Editorial  The republican factor

This special edition of Pacific Journalism Review publishes a selection of the papers presented at the Public Right to Know (PR2K) Conference in Sydney in October 2003. The annual PR2K conferences are a project of the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism (ACIJ) at the University of Technology, Sydney. The 2003 conference was the third in the series.

The PR2K project is both wide-ranging and focussed: wide-ranging in that there are no limits placed on the professional or disciplinary background of the contributions from academic, professional and public participants, and focussed in that the project anticipates a renewed attempt to establish Australia as a republic in the not-too-distant future, where the question arises of whether or not a Republic of Australia should have a Bill of Rights, with clauses dealing with the various dimensions of the public right to know. Opinion polls consistently report that two-thirds of Australians support the transition to a republic of some sort. The Leader of the Labor Opposition, Mark Latham, announced in April 2004 that he would launch a series of referenda on the issue in his first term of office as Prime Minister, which might possibly commence after the national election likely to be held later this year. A plebiscite in the first year would ask voters whether they want a republic. A 'yes' vote would trigger a second plebiscite one year later to determine the republican model, which would then be put to a referendum at the 2007 federal election.

So the republican bandwagon may creak back into motion sooner rather than later. Latham favours a minimalist approach to constitutional change, and has rejected calls for a fully elected constitutional convention to determine the nature and extent of constitutional change. However, Australia is one of a handful of countries in the world that does not include a Bill of Rights in its constitution or legislation at either the national or state level (although the Australian Capital Territory House of Assembly did enact a statutory Bill of Rights in 2003). It is likely that there would be calls and perhaps a campaign from a range of community interests to enact or entrench a Bill of Rights at the time of the referenda. It is imperative in the lead-up to such a campaign and discussion that the advantages and disadvantages of a range of statutory and constitutional models be explored. The PR2K project aims to explore these issues with respect to the various rights associated with the Public Right to Know, including freedoms of the press, expression and assembly, and rights to privacy and information.

New Zealand and some Pacific island nations have had experience with Bills of Rights, and a critical elaboration and discussion of this experience would undoubtedly be valuable for the Australian republican debate. For that reason, the ACIJ is grateful to Auckland University of Technology's Pacific Journalism Review for this special edition of the 2003 PR2K papers. It provides an opportunity to make direct contact with scholarly, professional and general communities that could make a strong contribution to the Australian discussion. In return, hopefully a republican Australia with an enhanced Public Right to Know ethos will provide another bulwark for democratic deliberation and development in the Pacific region.

At the time of the 2003 conference, the potential for an early resurgence of republicanism looked rather dimmer. Consequently, the articles in this edition are more wide-ranging and less focussed on the constitutional dimension, although the legal field of contestation over rights to know is well covered: David Robie examines two cases involving media regulation in the South Pacific – Fiji and Tonga, Patrick Keyzer examines the clash between indigenous land rights and freedom of the press, and Mark Pearson maps some changes in thinking on the Australian High Court about press freedom since Justice Ian Callinan was appointed to the court. Rosslyn Reed explores contemporary contests in the public right to know about science, while in a related area James Arvanitakis examines the concept of a cultural commons, and the stand-off between intellect and intellectual property. Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin argue that ‘backfire dynamics’ can have a tactical impact on free speech conflicts when attempts at suppression and censorship go wrong.

The ravages of international conflict, and their resonance on national political debates, continue to raise issues in media representation and communication. Mary Quilty and Jo Gow look at the difficulties of mounting advocacy campaigns on behalf of detained asylum seekers when they are isolated both physically and from communication, while Annabelle Lukin,
David Butt and Christian Matthiessen present a detailed dissection of the 'grammar of war' in media coverage of the war in Iraq. Marcus O'Donnell continues the textual theme with an analysis of press reports of the gay marriage debate, while Alan Knight adds an historical dimension with a reprise and analysis of the radical press in Queensland in 1968, a year of international student and social activism.

In one of two commentaries from PR2K, Quentin Dempster focuses on how the ABC's role as Australia's public broadcaster is being further eroded while Andrew Hewett examines a concerted establishment campaign against NGOs and charities.

Among other PJR commentaries in this edition, Steven Price critiques the New Zealand media coverage of the war on terrorism, in particular the detention without charge of Algerian theologian and politician Ahmed Zaoui, and Frank Sligo analyses NZ's journalism unit standards in the context of a debate about academic staffing at media schools. Ben Bohane provides an obituary for the remarkable Pacific film-maker and journalist Mark Worth, whose documentary on Papua, Land of the Morning Star, was broadcast by the ABC shortly after his death, and Jon Stephenson offers a tribute to one of New Zealand's finest investigative journalists and publishers, Warren Berryman.

In the forum section, David Venables, outgoing president of the Journalism Education Association of NZ (Jeanz), poses some challenges to his colleagues and Tupeni L. Baba discusses 'embedded journalists' in the context of George Speight's attempted coup in Fiji in May 2000.

Thanks to David Robie and Fran Molloy for a brisk and efficient publication schedule for these articles.

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Selections of papers from the previous PRK2 conferences were also published:
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTSLR/1.html
The call for papers of the 2004 Conference is available at:
acij.uts.edu.au/pr2k/call.html

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Theme The public right to know

1. Going to the chapel: Same sex marriage and competing narratives of intimate citizenship

ABSTRACT

The public discourse about marriage oscillates between a story of the ideal and a story of the everyday. A range of symbolic references or myths are mobilised in media stories about marriage; this is particularly evident in the polarised debate around same-sex marriage. This article identifies and explores three of the myths that underlie the rhetoric in same-sex marriage stories: 1) the evolution/revolution myth; 2) the apocalypse myth and 3) the myth of the child. It also argues that the production of such stories has effects on the realm of 'intimate citizenship' (Plummer 1995) and that it is through this contested storytelling that new identities and their attendant rights become possible.

MARCUS O’DONNELL
Editor, Sydney Star Observer

T HIS ARTICLE looks at the cultural and media debates about same-sex marriage and argues that these debates draw upon a wide range of symbolic or mythic storylines. This study arises out of an analysis of print media stories on same sex marriage, which appeared in Australian and key international publications during July - October 2003, the three months surrounding major statements on the issue by the Vatican, US President George Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard.
Free speech

8. Freedom of speech issues in Peach v Toohey and a hypothetical variant of that case

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to consider the tensions within Australian free speech jurisprudence based on a hypothetical variant of the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Peach v Toohey. In particular, this article briefly explores the competing legal interests that operate when journalists seek access to restricted areas, in this case aboriginal land, in the course of an investigation. After considering the case and the issues it raises the author develops a hypothetical that draws out some of the deeper tensions in this area of the law. The article concludes with proposals for new approaches to the test developed by the High Court of Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation for the balancing of freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs – including the public right to know – against other legitimate objectives such as the maintenance of property rights and the privacy interests that can be associated with property rights.

PATRICK KEYZER
University of Technology, Sydney

Introduction

THE PURPOSE of this article is to consider some of the wider issues raised by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Peach v Toohey ([2003] NTSC 57). In particular this article briefly explores the competing legal interests that operate when journalists
seek access to restricted areas, in this case aboriginal land, in the course of an investigation. After considering the case and the issues it raises this paper concludes with proposals for new approaches to the test developed by the High Court of Australia in \textit{Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation} ((1997) 189 CLR 520) for the balancing of the freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs – including the public right to know – against other legitimate objectives such as the maintenance of property rights and the privacy interests that can be associated with property rights.

\textbf{Peach v Toohey}

On the 23 October 2002, an Aboriginal man died after being shot in the chest by police during a confrontation at Wadeye (Port Keats) between fighting members of two opposing Aboriginal groups. A second man was shot and wounded. The incident attracted some media attention that exposed a culture of violence in that community. Subsequently the Magistrates Court cancelled its proposed sittings at Port Keats, which had been scheduled for the November 11. This took place after the police told the circuit magistrate, Jenny Blokland SM, that due to expected violence in the community they could not guarantee the safety of members of the court party travelling to and from Port Keats, nor between the airport and the courthouse (see [2003] NTSC 57 at paragraph [6]). This was because the funeral for the dead boy was happening in the same week that magistrate Blokland was scheduled to go to Port Keats; and hundreds of people were expected to attend.

On the November 8, Paul Toohey of \textit{The Australian} published a story that reported these developments. By way of a follow-up, between the November 8 and the 13 he made repeated attempts to obtain a permit to visit the community. Specifically, he hoped to attend the funeral of the dead man and interview his family. His application for a permit was repeatedly refused. Despite this, on the November 13, Toohey entered Aboriginal land to continue his investigation. The facts that follow appear in the judgment of Angel J of the Supreme Court, in a form admitted by Toohey at trial:

On the morning of Wednesday, 13 November, this year, Wadeye Community was holding a funeral for a local man who had died during an incident approximately two weeks before.

The incident that the male died in was the subject of media interest and the defendant in the matter was one of many journalists who contacted the Kardu Numida Community Government Council requesting permission to enter Wadeye Community in relation to the matter. The council, out of respect for the deceased’s family and community feelings, advised all those who inquired for these reasons that they, as the issuing body under the Aboriginal Lands Act, would not give permission for them to attend Wadeye Community.

The defendant recontacted members of the council on several further occasions for comment on the incident or for permission to do and on each occasion he was advised that they did not wish to speak to him and that they would not give him permission to enter the community.

On the day of Wednesday, 13 November this year, the defendant drove to Port Keats Community in a hire vehicle and upon attendance at the community took photographs [of a deserted oval where the boy had been shot] and attempted to interview members of the deceased’s family immediately after the funeral.

The family of the deceased became upset at the defendant attempting to interview them and made a complaint to members of the council about the defendant being in the community. The council then contacted police and advised that they wished to lay a complaint under the \textit{Aboriginal Lands Act} of the defendant being in the community without a permit and requested [that] the defendant be prosecuted.

Police located the defendant driving along the main street of the community. He was apprehended and taken to the police station. He was asked why he had entered Aboriginal land without a permit. He stated that he believed it was necessary to do so in order to obtain the story. He also admitted to not having a permit. He was [fingerprinted and had his film destroyed and his tape confiscated and his car searched] charged, bailed and escorted from the community, and the bail conditions were immediately to leave the community.

Wadeye Community is approximately 200 ks within the Daly River Aboriginal Land Reserve which is gazetted Aboriginal land. The defendant was in Wadeye Community without a permit.

The additional facts in parentheses were not included in the judgement of Angel J.

On November 19, Toohey appeared before Stipendiary Magistrate David Loadman in the Darwin Court of Summary Jurisdiction on a charge that he had breached s4 of the \textit{Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT)}, which requires people entering aboriginal land to obtain a permit before they do so. Toohey pleaded guilty. However Magistrate Loadman, while finding the respondent guilty,
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行使他的裁量权在地方判刑立法下没有记录的判决并且驳回了指控。《判刑法》(NT) 第8(1) 条规定：‘判决或非判决 (I) 在决定是否记录判决时，法庭应考虑案件的情况，包括—— 违犯者的品格、前史、年龄、健康或精神状况；该犯罪的性质，如有的话；该犯罪是由于何种情况而犯的。’ 加德曼接受了廷为佐治的律师 Mr Geoff James 提出的“他有比这个隐秘和不被考虑的法律更高的责任”。

执行警长提出了申诉，描述佐治进入阿布力土族人土地的行为是故意的，并认为应该受到惩罚。

裁判官加德曼不同意，并反映了他在南非的个人经历，说：

我离开南非是因为许多我在詹姆斯先生提到的事，而且当然还有很多。我生活在一个政府自由受到无情的政府的压迫，所有政治观点被约束的地方。我猜那是因为我有偏见，至少在与我必须今天来判断有关的职能。我认为，詹姆斯先生在私人方面已经做得很好。我不能提出，为了作为法官而使用这个职能的原因是——或对政治职能在允许的系统中。这些感到关心的人在詹姆斯先生说的任何情况下都必须自己决定。

然而，毫无疑问的是，系统的存在以及这些力量的使用在制度关系到这一方面和制度力量在系统关系到这一方面方面可能有助于在法律中起到重要的作用。我认为，詹姆斯先生在私人方面已经做得很好。我不能提出，为了作为法官而使用这个职能的原因是——或对政治职能在允许的系统中。这些感到关心的人在詹姆斯先生说的任何情况下都必须自己决定。

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The Crown appealed on two grounds. They argued that Magistrate Loadman wrongly exercised his discretion not to record a conviction, on the basis that the order was manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case.

The Supreme Court appeal

On the 30 May 2003, Justice David Angel of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory upheld the Crown appeal. While Angel J regarded Toohey as ‘a person of good character and high standing in his professional life’, noting that he had won a Walkley Award and had ‘a national profile for writing articles concerning violence on Aboriginal communities’ he concluded that the breach of the permit system had not been a trivial offence. Under the sentencing legislation, the magistrate should have taken the nature of the offence into account before exonerating him. Because he had not taken that relevant consideration into account in sentencing, the magistrate’s decision disclosed an error of law and the appeal had to be allowed (this contrasts with Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257 at 275 – there must be sufficient facts to justify an exercise of discretion declining to convict and dismissing a complaint – adopted by Rice J, with whom Nader and Kearney JJ agreed in R v Allinson (1978) 49 NTR 38 at 43). Justice Angel said that a judge exercising such a discretion cannot allow himself or herself to be carried away by sympathy and use their discretion to defeat the intention of the Parliament as expressed in the land rights legislation (Bailey v Laczko (1978) 20 A LR 658 at 661; Crafter v Schubert [1934] SASR 84 at 86). In the circumstances the offence should not have been considered to be trivial (Eupene v Hales (2000)
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10 NTLR 16 at 27). On this point, Angel J said that:

The conduct of the respondent cannot reasonably be said to be of a trivial nature. His offence was constituted by a deliberate contravention of the statute committed in full knowledge that he was not welcome at Wadeye on the day of the funeral. The respondent’s duty as a journalist was to act lawfully, not unlawfully in contravention of the provisions of the Aboriginal Land Act (NT). The respondent had unsuccessfully applied for a permit on more than one occasion and was informed that he could not travel into the Port Keats community on the day of the funeral. The refusal to grant a permit was confined to the day of the funeral. The respondent had every reason to think he would be granted a permit some time shortly following the day of the funeral when he could conduct his business as a journalist. No reason was advanced why his attendance at Port Keats on the day of the funeral would achieve anything that could not be achieved on a day thereafter. As the appellant submitted, a funeral and its immediate aftermath is ordinarily a private affair to which the media can be invited, or for that matter, from which the media can be excluded. The funeral was but a temporary interruption to the continuing media coverage of events at Port Keats, which, given an inquest, were in no danger of going ‘unpublished, unrevealed and unventilated’.

In these circumstances the respondent’s ‘duty as an investigative journalist’ referred to by [the Magistrate] does not constitute an extenuating circumstance for the purposes of [the application of the sentencing legislation]. The respondent’s offence, if not a typical example of a breach of the section, is more serious in that it was wilful and calculated.

Justice Angel said that Magistrate Loadman had erred in his taking account of the need to prevent ‘the Australian public’ from being kept ‘in the dark’. In the circumstances, even taking account of Toohey’s good character he ought to have recorded a conviction. However Justice Angel declined to order a fine.

Paul Toohey’s account of the events and the justifications for this approach as an investigative journalist are quite different. Toohey had learned that armed police from the Tactical Response Group were attending the funeral. Police had already shot two young men, and if the violence the police

prosecutor had assured Magistrate Blokland would occur did occur, then Toohey wanted to be there to cast an independent eye on the events. Toohey says that was really his only reason for going to Port Keats on the day of the funeral. These facts were confirmed by the NT Court of Appeal in its judgment upholding Toohey’s later appeal from the judgment of Angel J.

Grounds for a constitutional challenge?
Did Toohey or The Australian have any further legal recourse? Could they challenge the constitutionality of the permit system on free speech grounds?

To challenge the operation of the permit system in these circumstances it would have been necessary to argue that provisions of the Aboriginal Land Act (NT) were invalid. As noted above section 4 is the critical section. It provides the local community with a power to deny access in largely unqualified terms.

However the section is also expressed to be subject to any provision to the contrary in a law of the Territory. The freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs drawn by implication from the Commonwealth Constitution is a law that applies in the Territory and any challenge to s4 would commence with the proposition that the provision is somehow repugnant to the constitutional freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs and an allied freedom of movement.

In Lange v ABC, the unanimous High Court recognised that the Constitution limits ‘legislative and executive power to deny the electors and their representatives information concerning the executive branch of government’. This includes ‘the affairs of statutory authorities’ such as the police ‘which are obliged to report to the legislature or to a minister who is responsible to the legislature’. To that extent, Toohey’s investigations relating to police conduct and related matters on Aboriginal land seem to fall squarely within the scope of the activity protected by the freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs. Toohey’s investigations were important to the public’s right to know how the police might behave at Port Keats, and this reflects on the administration of the Police Department by the Minister for Police and the Government of the Northern Territory.

It should be noted that the application of the implied freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs to the territories was not an essential integer of the reasoning in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (see particularly at 566). Lange’s defamation action had been brought in New South Wales. However the unanimous judgment in Lange
makes the conclusion that the implied freedom of speech applies in the
territories irresistible (even though at least one of the justices of the High Court
has since questioned Lange: see ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR
199 at 331 per Callinan J).

Pressing these wrinkles into the fabric, the basic and applicable principles
are that the freedom of communication does not invalidate a law enacted to
satisfy some other legitimate end if the law satisfies two conditions. The first
condition is that the object of the law is compatible with the maintenance of
the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible gov-
ernment. The second is that the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to
that end.

The leading decision illustrating the operation of the Lange test, and the
closest analogous case in Australia’s nascent free speech jurisprudence is Levy
v Victoria ((1997) 189 CLR 579). Levy v Victoria concerned Victorian
regulations that prohibited people from entering areas where shooting was
taking place during duck hunting season. The regulations were unanimously
upheld by the members of the High Court as being reasonably appropriate and
adapted to the legitimate end of protecting public safety in the circumstances
(Levy at 599, 608, 614-615, 620, 627, 647).

Adopting that line, a challenge to the permit system would be likely to
meet the argument that the system is a reasonably appropriate and adapted way
of recognising traditional Aboriginal ownership of land and regulating access
to that land. The historical recognition of Aboriginal land rights and the
compelling justifications for doing so would provide a potent justification for
a conclusion that the law should be upheld in the event of challenge. In
addition, analogies could be developed with the rights protected by the
common law of trespass. It would be highly likely that a Court would find that
the recognition of traditional Aboriginal ownership of land, along with the
permit system to regulate access to that land to be both compatible with the
system of representative and responsible government that is ordained by the
Constitution and also reasonably and appropriately adapted to that legitimate
end.

However, while I think this would help on the question as to whether this
is apt to deal with the facts in Peach v Toohey remains. What Peach v Toohey
really demonstrates is that the application of a statute in context can result in
a conflict between two legitimate ends. The legitimate interest of Aboriginal
people in maintaining power to control access to their land cannot be doubted.

But the legitimate interest of the public to expose questionable police practices
cannot be doubted either (that is, assuming that there had been questionable
police practices). Which interest should prevail?

**Teasing out the competing legitimate objectives**

Ultimately the answer to this question, as far as the reader is concerned,
depends on the weight which one gives to the relative values of aboriginal self-
determination (including the enjoyment of exclusive or close-to-exclusive
property rights) and the public right to know. The answer to the question as
far as an Australian court would be concerned is that the legislature’s
determination of the relative weight of the policy goals is settled by the
legislation in issue (so long as the end is legitimate – a test which smacks of
circularity). In this way the Lange approach reflects a deep-seated commit-
ment to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.

I don’t propose a solution here. Rather, I would like to pose a hypothetical
to draw out what seems to be a critical weakness of the Australian constitu-
tional principles of free speech when it comes to the resolution of situations
of this nature. I will then discuss what types of changes might be necessary to
advance the principle of the public right to know. I am conscious that the
suggestions made here might be considered by some observers to be quite
implausible but they are made in a spirit of academic inquiry rather than as an
attempt to justify an incremental advance in legal doctrine.

Again, for argument’s sake, take the facts in Peach v Toohey and alter
them: assume for a moment that access to the community had been denied
because the relevant decision-maker had been subject to improper influence by
the police. I am not suggesting or inferring this happened, I am just developing
this hypothetical to make a point. Assume also that the reporter in question had
been alerted to the fact of improper influence by a reliable, but confidential,
source.

Leaving aside the interesting questions arising from the reporter’s reliance
on confidential sources in this hypothetical, it is plain that while the regulation
would, on its face, remain valid under currently applicable rules, a determina-
tion of validity on such facts would be a manifestly bad result. It would enable
the power to refuse a permit to be abused. Is there any way to reconceive the
applicable constitutional principles in a fashion that would advance a jour-
alists’ right of access (and consequently the public’s right to know) in these
circumstances without undue intrusion on the collective property rights
THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO KNOW enjoyed by the aboriginal community? Could the implied freedom of speech be expanded to encompass a public right to know?

In the United States it has been held that 'the mere avoidance of controversy' is not a 'compelling governmental interest' justifying restriction of free speech. This statement was referred to with apparent approval by Justice Kirby in Levy v Victoria (supra, at 641).

However, even though the First Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, the US Supreme Court has held that this freedom does not immunise journalists from criminal or tortious liability for their conduct (see Saxbe v Washington Post Co 417 US 843 (1974) and Pell v Procunier 417 US 817 (1974). The press has no greater right than the public in access to penal institutions, access to which is properly regulated in the interests of public safety; see Stahl v State 665 P 2d 839 (journalist convicted for criminal trespass on nuclear power site while reporting on demonstration); Greer v Spock 424 US 828 (1976) (no First Amendment right of access to military bases) also Loveland, 'Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms', (1975) 53 Texas Law Review 1440; Collins, T.A., 'The Press Clause Construed in Context: The Journalists' Right of Access to Places' (1988) 52 Missouri Law Review 751; Note, 'And Forgive Them Their Trespasses' (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 890).

This principle was recently re-confirmed in the decision of the US Supreme Court in Food Lion v Capital Cities Ltd. Two ABC television reporters, after using false resumes to get jobs at a Food Lion supermarket, secretly videotaped what appeared to be unwholesome food handling practices at the store. The reporters were investigating allegations that Food Lion employees ground out-of-date beef together with new beef, bleached rank meat to remove its odor, and re-dated (and offered for sale) products not sold before their printed expiration date. The Supreme Court upheld Food Lion's claim that the journalists had breached their duty of loyalty to the store and that their behaviour was not protected by the First Amendment. There is no presumptive right of access to journalists even in the United States with its comparatively robust tradition of freedom of speech.

**Striking a new balance?**

No one could question the right of Aboriginal people to their land and my purpose here is not to question land rights and the legal rights and entitlements that are ordinarily enjoyed by people who occupy land. However, Peach v Toohey does raise questions regarding the balance that Australian courts strike between the public right to know and the interests of property-owners. Recognising the right of the local community to deny access is one thing, but upholding that right in circumstances where there may have been questionable police behaviour is another. Are there ways to develop a more creative balance between the interests at stake and ensure that property rights are not used as a blanket prohibition on the public right to know? I only sketch some possibilities in very brief detail here and invite readers to respond with their support or differences of opinion.

In order to publish, the media must gather information. Since access to places is essential to gathering information, this access must be afforded some protection. It is trite to point out that freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs is necessary because 'the abuse of official power is an especially serious evil' (Blasi, V., 'The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory' [1977] American Bar Foundation Research Journal 521, 538). For that reason it has been argued that our understanding of freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs ought be based at least in part (Collins, supra):

on the premise that the Government's right to limit people's access to government-owned or privately-owned and government-controlled places is circumscribed by its role as servant of the citizens. Restrictions can occur only to further the efficiency of government operations. Otherwise the public need for information requires access to Government facilities. The media must be provided priority access when circumstances dictate the restriction of those wishing to enter a place, or else Government operations will be unseen and unchecked. Careful scrutiny of justifications for exclusions must be given when the public and the media are excluded in order to assure the media is treated in such a way as to be able to do its job effectively. Essentially, the issue is whether the media can function as the media within the restrictions imposed.

This argument cannot be uncritically transferred to every context. There are certainly very significant cultural reasons why aboriginal land should be regarded as a special type of property at any rate (as distinct from, say, prisons,
where there seems to be a far less compelling State interest in precluding media access). But an approach based on careful scrutiny of justifications for exclusions could settle a more finely-tuned and preferable order of priorities when the problem of conflicting legitimate objectives emerges.

To achieve such a balance in the Australian context it would be necessary to reconceive the High Court's test in *Lange v ABC*. The test, as currently formulated, is as follows:

> The freedom will not invalidate a law enacted to satisfy some other legitimate end if the law satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that the object of the law is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government. The second is that the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to that end.

I want to forward some radical changes to this test to provoke discussion (not because I necessarily endorse these proposals personally, if that mattered). In that spirit, a new qualification to that test could be included to the effect that

> in the event that a law is applied in a way that restricts freedom of speech to discuss political and governmental affairs, that instance of regulation must be subject to close scrutiny, and if the legitimate end sought to be achieved by the relevant law is in fact impeded by the application of the law in context, then there is a presumption that the free speech activity ought to be allowed.

That free speech activity could include newsgathering. If it was considered necessary to engineer additional legal safeguards to ensure that journalists taking the exceptional step of entering a property without permission were justified in doing so perhaps an additional test of public interest along the lines of the test developed by the Court in *Lange* applicable to the law of defamation could also be applied (i.e. that it is necessary for the public to have an interest in receiving the relevant information). The common law defence of necessity could be adapted when investigative journalists commit a trespass:

> In applying the necessity defense, a court would consider the possible existence of an imminent danger to the public, whether alternative means exist to gather the information, and the journalist's belief that she

If additional steps were considered necessary to protect private interests (such as the type of private interests in Food Lion and also in the High Court's decision in *ABC v Lenah Game Meats* (2001) 208 CLR 199, then this could be judged and controlled through a suitable process. For example, evidence might be reviewed by a court on an urgent basis (or even, in exceptional cases, on an 'ex parte' basis) and the court could then authorise entry and/or publication, with appropriate conditions. This type of order is made by courts in intellectual property counterfeiting cases where there is a danger that a counterfeiter might destroy evidence if they do not receive a surprise visit from the owner's solicitor. Surely there are circumstances where the public right to know what is going on in restricted areas is at least as serious and important as the rights of an intellectual property owner to prevent infringement of their rights.

**Conclusion**

In this article I have engaged in only a very brief consideration of some approaches that might be developed to deal with a critical shortcoming of the *Lange* principle of freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs: the fact that it is impossible under the current approach to effectively rank competing legitimate objectives and develop a more finely-tuned balance of them. The approaches proposed here recognise that laws that are perfectly justifiable in the abstract may be improperly applied to obstruct the public's right to know. These proposals raise significant issues that I have not attempted to review in comprehensive detail here. Constructive criticism of the proposals outlined above is welcome.

**Postscript**

After this paper was delivered (but before its publication as an article in *PJR*), the NT Court of Appeal delivered judgement in Toohey's appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court: [2003] NTCA 17. The Court of Appeal upheld Toohey's appeal.

ABSTRACT

Australian governments have made continuing attempts to restrict the public’s right to know. This article looks back to 1968 when radical Queensland university students challenged state government restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and information. They did so by using then new offset press technology to create alternatives to a mainstream press monopoly. In a world without internet, community radio and television, or even mobile phones, leaflets and small newspapers were the primary media for such minority groups wishing to spread their critiques to the wider community. The article examines the radical newsletter’s themes including freedom of speech, civil liberties, Australian racism, press ownership and the anti-war movement. It includes references to Queensland produced cartoons and posters. It was produced with material from the Fryer Library at the University of Queensland.

ALAN KNIGHT
Central Queensland University

The Society for Democratic Action is known as an extremist organization but the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists of hate or love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or the extension of justice? In that dramatic scene on Calvary’s hill three men were crucified for the same crime – the crime of extremism. Two were extremist for amoral-
The public right to know

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