborigines. At the time of the 228 Incident this was one of the most remote coastal parts of Taiwan, and until quite recently there has been little documentation on what occurred there. More information has emerged recently relating to disturbances involving Aboriginal communities, however, and a very different picture has emerged.

In the original Taitung County government report, vague reference was made to a killing in Chinshan (now Chinfeng) Township, which was indeed the only death reported in Taitung County. In a list of "public servant personnel casualties," the victim is identified as a teacher at an elementary school for Aboriginal children in Chinshan; <sup>197</sup> later in the report, the school is named as Pinmao Elementary School, and that the teacher, Ouyang Tsuo, had been killed on campus on March 5 because of "enmity towards mainlanders," <sup>198</sup> though the aggressor is not identified as Aboriginal.

Recently published government documents and other interviews, however, confirm the identity of the person responsible for the killing to be a Paiwan tribesman. The full story is rather complex, but worth recounting in some detail. A compensation application in 1992 by the relatives of Ouyang Chao-yu – the teacher's actual name, though the third character is also written as *zhao* in the document 199 – provides us with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> Chinlun Township originally included the coastal strip plain; in 1947 this township was divided into non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal townships and named Taimali and Chinshan respectively. Chinshan was subsequently renamed Chinfeng in 1958 to distinguish it from a township in Taipei County.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> *ibid.*, p.50.

<sup>199</sup> The fourth character in Ouyang's name is also incorrectly written as you in Meng Hsiang-han's history

one account of the incident and its enigmatic judicial aftermath.<sup>200</sup> The 19-year-old Ouyang arrived in Taitung in July 1946 from Fujian Province, and was appointed teacher at Pinmao Elementary School by the county government in the autumn of that year. At around 7pm on March 2, 1947, three days earlier than the government report contends, Ouyang was shot and decapitated outside the school by Li Pin-hsiung, a Paiwan tribesman who, according to the application, previously served in the Japanese army.<sup>201</sup> Li was eventually arrested and Ouyang's relatives in mainland China informed of the murder. One relative arrived on March 13 to follow up the matter, and on March 17 he joined a team consisting of county government officials, police, district court investigators, health officials and other distant relatives resident in Taiwan to set out for Pinmao, which had yet to be relocated and was still located deeper in the mountains. The following day they were led to a pit where the body and skull, "buried in different locations and already showing signs of decay," were exhumed. The remains were brought back to the Taitung morgue by local Aborigines, and a funeral was held by the county government.<sup>202</sup> Li Pin-hsiung was sentenced to five years in jail, an extraordinary sentence given the nature of the crime and the context in which it was committed.<sup>203</sup>

Further information on this and other incidents is provided in Chen Hsiao-i's biography of his father, Aboriginal administrator and politician Chen Tien-cheng. The book's account confirms the details discussed so far, but also asserts that Paiwan tribesmen from the nearby Chuehmolo community had been misled by a rumour that mainlanders were communists and should be killed. After this rumour filtered back to local

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of Taitung County. Otherwise, Meng's work provides the most thorough summary available of the 228 Incident as it occurred in Taitung; most of the sources consulted here were also used by that author.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> TWS III, op. cit., pp.769-774. This compensation claim was submitted after the Taiwan authorities established a mechanism of redress for victims of the 228 Incident or their families in the 1990s.

<sup>201</sup> ibid. p. 773. The text here appears to erroneously replace Li Pin heimag's name with that of his older.

ibid., p.773. The text here appears to erroneously replace Li Pin-hsiung's name with that of his older brother, Li Feng-hsiung.

ibid. The Taitung County Documents Committee states that this large-scale service was held in Ouyang's memory on May 19, which amounts to a remarkable delay. See Taitung County Documents Committee (ed.)(1963): *Taidong xianzhi dashiji* (A record of significant events in Taitung County). Taitung: Taitung County Documents Committee, p.21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.773.

communities, mainlanders became genuine targets, culminating in the death of Ouyang and threats to many others. In Ouyang's case, Chen Hsiao-i deliberately identifies the assailant by surname only, then says that a hunting rifle or an arrow was used to kill the teacher before decapitation. Ouyang's head was then briefly used as a football or for some other activity.<sup>204</sup>

Chen Hsiao-i says that Li Pin-hsiung was sentenced to three years in jail – not five, as Ouyang's family claim – by the Hualien High Court.<sup>205</sup>

Lai Hung-yen, a Paiwan tribesman and teacher whose political ideas caused him considerable trouble (see Chapter Seven), was present during the events at Pinmao Elementary. He argues that the accumulation of hatred toward mainlanders, dating back to World War II, is significant in explaining the violence directed at mainlanders in this area during the 228 Incident as well as the incident at Tahsi described in the previous chapter. As "Chinese," mainlanders were regarded as allies of the United States and therefore associated with alleged mistreatment of Paiwan prisoners of war in American custody. Lai states that Li Pin-hsiung took advantage of a contact in the administrative office to secure a hunting rifle, then went to the school and killed Ouyang out of revenge for the abuse he had suffered during the war.<sup>206</sup> Ouyang was eating at the time and Lai recalled the children on campus crying after the incident occurred.<sup>207</sup> Another source has also mentioned the use of a firearm in killing Ouyang.<sup>208</sup>

One important piece of information comes from another former pupil at Pinmao

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> See Chen Hsiao-i (1994): Chu Dawushan ji: shanzhong junjie Chen Tianchengde gushi (A chronicle out of Tawushan: the story of the extraordinary Chen Tien-cheng of the mountains). Panchiao: Taohsiang, p.66.

ibid., p.67. Lai Hung-yen agrees with the figure of three years. Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> See Tiyaken (1995): "Yongyuande shidai juren (liu)" (Eternal giant of an era, part 6). Austronesian News, 21, p.7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Kuan Hsiao-jung, op. cit., p.80-89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Interview with anonymous source B (name withheld), July 24, 2000.

Elementary at the time. This source claims that after the teacher was killed and decapitated, numerous local tribesmen cut and stabbed the corpse, reducing it to "pulp" (roujiang). The source implied that this killing had a communal character, rather than merely being the act of an individual.<sup>209</sup> The general sentiment within the community was that there was nothing inappropriate about the death as such, except for the fact that the killer was not a chieftain and so was not at liberty to kill a prisoner.<sup>210</sup> Another elderly Paiwan tribesman interviewed for this research also claimed that the killing of the teacher had a communal element to it.<sup>211</sup> Lai Hung-yen says that Ouyang's skull was destroyed in front of the Pinmao police station, and that what was left of it was eaten by dogs.<sup>212</sup>

Another death occurred soon after in Pinmao, but this case, in which a young Paiwan schoolteacher's sudden death was (perhaps incorrectly) attributed to a local Paiwan policeman, appears to have no relation to the 228 Incident. However, that policeman, Cheng Te-sheng, is a source in Chen Hsiao-i's book for more claims of threats against mainlanders in Aboriginal areas. In the mountain community of Pilu, two mainlander schoolteachers were also labelled as communists during the 228 Incident and narrowly escaped harm. One teacher had come under attack by two tribesmen — whom Chen does not identify — and was rescued by a local policeman who escorted him to a police station in the coastal town of Taimali, where at least fifty other mainlanders from around the area were "sheltering" (see below).<sup>213</sup> Later in Chen's book, another mainlander government employee, Lin Chih-hsiung, is reported to have "narrowly escaped humiliation" in the nearby Paiwan village of Chialan.<sup>214</sup>

<sup>209</sup> ibid..

<sup>214</sup> Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., p.99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Interview with anonymous source A (name withheld), September 14, 1999; interview with anonymous source B (name withheld), July 24, 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., pp.67-68. The mayor of Taimali himself has quoted a figure of sixty to seventy mainlanders sheltering in Taimali's police station. See Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (ed.)(1996a): Taidong xian xiangtu shiliao (Local historical materials in Taitung County). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.143.

Also of interest is the presence of Chang Po-lung at the Pinmao Elementary School during the incident. Chang, an Amis tribesman and the then principal of the school, would go on to be elected county councillor, Aboriginal representative at the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, and eventually serve as consultant to ROC President Lee Tenghui in the 1990s.<sup>215</sup> At the time the trouble began in Pinmao, Chang feared for his own safety as well as that of the school's two remaining teachers. The night of the killing, however, local tribesmen held a "heroes' ceremony" (yingxiongji), and Chang "reluctantly participated in their evening feast" celebrating the death of his staff member. His attendance was under the "protection" of one Wang Hsin-te. 216 The compensation claim by Ouyang Chao-yu's relatives also mentions Chang and cites him as a witness.<sup>217</sup> In an interview I conducted with Chang, he claimed to have no knowledge of the incident, despite acknowledging his tenure at Pinmao Elementary School.<sup>218</sup> A brief biography of Chang funded by the near-defunct provincial authority makes no mention of the 228 Incident at all.<sup>219</sup>

Ouyang was the only person killed in this area during the 228 Incident, but a recently released document suggests that circumstances in Taimali nearly resulted in the massacre of many more mainlanders by Aboriginal tribesmen. Chen Hung-hsi, head of the Taimali branch office of the Forestry Bureau, wrote a detailed report dated March 26 suggesting that the situation was dire. He reported that on the evening of March 4, the township offices for Taimali and Chinshan held a meeting at which an unnamed person or persons from Taipei urged the Aboriginal communities in the area to massacre mainlanders. Chen

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Anchilo (1996): "Zhang Bolong huopin wei guoce guwen" (Chang Po-lung appointed as national policy advisor). Austronesian News, 45, 3.

Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., p.66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> TWS III, op. cit., pp.772-773.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Interview with Chang Po-lung, 24 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> See Chuang Chin-sheng (ed.)(2001): Taiwan shengcanyihui, linshi shengyihui ji shengyihui shiqi koushu lishi fangtan jihua: Zhang Bolong xiansheng fangtanlu (Oral history interview project for the period of the Taiwan Provincial Senate, Provisional Provisional Assembly and the Provincial Assembly: record of an interview with Mr. Chang Po-lung). Wufeng, Taichung County: Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council.

names Chinshan Township mayor Chiu Kui-chun, deputy mayor Pai Chuan-kuan and two employees at the office, Chen Tien-ting and Liu Hsien-chin, as the individuals who instigated the events that followed.<sup>220</sup>

Chiu and Pai made and distributed propaganda fliers and gathered village heads and young tribesmen to round up mainlanders and place them in the police dormitory, where they were insulted and threatened with violence if they tried to leave. Chen Hung-hsi feared they would be slaughtered, but this changed when news arrived of the presence of military reinforcements. The detainees were then released. Earlier, Aborigines attempted to take guns from other offices on March 5, led by an unknown person from Taipei. Unsuccessful, that person then travelled to other Aboriginal villages, telling the tribespeople that mainlanders in western Taiwan had all been killed and that people were free to take their clothes and belongings. The person then returned to the Taimali township office where he encouraged the would-be rebels to call themselves a "revolutionary army" (gemingjun) and urged them to head to the west of the island to take part in the fighting there.<sup>221</sup>

While travelling to Taimali from his office half an hour away, Chen Hung-hsi witnessed armed, menacing groups of Aboriginal men by the side of the road; he estimated that he had passed three hundred in total. After arriving at the Taimali office he was frisked, detained and told that the *zhangguan* (chief administrator; presumably Chen Yi) had fled to China. Chen Hung-hsi and the other mainlanders were not released until March 13, and in the interim he and others feared for their lives.<sup>222</sup>

Prior to the recent publication of Chen Hung-hsi's report, there were only scattered

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (ed.)(2002f): Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (shi) – Taiwan sheng zhengfu, Taiwan sheng wenxianhui dang'an (A collection of files on the 228 Incident, vol. 10: files from the Taiwan Provincial Government and the Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee). Hsintien: Academia Historica, p.213.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> *ibid.*, pp.213-215.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> *ibid.*, pp.210-213.

references to the situation in Taimali, Chinshan and areas nearby. One source that confirms the general atmosphere of the time is Lo I-hsiung, the son of a Shanghai immigrant and a Paiwan mother. He said that when rumours arrived from western Taiwan that "plains people [Taiwanese] and Aborigines had all been killed by mainlanders," local Paiwan tribesmen made preparations to surround and massacre all mainlanders stationed in the villages in Anshuo (in Tajen Township to the south), Tawu, Taniao, Chiachin, Tachu (all in Tawu Township) as well as Taimali. He also claims that a three hundred-strong unit of mainlanders was surrounded by Aborigines, but that he personally prevented bloodshed by urging the tribesmen to wait for confirmation of casualties in Taitung City. Later, General Peng Meng-chi said that Aborigines in the area had returned to their communities by March 6, which appears to be untrue. Peng's report to Chen Yi further stated that the coastal road between Tawu and Mutan in Pingtung County was now under Aboriginal guard. 225

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1996a), op. cit., p.356. The source of this information was probably radio broadcasts from Kaohsiung. See AS III, op. cit., p.239. <sup>224</sup> Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1996a), op. cit., p.356. For Lo's parentage, see Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., p.86. Lo alleges that he met one Nan Hsin-an, who asked why Lo had not given the order to kill these mainlanders, since "the mainlanders in Taitung City have all been killed." Lo then travelled to Taitung to see for himself, and discovered a situation "in deadlock, becoming volatile," and convinced local youths not to kill mainlanders without good reason. Finally, Lo claims that the welfare of the mainlanders in southern Taitung County depended on his safe return from the city; his brother, however, is said to have assumed that Lo had suffered a bad fate and had "already agreed to kill a teacher in Lichiu." Lichiu Village was in the same valley as Pinmao Elementary School, though this would not appear to be related to the death of Ouyang Chao-yu. There is no explanation why Lo could make the tribesmen wait for his orders or for news of his welfare before slaughtering mainlanders, though Lo has been referred to as a chieftain despite his parentage. See Meng Hsiang-han (1997): Taidong xianshi kaituo pian (A history of Taitung County: the pioneers). Taitung: Taitung County Government. He is also named as a chieftain for the Taimali area in the Taiwan Presbyterian Church's history of Aboriginal missions; see Chiukaer (ed.)(1998); Taiwan jidu zhanglao jiaohui Yuanzhuminzu xuanjiao shi (A history of the Aboriginal mission of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church). Place of publication not shown: Aboriginal Ministry Committee of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church General Assembly, p.251. Lo went on to become mayor of the non-Aboriginal Taimali Township in the 1960s; see Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee (ed.)(1992): Chongxiu Taiwan sheng tongzhi, juan qi, zhengzhi zhi: yihui pian, xuanju bamian pian (Revised annals of Taiwan Province, book seven (political records): edition on assemblies and edition on recalled elections). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.493.

AS III, op. cit., p.239. Indeed, another early government report also accused Taitung County's Aborigines in general of mobilising and causing serious damage in the area on March 6; this is the same report that reported non-existent mayhem in Hualien, and so lends itself to being discounted; see AS IV, op. cit., p.461.

Similarly, in the non-Aboriginal township of Tawu to the south, eighteen public servants and teachers were sheltered, fed and guarded by Tawu's mayor and the head of Taniao, an Aboriginal village just to the north of Tawu Village.<sup>226</sup> The Tawu mayor, Hsu Liang-chia, a Han Taiwanese who married a chieftain's daughter, is said to have entrusted Taniao Village head Lin Chuo-ssu with the mainlanders' protection. Lin then organised a squad of Paiwan youths armed with machetes to guard them, while the chairman of the Tawu Township Council, Wu Chi, provided a regular supply of food.<sup>227</sup>

With regard to Paiwan involvement in Taitung City, Chen Hsiao-i's book also makes mention of Lin Hsiu-ming, a former assistant to the first mayor of Chinshan Township, whose training to improve qualifications as an administrative assistant was disrupted by the 228 Incident. During the disturbances he was in Taitung City and received orders to assist in protecting the local radio station.<sup>228</sup>

Douglas Mendel's study on Formosan nationalism also implies that there was still discontent over the 228 Incident as late as the early 1960s in this part of the country. His fortuitous conversation with Aborigines in Chihpen to the southwest of Taitung City included references to the taboo issue of the "1947 atrocities," though Mendel does not refer to any incident in particular. 229

<sup>226</sup> Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1996a), op. cit., pp.142-143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup> Wang Ho-sheng, op. cit., p.358.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., p.68 and p.124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> See Douglas Mendel (1970): *The politics of Formosan nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.55. Mendel was fortunate in that his fluent Japanese allowed him to conduct research on this theme which for political reasons was nearly impossible to do at the time.

# Aboriginal intervention supporting the government

We now turn to examples of Aboriginal individuals and communities intervening in the 228 Incident by supporting the government. It shall be argued, however, that the reasons for this support were largely the same as the reasons for attacking government officers, installations and the military.

## Ma Chih-li and the pacification of Taitung

Until the 1930s, the Beinan and Bunun Aboriginal communities to the north of Taitung City<sup>230</sup> had maintained a ferocious and costly feud with one another, a conflict dating back to at least the eighteenth century. After the Japanese annexation of Taiwan, many officials and police were killed because of Bunun recalcitrance. Eventually the Japanese attempted to minimise losses to their own personnel by posting Aboriginal constables from Amis and Beinan communities in these areas under the command of Japanese sergeants – but without spectacular success. In 1939, however, a truce was declared between Beinan and Bunun chieftains, based on agreed boundaries for hunting fauna.<sup>231</sup>

The man mostly responsible for this detente was Ma Chih-li, the Han son of Chu Laisheng, an immigrant from China who married into the Beinan Aboriginal community near what is now Taitung City. Ma moved to the east coast with his father as a child and grew up among the Beinan. He became an influential figure with the Japanese, serving as a translator of Aboriginal, Japanese and Chinese languages for the police, and with the Beinan community, where he was made a chieftain at the age of 28. From 1937 he was a councillor for the Beinan area. After attaining the status of chieftain, Ma

<sup>231</sup> See Lin Chien-cheng (1998): Houshan zugun zhi ge (The settlers' stories in Taitung). Taipei: Yushan,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> In 1947, Taitung City was classified only as an "urban township" (*zhen*), though for convenience the township is described below as a city to distinguish it from the surrounding rural townships.

When the 228 Incident erupted, Ma Chih-li again played a crucial role in keeping the peace in Taitung County. When word of the uprising reached Taitung, local youths surrounded the airport, the county government building, Taitung Railway Station and the offices of the county's mainlander mayor, Hsieh Chen. In the middle of the night, Ma Chih-li arranged for the mayor, his family and as many as fifty to one hundred mainlander government officials and their families to be spirited to a Beinan village and then a more remote Bunun community near the Beinan village of Chulu. The officials were guarded in both villages by Beinan and Bunun Aboriginal tribesmen throughout the unrest. Ma also sent a unit of Beinan youths to assess the situation as it developed in Taitung City before order was restored.<sup>233</sup>

The question of how first contact between Hsieh Chen and Ma Chih-li occurred at the outset of the 228 Incident remains unclear. A Taiwan Provincial Executive Administration Office report suggests that on March 3, rebellious elements attempted to incite a small number of Aborigines to "come down from the mountains," but the next day, March 4, Aboriginal leaders made it clear that they would support the government, and it was for this reason that the rebels did not act. 234 Another source, however, suggests that Ma Chih-li was initially lobbied by a trusted Taiwanese merchant, Ko Chen-ling, who argued against joining Han Taiwanese youths as they attempted to occupy the urban center. Before this exchange, Beinan tribesmen are alleged to have

pp.23-26. 232 *ibid*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.259. The sheltered government officials appear to have included Wu Pu-sheng, the (mainlander) chief of police in Taitung County; afterwards Wu is said to have looked after Aborigines in his jurisdiction, particularly by elevating a number of Aboriginal policemen to senior posts in the force; see Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1996a), op. cit., p.141. Before the 228 Incident, Wu was reported to have participated in the county's mountain area inspection unit which delivered various clothing and food supplies to Aboriginal communities in need; see Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zo), op. cit.. Different figures for the number of mainlanders sheltered by Ma Chih-li are offered in Lin Chien-cheng (1998), op. cit., p.83 and p.86. TWS II, op. cit., p.518.

The most detailed account of Aboriginal actions in Taitung is provided in the *Report on the Progression of the Incident for Taitung County*. This county government report includes a chronology from which the following detail has been selected. On March 3, Hsieh Chen withdrew to Peinan Township to avoid the "conspirators" who began to surround key installations and food storage centres in Taitung City (Peinan Township is where the bulk of the plains-dwelling Beinan Aboriginal communities were and are located, though it is not designated as an Aboriginal township). On March 4, a series of high-level officials made their way to Peinan Township, where they met with the mayor to discuss how to respond to the crisis. 237

On March 5, Hsieh Chen convinced an unnamed Aboriginal chieftain or chieftains to assist the government and not be roused by "thugs." It is then noted that the Beinan Aborigines' homeland more or less surrounded Taitung City and that the assistance of the people of Peinan Township would have exerted great pressure on the "thugs." On this day, the speaker of the Taitung County Council and head of the Taitung 228 Incident disposal committee, Chen Chen-tsung, was threatened by "armed thugs" sent by those in the "traitorous party" to encircle his home. Chen is said to have scaled a wall at his residence to escape danger. Thereafter he fled to Peinan Township and linked up with the mayor, where it was agreed that every Aboriginal community within the bounds of Taitung County would be contacted to assist in keeping the peace. 238

<sup>235</sup> Lin Chien-cheng (1998), op. cit., pp.86-87. Ko Chen-ling would later be handsomely rewarded for his actions and use his reward to build a hot springs resort in Chihpen, thus commencing the modern-era exploitation of the famed tourism precinct.

exploitation of the famed tourism precinct.

236 AS IV, op. cit., p.27. Please note that Beinan and Peinan are the same word; the awkward difference in spelling here results from the use of phonetically more reliable "English" for Aboriginal tribal names (Beinan) and, for the sake of consistency, the use of Taiwan's corrupted – and beleagured – Wade-Giles variant to Romanise place names (Peinan Township).

ibid., p.29. The date of the mayor's withdrawal contradicts the assessment of the Executive Yuan report; see Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.148. The latter also obscures the role of Ma Chih-li and other Aboriginal figures in protecting the mayor and his entourage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>238</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.29-30.

Liaison with Aboriginal communities therefore commenced on March 6. The mayor and council speaker dispatched more than thirty county government officials to travel "deep into mountain areas to pacify [Aboriginal] compatriots and to commission a number of [Aboriginal] chieftains to travel to each community in the mountains and have them be in close contact and provide assistance to the government, and not be swayed by agitators." In addition, the mayors were requested to "maintain order, preserve local strength and prevent the activities of the traitorous party."<sup>239</sup>

A report dated March 17 from General Peng Meng-chi in Kaohsiung to Chen Yi in Taipei claims that Taitung County's Aborigines had been roused by radio broadcasts from Kaohsiung and had intended to cause trouble, but then returned to their communities by March 6.<sup>240</sup> The programme of liaising with Aboriginal chieftains continued on March 7, with chieftains from each community "hurrying to where the mayor was stationed to indicate they would fully obey the government, accept government direction and accept responsibility for suppressing the rebellion." Meanwhile, in Taitung City, Aboriginal youths refused to be "used" by the Han Taiwanese youths and surrounded their villages to prevent further unrest. 242

Also on this day, radio broadcasts by representatives of the Taitung 228 Incident disposal committee began inviting the mayor and council speaker to return to their offices and assume control. Representatives were sent to the Aboriginal retreat the next day to deliver the same message. Instead, the mayor and council speaker elected to remain with the Aborigines and send an advance unit into Taitung City to assess the

<sup>239</sup> *ibid.*, pp.30-31.

<sup>242</sup> *ibid.*, p.32.

AS III, op. cit., p.239. Peng Meng-chi would later recall a rumour spread via radio that a "Mountain Comrades Association" (shandi tongzhihui) had formed and several tens of thousands of Aborigines had attacked a certain location; see TWS II, op. cit., p.606.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.31-32.

situation there in light of reports that "thugs" had yet to hand in their weapons.<sup>243</sup>

A Beinan tribesman also claimed that news arrived in Peinan Township that an attack on the township was imminent. After a week of sheltering in huts behind the Chulu police station, guarded by Beinan tribesmen armed with guns, Ma Chih-li decided to send the mayor and his entourage to a more remote location. The frail in the group were carried on the backs of Beinan tribesmen. At this point, a warning was sent out to those seeking to attack mainlanders: they would have to pass a line of Beinan tribesmen first.<sup>244</sup>

At about this time, Ma Chih-li and the mayor held a conference with Nan Chih-hsin, the Japanese-educated Beinan tribesman and doctor mentioned in the last chapter, who had been elected as one of seventeen Taiwanese delegates to the ROC National Assembly. When the disturbances started, Nan and Cheng Pin-tsung, had been on a tour of Aboriginal communities in their capacities as national assemblymen and as part of the KMT's attempts to establish authority and engender trust.<sup>245</sup> The men agreed that the disturbances were the result of a misunderstanding, and the mayor "guaranteed not to kill any Taiwan compatriots once the disturbances had settled."<sup>246</sup>

On March 9, the Taitung disposal committee sent eight representatives to the mountain retreat, identified in the government report as the Bunun Aboriginal hamlet of Shangli, upriver from Hungyeh Village in Yenping Township. The response of the mayor and council speaker was to draw up a four-point plan of recovering weapons, identifying the troublemakers and preventing them from influencing local youths, leaving the council speaker in Shangli to continue appearament work with the Aborigines, and having the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>243</sup> *ibid.*, p.33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Lin Chien-cheng (1998), op. cit., p.85 and pp.86-87. The name of the Beinan tribesman who witnessed these events is Chen Chang-hui.

Wang Ho-sheng, op. cit., p.43. A photo of Nan, Cheng and others in Hualien just prior to the 228 Incident is on p.45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.259.

mayor and accompanying officials return to Peinan Township the following day to take charge there.<sup>247</sup>

When the Bunun Aborigines learned of this, they sent a delegation that urged the mayor to remain in the mountains to avoid being tricked by "thugs." The tribesmen were assured by the mayor that he would stay with the Beinan community in Peinan Township and await the recovery of the weapons before returning. The delegation was thus satisfied and withdrew. The next day, three departmental heads left the retreat and arrived at the city government building via Peinan Township. The mayor remained in Peinan Township and set up a temporary headquarters, and from there, Aboriginal youths were sent to guard the city and make the "thugs" hand over their weapons. 249

On March 11, the mayor, still in Peinan Township, was visited by council deputy speaker Ma Jung-tung and Cheng Pin-tsung. At 4pm the next day, the mayor travelled by motor vehicle from Peinan Township to the county government building where a radio broadcast was made, including the statement that Aboriginal compatriots had "acted with great wisdom" (*shenming dayi*). Emissaries representing the mayor and the county council then reported to Chen Yi in Taipei on March 13 about the situation in Taitung. The mayor, meanwhile, had returned to Peinan Township and received an update that Taitung City was stable. The mayor instructed the council speaker to leave the mountain retreat in Yenping Township and return to Taitung.<sup>251</sup>

The council speaker and other officials arrived in Peinan Township from the mountain retreat on the afternoon of March 14. Together with the mayor, the entire group then set out for Taitung City. In what must have been an extraordinary sight, perhaps akin to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.33-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> *ibid.*, p.34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> *ibid.*, pp.34-35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> *ibid.*, p.36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> *ibid.*, p.37. However, Lai Tse-han (1994), *op. cit.*, p.150, seems to suggest the mayor remained in Taitung after March 12.

a triumphant procession, the sizable team of Chinese officials was escorted into the city by a throng of Aborigines, "young and old alike." Newspapers also reported that the army's arrival in Taitung on March 18 was greeted by enthusiastic Aborigines from all over the county, 253 and that the mayor had asked the provincial authorities to commend and reward the Aborigines for their actions throughout this period. 254

The government's report illustrates the critical role of Aboriginal networks in combining to stifle violence committed by Han Taiwanese toward mainlanders, thereby avoiding the kind of military recrimination occurring elsewhere. Of special note is the significant extent to which this was acknowledged by the Taitung County government in its report, if not in subsequent reports by other agencies. The summary of the report praises Aboriginal assistance, and it is here that Ma Chih-li is named as the "principal chieftain" that provided important assistance in not only sheltering government officials but also keeping other Aboriginal communities "stable." The situation, it was stated, would have greatly deteriorated without this help. The summary also emphasises the circling of Han villages by Aboriginal tribesmen, which hastened the return of weapons.<sup>255</sup>

In a section detailing the government's handling of the crisis, explicit reference is made to the high proportion of Aboriginal people in Taitung and their "straightforwardness, courageousness and inclination to conflict." Consequently,

Had [they] been manipulated by the thugs (baotu), the disastrousness of the situation would not bear contemplation. [The government] therefore made every effort to reach our [Aboriginal] compatriots so that they would have firm trust in the government and assist in keeping the peace. The success of

<sup>253</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.165.

<sup>255</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.11-12 and p.14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> AS IV, op. cit., pp.37-38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947m): "Gaoshan tongbao weichi zhixu, Taidong xianzhang chengqing jiangli" (Kaoshan compatriots maintain order, Taitung county mayor requests rewards for them). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 23 March 1947, p.2.

these efforts was of the utmost significance in influencing the overall state of affairs.<sup>256</sup>

One of these efforts, the recruiting of volunteer Aboriginal youths to patrol Taitung, is mentioned.<sup>257</sup>

The report's membership list for the Taitung 228 Incident disposal committee would have been used during the subsequent security census to purge supposed dissidents; it is noteworthy, however, that although Ma Chih-li is named as a co-deputy head of the committee, a note is added to the file pointing out that Ma had "cooperated with the government throughout." The joint heads of the committee were also Aboriginal: Chen Chen-tsung apparently fell foul of the committee's members when he supported a peaceful resolution, and so fled to Peinan Township. Shan Chih-hsin, the other joint head, was elected or appointed *in absentia*, and the file states he was not in Taitung at the time. The following section then states that chieftains in every community prevented "outsiders" from entering and tribesmen from leaving, thereby preserving order. Shan Chih-hsin, thereby preserving order.

An intriguing appendix to the report lists members of a former association convened late in the period of Japanese rule promoting the inculcation of Japanese cultural values in Taiwan. The Imperial Subjects Public Service Association was part of a programme attempting to convert Taiwanese into Japanese cultural and spiritual subjects and had chapters throughout Taiwan.<sup>261</sup> The presence of a Taitung chapter list in the Taitung government report strongly suggests that its members were suspected of contributing to

<sup>256</sup> *ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>257</sup> ibid., p.21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> *ibid.*, p.14.

<sup>259</sup> ibid p 11

*ibid*., p.18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> Yang Pi-chuan, op. cit., pp.102-103.

the disturbances, or at least were worthy of investigation.<sup>262</sup> Nan Chih-hsin and Chen Chen-tsung were both on this list: Nan was named as a joint manager of business for the Taitung chapter and Chen as a councillor with duties connected to a "wartime lifestyle unit." As with the disposal committee list, however, both men are cleared of suspicion in added notes. Nan is further claimed to have been in western Taiwan pacifying other Aborigines.<sup>263</sup>

The final part of the Taitung government report lists victims of the violence, including one death - the schoolteacher Ouyang Chao-yu, though he is not named - which was discussed in the previous section. The injured included mainlander teachers stationed in Tulan and Changpin, both Amis Aboriginal communities; in the Paiwan community of Tupan; and an administrator in Tajen Township, also a Paiwan community. The remainder were attacked in or close to Taitung City, including a mainlander who served as a "youth training lecturer" at the Taitung County Mountain Area Supervisory Office.<sup>264</sup>

A newspaper article published in 1991 claims that government officials left Taitung City not separately but as a single group before spending the night at Ma Chih-li's home. The article also claims that one hundred people from Nanwang Village, just north of Taitung City, were chiefly responsible for seizing weapons from police stations and hunting down mainlanders.<sup>265</sup> If true, the likelihood of those one hundred people not including Beinan Aboriginal youths from the Nanwang area would appear rather low. Another source mentions the name of Lin Kuang-hsiung, also a Beinan tribesman from Chulu Village, who is said to have assisted Ma Chih-li in the evacuation of personnel.<sup>266</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> The report on the 228 Incident by government investigator Yang Liang-kung claims most of the members of this former organisation participated in the disturbances; see Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., pp.224-225.
AS IV, op. cit., p.24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>264</sup> *ibid.*, p.50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> TWS I, op. cit., pp.206-207.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> TWS I, op. cit., p.577.

Elsewhere, the Aboriginal police inspector Nan Hsin-yen, policeman Kao Te-i and Pan Fa-te have been named as parties to the effort to maintain stability in Taitung County. Nan Hsin-yen was a Beinan tribesman who would move on to become a county councillor; he was credited with preventing guns and ammunition from falling into the hands of local youths, and Kao Te-i with foiling a plan to mobilise tribesmen from various communities, presumably to attack government fixtures and mainlanders. Ma Chih-li himself is also suggested to have quelled desires by Bunun tribesmen to confront authorities before arranging for them to help the mainlanders. <sup>267</sup>

There are no reports of Aboriginal casualties during this period. However, after the disturbances subsided, two Beinan youths were arrested and readied for execution at Taitung's airport because of their alleged involvement in the unrest. Hung Ming-cheng and Tsai Chin-neng, and possibly some non-Aboriginal prisoners, were saved from this fate and released after Ma Chih-li's intervention. Tsai's (but not Hung's) name appears on an arrest list for Taitung County but, curiously, the date of arrest is April 3, much later than one might have expected for an extrajudicial execution. Nonetheless, he was sent to the Eastern Pacification Command for processing. Tsai had apparently served in the Japanese air force (though the arrest list claims he was *nineteen years old* in 1947, and would surely have been too young to be a pilot at age fifteen) and would eventually become principal of Paosang High School in Taitung City. Another source claims that Tsai was involved in attacks on military police and was tortured into confessing before being released.

Much later, on July 27, Ma Chih-li and Cheng Pin-tsung were reported to have visited

<sup>267</sup> Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1996a), op. cit., p.280; Lin Chiencheng (1998), op. cit., p.84; and Wang Ho-sheng (2001), op. cit., p.49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.259; and Lin Chien-cheng (1998), op. cit., p.85. Tsai claimed compensation for this incident in the 1990s, according to a public notice published in the *Independence Morning Post* on 20 October 1997 (information courtesy of Chen Su-chen).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> AS V, op. cit., p.571.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> KS4, op. cit., p.308.

the garrison headquarters and county government to express their gratitude for the government's "magnanimous handling" of 228 Incident suspects.<sup>272</sup>

#### Other Bunun involvement

The township dominated by Bunun communities in Taitung County other than Yenping Township, is Haituan, its northern neighbour. Chen Hsiao-i's book about Chen Tiencheng, his policeman father, says the elder Chen was stationed in Haituan at the time of the 228 Incident, and that he had orders to prevent Bunun tribesmen from leaving the mountains lest troublemakers "incite" them, suggesting that someone attempted to mobilise Aboriginal people. There were certainly fears of what would transpire if this had been successful. The threat was minor, however, because the area was so remote and infrastructure so poor. Consquently, it took at least a week for trainee police who were in the mountains to return by foot or available vehicle to Taitung City to await orders.<sup>273</sup>

A more recent account suggests that Haituan, like Yenping, served as a sanctuary for mainlanders at risk. A half-Han, half-Bunun policeman named Cheng Chiang-shui was stationed at the Kuanshan Township police station next to Haituan. Cheng's intimate knowledge of and respect for the Bunun communities in the area allowed him to arrange for the Aboriginal village of Wulu to shelter the mainlanders, whom he personally escorted into the mountains. But because of his absence from the police station and apparent jealousy over his influence, a raid on the station and the loss of six rifles fuelled a rumour that Cheng orchestrated the theft. In March he was arrested, removed to Taipei, probably tortured and sentenced to death. Cheng Pin-tsung came to his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947p): "Dongbu tongbao ganji zhengfu" (Compatriots in eastern Taiwan grateful to the government). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 July 1947, p.4. In this article, the second character of Ma Chih-li's name is omitted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., p.66.

rescue, saving him from execution and allowing him to return home. He was changed by his experiences in detention, however, and decided to leave his job and learn a trade instead.<sup>274</sup>

# Cases of aborted Aboriginal mobilisation

This section of the survey examines Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident which did not result in organised community attacks on or defense of government interests. It covers scattered incidents of mobilisation that came to nothing, individual acts of violence, as well as situations where Aboriginal communities rejected approaches by Han Taiwanese hoping to find a willing ally in the fight against the Nationalist government.

## Tardy pigs and rumour in Wulai

At the beginning of this chapter, I described the activities of Aboriginal students in Taipei, and I suggested that the Wulai community, where a number of them originated, may have been approached to launch an attack on troops. Sources indicate that this approach occurred, but it seems that the communities refused to be involved. One source says that on March 6, an unnamed chieftain of the Wulai Aborigines met a delegation of students wanting to know why an arrangement to meet had been broken.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>274</sup> Cheng Chiang-shui (1906-1983) is a fascinating figure and a compelling example of the close ties that could exist between Han and Aboriginal society on the east coast under the Japanese. Born into a family of *tongshi* ("translators," or Han-Aboriginal intermediaries), Cheng married the daughter of a Bunun chieftain when he was sixteen years old. He was fluent in a number of the area's languages and was an influential figure during the dark days of Bunun-Japanese conflict. After returning from the war in the Pacific, where he headed the Aboriginal unit in his division in the Philippines, Cheng worked to prevent Han Taiwanese from cheating Aboriginal people out of their land and other resources. At one point, he was mistaken for a Japanese person by the KMT authorities because of his fluency and threatened with repatriation. See Wang Ho-sheng (2001), op. cit., pp.339-340.

The chieftain said that before leaving for battle, custom dictated that a war ceremony should be held. This required the presentation of two pigs for ritual slaughter<sup>275</sup> in addition to appropriate supplies of rice, salt and matches. Because the students did not provide them, the tribesmen did come down from the mountains to support the student militia.<sup>276</sup>

The students therefore purchased the required animals and supplies and, according to another militia leader, Chen Ping-chi, the (unnamed) chieftain agreed to participate. There is also evidence that tribesmen had begun to gather weapons to intervene. One tribesmen has said that his father collected swords and bows and arrows to this end; this was despite the fact that their residence at the time was in Fushan Village, the most remote in Wulai Township.<sup>277</sup>

At around this time, probably March 5 or 6, an Aboriginal delegation consisting of Atayal and Amis tribesmen went to the US consulate and consulted George Kerr, later the author of *Formosa Betrayed*. Kerr was a Taiwan specialist and assistant naval attache to the United States embassy in Nanking, and was now acting as an assistant to the consulate in Taipei.<sup>278</sup> Kerr had lived in and travelled throughout Taiwan prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific, and these travels included visits to the Truku Aboriginal communities in Taroko Gorge, Atayal communities in Wulai and the Yami of Orchid Island (Lanyu).<sup>279</sup> After the Japanese surrender, Kerr visited Atayal

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> TWS III, op. cit., pp.60-61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> *ibid.*, p.66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> See Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (ed.)(1997): *Taibei xian xiangtu shiliao* (Local historical materials in Taipei County). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.441.

p.441.

278 Kerr (1965), op. cit., p.277. The date of this visit is not specified. Kerr says it was "mid-week," and in 1947, March 5 was a Wednesday. This date would also fit well between Aboriginal expressions of interest in intervening in the disturbances and the arrival of mainland reinforcements on March 9.

279 Cheng Tsun-i (ed.)(1999): Beichumaide Taiwan: Ge Chaozhi (George H. Kerr) wenwu zhan zonglan: cong shijie shide jiaodu fanxing ererba shijian (Formosa betrayed: George H. Kerr's collections: reflections on the 228 Incident – an international perspective). Taipei: Taipei 228 Memorial Museum, p.10 and p.100. The location of the latter page's photograph featuring George Kerr is disputed in the text. It is probably Lanyu (the hill in the background appears to be Lanyu's Mantou Mountain) and the Aborigines pictured are Yami (Tao) tribesmen.

communities near Taipei – "some thirty miles away," therefore most likely Wulai; possibly Chiaopan (now Fuhsing) Township in Taoyuan County – and assisted them with the repatriation of Aboriginal soldiers and support personnel in the Japanese army. Fortuitously, the repatriations were completed within a few days, and the Aborigines returned to Taipei to present Kerr with gifts to "Thank America' for so promptly answering their request for help." Kerr does not say that these Aborigines were the same as those who came to see him during the 228 Incident, but it is possible that these involved the same people, especially if Kerr's earlier actions earned him credibility and a good reputation among the northern Atayal. As for the Amis tribesmen, it is impossible to establish their origins. A related but difficult question is how and why these groups came to be together before approaching Kerr. Regardless, the delegation now before him had come to "seek direction" from United States officials in relation to the 228 Incident. He promptly told them that they should return to their communities and not get involved. In the promptly told them that they should return to their communities and not get involved.

Kerr also reports that during the 228 Incident, mainlanders were fearful of mass intervention by Aborigines:

Our sources of information indicated that the mainland Chinese were suffering a peculiarly unsettling fear of "what the aborigines might do." Rumours of the wildest sort were circulating in Taipei, relaying reports that "thousands of headhunters" were coming down from the mountains and had already reached the suburbs of the capital city. This was nonsense, but it represented the survival or reactivation of traditional Chinese mainland views of Formosa, the savage island.<sup>282</sup>

Wild rumours they may have been, but they appear to have reached as far as Nanking.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> Kerr (1965), op. cit., pp.88-89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>281</sup> *ibid.*, p.277.

On March 10, a report was sent to Chiang Kai-shek from the director of the Nanking-based Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau, Yeh Hsiu-feng, who stated that the Taipei disposal committee had begun to search the city for residences of mainlanders, and that more than five hundred Aborigines were preparing to join the operation under the command of former Aboriginal officers in the Japanese army.<sup>283</sup>

Chen Su-chen has said that such reports of Aboriginal mobilisation and preparation to attack may not have been rumour, but *fabrications* to serve the interests of different factions within the KMT.<sup>284</sup> Certainly, the outlandish flavour of some of the "intelligence" being sent to Nanking would support this view, as would contradictory accounts emanating from different agencies – it may have been in the interests of one or another group to exaggerate the situation and justify a stronger intervention. Certainly, most Han Taiwanese would have been oblivious to much of the politics of the matter, which means that Aboriginal communities would have been even less equipped to understand what was going on so far away from their homes.

Recently released documents from the Taipei County Government seem to confirm the exaggerations of the earlier correspondence. A report dated March 19, 1947, by the Wenshan District Office, at that time part of Taipei County, makes special mention of the Aboriginal role in the unrest. It claimed that the office was in frequent contact with Wulai, sending officials to "deal with matters." It confirmed that youths – probably unfairly linked to the Taipei disposal committee – were visiting Wulai daily with gifts of meat and alcohol in an attempt to convince the tribesmen to come down from the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>283</sup> AS II, op. cit., p.137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> For an analysis of KMT factionalism, see Kuo Hsu-yin (ed.)(1993a): Guomindang paixi douzheng shi (shangce) (A history of factional struggle in the Kuomintang, vol. 1). Taipei: Kuikuan; and Kuo Hsu-yin (ed.)(1993b): Guomindang paixi douzheng shi (xiace) (A history of factional struggle in the Kuomintang, vol. 2). Taipei: Kuikuan. For the role of factions in the 228 Incident, see Chen Tsui-lien (1995): Paixi douzheng yu quanmou zhengzhi: ererba beijude lingyi mianxiang (Factional struggle and power politics: another face of the 228 tragedy). Taipei: Shihpao Wenhua.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> See Chang Yen-hsien (ed.)(2002g): Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (shiyi) – Taibei xian zhengfu dang'an (A collection of files on the 228 Incident, vol. 11: files from the Taipei County Government). Hsintien: Academia Historica, p.30.

mountains and help their cause. However, the report then says that this was stymied by Wulai Township mayor Chen Chih-liang, deputy mayor Shih Liang-fang and the local school principal, Kao Yuan-yuan (Kao was not Aboriginal), who went from village to village convincing tribesmen not to get involved.<sup>286</sup>

The documents also include a report by the Wulai Township Office signed by Chen Chih-liang, which says that he convened a meeting of all Aboriginal holders of public office on March 1 to warn that the unrest had nothing to do with Aboriginal communities. On March 2 and 3 he toured the township's communities and reported that all was peaceful. The report makes no mention, however, of the documented involvement of Aboriginal people in the unrest in Taipei nor of the visits of students to Wulai seeking assistance.<sup>287</sup>

Ku Jui-yun claims that an attempt to recruit the Aborigines of Wulai failed because the messengers did not know the road to the mountains. This account sits strangely with other testimony, and comes from a person whose recollections have been disputed elsewhere. 288 Another account suggests that sudden storms disrupted attempts to liaise with the tribesmen.<sup>289</sup>

#### Instability in Ilan

Only a limited amount of evidence shows Aboriginal communities in northeastern Taiwan adopting an active role in the 228 Incident. In 1947, present-day Ilan County was part of Taipei County but still quite remote. The communities in Ilan's two Aboriginal townships, Taiping (now Tatung) and Nan'ao, continued to reside in

<sup>286</sup> *ibid.*, pp.30-31. <sup>287</sup> *ibid.*, pp.82-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.49.

generally difficult or distant mountain terrain. One community, however, was adjacent to the Ilan plain prior to the forced merging of Aboriginal communities under the KMT. This community, Hanhsi Village, was the home of an Aboriginal man allegedly executed for his role in the 228 Incident. A source says the Atayal tribesman, known as Oyama in Japanese ("Tashan" in Chinese), was a Taipei Normal College graduate and detained in Lotung, just south of Ilan's urban centre, during the 228 Incident. The source says he was then executed, but does not provide the date of execution. <sup>290</sup>

However, a second source says that this man was not executed but died in prison some time later, and that Takashi Oyama was an intelligent tribesman who ended up an "ideological criminal." Before the 228 Incident, Oyama would get drunk and threaten to kill Chinese people, leading the authorities to investigate him. The source implies that Oyama was rounded up at about the same time that Lin Jui-chang, Kao I-sheng and other prominent Aboriginal figures were arrested and executed. While being in held in detention, the source says, Oyama told his son that there was nothing to fear and that if anybody informed on him he would beat them up when he returned home. Instead, Oyama was transferred to Green Island — a facility for political prisoners — where he died, and where his grave apparently remains to this day. <sup>291</sup> A source from the Japanese era also mentions that Oyama was a promising student. <sup>292</sup>

One of the sources also said that there was no real trouble in Taiping Township during the 228 Incident, though a schoolteacher was one of two tribesmen to flee the area before returning at a later time.<sup>293</sup>

<sup>289</sup> Wang et al. (1990), op. cit., p.170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> See Shen Hsiu-hua and Chang Wen-i (eds)(1992): Gemalan ererba: Yilan 228 koushu lishi (Kevalan 228: An oral history of 228 in Ilan). Taipei: Independence Evening Post, p.259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> Information provided by anonymous source C (name withheld).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> See Taiwan Governor-General's Office Police Bureau (ed.)(tr. Chen Chin-tien, Wu Wan-huang and Ku Jui-yun)(1924/1999): *Riju shiqi Yuanzhumin xingzheng zhigao, you ming, li fan zhigao, disijuan* (Annals of Aboriginal administration in the period of Japanese rule, or, Annals of savage regulation). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Anonymous source C (name withheld).

Two newspaper reports dated March 23 and April 14, however, suggest local Han Taiwanese attempted to bring Aborigines into the conflict. The first report involves the Aborigines of Nan'ao, to the south, and it states:

...the people of Nan'ao Township in Taipei County were not swayed by the agitation and manipulation of the rogues, and, amidst this chaotic atmosphere, convened meetings of township representatives, worked together to keep the peace and maintained local stability and order. The people of this township were law-abiding, and township mayor Yu Chungchien's leadership was sound. The authorities yesterday wired [them] to convey their compliments.<sup>294</sup>

A relatively large number of weapons was stored in the area as part of the Japanese-era administration of Aboriginal territories. Members of the nearby Chinese community at Suao apparently collected these weapons after the Japanese withdrew and attempted to form a force of resistance against the government during the 228 Incident.<sup>295</sup> It was most likely this group of people that failed to persuade Aboriginal people in the villages of Tungyueh and Aohua to participate in the resistance.<sup>296</sup>

The second report stated that the Aboriginal people of Taipei County did not succumb to attempts by "rogues" to incite them and that Aboriginal townships and administrative offices were peaceful and functioned as normal. Later, the Aboriginal mayors met with government officials, including Taipei County mayor Lu Kui-hsiang, and, surrounded by silk banners featuring the words "loyal and patriotic" (zhongzhen aiguo), described what happened. The report also mentions the dispatch of a supervisor on Aboriginal affairs, Chang Huai-chuan, into Taipei County's Aboriginal communities

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947m), op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> Shen and Chang (1992), *op. cit.*, p.213. <sup>296</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (2002g), *op. cit.*, pp.168-169.

to perform "pacification" (xuanwei) duties and to commend the township mayors. The report listed four destinations for the supervisor, three of which were the three Aboriginal administrative townships in Taipei County – Wulai, Taiping and Nan'ao. Curiously, the fourth was Hanhsi, which lies within Taiping Township.<sup>297</sup> The special reference to Hanhsi may be incidental, but suggests Hanhsi's role might have been more complex.

According to a recent release of documents from the Taipei County Government, Taiping Township deputy mayor Chang Fang-keng specifically invited Lu Kui-hsiang to inspect the area, present awards and provide encouragement after the township suffered "influence from all quarters" during the unrest which had confused the Aboriginal community. Mayor Li Jung-chin had then convened a meeting of all Aboriginal representatives, chieftains and police on March 6, which averted bloodshed and ensured that "outsiders" (*taren*) did not interfere with the tribespeople.<sup>298</sup> Chang himself had already convened a meeting of fifty officials in Li's absence on March 3. But it was not until this meeting on March 6 that the officials decided to place a temporary ban on Aborigines leaving the township.<sup>299</sup>

Only one source points to disturbances in the main section of Taiping Township, which occupies the Lanyang River valley to the southwest of Ilan City. Inosuke Inoue, a Japanese doctor and covert missionary who was exempt from repatriation at the time, reports that during the first three days of March, some sixty Atayal tribesmen from the Liumao'an community further up the valley had raided a Han Taiwanese village in the Ilan basin, demanding sixty pigs per household as compensation for the use of land. In addition, this source reports on a possible dispute between a Bunun village head (his name and place of origin not are provided) and impolite Han Taiwanese in Lotung,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947n): "Taizhong gejie zhaodai ershiyi shi guanzuo" (All of Taichung entertains the 21st Division and their aides). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 14 April 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (2002g), op. cit., pp.98-99.

culminating in the village head's threat to bring tribesmen to Lotung to kill them. Thirdly, a young Atayal woman was killed by her Atayal husband on March 4 in a domestic dispute. These three conflicts appear to have no connection with the 228 Incident, except that a prevailing mood of lawlessness may have encouraged them to develop and worsen. Inoue states that, at the very least, Aboriginal secondary students had all returned to their mountain communities by this time, and that the mood both in the towns and in the mountains was becoming chaotic.<sup>300</sup>

Another source makes fleeting mention of Chen Cheng-yueh, a dentist who acted as the head of a local peacekeeping unit. The army's Central Pacification Zone report, which should have dealt with only the central west coast of Taiwan and not the Ilan area, mysteriously included him as a suspect. It states that the Lotung-based practitioner not only organised the local disposal committee, disseminated propaganda and formed a local militia, but went on to "force people to incite the Aborigines into participating in the rebellion." I found no other evidence to verify an Aboriginal connection to this claim, but if there was contact between Chen and local Aborigines, the nearest Aboriginal community to Lotung was – and is – Hanhsi. 302

Despite all of this evidence, however, the Lotung District Office, which had jurisdiction over the two Aboriginal townships, reported that Taiping and Nan'ao were not affected by the unrest.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>303</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (2002g), op. cit., p.234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>300</sup> Inoue, op. cit., pp.255-256.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>301</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>302</sup> Chen Cheng-yueh's son makes no reference to Aborigines in his interview on the subject of the 228 Incident. For that interview, see Shen and Chang (1992), op. cit., pp.119-129.

Taoyuan City in the northwest was a scene of considerable disorder, with Han Taiwanese attacking government officials, police and mainlander civilians, as well as occupying government facilities, though military reinforcements restored order rather quickly. 304 Government documents do not mention Aboriginal involvement in Taoyuan City short of stating that a small number of Aborigines made an appearance. 305 but there is mention of an attempt at Aboriginal mobilisation in Tahsi, a plains township adjacent to the Aboriginal township of Chiaopan (now Fuhsing). A military report reviewing events in Hsinchu County, which then included present-day Taoyuan County, states that Hsinchu County Library head Huang Shih-chiao attempted to incite Aborigines into opposing the government. Huang was a KMT member and not Aboriginal, and it is not clear if the thirty to fifty youths who participated in an armed brigade included Aboriginal youths from the area.<sup>306</sup> An intelligence report dated March 3 says this or a similar group travelled to Tahsi to recruit "the local population and Aborigines," 307 but in the end this attempt to get Aborigines to come down from the mountains and join the uprising was "without result." In addition, a small brigade headed by one Kuo Yungfan (Kuo's ethnicity is not clear) disbanded after "disagreement" between its "Fujianese" (Hoklo-speaking Taiwanese) and Aboriginal members (fanren). The location of this brigade in Hsinchu County is not given, and may have involved Aborigines from either or both the Atayal and Saisiat tribes in these areas.<sup>309</sup> Another military intelligence document dated March 5 refers to armed rebels and Aborigines in the Tahsi area that intended to cause further trouble.310

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<sup>304</sup> Lai et al. (1991), op. cit., pp.123-124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>305</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.412.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>306</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.387, p.389 and p.391; and Wang et al. (1990), op. cit., p.309. Huang Shih-chiao was also a member of the KMT.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>307</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.709. A later summary of events relating to the 228 Incident to March 10 states that this attempt took place on March 2; see AS IV, op. cit., p.455.

<sup>308</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.451.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>309</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.390.

<sup>310</sup> AS VI, op. cit., pp.710-711.

Lin Jui-chang, the prominent Atayal tribesman and doctor who would later be elected provincial assemblyman before being executed, apparently prevented Aboriginal youths from intervening in the disturbances after Han Taiwanese had approached them.<sup>311</sup> A second source claims that Lin, together with the mayor of Chiaopan Township and its council speaker, was in Taipei attending a meeting with provincial administrators during the outbreak of violence. Lin is said to have witnessed violence in Taipei before returning to Chiaopan and meeting with community leaders, whom he asked to "protect the country and uphold the law." A third source says that Lin told the meeting for mayors of Aboriginal townships that they should "vow not to act foolishly." Lin later received congratulations from the government for assisting in quelling local tension.<sup>312</sup>

A fourth source claims that Lin used his high standing in Aboriginal communities to prevent Atayal tribesmen in the vicinity of Wulai and Chungli, in addition to those near his base in Taoyuan, from taking part in the disturbances, and for this reason was rewarded by the KMT with a citation.<sup>313</sup>

Several sources report a memorable incident in which a female county councillor representing the Atayal people, Li Yueh-chiao, tended to the victim of a gang rape committed by Han Taiwanese during the disturbances. The victim, a mainlander high school teacher, later committed suicide, but Li's deed attracted the attention of

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311 Tai and Yeh, op. cit., p.308.

p.100; and Lyiking Yuma, op. cit., p.104.

313 See Lin Chao-chen (1993): "Lin Ruichang yunan 40 zai, Yuanzhumin juhui zhuidiao" (On the fortieth anniversary of Lin Jui-chang's demise, Aborigines gather to commemorate). China Times, 4 October 1993, p.4.

<sup>312</sup> See Fann Yen-chiou (1992): "Lunwang yu ererbade Yuanzhumin yingling (shang)" (Heroic Aboriginal spirits ruined by the 228 Incident, part 1). Liberty Times, 26 February 1992, p.4; and Huang Tzu-ming (1995): Taiwan sheng shandixiang quanli jiegou bianqian zhi yanjiu: Fuxing xiang gean fenxi (Research on changes in power structures in Taiwan Province's mountain area townships: a case study of Fuhsing Township). Unpublished Masters thesis, Sun Yat-sen Graduate Institute, Chinese Culture University, p. 100; and Lyiking Yuma. on cit. p. 104

government investigators,<sup>314</sup> as well as the Chief of the General Staff of the Taiwan Provincial Executive Administration Office, Ko Yuan-fen, who, in a later description of the 228 Incident otherwise notable for the absence of Aboriginal involvement, praised Li Yueh-chiao and her assistance to a victim of people "worse than beasts." The same selective use of history occurs in a summary of the 228 Incident by the head of Taiwan's KMT apparatus, Li I-chung, in which Aboriginal actions are entirely absent except for Li Yueh-chiao and the rape victim. Li Yueh-chiao would go on to play a prominent role as an Aboriginal representative in a women's organisation convened by Soong May-ling, wife of Chiang Kai-shek. Soong May-ling, wife of Chiang Kai-shek.

## Rejection and rewards in Hsinchu

Hsinchu County today has two Aboriginal townships — Chienshih and Wufeng. The only official document that mentions Chienshih's Aborigines cites a report by the Aboriginal mayor, Chang Fu-tien, who said that on March 6 at least ten "bandits" (*feitu*) requested entry into Chienshih Township to "negotiate" with local Aborigines. Chang's report said that they were refused entry and disbanded soon after, with no further incident taking place. The alleged link between the "bandits" and the Chinese Communist Party was made directly in a newspaper piece at the end of the month lauding the actions of the mayor. It said that "more than ten Communist Party thugs" were uncovered in neighbouring Hengshan Township, who attempted to "penetrate"

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>314</sup> See Chen Hsing-tang (ed.)(1992a): *Taiwan "ererba" shijian dang'an shiliao (shang)* (Historical files for Taiwan's "228" Incident, part 1). Taipei: Renjian, p.358.

<sup>315</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.562.

<sup>316</sup> AS II, op. cit., p.377.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>317</sup> For a picture of Li Yueh-chiao at the formation of this organisation, see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1950a): "Zhonghua funü fangong kang'e lianhehui chengli dahui" (Chinese Women's Oppose-the-Communists Resist-the-Russians Federation convenes conference). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao Weekly Picture Supplement*, 23 April 1950 (no.38), p.1.

See AS IV, op. cit., p.6, pp.238-240 (for handwritten version of the report) and pp.257-258 (for typed

Chienshih on March 13 (one week later than officially reported) to "coerce" locals into taking part in the violence. It also stated that after being rejected by the local people, the same group tried once more to influence Aborigines on March 15 in the village of Chiale, and it was this act which led Chang Fu-tien to summon the various village heads and other representatives of Chienshih Township to discuss how to prevent discord in their community. They "restrained [their] Aboriginal youth, and warned these thugs to withdraw immediately from the mountains," and also considered means of tricking the visitors into handing over their weapons. One youth, Chiu Liang-yun, is said to have collected guns, knives, matches and ammunition in this manner. After the withdrawal of the "thugs" the authorities commended the people of Chienshih, and Chiu received a reward of 3,000 yuan. 319

As late as April 14, however, Han Taiwanese from Chutung and Kuanhsi townships in Hsinchu County were reported to be fleeing into Aboriginal areas.<sup>320</sup> A June 1947 report lists Peng Hsi-wen from Chutung as a suspect accused of attempting to liaise with Aborigines.<sup>321</sup>

I have found no documents indicating participation in the 228 Incident by Aborigines from Wufeng Township in Hsinchu County.

Near-mobilisation in Kaohsiung

Troops based in Kaohsiung City bloodily suppressed anti-government activity even before mainland reinforcements arrived, including the arbitrary house-to-house killing of

version of report).

320 AS IV, op. cit., p.431.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947o): "Shandi tongbao aihu zuguo, Jianshi xiangmin zhi qu baotu" (Mountain area compatriots love and protect the ancestral country, people of Chienshih Township wisely drive out thugs). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 29 March 1947, p.4.

civilians. The notoriety of the military crackdown in Kaohsiung and the abundance of witnesses, local and foreign, ensured that detailed examinations of these events would eventually surface after the lifting of martial law in 1987. We saw in our discussion of events in Taichung City that an abortive attempt was made to mobilise Aborigines from the Puli area to travel to Kaohsiung to engage government troops. Apart from this source, however, neither analyses nor government reports indicate that Aboriginal people intervened at any time in Kaohsiung City. An interviewee in a collection of oral histories on the Kaohsiung bloodshed says Aborigines were executed after involvement in the infamous and ill-fated negotiations between locals and General Peng Meng-chi at his headquarters. However, this claim was heresay and was quickly corrected by that publication's editor. Nonetheless, the question arises as to how the rumour came to exist in the first place.

A rumour of considerably greater significance is cited in the Executive Yuan report on the 228 Incident, which says that the pre-emptive attack on civilians by Peng Mengchi's soldiers, in apparent violation of orders from General Chen Yi, might have been due in part to fears of a combined Aboriginal-Japanese attack on the naval base at Tsoying and the army fortress overlooking Kaohsiung City at Shoushan.<sup>325</sup> This extraordinary claim is barely noted in other works on the subject.

In 1947, Kaohsiung County consisted of present-day Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties, featuring a total of eleven Aboriginal townships. Present-day Kaohsiung County has three of those: Maolin, Taoyuan and Sanmin (in 1947 these townships were called Tona, Yani and Maya respectively). Each is located in the northeastern half of the

321 AS VI, op. cit., p.180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>322</sup> Lan Po-chou (1997), op. cit., pp.324-325.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>323</sup> See Allan J. Shackleton (tr. Sung Ya-po)(1999): Fuermoshade huhuan: yiwei Niuxilanren zai Taiwan ererba shijiande qinshen jingyan (Formosa calling: the personal experience of a New Zealander in Taiwan during the 228 Incident). Taipei: Wangchufeng wenhua. For the government report at the time, see TWS III, op. cit., pp.487-491.

<sup>324</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.219.

<sup>325</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.118.

county. A rumour reached eastern Taiwan saying that soldiers were killing Aborigines in the nearby township of Liukui.<sup>326</sup> Liukui was a non-Aboriginal township abutting the Aboriginal townships of Tona and Yani, but there is no evidence to suggest that the rumours had any substance. On the contrary, Aboriginal figures in the vicinity of Liukui may have provided key assistance to the government in the post-Incident consolidation of mountain security.

Kaohsiung County mayor Huang Ta-ping probably contacted Aboriginal chieftains in his constituency through the police bureau on March 3, requesting that they prevent tribesmen from intervening in the unrest.<sup>327</sup> This may have been a prudent decision: evidence suggests that Aborigines in present-day Kaohsiung County were close to mobilising and engaging the army or taking part in other unrest. An appeal against life sentences handed to two Han Taiwanese men resident in nearby Chishan Township for sedition included the names of two Aboriginal township mayors as witnesses to their innocence. The appeal, which was upheld, claimed that "during the course of the Incident the appellant feared Aborigines would amass and so made every effort to obstruct them and prevent them from rebelling." The appeal said Aboriginal township mayors Ko Shui-sheng and Lin Tse-chun could corroborate this claim.<sup>328</sup> A former policeman in Tona Township states that during the 228 Incident the three Aboriginal townships formed a self-defense corps, but no-one from the area became involved in the disturbances.<sup>329</sup>

A Taiwan Garrison report dated March 5 alleges that rebellious elements from Taipei entered the Aboriginal areas of not only Taichung and Tainan (i.e., Wufeng Township),

326 TWS II, op. cit., p.746.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>327</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., pp.125-126 and p.184 (n.459). However, one report says that county authorities started contacting Aboriginal chieftains and administrative offices in the Aboriginal townships on March 2; see Chang Yen-hsien (2002b), op. cit., p.97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>328</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.445.

See Lu Shun-an (ed.)(1994b): *Gaoxiong xian xiangtu shiliao* (Local historical materials in Kaohsiung County). Nantou City: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.231.

but also Kaohsiung. No more detail is provided, so it is not clear which of Kaohsiung County's eleven Aboriginal townships are being referred to. 330

## A death in Hengchun and preparations for conflict

Only one Aboriginal person is confirmed to have been killed anywhere in Taiwan during the 228 Incident.<sup>331</sup> The killing took place in Hengchun, Taiwan's southernmost township. The victim, Kao Kuang-hsiung, was a Paiwan tribesman from the adjacent Aboriginal township of Mutan. Household registration data state the 23-year-old was "killed by a stray bullet" in the town centre on March 20, but his ethnicity is not mentioned in his entry in the Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee summary of deaths for the Pingtung area.<sup>332</sup> Kao's ethnicity was confirmed by Hua A-tsai, former secretary-general of the Council of Indigenous Peoples and a fellow Paiwan tribesman. Hua told me that Kao's Aboriginal companions witnessed his death as they rushed home to Mutan. 333 Hua also said that one of Kao's companions, a high school student, claimed Kao was killed at the township's southern gate after challenging some soldiers.334 Hua A-tsai's older brother, Hua Ai, a former KMT legislator who was an employee at Mutan Township's administration office in 1947, told me that Kao had been killed at the southern gate of Hengchun after failing to understand an order issued by a soldier – presumably in Mandarin – to halt.<sup>335</sup>

<sup>330</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.710.

<sup>331</sup> George Kerr originally claimed that "Aborigine village leaders [on the east coast] who had resisted official depredations during 1946 were butchered"; see George H. Kerr (1947): "Formosa: The March massacres." Far Eastern Survey, 16(19), 224-226. This statement is not supported by any other evidence, and was not repeated in his later and fuller treatment of the subject, Formosa Betrayed; see Kerr (1965), op. cit.. There is also an unconfirmed reference to an Aboriginal woman being summarily executed beside a river in Peikang Township, Yunlin County, together with a Japanese native to the area and a number of others. See Chang et al. (1995), op. cit., p.89. The woman is described as "Takasago" (gaosha).
332 TWS III, op. cit., p.615.

<sup>333</sup> Interviews with Hua A-tsai, 2 May, 1999, and 27 August, 2001.

<sup>334</sup> Interview with Hua A-tsai, 27 August, 2001. 335 Interview with Hua Ai, 29 September, 2001.

Kao's family lodged a compensation claim in the 1990s over the death.<sup>336</sup> Measured against the accounts of Hua Ai and Hua A-tsai, the official claim that Kao was killed by a "stray bullet" seven days after Hengchun had become stable is unconvincing.<sup>337</sup>

Hua A-tsai also reported that villagers in Mutan Township made preparations to defend their homes against attack by Nationalist troops. Hua's house was in a village that would have been on the front line of any conflict. Eight years old at the time, he recalls that his father sharpened all of his weapons in response to reports of imminent attack, though in the end nothing happened.<sup>338</sup> Hua Ai reports that Han Taiwanese from Hengchun, Kaohsiung and Pingtung visited the Aboriginal community in Mutan, encouraging them to "rise up together" (*tuanjie qilai*), form a militia and fight the KMT. These overtures were rejected by Hua Ching-chi, the township mayor and the Hua brothers' uncle.<sup>339</sup>

Hua Ai also says that after the unrest began, Hua Ching-chi telephoned Hengchun District head Kang Yu-hu, presumably a mainlander official and therefore in danger. Accompanied by Wang Chun-mu, a section head in the Hengchun office, Hua Ai then travelled by car to Oluanpi, the southernmost point of Kaohsiung County, to remove him from danger. However, the car was stopped in nearby Kenting and surrounded by angry locals, who threatened to kill Kang. Hua Ai negotiated with them, and one of the group even spoke a few words of the Paiwan language to verify that Hua Ai was Aboriginal. In the end Kang, Hua and Wang were allowed to go, but not before the locals stripped the car of its tyres.<sup>340</sup>

<sup>336</sup> According to a public notice of a compensation claim lodged by his family and published in the *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (date obscured), Kao was 25 years old at the time of his death (information courtesy of Chen Su-chen).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>337</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.134, states that the situation in Hengchun was stable after March 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>338</sup> Interview with Hua A-tsai, 27 August, 2001.

<sup>339</sup> Interview with Hua Ai, 29 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>340</sup> Interview with Hua Ai. 29 September, 2001.

A Hengchun resident also reports that Wang Chin-hsing, an official of non-Aboriginal Fangshan Township, borrowed a gun to "resist" Aborigines and was killed by soldiers in Hengchun when he attempted to return it.<sup>341</sup> This curious account provides no detail of any conflict between Wang and (presumably) the neighbouring Paiwan Aborigines of Shihtzu Township, nor whether the problem was related to the 228 Incident.

#### Truku anger in Hualien

Hualien County covers the central east coast of Taiwan and the precipitous, rugged eastern flank of the central mountain range. It has three Aboriginal townships covering the mountain areas: Hsiulin (formerly Shihlin) in the north, Wanjung (formerly Wanli) in the center and Chuohsi (formerly Taiping) in the south. The first two townships are predominantly composed of people from the Truku ethnolinguistic group; the third mostly of Bunun Aboriginal communities. Another notable feature of Hualien, however, is the large number of Aboriginal communities not incorporated within designated Aboriginal townships. These belong to Taiwan's most populous Aboriginal group, the Amis, who are mostly nestled in the lengthy valley between Hualien and Taitung and along the rugged east coast.

In 1947, Hualien City was a remote port with limited infrastructure. As with Ilan in then-Taipei County, the county as a whole avoided bloodshed of the magnitude witnessed in western Taiwan not just because of its small population and inaccessibility, but also because local elites moved to contain unrest reasonably proficiently.<sup>342</sup>

<sup>342</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., pp.143-147.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>341</sup> See Hsiao Ming-hsiang (ed.)(1994): *Pingdong xian xiangtu shiliao* (Local historical materials in Pingtung County). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.707 and p.745.

Aboriginal people came very close to inflaming the situation in Hualien. Fenglin Township mayor Lin Mao-sheng, a Han Taiwanese, provides an invaluable account of the reaction of Wanli Aboriginal leaders and other communities to the 228 Incident. He says that Aborigines from Wanli and other local youths, influenced by rumour and provocation – especially through broadcasts from occupied radio stations – threatened to escalate the unrest in Hualien into "catastrophe," and he claims responsibility for preventing this. When news of violence in Taipei broke, Lin was in Hualien City. He thought the city's Han Taiwanese youth would probably cause problems even if local people in general were not disposed to action. Upon returning to Fenglin, a non-Aboriginal township some thirty kilometres to the south, he formed security patrols of youths aged between twenty and thirty. A group of Han Taiwanese youths then arrived in Fenglin from Hualien on March 6 wanting to borrow weapons and ammunition held by officials, fearing that government forces were preparing to embark on a killing spree in the city. Lin turned the request down, insisting their fears were groundless.

The next day, the Aboriginal leadership of Wanli Township — mayor Kuo Tien-tsai and council speaker Lai Wen-tsai (see Figure 4.1) — approached Lin. Kuo said he heard there was fighting in Hualien City, and they had come to borrow weapons to arm a force of one hundred Aboriginal youths already mobilised nearby to protect the public from government forces. Again, Lin insisted they had heard rumours, but Kuo and Lai disagreed. Lin suggested that a scout patrol go to Hualien to determine what was happening, but Kuo "did not dare make the final decision," and Lin was forced to negotiate directly with the young tribesmen. Carrying home-made hunting rifles, sabres, machetes, spears and bows and arrows, the youths were said to have been impressed with Lin's Japanese-language ability, and agreed that Kuo, Lai, three Aboriginal youths,

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<sup>343</sup> TWS II, op. cit., pp.730-773.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> *ibid.*, p.730.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>345</sup> *ibid.*, p.734.

<sup>346</sup> ibid., pp.738-742.



Figure 4.1: Images of Kuo Tien-tsai (right) and Lai Wen-tsai. Photograph taken at the Wanjung Township Representative Council in Hualien County. Kuo was appointed mayor by the Chen Yi administration; Lai was the first elected mayor.

a Fenglin patrol unit leader and four other Han Taiwanese youths would travel to Hualien to assess the situation. Lin arranged for Ma Yu-yueh, Hualien's provincial senator and chairman of the local 228 Incident disposal committee, to meet the group and show them the barracks area to prove there had been no unrest.<sup>347</sup>

Lin then received a call from Ma saying that Kuo Tien-tsai was now intent on borrowing guns and crossing the mountains to Wushe in Taichung County. Deeply concerned, Lin "did not know how to deal with these simple, straightfoward, intransigent and obstinate mountain compatriots whose quarrelsome nature bordered on the uncontrollable." Kuo in particular had an "indomitable character," and in dealing with him, "one could not but use caution."

Other documents claim that Ma prevented the Aborigines from worsening the situation in Hualien City "with all his might." Several passages describe how Ma, unable to convince the "sincere but easily misled" Aboriginal party of the folly of intervening in the unrest, resorted to tears, pleas and buying their weapons to prevent any action that would lead to bloodshed across the county. The Aborigines, moved by his sincerity, changed their minds and returned home. 350

On his return to Wanli, Kuo acknowledged that Hualien was stable, but then said a radio broadcast had reported indiscriminate killing of Aborigines throughout western Taiwan. While in Hualien, the Fenglin delegation had provided lunch for Kuo, Lai and the other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>347</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.743; and Chen Hsing-tang (ed.)(1992b): Taiwan "ererba" shijian dang'an shiliao (xia) (Historical files for Taiwan's "228" Incident, part 2). Taipei: Renjian, p.606. In the latter reference, the Hualien County government also accuses Lin Mao-sheng of sending a messenger to Wanli, Kuangfu and Juisui Townships at the outset to seek support. The hundred youths who then arrived in Fenglin are said to have been sent by Kuo Tien-tsai and deputy township mayor Kuo Ching-yun in response to this request (p.608).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>348</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.743.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>349</sup> See Chang Yen-hsien (ed.)(2002e): Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (jiu) – guojia anquanju, Taiwan sheng ziyihui dang'an (A collection of files on the 228 Incident, vol. 9: files from the National Security Bureau and the Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council). Hsintien: Academia Historica, p.599.

<sup>350</sup> ibid., pp.607-608, p.628, and pp.629-630.

Aborigines. Now, Lin intended to win over the Aborigines with an evening meal and the gift of a barrel of rice wine, hoping that an intoxicated Kuo Tien-tsai would forget about going to Wushe. But this had no effect, and Kuo stood by his plan to take twenty tribesmen and borrowed weapons to Wushe to save the community there.<sup>351</sup>

Lin then spoke to Kuo more bluntly. Most of the dialogue in his account seems rather embellished, but one of the sentiments he expressed toward the Aboriginal leaders is worth quoting, because it appealed to a common identity of the Aboriginal and the Han Taiwanese:

Ours are neighbouring townships, geographically inseparable, bound together through thick and thin. We must join together to guarantee security for our townships. Only with thorough preparation will we not fail.<sup>352</sup>

Lin argued that sending tribesmen to Wushe would compromise the defense of local tribespeople if conflict spread to Wanli, and that the guns should be kept together in case there was a good reason to use them. The Fenglin unit leader, a Han Taiwanese, agreed with Lin:

I hope that the youth of our two townships can join together under township mayor Lin's leadership. Though we were born on different days, months and years, should a moment of imminent calamity arrive, may we then die on the same day, month and year for this place.<sup>353</sup>

These sentiments moved Kuo and he withdrew, taking the company of Aboriginal youths back to Wanli. When Lin reported this incident to the district head, a mainlander, he discovered that the arrival of the Aborigines in Fenglin had panicked the staff in his

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<sup>351</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.743.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>352</sup> *ibid.*, p.744.

<sup>353</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.744.

office, compelling one official to send his wife and daughter to Lin's own home for safety. Lin said there was no real danger, that the Aborigines had been frightened by rumours and only wanted to confront mainlanders who had attacked locals. The Aborigines, Lin said, bore no ill will toward anyone.<sup>354</sup>

The next day, March 8, Lin returned from visiting the ill – and ill-fated<sup>355</sup> – national assemblyman Chang Chi-lang. Waiting for Lin in the Fenglin administrative office were Kuo Tien-tsai, Lai Wen-tsai and the Wanli Township Office secretary, Hsu Jung-chuan. The Aboriginal leadership had arrived to borrow a gun so that Kuo could personally travel to Liukui in Kaohsiung County. Kuo said that many Aborigines had been killed there and that Lai would take charge in Wanli in his absence.<sup>356</sup>

Once again, Lin Mao-sheng treated the Aboriginal leaders to dinner and an ample supply of alcohol which, he says, was necessary to promote good feeling between them. Lin again attempted to dissuade Kuo, warning of the extreme danger of carrying a gun, a sabre, or even wearing his Japanese army uniform in areas crawling with Nationalist soldiers. Lai agreed with Lin:

That's right. Township mayor Lin is absolutely right. Us mountain people are really stupid. Why didn't we think of that?<sup>357</sup>

This infuriated Kuo, who drew his sabre and threatened to make a "blood sacrifice" out of his fellow tribesman and continue to Liukui anyway. One of the Fenglin patrol leaders restrained Kuo and wept, urging him to remember their commitment to to defend their homelands, to the death if need be, and that he would first act as a "blood sacrifice" before letting Kuo travel to Liukui. Kuo was chastened and said:

<sup>354</sup> *ibid.*, pp.744-745.

<sup>355</sup> Chang, a doctor, would be assassinated by soldiers on April 4, along with two of his three sons.

<sup>356</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.746.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>357</sup> *ibid.*, p.747.

Mr. Mayor, sir, I apologise. Patrol Leader Hsu, sir, thank you. Your tears drove the demons from my heart. We really *are* stupid. From now on, I will listen to the orders of the mayor, and will not come here to bother him again. I extend a full apology to all.

With that, the group moved to another room and drank into the evening, while Lin, who was exhausted, took his leave.<sup>358</sup> The threat of involvement by the Truku Aborigines of Wanli Township in the 228 Incident ended here.

## Sanctuary among the Amis

Lin's story continues, however, and Aboriginal communities elsewhere play a critical role in it. The following week, while returning from Taitung on a mission to deal with the worsening food shortage in Hualien, Lin received news that his father had died, and then received a tip-off from Chang Chi-lang that he was being investigated by military police. Lin's daughter also told him that the mainlander district head now had "an attitude completely different to before" and was untrustworthy; it was therefore very dangerous to return to Fenglin. 359

Lin secretly made his way to Chingpu, the southernmost coastal village in Hualien County, and an Amis village over which Lin formerly had administrative authority during the Japanese period. He stayed there for at least ten days before the (unnamed) local chieftain learned of his presence. The chieftain assured Lin that he would be sheltered, and that local youths were informing all villagers that his presence was a secret and that they were to actively protect him.<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>358</sup> *ibid.*, pp.746-747.

<sup>359</sup> *ibid.*, pp.752-753.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>360</sup> *ibid.*, p.754.

After Chang Chi-lang was assassinated, a messenger informed Lin that the squad responsible was searching for him and heading his way. The Chingpu chieftain decided to hide Lin in a hut on a terraced paddy on the slopes of a nearby mountain. He sent an escort of ten youths to monitor the hit squad's movements to the north. Another group was sent to prepare the place where Lin would stay, and an escort of five youths in military uniform ushered Lin up the mountain. That night, a detail of around thirty Aboriginal youths acted as sentries in the huts. The youths, who served overseas as conscripts in the Japanese army, were in full military dress. Lin argues that the chieftain sent them there to keep them out of trouble and to pool resources should Lin's safety be threatened. The youths stayed three days, working in the paddies by day and staying in the huts by night.<sup>361</sup>

The soldiers failed to glean any information from the locals while in the area, with the language barrier contributing to the perfunctory nature of their search.<sup>362</sup> Most of the guard returned to their homes, thinking the crisis had passed. But on the fourth day, the large group of youths returned to the paddy where Lin was hiding. This time they were in military dress, carried sabres, and were livid because soldiers had molested girls in the village. They were now planning to launch an early morning attack on the local primary school where the soldiers had set up camp and slaughter them. Should reinforcements be sent, they would retreat to Layashan – the "birthplace (faxiangdi) of the Amis people" – and fight to the death.<sup>363</sup>

Lin was troubled by their "stupidity and simple way of thinking," and talked them out of taking action, suggesting other measures to prevent the soldiers from molesting the

<sup>361</sup> *ibid.*, pp.754-755.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>362</sup> The Aborigines spoke Japanese and their tribal language, and possibly a little Hoklo, but not Mandarin

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.755. It is not clear from the text or other sources if Layashan is an actual location or a figure of speech.

girls of the village. Later, the military asked the local police station to send youth patrols into the hills to find Lin. The youths in question duly moved there, went fishing and shared the catch with Lin before returning to announce there was nothing to report.364

Lin remained in the paddy for ten days, but then received a warning that his hideout had been disclosed to the district head. Two Aboriginal youths escorted Lin down the mountain, before Lin headed for a friend's hut on a camphor tree plantation a little to the south, across the county line in Taitung.<sup>365</sup> Another ten days later, he moved deeper into the mountains and reached a cave a friend had told him about, where he hid for more than two months.<sup>366</sup>

## Praise in a petition

In early June, an army officer attempted to coax Lin back to Fenglin through his family. Lin ignored the offer, <sup>367</sup> a prudent decision because a warrant for Lin's arrest was issued on June 12. He was accused of being one of the masterminds of the "rebellion"; the list of crimes included "travelling to Wanli Township to incite [Aboriginal] youths to rebellion."<sup>368</sup> The warrant also mentioned a Fenglin unit leader, Liu Lien-heng, who was cited for, among other things, "inciting [Aboriginal] compatriots to take part in the uprising."369

By the end of the month, Lin heard Hualien County was settling down - and that his mother had fallen ill. He secretly returned to see her, then left for another hiding place –

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> *ibid*..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>365</sup> *ibid*., p.756.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>366</sup> *ibid.*, pp.757-758.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> *ibid.*, p.763.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>368</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.219.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>369</sup> *ibid.*, p.219.

a hot springs resort in Juisui Township to the south of Fenglin. The resort manager praised Lin and said that "even the mountain youths [Aboriginal youths] know that you've been framed."370 Two days later, two young Aboriginal men carried Lin's ailing mother in a rattan chair up the hill from the train station so that she could meet Lin and recuperate. Five days after that, Lin received news that the army had located him. He returned to his house in Fenglin to discover a group of friends and others discussing his case and how to clear his name. One mentioned that Kuo Tien-tsai had promised his support.<sup>371</sup> An official called on Lin's house, saying that several charges including sedition and "rousing more than one hundred and thirty mountain youths to make trouble" had been contradicted by numerous witnesses. Lin's supporters had also written a petition, in which Kuo Tien-tsai "praised [Lin] as a brave and wise man, and as a capable leader." The official said that "without Lin's correct leadership and fearless obstruction of Hualien City's youths and Aboriginal youths, the consequences would have been unimaginable." On August 15, Lin, accompanied by family members and twelve representatives from Fenglin and Wanli, reported to the authorities. Kuo Tientsai was among them and handed the petition to a military court official.<sup>372</sup>

Lin was then released after a brief interrogation.<sup>373</sup> Back at Lin's house, Kuo thanked him for preventing him from going to Hualien City, Wushe and Liukui, and said he would probably have died if he had done so. He also wished Lin and his family well on behalf of all the people of Wanli Township.<sup>374</sup> In the years to come, Lin Mao-sheng would be elected Hualien County councillor, deputy speaker of the council, Hualien County mayor and Hualien's representative in the provincial assembly.<sup>375</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>370</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.765.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>371</sup> *ibid.*, pp.766-767.

ibid., pp.768-769. Several weeks before, on July 21, Kuo and a number of other Aboriginal figures, including Lai Wen-tsai, five village heads and other representatives, added their names to a separate petition including signatories from around Hualien County attesting to the good character of Ma Yuyueh, who had also been detained on suspicion of sedition. See Chang Yen-hsien (2002e), op. cit., pp.595-596.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>373</sup> TWS II, op. cit., pp.769-770.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>374</sup> *ibid.*, p.771.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>375</sup> *ibid.*, p.773.

The main details in Lin's account are corroborated in other sources,<sup>376</sup> but Li Ching-hui, a deputy leader of one of the Fenglin youth patrols, provides additional information. Li says that when the hundred-strong Aboriginal group first came to borrow guns, he decided threats of violence would not deter them because many more Aborigines were World War II veterans. Instead, deception was a better option.<sup>377</sup> Li sent a deputy to find the cache of guns and remove the firing pins. Li then told the Aboriginal group that they needed to find other guns that would work. He then describes the scout mission to Hualien, in which seven representatives – not five, as Lin Mao-sheng states – from Fenglin and Wanli were met by two local figures, one of whom – a doctor – slapped some of the Aborigines on their shoulders and convinced them that all was well. When the group met Ma Yu-yueh, Li urged the Aborigines to understand that Ma's tears were proof of his commitment to Hualien.<sup>378</sup>

At dinner that night, Li reports that the Aborigines drank heavily before heading home at midnight. When Kuo Tien-tsai returned the next day, he requested ten guns and two hundred rounds of ammunition for the trip to Wushe, but "once again, alcohol had to substitute for words," and the problem was thus resolved.<sup>379</sup>

Ma Yu-yueh is quoted by the head of broadcasting services in Taipei as saying that his efforts to dissuade Aborigines from committing violence were close to failure and that a radio broadcast from Taipei by Aboriginal national assemblyman Nan Chih-hsin at around this time was crucial in preventing further Aboriginal intervention in Hualien.<sup>380</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>376</sup> See also TWS I, op. cit., p.278 and p.468; and Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (ed.)(1999a): *Hualian xian xiangtu shiliao* (Local historical materials in Hualien County). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.193.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>377</sup> TWS II, op. cit., pp.775-776.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>378</sup> *ibid.*, p.776.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>379</sup> *ibid.*, pp.776-777.

<sup>380</sup> KS4, op. cit., p.33.

Kuo Tien-tsai's own movements in the months between Lin's escape and surrender are sketchy, but one source said he hid in the mountains for one month after the military gained control. This claim awaits verification, and the source makes no mention of Kuo's earlier readiness to attack the military.<sup>381</sup>

Kuo died in 1997. He was involved in local representative politics even in his twilight years, and there is no evidence that his involvement in the 228 Incident or the behaviour of other Truku Aborigines at that time influenced the relationship between the Wanli communities and the authorities.<sup>382</sup>

#### Other unrest in Hualien

An early military report on the unrest around Taiwan up to March 10 paints a different picture of Hualien. It claimed that Aborigines entered Hualien on March 5 and committed violent acts, inflicting heavy losses on the military and military police. On March 7, the summary conceded that the situation in Hualien was not at all clear due to poor communications, but it did insist that Aborigines had mobilised and "certainly caused heavy damage." The 1994 Executive Yuan report on the 228 Incident dismisses the report as the product of rumour or exaggeration. A Taiwan Garrison Command report later reversed this assessment, saying that on March 4 Aborigines in Hualien and Taitung counties liaised with the county government, the military and military police in keeping the peace. The revised date of March 4 in the latter report does not fit well, however, with other dates provided in the original report.

Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1999a), op. cit., p.193.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>382</sup> Data collected from the office of the Wanjung Township Representative Council; and interview with Kuo Hsiang-lan, 4 October 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>383</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.461.

<sup>384</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.144.

<sup>385</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.454.

Another official report dated March 8 was more specific about the Aboriginal presence in Hualien City. It said that twenty representatives from various Aboriginal communities, armed with "Japanese swords," had come to the city to inspect the state of the administration there. The disposal committee, hearing of their arrival, informed the group that the government had already accepted their demands and sent them back to Fenglin by train.<sup>386</sup>

According to a pseudonymous, pro-government account dated May 1947 by "Mien Chih," no mobilisation occurred in the Aboriginal townships of Chuohsi and Hsiulin. Much of the material in the account by "Mien Chih" seems to draw on the Hualien County government's undated report on the 228 Incident. In the latter document, however, Hsiulin Township mayor Lin Ming-yung is specifically named as a disposal committee member and "negotiator." Both accounts allege that Aboriginal communities were targeted for "incitement" by the disposal committee on March 5.388 On March 6, the Hualien County mayor is said to have sent secret messengers to each of the Aboriginal townships to express the government's goodwill but also to warn them of dire consequences from "central [army] units" should they became involved in the disturbances. Lin Ming-yung and Chuohsi Township mayor Kao Tsung-jung abided by this advice and prevented local tribesmen from intervening. On the same day, the Hualien disposal committee passed a resolution that Lin Ming-yung should contribute to a radio broadcast to Hualien County addressing the maintenance of order and the state of negotiations with the government.

386 Chang Yen-hsien (2002b), op. cit., pp.134-135.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>387</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.605 and p.614.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>388</sup> Teng Kung-chao, *op. cit.*, p.201; and Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), *op. cit.*, p.611. It should be noted here that Lai et al. (1991), *op. cit.*, misinterpret or mistranslate Mien Chih's text. The original reads "At the same time, people were dispatched to incite [Aborigines] into participating" (p.201); their version reads "If more committee members were required, aborigines could be invited to participate" (p.133). <sup>389</sup> Teng Kung-chao, *op. cit.*, p.202; and Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), *op. cit.*, p.612. The latter report contradicts itself when it states elsewhere (p.621) that the two township mayors began to prevent their tribesmen from intervening in the disturbances on March 5. Kao Tsung-jung is called Kao Chung-jung on p.621.

disposal committee were reasonably close, or at least that the committee saw him as an important figurehead who could work with Aboriginal communities. It is not clear, however, if Lin eventually made the broadcast, and if so, whether he had already agreed to abide by government demands.

"Mien Chih" alleges that Kuo Tien-tsai was "incited" into entering the city with *twenty* tribesmen, only to be reprimanded by Lin Ming-yung before withdrawing.<sup>391</sup> This account is quite inconsistent with the accounts of Lin Mao-sheng and Li Ching-hui, as is the government's allegation that Kuo Tien-tsai and Wanli Township Office secretary Hsu Jung-chuan were members of a Fenglin District disposal committee.<sup>392</sup> Regardless, by March 9 the Atayal and Amis Aboriginal communities were said to have ceased acting in accordance with the disposal committee.<sup>393</sup>

However, other events occurring in Hsiulin Township likely gave the government cause for concern. Several names appear in a Hualien County arrest list connected to Hsiulin. Tsai Lung-cheng, a former mayor of Hsincheng Township, which lies between Hsiulin and the coast, was arrested for inciting Aborigines in the Hsiulin Township village of Sanchan and procuring weapons to attack government forces. There is also evidence of unrest in the Truku village of Fushih at the mouth of the Taroko Gorge. Chen Hsi-jen and Huang Shui-wang, two county government mountain area supervisors for Fushih and Hsincheng, were arrested for "going to the Fushih area to incite the Truku savages to come down from the mountains and massacre the Chinese pigs." It is unlikely that these men were Aboriginal. Near these entries on the arrest list is Chung Huan-kung, a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> Teng Kung-chao, op. cit., p.202; and Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.606.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>392</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.615 and p.620.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>393</sup> Teng Kung-chao, op. cit., p.205; and Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.607.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>394</sup> AS V, op. cit., p.672; and Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1999a), op. cit., pp.60-61. Tsai was named as a "mastermind" of the disturbances by the county government at one time; see Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.609. He would later claim compensation for suffering experienced in the fallout of the 228 Incident, according to a public notice (date obscured) published in the Taiwan Hsinshengpao (information courtesy of Chen Su-chen).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>395</sup> AS V, op. cit., p.674.

disposal committee member, but it is not clear which Aboriginal communities he is accused of contacting.<sup>396</sup> A second disposal committee member, Wu A-ching, was accused of "inciting the *gaoshazu* [sic] of Peipu and Hsincheng to participate in the rebellion."<sup>397</sup>

Another name on the arrest list is that of a higher-placed local official, Huang Chin-i, who was a deputy mayor of Hsiulin Township. He was charged with "inciting the mountain compatriots of Fushih Village and Erchiaolang to join the rebellion." However, the details in the arrest list are not necessarily reliable. My interview with the former administrative secretary of Fushih Township at the time of the 228 Incident points to some of the data being in error. Other evidence suggests that there was violence in the Hsiulin Township Office itself: Wu Ken-jui, a mainlander clerk (ganshi) at the office, possibly together with another public servant, Wu Keng-ching, were beaten on March 5<sup>400</sup> or March 6 in their workplaces.

Another arrest list dated July 13 also provides a name of a public servant in Hualien accused of inciting Aborigines as well as murdering soldiers and others; the Aborigines whom the public servant, Pan Yung-tsai, is alleged to have roused are not identified.<sup>402</sup>

<sup>396</sup> *ibid.*, p.674.

ibid., p.676. Peipu and Hsincheng have both been used in maps to refer to Hsincheng Township as well as to individual villages within that township. This narrow administrative area is sandwiched between Hsiulin Township and the Pacific Ocean, north of Hualien City. However, the names as used in this instance may be referring to the district in general rather than that area within administrative boundaries. They therefore may refer to Aboriginal communities both within and without Hsincheng Township proper. Wu A-ching is also named as a "mastermind" of the disturbances in the Hualien County government's report on the 228 Incident; see Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.609.

AS V, op. cit., p.675.
 Interview with Chen Hua-feng, 3 October, 1999.

<sup>400</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>401</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.623; and Teng Kung-chao, op. cit., p.202. Wu Keng-ching is instead written as Wu Su-ching in the original victim report (AS IV, op. cit., p.51) and in Mien Chih's account in Teng Kung-chao. The names of both Wus are written incorrectly later in the Hualien County report; see Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.623.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>402</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.197. A Taitung County arrest list also includes a person with the same name and age, but states his home county to be Taitung, not Hualien (*ibid.*, p.573).

The Truku communities were later mentioned in a report sent to Chiang Kai-shek which claimed that unrepatriated Japanese soldiers were training Aborigines. However, the report does not say which Truku Aborigines were involved, merely that Hualien was one of the locations where this was taking place. No independent evidence from Hualien points to concerns about Japanese involvement, and a rumour that government reinforcements travelled from the east coast via Nengkaoshan to attack Japanese-led Aboriginal militia in Wushe appears to be baseless. The Hualien County report on the 228 Incident, oddly, does state that after the unrest was quelled, tribesmen were sent across the mountains to Wushe to counter the influence of insurgents. Finally, a newspaper report dated March 20 stated that Hualien's Aborigines were also responsible for detaining fourteen "conspirators," though no further details were provided.

### Amis involvement in Taitung

The northeast coast of Taitung County is the homeland of a number of Amis Aboriginal communities, and like Hualien County these communities did not belong to designated Aboriginal townships. There is little material that describes the actions of Aborigines in these areas, though a Han Taiwanese sheltered at least ten mainlander personnel in coastal Chengkung Township. 407

The account of a former Chengkung deputy mayor, Chen Jung-sheng, provides a little information on Aboriginal involvement. After the arrival of the Nationalists in 1945, Chen joined with fellow Han Taiwanese Wu Shih-lin, a member of the local gentry, to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>403</sup> AS II, op. cit., pp.334-335. The report refers to the Truku as "Atayal."

<sup>404</sup> Inoue, op. cit., pp.256-257.

<sup>405</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., pp.624-625.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>406</sup> Lin and Chen (1992), op. cit., p.165.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>407</sup> Wang Ho-sheng (2001), op. cit., p.453.

run for deputy mayor and mayor respectively in Chengkung Township. Three months later the 228 Incident broke out, and on March 2 police in Taitung sent a secret cache of weapons to help local police guard their facility. Around twenty local youths discovered the delivery and demanded the weapons to help "keep the peace." Armed with Japanese swords, the youths intimidated Chen and Wu into signing out the weapons to different locations for "safekeeping." Chen says this was done to pacify the "unreasonable" youths and prevent further trouble, but a machine gun was later heard firing "practice shots" near the docks. At this time the local police station sent two Aboriginal policemen, Lin Ching-fu and Shinro Kigawa, to Wu's house to guard the weapons stored there. Over the next few days there was no major incident, and Chen was guarded at home by friends for fear of the youths turning against local officials. The weapons were eventually returned, but not the release form with the signatures of Chen and Wu, which ended up in the hands of investigators. Consequently, Chen was in and out of jail for years for his "role" in the unrest. Wu was only detained for several months; his release was apparently secured because of connections with Chen Chentsung. 408 Chen Chen-tsung's mother was Aboriginal - from the Beinan tribe near Taitung City – but Wu, the maternal nephew of Chen, was not Aboriginal. Given the high proportion of Aboriginal people in Chengkung at the time, it is quite possible that many of the twenty or so youths who took the weapons were Aboriginal. Yet Chen Jung-sheng uses the expression shandiji (Aboriginal) when referring to the two policemen in his account. 409

Another example of aborted Amis involvement is described in Chen Hsiao-i's book. The unnamed Amis wife of the Amis schoolteacher Lu Kuo-chi was "incited" by dissenting elements and planned to travel throughout the area to offer "moral support" to antigovernment forces, but a relative persuaded her en route to discontinue this action. This

<sup>408</sup> TWS I, op. cit., pp.576-577.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>409</sup> TWS I, op. cit., pp.576-577. See also Wang Ho-sheng (2001), op. cit., pp.413-414.

account has been disputed by another source, however. 410

Wang Ho-cheng, an Amis tribesman from the Malan community in Taitung City, was an

influential figure who had joined a group of Aboriginal chieftains and others on a tour of

Taiwan and Japan during the Japanese period. During the 228 Incident, the 38-year-old

Wang left for Hualien seeking help because he feared that soldiers would precipitate a

tragedy in the Taitung area. He met officials in Hualien, but while returning to Taitung

he became ill. He died the following year from causes related to the illness. 411

Finally, the list of arrested persons in the Taitung government report on the 228

Incident includes a Japanese name, Shinichi Tanaka. This person was charged with

"training [Aboriginal] compatriots and calling himself a borough head from Japan," and

was arrested on April 16 by military personnel stationed in Hsinkang (Chengkung).

However, there is no way of determining from this evidence which Aborigines Tanaka

"trained," if any. 412

Amis and Kavalan actions in Hualien

The participation of Hualien's Amis communities in the 228 Incident is among the least

documented of any of the Aboriginal ethnolinguistic groups. Earlier I mentioned the case

of the Chingpu chieftain who sheltered the Fenglin mayor, Lin Mao-sheng, but apart

from this incident and the reference in Mien Chih's article describing Amis non-

cooperation with the Hualien disposal committee, only a few other sources explicitly

mention Amis communities in Hualien County. The first source says that on March 5,

Hu Ming-ho, a senior - and probably Han Taiwanese - policeman, was arrested for a

<sup>410</sup> Chen Hsiao-i, op. cit., p.68.

411 Wang Ho-sheng (2001), op. cit., p.195.

<sup>412</sup> AS V, op. cit., p.573.

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number of offences, including inciting "Amei savages" (Amis Aborigines) to commit violent acts, though the Amis community in question is not named.<sup>413</sup> The Hualien County report on the 228 Incident also says Aborigines in the hamlet of Tienpu in Chiyeh Township (now Chi'an Township) were persuaded to assist with keeping the peace by one Wu Te-cheng.<sup>414</sup>

Another source says the disposal committee in the Hualien-Taitung valley township of Kuangfu attempted to involve Amis tribesmen. The plan collapsed, however, when the committee member abandoned the area and fled south to Fuli Township. An Aboriginal policeman from Kuangfu, Chen Ho-jen, seems to have been imprisoned for three and a half years for allowing others to use guns in his care during the 228 Incident, though the incident may have taken place much earlier. The Hualien County report on the 228 Incident also states that Amis Aborigines in the village of Futien in Kuangfu Township were persuaded not to intervene in the unrest by a Han Taiwanese, Fang Chien-chi. Alar

Other Hualien County townships such as Yuli and Fuli contain sizable Amis communities, but no sources account for them during the 228 Incident. Arrest lists for Hualien County include many names from the Yuli area, 418 so it would seem premature to dismiss the possibility that Amis individuals there joined Han Taiwanese in opposing or threatening to oppose government forces.

There is also mention in oral history sources of suspicion falling on two pingpu

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>413</sup> *ibid.*, p.672. The characters *amei* were used to denote Amis Aborigines before the currently used characters became the standard. Hu Ming-ho's occupation is listed at AS VI, *op. cit.*, p.195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>414</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.621. Tienpu is written with the grass radical for the second character on current maps; they are assumed here to refer to the same location.

<sup>415</sup> Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1999a), op. cit., p.346.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>417</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.621. For this and the above reference to Tienpu, the Hualien County report uses the enigmatic ethnic name Ating to classify the two villages. This is presuambly referring to Amis communities in both cases.

<sup>418</sup> See, for example, AS VI, op. cit., pp.191-198.

tribesmen from the Kavalan ethnolinguistic group resident in Fengpin Township. The first, Chen Chun-jung, was implicated when his identification papers were found in the home of assassinated doctor Chang Chi-lang. Chen was later released after more than a year's detention following a petition drive by the Fengpin Township council speaker. The second unnamed man allegedly participated in militia activities in Keelung and later hid in the mountains for up to a year.<sup>419</sup>

## Penghu

The islands of Penghu County might seem an odd location when discussing Aboriginal activities, for this impoverished island chain in the Taiwan Strait had a sparse population and has never been a homeland for Aboriginal people. However, there was Aboriginal participation during the 228 Incident even in this location. Hsu Cheng-ching, a doctor and the head of the Penghu 228 Incident disposal committee, intervened to prevent Aboriginal soldiers serving in the ROC army on Penghu from rising up as a group. No other details are given in Hsu's account, but it is intriguing that the Aborigines seemed to act as a pan-ethnic unit, apparently independently of the Han Taiwanese soldiers with whom they served.

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<sup>420</sup> KS3, op. cit., p.303.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>419</sup> Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee Data Collection Unit (1999a), op. cit., pp.248-249.

## Cases of Aboriginal non-intervention

### Aboriginal students in Tainan

A former Aboriginal student of the Tainan Normal College told me that the forty or so Aboriginal students studying there in early 1947 – from the Amis, Beinan and Paiwan communities of Taitung and Kaohsiung counties – did not participate in the 228 Incident. As the situation in the city deteriorated, the team leader and deputy team leader of the students, Hsieh Kui and Lin Pao-teh, declined an invitation to join the locals in fighting government forces. Five of the students were picked up by their respective township mayors who were returning from a conference in Taipei – probably the same conference attended by Lin Jui-chang – and who were concerned for their safety. Lin Pao-teh stayed in his community for two months until the situation improved. The other students apparently made their way home of their own accord. Later, at least some of the students received awards for *supporting* the government, though it is not clear what "support" meant under the circumstances. Hsieh Kui was a gifted young man who would go on to become one of the most important Aboriginal administrators of his era.

#### Yami non-involvement

Finally, no documents mention involvement in the 228 Incident by the Yami (or Tao) Aborigines on the island of Lanyu, one of Taitung's five Aboriginal townships. The remoteness of the island, poor communications and the probable near absence of Han Taiwanese on the island might account for this. Nor are documents available that describe the nature of the locals' response. I could not even identify documents detailing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>421</sup> Interview with Lin Pao-teh, 19 August, 2001. The mayors were Lin Ho-pen from Machia Township

when or how locals came to know of the disturbances on the mainland.

## **Conclusions**

The data in this survey shows that Aboriginal individuals or groups were implicated in the unrest all around Taiwan, with the Aboriginal presence in Chiayi, Taitung and Taichung playing a critical role. However, it is also clear that involvement or non-involvement was largely a function of the relationship Aboriginal leaders had with Han Taiwanese elites in their respective counties, and not the result of pan-Aboriginal identification. This was especially conspicuous in Chiayi, where Kao I-sheng's decision to send in the Tsou Unit and shelter the county mayor was mostly based on connections he and his deputies had with officials based in Chiayi City and in the esteem in which he was held after years of pursuing common interests. Likewise, in Taichung, the participation of Aborigines in the 27 Unit and the refusal of most Wushe villagers to take up arms were functions of the relationship these Aboriginal groups had with Han Taiwanese. Where this relationship was strong, there was a greater chance of convincing tribesmen to fight.

In Taitung City, where Aborigines defended the city and the county government, the situation was different because of the lack of a substantial military presence and because of the proximity of Aboriginal villages. But Ma Chih-li acted with the same caution that Kao did in Chiayi, and the motivation was the same: Stabilise the area of conflict and protect civilians from harm. In Taitung's case, this meant restraining a limited number of Han Taiwanese youths. In Chiayi, it meant besieging an airport filled with mainland soldiers. Both situations, together with the growing bonds between Aboriginal students and their Han Taiwanese classmates, suggest that Aboriginal elites and their Han

colleagues were beginning to identify with one another in a new if uncertain way. A sense of fraternity and a recognition of common political interests — no doubt enhanced by the use of the Japanese language and other shared cultural expressions — had emerged, as the comments of Kao Chu-hua in Taichung and the relationship between Kuo Tientsai and Lin Mao-sheng in Hualien illustrate. This is also reflected in the fact that Aborigines who intervened were reacting to instability outside of their villages and in almost every location were *invited* to join in operations against the KMT — and expressed sympathy even if they chose not to do so.

The exception to this rule was in southern Taitung County, where Paiwan tribesmen killed a mainland teacher and imprisoned other mainland officials. The remoteness of this group and previous tensions involving soldiers may have contributed to this.

There were instances of pan-Aboriginal sentiment, however. Kuo Tien-tsai expressed outrage at the "deaths" of Aborigines in distant villages. The Tsou Unit also represented a powerful new display of pan-Tsou sentiment – a recent development and largely the result of Kao I-sheng's efforts as the township's mayor.

It is worthwhile to consider for a moment the role of *yamatodamashi* ("Japanese spirit") in the actions of Aboriginal people in relation to the new government. Certainly, during the 228 Incident and other conflict with the state outlined in the following chapters, the use of the Japanese language, body language, material culture (such as clothing and weapons) and even tenacity in contexts of Aboriginal mobilisation and strategy points to a legacy of *yamatodamashi*. The suggestion that this legacy was the *primary* determinant of conflict between Aborigines and the Nationalist state, <sup>422</sup> however, is difficult to support based on the available evidence. It is certainly true that KMT attempts to purge Aboriginal communities of Japanese influence on every level resulted in considerable potential for conflict. It seems likely, however, that a number of

faces of KMT administration – rhetorically, at the very least – would have appealed to Aboriginal people and Aboriginal elites in particular, for whom opportunities for advancement and self-aggrandisement had improved considerably. Such actions of the new regime were not always unwelcome.

In any event, the Aboriginal response to the 228 Incident was variable, differing even between individuals who were more educated and who had received military training. If Huang Chih-huei is correct when she says that yamatodamashi was facilitated by preexisting patterns of thinking and behaviour, 423 then we are also faced with the difficulty of distinguishing between what resulted from pre-Japanese Aboriginal "spirit" and from "Japanese spirit." It is possible that "Japanese spirit" could explain the heightening of the willingness to engage an enemy, but many Aboriginal tribesmen were in fact acting under orders from or with the blessing of their chieftains. Finally, there are no reports in any documentation suggesting that Aboriginal behaviour at any time resulted from lingering devotion to the Japanese emperor or the state. On the balance of the evidence, yamatodamashi probably fuelled tension as the KMT attempted to confront it, and it probably had a fortifying role to play in Aboriginal actions against the KMT, but it is unlikely to have been the leading cause of ethnic conflict.

As we shall see in the next chapter, the more pertinent consequence of the violence of the 228 Incident was the government's reification of the Aboriginal actions as characteristic of an Aboriginal "race" rather than their relationship with neighbouring Han Taiwanese.

<sup>422</sup> Mao-kuei Chang, personal correspondence.

<sup>423</sup> Chih-huei Huang, op. cit., page number not shown.

# **Chapter Five**

# The qingxiang campaign and Aboriginal activism

欲講國防,必需先講邊防

If one speaks of defending the country, then one must first speak of defending the frontier.

Pai Chung-hsi,
 ROC Minister of National Defence<sup>1</sup>

Before I outline the response of the central, provincial and county authorities in Aboriginal areas, I want to briefly review government and other reports on the 228 Incident to confirm that the authorities were aware of the extent of Aboriginal involvement.

## The aftermath of the 228 Incident

We saw in the previous chapter that a number of sources – with varying degrees of accuracy – sent intelligence to Chiang Kai-shek pointing to Aboriginal intervention throughout Taiwan. A report by government investigators Yang Liang-kung and Ho

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.807.

Han-wen in April 1947, listed the demands of the Taipei disposal committee, which included promoting Aboriginal interests. The report also mentioned Aboriginal actions in Chiayi and Taitung, and added a summary of the overall Aboriginal role in the disturbances:

The Kaoshan people of Taiwan Province are of a fierce disposition. Under the Japanese they rose up in rebellion time and again, and there was a very large number of massacres. At the beginning of this incident, there was a considerable tendency [for Aborigines] to get involved due to the propaganda they heard on wireless broadcasts and due to incitement by Communist Party thugs. Thereafter they came to understand the situation through government tutelage and resistance from their wise chieftains, who ordered them to calm down, and thus prevented the remnants of those thugs acting under Communist Party duress from retreating into their areas. After the affair the government issued various kinds of commendations. Presently the situation is very calm. However, the Kaoshan people received their education from the Japanese and are fluent in the Japanese language, and so they do not understand Chinese. From now on the educational problems of the Kaoshan people are a matter that should be urgently and actively attended to.<sup>2</sup>

This summary was followed by a list of recommendations relating to administrative reform. The only one of these specifically referring to Aborigines called for the strengthening of Aboriginal education in written and spoken Mandarin.<sup>3</sup>

Ho Han-wen later defected to the People's Republic of China and wrote a revised account of his investigation into the 228 Incident, this time with an emphasis on the politics underlying it. His report also includes a brief but significant revision of the role played by Aborigines. That revision starts with a list of tribal names, a repeat of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., p.224.

claim that Aborigines were of a fierce nature, and a mention of the last three major uprisings against the Japanese. Then, he writes:

[When] Chen Yi governed Taiwan, he adopted discriminatory and repressive policies toward our brothers the Kaoshan people, thereby attracting their hatred. In the winter of 1946, an incident occurred in the Puli area of Taichung [County] in which a government employee[s?] was killed and food supplies looted. After the flames of the 228 uprising ignited, droves of Kaoshan people came together around Puli in Taichung, and around Wushantou [Wutoushan] and Tawushan near Pingtung, to enter city areas and support the uprising. But Kaoshan people everywhere usually felt alienated from those in the outside world, so there was a delay in gaining their trust. While waiting for them to rise up, [the rebels found that] the flames of the uprising had already been stamped out. Thus, apart from killing a few public servants in Taichung, Taipei, Taitung and Kaohsiung counties, they were too late to join the main current of the uprising. According to Taichung County mayor Liu Tsun-chung, the Japanese had stored a large quantity of arms near [Alishan] which they hadn't shipped out. This place was in a Kaoshan area, but because [the Aborigines] did not know this batch of arms existed, those taking part in the uprising in Taichung did not know either. Had this batch of arms fallen into the hands of the people during the uprising, it would not have been put down so speedily by Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers.4

Both accounts portray the Aboriginal response to the 228 Incident as intimately tied to generalisable characteristics of Aboriginal people, rather than to the growing connections between Aboriginal villages and leaders and adjacent Han Taiwanese communities and elites.

<sup>3</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., pp.255-256.

The Taiwan Garrison Command report, on the other hand, provides a small number of discrete and undetailed descriptions of Aboriginal involvement, though it does cover the entire island, with every county reporting Aboriginal activity in some form.<sup>5</sup> The report's special subsection on Aboriginal involvement states that Aborigines returned to the mountains as soon as they realised that they were being "used." The report also praises Aboriginal leaders who used their "communal strength" to protect local governments before hauling their tribesmen back to their communities, Events in Taitung are cited in this regard - though Taitung was, in fact, the only example of this phenomenon. The report also claims that Tainan County mayor Yuan Kuo-chin convinced Aborigines in his jurisdiction to return to the mountains. This is not elaborated on – for example, there is no mention of Yuan being sheltered by Kao I-sheng - but the report praises the Tsou, who are not mentioned by name, for "refusing to participate in the rebellion" after returning to the mountains. This account is obviously inconsistent with what happened, but the effect was to make Aboriginal people as a whole seem supportive of the government. I discuss the significance of Yuan Kuo-chin's subsequent role in the second half of this chapter.

The Taiwan Provincial Executive Administrative Office's report contains much of the same material as the Taiwan Garrison Command report in regard to Aboriginal involvement, but also says that Aboriginal people acted wisely, and that they largely disregarded the attempts of "thugs" (*jianfei*) to stir them up.<sup>7</sup>

However, there were other reports outside of Taiwan that were unflattering toward the Chen Yi administration. A story in the March 13 edition of the newspaper *Wenhuipao* in Shanghai featured the comments of an anonymous mainlander official in Taiwan on the causes of the 228 Incident. He included a brief remark on the background to the

<sup>5</sup> TWS II, op. cit., pp.387-472.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p.412.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.364

## Aboriginal role in events:

They were heavily oppressed by Japanese imperialism during the period of Japanese rule. The land on which they lived was gradually reduced, and their numbers gradually dwindled. They hoped that their ancestral country would truly be able to liberate them, but they had no idea that victory would be of no benefit to them at all. On the contrary, the rice they ate was very expensive, they saw [mainlanders] talking big with nothing to back it up and they heard themselves being addressed as "Savages! Savages!" They were therefore forced into a position where they could not but explode.

In general, however, the government is not likely to have interpreted the problem of "thugs" fleeing into the mountains as posing a genuine security risk in terms of communist infiltration. General Peng Meng-chi, speaking at the opening ceremony for the reconvening of the Taiwan Provincial Senate, was quite blunt in dismissing the communist threat:

I want to raise one other matter here, which is the problem of the Communist Party that I just heard [KMT provincial committee] chairman Chiu [Nien-tai] bring up. I'll say this now: there isn't any problem with the Communist Party in Taiwan, whether it be similar such cases in this province, which I've dealt with, or Communist Party members in Fukien fleeing here or coming here for operations, whom I've all dealt with under Fukien law; or whether it be the situation in the plains areas or in this island's mountainous interior. I know what's going on. I would ask you to all relax, and place your trust in me.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.724.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Taiwan Provincial Assembly Secretariat, op. cit., p.102.

## Nan Chih-hsin and the Taipei disposal committee

We saw in the previous chapter that Nan Chih-hsin was the sole national Aboriginal representative at the time of the 228 Incident. It is therefore instructive to more closely examine his actions in response to the unrest, though much of these remain unclear. As I described earlier, Nan had embarked on an islandwide inspection tour of Aboriginal communities with fellow Taitung-based national assemblyman Cheng Pin-tsung just prior to the 228 Incident. A newspaper report says that this tour started on February 11 and was instigated by Taitung's mayor and authorised and financed by the provincial authority. The two men travelled through Aboriginal communities in Taitung County until February 14 before travelling to Hualien and elsewhere.

Nan's whereabouts on February 27 are unclear, though he was likely in the middle of the inspection tour, or possibly attending the meeting of Aboriginal leaders in Taipei that was interrupted by the violence. But within days of the outbreak of unrest, Nan went to Taipei's radio studio to broadcast a message to Aborigines around the island. The head of broadcasting services, Lin Chung, claims that a speech Nan had been *ordered to make* had to be modified by him and his wife, Lin Chien-yun, to emphasise the need for tribesmen to calm down and not spread rumours. Lin does not say who ordered Nan to deliver the speech. Lin Chung also says that Ma Yu-yueh later told him that he was in Hualien when the speech was broadcast and that it had an immediate calming effect on Aborigines in the area.<sup>12</sup>

On March 7, the People's Daily newspaper in Taipei then reported on a speech

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947q): "Nan Zhixin Zheng Pincong xunwei Gaoshan tongbao" (Nan Chih-hsin and Cheng Pin-tsung inspect and assuage Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 14 February 1947, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Taitung County Documents Committee, op. cit., p.20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For Lin Chung's two accounts of this matter, see TWS III, op. cit., p.142 (in which Nan is called a "provincial committee member," and the second character of Nan's name is mistakenly written as ci instead of zhi); and KS4, op. cit., p.33.

delivered by one of Nan Chih-hsin's sons:

At about 7pm on March 6, the son (lingxi) of Kaoshan compatriot national assemblyman Nan Chih-hsin made a broadcast at the Taipei Broadcasting Station. Its contents were as follows:

Taiwan compatriots! What have political conditions been like in Taiwan under the leadership of Governor Chen since guangfu? Everyone knows the answer. The goal of today's struggle is to strive for a democratic Taiwan while committing to the construction of a new Republic of China. Now, in Taipei, representatives from all over the island have been meeting continuously to seek a political resolution to this situation. We must maintain calm for now, just like here in Taipei, and await the results of political negotiations. But maintaining calm does not mean abandoning the struggle. Our attitude is to await the results of negotiations and then decide [on a course of action]. Should our demands not be realised, we will fight for democracy to the very end.13

On March 8 the British consulate informed London of this speech as follows:

On March 6th two representatives of the aborigines spoke over the wireless on the present affair. Both severely criticised the authorities for maladministration. One of the speakers was Mr. Minami, son of the aborigines' delegate to the National Assembly. He declared that all the aborigines would act as vanguard in the fighting in case the authorities failed to accept the points put forward by the Disposal Committee.<sup>14</sup>

"Minami" is the Japanese surname corresponding to "Nan" in Chinese, but it is not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., pp.140-141. The People's Daily was subsequently closed down for "publishing seditious speeches" (*ibid.*, pp.155-156). <sup>14</sup> TWS III, *op. cit.*, p.535. Emphasis mine.

clear which one of Nan's five sons this might have been.<sup>15</sup> I assume it was his eldest son, Nan Hsin-i (born 1912), who accompanied his father earlier in the month on the tour of Aboriginal villages. Nan Hsin-i formerly had business interests in Japanese-occupied parts of China which closed down at the end of the war, and this may partly account for his open hostility to the provincial authorities.<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, the other "representative" is not identified, nor on what basis either man claimed to represent Aborigines. It seems that this is not the speech referred to by Lin Chung, and it also seems unlikely that Lin would have mistaken the two men. Given that Taiwan was awash with rumour and rumour-mongering at the time, it is perfectly reasonable to also speculate that the speakers were Han Taiwanese impersonating Aborigines. The last problem to note is the British consul's interpretation of the speech. The Chinese version makes no mention of a pan-Aboriginal vanguard as the consul claimed, though it is possible that not all of the speech was recorded in the *People's Daily*.

One confidential document and a Central News Agency report state that the Taipei disposal committee had one or more Aboriginal representatives.<sup>17</sup> Another government document claims that the committee not only sought the participation of Taiwan's national assembly delegates but also Aboriginal representatives from every city and county in Taiwan.<sup>18</sup> We saw in the previous chapter that the Taipei disposal committee was suspected of lobbying for Aboriginal support, but the actual identity of any Aborigines working for or on the committee has yet to be confirmed. Based on this evidence, it is possible that Nan Chih-hsin or Nan Hsin-i were involved. In any case, and assuming the speakers in the broadcast were Aboriginal, the elements of pride and

15 Wang Ho-sheng, op. cit., p.43. Nan had twelve children in total, as well as raising other children.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p.46. Nan later became something of a celebrity and local hero because of his martial arts activities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., p.62 and p.82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992a), op. cit., p.246.

the threat of a pan-Aboriginal vanguard for a full-scale Taiwanese insurrection are quite extraordinary.

The following day, March 7, the Taipei disposal committee presented a long list of demands to Chen Yi, which included the demand that "the political and economic status of Kaoshan compatriots as well as the benefits they are entitled to enjoy should be strictly protected." Chen assured the committee that he would give the demands due consideration, but after the arrival of military reinforcements the negotiation process terminated.

Nan then returned to Taitung on March 8 or March 9 to assist with discussions between Beinan and Bunun Aborigines and the government officials they were sheltering, as I described in the last chapter.<sup>20</sup> Later, a newspaper report dated March 19 stated that Chen Yi had asked Nan Chih-hsin and Cheng Pin-tsung to assist with pacification elsewhere in eastern Taiwan and that they had already travelled to Hualien City to this end.<sup>21</sup> A government report dated March 30 credits Nan with assisting the government, though he is mistakenly referred to as a representative from Hualien.<sup>22</sup>

Nan's career seems to benefit from his conduct during the 228 Incident, and after finishing his term as national assemblyman, he held a senior post in the new provincial government until 1949.<sup>23</sup> Nan later became disspirited by the political sphere, however, and returned to Taitung.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Lai Tse-han (1994), op. cit., p.71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., p.259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947r): "Zheng Pincong shi xuanwei dong Tai minzhong" (Mr. Cheng Pin-tsung guides the people of eastern Taiwan). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 19 March 1947, p.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Chen Hsing-tang (1992a), op. cit., p.362.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> TWS II, op. cit., pp.102-103; AS II, op. cit., p.259 and pp.260-261; and Huang Fu-san, Kaim Ang and Mrs. Farrington (eds)(1998b): Taiwan archives in the British Public Record Office (V). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History Preparatory Office, Academia Sinica, p.32. Nan was replaced on the provincial government committee by his Paiwan rival, Hua Ching-chi; see Huang Fu-san, Kaim Ang and Mrs. Farrington (eds)(1998c): Taiwan archives in the British Public Record Office (VI). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History Preparatory Office, Academia Sinica, pp.125-126.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Interview with Ma Lai-sheng, October 7, 1999.

### Pai Chung-hsi and the 228 Incident

On March 6, Chen Yi asked Chiang Kai-shek to send a senior central official to assist with handling the disturbances. Chiang agreed on March 7, naming the Republic of China's defence minister, General Pai Chung-hsi, as that official. The government order sending Pai to Taiwan was issued on March 11.<sup>25</sup> After a lengthy and unexplained delay, Pai arrived on March 17 and remained until April 2. His efforts in Taiwan mostly consisted of meetings in Taipei and major urban centres in western Taiwan with government, party and military officials and civilian representatives. He introduced measures to reform the administration and restore a degree of procedural integrity, particularly the handling of those suspected of participating in the 228 Incident by the military and the judiciary. He also assisted with the drawing up of plans for post-Incident security sweeps.<sup>26</sup>

After four days in Taipei, Pai flew to southern Taiwan on March 21 and spent five days meeting officials at various locations on the road back to Taipei. By this time, the provincial authorities had ordered civil, police and educational administrators in every county government to send capable officers into mountain areas to pacify Aborigines and help restore order,<sup>27</sup> and on March 23 Pai Chung-hsi himself made a deviation to Sun Moon Lake in part to continue this programme of pacification.

Sun Moon Lake had already been identified as a vital location because of its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> TWS III, op. cit., pp.808-809. The author of this respectful assessment of Pai Chung-hsi's conduct during his 228 Incident investigations is Chen San-ching, one of four staff who interviewed Pai Chung-hsi in the 1960s and produced his memoir on behalf of the Academia Sinica's Institute of Modern History some two decades later (see following footnote).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See Chia Ting-shih and Chen San-ching (eds)(1984): Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu (xiace) (A record of an interview with Mr. Pai Chung-hsi). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, pp. 558-559; and TWS III, op. cit., pp.819-820.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., pp.167-168.

hydroelectric facilities. On March 15, Peng Meng-chi had wired Chen Yi with a statement to this effect, urging the dispatch of troops to defend it against any threat.<sup>28</sup> Now accompanying Pai on this leg of his journey was a power company representative who led Pai on an inspection of the nearby hydroelectric facilities on the evening of March 23. Pai congratulated staff who had prevented the facilities from falling into the hands of anti-government elements during the unrest. One newspaper report said Pai was very aware that the Sun Moon Lake hydroelectric system, which included a facility at Wushe, was the "heart of Taiwan's industrialisation" under the Japanese.<sup>29</sup> Pai also learned just prior to his departure for Sun Moon Lake that communist activist Hsieh Hsueh-hung had retreated to Wushe and was in contact with Aborigines there.<sup>30</sup> It is feasible, therefore, that Pai looked to develop good relations with Aborigines not only to weed out people who had fled into the mountains, but also to protect key infrastructure.

Early the next day, March 24, the power company man led Pai on an inspection of the local Thao Aboriginal community and watched a performance of singing and dancing. The Thao then requested electric lights for their village and an expansion of tillable land. Pai, "with the utmost concern for the livelihoods of these people," told the company representative to speedily arrange the installation of electric lighting for this Aboriginal community, adding a warning in figurative terms to the representative and the Taichung County mayor that a failure to do so would be detrimental to Aboriginal relations with the government. He also instructed the Taichung County government to improve the area's educational and health facilities.<sup>31</sup>

20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.155.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947s): "Bai buzhang jiamian Riyuetan liang fadiansuo yuangong" (Minister Pai praises and encourages personnel at two Sun Moon Lake power plants). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 27 March 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Pai Ko (1983): "Taiwan, renweide taifeng zhi san: sui Bai buzhang xuanwei" (A man-made typhoon in Taiwan, part 3: accompanying Minister Pai as he calms [local communities]). *Taiwan yu shijie*, 4, p52. <sup>31</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947t): "Weimian Gaoshan tongbao" (Assuaging Kaoshan compatriots). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 26 March 1947, p.4; and Pai Ko, *op. cit.*, p.53. A photograph of Pai Chung-hsi at Sun Moon Lake can be seen at TWS II, *op. cit.*, p.484.

These requests of the Thao people mirror those apparently dismissed by Chen Yi only three months earlier when he visited the area, as I mentioned in Chapter Three. It is thus noteworthy that the post-Incident change in the political and security environment benefited the Thao people.

At 11.40am, Pai convened a meeting of more than fifty Aboriginal leaders at the lakeside Hanpi Building. Leading the attendees were Ko Kui-chih, head of the adjacent Bunun Aboriginal township of Hsin'i, and "Aboriginal representative" Chuan Wan-sheng, who would later be elected head of the same township. Pai's speech to them was reported as follows:

Over the course of this Taiwan incident, Kaoshan compatriots have acted with great wisdom, with the great majority not getting involved. Moreover, in Taitung's case, you were able to assist the government in keeping the peace, which is highly gratifying. The rebellion has now been put down; there remains only a small number of communist thugs who have gone into hiding in the mountains. The government will protect those among the people who are good, but it has been decided that the rebels will be totally annihilated. It is hoped that Kaoshan compatriots everywhere will assist the military in detaining and neutralising the thugs and returning weapons so that harm to local areas can be avoided. [To this end] the government will provide a reward.

The central [authorities] take matters involving Kaoshan compatriots very seriously. From now on, it is expected that your study of the national language will be intensified, that your knowledge will be broadened and that together with us you will strive to build a new Taiwan.<sup>32</sup>

Pai then presented 50,000 yuan to the Aboriginal representatives for food and

transportation.<sup>33</sup> Other Aboriginal participants at this meeting are not named; it seems quite possible that, despite reference to the Aboriginal participants travelling from far away to attend the conference, they were mostly if not all from adjacent communities. Ma Chih-li and Nan Chih-hsin were certainly absent, because they had yet to make their way from Taitung to Taipei.

Pai held a second conference in the Hanpi Building at 3.30pm, this time with the central government officials who accompanied him from Nanking. These officials included his deputy chief of staff, Leng Hsin, the head of the defence ministry's historical commission, Wu Shih, and the head of the military legal department, Ho Hsiao-yuan. Also in attendance was Chen Yi's chief of staff, General Ko Yuan-fen. The content of this meeting was not reported. After staying one more night at Sun Moon Lake, Pai returned to Taipei.<sup>34</sup>

Pai's account of his activities is more nostalgic than informative, making no reference to the content of his talks with officials or Aboriginal representatives. Instead, he spends time reminiscing about egret hunting on Sun Moon Lake. The sequence of activities as he relates them is also a little inconsistent. He does mention meeting a group of Aborigines, as well as Thao "chief" Mao Hsin-hsiao, whose two daughters and other young Thao women and men gave a performance of song and dance on themes of love and the harvest. "Chief" Mao is then identified as the person who requested electric lighting to be installed in the area. Mao asked Pai to write some commemorative calligraphy. Accordingly, Pai wrote minzu pingdeng, loosely translatable as "ethnic equality" or "national equality." It also appears that Pai and Mao continued their acquaintance for many years after Pai fell from grace in the political establishment: Pai

<sup>32</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947t), op. cit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Another source states the amount of money handed to Aborigines was 200,000 *yuan*; see Pai Ko, *op. cit.*, p.53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947t), op. cit.. Wu Shih was executed in June, 1950, after being accused of collaborating with the communists.

reports returning to Sun Moon Lake years later, at which time Mao expressed profound gratitude for the introduction of electric power to his community.<sup>35</sup>

On the evening of Pai's return to Taipei (March 25), he attended a banquet with Chen Yi, censor Yang Liang-kung and various military officials, including Ko Yuan-fen. Also in attendance were several (unnamed) Aboriginal representatives.<sup>36</sup>

A newspaper report and a National Security Bureau report indicate that earlier on that day, Chen Yi received a party of five representatives from Taitung, including Nan Chihhsin, Cheng Pin-tsung, Chen Chen-tsung and Ma Chih-li, the "principal chieftain of the Kaoshan people of Taitung." Chen congratulated the party for their wisdom over the course of the 228 Incident, for not being influenced by "ruffians of the treacherous party" (*jiandang baotu*), and for their efforts in helping the county government maintain order in the region. Chen Yi also praised Taitung's Aborigines and "local people" generally for their actions.<sup>37</sup> It was mostly likely that this group of Aboriginal representatives was that which attended the evening's banquet with Pai Chung-hsi and Chen Yi.

The next morning (March 26), Pai Chung-hsi met separately with various high-level officials. He also met with the party from Taitung, including Cheng Pin-tsung, Nan Chih-hsin and Ma Chih-li – once again described as the "principal chieftain of the Kaoshan people of Taitung." During the meeting a commemorative photograph was

35 Chia and Chen, op. cit., p.562.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947u): "Bai buzhang zuo liangdu huiyi bing ceng tingqu gefang yijian" (Minister Bai yesterday attended two conferences and listened to the opinions of all sides). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 27 March 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947v): "Taidong guodai ji Gaoshan lingxiu zuo ye Chen zhangguan zhijing" (Taitung National Assembly representatives and Kaoshan leaders yesterday have an audience with Governor Chen and pay their respects). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 26 March 1947, p.4; and Chang Yen-hsien (ed.)(2002b): *Ererba shijian dang'an huibian (er) – guojia anquanju dang'an* (A collection of files on the 228 Incident, vol. 2: files from the National Security Bureau). Hsintien: Academia Historica, p.248.

taken outside their meeting place, the Taipei Guesthouse (see Figure 5.1).<sup>38</sup> It was probably at this time that Pai Chung-hsi invited Ma Chih-li to act as an unofficial Aboriginal ambassador to assist the KMT in calming Aboriginal communities.<sup>39</sup>

At 7pm Pai Chung-hsi went to Taipei's radio station to deliver a special broadcast to Aborigines around the island.<sup>40</sup> I translate the speech in full:

### Kaoshan compatriots of Taiwan:

The unfortunate incident occurring in Taiwan at this time is of the greatest concern to the Nationalist government and Chairman Chiang [Kai-shek], who specifically instructed me to come to Taiwan to calm the situation. This incident was caused by a small number of thug operatives from the Communist Party as well as by other opportunists who fanned the unrest and caused disturbances in local areas. Kaoshan compatriots not only failed to be incited into taking part in seditious activities by these elements, but also assisted local county and city governments in defending these areas. The contributions of representatives Mr. Nan Chih-hsin and Mr. Ma Chih-li, as well as many other Kaoshan compatriots, have been most impressive. This spirit of protecting the country and upholding the law is of the greatest comfort to us, and worthier still of praise.

The incident has been largely quelled at this time. As for the ringleaders who conspired to commit acts of sedition, we must take strict punitive action to restore the rule of law so that fair can be told from foul and wickedness from virtue. To punish these evil thugs is also to protect those who are good. We hope that the communist thugs and the youths and students blindly following them — who at this time remain in hiding throughout [Taiwan] — will stop this before they go too far, and quickly come to their

<sup>39</sup> Lin Chien-cheng (1998), op. cit., p.85.

<sup>38</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.815.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947w): "Shi Gaoshan tongbao dushu renzi, yizhi jieshou zuguode jiaoyu" (Make Kaoshan compatriots read and attain literacy so that all may receive the ancestral country's education). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 27 March 1947, p.4.



Figure 5.1: Commemorative photograph for a meeting of government, military and civilian leaders at the Taipei Guesthouse taken on March 26, 1947. From third left, Chen Chen-tsung, Nan Chih-hsin, Chen Yi, Pai Chung-hsi, Ma Chih-li and Cheng Pin-tsung. Original photograph courtesy of Ma Lai-sheng.

senses. If those coerced youths and students are able to come to their senses. the government will be magnanimous and let bygones be bygones. If the communist thugs hand over their weapons and surrender, repent and start anew, then they shall also be ... dealt with leniently. The Taiwan Garrison Command has decided to undertake pacification (suijing) by district. If the communist thugs persist in their erroneous ways and continue to hoard police guns and weapons from storehouses, ammunition, uniforms and so on, then in pacifying local areas, the military will have to exterminate them to keep the peace. According to reports we have received, a division of communist thugs has gone into hiding in Kaoshan areas, and we hope that each and every Kaoshan compatriot will, under the leadership of county or city governments, assist the military in wiping them out. Those able to capture and decapitate communist thugs or turn their weapons and ammunition over to the government are authorised to receive a substantial reward. If anyone shelters these rebels, or conceals their weapons and ammunition, they will receive severe punishment once they are found out. This is something that Kaoshan compatriots ought to note very carefully. The Kaoshan people are also Taiwanese compatriots and are, like the rest of Taiwanese compatriots, the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, and members of the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu).

At this point in his speech, Pai utilises descent from Chinese ancestors in a thoroughly racial appeal to patriotism. Pai follows this with an elaboration of the historical circumstances of Aborigines, and paints a picture in which Taiwan's Aborigines are fallen Chinese, destined to return to the bosom of the mother culture:

Before, during more than fifty years of Japanese rule, you suffered every form of oppression and hardship. After victory in the War of Resistance came *guangfu*, and only then were you able to see the light of day, returning under the banner of the ancestral country. The central government is in fact extremely concerned for the compatriots of Taiwan, particularly Kaoshan compatriots.

However, because of differences in language, customs and habits, you were unable to communicate with your ancestral country, so you sank into isolation, and still lead poverty-stricken lives. By way of redress, the government must attempt to the best of its ability to promote education, allowing Kaoshan compatriots the opportunity to read and gain literacy so that everyone may receive the ancestral country's tutelage. First you must come to know the entire history of the ancestral country and its written and spoken language; only then can your solidarity and cooperation as part of the entire Chinese nation (*zhonghua minzu*) be strengthened and improvements be made to your lives. I hope that all Kaoshan compatriots will stand up and strive for self-improvement, become modern citizens and together strive to construct a new China.<sup>41</sup>

This is the last report I could find of Pai addressing Aboriginal issues while in Taiwan. After returning to mainland China, Pai wired Chiang Kai-shek on April 14 with numerous recommendations to improve administration, economic management and military procedures in the wake of the 228 Incident. These included, for example, replacing the Executive Administrative Office with a formal provincial government, tightening control over the military command, and even floating nuclear weapons research at National Taiwan University.<sup>42</sup> Only one recommendation included a direct reference to Aborigines:

Pay attention to social education, start a campaign for the universalisation of Mandarin. Education for Kaoshan people is in particular need of attention. Also improve their ways of living, with the view to having them naturalised (guihua) as soon as possible.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *ibid*..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> TWS П, *op. cit.*, pp.95-103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.98.

In addition, it is likely that Pai's eugenic recommendation encouraging intermarriage between mainlanders and Taiwanese was intended to include Aborigines. In light of his later dismissal of the idea that the ROC required any more than five races, his suggestion that intermarriage "integrate [Taiwanese] into a great national unity",44 fits happily with the push to "naturalise" Aborigines.

Pai Chung-hsi and the question of minority nationalities

Pai Chung-hsi was the most senior government official to deal directly with Aborigines over the course of the 228 Incident. Because his account of dealings with them is so brief, an understanding of early relations between ROC authorities and Aborigines benefits from a description of Pai's attitudes and actions toward other ethnic minorities in China.

Pai claims in his memoirs that one year later, during the national assembly session of April 1948 that would elect Chiang Kai-shek as president, he was asked to convince wavering delegates from Tibet to participate as "representatives," and not merely as "observers." The delegates requested this under the instructions of the Dalai Lama, but according to Pai's account, his friendly lecture to the delegates resulted in them wiring the Dalai Lama and receiving his permission to act as "representatives." Pai's lecture contains references to Tibet being part of the territory of the Republic of China, to Tibetans being one of the five races that constituted the republic, and to the British being responsible for previous and current hostilities between Tibet and the Chinese authorities. He also insisted that cooperation would be beneficial to development and education in the area.<sup>45</sup>

44 *ibid.*, p101.

<sup>45</sup> Chia and Chen, op. cit., pp.851-852.

Pai made a similar appeal to delegates from Sinkiang (Xinjiang), who intended to propose that the assembly rename the territory as "East Turkistan" and to state they had "the right to a high degree of autonomy." In his capacity as convenor of the Frontiers Sub-committee, Pai was asked by the "chairman" – presumably of the assembly secretariat, but possibly Chiang Kai-shek himself – to convince the delegates to withdraw their motion before it reached the assembly floor. As with the Tibetans, Pai referred to Sinkiang as ROC territory and to the Hui (Muslims) as one of the five races constituting the republic. Autonomy was not necessary, he reasoned, because everyone enjoyed equal status. Pai accused the delegate leader – the deputy chairman of Sinkiang Province – of being a communist, and warned the other delegates that the move toward autonomy was merely the first step in a conspiracy that would result in Sinkiang's fall to the Soviet Union. The motion was withdrawn.<sup>46</sup>

It is not possible to discuss here the reliability of Pai's account of his dealings with the delegates from Tibet and Sinkiang. The critical point is Pai's insistence that ethnic or national autonomy within China was firmly linked to the spectre of communist infiltration and appropriation of ethnic activism. Indeed, in his memoirs, Pai goes to some lengths to develop this concern. He argues that Lenin considered not proletarian but "ethnic" (minzu) revolution to be the answer for the "backward nations of the East," and that it was on the basis of this theory that the Soviet Union formulated its policies on minority nationalities, promoting "independence for national minorities" as a companion to proletarian revolution. Pai states that the People's Republic of China adopted this approach as well, and hoped that states forged from minority nationalities would be overthrown in turn by China's "manipulation of political contradictions within a minority nationality in that country," leading to the establishment of a communist state. Pai concludes with these words:

46 *ibid.*, pp.852-853.

...[The Chinese Communist] policy on nationalities (minzu) is a strategy, and not one that truly helps each nationality achieve independence. It is a facade, phony. At the very end there remains a proletarian revolution. This is the essence of the communist bandit policy on nationalities.<sup>47</sup>

Yet, with this conclusion, Pai clearly implies that aspirations for independence by national minorities did not necessarily amount to support for communism.

Interviewed in 1965, Pai had the luxury to reflect on what he knew of established minority policies in the PRC, and he came to the conclusion that autonomous provinces, counties and so on were propaganda showcases for the benefit of foreigners, or attempts to appease the more obstreperous nationalities, or else secret training grounds for communist designs on southeast Asian states containing similar ethnic groups. After all, he asked, how could autonomy have any special meaning or significance to minority nationalities who were, in the main, ignorant and economically backward?<sup>48</sup>

It is worth recalling that Pai Chung-hsi was himself a member of a minority nationality — a sinicised Hui (Muslim) from Kwangsi Province in southern China. In his memoirs, Pai displays a certain interest in the sizable ethnic minorities of Kwangsi in his short description of the province. However, the Han chauvinism, even racism, that pervades writings by Nationalist authors back to Sun Yat-sen and even earlier, <sup>49</sup> informs his comment that "the whole country should gradually move down the road of a five-race republic and should not be divided into any other races." Pai's nationalistic chauvinism and support for assimilation, though rooted in a patronising inclusiveness — more akin to the psychology of a haughty missionary than a bigot — stems from old Confucian notions of a benign superiority radiating from the civilisational centre and

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*, pp.632-633.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, pp.633-634. See also pp.634-636 and pp.638-639.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Dikötter, op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, p.631.

transforming the uncivilised.<sup>51</sup> In Taiwan's case, however, Aborigines eventually found themselves too close to the last "centre" of a Nationalist government facing a worsening security crisis, and were therefore highly vulnerable to assimilationist strategies of administration.

We now move to Pai Chung-hsi's position on Taiwan's Aborigines. In his 1965 interview, Pai described Aboriginal people using the stock expression "culturally backward" (wenhua luohou). He argued that they only arrived in Taiwan during the southern Sung Dynasty (twelfth and thirteenth centuries AD) from southern China after replacing two earlier Melanesian and Polynesian peoples, who had died out. The Kaoshan people, he said, were similar to the Malays in language and custom, but were in fact descendants from the people of Chu in southern China – around 2,500 years before. This hypothesis seems related to Pai's claim in his 228 radio broadcast to the Aborigines that they were descendents of the Yellow Emperor and therefore members of the Chinese nation, a position that Chen San-ching, a specialist on Pai Chung-hsi, argues is "not entirely in agreement with scientific argument, but which can be looked at as a kind of platform to appeal to the sentiments of mountain compatriots on special occasions." Sa

Despite extensive criticism of communist policy on minority nationalities, Pai does not comment on political structures in Taiwan in place under KMT rule for nearly twenty years that mandated Aboriginal representation at levels up to and including the province, and which sealed off 44 percent of Taiwan's land mass as Aboriginal townships. Nor does he refer to his support for Kwanghsi's autonomy at the expense of Chiang Kai-shek's authority during his active days in the "Kui" military faction,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See Bill Brugger and Stephen Reglar (1994): *Politics, economy and society in contemporary China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p.306.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Chia and Chen, op. cit., p.563 and p.553.

<sup>53</sup> TWS III, op. cit., pp.807-808.

which included later-to-be-deposed acting president Li Tsung-jen.<sup>54</sup>

By the time Pai arrived in Taipei in late 1949 to join the exiled KMT government, he

had already begun to lose his military and political foothold in the regime. His long-

standing differences with Chiang Kai-shek and alignment to Li Tsung-jen led to his

ostracisation and an isolated and bitter life. He died in November 1966, the year after his

series of memoir interviews was completed. Former intelligence agent Ku Cheng-wen

claims Pai's suspicious death in 1965 was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>55</sup> In any event,

Pai's dealings with Aborigines after 1949 were in an unofficial capacity.

Curiously, a number of writers claim that Ma Chih-li made at least seven trips with Pai

to numerous Aboriginal locations around Taiwan as interpreter and to mediate between

local tribesmen and the military.<sup>56</sup> Unless this took place in the 1950s when Pai had

already been stripped of his authority, I do not see where there would have been time to

do this within Pai's limited itinerary in March, 1947. Sources agree, however, that Ma

and Pai were on good terms (see Figure 5.2).<sup>57</sup>

If these tours did take place, they suggest a greater tension among Aboriginal

communities than Pai or other commentators have conceded in documentation relating to

the 228 Incident. Researcher Lin Chien-cheng goes as far as saying that it was the vital

diplomatic role that Ma played which allowed the KMT to stabilise the situation in

Aboriginal communities throughout Taiwan "without the loss of a single soldier."58

<sup>54</sup> See Ku Cheng-wen (1995): *Baise kongbu mimi dang'an* (Secret files from the White Terror). Hsintien: Tuchia wenhua, pp.231-233.

55 ibid., pp.231-240.

<sup>56</sup> For example, see Lin Chien-cheng (1998), op. cit., p.85.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Ma Lai-sheng, October 7, 1999.



Figure 5.2: Image of a memento portrait presented to Ma Chih-li by General Pai Chung-hsi dated March 28, 1947. The words on the upper right read "Chih-li, my brother." Original photograph courtesy of Ma Lai-sheng.

Whatever powers of persuasion Ma had, however, it is still open to debate whether he was so influential and credible that he could have prevented the venting of substantial anger, or indeed whether Aboriginal communities, other than the Tsou of Alishan, posed a serious problem in the first place. Regardless, Lin Chien-cheng's comparison of the Ma's pacification efforts with the blood spilled during Japan's decades of unsteady rule is hardly valid.<sup>59</sup> Unlike the Japanese, the KMT arrived to find Aborigines no longer their own masters and incorporated within a colonial administrative structure. Between "retrocession" and the 228 Incident, there had been no Aboriginal attempt to oppose that structure.

#### Chiang Ching-kuo and 228

One of the lesser known - previously covered up, in fact<sup>60</sup> - but most intriguing elements of the 228 Incident is the role played by Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kaishek and his eventual successor as president of the Republic of China. Chiang Chingkuo was part of Pai Chung-hsi's entourage that arrived in Taipei on March 17, but he only stayed for two days before flying back to Nanking on the morning of March 19. His ostensible brief was to investigate circumstances and rectify problems relating to the Three Principles of the People Youth Association, of which he was a senior official.<sup>61</sup> There was good reason for this, admittedly, as many Taiwan-based members had participated in anti-government activity in the name of that organisation. However, Chiang's presence in Taiwan appears to have served a more important purpose.

Researcher Li Ao argued in 1988 that Chiang Ching-kuo was sent by his father to keep

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> ibid..

<sup>60</sup> Li Ao (1989b), op. cit., pp.1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> TWS III, op. cit., p.812. See also Chiang Nan (1995): Jiang Jingguo zhuan (A biography of Chiang Ching-kuo). Taipei: Li Ao, pp.121-136, for more detail on the purposes of this organisation and Chiang's role in it.

an eye on Pai Chung-hsi.<sup>62</sup> Li Ao's suspicions were later vindicated by the release of a handwritten memorandum from Chiang Ching-kuo to his father, dated March 18, 1947, which proved he had been sent for intelligence reasons. Presumably, he was acting as his father's trusted man on the ground.<sup>63</sup>

That brief report included a laconic reference to Aboriginal activity in the 228 Incident. Chiang mentioned the retreat of anti-government forces to Puli, including Hsieh Hsuehhung's flight to Wushe, before ending with the following:

The Kaoshan people gang up readily, can readily cause serious incidents. (Problem) The Kaoshan people have leaders, fifteen of them, eight races, one chieftain per tribe. (Use one person to lead)<sup>64</sup>

The editor of the book containing this memorandum suggests the "one person" was Ma Chih-li. If this is true, it suggests that Ma Chih-li was selected as an "ambassador" as early as March 18, or at the very least it indicates that the central government was considering an ambassadorial strategy in dealing with the Aborigines. It is not possible at this time to identify where Ma was on March 18, or when he was first invited to act as "ambassador," which would have been March 26 at the latest. He may have acted in that capacity much earlier if, in fact, he accompanied Pai Chung-hsi on the latter's trip along western Taiwan.

The evidence laid out in the previous chapter and above shows quite clearly that the provincial and central authorities took the Aboriginal role in the 228 Incident quite seriously. It also shows that the living circumstances of Aboriginal people and the administration's increasing awareness of their strategic location was now directly linked

<sup>62</sup> Li Ao (1989b), op. cit., p.2 and p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., pp.157-160. Ho Han-wen even suggests that Chiang had come in search of the "progressive" Hsieh Hsueh-hung, with whom Chiang is alleged to have shared classes in his days in the Soviet Union; see Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., pp.247-248.

to the need for assimilation, or "naturalisation." We now turn to the response of the government in terms of pacifying and monitoring Aboriginal communities in the wake of the unrest.

# 'Cleansing the countryside'

The government wasted no time in launching a sweep of Taiwan's urban, rural and mountain populations. A security census known as "qingxiang" (cleansing the countryside) collected information on almost every household to establish where suspects were located and to mop up individuals who had fled their home towns. The Aboriginal areas were no exception, but because of their remoteness and the special care needed in dealing with nervous Aboriginal villages, special measures were required, which I will now discuss.

The Taiwan Garrison Command report lists Taiwan's seven "pacification zones" (suijingqu), their respective military and police units and commanders. Apart from the zone covering the Penghu islands, each zone incorporated a "high mountain area" (gaoshanqu), which effectively meant Aboriginal areas. The zones were drawn up according to county boundaries, although Ilan, the area of Taipei County south of Keelung, was included in the Keelung Pacification Zone, together with its two Aboriginal townships. The Taipei Pacification Zone included Hsintien (and therefore Wulai Township); the Hsinchu Pacification Zone included the "Northern High Mountain Area" (Fuhsing, Chienshih, Wufeng and Ta'an townships); the Central Pacification Zone included the "Central High Mountain Area" (Hoping, Jen'ai, Hsin'i and Wufeng townships); the Southern Pacification Zone included the "Southern High Mountain Area" (all eleven of Kaohsiung County's Aboriginal townships); and the

<sup>64</sup> ibid., p.159. The parentheses are in the original.

Eastern Pacification Zone included the "Eastern High Mountain Area" (the Aboriginal townships of Hualien and Taitung counties).<sup>65</sup>

It is interesting to note that the Taichung-Nantou-Chiayi area was drawn together to form a single pacification zone. One can only speculate on whether this was influenced by the fact that these locations saw the most impactful presence of Aboriginal tribesmen anywhere in Taiwan. It is also interesting to note that this zone merged two areas that continued to harbour the largest number of anti-government refugees from the plains and featured the most heavily armed Aboriginal communities at the conclusion of the 228 Incident. Certainly, the July 1947 report on pacification by the ROC army's 21st Division regarded this region as the most "violent" and discussed the presence of rebels in the mountains from "east of Puli" to Alishan. 66 Most interestingly, the new commander of this pacification zone was none other than General Liu Yu-ching, head of the 21st Division, whose soldiers had arrived as reinforcements in Keelung on March 9 and had bloodily brought greater Taipei and elsewhere under control. Also worthy of note is the fact that Kaohsiung Fortress commander General Peng Meng-chi was appointed commander of the Southern Pacification Zone, which would soon see a spillover of Aboriginal activism from the Alishan area.

#### The Southern Pacification Zone

Prior to the creation of this zone, Peng Meng-chi's wire to Chen Yi on March 17 indicated that, apart from intelligence-gathering work, his forces had formed pacification units that were employing people with prior or current work experience in the mountains, including police. The radio station in Tainan City was also used to broadcast

<sup>65</sup> TWS II, op. cit., pp.423-425.

<sup>66</sup> AS I, op. cit., p.254.

messages to Aboriginal communities.<sup>67</sup> Security census work begin in Pingtung City as early as March 12, and that area's guidelines go to the effort of reminding operatives that Aborigines were "citizens of this country" – as if there was were niggling doubts about the matter – and therefore were to be included in the census.<sup>68</sup> After Chen Yi issued formal pacification and security census guidelines, the Kaohsiung County government announced the work would be completed by April 15.<sup>69</sup>

#### The Eastern Pacification Zone

For this zone, documents dated April 1947 specifically include Aboriginal pacification work as part of the general propaganda and pacification effort under the leadership of Chu Kao-chin.<sup>70</sup> In addition to general measures for returning weapons,<sup>71</sup> the zone's documents feature additional measures. The first of these exempted weapons used by the general population as part of their day-to-day activities. Listed among these were machetes, home-made hunting rifles and spears used by Aborigines.<sup>72</sup>

Intelligence gathering was divided among four bodies: the military headquarters, the military police, the county government and the county police force.<sup>73</sup> "Developments among the Kaoshan people" was one of ten parameters of intelligence collection.<sup>74</sup>

Propaganda techniques were also devised specifically for Aboriginal communities in Taitung County, which suggests that the authorities were mindful of how close some of

<sup>67</sup> AS III, op. cit., pp.239-240.

<sup>68</sup> AS V, op. cit., p.318.

<sup>69</sup> ibid., p161.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, p17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> *ibid.*, p23. The machetes of plains-dwelling Amis Aborigines, whose communities were located in areas covered by standard pacification guidelines, were also exempted from confiscation; see Chen Hsingtang (1992b), *op. cit.*, p.622. The name "Yami" in this reference refers to Amis communities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.28.

the Paiwan villages in the south of the county came to murdering the mainlanders in their custody. In addition to propaganda and pacification methods applying to the entire population - such as frequent press conferences, radio telecasts, the dispatch of intelligence personnel to high schools and colleges for functions and lectures and the forming of "friendship associations" (lianyihui) in the industrial sector - Aboriginal communities were targeted in the following manner:

- 1. Local administrative organs combined with subunits under zone command to enter Aboriginal communities and undertake pacification work,
- 2. Silk banners and "historic" commemorative items were presented as tokens of commendation,
- 3. Song and dance friendship associations aimed to instill harmonious feelings in the communities,
  - 4. Special literature was produced to fill the linguistic gap in propaganda, and
- 5. Appeals were made to higher authorities to assess the extent of Aboriginal poverty and quickly provide large amounts of aid.<sup>75</sup>

Additional measures issued in mid-April outlined security census procedures relating to the security census across Taitung County. Among these was a guideline stating that civilians entering Aboriginal areas without permission would be arrested.<sup>76</sup>

There are photographs of Ma Chih-li attending the Taitung meetings for this pacification zone, suggesting that a degree of consultation informed the regulations for mountain security sweeps (see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). In Hualien County, a pacification unit began work among Aboriginal communities by April 29.77 On about the same day, a pacification unit embarked on a ten-day tour of Aboriginal communities

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, p.29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, p.35. <sup>76</sup> AS V, *op. cit.*, p.131.



Figure 5.3: Photograph of Ma Chih-li (beside banner on the left) attending a meeting of the Taiwan Province Eastern Pacification Zone Command dated April 8, 1947. Original photograph courtesy of Ma Lai-sheng.



Figure 5.4: Commemorative photograph for a meeting of the Taiwan Province Eastern Pacification Zone Command dated April 8, 1947, featuring Ma Chih-li (front row, sixth from right). Original photograph courtesy of Ma Lai-sheng.

in Taitung County.<sup>78</sup> The work would not have been easy, because the latter period of the 228 Incident combined with a serious grain shortage in both Taitung and Hualien. As an emergency measure, every Aboriginal community was required by the Hualien County government to ship sweet potato from their own supply to Hualien City to sell to the Han Taiwanese population.<sup>79</sup>

#### The Central Pacification Zone

A Taichung County government report states that on March 9 the county's consultative committee met and agreed on measures to prevent Aborigines from aiding people fleeing into the mountains. The government sent printed material to its Aboriginal communities, which urged them not to be deceived by "treacherous parties" and to organise local militia to repel them if they attempted to enter the mountains. The report claimed that this tactic worked. It also recommended that rewards be given to Aborigines for capturing suspects.<sup>80</sup>

The Central Pacification Zone is the key security zone because it included the Aboriginal areas of Wushe and Alishan, as well as Meishan Township in Tainan County, which would harbour long-term Han Taiwanese resistance against the KMT. Aboriginal districts were classed from March 29 as "voluntary informant zones" (zidong jianjuqu). Such zones was defined as areas in which "county and city governments under the supervision of Pacification Command Headquarters would, by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947y): "Dongbu suijing silingbu xuanwei Hua jing Gaoshan tongbao" (Eastern Pacification Command calms Kaoshan compatriots in Hualien area). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 30 April 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947x): "Hualian liangshi qique" (Strange grain shortage in Hualien). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 19 March 1947, p.2; and Chen Hsing-tang (1992b), op. cit., p.625.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., p.225.

<sup>81</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.41.

means of reward and measures of conciliation or intimidation, encourage Takasago [sic] people to voluntarily inform on or capture and hand over 'treacherous thugs." In encouraging Aborigines to detain dissidents and return weapons, "guidance activities should be implemented according to the special circumstances of Kaoshan compatriots." The pacification measures were therefore issued separately from those for non-Aboriginal areas. 84

#### The Hsinchu Pacification Zone

A military report on pacification activities in this zone states that operatives were forbidden from entering Aboriginal areas, and that the communities were given the responsibility of monitoring their territory and allowed to keep their traditional weapons. <sup>85</sup> In addition, if Aboriginal people suspected other Aborigines of involvement in questionable activities, then the chieftain had the authority to handle the matter and detain the suspect. If an arrest was necessary, the chieftain would contact local government representatives and escort the prisoner to a non-Aboriginal area for transfer to the military or the judiciary. Police, military police and soldiers were not permitted to make arrests within Aboriginal areas. <sup>86</sup> For example, Chiaopan Township was excluded from military security operations in the Taoyuan area. <sup>87</sup> On one occasion, chieftains were summoned by the military and informed of these procedures. <sup>88</sup> It is worthwhile to note that these measures privileged the chieftain over the Aboriginal mayor if the two were not the same person, and are evidence that the position of chieftain retained significant authority in certain villages at this time.

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<sup>82</sup> ibid., p.42.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, pp.56-57.

<sup>84</sup> AS V, op. cit., p.240.

<sup>85</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.232 and p.291.

<sup>86</sup> ibid., p.233 and p.298.

<sup>87</sup> ibid., p.314.

<sup>88</sup> ibid., p.328.

Despite these arrangements, a pacification zone unit made arrests in the Aboriginal township of Ta'an on April 20. The names and ethnic background of the detainees were not provided.<sup>89</sup> Inspections were later conducted in the non-Aboriginal township of Nanchuang on April 28 and 29. This township contains a number of Saisiat Aboriginal communities, but no arrests were reported.<sup>90</sup>

### The Keelung Pacification Zone

This zone extended south to include the Ilan area and its two Aboriginal townships. In 2002, the Academia Sinica published documents from the Taipei County government which provide a much more detailed picture of the pacification process as it applied in Aboriginal areas. In Nan'ao Township, mayor Yu Chung-chien commenced a tour of villages with the deputy mayor, village heads and other officials. The forty-strong team toured the area from March 15 until March 22. Meeting with villagers included discussion of the 228 Incident and the need to obey the government and keep the peace. 91

In Taiping Township to the north, pacification measures began on March 20 following earlier meetings organised by the township deputy mayor that banned Aborigines from leaving the area. On April 1, the mayor asked villagers to obey the government and detain "bad elements" who strayed into Aboriginal villages. <sup>92</sup> Security census work took place between May 1 and May 20. <sup>93</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> *ibid.*, pp.277-278.

<sup>90</sup> ibid..

<sup>91</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (2002g), op. cit., pp.66-77, pp.100-103 and pp.171-173.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, pp.186-187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, p.347.

#### The Taipei Pacification Zone

No special measures relating to Aboriginal areas are included in available documents for this zone, but the recently released documents from the Taipei County government describe pacification and security census work in considerable detail in Wulai Township. On the morning of May 3, a zone propaganda unit visited Wulai, where the township's Han Taiwanese school principal, Kao Yuan-yuan, chaired a meeting attended by that school's two hundred students and three hundred other locals. The report's listing for the Aboriginal township is the only one among eighty-six entries that added extra notes, stating that five village heads and six local council representatives were also in attendance. Unfortunately, no information is provided on the content of the meeting. 94 A security census was then undertaken on May 8, 9 and 10.95

The Wenshan District Office was so impressed by the pacification work undertaken by the mayor, deputy mayor and other officials throughout Wulai that it recommended the awarding of prizes and increases in salary.<sup>96</sup>

An interesting postscript to this process is that each of the mayors for the Aboriginal townships – Chen Chih-liang, Yu Chung-chien and Li Jung-chin – were subsequently elected as councillors to the Taipei County Council, a result no doubt helped by the praise and support given to them by the government.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.207. Kao Yuan-yuan was born in Wulai. During the Japanese era, his grandfather became the first "Chinese" to enter Wulai with a view to developing the area. Kao would later serve in various county and provincial-level positions relating to Aboriginal administration, as well as gain elected positions in local and adjacent townships; see Wen Chung-i and Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao (eds)(1990): Wulai xiang zhi (Wulai: a local history). Wulai, Taipei County: Wulai Township Office, p.117. Kao's book on Aboriginal culture and administration was published in the martial law era and makes no reference to the 228 Incident; see Kao Yuan-yuan (ed.)(1977): Taiwan Gaoshanzu (The Kaoshan people of Taiwan). Taipei: Hsiangtsaoshan.

<sup>95</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (2002g), op. cit., p.335.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> *ibid.*, pp.106-109. This reference also contains a damaged copy of the account of the pacification process on pp.111-116.

ibid., p.515. The three men's rivals are listed on p.519.

Security census and other intelligence work in Atayal areas in this and other zones was also performed with the assistance of at least two unrepatriated Japanese agents and a number of Koreans.<sup>98</sup>

All of the evidence I have presented here suggests that orders preventing government personnel from entering Aboriginal areas around Taiwan were issued at the highest level – perhaps by Chen Yi himself. The orders may have also suggested that Aboriginal communities receive goods and cash to "avoid misunderstandings."

At the end of the pacification process, the ROC army's 21st Division stated in a July report that the authorities achieved considerable results after Aboriginal communities were called upon to capture "bandits" and to return weapons. However, the monitoring process and security census work had not been comprehensive. On February 27, 1948 – the first anniversary of the 228 Incident – a secret report described the pending assignment of an intelligence unit with a wide-ranging agenda into Aboriginal areas:

... the "Mountain Area Comfort and Entertainment Troupe," jointly organised by the provincial government and the military, is about to set out on assignment. This troupe will carry a large amount of funds and commodities for distribution to mountain areas throughout the province based on three zones. Each zone will dispatch its own team of personnel into [the mountains]. Its superficial duty is to comfort and entertain Aboriginal people (shandi renmin), but its real aim is to study the mountain area population and to survey and chart roads in mountain areas. Presently no-one has any knowledge of the roads in mountain areas, and the actual

<sup>98</sup> Nakamura and Hung, op. cit., pp.18-20, p.262 (n.100) and p.263 (n.106).

<sup>99</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.328.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> AS I, op. cit., p.257. Most of this report relating to Aborigines is cannibalised from an earlier report on the 21st Division's CPZ activities; see AS III, op. cit., p.292.

number of bad elements (dairen) there is also a mystery. This work will require around two to three months to complete, and as soon as it is completed, each [zone] will have obtained a clear idea of whether there actually are Taiwanese thugs (taiji baotu) and Japanese soldiers hidden in the mountains, and how many there are in total. If it is indeed discovered that there are Taiwanese thugs and Japanese soldiers in hiding, they will first be called on to surrender. If they are not willing to surrender, they will be blockaded and attacked. The "Mountain Area Comfort and Entertainment Troupe" is under the command of Wang Cheng-chang, a high-ranking military officer. 101

The most curious aspect of this intelligence-gathering work is the suspicion that a substantial number of Japanese forces remained in Taiwan. This requires a brief discussion of the KMT's stubborn fear of a Japanese attack from within, a fear that permeated to the very top of the command structure.

Mountain security and the phantom Japanese army

On February 12, 1947, the British acting consul, G.M. Tingle, wrote to the British embassy in Nanking to summarise the KMT administration's performance after fifteen months in power. He included the following assessment:

It seems eminently probable that in the mountains there are Japanese soldiers to the number of five or six hundred who escaped the general repatriation and took refuge there. They probably lead not too hazardous an existence, since they would have their small arms, and be able to cultivate plots of land for their maintenance, and be left unmolested by the Chinese, who now have only one division of troops, the 21st, in the island. The authorities have at present neither the means nor the inclination to carry

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Lin and Chen, op. cit., p.218.

out a mopping up operation in the mountainous hinterland, and this impotence and disinclination reflects on their handling of the aborigine question also.102

Tingle provided no evidence or sources for this motley crew of Japanese soldiers-cumfarmers. It is likely he gleaned the information from the daily newspapers. But it does suggest that there was a common perception among the public that a smattering of Japanese remained in Taiwan in places unknown.

When the 228 Incident started, the government must have been concerned about the potential damage these soldiers could inflict at a time of considerable instability. During the unrest, much of this fear was no doubt vindicated by the appearance of Japanese soldiers in Taichung and Chiayi – actually Aborigines and a few Han Taiwanese who donned their old army uniforms before engaging KMT forces.

When, at the end of the resistance, it became clear that there had been no incursions into the cities by Japanese units, one National Security Bureau report dated April 7 reasoned - quite idiotically - that they "dared not come down from the mountains because, one, they were mindful of Japan's international position, and two, the slogans of the Taiwanese were to 'support the central [government]' and 'down with the corrupt emissary,' which contained not the slightest hint of nostalgia for Japan." Elsewhere, in Taipei County's Nan'ao Township, a township report on post-Incident security measures recommended searching nearby mountains for thugs and Japanese, despite this area being one of the most inhospitable on the island. 104

A month later, the subject of the Japanese military legacy emerged once more. Chiang

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> See Huang Fu-san, Kaim Ang and Mrs. Farrington (eds)(1998a): Taiwan archives in the British Public Record Office (IV). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History Preparatory Office, Academia Sinica, pp.253-254.
Chang Yen-hsien (2002b), op. cit., pp.183-184.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Chang Yen-hsien (2002g), op. cit., p.172.

Kai-shek received a report dated May 19 from the ROC Chief of the General Staff, Chen Cheng - later Taiwan governor, ROC premier and ROC vice president - in Nanking, which relayed intelligence dated May 17 that claimed several thousand unrepatriated Japanese soldiers with light and heavy weaponry were living off the land in the mountains near Taichung. The Japanese were said to be promoting among Aborigines the retention of a "Japanese spirit," spreading propaganda about KMT corruption, encouraging ill feeling between the government and the people, and most dangerously, providing basic military training to the Aborigines in that area. Chen Cheng's report also claimed that communist activist Hsieh Hsueh-hung had liaised with the Japanese hiding among the "Taroko savages," implying that - in all seriousness, it would appear - Taiwan's mountains were witnessing a united front of Chinese communists and Japanese imperialists. The precise location of the "Taroko" Aborigines in question is unclear; the broad area occupied by the Truku ethnolinguistic group in the mountains of greater Taichung and Hualien is all that is mentioned. The report also states that Aborigines in the Tungshih region, namely Pahsien Mountain - which lies on a ridge separating the Aboriginal townships of Hoping and Jen'ai - were sheltering one thousand heavily armed Japanese who were now in the process of "organising" the Aborigines. This ill-informed communication strongly points to an official perception that certain Aboriginal communities were posing serious problems long after the 228 Incident had drawn to a close. Chen Cheng's commentary in the report argued that these matters should be taken very seriously and handed to the defence ministry to investigate. If true, he said, they should be thoroughly dealt with in conjunction with the provincial government and the Taiwan Garrison Command. 105 But the hundreds of Japanese soldiers threatening to attack from within never materialised. Only a handful of Japanese turned up in the arrest records relating to Aboriginal areas, as I described in the previous chapter.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> AS II, op. cit., pp.334-335.

The concern about a phantom Japanese army continued until as late as March 1950. It seems that even at this time officials were able to be tricked into thinking that there was significant Japanese participation in the 228 Incident and that a sizable Japanese threat in the mountains remained. 106 This near-pathological fear, however, went straight to the top of the command chain. Hsieh Tsung-min reports that soon after the 228 Incident exploded, Chiang Kai-shek indicated to an audience of Taiwanese delegates in Nanking that he believed there were one hundred thousand Japanese soldiers in Taiwan's mountains waiting for an opportunity to retake the island. This preposterous theory illuminating Chiang's incompetence and stark ignorance of worsening food shortages in Taiwan - was immediately challenged by the assembled party, who vigorously explained that it was impossible for Taiwan's mountains to support such a large force. 107 Even a Nanking newspaper was able to report at the time that the issue of concern was not Japanese soldiers but the weapons they were likely to have left behind, especially those stored in mountain areas among the "Li [sic] mountain people." This enduring Chinese fear of what Taiwan's mountains might contain - rational or otherwise - clearly affected the way authorities viewed the Aboriginal people who were living in these areas.

## Aboriginal activism in the wake of 228

To finish this chapter, I will focus on the only part of Taiwan that posed a genuine and ongoing security threat. In the immediate aftermath of the 228 Incident, Kao I-sheng and his collaborators – perhaps injudiciously – attempted to proceed with a campaign for autonomous government. This campaign came to nought, but it is an essential background to later developments involving communist infiltration of the Tsou, the

<sup>106</sup> Chung I-jen (1995), op. cit., pp.102-104.

<sup>107</sup> Chen Fang-ming (1989), op. cit., pp.62-63.

TWS III, op. cit., p.743. This curious name for Taiwan's Aborigines may have been borrowed from

destruction of progressive Aboriginal leadership and decades of repression and strict surveillance in the Alishan area.

#### The Alishan security threat

Government reports on conflict around Chiayi readily indicate concern over security problems in the Alishan area. The report by Yang Liang-kung and Ho Han-wen, which I referred to earlier, stated that retreating communist elements had made their way to Alishan where they were intending to incite the local Aborigines. The Taiwan Garrison Command report on the 228 Incident, however, states that although around eighty Aborigines intervened in the Tainan (i.e., Chiayi) area, they returned to the mountains and refused to intervene further under the guidance of the Tainan County mayor, Yuan Kuo-chin. The second control of the Tainan County mayor, Yuan Kuo-chin.

The Chiayi City mayor's report, dated March, merely mentioned the presence of an Aboriginal unit in Chiayi and did not elaborate on its activities other than to say it was under the direct command of the local disposal committee's public security corps (baoan zongdui), and suggests that Aborigines were active in the city no later than March 5. However, the report went on to say that "thugs" involved in the disturbances and armed with heavy weaponry had fled to Alishan. Alishan was a strategically significant place, it said, poorly defended by government forces, and rebels could easily exploit the area. The mayor suggested that further reinforcements be sent to Chiayi for deployment in surrounding areas as well as the city. 111

that used for the indigenous Li of Hainan Island.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> TWS II, op. cit., p.132.

<sup>110</sup> *ibid.*, p.412.

This handwritten original is in AS IV, op. cit., p.58, p.59, p.64, p.72 and p.77. The typed version of the same report printed by the Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee seems to have been edited, removing, among other things, one reference to Aboriginal participation, and deleting a diagram which illustrated the Aboriginal position in a chain of command of the "rebels" (for the remainder, see TWS III, op. cit., p.468, p.470 and p.472).

We also saw earlier how reports to Nanking at the time may have exaggerated the number of Aborigines in Taipei and Taichung who came down from the mountains. In the case of Chiayi, the Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau intelligence report – dated March 8 to Chiang Kai-shek – stated that *six hundred* armed Aborigines had surrounded one of their battalions, suggesting that the various Taiwanese militia flanking the airport were mistaken for Aborigines. A progress report on the 228 Incident also claimed that three hundred Aborigines took part in the airport siege.

Therefore, while most of Taiwan was no longer posing security problems in the wake of Pai Chung-hsi's visit, a serious problem for the government remained in the Alishan area during Pai's tour of Taiwan and after his departure. The Tsou tribesmen had engaged the military so successfully that military reports had estimated their number to be as large as three to six times the actual number. They had returned to the mountains, along with an unknown number of anti-government Han Taiwanese accused of being communists; they were also armed with heavy weapons and guns, and were preparing for a military assault on their communities. This area was therefore the primary focus of post-228 security concerns.

The military responded to the situation with caution, adopting a wait-and-see approach and continuing to collect intelligence reports from the area. On March 17, Kaohsiung Fortress commander Peng Meng-chi wired Chen Yi in Taipei to inform him of the latest developments. That report included a reference to rebels in Taichung and Chiayi transporting seized commodities to Alishan by motor vehicle, as if to prepare for the defence of the area. 114 Chiang Kai-shek was also notified on March 26 that the "savage tribe" area in Alishan continued to harbour armed "thugs and bandits." Concern was

<sup>112</sup> AS II, op. cit., p.112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.459.

AS III, op. cit., pp.234-235.

<sup>115</sup> AS II, op. cit., p.229.

likely amplified by later intelligence reports dated March 28, April 2 and April 11. The first stated that a non-Aboriginal militia leader recently active to the north, hospital director Dr. Chen Tsuan-ti, had retreated with a band of men into the mountains in Meishan Township (near Alishan, as the report points out), and was colluding with Kao I-sheng and "savage elder" Tang I-jen [Tang Shou-jen] in a plot to commence seditious activities. The one hundred or so rebels were also "in the process of devising a way of inciting [the Aborigines]." This report was then relayed on March 29 by Chen Yi to the commander of the 21st Division of the ROC army, Liu Yu-ching. The second report said the group had tried to "lure the savages" into collaborating with them in a long-term guerrilla campaign against government troops. The third report once more specifically named Kao I-sheng and "savage chief" Tang Shou-jen as suspects in this matter.

### The campaign for Aboriginal self-government

At the same time, the situation became more complex and politically charged when it was discovered, or alleged, that Kao I-sheng and others within and outside the Tsou people had commenced a campaign promoting greater Aboriginal autonomy. The first evidence the government received relating to this campaign is contained in the aforementioned reports sent from Peng Meng-chi to Chen Yi and relayed to commander Liu Yu-ching. These reports stated that documents had been confiscated from "bandits" (feitu) in the Kaohsiung County township of Chishan (a non-Aboriginal administrative area to the south) proposing that a meeting of two Aboriginal representatives from each Aboriginal administrative township be held in Wushe on April 10 to "form Aboriginal government." The report recommended that pacification work be implemented

116 AS III, op. cit., pp.244-245.

ibid., pp.129-130.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> AS I, *op. cit.*, p.277.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, p.241.

immediately among Aborigines and that the issue be investigated as a priority. 120

Subsequent intelligence reports provide us with the confiscated "documents" themselves, and official reaction to them is worth examining in some detail. Peng Mengchi sent reports to Chen Yi on March 28 and April 2. The first merely included copies of the handwritten documents, dated March 17, and asked for advice on how to proceed. The second report provides a commentary on the documents, summarising the Japanese-language material attached to it, fleshing out comments in the March 29 report, as well as recommending measures to deal with the matter. It reads:

(1) Two self-styled representatives of Wufeng Township in Tainan County, Kazuo Yata [Kao I-sheng] and Takeshi Yasui [An Meng-chuan], jointly signed and issued a mimeographed notice inciting Kaoshan people to send two representatives from each township to Wushe in Taichung on April 10 to convene a meeting and conspire to commit treason. In addition, they dispatched two followers, Chuan Kou and Lin Tao-sheng, to convey this notice to areas in Kaohsiung County for distribution, and then have it conveyed to Taitung and Hualien Port, etc. Chuan Kou and Lin Tao-sheng were arrested by our people around the time they commenced distribution in Chishan and Hengchun. (2) When the Kaohsiung County government summoned Kaoshan representatives - i.e. Kaoshan chieftains - to attend a meeting on April 1, the Kaoshan representatives reported of their own accord that they had received the aforementioned mimeographed notice, and sincerely indicated that they would never join the rebellion, follow government orders and support government edicts. They also suggested taking this notice to Wushe for the meeting and use it to do the following: (a) urge other Kaoshan people not to be manipulated by thugs (jianfei), (b) employ the ability of Kaoshan people to capture thugs hiding in mountain areas and hand them over for disposal, (c) provide the government with all information acquired from the meeting. (3) The Kaoshan people of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> AS III, op. cit., pp.244-245 and pp.129-130.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> AS VI, op. cit., pp.685-692.

Kaohsiung County make up as many as one third of the total of the province's Kaoshan population and the Kaoshan people of Kaohsiung County can begin to serve a leadership function. The Kaohsiung County government has behaved toward the Kaoshan people of Kaohsiung County in a way that certainly worked against them participating in the rebellion, and it requests that this office submit the measures in (2) above to His Excellency's Office, and that the 21st Division in Taichung be notified that, in regard to Wushe, only the plains areas be blockaded, and that [the Division] temporarily delay an attack in order to avoid misunderstandings from occurring between soldier units and Kaoshan people. An examination of this island-wide disturbance shows that Kaoshan people have acted wisely and have not yet been incited. The aforementioned measures seem to be viable. Apart from notifying the ... 21st Division in Taichung, we are duty bound to wire Your Excellency for instructions. 122

Chen Su-chen reminds us that the messenger "Lin Tao-sheng" was in fact Dr. Lin Li, the same man who had strong ties with the Tsou community and who had lobbied Kao I-sheng to intervene in Chiayi during the 228 Incident. The other messenger, "Chuan Kou," is discussed below. It is also interesting to note how the report cites the Kaohsiung County Aborigines – largely Paiwan people – as a source of potential leadership.

In his notes on this communication, dated April 9, Chen Yi concurred with the suggestions and ordered that the Aboriginal representatives be made to assist the government in eradicating "thugs." He also approved the limiting of blockades to plains areas. <sup>124</sup> Further instructions on the matter were sent to Peng Meng-chi on April 12. <sup>125</sup>

<sup>122</sup> AS III, op. cit., pp.281-283. Emphasis mine.

125 ibid., p218.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994e): "Libo sumingde Gao Yisheng: Gao Yishengde Yuanzhumin zizhiqu lun fanle panluanzui" (The tenacious Kao I-sheng: Kao I-sheng's theory of Aboriginal autonomy becomes an act of sedition). *Taiwan Literature*, 2, pp.33-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.281.

There is no further evidence available on what took place at Wushe and whether the meeting took place. Later, two telephone messages from informants to the Kaohsiung Fortress Command on April 17 and 18 detailed further developments involving Kao Isheng. The information was then passed on from Chen Yi to Liu Yu-ching in Taichung on April 19. The first telephone message reads:

Wufeng Township mayor Kao I-sheng is regretful and will reform (huiguo zixin). He has been in contact with the heads of Minchuan and Liukui townships. The treacherous bandits and thugs who dispersed and fled to the region in the vicinity of Wufeng Township number around seven hundred (among them is a portion of students) and the majority have weapons. They have no accommodation and are camping throughout the mountains. Also, difficulties with provisions have led to theft from Kaoshan people and they are extremely resentful. Currently they and Wufeng Township mayor Kao I-sheng are devising means to resolve the problem of treacherous thugs. Please call nearby Kaoshan people and request that they postpone handing over weapons — only seventy to eighty rifles seized from Chiayi armouries — and make use of them. Also ask the people of Minchuan and Liukui townships to dispatch around a hundred men to assist. This is likely to bring about a successful result. 126

I should note here that there was no Minchuan Township; this report may refer to the *village* of Minchuan in what was then called Maya Township (now Sanmin Township), in the northeast of Kaohsiung County. Sanmin Township is largely populated by Bunun Aborigines, but is also the home of Saalua and Kanakanavtt Aborigines, who are classed as a southern branch of the Tsou.

Liukui Township, on the other hand, is a non-Aboriginal township. Why and how these two township heads were involved with Kao I-sheng, however, remains a mystery.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> AS IV, op. cit., p.427.

Also of interest is the role of northern Kaohsiung County Aborigines in assisting the government to round up rebels, well away from their own homelands.

A second message was left the next morning with the Kaohsiung Fortress Command. It said that there would be no problem regarding Kao's rehabilitation, though it did warn of an ongoing presence of anti-government Han Taiwanese in the area and suggested more action be taken by the military in monitoring them. Chen Yi concurred with this as well, and so the reasonably delicate handling of this matter continued. 127

Another report suggests, however, that the rebel presence in Alishan was beginning to be seen as a potential threat to the entire southwest of Taiwan. This perception might be reflected in a brief but rather elaborate drill ordered by General Peng Meng-chi on April 23. The drill, which simulated an attack on Kaohsiung City by heavily armed rebels based in Alishan, was staged on April 26. The "attack" was launched from Chishan Township, which lies halfway between Kaohsiung City and the Liukui-Maya township area, and therefore lay on the probable route of any genuine attack from the Alishan area. The drill, however, was carried out with an emphasis on logistical ceremony rather than military pomp (gunfire was prohibited). 128 It is also interesting to note that Chishan is the place where Kao I-sheng's alleged messengers earlier attempted to distribute campaign materials promoting Aboriginal autonomy.

There was at least one arrest within the Aboriginal district during this period. Chiayi military police detained Wang Tien-sung on April 16 on suspicion of involvement in seditious activities, and that he had responsibilities relating to the "savage soldiers" (fanjun). The report does not say precisely where he was arrested, or if Aboriginal people within Wufeng Township detained him first. 129

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> *ibid.*, p.428.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> AS III, *op. cit.*, pp.143-148.

129 AS IV, *op. cit.*, p.145.

Generally, however, the military did not let the rules stand in the way of its investigation into the Tsou Unit. It required selected Tsou tribespeople to travel individually from their villages to a station in Fenchihu, where they were forced to do menial labour, attend indoctrination sessions (Tsou tribesman Wang Cheng-yuan says "We didn't understand a single word") undergo interrogation and in some cases receive a degree of punishment for a week or more before returning home. <sup>130</sup>

#### A semblance of stability

In late April, two events took place in Tainan involving the government and Aboriginal communities. Two days before the Kaohsiung drill was staged, the Southern Pacification Zone's "guidance unit" (xuandaozu) undertook a number of propaganda-related activities in Tainan City. Among these was a visit to the Tainan Normal College, where a tea party was held for its Aboriginal students. The forty-four students were aged fifteen to twenty-five, and had been selected the previous October from aspirants in Kaohsiung, Taitung and Taichung counties. The college principal praised their diligence and athletic prowess. After performances of song and dance, self-introductions in halting Mandarin, and the distribution of gifts of stationery, a guidance unit representative explained to the Aborigines that "nationalism within [China amounted to] equality between the races, and we hope that Kaoshan classmates will strive for equal conditions." <sup>131</sup>

The second development related to the Tsou community itself. On April 25, the day before the Kaohsiung drill, more than forty Aborigines from Alishan travelled to Chiayi

130 KS3, op. cit., p.111.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947z): "Nanbu xuandaozu zai nanshi zhaokai Gaoshan qingnian chahui" (Southern guidance unit convenes tea party for Aboriginal youth at Tainan Normal College). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 April 1947, p.4.

City under the "command" of Kao I-sheng, Tang Shou-jen and An Meng-chuan. There they met government and military officials, handed over weapons and requested that they be allowed to "rehabilitate" (zixin) and "repent" (huiwu) for their involvement in the attack on Shuishang Airport. A newspaper report said the government was understanding toward the tribesmen, and on that evening a banquet was arranged for the Aborigines and military officials by Chiayi City mayor Sun Chih-chun. 132

The next day, April 26, Kao I-sheng made a broadcast to the people of Taiwan from Chiayi's radio station. I quote Kao's speech in full, because it has not appeared since and is a rare opportunity to hear his voice, however under duress he may have been:

#### Gentlemen,

I am Kao I-sheng, the mayor of Wufeng Township in Tainan County. It is an honour to have this opportunity today to broadcast to you. Unfortunately, the 228 Incident that has occurred in this province has brought considerable disorder to this beautiful island, a matter that is most heartbreaking. Luckily, through the hard work of the nation's military and every level of government, the situation has calmed down very quickly, which earns our heartfelt thanks.

Since this incident started, thugs from the treacherous party (*jiandang baotu*) moved everywhere spreading rumours that Kaoshan compatriots were storing weapons or convening some sort of conference, thus sewing discord in many cases. We Kaoshan compatriots are the most law-abiding and the most honourable [of people], we absolutely abide by the government and will not team up with treacherous party thugs. On this point we ask all government officials and the gentlemen [listeners] to believe us.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947za): "Gedi zishou zixin yongyao, Gaoshan tongbao chengjiao wuqi" (Eagerness everywhere to surrender and repent, Kaoshan compatriots hand over weapons). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 27 April 1947, p.4.

During this Chiayi incident, we Kaoshan compatriots of Alishan received requests on five or six occasions from a group of gentlemen in Chiayi City and so sent a few people here to Chiayi City to maintain order. This was entirely well-meaning, and we certainly did not join the thugs in committing sedition. Later, we received instructions from Tainan County mayor Yuan [Kuo-chin] and only then understood that we had been tricked by the treacherous party. I then immediately ordered the people who had been dispatched to go back [to Alishan]. Later, as battalion commander Chu [full name not given] swept the Tsaoling area [in present-day Yunlin County] for bandits, we were ordered to dispatch able-bodied men throughout the area to stand guard and assist the military in pacification work. Today, I have already collected the guns scattered throughout the high mountain district and returned them to the Chiayi Security Command division. All of these facts should serve to demonstrate the sincerity of Kaoshan compatriots and to discredit the rumours of the thugs.

The government is extremely concerned for Kaoshan compatriots, and we are very grateful for this. Although Kaoshan compatriots are different in terms of written and spoken languages, we are all members of the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu), therefore we should, as one, love and protect the Republic of China. Our country is large, and every province has minority nations. But in future everyone will be equal, and there will be nothing separating us. This is the principle of nationalism in the Three Principles of the People, and it is also the principle of the nation-state (guozu zhuyi). Our Taiwan must not leave the entirety of the country's peoples and break away.

However, life in the high mountain districts is hard, and cultural levels are still unable to flourish as they would on the plains. I hope the government and compatriots from every sphere will provide us with more support in Wufeng Township. The entire township's compatriots will resolutely abide by the law, obey the government, and move ahead with raising cultural and living standards. We all should support the Nationalist government and

support Chairman Chiang [Kai-shek]. Finally, I wish good health to you, gentlemen.<sup>133</sup>

A few days later, Kao, Tang Shou-jen and An Meng-chuan travelled to Taichung City in the company of Yuan Kuo-chin, the Tainan County mayor. In a ceremony at the 21st Division's Chungshan Room at 10am on April 27 or April 28, the Aborigines presented its commander and Central Pacification Zone head General Liu Yu-ching with silk banners featuring the slogan "protect the country, defend the people." Liu may not have been present; a newspaper report indicates his deputy Tai Chuan-hsin received the delegation along with several senior military and government officials. The officials expressed to the tribesmen their hope that the Aborigines would believe in the Three Principles of the People and support the Nationalist government, study spoken and written Mandarin and promote cooperation between the military and their communities. Six batches of alcohol and cigarettes were also presented for later distribution among the Aboriginal communities.

The role of Yuan Kuo-chin in the rehabilitation of the Tsou Aboriginal leaders should not be underestimated. The Tainan County mayor had earlier met senior military officials and investigators, including Pai Chung-hsi at Hsinying Railway Station on March 22 as he travelled north on his islandwide tour. This was very soon after Yuan's return from hiding in Alishan. Whether Yuan acted on his own volition to help the Tsou Aborigines or whether higher authorities compelled him to do so, or both, is difficult to assess at this time. It is highly likely, however, that Yuan's close links to the Tsou leadership acted as insulation for individuals such as Kao, Tang and An, who otherwise might have been in great trouble. It is also likely, however, that the government continued to be wary of insurrection in the Alishan area. Therefore, the fact that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947zc): "Gao Yisheng guangbo ci" (Text of a broadcast by Kao I-sheng). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 30 April 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947zb): "Dong Tai jun min xiangchu rongqia" (Military and civilians in harmony in eastern Taiwan). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 29 April 1947, p.4. This article erroneously names

Tsou leadership escaped punishment may well have had more to do with strategy than endorsement from Yuan Kuo-chin.

On April 29, Kao, Tang and An continued to Taipei, where they had an audience with Chen Yi. In the presence of senior Tainan County officials they presented Chen and civil affairs office director Chou I-o with silk banners bearing the words "care for the people, love the people" (qin min ai min) and briefly lectured them on their responsibilities to the country. This appears to have been the last step in their rehabilitation.

Kao I-sheng's model for autonomous Aboriginal government

A model for increased self-government, allegedly developed by Kao I-sheng and An Meng-chuan, was in the possession of the military when it first suspected Kao of sedition, though there is no information on where it came from or how the military obtained the data. The model proposed that Aboriginal townships be severed from their counties and combine to form a single county-level government. This "Aboriginal county" was divided into an unspecified number of "autonomous zones," each of which would be headed by the chief of police for that zone.

Each zone would have its own administrative structure, consisting of bureaus of health, finance, reconstruction, education, industry and police. Each bureau had a small number of departments. The employment of younger Aboriginal people (between fifteen and forty-five years of age and presumably men) as security officers as required is

the Aborigines' township as "Fengshan" instead of "Wufeng."

<sup>136</sup> For the autonomy model and accompanying Japanese text, see AS III, op. cit., pp.284-287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947zd): "Wufeng xiangzhang Gao Yisheng xiang zhangguan xian qi zhijing" (Wufeng Township mayor Kao I-sheng pays respects to the governor with presentation of banner). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 30 April 1947, p.4.

especially notable.<sup>137</sup> This would appear to be an attempt to extend the traditional Aboriginal responsibilities of hunting and defence into the modern administrative era: "keeping the peace" remained a communal task, and was not seen to be the exclusive domain of state-appointed police.

The model provides no criteria for determining the nature or number of autonomous zones. It is possible – indeed, it seems likely – that the model extinguished geographical divisions between Aboriginal townships (mostly based on ridges and waterways, similar to plains townships) in order to install new boundaries based on ethnic or tribal distribution. If this was the intention, then it is probable that the thirty Aboriginal townships would have been replaced by a much smaller number of autonomous zones along ethnolinguistic lines, or by a much larger number of zones along community lines.

In addition, the model refers to executive functions and does not describe legislative or representative structures, which presumably were going to be enunciated elsewhere.

The graphic for the model is accompanied by two sets of text. The first provides an overview of the proposal and details of the April 10 meeting. The second set of text is an attachment that appeals to the collective historical experience of Aboriginal people and offers more detail on the reasoning behind the plan:

Taiwan's Aboriginal people (yuanzhumin) were originally the masters of the island of Taiwan, but regardless of the loyalty that was shown to governments of the day, we, the Takasago people, were treated in an insulting manner as a matter of course over several hundred years with expressions such as "untamed savages" and "savages." On the other hand, we stubbornly maintained our martial energy to carve out the image of mountain people (shandiren) as brave and righteous. However, in this way

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> *ibid.*, p.287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> *ibid.*, pp.284-285.

we not only naively sacrificed ourselves by being incited into helping a number of plains [Han Taiwanese] opportunists and revolutionaries dodge bullets, but also had charges of banditry lumped upon us as punishment.

What has been described above has been, in sum, the fate of the Takasago people over the last several hundred years.

Fortunately, democracy has become Taiwan's goal. At this time, a time for the institutionalisation of democracy, we, the Takasago people, must rally together and, for the sake of the happiness and welfare of all Takasago people, establish through peaceful negotiation a territory of which the Takasago people are the master. And although it shall be a territory established by us, with Takasago districts and police bureaus, for example, administratively it shall remain under the jurisdiction of a county mayor and the governor. In addition, the construction of a completely autonomous mountain territory will establish a region that is truly peaceful for the Takasago people.

All people of virtue and influence from mountains throughout the island! We entreat you to graciously put forward your informative ideas at the aforementioned conference. We respectfully request this of you. 139

One striking feature of this postscript is the early use of the characters for *yuanzhumin* in Kanji to denote Aboriginal people, a term which the Aboriginal movement would later champion from the 1980s before enjoying government recognition in the 1990s.

More importantly, there is no evidence in this material to suggest that the autonomy campaign was a reaction to the 228 Incident. There is a substantial possibility that Kao I-sheng and others had been formulating their ideas for some months. One important question that also remains unanswered is whether the model intended to incorporate the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> *ibid.*, p.286. This quote is based on a Chinese translation of the Japanese text; see Chen Su-chen (1994e), *op. cit.*, pp.36-37.

other half of Aboriginal communities falling outside the thirty Aboriginal townships. The word for the proposed territory is *gaoshan*, an ambiguous expression that can either refer to both non-assimilated and semi-assimilated Aborigines as an entire "race" (including the plains-dwelling Amis and Beinan peoples and the mountain-dwelling Thao at Sun Moon Lake), or else only those Aborigines in dedicated Aboriginal townships.

There may have been a plan to include plains-dwelling Aborigines: "Chuan Kou," one of the messengers arrested for publicising the meeting in Wushe, was an Amis tribesmen from Hualien known as Wu Chung-cheng who had been adopted by a Tsou family and who later married into the Tsou community. If the messengers intended to travel to Taitung and Hualien, as the military's report alleges, Wu Chung-cheng may have been the messenger, and he may have targeted Amis communities there. Thus, the two representatives invited from each township to attend the meeting may have included those from non-Aboriginal townships containing Aboriginal communities — and in the case of Hualien and Taitung, every township fell into this category. The annexation of plains-dwelling Aborigines into a provincial Aboriginal county would have had a drastic impact on the structure of Hualien and Taitung counties and generated considerable friction.

Another important problem is the authenticity of the autonomy model itself. Chen Suchen implies that the documents featuring the model and accompanying text may have been fabricated. She argues that Kao I-sheng would not have signed the documents with his Japanese name, given that he had already been using his Chinese name for some time in his dealings with county officials.<sup>141</sup> This is a reasonable point, but it does not seem unreasonable that Kao I-sheng would have used his Japanese name when communicating with the many Aboriginal leaders who were barely literate in Mandarin.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> *ibid*., p.34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> *ibid.*, p.33.

It is certainly unlikely that the model and accompanying text are the originals as presented in the intelligence report. This point is well made by Chen Su-chen. 142 Upon closer examination, the two versions of the administrative flow chart published by the Academia Sinica reveal different handwriting and minor textual discrepancies, indicating that one or possibly both are handwritten copies of the original document. The first version of the flow chart in a document dated April 2 (published in 1993), 143 appears to be a corruption of an earlier version in a document dated March 28 (published in 1997). 144 The 1993 version includes unsimplified forms of five characters consistent with Chinese usage (e.g., "zone" and "study"), whereas the 1997 version uses the simplified forms. In addition, the 1993 version contains one text error and one text omission not found in the 1997 version. One character is also changed entirely – from chan to mu (see Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6). The accompanying texts also feature a number of minor discrepancies, which were probably copying errors. 145

However, the important question to ask is not whether these versions are authentic, but whether they were copied from an authentic document penned by Kao and/or An. I am inclined to say there indeed was an original document, because a document concocted by the military or other security organs would have been less restrained and more incriminating in its attempt to implicate Kao and An in anti-government activity. A forgery designed to frame the Aborigines in question would have included references to communism or – at the very least – to the Japanese, given that the government blamed these two groups for the 228 Incident.

<sup>142</sup> *ibid*..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> AS III, op. cit., p.287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> AS VI, op. cit., p.692.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Cf. AS III, op. cit., pp.284-286; and AS VI, op. cit., pp.686-691.




Figure 5.5: Scan of Kao I-sheng's plan for autonomous Aboriginal government from intelligence document dated March 28, 1947, including markings showing examples of discrepancies with Figure 5.6. Source: AS VI, op. cit., p.692.




Figure 5.6: Scan of Kao I-sheng's plan for autonomous Aboriginal government from intelligence document dated April 2, 1947, including markings showing examples of discrepancies with Figure 5.5. Source: AS III, op. cit., p.287.

The available documents depict nothing of the sort. It is difficult to imagine that a forgery devised to implicate Kao I-sheng and others in seditious activity would include the entirely sensible suggestion that an Aboriginal county "remain under the jurisdiction of a county mayor and the governor."

Considering the volumes of compromised evidence and the routine abuse of due process over the course of KMT rule, these would be fabrications of the most unusual subtlety and sophistication. In addition, there is no reference to this matter in the legal documents relating to Kao's execution in 1954.

The model proposed nothing particularly radical or hostile to the authority of the national or provincial authorities, although county authorities would have been angered at the prospect of losing access to areas boasting significant natural resources. But the proximity of the autonomy campaign to the instability of the 228 Incident meant that it was inescapably associated with subversive activity, and probably represented a loss of face for the KMT.

Han Taiwanese criticism of the conduct of the KMT administrators and the resulting loss of face for the regime before and during the 228 Incident are essential to understanding the period, according to George Kerr. 146 The strongest impression I have of the literature on the 228 Incident is that the great majority of people imprisoned and executed for their involvement in disposal committees and other organisations supported reform of a spectacularly inept and corrupt administration – but not its destruction. Once order was restored and the offending elements disposed of, the KMT recognised the gravity of the situation and began to implement – to a degree – some of the very reforms that the Taipei disposal committee demanded, the foremost being the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Kerr (1965), op. cit., pp.309-310.

almost immediate replacement of Chen Yi's administration with a provincial government. It is possible, then, that the central government's crackdown on Taiwan's elites from March 9 was as much a reaction to the style of opposition as to its content.

It is therefore worth considering the offense that mainlander administrators might have felt when Kao I-sheng attempted to speak to the regime on an equal basis. As I showed in Chapter Three, a broad range of newspaper articles and government officials considered Aborigines to be barely out of the realm of savagery. In this light, Kao I-sheng's attempt to mobilise elites to discuss political grievances takes on a rather insolent appearance. It dared to elevate the status of Aboriginal government from one of fragmentation across Taiwan's counties to a single administration on an ethnic level equal to the Han.

The problem with the proposal for Aboriginal autonomy, as with Lin Jui-chang's proposal to recover land in Taoyuan County, was that it challenged authorities to embrace the principle of *minzu pingdeng* (national or ethnic equality), which some Aboriginal leaders were now interpreting quite broadly. In the wake of the 228 Incident and the security sweeps that followed, however, there was no longer room – in public – for such a discourse.

### **Conclusions**

The government's reaction to Aboriginal involvement in the 228 Incident was remarkably judicious and bloodless compared with the killings and retribution inflicted on Han Taiwanese. This was particularly evident in Chiayi, where the Tsou Unit's punishment consisted of little more than intimidation, a short stretch of manual labour and lectures on Sunist thought. It is clear, however, that the military was wary of the

Alishan area because of the Han Taiwanese escapees hiding there and the possibility that Kao I-sheng had not returned all of the weapons stored among the Tsou villages. This gives weight to the theory that authorities were biding their time before responding in a more punitive fashion. But Kao I-sheng, Tang Shou-jen, An Meng-chuan and other Tsou figures seemingly underwent a genuine and public process of rehabilitation, which the intervention of Tainan County mayor Yuan Kuo-chin might have contributed to.

Much of the government's rationale for this special treatment was based on the idea that the Aborigines were still too close to their primitive state and had not been exposed to a sufficiently rigorous Nationalist re-education. Aborigines, according to Chiang Chingkuo, were highly susceptible to incitement, especially by communists, though the only contact between communists and Aborigines occurred in Taichung City and Wushe, where the villagers roundly rejected the approaches of Hsieh Hsueh-hung. Indeed, Pai Chung-hsi's statement that Aborigines had "acted with great wisdom" in resisting incitement sits curiously with labels of cultural backwardness. What is most interesting is that in all of the intelligence documents there is not a single characterisation of Aboriginal people relating to ethnolinguistic group or region. This points to the government actually believing its own broad ascriptions for Aboriginal people, although security forces were no doubt interested in the activities of individuals.

The new political role of Aboriginality becomes apparent in the aftermath of the 228 Incident. Nan Chih-hsin's broadcast as provincial Aboriginal representative, his unidentified son's appeal to Aboriginal people to act as a vanguard of democracy, the employment of Ma Chih-li as a roving Aboriginal ambassador, and the politically beneficial pacification tours of the Taipei County Aboriginal mayors all constitute a firming of pan-Aboriginal sentiment. Kao I-sheng's plan for an autonomous government was the most direct expression of this, though its unfortunate timing and use of Japanese were always going to meet strong government opposition.

Finally, the *qingxiang* campaign started the process of quarantining Aboriginal people from the very society that was supposed to assimilate them. As we shall see in the next two chapters, the assumption that tight mountain security and close party control of almost every component of Aboriginal people's lives would facilitate this process was wrong.

## **Chapter Six**

# The White Terror and quarantined Aboriginality

From the end of the 1940s – when the KMT began retreating to Taiwan – to the start of the Korean War, the mountainous area of Taiwan and the Aboriginal people living there became entangled in a growing security crisis as the likelihood of communist attack grew. In this chapter, we turn to the Aboriginal elites, communities and regions that were caught up in this crisis, and examine the extent to which dissenting Aborigines suffered from government conflation of their political and cultural interests with communist infiltration.

The evidence clearly shows that Aboriginal leaders and communities were priority targets as part of communist attempts to establish bases in the mountains. In response, the government liquidated capable and assertive Aboriginal leaders and intellectuals and turned the expression of Aboriginality into a security threat. This situation, combined with mountain entry restrictions, amounted to a quarantining of Aboriginal ethnic expression and identity. In this chapter, I discuss how this process of quarantine and the downfall of this new generation of Aboriginal leaders served to *undermine* assimilationist policy.

Seemingly unscathed by the 228 Incident and the *qingxiang* campaign, Kao I-sheng, Ma Chih-li, Nan Chih-hsin and Lin Jui-chang continued to promote Aboriginal interests and encourage greater engagement with the larger community and the greater economy. The declaration of martial law in April 1948 had little effect on these activities at first.

#### Hsinmei Farm

One of the more interesting examples of such engagement was an agricultural endeavour in Alishan that would play a role in the downfall of two of these four key leaders. Kao, Lin and Tsou tribesman Tu Hsiao-sheng worked together to establish the Hsinmei Farm, a project aimed not only at providing much-needed income to Tsou villagers from plantation harvests and milking cows, but also to protect the Tsengwen River, dikes and dam infrastructure downstream from damage after torrential rains.

Only nine months after the 228 Incident, the Tainan County government gave its support to Kao to move villagers into the area to take advantage of land that had become disused under the Japanese.<sup>1</sup> The project, originally called the Shanmei Farm, also provided for Han Taiwanese participation in its day-to-day operations, and enjoyed coverage in the national press, including a lengthy feature by reporter Chen Hsueh-ming and a story on the farm's formation and funding difficulties in the *Central Daily News*.<sup>2</sup> Chen had already written a substantial feature on Wufeng Township a few months earlier in which he described Kao I-sheng as the most "prestigious" of the Aboriginal leaders and Tang Shou-jen as the second key figure in the township. Both men provided the reporter with most of his information for the feature.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See the additional report to *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1947ze): "Baoliudi nianwuwan gongqing zhuan gong zengjin shandi jianshe" (250,000 hectares of reserved land to be used specially for expanding mountain area development). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 10 November 1947, p.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Chen Hsueh-ming (1950b): "Kaikenzhongde chunüdi – Xinmei jiti nongchang sumiao" (Virgin land under development – a sketch of the Hsinmei Collective Farm). Central Daily News, 2 August 1950, p.8; and Central Daily News (1951a): "Wufeng xiang Xinmei nongchang dingding zhengdun jihua" (Hsinmei Farm in Wufeng Township seals recovery plan). Central Daily News, 27 March 1951, p.6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Chen Hsueh-ming (1950a): "Shandi jianshe jinbuzhong – Tainan xian Wufeng xiang shanbao fangwen ji" (Mountain area development in progress – a record of interviews with mountain compatriots in Wufeng Township, Tainan County). Central Daily News, 22 May 1950, p.8.

But the farm project soured when it became the basis for trumped-up charges of corruption that Tu says were a cover for Kao's destruction by security forces. Tu was later jailed over the incident and shunned on his return to the community.<sup>4</sup> I will return to this matter in a moment.

Crackdown on an Amis 'secret organisation'

Elsewhere in Taiwan, there were no reports in the media of security problems involving Aboriginal people, but there was a steady series of stories detailing Aboriginal hardship and the extensive measures the government was supposedly introducing to solve these problems.

In November 1949, however, a newspaper reported that thirty-four Amis youths had been arrested in Hualien for participating in an illegal organisation. The youths were apparently former Japanese soldiers, and had formed the group to "restore the Japanese bushido spirit." There are no more details on what the suspects were accused of doing, but the report does say that the authorities magnanimously released them to the mayors of their home townships in view of their youth and ignorance.<sup>5</sup>

I could find no other references to this matter in the literature. Relying on contacts in Hualien, I located Lin Tien-ching, a retired Amis policeman, who witnessed this group being brought into his police station. He said the young people involved were not capable of sedition, and had been informed on – possibly out of spite – by another Amis tribesman. Lin said the group was simply holding a meeting in line with the Amis

<sup>4</sup> See Chen Su-chen (1995): "Yunshan shenchude yongzhe – Taiwan zaozhumin zai baise kongbu shidaide shounanzhe" (Heroes deep in the misty mountains – Taiwan Aboriginal victims in the White Terror era). *Taiwan Literature*, 12, pp.104-105.

<sup>5</sup> See *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1949): "Hualian pohu fandong zuzhi" (Reactionary organisation busted in Hualien). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 28 November, 1949, p.5.

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system of age-group gatherings (*nianling jieceng*). Martial law meant that such a gathering without permission – regardless of purpose – was illegal, but it is not clear why the security forces chose to depict this group as seditious. Lin said that the group was detained for one night in Hualien and that eight of its number were transferred to Taipei for further investigation before returning home. The arrests, he said, made him sad at the time, and other Amis tribespeople were very angry, but there was nothing that could be done. Other than provoking anger, the impact of this arrest on local Amis villages is not clear, but it is sensible to assume that the tribespeople now viewed certain cultural events as vulnerable to arbitrary police attention.

### The raid on Leveh Village

Meanwhile, Kao I-sheng continued to cultivate media connections and meet senior leaders and other prominent figures. At various times he had audiences with Chiang Kaishek and Soong May-ling, premier Chen Cheng, Chiang Ching-kuo and his wife Chiang Fang-liang, provincial governor Wu Kuo-chen and Lien Chen-tung.<sup>7</sup>

Two weeks after his latest meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng (see Figure 6.1), national newspapers announced on April 1, 1951, that security forces had raided the village of Leyeh in Wufeng Township and seized weapons and ammunition that was being stored there. Kao I-sheng and Tang Shou-jen were among the main suspects and accused of sedition, but allowed to "repent" and "rehabilitate." In a moment, I will discuss this incident in greater detail below in the context of the overall network of communist agents in Taiwan. For now it is worth noting that the Ministry of National

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Lin Tien-ching, September 26, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For Kao's last meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Soong May-ling and Chen Cheng before the raid on Leyeh Village, see *Central Daily News* (1951b): "Hualian Amei zu daibiao mingri jin sheng jiang yejian zongtong zhijing" (Hualien Amis delegates visit provincial government tomorrow, will have an audience with the president and pay their respects). *Central Daily News*, 14 March 1951, p.3.




Figure 6.1: Scan of story in the March 14, 1951, edition of the *Central Daily News* on meetings between Aboriginal delegates from Hualien County and Wufeng Township and Chiang Kaishek, Chen Cheng and other senior officials, including photograph of Kao I-sheng (first left) and Kao Chu-hua (second left) meeting Chen Cheng (centre).

Defense's lengthy statement on the matter describes communist plans for a "mountain area democratic and autonomous government" as an attempt to divide and weaken the Nationalist authorities. It also argues in considerable detail that the communist line of identifying Aborigines as originating in the South Seas was a plot to divide people, and that Aborigines in fact belonged to the "yellow race," not the "brown race." Also noteworthy is the claim that the communist operatives devised the name "Penglai" as a unifying ethnic term for Taiwan's Aborigines, and that their committee had subcommittees responsible for each of seven Aboriginal ethnolinguistic groups.<sup>9</sup>

But despite the seriousness of this situation and the supposedly perilous nature of the Alishan area, the Ministry of National Defense sent Chiang Ching-kuo's wife, Faina Chiang Fang-liang, to Wufeng within a week as head of a women's group to meet the local leadership and undertake pacification work.<sup>10</sup>

### Aboriginal dissidence in National Security Bureau files

I now turn to a wider appraisal of security breaches in Aboriginal areas that places the Leyeh raid in context. One of the most valuable documents to become available in Taiwan in the last fifteen years is a confidential collection of sedition case files produced by the National Security Bureau that date from the end of the 1940s to the mid-1950s. These files were supplied to Li Ao — the maverick historian, one-time political prisoner

For the Ministry of National Defense's report, see Central Daily News (1951d): "Fei yinmou chedi shibai" (Bandit conspiracy fails utterly). Central Daily News, 1 April 1951, pp.1-3. This edition of the newspaper, as well as the same day's editions of the Taiwan Hsinshengpao and the Kunglunpao, have numerous stories relating to this development. All include handout photographs of Leyeh Village, the

seized weapons and places where the weapons were stored. There are no images of the suspects.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, p.1. The Rukai and Beinan groups were probably classified under the Paiwan group in this list.

<sup>10</sup> For the late Chiang Fang-liang's trip to Wufeng after the Leyeh raid, see *Central Daily News* (1951c): "Guofangbu fulian fenhui weilao shanbao guilai" (A chapter of the United Women's Group under the Ministry of National Defense entertains mountain compatriots and returns). *Central Daily News*, 9 April

and presidential candidate, and since December 2004 an independent legislator – after a former senior intelligence officer, Ku Cheng-wen, became disenchanted with the direction of the KMT under the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui.<sup>11</sup>

These files are rich in material showing not only that communist agents targeted Aboriginal individuals and communities for indoctrination, but also that these attempts to use Aboriginal communities and territory had a profound impact on administrative policy.

The files are not without problems. At least some of the evidence convicting suspects is likely to have been fabricated, not least because of the techniques used to extract confessions. These included torture and the provision of bonuses for "confessions" that met the expectations of investigators. There are also discrepancies in dates and inexplicable delays between the times some crimes are said to have been committed and the execution of sentences. In general, however, the files are an excellent first source of data for showing the extent to which Aboriginal communities and Aboriginality were monitored and quarantined.

The Mountain Area Work Committee and Alishan

The first sedition case points to early KMT concern about mountain areas becoming bases for communist activity. It was solved on November 8, 1949, and referred to attempts by two suspects to establish an armed base in the Alishan area. However, Aboriginal people are not mentioned in the case summary.<sup>13</sup> Another case, solved in

1951, p.2.

12 ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See Ku Cheng-wen (1995), op. cit., especially Li Ao's introduction and pp.246-253 for the material relating to Lee Teng-hui.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.10-13.

January 1950, provides more detail of seditious activity linking Aboriginal areas to units under the umbrella of the communist Taiwan Province Work Committee. Communist agent and Taipei City Work Committee member Kuo Hsiu-tsung, who attempted to rally Wulai's Aborigines during the 228 Incident, was one of dozens arrested in a case which saw the mountains north of Taipei City as well as Wulai emerge as a potential base for military activity. In addition, the Tsou Aboriginal village of Leyeh in Wufeng Township was named as a communist refuge, complete with an administrative chapter made up of fugitive dissidents. Prior to his arrest and execution, Kuo Hsiu-tsung also spent time developing communist infrastructure in the Ilan area as part of the Lanyang Area Work Committee. 15

However, a much fuller picture of alleged communist designs in mountain areas and among Aboriginal communities emerges in a sedition case relating to the Taiwan Province Work Committee itself.<sup>16</sup> The case was cracked between October 1949 and February 1950 and broke the back of Taiwan's communist network. The leader of the network, Tsai Hsiao-chien, proved to be a most fruitful subject for interrogation. He provided the names of key network figures, which led to the unmasking of cells around Taiwan – including the Taiwan Province Mountain Area Work Committee, discussed below – and the arrest of hundreds if not thousands of people. Many of these people were subsequently tortured, imprisoned and executed, but Tsai was allowed to "rehabilitate" (zixin) and climbed through the lower ranks of the KMT security apparatus. Late in his life he lived as a recluse in the northern Taipei suburb of Shihlin, before dying in 1982.<sup>17</sup>

The case highlights the communist perception that Aboriginal people and territory were

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, pp.14-22.

<sup>17</sup> Yang Pi-chuan (1997), op. cit., p.19.

<sup>15</sup> ibid. Lanyang is the name of the major river that runs through the Ilan plain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Li Ao (ed.)(1991a): Anquanju jimi wenjian linian banli fei'an huibian (shangce) (Secret documents from the National Security Bureau: a collection of "Bandit" cases handled over the years, part 1). Taipei: Li Ao, pp.12-18.

essential to a viable network of bases in Taiwan. Its broad strategy was to:

"Closely mobilise workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals," adopt "the principles of opposing American imperialism and KMT officials and supporting the implementation of democracy and autonomy," call on "persons from all classes throughout the province, including mainlanders and Kaoshan compatriots, to organise an extensive patriotic (aiguo) and nativist (aixiang) united front for democracy and autonomy." First commence a "movement of non-cooperation" and a "movement of resistance," then finally set in motion an "armed uprising" to coordinate with the "People's Liberation Army's liberation of Taiwan." 18

The targeting of Aboriginal communities was one of a number of priorities, but it required particular effort to allow Aboriginal people to join their Han Taiwanese compatriots in a common struggle. A section in the report devoted to Aboriginal matters provides detail of these methods. The first fundamental aim in building a communist presence in Taiwan was establishing an autonomy and self-defence movement for Aboriginal people that would bring about their "national liberation" (minzu jiefang). The second aim was to convince Aboriginal people that their autonomy and security was inseparable from the "anti-KMT, anti-US imperialism" struggle of the Taiwanese people. The communists hoped that Aboriginal people would eventually co-ordinate with Taiwanese militia in rural and mountain villages and launch attacks on KMT troops from the rear during an attack on the island.

Practical measures to bring this about included winning over the chieftains, township mayors and village heads in Aboriginal townships; winning over Aboriginal intellectuals (especially employees of administrative offices and co-operatives), schoolteachers, police personnel and township representatives; and winning over non-Aboriginal people working in mountain areas in order to infiltrate local governments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Li Ao (1991a) op. cit., pp.12-13. The quote marks correspond to quote marks in the text.

Of considerable interest here is a specific restriction the communist agents placed on Aboriginal people in relation to revolutionary activity.

Propaganda work of an ideological nature must not be used, and in particular, secret documents are not to be passed directly to Kaoshan people or viewed by them.<sup>19</sup>

The communist agents were of the opinion that Aboriginal people, including intellectuals and leaders, would be unable to comprehend or accept the ideological bases of communism, and that attempting to explain them would jeopardise the entire campaign. Nor were Aboriginal people considered capable of holding information in confidence. This condition, which was not applied to Han Taiwanese, is fascinating because it calls into question the "guilt" of Aboriginal suspects charged with sedition. But despite the security agencies' acknowledgement that Aboriginal suspects were being deceived by communist agents for strategic reasons, many of the suspects went on to receive severe sentences.

In late March 1950, another cell was exposed in Taichung County.<sup>20</sup> The National Security Bureau file in question states that various bases were being developed in the mountainous regions of Taichung County. One of these – Paimao Mountain – was adjacent to the Atayal communities of Hoping Township. Although no Aboriginal people were arrested in this case, the file indicates that Aboriginal communities were potential targets.

Five major problems beset the communists in establishing civilian militia in Taiwan. First, supplies in the mountains were scarce, while conducting activities in plains areas

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, pp.38-43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, p.15.

was very difficult. Second, civilians had few, if any, weapons. Third, the military were closely watching cities and other urban and industrial infrastructure. Fourth, the strict administrative system of household registration (*baojia*) was obstructive. Finally, Aboriginal people were not being targeted very effectively. However, agents did not consider these problems to be insurmountable. They thought that a common hatred of the KMT might nourish the development of a viable civilian guerilla force operating from the mountains. They also thought that Aboriginal people could be "talked into participating in the 'People's Liberation Army' because their lives are full of hardship."<sup>21</sup>

The Taichung file includes a commentary by the author on how to deal with this threat.

With regard to Aboriginal people, he concluded:

In handling Kaoshan compatriots, the government should use economic and educational means to raise their cultural and living standards, while on the other hand it should strictly prevent undercover Communist Bandits from infiltrating mountain area administration work so that they cannot exploit it. Another method to consider is issuing propaganda and explaining the malicious ways of Communist Bandits to mountain compatriots.<sup>22</sup>

More generally, but no less pertinent to Aboriginal administration, the report said that:

At times, township mayors, village heads and inspectors at police stations in remote regions are in effect the rulers (tongzhizhe) of those regions. The Communist Bandits' consistent policy towards these kinds of people has explicitly been not to destroy or attack them but rather to devise ways of winning them over, making them part of the so-called "two-faced faction" (liangmianpai). Thus, the government's control over the average township mayor and village head and police inspector must be strengthened, otherwise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, p.41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, p.42.

the Communist Bandit conspiracy could be realised most readily. If these people someday become members of the so-called "two-faced faction," this will make purging concealed Communist Bandit elements even more difficult.23

In April 1950, the section of the Taiwan Province Work Committee specialising in Aboriginal communities was exposed.<sup>24</sup> Its parent group, the Mountain Area Work Committee, had been established in October 1949 by Chien Chi, a renowned left-wing activist and former political prisoner. A native of Kaohsiung, he had been a thorn in the side of the Japanese in previous decades, organising a peasant movement and staging hundreds of protests. Later he was jailed for ten years for his dissidence. After 1945, Chien held a number of low-level government posts. His first serious act of opposition to the KMT government took place during the 228 Incident, when he helped organise one of the civilian militia in Chiayi.<sup>25</sup>

Chien had also been in frequent contact with his old associate, Tsai Hsiao-chien, who now headed the Taiwan Province Work Committee, and fell directly under Tsai's command in the first half of 1949. Chien became secretary of the Mountain Area Work Committee, and he and two fellow Han Taiwanese, Wei Ju-lo and Chen Hsien-fu, were each responsible for recruiting members and "inciting the masses" in one of three sectors - northern, central and southern Taiwan. Lower-level cadres were ordered to "devise strategies of infiltration among mountain compatriots, encourage 'national selfdetermination' (minzu zijue), promote 'autonomy and self-defence' (zizhi ziwei), facilitate mobilisation among each tribe and win over chieftains, township mayors and village heads for each tribe, as well as intellectuals, public servants, teachers and [Aboriginal] students, as part of secretly carrying out subversive activities."26

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, p.43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.72-78.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Yang Pi-chuan (1997), op. cit., pp.107-108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.72-73. A list of names of other Han Taiwanese arrested for their connection to this committee is available at Li Hsuan-feng (ed.)(1998a): Taiwan diqu jieyan shiqi wushi niandai

These conspiratorial activities – and the way the report depicts them – closely resemble the case file for the Taiwan Province Work Committee. Indeed, one appears to be a template for the other, with the only notable difference between them being the replacement of the term *gaoshanzu* (Kaoshan people) with *shandi tongbao* (mountain compatriots). Why this substitution was made is not clear, but it points to modification of the latter file after the former term fell into official disuse.

This case file gives rich detail of the communist network's plans for mountain areas and names Aboriginal people suspected of involvement. The activities included setting up an armed base stocked with supplies; directing arms to the Wulai and Sun Moon Lake areas to protect reservoirs and power infrastructure; establishing hospitals and weapons maintenance facilities; setting up communications facilities including telephony and radio while co-opting government radio and meteorological stations at Hsinkaoshan (Yushan); gathering maps and other materials suitable for training unit members; selecting influential Aboriginal figures who could promote "national self-determination" and communism among their communities; recruiting young Aboriginal people into communist organisations; and expanding financial resources.<sup>27</sup> The second last of these activities, of course, does not sit comfortably with the earlier requirement that Aboriginal people be kept away from ideological propaganda.

Although this case was solved well before the final arrests of Aboriginal provincial assemblyman Lin Jui-chang, Atayal policeman Kao Tse-chao and Chiayi county committee member Tang Shou-jen, it is the first to describe their offending activities. The three men were accused of joining the Communist Party after being promised personal advancement. The "Alishan Pavilion," a business managed by Tang Shou-jen in

zhengzhi anjian shiliao huibian (yi) zhong wai dang'an (A compilation of historical material of political cases in the period of martial law in Taiwan, vol. 1: Chinese and foreign files). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., p.74.

Leveh Village, was a part of the support network for the committee. The report also says that a "Takasago People's Autonomy Committee" - later renamed the "Penglai National Liberation Committee" and the subject of an investigation in its own right, as I describe below - included chairman Lin Jui-chang, the political chief, and committee member Tang Shou-jen, the military chief.<sup>28</sup>

The commentary for this case indicates that the infiltration of Aboriginal communities was becoming a serious concern for the KMT:

That a provincial assemblyman within our government and an employee in mountain area work within a local police department turned out to be recruited and used by the Bandits, and without anyone's knowledge prior to this matter, certainly points to major faults in our systems for personnel background checks and evaluation. In addition, the familiarity of police personnel with the stance we hold and the stance the Bandits hold is inadequate.29

The commentary also said that:

Such a bold means of penetration would have very easily expanded their organisation and their strength.30

The report has an extensive list of people involved in the case, though no other Aboriginal people appear to be among them. There is no mention of Kao I-sheng, but one key Han Taiwanese figure discussed in Chapter Four is on the list. Lin Li, the doctor who lobbied Kao I-sheng to mobilise the Tsou and attack government forces in Chiayi during the 228 Incident three years earlier, was accused of being a cadre in the Mountain Area Work Committee. He was executed, together with at least ten other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> *ibid*..
<sup>29</sup> *ibid*., p.76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, p.75.

suspects, including Lin Jui-chang and Kao Tse-chao.31

The Sedition Case of Kaoshan Bandit agent Tang Shou-jen et al.

In the previous case file, Tang Shou-jen does not appear on the list of those convicted. Instead, he figures prominently in a case that cast the widest shadow over a number of Aboriginal communities, and is indeed named after him.<sup>32</sup> It led to the execution of six Aboriginal elite figures – four Tsou tribesmen (Kao I-sheng, Tang Shou-jen, Wang Ching-shan and Fang I-chung<sup>33</sup>) and two Atayal tribesmen (Lin Jui-chang and Kao Tsechao). It also resulted in lengthy sentences for two other Tsou Aborigines – Kao's maternal half-brother Tu Hsiao-sheng received fifteen years, and Wu I-te was given a life sentence (see Figure 6.2). One Han Taiwanese, Liao Li-chuan, received a twelve-year sentence.<sup>34</sup>

The case synopsis states that Kao I-sheng and Tang Shou-jen met Chen Hsien-fu in the summer of 1949 and then through him met twice with Lin Jui-chang, Kao Tse-chao and Chien Chi in Taipei City, where they discussed administrative and security matters in Aboriginal areas to facilitate communist infiltration. Chen is also alleged to have ordered the formation of the "Takasago People's Autonomy Association" (or "Committee" as it was called in the earlier case file). Activities attributed to Tang Shou-jen and the other suspects included those mentioned in the Taiwan Province Work Committee file: indoctrination of Aboriginal youth, protection of water and power supplies, preparation for a coordinated attack on KMT troops at the time of a communist invasion, and so on.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p.76.

<sup>35</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.86-87.

<sup>33</sup> ibid., p.86. The file misidentifies the latter two names as Wang Ku-shan and Fang I-shen.

<sup>34</sup> ibid.. The file misidentifies the latter name as Wu Te-i.




Figure 6.2: Ex-political prisoner Wu I-te pictured in Tapang Village during its biannual mayasvi (Tsou war ceremony) in February 2000.

The file spells out five "conspiratorial strategies" in some detail:

- 1. Exploit the courage and ferocity of Kaoshan compatriots as well as their blindness to current events by organising the "Takasago People's Autonomy Committee" and developing Kaoshan work.
- 2. Exploit remote networks in mountain areas to provide administration in those areas that the authorities have neglected. Seek out Kaoshan compatriots in these areas who possess strong leadership; develop bogus<sup>36</sup> Bandit organisations, coordinate with a Bandit army attack on Taiwan.
- 3. Use the remoteness of Kaoshan areas and developing or established organisations and connections to conceal either Bandit agents who have "slipped through the net" or those political criminals whom the government has announced should be hunted down and arrested. Also assist them in obtaining daily necessities and accommodation. Implement a strategy of "attacking when advancing and defending when retreating."
- 4. Arrange for "national self-determination representatives" to prepare for the protection of hydroelectricity generators and sources of water at Sun Moon Lake and Wulai, thus safeguarding important power facilities for the Bandits.
- 5. Work hard to take advantage of the special geographical characteristics of mountain areas and the special features of mountain compatriots. Perform indirect development and control work through influential mountain compatriots who have already been recruited.<sup>37</sup>

The file then says that Kao I-sheng, Tang Shou-jen and other suspects in the case, who had surrendered to the authorities earlier (the circumstances of this surrender are not described), had exploited the magnanimity of the government after being released by continuing to associate with communists and plotting against the government. They were therefore arrested "because of their incorrigibility." However, there is no mention

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> The word "bogus" (*wei*) customarily preceded the names of communist organisations and titles in official documents and in the news media.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., p.86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, p.87.

in the file of corruption allegations against Kao I-sheng relating to the Hsinmei Farm, allegations which were communicated to Tsou tribespeople at the time and most likely inventions to minimise community backlash. This matter will be discussed below.

The bureau's final assessment of this case is quite candid and worth quoting in full:

The case of the Bandits' Taiwan Province Work Committee is one in which development of mountain area work was the most concrete and the most effective. In this case, the mountain area personnel they brought into this organisation included a mountain area provincial assemblyman and persons responsible for mountain area township administration, young Aboriginal people and policing. It is not difficult to imagine the potential for disaster had this case not been solved in time, given the ease with which mountain compatriots can be riled and the special features of the mountain environment. Inspection of records shows, however, that the Communist Bandits at that time did not have a thorough understanding of the special nature of mountain compatriots. This can be observed in the review by Bandit Tsai Hsiao-chien, the leader of the Bandits. Tsai said: "Our work among the Kaoshan people was a failure. This is because we implemented the same set of methods in mountain areas that we used in the plains. We didn't grasp their distinctiveness - such as their simple way of thinking, their simple lifestyle, their emphasis on practical matters, and lack of experience in keeping a secret - let alone activate their political consciousness..." Moreover, it can be seen from inspection of the circumstances relating to Communist Bandit "mountain area work" activities that, ever since the solving of this case, there has been no active keeping of records [by the communists]. This could demonstrate that some influence was exerted on the Bandit group's mountain area work following Bandit Tsai's assessment. This strongly warrants an assessment of the mountain area work we have undertaken.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> *ibid.*.

The file says the case was solved in October 1950 – some time before its suspects were arrested.<sup>40</sup>

This was not the last file to deal with seditious activities in the Alishan area. Greater detail on the activities of the executed Tsou tribesmen is included in a related case closed in February 1952. Here, Tang Shou-jen is accused of harbouring known communists at his residence (Leyeh Village) and elsewhere as early as February 1950. By March, Tang helped to protect an increasing number of fugitives and stored weapons for later use. Many of the fugitives worked at Tang Shou-jen's soy sauce factory (this is presumably the "Alishan Pavilion" referred to earlier) to earn their keep. The fugitives may also have opened up land for cultivation.<sup>41</sup>

The two other executed Tsou tribesmen allegedly abetted in the transfer of fugitives from Chiayi City to Alishan and helped to shelter them after they arrived. Fang I-chung was sent by Tang Shou-jen to manage a store named "Minsheng" in Chiayi City, which was the first point of contact for fugitives before entering Wufeng Township. Fugitives unfamiliar with the store's staff used a password to verify their identity. Once in the mountains, these fugitives would be protected by certain police officers – assistant police officer Wang Ching-shan is named as one of these police – who would escort and conceal them, even validating papers if need be.<sup>42</sup>

The file says Tsai Hsiao-chien visited the village on one occasion to inspect the area, whereupon the Alishan chapter was formally established under the command of two Han Taiwanese.<sup>43</sup> One of the "conspiratorial activities" this group performed is memorable for the language used in the report: "naive" (sixiang danchun) Aborigines

<sup>41</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.328-333.

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, p.86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> The file misidentifies the men as Fang Chung-i and Wang Ku-shan; *ibid.*, p.331.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994f): "Dujuanshan bianzouqu" (Azalea Mountain partita). *Taiwan Literature*, 2, p.38, states that other prominent figures linked to Tsai Hsiao-chien, such as Chang Chih-chung and Hung Yu-chiao, also visited Tang Shou-jen in Leyeh Village.

were to be "duped" (youpian) into joining the organisation.<sup>44</sup> It is not clear whether this wording reflects an attempt by the communists to generally deceive Aborigines, as alluded to earlier, or instead reflects – in the mind of the government – the natural gullibility of Aborigines when subjected to propaganda or other inducements.

The problem of hidden weapons is covered quite perfunctorily in this case file. It alleges that communist groups had been collecting weapons ever since the 228 Incident, and that Tsai Hsiao-chien ordered that they be stored in mountain areas across Taiwan as they prepared to establish the bases from which guerilla warfare or full combat could be waged. In Alishan's case, the file claims, a number of weapons were not returned when the first sedition case involving Tang Shou-jen and Kao I-sheng was solved, and so after the two men and others were released, the remaining weapons were hidden elsewhere. The case file makes no mention of the weapons Kao I-sheng handed over to the government in the wake of the 228 Incident.

In its concluding comments, the file attacks Tang Shou-jen and Kao I-sheng for exploiting the goodwill of the government by pretending to surrender, and claims that they employed this tactic because their communist masters required them to do so.<sup>45</sup>

The timing of the arrests is difficult to explain, but it is likely that the arrests had been planned much earlier. The KMT's exasperation with recalcitrant Aboriginal leaders (especially Tang Shou-jen), its knowledge of dealings between these leaders and communist agents, its confidence that it could make the arrests without substantial resistance from the Tsou community (and with the full assistance of collaborators) and most importantly, the simultaneous removal of provincial assemblyman Lin Jui-chang, may have combined to overwhelm inhibiting factors. This time, however, the arrests were not trumpeted in the media. I searched all available national newspapers for stories

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., p.330.

<sup>45</sup> ibid., p.332.

on the second arrest of Kao and Tang or their execution and could find nothing. This absence of media coverage is significant, because the deaths of these popular, well-known and well-connected men may not have reflected well on the regime.

The arrest of the Tsou leadership was initiated by a high-level security official from Taipei and employed a common tactic of deception. On September 9, 1952, Kao I-sheng and most of the other Tsou suspects received a telephone call from Lin Hsiu-le<sup>46</sup> requesting everyone attend a mountain area security conference in Chuchi Township, the first large town to the west on the Alishan railway line. After arriving in Chuchi the next day, they were promptly arrested and transferred to Taipei.<sup>47</sup> Other suspects were rounded up later. Meanwhile, a unit of soldiers from the Fenchihu military post entered Wufeng Township and surrounded Kao's home as others rounded up villagers. Chiayi County mayor Lin Chin-sheng accompanied the soldiers, and he told the captive audience that Kao had stolen their money, he had been arrested for corruption and that he was a communist. A petition denouncing Kao as a communist and corrupt was distributed and the villagers were required to sign it. The soldiers continued to guard Kao's home that evening and stayed several days before withdrawing. Many of Kao's personal effects and books were confiscated. Other materials were taken away by people within the community and never returned.<sup>48</sup> In the wake of the arrests, Tsou men and women were ordered to go to Fenchihu to participate in indoctrination classes.49

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Li Hsuan-feng (1998a), op. cit., p.69, names the official as Lin Hsiu-luan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994f), op. cit., p.40, states that the arrests took place closer to Chiayi City, at the Peimen Railway Station.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See Chen Ming-cheng (1994): "Xunnande Yuanzhumin jingying – Gao Yisheng" (Kao I-sheng – a martyred Aboriginal elite figure). *Independence Evening Post*, 26 April 1994, p.14; and Chen Su-chen (1994f), op. cit., p.38 and p.40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See Chen Su-chen (1994g): "Yuanqing gaobai" (Grievance notice). Taiwan Literature, 2, p.42.

The second major sedition case involving Aboriginal people is listed in Li Ao's book as the Sedition Case of Lin Chao-ming et al. from the Bandits' "Young People's Alliance for the Struggle for Salvation of the Penglai Nation" in Taiwan (hereafter abbreviated as Penglai). This case, which was solved in August 1952, and the verdict that accompanies it complement the insights into security processes in the mountains and government attitudes toward Aboriginal communities. <sup>50</sup>

Lin Chao-ming, the main suspect in *Penglai*, was an Atayal tribesman from Fuhsing Township studying at the Taipei Normal College in the late 1940s. The file says he stayed at the Taipei residence of Lin Jui-chang, his uncle, at this time. It alleges he met and received a "reactionary education" from the communist operatives mentioned earlier – Mountain Area Work Committee secretary Chien Chi and Lin Li, as well as another cadre, Chuo Chung-min. Wulai Township tribesman Kao Chien-sheng and Wufeng Township (in Hsinchu County) tribesman Chao Chu-te – Lin's classmates and fellow Atayal tribesmen – were also accused of joining this group, organising regular meetings and receiving instruction in communist thought. The file then states:

A promise of autonomy for the Penglai Nation [Aborigines] after the "liberation" of Taiwan was offered to them as bait, and this led Lin Chaoming, Kao Chien-sheng and Chao Chu-te to form the "Young People's Alliance for the Taiwan Penglai Nation's Struggle for Salvation" in Taipei City at the beginning of May of the same year [1949]. They settled on a declaration with the mutually reinforcing slogans of national "awakening," "autonomy" and "self-defence"; made preparations to work as internal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> The bureau file is Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.148-151. The court's judgement is at Li Hsuan-feng (ed.)(1998d): Taiwan diqu jieyan shiqi wushi niandai zhengzhi anjian shiliao huibian (si) ge'an ziliao (A compilation of historical material of political cases in the period of martial law in Taiwan, vol. 4: individual case materials). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, p.113. The date the case was solved is said to be 16 August 1952, but this document puts the date one year earlier at 16 August 1951.

operatives at the time of a Bandit army attack on Taiwan; and decided to undertake separately the work of recruiting young Aboriginal people (shandi qingnian).<sup>51</sup>

The file accused Lin Chao-ming of passing on the names of every Aboriginal township mayor and village head to his superiors. Lin was also allegedly responsible for recruiting Aborigines studying at Taichung Normal College and Aborigines from Alishan, while Kao and Chao recruited tribesmen studying at Taipei Normal College. The three men were sentenced to fifteen years in jail, while tribesmen who were recruited or otherwise implicated included Fuhsing Township teachers Li Hsun-te and Liao I-hsi (sentenced to seven years' jail); Hsiulin Township teacher Cheng Teng-shan (two years); Fuhsing Township student Lin Mao-hsiu, who was the adult son of Lin Jui-chang and a high school student in Taipei (two years); and Wufeng Township (in Hsinchu County) merchant Chao Wen-tsung (two years). Others implicated but not apparently sentenced included Tseng Chin-shui, Hsieh Tien-hsing, Kao Tse-ching and Lin Te-tsai, all of whom surrendered to the authorities.<sup>52</sup>

An assessment of the veracity of the charges is not possible here; I want to focus instead on how the *Penglai* file describes Aborigines in terms of their ethnic history and contact with communist operatives. The file outlined three "conspiratorial strategies." The first strategy emphasised that:

... the Kaoshan people were a separate people (minzu) who had migrated from the South Seas and who did not belong to the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu), [which resulted in] a gulf between the Kaoshan people and the plains areas. Later, [the communists] exploited the enduring antagonism of the Kaoshan people toward other peoples and came up with the slogan "self-determination for minority nationalities" to stir up ill

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., p.150.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, p.148 and p.150.

The second strategy cultivated Aboriginal opposition to the Nationalist government by dismissing its administration of Aboriginal areas as a "mixture of late Qing policy and Japanese policy." This, says the file, was an "insulting lie." The third strategy was to inform Aboriginal people that the new government in China included a Taiwan Aboriginal representative by the name of Tien Fu-ta, who insisted that the communists should "support and agitate for autonomy and self-determination for the Kaoshan people." <sup>54</sup>

The seditious activities attributed to these Aboriginal recruits are largely the same as those listed in previous files, but two of the activities are different and worth noting. The first alleges that the Mountain Area Work Committee was distributing socialist pamphlets and texts to "numb the thinking of young people" – contradicting the bureau's earlier assertion that communist operatives could not trust Aboriginal people to digest ideology. The second seditious activity is fascinating and very explicit in linking the development – indeed, the *creation* – of Aboriginal identity to security concerns in the eyes of the KMT:

Establish the "Mountain Area Liberation Corps," develop the mountain area economy, undertake research into and invent written languages for mountain areas. Construct mountain area culture so that the implementation of Penglai national autonomy can follow the Communist Bandit occupation of Taiwan.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, p.148

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> *ibid*. Tien Fu-ta is an Atayal tribesman who became a prisoner of war while fighting with the Nationalist army in China. He later served as one of five Taiwanese delegates in the communist government; the others included Hsieh Hsueh-hung and Yang Ko-huang. He remains in China today. See Hsu Tsung-mao (2003): "Taiwande 'Agan zhengzhuan'" (Taiwan's *Forrest Gump* – Yuming Patu). *Chungshih Jenchien Fukan* (China Times Jenchien Supplement), 3 April 2003.

<sup>55</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., p.149. Emphasis mine.

We have seen that the security agencies frequently tied the possibility of increased Aboriginal autonomy to sedition, even if there was never an explanation offered for why this should necessarily be the case. But this reference to the creation of a writing system and the construction of Aboriginal culture hostile to KMT interests represents the first time *cultural* matters were tied to dissidence in this manner.

The report considered that the "Red calling card" (hongse zhaopai) of administrative independence for Aboriginal people was a potentially effective one to play. <sup>56</sup> However, the operatives' attempt to utilise Aboriginal resources for military reasons, and not out of obvious concern for Aboriginal dignity, was interpreted so that Aboriginal initiative on cultural and political matters could *only* be conflated with a security threat. Yet the KMT's own evidence is clear: if Aborigines were susceptible to propaganda, it was not because they had a weakness for socialist ideology, but because of dissatisfaction with the KMT – and because they were attracted to the idea of ethnic autonomy.

The file concedes that a significant cause of underlying Aboriginal discontent was ethnic, not ideological:

The interests of Kaoshan people and plains people are not identical, and the great majority of mountain compatriots are unwilling to participate in the political struggles of plains people. For this reason, the Communist Bandits hoped that an "autonomy" and "self-defence" movement among the Kaoshan people would be able to co-ordinate with the "anti-KMT, anti-US imperialism" struggle of the Taiwanese people. But this was hardly likely.<sup>57</sup>

This claim, of course, ignored all evidence of burgeoning Aboriginal participation in Han Taiwanese politics – not to mention the nature of Aboriginal participation in the 228 Incident. The irony is this: The most active and conspicuous Aboriginal leaders who

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, p.150.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> ibid..

would have defied this reasoning were the people now being charged with sedition.

A more explicit acknowledgement of the separability of Aboriginal autonomy from communism lies buried in the court judgement that furnished the bureau's report. As part of an exposition on the "crimes" committed by Lin, Kao and Chao and their sentences, the judgement states that the trio were "prepared to act as internal operatives when the Bandit Gang attacked Taiwan *on the condition that* Penglai national autonomy be permitted after the Bandits occupied Taiwan." The judgement apparently did not take into account the significance of Aboriginal partisans having a conditional revolutionary zeal.

The court judgement then concedes that the "Bandit literature" allegedly distributed among Aborigines by Lin, Kao and the others did not present itself as conspicuously socialist. Wang Shu-chen, a Tsou woman, was detained because she happened across Kao Chien-sheng and Chao Chu-te in a Chiayi park in May 1950 as the latter toured educational facilities in the county. The judgement text said Kao gave Wang a one-page manifesto listing the aims of their Aboriginal organisation – "awakening, autonomy and self-defence" among them – and a booklet commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Communist Party. Despite this, said the court, referring to the manifesto, "the average, objective person would struggle to identify this as a Bandit organisation." Wang herself did not meet the men again after that day, and she was found not guilty, though she may have been detained as long as a year before the decision was handed down. This, despite the fact that she was "an Aborigine (shandiren) of this province and neither received a Chinese education nor could read Chinese." This statement was

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<sup>58</sup> Li Hsuan-feng (1998d), op. cit., p.113. Emphasis mine.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> See Chen Su-chen (1996): "Yunshan shenchude yongzhe – Taiwan zaozhumin zai baise kongbu shidaide shounanzhe" (Heroes deep in the misty mountains – Taiwan Aboriginal victims in the White Terror era). *Taiwan Literature*, 13, p.104. Wang is listed as having been sentenced to one year in jail in Chen's list. Wang is also identified in the court's judgement as Wang Ai-lan, and by her Japanese name Masako Yamanaka; see Li Hsuan-feng (1998d), op. cit., p.113.

followed by the elegant deduction that "this defendant's contention that she did not read the booklet that Kao Chien-sheng passed on to her ... [text obscured] ... bears scrutiny."61

So, despite the clear direction of the reasoning in these cases, it seems that the bureau's various assessments could not bring themselves to admit that the attractiveness and viability of Aboriginal autonomy existed prior to the communist attempt to exploit it.

Admittedly, these rather abstract matters were increasingly irrelevant to security considerations. In the end, the practical issue was to secure the mountain areas and reform or liquidate those who would provide an opening for future insurrection. Conceptions of Aboriginal self-determination that fell outside KMT orthodoxy now amounted to sedition and communist banditry, even in the absence of socialist inspiration. The extent of social control now extended to Aboriginal intellectuals who offered little in the way of dissidence. For example: Chiu Chih-ming, an Atayal teacher in Fuhsing Township, was investigated on the basis that he "spoke about ridiculous things as a matter of course and conducted himself strangely and so was strongly suspected to be a Bandit."

The *Penglai* file concluded with criticisms of administrative weakness and a telling recommendation regarding both traditional and modern forms of Aboriginal leadership:

Our local organs are neither well briefed nor thorough in their work relating to the Kaoshan people. Economic and educational matters, in particular, have yet to see any general improvement. The appropriate authorities should therefore pay attention to consolidating and improving this situation at every opportunity to stop the Bandits taking advantage of the situation.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Li Hsuan-feng (1998d), op. cit., p.113.

<sup>62</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., p.150.

The Communist Bandit conspiracy attempting to win over Kaoshan chieftains, township mayors, village heads and intellectuals is extremely malicious. Thus, our government should make every effort to ingratiate itself with Kaoshan chieftains, township mayors and village heads to ensure that there is a centripetal force towards us.<sup>63</sup>

I tend to believe that the Han slogans of Aboriginal naivete and intellectual inferiority masked the recognition of the tenuous link between Aboriginal aspirations and communist ideology. There is evidence that this link acted as a buffer for a number of Aboriginal people who would have received sterner punishments for their association with communist operatives:

Bandits Lin Chao-ming, Kao Chien-sheng and Chao Chu-te intended to use illegal methods to overthrow the government, and by law this required the severest of penalties. But all were young Aboriginal people (*shandi qingnian*) of this province, and the seditious acts they committed occurred during their student years when they were young and had a shallow understanding of things – and when they were the most vulnerable to Bandit incitement and interference. They fell foul of the law, but in weighing up the circumstances of this case a degree of pity is appropriate, and because they were able to provide a frank confession after this case was brought before the authorities, our government reduced their sentences to jail terms of fixed duration so that they could embark on a road to rehabilitation. Such a policy is certainly magnanimous.<sup>64</sup>

In other cases, a degree of mercy was afforded to convicted Aborigines simply because their ethnicity implied the possession of inferior values. Lin Jui-chang's son, Lin Maohsiu, ran into trouble for being present at meetings allegedly involving his father and communist operatives. He was charged as an accessory, and his judgement concluded thus:

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<sup>63</sup> ibid..

But we are cognisant of the fact that the defendant is an inhabitant of the mountain areas and does not understand the meaning of "sacrificing one's relatives to uphold righteousness."

Unlike the case focusing on Alishan, the Penglai case may have been based on fabrications drawn up by security forces. There is no dispute in the sources that Tang Shou-jen associated with communist agents and fugitives, hoarded weapons and defied the government even after receiving a warning. In the *Penglai* case, however, the security forces could have created a communist spectre where no threat existed. Parts of Lin Chao-ming's account of his arrest differ markedly to the official version. Lin says that he stayed at Lin Jui-chang's home in suburban Wanhua while attending Chienkuo Middle School in 1947, together with his cousins Lin Mao-hsiu and Lin Mao-cheng. Soon after, Lin began to mix with Aboriginal students attending Taipei Normal College, especially Chao Chu-te and Kao Chien-sheng, and they frequently discussed problems facing Aboriginal society, including the ramifications of assimilationist policies introduced by the new government. Lin Chao-ming felt that such policies disparaged the right of Aboriginal people to protect their own culture, language and lifestyle, and recalled warnings from community elders that such a process would lead to assimilation, just like the pingpu Aborigines of past centuries. The pressing issue was what could be done about it.66

Lin also frequented libraries in his spare time and read books on philosophy, economics, politics and other disciplines in Japanese translation – which the general public were still allowed to borrow at that time – by writers such as Marx, Engels, Hegel, Kant and Adam Smith. Unfamiliar concepts of class struggle, revolution and the liberation of

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<sup>65</sup> Li Hsuan-feng (1998d), op. cit., p.113.

<sup>66</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994a), op. cit., p.2 and p.5.

nationalities entered his vocabulary, even if their application was confused.<sup>67</sup>

Lin Chao-ming's father (Lin Jui-chang's brother) believed that modern technology – especially new forms of agriculture – and cultural influences brought by the Japanese and the Chinese were not to be rejected but respected for the role they could play in enhancing Aboriginal culture and livelihoods. Anything that allowed Aboriginal culture to be elevated to the same "level" as foreign cultures was to be embraced, and central to this elevation was educating the next generation of Aboriginal youth. In this regard, the attitude of Lin's father was consistent with those of Lin Jui-chang and Kao I-sheng – ethnic identity could be strengthened without harming the relationship with the dominant ethnic group.

In contrast to the Japanese era, the KMT era introduced the rhetoric of equality and implemented various measures that appeared to do justice to this sentiment. But Lin Chao-ming and his friends were the first generation of Aboriginal people to perceive a gap between the rhetoric and practice. Even if Atayal Aborigines reached the same "level of advancement," Lin states, they retained a permanent status of difference, which was confirmed in their minds by the rejection they experienced socially, culturally and psychologically. Educational disadvantages reinforced the privileging of non-Aboriginal people over Aboriginal people as a result of Mandarin replacing the uniformly alien Japanese language in the classroom. Lin Chao-ming was also exposed to Lin Jui-chang's growing discontent with the way the administration was handling Aboriginal issues, and fortified by his uncle's handling of the 228 Incident, which probably saved the lives of many Atayal Aborigines and represented strong leadership. 69

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<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, p.3.

<sup>69</sup> ibid...

It was in this environment that Lin Chao-ming, Chao Chu-te and Kao Chien-sheng formed the Young People's Alliance for the Taiwan Penglai Nation's Struggle for Salvation, together with the slogans of "awakening," "autonomy" and "self-defence." The use of the word "salvation" was not excessive, for there was a perception that KMT policy would result in Aboriginal people "dying out" (xiaomie) within twenty years, and this had to be prevented.

The first priority was protecting Aboriginal languages and culture. The group planned to conduct oral history research among community elders; compose a history of the migration patterns and development of individual Aboriginal communities; and devise a script that could Romanise Aboriginal languages. It also planned to organise tuition in those languages to make up for the inadequacies of the KMT's education curriculum (Lin Chao-ming takes credit for the plan to compose written versions of Aboriginal languages, and claims to have tinkered with both Japanese and Roman scripts as a high school student). In short, the alliance was "akin to an intellectual organisation for scholarly research" attempting to attract interested young Aboriginal people, particularly those at Taipei Normal College and Taichung Normal College, in the hope that "constructive policy ideas could be floated before the government in a peaceful and rational manner."

Lin states that the alliance was independent and had no association with political parties, but concedes that their methods of contact and liaison with fellow Aborigines were somewhat "underground" in appearance, as were the activities of many other civic organisations of the day.<sup>71</sup>

Lin also acknowledges meeting a number of people likely to have been communist agents or future suspects; these people visited his house to get to know his uncle, and in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, pp.5-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, p.6.

time he too became friends with them. Some of them even accompanied Lin on his trips to meet Aboriginal students, but in the end Lin rejected their overtures to stop studying, and to join their group on a full-time basis. Lin also states that at the time he was aware of the existence of minority nationality autonomous zones in China, and that these minorities were represented at the highest levels. This was different to Taiwan, where Aborigines were restricted to three provincial posts and where day-to-day administration was performed at the county level. In short, Lin insists that the alliance was not a communist organisation.<sup>72</sup>

After the arrest of Tsai Hsiao-chien, the alliance's three founders decided that there was considerable danger and so ceased their six months of activities, not knowing they had been implicated by Chien Chi after his arrest. Lin was in Fuhsing Township waiting for the university semester to begin when he was called on to report to the authorities. He was arrested the next day - September 11, 1952. The others were arrested at about the same time and all were transferred to the same detention facility in Taipei City. 73 After transfer to another facility, Lin ran into both his uncle Lin Jui-chang and Kao I-sheng, the latter suggesting that all would be well and that the government would be generous. That was the last time Lin saw Kao I-sheng alive.<sup>74</sup>

Lin Chao-ming had been indicted for a capital offense, and until the day his sentence was handed down, he assumed he would be sentenced to death like the six other Aboriginal prisoners. The judges, however, reduced his sentence and those of Kao Chien-sheng and Chao Chu-te from execution to fifteen years' imprisonment because the defendants were "youths under the age of twenty."<sup>75</sup>

On 17 April 1954, when Lin Jui-chang, Kao I-sheng and the other four Aboriginal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> *ibid.*, p.7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, p.8. <sup>74</sup> *ibid.*, pp.9-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, p.11.

prisoners were executed, Lin's older brother, Fuhsing Township mayor Lin Chao-kuang, was also arrested in what Lin Chao-ming calls a KMT attempt to prevent adverse reaction in that community. Lin Chao-kuang's story is less frequently told. Of chieftain stock and the first elected mayor of Fuhsing Township, Lin was a conscript in the Japanese army and spent many years in Japan before returning to Taiwan in 1946. He then joined Lin Jui-chang's land rights movement, which promoted cultural respect and the right for Aborigines to choose a name reflecting the respect they deserved. That view has not changed over the decades. In the mid-1990s he stated that *yuanzhumin* — the term fought for by Aboriginal activists in the 1990s and used today in official documents — implied cultural inferiority and should be replaced by the names *Taiwanzu* (the "Taiwanese people") or *Penglaizu* (the "Penglai people").

### Monitoring of dissidents and families

The KMT's standard technique of monitoring and intimidating political prisoners after their release had a particularly powerful effect in Aboriginal communities. The taut networks of informants, poverty and relative lack of mobility meant that for some Aborigines the best option was to leave their communities altogether and find work among the Han. Because most political prisoners were relatively well educated, this option was not implausible.

Kao I-sheng's wife and children in particular became a pariah family after Kao's arrest and execution, with older son Kao Ying-chieh reporting obstruction in his career as a teacher and other harassment (see Figure 6.3).<sup>78</sup> Kao I-sheng's wife had to put up with

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> ibid..

To See Cheng Hsien-ching (ed.)(1996): Taiwan Yuanzhumin shiliao huibian di'erji – Yamei, Shao zu, lishi pian ji dushi Yuanzhumin caifang jilu (A collection of historical materials on Taiwan's Aborigines, vol. 2: the Yami, Thao and historical edition plus a record of interviews with urban Aborigines). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee, pp.184-185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Kao Ying-chieh, personal communication; and Chen Su-chen (1994g), op. cit., p.48.



Figure 6.3: Kao Ying-chieh in Tapang Village during its biannual mayasvi (Tsou war ceremony) in February 2000.

hostile treatment from fellow villagers and harassment from township officials before eventually succumbing to dementia, while Kao I-sheng's talented daughter, Kao Chuhua, suffered the worst fate. She and her family were harassed by security forces and Aboriginal collaborators for decades, and in July 1971, she was threatened into signing a confession. She had gained some fame as a singer, and was therefore forced by the Ministry of National Defense to act as an escort for foreign dignitaries and soldiers.<sup>79</sup>

After release from prison, Lin Chao-ming returned to Fuhsing Township but was placed under surveillance. He therefore moved to northern Taipei to work, but even there he was required to report regularly to police. Later, he and two fellow ex-prisoners opened a factory in Hsinchu before travelling throughout Asia in a business capacity.<sup>80</sup> Throughout this period, members of Lin Jui-chang's family continued to be arrested.<sup>81</sup>

The continuing harassment of these individuals had an impact on the ethnic boundaries between certain Aboriginal communities and Han people. Because these elite figures had both precious educational and/or professional experience and extensive contacts, their removal from positions of influence in their communities changed the way those communities related to not only the KMT and the rest of society but to themselves as Tsou tribespeople. Wang Sung-shan notes that one of the effects of Tsou experiences during the 228 Incident and the White Terror was to revitalise cultural practices favoured by formerly powerful families – the nobility – who had been usurped by Kao in his role as a modern, Japanese-educated bureaucrat. A more abstract effect on the Tsou community has been its inability to address its history of KMT intervention, community division and collusion until very recently.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994g), op. cit., p.44 and pp.48-49.

<sup>80</sup> Cheng Hsien-ching, op. cit., p.187.

<sup>81</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994g), op. cit., p.51.

<sup>82</sup> Tai and Yeh, op. cit., p.308.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> See Wang Sung-shan (1990): Alishan Zou zude lishi yu zhengzhi (History and politics of the Tsou people of Alishan). Panchiao: Taohsiang, p.15, p.91, pp.158-159 and pp.215-216.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Chen Su-chen and some of Kao I-sheng's children have been at the forefront of this process, arranging conferences, exhibitions and other activities. See Chen Su-chen (ed.)(2001): Shi ge pianpian chengguo

inability is a bizarre and ugly memorial to the 228 Incident that sits incongruously in a car park in Tapang Village, the administrative center of Alishan Township. It contains no reference to the Tsou Unit or to any of the people executed or imprisoned during the White Terror. It is, as Wang Ming-hui says, "the culture of Han people" substituting for a genuine Tsou appreciation of history (see Figure 6.4).<sup>85</sup> A further example of this troubled relationship with the past was the forty-year delay in establishing a formal grave for Kao I-sheng (see Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6).

Such problems did not affect other Aboriginal communities, however, as similarly skilled or educated people who rose up KMT ranks did not suffer such harassment. This differential effect is of interest here because the democratic process came to pit different ethnic groups against one another in securing higher representative office or advisory positions, and the violent removal of key Tsou and Atayal figures damaged the ability of elite figures from these groups to compete with more KMT-friendly groups such as the Paiwan.

#### Other National Security Bureau cases

The cases discussed above focused on the activities and alleged sedition of prominent Aboriginal figures in the Tsou and northern Atayal communities. However, inspection of other National Security Bureau files reveals a small but significant degree of Aboriginal participation or potential involvement in seditious activities in other areas during this period.

jilu (Fluttering songs and verse: a record of achievement). Place of publication not shown: Publisher not shown. This group was also responsible for producing and performing a superb CD of Kao I-sheng's compositions which mixed Tsou, European and Japanese musical styles. Before the CD was released in 1994, a prominent Tsou figure with senior government and academic connections tried to obstruct its production. The CD is entitled *Chun zhi zuobaoji* (released by Hsintai Changpian).

<sup>85</sup> See Wang Ming-hui (1999): "Gei ererba xishengde Zou zu yinghao" (For the Tsou heroes sacrificed to 228). *Tsou Adoana*, 14, 9-12.



Figure 6.4: The Tapang Village memorial for the 228 Incident.



Figure 6.5: Far view of the grave of Kao I-sheng in Tapang Village, Alishan Township, Chiayi County. The text at bottom was composed by Chen Su-chen and reads, "He gave his life for the Tsou people with love, hate and no regrets."

Figure 6.6: Near view of the grave of Kao I-sheng in Tapang Village, Alishan Township, Chiayi County.



Earlier in this chapter I discussed alleged communist attempts to infiltrate Aboriginal communities in Taichung County. That case was followed by another, solved in April 1950, which uncovered communist activities in nearby Nantou County. The lead suspect in this case was found in the possession of a summary on alleged communist activities in the Aboriginal village of Pingteng in Hoping Township. Little more is said on the matter in the file, other than the bureau's admission that, "Our investigative and protective work must not neglect control of mountain areas [Aboriginal townships] and mountain areas in the plains [non-Aboriginal townships]."86 A similar case followed in the same month in which Nengkao District in northeastern Nantou County was said to have become a potential base for armed units, but in this instance no Aboriginal people or communities were named.<sup>87</sup> Evidence of more direct Aboriginal participation in seditious activity in Nantou County is provided in a case said to have been solved in May 1955, though probably solved much earlier than this date, in which two Aboriginal suspects in their twenties, Hung Cheng and Wu Li, were jailed for ten years for joining the "Alliance for Taiwan Democracy and Autonomy" (Taiwan minzhu zizhi tongmeng).88 Their ethnicity is not stated in the file, but Chen Su-chen states that the pair were Aboriginal.<sup>89</sup> The organisation was alleged to have targeted unemployed Han and Aboriginal youth in order to "enter deep into mountain areas using their positions as teachers as a cover for undertaking seditious activities."90 A related case file noted that one of the alliance's intended locations was Pahsien Mountain, which lies on the border of Taichung County's Hoping Township and Nantou County's Jen'ai Township - adjacent to several Atayal communities.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.65-71. A separate report by the provincial Office of Police Affairs has much more detail on this case; see Taiwan Provincial Office of Police Affairs (ed.)(1953): *Taiwan sheng shandi jingzheng yaolan* (Essentials in Taiwan Province Mountain Area Police Administration). Place of publication not shown: Taiwan Province Office of Police Affairs, pp.187-191.

<sup>87</sup> ibid., pp.79-84.

<sup>88</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.105-109.

<sup>89</sup> Chen Su-chen (1996), op. cit., p.105.

<sup>90</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.105-109.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> *ibid.*, pp116-118.

The Aboriginal township of Hsin'i in southeastern Nantou County is also mentioned in a case solved in June 1952. In this case, Han fugitive Liu Chan-hsien had arranged to enter Hsin'i after meeting his Taiwanese escort and find employment in the region of Neimaopu, but news of this arrangement was reported to local authorities, who sent personnel to lay in wait for him. Due to incompetence and a communication breakdown, Liu escaped his pursuers twice before eventual arrest. The case made no mention of local Aboriginal people, but did stress the need to strengthen mountain area security and cooperation among security agencies to prevent fugitives from obtaining work in slackly policed mountain industries such as logging. 92

Also noteworthy is a case solved in February 1950, in which the suspects were accused of developing an armed base area in the Nanchuang-Sanwan-Tahoti region of Miaoli County. This region was largely populated by Hakka communities, and although there is no mention of Aboriginal involvement, the area described abutted the homeland of Saisiat Aboriginal villages. It is quite possible therefore that members of these communities were targeted by the suspects. A more direct link between Aboriginal administration and seditious activity in this area emerged in early February 1951, in which a staffer at the Ta'an Township (now Tai'an Township) Administrative Office was implicated in a larger case involving suspects from across Miaoli County. The ethnicity of the "leftist" staffer, Kuo Huan-chang, was not stated, and he was sentenced to a programme of re-education. Ta'an Township was also cited in a later case as a refuge for a Han fugitive who was eventually shot and captured.

To the north, the Atayal Aborigines of Shihsanfen – just to the north of Fuhsing Township in Taoyuan County – had been explicitly targeted as potential recruits

92 Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.348-352.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, pp.41-53.

<sup>94</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.100-103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> The file in question states the location of arrest as Chulin Village, Ta'an Township. This may be the Chulin that lies within another village boundary in adjacent Hoping Township in Taichung County. See Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.324-327.

around the winter of 1949. No further information is available on this plan in the case file in question. A case that followed it, solved in the same month, provides more detail. It claimed that using a four-stage "Southern Conquest Plan," communists based in the north aimed to establish a "Little Yen'an" in mountainous Taipei County from which a vanguard would push through the Wulai area towards the mountains of Taoyuan, Ilan and Hsinchu counties into central Taiwan where a "liberation zone" would be established, before heading to Tainan, Chiayi and Pingtung counties and extending the zone to all of Taiwan's mountain areas. The plains would then have been a "guerrilla zone." The plan itself may have been concocted by the security agencies, because its main architects were allegedly the same people arrested in the Luku Incident in Taipei County. In response to the growing threat of fugitive activity in mountain areas, the file said mountain area police should solicit intelligence from residents and warn them of the consequences of associating with fugitives."

I mentioned earlier that the Ilan area and Lanyang Valley was an area featuring some seditious activity. A case solved in November 1951 provides further evidence of communist interest in this region's Aboriginal communities. <sup>100</sup> Yeh Min-hsin, the Han Taiwanese head of Peifeng District and chief of the district's police, was accused of shipping government arms to communist agents in preparation for an armed uprising in the mountains. He and a military school colleague were also accused of attempting to incite an entire battalion of the Nationalist army to join the communists in the event of a Chinese invasion. Yeh was alleged to have recruited teachers, administrators and military personnel as well as young Aboriginal people in late 1949 and early 1950. Among the recruits was mainlander Chao Li-chuan, the principal of Chuoshui Public School in the Aboriginal township of Taiping (now Tatung Elementary School in Tatung Township);

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<sup>96</sup> ibid., pp.392-406.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> ibid., pp.407-416.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> See Chang Yen-hsien and Kao Shu-yuan (eds)(1998): *Luku shijian diaocha yanjiu* (Investigative research into the Luku Incident). Panchiao: Taipei County Cultural Center.

<sup>99</sup> Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.407-416.

and Shih Tsang-keng and Shih Tsang-po, Han Taiwanese brothers who worked in Aboriginal administration at the Nantou County government and Jen'ai Township respectively. Chao Li-chuan, Shih Tsang-keng and Yeh Min-hsin were alleged to have formed a subcommittee to "arrange for mountain area youth to receive the Bandit army when they attacked Taiwan." Yeh is alleged to have approached a number of others to join his group but who refused. Among these were Liang Hung-hui, another Han administrator in the Nantou County government, and Chiu Lin-hung, 102 an assistant policeman — possibly Aboriginal — stationed in Hanhsi Village. Yeh, Liang and Chiu were jailed for five years. The file also says that Yeh, his superior Wei Chao-fu and another man "formed the Peifeng District Work Committee in April 1950 to concentrate on work among the Kaoshan people." 103

An odd case followed soon after, in which the "Lanyang High School Alumni Association" and a group of American football devotees were accused of acting as a front organisation. One of the aims of this organisation, other than investigating local military matters and industrial facilities, was to win over Aboriginal people in the area and convince them to join the Communist Party so that an armed base could be set up in the mountains.<sup>104</sup>

A case solved in May 1950 suggested that the mountains and logging zones along the

<sup>100</sup> ibid., pp.282-287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, p.282.

ibid., p.282. and p.286. The file clumsily renders this person's name as both Chiu Lin-hung and Chiu Hung-lin; it is not clear which is correct.

this time involving an Aboriginal attack on a dormitory where she and a number of other non-Aboriginal public servants were living. The attack was supposedly related to conflict between the Aboriginal mayor of Taiping (now Tatung) Township and a senior public servant at the administrative office. Most escaped without being beaten before fleeing downriver to the local police station, but soon after her reassignment to a different precinct, she and all other staff under Yeh Min-hsin were arrested. Tseng does not offer any explanation for why these events might have been connected; see Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1999b): Jieyan shiqi Taibei diqu zhengzhi anjian koushu lishi, disan qi (Oral history records of the White Terror victims in northern Taiwan under the martial law, vol. 3). Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, pp.986-989.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.130-131.

east coast were potential bases for fugitives who could co-ordinate with a communist assault on the area.<sup>105</sup> A second case solved in February 1951 includes a reference to a schoolteacher from Juisui Township in Hualien County who was executed for attempting to develop a county-wide "mountain area organisation."<sup>106</sup> These suspects were not identified as Aboriginal, but if their operations were genuine, then they would probably have been noticed by the Aboriginal communities still scattered along the fringes of the mountains of Hualien and Taitung counties.<sup>107</sup>

One other case solved in December 1951 is worth noting. Wu Nai-kuang, a teacher and bookstore owner in southwestern Taiwan, was accused along with his colleagues of spreading communist propaganda. One of their "conspiratorial strategies" was to:

Go to mountain areas, ostensibly studying the arts and crafts of mountain compatriots, to investigate the circumstances of mountain compatriots, their population, customs and habits and local terrain. A study of mountain area work can then be performed.<sup>108</sup>

Unfortunately, there is no reference to where this work was to take place, nor what institutional authority Wu and his colleagues had that would allow them to apply to enter restricted mountain areas.

## **Taiwan Garrison Command data**

The previous discussion mostly drew on court judgements and the case files of the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> *ibid.*, pp.48-51.

Li Ao (1991b), op. cit., pp.184-199.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> For example, Lo Ming-mao, a teacher at that time and later a political prisoner, recalls taking students to camp at a lake near Hualien City. The government was freely criticised at these meetings, and nearby Aborigines (their origin is not specified) would sometimes join in these activities; see Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (1999b), op. cit., p.1006.

National Security Bureau, but these covered a very small number of the total investigations conducted by security agencies. These also produced occasional references to the structure of security mechanisms for Aboriginal administration. The annual reports of the Taiwan Garrison Command are another useful source of evidence, providing a clearer picture of security measures as they were introduced. The annual reports examined here range from 1949 to 1954, which coincides with the period in which the Aboriginal leaders discussed here came under the scrutiny of security agencies.<sup>109</sup>

The 1949 report states that the eradication of communists and other reactionary elements required intelligence on specific organisations as well as more general research into Taiwan's political factions, civic organisations and the military. Also targeted for investigation were the circumstances of "mountain compatriots" and in particular the "secret activities" of foreigners in mountain areas.<sup>110</sup>

Four areas of investigation in Aboriginal communities were named: first, monitoring feelings toward the government and assessing the efficacy of reforms; second, collecting the names of all chieftains (*buluo qiuzhang*) and detailing their thinking, personalities and tastes; third, studying living habits and material deficiencies; and fourth, examining sources of friction and conflict, particularly relating to Han people (*pingdi minzhong*).

This list is notable for two reasons. First, despite substantial change in both Aboriginal leadership cultivation and administration under the Japanese and the KMT, the security forces clearly considered that Aboriginal chieftains retained enough influence to justify including them in their surveillance activities. Second, acknowledgement of the potential

108 Li Ao (1991a), op. cit., pp.127-129.

110 ibid., p.4 and p.18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> In the period 1945 to 1958, Taiwan Province's premier security organ underwent numerous name and structural changes, as well as frequent rotation of its commander. For simplicity's sake, this evolving body will be referred to as the Taiwan Garrison Command. A table showing major changes to the organisation is at Li Hsuan-feng (1998a), op. cit., p.2.

for discord among Aboriginal communities and between Aboriginal communities and Han Taiwanese suggests that security forces thought disputes of an ethnic nature could generate seditious outcomes. The security organs were in fact expressing concerns that justified the segregation of Aboriginal communities from one another and from Han Taiwanese – regardless of the demands of assimilationism.

The 1951 report adds little relating to Aboriginal communities, which is somewhat surprising given developments in Alishan that year. However, in concluding, the report does state that particular attention was paid to strengthening "elimination and protection work" (*sufang gongzuo*) in mountain areas and that intelligence-gathering activities had been streamlined (*tongyi*). Some degree of reorganisation of mountain area security organs also started at this time, acknowledging that existing military deployments were inadequate should an uprising occur in mountain areas.<sup>111</sup>

It was not until 1952, however, that the Taiwan Garrison Command cemented its presence in mountain areas. On January 30, the Garrison's unified command structure was approved by the government, and from July, existing security forces under provincial jurisdiction in mountain areas – including those posted in township offices and schools – were incorporated in that structure. Although they were now under Garrison authority, the provincial government authorities retained responsibility for salaries and personnel. 112

Throughout the year, eight command posts were established based on the county distribution of Aboriginal townships with a total of 302 staff. The thirty security subunits (baofang xiaozu) refer to the thirty Aboriginal townships (shandi xiang; see Figure 3.1), and although those townships are not named, it is safe to assume from the prefix of each title that the townships were distributed in this manner: Peifeng (Taipei and Ilan

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<sup>111</sup> ibid., pp.41-42.

ibid., p.50 and p.96.

counties), Hsinfeng (Taoyuan, Hsinchu and Miaoli counties), Chungfeng (Taichung and Nantou counties), Kaofeng (Pingtung County), Hsiungfeng (Kaohsiung County), Tungfeng (Taitung County), and Lienfeng (Hualien County). Significantly, the final command post is named after the Tsou township of Wufeng, rather than the county of Chiayi. There were also 49 investigative sub-units (zhenfang xiaozu) with 194 staff, which were established to monitor mining, logging and other mountain area industries in each township that could be targeted for infiltration. 113

In addition to these measures, a sub-unit under the combined security agencies' Mountain Work Committee dispatched personnel into the eight mountain zones to investigate local conditions (inconveniently, the committee's name is identical to that of the communist cell headed by Chien Chi). This unit was also responsible for recruiting informants. By the end of the year, sixty-seven Aboriginal people were acting in this capacity in the thirty Aboriginal townships. 114 The 1952 report also indicated that intelligence gathered in mountain areas relating to security matters was being assembled for publication and internal distribution. Unfortunately, it is not clear if such volumes were completed or if any still exist. 115 These would be tantalising sources of data, but their release might well cause some unrest in the communities today.

On June 11, 1953, command post security activities, including those related to township administrative offices and public schools, came under the centralised monitoring of the Central Security Report Secretariat. On September 19, the provincial government's forestry and agricultural units in Aboriginal areas also came under the control of mountain area command posts. The Central Security Report Secretariat subsequently approved the "Measures for the Implementation of Classified Information and Counter-Espionage in Mountain Area Control Zones in Taiwan Province" drafted

<sup>113</sup> ibid., p.56.

ibid., p.63.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> *ibid*., p.66.

by the Taiwan Garrison Command on December 24. Provincial personnel continued to be absorbed. Among these were thirteen defence units and forty-seven sub-units amounting to 300 staff, and 138 staff from twenty-seven campus units and 66 sub-units.<sup>116</sup>

It is in the 1953 report that missionaries are first specified as targets for surveillance throughout Taiwan; this was significant for mountain area security given the rapid spread of Christianity in Aboriginal communities, as I show in the following chapter.<sup>117</sup>

In 1954, additional mountain area security offices (*shandi zhi'ansuo*) were set up in Taipei, Taoyuan, Miaoli and Taichung counties. The number of mountain inspection stations (*chayanzhan*) increased to 189, and command posts were ordered to seal non-essential access roads into the mountains and dispatch regular patrols in conjunction with local police. By the end of 1954, the year of the execution of the Tsou and Atayal Aboriginal leadership, security and intelligence staff amounted to 29 security unit heads, 216 security personnel and 216 informants, who between them gathered 744 items of intelligence and investigated fifty people. Unfortunately, the report does not provide the names of people under investigation or the locations of these operations. <sup>118</sup>

All of this evidence demonstrates that a significant increase in surveillance activities and military deployments took place in Aboriginal townships over the same period that Kao I-sheng, Lin Jui-chang and other Aboriginal elite figures were investigated, arrested and executed. It also points to sources of data relating to intelligence collection in Aboriginal communities. While Chen Su-chen argues that a portion of these informants were retired soldiers, officials and other Han personnel living in the mountains, <sup>119</sup> there is no doubt that a significant proportion were also Aboriginal. In the following chapter, I will

116 ibid., p.96, p.98 and pp.101-102.

ibid., pp.138-139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> *ibid.*, p.99.

<sup>119</sup> Chen Su-chen (1994f), op. cit., p.40.

discuss the case of an Aboriginal activist who was released from exile on the island of Lanyu on condition that he act as such an informant.

### Assimilation discourse in Shihchien

Another source that reveals KMT thinking on Aboriginal administration has not been examined in the literature to date. That source is the journal *Shihchien* (Practice), the newsletter of the Revolutionary Practice Institute, a think tank and training centre for KMT cadres situated in the hills of Yangmingshan in the north of Taipei City. The founder and inaugural director was Chiang Kai-shek himself, and various senior figures such as Chiang Ching-kuo, Peng Meng-chi and Sun Li-jen were also associated with its development and initial administration. The first issue of *Shihchien* appeared on October 15, 1949, heralding the opening ceremony of the institute on the following day. 120

Because of its strictly limited circulation, and because its institute was formed at a time of abject crisis for the KMT, the journal arguably offers a more candid reflection of KMT thinking on a range of issues, and particularly those aligned to Chiang Kai-shek prior to his resumption of the *de jure* presidency. The problem of Aboriginal administration was not left off the institute's agenda, and a number of intriguing essays were written on the subject, together with occasional references to Aboriginal affairs.<sup>121</sup>

In the early issues of *Shihchien* there are discrete references to Aboriginal matters, the most notable attributed by the journal's editor to premier Chen Cheng in June 1950. Chen stated that Taiwan's Aborigines, along with demobbed soldiers and fishermen,

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<sup>120</sup> I am indebted to Darius Edler for bringing this publication to my attention.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> As a security measure, the journal was numbered according to recipient prior to distribution. Decades later, *Shihchien* would degenerate into an unrestricted, glossy and uninteresting periodical, lacking the

should, be trained to improve their contribution to production and in preparation for a lengthy battle with the communists. Chiang Kai-shek welcomed these ideas. 122

The first substantial article on Aboriginal administration was published on September 16, 1950, and was written by the director of the provincial authority on Aboriginal affairs, Chang Sung. 123 The article begins with a consolidation of the claim to kinship with Aboriginal people, and continues with a fanciful attack on the motives of Japanese anthropologists:

In the past, Taiwan's mountain compatriots were called "savages" (fan) or the "Takasago people" (gaoshazu). Many people are mystified or terrified by them, yet they are the most proficient and law-abiding of the Yellow Emperor's descendants. In order to divide the Chinese nation, the Japanese classified them as people who were of Indonesian national stock and who migrated to Taiwan from the South Seas. 124

Chang insists on the 3,000-year-old Chinese origins of Taiwan's Aborigines and claims their migratory history began in the state of Yue, where they were like other "backward" compatriots of China. Like Pai Chung-hsi in the previous chapter, Chang says that after arriving in Taiwan, cultural and intellectual levels fell even further behind the rest of the Han. He then discusses the difference between the disused categories of "raw" and "cooked" Aborigines, the Sinicised pingpu Aborigines, as well as the so-called huafan - the present-day Thao and Saisiat communities, who in terms of cultural sophistication lay above the "raw" Aborigines but beneath the pingpuzu. He also admits that the division of Aborigines into seven ethnic categories was imprecise, citing variance in language and custom within each group, but he errs in stating that surviving

<sup>124</sup> *ibid.*, p.1.

grim determination and wide-ranging content of the austerely produced original.

122 See Shihchien (1950): "Bianhou fuji riyi" (Editor's afterword, no.1). Shichien, 32, 18.

<sup>123</sup> Chang Sung (1950): "Shandi tongbao yu shandi xingzheng" (Mountain area compatriots and mountain area administration). Shihchien, 42, 1-4. Chang Sung's office is cited at the end of the issue by the editor (p.28).

Chang's crucial discussion on the administrative division of Aborigines provides an unusually candid and meaningful explanation of the system as it was envisaged at the time. "The objects of mountain administrative measures," Chang states, "were those mountain compatriots with whom communication was inconvenient, who were of relatively low cultural standards, and who dwelled in mountainous areas." All communities deemed to be outside these categories fell under standard administrative townships, dominated by non-Aboriginal local government. Therefore, this administrative distinction did not assess cultural advancement and intellectual capacity according to the ethnic classification of the community. Consequently, a minority of Paiwan communities were – and still are, in effect – classified as "plains area mountain compatriots" (pingdi shanbao), while a very small number of Amis communities (in southern Pingtung County's Mutan Township) were – and are – classified as "mountain area mountain compatriots" (shandi shanbao).

The employment of these three categories – poor communication, cultural advancement and mountain residence – as determinants of Aboriginal township allocation is obviously clumsy. Even at the time, it would have been clear to the critical observer that violations were occurring for each of these "rules," so much so that "mountain" or "plains" designations for some communities were almost arbitrary. For example, "mountain" Aboriginal communities, such as Atayal communities in Taipei County and Taoyuan County, were less "remote" than some "plains" communities, such as the coastal Paiwan of Taitung County, even though they had marginally better communications and comparable "cultural levels" by whatever hierarchical standards the KMT chose to apply. Additionally, some ethnolinguistic groups with generalisable cultural and linguistic features – the Paiwan of Taitung County, for example – found

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, p.1 and p.2.

ibid., p.1.

themselves divided into two administrative zones, thus hampering communication and mobility because of security restrictions. Aboriginal communities classified as plains Aborigines were subject to the economic benefits and drawbacks brought by the infusion of Han Taiwanese, while migration, land ownership and economic interaction was largely forbidden in Aboriginal townships. As time went on, many mountain-dwelling communities were moved *en masse* to plains areas on the nearest edge of their townships, ending their remoteness and improving access to infrastructure. Theoretically, the continuing conflation of mountain residence, cultural inferiority and poor infrastructure did not bear much scrutiny.

The distinction between plains and mountain Aborigines is of interest to us because its introduction was not based on differences in local identification, anthropological classification or even – despite the terms employed – geographical features, though each of these had different roles to play. The key variable was effectively *cultural and physical distance* from the Han, and the explicit programme was to eliminate both gaps – the former through cultural destruction and the latter (presumably) through Han migration into Aboriginal areas.

Chang Sung's article then goes into the details of the agenda for Aboriginal administration, for which he claims personal credit. This is one of the most detailed descriptions of Aboriginal administration since the loss of the civil war, and predates the more comprehensive publications summarising Aboriginal administration.<sup>127</sup> The

<sup>127</sup> See, for example, Chang Sung (1953): Taiwan shandi xingzheng yaolun (Fundamentals of mountain area administration in Taiwan). Taipei: Chengchung Bookstore; Taiwan Provincial Government Office of Civil Affairs (ed.)(1954): Jinbuzhongde bensheng shandi (This province's mountain areas in progress). Place of publication not shown: Taiwan Provincial Government Office of Civil Affairs; and Taiwan Provincial Government Office of Civil Affairs (ed.)(1971): Fazhanzhongde Taiwan shandi xingzheng (Taiwan's mountain area administration in development). Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Government Office of Civil Affairs. Chang had also written an earlier piece for a daily newspaper on Aboriginal matters; see Chang Sung (1948): "Shandi xingzhengde jige shiji wenti" (A number of practical problems involving mountain area administration). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 5 July 1948, p.5. Chang also wrote an article for the same newspaper discussing exploitation of mountain resources and development of agriculture; see Chang Sung (1949): "Taisheng shandi chanye kaifade zhanwang" (A number of practical problems involving mountain area administration). Taiwan Hsinshengpao, 15 March 1949, p.7; 16 March 1949,

summary is notable for complimenting Japanese goals in Aboriginal administration, but despite the conspicuous participation of a number of Aboriginal figures – such as Kao Isheng, Lin Jui-chang, Nan Chih-hsin and Ma Chih-li – and the large number of Aboriginal police under Japanese supervision, he states that Aborigines have "no knowledge of modern governance whatsoever."128

He argues instead that the KMT's policies, rooted in the Three Principles of the People, were better suited to Aboriginal communities and would allow them to "gradually shed their primitive state (yuanshide xingtai)."

Chang then provides a lengthy list of creditable and discreditable features of the Aboriginal "character." On the positive side, Aborigines were "honorable, righteous, had self-respect, knew shame, courageous, united, fraternal and mutually supportive," while on the negative side they were "suspicious, strongly chauvinistic toward anything outside the community, secretive, excessively practical, prejudiced, narrow-minded, guarded, savage, fierce, edgy, lacking in patience, easily riled, covetous of strength, lacking in vision, intuitive and simple in outlook." Yet, despite these generalisations and the outward appearance of peace and simplicity in their villages, Chang warns of complexity lying beneath a tranquil surface. Preventing this complexity from manifesting itself in disquiet, he said, took considerable effort. 129

By 1954, however, the institute was hearing more sober assessments of assimilationist policies that suggested a new approach was necessary. Li Chih-chang argued that after retrocession, most Han Taiwanese only saw the Three Principles of the People as slogans. In mountain areas, the situation was more difficult: Aboriginal minds were like a tabula rasa (youru yizhang baizhi), and reactionary thinking readily entered mountain

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, p.2.

p.7; 17 March 1949, p.7; and 18 March 1949, p.7.

Chang Sung (1950), op. cit., p.2.

areas and misled Aborigines – as was the case during the 228 Incident. <sup>130</sup>

In previous chapters I provided evidence that makes this interpretation objectionable – and not just for its chauvinism. The same year as these comments were made, the very Aboriginal leaders who openly and for a long period showed them to be inaccurate were executed for that defiance. Li does not refer to this matter except with an allusion to recruitment drives in response to communist operative activity in the mountains and the need to work harder at this.

Of the utmost interest is his prognosis for Aboriginal administration. Because communist agents prey on Aboriginal simpleness, he says, the party should counter this by *appealing to the Aboriginal character*. In other words, the focus for Li was no longer eliminating difference, but making strategic use of it.<sup>131</sup> This idea had already appeared in the Alishan case file in the context of understanding difference, but this more accommodating approach speaks of a growing suspicion that assimilation was not the key issue anymore.

In a further retreat from a crude conception of "equality," Li said that training Aboriginal party members was completely different to training anyone else, and measures needed to be introduced that would meet differing Aboriginal demands and which would allow training to fit in with their daily lives. Nor, he said, should certain party duties apply to Aboriginal members.<sup>132</sup>

Li concludes his article with a blunt confession. KMT propaganda was lagging behind Christian missionary work, and this was because the missions combined preaching with humanitarian aid. Inculcation of Sunist doctrine should follow this strategy, he

See Li Chih-chang (1954): "Shandi dangwu zhi deshi yu gaijin yijian" (Gains and losses in mountain area party affairs and some ideas on their improvement). Shihchien Choukan, 194, p.6.
 ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> *ibid*..

argued.<sup>133</sup> This is a delicious moment in the history of KMT assimilationism: the Three Principles of the People could only reach Aboriginal hearts and minds if the government applied the tactics of the same Christians who were being monitored by its security agencies.

## **Conclusions**

By physically separating Aboriginal communities from the Han Taiwanese majority, the KMT attempted to assimilate them by remote control. Aborigines were expected to adopt patterns of living, working and thinking that approached the Nationalists' standard of citizenship. But at least half of the Aboriginal population — those living in dedicated Aboriginal townships — remained confined to areas that could not support the kind of economic development and social exchange that this required. The irony is that during the White Terror, the KMT destroyed the two Aboriginal leaders who were the most vocal *advocates* of increased contact with the Han. It is entirely fitting, then, that the Hsinmei Farm case, which served as a scapegoat for the arrest of Kao I-sheng and Lin Jui-chang, was originally supposed to bring the "mountains" and "plains" economies closer together.

The impact on the Tsou and Atayal communities was considerable at a political level. With many of its brightest thinkers stigmatised by their criminal records, the Atayal did not produce nationally significant representatives until the legislature resumed its status as an elected body in the 1980s. The Tsou – which was likely targeted in its entirety by security forces to maintain internal divisions and ensure compliance <sup>134</sup> – has only had one senior semi-political figure since Kao I-sheng: Pu Chung-cheng, the deputy chairman of the Council of Indigenous Peoples. By intervening in these communities in this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> *ibid*..

fashion, the KMT also ensured that Aboriginal political power would be distributed away to other ethnolinguistic groups, especially the Paiwan. This leads to another irony: although the KMT was incapable of grasping the failure of its assimilationist strategy at this time, it was all too aware that it could readily disrupt potential alliances and pan-Aboriginal identification by directing political and other resources to selected Aboriginal townships.

There was one significant force within Aboriginal communities, however, that promoted pan-"tribal" and pan-Aboriginal identification with a degree of impunity and provided Aborigines with a new source of spiritual sustenance. This "force" – and how it repelled assimilationist policy – is the subject of the next chapter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Chen Su-chen (2001), op. cit., p.13.

# **Chapter Seven**

# Aboriginality and nativisation:

# Christ and culture in the subversion of assimilation

One observation which impressed me particularly was [missionary Lillian Dickson's] description of the encouragement which the Republic of China had given to the missionary work among the aborigines, in contrast with the forbidding attitude of the Japanese rulers. The consequence of this policy has been seen politically. In 1946 when there was serious trouble between the provincial government and the Taiwanese people, the tribesmen were urged to join in the antigovernment demonstration. Through the influence of the Christians among the mountain people, they remained aloof. Excellent harmony exists between the missionaries and the government officials throughout the aboriginal country, she told me. <sup>1</sup>

These words from Hollington Tong, a former ROC ambassador to the US, point to a dilemma facing Christian missionaries who worked under KMT surveillance. Dickson, like her husband, James, was a major figure in Presbyterian mission work in Taiwan. Their efforts dated back to the Japanese era, when James Dickson was instrumental in educating Chi-oang, an aging, tattooed Truku woman, who converted many of her fellow

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Hollington K. Tong (1961): Christianity in Taiwan: a history. Taipei: China Post, p.151.

tribespeople under extraordinarily difficult circumstances during the war. When the Dicksons returned, they found around four thousand Truku converts waiting for them. This was the so-called "Pentecost of the Hills."

The Dicksons were intimately aware of the suffering of Taiwanese people and the Aborigines in particular, and spent years bringing material and spiritual relief to a desperately poor and sickly population. They would also have been very aware of the role of KMT corruption and indifference in this suffering, and had to play a careful diplomatic game to ensure continued access to the communities they served. Yet the words Tong attributes to Lillian Dickson point to something else: a small but noteworthy misrepresentation of very recent history.

One is tempted to approach Tong's account of his conversation with Lillian Dickson with caution. His book was, after all, published during martial law, and is "respectfully dedicated to Madame Chiang Kai-shek as a tribute to her inspiring Christian leadership," and offers "a prayer for deliverance from neutrality in a world where the issues are clearly drawn between good and evil." However, this does not explain why he names 1946 as the year that the 228 Incident occurred, and it is not clear which Aboriginal communities refused to be involved. More seriously, Dickson's claim – if she made the claim – that missionaries warned Aborigines against intervention because of earlier KMT encouragement invites a scathing response. Yet Lillian Dickson's own account of her time in Taiwan does not contain this statement or anything like it.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Lillian Dickson (1958): These my people: serving Christ among the mountain people of Formosa. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House; Kenneth L. Wilson (1964): Angel at her shoulder: Lillian Dickson and her Taiwan mission. London: Hodder and Staughton; James Dickson (tr. Paul M. Fan and Russell E. Nelson)(1951): Bi chuanqi geng qi (Stranger than fiction). Hong Kong: Lutheran Missions Literature Society; Ralph Covell (1998): Pentecost of the hills in Taiwan: the Christian faith among the original inhabitants. Pasadena, California: Hope Publishing House, pp.184-185; and Edward Band (ed.)(1956): He brought them out: the story of the Christian movement among the mountain tribes of Formosa. London: The British and Foreign Bible Society, p.22.

Tong, op. cit., p.iii.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lillian Dickson, op. cit..

I raise this matter by way of introducing the difficult balance that missionaries had to strike when dealing with KMT officialdom, and in Aboriginal areas in particular. One of the more interesting aspects of the 228 Incident was the general Presbyterian response:

Because the [KMT] had shown itself hostile to the aspirations of the Taiwanese, the Presbyterian leaders outspokenly opposed the new regime. As a result, church leaders and members suffered at the hands of the island's liberators. Church leaders continued to oppose the state even after the bitter days of [228]. Indeed the episode strengthened their resolve. Government repression forced them to adopt a low profile but they continued to speak out when circumstances permitted or when the government did something so outrageous that they could not hold their tempers.<sup>5</sup>

Many Presbyterians were killed in the 228 Incident,<sup>6</sup> but Church entreaties to Chiang Kai-shek and Soong May-ling about this and other KMT excesses were disregarded.<sup>7</sup> This contrasts with the stance of denominations such as the Southern Baptists and the Catholics, who preferred not to mix faith with politics.

Nonetheless, there are moments of curious Presbyterian Church silence, such as when security forces eliminated "dissident" Kao I-sheng. Kao had travelled to Taipei in 1946 to meet James Dickson and invite him to send missionaries to Wufeng Township to preach the gospel. Dickson and two colleagues obliged, and this was followed by frequent visits from other Han ministers in the Presbyterian Church. But this opportunity was cut short when the 228 Incident exploded. The Church resumed its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Murray A. Rubinstein (1991a): The Protestant community on modern Taiwan: mission, seminary and church. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, p.29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Cha Shih-chieh (1996): "Taiwan guangfu qianhoude jidujiaohui (yijiusiling – yijiusiba)" (The Christian Church around the time of retrocession in Taiwan (1940-1948)). In: Lin Chih-ping (ed.): *Jidujiao yu Taiwan* (The Christian Church and Taiwan). Taipei: Yuchoukuang, p.152.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Sheldon Sawatzky (1981): "State-church conflict in Taiwan: its historical roots and contemporary manifestations." *Missiology: An International Review*, 9(4), pp.455-456.

activities in Wufeng in 1956, but security forces continued to cause many problems.<sup>8</sup> There is no mention of Kao in any of the Dicksons' publications.

Whatever rationalisation of political oppression was occurring among the churches at that time, this chapter argues that the major denominations in Aboriginal areas helped to obstruct the KMT in a subtle but much more impactful way. They deliberately unravelled the party's assimilationist agenda by quickly marrying faith to Aboriginal identity – all under the watch of the country's strictest network of community surveillance.

This chapter also presents an instance of how security agencies dealt with Aboriginal dissidence that could no longer be attributable to communist influence. Almost all of the dissidence discussed so far had no meaningful connection with communism either, but it had been portrayed as part of a credible threat posed by the People's Republic of China. The material I describe in the second half of this chapter could not be tied to communist meddling.

But if not communism, then what else? Here I use the term *nativisation* to refer to new acts of group identification not in accord with assimilationist policy that take Taiwan, or areas within Taiwan, as their boundary. The major concerns for security agencies relating to Aboriginal nativisation were, first, the networks of Christian missionaries, ministers and churches and, second, the sporadic outbreaks of cultural and political activism that occurred outside the perimeters of party authority. While the latter were quite easily dealt with, I argue that the missions and Christian institutions capitalised on the distinction between processes of modernisation and assimilation. This resulted in considerable damage to the KMT's assimilation programme.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Presbyterian Church of Formosa Committee on History, op. cit., pp.458-459.

Finally, I discuss some examples of Aboriginal cultural and political expression that the KMT utilised in national contexts. I argue that these contradictory expressions are just as useful in explaining the decay of assimilationist rhetoric.

# The Presbyterian subversion of assimilation

The modern era of Christian mission work in Taiwan began with the Qing authorities' loosening of restrictions on entry following the Opium War treaties of 1858. The Presbyterians and the Dominicans were the first denominations to benefit from this development, though it took until 1865 for the Presbyterians to establish a foothold under James Maxwell and then George Mackay in 1872. Prior to the Japanese period, the great majority of Aboriginal converts, however were *pingpu* tribespeople living within the administrative realm of the Qing provincial government.<sup>9</sup>

The Japanese era accelerated Taiwan's modernisation and, with this, Christian missions were able to operate with more security and success until the militarisation of the Japanese government made mission work increasingly difficult, resulting in the eventual evacuation of foreign clergy just before the entry of Japan into World War II. Even before this, however, the Japanese applied strict controls on missionary access to Aboriginal communities in restricted mountain areas, and to the deep regret of the church, almost all of the *pingpu* churches succumbed to assimilative forces and ceased to function.<sup>10</sup>

The arrival of James and Lillian Dickson in 1927, however, represented the first concerted engagement with Aboriginal people, particularly on the east coast, and it was this connection that eventually saw James Dickson invite Chi-oang to Taipei to study.

<sup>10</sup> ibid., pp.48-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Dorothy A. Raber (1978): Protestantism in changing Taiwan: a call to creative response. South Pasadena, California: William Carey Library, pp.29-43.

Later she assumed the pioneering role of proselytiser before and during the war in the absence of church guidance – and in the shadow of Japanese persecution. <sup>11</sup> But the greatest expansion of the Christian faith occurred after the war, when church workers arrived in considerable numbers to salvage their work or seek new opportunities. However, the pattern of Christian subversion of state interests had already been set.

The conversion of Aboriginal people to Christianity concerned KMT security agencies because it involved a regular presence of foreigners in a high-security area as well as cultural expressions that did not conform to Nationalist ideals. Before long, Church representatives and members of congregations became the target of security agencies when they strayed into activities that increased the utility of Aboriginal cultures and languages. By the 1980s these expanded to include regular campaigning on social issues.

The situation was quite complex, however, as benefits flowed in both directions. Churches helped to keep the communities orderly; they showed the KMT how to bring about change through intimate connection to a community; and they gave the party credibility in international eyes — chiefly the United States, where the KMT was rewarded with the dedication of conservative religious lobbyists. <sup>12</sup> In return, the missionaries and ministers were allowed to do largely as they pleased within their theological terms of reference. This trade-off, however, must be placed in the context of security policy as it applied to Aboriginal areas.

#### Mountain area security measures

In an internal report released by the Taiwan Provincial Office of Police Affairs in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Covell, op. cit., pp.165-170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See Murray A. Rubinstein (1991b): "Taiwanese Protestantism in time and space, 1865-1988." In: E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams and Joseph Wong (eds): *Taiwan: economy, society and history*. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, p.261.

October 1953, we see a glimpse of the security guidelines within which missionaries and churches operated.<sup>13</sup> The preamble to this report cites the oppression of Aborigines by the Japanese authorities and notes how worship of the Emperor was encouraged at the expense of all other religions. It also claims - falsely - that no religious tradition other than emperor worship was able to penetrate the mountain areas under the Japanese, and says that Nationalist police now acted as "guardians" of the missions. 14

The report cites Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of China as providing citizens with freedom of religion, then claims that no restrictions apply to missionary organisations in entering mountain areas. This, combined with the protection afforded to missionary staff, it says, is the reason for the ubiquitousness of churches of all denominations in mountain areas.15

The report points out, however, that attaining as many converts as possible, though resulting in numerous charitable projects, had led to clashes between churches as well as the creation of factions in Aboriginal communities. Some churches, it says, had no places of worship and had begun to hold services in the open air, prompting the police agency to request a change to the regulations. Ministers and missionaries were thereafter required to "contact the local government" - a euphemism for making a formal application, which could be readily denied - before holding services to "prevent misunderstandings from occurring."16

In 1950, the government introduced regulations for missionary entry into mountain areas. Missionaries were refused entry if they violated - or had the potential to violate, presumably - the Three Principles of the People, government policy or the law; if they obstructed the government's educational objectives; or if they acted coercively against

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See Taiwan Provincial Office of Police Affairs, op. cit..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p.149.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p.150.

other faiths. The first two conditions were so ambiguously worded that any missionary could have been denied entry at any time. However, the report hailed them as improving the situation in general.

The report said that because of the "special circumstances in the mountains areas," there was a balance of positives and negatives relating to the missionary presence.<sup>17</sup> Two positive achievements were listed. The first was that efforts to reduce drinking and smoking among Aborigines of all ages only began to have an effect after the missions took up the cause. The second was that the "ferocious temperament" and "coarse manner" of Aboriginal people were largely changed for the better through the missionaries' use of the doctrine of moral retribution.<sup>18</sup>

But five negative aspects were also listed. They were:

- 1. The creation of factions through church rivalry was tending to make unwitting Aboriginal followers "cunning and treacherous" in their thinking and behaviour,
- 2. The financial burden in building churches was increasingly difficult to bear for church members,
- 3. The proliferation of church services was interfering with agricultural work and the training of young people, as well as obstructing the implementation of policy,
- 4. Evening services were affecting class attendance among older people in public schools and obstructing the promotion of Chinese-language education, and
- 5. Missionaries entering the mountains were of an uneven standard, and those with a substandard character or substandard training were offending local standards and using absurd or superstitious language to trick Aborigines into becoming believers. This was damaging the "better practices" within local culture. 19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, p.150. <sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, p.150.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, p.151

Unfortunately, no examples of such misconduct are provided, nor is an explanation of how security forces could distinguish between the acceptable myths of the gospel and the unacceptable myths it sought to repel. The report instead says that martial law provisions required missionaries to first obtain permission from the local security command post before the standard application process commenced, and that missionaries deemed to be spreading lies or superstition would be refused entry. Similarly, a number of regulations are provided for the expulsion of missionaries deemed to be acting in an injurious manner toward the locals, though no examples of this are provided either.20

Finally, the report lists restrictions imposed upon missionaries and churches with regard to the use of language. They are:

- 1. Religious education for children had to use teaching materials in Mandarin, though oral "explanations" could use Taiwanese (Hoklo) or the local Aboriginal language,
- 2. Supplementary classes had to be provided for teaching Mandarin, including the Bible and poems and songs; oral explanations could also be delivered in Taiwanese or the local Aboriginal tongue,
- 3. Japanese editions of the Bible were not to be used when worshipping or gathering in public gathering places, and Japanese was not to be spoken or sung while preaching the gospel, even for the purposes of explanation,
- 4. Personal copies of Japanese-language bibles could only be used at home for reference and could not be used in any other context. These bibles had to be examined and registered within a certain time, otherwise they would be confiscated,
- 5. Restrictions applied to Japanese-language materials were also applied to Romanized bibles and song books.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, pp.151-152. <sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, p.152.

The last restriction meant that it was illegal to render the Bible into Aboriginal languages. One of the consequences of this was neatly summed up by George Vicedom, whose vital report on Aboriginal Christianity in the mid-1950s will be discussed in the next section. In the politest possible language under the circumstances, Vicedom complained that this policy was impeding the work of the Church:

The Bible is essential to the Church and to the individual Christian. But with the low standard, or non-existence of modern education, the complicated language situation and the scarcity, or lack, or [sic] appropriate translations of the Bible, the tribes can scarcely hear the Word of God speaking to them through his Book.

I have never heard of a tribal person finding his way to Christ through the reading of the Bible. It is the "viva vox evangelica" not the printed word, which has converted the tribes.<sup>22</sup>

#### George Vicedom and the paradox of assimilation

Writing in 1957, Vicedom, a Lutheran and a professor at a theological seminary in Germany, provided a candid glimpse of the state of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan's Aboriginal communities and of related problems associated with Aboriginal assimilation to Chinese culture. This report, published ten years later under the title of *Faith that Moves Mountains*, with a brief update by Murray Garvin, is invaluable not only because of the scarcity of material with this theme but also because of its particular interest in the spiritual and physical welfare of Aboriginal people, and its rare willingness to discuss both the hardships faced by Aboriginal people and the elements of mission work that were difficult to implement.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See George Vicedom (1967): Faith that moves mountains: A study report on the amazing growth and present life among the Church among the mountain tribes of Taiwan. Taipei: China Post, p.34.

The parts of the report I will discuss explicitly tie the missionaries' goals to the KMT programme of modernising and assimilating Aboriginal culture, but they also point to a parting of ways between these superficially allied processes. The role played by the missionaries and the churches in both advancing and obstructing KMT policies is also relevant in charting changes in the security context in which they worked.

Near the beginning of his report, Vicedom uses careful language to describe the generally squalid conditions in which disease-stricken Aboriginal people were living. Their circumstances were made harder, he says, by the deceitful behaviour of moneylenders and other Han Taiwanese from the plains who would cheat them. Vicedom then posits the emergence of a spiritual and social vacuum in the wake of the annullment of tribal law under the Japanese, which saw the replacement of tribal chiefs with elected or appointed heads of villages.24

The Gospel, Vicedom argues, brought to these struggling communities "a new religion and a new social community,"25 a process that was aided by dissatisfaction among the people with their original way of life as it was dismembered by colonial authorities. <sup>26</sup> In this sense, the process of assimilation was energized not so much by Japanese culture per se as much as the ability of that culture to inculcate in Aborigines a sense of inferiority. This "inferiority complex," Vicedom argues, is the precursor to the process of assimilation, or at least its greatest facilitator once significant armed resistance to the colonist ends.<sup>27</sup>

Vicedom's claim that the Japanese were "just and efficient" in their treatment of the

ibid., p.9 and p.13.
 ibid., p13.
 ibid., p14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> ibid..

Aborigines<sup>28</sup> was not shared by most KMT propagandists who, as we have seen, insisted that the Japanese were malevolent and had a regressive influence on Aboriginal societies. For his part, Vicedom says that the Aborigines "were very hesitant to acknowledge that the Japanese did good work among them, all they could feel at the time was their frustration and disappointment."29

But eventually the "Japanese and the Chinese became the model of higher culture, of a life worth struggling for, of a brilliant future,"30 so much so that it "became the great conviction of the tribes that they had to become equal members of Chinese society"; they therefore began to imitate – comically at times – the ways of the Chinese, including harbouring a "materialistic and secular attitude." Indeed, Vicedom considers the desire to assimilate to Chinese society to be the strongest motivation for conversion to Christianity.<sup>32</sup> Closely tied to this is what Vicedom calls the eudaemonistic tendency among Aboriginal people to see in Christianity a means of advancing their lot, a tantalising dilemma for the Presbyterians because of the growing presence of the better funded Roman Catholic Church, which used its resources to not only attract unbelievers but also to convert members of other churches.

So, the question arises: Why did the tribes not embrace Chinese religion as part of the process of assimilation, as the plains Aborigines had done over the centuries? Here, Vicedom opens the door to a paradox in the process, though he does not identify it as such: apart from being intimidated by the paraphernalia of Chinese worship on their occasional trips to town markets, and notwithstanding the lack of a missionary agenda among the Chinese with regard to Aborigines, Aboriginal people were looking for "a religion that would free them from Chinese domination, and, at the same time, uphold

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, p.8. <sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, p.8.

<sup>30</sup> ibid., p.14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p.74.

<sup>32</sup> ibid., p.35.

the high moral principles of the old tribal religion."<sup>33</sup> The same had been the case, Vicedom argues, with the plains tribes, but their churches gradually disappeared after being overwhelmed by Chinese society toward the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>34</sup> As Vicedom's report progresses it becomes more apparent that the Presbyterian Church and other denominations were exploiting this disjuncture to set firm roots in Aboriginal society.

### A spiritual 'vacuum'?

Vicedom's use of the term "vacuum" to describe spirituality subject to assimilation is problematic, however, because it implies that all subsequent spiritual and social content is imported and unchanged upon adoption by that society. A spiritually vacuous society would no longer have the strategic wherewithal to attempt resistance of this nature, nor would it harbour substantial residue from the "old tribal religion" to produce syncretic forms of faith tolerated by the Catholic Church more than the Protestant denominations.

The term "vacuum" also tends to downplay resistance to missionaries from within Aboriginal society, opposition which Vicedom himself cites and analyses in some detail, likening the process to nothing less than a "struggle" between the parties involved. Indeed, at the time he was writing, half of all Aborigines had been converted to Christianity — an impressive figure in view of the time that had elapsed since the war. But this meant that many among the other half of the population were clinging to the old ways, suggesting that a struggle was still taking place. It is clear from his analysis that, in relying on the conversion of Aborigines via whole family groups rather than

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, pp.15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, p.15.

<sup>35</sup> Vicedom, op. cit., p.23, pp.28-30, pp.49-57, pp.77-78, p.81 and pp.94-99.

individuals, the missionaries and the churches were not acting in a vacuum. They employed indigenous social structures and spiritual traditions to establish their presence, and vigorously countered the opposition of Aborigines, especially chieftains, who considered them usurpers.<sup>37</sup> By 1958, however, it was clear that a good number of the chieftains needed the support of Christians to get anything done in their communities, and relations were generally cordial.<sup>38</sup>

### Resisting Chinese society

Most importantly, Vicedom identifies Christianity as a source of resistance to Chinese society, which he warned was threatening to overwhelm Aboriginal communities and their new faith – however crudely practiced. He then spends much of the report asking how the Church can hold its ground or expand its territory among Aboriginal people.

Probably because of the political situation, Vicedom couched all of this in quite careful language, but it is clear from the beginning that his suggestions for the survival of the Presbyterian Church in Aboriginal Taiwan delicately balanced the need to modernise courtesy of co-operation with the KMT - with the need to oppose the degree of cultural assimilation that would threaten the agenda of the church.

Accordingly, one of the newest threats to this agenda was changing attitudes among young people, many of whom opposed the conservative elements of the Church that allowed their parents to resist assimilationist policy. One of the drawbacks for the Church was the introduction of Chinese customs such as recreational drinking, which helped to make elements of the tribal religion more attractive to young people in the face

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, p.51 and p.99. <sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, p.79.

of Church conservatism.<sup>39</sup> The Protestants, in seeking to uphold certain practices and standards that were incompatible with wholesale assimilation, were faced with a sobering question regarding the younger generations now targeted by KMT pedagogy:

[For young Aborigines, it] does not matter so much what would be useful to the church, but what would pave the road towards becoming Chinese...

It is hard to say what the Church should do in such a situation. Of course, it must try to preserve the best of the culture of the mountain tribes, but on the other hand, it cannot stop this process of assimilation.<sup>40</sup>

This statement is critical, because it reflects a fundamental point of departure between Vicedom – if not the Church as a whole – and the KMT. The Christian mission, Vicedom argues in effect, should commit itself to the defense of ethnicity and hinder the assimilation plans of the Nationalists. The need for the Church in Taiwan to distinguish between the modernisation of Aboriginal people and their absorption by a dominant culture becomes apparent at this moment.

Vicedom flags the defense of Aboriginal culture as a fundamental responsibility in ensuring the success of the missions, and arrives at this conclusion with the example of intermarriage. The drifting of Aboriginal girls to the plains in search of a Han husband – to leave a backbreaking existence and secure a better material life – was "endangering the life of the churches." His solution to this problem, apart from the practical need to find ways to advance the economic development of Aboriginal villages, was to link ethnic survival and divine command:

We should show these people their responsibility to their village, their community, to the Church, and convince them to act in the light of the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> ibid., p.77 and pp.113-114.

<sup>40</sup> ibid., pp.119-120.

Word of God. I do not think we could stop the process [of intermarriage], but we could channel it to such an extent that the village and the church would not be endangered.42

Vicedom also opposes the disappearance of Aboriginality through a plea to the Presbyterian Church to establish schools of intermediate education along tribal lines:

We must recognize the fact that Christian education must also be Chinese education, but with Christian ideals and worthy tribal objectives added to it.43

One of these "worthy objectives" is that those Aboriginal youths who receive an education should:

... be inspired to return to their own tribes. They must be led to see that this is their Christian duty. Only in this way have the tribes any hope of improving their conditions and of preserving their entity and culture, and of the Church receiving intelligent and enlightened leadership. Only in this way have the tribes a future of their own, with a hope of becoming a part of Chinese society, and not being completely absorbed by it.44

Vicedom's rejection of the KMT claim to the superiority of Chinese civilisation over the Aboriginal cultures and his dismissal of the criticality of Mandarin could not have been made more explicit when he argues that, in regard to leadership training:

Since each tribe wants a school of its own, the feeling has been expressed that their young should learn the Bible in their own languages, and that Bible teaching should be adjusted to the tribal mentality. In such schools, the Gospel could be translated into tribal thinking ... all emphasis in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> *ibid.*, p.121. <sup>42</sup> *ibid.*.

<sup>43</sup> ibid., p.124. Emphasis in original.

Bible School should be laid on the fact that the teachers have to present the message of the Gospel in the thought patterns of the students.<sup>45</sup>

Vicedom then rejects the idea that such schools should be placed in the hands of Han Taiwanese Christians – because of their handicap of cultural distance. They would be "teaching the Bible in a way which would be helpful to the Taiwanese Church, but not to a church which is in its embryonic stage." Or, in other words, a *separate* Church. This Church, Vicedom states, would inevitably find indigenous forms, and to ensure that such expression did not deviate to the point where sects were produced, it was vital that church leaders "study tribal culture and art and traditions, and give room and encouragement for indigenous expressions of Christian truth."

Given the destruction of traditional Aboriginal culture that was occurring at the time, particularly at the hands of a number of Protestant missions,<sup>48</sup> Vicedom's refusal to regard much of Aboriginal culture as pagan or idolatrous is noteworthy and quite ahead of its time, resembling his Catholic counterparts and the Aboriginal Presbyterian ministers of the 1980s to the present.<sup>49</sup>

Even so, Vicedom was genuinely pessimistic about the prospects for Aboriginal languages, predicting with a middling degree of accuracy that they would disappear in a few generations, and suggesting that "the Bible in the tribal tongues, important as it is now, will have no future."<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Stainton, op. cit..

<sup>44</sup> ibid., p.127. Emphasis in original.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> ibid..

<sup>46</sup> ibid., p.128.

<sup>47</sup> ibid., p.129.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Interview with Li Lai-wang, 25 September, 2001. Li, a prominent and much-loved Amis teacher and administrator, died in September 2003. He told me that based on his experience, Christianity was enormously destructive of Aboriginal culture, encouraging the fear of God as a substitute for respect for the environment. In the first ten years of KMT rule, he said, missionaries and church members destroyed large amounts of material culture, while denominational competition corroded community unity.

As a theological and ethnological call to arms, Vicedom's work is a subtle but remarkable document to read, especially in light of the time it was written. The fact that it could be published in Taiwan at that time – in English only, it would appear – is evidence that by the late 1960s the KMT had abandoned any assimilationist ideology that would require increased levels of coercion or comprehensive intervention in standard church activities.

It is tempting to argue (though surely no Christian writer at the time would have been so bold to do so publicly) that the churches, represented largely by Western missionaries, must have looked upon their role of modernising Aborigines as one that could be performed better than the KMT, and wherever possible, independently of it. The scope for this was obviously extremely narrow given the limited resources and security constraints, but one critical example is the provision of medical resources and personnel to Aboriginal communities at a time when the KMT was thoroughly neglecting the dire health problems and food shortages in the mountains.

Overall, the objectionable elements of KMT rule are not underlined in Vicedom's report, though Vicedom uses the most diplomatic language to say there was substantial cause for dissatisfaction:

I found it remarkable that the tribes never complained about the laws and government of the Republic of China, to which they are subject. They say there are Christians in the legislative bodies, so the laws won't adversely affect Christian life. They cooperate with the government, and the government officials, on the whole, respect the tribes.

Vicedom notes another Church role that strengthened the distinction between Han Taiwanese and Aborigines, though he does not state this as such. By inculcating in its believers a sense of fellowship, or Christian community, the often bitter and violent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Vicedom, op. cit., p.132.

rivalries between Aboriginal villages were eaten away. In this we see another crucial contribution of the conversion of Aboriginal communities to ethnic identification, with the ground being laid for pan-Aboriginal identity at an ethnolinguistic level. Vicedom cites the Paiwan and the Atayal in Ilan County in this regard (see Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2).<sup>51</sup> And yet, he also laments that the language barrier was largely responsible for poor communication between Christians from different Aboriginal ethnolinguistic groups, a "tribal matter" which "has to be overcome before the mountain churches will become one Church." For Vicedom, Aboriginal Christianity could best survive by fortifying the boundary separating the Han, and weakening the boundaries dividing Aboriginal "tribes."

This distinction between Aborigine and Han Taiwanese was also being reinforced by the Han Taiwanese in the Presbyterian Church themselves. Vicedom is scathing about the officiousness and lack of interest in the circumstances besetting Aboriginal communities displayed by this section of the Church. The Aboriginal Christian movement, Vicedom argues, had no evangelising Church behind it because the Han Taiwanese "did not care to help them." At the time the report was written, this was best reflected by the fact that the General Assembly of the Formosan Church had a special committee dealing with "tribal work" with no Aboriginal representation, and which blocked the Aborigines' problems from being discussed by the General Assembly. 54

Vicedom elaborates on the mindset of the Han Taiwanese Presbyterians thus:

When I questioned Taiwanese pastors on this subject [of the appropriateness of Han Taiwanese church order in fledgling Aboriginal churches], they were loath to talk about it, and closed the discussion with, "It is all according to church order." The problem is all the more acute

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, p.42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, p.102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, p.69 and p.129.

<sup>54</sup> ibid., p.102.



Figure 7.1: Presbyterian clergy and guests pray during an activity for women church members at the Nei-Pu Senior Agricultural-Industrial Vocational High School in Shuimen, Neipu Township, Pingtung County, in August 1999. The Paiwan-style pots at front are awards for some of the attendees.



Figure 7.2: Paiwan women pray during a Presbyterian cultural activity at the Nei-Pu Senior Agricultural-Industrial Vocational High School in Shuimen, Neipu Township, Pingtung County, in August 1999. The women are dressed in "traditional" clothes marking local church affiliation.

because the Taiwanese Church is not really concerned about the mountain Churches. It has garnered a harvest for which it has not toiled. Will the mountain Churches grow to maturity and solve this problem themselves?<sup>55</sup>

Vicedom says there were exceptions to this dilemma, such as in Pingtung County, Taitung County and Lotung (in Ilan County). But the overall situation was very disappointing, exacerbated by the security obstacles placed between the mountain and the plains:

In general, the believers say that the Taiwanese Christians are friendly to them, but they also reported cases where the Christians are worse than the non-Christians. "Their pastors look down on us" is somewhat of a slogan among the mountain people. Because of this attitude the mountain churches must struggle along alone and isolated.<sup>56</sup>

It is fascinating that, as Aboriginal Christians built bridges between their communities, potential bridges with "modern" society were left half-built by the same people they would have regarded as benevolent agents of assimilation and sources of encouragement.

The scene ten years later

In the appendix to Faith that Moves Mountains by Murray Garvin, an associate secretary of the Presbyterian Church of Formosa's Mountain Work Committee, the succeeding ten years of development of the Church and Aboriginal society are summarised. Garvin notes some advances, such as higher incomes, better education, better personal economic management, increased church membership and new congregations, opportunities in local administration and representative government,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, p.71. <sup>56</sup> *ibid.*, p.76.

agricultural and professional training and, most importantly, the establishment of the Yushan Theological College in Hualien, which had growing enrolments and had placed graduates in Aboriginal communities all over Taiwan. Three tribes are also noted for setting up presbyteries of their own: the Sediq (a subdivision of the Atayal), the Amis and the Paiwan. Aboriginal students were also attending theological colleges in Tainan, Hsinchu and Taipei.<sup>57</sup>

However, the Church had become increasingly concerned about socio-economic problems relating to assimilation, including intermarriage with Han Taiwanese, the migration of Aborigines to the plains, ongoing problems with the concept of money and its management and other issues.<sup>58</sup> However, there is no mention of the state of the KMT's assimilation policy other than in one paragraph:

Interference by police also is not common. There are instances where some antagonistic policemen have tried to hinder the Church, but such cases are relatively few, and there is no indication that they arise from official policy. In fact, many local policemen, as well as higher officials, are most cooperative and helpful. Distribution of the Japanese Bible is sometimes hindered, but this is because it is a foreign-language publication. Chinese Bibles are freely distributed.<sup>59</sup>

This short passage confirms something hinted at in Vicedom's text: the KMT was now concerned about church activities only to the extent that certain symbolic taboos might be occasionally violated – and in the case of the Japanese Bibles, it appears, such violations were not always being acted on - or if the peace was being disturbed. I now turn to the problem of KMT harassment of Christians to assess this claim.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, pp.134-145. <sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, pp.134-145.

### Official hostility toward missionaries

Was the harassment of missionaries and Aboriginal Christians by police and party operatives reflective of a wider policy direction, or merely the frustrated reaction of township officials and party operatives to matters outside their control? The quote in the previous section would suggest the latter, but it is worthwhile to note examples of this behaviour, because there may have been more to the situation then these authors knew or were able to discuss.

A source from a Paiwan community in Taitung County's Tajen Township told me that during the earlier phase of KMT rule, police and schoolteachers would actively dissuade Aboriginal people from converting to Christianity, and that locals would receive less pressure from the authorities if they said they were Buddhist. The source speculated that the local authorities were unhappy about the presence of foreign missionaries in the area and concerned about the influence they might wield.<sup>60</sup> This is consistent with George Vicedom's claim that there was strong sentiment among the Chinese at the time that being a Christian was antithetical to being a "good Chinese."<sup>61</sup>

Vicedom himself cites several examples in which police and other authorities intimidated or acted against Aboriginal Christians. In one example, a young Bunun woman (her home village is not stated) was threatened with punishment by police if she insisted on going to a church conference in Hualien, though the girl was apparently not punished upon her return. <sup>62</sup> In other examples, raised in the context of what Vicedom calls the connection of a Buddhist revival in Taiwan with the rise of Chinese nationalism, police are said to have placed pressure on the Presbyterian Church to combine worship with Chinese dates of importance and local harvest festivals. Some officials are said to have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> ibid., pp.139-140. Italics in original.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>61</sup> Vicedom, op. cit., p.75.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, p.32.

warned Aborigines not to attend services because they would be bitten by snakes, among other more realistic threats. Pastors were "closely interrogated" before being forced to wait for entry permits into mountain areas and their sermons were vetted and censored. Schoolteachers were apparently also required to discriminate against the children of Christians in some cases, though no examples are given. 63 Vicedom, like the source in the previous paragraph, seems to think that such harassment was indicative of local, even petty, factors rather than a concerted campaign from higher levels of the security or political apparatus:

The police fear that the influence of the preachers might outgrow their own, or they are jealous because Christian weddings are conducted in the Church, and they have no part in them.<sup>64</sup>

Ralph Covell's study on Protestant Christianity, *Pentecost of the Hills in Taiwan*, tells how the government appeared to be in two minds over what to do with religious literature written in indigenous languages: in 1969, the Ministry of Education said it would approve the practice, but the Taiwan Garrison Command confiscated the material after it had been posted. Similar seizures continued until the 1980s, all the while accompanied by conflicting opinion from at least four government agencies.<sup>65</sup>

A source I interviewed in relation to this matter is a retired military policeman who had considerable experience in dealing with Aboriginal communities. He was trained at the Ministry of Defence's training school for military police in Wuku, Taipei County. This was followed by a four-year stint of training in intelligence. Several years later the source was assigned to eastern Taiwan as a liaison officer to one of the local Aboriginal administrations. One of his jobs there was to threaten individuals to ensure that

65 Covell, op. cit., pp.242-243.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, pp.75-76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> *ibid.*, p.76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Interview with anonymous source E (name withheld), 25 September, 2001.

candidates favoured by the KMT were elected to official posts. In his experience, the most powerful individual in an Aboriginal township was not the elected Aboriginal mayor, but the director of the local community service office, which was part of the party machine.<sup>67</sup>

Then, my source's surveillance work turned to missionaries. One of his jobs in the 1980s and 1990s was to monitor and round up Aboriginal people who had a community profile or platform inconsistent with KMT interests. They were generally good public speakers, spoke "the truth" and attracted community support. Consequently, most of them were Presbyterian ministers.<sup>68</sup>

### Harassment of Catholics

Activist Presbyterians were not the only Christians to have their lives disrupted by the authorities. In 1970, Ko Hui-i, a young Catholic Paiwan woman living in Tahsi Village in Taitung County's Taimali Township, came under scrutiny from teachers and police because of her association with Raleigh Ferrell, an American academic. The Academia Sinica-based Ferrell had been doing fieldwork on Aboriginal languages and had been allowed to use a desk in the local Catholic church. At some point, however, the authorities revoked permission for him to study in the area. Ko's subsequent attempts to hold activities for the youngsters in the area were impeded by the local elementary school teacher, a Mainlander, who at one point warned his pupils that if they associated any more with Ko they would be beaten. Accompanied by a foreign Catholic priest, Ko confronted a local official, who abused her in front of him, prompting Ko to angrily denounce the official as being no better than a communist for preventing children from

68 ibid..

<sup>67</sup> ibid..

attending a church.69

Ko was informed by a sympathetic Aboriginal policeman that the elementary school teacher was preparing to report her to security officials for "damaging road infrastructure," a charge which could lead to serious consequences. The Taitung priest then met with education officials, who sent a representative to Tahsi to investigate, after which the matter was cleared up. However, Ko found that pressure was continuing in other ways: she felt she was on a blacklist, and when an Aboriginal KMT member told her that she could avoid a lot of trouble simply by joining the party, she did so. All of her work on the Paiwan language ceased at this point.<sup>70</sup>

Ko was concerned about the effect her presence might have on the local church, so she ceased her missionary work and fled to the other side of Taiwan, only to find herself working in a shoe factory in Taichung for the next ten years.<sup>71</sup>

This period of work was interrupted when she received a letter from Hans Agley,<sup>72</sup> a Swiss Catholic priest who was researching indigenous languages and archaeology. He hoped she could help him study the Paiwan language and compile a dictionary and a collection of traditional stories because no one else was willing to do so.<sup>73</sup> Agley also told Ko he had been tremendously saddened when archaeological items he had collected for his research had been confiscated by "government officials" while staying in Taitung. Later, when seeking funding from the government to do some research in this area, Agley's research stored on computer disks was requested as part of the application process. When the material was returned to him, the disks had been erased. Eventually, a German-language work on the Paiwan language and traditional stories was published.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Interview with Ko Hui-i, 24 July, 2000.

<sup>70</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> *ibid.*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Hans Agley's name is to be confirmed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Interview with Ko Hui-i, 24 July, 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> *ibid*.. The years in which these alleged incidents occurred were not clear. The name of the work that

But such suppression of religious and political interests was only a superficial attack on the churches' authority. The most fundamentally subversive act had already taken place, and within easy reach of the authorities, no less – the churches had defined Aboriginal communities in terms independent of the state. It was simply a matter of time before this nativisation would be allowed full expression.<sup>75</sup>

#### A Catholic lecture at a KMT think tank

So far I have concentrated on Vicedom's discourse to show how the KMT forfeited its assimilationist agenda. But what of the Catholics? I said above that the Catholic Church was less inclined to become involved in political matters. But the Catholics were, if anything, more respectful of "traditional" material and spiritual culture than Protestant denominations, and were more inclined to combine these with its own traditions. As an example of this, I refer to a speech given in 1960 by a Catholic official to the same KMT think tank, the Revolutionary Practice Institute, which – as I showed in the previous chapter – had distributed an article a few years before that eased assimilationist rhetoric. The official, Yu Pin, lecturing on the relationship between Catholicism and *Chinese* culture, said:

The decay of a society's customs and practices is inconsistent with a moral standard. The Catholic Church therefore takes responsibility for thinking of ways to prevent this from happening. The Bible said that salt prevents decay; one could say that the Catholic Church is a kind of salt for the spirit.<sup>76</sup>

was published is also not clear at this time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Stainton, op. cit., is an essential but lesser known account of the role of the Presbyterian Church in advancing Aboriginal interests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> See Yu Pin (1960): "Tianzhujiao yu wenhua jiaoliu" (The Catholic Church and cultural exchange). *Shihchien Shuangchoukan* (Practice Biweekly), 422, p.5.

### Later, he said:

Wherever in the world the Catholic Church goes and comes into contact with local ethnic (*minzu*) culture, mutual understanding has the effect of enhancing that culture.<sup>77</sup>

Yu's talk was, of course, meant as a validation of the Nationalist "Chinese culture" that his hosts were protecting from the scourge of communism on their island refuge. But it is all too clear that this is precisely what his colleagues stationed in mountain areas were doing as well.

### A cultural form of subversion: the plans of Lai Hung-yen

I now return to overt political dissidence with the story of a young Aboriginal teacher who attempted to campaign for cultural dignity in the guise of plans for an Aboriginal state. His story is interesting because this campaign was not branded as the product of communist infiltration or inspiration, and represents the first act of Aboriginal "nationalism." It is an important case, because it reflects the changing security interests of the KMT. It is also interesting because this story remains quite obscure, and to this day – more than a year after his death – Lai's contribution to the history of agitation for Aboriginal cultural dignity remains uncelebrated, even among the Aboriginal elites. This obscurity reflects how effectively the KMT controlled Aboriginal communities, but even more encapsulates how the campaign to develop a pan-Aboriginal political sentiment struggles to embrace its own history.

Lai Hung-yen was born on August 13, 1934, into a chieftain's family (see Figure 7.3).

He was a student at Pinmao Elementary School in Taitung County during the 228 Incident and witness to the last confirmed Aboriginal decapitation of an "enemy," which I described in Chapter Four. He graduated to high school in Kaohsiung with the first of a series of scholarships for Aboriginal students (starting in 1947) to be handed out by the new KMT government.<sup>78</sup> There Lai came into contact with "plains" (Han Taiwanese) society for the first time, including the inevitable experiences of racial abuse, though at first this was not a problem for him. He then transferred to a school in Taitung to be closer to his family.<sup>79</sup>

After graduating from high school, Lai worked as a translator for three years for a Swiss Catholic priest who relocated from China and was now proselytising in Aboriginal communities.<sup>80</sup> Inspired by the students he met, Lai was admitted to the Taitung Normal College (now National Taitung University). There he read about the Wushe Uprising and the Mutan Incident for the first time, and made trips to neighbouring Mutan to learn more about the history of the Japanese attack on southern Taiwan. This reading and informal fieldwork triggered Lai's interest in combating the oppression of Aboriginal people.<sup>81</sup>

Lai extended his reading to cover the postwar sense of emancipation of national groups around the world, and began to respond physically to racial taunting by his young adult classmates. He also began to struggle with the idea of establishing an Aboriginal state, and took copious notes of the complexities this would entail, as well as attempting to establish a unifying system of Romanisation for the Paiwan language.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> ibid..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Kuan Hsiao-jung, op. cit., p.81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> *ibid*., p.84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Lai identified the missionary as Jacob Herber, though this name is to be confirmed. Interview with Lai Hung-ven, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>81</sup> Kuan Hsiao-jung, op. cit., p.85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> ibid..



Figure 7.3: Lai Hung-yen, his wife Tsai Mei-yu and their grandchildren at the Lai residence in Tajen Township, Taitung County in October, 1999.



Figure 7.4: An impression of Lai Hung-yen's Aboriginal national flag.

At this point Lai sketched the first attempt at an Aboriginal national flag (see Figure 7.4). This was in the mid-1950s, the height of the White Terror, and Lai had already been a person of concern for the college by this time. His activities were being monitored and noted by fellow students, who would pass the information to the authorities. Many of his notes had been secretly photographed. A teacher at one time summoned him and asked him if his scribbling was related to the newly introduced system of Romanisation in China, Hanyu Pinyin, and whether he was being pressured by communist agents or sympathisers into writing Chinese characters in Roman script.<sup>83</sup>

Lai's first job after graduating from college was a teaching position at his own elementary school in Pinmao. Although the school contained security personnel, Lai continued to speak his mind on political and cultural matters, boosted by his status as "a chieftain of the Paiwan people, and the only Aboriginal intellectual to have graduated from the formal educational system for teachers." Visitors to the area, especially students and the Aboriginal nobility, would meet Lai and listen to his ideas.<sup>85</sup>

Lai claims that his thinking began to attract the respect and attention of the Aboriginal community, especially those attending schools and colleges. He therefore ran for Chinfeng Township's seat on the Taitung County Council, but the KMT's favoured candidate won after Lai was undone by dirty campaigning and polling "irregularities," such as forcing voters to show party observers how they had voted. As Aboriginal author Walis Nogan points out, this was the time that the group of Atayal Aboriginal intellectuals formed the Young People's Alliance for the Struggle for Salvation of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, pp.85-87. The flag came to wider attention in the article by Kuan Hsiao-jung in 1994 but no one has apparently attempted to entrench it as a cultural icon in the same way that the Australian Aboriginal flag has become indispensible.

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, p.87.

<sup>85</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> These were common KMT tactics to ensure the right candidates won – candidates who, in Lai's words, would "have no voice." See Kuan Hsiao-jung, *op. cit.*, p.87; and interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September, 2001.

Penglai Nation, and Nogan rues the fact that like-minded members of the Aboriginal elite were not able to know one another, or indeed learn of the earlier activities and pronouncements of Aboriginal leaders such as Nan Chih-hsin and Ma Chih-li.<sup>87</sup> Lai's election loss ensured that, in his case, this situation would continue indefinitely.

After three years at the school, Lai commenced his military service, where he claims to have been discriminated against and prevented from gaining promotion or using the basic medical skills he acquired at the time.<sup>88</sup> Lai then returned to teaching at a different school in his home district, but a dispute over disciplining a student saw him being sent to teach on Lanyu, the island home of the Yami (Tao) people off the southeast coast. In 1965, Lai returned to Taitung for recreation, but was picked up by officers on August 21 from the local investigative branch of the justice ministry, and he was interrogated for four days before being released.<sup>89</sup> His investigators referred to two thick volumes of materials that had been gathered relating to his case, including his ideas for a Paiwan nation, and possible nominees for president and defence minister, as well as the design for a national flag. Lai claims that the information gathered proved that many of his teachers, friends and colleagues had informed on him.<sup>90</sup>

The investigators asked Lai if he was a communist spy, whether he had any dealings with communists in his past, and if he wanted to be the president of an independent country. Lai denied the link to communists, but affirmed his desire for an independent state. Threatened with military prosecution, he nonetheless retaliated with the memorable line:

<sup>87</sup> Walis Nogan (1994): "Zhuizong Paiwan zude fanbao yuandian: zai shengmingde zhuanzhechu" (Tracing the origins of the Paiwan people's opposition to violence: turning points in life). *Hsin Kuohui*, 5, p.92

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Kuan Hsiao-jung, op. cit., p.87.

<sup>89</sup> *ibid.*, p.81.

Wuan Hsiao-jung, op. cit., p.81 and p.87. During my interview with Lai on 23 September, 2001, he accused one former teaching colleague, Hsu Yung-fu, of being an informant, something that Lai said had affected his relationship with Hsu ever since.

"I'm no communist spy! I've never seen a communist in my life. Since when were there communists among us shandiren [Aborigines]? It's only you lot from the mainland that have communists in your family."91

After his release, Lai returned to Lanyu. Within a few months, Chiang Kai-shek arrived on the island and Lai was summoned by Chiang's head of personal security (and later ROC premier), Hau Pei-tsun, to meet the president. He was warned that he needed to make a good impression. Lai showed Chiang some of Lanyu's sights, and whenever Lai responded to Chiang's questions in a deferential fashion, Chiang would pat the 31-yearold Lai on the shoulder, saying, "Good boy, good boy." The two were photographed together, and a photograph of Lai, Chiang and members of the local community hangs to this day on the walls of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.

A week after Chiang left, Lai was required to atone for his earlier dissidence by serving as an informant on the island, reporting daily to security officials on the behaviour of public officials, teachers and soldiers, including where that behaviour resulted in discontent among local Aboriginal people.<sup>93</sup> Throughout this period, previous suspicions of communist connections seemed to have been abandoned, and there is no reference to any accusations thereto in subsequent sources.

When the military contingent on the island learned about Lai's clandestine work a year later, the authorities allowed him to return to the mainland and continue his teaching work there. Upon his return, Lai was also required to join the KMT and act as a paid informant in Tajen Township. This was how Lai lived until 1983, when the money from the security agencies stopped and investigators no longer paid attention to his activities. This was the year that the first dissident Aboriginal journal, Gaoshanqing, was published, and the year before the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines was established,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Kuan Hsiao-jung, *op. cit.*, p.87. <sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, p.88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> ibid..

whose first president, famed singer and cultural activist Kimbo (Hu Te-fu), was one of Lai's students.94

After retirement, Lai continued to assist at the local elementary school in Tajen Township's Taipan Village, and he set about writing a comprehensive Romanized dictionary of the Paiwan language. 95 This period was relatively stable, and Lai married and had three children, but for the rest of his life he was haunted by his past (see Appendix B).

### The hopelessness of the campaign

Walis Nogan, writing in 1994, said the story of Lai Hung-yen showed that Taiwan's political and physical environment was bound to bring sorrow to the protagonists of any campaign against discrimination and ethnic oppression. In addition to the shortage of like-minded people, the lack of new people to fuel the next wave of activities and the lack of adequate communications infrastructure, there was always the KMT and its comprehensive system of surveillance and interference to ensure that the program never proceeded beyond the stage of a crude blueprint. 96 What Lai's experience demonstrates, however, is that after his initial interrogation in Taitung, there was no credibility attached to the idea that communism was responsible. Aided by a comprehensive system of informants, in the 1960s it seems to have become clear to the KMT that the advance of Aboriginal autonomy was a problem that was unconnected to communist intrigue and could be deprived of oxygen in a measured if coercive fashion by maintaining financial and political support systems across Aboriginal districts, as well as cultivating community representatives. In previous years, there would have been a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> ibid.. <sup>95</sup> ibid..

<sup>96</sup> Walis Nogan (1994), op. cit., p.92.

much greater chance of Lai being executed, and indeed he told me that one word out of place when meeting Chiang Kai-shek on Lanyu would have spelled disaster.<sup>97</sup>

For his part, Lai has in recent years claimed that the Aboriginal government he envisaged was more a symbol of personal defiance than a genuine nationalist project. Speaking in an interview with the *Austronesian News*, Lai said that he never wanted to establish an independent state. The rhetoric and plans for a republic and a national flag were simply born of the absence of human rights for Aboriginal people.<sup>98</sup>

Another important point is that the people Lai envisaged as heads of an imaginary Aboriginal government were not radicals. Hsieh Kui, an outstanding administrator from Pingtung County and darling of the provincial government, was named as an education minister, the defence minister was Kao Ming-yuan, an Amis Aborigine who was a military cadet at the time, and the ideal president was Ko Liang-pai, a Paiwan, also from Taitung County and fifteen years older than Lai. Ko was a mentor to Lai and a one-time provincial assemblyman with considerable experience in local and provincial politics.<sup>99</sup> It is not clear whether Kao and Hsieh knew of Lai's ideas, but Lai reported that he had talked about the idea of Aboriginal independence with Ko as early as 1965, though Ko did not respond.<sup>100</sup>

The vacuum of the present

Lai Hung-yen died on April 4, 2004. His wife, Tsai Mei-yu, told me that he had become

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> See Tiyaken (1995b): "Yongyuande shidai juren (ba)" (Eternal giant of an era, part 8). Austronesian News, 23, 7.

<sup>99</sup> Kuan Hsiao-jung, op. cit., p.87 and p.89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Interview with Lai Hung-yen, 23 September 2001. Lai's later comments about Ko's relationship with him caused consternation among Ko's relatives even after Ko's death. Around ten years ago, some of Ko's relatives abused him over the phone for implicating Ko in his plans for an Aboriginal state.

vague in the last days, and that on the night before he died, he had asked her not to leave him alone with all of the people milling around his house, though only he and she were actually there.

My partner and I were invited to attend the funeral, which was held the following Sunday, 11 April (see Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6). The ceremony was interesting because Lai had been something of a sensitive figure in his community — a respected teacher and activist yet a pariah, before being known in retirement as an amateur linguist and local historian. His continuing support for Taiwanese independence *and* Aboriginal autonomy may not have endeared him politically to a community that traditionally stands by the KMT or its pro-unification splinter parties, but the variety of people who attended the funeral did not reflect this. Representatives from the local Democratic Progressive Party and KMT branches were present, as were county government officials and Aboriginal administrators from neighbouring townships. Lai's relatives spoke freely and comprehensively about his life, including his banishment to Lanyu and his political ideas, which were rare for the time and even rarer to be acted on.

But there was something else about the attendees that was conspicuous. Absent were all ten<sup>101</sup> of the Aboriginal legislators, including five legislators who were named as honorary members of the funeral organising committee.<sup>102</sup> The head of the Council of Indigenous Peoples (formerly known in English as the Council for Aboriginal Affairs), former Taitung County commissioner Chen Chien-nien, was also absent, despite being on the committee. The other significant absent committee member was Chang Po-lung, the head of Pinmao Elementary School during the 228 Incident and later a provincial assemblyman and presidential advisor.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> In the legislature at that time, eight legislators represented Aboriginal districts, and two others were elected as legislators-at-large, one each from the Democratic Progressive Party (Chen Tao-ming) and the People First Party (Tsai Chung-han).

Lai Hung-yen's funeral notice listed legislators Tseng Hua-te, Walis Pelin, May Chin (Kao Chin Sumei), Chen Tao-ming and Lin Chun-te as honorary members of the committee.



Figure 7.5: Mourners place Lai Hung-yen's coffin in a hearse to be taken to burial after his funeral service in Taipan Village, Tajen Township, Taitung County, on April 11, 2004.



Figure 7.6: Mourners wait for Lai Hung-yen's hearse to depart his funeral service in Taipan Village, Tajen Township, Taitung County, on April 11, 2004.

I did not attempt to enquire why there were so many absentees, but it did not really matter. The truth, in any case, was that the solitude of Lai Hung-yen's Aboriginal "nationalism" had endured to the extent that none of the Aboriginal political elite most symbolically indebted to his efforts could spare a Sunday morning to pay final respects. This was a sobering reminder that the vacuum in Aboriginal communities is not spiritual, as the missionaries and the KMT believed fifty years ago. The vacuum is "national," because there is no shared image, person or event in Aboriginal history that can unite and energise a significant proportion of Aboriginal people to act as one ethnic group.

### KMT indecision and permissible Aboriginality

Before concluding I want to briefly refer to two other ways in which the KMT contributed to the downfall of its own assimilationist agenda.

The first relates to Aboriginal political culture. When Chang Po-lung, a KMT member and former advisor to the president, was serving as a provincial assemblyman in the mid-1960s, he proposed that the electorates for Aboriginal voters be modified to increase the representation of the "plains area mountain compatriots" (*pingdi shanbao*) to two assemblymen to match the number of "mountain area mountain compatriots" (*shandi shanbao*). The provincial government was not interested in this proposal, but after intervention by the central government, Chang's wish was granted. <sup>103</sup> It is not clear why the different levels of government disagreed, and it is not clear at this time why the central government considered the matter important enough to override the authority of the provincial government. However, Chang told me that when he proposed that the electoral distinction between "mountain" and "plains" Aborigines be dissolved, the

"mountain" assemblymen objected. The party responded to this dispute by having no opinion on the matter.<sup>104</sup> This tepid response suggests that the KMT had become indifferent to searching for a political mechanism that could eliminate cultural difference. Furthermore, by granting Chang his wish, the party invested political capital into Aboriginality. The provincial representatives built the political culture that would later transfer to the legislature, particularly after Aborigines were awarded guaranteed seats, which now number eight – in addition to Aboriginal legislators elected through the proportion of the vote secured by individual parties.

Retired legislator Hua Ai, a Paiwan tribesman of military background, provides another example of the difficulties the KMT faced in appropriating Aboriginal culture. I have heard Aboriginal activists deride Hua for his hostility toward the Aboriginal movement, but in an interview with me he was at pains to point out that he supported the Aboriginal right to traditional weaponry (machetes, homemade rifles), and that hostility toward the more overt expressions of pan-Aboriginality in the 1980s came from the KMT's central mechanisms. He was also critical of the inequity in allocation of land and other resources to Aborigines, and said that most of his suggestions to the party were ignored. The KMT also interfered with a number of Hua's publications targeting Aboriginal readers, including *Chuangching Shanmai* (The empowered mountain range), a periodical whose funding was stopped because of alleged displeasure among senior KMT officials. Hua's dedication to his party was entirely consistent with defending his interpretation of Aboriginality, especially Paiwan Aboriginality. If Hua was the most conservative of the KMT Aboriginal elite, then it clearly meant that the party's hopes for assimilating Aboriginal culture were going to be dashed.

The second way in which the KMT damaged its assimilationist agenda relates to

103 Chuang, op. cit., pp.27-28.

<sup>104</sup> Interview with Chang Po-lung, September 24, 2001.

"traditional" performance culture. Hsieh Shih-chung has written of the segment of the tourism industry that relies on distortions of Aboriginal cultural practices to enhance the audience's sense of exotica. 106 But a review of newspapers from the late 1940s and early 1950s indicates that performances of "Aboriginal culture" by groups of Aboriginal men and women served a much more political role than the largely entrepreneurial culture parks of later years. The two daughters of Sun Moon Lake's "Chief" Mao somewhat exotically known as the "two princesses" - were only the most conspicuous of these performers. Men and women from many other villages formed groups which performed not only for other Aborigines and Han audiences, but also for the military, including defeated troops arriving from the mainland. 107 These groups performed a propaganda role, as well as providing the young soldiers with some entertainment and "exotic" young women to enjoy (and, in many cases, marry). But whatever the motivation for these performances, they helped not only to retain forms of hybrid Aboriginal culture, but also to validate the subservient role of that culture within a nationalist framework. The tension between this need to exploit Aboriginality and the desire to destroy it is no more powerfully rendered than in the sight of Nationalist soldiers sitting neatly in rows watching alluring young barbarian women dance.

### **Conclusions**

In this chapter I have argued that new patterns of group identification generated by the success of Christian denominations provided the framework for a defense against assimilationist policies. The fact that this was a conscious process on the part of George

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> See Hsieh Shih-chung (1994): "Shanbao guanguang": dangdai shandi wenhua zhanxiande renleixue quanshi ("Mountain compatriot tourism": an anthropological interpretation of displays of contemporary mountain culture). Taipei: Independence Evening Post.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> There are many dozens of these newspaper stories. For an example of the "two princesses" performing for the military, see *Taiwan Hsinshengpao* (1950b): "Shandi gewutuan laojun gongyan" (Mountain area singing and dancing troupe entertains the troops in public performance). *Taiwan Hsinshengpao*, 25 June, 1950, p.5.

Vicedom and his Taiwan-resident colleagues, such as John Whitehorn and Justus Freytag, <sup>108</sup> means that the KMT's policies of assimilation were more actively subverted than is apparent in the literature. Yet this was allowed to happen, partly because of the government's need to impress the United States by granting missionaries access to Aboriginal villages, and partly because the KMT's assimilationist project was so illdefined that substantial ethnic change went unrecognised until it was either too late for the KMT to do anything about it, or at least until the party lost interest in the matter.

I also argue that later Aboriginal cultural expressions constitute a form of nativisation that opposes assimilationist ideals. The more overt and dissenting expressions, such as those of Lai Hung-yen, could be contained quite readily and with a degree less force than those associated with communist operatives. The less offending expressions and identifications - political and performance culture - ended up being cultivated by the KMT itself.

<sup>108</sup> For an example of the research and survey work of Aboriginal communities informed by this approach, see Justus Freytag (1967): A new day in the mountains: problems of social integration and modernization confronting the tribal people in Taiwan. Tainan: Research Center, Tainan Theological College. See also Covell, op. cit., pp.268-270.

### **Chapter Eight**

### Conclusion

Before the KMT arrived in Taiwan, China-based commentators and officials thought Aboriginal people were a savage race of unclear origin – possibly Malay, possibly something else. Within months of arrival, this classification reversed: China's newest minority were *ethnically* Han – even if the connection was remote. This dramatic change in categorisation contrasted with new group identifications among Aboriginal elite figures. Leaders such as Kao I-sheng, Lin Jui-chang and Nan Chih-hsin trained together with their Han Taiwanese colleagues in a Japanese education system, allowing them to develop ideas – including budding claims of Aboriginality – that would offend the KMT's official line.

When Taiwan fell into disorder in early 1947, these leaders had already established themselves as vocal proponents of Aboriginal interests through increasing contact with Han Taiwanese society and the media. When the 228 Incident exploded, the form of Aboriginal intervention around Taiwan was determined by the strength of these ties. Thus, in Taitung, local Beinan and Bunun tribespeople and their leaders probably saved the lives of dozens of mainland officials and their families because of close working relationships with those officials; in Taichung, the 27 Unit featured Aboriginal people in key moments of conflict and in key positions of authority because of previous ties; in Chiayi, the Tsou Unit participated in a siege that delayed the massacre of civilians after its commanders decided that Han Taiwanese civilians and officials ought to be protected from harm.

Only one Aborigine died out of a death toll in the tens of thousands. The real damage wrought by the 228 Incident was on the growing connections and identification between Aborigine and Han Taiwanese. Aborigines were well on their way to forging a new identity with their Han Taiwanese neighbours. The miracle of a new *lingua franca* and the ambitions of a small but influential number of elite figures promised to help Aboriginal people integrate with the rest of the province and even the rest of China, while retaining autonomy and recovering stolen land.

From the *qingxiang* campaign onwards, however, the mountains became high security areas, and villagers in dedicated Aboriginal townships were forced into an ascriptive dialectic with KMT bureaucrats, party officials, police and the military. The state had imposed a quarantined but assimilationist regime in place of increasing contact with the Han Taiwanese economy and cultures.

John Shepherd warns that anthropologists should distinguish between the process of assimilation (which unifies identity) and the much more common process of acculturation (which disseminates cultural elements). He argues that for the plains Aborigines under the Qing, "most officials assumed that both civilization and sinicization would come naturally with time. There was no need to actively enforce cultural conformity as long as there was no direct challenge to government control."

But the Qing court ruled over an empire, not a nation. For those of Taiwan's Aborigines who survived until the mid-twentieth century, the security crisis led KMT — nationalist — officials to believe there was no time to allow such processes to take their "natural" course. They therefore actively enforced cultural conformity, and the threshold for what constituted "direct challenges" to government control was dramatically lowered.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Shepherd (2000), op. cit., p.10.

During the first years of this new administrative environment, the government's rhetoric — expressed both in policy and in a pliant print media — was unambiguously assimilationist. This does not, of course, presuppose that policy was drawn up with theoretical or empirical rigour. This lack of rigour probably contributed to its own downfall: It seems no one felt that the indefinite segregation of most Aboriginal communities in remote or secure areas would jeopardise that agenda.

Security measures were not limited to handicapping the mobility of Aborigines already suffering from disease and poverty. Security and party officials were also responsible for political indoctrination, the denigration and destruction of native languages, the cultivation of political talent that complied with KMT orthodoxy and punitive action for those Aborigines who sensed a growing crisis for both Aboriginal culture and Aboriginal identity. Documented cases of communist operatives appealing to ethnic sentiment facilitated the punishment of intellectuals who felt this crisis and acted on it.

All of this had decisive effects on Aboriginal cultural and political expressions and identifications that would not contribute to the death of Aboriginal identity but instead produce what Hsieh Shih-chung called stigmatised identity,<sup>2</sup> together with attendant rates of aberrant social and health phenomena characteristic of the Fourth World.

The KMT's security measures contributed to the survival of Aboriginal ethnicity in another fundamental way: they tolerated Christian denominations which subverted the Nationalists' image of the modernising, sinicizing Aborigine. The churches and missions did this in a surprisingly open way: they co-opted Aboriginal identity to ensure their own survival. The occasional and piecemeal crackdowns tended to focus on only the most obvious, material forms of that subversion – such as bibles in Aboriginal languages.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Hsieh Shih-chung (1987): *Rentongde wuming* (The stigma of identity). Taipei: Independence Evening Post.

At some point the focus of the KMT's security forces turned from communist infiltrators to nativist dissidence, and with this shift Aboriginal areas no longer posed a genuine military threat. Perhaps it was this that weakened the enthusiasm with which these policies were implemented, as there was no longer a pressing security imperative to make Aborigines identify as Chinese. The level of "acculturation" that now existed was an acceptable substitute for assimilation. This might explain why the KMT seemingly tolerated more frequent expressions of Aboriginality at a local level and within its own ranks, but moved to stifle those expressions which alluded to pan-Aboriginal sentiment – especially political sentiment.

The irony is compelling: The KMT wished to weaken if not eradicate Aboriginality as a group identification in any form, but at every juncture it imposed geographical, administrative, electoral, psychological and punitive categories grounded in its own reifications of Aboriginality. The development of an Aboriginal political culture conforming to KMT ideals only perpetuated these reifications among the KMT elite, and made incorporation of those categorisations among Aboriginal people all the more likely. The "unintended consequence" of state intervention in Taiwan is the propping up of Aboriginality in an autocratic interlude between imperial and democratic administrations.

The problem for activists that endures to this day is that the pan-Aboriginality that was nurtured by or bullied into many of the Aboriginal elite, a process that is the main focus of this thesis, has struggled to filter down to the hundreds of Aboriginal communities despite all of the potential for reform that it offers. While certain recent and politically shaped expressions such as *yuanzhumin* have enjoyed general acceptance, even among the relatively (by global standards) congenial Han majority of Taiwan, the political payoff has proven difficult to secure even in an environment in which the state, the

church and Aboriginal elites have joined hands and legitimised pan-Aboriginal discourse. The problem for Aboriginal activists is how to secure the benefits of pan-Aboriginal thinking and mobilisation such that the final, utopian step of a pan-Aboriginal autonomy, followed by devolution into local, self-sustaining, socially and culturally apt Aboriginal identities, can be attempted. But even if this is an impossible step, there remains a bitter triumph for activists to reflect on and from which they can draw succour: yoked ethnic communities can retain a significant degree of structural integrity using the oppositional culture generated by the very disadvantage that they cannot entirely escape. It is such a culture that continues to generate pan-Aboriginal identity in those who would speak for all Aboriginal people.

Richard Jenkins argues that categorisation "is a vital element in our models of the social construction of ethnicity" and "place[s] issues of power and compulsion — and resistance—at the heart" of research.<sup>3</sup> I argue that the Aboriginal experience in Taiwan is a fine example of this: It illuminates not the destruction, but the *production* of ethnic phenomena following the sustained and oppressive use of categorisations by the state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Jenkins, op. cit., p.166.

# **Appendices**

- A Ethics consent form for interviewees authorised by the Human Ethics Research
  Committee of the University of Technology, Sydney
- B Statement submitted to the Control Yuan by Lai Hung-yen
- C Glossary of Chinese and Japanese names and expressions

## Appendix A

# Ethics consent form for interviewees authorised by the Human Ethics Research Committee of the University of Technology, Sydney

This form was used for formal interviews. Copies were retained by me and the interviewee.

> Broadway NSW 2007 Australia Tel +61 2 9514 2000 Fax +61 2 9514 1551



University of Technology, Sydney

**CONSENT FORM - STUDENT RESEARCH** 雪梨科技大學博士論文研究計劃 受訪者同意書

Student 博士候選人

Mr Martin Williams

(612) Dr Feng Chongyi

(02)

(Australia 澳大利亞) (Taiwan 台灣) Australia 澳大利亞)

Taiwan Contact 台灣聯絡人 Prof Michael Hsiao Interviewee's name: 受訪者姓名:

Interview date: 日期:

Place of interview:

I agree to participate in the doctoral (PhD) research project "Ethnicity and politics: Telwan Aborigines since 1945" being conducted by Mettin Williams, of the University of Tochnology, Sydney, I understand that the purpose of this study is to investigate the political development of Talwan's Aboriginal people and to investigate the development of ROC policy relating to Aboriginal affairs. I understand that my participation in this research will involve at least one interview of agreed duration which may be tased, I understand that all tapes or notes resulting from my participation will be accessible only to Mr Williams and his supervisors and to myself upon request. I am aware that I have the right to on the interview and ask the tape recorder to be furned off at any time. I am also aware I may be take contacted and consulted regarding the use of interview material. I understand that I can restrict from publication or other use any information gained from this interview or subsequent communication involving myself; otherwise, I consent to information gained from this interview or subsequent communication involving myself; otherwise, I consent to information gained from this interview or subsequent communication involving myself; otherwise, I consent to information gained from this interview or of all of my questions tuly and clearly, and I understand that I can contact him or his supervisor, Dr Fang Chongyl (in Australia), or Frof Hair-Iwang Michael Hairs (in Talwan) I'l have any concerns about this research.

本人同意協助等梨科技大學博士候遷人馬鹏先生(Mr Martin Williams)之博士論文研究,其題 目爲「族群與政治:一九四五年後之台灣原住民」,其內容爲研究台灣原住民之政治發展及中華 民國政府之相關政策,本人之協助研究方式爲接受馬騰先生之訪問等,受訪過程錄製與否及以何 福方式錄製。馬騰先生必須徵求本人之同意。錄製內容僅本人。馬騰先生及其指導教授得以收錄 或收載。訪該過程中之任何時刻,木人有權要求停止錄製或中止訪問。本人更訪內容僅提供馬騰 先生之博士論文及相關著作使用。馬騰先生得在本人曼訪後針對相關內容向本人諮詢。本人有權 限制本人受动内容之發表及引用。本人受訪前已與馬麟先生語詢有關其研究之相關問題。研究他行過程中,本人得向馬鵬、馮崇義博士(Dr Feng Chongyi - 指導教授)及蕭新炮教授(Prof Hsinhuang Michael Hsiao - 台灣聯絡人)提出本研究之相關問題。本人無須提供任何理由即能退出此項

Signed by 簽名 Date 日期 Witnessed by Date

NOTE:
This sludy has been approved by the University of Technology, Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any completes or reservations about any sepect of your participation in this research you may contact the Ethics Committee through the Research Ethics Officer, Me Susanna Davis (ph: (8/12) 8514 1279). Any complaint you make will be threated in outlineass and investigated thisy and you will be informed of the outcome.

非: 沒有對果己得何實疑,可與雪梨科技大學解究論理委員會的批准。受訪者若對此研究行任何實疑,可與雪梨科技大學論理委員會行政主管蘇闊鄉·聚維斯女士(Ms Susanna Davis)聯繫(電話612-9514-1279)。您的實驗將在保證您的隱私的前提之下,進入調查程序:我們將會避知您此調查的結果。

Office City campus, No.1 Broadway, Sydney NSW Campuses City, Kuring-gai, St Leonards

## Appendix B

# Statement submitted to the Control Yuan by Lai Hung-yen

Lai Hung-yen's statement, dated July 30, 1999, summarises his experiences in a historical context, and is complete except for the Lai family's address and phone number, which I have deleted for privacy reasons.

### 陳情書

一、為呈請監察院監察委員諸公柏公台伸長正義,將五十年代遭受白色恐怖,大 無辜者惠予平反給與精神之損失以示公道案:

二、受文者:監察委員:張委員富美;康委員寧祥;江委員鵬堅。

### 三、理由:

- (1) 陳情人是嚮應一九四五年大東亞戰爭終戰後一九四七年春二二八事變後不滿中國之統治,前赴日本進行「台灣獨立建國運動」的領導人。已故廖文毅博士(雲林西螺人)的台東排灣族人(中國名,賴紅炎;日本名,遠山治雄;原住民名,Turivuan Danav)惟廖文毅博士晚節不保不得志,而終於回歸台灣向國民黨政權靠攏(我所謂國民黨並非現在之台灣國民黨而舊國民黨與新黨)。至目前為止,我默默地致力於台灣獨立建國運動不遺餘力,近半世紀以來未曾間斷與懈怠。我是經國立師範大學教育學院院長林玉体教授之指點認識民進黨先進的。
- (2) 我自一九五一年代至今近半世紀以來,遭受外來政權的政治破壞與白色恐怖的蹂躪,其間生活於永無天日水深火熱中求死不能、求生不得的痛苦呻吟中生活,五十年來在永無寧靜的艱苦患難中渡過。
- (3) 一九五二年開始編撰排灣族文字,但遭受學校教官及訓導人員之深夜偵訊 而無法繼續。一九五六年台北美華顧問雷諾士官槍殺劉自然案校方教官誣賴我 「擁美排華」之不愛國份子。
- (4) 一九五八年以無黨籍身份參選台東縣第四屆縣議員,在國民黨及檢調警情 治單位之暴力壓迫亮票下高票落選(按我兄長及家人在檢調警情人員之監控脅迫 下無法投票給我)。從此後,無時無刻受到學校校長及同事們之監控(按校長及 外省教師幾乎都是調查站的線民),永無寧靜的日子。
- (5) 一九六○年十二月,二十七歲服役,旋入國防部陸軍衛生勤務學校醫務行政士官班(台北士林芝山巖),結業分派軍醫署後送達,一分發同學們均掛士官階級;唯獨我一等兵起敘長官、營長、連長及政工人員對我另眼看待,經常欺凌辱罵,謂:「我是台獨份子或思想走私不愛國者。」但我忍辱負重,默默執行長官所交付工作,毫無怨言。
- (6) 一九六二年十二月退伍還鄉二十九歲,鄉民代表會陳情縣長黃拓榮推薦我做介達國小校長,縣長雖然答應,但縣黨部主委「李仲平」卻說:「十年也不會給你考慮」等語,「以黨領政」之共黨專政般的政治暴露無遺了。大凡大小選舉對國民黨不利者,均將責任推到我身上。旋於一九六四年秋我被放逐到蘭嶼孤島。

- (8) 一九六五年十月卅一日蔣介石七十九華誕至蘭嶼避壽時,特別引見我(由當時侍衛長郝柏村引領我晉見),同時隨行調查人員將擬好之宣誓詞交給我簽字;其內容是「余誓以至誠,盡忠職守,忠黨愛國,邇後不得再有叛國之行為,倘若再有犯意願受國家最嚴厲之處分」 宣誓人 賴紅炎 簽字。此後,雖然恿我入黨,然而往後的日子更加痛苦,不是被利用就是做牛馬走狗。連最基層的小組長都沒有。促徵選主任、校長或鄉長、縣員及省級中央民代,均因安全顧慮或思想走私而被拒於門外無法如願。近五十年來,我外國、日本人的朋友們的書信交往也不放過遭受監控、拆閱刁難(我在被偵訊時在檔案中給我看我才知道的)。
- (9) 一九八八年我大兒子投考警專,以安全理由被排擠門外不准參加考試。這樣像水深火熱中的生活,求死不能、求生不得、生不如死的政治破壞與白色恐怖的滋味,比受牢獄之災與遭槍決更痛苦、更恐怖,難道這是沒有被槍決或沒有判刑所付出之代價嗎!
- (10) 台灣四百年來遭受外來的統治;歷經荷蘭、西班牙、鄭氏成功、滿清(康熙)、日本、國民黨之代領及中國共產黨五十年來之文攻武嚇;打壓封殺台灣人民之獨立與外交空間;我總認為一九四五年台灣之光復實為台灣人民之不幸。我的政治理念是建立台灣為新而獨立的民主共和國,推動民主,廢除萬年舊國會。廢除國大,實行單一國會,修改憲法,舉行公民投票,廢除台灣省,反對設置核廠\_\_\_等政治訴求為我生涯中夢寐以求的理想,今日起更與愛好台灣的人民為台灣的獨立建國而犧牲奮鬥。

四、鑒請核查。如蒙賜願實感德無量。 謹致

監察院監察委員:張委員富美 委員:康委員寧祥

委員:江委員鵬堅

具陳情人:賴紅炎簽章

住 址:台東縣達仁鄉台坂村□-□□號

電 話:(〇八九)□□一□□□□

公元一九九九年七月三十日

# Appendix C

# Glossary of Chinese and Japanese names and expressions

Entries are arranged alphabetically, privileging spaces and hyphens before letters; for example, Chuan Kou precedes Chuang Yeh-chiu. Apostrophes are treated as invisible.

A
ai 隘
aiguo 愛國
aiyong 隘勇
aixiang 愛鄉
Alishan Pavilion 阿里山閣
Alishan Township 阿里山鄉
Alliance for Taiwan
Democracy and Autonomy
台灣民主自治同盟
Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines
台灣原住民族權利促進會
Amei 阿眉
Ami 阿美族
Amis 阿美族
An Meng-chuan 安猛川
Anshuo Village 安朔村
Aohua Village 澳花村
Association for Taiwan
Indigenous People's Policies
台灣原住民族政策協會
Atayal 泰雅族
Austronesian News 南島時報
В

banshan 半山

Banshu Province 播州

baoan zongdui 保安總隊
baofang xiaozu 保防小組
baojia 保甲
baotu 暴徒
Bawan Nokan 巴萬·尤乾
Beinan 卑南族
benshengren 本省人
bijiao danchun 比較單純
buluo qiuzhang 部落酋長
Bunun 布農族
Bureau of Civil Affairs 民政處
bushido 武士道
C
Central Investigation and
Statistics Bureau 中統局
Central News Agency
中央通訊社
Central Pacification Zone
中部綏靖區
Chahar Province 察哈爾省
chan 產
Chang Chen 張鎮
Chang Chi-lang 張七郎
Chang Chih-chung 張志忠
Chang Ching-chang 張慶昌
Chang Fang-keng 張方鏗

Chang Fu-tien 張福田 Chang Hsin-han 張新漢 Chang Huai-chuan 張淮川 Chang Po-lung 章博隆 Chang Sung 張松 Chang Yao-ying 張躍贏 Chang Yen-hsien 張炎憲 Changhua 彰化 Changpin Township 長濱鄉 Chao Chu-te 趙巨徳 髭 Chao Li-chuan 趙立權 Chao Wen-tsung 趙文從 chayanzhan 查驗站 Chekiang (Zhejiang) Province 浙江省 Chen A-yuan 陳阿員 Chen Chang-hui 陳彰輝 Chen Chen-tsung 陳振宗 Chen Cheng 陳誠 Chen Cheng-kung 陳成功 Chen Cheng-yueh 陳成岳 Chen Chi-tsung 陳起宗 Chen Chien-nien 陳建年 Chen Chih-liang 陳志良 Chen Chin-mu (militia commander) 陳金木

Chen Chin-mu (Chen Shui-mu's Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 Chuan Kou 川口 alias) 陳錦木 Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Chuan Wan-sheng 全萬盛 Chen Ching-yuan 陳慶元 Chuangching Shanmai Hall 中正紀念堂 莊敬山脈 Chen Chun-jung 陳春榮 Chiang Yuan-sheng 蔣源盛 Chiaopan Township 角板鄉 Chuang Yeh-chiu 莊野秋 Chen Ho-jen 陳鶴仁 Chiayi 嘉義 Chuchi 竹崎 Chen Hsi-jen 陳希仁 Chen Hsiao-i 陳孝義 Chiavi City Consultative Chuehmolo 覺摩洛 Chen Hsien-fu 陳顯富 Council 嘉義市參議會 Chukou 觸口 Chen Hua-feng 陳華封 Chiavi Middle School Chulin Village 竹林村 Chen Hung-hsi 陳鴻禧 嘉義中學 Chulu Village 初鹿村 Chiayi Preparatory Office Chun zhi zuobaoii 春之佐保姫 Chen Jung-sheng 陳榮昇 Chen Kung-ta 陳孔達 嘉義籌備處 Chung Huan-kung 鐘煥觥 Chief Mao 毛王爺/毛信孝 Chung I-jen 鍾逸人 Chen Ming-chung 陳明忠 Chen O-an 陳俄安 Chien Chi 簡吉 Chungfeng Security Command Post 中峰治安指揮所 Chen Ping-chi 陳炳基 Chienkuo Middle School Chen San-ching 陳三井 建國中學 Chungking 重慶 Chen Sheng-fan 陳生番 Chienshih Township 尖石鄉 Chungli 中壢 Chen Shui-mu 陳水木 Chih Po-ven 志波巖 Chungshan Room 中山室 Chen Su-chen 陳素貞 Chihpen 知本 Chunjih Township 春日鄉 Chuo Chung-min 卓中民 Chen Sung-shou 陳松壽 Chinfeng Township 金峰鄉 Chen Tao-ming 陳道明 Ching Dynasty 清朝 Chuohsi Township 卓溪鄉 Chen Tien-cheng 陳天成 Chingfan 青番 Chuoshui Public School 濁水國民學校 Chen Tien-ting 陳添丁 Chingmei 景美 Chuoshui River 濁水溪 Chen Tseng 陳曾 Chingpu Village 静浦村 Chen Tsuan-ti 陳篡地 Chingwei 景尾 Chutung Township 竹東鎮 ci 次 Chen Tu-chi 陳土吉 Chinlun Township 金崙鄉 Control Yuan 監察院 Chen Yi 陳儀 Chinshan Township 金山鄉 Cheng Cheng-cheng 鄭正成 Chishan Township 旗山鎮 Council of Aboriginal Affairs Chiu Chih-ming 邱致明 行政院原住民委員會 Cheng Cheng-i 鄭政義 Cheng Chiang-shui 鄭江水 Chiu Hung-lin 邱鴻鱗 Council of Indigenous Peoples Chiu Lin-hung 邱鱗鴻 行政院原住民委員會 Cheng Pin-tsung 鄭品聰 Chiu. Fred 丘延亮 Culture Building 教化會館 Cheng Te-sheng 鄭徳生 Cheng Teng-shan 程登山 Chiu Kui-chun 邱貴春 Chiu Liang-yun 邱良運 D Chengkung Township 成功鎮 dairen 歹人 Chi-oang 芝苑 Chiu Nien-tai 丘念台 Chiachin Village 加津村 Chiyeh Township 吉野鄉 Dianav Jenror 丹耐夫·景若 Chialan Village 嘉蘭村 Chou I-o 周一鶚 Defense of Democracy Unit Chiale Village 嘉樂村 Chou Ming 周明 民主保衛隊 Chu 楚 Chi'an Township 吉安鄉 Democratic Progressive Party Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 Chu Kao-chin 朱高欽 民進黨 Chiang Fang-liang 蔣芳良 Chu Lai-sheng 朱來盛

disposal committee 處理委員會

E

Eastern Pacification Zone 東部綏靖區

Erchiaolang 二角浪 Executive Yuan 行政院

F

fan (pre-Japanese era) 番
fan (Japanese era) 蕃
Fan Hsun-lu 范巽綠
fandi 蕃地
Fang Chien-chi 方建基
Fang Chung-i 方仲義
Fang I-chung 方義仲
Fang I-shen 方義伸
Fang Mei-ying 方美英
Fangshan Township 枋山郷
fanjie 蕃界

fanjie 番芥
fanjun 蕃軍
fanmin 蕃民
fanren 蕃人
Fantsaikou 番仔溝

fanzai 番仔 fanzaibing 番仔兵

fanzu 蕃族 faxiangdi 發祥地

feitu 匪徒

Fenchihu 奮起湖

Fenglin Township 鳳林鎮
Fengpin Township 豐濱鄉
Fengshan Township 鳳山鄉
Forestry Bureau 林務局
Fuhsing Township 復興鄉
Fujian Province 福建省
Fuli Township 富里鄉

Fukien (Fujian) Province 福建省

Fushan Village 福山村

Fushih Village 富世村 Futien 富田

G

gaizao 改造
ganshi 幹事
gaosha 高砂
gaoshan 高山
gaoshan tongbao 高山同胞
Gaoshanqing 高山青
gaoshanqu 高山區
gaoshanzu 高山族
gaoshazu 高砂族
gemingjun 革命軍
Governor's Office 總督府
Green Island 綠島
guangfu 光復
guihua 歸化
guozu zhuyi 國族主義

Н

Hainan 海南
Haituan Township 海端鄉
Hakka 客家
Han 漢人/漢族
Hanhsi Village 寒溪村
Hanpi Building 涵碧樓
Haruyama, Shigemitsu

春山茂光 Hau Pei-tsun 郝柏村

heiyi budui 黒衣部隊
Hengchun Township 恆春鎮
Hengshan Township 横山郷
Hime ヒメ
Hino, Saburou 日野三郎
Hirai, Kouki 平井幸基
Ho Han-wen 何漢文
Ho Hsiao-yuan 何孝元
Hoklo 河洛

hongse zhaopai 紅色招牌 Hoping River 和平溪 Hoping Township 和平鄉
Houlung 後龍
Hsia Tao-sheng 夏濤聲
Hsieh Chen 謝真
Hsieh Hsing-chi 謝幸基
Hsieh Hsueh-hung 謝雪紅
Hsieh Kui 謝貴
Hsieh Nan-kuang 謝南光
Hsieh Shih-chung 謝世忠
Hsieh Tien-hsing 謝天性
Hsieh Tsung-min 謝聰敏
Hsieh Tung-min 謝東閔
Hsincheng Township 新城鄉
Hsinchu 新竹
Hsinchu Pacification Zone

Hsinfeng Security Command
Post 新峰治安指揮所
Hsinkang 新港
Hsinkaoshan 新高山
Hsinmei Farm 新美農場
Hsintai Changpian 新台唱片
Hsintien 新店
Hsinyi Township 信義鄉
Hsinying 新營
Hsiulin Township 秀林鄉

Hsiulin Township Office

新竹綏靖區

秀林鄉鄉公所 Hsiungfeng Security Command

Post 雄峰治安指揮所
Hsu Cheng-ching 許整景
Hsu Hsing-min 徐醒民
Hsu Hsueh-chi 許雪姫
Hsu Jung-chuan 許榮川
Hsu Kun-hou 徐坤厚
Hsu Liang-chia 許兩家
Hsu Mu-chu 許木柱
Hsu Yung-fu 徐永福
Hsueh Wen-shan 薛文山
Hu Fu-hsiang 胡福相
Hu Ming-ho 胡明和

Hu Te-fu 胡德夫 Hua A-tsai 華阿財 Hua Ai 華愛 Hua Ching-chi 華清吉 huafan 化蕃 Hualien 花蓮 Hualien High Court 台灣高等法院花蓮分院 huan 番 huan-a 番仔 Huang Chao-chin 黃朝琴 Huang Chao-ta 黃肇達 Huang Chin-i 黃進益 Huang Hsin-ching 黃信卿 Huang Ko-li 黃克立 Huang Po-hu 黃伯虎 Huang Shih-chiao 黃師樵 Huang Shui-wang 黃水旺 Huang Ta-ping 黃達平 Huang Ying-kuei 黃應貴 huangminhua yundong 皇民化運動 Hui 回族 huiguo zixin 悔過自新 huiwu 悔悟 Hung Cheng 洪成 Hung Ming-cheng 洪明成 Hung Yu-chiao 洪幼樵 Hungmaopi 紅毛埤 Hungtouyu Township 紅頭嶼鄉 Hungyeh Village 紅葉村 Hyogo Prefecture 兵庫県 Ι Ichang Village 宜昌村 Iha, Jintaro 伊波仁太郎 Ilan 宜蘭

Imperial Subjects Public

皇民奉公會

Service Association

Inada, Masaharu 稻田正治 Independence Morning Post Inoue Inosuke 井上伊之助 Isak Afo 以撒克・阿復 Ivan Nokan 伊凡·諾乾 J Ien'ai Township 仁愛鄉 jiandang baotu 好黨暴徒 iianfei 奸匪 Jiang Shunxing 蔣順興 Iu Shao 如紹 Juisui Township 瑞穗鄉 K Kameyama 龜山 Kamiyama, Takanao

Kanakanavtt 卡那布群 Kang Yu-hu 康玉湖 Kansu (Gansu) Province 甘肅省 Kao Cheng-i 高正義 Kao Chi-shun 高啟順 Kao Chien-sheng 高建勝 Kao Chu-hua 高菊花 Kao Chung-jung 高崇榮 Kao Hsi-mei 高喜美 Kao I-shan 高一山 Kao I-sheng 高一生 Kao Kuang hsiung 高光雄 Kao Ming-yuan 高明源 Kao Ta-jung 高達榮 Kao Te-i 高徳儀 Kao Tse-chao 高澤照 Kao Tse-ching 高澤清 Kao Tsung-i 高聰義 Kao Tsung-jung 高宗榮 Kao Ying-hui 高英輝 Kao Yuan-yuan 高淵源

神山高直

Kaofeng Security Command Post 高峰治安指揮所 Kaohsiung 高雄 Kaohsiung Fortress Command 高雄要塞司令部

自立早報

Kaoshan 高山族 Kaoshan Association Corporation 高山協會財團 Kaoshanyako 高山雅歌 Kavalan 噶瑪蘭族 Kazuki, Terunobu 香月照信 Keelung 基隆 Keelung Pacification Zone 基隆綏靖區

Kenting 墾丁 Kigawa, Shinro 木川真郎 Kikuta, Asao 菊田朝夫 Kimbo (Hu Te-fu) 胡德夫 Kishimoto 岸本 Kishino 岸野 Ko Chen-ling 柯珍令 Ko Hui-i 柯惠譯 Ko Kui-chih 柯桂枝 Ko Liang-pai 葛良拜 Ko Shui-sheng 柯水生 Ko Yuan-fen 柯遠芬 kominka 皇民化 Koxinga 國姓爺/鄭成功 Ku Cheng-wen 谷正文 Ku Ien-kuang 古仁廣 Ku Jui-yun 古瑞雲 Ku Ming-che 古明哲 Kuan Hsiao-jung 關曉榮 Kuangfu Township 光復鄉 Kuanhsi Township 關西鎮 Kuanshan Township 關山鎮 Kui 桂 Kui Chi-lung 歸基隆 Kui Kan 歸感 Kui Shun-i 歸順義 Kunglunpao 公論報

Li Wan-chu 李萬居 Kungssuliao 公司寮 Kuo Ching-yun 郭清雲 Li Wei-chen 李蔚臣 Kuo Hsiang-lan 郭香蘭 Li Yu-pang 李友邦 Li Yueh-chiao 李月嬌 Kuo Hsiu-tsung 郭琇琮 Kuo Huan-chang 郭煥章 Liang Hung-hui 梁宏輝 Kuo Tien-tsai 郭天才 liangmianpai 兩面派 lianyihui 聯誼會 Kuo Yung-fan 郭永番 Kuomintang (KMT) 國民黨 Liao I-hsi 廖義溪 Kwangsi Daily 廣西日報 Liao Li-chuan 廖麗川 Kwangsi (Guangxi) Province Liao Te-tsung 廖德聰 廣西省 Liao, Thomas 廖文毅 Kwangtung (Guangdong) Lichia Village 里佳村 Province 廣東省 Lichiu Village 堰坵村 Lien Chan 連戰 L Lien Chen-tung 連震東 Lai Hung-yen 賴紅炎 Lien Heng 連橫 Lai Shih-jung 賴世榮 Lienfeng Security Command Post 蓮峰治安指揮所 Lai Wen-tsai 賴文財 Laichi Village 來吉村 lifan gongzuo wunian jihua Laiyi Township 來義鄉 理蕃工作五年計劃 Lanyang High School Alumni lifan zhengce dawang Association 蘭陽中學同學會 理蕃政策大綱 Lanyang River 蘭陽溪 Lijungkangmachia community Lanyu Township 蘭嶼鄉 Layashan 拉牙山 Lin Chao-kuang 林昭光 Lin Chao-ming 林昭明 Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 Leng Hsin 冷欣 Lin Chiang-wen 林講文 Leveh Elementary School Lin Chien-cheng 林建成 樂野國小 Lin Chien-yun 林錢韻 Lin Chih-chieh 林至潔 Leyeh Village 樂野村 Li Ao 李敖 Lin Chih-hsiung 林志雄 Li Ching-hui 李慶輝 Lin Chin-sheng 林金生 Li Feng-hsiung 李峰雄 Lin Ching-fu 林清福 Li Hsiao-fang 李曉芳 Lin Chun-te 林春德 Li Hsun-te 李訓徳 Lin Chung 林忠 Li I-chung 李翼中 Lin Chuo-ssu 林卓司 Li Jung-chin 李榮進 Lin Ho-pen 林和本

Li Lai-wang 李來旺

Li Pin-hsiung 李賓雄

Li Tsung-jen 李宗仁

Li mountain people 高山黎人

Lin Hsien-tang 林獻堂

Lin Hsiu-luan 林秀樂

Lin Hsiu-ming 林秀明

Lin Hsiu-le 林秀樂

Lin Jui-chang 林瑞昌 Lin Kuang-hsiung 林光雄 Lin Li 林立 Lin Li-sheng 林利生 Lin Mao-cheng 林茂成 Lin Mao-hsiu 林茂秀 Lin Mao-sheng 林茂盛 Lin Ming-yung 林明勇 Lin Pao-teh 林寶德 Lin Tao-sheng 林道生 Lin Te-tsai 林德財 Lin Tien-ching 林田清 Lin Tse-chun 林青春 lingxi 令息 Little Yen'an 小延安 Liu Chan-hsien 劉占顯 Liu Chao-ming 劉朝明 Liu Chi-kuang 劉啟光 Liu Chia-pin 劉佳彬 Liu Chin-kun 劉錦焜 Liu Chuan-lai 劉傳來 Liu Chuan-neng 劉傳能 Liu Hsien-chin 劉先進 里榮岡馬加社 Liu Kuang-tsan 劉光燦 Liu Kuo 劉闊 Liu Lien-heng 劉連亨 Liu Po-huan 劉伯渙 Liu Tsun-chung 劉存忠 Liu Yu-ching 劉雨卿 Liukui Township 六龜鄉 Liumao'an 留茂安 Lo Ching-chun 羅慶君 Lo Fu-yuan 羅富元 Lo I-hsiung 羅義雄 Lo Mai 羅邁 Lo Ming-mao 羅明懋 Lotung 羅東 Lotung District Office 羅東區署 Lu Kui-hsiang 陸桂祥 Lu Kuo-chi 路國基

Lu Ping-chin 盧炳欽 Luku Incident 鹿窟事件

#### M

Ma Chih-li 馬智禮 Ma Hsi 馬溪 Ma Jung-tung 馬榮通 Ma Lai-sheng 馬來盛 Ma Yu-yueh 馬有岳 Machangting 馬場町 Machia Township 瑪家鄉 mainlanders 外省人 Malan 馬蘭 Malan Public School

Mantou Mountain 饅頭山 Mao Hsin-hsiao 毛信孝 Maolin Township 茂林鄉 Matsuoka, Yoshio 松岡義夫 May Chin (Kao Chin Su-mei)

馬蘭國民學校

高金素梅

Maya Township 瑪雅鄉 Meihsi 眉溪 Meishan Township 梅山鄉 Meng Hsiang-han 孟祥瀚 Miao 苗族 Miaoli 苗栗 "Mien Chih" 勉之 Min 閩 Minami 南 Minchuan Township 民權鄉 Ming Dynasty 明朝 minjun 民軍 Minsheng Store 民生商店 minzu 民族 minzu jiefang 民族解放 minzu pingdeng 民族平等 minzu sixiang 民族思想 minzu zhengce 民族政策 minzu zijue 民族自覺 Mori, Kazuto 森一人

Mori, Shiro 森四郎 Motozawa, Masayoshi 本澤正義

Mountain Area Comfort and Entertainment Troupe 山地慰勞團

Mountain Area Liberation Corps 山地解放團 Mountain Area Work Committee 山地工作委員會 mu 牧 Mura, Masahiro 村昌宏 Muravoshi, Rou 村吉臘

Mutan Incident 牡丹事件 Mutan Township 牡丹鄉

Musha 霧社

N

Nan Chih-hsin 南志信 Nan Ching-ching 楠井清 Nan Hsin-an 南信安 Nan Hsin-yen 南信彦 Nan'ao Township 南澳鄉 Nanchuang Township 南庄鄉 Nanking 南京 Nantou 南投 Nanwang Village 南王村 National Assembly 國民大會 National Central Library 國家圖書館

National Security Bureau 國家安全局

National Taitung University 國立台東大學

National Taiwan University 國立台灣大學

Nei-Pu Senior Agricultural-Industrial Vocational High School

國立內埔高級農工職業學校 Neimaopu 內茅埔

Neipu Township 內埔鄉 Nengkao District 能高區 Nengkaoshan 能高山 New Party 新黨 nianling jieceng 年龄階層 Ninghsia Province 寧夏省

0

Office for the Regulation of Savages 理番課 Okayama, Katsuichi 岡山勝一 Oki, Takaichi 沖多賀一 Oluanpi 鵝鑾鼻 Ota, Hiroshi 太田廣 Ouyang Chao-yu 歐陽朝佐 Ouyang Tsuo 歐陽佐 Oyama おおやま Oyama, Takashi 大山節

Pahsien Mountain 八仙山 Pai Chuan-kuan 白泉官 Pai Chung-hsi 白崇禧 Paimao Mountain 白毛山 Paiwan (old form) 派宛族 Paiwan (present form) 排灣族 Paiwan community 白灣社 Pan Fa-te 潘發德 Pan Mu-chih 潘木枝 Pan Yung tsai 潘勇仔 Paosang High School 寶桑國中

Peifeng District 北峰區 Peifeng District Work Committee 北峰區工作委員會 Peifeng Security Command Post 北峰治安指揮所 Peikang Township 北港鎮 Peimen Station 北門車站 Peinan Township 卑南鄉 Peipu 北埔

Peng Hsi-wen 彭細文 Peng Meng-chi 彭孟緝 Peng Su-ying 彭素英 Penghu 澎湖 Penglai National Liberation Committee 蓬萊民族解放委員會 Penglaizu 蓬萊族 People First Party 親民黨 People's Daily 民報 pepohoan 平埔番 Pilu Village 比魯村 pingdi 平地 pingdi minzhong 平地民眾 pingdi shanbao 平地山胞 pingpu 平埔 pingpufan 平埔番 pingpuzai 平埔仔 pingpuzu 平埔族 Pingquanhui 平權會 Pingteng Village 平等村 Pingtung 屏東 Pingtung City Council 屏東市議會 Pinmao Elementary School 宵茂國校 Pinmao Village 賓茂村 Practice 實踐 Pu Chung-cheng 浦忠成 Public Television Service 公共電視/公視 Puli 埔里 Puvuma 畢瑪族/普悠瑪族 qin min ai min 親民愛民

gingxiang 清鄉 R Reverend Chen 陳牧師

Revolutionary Practice Institute shaoshu fanzu 少數蕃族 革命實踐研究院 ronghe 融和 roujiang 肉漿 Rukai 魯凱族 S Saalua 沙阿魯阿群 Saburou 三郎 Sahsieh community 撒偕社 Saisiat 賽夏族 Sanchan Village 三棧村 Sanchung 三重 Sanhsing Agricultural and Vocational Junior Middle School 三星初級農業職業學校 Sanhsing Township 三星鄉 Sanmin Township 三民鄉 Santi Township 三地鄉 Santimen Township 三地門鄉 Santimeng 三地盟 Sanwan 三灣 Sediq 賽德克族 Sha Chao-fu 沙朝夫 Shamichi 砂米箕 shan 山 shandi 山地 shandi qingnian 山地青年 shandi renmin 山地人民 shandi shanbao 山地山胞 shandi shichatuan 山地視察團 shandi tongbao 山地同胞 shandi tongzhihui 山地同志會 shandi zhi'ansuo 山地治安所 shandiji 山地籍

shandiren 山地人

Shangli 上里

shandixiang 山地鄉

Shanmei Farm 山美農場

Shanmei Village 山美村

she 社 Shen Chung-chiu 沈仲九 shengfan 生番 shenming dayi 深明大義 Shih Liang-fang 施良芳 Shih Ming-teh 施明德 Shih Tsang-keng 石滄庚 Shih Tsang-po 石滄柏 Shihchuo 石卓 Shihlin (in Taipei) 士林 Shihlin Township 士林鄉 Shihsanfen 十三分 Shihtzu Township 獅子鄉 Shihtzulu 十字路 Shimada, Ichiro 島田一郎 Shimoyama, Hiroshi 下山宏 Shiono, Kouichi 鹽野高一 shoufan 熟番 Shoushan 壽山 Shuilikeng 水裡坑 Shuimen 水門村 Shuishang Airport 水上幾場 Shuishe 水社 Sinkiang Province 新疆省 sixiang danchun 思想單純 Soong May-ling 宋美齡 Southern Pacification Zone 南部綏靖區 Su Yu-peng 蘇友鵬 sufang gongzuo 肅防工作 suijing 綏靖 suijingqu 綏靖區 Suiyuan Province 綏遠省 Sun Chih-chun 孫志俊 Sun Li-jen 孫立人 Sun Moon Lake 日月潭 Sun Ta-chuan 孫大川 Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 Sung Chun-lan 宋春蘭 Sung Dynasty 宋朝

Т Ta Chien-tsan 大前贊 Ta'an Township 大安鄉 Ta'an Township Administrative Office 大安鄉公所 Tachu Village 大竹村 Tachuoshui River 大濁水溪 Tahoti 大河底 Tahsi Township 大溪鎮 Tahsi Village 大溪村 Tai Chuan-hsin 戴傳薪 Taian Township 泰安鄉 Taichung 台中 Taichung Agricultural College 台中農學院 Taichung Normal College 台北師範學院 taiji baotu 台籍暴徒 Taimali Township 太麻里鄉 Tainan 台南 Tainan Normal College 台南師範學校 Taipan Village 台坂村 Taipei 台北 Taipei Broadcasting Station 台北廣播電台 Taipei County Government 台北縣政府 Taipei Guesthouse 台北賓館 Taipei Normal College 台北師範學院 Taipei Pacification Zone 台北綏靖區 Taiping Township 太平鄉 Taitung 台東 Taitung County Mountain

Area Supervisory Office

台東山地指導室

Sung Fei-ju 宋斐如

Taitung Normal College 台東師範學校 Taiwan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government 臺灣憲政協進會 Taiwan baodong jingguo cuovao 台灣暴動經過撮要 Taiwan Garrison Command 台灣省警備總司令部 Taiwan Hsinshengpao 台灣新生報 Taiwan Investigative Committee 台灣調查委員會 Taiwan Minshengpao 台灣民生報 Taiwan minzhong 台灣民眾 Taiwan Political Reconstruction Society 台灣政治建設協會 Taiwan Province Eastern Pacification Zone Command 臺灣省東部綏靖區司今部 Taiwan Province Police Affairs Office 台灣省警務處 Taiwan Province Work Committee 台灣省工作委員會 Taiwan Provincial Assembly 台灣省議會 Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council 台灣省諮議會 Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee 台灣省文獻委員會 Taiwan Provincial Executive

Administrative Office 台灣省行政長官公署 Taiwan Provincial Government 台灣省政府 Taiwan Provincial Senate 臺灣省參議會

Taiwanren 台灣人

Taiwanzu 台灣族 Taiwu Township 泰武鄉 Taiyuan Prison 泰源監獄 Tajen Township 達仁鄉 Takasago 高砂 Takasago Giyutai 高砂義勇隊 Takasago People's Autonomy Committee 高砂族自治委員會 Takasagozoku 高砂族 Takoer 達哥爾 Tamaki, Sadao 玉木貞夫 Tanaka, Renkichi 田中連吉 Tanaka, Shinichi 田中新一 Tang I-jen 湯一仁 Tang Shou-jen 湯守仁 Taniao Village 大鳥村 Tanshui River 淡水河 Tao 達悟族 Taoyuan (city, county) 桃園 Taoyuan Township 桃源鄉 Tapang Village (variant form) 大阪村 Tapang Village (usual form)

達邦村

Tapu Township 大埔鄉 taren 他人 Taroko Gorge 太魯閣 Tashan 大山 Tashiro 田代 Tatung Elementary School 大同國小

Tatung Township 大同鄉 Tatungho 大東河 Tawu Township 大武鄉 Tawu Township Council 大武鄉民代表會

Tawushan 大武山 Tefuyeh Village 特富野村 Teng Hsiang-yang 鄧相揚 Thao 邵族

Three Principles of the People 三民主義 Three Principles of the People Youth Corps 三民主義青年團 Tien Fu-ta 田富達 Tien Hsu-chao 田許照 Tienpu (old form) 田埔 Tienpu (new form) 田蒲 Tona Township 多納鄉 tongbao 同胞 tongshi 通事 tongyi 統一 tongzhizhe 統治者 toumu 頭目 Truku 太魯閣族 Tsai Chin-neng 蔡芹能 Tsai Chung-han 蔡中涵 Tsai Hsiao-chien 蔡孝乾 Tsai Lung-cheng 蔡龍成 Tsai Mei-yu 蔡美玉 Tsao 曹族 Tsaoling 草嶺 Tsaotun 草屯 Tsarisen 澤利先族 Tseng Chin-shui 曾金水 Tseng Hua-te 曾華德

青海省

Tsou 鄒族
Tsou Unit 鄒族部隊
Tsoying 左營
Tu Hsiao-sheng 杜孝生
tuanjie qilai 團結起來
Tulan Village 都蘭村
Tung Chun-ching 童春慶
Tung Tu-kuan 童土寬
Tungfeng Security Command
Post 東峰治安指揮所

Tseng Yu-ai 曾玉靄

Tsengwen Dam 曾文水庫

Tsinghai (Qinghai) Province

Tsengwen River 曾文溪

Tungho Township 東河鄉
Tunghsiao Township 通霄鄉
Tungmen Village 銅門村
Tungshih District 東勢區
Tungyueh Village 東岳村
Tupan Village 土坂村
turen 土人
tuzhu shengfan 土著生蕃
27 Unit 二七部隊
228 Incident 二二八事件

U Utsugi, Ichiro 宇都木一郎

W

Wachiawa community 瓦加哇社 Walis Nogan 瓦歷斯·諾幹 Walis Pelin 瓦歷斯·貝林 Wanchiao 灣橋 Wang Ai-lan 汪愛蘭 Wang Cheng-chang 王成章 Wang Cheng-yuan 汪成源 Wang Chin-hsing 王金星 Wang Ching-shan 汪清山 Wang Chun-mu 王春木 Wang Ho-cheng 王和承 Wang Hsin-te 王新德 Wang Ku-shan 汪沽山 Wang Kuo-yuan 王國元 Wang Shu-chen 汪淑貞 Wang Tien-sung 王天送 Wang Yu-lan 汪玉蘭 Wanhua 萬華 Wanjung Township 萬榮鄉 Wanjung Township Representative Council 萬榮鄉代表會 Wanli Township 萬里鄉

Wanta 萬大

wei 偽

Wei Chao-fu 魏朝福 Wei Hwei-lin 衛惠林 Wei Ju-lo 魏如羅 Wei Pei-te 魏培德 wenhua luohou 文化落後 Wenhuipao 文匯報 Wenshan District Office 文山區區署 White Terror 白色恐怖 womende laodage 我們的老大哥 Wu A-ching 吳阿慶 Wu Chi 吳記 Wu Chien-hua 吳健華 Wu Chin-tsan 吳金燦 Wu Chung-cheng 武忠誠 Wu Feng 吳鳳 Wu I-te 武義徳 Wu Ken-jui 吳根瑞 Wu Keng-ching 吳更青 Wu Kuo-chen 吳國楨 Wu Li 伍利 Wu Nai-kuang 吳乃光 Wu Pu-hsing 伍普星 Wu Pu-sheng 伍普生 Wu Shih 吳石 Wu Shih-lin 吳石麟 Wu Su-ching 吳甦青 Wu Te-cheng 吳德成 Wu Te-i 武徳義 Wufeng Cooperative 吳鳳鄉合作社 Wufeng Security Command Post 吳鳳治安指揮所 Wufeng Township (Chiayi County) 吳鳳鄉 Wufeng Township (Hsinchu County) 五峰鄉 Wufeng Township Office

吳鳳鄉公所

Wuku Township 五股鄉

Wulai Township 烏來鄉
Wulu Village 霧鹿村
Wuniulan Bridge 烏牛欄橋
Wuniunan Bridge 烏牛禰橋
Wushantou 霧山頭
Wushe 霧社
Wutai Township 霧臺鄉
Wutai Township
Representative Council
霧臺鄉代表會
Wutoushan 霧頭山

## X

xiang 鄉
xianjuezhe 先覺者
xianzhumin 先住民
xianzhumin tongbao
先住民同胞
xiao chaqu 小插曲

xiao chaqu 小油曲 xiaomie 消滅 xuandao 宣導 xuandaozu 宣導組 xuanwei 宣慰

#### Y

Yamanaka, Masako 山中政子 yamatodamashi 大和魂 Yami (Tao) 雅美族 Yami (Amis) 亞米族 Yang Chao-fu 洋招富 Yang Hui-chuan 楊會全 Yang Ko-huang 楊克煌 Yang Liang-kung 楊亮功 Yangmingshan 陽明山 Yani Township 雅你鄉 Yasui, Takeshi 安井猛 Yata, Kazuo 矢多一生 Yeh Chi-tung 葉紀東 Yeh Ching-san 葉慶三 Yeh Chiu-mu 葉秋木 Yeh Hsiu-feng 葉秀峰

Yeh Min-hsin 葉敏新
Yellow Emperor 黃帝
Yen Chin-lung 顏金龍
Yenping Township 延平鄉
Yijang Baluar 夷將·拔路兒
Yingkuang Dormitory 螢光舍
yingxiongji 英雄祭
Yoshinaga, Masatsugu
悅永政嗣

you 祐
Young People's Alliance for
the Taiwan Penglai Nation's
Struggle for Salvation
台灣蓬萊民族自

救鬥爭青年同盟 youpian 誘騙 youru yizhang baizhi 猶如一張白紙

Yu Chung-chien 游伸健 Yu Mi-chien 游彌堅 Yu Pin 于斌 yuan 元 Yuan Kuo-chin 袁國欽

yuanshide xingtai 原始的形態 yuanzhumin 原住民 yuanzhuminzu 原住民族

Yuchih Township 魚池鄉
Yuchih Township 魚池鄉
Yuch (ancient state) 越
Yuch (Kwangtung) 粤
Yuli Township 玉里鎮

Yunlin 雲林 Yushan 玉山

Yuanlin 員林

Yushan Theological College

玉山神學院

Yuuki, Jotaro 結城丈太郎

Z

zaozhumin 早住民 zhangguan 長官 zhao 兆 zhen 鎮
zhenfang xiaozu 偵防小組
zhi 志
zhijingtuan 致敬團
Zhonghua minzu 中華民族
zhongzhen aiguo 忠貞愛國
zhongzu miewang 種族滅亡
zhurende diwei 主人的地位
zidong jianjuqu 自動檢舉區
zijue 自決
zixin 自新
zizhi 自治

zu 族

# References

Newspaper references in the same year are distinguished by a letter suffix (a, b,c...), then when these are exhausted by the addition of "z" (za, zb, zc...), then the addition of "zz" (zza, zzb, zzc) and so on.

### List of abbreviations used in footnotes, showing author and year only:

TWS I: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee 228 Incident Document Compilation Unit (ed.)(1991)

TWS II: Wei Yung-chu (ed.)(1992)

TWS III: Wei Yung-chu and Li Hsuan-feng (eds)(1994)

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AS II: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1992b)

AS III: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1993a)

AS IV: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1993b)

AS V: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History (ed.)(1997a)

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  Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documents Committee 台灣省文獻委員會.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945a): "Gaoshazu daibiao jinye Chen zhangguan zhijing" 高砂族代表晉謁陳長官致敬 (Delegates of the Takasago people presented to Governor Chen to pay their compliments). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 28 October 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945b): "Chen zhangguan yanjian Gaoshanzu daibiao" 陳長官 延見高山族代表 (Governor Chen continues to receive delegates of the Kaoshan people). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 October 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945c): "Shelun: huanying Gaoshanzu daibiao" 社論:歡迎高 山族代表 (Editorial: Welcome to the delegates of the Kaoshan people). *Taiwan* Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 October 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945d): "Xin Taiwan jianshe ni xieli, Gaoshanzu daibiao chicheng wo pili" 新臺灣建設に協力,高山族代表赤誠を披瀝 (Delegates of the Kaoshan people offer sincere opinions in contributing to the construction of a new Taiwan). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 October 1945, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945e): "Xiwang zhengfu youxian shijiao" 希望政府優先施教 ([We] hope the government will give [us] precedence in education). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 November 1945, p.3.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945f): "Zhudong jun Gaoshanzu daibiao zuo jinye Chen zhangguan zhijing" 竹東郡高山族代表昨晉謁陳長官致敬 (Delegates of the Kaoshan people from Chutung Shire presented to Governor Chen to pay their compliments). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 7 November 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945g): "Xinzhu lingxun" 新竹零訊 (Hsinchu news brief).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 17 November 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945h): "Gaoshanzu tongbao xiwang pingdeng jiaoyu" 高山族 同胞希望平等教育 (Kaoshan compatriots hope for equality in education).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 25 November 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945i): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 24 December 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945j): "Xue weiyuan shicha Wulai" 薛委員視察烏來 (Committee member Hsueh [Jen-yang] inspects Wulai). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 November 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945k): "Xian zhi huafen jike guiding" 縣制劃分即可規定 (County system divisions to be made official). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 18 December 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (19451): "Shelun: jingzheng guankui" 社論: 警政管窺 (Editorial: A vision for police administration). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14
  November 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945m): "Alishan Gaoshanzu xiwang ru qingniantuan" 阿里山高山族希望入青年團 (Kaoshan people of Alishan hope to join youth corps).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 28 October 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945n): "Alishan Gaoshanzu tongbao shouxian kaishi wuqi jiaochu yundong" 阿里山高山族同胞首先開始武器繳出運動 (Kaoshan compatriots of Alishan commence weapons-handover drive). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 12 November 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945o): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14 December 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945p): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 25 December 1945, p.3.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945q): "Jinhoude Taiwan jingzheng" 今後的臺灣警政 (Police administration in Taiwan from now on). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14 November 1945, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1945r): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 22 December 1945, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946a): "Gongshu zuzhi kaochatuan xuanwei Gaoshanzu tongbao" 公署組織考察團宣慰高山族同胞 (Executive Office organises inspection teams to guide Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 21 February 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946b): "Gaoshanzu kaochatuan disanzu dao Hualian" 縣制劃分即可規定 (The third team Kaoshan people inspection team reaches Hualien). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 22 February 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946c): "Xuanwei Gaoshanzu tongbao kaochatuan yi fan Taibei" 宣慰高山族同胞考察團已返臺北 (Inspection teams guiding Kaoshan compatriots have returned to Taipei). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 10 March 1946, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946d): "Shandi xingzheng gongzuo minzhengchu kaihui jiantao" 山地行政工作民政處開會檢討 (Bureau of Civil Affairs seminar discusses mountain area administrative work). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 August 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946e): "Quansheng minzheng huiyi ding benyue jiuri kaishi" 全 省民政會議訂本月九日開始 (Provincewide civil affairs conference set to start on the ninth of this month). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 7 September 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946f): "Minzhengchu gongzuo baogao" 民政處工作報告 (Work report of the Bureau of Civil Affairs). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 16 December 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946g): "Jiaohua Gaoshanzu" 教化高山族 (Educate the Kaoshan people). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 3 May 1946, p.6.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946h): "Wei peiyu Gaoshan qingnian teshe chuji zhongxue" 為 培育高山青年特設初級中學 (A special junior high school will be established for the education of Kaoshan youth). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14
  September 1946, p.5.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946i): "Shengshi canyihui jin zhaokai lianxi huiyi shangtan Jieshiguan xianjin shiyi" 省市參議會今召開聯席會議商談介石館獻金事宜 (Provincial and city councils today convene a joint conference to discuss the matter of money bestowed by [Chiang] Kai-shek House). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 24 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946j): "Taolun shandi gongmin xunlian, gongxunhui zuo juxing huiyi" 討論山地公民訓練公訓會昨舉行會議 (Civics training committee convened a conference yesterday to discuss civics training for mountain areas).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 5 December 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946k): "Zhankai shandi gongmin xunlian" 展開山地公民訓練 (Develop civics training in mountain areas). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 21 December 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946l): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 11 January 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946m): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 21 January 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946n): "Gaoshan tongbao diwei tigao" 高山同胞地位提高 (Status of Kaoshan compatriots is raised). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 1 March 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946o): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 18 March 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946p): "Alishan senlin pinpin fahuo" 阿里山森林頻頻發火 (Fires continue to break out in Alishan's forests). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 May 1946, p.6.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946q): "Cujin Gaoshan tongbao zizhi" 促進高山同胞自治 (Promote autonomy for Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 3 June 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946r): "Alishan sheli xianggongsuo" 阿里山設立鄉公所 (Township office established in Alishan). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 20 June 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946s): "Tainan xian xianzhang shicha Alishan" 臺南縣縣長視察阿里山 (Tainan County mayor inspects Alishan). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 13 August 1946, p.5.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946t): "Tainan xianzhang Yuan Guoqin shicha gaoshanqu" 臺南縣長袁國欽視察高山區 (Tainan Mayor Yuan Kuo-chin inpsects mountain district). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 23 August 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946u): "Tainan gaoshan diqu jiji xingxue" 臺南高山地區積極 興學 (Tainan's mountain district active in promotion of schooling). *Taiwan* Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 9 September 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946v): "Chen zhangguan shicha Jianan dazhen, dui ci da gongcheng ji gan xingqu" 陳長官視察嘉南大圳對此大工程極感興趣 (Governor Chen inspects the Chiayi-Tainan embankment, shows considerable interest in this large engineering project). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 9 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946w): "Gaoshan gongyuan exi wei chu, zhansha mai rouzong xiaohaizi" 高山工員惡習未除斬殺賣肉粽小孩子 (Evil customs of Kaoshan workers yet to be eradicated after decapitation of children selling meat rice dumplings). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 7 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946x): "Sharen jizu shi yong" 殺人祭祖示勇 (Ancestor worship through killing indicates heroism). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報,7 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946y): "Gaoshan tongbaode yiju" 高山同胞的義舉 (The chivalry of Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 20 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946z): "Pingdeng daiyu Gaoshanzu, ying zhidao shi zhi tonghua" 平等待遇高山族應指導使之同化 (Treating Kaoshan people equally means they should be guided along the path of assimilation). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 8 August 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946za): "Shelun: Ruhe gaizao Gaoshanzu" 社論:如何改造高山族 (How to remould the Kaoshan people). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 November 1946, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zb): "Jiuji Hengchun nanmin" 救濟恆春難民 (Providing relief to the victims in Hengchun). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 24 August 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zc): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新 生報, 24 February 1946, p.3.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zd): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新 生報,7 March 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946ze): "Hualian dangwu gongzuodui shenru Gaoshanzu diqu gongzuo" 花蓮黨務工作隊深入高山族地區工作 (Hualien party affairs work team goes deep into the Kaoshan people's territory to work). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 17 August 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zf): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新 生報, 1 April 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zg): "Jiuji Gaoshanzu tongbao" 救濟高山族同胞 (Bringing relief to Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 April 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zh): "Gaoshan tongbao xuyao shiyan yu yiyao, yi shefa yuanyuan yunwang" 高山同胞需要食鹽與醫藥宜設法源源運往 (Kaoshan compatriots need salt and medicine, necessitating the sourcing of materials to be sent to them). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 3 August 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zi): "Jiuji fenshu fenfa xianweipin" 救濟分署分發纖維品 (Relief division distributes clothes). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 September 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zj): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 15 March 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zk): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 28 March 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zl): "Hualian Gaoshan tongbao jin jun yizhu shanjiao gengzhong shoulie" 花蓮高山同胞近均移住山角耕種狩獵 (Hualien's Kaoshan compatriots recently moving to foothills to cultivate and hunt). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 October 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zm): "Bensheng shandi guomin xuexiao xian yi daliang sheli" 花蓮高山同胞近均移住山角耕種狩獵 (A great number of the province's mountain area public schools have been set up). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 12 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zn): "Minzhengchu Zhou chuzhang fangwen Gaoshan tongbao" 民政處周處長訪問高山同胞 (Bureau director Chou meets Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 3 July 1946, p.4.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zo): "Taidong xian zuzhi shandi kaochatuan" 臺東縣組織 山地考察團 (Taitung County forms mountain area inspection team). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 23 September 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zp): "Qingqiu Jialulan zhu gang" 請求加路蘭築港 (Request for a port to be built at Chialulan [Fukang]). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 24 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zq): "Hualian Gaoshan tongbao dahui taolun tigao wenhua gailiang fengsu, qing fenpei tudi ji weisheng shebei" 花蓮高山同胞大會討論提高文化改良風俗請分配土地及衛生設備 (Conference of Hualien Kaoshan compatriots discusses raising cultural standards and improving customs, asks for land and health facilities to be allocated). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 1 December 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zr): "Shandi jumin fuyin: minchu kanxing zhongriwen tongxun" 山地居民福音民處刊行中日文通訊 (Good News for mountain area residents: Civil Affairs Bureau to publish Chinese-Japanese language bulletin). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 24 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zs): "Taidong qingzhu fengnian tekai Gaoshan wuhui" 臺東慶祝豐年特開高山舞會 (Taitung celebrates a bumper year, stages a Kaoshan dance especially). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 July 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zt): "Gaoshan tongbao jinwan bochang minyao" 高山同胞今晚播唱民謠 (Kaoshan compatriots to broadcast performance of folk songs tonight). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 22 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zu): Untitled photo extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新 生報, 26 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zv): "Jingwu shangdai jixu nuli, wuqiu dadao you an bi po" 警務尚待繼續努力務求達到有案必破 (Police administration requires continuing hard work, goals have been met but still cases to be cracked). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 7 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zw): "Sheng jingcha xunliansuo Gaoshanzu xuesheng ming jiexun" 省警察訓練所高山族學生明結訓 (Kaoshan students complete training tomorrow at provincial police training center). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 5 May 1946, p.6.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zx): "Gaoshanzu jingxun jieye, Chen zhangguan qinlin xunhua" 高山族警訓結業陳長官親臨訓話 (Police training for Kaoshan [students] completed, Governor Chen attends to make personal address). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 7 May 1946, p.6.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zy): "Qitu shanhuo Gaoshanzu, Chong Duoheyi beidai" 企 圖煽惑高山族沖多賀一被逮 (Takaichi Oki arrested after attempting to incite Kaoshan people). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 18 January 1946, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zz): "Pingdi renmin jinru shandi ying dai gai guan xianfu zhengshu" 平地人民進入山地應帶該管縣府證書 (Plains people entering mountain areas must per regulations carry papers from county governments).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 11 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zza): "Daxi cun nonghui qiangsha an, renfan yi yi fayuan banli" 大溪村農會搶殺案人犯已移法院辦理 (Suspects in Tahsi Village Agricultural Cooperative robbery-murder case taken to court for processing).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 5 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzb): "Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu gonggao" 臺灣省行政長官公署公告 (Public notice from the Taiwan Provincial Executive Administration Office). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 1 April 1946, p.1.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzc): "Renshi zuguo jiaqiang lianxi, Taiwan zhijingtuan ming fei Hu" 認識祖國加強聯繫臺灣致敬團明飛滬 (To know the ancestral country and strengthen ties, Taiwan's goodwill delegation flies to Shanghai tomorrow). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 26 August 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzd): "Guoda bensheng daibiao xuanju wenti, zhongyang yi dianshi yaodian" 國大本省代表選舉問題中央已電示要點 (The central government has wired measures relating to problems associated with the election of this province's representatives to the National Assembly). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 22 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zze): "Guoda daibiao xuanju jieguo: Li Wanju deng dangxuan" 國大代表選舉結果李萬居等當選 (Results of the election for National Assembly representatives are in: Li Wan-chu, others elected). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 1 November 1946, p.4.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzf): "Bensheng Guoda daibiao dangxuanren fabiao tanhua" 國大代表選舉結果李萬居等當選 (This province's representatives elected to the National Assembly speak). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 2 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzg): "Zhangguan zhaodai Guoda daibiao, zuo zai binguan juxing chahui" 長官招待國大代表昨在賓館舉行茶會 (Governor entertains National Assembly representatives, holds tea party at the [Taipei] Guesthouse yesterday). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 7 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzh): "Guoda daibiao zuowu jin Jing" 國大代表昨午進京 (National Assembly representatives reached Nanking yesterday afternoon).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 8 November 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzi): "Jiang zhuxi yu Taiwan Guoda daibiao heying" 蔣主席與臺灣國大代表合影 (Group photograph of Chairman Chiang and Taiwan's National Assembly representatives). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 17 December 1946, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzj): "Taiwan xianzheng xiejinhui zuo juxing chengli dahui" 臺灣憲政協進會昨舉行成立大會 (Taiwan Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government held inauguration ceremony yesterday). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 28 October 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzk): "Chen zhangguan shicha Riyuetan, canguan Gaoshan tongbao wudao" 陳長官視察日月潭參觀高山同胞舞蹈 (Governor Chen inspects Sun Moon Lake, watches Kaoshan compatriots dance). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzl): "Zhengfu yi pingdeng yuanze duidai Gaoshan tongbao" 政府以平等原則對待高山同胞 (Government treats Kaoshan compatriots on the basis of equality). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzm): Untitled photograph. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 6 October 1946, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzn): "Chen zhangguan zai Riyuetan" 陳長官在日月潭 (Governor Chen at Sun Moon Lake). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報,7 October 1946, p.5.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzo): Untitled photograph (no.5). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 20 October 1946, p.6.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1946zzp): "Shicha Eluanbi jiejian Gaoshan tongbao" 視察鵝鑾鼻接見高山同胞 (Inspecting Oluanpi and receiving Kaoshan compatriots).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 10 October 1946, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947a): "Shandi xingzheng zhi guoqu yu xianzai" 山地行政之過去與現在 (The past and present of mountain area administration). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14 January 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947b): "Jiushu bofa mianfen jizhu gaoshan xuesheng" 救署撥 發麵粉濟助高山學生 (Aid agency distributes flour to assist Kaoshan students).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 18 January 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947c): "Gaoshanzu shasi mai zong xiaofan an zhuyao fan ge chu sixing" 高山族殺死賣粽小販案主要犯各處死刑 (Chief villains sentenced to death in the case of Kaoshan people killing young vendors selling rice dumplings). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 2 January 1947, p.3.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947d): "Jiuji Gaoshan tongbao" 救濟高山同胞 (Bringing relief to Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14 January 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947e): "Taidong ban qingnian xunlianban peiyang Gaoshan gongzuo ganbu" 臺東辦青年訓練班培養高山工作幹部 (Taitung forms a youth training unit to cultivate cadres working among Kaoshan people). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 16 February 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947f): "Fazhan shandi jingji" 發展山地經濟 (Develop the economy of the mountain areas). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 10 January 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947g): "Shandi nianlai xianzhu jinbu, xuyao zuguo lequ wuyong" 山地年來顯著進步需要祖國樂曲舞踊 (Mountain areas have improved noticeably in a year, need the ancestral country to "dance to the music"). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 26 February 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947h): "Quzhang weiwen Gaoshan tongbao" 區長慰問高山同胞 (District head consoles Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 26 January 1947, p.5.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947i): "Yuanshi yishu yuanshi wu, Gaoshan shaonü xianshen zi" 原始藝術原始舞高山少女現身姿 (Performance by young Kaoshan ladies encapsulates primitive art and primitive dance). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 18 February 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947j): "Hualian shandi shizheng gangling" 花蓮山地施政綱領 (Program for mountain area governance in Hualien). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣 新生報, 3 February 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947k): "Taizhong tuijin shandi xingzheng bo shiye fei liushierwan" 臺中推進山地行政撥事業費六十二萬 (620,000 [yuan] in operating costs allocated to mountain area administration in Taichung). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 13 February 1947, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (19471): Untitled news extract. Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 21 March 1947, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947m): "Gaoshan tongbao weichi zhixu, Taidong xianzhang chengqing jiangli" 高山同胞維持秩序臺東縣長呈請獎勵 (Kaoshan compatriots maintain order, Taitung county mayor requests rewards for them). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 23 March 1947, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947n): "Taizhong gejie zhaodai ershiyi shi guanzuo" 臺中各界招待二十一師官佐 (All of Taichung entertains the 21st Division and their aides).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14 April 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947o): "Shandi tongbao aihu zuguo, Jianshi xiangmin zhi qu baotu" 山地同胞愛護祖國尖石鄉民智驅暴徒 (Mountain area compatriots love and protect the ancestral country, people of Chienshih Township wisely drive out thugs). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 March 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947p): "Dongbu tongbao ganji zhengfu" 東部同胞感激政府 (Compatriots in eastern Taiwan grateful to the government). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 July 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947q): "Nan Zhixin Zheng Pincong xunwei Gaoshan tongbao" 南志信鄭品聰巡慰高山同胞 (Nan Chih-hsin and Cheng Pin-tsung inspect and assuage Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 14 February 1947, p.5.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947r): "Zheng Pincong shi xuanwei dong Tai minzhong" 鄭品 聰氏宣慰東臺民眾 (Mr. Cheng Pin-tsung guides the people of eastern Taiwan).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 19 March 1947, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947s): "Bai buzhang jiamian Riyuetan liang fadiansuo yuangong" 白部長嘉勉日月潭兩發電所員工 (Minister Pai praises and encourages personnel at two Sun Moon Lake power plants). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 March 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947t): "Weimian Gaoshan tongbao" 慰勉高山同胞 (Assuaging Kaoshan compatriots). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 26 March 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947u): "Bai buzhang zuo liangdu huiyi bing ceng tingqu gefang yijian" 白部長昨兩度會議並曾聽取各方意見 (Minister Bai yesterday attended two conferences and listened to the opinions of all sides). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 March 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947v): "Taidong guodai ji Gaoshan lingxiu zuo ye Chen zhangguan zhijing" 臺東國代及高山領袖昨謁陳長官致敬 (Taitung National Assembly representatives and Kaoshan leaders yesterday have an audience with Governor Chen and pay their respects). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 26 March 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947w): "Shi Gaoshan tongbao dushu renzi, yizhi jieshou zuguode jiaoyu" 使高山同胞讀書認字一致接受祖國的教育 (Make Kaoshan compatriots read and attain literacy so that all may receive the ancestral country's education). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 March 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947x): "Hualian liangshi qique" 花蓮糧食奇缺 (Strange grain shortage in Hualien). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 19 March 1947, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947y): "Dongbu suijing silingbu xuanwei Hua jing Gaoshan tongbao" 東部綏靖司令部宣慰花境高山同胞 (Eastern Pacification Command calms Kaoshan compatriots in Hualien area). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 30 April 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947z): "Nanbu xuandaozu zai nanshi zhaokai Gaoshan qingnian chahui" 南部宣導組在南師召開高山青年茶會 (Southern guidance unit convenes tea party for Aboriginal youth at Tainan Normal College). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 April 1947, p.4.

- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947za): "Gedi zishou zixin yongyao, Gaoshan tongbao chengjiao wuqi" 各地自首自新踴躍高山同胞呈繳武器 (Eagerness everywhere to surrender and repent, Kaoshan compatriots hand over weapons). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 27 April 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947zb): "Dong Tai jun min xiangchu rongqia" 東臺軍民相處融洽 (Military and civilians in harmony in eastern Taiwan). Taiwan

  Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 29 April 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947zc): "Gao Yisheng guangbo ci" 高一生廣播詞 (Text of a broadcast by Kao I-sheng). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 30 April 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947zd): "Wufeng xiangzhang Gao Yisheng xiang zhangguan xian qi zhijing" 吳鳳鄉長高一生向長官獻旗致敬 (Wufeng Township mayor Kao I-sheng pays respects to the governor with presentation of banner). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 30 April 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1947ze): "Baoliudi nianwuwan gongqing zhuan gong zengjin shandi jianshe" 保留地廿五萬公頃專供增進山地建設 (250,000 hectares of reserved land to be used specially for expanding mountain area development).

  Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 10 November 1947, p.4.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1948a): "Huainian pingmin yingxiong Wu Feng" 懷念平民英雄吳鳳 (In memory of Wu Feng, hero of the common man). Taiwan Hsinshengpao臺灣新生報, 24 September 1948, p.2.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1949): "Hualian pohu fandong zuzhi" 花蓮破獲反動組織 (Reactionary organisation busted in Hualien). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 28 November, 1949, p.5.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1950a): "Zhonghua funü fangong kang'e lianhehui chengli dahui" 中華婦女反共抗俄联合会成立大会 (Chinese Women's Oppose-the-Communists Resist-the-Russians Federation holds conference). Taiwan Hsinshengpao Weekly Picture Supplement 臺灣新生報星期畫刊, 23 April 1950 (no.38), p.1.
- Taiwan Hsinshengpao (1950b): "Shandi gewutuan laojun gongyan" 山地歌舞團勞軍公演 (Mountain area singing and dancing troupe entertains the troops in public performance). Taiwan Hsinshengpao 臺灣新生報, 25 June, 1950, p.5.

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