The Role of Fairness and Ambiguity in Negotiating Marketing Alliances

This paper provides empirical support for the positive effects of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness on the choice to form a marketing alliance. Furthermore, the results provide some support for the negative impact of ambiguity in respect to the partner's marketing capabilities on the choice to form a marketing alliance.

Fairness, Ambiguity, Marketing Alliances

Category: Paper Presentation

Introduction

The need to create and foster partnerships in order to improve business performance is significant and becoming increasingly important to businesses today. These partnerships, alliances and other forms of collaborative working arrangements are now quite commonplace (Eden and Huxham 2001). Parties may choose to collaborate for a variety of reasons, such as making a joint decision about creating a marketing alliance between two brands, or perhaps creating a strategic joint venture between two organisations. Strategic joint ventures are greatly increasing as firms deal with global technological, financial and marketing challenges, creating strength and opportunity through alliances (Rao and Schmidt 1998). Whatever the reason for collaborating, the parties will make a decision as to whether or not they will form an alliance.

Creating an alliance is often a challenging ordeal, and there are a variety of factors that could potentially influence the decision to form an alliance. Potential factors include business variables such as market know-how and distribution capabilities to name just a few. Alternatively the decision could be affected by emotional factors such as predispositions for a partner and perceptions of trust. Thus, there is a variety of potential factors which may influence the formation of a strategic alliance beyond the capabilities that are required to make an alliance successful. For example, previous research by Arino and Ring (2004) found that negotiations characterised by fairness and misunderstandings affect the formation of strategic alliances. Their

work, however, is case study based and lacks quantitative substantiation. The purpose of this paper is to examine role of fairness and ambiguity in the negotiation of marketing alliances. More specifically, we aim to understand better whether *(a)* ambiguity affects the decision to form a marketing alliance, and *(b)* whether fairness influences that decision.

Negotiating Alliances

While there is distinct lack of research that addresses negotiations in alliances, the wider literature provides some foundations. Bazerman (1998) argues that when two parties aim at reaching a joint decision yet have different preferences, they negotiate to reach a mutually agreeable outcome. The literature on negotiation styles and associated negotiation behaviour provides several conceptual frameworks of negotiation behaviour. For example, Thomas and Kilmann (1987) assume that negotiation styles are independent of a particular context, thus that individual negotiation behaviours can be assessed across situations. Accordingly, negotiation styles are relatively stable behaviours that arise in negotiation encounters. They are patterns in individuals' behaviour that reappear in negotiation situations through the mechanism of predisposition toward particular courses of conduct (Gilkey and Greenhalgh 1986). On the other hand, Hall (1969) argues that negotiation behaviour is influenced by the situation, Rahim (1983) by the target, and Putnam and Wilson (1982) by both the situational context and the target.

The literature states numerous negotiation styles and related behaviours. For example, Putnam and Wilson (1982) identify three negotiation styles—control, solution-oriented and non-confrontation modes. These three negotiation styles are similar to those identified by authors such Mnookin et al (2000) and Weider-Hatfield (1988). Other authors specify five negotiation styles—integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding and compromising (Rahim 1983) or collaborating, compromising, competing, accommodating and avoiding (Thomas and Kilmann (1987). Common

among those and the various other typologies are two distinct styles: the integrative and distributive styles. An integrative negotiation style is linked to a problem-solving orientation in which trust, affinity, and joint gain are emphasised, whereas the distributive negotiation style is linked to a competitive orientation in which power, and individual gain are stressed. In this paper we lean on the dual-concerns model and the works of Allred (2000), Rahim and Magner (1995) and Thomas (1992) and focus the following four facets of negotiation behaviour—avoiding, accommodating, collaborative, and competitive. The underlying assumption is that parties displaying a behaviour that is characterised as collaborative would more likely to agree when negotiating an alliance than those being competitive (Pruitt 1981; Lewicki et al. 1986; Bazerman 1998). The negotiation literature falls, however, short of explaining how ambiguity or fairness may affect whether or not parties will form a an alliance.

Ambiguity

Ambiguity has been addressed only implicitly in the alliance context by Arino and Ring (2004). In the wider literature, Ellsberg describes ambiguity as being present in situations where the available information is barely sufficient or obviously unreliable and highly conflicting (Ellsberg 1961). Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) note that there is a difference between ambiguity, ignorance and risk. These differences can be distinguished according to the degree to which one can rule out alternatives; that is, ambiguity is an intermediate state between ignorance (no alternatives can be ruled out) and risk (all but one alternative is ruled out) (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985).

According to March and Simon (1967), and Epstein (1999), ambiguity and risk differ in relation to the known probabilities of likely events. It is argued that risk relates to situations where the perceived likelihood of events can be represented by probabilities which are fixed and objective, such as tossing a coin or rolling dice (March and Simon 1967; Epstein 1999). On the other hand

ambiguity, also referred to as uncertainty, relates to situations where the information available is too imprecise to be summarised by a probability measure (March and Simon 1967; Epstein 1999). The advantage of studying ambiguity instead of risk is that it assesses uncertainty in the real-world, and it is not limited to games of chance and stated probabilities. Thus ambiguity is present in negotiation scenarios where the decision maker cannot determine the probability of their opponent's actions or the probability that an agreement will be achieved.

Drawing upon various definitions of ambiguity we define it as it applies to the present study. Throughout this research ambiguity will be synonymous with uncertainty. Ambiguity relates to the doubtfulness, uncertainty or vagueness within the decision maker when deciding on a possible alternative. Ambiguity is present when choosing an alternative in which the probability of the outcome of that alternative is too complex to be calculated. Ambiguous information is that which is misleading, incomplete or prevents the decision maker from determining the true state of that information. There can be ambiguity in situations where the negotiator does not have sufficient information to make a rational decision. Drawing on the aforementioned definitions of ambiguity, we argue that judgement and decision making is affected by perception of ambiguity.

Social Judgement Theory (SJT), developed by Austrian born psychologist Egon Brunswick (Cooksey 1996; Goldstein 2004), in negotiations explains that the nature of human judgement itself is a source of conflict and that disagreements often flow from the judgement process (Balke, Hammond and Meyer 1973). SJT has been employed to examine labour-management negotiations, and in particular how it can be used to explain conflict between negotiators (Balke et al. 1973). Human judgement is described to be highly subjective, inaccurate and at times inconsistent which may lead to conflict between negotiators (Balke et al. 1973). A source of disagreement lies in the differing weights that they attach to the elements of a labour contract (Balke et al. 1973). Therefore SJT provides a possible explanation for how negotiators deal with

ambiguity, which may cause parties to disagree on a possible collaboration. SJT is a theoretical framework which may explain how negotiators perceive information in alliance formation contexts which are laden with ambiguity, particularly information about the opposing party's capabilities or the capabilities of oneself. By distorting the truth about capabilities it is possible that individuals may choose not to venture into an alliance. Although there have been no empirical studies which investigate explicitly this possible phenomenon, SJT may be a theoretical foundation for the understanding the role of ambiguity in the stage of alliance formation.

Fairness

Research on justice theory and its relationship to negotiations and collaborations emphasises the importance of fairness in negotiations. According to Bazerman (1998), handling fairness aspects appropriately affects negotiations, in general, and in alliance, in particular(Arino and Ring 2004). The latter authors stress the role of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness in and the effect of these in emerging collaborative ventures.

Distributive justice refers to an individual's perceptions of fairness in relation to the allocation of the available rewards/resources amongst group members (Chan 2000; Arino and Ring 2004; Welsh 2004). When negotiating an agreement, disputes often take place over how the resources will be allocated. For example, when negotiating an international joint venture, there are many distribution factors which can be disagreed on which may lead to disputes and the possible termination of an agreement. Arino and Ring (2004) study this occurrence through a case study of a negotiated international joint venture between two pharmaceutical companies, one Argentinean and the other Spanish. These two companies disagreed on factors relating to the distribution of ownership control, financial contributions and human resource contributions. Furthermore neither party was prepared to move from their starting positions. The negotiations failed because the

parties felt that the opposing party was acting unfairly in regards to ensuring that the benefits received to both parties would be proportional to the contributions made (Arino and Ring 2004). This shows that perceptions of distributive fairness during the negotiation process can have a significant impact on whether two parties are willing to collaborate or not.

Procedural justice relates to an individual's perception of the methods, mechanisms and procedures used to arrive at a decision, and the extent to which they believe these procedures or processes are fair or unfair (Greenberg 1990b; Greenberg 1990a; Chan 2000; Tyler 2000; Welsh 2004). Procedural fairness is argued to have a greater impact on negotiation outcomes than distributive fairness (Barling and Phillips 1992). Unjust procedures have been shown to create negative consequences such as lower performance, higher turnover, less commitment and negative behaviour (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). It is well established that perceptions of fairness of the decision making process have a significant impact on the reactions and motives of individuals after a decision has been made (Tyler 1986; Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza 1995; Chan 2000; Tyler 2000; Welsh 2004).

Güth and co-authors have shown that procedural fairness plays an important role in the outcome of two-player ultimatum games, which can be paralleled to the ultimatum scenarios created within two-party non-equity alliances (Borges and Knetsch 1997). Furthermore, parties have been shown to reject profitable negotiation offers when they believe that the distribution of resources is unfair or unequal, in essence punishing their opportunistic partner for not sharing the resources equally (Borges and Knetsch 1997). Also, when procedural fairness is perceived to be strong, parties are more likely to accept an agreement and commit to the decision, even when a party felt that the outcome of the decision was unfair (Eden and Ackerman 2001). This illustrates that if negotiators use the correct procedures and protocol during a negotiation then the final result is more likely to be adhered to, even if it favours one party more than the other. Commitment to an

agreement will fail when the negotiators begin to break away from the required or expected rules and procedures of the negotiation.

The literature on fairness does not empirically investigate whether perceptions of procedural fairness will jeopardise the likelihood of coming to an agreement, thus it would be beneficial to measure the effect of procedural justice on the choice to form an alliance as a separate factor to distributive and interactional justice.

Interactional justice refers to the way in which people treat each other whilst carrying out procedures, or the fairness between the 'interactions' accorded to one another (Chan 2000; Arino and Ring 2004). Interactional fairness consists of two components; interpersonal sensitivity and social accounts (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). According to Folger and co-author (1998), interpersonal treatment refers to fair treatment and politeness, whereas social accounts provide a rationale for undesirable outcomes to the recipients. These elements of interactional fairness include levels of conflict, poor attitudes, poor performances, tone of voice and levels of respect. These factors could potentially weaken negotiations if allowed to escalate out of control. Other research has stated that interactional fairness is a combination of the perceived fairness of how decision makers implement procedures and the extent to which decision makers convey an image of themselves as being a fair person (Greenberg 1990b; Greenberg 1990a; Tyler and Bies 1990). High levels of interactional unfairness will most likely result in parties not wanting to collaborate, because unfavourable first-encounters during the negotiation phase may be indicative of a negative relationship in the future if an agreement is made. Parties will most likely exit the negotiation either through being offended or simply not wanting to risk committing to a relationship prone to conflict. Relationships are an integral aspect of any working collaboration, and it has been shown that higher levels of interactional fairness are positively related to higher

levels of success in relationships between employees and also between managers and employees (Lamertz 2002).

Arino and Ring (2004) illustrated the effect which interactional fairness can have on the outcomes of negotiated alliances in their previously mentioned case study of the two international pharmaceutical companies. They found that letters of communication which were written in a negative tone had an impact on the desire of the opposing party to collaborate. Furthermore, the parties became absorbed in resolving a number of interpersonal conflict matters and other issues of interactional fairness which resulted in delaying the collaboration, which greatly effect the time taken to reach an agreement. If parties are fighting over small matters of conflict then they are unable to focus on more important issues in the negotiation, such as the distribution of resources. This may jeopardise collaboration amongst firms.

There has been significantly less research on interactional fairness than distributive and procedural fairness, and quite often interactional fairness is explicitly viewed by authors as an aspect of procedural fairness rather than an independent concept (Greenberg 1990b; Cropanzano and Greenberg 1997). Barling and co-author (1992) found that in cases where interactional justice was not mentioned in the research, the results of procedural justice outcomes may have been confounded by the effects of interactional justice which, in some cases, may be stronger than the expected effect of procedural fairness.

A Model of Alliance Negotiation accounting for Fairness and Ambiguity

The proposed model suggests that the choice to collaborate in an alliance is affected by both ambiguity and fairness. Taking a utility maximisation perspective in accordance to random utility theory (eg, Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000), the choice to form an alliance will depend largely

on the utility derived from a potential alliance offer. Ambiguity and fairness are likely to affect the perceived utility associated with an alliance and, thus, the choice to form an alliance or not.

We argue that ambiguity will have a negative impact on the perceived utility of a possible alliance. Within the context of marketing alliances, ambiguity can be synthesised as a restricted view of the opposing alliance party's marketing capabilities which they bring to the collaboration. By not being able to accurately judge the opposing party's marketing capabilities it is posited that the decision maker will be averse to forming an alliance of such a magnitude. The ambiguous state will make it difficult for an individual to form a rational judgement about the opposing party and, in accordance to RUT, decrease the value of the utility function that defines the importance of the marketing capability factors to the overall utility of the alliance being offered. The contrast to an ambiguous state is a clear state, whereby the marketing capabilities of the potential partner are fully understood and do not hinder the decision making ability of the individual. In this unambiguous state the decision maker will have access to adequate information to be able to make a rational judgement and form utility functions for the marketing capabilities presented to them. Thus, ambiguity is likely to have a negative relationship with alliance formation. Thus we posit that;

H_1: *Increasing levels of ambiguity will decrease the perceived utility of an alliance and the likelihood of forming an alliance.*

We suggest that fairness has a positive impact on alliance formation, with increasing perceptions of fairness consequently increasing utility perceptions and the decision to collaborate. Fairness, in its three forms, increases utility perceptions. Perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness can affect an individual's willingness to collaborate. Furthermore, the motivation for forming an alliance can be hindered by feelings of injustice or ill treatment. Thus, we posit that distributive, procedural and interactional justice have a positive relationship with

alliance formation. Increasing levels of fairness will likely result in an increased perception of alliance utility and an increased willingness to form an alliance. Conversely low levels of fairness (i.e. high levels of injustice) will possibly lead to a decreased utility perception of the proposed alliance; hence, leading to a decreased desire to form the particular alliance. Thus we posit that;

H_2: Increased levels of distributive fairness will increase the perceived utility of an alliance and the likelihood of forming an alliance.

H_3: Increased levels of procedural fairness will increase the perceived utility of an alliance and the likelihood of forming an alliance.

H_4: Increased levels of interactional fairness will increase the perceived utility of an alliance and the likelihood of forming an alliance.

Empirical Study

The empirical study reported in this paper employs an experimental design utilising a discrete choice analysis of data from business students in the fourth year of undergraduate studies and MBA students in Australia. This method was chosen in order to systematically examine the effects of ambiguity and fairness using a convenience sample of individuals with a suitable background; with 200 respondents completing this experimental study.

Experimental Design

The experimental design was devised in order to test all possible main effects of the fairness attributes and ambiguity levels as well as levels of marketing capabilities; the latter was included to control for the effects resultant from the level of capabilities underlying the strategic rationale for forming a marketing alliance. The three fairness attributes (distributive, procedural and interactional) were designed in binary levels of True or False (depicting either Fair or Unfair).

The marketing capabilities attribute took on four possible levels which describe the level of competence the opposing party has in regard to their marketing capabilities. These levels were labelled Insufficient, Average, Good and Superior in ascending order. Finally, ambiguity was measured on two levels as either Ambiguous or Clear, both depicting the state of clarity with which the marketing capabilities are communicated. With four attributes of two levels and one attribute of 4 levels the design would be 2^4 x 4, giving 64 possible alternatives. These alternatives were duplicated in order to increase the number of data points which would be obtained, giving a total of 128 choice sets. Considering 128 choice sets or even 64 choice sets is an arduous task for respondents to complete, the design was split into 8 blocks containing 16 choice sets in each block. The 8 blocks were then administered randomly to the respondents, to ensure that the complete data set had been tested adequately.

Instrument and Scenario

The context of the choice experiment involved two hypothetical sweets manufacturers in the Australian/New Zealand food industry. The respondent was assigned the responsibility of marketing manager for one organisation, who was to decide whether or not to collaborate with the other organisation to enter the New Zealand sweets market. The respondent was informed of the importance of the combined marketing capabilities of the two organisations in order for the alliance to be successful. The respondent was then asked to complete the choice survey by indicating which alliance option they preferred out of two options, and whether they would agree to form an alliance based on the preferred option in that scenario.

Marketing Capabilities: It was important to include marketing capabilities in the choice scenario for a number of reasons. Firstly it provides an adequate basis to embed the alliance scenario, on the premise that an alliance should be formed upon evaluation of a potential partner's marketing

capabilities. Even though measuring marketing capabilities was not the focus of our research hypotheses, it provided an avenue for us simulate the affect of ambiguity so that it may be measured in accordance to the aforementioned research hypotheses. Inclusion of marketing capabilities alongside fairness factors also provided an alternative decision rule for alliance selection other than the fairness factors. Simulating ambiguity via the marketing capabilities enabled us to test its effect on preferences without the respondent being aware of its effect. The effect of ambiguity on alliance preferences can be derived by testing aversion to high variances in marketing capabilities, and it is posited that higher variances will lead to a reduced likelihood of collaboration. The marketing capabilities were conveyed via four statements which were derived from a measurement scale originally developed by Atuahene-Gima (Atuahene-Gima 1993).

Ambiguity: Ambiguity was measured by varying the levels of the separate components of the overall marketing capabilities so that the respondent would not have a clear indication of the overall value of the marketing capabilities. The variance of the marketing capabilities item for each scenario option was calculated to reflect the ambiguity associated with the marketing capabilities. For an option that had no ambiguity (i.e. all of the items were identical in value) the variance would be zero. Conversely, an alliance option with high ambiguity (i.e. all of the items in the option were different) has a variance of four (the mean would be 2.5, and the total variance from the mean is 4). The results were analysed to determine whether the respondents have an aversion to higher variances, which infers that they have an aversion to higher levels of ambiguity.

Fairness: The fairness components were measured using three separate attributes and associated statements. The distributive fairness statements were adapted from a scale originally developed by Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995). The procedural fairness statements were adapted from a measure originally developed by Lamertz (Lamertz 2002). The interactional fairness statements were adapted from a measure originally developed by Lamertz (2002). The three fairness

attributes (distributive, procedural and interactional) comprising 4 statements each were articulated as binary levels depicting either Fair or Unfair (True or False).

Covariates: A set of demographics as well as the respondents' negotiation style, namely avoiding, accommodating, competitive and collaborative, was measured to examine possibly confounding effects. The styles were measured using the scales developed by Gudergan and co-authors (2004).

Results and Remarks

Tables 1 to 5 summarise the results of the analyses carried out to examine the hypotheses developed in this paper. Overall, they provide support for the hypothesised effects. Thus, fairness and ambiguity influence the decision to form an alliance. In conclusion, this paper extends the work of Arino and Ring (2004) by providing a theoretical foundation for the role of ambiguity in the negotiation of alliances and additional quantitative empirical findings supporting the hypothesised effects. Further empirical research is recommended to provide additional support.

Table 1

Choose B and Collaborate

		B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.		A+B
Option A	ADistFair	0.345	0.111	9.717	0.002	DistFair	-1.634
	AProcedFair	0.272	0.106	6.602	0.010	ProcedFair	-1.238
	AInteractFair	0.523	0.110	22.577	0.000	InteractFair	-0.786
	ACapability	-0.182	0.048	14.596	0.000	Capability	0.343
	AAmbiguity	-0.065	0.113	0.332	0.565	Ambiguity	-0.763
Option B	BDistFair	-1.979	0.121	268.243	0.000		
	BProcedFair	-1.510	0.113	180.126	0.000		
	BInteractFair	-1.309	0.117	124.986	0.000		
	BCapability	0.525	0.050	111.399	0.000		
	BAmbiguity	-0.698	0.116	36.352	0.000		
Style	Avoiding	-0.409	0.221	3.440	0.064		
	Accomodating	0.724	0.225	10.373	0.001		
	Collaborative	0.482	0.218	4.878	0.027		
	Competitive	-0.217	0.233	0.868	0.352		
	Constant	-0.643	0.317	4.120	0.042		

Table 2

Choose B and Collaborate

		B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.			
Option A	ADistFair	0.356	0.111	10.267	0.001	DistFair	-1.632
	AProcedFair	0.267	0.106	6.304	0.012	ProcedFair	-1.249
	AInteractFair	0.524	0.110	22.548	0.000	InteractFair	-0.778
	ACapability	-0.181	0.048	14.362	0.000	Capability	0.352
	AAmbiguity	-0.060	0.113	0.285	0.594	Ambiguity	-0.764
Option B	BDistFair	-1.988	0.121	268.381	0.000		
	BProcedFair	-1.515	0.113	179.756	0.000		
	BInteractFair	-1.303	0.118	122.867	0.000		
	BCapability	0.533	0.050	113.410	0.000		
	BAmbiguity	-0.704	0.116	36.711	0.000		
Style	Avoiding	-0.390	0.222	3.074	0.080		
	Accomodating	0.722	0.227	10.143	0.001		
	Collaborative	0.551	0.226	5.932	0.015		
	Competitive	-0.338	0.272	1.541	0.215		
	AGE	0.087	0.125	0.487	0.485		
	GENDER	0.008	0.022	0.118	0.731		
	MANAGER	0.067	0.105	0.405	0.525		
	MANAGYRS	0.790	0.433	3.330	0.068		
	ALLIANCE	-0.370	0.144	6.640	0.010		
	ALLYRS	-0.520	0.904	0.330	0.565		
	Constant	-0.875	0.614	2.030	0.154		

Table 3

Choose B and Collaborate — Excluding Avoiding and Collaborative

		B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.			
Option A	ADistFair	0.352	0.111	10.072	0.002	DistFair	-1.642
	AProcedFair	0.261	0.106	6.060	0.014	ProcedFair	-1.256
	AInteractFair	0.517	0.110	22.067	0.000	InteractFair	-0.787
	ACapability	-0.189	0.048	15.689	0.000	Capability	0.342
	AAmbiguity	-0.057	0.113	0.256	0.613	Ambiguity	-0.754
Option B	BDistFair	-1.993	0.121	270.820	0.000		
	BProcedFair	-1.517	0.113	180.768	0.000		
	BInteractFair	-1.305	0.117	123.517	0.000		
	BCapability	0.531	0.050	113.174	0.000		
	BAmbiguity	-0.697	0.116	36.200	0.000		
Style	Accomodating	0.646	0.224	8.327	0.004		
	Competitive	-0.244	0.269	0.825	0.364		
	AGE	0.096	0.124	0.603	0.437		
	GENDER	0.001	0.022	0.003	0.955		
	MANAGER	0.056	0.105	0.282	0.595		
	MANAGYRS	0.949	0.429	4.902	0.027		
	ALLIANCE	-0.387	0.144	7.252	0.007		
	ALLYRS	-0.486	0.897	0.293	0.588		
	Constant	-0.580	0.570	1.036	0.309		

Table 4

Choose B

		B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.		
Option A	ADistFair	1.187	0.094	159.587	0.000	DistFair	0.067
	AProcedFair	1.175	0.093	159.900	0.000	ProcedFair	0.419
	AInteractFair	0.787	0.089	77.424	0.000	InteractFair	0.054
	ACapability	-0.547	0.040	184.846	0.000	Capability	0.205
	AAmbiguity	0.133	0.090	2.181	0.140	Ambiguity	-0.083
Option B	BDistFair	-1.120	0.091	152.584	0.000		
	BProcedFair	-0.756	0.088	74.158	0.000		
	BInteractFair	-0.733	0.090	65.673	0.000		
	BCapability	0.752	0.042	318.195	0.000		
	BAmbiguity	-0.215	0.093	5.375	0.020		
Style	Avoiding	0.101	0.186	0.294	0.588		
	Accomodating	-0.004	0.187	0.001	0.982		
	Collaborative	0.242	0.190	1.626	0.202		
	Competitive	-0.414	0.227	3.319	0.068		
	AGE	0.004	0.104	0.001	0.972		
	GENDER	0.004	0.019	0.051	0.821		
	MANAGER	0.048	0.089	0.296	0.586		
	MANAGYRS	0.256	0.341	0.566	0.452		
	ALLIANCE	-0.084	0.104	0.661	0.416		
	ALLYRS	-0.585	0.657	0.792	0.373		
	Constant	-0.776719	0.511237	2.308254	0.128689		

Table 5

Choose B — **Excluding Avoiding and Collaborative**

		B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.		
Option A	ADistFair	1.184	0.094	159.053	0.000	DistFair	0.062
	AProcedFair	1.177	0.093	160.409	0.000	ProcedFair	0.420
	AInteractFair	0.783	0.089	76.833	0.000	InteractFair	0.049
	ACapability	-0.549	0.040	186.556	0.000	Capability	0.202
	AAmbiguity	0.133	0.090	2.179	0.140	Ambiguity	-0.082
Option B	BDistFair	-1.122	0.091	153.234	0.000		
	BProcedFair	-0.757	0.088	74.324	0.000		
	BInteractFair	-0.734	0.090	65.959	0.000		
	BCapability	0.751	0.042	317.729	0.000		
	BAmbiguity	-0.214	0.093	5.323	0.021		
Style	Accomodating	-0.003	0.185	0.000	0.988		
	Competitive	-0.423	0.226	3.514	0.061		
	AGE	0.001	0.104	0.000	0.990		
	GENDER	0.002	0.018	0.014	0.907		
	MANAGER	0.042	0.088	0.222	0.637		
	MANAGYRS	0.316	0.337	0.881	0.348		
	ALLIANCE	-0.092	0.104	0.788	0.375		
	ALLYRS	-0.479	0.651	0.541	0.462		
	Constant	-0.522	0.473	1.220	0.269		

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