

# **Market reactions when zero-leverage firms obtain bank finance**

**Matthew James Grosse**

**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of**

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**February 2014**

**Accounting Discipline Group**

**University of Technology, Sydney**

**Supervised by:**

**Professor Andrew Ferguson**

**Dr Robert Czernkowski**

**Dr Peter Lam**

## **Certificate of original authorship**

I certify that the work in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree except as fully acknowledged within the text.

I also certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

Name of Student: Matthew Grosse

Signature of Student:

Date:

## **Acknowledgements**

I wish to specially thank my primary supervisor Professor Andrew Ferguson, his continual support and motivation throughout the thesis has been greatly appreciated. His optimism and enthusiasm for research has made working with him a pleasure. I would also like to thank my co-supervisors Dr Peter Lam and Dr Robert Czernkowski. The insightful comments and suggestions received from Professor Philip Brown are also acknowledged.

I would like to acknowledge the help and support from UTS staff members, visitors, and in particular my fellow PhD students, Thomas Scott, Stephen Kean, Alexey Feigin, Gabriel Pündrich, Adrian Raftery and Nelson Ma, who have all helped on various projects with their generous sharing of ideas.

The financial support of UTS is gratefully acknowledged, as is the financial support of the Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ) through their PhD Scholarship. The professional editing services provide by Shona Bates are appreciated. Additionally, the research assistance provided by Demara Roche is also acknowledged.

## **Abstract**

Prior studies of bank loan announcements depict significant capital market reactions. More recent evidence however, fails to identify such reactions (Fields *et al.* 2006, Maskara & Mullineaux 2011). In this study, I consider market reactions to loan initiations where the borrower has no prior record of bank lending. Zero-leverage firms are firms that have zero outstanding short-term or long-term debt in their capital structure (Strebulaev & Yang 2013). Using a unique hand collected sample of bank loan announcements for Australian Mining Development Stage entities, I find that both initial bank loans and subsequent bank loans attract significant market reactions. Further, I produce evidence consistent with announcements of such loans reducing information asymmetry which I proxy for with bid-ask spreads and trading volume. My final analysis examines evidence of bank specialisation. I find that borrowers from the industry leader in terms of loan origination (Macquarie Bank) in this sector exhibit stronger abnormal returns.

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