Chapter 7
Evaluation and cognition: Inscribing, evoking and provoking opinion

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1. Introduction

The media – whether newspapers, the radio, the internet or the TV – arguably influence to a great extent how we view and think of the world we live in. Consequently, “[t]o study media discourse … is to work to make sense of a great deal of what makes up our world” (Cotter 2001: 431). This is one of the concerns of this paper whose purpose it is to analyze newspaper discourse (focusing on the “hard news” [Bell 1991: 14] item), and to provide new insights into the phenomenon variously known as evaluation, appraisal and stance and its connection to cognition. Evaluation (the expression of speaker/writer opinion), has only recently become the focus of linguistic analysis and this mainly within studies of EAP (English for Academic Purposes) or – under the name of appraisal – within SFL (Systemic Functional Linguistics). In contrast, the approach taken here draws on a wide range of linguistic studies on evaluation to establish its own framework of evaluative parameters, which is then applied to a close manual analysis of a small corpus of British ‘tabloids’ and ‘broadsheets’ that report on the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool (UK) on 10 October 2003.

The paper also investigates the relationship between memory and evaluation, and the extent to which evaluative meaning is ‘inherent’ in lexical items and to which it depends on the readers’ application of cognitive frames. It will be shown that the interplay between evaluation and cognition is in fact highly complex, and depends both on the context and on the reader’s position.

The structure of this paper is as follows: I shall first introduce the parameter-based framework of evaluation in section 2, before providing an account of evaluation and its connection to cognition in section 3, analyzing evaluation in the corpus in section 4, and making some final remarks in section 5.
2. The parameter-based framework of evaluation

2.1. Introduction: What is evaluation?

Generally speaking, there are at least three possible answers to the above question, since evaluation can be looked at from very different points of view. Consequently, we must make a basic distinction between three notions or definitions of evaluation: (a) the cognitive operation of evaluation, (b), the relatively stable evaluation attached to mental representations, and (c) evaluation as the linguistic expression of speaker/writer opinion. I shall come back to this later in more detail. However, it must be pointed out now that the parameter-based approach to evaluation focuses on evaluation as in (c), and takes as a springboard Thompson and Hunston’s (2000) definition of evaluation as

the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker’s or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of other sets of values (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5).¹

These “sets of values” are identified here as evaluative parameters (a term adopted from Francis 1995). Broadly speaking, I suggest that there are (at least) ten parameters along which speakers can evaluate aspects of the world. Each of the proposed parameters involves a different dimension along which the evaluation proceeds and includes what I call sub-values which either refer to the different poles on the respective evaluative scale or to different types of the parameter:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>VALUES: examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPREHENSIBILITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMPREHENSIBLE: plain, clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INCOMPREHENSIBLE: mysterious, unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENVIRONMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POSITIVE: a polished speech</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NEGATIVE: a rant</td>
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¹

²
3. IMPORTANCE
   IMPORTANT: key, top, landmark
   UNIMPORTANT: minor, slightly

4. SERIOUSNESS
   HUMOROUS: funny
   SERIOUS: serious

5. EXPECTEDNESS
   EXPECTED: familiar, inevitably
   UNEXPECTED: astonishing, surprising
   CONTRAST: but, however
   CONTRAST/COMPARISON: not, no, hardly, only (negations)

6. MENTAL STATE
   (marginal evaluation)
   BELIEF/DISBELIEF: accept, doubt
   EMOTION: scared, angry
   EXPECTATION: expectations
   KNOWLEDGE: know, recognise
   STATE-OF-MIND: alert, tired, confused
   PROCESS: forget, ponder
   VOLITION/NON-VOLITION: deliberately, forced to

7. EVIDENTIALITY
   HEARSAY: [he said it was] "a lie"
   MINDSAY: "well done" [he thought]
   PERCEPTION: seem, visibly, betray
   GENERAL KNOWLEDGE: (infamously
   EVIDENCE: proof that
   UNSPECIFIC: it emerged that, meaning that

8. POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY
   NECESSARY: had to
   NOT NECESSARY: need not
   POSSIBLE: could
   NOT POSSIBLE: inability, could not

9. RELIABILITY
   GENUINE: real
   FAKE: choreographed
   HIGH: will, be to
   MEDIUM: likely
   LOW: may

10. STYLE
    frankly, briefly
Most of the proposed parameters (but not all) are scales involving two poles, but also potential intermediate stages between them (cf. also Lemke 1998; Malrieu 1999; Hunston 1993, 2000; Bublitz 2003). For instance, the parameter of EMOTIVITY concerns the evaluation of aspects as more or less positive or more or less negative. As a consequence, most evaluative meanings can be located on a cline of low to high force/intensity (see also White 2001a: 5). However, this notion of scaling "can be seen as an interpersonal coloration or tonality across the APPRAISAL [here: evaluation] system" (White 1998: 109, small caps in the original), and is thus not considered as a 'parameter' of evaluation in the framework adopted here. Moreover, there is no appropriate methodology available for identifying the exact position of an evaluator on an evaluative scale. This is why, in the empirical analysis, the evaluators are classified as belonging to one of the two poles on the scale (e.g., as POSITIVE or NEGATIVE) rather than categorizing them according to their evaluative intensity. Only with RELIABILITY was it possible to distinguish between three positions on the scale: LOW, MEDIAN and HIGH.3

In the following section (2.2) I shall briefly comment on the parameters (more detailed information on the framework is provided in Bednarek in press) before outlining the connection between cognition and evaluation (3).

2.2. A brief outline of the parameter-based framework

As previously mentioned, there are at least ten parameters along which speakers/writers can express evaluations. I shall now discuss these in turn.

Evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY have to do with the extent to which writers evaluate entities, situations or propositions as being within or outside the grasp of human understanding. Such evaluations are situated on a cline ranging from more or less COMPREHENSIBLE (clear, definite) to more or less INCOMPREHENSIBLE (unclear, vague, complex), because aspects of the world can be more or less understandable and complex, and we can understand them fully, partly or not at all.

The parameter of EMOTIVITY is concerned with the writer's evaluation of aspects of events as good or bad, i.e., with the expression of writer approval or disapproval. Evaluations of EMOTIVITY are situated on a cline ranging from more or less POSITIVE (polished, stouly) to more or less NEGATIVE (fanatic, perverse).

Evaluations along the parameter of IMPORTANCE evaluate the world (and discourse about it) according to the speaker's subjective evaluation of its
status in terms of importance, relevance and significance. Evaluations of IMPORTANCE are situated on a scale ranging from IMPORTANT (significant, importantly) to UNIMPORTANT (unimportant, minor).

The parameter of SERIOUSNESS is identical to Lemke's (1998) parameter of humorlessness/seriousness and has to do with the writer's evaluations of aspects of the world as situated on a cline of SERIOUSNESS, i.e., as more or less SERIOUS (serious) or HUMOROUS (hilarious).

The parameter of EXPECTEDNESS involves the writer's evaluations of aspects of the world (including propositions) as more or less EXPECTED (usual, little wonder that) or UNEXPECTED (unexpected, surprising, astonishingly) (again, a cline is involved). I also regard CONTRAST (expressed e.g., by but, while, still, although, though) as well as CONTRAST/COMPARISON (expressed by negation) as sub-values of EXPECTEDNESS.

The parameter of MENTAL STATE is an instance of marginal evaluation (it is excluded for example by Biber and Finegan (1989) in their concept of stance). The parameter refers to the writer's evaluation of other social actors' mental states. Here the sub-values are associated with the different kinds of mental states actors can experience: emotions, wishes/intentions, beliefs, expectations, knowledge, etc (the examples are extracted from a larger corpus of newspaper discourse):

MENTAL STATE: BELIEF  the individual suspected by the Princess
MENTAL STATE: EMOTION  appalled chiefs
MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION  The day began with high expectations
MENTAL STATE: KNOWLEDGE  half of all players knew other pros who took recreational drugs
MENTAL STATE: STATE OF MIND  the weary PM
MENTAL STATE: PROCESS  For the conspiracy theorists who have spent six years pondering the significance of the missing white Fiat
MENTAL STATE: VOLITION  An asylum seeker who deliberately infected two women with the Aids virus
MENTAL STATE: NON-VOLITION  So how did such an intelligent, cultivated and, in her youth, extremely attractive woman end up running the world's biggest international vice ring?

The difference between the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS and the parameter of MENTAL STATE: EXPECTEDNESS is hence the source of the evaluation: with the former it is the author's expectations that are referred to, with the latter it is the expectations of a social actor other than the author that are
involved. With the parameter of MENTAL STATE what we are dealing with are the author’s inferences about the mental states of third parties.

EVIDENTIALITY concerns writers’ evaluations of the ‘evidence’ for their knowledge. Evidential evaluators, or evidentials “put in perspective or evaluate the truth value of a sentence … with respect to the source of the information contained in the sentence” (Rooryck 2001). Here, the sub-values relate to the different types of source on which the writer’s knowledge is based (the examples below are invented):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVIDENTIALITY</th>
<th>He said they were right.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY</td>
<td>He thought they were right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY</td>
<td>It’s well-known they were right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>It emerged that they were right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVIDENTIALITY: UNSPECIFIED</td>
<td>There are signs they were right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION</td>
<td>Evidently, they were right.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY deals with what has traditionally been described as deontic or dynamic modality, i.e., with the writer’s evaluation of what is (not) necessary or (not) possible, of what you should, do not need to, can and cannot do. The two notions (possibility and necessity) are in fact closely connected and can be associated with just one parameter because they are logically related: ‘It is not possible for you to leave’ is logically equivalent to ‘It is necessary for you not to leave/to stay’ (on logical relations and modality see e.g., Lyons 1977: 787; Coates 1983: 19–20).

Evaluations of RELIABILITY are connected to what is generally described as epistemic modality, i.e., to matters of reliability, certainty, confidence and likelihood. The parameter of RELIABILITY goes beyond this, however, to include both the writer’s evaluation of the reliability of a proposition and his/her evaluation of the ‘genuineness’ of an entity/entities. There are five values subsumed under this parameter: FAKE, GENUINE, LOW, MEDIAN, HIGH. The first two (FAKE/GENUINE) refer to the evaluation of genuineness — writers evaluate states of affairs as either real (GENUINE, real) or artificial (FAKE, artificial). As with other parameters, this parameter can thus be regarded as having a ‘positive’ (GENUINE) and a ‘negative’ (FAKE) value. The remaining sub-values (LOW, MEDIAN, HIGH) refer to the evaluation of the likelihood of propositions being true and have been adopted from Halliday (1994):
Finally, evaluations of style concern the writer’s evaluation of the language that is used, for instance comments on the manner in which the information is presented, or evaluations of the kind of language that is used (Biber et al. 1999: 975). In the newspaper corpus this parameter is important only in connection with reporting expressions (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs) which can be classified according to the following sub-values (modified from Caldas-Coulthard 1994):

NEUTRAL (only referring to the act of saying): e.g., say, tell
ILLOCUTIONARY (mentioning the speaker’s purpose): e.g., demand, promise
DECLARATIVE (dependent on a cultural-institutional setting): e.g., acquit, plead guilty
DISCOURSE SIGNALLING (marking the relation to the discourse): e.g., add, conclude
PARALINGUISTIC (commenting on prosodic/paralinguistic aspects of the utterance): whisper, scream

These parameters can also be combined to greater and lesser extents. For instance, reporting expressions such as promise, threaten or accuse simultaneously indicate that the following proposition is based on hearsay and express the speaker’s/writer’s comment on the type of illocutionary act involved (style).

3. Evaluation and cognition

So far I have exclusively focused on evaluation defined as in (c) above, i.e., evaluation as the linguistic expression of speaker opinion. However, on account of the inherent complexity involved with the notion of evaluation, and in order to exemplify its connection to memory, I think it is clearly necessary to discuss the relation of the proposed parameter-based framework of evaluation to evaluation as a cognitive operation (a), and evaluation as the relatively stable evaluation attached to mental representations (b). I will attempt to offer some tentative remarks concerning the general relationship between evaluation and cognition (3.1, 3.2, 3.3), and relating to
the extent to which evaluative meaning is ‘inherent’ in lexical items (3.4). The latter will be demonstrated with examples from the corpus.

3.1. The parameter-based framework and evaluation as a cognitive operation

Concerning the notion of evaluation as a cognitive operation, Talmy suggests that

[a] psychological entity can perform the cognitive operation of evaluating a phenomenon for its standing with respect to some system of properties. A system of properties of this sort is typically understood as being scalar, running from a negative to a positive. Such systems of properties include veridicality, function, importance, value, aesthetic quality, and prototypicality. Thus a cognitive entity can assess some phenomenon at the positive pole of these scales as being true, purposeful, important, good, beautiful, and standard. (Talmy 2003: 476)

It will be noted that Talmy’s systems of properties exhibit some common features with the above-established parameters of evaluation. However, Talmy’s systems are specifically related to a cognitive framework for narrative structure, and, moreover, do not seem to be grounded in, or based on, language (as is my framework). In other words, Talmy assumes that “a person’s assessments … are due to the operation of a cognitive brain system whose function is to perform such assessment” (Talmy 2003: 478), whereas there is no a priori assumption in my approach that the parameters of evaluation that can be linguistically expressed necessarily reflect such operations. Though it may be assumed that some cognitive operation of evaluation must precede the linguistic expression of evaluation, no assumptions are made on the exact status and nature of this cognitive operation. In my view, more research is needed in order to determine the cognitive status of parameters (or systems) of evaluations before anything beyond hypothesis is achieved. In other words, I only claim that the English language allows us to express evaluations according to certain parameters — whether or not the cognitive operation of evaluation proceeds along the same kinds of parameters is as yet unknown. Talmy’s theory seems to suggest that there is some overlap (veridicality is related to RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE, importance to IMPORTANCE, value and aesthetic quality to EMOTIVITY, and prototypicality perhaps to EXPECTEDNESS) though he also mentions an additional ‘system’ (function). In this respect, it must be
stressed that even the cognitive status of evaluation as such is unclear. Some authors [in social and cognitive psychology] argue that evaluative processes are affective, some argue that they are cognitive, and still others claim that they are both cognitive and affective (Malrieu 1999: 53). In any case, such evaluative processes seem to depend on the individual’s memory of prior evaluations, and probably involve the activation of memorized representations of the world, and the perception of contrast or deviation from these memorized representations. This can be exemplified with respect to how a culture evaluates narratives according to Talmy’s category of prototypicality: As he suggests,

members of the culture at large will generally have certain norms, expectations, and forms of familiarity pertaining to [narrative] structure as a result of experiences with the historical tradition or with other exposure to narrative contexts. ... Authors ... that compose their works to deviate substantially from the current norms may be considered by contemporaries to be avant-garde and their works to be experimental. (Talmy 2003: 479–480, emphasis in the original).

3.2. The parameter-based framework and evaluation as memorized representation

Let us now turn to (b), i.e., the evaluation that we attach relatively permanently to mental representations. This relates directly to the question of how we organize our knowledge of the world cognitively. This has been discussed in artificial intelligence research, cognitive psychology and linguistics with the help of frame theory (cf. Pishwa, Introduction). Frame theory suggests that our knowledge of the world is organized in terms of mental knowledge structures which capture the typical features of the world (for an overview of research on frames and related notions such as scripts, schemas, cognitive models etc., see Bednarek 2005). Frames are part of our semantic memory, and usually shared by members of the same linguistic community (they are more or less conventionalized) and can refer to both more or less factual knowledge (spiders usually have eight legs), and to scientifically wrong folk knowledge (spiders are insects). Concerning the structure of frames, they are often assumed to consist of categories and the specific interrelations (e.g., X has a Y, X is on Y, X is a part of Y) existing between them, the categories providing default assignments (by supplying prototypes) and associated expectations (e.g., Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 212–213).
In terms of the relation between knowledge and evaluation it is of
course possible to use the notion of frame to refer only to non-evaluative
aspects of the entities, situations, events etc in the world. Hence, our frame
knowledge of spiders would include the fact that many people dislike spi-
ders while excluding our own opinion on the matter (i.e., whether we dis-
like them or not). However, we undoubtedly have certain opinions con-
cerning objects, events and situations in the world and it seems reasonable
to conclude that these are part of our mental representations. It would then
be possible to assume that frames have one or potentially more ‘slots’ for
such evaluations. Whereas the purely factual frame features would be inter-
subjectively shared across a large number of people (disregarding special-
ized, scientific knowledge), such evaluative frame features may be more
individual or shared only within certain discourse communities (though
some evaluations are perhaps also shared among many people). For
instance, most linguists will share a frame for corpus linguistics, which in-
cludes (more or less detailed) knowledge about the methodologies and
assumptions of corpus linguists. However, the different linguistic schools
will have contrasting opinions about the usefulness and significance of the
approach, and whether and when it is necessary and possible to use such an
approach. These opinions themselves depend on previous cognitive opera-
tions of evaluation in specific, individual instances (see above), which are
abstracted and become part of the mental representation of the individual
for corpus linguistics. In the assumption that frames involve both factual
and evaluative features I follow those cognitive scientists who assume that
evaluative information resides in memory, and is stored together with other
knowledge of aspects of the world (Malrieu 1999: 53).

Concerning the relation of such memorized evaluative information to
the parameter-based framework, the crucial question is what kinds of val-
ues (or what evaluative parameters) can fill the evaluative slot of frames.
Presumably, this relates to the above-mentioned question of the cognitive
status of parameters of evaluations, since it was assumed that the evaluative
features of frames are the result of an abstraction or condensation of indi-
vidual cognitive operations of evaluation. As previously mentioned, much
more research is needed before any valid conclusions can be drawn.
3.3. Functions of evaluations

To sum up the discussion above, the following figures demonstrate again the distinction between the three notions or definitions of evaluation, and our knowledge about the kinds of parameters that may be involved:

**Evaluation (a)**

Psychological entity (PE) → phenomenon/a

PE 'does' evaluation

parameters of evaluation: how good, bad, important?

(unclear how many and what kind of cognitive parameters)

**Evaluation (b)**

Psychological entity → mental representation of phenomenon/a

PE 'has' evaluation

evaluative frame features: how good, bad, important?

(unclear how many and what kind of evaluative frame features)

**Evaluation (c)**

Psychological entity → phenomenon/a

PE 'says' evaluation

linguistic parameters of evaluation:
COMPREHENSIBILITY, EMOTIVITY, EVIDENTIALLY, EXPECTEDNESS, IMPORTANCE, MENTAL STATE, POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY, RELIABILITY, SERIOUSNESS, STYLE

The difference between these three points of view can thus be discussed in terms of 'doing', 'having', and 'saying' evaluation. A last point to dis-
discussed, then, is the extent to which linguistic expressions of evaluation (saying evaluation) are related to the cognitive operation of evaluation (doing evaluation) and its mental representation (having evaluation), i.e., the potential functions of linguistic expressions of evaluation.

In my view, there are at least four possibilities. Firstly, such linguistic expressions may be the result of spontaneous, individual operations of evaluation. Secondly, they may be regarded as reflexes of the evaluative features of our mental representations (frames). Thirdly, they may simply indicate the existence of mental representations (frames) and associated expectations. Fourthly, they may be exploited purely for rhetorical-pragmatic purposes.

Let me give two examples:

(1) The evaluative utterance “Corpus linguistics is great” (involving the parameter of emotivity) may relate to an evaluation of corpus linguistics at a particular point in time (e.g., as a reaction of looking at concordance lines) or it may reflect the speaker’s general positive mental representation of corpus linguistics. A third option is that the evaluation is uttered for rhetorical-pragmatic purposes (e.g., to flatter a lecturer or to be polite).

(2) The evaluative utterance “It is surprising that Paul’s research is not based on corpus evidence” (involving the parameter of expectedness) may relate to an evaluation of the fact that Paul’s research is not based on corpus evidence as surprising at a particular point in time (as a reaction of reading Paul’s essay), and can then be considered as an indicator of the existence of a particular mental representation (frame) concerning Paul’s research (e.g., involving the assumption that his research is usually based on corpus evidence). Additionally, the evaluation may be used to evaluate Paul’s research negatively (if the speaker assumes that corpus evidence is necessary for good research).

The example in (2) points to the special role of evaluators of expectedness. Such linguistic expressions explicitly make reference to the fact that something is unexpected or expected in terms of our (factual) frame knowledge of how things are in the world rather than making reference to an evaluative frame feature of expectedness. They are the results of the default assignments and associated expectations concerning the categories that make up frame structure (see above). In other words, evaluations of
EXPECTEDNESS (e.g., contrastive coordinators and subordinators, negations, adjectives and adverbs such as surprising(ly), astonishing(ly)), are potential indicators for the existence of frames in speaker’s minds (see also Tannen 1993). For instance, negative statements by American speakers watching the famous ‘pear’ film (Tannen 1993: 21) such as this road that’s ... UH it’s not paved, it’s just sort of a dirt road are regarded by Tannen as “evidence that Americans expect roads to be paved” (Tannen 1993: 41), and of course, the relation between contrast and expectation has repeatedly been pointed out in research (e.g., Greenbaum 1969: 250, Quirk et al 1985: 935, Biber et al 1999: 1047). Other indicators of frames that have been identified by Tannen (1993), and that relate somehow to the parameter-based framework of evaluation are:

- obviously, seem (EVIDENTIALITY)
- just, even (EXPECTEDNESS)
- must, should, may, can (POSSIBILITY or RELIABILITY)
- evaluative adjectives and adverbs such as important, beautiful, carelessly, luckily, funny, suddenly, strange, artificial (IMPORTANCE, EMOTIVITY, EXPECTEDNESS, RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE)
- inferences (MENTAL STATE)
- moral judgements (EMOTIVITY).

Tannen suggests that such linguistic expressions are created by expectations or frames (Tannen 1993: 53) (and hence work as indicators of frames), but she also notes that employing evaluative adjectives and adverbs results from and reflects an evaluative process (Tannen 1993: 48). In other words, such expressions are regarded as being both the result of a cognitive operation of evaluation, and as indicators of the existence of mental representations. This two-fold function is in fact explicable by the above-made assumption that evaluative processes depend on the individual’s memory, and involve the activation of memorized representations of the world (frames).

In other words, evaluations in discourse may be related to memory in (at least two) ways: Firstly, they may reflect an evaluative frame feature (corpus linguistics is great/important/difficult etc), and secondly, they may simply point to the existence of a particular frame (Paul’s research is usually based on corpus evidence). In the second case, they are probably also the result of a cognitive operation of evaluation at a particular point in time. However, to assume that evaluative language simply reflects or relates to
our frame knowledge in a variety of ways is to disregard the fact that evaluations may be used for purely rhetorical purposes, as has been shown in much linguistic research for instance for expressions of modality (used to express politeness, for boosting etc rather than to reflect the speaker’s cognitive state of mind). It is a much too narrow view of evaluative language to regard it simply as a reflex of the speaker’s cognitive operations, and as an indicator of aspects of his/her memory. This, indeed, is one of the basic tenets of research on the language of evaluation, which holds that such language is polyfunctional and interpersonal.

Let me very briefly sum up this complex discussion: when we encounter aspects of the world we can perform a cognitive operation of evaluation on them (involving the activation of memorized representations); this evaluation may then become (relatively permanently) attached to our mental representations of these aspects; and linguistic expressions may (but need not) be used to reflect evaluative components of our mental representations as well as to indicate the existence of certain mental representations. Nevertheless, linguistic expressions of evaluation are also used for rhetorical and other purposes. In my view, the rhetorical-pragmatic functions of linguistic expressions of evaluation are at least as important, if, indeed, not more important.

3.4. Inscribing, evoking and provoking evaluation

Let us now turn to a slightly different topic, namely the question of how evaluation can be expressed (we are now back to our original definition of evaluation as the expression of speaker/writer opinion). What are the options on the part of the speaker to express evaluation in discourse, and how does this relate to memory? The crucial question is to what extent evaluative meaning is ‘inherent’ in lexical items, and to what extent it depends on the readers’ application of cognitive frames. In other words, what is the role of the reader’s memorized representations (frames) in evaluation?

As a starting point for the discussion we can take White’s (2001a) distinction between “inscribed” (or explicit) and “evoked” (or implicit) appraisal (evaluation). Inscribed appraisal refers to evaluation that is “overtly ‘inscribed’ in the text through the vocabulary choice” (White 2001a: 6), i.e., with the help of explicitly evaluative adverbs such as justly, fairly, adjectives such as corrupt, dishonest, nouns such as a cheat and a liar, a hero, and verbs such as to cheat, to deceive (White 2001a: 6). With
evoked appraisal, the evaluation is triggered by “tokens” of appraisal, i.e.,
“superficially neutral, ideational meanings which nevertheless have the
capacity in the culture to evoke judgmental responses (depending upon the
reader’s social/cultural/ideological reader position)” (White 2001a: 12).
Evoked evaluations thus crucially rely on the reader’s interpretation and,
moreover, are very much context-dependent (White 2001a: 13). Examples
of “tokens” of evoked evaluation are descriptions such as the government
did not lay the foundations for long term growth or they filled the mansion
with computers and cheap plastic furniture (White 2001a: 13) which can
trigger negative evaluation in their given context. Such evaluation depends
on shared socio-cultural norms and “rel[ies] upon conventionalised con-
nections between actions and evaluations” (White 2001a: 13).

In fact, as White (2004) has shown, there is a great extent of variability
in emotive expressions, a variability which is crucially dependent on the
context in which they occur, and which provides some evidence against
assuming a strict dichotomy of explicitness and implicitness. He concludes:

I am proposing, therefore, that rather than making a clear-cut distinction be-
tween explicit [inscribed] and implicit [evoked] evaluation, we work with a
notion of degrees of attitudinal saturation. The more limited the semantic
variability of the term the more saturated it is, the less limited the semantic
variability, the less saturated. (White 2004: 2–3).

If we talk about inscribed and evoked evaluation, then, this represents a
simplification to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the distinction is theoreti-
cally valid and useful as a starting point for discussing the connection
between evaluation and cognition.

In cognitive terms, evoked evaluation often depends on the readers’
application of cognitive frames to the discourse at hand. For instance, the
description of Iain Duncan Smith’s downward look in the corpus example
Mr Duncan Smith spent most of the time staring at his own feet – because
the autocue was bizarrely at floor level (Mirror) seems to clearly ‘evoke’
negative EMOTIVITY with the help of a cognitive frame: the wider context
can be regarded as opening up a ‘conference frame’ which includes con-
ventional knowledge that staring at your feet is definitely not a good thing
for public speaking, especially at a party conference where you are sup-
posed to assert your authority. Additionally, the causal conjunction because
gives us the reason for this behavior (the fact that the autocue was at floor
level), which, in turn, causes this fact to be evaluated as negative as well.
This negative evaluation seems then to be intensified by the writer’s
evaluation of it as UNEXPECTED (bizarrely, which probably carries negative
connotations in itself), as a deviation from the norm (perhaps aiming to prompt the reader’s questioning ‘Why in God’s name did they do this? Can’t the Tories even get this right?’). The utterance therefore not only evaluates Iain Duncan Smith as negative, but the whole organization of the conference, i.e., the Tory Party as a whole.

Some other examples in the corpus are:

(1) The Tory leader’s more polished performance delighted the party faithful inside the Empress Ballroom, earning him a climactic 12-minute ovation. (Guardian)

(2) The activists interrupted his speech with no fewer than 20 standing ovations – plus a final salute lasting fully eight minutes (Mail)

(3) The panic move fuelled fresh murmurs over the leadership and overshadowed a performance which won mixed reviews in the conference hall. (Sun)

(4) He defended his support for the Iraq war, while respecting the opinion of those who opposed it (Independent)

In examples (1) and (2) the reader again applies his/her conference frame to the discourse, leading him/her to evaluate Iain Duncan Smith’s performance as successful, whereas in example (3) the same frame leads to a less positive evaluation of Iain Duncan Smith. In example (4) it is a frame about ‘moral’ values whose application can lead to positive evaluation (‘in an argument it is good to respect your adversary’s opinion’).

On the other hand, EMOTIVITY can be expressed by “very clearly evaluative” (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 14) lexical items such as fail:

(5) Mr Duncan Smith received 18 standing ovations in a speech marked by a ferocious attack on the government and the Liberal Democrats, but failed to see off the threat of a leadership challenge this autumn. (Financial Times)

(6) Tory leader’s tirade against Blair fails to stave off revolt (Independent)

where Iain Duncan Smith is explicitly evaluated as a failure. Some other examples in the corpus are:
(7) It was meant to convince his party he's tough. Instead it evoked images of another wannabe urged to make the clenched hand his trademark – tennis ace Tim Henman (insert). (Sun)

(8) What was meant to be a roar turned into a bore as he delivered the longest speech in modern political history. (Mirror)

(9) Delegates were forced to rise to their feet 19 times to take part in "spontaneous" standing ovations orchestrated by a small group of fanatics. (Mirror)

In these examples quite explicitly negative expressions evaluate Iain Duncan Smith as a wannabe, his speech as a bore and the ovations as arranged by fanatics (note also the negative emotivity of forced to and the hedged spontaneous).

In-between inscribed and evoked evaluation we can find evaluators such as admit, which carry implicit evaluative assumptions. Admit shows that a statement was produced reluctantly (Clayman 1990: 87), carries the implied assumption that some negative act has been committed (Hardt-Maunder 1995: 13) or suggests that the content of the reported proposition is negative. It seems reasonable that its synonyms, acknowledge, concede, and confess, have similar evaluative meanings. (These evaluative assumptions might perhaps be argued to be part of a cognitive frame that we attach to the speech act of admitting.) These verbs are also all part of Thompson's (1994) group of reporting verbs which imply the writer's belief in the truth of the attributed proposition (Thompson 1994: 50). Consequently, such attributing expressions can be regarded as expressing a combination of four parameters of evaluation (when used for attributing propositions to sources other than the speaker):

- they name ILLOCUTIONARY (STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY) acts and evaluate a proposition as based on HEARSAY (EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY)
- they express the writer's negative evaluation of the "Sayer" (Halliday 1994: 140) (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE)
- they express the writer's belief that what the Sayer says is true (RELIABILITY: HIGH).

In my corpus six out of ten newspapers (Express, Star, Sun, Financial Times, Times, Telegraph) employ admit/acknowledge. Apart from the Daily Telegraph, it is always members of the Tory Party (usually those loyal to IDS) who admit something that is negative to Iain Duncan Smith.
In the *Daily Telegraph*, the situation is reversed: although it is still members of the Tory Party who *concede* something, the Sayers are critics of IDS and what is *admitted* is positive to Iain Duncan Smith:

(10) *And even some members of the shadow cabinet admitted yesterday that it remained to be seen whether their leader had done enough to stave off a challenge.* (Express)

(11) *Even shadow cabinet members acknowledged that this weekend could determine his fate.* (Financial Times)

(12) *But IDS’s aides admitted that some influential Tories still wanted him removed.* (Star)

(13) *One senior loyalist admitted IDS had no more than a “50-50” chance of survival.* (Sun)

(14) *But the speech, though rapturously received by the hardcore Tories in the seaside resort, failed to settle the question marks over his future — as one of his Shadow Cabinet members, Tim Yeo, swiftly and ominously acknowledged within minutes of its ending.* (Times)

(15) *His critics acknowledged that he had gained a reprieve but said he still had to demonstrate that he could build on the momentum of the conference speech to quell the doubts in the party and the country about his leadership.* (Telegraph)

Because of the evaluation of HIGH RELIABILITY that is expressed by the evaluators, what is said to be positive or negative to news actors additionally gains ‘factual’ status, and contributes to the evaluation of Iain Duncan Smith’s performance. The use of these evaluators can thus be regarded as correlating to newspaper stance to some extent: the pro-Tory *Daily Telegraph* differs crucially in this respect from all the other ‘anti-Iain Duncan Smith’ newspapers.

In the above examples we have seen how EMOTIVITY can be evoked by more or less factual descriptions of social actors’ behavior (though there is probably a cline between description and evaluation). However, evaluations of EMOTIVITY can also be triggered by evaluations along other parameters. In some of the above examples we can find evaluations of MENTAL STATE (*delighted, respecting the opinion of*), whereas in the following examples
evaluations of RELIABILITY, EXPECTEDNESS, and MENTAL STATE trigger both positive and negative EMOTIVITY:

(16) Some delegates shook their heads and refused to rise to the orchestrated [RELIABILITY: FAKE; NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY] applause. (Sun)

(17) And while it was a carefully-choreographed show of support, there was no doubt that the warmth and enthusiasm for Mr Duncan Smith in the packed Blackpool conference hall was genuine. [RELIABILITY: GENUINE; POSITIVE EMOTIVITY] (Mail)

(18) Mr Duncan Smith delivered an unprecedented [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED; NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY] personal attack on a serving prime minister. (Telegraph)

(19) Abandoning his “quiet man” image of a year ago, he unleashed an unusually [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED; NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY] strong tirade against the Prime Minister. (Independent)

(20) There was nothing [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON; NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY] about the economy – still Labour’s strongest card – but he hit the hot buttons on asylum, Europe, where he will campaign harder for a constitutional referendum, and the threat of still higher taxes, to warm applause. (Guardian)

(21) But he shocked [MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION; NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY] observers with a savage attack on Mr Blair over the suicide of MoD Iraq weapons expert Dr David Kelly. (Sun)

(22) Mr Duncan Smith surprised [MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION; NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY] some MPs with his personal attacks. (Financial Times)

In examples (16) and (17), evaluations of the reactions to Iain Duncan Smith’s conference speech as GENUINE or FAKE can – again with the help of the conference frame – give rise to evaluative overtones. Through evaluations of Iain Duncan Smith’s attacks as UNEXPECTED in examples (18) and (19), he is simultaneously evaluated as deviating from the ‘normal’ frame of how political debates are supposed to be held. This increases the negative EMOTIVITY that may be expressed by the lexical items which
these evaluations modify (personal attack, strong tirade). In example (20), contrasting the facts with an alternative possibility that could have been expected in the context of a conference speech (economy can presumably be regarded as a matter of high interest for the British public and as central to a party platform), a negative evaluation of the Tory Party can be triggered, without the writer’s actually using any explicit evaluations of negative emotivity. In examples (21) and (22), finally, evaluations of mental state (where the mental state of surprise is attributed to social actors other than the writer) seem to work similarly to examples (18) and (19), again implying a deviation on the part of Iain Duncan Smith from the norm of political debate. At the same time, however, the evaluation that is present in these examples also depends on the lexical items that are involved: for instance, with shock the evoked evaluation appears more negative than with surprise.

For the above cases, where evaluation along one parameter is triggered by evaluations along other parameters (rather than by purely factual descriptions), it would be possible to revive White’s notion of ‘provoked’ evaluation. This concept is used by White (1998: 105–106) to refer to cases where judgement (positive/negative moral evaluation) is triggered (provoked) by other appraisal values (usually affect: reference to emotions) in contrast to being evoked by experiential tokens. In connection with the parameter-based framework the difference between evoked and provoked evaluation becomes the difference between evaluation that is triggered by factual descriptions (evoked evaluation) and evaluation that is triggered by evaluations along other parameters (provoked evaluation). Lemke calls this “prosodic overlap” (Lemke 1998: 48).

In most of the examples mentioned above we are therefore actually dealing with provoked evaluation rather than evoked evaluation. The distinction between inscribed, evoked and provoked evaluation is in fact very complex in that provoked evaluation may be expressed via an inscribed evaluation. Thus, the example And while it was a carefully-choreographed show of support, there was no doubt that the warmth and enthusiasm for Mr Duncan Smith in the packed Blackpool conference hall was genuine (Mail) involves an inscribed evaluation of reliability (genuine) which provokes positive emotivity.

In other words, there are two issues involved: firstly, is the evaluation more or less inscribed (“IDS is incompetent”) or evoked (“IDS spent most of his time staring at his feet”). Secondly, is the evaluation along a certain parameter expressed (inscribed or evoked) by an evaluation of the same parameter or is it provoked by an (inscribed or evoked) evaluation of a dif-
different parameter? The following figures exemplify the difference between inscribed, evoked and provoked evaluation in connection with the parameter of EMOTIVITY:

When talking about the difference between inscribed and provoked evaluation in the following, this hence represents another simplification, and obscures the question of how the respective provoked evaluation is expressed.

inscribed

\[ \text{degree of attitudinal saturation} \]

\[ \to \text{evoked} \]

Factual description \( \to \) evokes
Explicit evaluation of EMOTIVITY \( \to \) inscribes
Evaluation of a parameter other than EMOTIVITY via linguistic devices of different degrees of attitudinal saturation (inscribed-evoked) \( \to \) provokes

One might be tempted to assume that it is only EMOTIVITY – identified as “the most basic parameter” by Thompson and Hunston (2000: 25) – that can be provoked. However, this is not the case: other evaluative parameters, it seems, can also be triggered. For instance, evaluations of RELIABILITY can be provoked (rather than inscribed via modal expressions such as put in doubt, certainly, possibly or evoked by factual descriptions) by evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED with even. These can be used to attach more RELIABILITY or give more credence to a reported proposition:

(23) But a YouGov poll of grassroots Tory members, published yesterday, put that in doubt by revealing 53 per cent thought they had made a mistake in electing Mr Duncan Smith in the first place. And even some members of the shadow cabinet admitted yesterday that it remained to be seen whether their leader had done enough to stave off a challenge. (Express)

(24) Mr Duncan Smith received 18 standing ovations in a speech marked by a ferocious attack on the government and the Liberal Democrats,
but failed to see off the threat of a leadership challenge this autumn. Even shadow cabinet members acknowledged that this weekend could determine his fate. (Financial Times)

(25) **Though some smart Tories watching on TV thought the performance too “mannered” to appeal to the wider audience at home, the snap verdict in Blackpool, even among sceptics, was that it was far from the feared disaster and at least good enough to “get him through the next week”**. (Guardian)

This effect has to do with the fact that, in order to evaluate the reliability of an utterance, a critical listener will apply his/her world knowledge and ask what the quoted speaker’s interests are and how these may distort his/her statements (Du Bois 1986: 323). By pointing out that **even** those speakers who would not normally be expected to utter the reported proposition because of conflicting interests (**shadow cabinet members, sceptics**) did in fact do so, higher reliability may be attached by readers to this attributed proposition.

Similarly, evaluations of **MENTAL STATE** might be argued to be provoked by evaluations of **EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE** as in example (26) where the delegate’s mental state can be inferred by the paralinguistic reporting verb used:

(26) **But some visibly flinched as he stooped to gutter politics with vicious personal attacks on political opponents. He said that after the death of weapons expert Dr David Kelly “Tony Blair said he’d had nothing to do with his public naming. That was a lie. He chaired the meetings that made the fatal decisions. He is responsible. He should do the decent thing and resign.” One delegate muttered: “Like you.”** (Mirror)

As becomes evident, the connection between evaluation and cognition as well as the distinction between inscribed, provoked and evoked evaluation, is highly complex and far from straightforward. It seems that in many cases of evoked evaluation the discourse prompts the reader to apply cognitive frames to the text, which, in turn, can give rise to evaluations. The extent to which this process (the application of frames) works subconsciously remains to be researched. However, it has been suggested that in as far as evaluations are expressed in very subtle, indirect ways, it is naturally much more difficult for readers to recognize and challenge them (Thompson and
Hunston 2000: 8). Thus, whereas inscribed evaluations are more or less explicit and recognizable (and can hence theoretically be challenged by the reader), this becomes more and more difficult as we move along the cline from inscribed to evoked evaluation.

4. Empirical analysis

4.1. Evaluation in the corpus

In discussing inscribed, evoked and provoked evaluation I have used examples from the newspaper corpus mentioned in the introduction. This mini-corpus was also the basis for an analysis of evaluation in newspaper reportage on Iain Duncan Smith’s (IDS – the leader of the Tory Party at that time) speech at the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool in 2003 using the parameter-based approach to evaluation introduced in section 2. This mini-corpus consists of ten (hard) news stories from the ten national newspapers in Britain: The Guardian (GUAR), The Independent (INDY), The Times (TIM), The Daily Telegraph (TEL), The Sun (SUN), The Star (STAR), The Daily Mail (MAIL), The Mirror (MIRR) and The Express (EXP). The word count is as indicated in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. The corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadsheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT GUAR INDY TIM TEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>584 983 1.204 1.017 782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A general comparison of evaluations along all (combinations of) parameters in this corpus showed that evaluations are more frequent in the tabloids than in the broadsheets, as was to be expected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Evaluations in the corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadsheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations word count per 1000 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis of evaluation in this small corpus provides illustrative rather than representative findings (Bednarek in press, however, analyses evaluation in British tabloid and broadsheet publications in a larger corpus, confirming the fact that evaluations are slightly more frequent in tabloid publications).\textsuperscript{5}

4.2. Evaluative prosody: evaluation and context

The examples given in section 3.2 clearly demonstrated the importance of the wider context for the analysis of evaluation. In the following I shall thus provide an illustrative analysis of a longer section of two texts, one from the tabloids and the other from the broadsheets, in order to show the interplay of evaluation in text as well as to exemplify again the distinction between different types of evaluation. In analogy to Bublitz's (2003) concept of emotive prosody (related to evaluation in terms of the good-bad parameter) we can speak of the evaluative prosody of each text. With both of these stories, most readers will intuitively recognize that they are highly evaluative, but only a linguistic framework allows us to say explicitly why this is so and how it comes about. Here is the analysis of the beginning of the news story in the Guardian (the parameter-based analysis is provided in square brackets):


2. No [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] more Mr Quiet Man [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE]...

Michael White, political editor


4. The Tory chief whip, David Maclean, took the initiative against dissidents whose threats to [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE:}
5. The former treasury minister, John Maples, and four other suspects are to be summoned to Mr Maclean's office for a "career development interview" [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] and told to shut up, ship out to their City jobs or put up a candidate to test Mr Duncan Smith's true level of support against their own.

6. But such rallying talk will not disguise the fact that Mr Duncan Smith's speech in which he told [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] plots [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] in the hall that the choice is him or Tony Blair – "there is no third way" [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] – has won [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] him only [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] enough time to regroup and see if the flattening opinion polls improve.


8. His attacks on Labour's high taxation, bureaucracy and policy on Europe were also rewarded with 17 standing ovations as the speech was delivered.

9. Most pleasing to delegates was the harsh language directed personally [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] against Tony Blair and his fantasy "Blair World" [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY].


11. In a judgment the Hutton inquiry is unlikely to endorse, Mr Duncan Smith urged [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] Mr Blair to resign.

12. "He won't of course, he won't do the decent thing, he never does," [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] he added [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: DISCOURSE SIGNALLING].

13. In a reference to last year's much-mocked self-description, the Tory leader also told [EVIDENTIALITY:
HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL  ] his own party critics: “The quiet man is here to stay and he’s turning up the volume” [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] – though [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] at times he spoke in a near-whisper. (Guardian)

Not surprisingly, this extract is dominated by evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY and EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE, reflecting simply its status as a news text which is based on news actors’ utterances. Next frequent are evaluations of EMOTIVITY. Although evaluations of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY are more frequent, we can also find some evaluations of POSITIVE EMOTIVITY. Here the limits of the analysis of individual evaluators become clear: although won (6) can be classified as POSITIVE EMOTIVITY, its positive potential is very much limited by the following evaluation of EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON (has won him *only* enough time to regroup and see if the flatlining opinion polls improve). Such evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS can trigger negative evaluation as we have seen, and are also quite frequent in the above text. Similarly, the comparison in line (7) implies that most other “performances” of Iain Duncan Smith were in fact not “polished”. Apart from the explicit evaluations of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY which are mostly directed against Iain Duncan Smith (*Mr Quiet Man, harsh language directed personally against Tony Blair, much-mocked*), other utterances with evaluations (mostly involving EXPECTEDNESS) can be said to provoke such EMOTIVITY: (6) but such rallying talk will not disguise the fact that, (11) in a judgement the Hutton inquiry is unlikely to endorse, and (13) the Tory leader also told his own party critics: “The quiet man is here to stay and he’s turning up the volume” – though at time he spoke in a near-whisper. In such cases it is the whole utterance, rather than the individual evaluators that carries the evaluation. The extract also shows how evaluation can work retrospectively: the MENTAL STATE evaluations that are attributed to the Tory delegates in (7) and (9) work to evaluate them negatively, because they are seen as responding in a positive way (they are said to be delighted and pleased and to applaud strongly) to something that is evaluated as negative by the newspaper (*the harsh language directed personally against Tony Blair*). Additional evaluations concern IMPORTANCE, MENTAL STATE and RELIABILITY, but none of them are as frequent as are EVIDENTIALITY and EMOTIVITY. On the whole the text hence exhibits a negative stance towards Iain Duncan Smith and the Tory Party (especially in the last paragraph of the extract), without, however, accumulating solely inscribed evaluations of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY. Apart from some provoked negative evaluations there are many evaluations of
EVIDENTIALITY, and some of (albeit weak) POSITIVE EMOTIVITY, IMPORTANCE and MENTAL STATE.

Let us now look at the tabloid text (Mirror) reporting the same story:

1. GRRRRR!
2. IDS GETS TOUGH.

By James Hardy, Political Editor

4. He gritted his teeth and tried his best to sound tough, but [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] the hardman image didn’t quite work [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] for Iain Duncan Smith yesterday.
5. What was meant to be [EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] a roar turned into a bore [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] as he delivered the longest speech in modern political history.
7. Delegates were forced to [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] rise to their feet 19 times to take part in “spontaneous” [RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY HEDGE] standing ovations orchestrated [RELIABILITY: FAKE/EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] by a small group of fanatics [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE].
9. Mr Duncan Smith spent most of the time staring at his own feet - because the autocue was bizarrely [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] at floor level.
10. He claimed [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY/RELIABILITY: LOW] he would see off critics and lead the party back into power.
12. He added [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: DISCOURSE SIGNALLING]: “We must destroy this double dealing, deceitful, incompetent, shallow,
inefficient, ineffective, corrupt, mendacious, fraudulent, shameful, lying Government once and for all.” [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]

13. And he urged [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLUCIONARY] his critics: “Don’t work for Tony Blair, get on board or get out of our way for we have got work to do.” [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]


16. He said [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] that after the death of weapons expert Dr David Kelly “Tony Blair said he’d had nothing to do with his public naming. That was a lie.

“He chaired the meetings that made the fatal decisions. He is responsible. He should do the decent thing and resign.” [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]


In contrast to the broadsheet text, in the tabloid text evaluations of EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE are clearly of the greatest significance; at times, up to three or four such evaluations occur in the same sentence (6, 7, 15) — whereas in the broadsheets only up to two such evaluations co-occur — and there are no evaluations of EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE. There are also evaluations that involve the parameter of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY in addition to the parameter of RELIABILITY: FAKE (7), and in addition to the evaluative combination of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLUCIONARY (14). Moreover, many of the other evaluations have the potential to provoke negative evaluation in the context of the negative prosody present in the whole text. Examples are the expression of the contrast between what the speech was meant to be and what it turned out to be (5), the contrast between what Iain Duncan Smith tried to achieve, and the fact that it “didn’t work” (4), the contrast between Iain Duncan Smith “getting tough” and “nobody being scared” (2, 3), the hedge (7), the MENTAL STATE evaluations in (8) and (15), the evaluation of EXPECTEDNESS in (9) and the evaluation of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC in (17). Furthermore, an evaluation of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY evaluates Iain Duncan
Smith's utterance in (10) as potentially unreliable. Thus, most evaluations in this text either inscribe or provoke negative emotivity. Only some additional parameters are not connected to emotivity but rather concerned with evidentiality: hearsay or evidentiality/style, again reflecting the text type. All in all, however, this text exhibits a very clear and explicit negative prosody that extends like a wave over the text, showing the tendency of evaluation to accumulate, to cluster, or to "propagate or ramify through a text" (Lemke 1998: 49).

Although it can thus be demonstrated that both newspapers express a negative stance towards Iain Duncan Smith (and clearly do not aim at 'objective' reporting), their means of achieving this stance are different: the negative evaluations are much more explicit and/or more frequent in the tabloid text than in the broadsheet text. In how far this consistent negative evaluation of Iain Duncan Smith contributed to his 'downfall' as leader of the Conservative Party remains open to debate: how newspaper bias affects its readership is "the source of the biggest debate surrounding media audiences because so little has really been discovered about the way that audiences receive and make sense of media texts" (Bell et al. 1999: 17).

The analysis of the texts also demonstrates the important evaluative potential of contrasts and the significance of the notion of provoked evaluation, as well as suggesting that the clustering of evaluation is more frequent in the popular press than in the quality press. It furthermore points to the pressing need to analyze the systematics of context influence on evaluation in more detail (along the lines of Lemke [1998] and Jordan [2000]). We still seem to know only little about the actual workings of context influence on meaning. Evaluation is just one example where this influence becomes very obvious e.g., when lexical items with a more or less 'neutral' dictionary meaning become evaluative in their context. Here lexical items can become a platform of negotiation and debate. All in all, the complex interplay of evaluation and context (cf. also Lemke 1998) shows that manual text analysis is an indispensable methodological tool when analyzing evaluation in discourse.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have presented an approach to evaluation that aims to provide a synthesis of and an alternative to existing approaches to evaluation: the parameter-based framework of evaluation. I have tried to show that evaluation is a complex phenomenon that can be defined and viewed in at
least three different ways, and whose relation to cognition varies accordingly. The framework was also applied to a mini-corpus of newspaper reportage, showing (1) the difference between inscribed, evoked and provoked evaluation, (2) the complexity of the interplay between evaluation and cognition, and (3) the context-dependence of evaluation. Specifically, it was demonstrated that positive/negative evaluation (EMOTIVITY) can be evoked both by more or less factual descriptions and can be provoked by evaluations along other parameters such as EXPECTEDNESS, RELIABILITY and MENTAL STATE, and that evoked evaluation often depends on the reader’s application of cognitive frames to the discourse. It was furthermore suggested that other parameters of evaluation can also be provoked in the same way as EMOTIVITY, and that evoked evaluation is more difficult for readers to challenge than inscribed evaluation. Finally, it was proposed that the difference between tabloid and broadsheet texts lies not so much in the stance they express as in the explicitness of the evaluation involved. At the same time the findings of this paper clearly remain illustrative rather than representative and many of the issues involving evaluation remain unsolved. Where evaluation is concerned nothing is settled yet: the ground is still shifting beneath our feet, and as yet it remains “relatively little explored” (Lemke 1998: 53) within linguistics.

6. Notes

* This paper is partly based on research undertaken at the University of Birmingham, where I was a visiting researcher from September 2003 to May 2004 with the support of the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service). I wish to express my deep thanks to both the Department of English at the University of Birmingham (specifically Professor Susan Hunston) and the DAAD. I am also very grateful to Alexanne Don and Dr. Peter White for discussing the specifics of appraisal with me again and again, and to Prof. Wolfram Buhlitz and Dr. Hanna Pishwa for their helpful comments. Additionally, I would like to thank Tony Bastow very much for his revision of an earlier version of this text and Collins and the University of Birmingham for permission to use the Bank of English.

1. *Attitude* is here used in a pre-theoretical sense, and not in its technical sense as in psychology.

2. The parameter-based framework ultimately derives from previous research that distinguishes between different ‘axes’, ‘systems’, ‘domains’, ‘categories’, ‘dimensions’, ‘kinds’, and ‘parameters’ of evaluation, for example appraisal theory (e.g., White 1998), work on stance (e.g., Biber and Finegan 1988; Conrad and Biber 2000) and research on evaluation (e.g., Hunston 1994;

3. The central question is whether these parameters are in general exhaustive, in the sense that “no radically semantic different features occur” (Lemke 1998: 39). As far as the corpus at hand is concerned, this seems to be the case. However, research into different genres might point to additional parameters of evaluation. The parameter-based framework of evaluation is hence to be regarded as an open-ended approach, and in its present form allows the simple addition of more parameters as research into evaluation progresses.

4. Likewise, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY can be used to explicitly refer to a particular facet of our knowledge, namely its source. Both evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY and evaluations of MENTAL STATE clearly depend on our theory of mind constituted by our everyday mental concepts (Perner 2000: 297). Young children, for instance, are not able to express the evidential (experiential) source of their knowledge (Perner 2000: 302). Memory, as Perner also points out, crucially entails a reflection of the evidential source of past events (2000: 307).

5. Moreover, the quantified comparison is strictly limited to inscribed evaluations by the writer; other kinds of evaluations in the text are disregarded (on the complexity of evaluation in discourse see Hunston [2000: 181]). In order to identify evaluation, which is a task that is far from straightforward (Hunston and Thompson 2000: 14–15; Stotnesby 2003: 330–331) I did not rely solely on my intuition; instead, a combination of methods was used, involving corpus-linguistic methods:
   – previous (often corpus-based) research was surveyed to identify potential evaluative means;
   – native speakers were questioned: when they gave contradictory responses (as was frequently the case) the linguistic expressions were excluded (as not unequivocally evaluative);
   – the Bank of English (a general corpus of spoken and written English from Britain, the US, Canada and Australia, which stood at 450 million words at the moment of the analysis) was the basis for extensive corpus research concerning the evaluative potential of individual linguistic devices;
   – a corpus-based dictionary was used to check the evaluative force of linguistic expressions (COBUILD).

6. For the wave metaphor in connection with evaluation see Hunston (1994: 200).
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Vestergaard, Torben

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Language and Memory

Aspects of Knowledge Representation

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Hanna Pishwa

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