

**Social Capital in modern, conflicted Iraq:  
Its characteristics, dynamics and effects at  
the micro level of Iraqi society**

**By**

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## **Certificate of authorship/originality**

I certify that the work in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree except as fully acknowledged within the text.

I also certify that this thesis has been written by me. Any help I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged.

In addition I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

*Signature of student*

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
## ABSTRACT

The thesis reports the results of a study of social capital in the nation state of Iraq. It specifically examines social capital activity at the individual *micro* level of the ordinary lives of Iraqi citizens. It identifies the dominant social networks within Iraq, and the kinds of benefits obtained from these networks at the individual and collective level. Utilising a qualitative iterative research design that involved focus group discussions with Iraqis in the Australian *diaspora*, a series of Tele-interviews with selected participants in Iraq, and finally a number of clarifying interviews with selected Iraqis in Iraq and Australia, the study was able to produce rich sets of empirical data. It found that virtually all Iraqis are members of up to three different types of social networks: Their Family networks in which they are born and in which they acquire a set of special reciprocal behaviours based on norms special to Iraqis; their separate Personal networks of friends and neighbours; and their Constrained social networks, such as work networks, in institutional settings where organisational rules may also apply. These networks were based on trusting interpersonal relationships of varying strengths. In this process the religious and ethnic backgrounds of the fellow members of their networks were irrelevant. Iraqi social networks crossed sectarian divides. This multiple membership characteristic meant that benefits from one network could be brought into another network in bridging social capital transactions. The study further found that in their social networks, Iraqis exchange a range of benefits which may be unique to Iraqi society. These were classified as qualitatively-different benefits of emotional support, informational and, at higher levels, practical and material support. The determinant of the benefits are the social settings of the transactions – and the external intrusive social contexts which may require help for threatened members of social networks. The study found that these benefits and the underlying willingness of Iraqis to provide them comprised the social capital assets of Iraq. Needy members could access benefits immediately. But as a latent community resource, this social capital could only be mobilised by trusted facilitators for an agreed community benefit. Personal trust was found to be a necessary pre-condition for forming social capital, but a lack of social and institutional trust, common in Iraq today, hindered the mobilisation of the community pools of social capital. Generally social capital transaction activity was found to be

vibrantly alive and flourishing in Iraq, but only at the individual *micro*-level of the society, with consequent implications for Iraqi social planners.



**Map1. Iraq - Governorates and Districts 2013**



**Map2. Map of the Old Mesopotamia**

**Table 1. THE MAIN ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS OF IRAQ**

<b>Kurds</b>	With their own language, clans and tribes and now their own territory. Mainly Sunni Muslims. The minority Shi'ite Muslim <b>Faili Kurds</b> live mainly in Diyala province and around Baghdad.
<b>Turkoman</b>	With their own language and clans live mainly around Kirkuk.
<b>Yazidis</b>	Adherents of an old <i>Kurdish</i> religion with ancient <i>Indo-European</i> roots, living mainly around Mosul.
<b>The Shabak</b>	An ancient Muslim Indo-Iranian tribe with their own language living around Ninevah.
<b>Sabian Mandaean</b>	A small pre-Christian sect with their clans and their own churches near running water which they call Mandas. They tend to live together in the bigger cities.
<b>Chaldean Christians</b>	Around Nineveh and Mosul but also in other major cities. They have their own Aramaic language, a system of parish churches, bishoprics and cathedrals and even their own villages. They are linked to the Catholic Church of Rome.
<b>Assyrian Christians</b>	Also around Nineveh and Mosul. They have their own Assyrian language and network of Churches and hierarchical clergy. They are linked mainly with the Orthodox Christian Church of Greece.
<b>Armenian Christians</b>	Mainly around Kirkuk but also scattered in the major cities. They only arrived in Iraq 90 years ago during the Turkish genocide against them at the end of the First World War. They are mainly Orthodox Christians.
<b>Sunni Muslims</b>	The more diffused Sunni Muslims with their chain of mosques and a small hierarchical clerical system comprising two networks of respected Muslim scholars who provide religious and social guidance on the Sharia'a law of Islam.
<b>Shia Muslims</b>	the largest group of Iraqis with their own chain of mosques and/prayer centres ( <i>husseinayats</i> ) There is a clerical hierarchy of Imams, Mullahs, Ayatollahs and at the top the Grand Ayatollahs, functioning as a <i>marja'iyah</i> or religious establishment. These recognise as their leader the revered Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

The 33 million or more citizens of the middle eastern nation of Iraq have, over three generations, had the experience of growing up in social environments of contrasts. Family life was warm and loving with parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, siblings and cousins in close and generally joyful relationships. Beyond the home were the fears and uncertainties of a life under the daily and careful scrutiny of governments of repression and conflict.

First there was the government of the Ba'athist regime of the late Saddam Hussein from 1979 to 2003, with his *Mukhabarat* (Arabic for *watchers*) his secret police and security agencies and local officials of the ruling Ba'ath Party always observing. This was also a period when many men went to war against Iran from September 1980 to August 1988. Up to 800,000 never came back. In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, until the US-led coalition forces forced the Iraqis back early in 1991. Up to 35,000 Iraqis died and another 75,000 were wounded during this conflict. Immediately following this came the Shi'ite uprising, the *Intifada*, in southern Iraq in March 1991 until the Ba'athists brutally repressed it with many executions, public hangings and other reprisals the following month. Tens of thousands died while some 1.8 million Iraqis left in a mass exodus for safer refuge in neighbouring countries and other nations.

The second contrasting change came in 2003 with the US led coalition force's invasion of Iraq in February and the collapse of the Ba'athist regime in May that year. In the transition to a new republic, cruel conflict again became a very real part of the daily lives of Iraqis. But it was a different type of conflict which suddenly exploded with sustained ethnic violence. Radical Shia against Sunni civilians, radical Sunni against Shia civilians, and radicals from both branches of Islam against Iraqi Christians and Sabian-Mandaeans and other minorities. Until the sectarian conflict slowed down in

2008, tens of thousands of Iraqis died while another 4.7 million fled the country to relative safety in other countries, as far away as Sweden and Australia. At the time of writing violence has resurged accompanied also by political conflict.

Yet, surprisingly, daily life in Iraq went on through all of the ebb and flow of conflict and Iraqis supported each other on an everyday basis. These are my experiences during this period as a young Iraqi Arab female born in Baghdad in 1968 into a Sunni Muslim family of one daughter and a son which developed in the time of the Ba'athist regime. After gaining my first degree I gained a position with a Ministry regulating the tertiary education sector. The spur for this study arises from my postgraduate research on social capital in an organisational setting in Iraq which I undertook between 2000 and 2003. The writing of my research dissertation was not yet complete when in 2003 the international coalition of armed forces led by the United States – including an Australian contingent - invaded Iraq and toppled the State apparatus of the Ba'ath Party regime and its autocratic president, the late Saddam Hussein. He was subsequently hanged, but the new rulers formed by the Coalition invaders kept the structures of the old Ministries and its institutions and I retained my position until I came to Australia in 2009 as a doctoral candidate at the University of Technology, Sydney.

From my experience in the Ministry I came to develop a new and different way of looking at not only my own world but that of other Iraqis - a social capital perspective. I began to reconsider how I looked at and what I experienced in the happenings in my world and how I observed and analysed, as a participant, the inevitable social turmoil and disruption to our daily patterns of life wherever we lived and worked and travelled in Iraq – in my case mostly in Baghdad.

A social capital perspective helped considerably to make sense of what appeared to be going on amid the disruption of the invasion of my homeland when on the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 2003, the foreign troops moved in from Kuwait. At this time we all experienced the noisy chatter and confusion of endless discussions between family and neighbours and friends and colleagues at work about what was happening and what we should do. These little group meetings and discussions became everyone's primary source of information, as we tried to reduce our uncertainty about our future to manageable

proportions. Adopting a social capital perspective helped me to step back and reflect on what these discussions meant.

It was a time of considerable confusion and misinformation. Iraqis had to depend on a State-controlled TV channel and radio stations and a number of State newspapers for our news and views of the world outside. The limited number of us who could access the internet could gain a different view from the so-called bloggers writing from within Iraq. But we could not access the international satellite TV channels.

There was throughout Baghdad a noticeable distrust of what the official Iraqi TV channels and the radio stations were saying about the progress of the invasion. We all knew they were following the Ba'athist government guidance on what was shown and said. But equally the government media could not claim every advance was a victory. They had to maintain some credibility. However it was not until invading aircraft started targeted bombings around Baghdad and we lost our electricity supply and even running water that we knew the war was upon us. I joined my family in fleeing to our relatives in our family province of Diyala.

There, in relative safety away from Baghdad, I could not help but note from my social capital perspective, the way in which Iraqis as individuals not only came together in natural social groups and exchanged the latest information they had heard but also the way they helped each other to make sense of the confusion swirling around them. From this they gained strength in freely coming together both in the privacy of their homes and on the streets. It became obvious they were exchanging emotional support and information and occasional practical assistance in participating in these groups. This in turn illuminated the sociological concepts with which I had come to grips during my earlier research.

Back in Baghdad after a few relatively tranquil months I also observed a new administration establishing itself under the watchful but often clumsy scrutiny of the new American-directed provisional government. Along with many others, we ordinary Iraqis noted first-hand how the institutions of Iraq re-organised themselves particularly in the education and the hospitals sectors. Schools re-opened, hospitals resumed treating



the sick. But into this process newly-emerging political institutions intruded with fearful consequences. These political institutions sprang mainly from the religious institutions of Iraq - with an old history of tensions between them. So we watched as Iraq's Shi'ite religious institutions came into conflict with Iraqi Sunni secular insurgents operating alongside Sunni radical religious movements like the Wahabis and Al Qaeda. This shattered the smooth realignment of Iraqi institutions as these opposing politico-religious factions started reorganising and arming themselves. Then as Iraqis watched in growing horror and fear, sectarian raids and killings became commonplace. Academics and professionals, along with former Ba'athist identities, were deliberately targeted for liquidation. Ordinary Iraqis in neighbourhoods of mixed religion found themselves seized and dragged away for execution while others were warned to get out of the neighbourhood. To many like myself it appeared that the social fabric of Iraq had been rent asunder by all these armed and usually fundamentalist gangs.

The first national election in Iraq's history in January 2005 produced a National Assembly with the task of writing a new Constitution and from its ranks came a transitional government. This helped both to re-stimulate the civil society and to reduce the blood lust of the radical armed groups on both sides as they re-focussed their bids to take control of the political future of our country. But it was to be another three years before the leaders of the armed militias on the Shia side cooled their followers and in 2008 re-organised them into political support groups or sent them in for training with the new Iraqi national and provincial Police forces or the New Iraqi Army. In the process I lost my brother to a murderous assault in December 2006 on the Ministry where he worked as a driver.

All this frightening activity raised a fundamental question for this researcher: Could the social capital of Iraq survive the bloody persecutory raids of these armed gangs pitting community against community of the society of Iraq for so many years?

It was to be another three years before a postgraduate scholarship from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research enabled me to come to Australia at the beginning of 2009 and begin to probe for answers to this question which would form the basis for a PhD research thesis.

## **1.2 Perspectives and Objectives of the study**

As a starting point, I wanted to investigate both the formation and the dimensions of the social capital of Iraq and then look at how it had been affected by the invasion and the sectarian conflicts and how it could be effectively put to use in rebuilding the Iraqi communities which seemed to have been shattered by the sectarian upheavals.

An initial literature review revealed an extensive body of writing about social capital. But these only produced a frustrating lack of insights and a lack of hard empirical data on the basic ‘who’ and ‘what’ and ‘where’ and ‘how’ information about social capital. There was insufficient data to underpin many of the theoretical propositions emerging about the concept of social capital. It also became clear that Iraq as a society did not really fit any of the western-oriented models of social capital being proposed by theorists so there would also be a need to revisit the history of what is now Iraq and its peoples’ long association with conflict over more than 40 centuries of human habitation. From this realisation came a decision to take a transactional process perspective on investigating the formation and use of social capital in Iraq.

I realized that the core of the social capital transactions that I witnessed among my own networks comprised an exchange of benefits, both tangible and intangible. From such a perspective, social capital in Iraq could therefore be viewed as the sum total of the benefits which Iraqis exchange freely with each other within their social networks to support and help each other in their daily lives. Exploring this phenomena from this perspective will therefore involve firstly identifying the social networks operating both within the civil society of Iraq and within our country’s formal religious, bureaucratic and business institutions; then there will be a need to identify the various sorts of benefits these networks can generate among their members. Insights will also need to be gained into how these social networks interact and transfer their benefits when appropriate.

Comprehensively exploring the behavioural phenomena underlying the concept of social capital requires posing some detailed and fundamental questions that will also take into account that this social capital transaction activity is taking place in a dynamic

and changing social environment that continues to be scarred by severe and violent social conflict – a conflict that has become re-energised following the departure of the American occupation forces at the end of 2011.

These questions became:

1. What are the key social networks of ordinary Iraqis and how do Iraqis benefit from these?
2. How do the networks intersect (especially across religious and ethnic divides)?
3. How have ordinary Iraqis responded to sectarian and military crises?
4. What are the implications for social policy?

These then become the key research questions for my investigation

### **1.3 Methodology**

It was clear to me that my research must generate hard empirical data to form a sound basis for developing theoretical propositions with sufficient explanatory power to be useful for, developing sound social policy and for community participants, to mobilise community support more effectively.

For this research, it was neither possible nor desirable to use quantitative research methodology. Under the current circumstances of violence and disruption, quantitative survey form of data gathering would be difficult. In addition there is no really acceptable statistical database about Iraqis on which to draw. The last – and only - census in Iraq was conducted some 56 years ago – in 1957. In the new post-2003 Iraq, there have been three attempts to conduct a new National Census. But each time it has been postponed due to political and social tensions between Baghdad and the Kurds and Turkomen over disputed territories in the north, particularly around Kirkuk.

Not only was the idea of a quantitative research project not feasible, it would not have been desirable in exploring the research questions. Therefore what was required was carefully-designed qualitative data-gathering, one that enabled a grounded, inductive approach.

Fortuitously a growing community of Iraqi refugees, a *diaspora*, has established itself over the past 20 years in the western suburbs of Sydney, Australia. They include Iraqis of all ethnicities and religious persuasions who still follow many of the important cultural customs of their land of birth and who still have many relatives residing in their home cities all over Iraq, while they enjoy a peaceful and secure life in Australia. Through a close friend in the district of Fairfield I was able to tap into their experiences with what I call social capital transactions. Because they were unfamiliar with the concept, I would be asking them for their recollections of the social networks of which they had been members and the benefits they received and gave.

Out of this initial exploration, a four-pronged research plan was devised. It comprised:

1. A participant-observer investigation and mapping of the ethnic groups and the potential social networks of Iraq. I utilised my own observations, past research, long experience of my own extended family network, and the reciprocating requests to which I responded for education-oriented benefits from members of my own social networks while I was working in the Ministry of Education.
2. A series of 18 focus groups held with 37 male and 31 female participants from the various ethno-religious groups in the Iraqi *diaspora* in Sydney, Australia. The aim was to provide both social network mapping validation data and data on their experiences in their extended family and other networks. These groups yielded valuable insights into the types of social networks of social capital value in Iraq and characteristics of the benefits exchanged within and between the networks. It was noteworthy also how once transported out of the religious radicalism in Iraq, there was no sign of social conflict between the Iraqi ethno-religious groups in their Australian setting. I observed only harmony, tolerance and general goodwill between them. While they all hold themselves to be Iraqis first, religious radicalism is not tolerated in the *diaspora*, and was not observed in any of the participant groups.

At these focus group gatherings utilised a simple personal questionnaire was completed as participants settled down in the meeting place. This yielded personal background information. Then participants joined in carefully-planned open-ended

exchanges about their experiences - with appropriate prompts - within their social networks and what they gained and provided in them. As an Iraqi myself I had no problem with Iraqi cultural sensitivities in interpersonal relationships and I was able to record the sessions.

3. A further round of data gathering involved video-phone interviews utilising the Skype service with 16 willing participants in Iraq who felt able to talk freely about their current social networks and the benefits they gained and provided. These interviews came after initial analysis of the *diaspora* data, to expand on emerging insights. These particularly probed the role of Iraqi women within the family and wider community.
4. The final round of data-gathering took the form of iterative interviews with six participants- four in Iraq and two in Australia. These I have called Special Interviews. Two were Iraqis residing in Baghdad, the other two lived in towns in a neighbouring province. One was a volunteer religious teacher at her local mosque. The other three were volunteers with some of the new Civil Service Organisations (NGOs) operating in Iraq at present. Two were Iraqis currently in Australia, both now Australian citizen Muslims with religious links to a Sunni mosque and to Shia *husseiniyats* and congregations around Sydney. They were interviewed for their special insights into the religious establishments in Iraq.

The research plan met the challenge of representativeness in the selection of respondents by utilising theoretical sampling, because the goal was to generate theoretical categories by talking to people who were suitable for exploring insights and relationships logically but revelatory or they offered unusual access to wanted data.

To encourage a free flow of data and given the patriarchal character of the society of Iraq, it was decided to conduct the discussions with separate groups of males and females. This became useful in yielding insights on gender differences in the volume and the type of social capital transactions. As a woman, I could facilitate the discussion with the women's groups, but relied on my male colleague to facilitate the discussion with the men's groups.

## 1.4 Outline of the thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters.

Chapter 2 presents a summary of the history of both social capital and conflict in the territories now known as Iraq. Iraq may not have been the birthplace of social capital as we know it, but it was one of the first regions of the world which utilised the strengths of social capital beginning in pre-history more than 60 centuries ago when early groups of hunter-gatherers realised the benefits of forming themselves into social networks and exchanging support and help in pursuit and food and in fending off enemies. Then they began moving out of the mountains of what is now northern Iraq onto the fertile plains of Mesopotamia, eventually forming themselves into tribes, then over centuries into townships and cities of the great Sumerian civilisation circa 4,000 BCE. Its civil society, its kings and its institutions all held together for 2½ thousand years through the combined social glue and lubricant which its social capital provided – until for reasons not well known the civilisation collapsed through internecine conflict.

This chapter goes on to chronicle the development of clan and tribal networks and the religious modifications to their social behaviours through the spread of the monotheistic religions, first Christianity and then 400 years later Islam. This was a period still punctuated with conflict from marauding hordes from the East until the peoples of what began to be called Iraq enjoyed the relative peace of the 400 years of Ottoman rule and in its later stages the introduction of modernity to rural tribal-dominated life until the disruption of the First World War. Then came the British-imposed Kingdom of Iraq from 1932 to 1963, the rise of republicanism and the quiet usurpation of power by the virtual dictator Saddam Hussein in 1968 until his toppling in 2003.

It concludes with a description of the society and institutions of the modern but still Middle East nation of Iraq, both shackled and strengthened by its tribal and behavioural norms and its strong family ties even as its tribal bonds are weakened and riven by conflict, but with its social networks still functioning as generators of social capital – the glue which binds the nation together. Statistical and socio-economic information about the population cities and towns is drawn from United Nations sources, primarily

the UN Country Team in Iraq report, United Nations Development Assistance Framework, Iraq 2015-2019 (UNDAF 2014).

Chapter 3 as a Literature Review seeks to summarise the development of the theoretical propositions about the concept of social capital and its apparent significance in societies as well as examine the writings of researchers and theorists on social networks as social capital generators and exchangers and the effects of various types of conflict on social capital utilisation for restoration and rebuilding. It also seeks to identify the gaps in the theoretical propositions that provide little guidance to a researcher looking for ways to identify the important characteristics of the social capital of a society like Iraq, something not attempted previously. It particularly looks at how researchers from a variety of academic disciplines and also policy analysts have looked at appropriate ways of measuring the social capital of a community or a civil society and have run into problems and disputes about what elements of the concept and the associated social network behaviours can be measured directly or only through what some critics call questionable surrogate or proxy indicators.

Chapter 4 describes in detail the data gathering methodology and approach used in the research for this investigation. Chapter 5 presents the results from the data-gathering both from the *disapora* group discussions and from the interviews with Iraqis by video-link. This chapter begins with a tabulated summary of one important finding – the different types of benefits reported by the participants (Table 5.1 *Summary count of benefits reported by all participants by type of benefit*). This chapter then concentrates on reporting in detail the results relating to the important Family networks. (Data about the participants and the benefits they recalled are not only tabulated separately, but are reported in full as appendices, as are copies of the research instruments used in the group discussions and the Tele-interviews). Results are reported by findings on particular characteristics of the Family network, including size, frequency of exchanges, network durability, learning characteristics, the place of personal relationships and gender differences. Chapter 6 reports the results of the study on the next important social networks identified from the data gathering, the Personal social networks plus a less clear set of networks which the study calls the Other Personal Cross-Linked social networks. It describes three such networks: Work networks, Worship networks and

Community Volunteer networks. These are social networks in which some Iraqis participate but in a more constrained manner than in their personal networks. These constrained networks function in organisational settings which can be both formal and informal. (Data about the participants and the benefits they recalled are tabulated separately along with records of the data and included separately as appendices, along with copies of the research instruments used). As in chapter 5 the results are reported as findings on particular characteristics of the networks.

Chapter 7 presents an analysis of the data and a discussion of the findings of the study. It begins with a schematic representation of the key findings about the important elements of the process of generating social capital in Iraq (Table 7.1 *The Social Capital Process in Iraq*). This table identifies what appear to be the elements involved in forming social networks, what is involved in engaging in social capital transactions within them, what are the benefits which members exchange received and what place these benefits have as assets in the pools of social capital residing in social networks. Finally it shows how these benefits are accessed immediately in times of need by members or become latent benefits which members can access at a later time or which can be mobilised by trusted facilitators for projects of benefit to their local communities. This chapter also includes an infographic representation of how the networks appear to interact with other elements of Iraqi civil society and state institutions at the *meso* regional or community level (Figure 2 – *The Stock of Social Capital in Iraq*).

The findings about the importance of interpersonal relationships in social networks, reported in Chapter 5 are analysed in more depth about their potential as perhaps more useful measures for determining the strength of a social network and the quality of the social capital benefits generated within it. They also point the way to a useful distinction between normal and potential higher-order benefits which can be realised in different social settings and contexts.

The analysis also explore the complicated question of trust and reciprocity as cognitive components of a society's social capital. It comes to a finding that these elements may have only an indirect link with the concept of social capital. It also examines other norms which influence the reciprocating behaviour of Iraqis in their social networks. It



particularly highlights the important norm in Iraq, of the socially-required practice of *wastaa* (intercession) - members using their contacts to intercede on behalf of another network member in trouble, with decision-making authorities at the clan, religious or State level.

The findings confirm that Iraq's social networks are embedded in an institutional framework which has many weaknesses and flaws. This limits the potential of Iraq's social capital to create potential linkages with the civil society networks and the State institutions network and improve the distribution of State social benefits to the communities of Iraq.

The findings also point to differences in how Iraqis behave as in benefit exchange transactions both as members of multiple social networks and in terms of their age and gender differences. The findings highlight the leading role of Iraqi women in these exchanges.

The study examines, in the light of some of its findings, how the fragile civil society of Iraq is emerging after its years of repression under the previous autocratic regime. The growth of new community aid groups and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and the potential they offer Iraqis who join them as volunteers to access and mobilise the latent social capital of these volunteers other Personal networks is promising.

But the framework of the institutions of the State are found to be troubled and inefficient, especially in the important bureaucratic sector which is expected to plan and implement the social programs of the government in a manner which will enhance the restoration of Iraq's social cohesion. The result, the study finds, has been an uneven delivery of State aid and assistance for helping the genuinely needy, the disabled and disadvantaged and the widows and orphans who comprise the most vulnerable groups in Iraq, amid a developing sense of widespread corruption and sectarian discrimination. It is noteworthy that, as the study reports, the UN Country Team's assessment is that the State and governorate administrations need retraining and rebuilding as they establish closer participation with their communities.

Chapter 8, as the conclusion of this thesis, establishes how the study's research program has met the specific four research objectives and summarises what further research is needed to clarify the picture of social capital stimulus at the institutional level of Iraq's society. It also canvasses some of the implications of the study for social policy in Iraq. It also provides an optimistic picture of how the strength and vibrancy of social capital activity among Iraqis at the basic *micro*-level of Iraqi society, may well suffice to sustain a suitable level of social benefits for Iraqis while the institutional leadership focuses on the social policy implications for enhancing and building up the stocks of Iraq's social capital.

## CHAPTER 2

### IRAQ –HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

#### 2.1 Introduction

Modern-day Iraq can lay claim to being the birthplace of prehistoric human social networks among the hunter-gatherers in small villages near the northern mountains of Iraq (Watkins, 1992). Those early human social networks are the source of the earliest forms of what we now call social capital. By the Bronze Age they had developed themselves into larger networks or clans on the fertile plains between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and began village settlements. Over the centuries these settlements gradually expanded into the first early Mesopotamian civilisations around 35 centuries ago (Ur, 2012).

We can safely speculate that these clans of early hunter-gatherers would have already learned to come together in what we now call a discrete social network of, most probably, related family groups. They learned to place value on the free communal exchange of practical assistance, information and emotional support benefits with each other in pursuit of food and fending off enemies. If they did not learn, they did not survive. They also began learning the basic value of developing and accepting social rituals and communal norms to regulate their behaviour towards each other as well as strangers, while enhancing the benefits they all experienced from each other.

As these clans moved out of the mountains of what is now northern Iraq onto the fertile plains of Mesopotamia, they utilised and developed their various types of social capital to form themselves into tribes and, over the following centuries into larger townships and institutions which would later underpin the great Sumerian civilisation circa 3,500 BCE. This, from anthropological history, appears to have become the first great civilisation of human history. Its civil society, kings and institutions functioned relatively smoothly for a further 2 ½ thousand years, bound together by the activity and assets of their social networks. But it obviously could not stave off conflict from

invasion. It could only help the survivors to sustain each other. Regretfully, because we know little of their social networks, we can only speculate as to the sophistication of their sources of social capital and its composition and its effects on this highly-organised civilisation. From the famous 14<sup>th</sup> century North African Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun who visited Damascus in 1400, we learn how he defined the concept of what he called *asabiyah*, literally “spirit of kinship”, as an important bond linking humans. From this came the formation of communities, clans and tribes on which he based his theories on the rise and fall of political leaders and their empires. Modern scholars (Gierer, 2001) see this “spirit of kinship” as embracing features of human behaviour under the influence of kinship, reciprocity expectations and emotional bonds.

However, the Sumerian civilisation collapsed and other types of organised communities emerged, grew, flourished then also collapsed as invaders from other regions rent them asunder through armed conflict. The invaders’ leaders in turn imposed a new social and political order on the inhabitants while absorbing the achievements of their beaten predecessors. This chapter chronicles briefly the history of conflict and the rise and fall of successive empires over the following 3,000 years.

This chapter goes on to chronicle the development of clan and tribal networks and the religious modifications to their social behaviours through the spread of the monotheistic religions, firstly Christianity and then 600 years later, Islam and its subsequent spread throughout the Middle East and into North Africa and beyond. While the historical record of conflict is well established, it will be up to future historians to catalogue the sources and richness of the social capital generated.

This was a period punctuated with conflict from marauding hordes from the East until the peoples of what began to be called Iraq enjoyed the relative peace of 400 years of Ottoman rule and in its later stages the introduction of modernity to rural tribal-dominated life until the disruption of the First World War. The British imposed the Hashemite Kingdom on the new Iraq from 1932 to 1963 which fell to the rise of republicanism and the quiet usurpation of power by the dictator Saddam Hussein in 1968 until his toppling in 2003.

This chapter concludes with a description of the society and the public and private institutions of the modern nation of Iraq, both shackled and strengthened by its tribal and behavioural norms and its strong family ties even as its tribal bonds are weakened by conflict, but with its society's social networks still functioning as generators of social capital – as a glue which helps keep the society together through all the changes.

## **2.2 Conflict and social capital in the territories of Iraq**

Terrible though the post-invasion conflict has been in Iraq since 2003, historical records shows conflict has been no stranger to the territory occupied by modern-day Iraq over the last 40 or so centuries, and some of it has been more terrible than the recent experiences. But the enduring extended family clan and tribal social networks have adapted and survived as an important element of Iraqi society as we now know it.

Although the emergence of the modern-day nation of Iraq has its genesis in the final years of the Ottoman Empire from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the development of the main source of the country's social networks – the extended family based clans and tribes of the region, go back into the dawn of human history.

As Tripp (2000) records in his *History of Iraq*, Iraq became the name in mediaeval times for the Mesopotamian plains around the dominant rivers of Iraq, the Euphrates and the Tigris. But the recorded history of the peoples of the region goes back well before then and the tribes and ethno-religious groups have always been in some form of conflict among themselves and at the hands of invaders. But the evolving social networks of families, clans and tribes have always dominated societal evolution in these territories.

So the current problems of Iraq are nothing new. The main difference is the prolonged intensity of the violent assault on the society of Iraqi people and the special demands on their social capital since 2003.

Lewis (1990) in his chapter of the US Library of Congress paper "*Iraq: A Country Study*" usefully traces the patterns of invasions and religious influences since the

establishment of the Sumerian empire around 3500 BCE and its legacy of recorded writing, the wheel, the growth of literature and written laws.

As noted, there followed the Akkadians around 2300 BCE, then the Amorites and the Elamites around 2000 BCE who formed the Babylonian empire and produced the famous King Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) and the world's first known Code of Laws. The cruel rules of the Assyrian Empire came next around 1200 BCE finally building Nineveh and destroying Babylon under their King Sennacherib. The neo-Babylonian Chaldeans took over around 612 BCE, of which their most famous ruler was King Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 BCE) who rebuilt Babylon.

The Achaemenid Iranian intrusion followed in 539 BCE, when Babylon fell to the Persian Cyrus the Great (550-530 BCE). Darius the Great followed, only to be unseated by the Greeks under Alexander the Great in 331 BCE. But during that time the Persians settled in great numbers in the region and this became an important demographic landmark for Iraq.

The advent of the Greeks for the next 200 years was also important. It introduced western ways and western ideas along with a business revival because Mesopotamia became an important trade route. Additionally, says Lewis (1990), 'Cultural interchange between Greek and Mesopotamian scholars was responsible for the saving of many Mesopotamian scientific, especially astronomical, texts.' (p.2)

Thereafter, the Iraqi territories became battlegrounds for the Parthians from Turkestan, the Romans and the Sassanids from Iran and the cultural mix of the territories was enriched by Arab, Iranians, and Aramaean settlers. During all this came the spread of conversions to Christianity after the death of Jesus of Nazareth. The spread and influence of Christianity marked the first notable intrusion of religion-based rules on social behaviour.

But the most telling invasion of all in the Iraqi territories was that of the new Muslim Arabs, with an army of 18,000 Arab tribesmen in 634 CE. The Sassanid rulers and armies collapsed, the Islamic conquest of the Mesopotamian territories was complete by

650 CE and Iraq remains a nominally Islamic nation today. Christianity is built on the basic rules of individual behaviours towards others, as set down as the Ten Commandments of Hebrew origins. Islam expanded on these with much more explicit rules of behaviours towards each other, embodied in Sharia'a Law. The most notable of these was perhaps the explicit rules for marriage, property management, bequests and shares of estates.

Significantly for the Iraqi territories in 631 CE, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was murdered in a dispute over who should have been the third Caliph and out of this was born the great Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian split in Islam – which continued to profound consequences which shaped Middle East societies for the next 12 centuries to the present day. As Lewis (1990) describes it, 'the groups in power directed their energies to maintaining the status quo while those outside the major power structure devoted themselves to political and religious rebellion. The ideologies of the rebellions usually were couched in religious terms. Frequently, a difference in the interpretation of a point of doctrine was sufficient to spark armed warfare. More often, however, religious disputes were the rationalisation for underlying nationalistic or cultural dissatisfactions'. (p.2)

In terms of religion as recorded in The Old Testament (Genesis, 11, 12), it is noteworthy that the prophet Abraham came from Ur of Chaldeans, within the present province of Thi Qar in southern Iraq. He left after a sharp dispute with his people over the concept of a monotheistic God. He settled in Mecca and built the famous Holy Qaaba in the centre of what is now the Great Mosque of Mecca. He is also credited with the foundation of the Hajj pilgrimage of Islam. He left his son Ismail in Mecca and took his other son Isaac to Palestine. It is from the Line of Ismail that the prophet Muhammad, a member of the Hashemite clan of the powerful Quraysh tribe of Mecca began preaching his revelations and gathered followers for the monotheistic faith of Islam 600 years after the death of Jesus Christ. Hence the very close links with Christianity. In fact the Holy Koran declares that Christians, Jews and Sabian Mandaneans are 'people of the book' (The Quran, Surat Al-Maida, verse 5, No.44).

The impact of the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam was profound on the entire historical events that have passed in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Significantly Judaism, Christianity and Islam all helped to codify the basic norms that had developed among the tribes about mutual help and a spirit of community solidarity within each other's clan and tribe. This provided a religious base for the micro-behaviours of Iraqis that generated the social capital of the society of each period. And, notably for Iraq, the split between the Sunni and Shia's branches of Islam, established and perpetuated the religious conflict between the two most powerful religions in Iraq.

The Islamic Abbasid Caliphate took over in 750 and ruled until 1258. During this time Baghdad developed into a centre of power and Arab and Iranian cultures intermingled to produce in the Arab world what Lewis calls 'a blaze of philosophical, scientific, and literary glory.' (Lewis, 1990, p.3).

Then the Iraqi peoples had to endure a Mongol invasion that virtually destroyed Baghdad. First Ghengis Khan's grandson, Hulagu, seized Baghdad in 1258 and killed the last Abbasid caliph. Lewis (1990) records that 'while in Baghdad, Hulagu made a pyramid of the skulls of Baghdad's scholars, religious leaders, and poets, and he deliberately destroyed what remained of Iraq's canal headworks. The material and artistic production of centuries was swept away. Iraq became a neglected frontier province ruled from the Mongol capital of Tabriz in Iran'. The Mongol leader Tamerlane swept down from Samarkand back into Baghdad in 1401 to wreak fresh havoc. After a century of tribally-based nomadism the Iraqi territories came under the control of the Ottoman Empire based in Turkey which lasted from 1534 until 1918.

### **2.3 The Ottomans and Iraq**

During these times of high conflict the ordinary people of these territories clung to their clan and tribal identities and within these social networks continued to exchange social capital benefits that kept them all at least in a state of survival and some to flourish. The new Ottoman authorities encouraged this as they set up their early administrative structures.



The Iraqi territories were set up as the provinces or *wilayets* of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Lewis (1990) asserts that the Ottomans stepped in because the Safavids, who were the first to declare Shia'ism the official religion of Iran, sought to control Iraq both because of the Shia'ism holy places at Najaf and Karbala and because Baghdad, the seat of the old Abbasid Empire, had great symbolic value.

But maintaining control in the territories of Iraq was not easy. As a pointer to the power of the tribes as dominant social networks, Lewis (*op cit*) notes that in Iraq, tribal authority once again dominated after continual tribal migrations and conflict. The central Ottoman authorities had little presence in the rural areas and were content to let tribal customary law settle disputes over water, land and personal status, especially marriage, but always as defined under Sharia'ism law.

## **2.4 Modernising Iraq**

In the final 40 years of Ottoman rule in the Iraqi territories the Ottomans regained authority when the reform-minded Midhat Pasha was appointed governor of Baghdad in 1869. Lewis (1990) relates how Midhat immediately began to use the Western model to modernise the Iraqi territories. Under his reforms, called the *tanzimat*, he set up elected municipal councils in the major cities, staffed largely by Iraqi notables with no strong ties to the masses. This altered the tribal-urban balance of power in favour of the central authority and its new land reforms replaced the feudal system of land holdings and tax farms with legally sanctioned property rights.

The introduction of Western disciplines in the schools stimulated a greater Western political and economic presence in Iraq. Both Britain and France opened consulates in Baghdad in 1802. Lewis (*op cit*) says, 'Steamboats began operating on the rivers in 1836 and telegraph lines opened telegraph communications in 1861. The Suez Canal opened in 1869, providing the Iraq territories with greater access to European markets' (p.2).

Pelletiere (1990), in his chapter in the Library of Congress paper, summarised the turn of the century tribal structure as one in which the classical nomadic structure became a social system in which the tribe unit shared responsibilities in feuds and war and

restricted and controlled marriages within its ranks and held and maintained a specified share of land. The tribe required mutual assistance and the older men, the elders shared authority. Within the tribe the primary family unit was the clan, families related by descent or adoption. But clans could and often did switch allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, rising tribe. The clans were also units of solidarity in disputes with other clans in the tribe, although there could be intense feuding among the lineage groups within the clan. Each clan also shared a territorial interest in the tribal land. While a tribe had a single sheikh (*ashira*) as its leader, tribes could band together in confederations under a paramount sheikh.

It was within this clan and tribal structure and always under the constraints of Islam on social behaviours that the people of what is now Iraq began to develop their own social capital behaviours. Pelletiere (*op cit*) noted that the lines between these village dwellers and the more nomadic tribal people were, at least until just before the First World War, quite distinct. As the extension of education, health, and other social services to the generally impoverished rural areas increased, the number and the social influence of the village people who were usually not kin of the nomadic tribal groups who grazed or farmed the surrounding lands increased.

From a social capital perspective, this infiltration process produced in these communities, sets of non-family social networks of artisans and merchants who generated their own pools of social capital to help each other and to reach out into the other more established clan and tribal based social networks. But these new social networks, along with the durable family and clan-based units still all functioned under their religion-based norms. One basic norm that grew from all this was the set of expected behaviours which came to be recognised in the Arabic language as *wastaa* - a term used, on the one hand, for the act of steering conflicting parties to compromise (*wasata*) and on the other, for the person who could act as the intercessor (*wastaa/wasit*) (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1993). It remains an underpinning of the free exchange of benefits within the social networks of Iraq.

Under the transforming Ottoman ruler Medhat, relationships between the institutions of government, the tribes and the religious elements of society also changed. By the end of

Ottoman rule with the advent of the First World War, the peoples of what is now Iraq were experiencing the social change of modernisation and urbanisation and they were adapting the ways in which they used their own communal social networks. But this appears to have basically remained a localised *micro* and *meso* level community benefit pooled within a tribally dominant socio-religious framework in geographically-isolated settings.

## **2.5 From Kingdom and Republicanism to the Ba'athist rule**

Change came more quickly after the disruption of the First World War of 1914-1918. The British first took control of all the *wilayets* of Baghdad and Basra in 1918 and later Mosul and the Kurdish areas. In the face of many changes in the civil society of the new Iraq due to the growth of the towns and cities, the British strengthened the influence and power of the rural tribes that had developed their own socio-legal framework for resolving disputes. Finally, the British installed the Hashemite Kingdom of the new and independent nation of Iraq in 1932. The towns and cities grew, generating different types of Social activity while the socio-religious-political framework of the society changed with different administrations in the kingdom introducing new institutions, reshaping them and imposing new intrusions into the lives of ordinary Iraqis.

The kingdom as an institution survived until after the Second World War of 1939-1945 but collapsed under the pressure of new contributions to the socio-religious-political activity of the nation State. These were the political ideologies of communism, Iraqi style, then in competition the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism and, hand-in-hand, the behaviours of the political groups which sought support within the institutions and more widely among the people of the society of the new Iraq. These parties generated much social unrest in the society and finally, it was one of the infected institutions, the Iraqi Army, which toppled the royal ruling elite of the day. An Army general, a nationalist and a Sunni with a Shi'ite mother, General Abdul Karim Kassem led the coup, proclaimed Iraq as a republic and installed himself as prime minister, ruling from July 1958 to 1963. His term was marked by constant balancing of the demands of the Pan-Arab Ba'athists and the Iraqi communists but more importantly for the development of the social capital of the new Iraq by sweeping agrarian reforms which abolished the old

feudal system of land control, widened the free education and health care system and with the Law on Personal Status, freed women from their previous patriarchal and religious subjugation.

Kassem also nationalised the newly established oil wealth of the country and conducted Iraq's first and only National Census. But, finally a Ba'athist revolt unseated him in February 1963 and he was executed.

Five years later, Saddam Hussein, the de facto head of the Ba'ath Party government for several years, took control of the Ba'ath Party and on 16 July 1979 installed himself as President. He was in power until the Coalition invasion of Iraq in April 2003.

## **2.6 Iraq under the Ba'athists and Saddam Hussein**

The historical record of Iraq under the late Ottoman rule until its transformation into a republic is, unlike the earlier periods, now well established. Historians and commentators such as the British historian Charles Tripp (Tripp 2000), the Americans Peter Sluglett and his wife Marion Farouk-Sluglett (Sluglett & Sluglett 2001, Sluglett 2012), the Palestinian émigré political sociologist Hanna Batatu (Batatu 1978) and the popular Iraqi sociologist Dr Ali Al Wardi (only recently beginning to be published in English – Al Kohei & Al Wardi 2010) sought to make sense from various analytical perspectives, of a combination of the historical record and rich folklore which developed from the late Ottoman rule onwards. The folklore became even richer during the time of the kingdom, the early republic then under Saddam Hussein – a period most older Iraqis like this researcher's father have lived through.

The historical records chronicle how the installation of the Ba'athist regime introduced more change of ideas and behaviours to Iraqis. The Ba'athists introduced the experience of the political ideology of Pan-Arab nationalism into the mindset of the educated Iraqis who still tended to be religiously oriented. Competing with the Ba'athists in this ideological battle were the various brands of Middle East communism which, through their parties, promoted a modified Marxist ideology of nationhood. Neither ideology appealed to the majority of Iraqis but the Ba'athists controlled the police and the Army and therefore Iraqis took notice of the Ba'ath Party. When access to tertiary education

and to jobs in the civil service became dependent on membership of the Ba'ath Party, Iraqis had no hesitation in joining in their thousands. It lessened their potential problems with the state, even if they had to endure from time to time the required attendance at local party meetings to undergo a poor form of indoctrination.

In the area of cross-links between the civil society and the ruling institutions, Saddam Hussein also institutionalised the traditional Arabic practice of *muqtada* or patronage in a special way. In his *History of Iraq* the British historian Charles Tripp notes how Saddam Hussein reinforced as an important element of his dictatorship, what Tripp (2000) called the 'social networks of kinship.' Saddam used them as channels of both reward and punishment to develop a kind of patrimonial system which, coupled with the economic power of Iraqi oil and the ruthless exercise of coercive power, sustained his regime until 2003.

The Ba'athist regime also heightened the potential benefit of sheer survival into the social capital mix in Iraq. Because of the regime's intolerance of any disagreement, Iraqis came under personal threat and individual members of extended family social networks sometimes desperately sought help from relatives for temporary shelter in rural areas. Then they needed financial help to pay smugglers to obtain false documents to flee persecution at the hands of the regime's *mukhabarat* (the secret police) because they were imputed to be opponents of or even merely disrespectful towards the regime and its president.

The Ba'athist regime also changed the relationships between the state and the people in other and more significant ways. The Ba'athists made only slight changes to Kassem's Law of Personal Status but it established these practices in a special way as a single body of family law. A brief amendment was enacted in 1963.

In all this change, the family remained a key element of Iraqi society under the Ba'athists. In terms of leadership, the senior male was always head of an immediate family unit which could often consist of a senior couple, their sons, the sons' wives and children, and their unmarried daughters. Other dependent relatives could also be attached to this household. As Pelletiere (1990) noted the senior male managed its properties and had the final voice in decisions and when he died the eldest son became

the head of the family. This custom continues to the present day. Economics, prestige and family strength in clan and tribal considerations all contribute to the high value placed on large families. Pelletiere (*op cit*) says: 'Family solidarity is stressed. The passage from adolescence to maturity is swift. Upon reaching puberty, there traditionally is a separation of sexes, and girls are excluded from male society except that of their close kin. Great emphasis is placed on premarital chastity, and this is one reason for early marriages. Boys have greater freedom during adolescence than girls and begin to be drawn into the company of their fathers and the world of men'. (p.3)

However, Saddam Hussein's Iraq-Iran War of 1990-1998 not only affected the types of social capital benefits transacted in Iraq at that time. It also had a profound impact on the status of the women of Iraq, changing the traditional pattern of male dominance, according to Tripp (2000). With so many men conscripted to the front lines of the war with Iran, the regime had to bring many more women into its civil service and into its mostly government run and service industries.

For many women this meant financial independence from their husbands and hence a change in the nature of the marital relationship with them and a different lifestyle from those of home-bound domestic duties. Extraordinarily for an Arab country, the Ba'athist regime not only sanctioned this new change for women, but it also generated a significant amount of propaganda in publicising the role of women as helping to win the war.

Also and very different for an Arab country, the regime was forced by UN sanctions after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War to move directly into an unaccustomed responsibility for a particular ongoing social service, the provision of monthly food rations directly to its citizens. This began in 1997 under the so called UN Oil for Food program, introduced when the heavy international sanctions against the Ba'athist regime began to take a toll on the health and nutrition of Iraqi people. It continues to the present time of writing though now as a direct Iraqi government initiative even after the UN withdrew from Iraq in 2010.

## **2.7 The new Republic of Iraq and its Social Capital**

In 2003 as a result of the international invasion of Iraq, Iraqis found themselves to be the citizens of a nation-state in transition from the toppled Ba'athist regime to what the U.S. Department of State calls a "constitutional parliamentary republic" (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights, 2013). As in the past, the invaders took over the Ba'athist State institutions and brought in changes to the system of governance and to the institutions of the State with the aim of providing for an elected central government that would develop into an undefined type of democratic, constitutional republic. It was a very different kind of governance to what Iraqis had been accustomed and the transition has not gone smoothly in the decade since the invasion.

Iraq has always been an Islamic nation and according to the latest figures (U.S. Department of State 2013), Muslims in various degrees of commitment to the religion of their birth, accounted for 97 per cent of the population. Of these, adherents to the Shia branch of Islam are estimated at between 60% to 65% while adherents to the Sunni branch are estimated at between 32% and 37%. The remainder are Christians and other smaller religious sects

After a lifetime of frustration and suffering under the repressive Sunni minority Ba'athist regime, the more Islamist-oriented elements of the Shi'ite religious establishment who embrace some of the more radical extremist interpretations of Islam formed their own private militias to enforce their religiously-oriented ideology of Islamist governance. In turn some disaffected Sunni insurgents formed their own insurgent armed groups to resist the new Shia dominated elected governments. Over the first five years of transition, bloody sectarian conflict erupted. It was only after successive elected governments were able, with the help of the Coalition occupation forces, to build up their own Army and police forces that the State was able to force the Shi'ite leaders to stand down their militias while continuing efforts to curb the effects of the Sunni insurgent groups.

But the Shia-dominated central governments increasingly also pursued their own divisive anti-Sunni agendas. The International Crisis Group described how Arab Sunnis found themselves “quickly-marginalised” by the Shia government in Baghdad and the Sunni Kurds in the north (ICG Middle East Report 2013). They turned away from the political parties and relied more on their tribal leaderships. Political conflict became intertwined with violent sectarian conflict in the provinces where the Sunnis had a strong prominence - Anbar in the west, Ninewa and Kirkuk in the north and Salah al Din and Diyala nearer to Baghdad. Then the U.S, withdrew its troops at the end of 2011 leaving the divided political authorities and the institutions of the State to pursue Iraq’s future themselves in continuing conflict.

After a decade of this political and sectarian turmoil Iraq as a nation-state , according to the most recent United Nations documents, in 2011 totaled 33,338,000 people, 50.9% of them males, 49.1% females, and growing at a rate of 3% per annum. (UNDAF 2014).

Iraq is rated as an Upper Middle Income country, thanks to massive oil revenues. But according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, there are serious inequalities. Some 6.5 million Iraqis, are impoverished and the unemployment rate is 11%. More than a million have been forced from their residences and become “internally displaced.” There is “extreme poverty” apparent in rural areas and in some governorates (provinces), labour market participation is extremely low for women, youth unemployment is high, illiteracy is “pervasive” education levels among rural young men and women is low and some 1.9 million Iraqis are “food insecure” (UNDAF 2014).

The institutions of the State are also found to be wanting. The UNDAF report says: “The capacity of institutions and groups in Iraq to provide quality services on an equitable basis is perceived to be low. There is a widespread absence of trust in institutions of all kinds.” (p.5). It also notes that “corruption continues to be a major challenge to public sector performance, efficiency and public trust.” (p.2). It further notes that affecting social cohesion in Iraq are “lack of political and institutional inclusion of minorities” and “a bureaucratic concern over sectarian identity (seen as discriminatory), lack of implementation of rights and liberties related laws, separate



education policies for different cultural, ethnic and linguistic groups, perceived inequitable service provision for different groups, gender discrimination, poorly designed de-Ba'athification strategies, forced displacement and a sense of spreading corruption.” (p.5). The Iraqi public sector, the report says, is in need of modernization and professionalism” and a “healthy and vibrant civil society” is required (p.14).

Evidence of the status of individual and family life is scarce. As noted previously, the last – and only - census in Iraq was conducted some 56 years ago – in 1957. Successive governments have had to rely on that census data ever since. In the new post-2003 Iraq, there have been three attempts to conduct a new National Census. But each time it has been postponed due to political and social tensions between Baghdad and the Kurds and Turkmen over disputed territories in the north, particularly around Kirkuk.

One indicator does emerge from data provided in July 2011, when the Ministry of Planning unit, the High Commission for Population and Housing Census (HCPHC) released a ‘Buildings, Dwelling and Establishment Census and Household Listing’ as part of its work on a national census. In its press release it estimated that Iraqis lived in nearly 5 million households within some 4.5 million houses and attached buildings. Of these 69 % lived in urban areas while the rural areas comprised the remaining 31%.

Within the private sector, The HCPHC unit said there were 1.45 million ‘economic establishments’, 70.5% of them in the urban areas and 86.4% of these were private sector businesses. The government remained the biggest employer. The Civil Service provided 45% of all jobs in the urban areas and 28% of the jobs in the rural areas. It was also the employer of 60% of all female Iraqis who work. The more recent UNDAF report noted, however, that the private sector provided only limited employment opportunities. Only 43.8% of Iraqis were in the labour force. Of these 75% were economically-active men, compared to 14.7% of Iraqi women.

This conveys something of the social milieu within which Iraqis today live their daily lives. But conflict still dominates and still makes special demands on their capabilities, their willingness and their own personal assets in their social capital transactions to

assist members of their social networks in times of stress. The UNDAF report (2014) states:

“Hazards, both man-made and natural, threaten communities throughout Iraq and especially the most vulnerable. There are not adequate systems in place at community level or within the government to anticipate or respond to these threats, exacerbating their impact. Many communities have struggled with insecurity, political violence, armed conflict and displacement over long periods of time. At the local level their capacity to prevent, mediate and resolve conflict varies greatly, as does their ability to recover quickly from the impacts of conflict and violence. Community resilience to conflict and violence needs to be strengthened in part through building social capital, trust networks and leadership...” (p.14).

## CHAPTER 3

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 3.1 Introduction

100 years ago, an observant and prescient 36-year-old American Supervisor of Rural Schools in the state of West Virginia, Lyda Judson Hanifan A.M, coined the term social capital as he penned a scholarly paper on ‘The Rural School Community Center’, The American Academy of Political and Social Science published his paper in its Annals in 1916. It was the first time the term social capital appeared in western academic literature, as Putnam (1995) has noted.

Here is how he described social capital at the *micro* level of society and its potential at the *meso* level for community building:

‘I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit ... The individual is helpless socially. If he may come into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbors ... When the people of a given community have become acquainted with one another and have formed a habit of coming together upon occasions for entertainment, social intercourse and personal enjoyment, that is when sufficient social capital has been accumulated, then by skilful leadership this social capital may easily be directed towards the general improvement of the community well-being.’ (Hanifan, 1916, pp. 130-131).

In light of what has happened over the last 100 years since the adoption of this new conceptual label and the subsequent reconceptualisations by theorists, researchers and policy analysts, it is instructive that Hanifan firstly described the basis for coining the term. He establishes as the foundational fact, born of human experience, that individuals alone are ‘socially helpless’ and have to rely on each other - even if only through the

family in which they grow up. He implied that the people of the American rural community about which he wrote, had only learned from within their family life, a limited basic set of behaviours towards each other towards becoming more ‘social.’ Secondly, he records how they had been encouraged (deliberately, by their local teachers) to expand their behaviours towards each other particularly in ‘coming together on occasions for enjoyment, social intercourse and personal enjoyment’ and so they had in turn learned there were benefits to be gained for themselves in enriching their own individual daily lives through these social activities.

He also set down a number of inter-related theoretical propositions about what he was the first to call social capital. These appear to be:

- Individual humans are not able to function as human beings, by themselves. They come together and recognise others as making up a ‘social unit.’
- They learn, usually within their family setting, a basic set of rituals governing behaviours towards other human beings – rituals based on the *mores* and folklore that have been handed down within their communities and which enables them to avoid being ‘socially helpless.’
- Individuals also learn by experience that they can improve the quality of their lives by learning new and richer sets of interactive behaviours with other people in their community. These behaviours, they discover, bring both to themselves and to the others with whom they interact, a variety of benefits that enable them to use the tangible assets they have accumulated to themselves for a more enriching life. He gives as examples of these tangible benefits, cash, personal property, real estate and examples of the intangible benefits: *goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy, help, social intercourse, entertainment and personal enjoyment.*
- In interacting in this richer way with the other members of their particular community or ‘social unit’ they are both exchanging these benefits and building up a resource of potential benefits for their social unit. These benefits become the social capital of the social unit.
- This social capital has ‘social potentiality’ for improving the whole community

while for the individual members their new associations with each other gives them the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of their neighbours.

- The social capital as a potential community asset needs ‘skilful leadership’ to realise this potential, so that the social capital is directed towards ‘the general improvement of the community well-being.’

It is notable that Hanifan thought that the pattern of behaviours in the American rural districts which he observed was too constrained, leading him to note that there was ‘almost a total lack of social capital in rural districts throughout the country’ (p.131).

Hanifan was describing what he perceived to be a sociological phenomenon produced by a particular ‘social unit’; a rural community of constrained relationships who had learned to interact with each other more intensively than required by what we can term the established socio-religious ritual framework of rules for friendly recognition and politeness that prevailed in these US rural communities.

He also made the first steps in describing and classifying the benefits that became their social unit’s social capital at the *micro* level – benefits which he specified as including goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy, social intercourse and help. The source of their social capital, he in effect proposed, were the members of the rural community in enhanced interaction situations in which they developed more productive relationships that led to the exchange of benefits.

He also put forward the propositions that their enhanced interactions were the producers involved in the process of generating social capital; that social capital has a ‘social potentiality’ for the whole community; but that potential inherent in the social unit’s social capital needed to be tapped by ‘skilful leadership’ within the social unit to realise the potential and stimulate community-building projects.

Hanifan explicitly nominated the local teachers as his agents of ‘skilful leadership’ – presumably outsiders brought into the community – and their project as a program of activities to turn the schools into community centres to create better community

awareness of itself. This would be done through an Agricultural Fair and School Exhibit, increasing the level of school attendance, adding adult education classes, raising funds for school libraries and also, importantly stimulating community discussions of community infrastructure problems such as community bond-financing of road improvements – all designed, as Hanifan noted in his conclusion, so that community members were helped to ‘discover for themselves what ought to be done and they will not be satisfied until it is done.’ He concluded: ‘The more people do for themselves the larger will community social capital become, and the greater will be the dividends upon the social investment.’ (p.138).

Some 40 years later, the French sociologist and cultural anthropologist Marcel Mauss in a study of what he called ‘gift exchange’ in primitive societies declared to be an imperative of any human community the proposition that continuing membership of a community requires an individual firstly to give, secondly to receive and thirdly to reciprocate (Mauss 1954, cited in van der Eijk et al 2005). But it was to be another 30 years before the re-emergence of Hanifan’s label for part of the activity that Mauss described.

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) also cite the work of a team of Canadian urban sociologists in the 1950s, the exchange theorist George Homans and the urban scholar Jane Jacobs in the 1960s and the economist Glenn Loury in 1971 for scholarly work that ‘encapsulate the vitality and significance of community ties’ (p. 229).

It was the French sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu who also adopted the term social capital in 1983, in a paper which was published in 1986 in *The forms of capital* (Bourdieu 1986). To Bourdieu, social capital was one of the many forms of capital, not just the form recognised by economic theory. He saw social capital as comprising “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources available in durable networks of relationships between individuals as members of the network” (p.248). As members, they hold what he called “credits” to the group’s collectively-owned “capital.”

In 1988 the American sociologist James S. Coleman also explored the role of social capital in the creation of another form of capital, Human Capital, in a landmark article in the *American Journal of Sociology*. In 1993, in the U.S., another seminal contribution came from the political scientist Robert Putnam who made the term a central feature of his first book *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Putnam 1993). He linked social capital with the concept of civic engagement. Putnam also acknowledged the work of Hanifan in his famous popular book *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 2000). He described Hanifan's description of social capital as anticipating 'virtually all of the crucial elements in later interpretations.'

As Schuurman (2003) and Ferlander (2007) have noted, the writings of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam helped move the conceptual focus on social capital from the community to the wider society of a nation state. This stimulated rapidly-growing interest among social theorists, researchers and policy makers in a variety of different fields. Government institutions in developed countries in Scandinavia, the UK and Australia took a special interest and mounted their own social policy studies of social capital. The World Bank also began its intensive and comprehensive social capital Initiative program of research to develop applications of the concept to the Banks' international social and economic stimulus work.

Yet 100 years after Hanifan, the concept of social capital remains a problematical theoretical area. Critics like Johnson and Percy-Smith (2003), van der Eijk et al (2005) and Ferlander (2007) suggest the theoretical area has become plagued by over simplified and unsatisfying definitions, inadequate theoretical elaboration and generally uncertain measurement. This may appear to be due to scholars and policy makers losing sight of the reality of social capital as primarily a community 'asset' grounded in observable, empirical social behaviours and benefits exchanged within the social networks of communities. Further they have loosely applied to the concept in its *macro* application to a nation state, normative propositions such as 'trust' and 'reciprocity' as inherent characteristics of social capital, rather than necessary preconditions to its formation, as Mauss (1954) implied. Nor has there been much attention to the adequate classification of the types of social capital benefits exchanged in building up a pool of assets – they are seen as mainly "emotional", "informational" or "instrumental" benefits

(Ferlander 2007). But scholars now distinguish between differences in the general types of social capital, classifying them initially as ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ forms and later adding the ‘linking’ type (Woolcock, 1998 and Ferlander, 2007).

From all this has emerged a large number of differing summary definitions of social capital - ‘networks of social relations characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity...a resource to collective action’ (Stone and Hughes 2000) or ‘the goodwill that is engendered by the fabric of social relations and that can be mobilised to facilitate action’ (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Given the richness of Halifan’s original description, these short-hand definitions are at best summaries that invite more detailed analysis. It is to this researcher understandable that Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003) were moved to propose a research agenda on social capital that would seek to clarify the answers to five questions:

*What is social capital?* – answers that should be conceptually coherent;

*Where does social capital come from?* – how is it created in the first place;

*How can we get more of it?* – what should be the balance between grass-roots bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives;

*Is social capital always a ‘good thing’?* - how best to encourage positive social capital and manage negative manifestations of social capital; and

*Who benefits from social capital?* - the civil society in general or a privileged favoured few and the implications for gender and class differences.

A Dutch group of economists and mathematicians have gone further in asserting that social capital at this stage of its theoretical development was a ‘black box’ in which is hidden its underlying and undeveloped mechanisms and also a ‘black hole’ to which ‘many empirical phenomena’ can be attributed (van der Eijk, Dolfsma and Jolink, 2005, p.2).

### **3.2 The four theoretical streams on social capital**

From the considerable output of theoretical works and policy papers on social capital, particularly over the past 35 years, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) have identified four streams of theoretical propositions. Each, it should be noted, appears to have different levels of empirical support.



They name as the *Communitarian* view, the stream of theorising which ‘equates social capital with local level organisations, namely associations clubs and civic groups...’ and distinguishes between ‘productive social capital and ‘perverse’ social capital. This view also warns about both the virtues and vices of social capital. There is within this perspective a body of research findings from studies of social capital being produced in small local communities, particularly in the public health and education sectors.

Next they label as the *Networks* view, the stream of thought which they say, stresses the importance of ‘vertical as well as horizontal associations between people and relations within and among other organisational entities such as community groups and firms.’ This stream introduces the notions of ‘bonding’ social capital and ‘bridging’ social capital. This gives rise to what they see as two clear and important dimensions to social capital: ‘‘strong’ intra-community ties (‘bonds’) and ‘weak’ extra-community networks (‘bridges’).’ This *meso*-level view also distinguishes social capital as a ‘double-edged sword’ and stresses the need for the sources of social capital to be distinguished from the consequences to be derived from social capital.

They then describe the *institutional view* as one that holds that ‘the vitality of community networks and civil society is largely the product of the political, legal and institutional environment.’ It is from this *macro*-level perspective that the attempts to derive measures to record and operationalise the concept have emerged, mainly for policy development purposes by economists and government policy analysts. But this view makes no attempt to analyse how the measures being developed are useful in intuitively establishing a clear picture of a community’s or country’s social capital and how useful they would be in a particular civil society like Iraq.

The 4<sup>th</sup> perspective emerging, the authors assert, is what they call the *synergy* view. This stream canvasses the community linkages to the State and its governance and holds that ‘the synergy between government and citizen action is based on *complementarity* and *embeddedness*. ‘Complementarity’, they say, refers to mutually supportive relations between public and private actors ... ‘Embeddedness’ refer to the nature and extent of the ties [directly] connecting citizens and public officials within their community...’ (p.30).

Woolcock and Narayan make the following interesting concluding comment about further theory, research and policy-making program development:

‘The synergy view suggests three central tasks for theorists, researchers and policy makers. The first is to identify the nature and extent of the social relationships characterising a particular community, its formal institutions and the interactions between them. The second is to develop institutional strategies based on an understanding of these social relations, particularly the extent of bonding and bridging capital in a society or community. The third task is to identify ways and means by which positive manifestations of social capital – widespread co-operation, trust, institutional efficiency – can offset and/or be created from its negative manifestations – sectarianism, isolationism, corruption. Put another way, the challenge is to transform situations where a community’s social capital ‘substitutes for weak, hostile or indifferent institutions into ones in which both realms ‘complement’ one another.’ (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p.14).

This classification of the “streams” of theorising also shows how far conceptualising has moved from the singular thinking of Hanifan and Bourdieu about what can be observed about the primary social process at work at the *micro*-level of social relationships to more speculative theorising about what appears to be the impact of different groups or classes of people and networks and institutions on each other at the *macro*-level of interaction between all elements of the civil society – and the State – in a region or a nation.

Scholars have also differentiated between the structural characteristics and what has been labelled the cognitive characteristics of social capital. Ferlander (2007) describes them as the social connections and their more subjective elements and goes on to point out that in the conceptualisations of social capital “most scholars view the social network as the core element of social capital.” (p.116). The most important cognitive, more subjective characteristics are the norms of reciprocity and trust which affect the behavioural elements of network participation by individual members of a network.

### **3.3 Operationalising the structural characteristics of social capital**

As Stone and Hughes (2000) suggest, a useful starting point is their characterisation of the core element of social capital as ‘networks of social relations.’

### ***3.3.1 Networks of Social Relations as sources of social capital***

When he first used the term social capital, Hanifan (1916) was identifying what he saw as a natural social process at work in a rural setting among individual people with an undeveloped sense of community in their separated everyday family and work lives. The process began when they came together and they found that their otherwise constrained lives were enriched by the intangibles of “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse”. This pool of enriching intangibles constituted, for him, the social capital of that community. While he did not describe that social process in any detail, he put forward the proposition that skilful leadership by some members in the community could direct that social capital towards “towards the general improvement of the community well-being.” (pp.130-131).

In effect Hanifan was suggesting that the important characteristics of social capital included:

- Individuals within a “social unit” – his rural community – coming together in social interactions
- Intangible benefits, actual and potential, automatically being produced
- The potential benefits become a community resource
- Under the right stimulus of “skilful leadership” this community resource can be tapped to improve community well being.

As Putnam (2000) noted more than 80 years later, in these propositions, Hanifan’s description anticipated virtually all of the crucial elements in later interpretations of social capital.

To Pierre Bourdieu who adopted the term social capital some 70 years later, social capital was one of the many forms of capital, not just the form recognised by economic theory. He described social capital as comprising the aggregate of the actual or potential resources available in “durable networks of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” ( Bourdieu, 1986, p.248). Individuals as members of these networks, hold what he calls “credits” to the group’s collectively-owned “capital.”

While Hanifan (*op cit*) concentrated on the community resource aspects, Bourdieu went a step further by putting the source of social capital firmly within a more specific context – individuals interacting within “durable networks of relationships.”

Since then the range of conceptualisations of social capital has expanded considerably. Adler and Kwon (2002) tabulated a diversity of definitions of from 20 different writers, produced between 1985 and 1998. They did so from three different perspectives – “external”, “internal” and “both” (Adler & Kwon 2002, Table 2, p.20). Interestingly, besides Bourdieu’s 1985 definition, only two others specified social networks as the source of social capital – Portes (1998) and Woolcock (1998). Others preferred to be more general using terms such as “specific social structures” (Baker 1990) “extensive networks of voluntary associations” (Inglehart 1997) and “the web of social relationships” (Pennar 1997).

As researchers aiming to “operationalise” the theoretical propositions so as to establish measures of social capital in a given society, the Australian team of Stone, Gray and Hughes in 2003 adopted the term social networks. They went onto identify three types of social networks:

*Networks of 'informal ties'*, which “include relationships with members of household, family and family in-law, friends, neighbours, and workmates”

*Networks of 'generalised relationships'*, which are “community based, and 'societal' relationships people have with people they do not know personally, including local people, people in general, and people in civic groups.”

*Network of 'institutional relationships'*, which are “the ties individuals have with institutions including the legal system, the police, the media, unions, governments, political parties, universities, and the corporate world” (Stone et al, 2003, p.3).

Also noteworthy for a Middle East researcher also seeking to “operationalise” the relevant theoretical propositions about social capital was the answer of Woolcock and Narayan (2000) to their own rhetorical question ‘what is social capital’. They said:

‘Intuitively... the basic idea of ‘social capital’ is that one’s family, friends and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake and/or leveraged for material gain...’

They added:

“Those communities endowed with a diverse stock of social networks and civic associations will be in a stronger position to confront poverty and vulnerability ... resolve disputes and/or take advantage of new opportunities...” (Woolcock & Narayan 2000, p.3)

It would appear that most scholars writing about social capital prefer to be less prescriptive than Bourdieu about specifying what particular types of social relationships can be social capital producers. They appear to leave it open that membership of groups within a community but separate from the family, can produce social capital whether those groups be local informal groups such as clubs, more formal civic associations, religious groups, sports clubs or groups of recreational or even digital enthusiasts. Even the availability of meeting places and spaces, such as halls, rooms and picnic facilities come into account – in short all those opportunities in a community where people can get together and develop social relationships with each other.

There are other characteristics of social capital noted by empirical researchers such as Leonard and Onyx (2004). They summarised their view of the essential characteristics of the conceptual label of social capital as being:

- ‘A resource created through numerous connections between members of a group which is the property of the group or society and not of any individual within it;
- ‘Involves co-operation gained through informal constraints such as social norms and mutual interest involvement, rather than force;
- ‘Involves high levels of trust;
- ‘Can be realised into tangible outcomes (e.g., co-operative ventures) not necessarily directly related to the original interactions;
- ‘Can be accrued and realised either inadvertently or through deliberate planning;
- ‘Is iterative in that a store of social capital can be translated into a co-operative activity, which can then lead to an increase in the store of social capital’ (p.3).

Stone et al (2003) also argue that the structure of the social networks of a community is important. They suggest that the structural characteristics of networks include the size of the network, the density of social ties within the network, and the diversity of the backgrounds and social situations or heterogeneity of the network members.

They describe a dense network as one in which “network members overlap and know one another,” and a closed network is one in which “social relationships exist between all parties.” They cite Coleman (1988) as arguing that the degree to which networks are dense or closed has implications for the quality of the relationships they embody, and their productive output. Dense, closed networks, they suggest, better facilitate the enforcement of group norms and sanctions while heterogeneity of group or network membership influences the levels of trust within networks, the extent to which trust of familiars translates into generalised trust of strangers, and the extent to which norms within networks are shared. Heterogeneity of the social ties within the network may, they suggest in citing Grootaert (1998) and Narayan (1999), promote linkages with a diverse range of networks and hence access to a broad range of resources or opportunities. But heterogeneity of social ties, they suggest in citing Stolle (1998) may also limit the extent to which social relationships are characterised by high levels of trust and reciprocity.

### ***3.3.2 Social network and social capital benefits***

As the early theorists generally referred to in their definitions, social capital is at its core a collection or a pool of ‘actual or potential resources’ (Bourdieu 1986), in the form of contributions that members of a social network make to other network members but held by the network and available to all members of a social network as what Bourdieu called a ‘credit’. They are generally seen to be intangible in nature but can, on a cooperative basis, lead to tangible outcomes.

Due to the demands of abstraction for theorising and problems of identifying and categorising the ‘credits’ as both actual and potential resources, and because individuals become members of social networks for different reasons, the literature refers only in vague terms to these actual and potential resources or benefits. They may relate to satisfying food and shelter or personal security needs in times of natural disasters or man-made conflict, to companionship or belongingness or other social needs. At a higher level they can relate to access to educational or work opportunities and advancement.

We can also see them rise above individual needs to relate to community needs. This became apparent in Australia where during this researcher's investigation, the natural disaster of bushfires in the hot summer seasons brought usually casual neighbours closer together to work with trained local volunteer rural fire fighters to save each other's houses under threat. The community was saved and as a result its members often deepened the nature of their social relationships.

In classifying social capital benefits, Grootaert et al (2003) refer to information, ideas and support as resources identified by the sociologists Ronald Burt, Nan Lin and Alejandro Portes. Separately, writers such as Ferlander (2007) have accepted a classification system that distinguishes between *emotional support* benefits, *informational* benefits; and *instrumental* benefits, though Ferlander adds the additional benefit of *companionship* (p.116). Of the few who have gone further, Song et al (2006) in examining social capital transactions in an Asian psychiatric clinic, distinguished between *instrumental support* such as work and activity assistance and *expressive support* in the sense of providing information, being a companion and lending objects or money, and/or being a confidante.

These potential and real benefits are clearly central to the notion of social capital because they can be seen as potentially-measurable indicators of social capital. Yet there has been little detailed investigation of the higher levels of benefits that can be generated within social networks affected by differences in social settings or social conflicts in a given society.

A recent development on investigating and pointing to the measurement of social capital benefit exchanges or transactions was the 2005 work of a Dutch group of economists and mathematicians, van der Eijk, Dolfsma and Jolink from the Erasmus Research Institute of Management at the University of Rotterdam. As noted, they asserted that social capital at this stage of its theoretical development was a 'black box' in which is hidden its underlying and undeveloped mechanisms and also a 'black hole' in which 'many empirical phenomena' can be attributed. But they also saw social capital benefits as a corollary of Mauss's 'gifts' in his gift exchange theorising (Mauss, 1954) and explored social capital from that perspective. They further included as an appendix, a

set of mathematical equations developed in 1981 by the economist and social systems theorist Kenneth Boulding which sought to quantify gift exchange (Boulding 1981 cited by van der Eijk et al *op cit*).

### **3.4 Operationalising the cognitive characteristics of social capital**

It appears to be widely accepted that the two most important “cognitive” elements of social capital are reciprocity and trust.

#### ***Reciprocity***

The notion of reciprocity appears to have developed from the findings, previously noted, of the French sociologist and cultural anthropologist Marcel Mauss who declared as an imperative of any human community the proposition that continuing membership of a community requires an individual firstly to give, secondly to receive and thirdly to reciprocate (Mauss,1954).

Putnam (1993) described reciprocity as involving “not ‘I’ll do this for you because you are more powerful than I’ nor even ‘I’ll do this for you now, if you do that for me now’ but ‘I’ll do this for you now, knowing that somewhere down the road you’ll do something for me’.” (pp.182-183). Adler and Kwon (2002) noted that generalised reciprocity as they termed it, “transforms individuals from self-seeking and egocentric agents with little sense of obligation to others into members of a community with shared interests, a common identity and a commitment to the common good.” (p.25).

#### ***Trust***

Stone (2001) notes how social capital theory stresses the importance of trust ‘for the well-functioning of a civil society ‘and for facilitating a range of desirable macro-level social outcomes including civic engagement and democracy’, citing writers beginning with Putnam. She goes further to classify a range of types of trust which theorists she cites have developed: among people known to each other “particularised” trust, or “personalised” trust; towards strangers, “generalised” or “social: trust; at the *macro* level, she notes “civic” or “institutional” trust (p.29). She further suggests that much of the empirical investigation of these different categories of trust appear to have been *ad hoc* rather than systematic.



In their research on social capital in a socially calm Australia, it is noteworthy that Leonard and Onyx (2004) devote a chapter of their book to both *Fear and Trust* (chapter 3). They characterise trust as not only central to almost all discussions of social capital but as something that ‘needs to be earned.’

They go on to suggest a need to construct ‘contexts in which differences can be explored’ and declare: ‘Ultimately we need multiple sources and avenues for the development of trust.’ (p.70).

### **3.5 Social capital and civil society**

From a social capital perspective, most scholars and theorists appear to distinguish between a society’s residents as individuals living in communities, then those communities being located within both a civil society and a business sector comprising the individuals as employees or business managers and all the interactions of a society’s residents between themselves in the civil society and also their interactions in various ways with the public institutions of the governance of the State (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002).

The theoretical interest in the literature centres mainly on the term civil society. The World Bank has noted that definitions of civil society “vary considerably based on differing conceptual paradigms, historic origins, and country context” (World Bank, 2011). It then provides the following definition which it says has been developed by a number of leading research centres:

“the term civil society refers to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.” (World Bank, 2011).

Providing a specific Iraqi perspective, Al Jawahiri (2010) defines civil society as:

“the body of free voluntary organisations which occupy the public domain between family and state in order to pursue the interests of its individual

members, while adhering to the values and standards of respect, mutual acceptance, tolerance, and sound management of differences and disagreement (and) which come into being and conduct themselves independently from government.” (p.1).

It is noteworthy that as an Iraqi he is placing civil society firmly between the Iraqi acceptance of the family as a social institution distinct from the institutions of the State, with the civil society between them. Furthermore he was describing a situation that at his time of writing, apart from the religious institutions, there was little opportunity for the development of civil organisations or of free association in the pursuit of common interests. As this researcher can personally confirm, the former Ba’ath Party so dominated public life that the only time Iraqis could freely come together without suspicion was on occasions of births, marriages and deaths and at the times of religious feasts. The civil society of Iraq was, at that time, very diminished.

It is also noteworthy that many scholars accept that the concept of social capital also encompasses within the civil society, all and any informal groupings within the *meso*-level of the community in which individuals come together for whatever reason. According to Stone and Hughes (2000), any social activity which brings the people of a community together enhances social capital as both the glue which holds communities together and as the oil which lubricates the working of the civil society.

### ***3.5.1 Social cohesion and the rule of law***

Social capital is seen by theorists as a contributor and an outcome of the desirable element of social cohesion in a society. The notion of the rule of law is seen as an important element in maintaining social cohesion in a society according to the institutional stream of theorising about social capital (Ritzen and Woolcock, 2000).

Ritzen and Woolcock define social cohesion as “a state of affairs in which a group of people (delineated by a geographical region, like a country), demonstrate an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change” (p.9). They trace the link with social capital from the institutional viewpoint of social capital as a measure of community willingness to collaborate; but they go on to point out that stressing social cohesion avoids some of the negatives aspects of social capital. They further stress that

encouraging effective rule of law, especially in post-conflict societies becomes a high priority for governments.

The United Nations holds that establishing respect for the rule of law is ‘fundamental to achieving a durable peace in the aftermath of conflict, to the effective protection of human rights, and to sustained economic progress and development.’ (UN, 2004, p.4).

The Secretary –General in a 2004 *Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies* described the concept this way:

‘For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’ (UN *S/2004/616*).

### ***3.5.2 Social capital and conflict***

It is a clear assumption in the social capital literature that the complex of social networks with a given community, and the complex of the communities within which they are nested can be said to make up what is popularly called the social fabric of a given society. That social fabric is, of course, never static. Rather it may be said to ripple in the winds of change that blow when different events inevitably intrude into the lives of the members of a society – happy events such as marriage and births, sad events such as sickness and death or natural disasters and disastrous events such as civil conflict. As Colletta and Cullen (2000) observe, violent conflict within a State weakens its social fabric.

As part of the World Bank’s social capital program they studied the conflict under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975-79 and the genocide in Rwanda in April-June, 1994 and its aftermath. In the extended Cambodian conflict during the Khmer Rouge rule, the accustomed social fabric was destroyed as families were uprooted and dispersed. What the researchers described as primary-group social capital all but vanished. Some degree of social capital survived in Cambodia because of the strong Buddhist tradition that kept alive the survivors’ willingness to work together. (p.12). Primary group activity was

reborn in the post-Khmer Rouge conflict in a defensive form providing an ‘indigenous survival-oriented safety net.’ They suggest that the Cambodian conflict illustrates ‘the ebb and flow of horizontal social capital’ and its dependence on the State and market forces as ‘instruments of vertical social capital.’

In Rwanda, they found that in the genocidal attacks by the Hutus against the Tutsis, ‘social capital atrophied as the country, communities, and families fell prey to hatred and violence.’ But integrative forms of social capital increased within families fighting for survival and ‘strong exclusionary social capital also emerged within Hutu extremism, with very negative ramifications for those excluded, revealing that violence can coexist with, or be the result of the existence of strong bonding capital among its perpetrators’ (p.18).

Studies of social capital activity in natural disasters may be instructive. Johannison and Olaison (2007) show how in the 2005 Hurricane Gudrun disaster which struck Sweden, residents drew upon their social capital to generate ‘emergency entrepreneurial networking’ and ‘social ingenuity’ to respond quickly.

Perhaps of greater relevance are studies of the extended, religiously-based Northern Ireland social conflict between the Protestant Unionists and the Catholic Republicans which wreaked social havoc in the British controlled province for some 30 years until, suddenly and unexpectedly, in 1998, the leadership of both sides reached agreement on political power sharing and disarmed their paramilitary units.

The experiences of Northern Ireland during these so called ‘Troubles’ may offer some hope to other societies in conflict if the assessment of Morrow (2005) is accurate. He characterised the Northern Ireland result as ‘not a conflict resolved but a conflict attenuated ... by evident political pointlessness.’

Campbell, Hughes, Hewstone and Cairns (2008) reported a post-conflict study of segregated and mixed communities comprising members from each side of the religious divide in Northern Ireland. They highlighted the interplay between their stocks of social capital and its capabilities and the other influences at work in the community dynamics

within the civil society of Northern Ireland. They noted particularly the links between social capital building and economic health and jobs and the better provision of government services. They also pointed to variations in the effect of trust and relationship building within communities.

A 2009 Report on lessons to be learned by Iraq from Northern Ireland (Oliver and Hinds 2009) arising from an Iraqi parliamentary delegation visit to Belfast, noted the strength and role of non-government organisations, variously called in that country voluntary and community organisations and civil society organisations – 5,000 of them for a population of 1,75 million people. The Government also set up a Community Relations Council to fund groups and projects to ‘build enduring good relations and great integration between communities.’ It also highlighted how, among other joint projects, the two main church organisations had set up ‘peace education’ programs in their schools. It also declared (p.34) ‘The simple practice of building neighbourliness and friendship is essential in a society that has too few friendships across religious, political and social divides.’

The Northern Ireland social experience seems relevant for Iraq. It further offers the hope that within the social networks of the religious and the political institutions a similar awareness of conflict ‘pointlessness’ might emerge and be converted into programs of religious relationship building at both the institutional and the community level in addition to economic and social programs to stimulate community rebuilding and weaken the fundamentalist approach to social governance.

### **3.6 Measuring social capital**

There is a strong demand within the social capital community for sound ways of measuring the social capital of civil societies. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Stone (2001) among others, chronicle the need in economic and social development policy making and program planning for using precise measures of social capital to examine within country and a cross-country, the variations in poverty reduction, government performance, ethnic conflict and economic growth. They note that a single ‘true’ measure of social capital is ‘probably not possible.’ But they claim that studies are now

producing ‘useful measures of and proxies for social capital.’ They discuss descriptors associated with social capital which are rarely if ever mentioned in the literature as proxies on which to base empirical questions.

The UK study (ONS, 2001) among other findings, declared there was a greater need to measure the quality as well as the quantity of social capital to develop a sound national social capital benchmark. In Australia, the Productivity Commission in a 2003 Research Paper (Productivity Commission, 2003) declared that many of the social capital studies to date ‘suffer from limitations that mean their findings are ‘suggestive’ only.’ (p. 13).

The World Bank’s social capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) concentrated on collecting data for analysis from, in a given location, households, the community and formal organisations (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002). Such measures are becoming more widely used in present day research studies. Stone (2001) notes a ‘gulf’ between theoretical understanding of social capital and the ways it has been measured in much of the empirical work, leading to empirical confusion about the meaning, measurement outcomes and relevance of social capital. She seeks to set down a ‘conceptually sound and theoretically informed measurement framework for empirical investigation of social capital...’ (p. 2).

Schuurman (2003) under the heading ‘Correlation is no causation’ notes that the causal explanation of studies correlating social capital with other social phenomena lacks a degree of ‘quantitative sophistication’ and adds:  
‘...social capital or trust represented as a statistical score does not reflect the underlying distributions which may vary according to national or regional patterns. In general this is indeed a reflection of the lack of theorisation with respect to social capital. Another indication of the later point is that sometimes (the lack of) social capital is used as a metaphor (‘a society without an adequate stock of social capital is sick) and is not meant to be operationalised, measured, correlated or used analytically’ (p.1001).

On the point of representativeness of data used in quantitative studies of social capital in its various perceived manifestations, Putnam in a recent paper (Putnam, 2007) discussed the methodological problems in seeking contextual data from neighbourhoods in urban

communities by relating them to US census tracts, an administrative census unit which can be quite different from what he calls the 'real neighbourhoods' in which people lead their daily lives.

In summary there is a clear risk that both the validity of descriptors of social capital and even the actual questions derived to measure them may not be readily apparent. The data generated may have little substance for generating valid and meaningful theoretical propositions, let alone data for useful comparative analysis within and across societies.

Nevertheless national and international policy makers and project planners tend to rely on them almost without question. Certainly there are, therefore, grounds for initial doubt about whether some of these measures would be useful for a case study on social capital in Iraq. Of course the absence of census data in Iraq almost rules out quantitative methodology in my investigation.

### ***3.6.1 Measuring the characteristics of social capital***

Social capital theorists have described for analytical purposes a variety of characteristics of social networks that can be grouped as structural and cognitive (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002) or structural, relational and cognitive (Stone, *op cit* and van der Eijk et al *op cit*).

As noted, scholars have further identified different forms of social capital characterised by either 'bonding' ties or 'bridging' or 'linking' ties. (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000 Baum and Ziersch 2003). Other writers point to the 'horizontal' and 'vertical' relationships between social networks at the *micro*, *meso* and *macro* levels (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002).

The distinctions made in these classifications of forms of social capital may be useful in developing insightful explanations of social capital. Schuurman (2003) points to the lack of bridging capital within the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, which each have large amounts of bonding social capital, as a major reason for their long conflict. He adds: 'If social capital is going to be used in the analysis of

multicultural societies, then a differentiation between bonding and bridging social capital would be a minimum requirement.’ (p.1002).

However there is no general acceptance of the three-type classification of forms of social capital and other forms might become apparent on further investigation.

This initial classification of the forms of social capital does, however, point to a need to explore in the first instance, the types of relational ties between individuals within that network and their strength and valency should be identified with as much precision as possible. This would provide more useful insights into the links between the social capital transaction behaviours and the forms of social capital they generate.

The picture of social capital that emerges from the literature is one in which individual people come together in social networks in which they engage in social contacts in a discrete community with various levels of personal constraint on their contact behaviour, as Hanifan (1916) originally suggested. Some of if not most of these social networks comprise individuals engaging freely in behaviour which results in an exchange of various types of mutually-beneficial support which in turn result in benefits being given and received. These benefits constitute an important element of the social capital of the community and can be exchanged across these networks for the benefit also of the community. But if the cultural anthropologists are correct, membership of a community requires an individual to commit to be ready, willing and able to give, to receive and to reciprocate (Mauss, 1954). If this is so, then reciprocity and trust are not an integral characteristic of social capital, rather they appear to be necessary preconditions to the social exchange behaviour which generates social capital. To reinforce this it is clear that without trust and a sense of reciprocity among its members, there is no social network able to engage in social capital transactions. Questions of institutionalised or political or other forms of so called ‘social trust’ may be relevant to the functioning of a society. But they appear to be irrelevant to the generation of social capital.

These considerations can be put to the test in theoretically valid if quantitative lines of inquiry during this investigation.



## CHAPTER 4

### METHODOLOGY

#### 4.1 Introduction

This investigation is a qualitative case study of a particular society, the Middle East nation-State of Iraq. It particularly focuses on the way in which Iraqis function daily in their various social networks and thereby generate the country's social capital in its various forms.

In keeping with the research objectives, the study had to find answers to the questions: What are the key social networks of ordinary Iraqis and how do Iraqis benefit from these? How do the networks intersect (especially across religious and ethnic divides)? and How have ordinary Iraqis responded to sectarian and military crises? This investigation was specifically designed to generate empirical data to find the answers and also to stimulate inductive theory building. “what” and “how” questions are more readily approached using qualitative and inductive methodologies, rather than conventional hypothetico-deductive quantitative approaches of logical positivism. This researcher in an earlier study of social capital had already used a logical-positivist deductive approach for an earlier study of the social capital features at work in a particular organisation (Al-Katawi 2003 - in Arabic). The field research was completed in 2002 and the final work reported at the end of year in which Iraq began another violent period of military, political and sectarian tumult after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was no way that any face-to-face questionnaire data-gathering could have been initiated for this new study, let alone completed; participants and interviewers' lives would have been at risk.

Nor, would such a study have produced any meaningful data. For a start there is no accurate data available about the demographic makeup of the current society of Iraq. Only estimates are available. There is no recent Census data – the last Census in Iraq was conducted in 1957 under the republican regime of the subsequently deposed and executed Prime Minister Abdul Karim Kassem. Following the military invasion of Iraq, in 2003, the new government established a Ministry of Planning with a Central

Statistics Unit three years later. After this time it was announced that a Census would be conducted in 2010-2011, but plans for such a Census remain bogged down in political squabbling about measuring the populations of the Kurdish regions and particularly the populations of the oil-rich, ethnically-divided and politically-troubled governorate of Kirkuk. The warring political groups clearly appreciate that the new Census data would be the determinant not only of political control but also of central government funds and resources.

Nor is there any other systematic and reliable quantitative data on Iraqi society to underpin a logical-positivist deductive approach to answering my basic research questions, as detailed in Chapter 1. There are only estimates from the Ministry of Planning's Central Statistical Organisation and international groups such the World Bank and the United Nations and its specialist bodies operating in Iraq.

However, even if such data banks were readily available, they would not be able to answer the basic "what" and "how" questions of this research. It is argued that the basic step of a comprehensive and systematic exploration of the elements of the social capital of Iraq's society and the process of its generation would uncover potentially rich empirical data and so begin to stimulate inductive theory building about the social capital process and its mechanisms, as Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) set down.

In terms of Veal's (2005) approaches to case study research, my investigation employed an ethnographic-style case study approach, which would lead to other research methods such as structured interviews of informants, specialist group studies, focus groups, document analysis and oral histories. This combination of both explanatory and evaluative research would lead to what Veal calls "explanation building" – in the sense of "an iterative process whereby a logical/causal explanation of what is discovered is developed by to-and-fro referencing between theory, explanation and data" (p. 177). An analysis of the findings from the data generated would provide a basis for answers to the final research question: What are the implications of the findings for social policy in Iraq?

## **4.2 Sampling**

The research plan met the challenge of representativeness in the selection of participants by utilising theoretical sampling because the goal is to generate theoretical categories by talking to people who are able to provide insights into the topics under study. The research would require at least three key informants for each of the ethno-religious networks identified in my initial Participant-Observer research. This was readily achieved within my investigations with participants among the Sydney Iraqi *diaspora*. They are a valid sample because they maintain close and regular contacts with their extended family members and friends in Iraq by fixed line and mobile telephones and by internet videolinks through VOIP services as Skype, Tango and Viber. In addition, I conducted interviews by videolink with participants in Iraq and followed up with personal interviews with participants among the *diaspora* population until the goal of exhaustion by repetition was sufficiently achieved to generate useful insights which would in turn generate a level of explanatory power in attempting to understand the social capital of Iraq.

## **4.3 Ethical Protocol**

The data-gathering was subjected to a set of ethical protocols as set out by the UTS Human Research Ethics Committee, which is underpinned by the Vice-Chancellors' Committee's Code of Conduct for the Responsible Practice of Research, in the *Commonwealth Privacy Act (1988)* and the *National Statement on Research involving Humans (NHMRC, 1999)*. Confidentiality and protection of identity was particularly important in the case of Iraq-based participants who could be at risk of retaliation from religious-sectarian extremists still disrupting Iraq. All participants and their locations have been identified only by ID letters assigned and used in the transcribing process. Recordings of all group discussions and interviews and associated questionnaires have been kept in a locked filing cabinet. The required ethics clearances and approvals have been obtained for the field work as shown in Appendix 1.

## **4.4 Research Data-Gathering**

### ***4.4.1 Participant Observation records***

The first step in this investigation was a Participant-Observation study, undertaken along the lines suggested by Labaree (2002). In taking this approach, despite its implicit limitations, I was heartened that I was following the initial pioneering work of Lyda.J. Hanifan (1916) as a school inspector in the US, then the influential French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and his experiences as an anthropologist in Algeria, and finally the seminal American theorist Robert Putnam (1993) and his experiences in his work within communities in southern Italy.

As part of this study and from the perspective of a participant observer, this report mapped both the present-day societal makeup of Iraq including the ethno-religious components of Iraq, the institutions of both the civil society of Iraq especially at the level where ordinary Iraqis interact with them and the institutions of the State.

It also mapped what appeared to be the all-important social capital-generating social networks operating in Iraq. These different mappings of different aspects of Iraq's societal makeup, as reported in the Appendices and analysed in the next chapter, were based on my own observations and past research and my own long experience of observing and participating in the activities of my own extended family network and the reciprocating requests to which I have responded. These activities included, particularly, providing education-oriented benefits on request from network leaders (uncles and aunts), while I was working in the Iraqi civil service. This is a not uncommon experience in Iraq; it is an example of the practice of *wastaa*, the social norm described in Chapter two.

### ***4.4.2 Diaspora Focus Groups***

The main source of empirical data came as a result of the help of my intermediary and facilitator, a very energetic Iraqi-Australian with wide community contacts. Through him I was able to arrange and conduct a total of 18 separate focus group discussions, whose participants had a wide variety of geographic, ethno-religious, social and

educational backgrounds, as shown in Appendix 2. Altogether the focus groups were made up of 68 Iraqi-born participants all now living in Sydney - 37 men and 31 women. They represented all of the well-known ethno-religious networks that comprise the civil society of Iraq. The oldest participant was a 67-year-old Kurdish grandfather who came to Australia in 1999 and the youngest a 23-year-old Shia Muslim wife and mother who came to Australia as a child in 1996. The most recent arrival was a 65-year-old Shia Muslim grandmother who arrived in 2010. The participants came from almost all the provinces of Iraq - now called governorates.

The variety of participants' is reflected in the data on the social benefits they recollected from their personal experiences within their various social networks. They gave their recollections in separate groups of Iraqi men and Iraqi women. This was arranged to ensure that Iraqi social conventions where males are placed at the head of the family, did not interfere with the women's ability to speak openly and frankly. This enabled the generation of richer data on gender differences of importance in recollecting social network experiences.

A number of important points were observed about the Iraqis living in their communities in Sydney. These included:

- There is little or no social conflict apparent between the various ethno-religious groups in their Australian setting. Notably, I have observed only harmony, tolerance and general goodwill between them. They all hold themselves to be Iraqis first. Public displays of religious radicalism is not considered acceptable among Iraqis in Australia.
- Two pilot quantitative and qualitative studies I previously conducted demonstrated that the bonds between the Australian Iraqis and their extended family social network members still in Iraq remain very strong. Across all of the ethno-religious networks, the Australian-based Iraqis generally maintain contact by fixed line and mobile telephones and by computer video-chats at least once a week and sometimes more frequently.

This gave me confidence that the Iraqi *diaspora* in Sydney were a source of reliable empirical evidence on the social capital characteristics of their extended family

networks back in Iraq, without undue data contamination due to the different social setting in Australia.

Although the participants generally had no understanding of the concept of social capital, and English remains an unfamiliar second language, their Iraqi cultural sensitivities in interpersonal relationships showed none of the western sensitivities about giving personal private information. For instance, they had no problems identifying their religious backgrounds but they always respected the standard courtesy behavioural norms in commencing verbal exchanges. The group discussions were therefore always conducted in Arabic. Naturally all the participants were made fully aware of the research in which they were taking part and readily gave their informed consent. The instruments for achieving this were written in Arabic. The subsequent translation work was undertaken by my intermediary and myself – a task in which we engaged together on our earlier pilot studies.

The open-ended group discussions and associated questionnaires used in these focus groups were carefully planned. They are published in Appendices 3 and 4. The research instruments used are provided separately in Appendix 5. The background data on the respondents came from responses to a common set of questions in the research instruments. These sought to establish:

- The size and location of their own extended family social network in Iraq
- The social capital components of their social network interactions in terms of the benefits they had and continued to experience.
- What their extended family network meant to them?
- Who they identified and accepted as the leaders – male and female?
- Other social networks to which they belonged – and why?
- What damage has the conflict they had experienced done to their extended family social networks?
- What contacts did they have with people from other ethno-religious groups? How did they regard them?
- Their comments about how their relatives viewed the political parties and leaders both in the central government and the governorates in which they live.

#### ***4.4.3 Tele-interviews with Participants in Iraq***

The Tele-interviews conducted in Iraq generated empirical data that was both useful and, as expected, raised more questions. As part of the iterative approach, these further set of interviews was arranged and conducted, this time with informed and consenting participants living in Iraq. We were always conscious that even with theoretical sampling, face-to-face interviews in their homes would have been too dangerous for both participants and the researcher. The interviews were therefore conducted by video phone, using the internet-based Skype service. This application of modern digital technology to structured interviews is considered to be a valid research tool because it is still a face-to-face interview and its reliability was heightened by the use of a form of *wastaa*, familiar to Iraqis, in that the facilitator was, in effect, an intercessor who knew the willing participants and arranged the interviews.

This stage of the research involved 16 interviews with equal numbers of married Iraqi males and females and young single Iraqi males and females from four of the main ethno-religious groups in Iraq: Shia and Sunni Muslims, Kurds and Christians. As noted, the participants in these interviews were selected by a trusted, educated “intercessor” contact with a professional work background and a wide range of friends. Those she recruited were themselves well-educated urban Iraqis from, as also noted, a variety of ethno-religious groups. They all spoke freely and intelligently in their responses and recollections.

Besides their backgrounds - as shown in Appendix 6 - they were prompted for their recollections of specific social capital benefit exchanges within their social networks of neighbours and friends - which the *diaspora* participants had identified as a potentially significant *micro*-level set of networks which produced social capital. The Interviews-Opening Script for these interviewers was carefully planned. They are provided in Appendix 7. The text of these interviews is provided in Appendix 14.

#### ***4.4.4 Follow-up “iterative” interviews***

Interspersed with these structured data-collection exercises, special interviews were conducted with a number of informants with the background to assist in exploring insights and relationships because they offered unusual access to further data of interest.

Altogether six such special interviews were conducted. Two of them were conducted with *diaspora* participants in Australia whose recollections of social capital transactions in special social contexts required clarification. Three of the four Iraqis interviewed were NGO activists with particular experience in utilising their NGO activity and their associated social networks of friends and bureaucratic contacts to achieve benefits in their communities. One pursued her own project involving repairs and upgrading of some of her local public schools. The fourth Iraqi was a volunteer teacher at her local mosque.

Each of these interviews followed a prepared script. The script is provided in Appendix 8. The full text of the interviews is provided in Appendix 15.

#### **4.5 Coding the Data**

The basic data analysis approach utilised to make sense of all the empirical data generated was that of thematic coding. Initially computerised analysis by one of the qualitative research software programs was employed, but it was found to be neither flexible nor particularly insightful. Intelligent human manual coding became the technique of choice.

The themes utilised in the coding came naturally from the nature and emphasis of the information provided by the participants about their networks and the outcomes of interactions within the networks, in terms of the benefits they recollected both receiving and giving, in the various social settings in which they interacted and the basic social context of State stresses imposed on them at various periods of their lives. Coding subdivisions also came from the respondents' own personal backgrounds – as either single male students or married males; or single and married females as well as where relevant, their working backgrounds.

As a result the responses data has been tabulated by identifiers that include the respondent's ethno-religious background, gender and individual code, in tables on

- Benefits exchanged in Family Networks in such social settings such as family enhancement, health, work, personal security, general material and practical benefits and, also, emotional support benefits (see Appendix 9)
- Benefits gained from Clan and Tribe networks (see Appendix 10)



- Benefits gained from Neighbour networks (see Appendix 11)
- Benefits gained from Friends networks (see Appendix 12)
- Benefits gained from Local Worship networks (see Appendix 13)

The Tele-interviews with the participants still in Iraq are each reported separately with each respondent identified by gender, marital status age, ethno-religious group and family composition. Their responses are summarised by the benefits they recollected from their various networks. Separate tables of their benefits responses are provided in terms of their gender and marital status – married and single women; married and single men. (see Appendix 14).

The Special Follow-up interviews are likewise each reported separately with general background points on the respondent. The text derived from the interview process is provided in detail. Each text closes with a commentary on the points of special interest (see Appendix 15).

Finally, data provided in specific narratives from some respondents is tabulated by what I have labelled the social context stresses which some respondents recalled at different periods of their lives under the two different State regimes in the last three decades. The first period was the pre-2003 Ba’athist regime of the late Saddam Hussein. In this period many of our respondents would have learned to live with the stress of the State’s surveillance of Iraqis’ everyday lives by both the secret police of the regime, the *Mukhabarat*, and the more zealous Ba’ath Party members who were part of every neighbourhood of Iraqi cities and towns and who, I observed, reported anything out of place to their local *Mukhabarat* offices. All the respondents older than 18 would have experienced this particular type of social context stress. Within this period, some respondents also highlighted the stresses imposed by their wartime experiences of the prolonged conflict of the Iraq-Iran War, which ran from September 1980 to August 1988.

The second period is the post-2003 period after the downfall of the old regime and the attempts to establish a State which was based on the new institutions of a constitutional republic - a popularly-elected legislature which in turn selected the State leadership comprising the President, the Speaker of the legislature and the Prime Minister.

Sectarian violence ensued in many different manifestations and continues as this is being written. It appears to have become so bitterly politicised that it remains difficult to see any role that the millions of ordinary citizens might play by mobilising their social capital to resolve those sectarian differences at the *macro*-level of the State.

This social context data is tabulated under the title Social Context Stress Narratives by way of a summary of the recollections of the respondents affected and sorted under the three headings: Stresses encountered during the Ba’athist period, stresses during the Iraq-Iran War and Post-2003 Sectarian conflict narratives. The respondent involved in each narrative is identified by ethno-religious origin and respondent personal identifier. Each narrative concludes with a brief commentary identifying the types of benefits involved and the network in which they were exchanged. The full summary is published in Appendix 16.

Additionally specific data was drawn from some published resources. This data, alluded to in the text of various chapters, proved useful in some areas, particularly when it came to more fully understanding the manifestations of the prolonged sectarian violence. Notable among these resources were the footnotes on specific points made in interviews conducted since 2003 by investigators of the International Crisis Group and published in their series of Middle East reports, covering security and political developments in Iraq since 2003. There was also data available from material published on the internet from UN agencies and Iraqi media, particularly as cited at the end of Chapter 2.

#### **4.6 Presentation of the Data**

As noted above, the detailed codified data is presented in this thesis as extensive tables and records of recollections in eight of the Appendices. Some summary tables are presented in the context of discussions in the following Chapters.

Specific illustrative narratives from participants are also quoted from these tables at appropriate points in the discussions in the following Chapters. The Appendix from which these are drawn is referenced at the end of each narrative.

## 4.7 Conclusion

The combination of all these different types of data-gathering produced empirical data about the generation of social capital in Iraq. This data provides a rich empirical base for the Findings and the Analysis which make up the remainder of this thesis.

It is noteworthy that group data collection approach proved fruitful because the early contributions of participant recollections provided a memory stimulus to the later participants when they contributed. It was also notable that their recollections covered the periods from the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-89 under the Ba'athist regime of the late Saddam Hussein all the way up to the conflict which started after the Coalition invasion and toppling of the Ba'athist regime in 2003, and reached its peak of sectarian viciousness in 2005-2008 – sectarian conflict which has now intensified into a virtual invasion of Iraq by radical Sunni Islamists who want to establish an old-style “caliphate” in adjoining parts of Syria and Iraq which they have taken over at the time of writing.

All participants in both the *diaspora* and in Iraq provided their recollections and anecdotes freely and these yielded insights on the social networks which they felt were important to them. They also cast special light on the variety of benefits they recall exchanging in their activity in their social networks in different social settings and different times of their lives.

They provide the basis for the Results and for the Analysis and Discussion chapters which follow.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESULTS – BENEFITS and FAMILY NETWORKS

#### 5.1 Introduction

Our first research question requires empirical data to establish the key social networks of present-day Iraq, what their characteristics are and how these networks interact with each other. This chapter and the next explores how the data from our respondents and the thematic coding approach described in the previous chapter has produced a rich pool of data which shows how ordinary Iraqis function daily in their various social networks and thereby generate the country's social capital in its various forms. The full set of responses within the focus groups and individual interviews is provided in appendices 9-13 and 14-15 these results are summarized and categorized in this chapter and the next. From this full set of data it is possible to identify the key social networks of ordinary Iraqis as their Family, Personal and Constrained networks and how Iraqis benefit from them. The data also shows how these social networks intersect with each other at the individual or *micro* level of Iraqi society, especially across ethno-religious divides. Further the data shows how ordinary present-day Iraqis have responded to sectarian and military crises, during their lifespans.

At the individual or *micro* level of Iraqi life, four social networks have been identified as important to ordinary Iraqis in their everyday lives. The first three are - their Family Networks, their Friends Networks and their Neighbours Networks. Their private Work Networks also stand out in the data as important, although in ways that are different. Other social networks relating to their specific personal interests appear to be important to some individuals. Among these are what we classify as Worship Networks.

Table 5.1 below provides a quantitative count of the different types of benefits given and received within their various networks from the anecdotes provided by all participants. These will be analysed in detail. This chapter examines the extended family networks and their benefits; the following chapter examines the other networks and their benefits.

**Table 5.1 Summary count of benefits reported by all participants, by type of benefit  
N=90**

<i>Networks</i>	<i>Family network</i>		<i>Friends network</i>		<i>Neighbour network</i>		<i>Work &amp; other networks</i>		
	<i>Gender</i>	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
<b><i>Emotional support</i></b>		38	8	30	7	33	9	16	4
<b><i>Informational support</i></b>		8	11	10	7	11	9	5	3
<b><i>Practical support</i></b>		10	17	13	20	15	12	6	8
<b><i>Material support</i></b>		18	14	17	10	18	11	10	15
<b>Total</b>		<b>74</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>30</b>

*Note: some participants gave multiple anecdotes*

## **5.2 The extended Family Network in Iraq**

This chapter explores what the data shows about the activities of Iraqis within the Family networks and the rich variety of mutually-sustaining benefits they gain from them. It also explores these activities and the type and characteristics of this fundamental major social network, identified in terms of their makeup; the way they can interact with each other in different types of **social settings** at the *micro* level; and how Family networks cope under what the data identifies as **social stress contexts** involving intrusions by the State into individual Iraqis' lives. It provides insights into how Family networks can interact at the *meso* level with their clans and with some of the private and public institutions of Iraqi civil society.

The chapter also discusses what the data reveal about differences in the roles of Iraqis as social network participants particularly the clear role of Iraqi women as important generators of social capital. It further examines the factors of the social rules of Iraqi society and the social cognition factor of trust - and its limits in the development and functioning of the Family social network.

It concludes with how the data provides rich insights into how the Family networks function to generate Iraq's real and potential stocks of social capital.

Our data confirms the central role of the family network in generating from network interactions a wide range of supportive benefits that both sustain and enrich the lives of Iraqi family members. This is a unique network because it is the only network into which Iraqis are born. Their other social networks are ones which they either form or join almost instinctively yet as a matter of choice both to sustain and to enrich their lives.

### ***5.2.1 Extended Family Size***


Most respondents appeared to take for granted the immediate families into which they were born. But it was clear that the extended family is for them the most important support network in their lives.

In Iraq, extended family networks are not only durable but can be large. In this study the largest family network contained 350 members. This was reported by a 55-year-old Shia Muslim male who only had two children but came from an immediate family of 4 brothers and 7 sisters who were all married and through whom had an unspecified number of nieces and nephews. This example demonstrates how an extended family network grows as the siblings of an immediate family member reach adulthood, marry, move out of the immediate family home and produce their own children. Over the lifetime of the parents of an immediate family, the extended family can grow to number in the hundreds. This researcher's family comprising two siblings, has an extended family - as mapped in Figure 1 - of 112 uncles, aunts, nieces and nephews, and 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> cousins. (Cousins removed once or twice were not tabulated). The respondent with the 350 siblings and relatives in his extended network was one of the adult Tele-interview respondents in Iraq who were specifically asked for the size of their family network. Other mature respondents were readily able to provide numbers of between 43 and 160 members of their extended family network. The larger numbers came from the older participants with a large number of siblings in their immediate families.

Figure.1 Extended Family Network In Iraq

S: son, GS:Grandson

D: Daughter, GD:Granddaughter



### **5.2.2 Benefits exchanged in Family Networks**

Participants who covered the full range of Iraqi ethno-religious groups, reported a wide range of particular benefits exchanged with their family networks at both the immediate family and extended family levels. Examples from the *diaspora* participants included:

1. I was responsible for my sister and my brothers. I helped them in their marriage – *Sunni male (O3)*.
2. My big brother encouraged my artistic work and always brought back oil colours when he went to the city -*Yazidi female (Q2)*.
3. Always helped children with homework and they did well – *Armenian male (G2)*.
4. My uncle always rewarded me for good results with a gold coin to encourage hard study - *Sunni male (O2)*.
5. Wives of brothers cared for me after a car crash while I was pregnant – *Sabeen female (D1)*.
6. My brother hid me in his house after I deserted from the Iraqi Army –*Chaldean male (E4)*.
7. Younger brother injured others in a car crash. Cousins paid for repairs to their car. Also gave him another car – *Armenian female (H2)*.
8. I went to live in Jordan with my husband and our two sons. When one of them fell sick my family members gave me emotional support and my brother sent \$3,000. My son recovered – *Sunni female (P4)*.
9. My husband rebuilt my brother's house at no cost when my brother was short of money. My husband also rented a shop for my brother to open a computer repair business – *Turkoman female (N2)*.
10. Very close to my Aunt. She defended me as I grew up – *Sunni female (P4)*.
11. Fled to Turkey while I was pregnant. The doctor said abort but my cousin came and stayed with me for five months. We named the baby after my cousin – *Kurdish female (J3)*.
12. My sister's husband suffered renal failure. All of us, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts and cousins donated money for his hospital costs – *Shia male (A6)*.
13. Uncle's clothes shop went bad in 1980's. Our family then only bought clothes from his shop. His business survived – *Sunni female (P1)*.



Among the Iraqi residents interviewed -

1. A Shia professional female recalled how a relative spotted her waiting in a big queue at a registry office. She did not know he worked here. He took her inside and arranged for her to get the ID cards and documents she needed quickly – instead of waiting for months. (*Interview B*).
2. A Christian male told how he intervened when his young son ran into problems with his French teacher. He arranged for the teacher to dine with them and another teacher friend. They persuaded the French teacher to help his son. The son achieved better grades. (*Interview M*).
3. A young Christian male university student declared that he drew both financial and moral benefits from his family and loved all his relatives and they all helped each other. (*Interview O*).

These excerpts provide a picture of both the richness of the responses and the variety of benefits which the participants recalled exchanging- by receiving and giving - in interactions with their family networks.

### ***5.2.3 Types of benefits***

There is a clear pattern in the responses of all participants about the types of benefits exchanged, as summarized in table 5.1. This pattern generally runs in parallel with the level of demands on the resources of the family givers in the benefits exchanges in the family networks.

All benefits exchanges clearly include **emotional support** for each other in every episode recounted, even where not formally acknowledged. . Emotional support is easily and freely given. Also freely-given is **informational support** at a basic level of, say, where the best buys are for daily necessities or recommending an honest and skilled tradesman. At the next level can be information about job opportunities for another member of a family network who may be out of work.

Participants provided illustrations of a higher level of support by what we have termed **Practical support** benefits– the support provided, for instance, by the Armenian father who told how he always helped his children with their homework (*G2*); the Chaldean male described how his brother hid him at his house after he deserted from the Iraqi Army (*E4*); a Shia professional female recounted how she was found by a relative who

worked in one of the registry offices while she was waiting in one of the inevitable long queues; he took her inside and arranged for her to get the personal documents she needed quickly – instead of queuing then waiting for months. (*Interview B*). Practical support was also illustrated by several examples of how relatives found them work in a Ministry after they graduated (*Assyrian L2; Armenian G1; Assyrian K3*). A different practical benefit provided by a cousin was recalled by a *diaspora* participant. He went back to Iraq after the 2003 regime change; the cousin now worked in a Ministry and so helped him to gain a government land grant and a \$30,000 payment because he had been a Ba’athist political prisoner (*Shabak R1*). Such practical support requires more input from the giver in terms of her/his time and personal efforts, skills, experience and access to his pool of facilities such as his house and his car and in some cases a loan of some of his minor his possessions. But it does not deplete his physical assets. It is higher order support that is qualitatively different from the other types of benefits.

Distinctively different again from the other types are what we have termed **Material support** benefits, often involving money or goods purchased with assets – such as the Yazidi brother who always brought his sister oil colours to encourage her artistic streak (*Q2*); the uncle who gave his young Sunni cousin a gold coin for good school results (*O2*); the father who on visits to his imprisoned Shia son always brought him a 10kg bag of garlic (*A5*); or the Turkoman mother who went to the extreme length of secretly arranging a bunker and food supplies to hide her son for years during the Iraq-Iran war to stop her son going off to fight (*N3*).

Payment of money for kidnapping ransoms or bribes to escape from prison was frequently recalled. The largest material support benefit recalled was by a Turkoman who went back to Kurdistan after 2003 to pursue a project to build a mini oil refinery. Family members in Australia sold property and raised \$4 million for him to back the project, but it did not succeed (*M4*). Appendix 9 classifies the recollections of *diaspora* participants in reporting them under the different types of benefits. The types of benefits involved in the Stress narratives of participants are also specifically noted in Appendix 16.

In the sense of the demand made on the giver, material benefits involve the giver’s own

personal assets, including money. They too are of a higher order than the easily-given emotional and informational support. In the obverse, they constitute a much more significant benefit to the receiver than, say, the sharing a coffee together and so can stimulate a sense of obligation to repay the benefit in the future.

The patterns of the recollections and anecdotes within the Family Network fell naturally into different types of benefits in different social situations, mainly concerned with helping each other in **everyday normal** situations and in what we call **everyday normal misfortune** situations.

Form the data the following can be identified as **everyday normal** situations:

**Providing and Maintaining** shelter, food, clothing and transport – “support” as when the Sunni male *diaspora* participant (*O3*) recalled how his father looked after the family of his deceased uncle by taking them into his home and “supporting” them; and the Chaldean woman (*F1*) who used cash from her wedding gifts to buy her parents a car.

**Education** – primary, secondary and for some, tertiary studies – as when another Sunni participant (*O2*) told how he looked after his brother’s family while the brother was in Libya and took the children to school. He also recalled how an uncle would regard him with a gold coin whenever he achieved good school results.

**Assisting with marriages** and celebrating weddings to recognise the couple as husband and wife and later births. This was a common story among the women. A Shia participant (*B1*) and a Sabian (*D1*) both told how they supported their siblings to find spouses and get married. (*D1*) helped her brothers get married and helped their wives during child birth.

**Employment** – helping both new entrants into the work force and the currently unemployed find jobs so they can continue to support themselves and their families. Some examples: at the request of my father, this researcher found a job as a driver in my Ministry workplace for my brother after he married. Similarly, an Assyrian participant (*L2*) reported how a relative in the Transport Ministry found a job for her son; an Armenian (*G1*) told how his uncle found him a position after he graduated as an engineer in the office of a Minister through a Sunni friend. A Chaldean said his sister’s husband gave him work during the tough times of the sanction against Iraq.

It was noticeable that the social network demands made on a family member in providing such benefits was not substantial. From the personal resources of the giving family member such demands could be readily met.

The **Normal Everyday Misfortune** situations identified included:

**Health** and illnesses and **Accidents** within families in a Family network. These were commonly recalled by participants such as the Shia woman (*B4*) who told how the family rallied when her brother needed money to pay for an appendectomy; the Turkoman woman (*N2*) who sent money for his brother for an eye operation; the Sabeian woman (*B1*) whose brothers' wives cared for her after a car crash when she was pregnant.

**Marriage breakdowns.** An Assyrian woman (*L2*) told how her sister sold all her gold jewellery to help her pay for the legal costs of a divorce; An Armenian woman (*G3*) reported that her brothers gave her \$30,000 towards her divorce.

**Loss of work or business venture downturns.** As cited above, a Chaldean male (*E2*) was provided with work by his sister's husband during the economic strains of the international sanctions against Iraq. A Sunni woman (*P1*) recollected how her uncle's clothes shop ran into financial problems, so the family purchased clothes only from his shop until business improved and he began to flourish.

**Disputes with others,** for example debts, rental agreements or recovery of stolen property in the urban areas and in rural areas, land and territory ownership. Participants in Iraq recounted examples of how rugs stolen from a residence were discovered in a shop and how through clan leaders' intervention they were recovered (*Interview B*) and how a daughter's loan to a work colleague was recovered from the family of the work colleague, again through their clan leader's intervention (*Interview F*). A dispute with a landlord about notice to quit was also solved by clan leaders' interventions (*Interview m1*). Another elderly Iraqi recalled an inter-clan dispute over ownership and use of a piece of rural land involving a firearm being discharged was resolved by a local public figure – who kept the gun (*Interview A*).

And, of course, the final and inevitable misfortune -

**Death** of a family network member - through either old age or misadventure. Several participants made mention of how family networks stepped in to help when a family member died. A Sunni *diaspora* woman recalled how after the murder of a cousin's husband in the sectarian conflict in 2005, relatives in Australia sent money each month to the widow and her 4 children (*P3*). A Sabian male told how he and other nephews led the burial rites when their uncle died and also paid the funeral expenses (*C4*). A Turkoman male (*M3*) recounted

how when his Aunt's husband died, his father arranged the funeral rites and his sister went and stayed with the widowed aunt. See also the account of the Sunni participant (O3) cited above.

The full summaries of all *diaspora* participants' family responses on benefits exchanged are tabulated under some of these headings in Appendix 9. It can be seen that among *diaspora* participants recalling benefits within the stimulus of groups, their accounts relating to misfortune situations were commonly about health and medical incidents. However participants in Iraq whose responses came in personal one-to-one interviews and tended to be more general, covered benefit exchanges in both normal and abnormal settings.

It was noticeable that the demands on the giving family members in these everyday abnormal situations were more substantial than the demands on exchangers in the everyday normal situations. They appeared to require more of the benefit-givers' time and more practical support by way of live-in care, expertise and skill and at times support by way of materials such as goods, food and often money which can be regarded as higher-level support.

A further pattern of benefits requiring very high substantial support, often at personal risk to the giver, became apparent, particularly in the respondents of older participants among the *diaspora* group: recollections of family benefits provided in times of **special social stress**. These included:

### ***5.2.3.1 Iraq-Iran War***

During the Iraq-Iran war participants recalled such "high level" benefits as:

1. My mother would not let my brother go fighting in the Iraq-Iran war. She secretly built a bunker and kept him there. She did not tell us about this until the war was over – *Turkoman female (N3 aged 49)*.
2. As then a senior Army officer I was able to arrange the transfer of my wife's relative's son from front-line service - *Armenian male (G4, aged 72)*.
3. Relative of an Air Force pilot. Visited us often. Helped my brother get frequent leave during his compulsory Army service - *Sunni male (O4 aged 51)*.

### **5.2.3.2 Ba'athist regime stresses**

In the days of the Ba'athist regime, when so many of the *diaspora* participants fled from Iraq to neighbouring countries, then came to Australia, they recalled such benefits as:

1. Father helped me when I was in prison in 1991, then family paid to excuse me from compulsory Army service. Parents looked after my wife and children when I escaped to Australia – *Shabak male (R1)*.
2. I was a prisoner. Inside with me was a doctor who said to eat a lot of garlic, so my parents used to bring me a 10kg bag of garlic and we shared it. – *Shia male (A5)*.
3. When we had to flee, a cousin in Turkey arranged a job in a local restaurant – *Turkoman male (N1)*.
4. My brother bribed *Mukhabarat* gaoler with \$3000 to let me escape. Then he hid me till I fled – *Chaldean male (E5)*.
5. Sister working at Oil Ministry got us extra fuel coupons during sanctions scarcity – *Assyrian male (K1)*.
6. My uncle was a senior Army officer. He would visit my unit when I did compulsory service, arrange 3-4 days leave for me and ensure no risky duties were assigned – *Sunni male (O1)*.
7. My husband was captured by Kurds during fighting. My husband's mother came and paid \$50,000 for his release – *Armenian female (H1)*.
8. Relative in Transport Ministry gave my son a driver's job. In 2003 he drove the relative and family to Mosul and stayed with them until the regime changed – *Assyrian (L2)*.

### **5.2.3.3 Post-2003 sectarian conflict**

Other participants recalled benefits provided to other family members when the post-2003 sectarian conflict erupted within 12 months of the installation of a new Iraqi government. Examples include:

1. Sister's Shia husband killed in sectarian conflict. Me and my brothers sent money from Australia for her and her 3 children – *Turkoman male (M2)*.
2. Through close links with long-time Shi'ite friend from schooldays who had become a leading officer in Al Mehdi Army in Missan province, we secured the release of Mehdi Army captives in Baghdad at height of sectarian terror – *Sabian male (C1)*.
3. We took in my sister and her family during the sectarian killings. She left our house for

Syria. Later she sold her house and repaid us – *Assyrian male (K3)*.

4. Relatives raised \$6000 for ransom of my kidnapped son – *Sabian female (D4)*.
5. We relatives gave monthly cash to a cousin and her 4 children when her husband was murdered in sectarian strife in 2005 – *Sunni female (P3)*.

More detailed reports of these and other anecdotes are provided in Appendix 16 as Post-2003 Sectarian conflict narratives.

#### ***5.2.4 Frequency of Family Network benefit exchanges***

The frequency of benefit exchanges was not canvassed directly with participants; but the responses give a picture of activity from which, together with this researcher's own experiences with her family network, permit an outline of the frequency of exchanges within the family network to be inferred as follows.

Within a normal immediate intimate family, networks interactions with resulting benefits are exchanged daily, mostly at morning and at night at the ritual interactions associated with breakfast and dinner. In keeping with the new digital era, mobile telephone calls between family members can be seen by experience, observation and anecdotes appear to occur also on a daily basis.

Mobile telephone and internet video calls also clearly become the medium of network interactions between immediate family networks and elements of the extended family network on a frequent basis two or more times a week. These elements include -

- The married sons and daughters who have moved out of the immediate family home and into their own residences, sometimes in other towns and cities or other quarters of the same major town or city where their parents reside. (*P1*) reported how when she married and moved out her parents pressured her to get a residence near them so they could visit often.
- The sisters and brothers of the parents who have also moved elsewhere to become members of the extended family in a distant location, as in the cases of all the *diaspora* participants who now live in Sydney, Australia.
- Cousins can also maintain frequent telephone contact with each other and may use individual social media “pages” (on Facebook or Twitter) to sustain contact with

each other, thus blurring the temporal timelines.

Frequent personal contact in what we have called a normal misfortune situation was illustrated by a *diaspora* participant who recalled how her sister visited their widowed disabled aunt every day (*Assyrian K2*). While this instance was unusual in the data, other participants such as *J3, L3, A1, C2 and O2* recalled extensive periods of continuous personal contact, particularly in health misfortune situations.

Iraqi social rituals involving the wedding and the marriage feast (*Zawage*) and the mourning ceremony (*majlas azaa or fatha*) for family network members who pass away, provide unpredictable occasions for interpersonal reunions of extended family members. So do family summer holiday visits usually planned only in the weeks preceding. In one unusual case (*Q1*) told how his newly married wife stayed with his parents after he came back to Australia for the months she had to wait for a visa to join him.

Important feast periods such as the annual *Eid* festal holiday period after the fasting month of Ramadan also provide opportunities for extended family gatherings. One *diaspora* participants recalled:

Every *Eid*, our father and brothers prepared a tent for 200 relatives for feasting and accommodation. My father says its important- *Sunni female (P3)*.

### **5.2.5 Durability of Family Networks**

Among our participants were 21 men and women aged from 55 to a maximum of 76 with grandchildren and great-grandchildren. The youngest participant was 19. In short there were accounts from four generations of Iraqis with experience of living under three different Iraqi republican regimes – and in the case of the older participants, family memories of the later days of the kingdom or Iraq. The data shows from the volume of accounts of family activity that most of the participants valued their family networks as the standard against which they assessed their other relationships as participant (*D4*) showed in describing her neighbours as “like my family” and the taxi-driver (*K1*) reporting he was closer to his neighbours than his relatives.

By comparison with other of their social networks which they rated as important to them, our analysis shows that their family networks are the most durable and survive for



generations. An immediate family network in Iraq may die out through natural expiry of its members as they grow old and die – or if members die violently because of State intrusions in their lives. But their descendants clearly maintain the extended network of which they are members. It can clearly be seen from the data that the descendants keep the networks alive by continuously exchanging at least emotional support and information support – by way of “family news” – and, when required, practical and material support.

### ***5.2.6 Personal Relationships within Family Networks***

It was evident in the narratives particularly of the *diaspora* groups that they felt very close to most of the other members of their extended family network based on their experiences in Iraq before they came to Australia. But clearly there were variations in the nature of these close relationships, reflected in the behaviours they reported. The Assyrian participant who reported how her sister visited their widowed and disabled aunt every day (*Assyrian K2*) reflects a more intimately closer relationship than, say, the Sunni *disapora* participant who recounted that during the sanctions hardships of the Ba’athist regime, her husband sent food every day from their corner supermarket to their aunt who fell sick (*Sunni O4*).

Generally because of their intimately close relationships, an immediate family can be seen to enjoy **intimate** relationships which can be characterised as very close, emotional bonds between parents and in most cases siblings. Some relationships of those family members with other extended family relatives can be close and intimate – such as the relationship an Assyrian mother described between her daughter and her own sister who could not have children. That relationship developed when the mother’s sister came to give live-in care to the daughter when she was sick. It became so closely intimate that after this family came to Australia, the daughter went back to Baghdad to care for her aging aunt (*Assyrian L3*).

The relationships between Iraqis and their aunts, uncles and cousins also appear to be different from the type of relationship Iraqis form in other networks. These can readily be classified as **private** relationships – characterised by both emotional closeness, deeper trust from confiding in each other and longevity of the relationship. They

appear to be qualitatively different from the everyday **social** relationships which Iraqis form with friends and neighbours and also with colleagues at workplaces or at mosques and churches. In fact the **private** relationship can be characterised as commonplace between almost all members of an extended family network.

The depth and closeness of the relationships between network members is important in two aspects. In the practical sense, the data shows that the closer the relationship, the more ready a family member will be to provide one of the higher order and more demanding benefits which another family member may need, particularly in times of stress such as those imposed by State intrusions in their life. This is clear from the narratives of older participants provided in Appendix 16.

In the sense of the “cognitive” characteristics of social networks detailed in Chapter 3 about theorists’ identification of “trust” and “reciprocity” as important elements of social capital, there can also be seen from observation and experience, a link between the depth and closeness of a relationship based not only on blood ties but also on the degree of personal trust developed between the individuals in a relationship. This is further discussed in the following chapters.

### ***5.2.7 Learning Characteristics of Family Networks***

Another characteristic of the importance of the Family Network in the makeup of Iraqi society is its position as the source of learning about acceptable social behaviours, both in public and within social networks, in terms of the social rules and rituals and the exchange behaviours within the Family network.

On the basis of personal experience and observation this researcher would hold it to be self-evident that all social behaviours of an Iraqi individual, indeed of all humans, are learned behaviours. Some types of social behaviour are integral to social network exchanges and the Family network appears to be at least the initial source of the learning of these behaviours. In Iraq, as in most other human communities, we would hold it to be self-evident from personal observation and experience, that a child’s learning and socialising experience begins within the special intimacy of the immediate family network.

From a social capital perspective, it becomes clear that the processes by which every Iraqi child from the moment of birth is lovingly nurtured towards adulthood involves the child experiencing social capital benefits being bestowed upon her or him by the child's immediate social network members. These include instrumental benefits such as the daily food prepared by loving mothers, the shelter and transport, even the clothing provided at much personal expense by loving and generally hard-working fathers. It also includes the benefits of the emotional support of both parents and the child's siblings, and the informational benefits provided by them as the Iraqi child grows and learns to interact and cope with her or his young world.

The range and the different types of these benefits expand markedly during the child's first ten years of life. This is particularly so as the child heads towards adulthood through primary and secondary schooling as well as experiences that are defined by the closeness of uncles and aunts and cousins and the child – who also learns about the religion into which she or he was born. The child grows accustomed to experiencing an expanding world of interaction and experiences with peers and older people. The child can be said to grow to accept almost without question or any specific recognition, all the social capital benefits bestowed on them day after day from her or his immediate and extended family. This is of course expanded by the experiences with others at school and play and from older others on adventures into the world of markets and shops and restaurants. Even when misfortune occurs and medical help or special attention is required, the young Iraqis will continue to benefit from the loving care and nurturing bestowed upon them.

But during all this the child also learns and comes to understand and accept what is expected of her or him in similar situations of need among those in their Family social network. This learning and understanding comes about when they interact with family at funerals and weddings, at religious feasts and at lesser social gatherings. The Iraqi child learns how to give, as well as to receive, the social capital benefits available to her or him as a member of a Family social network – and, it is held to be self-evident, this process continues through each generation.

It also paves the way for an Iraqi's participation in the other important networks in her/his life, as they learn to become self-sufficient in their own personal social lives and in the social life of the civil society of Iraq outside the family network.

### ***5.2.8 The Family Network as a source of social capital***

The accounts that participants provide about the benefits exchanged within their Family networks points to an underlying social mechanism at work to produce these benefits at the individual exchange level in the Family network. The elements of this mechanism so far identified indicate that a benefits exchange cannot be initiated unless the individual Iraqis involved are not only members of a Family network based on blood ties but they also, as a result of individual training, experience and acculturation, are ready and willing to engage in what we can call reciprocal exchange transactions, because of what they have learned. This underlying willingness may be based not only on a realisation of the potential benefits which can accrue to them but also on a close relationship which in turn is clearly based on a combination of personal trust of those other family members and on an individual acceptance of the unwritten social rules and social practices of Iraqi society in force as they grew up. Of special interest is the peculiar Iraqi version of the Middle East social practice of *wastaa*, a norm expected particularly of a family network member who holds a position of authority or who has developed special contacts with officials to intercede on behalf of a family member involved with or requiring some assistance in dealings with officers of a State authority. (See Chapter 2, discussion in section 2.4).

This willingness to take on the burdens of membership of a family network, are in effect, pre-conditions to benefits exchange transactions in interactions within the Family network. Participants in providing their narratives of benefits within their family networks did not explicitly refer to the possible burdens involved, but their unstated acceptance of them was clearly evident in their willingness both to give and to receive in the benefits transactions they described. *Diaspora* participant (G3) told how (in an illustration of *wastaa*) his uncle arranged for a position in a Ministry for him through a Sunni friend after he graduated as a young engineer. In another illustration of *wastaa*, Iraq participant (*Interview A*) recounted how he interceded for a wayward brother living in a province and engaged in selling of phone cards from an unregistered shop and

being arrested for this. The participant got in contact with a friend with a contact in the Prime Minister's office who intervened with the provincial authorities concerned to get his brother released with only a warning. They gave no indication of any hesitation in providing the benefit of intercession in the second case or of receiving it in the first place.

The outcomes of these interactions are the benefits described above. The most apparent group of benefits are the emotional benefits which reinforce the personal relationship between the interacting family members. These begin with the routine social greeting rituals prescribed by Iraqi custom. Closely allied with these are the informational benefits associated with the greeting rituals – inquiry about the other's health and well-being and the exchange of information about other family members. The higher-order benefits exchanged arise from the social settings in which the benefits are sought – most usually in what we have called the normal everyday settings associated with social landmarks such as marriage, feast days or holiday visits or work opportunities for a new school-leaver and with the misfortune settings associated with health and other setbacks. The highest order and most demanding benefits requests come in times of the special social stress imposed by State intrusions, particularly where the lives of family members may be at risk.

### ***5.2.9 Gender Differences in the Family Network***

A clear pattern of difference between Iraqi men and women as social capital generators emerges from the data on the Family networks.

The women participants frequently recalled instances of emotional support to and from their families and aid and assistance between family members and relatives.

#### *Emotional support*

- I continue to call my family and my neighbours in Iraq twice a week (B2).
- I value my family, neighbours and friends for their support when I need it, (P2).
- My cousin and I helped each other a lot. On children's birthdays we would bake cakes together and I would decorate them (N1).
- Supported brothers and sisters in finding spouses and getting married (B1).

#### *Practical and material support*

- Used cash gifts from my wedding to buy my parents a car (F1).
- Our family is strong and we siblings help each other. I sent money to my

brother for an eye operation and I paid for my sister to go on the *Haj*. They helped us with our house deposit in Sydney (N2).

Men tended to recall most readily episodes of assistance in both normal everyday misfortune settings and in times of social stress from State intrusions. They also recognised the role of their women in their family units.

- As the eldest, I helped my father make sweets during my schooldays. Then I supported the rest of the family when I got a job. Now I send money for our parents (M4).
- I was responsible for my sister and my brothers. I helped them in their marriages (O3).
- We nephews led burial rites when our uncle died and we paid the funeral expenses (C4).
- When aunt's husband died my father arranged the funeral and my sister stayed with our aunt (M3).
- My father took over his family when my uncle died. He supported them. They married and appreciate my father deeply (O3).
- Aunt gave live-in care for my sick mother and did all the domestic work (C2).
- Brother helped me escape to Turkey after I deserted. Gave me all his money. I repaid him, from Australia (II).
- Sister's Shia husband killed in sectarian conflict. Me and my brothers sent money from Australia for her and her 3 children (M2).
- I had to flee. Gave brother my share of house. When he sold it, he paid me my share (E1).

It was of interest that none of the Iraqi male participants recalled benefit exchanges of primarily emotional support. Perhaps this was because of their perceptions of their role as heads of an immediate family of providing a different type of support for their extended family members. But it does suggest that Iraqi women in their family networks not only develop closer relationships between each other but also engage more frequently in benefit exchange behaviours to help each other than their menfolk do

### ***5.2.10 The Family Network and Clans and Tribes***

All Iraqis as members of a family find themselves also members of a clan and a tribe. To the heads of an immediate family there are benefits to be seen from the assistance of their clan in special everyday misfortune settings affecting a family member.

Participants recalled the following interactions:

- Contributed blood money to the clan of a murdered policeman to free our clan member for the murder - *Shia male (A1)*.
- We Sabian men would estimate the longevity of our elders and pool funds for their funerals – *Sabian male (C4)*.
- We Yazidis join in our many feasts so we maintain our ethnic identity and so our children can make friends within our community – *Yazidi male (Q1)*.

These were participants in Australia and therefore out of touch with their clans and clan leadership. The participants living in Iraq noted in response to questions that with the exception of some of the young single Iraqis that they knew their clan and their clan leader and in many cases they also knew their tribe and tribal leader. Many of them were able to recount incidents where their clan leaders helped them, primarily in resolving more serious disputes outside the civil legal system. These recollections included:

- A married Shia woman told how rugs stolen from her washing line were found in a shop and they were told the identity of the seller. The clan leader went to the thief's clan leader and at a special meeting the rugs were returned, compensation paid and the thief ordered to leave the district. (*Interview B*).
- A married Sunni woman told how her daughter lent money to a work colleague and he would not repay it. She and her husband went to their clan leader. He went to the borrower's family and they agree to repay the loan in instalments. (*Interview F*).
- A married Christian woman related how their clan leader came to her house and helped resolve a family problem; the same clan leader helped a Christian family from Basra to resettle in their neighbourhood. (*Interview N*).
- A Shia male recounted how his clan and another and bigger Shia clan came to blows and gunshots in a dispute over ownership of a piece of rural land. A prominent provincial identity stepped in and consulted with the clan heads. Ownership was resolved – and the provincial identity took the firearm involved (*Interview A*).
- A Kurdish dentist told how his landlord wanted to terminate his occupancy on the grounds of not having a proper lease. His brother went to their clan leader who called on the landlord's clan leader. The landlord backed down and accepted six months notice. (*Interview I*).
- An older married Sunni retiree recalled how during the height of the post 2003 sectarian conflict, the Muslim head clan leaders of two adjoining districts of Baghdad met together because Sunni residents of one of the districts could not get to the jobs in the Shia district and *vice versa*. They arranged to guarantee the safety of the workers concerned. (*Interview E*).

Clan leaders in Iraq clearly have some special moral authority, through trust and respect, and the matters reported were resolved with reasonable speed. Their role in helping clan members resolve disputes, both minor and serious, in an informal manner, can be seen to be important to clan members. The Iraqi justice system appears to support this, as noted by Carroll (2011).

Membership of a tribe, however, does not involve a social network, no matter how Iraqis may identify with their tribes. The tribes and their leaderships constitute a social institution and only intrude into individual lives in normal settings in the outlying areas of some provinces, where there is little or no state authority presence or action over road water and property access. Otherwise Iraq's tribal leaders continue to have mainly a political role with the agencies and political leaderships of the State, as widely recorded both in international reports on Iraq and the international news media coverage of the resurgence of sectarian violence at the time of writing.

The role of clans and tribes in Iraq appears to be unique although other Middle Eastern societies have their own tribal links with the authorities of the State. Certainly there appears to be no equivalent linkages within the justice systems of western nations in Europe.

In summary the data confirms the place of the Family network as an enduring foundation source of Iraq's social capital in two key areas. It confirms the Family network as the production centre of the full range of the benefits that comprise the assets of social capital. It also establishes the Family network as the nursery and training centre where Iraqis as individuals learn and develop the sets of benefit exchange behaviours that are at the heart of social capital generation.

The data also shows the capacity of the Family network to sustain itself by generating relatively simple social capital benefits almost daily then, when required generating a more complex and more demanding set of social capital benefits in times of social stress from outside the network, especially stresses imposed by the State.



## CHAPTER 6

### RESULTS – PERSONAL NETWORKS

#### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed examination of what the data reveals about the workings of the other major social networks within which Iraqis interact to help and sustain each other in everyday social settings and also in intrusive situational stress contexts. In these interactions, they generate each day more social capital by way of emotional, informational, practical and material benefit exchanges.

The data shows that Iraqis have at least two other significant social networks that play a major part in their everyday exchange of benefits, the results of which becomes the social capital of the networks and of their communities. They are their Friends networks and their Neighbours networks. They can be seen as a “natural” social network.

Participants also identify another set of personal networks with which they can become involved and which are marked by the characteristic of being constrained in their involvement. One of these which many of them identify is the networks they form and join when they gain employment, particularly in a formal organisation such as a Ministry or large company. Others are organisations of civil society which some of them join voluntarily as a result of their religious fervour – their Worship networks – or their desire to help others – the body of community aid organisation, sometimes known as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some of these can be sources of benefits for their “natural” social networks. All of them involve the constraint of being required to conform to the culture norms and rules of the organisation they join. Some of these organisations also engage in cross-linking social network behaviour of horizontal linking within the civil society of which they form part and sometimes in vertical linking with people in other institutions in the civil society and the State.

The data confirms that these are fundamentally distinct from Family networks because they are formed through the development of interpersonal relationships outside the confines of the Family networks. These Friends and the Neighbours networks have

further significance because they provide opportunities for unfettered exchange interactions without any social restrictions or other intrusions except those imposed by the cultural rules and practices and the religion-based social rules and norms widely accepted in Iraq, as explored in Chapters 2 and 3.

However, as noted, the data suggests that within the Work Networks and Worship Networks exchange benefit transactions take place in a more confined social setting. Work Networks have to operate within the constraints of the work organisation's own internal rules and procedures which generally seek to focus and direct staff behaviour for effective organisation results. Worship networks are constrained by the rules and norms of the religious establishments within which they are formed. But both networks can be important sources of social capital benefits for their participating members.

They are also of special interest to scholars and researchers because the social settings of these networks provide a bridge for ordinary Iraqis across which they intersect with some of the institutions in their wider community life. From these they appear to learn the difference between the free experiences of their interactions within their friends and neighbours networks and the more constrained experiences of working within a formal organisation.

This chapter explores what the data confirms about the characteristics of these personal networks, what makes them different to the Family network and the way they operate to generate wider social capital benefits for their memberships.

## **6.2 Friends Networks in Iraq**

Our participants confirmed that their social networks of Friends are just as important to Iraqis as their Family networks as source of mutual benefits in their everyday lives - in both their everyday social settings and in intrusive social stress contexts. But unlike the relative ethno-religious homogeneity in Family networks, Iraqis readily form and maintain friendships with other Iraqis from other ethno-religious groups.

### ***6.2.1 Crossing the ethno-religious divides***

The data clearly shows importantly that Friends networks tend to be ethnically and religiously mixed without any sign of external constraints. Examples from the *diaspora* participants:

1. A Chaldean woman recalled how her open family had close Muslim Shia and Sunni friends and went to the churches of other Christian sects. (F4).
2. A Sunni woman told how she valued her Shia and Sunnii neighbours and her Sunni, Shia, Christian and Kurdish friends for their help when she needed it (P2).
3. A Shia woman said that from Australia she still called her Sunni neighbours twice a week to keep in touch. (B2).
4. Another Chaldean woman recalled how after she arrived in Australia with her family, she wanted to go back to Iraq because she missed the afternoon gatherings of her Shia, Sunni, Chaldean and Sabian friends. (F2).
5. An Armenian male recalled how his Arab, Christian and Kurdish friends used to get together for *Ghawa* (coffee) nights - a social ritual among Iraqi menfolk - and help each other find work for each other. (G1).
6. A Turkoman male gave an instance of *wastaa* in a friends context in relating how when his cousin was arrested, a Sunni friend who had a relative in the *Mukhabarat* was able to arrange in exchange for bribes to get him released. The bribe money came from the Turkoman's family. (M2).

Significantly, some of the *diaspora* participants volunteered this information while most of the Iraqi participants in Iraq, who were directly prompted to recall, reported that their Friends networks contained other Iraqis from across the ethno-religious divide.

A female Shia professional woman in Baghdad specifically reported Shia, Sunni and Feili Kurd friends in her network (*Interview B*). A male Christian also from Baghdad reported that his 13 good friends who got together regularly included Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Sabian and Christian friends (*Interview M*). The young single women and men participants likewise reported a range of friends across ethno-religious divides.

As noted, it was also significant that to most participants, both men and women in both the *diaspora* and the Iraqi interview groups, ethno-religious background was never a barrier to forming a network of friends. Participants readily recalled how their

friendships crossed the ethno-religious divide, such as the Chaldean female (*F2*) who nominated Sunni, Shia and Sabians among her friends; and the married Shia female teacher (*Interview B*) who listed Shia, Sunni, Sabian, Faili Kurd and Christian women among her valued friends.

### ***6.2.2 Size, formation and composition***

Friends networks emerge as less structured than the family networks perhaps because they are based on personal relationships and not the blood ties of the extended family. They also tend to be smaller in size. Iraqi interview participants gave in response to a specific question, numbers ranging from 2 from a single female (*interview D*) to 20 from a married male (*interview I*). Interestingly many of them tended to refer in their accounts of their Friends networks, only “close friends” they met and interacted with frequently.

The age of the Iraq participants as well as their genders and their social settings also appeared to be a factor in the size of their networks. The single females, all students and aged 19 to 23, reported smaller numbers in their networks - no more than 5 - and the single males a larger number between 8 and 12. The married females aged between 46 and 53 reported between 6 and “a wide range” while the married men aged between 32-76 reported their networks numbers at between 13 to 20.

There was a clear pattern in the recollections of participants that shows that Iraqis begin forming strong friendships in their school days. Some of these friendships can last well into adulthood. The 61-year-old Sabian male (*CI*), cited earlier, relied on his friendship of 45 years or more with a long-time Shi’ite friend from schooldays who had become a leading officer in the militant Al Mehdi Army in an outlying province. Through this he was able, to arrange the release of Sabian relatives seized violently in Baghdad.

The forming of a friends network at school is clearly seen among many if not most of the Iraqi parents as a desirable part of a child’s social learning and participants recalled some special experiences as a result.

One of our *diaspora* Armenian participants recalled how after school she would go to a friend's house and the mother of her friend, a teacher, would help them with their maths studies (H1). Another Armenian lady recalled how she and her schoolfriends used to walk home together to protect each other from school bullies (H3). A Turkoman student told how as a tertiary student, he and four friends were ordered to leave their lodgings by their landlord. The Shia Muslim father of one of them arranged a cheap flat for them all (M4).

The data also showed that among Iraqis, the membership of their friends networks changed as their lives changed, from their school days to their married working lives and into old age and also as they changed their living locations. However it became clear that while mostly were social relationships some became close private relationships that endured, even though interactions become infrequent. This was reflected in the ability of the previously-cited Sabian participant (C1, aged 61) who, as recounted above, was able to call on an old schoolfriend from the province in which he grew up and who had become a Shi'ite Al Mehdi Army leader, to secure the release of some of his Sabian relatives in Baghdad at the height of the initial sectarian conflict.

Friendships can also develop and change in different ways. A Shia Turkoman woman from Baghdad (Interview J) told she used to stay during holidays with the friend of her husband in Dohuk and she formed a "special" friendship with the husband's friend's three sisters and keeps in touch with them. A Turkoman *diaspora* participant (M1) recalled how during his compulsory military service he formed a trusting relationship with 3 other Arab conscripts working alone at a remote signals outpost in western Iraq. They arranged a pattern of leave so one of them of them could take a week's leave at a time. Their distant superiors never knew. A Yazidi female *diaspora* participant (Q2) recalls how two of her brother's Shia friends saved him from drowning during the Iraq-Iran war. Later her family sheltered one of those friends and his family when they had to flee from the regime. A Kurdish male participant (I4) told how he was forced to relocate into a different province. A friend of one of his Shia friends helped him to find work, meet his new neighbours and settle in.

A further illustration of the almost-primal need to form Friends networks even in unusual settings was the account of *diaspora* participant (A5) about his time served in prison when he distributed among his newly-formed fellow-prisoner friends, the big quantity of garlic his family would bring him during visits so they could all maintain some healthy additions to the prison food provided to them. – on the recommendation of a fellow-prisoner doctor. Even in prison he clearly found himself forming friends with people who would otherwise have been strangers.

### ***6.2.3 Frequency of exchanges and durability of Friends Networks***

Outside the immediate family group, the data combined with observation and experience showed that among working Iraqis, friends met face-to-face much more frequently than with any other people, except perhaps within their work groups. Young Iraqi participants at school or at university indicated in passing that they naturally gravitated every day towards their friends between class breaks and at lunch time. Older participants such as (F2) recalled in passing how their friends tended to meet in the afternoons at least once a week. Older Iraqi men such as (G1) recalled their *Ghawa* nights, events which observation suggests tends to be a weekly ritual. Retired older men with time on their hands can be seen anywhere in the cities of Iraq daily playing dominoes with a group of male friends at special tables outside their favourite coffee shops.

Friends networks often appear to be as durable as family networks, in the sense that Iraqis cannot realise their needs alone. They always need friends for mutual support. But time and separation can readily change the composition of their networks, as noted above. Many of the *disapora* participants such as the Chaldean woman (F3) and the Sunni male (O4) told about exchanges with friends in Australia formed since their arrival. Many, however, recalled old friends in Iraq and many told of keeping in touch with them despite the separation of a vast distance – an activity made easier in this digital age by mobile telephone and computer videolink services, as well as through the social media such as Facebook and Twitter.

#### ***6.2.4 Personal Relationships in Friends Networks***

Participants did not directly tell how they formed their own friends networks. But the researcher's observation and experience suggests that in Iraq networks are formed either on Iraqis' own initiative or by introduction into another network of friends. A Turkoman woman (*N3*) did recall how her sister used to drive her to occasions when the participant would meet her friends and they became friends of her sister.

Generally it was as if they took it for granted that they all developed a network of friends as a natural even instinctive feature of their daily living. But clearly discernable in the data on the friends networks is a process of developing either a private or a social type of interpersonal relationship as the first step in becoming involved in a Friends network - as described by the Turkomen participant (*N3*) cited above. In fact there clearly emerged from the accounts of all participants some distinct qualitative differences in relationships with others in their Friends networks. Merely lumping them together under the social capital literature's common label of "close ties" (Forrest & Kearns 2001, Adler & Kwon 2002) was insufficient to account for the distinct differences noted.

These differences could be seen in two ways of examining the participants' narratives of their experiences with friends. First there were the declared recollections about special close friends with unusual benefit exchanges. The Sunni male participant (*O4*) recalled how he paid for a friend who became a gambling addict in Australia to return to Baghdad away from poker machines and to marry.

Then there were the unstated background underpinnings of the recollections. Friends appeared to be sufficiently strong in participants' memories to be cherished as people from outside their family who had helped the participants in a variety of positive, beneficial ways, as declared by the Sunni woman participant (*P2*) and the Assyrian male participant (*K1*). We can categorise these as evidence of positive and even close social relationships. These are distinctly different from the looser but still friendly relationships which Iraqis might form with other Iraqis with whom they came in contact in different settings at various times, such as friendly shopkeepers and store staff from whom they regularly purchased food and household needs, or other Iraqis they meet

casually for a short time but on a friendly basis.

Among the declared recollections of the participants, as cited above, there were some which were largely about deeper friendships and more intense levels of benefits. These provided examples of other distinctively different, more close ties which we have called private relationships. Furthermore, some recollections, as in the case of participant (*I2*), a Kurdish male who sheltered a deserting friend during the Iraq-Iran war and later he married the deserter's cousin appeared to come very close to matching the intimate relationships which characterise the nuclear family and very close relatives in the rest of the Family network.

It became clear that these different levels of relationships – intimate, private and social, accounted not only for the variations in ties between members of a Friends network but also became important in accounting for clear differences in benefits exchanged.

### ***6.2.5 Types of Benefits exchanged***

Participants in the data collection recalled a wide variety of benefits exchanged within their Friends networks. The benefits they recalled fell readily into the same classification of types revealed within the Family networks. However the emotional support, informational support and practical support benefits appear to be exchanged just as frequently as within their immediate family networks and in turn more frequently than within the wider extended family network. Table 5.1 in the previous chapter provides a count of the various types of benefits recalled in Friends networks.

A Kurdish female (*I3*) recalls how she met her future husband. He was the brother of one of her friends and the friend kept the romance secret from both their families until they were sure about each other. Then they involved their families and married with full family consent and support. A Chaldean female (*F2*) warmly told how her friends would meet almost every afternoon to exchange ideas, experiences and news about events, clothing, ornaments and recipes.



Iraqi men might meet less frequently, but they enjoyed their *Ghawa* (coffee) evenings, a special feature of Iraqi male social life when a network of friends and sometimes relatives get together at a favourite coffee shop perhaps once a week to talk about their families, their health issues, the political and economic health of their communities and their nation, and among the younger ones to discuss jobs and work opportunities, as an Armenian *diaspora* participant (*G1*, aged 56) recalled.

A younger Christian single female in Iraq (*Interview P*) described how she drew emotional and social benefits from her friends at her university and how they helped each other a lot. A single Sunni female (*Interview H*) related how her seven fellow university friends not only met together daily but also kept in touch via their mobile phones and their computers. She specifically recalled how they all warned and counselled one of her friends who became hopelessly close to a male student after they found out he was using her to do his homework and taking money from her. The Kurdish professional male in Baghdad (*Interview I*) said that the closeness of his friends helped relieve him of his work pressures and provided benefits to his family both socially and psychologically.

The narratives of participants about their benefits exchanges within their friends networks in what we classified as normal everyday settings. But participants also recalled exchanges in what we have classified as abnormal everyday settings.

A Kurdish woman (*J2*) told how a close friend and her husband persuaded her own husband to come back to her after they parted and so avoid a divorce. An Armenian woman (*H4*) told how her family befriended another Armenian Iraqi family while they were refugees in Greece and they provided each other with mutual support. The son of the other family became close with and eventually married her daughter. A Kurdish former refugee (*J1*) told how she and her husband made friends with other escaping refugees in Syria and at a river crossing into Greece they all helped a mother whose children had fallen sick. In an example of material benefit given and in return a practical benefit gained, an Assyrian participant (*K1*) recalled how in Iraq he helped a Shia friend in 1993 by financing him to build his house. Years later he met the friend, now a

refugee in Syria and the friend gave him his house to use for the Assyrian's honeymoon with his new bride.

Examples of benefits from friends exchanged in abnormal everyday settings came from participants (I4) and (Q2) already cited: The Kurdish male forced to relocate to Thi Qar who received help from the friend of one of his Shia friends; the Shia friends of the brother of a Yazidi who saved the brother from drowning during the Iraqi-Iran war – and the participant's family later sheltered one of them while he was fleeing from the ruling regime in Iraq.

But except in a few cases such as those of the two participants above, Friends did not appear to become involved often in providing practical or material benefits in social stress contexts. They appear from the data to be engaged predominantly in exchanging bonding-style emotional support benefits intertwined with information exchange in everyday normal settings – which would, of course, extend into the ceremonial settings of weddings and mournings, which would involve exchanges of practical benefits and material benefits among the participants in providing gifts at the weddings and foodstuffs and preparation assistance for the mourning rituals.

There was one striking exception to all this in the account of the Iraqi special interview woman participant (SI3) a Sunni widow, teacher and NGO worker. She recruited both friends and relatives in her private initiative to improve the run-down schools of her district in her provincial city. It appeared to have developed, with their help, into a well-organised campaign targeting provincial political and bureaucratic decision-makers and initiating an ongoing repair and rebuilding campaign her account was an unusual narrative involving the deliberate harnessing of the social capital of her networks of 50 friends and 12 neighbours to the mutual benefit of the local community.

### ***6.2.6 Learning Characteristics of Friends Networks***

If the Family network is also the nursery for acquiring experience in the value of mutual benefits exchanges, the Friends networks clearly provides, in parallel and from an early age, opportunities for enriching the initial Family network learning experiences almost every day.

Significantly in some cases participants extended that learning experience into providing benefits assistance to others who came into their community, as in the case of the Iraqi NGO woman (*SI3*) cited above.

Individual social initiatives like that of (*SI3*) and organised NGO community assistance initiatives reflected in the data appear only to have become possible under the different State regulation of Iraqi society made possible by the 2003 regime change after the US-led invasion. They also appear to have an impact in the way that Social Capital can be harnessed for the benefit of Iraqis communities in both urban and provincial settings and therefore merit further investigation.

### ***6.2.7 Friends Networks as a source of social capital***

The data appears to confirm the strong indications emerging from the Family network data of the same underlying social mechanism at work in benefits exchanges in Friends networks.

*Diaspora* participants, in the safe social interaction climate prevailing in Australia, appeared to take for granted their personal security in engaging in Friends networks interactions. However the young Sunni single female student (*Interview H*) drew attention to the importance of friends (and neighbours) in the less uncertain interaction climate in present day Iraq. This has resulted in a fear of strangers. She was, in effect, highlighting the importance of interpersonal trust as a prerequisite to the formation of a friendship that characterises a Friends network in present-day Iraq.

This researcher can confirm by experience the fear of strangers in present day Baghdad. During a visit to Baghdad in August 2013 the topic of the last terrorist incidents was high on the agenda of concerns in interactions with members of family, friends and neighbours networks. They always warned about being careful in public. “The stranger approaching you may be wearing a suicide bomb vest” was a common theme of friends’ cautions. But that did not stop Iraqis interacting freely and continually in public places with the people they trust – their friends.

As noted, Friends networks generated social capital benefits that always reinforced the friendship bonds. The Baghdad-based Shia female teacher (*interview B*) related how her friends network often met at her place or went shopping together and kept each other informed of new products and best prices. These are examples of what Woolcock (2001) describes as “bonding” social capital – benefits resulting from “relations between family members, close friends, and neighbors” (p10).

In times of need friends provided strengthening benefits ranging from information about job opportunities to higher-order practical and material benefits. A young single Baghdad-based participant (*Interview K*) told how a friend helped him gain work at the friend’s family trading firm, which proved to be an important experience for him. The Baghdad-based engineer (*Interview M*) related how his friends helped each other. One in particular was a motor mechanic who charged him reasonably for his car repairs; another was ready to loan him money when he needed it to win a private contract. These benefits fit in part with Woolcock’s description of bridging social capital – benefits from relations between more distant friends, associates, and colleagues.

In social capital terms, of special interest was the account cited above of the provincial Sunni widow and NGO worker (*SI3*) who recruited her friends in a self-help community schools rebuilding project. This fits well with Woolcock’s classification of linking social capital – benefits from relations with the capacity to “leverage resources, ideas, and information from formal institutions beyond the community” (p11).

Equally notable is how a Friends network was capable of generating all three types of Social Capital.

### ***6.2.8 Gender Differences in Friends Network***

The pattern of differences between Iraqi men and women as social capital generators noted in the Family networks continues in the data on the Friends networks.

Iraqi women seemed to value their friendships in normal settings more strongly than Iraqi men. *Diaspora* participant (*F2*) specifically recalled how her friends met in afternoons to exchange ideas and experiences on events, clothes, ornaments and recipes. In Baghdad, (participant B) met her friends often at her place or went shopping together

and kept each other informed on new products and best prices. The Chaldean *diaspora* participant (*F2*) valued her friends so much that after arrival in Australia she wanted to go back because she missed them. Baghdad participant (*IF*) said that to her, her friends were like her family. Baghdad student participant (*Interview D*) declared that her two close friends would meet in the library during lecture breaks and lunch together to avoid “annoying people. “ Iraqi men, however, more often recalled how their friends had helped each other in times of need. *Diaspora* participant (*G1*) recalled how his friends would exchange information on work opportunities when they met for their weekly coffee nights. This suggests that Iraqi women, appear to rely on their networks especially for emotional support, whereas Iraqi men talk more about practical support. Many of the other male *diaspora* participants tended to recall higher order practical and material benefits exchanged within their friends networks. Iraq-based participants more generally told how through their interactions with their friends networks they helped each other with moral and financial support (*Interview A*) or helped relieve work pressures, while bringing “various” social and psychological benefits to his family (*Interview I*).

But generally Iraqi women appeared to be more active in participating more frequently in friends network interactions. The initiative of participant (*SI3*) in harnessing her friends into helping with what became a grass-roots campaign to bring about improvement to the schools of her community was also noteworthy.

### **6.3 Neighbour networks in Iraq**

In Iraq, neighbours clearly emerge as a distinct social network in the data from all participants - even if on initial examination, Iraqis ‘neighbours might appear to be a subset of their friends.

The data shows that all Iraqi participants readily distinguished between their network of friends and their network of neighbours. The data also showed that both networks produce mutually-supporting benefits for members and that both networks were formed initially on the basis of interpersonal relationships that appear to be come private relationships; that both crossed the ethnic-religious boundaries, and both were active on almost a daily basis with frequent social capital-generating interactions.

They clearly differ in the characteristic of location in terms of nearness to each other's residences, thus permitting ready, frequent and informal access to each other. Neighbour networks also emerge as a distinctive source of practical and material benefits in both abnormal everyday situations and in time of intrusive stress context situations.

### ***6.3.1 Size, formation and composition***

Among participants, neighbour networks started at a minimum of 1 reported by a young provincial student female (*Interview D*) who said that as a tertiary student who had to work hard at her studies, she did not have any more friends in her neighbourhood. But she got together with her neighbour friend four times a week because she needed to "talk about many things." This size rose to five neighbours reported by a busy married and working Baghdad woman with whom she said she was close (*Interview J*) and to up to 60 neighbours whom she described as being close. She herself is in her fifties. She said her neighbour friends were 40 to 60 years old. The married working male participants currently in Iraq tended to report neighbour networks of between two and six and in the case of an older 63-year-old, a network of 12 whom he saw almost daily and valued as close friends.

An insight into the way neighbour networks developed came from the Kurdish *diaspora* participant (*I4*) forced to relocate his residence to another province. A friend introduced him to a friend in the new city; this person helped him settle in and introduced him to his neighbours. Experience and observation suggests that the women of a household introduce themselves to a next-door arrival, quickly form a relationship then introduce them to other neighbours.

The data shows that in Iraq, the formation and the composition of neighbour networks is dependent only on the interpersonal relationship between the members of the network. The question of the new arrivals' ethnicity or religion affiliation does not appear to be a consideration of anything. Both Iraqi-based male and female participants all reported their neighbours were from other ethno-religious groups. Many *diaspora* participants referred with some pride about this characteristic of their friends network.

Iraqi-based Shia married participant (*IB*) identified among her 10 neighbour network group (aged between 25 and 70), women who were from the main ethno-religious groups - Shia and Sunni Arabs, Feili (Shia) Kurds, Sabians and Christians. Christian married participant (*IN*) told how network of 7 neighbours helped her to organise a christening party “although some of them were Muslims.” Among the *diaspora* participants the Sabian (*D4*) said her Shia neighbours were like her family. The Assyrian Christian male (*K2*) recalled how when he and his family went outside Baghdad for visits or holidays, he always left his key with a Sunni neighbour who visited with the family’s aunt and fed their birds. The Sunni male (*O2*) told how when a Shia neighbour was executed for his anti-Ba’athist political activity, all the neighbours rallied to support his bereaved family.

But a striking example of the strength of a neighbour network was provided by the Sabian woman (*D1*) who reported how her family fled from Baghdad during the sectarian strife and took their elderly mother with them. Some of the family found refuge in Germany. But her mother could not settle in this new and colder environment where no one could speak Arabic or Aramaic with her. After only a few months, the mother announced she was returning to live out her remaining years in her old familiar surroundings among her Shia neighbours and her other old friends. The family has since dispersed. But the mother was welcomed back into her old neighbourhood and her Shia neighbours and her friends now look after her and protect her during the continuing sectarian volatility, while the family supports her financially from afar. Clearly, with age, close neighbourhood ties can prevail over even family links.

### ***6.3.2 Frequency and durability***

Because of the close proximity neighbour network interactions happen frequently particularly among the married women engaged in domestic duties. In many cases there can be a daily exchange of mutually supportive benefits particularly emotional and informational support exchanges and in some cases practical benefit exchange. The Assyrian participant (*L3*) recalled that she took turns with her Sunni neighbour in driving their children to school each day to conserve petrol use. During the international sanctions against the Ba’athist regime, a Turkoman participant (*NI*) told how her family shared their rations with their impoverished neighbours and the neighbour responded by

helping her with her housework.

Naturally a particular neighbour network can change its composition as neighbours move to other, more distant locations. But new neighbours come in and are invited into an existing network, making them very durable. And it is clear from some of the examples already given that very close neighbours can readily make the transition from a neighbour network to a friend's network even though they now live apart. Modern telecommunications media ensure they can keep in contact with each as members of a Friends network – as clearly happened with the elderly Sabian mother who preferred to return from lonely safety in Germany to the familiar neighbours and friends and the familiar if perhaps more risky lifestyle of her old neighbourhood in Baghdad.

### ***6.3.3 Differences in Personal Relationships***

There is evidence in the data provided by participants to suggest that proximity and opportunity and a common interest in responding to their daily domestic duties among the married women of a neighbourhood helps develop stronger interpersonal relationships between like-minded members of a Neighbour network mainly at the social level. But this could develop into a private relationship as they become closer. For example, an Assyrian taxi-driver (*K1*) told how each day he gave a lift to his Shia neighbours to their bus depot and felt he was closer to them than to his own relatives. Another Assyrian (*K4*) recalled how their Sunni neighbour's mother fractured her hip in a car accident. His mother visited her daily and taught the disabled woman's daughters how to look after her. The mother obviously had developed a closer private relationship with this neighbour than with her other neighbours and wanted to make sure she was well looked after. This affected the level of benefit in their social capital transaction.

Our male *diaspora* participants more readily recalled instances of how their neighbours had helped them in abnormal everyday settings or in stress times of political or conflict intrusions. The Assyrian (*K2*) recalled how during the post-2003 sectarian violence, a Shia neighbour came under threat from a Sunni fundamentalist militia group so he and his family helped them quickly to acquire a car so they could relocate in southern Iraq. In the Ba'athist days, Turkoman (*M2*) told how his neighbours warned him the regime's *Mukhabarat*, the secret police, were coming to arrest him. He was able to flee



immediately and go into hiding at his sister's place in another province.

These were other instances of Neighbours provide higher-level benefits to each other in times of need because of the close relationships they had with each other.

### ***6.3.4 Benefits exchanged in Neighbour Networks***

While the Iraq-based participants tended to make more general observations about how supportive their Neighbour networks were among each other, it was the *diaspora* participants who gave examples that covered the whole range of benefits which neighbours in their networks exchanged.

Table 5.1 in the previous chapter provides a count of the various types of benefits recalled in Neighbour networks.

Some of those are recounted above. Others included:

*In everyday normal settings:*

“Helped neighbour's children with meals before school” (B3); Shared celebrations with neighbours, no matter what their religion (D2) “neighbour schoolfriend helped me with maths and I helped her with Arabic” (J2).

*In everyday abnormal settings:*

“Neighbours aunt came to look after us when we were little after she took our sick mother to hospital” (P4); Took neighbour into our house when she developed cancer and for her operation (B3); “Neighbour, a policeman, helped my husband in a faulty truck sale dispute. Seller agreed to replace the truck “(J2).

*Intrusive stress settings*

During air raids neighbouring elders in shelters told us stories that quelled our fears (F3); During the war, a rocket damaged a neighbour's house. My husband helped them repair the damage (L3); Baáth party team came to destroy Shia houses in our district in 1991 uprising. Our Sunni neighbour intervened to save our house (A5); During sectarian strife my husband forced to close his bakery business. Our neighbours persuaded him and help him set up to resume baking breads at our house (N2); Our Shia neighbour in

Diyala threatened by Sunni armed group. We stored his furniture while they went into hiding (P2). Neighbour's little son kidnapped my family raised \$13,000 ransom to secure his release (M3).

The data shows how ready neighbours in Iraq can be to help each other in everyday settings by exchanging emotional support and informational benefits but also to contribute higher-order practical and material benefits in times of special stress.

### ***6.3.5 Neighbour Network as a source of social capital***

The data noted above illustrates a characteristic which distinguishes a neighbour network from a friends network – the readiness of neighbours to provide higher-order practical benefits and sometimes material benefits in times of special need.

The data appears also to confirm the strong indications of the same underlying social mechanism at work in benefits exchanges in neighbour networks that have emerged in the data on family and friends networks. This is a mechanism whereby an interpersonal social relationship develops between individuals, based on interpersonal trust. These individuals form a network which then engages in various types of interactions that produce benefits exchanges. These exchanges always provide reinforcing emotional support and simultaneously a mix of informational and/or practical and/or material support, dependent upon the social setting of the interaction and the level of stress involved.

Two further characteristics emerge in applying the paradigmatic classification of social capital as bonding, bridging and linking (Woolcock, *op cit*) to neighbour network benefit exchanges.

First, the neighbour networks data shows how neighbour networks, as with friends networks, produce bonding social capital in the form of immediate emotional support and generally informational benefits, as illustrated above. In addition they also point to what appears to be a ready willingness among neighbours in Iraq to provide the higher-order practical and material benefits that may be required without hesitation in times of special and urgent need, such as in dangerous intrusions by State security or other

private armed groups. Given that Iraqis are individual members of both family and different personal social networks, they have the capacity not only to exchange immediately basic emotional and informational benefits but also the potential to exchange higher-order practical and material benefits. As a result, the social capital of a community can be seen as the pool of actual and potential “assets” – as defined by Bourdieu (1986) - available to its various social networks.

Secondly, there appears to be an inherent problem in classifying social capital transactions by the paradigmatic descriptors of bonding, bridging and linking types. The data of this study clearly shows that the personal social networks like the neighbour networks generate social capital by way benefit exchanges that is often simultaneously bonding and bridging and in some cases also linking as in the case of participant (I3). He helped his neighbour under Ba’athist stress with shelter and money; the neighbour became a high government official after 2003 and gave our participant special help.

### ***6.3.6 Gender Differences in the Neighbour Network***

There was a discernable difference in the pattern of gender interactions within neighbour networks, as reported by participants. This was most obvious in the Iraq-based participants. Women like (Interview B) reported how she met with her neighbours almost every day when she returned from work. (Interview F) recalled how her neighbours visited and consoled her when her brother died. (Interview H), a student, saw her neighbours three times a week and regarded them as close friends. An older male, (Interview A), made no mention of how frequently they met but readily recalled how they helped each other especially in critical times such as damage to a neighbour’s house. (Interview E) highlighted how he and his neighbours helped each other on special occasions especially weddings and funerals. Among the *diaspora* participants, reported previously, the role of the women as active helpers to neighbours in sickness and medical stress was notable.

Iraqi women as neighbours appear more active with their networks in meeting with each other, supporting each other not only with emotional support but also with information about their domestic work and their neighbourhood activities and helping each other particularly in health and illness situations. With the support of their spouses, Iraqi men

appear to be willing to step in with practical and at times material support to help their neighbours in times of stress.

## **6.4 Other Personal Cross-Linked Social Networks**

Some of the Participants provided limited data about other social networks to which they belonged and regarded as important to them. These networks have the special characteristic of cross-linking these individual Iraqis in their everyday lives with some of the institutions that comprise the civil society of Iraq. They are therefore of interest as a set of different sources of social capital in Iraq available to members of social networks.

Table 5.1 in the previous chapter provides a count of the various types of benefits recalled in what is headed Work and Other networks.

The networks identified include:

### ***6.4.1 Work Networks in Iraq***

The data from participants also directly and indirectly identified another type of personal social network of importance to working Iraqis – the group of friends they have formed within in the organisations in which they were employed.

These work networks are of importance to the participants in sustaining themselves in their work activities on behalf of the organisation within the organisations own rules. They are also important as a source of bridging social capital benefits to members of their other networks in the form of job opportunities.

The composition of these networks appears to vary. Iraq-based (*Interview F*), a professional woman reports she is close to her 14 colleagues in her work network. It includes some men. When a new arrival joined the organisation they rallied to help the family find a residence and settle in. They also arranged for their professional association to assist with the rent.

All reported their work networks crossed the ethno-religious divides. Some also reported they helped each other at their work, like the married female teacher in Baghdad (*Interview B*) who recounted how she often covered for her colleagues who had to do something away from their school, sometimes by combining classes. They would do the same for her when necessary.

The *diaspora* participants frequently reported how their other work network members helped them obtain jobs. (*L3*) reported how a relative in a Ministry arranged a driver's job for his son; (*G1*) and told how after they graduated, relatives with friends for a position for them in a Ministry; (*H3*) related how a friend's husband arranged for a Ministry position for her husband.

Interestingly, several participants reported how they helped protect their friends in their job network despite the rules and requirements of the organisation. (*L2*) reported how her friend in her Ministry and her would look after each other's workload when one wanted to take some time away. (*P1*) reported how he joined with others in his work network at a Ministry to intercede with the Director-General for a woman in their group who had become involved in a work problem. (*K1*) gave an example of a different bridging benefit to a family network in telling how his sister working for the Oil Ministry in the stress of the international sanctions providing the family with extra fuel coupons.

For a section of the Iraqi community, these work networks can be a source of benefits; hence their importance. This personal network is also of special interest because it is one within which individual Iraqis in their individual lives intersect with one of the institutional sectors of Iraqi civil society, which of course has a life of its own - with its own bureaucratic culture and set of norms and rules. The work network can be seen as a cross-linking network bridging individual everyday life with the institutions of the civil society of Iraq

The implications of this both for organisation and management theory and for the better understanding of the generation and impact of social capital in Iraq will be discussed in following chapters of this thesis.

### ***6.4.2 Worship Networks in Iraq***

Some of the participants also reported interaction activity suggesting that they exchanged benefits through their involvement with their religious affiliations and public worship behaviour as devout religious practitioners.

It first became apparent in the accounts provided by some *diaspora* participants from across some of Iraq's ethno-religious groups. These accounts were mainly about the benefits they gained from their religious affiliations in the secularised environment of Australia. A number of Sabian participants (*D2, D4 and D5*) referred explicitly to the sense of support they obtained through their weekly worship and the links they formed with others in the small Sabian Mandaean community in Sydney both when they first arrived in Australia and afterwards. Chaldean participants (*F1, F2, F3*) told how in their larger Christian community with its own network of parishes in Australia supplied them not only with fresh additions to their friends networks but also benefited them by relieving them of the stresses of re-settlement and making them happier. (*E3*) also described how their church friends worked to raise funds to bring sick Iraqis to Australia for special medical treatment. Shia participants (*A3 and A6*) told of the local associations their community had formed and how the activities arranged by the associations helped not only with their childrens' religious and social acculturation but also with marriage opportunities for the younger generation.

This may be seen as an example of a small and relatively new community working together to assist each other in preserving their cultural identity in an alien social environment while they settle into it. But in a different light, an Iraq-based widowed Sunni participant (*Special Interview 1*) told how as a result of her desire to have the benefit of religious instruction, she became a volunteer teacher under the wife of the local religious leader at her local mosque, working during the school holidays for three days a week. Two other participants in Australia (*Special Interviews 2 and 6*) elaborated on this particular personal volunteer social network and provided additional background on the institutionalised religious establishments within which these networks function.

This Worship network, as we have labelled it, is another example in similar vein to the cross-linked Work network where Iraqis in their individual lives intersect with one or more sectors of the institutions of Iraqi civil society.

### ***6.4.3 Community Aid Volunteer Networks***

Data on an unusual interaction involving a friends and a neighbour network for the benefit of a community has been presented above in an account provided by the Iraqi participant (*Special Interview 3*), a Sunni widow in her forties, a teacher and NGO volunteer worker. She recruited both friends and relatives in her private initiative to improve the run-down schools of her district in her provincial city. Her account was an unusual narrative involving the deliberate harnessing of the social capital of her networks of 50 friends and 12 neighbours to the mutual benefit of the local community.

To gain more insights into the impact of these non-government organisations (NGO's) in harnessing the social capital of Iraq for community aid and improvement, two more special interviews yielded additional data.

(*Special Interview 4*) a Sunni teacher in her early-fifties, was also an active volunteer with a regional office of a large NGO. She told of how she and her fellow volunteers worked with the organisation's paid staff to deliver medical and remedial education services to displaced victims of the sectarian strife and to older illiterate residents and press State government agencies for a more active role for women and the unemployed in the civil society of Iraq. They often try to involve their friends and neighbours in some of their campaign, even while they are intersecting with senior Ministry staff, local administration officials and from time to time politicians, delivering government-funded aid programs.

(*Special Interview 5*) a Shia women who was a retired professor in her sixties told how she worked as a volunteer with seven others with the paid staff in the provincial office of another national community group running direct-help literacy and talented children programs mainly for needy children. She related how they and other branches of the organisation cross-linked with the volunteers and staff of other community aid organisations in campaigns that involved establishing interpersonal relationships with

other community, religious and business leaders, high-ranking civil servants and politicians.

There can be no doubt on the basis of this limited data that the activities of NGO's rely heavily on the social capital inputs from the volunteers to deliver clear benefits to the individual disadvantaged Iraqis with whom they interact. But there is at this stage no data to provide a general picture let alone a measurable profile of both the quantitative beneficial support effect delivered or of the size of the disadvantaged population they endeavour to assist. But it does provide insights into how the potential social capital of the natural set of personal social networks can be harnessed through the more constrained cross-linking social networks formed between community workers and resource decision-makers to help disadvantaged Iraqi communities improve the quality of their everyday lives.

The implications of the range of insights offered by the data on these cross-linked personal networks is explored in subsequent chapters.

## **6.5 Variations between Personal Social Networks**

The data suggests that there are clearly differences between the Family networks and the range of the personal networks in which Iraqis are members by their own choice.

All Iraqis are born into Family networks and most Iraqis readily learn, acquire the participatory skills and accept the responsibility of membership of their Family networks because of the emotional, informational, practical and material benefits it brings them.

They also form or join what we can distinguish as "natural" Personal networks of friends and neighbours characterised by strong interpersonal relationships based on interpersonal trust and freely engage to the limit of their personal capacity in benefits-exchange activity. The benefits they exchange are an intertwined mix of emotional support and informational benefits as well as practical and material benefits of various orders, depending on the everyday settings affecting them, both normal and abnormal



and the degree of stress imposed by external intrusions into their daily lives by both government agencies and some unwelcome community elements.

There appear to be a further set of personal social networks in which adult Iraqis involve themselves in more constrained social settings and contexts. We have classified them as Other Personal Cross-Linked social networks.

The most obvious of these is in the setting in which they spend most of their daylight time – their work as staff members of an organisation. Within their employing organisation they will form a working relationship with colleagues, but they are also likely to form a friends-at-work network to support and enhance their own sense of work enhancement. Their exchange behaviour in this network will be constrained by the organisation's own norms and rules.

Depending on their own sense of need or desire to assist others, they may also join voluntarily in other organisations which general will be part of the civil society of Iraq. Again this involves them in a social setting constrained by the organisation's own culture and norms and rules. But it may also involve them in cross-linking activity horizontally with colleagues and members of other similar organisations or vertically with decision-makers and supporters of these community-oriented organisations active in Iraqi civil society.

The data and the insights it produces about these different sets of networks in which Iraqis involve themselves are discussed and analysed for the impact of these networks on the generation and development of the actual and potential Social Capital of Iraq in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER 7

### ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

#### 7.1 Introduction

The results of this study has, despite its limitations, provided a clear picture of the social capital activity at the *micro*-level in present-day Iraq. It has also provided a clearer picture of the underlying social process which at the *micro*-level of Iraqi society produces and sustains the nation's resources of social capital.

It is by no means a definitive study of Iraq's *micro*-level social capital activity, due to all the limitations noted earlier and particularly in the absence of comprehensive demographics data on the 33 million or so Iraqis living in this nation-state, as it is currently constituted. Because of the sampling approach required by the continuing sectarian and now widening conflict, the results may be weighted in favour of the better-educated and employed sector of the population who live in major urban centres in the capital, Baghdad and in the governorates. Nevertheless the picture of social capital that emerges, this researcher claims, may be considered generally representative of what goes on in almost all segments of Iraqi society. It also serves well as a useful basis for hypotheses, worthy of further investigative testing, about unclear elements of the social capital characteristics of Iraq.

The clarity of the detail of the picture that emerges from our results varies. Some of the findings reported here can be stated with a high level of confidence, particularly those related to the social networks we have identified which appear to generate so much of Iraq's social capital resources, as well as to the social settings and the intrusive stress situations in which they function and also to the types and levels of benefits they exchange.


But the picture is less clear about the constrained social networks in which Iraqis also produce social capital benefits at the *micro*-level of Iraqi society. These networks clearly spread into the institutions of Iraqi civil society, the Iraqi business sector and even into the State governance sector. At best the results show only insightful glimpses

into the types of benefits exchanged in such constrained social network interactions with individual officials in the institutions of the civil society and the governance institutions. Any prospective findings about the activity within these constrained networks can at best be hypotheses which must await further testing. These different finding will be noted in analysing the detailed findings below.

A theoretical framework is emerging from the results of this research. The following schematic representation illustrates the underlying process which appears to be at work in generating Iraq’s social capital. A discussion of the Table follows:

## 7.2 Social capital activity in Iraq – a summary of the process

**Table 7.1 - The Social Capital process in Iraq**



### ***7.2.1 The underpinnings of the social capital process in Iraq***

The data shows that the underlying process which generates social capital in Iraq – as represented schematically in Table 7.1 above - begins with the way in which Iraqis acquire both the desire and the skills in what we can call social capital behaviours and then using these behaviours, join or form their own social networks in which the society's social capital is generated.

The data shows that individual Iraqis are born into an Immediate Family social unit and, as they grow up, they learn and acquire sets of behaviours towards each other and to their relatives in the Extended Family network within which their immediate family is embedded. They learn naturally how to incorporate this set of behaviours in their everyday lives as part of a natural social requirement of continuing membership of their community – the requirement postulated by the French sociologist and cultural anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1954) that an individual must learn firstly how to give, secondly to receive and thirdly to reciprocate. At the same time they also acquire experience with the prevailing Iraqi rules and norms which have been instilled within those behaviours. Besides reciprocity, these include, notably, respect for authority (*ahtraam*), trust in those they know and the special Iraqi practice of being ready to intercede with authorities on behalf of others (*wastaa*). In return, they also experience the full range of benefits to be gained from these behaviours and the value of these benefits in sustaining, maintaining and enhancing themselves in their everyday lives. In this sense, it can be asserted, that Iraqis are, by a natural process, socialised towards what can be seen as social capital behaviour.

Naturally, Iraqis have other sets of behaviours which form what we can call from observation and experience, the ritual framework of casual social interactions with other Iraqis. In their everyday lives, Iraqis young and old, interact with other Iraqis in casual social situations - when they go shopping or mingle with other Iraqis in other settings. In these they interact under the rituals of the Iraqi version of what we can call polite public behaviour.

But their set of behaviours towards those they know and with whom they socialise at a personal level are distinctively different from their sets of casual public behaviours. This socialising set of behaviours also develops as Iraqis grow older and establish their own interpersonal relationships with other Iraqis and so form an emotional linkage or tie with them. From there they go on to develop a network of these personal relationships. These can be networks of either short term or longer-term relationships that can be readily distinguished and in which they find mutual benefit. These become their social networks. Notably, every Iraqi is a member of at least three or more of these social networks.

### ***7.2.2 The Social Networks of Iraqis***

A clear picture of the various types of networks of which individual Iraqis become members in the course of their normal daily lives, emerges from the data. As set down in Table 7.1 these networks are:

**Family Networks.** Iraqis become by birth members of an extensive and enduring two-part network comprising their immediate family and their extended family members.

**Personal Networks.** From an early age they go on to apply the same behavioural process in developing on a personal basis their own social networks, independently of their family network. These personal networks in which they interact with each other freely, include their

**Friends Network** – a network of other Iraqis outside their family network with whom they establish a friendly interpersonal relationship, beginning at school and which can grow stronger; and their

**Neighbour Network** – a network of other Iraqis also outside their family network but located in the same physical area where they reside and with whom they also establish a friendly interpersonal relationship which can grow closer.

In these networks they can join freely without constraint in generally enjoyable interactions of mutual benefit to all members of their network. The data suggests that these related networks are formed as a result of interpersonal relationships initially established within the same setting, such as at school or in some other setting. The relationship develops between two people and widens to include others, as mutual trust

is established and more social interaction takes place. In this way the ties between the friends develop first into a *social* relationship with each other or with other neighbours and friends in an already-established network. Some of the ties between members of a friends network can become close enough to merit the term *private* relationship or similar to the very close relationship usually found only within a family network, an *intimate* interpersonal relationship.

The data shows there is another set of special social relationships which we have classified as **Constrained Social Networks**. They are networks Iraqis develop when after completing their education, individual young adult Iraqis find a job or begin to worship at a particular mosque or church or engage in other productive and mutually beneficial sporting, recreational or hobby activities. In each of these settings they develop interpersonal relationships with other Iraqis in the workplace or at their worship centres or where they go for recreation or sport. From that beginning they form another social network base on developing interpersonal relationships.

But Iraqis often find that in these constrained settings, their interactive and mutually-beneficial behaviours are affected by the imposition of a different and sometimes conflicting set of rules drawn up by the leaders of those organisations. In work and secular organisational settings, these are usually explicit rules about expected behaviour in performing tasks required of them. In other settings, particularly non-secular organisations, the constraining rules come into play less explicitly.

The networks identified in this study include -

### **Work networks**

Within employing organisations Iraqis readily form their own personal network of work colleagues based on the development of social relationships and acceptance of the same norms of trust and reciprocity and other informal rules which they all accept. But this new variation of a friends network in the setting of their work place is constrained by the organisation's own internal rules about performance of duties and involvement in achieving the organisation's management goals. Interestingly there is evidence from our results that among some Iraqis, when there is conflict between the social obligations

accepted within Iraqis' work networks and their employing organisation's rules, the work network's members will act to bypass the management rules – and if the infraction is discovered and discipline applied, the work social network will seek to intervene and intercede with management decision-makers. Particular examples of this were in the anecdotes of participant (*L2*) about how her friend in her Ministry and she would look after each other's workload when one wanted to take some time away; (*P1*) reported how he joined with others in his work network at a Ministry to intercede with the Director-General for a woman in their group who had become involved in a work problem.

These work networks are an important feature of social capital activity and appear to be established in all workplaces, whether they be small manufacturing and service businesses many of which are family-owned, or the larger private financial, manufacturing, oil and gas production and communications firms; or the biggest group of employers, the ministries and government agencies of the State sector at both the central and the provincial level.

### **Worship networks and Community Aid networks**

Iraqis also volunteer their services to organisations that are religious or community, and generally non-profit oriented. Our results identified two of these.

The **Worship** networks have long been a feature of Iraqi life, especially since the primary and secondary school system has no religious orientation. Local Muslim mosques and the Christian parishes and to a lesser extent the other religious establishments appear to rely heavily on volunteer teachers to provide detailed religious instruction to the children and the adults among their adherents. These volunteers become friendly with each other and a social network develops.

**Community Aid Volunteer** networks are a relatively new but growing feature of Iraqi community life. Community aid and service organisations have only become active since the downfall of the Ba'athist regime in 2003. Now, according to data provided by the NGO Directorate of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of Iraq, 2,051 Iraqi origin and international NGOs have by mid-2014 registered under Public Law 20.

However, the directorate's website ([www.ngoao.gov.iq](http://www.ngoao.gov.iq)) provides no details about the types of these NGO's or the latest numbers registered recently.

This listing of constrained social networks of some durability is by no means exhaustive. Other such networks of significance for the social capital resources of Iraq may be identified by further research. These could well be in other areas of joint Iraqi social activity, such as sport and recreational hobbies.

All the networks identified in the results of this study are significant because these networks appear to remain stable and durable and even strengthen over a reasonable period. The interactive activity which takes place, usually on an everyday basis generates a variety of different and important types of benefits for network members. Such networks qualify as natural social capital because the real benefits exchanged when coupled with the willingness of social network members to provide them, become part of the beneficial if latent and intangible potential that comprises the resources of Iraq's Social Capital.

### **7.3 Benefits generated by Iraq's Social Networks**

The results of this study show that in the process of producing social capital, Iraqis in their everyday, ordinary daily lives engage in many casual social interactions with other Iraqis. But within their own family, relatives and their friends - within their family and personal social networks – each time they meet, they engage in a different set of interactive behaviours which produce a range of benefits for network members.

These benefits may on the surface, appear to be associated with what Hanifan (1916) described 100 years ago as the benefits of “goodwill, fellowship and mutual sympathy.” However, the results of this study go beyond The Hanifan listing. The study reveals a rich picture of mutually-supportive benefits generated in Iraqi's social networks activity.

Because the benefits resulting from these everyday social network interactions are qualitatively different, it is possible to classify them readily as:



**Emotional** support – the readily-given verbal and non-verbal support of comfort , reassurance, and confirmation of closeness which can be provided readily in each interaction.

**Informational** support – the intertwined sharing of information about matters of mutual interest, ranging from gossip or shopping bargains, to details about, say, a job opportunity available for a network member in need. This is support also easily given.

**Practical** support – providing a network member in need with the higher-order benefit of , say, helping children with their homework (participant G2) or, as a ministry staff member, assisting a relative or friend with obtaining needed personal identity documents. In times of special stressful need, the benefit provided may be shelter from external intrusive threats. Such practical support requires more input from the giver in terms of her/his time and personal efforts, skills, experience or access to his pool of facilities such as his house and his car. In some cases it may involve a loan of minor possessions. But it does not deplete the giver’s physical assets. It is higher-order support that is qualitatively different from the other types of benefits.

**Material** support – often involving money property or personal assets. The examples provided by participant showed them to be a higher-order benefit that is distinctively different again from the other types of benefits. These type of benefits can range from an uncle giving his young relative a gold coin for good school results to selling family gold and jewellery to assist with the ransom payment of a kidnapped relative.

The results of the study also show that precise type and level of benefit provided in turn depends upon the network in which a need emerges and upon the social setting in which a need is embedded. As pictured in Table 7.1, these setting can be identified as *normal, everyday settings and everyday abnormal settings*.

In **normal everyday settings**, emotional support is provided as a matter of course by the friendship rituals of Iraqi greetings and inquiries about the health of other network member’s families. Informational support is provided in the course of the interaction about matters of mutual interest ranging from the latest news on network members and what is happening in the community. It can also be specific information about a matter of mutual interest.

A higher level of emotional support, information and practical or material help can be required in what we have classified as **everyday abnormal settings** as in the event of such out-of-the ordinary or abnormal events as sickness, requiring daily care, or a death in the social network.

It will be noted that this social settings classification is clearly based on the basic life cycle of all individuals – birth, marriage and death in any society.

But particularly for Iraqis there are **intrusive social contexts** which can seriously disturb the natural course of daily life and cause high-levels of stress for some individual Iraqis. They can only turn to their social networks for support and help. Some of these intrusive contexts can be natural disasters from which Iraqis suffer, such as from periodic floods and heavy dust storms as well as creeping desertification. A society can, at best, only prepare to alleviate such incidents. But Iraqis can also come under external intrusive threats to their well-being, safety and even to their lives. Since 2003, these threats can come suddenly from armed politico-religious groups engaged in terrorising and ethnic cleansing. They may also come from the official public security authorities acting, they claim, to suppress dissent and insurgency.

Researchers and theorists clearly have had problems capturing the richness and diversity, the complexity and the frequency and the settings of the benefits exchanged at the *micro* and *meso* level – which this study shows. Millions of Iraqis in their family and personal networks engage in such exchange transactions every day as part of their regular, ordinary lives.

As noted in earlier chapters, most writers accept a benefits classification system that merely distinguishes between *emotional support*, *informational* benefits and *instrumental* benefits (Baum & Ziersch 2003, Ferlander 2007). One of the few to go further has been Song et al (2006) who in examining social capital transactions in an Asian psychiatric clinic, distinguished between *instrumental support* such as work and activity assistance, and *expressive support* in the sense of providing information, being a companion and lending objects or money, and/or being a confidant.

This is a starting point. But this study has found that the range of social capital benefits described by the Iraqi participants were so qualitatively different that the term ‘instrumental’ was not only inadequate to differentiate them; it also impeded insightful analysis.

The terms emotional support and informational benefits have some intuitive appeal. But, as the results showed, there are a much more complex and interdependent range of social capital benefits realised across daily life. The catchall term ‘instrumental’ fails to recognise significant differences between benefit transactions involving a social network member providing his or her time or labour or special skills in directly helping another network member with a special repair or rebuilding need – and benefit transactions involving providing material goods and objects or money to meet another type of need.

Furthermore it conceals another characteristic of benefit transactions that could lead to better measurement of social capital resources – an assessment of what can be called the “transaction cost” for the social network member as a giver in a time of need, of his/her time and skills and experience or of his/her material assets in freely meeting the need of another member might require.

It is relatively easy for an uncle to encourage a nephew with a gold coin for good school results. It can be much more difficult for the head of a family network to make a substantial contribution to a ransom demand for \$50,000 for a relative. Demands can clearly be a limitation on the willingness and ability to contribute social capital benefits in some circumstances. In this sense they are a transaction cost influencing the readiness and willingness of a giving social network member.

#### **7.4 The dynamics and types of social capital activity in Iraq**

Our results show that the dynamics of social capital transactions within networks and between social networks is both complex and variable. It can be seen from the results that:

- There is a very high volume of social capital transactions every day in Iraq, mostly in ordinary everyday settings. These transactions mainly require the exchange of ordinary levels of benefits.
- Transactions in these *micro*-level settings take place quickly and mainly on a verbal basis. They tend to be bonding social capital transactions (Woolcock, 2001).
- Because Iraqis are members of multiple social networks, benefits can be readily acquired by members of one social network from another social network and transferred to needy members of that network. Examples provided in the results involved, for instance, arranging job opportunities available from Work networks and providing this benefit to young graduate relatives and friends. Such benefits, which we have classified as practical and material benefits, can be seen as examples of bridging social capital transactions (Woolcock, *op cit*).
- Some benefits can take more time and effort if they come from other networks or can be provided only on an intercessory *wastaa* basis from other informal or formal authority figures. These can involve a more formal process of consultation. Where a family problem has to be resolved they may involve the aid of a clan leader or an informal, so-called *sullah sheik* (as described by Carroll 2011) to adjudicate, e.g., on the amount of blood money to be paid where a killing is involved. None of our participants reported any encounters like this, but Carroll reported that *sullah sheikhs* had become busy with claims where the members of armed groups responsible for a killing had been traced. This can be seen as an example of higher order practical and material benefits being involved in a complex, vertical linking-style social capital transaction outside the formal judicial process.
- Another type of benefit on record which involved more time and effort by social network members were ones where Iraqis chose to bypass the formal legal process to seek justice or settle a dispute. One of the study participants (*Interview B*) recalled how she discovered newly-cleaned carpets had been stolen from the clothes line of her residence. She and her husband did not bother to report it to the nearest Police Centre. But when a friend noted the carpets for sale in a nearby shop, the shopkeeper was able to identify who sold the carpets to him. They went to their clan leader and with him confronted the thief's

family. Our participant retrieved her rugs and some compensation. The family expelled the thief from their residence and he had to relocate elsewhere.

## **7.5 Iraqis in their social capital transactions**

Social capital is only accessible through a social network, so the social capital behavioural characteristic of Iraqis merits scrutiny because their readiness and willingness to engage in social capital transactions can affect the benefits they can provide. The results clearly show that these characteristics of Iraqis in their social network activities include the following.

### ***7.5.1 Universally, Iraqis are members of many social networks***

Iraqis are always members of several and different social networks. This widens the range of social capital benefits they can access for themselves or for other members of their social networks. This makes for a significant contribution - although perhaps not an obvious one – to the daily ferment of social capital transaction activity among the nation's elaborate complex of social networks in every community on a daily basis.

It also means that in Iraq the availability of social capital benefits are not locked into particular social networks but can be transferred and exchanged between all the networks the study has identified, mostly quite readily.

This multi-membership characteristic of Iraqis clearly results in an ability to engage in transactions that can simultaneously involve both bonding and bridging and even linking forms of social capital activity within the same network.

This characteristic raise questions about the apparently loose manner in which scholars interchangeably classify social capital and its associated social networks as either *bonding, bridging, or linking*. This is discussed further below.

### ***7.5.2 Family networks - the source of renewal of social capital in Iraq***

An analysis of our data on Iraqi social networks clearly indicates that it is the Family networks that are of special importance in sustaining and renewing the social capital resources of Iraq.

From a social capital perspective it becomes clear that the processes by which every Iraqi child from the moment of birth is lovingly nurtured towards adulthood involves the child experiencing social capital benefits. These benefits are bestowed upon the child by the child's immediate social network members. The benefits include the daily food prepared by loving mothers, the shelter and transport, even the clothing provided at personal expense by loving and generally hard-working fathers. This always comes with the emotional support of both parents and of the child's siblings; there are also informational benefits provided by them all as the child grows and learns to interact and cope with her or his young world.

The range and the different types of these benefits expands markedly during the child's first ten years of life and as they head towards adulthood through primary and secondary schooling. The child also learns about the religion into which she or he was born and the child grows accustomed to experiencing an expanding world of interaction and experiences with peers and older people. The child grows to accept without question or even specific recognition all the benefits bestowed on them day after day from her or his immediate and extended family and from the friendly relationships they form at school and play and from older others on adventures into the world of markets, shops and restaurants. Even when misfortune occurs and medical help or special attention is required, the young Iraqis will continue to benefit from the loving care and nurturing bestowed upon them.

During all this the child also learns and comes to understand and accept what is expected of them in similar responses to those in their social networks and towards others they interact with at family funerals and weddings, at religious feasts and at lesser social gatherings. The Iraqi child learns how to give, as well as receive and to reciprocate on the special benefits available to her or him as a member of his Family social network – and this process continues through each generation.

### ***7.5.3 Iraqi Women are at the top in social capital benefit activity***

Iraqi Women appear by far to be stronger generators of and participants in social capital transactions benefits than Iraqi men. In one sense Iraqi women generate better social capital than their menfolk because of their propensity for more readily forming close private relationships. This is particularly so outside the family within their personal networks of neighbours and friends networks and again is more so than their menfolk. Iraqi women as mothers play a key role through their nurturing behaviour by inculcating in young Iraqis a readiness to give as well as to receive social capital benefits within their social networks.

This would appear to give them a special place in social capital generation as well as a potentially-important place in any attempts to mobilise the social capital resources of the networks in a wider community, for improvement of both infrastructure and social attitudes, as came through clearly in the accounts of women participants in the secular community aid organisations in present-day Iraq.

### ***7.5.4 Iraqi as young adults***

Young Iraqis are also active in engaging daily in social capital transactions but they do not appear to be as deeply aware of extended family clan and tribal links as their parents and relatives. More prominent in their recollections are the social capital benefits they gain from their friend's networks, especially the emotional support benefits available to them.

However, this appears to change when they marry and take on adult responsibilities and rely openly on the benefits they can obtain from and to their extended family. Their friends networks grow, they join in neighbours networks and become involved in social networks where they work.

### ***7.5.5 No sectarian barriers in Iraqi social capital transactions***

What is noticeable in the results is the absence between members of personal networks and in the constrained networks particularly work networks, of any suspicion, fear, mistrust or other negative concerns about any difference in the ethno-religious

backgrounds of members. Relationships between network members are based on trust not ethno-religious affiliation; once a close relationship has been formed it grows stronger, no matter what the ethno-religious background of the network members may be.

But significantly there is some evidence of deep mistrust of other Iraqis who are strangers. The mistrust does not appear to be of an ethno-religious basis, but rather on whether the stranger may be a fanatic activist from a threatening group. Clearly, development of personal relationships within networks overcomes any sectarian mistrust at the grass-roots individual level.

But this mistrust clearly has implications for the as yet unclear process of effectively tapping the social capital resources within the social networks of the separate but interlinked Iraqi communities to help in the rebuilding of this currently still-violent country.

In short, there is no evidence of ingrained sectarian suspicions among the vast majority of ordinary Iraqis at the grassroots level. But, as was suggested in one of the Special Interviews (S1), reported in Chapter 5, there has developed an ingrained suspicion about some of the more radical politico-religious institutions operating at both the *meso* level of Iraqi public life and at the *macro* level of both the Civil Society and the State. As the UN's Country Team in Iraq confirm in their UN Development Assistance Framework report (UNDAF 2014) such suspicions highlight the difficulties in achieving stability and cohesion in the *meso* and *macro* levels of Iraqi society.

#### ***7.5.6 Iraqis' primary commitment is to their Family and Personal social networks***

The results also suggests that Iraqis hold that their primary commitment is to their social networks, particularly their family network. For all Iraqis, the order of commitment appears to be: their family, then their clan, then their friends, then their work and for the spiritually inclined, their mosque or church and for Muslims of the Sharia's law of Islam and for the Christians the Ten Commandments.



The laws and rules of the State and most of its security and bureaucratic institutions come a long last in their levels of commitment - even in the Iraq of today when Iraqis have freely elected their political representatives.

Privately, many Iraqi *diaspora* participants have expressed to this researcher their curiosity at an Australian government requirement that they must sign an ‘Australian Values Statement’ before they can obtain a visa or be granted citizenship. One sentence in it requires a ‘commitment to the rule of law’ (DIAC 2011).

But among individual Iraqis there does not appear to be any commitment to the western notion of the paramount importance of the rule of law in a modern society as defined by the United Nations and reproduced in Chapter 3. To our Iraqi research participants a ‘commitment to the rule of law’ appears to be an alien concept not readily understood – and which in Iraq, they say, would be met with derision. They may have respect for their political leaders but they have little trust in them.

As the results of this study clearly show, when they or their family or close friends are under threat they will without hesitation infringe any law which the ruling regime of the day may have imposed to save their social network member or members under threat.

### ***7.5.7 Iraqi norms at work in social capital transactions***

As noted in the literature review, a society’s norms are seen as an important cognitive element of social capital, but as Ferlander (2007) further notes, these norms are rarely defined. From what is indicated in the results and from this researcher’s participant-observer experience, the background picture of the norms that underlies Iraqi social capital transaction behaviour appears to be:

- The Iraqi sense of social cohesion demands that primacy in Iraqi society belongs to families and family networks.
- As a result, it is the right of every male leader of a family in Iraq to work and earn remuneration so that he can meet his responsibility to support his family.
- It is further the duty of every Iraqi to respect his parents and his relatives and be ready to contribute to their well-being and security throughout their life.

- No one in a family can do anything that might ‘dishonor’ the family – however that might be defined.
- Respect (*ahtraam* in Arabic) must be extended to all heads of family, immediate and extended and, outside the Family networks, to public figures such as elders, sheiks, clerics, priests and to secular officials and political leaders and ministers at both levels of government – even if they are not trusted.
- It appears to be the right of every Iraqi to approach a member of any of his Family network or personal social networks to request assistance with dealing with outside authorities at the *micro* or the *meso* level. As noted previously this invokes the social process of *wastaa*. In this context, *wastaa* (literally intermediary) is an obligation on both family members and friends with special contacts to seek a benefit for other family members or friends through a process of intervening as an intercessor, to obtain a favourable decision with someone of influence who can deliver the requested benefit. Several accounts in the results detailed instances of such intercession. However, it has become widely known to be associated with obtaining a benefit for someone by outright if low-level bribery payments.
- In fulfilment of family responsibilities, it is the right of any Iraqi to ignore or get around any law or regulation that would inhibit the support and protection of his family, unless such an infringement would attract a penalty that would prevent him/her from meeting that primary responsibility. Iraqis have, as previously discussed, their own very different concept of the western notion of ‘the rule of law’.

**Reciprocity**, another norm rated as an important characteristic of social capital, appears to be ingrained into Iraqis through their family socialisation. No Iraqi can be a continuing member of a social network without displaying a readiness to reciprocate. It appears to be a necessary pre-condition to membership of an Iraqi social network and the social capital assets the network generates, rather than an aspect of social capital itself.

### ***7.5.8 Trust in social network activity in Iraq***

**Trust** is a social construct which, as was seen in the literature review in Chapter 3, is regarded as an important ‘cognitive’ characteristic of social capital. But it is a

characteristic about which the social capital theorists find themselves in considerable confusion, as discussed by Stone (2001). Woolcock (2001) describes trust as essentially an individualistic behavioural disposition but Stone (*op cit*) shows how theorists stress importance of trust ‘for the well-functioning of a civil society’ or how it facilitates a range of desirable macro-level social outcomes including civic engagement and democracy’. So the literature has developed notions of types of trust: “particularised” trust, or “personalised” trust between people who know each other; generalised or “social” trust towards strangers, and at the *macro* level, “civic” or “institutional” trust (p.29)

The results of this study find common ground with scholars that trust is an important “cognitive” characteristic in analysing and determining the characteristics of a society’s pool of social capital. But they lean more to confirming Woolcock’s proposition that trust is better understood as an outcome of social capital not as a constituent. “We invest in the networks and institutions that produce trust, not in trust, in and of itself” Woolcock (2001, p.9).

The study goes further. We can argue from the results that in Iraq only *personal trust* can be linked with social capital – and then only as a *necessary pre-condition*. It is necessary to the forming and functioning of a social network. Continuing personal trust strengthens the links between members as they go about transacting the exchange of special types of benefits. It is these benefits that in turn become the assets of the network’s social capital, assets that can subsequently be mobilised for the benefit of the network’s community. So the link between trust and social capital as a community resource is indirect.

As previously found, it is clear that for an Iraqi to form or join a social network he or she must first form at least a social relationship with another prospective or current member. As the network develops and becomes active, the relationships and the personal trust between members require that they be honest, helpful as far as their competence allows and above all, not do the others any harm. As outlined in the literature review, this trust at the interpersonal level is one which, as Leonard and Onyx (2004, p.70) have declared, is a characteristic that “needs to be earned.” Our data has

also shown that it is only personal trust that becomes indirectly involved in efforts to mobilise social capital for a community benefit, as we will show below.

We re-iterate that in Iraq, personal trust is clearly a critical pre-condition in all the social networks to which an Iraqi belongs – and breaches of it means a loss of membership of that particular network and as a consequence loss of access as well as a loss of contributions by the now untrusted member to the benefits the network can provide. But other types of trust are not a requisite for the continued functioning of an Iraqi community's social networks life. Indeed there appears to be a widespread lack of trust among Iraqis to anyone who is not in their complex of family, personal and constrained networks. Lack of trust is clearly seen towards public figures who hold positions in the political establishment and the public security agencies and who pursue policies, programs and activities which marginalise sections of the Iraqi community, as has been noted by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2013) and the UN Iraq Team (UNDAF 2014).

It is the higher level of generalised 'social trust' which the World Bank team of researchers analysed and tried to measure. But at this stage such a measure of trust may be irrelevant in Iraq. By comparison, in western countries like Australia, not torn by violent conflict, there is a large element of 'social' trust. This researcher noted continuously the sense of trust that one's fellow users of the streets and shopping centres and other public facilities will not cause any harm to others. A 2012 incident in the large urban centre of Melbourne in which a young professional woman was accosted by a stranger in the evening as she walked home, led away, raped and murdered caused a major public outcry. This included public demonstrations of grief and support from other residents of her area who did not know her personally, about what they considered to be a grievous breach of social trust. There does not appear to be such a strong degree of feeling about breaches of any sense of social trust in the Iraqi context. But what is currently portrayed as an element of sectarian conflict in Iraq is a lack of "social trust" between the leaderships of Sunni communities in western governorates and the leadership of the Shi'ite central government because of central government programs and policies that international media reports have termed discrimination and marginalisation against Sunnis.

At the community level in present-day Iraq there can be nervousness when entering public street environments. Our results show there is no 'social trust' of strangers. Strangers are to be feared until they demonstrate in one way or another that they are not likely to be a terrorist.

But this intrusive stress at the community level still does not stop Iraqis in their ordinary daily lives engaging in scores of thousands, perhaps even millions, of small and large social capital transactions every day.

In the absence of social trust, it appears that Iraqis who through contacts engage in linking social capital transactions with elements of the leaderships of both Civil Society and State institutions at the *macro* level will demonstrate that special Iraqi respect (*ahtraam*) which enables social capital transactions to conclude usefully, even though the Iraqi individuals participating may have little or no trust of the leaders with whom they are negotiating.

There can be no doubt about the importance of personal trust as a fundamental prerequisite for the generation of the social capital resources of Iraq. But this study did also provide glimpses of how networking interactions between the bureaucratic elements of the institutions of the State and the leaderships of the emerging NGO's resulted in the direct funding of NGO programs. This in turn has brought direct health, educating and self-awareness benefits to the disadvantaged clients of the NGO's and so made an added contribution to the social capital resources of Iraq. This evidence lends support to the observation of Woolcock (2001) that there is a clear relationship between the social capital generated by communities of social networks and the "broader institutional environment in which communities are inherently imbedded" (p.7). The results can be quite beneficial for a community. But at this stage it is impossible without further research to establish both the nature and the degree of the actual resources such linking interactions between the networks in the communities and the decision-makers in the broader institutional environment contribute to the nation's pool of social capital.

All that can be stated is that our study tends to confirm that in Iraq, one of the benefits of a constrained social network's vertical-linked activity may be help with acquiring the State's financing for a beneficial community activity.

## **7.6 Mobilising the Social Capital of Iraq**

There appears to be widespread theoretical acceptance that social capital is a community resource, grounded in the activities of special and discrete social networks. But there is little guidance in the literature on useful strategies and tactics for mobilising a community's pool of social capital.

In Iraq it can be seen from our study that the resource appears to be made up of two elements. Importantly for the members of social networks, the resource comprises the *real* benefits available to them directly from the network in times of their needs of the moment. Indeed many of the benefits identified in our study are accessed almost immediately by the members of social networks as they go about what Woolcock (2001) aptly describes as coping with their uncertainties, extending their interests, realising their aspirations and achieving outcomes they could not attain on their own.

The second element of a community's social capital comprises the *latent* benefits which can be mobilised - or as termed by Adler & Kwon (2002) 'appropriated' - for both future needs of social network members and for potential improvements at the community level.

The literature contains little in the way of studies of just how this latent feature of social capital can be mobilised for a community. Our study did, however, uncover some of the limits and considerations that appear to be at work in this mobilising process. This mainly came through an account provided by a provincial teacher and NGO community aid volunteer (SI 3) who identified a need for improvement of some of the schools in her district. She then mobilised her friends from her personal and constrained social networks and they agreed to mount their own private campaign to gain approvals from provincial decision-makers to fund and manage repairs to school buildings and facilities. Her group also monitored performance in the rebuilding of the school

facilities. In this role she can be seen to be an active community practitioner for beneficial change who gained the willingness of her various social network members to take part in the project. They were willing to be co-opted to apply their emotional, informational, practical skills and material contributions because they trusted her and they clearly approved of the project. Because of her abilities she also provided what Hanifan a century ago termed “skilful leadership” to direct the social capital of her network members “towards the general improvement of the community well-being” (Hanifan, 1916, p.131).

This we can readily label an example of *planned* mobilising of Iraqi social capital resources at the community level.

By comparison one of the participants (*Interview B*) reported a simple example of *opportunistic* mobilising of her family network’s social capital resources in a community setting. She was waiting in a queue at one of the Iraqi civil registries from which she had to obtain identity documents. A relative whom she did not realise worked in the registry approached her then took her inside and quickly arranged the document she required. This saved her hours of waiting. She unexpectedly realised a latent social capital benefit as a result of their fortuitous meetings.

In terms of accessing immediate benefits from within a social network, Iraqi members of a social network benefit almost every day through their network’s social capital transactions. The study showed that the mere participation in transaction provided an emotional support benefit for every member as they identify a need of another member. The need may be an informational need or one requiring a practical or material benefit. In its basic simplest form it can be a simple request in a friends network: *My laptop isn’t working. Who is a good repairer?* It may be in a family network: *I am not feeling well who can drive me to the doctor?* In a work network it may be: *“I have to go out to buy something for my son’s school project. Can somebody take notes for me at today’s meeting?”* A need may, of course, be more complex but it is in this way that a member can readily access the social capital resources of her/his network.

The study also produced an example of *latent accession* of the social capital of an old network which demonstrated the power of a close relationship within a friends network. It came from an elderly Sabian *diaspora* participant who recalled how he utilised a

schoolboy friendship dating from more than 35 years previously to secure a benefit for a relative – the relative’s release from seizure by the Shia armed group the Mehdi Army. The participant (C1) had grown up in Missan province and developed a close friendship with a Shia Muslim of the same age. When he was an adult, he moved to Baghdad, but they kept in touch occasionally. Then the Ba’athist regime collapsed, and the sectarian conflict erupted. His Shia friend became an officer in the Mehdi Army in Missan. However that sectarian divide did not stop our participant from calling his friend, who agreed to try to obtain the release of our participant’s relative who had been seized in Baghdad. The relative was released. The mobilisation of the latent benefit took only a phone call but the benefit was readily exchanged between the two friends, now separated by distance.

There is also a considerable body of public evidence of attempts by external agencies to develop social networks in the hope of strengthening community ties in Iraq. But they provide no insights into how they went about this nor any reports evaluating how successful their efforts were. There is indirect public evidence in the reports of UN agencies with the help of international aid agencies on their community activity in special programs to help disadvantaged and internally-relocated Iraqis and to rebuild and re-establish local infrastructure. It can be inferred that the agency officials involved go through a process of engaging initially with local active community participants who then become the Iraqi community facilitators with whom these agencies work to acquire not only community goodwill and support for the proposed program but also their participation, as required.

There is a more substantial body of evidence from US Defence and State Department reports on how during the 11 years of the coalition military occupation of Iraq, US Army commanders and their special civilian aid groups recruited and used local Iraqis, many of whom they initially engaged as translators, to be facilitators in seeking to appropriate the social capital of local communities to apply to the US programs to rebuild community facilities and so engage in goodwill-building. These liaison exercises, according to the reports, met with varying degrees of success, and sometimes with ethical disagreements, by participating American experts brought into help (see Poyraz 2008 particularly on Iraqi deterioration of social capital pp.46-51, Chandler-Garcia, 2013).



The study produced one direct example of the mobilising of the social capital of a social network to assist in the community schools reconstruction initiative. In this case the research participant was both the initiator and the facilitator. Because of her background as a teacher and an NGO volunteer, she saw the need for the refurbishment of some of the schools in her provincial centre, knew how to design an action program and turned to her social networks of friends, fellow volunteers and family to initiate and manage it successfully. The local school communities all benefitted. She was able to get it going because her fellow members of her social networks approved of her initiative and trusted her. She did not say so in her own words, but on analysis, it became clear that their trust in her was fundamental to their willingness to join with her in the initiative and to assist her with both the planning and the operational work that had to be done with provincial decision-makers to ensure their plan was funded and became operational.

This example of an Iraqi community participant-inspired initiative fits with Hanifan's assertion of 100 years ago that when the members of a community are helped to 'discover for themselves what ought to be done and they will not be satisfied until it is done... The more people do for themselves the larger will community social capital become, and the greater will be the dividends upon the social investment.' (Hanifan, 1916, p.138).

However other theorists have pointed to negative effects when social capital resources can be used against a community – what Landolt & Portes (1996) called the “downside” of social capital. (Adler & Kwon 2000 & 2002) explore this “downside” in terms of benefits and risks. Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003) asked if social capital was always a “good thing”, referring to “positive” social capital and finding how best to manage “negative manifestations” of social capital. Galabuzi & Teelucksingh (2010) discuss social capital in the context of social exclusion in a Canadian regional study. It is notable that these accounts of negative and exclusionary phenomena associated with social capital appear to be derived from observations of economic behaviours within diverse and economically disadvantaged groups in large urban centres of western countries.

The research provided only a glimpse of an exclusionary and negative effect of the way social networks can apply their pool of social capital be applied in Iraq. One *diasapora*

participant (E10) recalled in passing how two closely-bonded clans in a provincial community became a bullying “scourge” on other people of the district. Unfortunately the outcome of this behaviour is not known. But other informal community interventions, particularly through clan and tribal leaderships, can be predicted to have come into play to resolve the local community’s problem with these two clans.

It clearly emerges from this that it is not the way that social capital is developed within a network, small or extended that is at the heart of these social problems. It is the way that some social network members misguidedly appropriate their network’s social capital resources.

### **7.7 Social Capital: Bonding, Bridging and Linking in Iraq**

There is intuitive explanatory appeal of Michael Woolcock’s widely recognised classification of social capital into three types, based on the ties between the members of social networks (Woolcock, 2001).

But as we noted previously, a special feature of social capital behaviour in Iraq is the multi-membership characteristic of Iraqis. We argue that this clearly results in an ability of an Iraqi when a need in one of his/her social networks emerges to engage in a series of transactions that can simultaneously involve both *bonding* and *bridging* and even at times *linking* forms of social capital activity within the same network.

This characteristic raises questions about the apparently loose manner in which scholars interchangeably apply these classifications to social capital and to its associated social networks. Certainly the study suggests that the exchange interactions produce benefits that can be described readily as either bonding, bridging or linking. But any attempt to describe the Iraqi social networks as bonding networks or bridging networks or linking networks would be irrelevant. Certainly, it does not seem reasonable to infer that Iraqi family networks are merely exclusive bonding networks or even producers of only bonding social capital.

It may mean that further evidence of social networks producing intertwined bonding and bridging types of social capital in the same transaction may require theoreticians to re-conceptualise their classifications of social capital. In Iraq, the theoretical distinction

can apply only to the outcomes of transaction behaviours, but never to the social network producing the outcomes.

This Iraqi study also detects differences in linking social capital behaviours in Iraq. The study does not yield a clear picture of the social network process at work in the constrained networks the study has identified. But the study does provide some limited insights into how volunteer members of one civil aid organisations may become involved at a horizontal level with, as equals, members of another similar organisation in planning a joint community program for their respective areas and in the process form a social network. As an Iraqi moves up to managerial levels within an organisation, he/she may find themselves also involved in hierarchical “chain-of-command” networks with other senior organisational decision-makers, so forming a social network characterised by vertical linkages.

This can be seen at work, for instance in the data supplied by participants who were volunteers and officers of district NGOs. They were approached in a horizontal- linking social capital transaction by friends in another NGO to participate jointly in a community mobilisation campaign about, say, unemployment or human rights issues at a horizontal level. But any such proposal had to have the agreement of the senior management of their NGO. This latter process required vertical-linking behaviours of participants in the approvals process.

This in turn suggests that, peculiar to Iraq, individual social capital behaviours with their underlying norms may come into play in at least informal interactions at the State bureaucratic and political institutional level. This could in turn mark the beginning of a trusting interpersonal relationships between these individuals at this level.

## **7.8 Social capital and civil conflict in Iraq**

The recollections of the research participants have provided a detailed picture of the disruptive impact on Iraqi individuals’ normal, everyday social network interacting and the adjustments they have had to make in recent conflict situations. This becomes clear from participants’ anecdotes about social capital benefits sought and given during and after the international invasion of Iraq in 2003, the deposing of the Ba’athist regime of the late but still-remembered Ba’athist president Saddam Hussein and during and after

the events surrounding the subsequent establishment of Iraq as a constitutional parliamentary republic.

The results from this data has shown that despite all their trials and tribulations in the decade since the 2003 regime change, Iraqis have never lost their capability to help each other through their social networks. It is clear that the stock of social capital in Iraq has never been seriously disrupted. Indeed it appears to have adjusted well to the new demands that the continuing sectarian conflict has imposed on many unfortunate members of Iraq's social networks.

It is clear from the results that in the current civil conflict social capital activity in a specific community is blocked or destroyed by episodes of mass genocidal killings as has happened in some recent incidents during 2014. In other communities it is seriously disrupted when residents flee the conflict and seek safe havens. But at least among Family networks, activity resumes on a separated basis. In communities under threat of conflict, social capital activity continues on an adjusted basis, often requiring exchanges of higher level practical and material support benefits. In this, the results show, Iraqis have a long history of special adjustments under threatening State intrusiveness and are ready not to ignore prevailing regulations but also actively assist their family and friends with very high levels of practical and material benefits.

In short, this study has found that the social capital activity of Iraq appears to be alive and flourishing, and has been able to adjust readily to the continuing efforts of a numerically-small ideologically-committed elements of some of the religious establishments to divide Iraqi communities through civil conflict and force a change of government.

## **7.9 Institutional influences on the Social Capital of Iraq**

Woolcock (2001) observes that Social Capital is “inherently embedded” in an institutional context (p.7) Grootaert (1998) declares that the more formalised institutional relationships and structures involved in government, the political regime, the rule of law, the court system and civil and political liberties must be included in an

encompassing view of the stock of social capital and its re-generation in a particular society.

This study, focussed as it was on uncovering the social process by which social capital is generated in Iraqi communities, yielded some insights into the developing civil society in Iraq, virtually absent apart from religious institutions until the toppling of the previous Ba'athist regime in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The study generated nothing directly on relationships with the institutions of the State. But public documents, assist in developing a picture of the groups and institutions in the Iraq's new civil society and the institutions of the State.

### ***7.9.1 The State's institutional framework influencing Iraq's social capital***

Under the Ba'athist regime, Iraq developed an extensive and complex network of State institutions functioning as required at the national, regional and community levels of Iraqi society. The civil service of Iraq has become the largest single employer in the country, providing 45% of all jobs in the urban areas and 28% of the jobs in the rural areas. It is also the employer of 60% of all female Iraqis who work. But this is in the context of 11.1% unemployment in Iraq.

There now appear to be in the State sector in Iraq two distinct sets of institutions with the potential to affect the development and mobilising of Iraq's pool of social capital resources.

First there is the extensive and complex network of State institutions both bureaucratic and political. As detailed in the UN Country Team's United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2015-2019 report (UNDAF 2014), Iraq's 33 million citizens live in a complex of urban and rural communities within a federation of 18 governorates each with its own capital city, an elected legislature and its own body of civil servants. These governorates are further subdivided into districts usually drawn around a major city or town. Depending on their size, these cities and towns may have elected councils. The bigger cities are divided into *malhalla* or neighbourhoods with an appointed *mukhtar* a type of mayor who appears to perform mainly administrative monitoring and registration duties. The elected and administrative officers of the governorates all

officially liaise closely with their counterparts in the central government located in Baghdad, whose day-to-day functions are vested in the elected Prime Minister and his personally-chosen Ministers. They supervise the activities of the established Ministries and State agencies. They are in turn nominally responsible to the elected unicameral legislature known as the Council of Representatives in association with the nominal President of the republic, but in real terms to the office of the Prime Minister of the day.

But the UN report suggests there is an uneven level of interaction between the communities of Iraq's civil society and the elected and administrative officers of these State institutions. Furthermore, the UN report shows, the officials of these bureaucracies are themselves involved in discriminatory practices against some groups and communities

Much of the interface activity at the *meso* and *macro* level is with the State's well-developed bureaucracy, which through Ministries of the government, both administers approved programs and engages in development of new policies. These State institutions interact closely at both the national and regional level with a growing business sector comprising both State-owned and private business and financial companies. They appear to be starting to interact more closely with the civil aid organization components of Iraq's development civil society, which has expanded into a variety of private secular groups as well as with religious institutions often interlinked themselves into a series of what have been called 'establishments'.

As widely reported in the Iraqi media, the new Iraq now has at the national or *macro* level, a complicated political establishment, at least three sets of religious establishments - two Muslim and one Christian, a definable though unclear tribal establishment of varying influence and impact, and to a lesser extent an growing and coordinated network of private, secular community service groups and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).

The second - and only temporary - set of institutions with the potential to impact on the development of Iraq's social capital is the complex of 13 UN agencies with their own central and field staff groups operating in Iraq. These UN agencies, who call themselves

the UN Country Team in Iraq, work under the umbrella of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Working with them under UNAMI are a further 5 advisory UN agencies.

This active family of United Nations agencies are providing direct community reconstruction aid in association with international charities and aid agencies. They are also providing technical advice and training to provincial and central government agencies on social, political, economic and developmental policy development and administration.

This set of UN institutions also provide a carefully researched and compelling critique of the socio-economic status of ordinary Iraqis – a critique, furthermore, acknowledged by the Iraqi government, as the basis for continuing development aid to Iraq.

The UN Country Team in Iraq in its recent report (UNDAF 2014), highlighted a series of socio-economic problems as threats to the social cohesion of Iraq. The report nominated as indicators of this social threat: gender and youth inequalities, inadequate assistance to “marginalised vulnerable and impoverished” citizens and “low levels” of participatory governance. It also pointed to “a bureaucratic concern over sectarian identity (seen as discriminatory)” as well as inequitable service provision for different groups and a sense of spreading corruption.

The report, notably, acknowledges Iraq’s social capital as one of the pillars of its social cohesion. The report’s definition is interesting. It sees social capital as characterised by “levels of trust and networks between individuals and groups in society” and includes ideas of tolerance, civic participation, civic values and respect for rule of law,” characteristics, it says, which are factors which combine to provide a mechanism for cooperation and non-violent resolution of disputes.” It goes on to declare:

“A number of social capital related issues are apparent in Iraq including: a loss of trust between social/ethnic/religious groups, a divisive political arena and hate speech in the media.” (p.5).

### ***7.9.2 The influence of Iraq's State Institutions***

**A central question** for social capital researchers in Iraq is: how do the State institutions of Iraq contribute to or affect the generation and development of the social capital resources of Iraq?

The present study suggests that while there are direct State impacts on the everyday lives of Iraqi individuals, there are only limited indirect impacts on Iraqis' social capital resources. The Food Ration distribution program funded and managed directly by the State, the education and health care programs sustained and managed by the State are examples of direct benefit to the citizens of Iraq but they cannot be regarded as social capital benefits. But information about the availability of civil service jobs or the actual arranging for a civil service post constitutes a social capital transaction benefit for a social network member in need.

Likewise this study shows there are links between a Ministry funding a program for NGO's delivering special education or direct food, medical and training assistance to disadvantaged Iraqis. Information about these programs may constitute a social capital transaction benefit for a needy social network member.

Within the State bureaucratic institutions level of the State, in the view of Cunningham and Sarayah (1993) discussed in Chapter 2, a State's bureaucratic institutions serves the State's desires to have not only a means of regulation and record keeping but also a means of social control for the state. If this holds true for the civil service of Iraq, then it might appear that the bureaucracy is a virtual enemy of social capital because it might weaken the State's desire for social control. But the research does not give any strong support to this view. The State through the Iraqi legislature imposed laws to register non-profit secular community organisations and to regulate them. But, as noted in our results, that does not appear to inhibit senior officials from the social Ministries from working co-operatively with NGO leaders to devise and fund community health and improvement programs for the NGO's to deliver.

In Iraq it is now possible to see at least two levels of active social network activity. Iraqis as individuals freely function in social networks of their own choice and engage in social capital transactions to assist each other. In their working lives, they also



function on two levels: at the *micro*-level they form their own social network of friendly colleagues. But at the same time they also appear to come together in a looser friendly but more formal hierarchical network. The picture from the results of the study suggests that working together still requires individual trust between team colleagues plus a willingness to abide by a different set of norms and rules that may not require the same level of reciprocity between team members. In this more constrained setting they may be required to become a member, for problem solving purposes, of a team which could be termed an ‘institutional liaison social network’ that is linked at a horizontal level in interfacing with other similar teams from other sections of the organisation to tackle the problem. As part of the problem-solving, they may have to interface with other Iraqis in the outside community. In this institutional team work, they may bring into play some elements of their social network set of behaviours and in the process find themselves exchanging both information and emotional support benefits. Likewise when they attain senior management positions they may become members of what might be termed ‘institutional decision-maker networks’. These may involve both horizontal and vertical “up the chain of command” linkages and require interfacing with higher echelons of both their organisation and with the institutions and establishments of the civil society, the business sector and also of the State.

However there is little empirical support from our results and such propositions would require further organisational-oriented research.


It was also of special interest and of potential importance to note in our results, how the accounts of participants still in Iraq who were NGO volunteers provided glimpses of how the leadership of these community aid organisations interacted with institutional planners within both State and private institutions. There appeared to be quite friendly decision-maker networks formed between them, resulting in the funding of direct community aid programs and acceptance of the aid groups’ separate public awareness and education campaigns to gain greater support for disadvantaged groups.

This suggests that what Iraqis learn about the norms and reciprocity and trust and the resulting special set of behaviours they practice within their social networks may also be applied in developing special institutional decision-maker social networks. These types of networks could be interacting horizontally across a community and also vertically up

the chain of command of the various bureaucratic institutions of the State and other key political institutions.

To illustrate some the complexity of horizontal and vertical linkages that could be involved at the community intersection of the *micro* and *meso* level of Iraqi society, Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of *The Stock of Social Capital in Iraq*

Figure 2: The Stock of Social Capital of Iraq



## **7.10 Social Capital, Civil Society and the Iraqi State**

A key question remains as to how the social networks of Iraq interact not only with each other but with the local community elements of Iraqi civil society and of the agencies and institutions of the State. The study has so far provided a clear illustration of how ordinary Iraqis as members of both personal and constrained social networks interact with each other to generate different types of social capital initially for their mutual benefit and also as a community resource. But it is less clear what role does social capital apply in the governance of the State and in what way the State can affect the generation and maintenance of the society's stock of social capital for the benefit of all citizens.

The study does not provide any clear picture of any impact on State institutional behaviour on the aggregate of Iraq's community stocks of social capital. However our study clearly shows that the impact of the State in Iraq has been substantial, but not necessarily in ways that most Western-oriented theorists might anticipate. We have noted how Al Jawahiri (2010) holds that while a civil society has to adhere to the values and standards of respect, mutual acceptance, tolerance, and sound management of differences and disagreement, it can only flourish, in a state "governed by justice and the rule of law."

There can be little dispute that historically the civil society sector had difficulty flourishing in Iraq when the state was governed by a repressive autocracy. This led to inequality, conflict and economic clumsiness that marked the Ba'athist regime until 2003 - a regime that historians suggest only paid lip-service to notions of justice and the rule of the regime's law. It was an environment of repressive governance from which Iraq is still only in transition. Now elements of repressiveness still remain. In particular the various security agencies of the present government have been publicly criticised by international authorities for widespread arrests of Iraqis and holding them for interrogation in secret prisons for extended periods. This body of intrusive State threats, as some participants have told has made heavy demands on the types of social capital benefits that Iraqis have been forced to exchange to assist fellow network members.

The findings of this study have not been able to show any apparent direct causal and negative impact on the generation of social capital assets. But there is clearly an association between the way the State intervenes to shape the social and political environment in which Iraqi society functions - and how this can in fact influence the ways that the different forms of social capital held within the social networks are both generated and accessed.

While the security behaviour of the State towards its citizens has been and still is one such influence on Iraq's social capital, the study confirms the most recent view of the UN Country Team in Iraq (UNDAF, 2014) which suggests there are social capital-related issues that still "threaten the social cohesion of Iraqi society" (p.5).

Historically, as described in an earlier chapter, in the days of Ottoman rule, the distant Caliphs imposed on local rulers responsibility for levying taxes and occasionally contributing troops for the Caliph's wars. In turn the local rulers appeared mainly content to leave to the tribal leaderships and the local religious establishments responsibility for justice, education and social welfare in their areas, in keeping with the Sharia's law of Islam. As Rahimi (2007) points out, the Iraqi State has now taken over responsibility for the formation and administration of a secularised justice system, a free education system and a free basic hospital treatment system.

But the State's progress towards establishing a social safety net type of welfare system has, despite Iraq's growing oil wealth, been and continues to be erratic and hesitant, according to the UN (UNDAF, 2014). This leaves vulnerable, impoverished and marginalised groups of Iraqis at risk.

The only wide-scale social welfare program provided nationally is the monthly food ration program originally forced on the former Ba'athist regime under the Food for Oil program previously described and still, reluctantly, continued. There also appears to be some attempt to provide a basic level of housing particularly for the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis displaced by the continuing sectarian conflict. But there is no social security system apparent for redistributing income or for helping the genuinely needy, the disabled and disadvantaged and the widows and orphans. Nor is there any unemployment relief system or pension system – except for civil servants. There is no health insurance system to cover medicines or higher-order medical specialist treatment.

Nor does there appear yet to be any programs for achieving greater equality of opportunity through social justice policies.

Helping the genuinely needy among their adherents is still left mainly to Muslim and Christian religious establishments. But now it is of special interest to note from this study how it is also being provided through the growing band of private community service and aid organisations only formed since 2003. The study has noted that private NGOs are also setting up programs to develop greater citizen awareness of the civil and political rights of all citizens, including women and minorities, as well as associated environmental awareness issues that could affect Iraq.

This means the social welfare burden still falls mainly on individual Iraqis through the social capital they generate in their social networks. Regretfully, there are no available measurements of either the social capital resources or the impact of the social welfare burden on Iraq's transitional development.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

This study set out to find the answers to specific questions about the social networks of Iraq and how they intersected in Iraqi social life and how Iraqis have responded to the sectarian and military crises in their lifetimes. A final question sought to explore the implications of the answers to the first three questions for the development of social policy in Iraq.

The first question posed was: *What are the key social networks of ordinary Iraqis and how do Iraqis benefit from these?*

As a detailed “bottom-up” investigation of just how the 33 million ordinary Iraqis interacted with each other day to day, in a continuing, uneasy socio-political environment, this study has yielded a rich set of results that provide clear answers to this first question.

#### **8.1 Social networks and benefits**

The study found that:

##### ***8.1.1 The Social Networks of Iraq***

There are three distinct groups of social networks in which most Iraqi citizens can freely engage in benefit-exchange activities that the study further found to comprise the underlying assets of the social capital of Iraqi communities. Most Iraqis are members of at least four of the social networks from within these major groups.

All Iraqis belong to a primary, durable and important **Family network**, comprising their immediate family nested within their extended family of relatives. They are born into their Family networks and from an early age experience the benefits on which they depend in their formative years. It is also important as the “nursery” in which they acquire a set of learned special reciprocal behaviours based on norms special to Iraqis.

As they grow older, Iraqis freely form a separate group of **Personal networks** within which the study has located their **Friends Networks** and **Neighbours**. Each Iraqi has a Friends network and most have Neighbour networks. These appear to be all formed on the basis of trusting interpersonal relationships.

When they go out into their communities Iraqis also become involved in activity within a third group which the study terms their **Constrained** social networks. These are social networks based on similar personal trust characteristics, but formed in institutional settings where organisational rules may also apply to constrain the benefit exchange behaviours within the social network. The study identified, as examples, their **Work** networks at their places of employment, their **Worship** networks, associated with their local mosques and *husseiniyats* and, for the Christians, the churches where they worship. In a secular setting, the study also identified what is termed **Community Aid Volunteer** networks, formed when some Iraqis volunteer to join some of the 2,051 newly- registered NGO's formed since the collapse in 2003 of the previous Ba'athist regime. Some may join other associations and informal groups which may not register with the authorities. Hence the list of Iraqis' constrained social networks is not exhaustive.

### ***8.1.2 The benefits exchanged in Iraqi social networks***

The study has also been able to identify the benefits exchanged within these networks and classify them into four qualitatively-different types: **emotional support** benefits, **information support** benefits and at higher levels, substantial **practical support** and **material support** benefits. Interestingly the study also suggests that the benefits are not necessarily separate. Indeed some of the data in the study showed that the benefits can be interlinked and even intertwined – and further that emotional support may be at the core of every benefit exchange, in the sense of demonstrating non-verbal support for each other by each explicit benefit offered and accepted

The study went further to show how the level of a benefit support exchanged is dependent upon the setting and context of the network interactions. An everyday normal meeting to exchange both emotional support and information over the practical benefit



of a cup of tea or coffee requires a lower and less demanding level of support than in the setting of the customary mourning rites for the death of a relative. This requires a higher level of support for the bereaved family, requiring the women to provide their practical help in preparing food for the mourners and the male mourners to bring a bag of rice or other material benefit for the mourning refreshments. When a social network member requires help to cope with a suddenly intrusive natural catastrophe – or an intrusive social context threat, such as a kidnapping or property destruction in a car bombing or threats to leave from an armed group or a raid by a government security agency team, a much higher, more demanding level of benefits will inevitably be required.

### ***8.1.3 The social network behaviours of Iraqis***

The study also provided a clear picture of the set of reciprocal behaviours which Iraqis display when they engage in these benefit-exchange transactions within their networks. This set of distinctively-different special behaviours, is clearly learned and acquired within their Family network. It is quite distinct from the normal ritualistic social behaviours when interacting with other Iraqis, known and unknown, in public settings. The basis for the reciprocal behaviours appears to be a spirit of willingness to support and help each other in their networks. Some elements such as special intercessory practices on behalf of network members known by the term *wastaa* have become established as norms of behaviours in Iraq. The study also showed that another underlying norm instilled into Iraqis as children is respect for elders, known by the term *ahtraam*. But in the Iraqi context, *trust* is not involved in the norm of respect. In fact it became clear from the study that the general notion of trust plays very little part in generating social capital in the communities of Iraq. Indeed, there appears to be a widespread lack of trust in public life in Iraq. Within social networks only the level of *personal trust* comes into play as a very important characteristic of the reciprocal behaviour and therefore an important element of the willingness of network members to help each other. The closeness of the interpersonal relationships which the network members develop with each other can only be sustained by personal trust. In their community, but outside their network, participants indicated a mistrust of strangers; a lack of *social trust* at the community level. The study further appeared to show that

individual perceptions of the behaviours of some elements of the political and religious leaderships has also generated high levels of *institutional* mistrust.

## 8.2 Network Interlinking

The second research question asked: *How do the networks intersect (especially across religious and ethnic divides)?*

The study provided a clear answer with several findings with interesting social implications. A clear picture emerged of what might prove to be a special Iraqi characteristic of social network transactions – their multiple membership of social networks. As noted Iraqis are always members and generally active members of four or more different social networks. As a result of these multiple memberships, they can bring a benefit available from one of their networks and provide it to assist a needy member of another network. Their multiple membership creates a bridge or a link to the benefits available from another of their social networks. This multiple-membership characteristic of Iraqis also enables them to become facilitators in mobilising the social capital within their network for community-level improvement projects with wider beneficial impact beyond their immediate social network. They can do this because they are trusted by their network members – but, of course, the network members have to give their approval to the project proposed by the facilitator member.

It is this multiple membership characteristic that enables Iraqi social networks particularly the **Constrained networks** to be seen as intersecting with each other in a variety of settings. The study has further provided a clear picture of the basis on which Iraqis form their social networks – a basis of close interpersonal relationships based on personal trust, one in which the ethnic and religious affiliation of the members of the network is never a consideration. This was a clear and common element across all the participants in this study. In anecdote after anecdote, it became clear that friendships were formed in networks comprising Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, no matter whether they were Arabs or Kurds or Turkoman or comprising Christians or others of the smaller ethnic groups. Trust and mutually-satisfying interpersonal relationships and a willingness to reciprocate appeared to be more important to members than any sectarian considerations.

What is much more important is the interpersonal relationship established between the network members and how it strengthens during benefit exchange transactions within the networks. In one notable anecdote an elderly Sabian Mandaean participant recounted how he energised a 35-year-old schoolboy friendship with a Shi'ite Iraqi now a leader of an Al Mehdi Army unit to cross the sectarian divide and secure the release of some of the Sabian's relatives seized by other elements of the Al Mehdi Army, This shows that it is not social networks that intersect in social capital transactions; it is individual Iraqi humans in trusting personal relationships. This enables networks to cross with ease the ethnic and religious divides that generate severe conflict in the political and religious institutions.

### **8.3 Conflict and Sectarianism**

The third question which the study sought to answer was: *How have ordinary Iraqis responded to sectarian and military crises?*

In addition to stories such as those just recounted, the study has provided a clear picture of how, given the long history of Iraqi society in dealing with conflict over more than 20 centuries, individual Iraqis in their Family and Personal networks have been able to draw upon a large body of experience in readily responding to threats whether sectarian or military, to their relatives or friends. They rally quickly and without question to the support of their relatives and friends under stress from such conflicts and provide a wide range of higher-level practical and material benefits depending on what the precise nature of the intrusive crisis incident may require.

The study participants, representing the current generations of living Iraqis, provided a range of reports on how over the past four decades, they have assisted relatives and friends with shelter or transport and other practical assistance and in many cases by material help with money when the stressed relatives had to flee from intrusive retribution. Such benefits were provided under stresses from the previous Ba'athist regime; they continue under the stresses of the military and sectarian conflict of the present.

It was notable that during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 now-retired Iraqi Army officers recounting how they took deliberate steps where possible to keep their young conscript relatives from frontline duties on the battlefields. Other participants told how in the post-2003 sectarian and political conflict, they have readily assisted relatives and friends who became victims in ethnic cleansing campaigns or armed raids targeting their relatives or friends. Sometimes the help required practical benefits in, say, storing personally precious possessions of victims while they went into hiding. Often the response required of the participants was for money to pay for ransoms of kidnapped relatives. This they willingly contributed to the limit of their means.

In a social capital context, they and fellow members of their particular social networks responded with higher-order practical and material benefits as fully as they could. But their social capital transaction activity did not stop. We would argue that the evidence clearly shows that this is the same for most of the millions of individual Iraqis pursuing their ordinary daily lives, no matter in what social settings or intrusive contexts. In short, the continuing high volume of social capital activity among all Iraqis appears to be incapable of suppression. And there appears to be clear detail of a willingness among all Iraqis within their social networks to go beyond the bounds of what might be considered normal levels of direct reciprocity to be expected in a less troubled western society. In their *micro*-level social networks, Iraqis demonstrate vibrant daily activity. Conflict clearly does not either restrict or subdue them. They readily adjust to it.

#### **8.4 Social capital and social policy**

The fourth research question identified in chapter one concerned the possible implications of social capital at the micro level for wider social policy in Iraq. It is now possible to return to this last research question. But first it is necessary to examine the nature of Iraq's civil society more broadly.

The study encountered difficulties in, firstly, mapping the formal and informal groups which constitute the body of free voluntary organizations are working independently of government, which as Al Jawahiri (2010) asserted constitute a nation's civil society. Naturally these would include any free and voluntary but informal groups which the members of a community may see fit to form such as local clubs, civic organisations,

community and religious associations, professional bodies. The study found that in Iraq, the civil society is still re-establishing itself after long years of Ba'ath Party repression, mainly through the establishment and growth of Iraqi non-government and secular civil aid organisations. The picture of their work and its social impact is unclear particularly how the work of the newly-registered secular Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) intersects with the traditional charity work of both the Shia and the Sunni religious establishments in Iraq and of the Christian churches - and also the hands-on socio-economic community development activity of the United Nations in-country teams from 13 different UN agencies at present operating in Iraq. In short, the picture of their numbers, their community focus, their regional spread and other characteristics remains quite clouded.

At the *macro*-level of the State's institutions and agencies, the study shows that while the *micro*-level production of social capital by Iraqis in their social networks is strong and vibrant, there appears to be major weaknesses within the institutional framework of the State. These weaknesses can sharply inhibit any community efforts to enhance and mobilise the social capital assets of Iraqi communities.

The UN team of agencies which also advises and helps provide training for the Iraqi public sector and government, has also detailed in their reports how the State's focus on internal political conflict in a divisive political arena and widespread civil conflict fuelled by hate rhetoric in factional propaganda, has led to serious weaknesses in State institutions. These weaknesses include bureaucratic inefficiencies and a developing sense of sectarian discrimination within the bureaucracy in delivering support programs with little local community participation in local governance and a sense of widespread corruption at the State level (UNDAF, 2014).

They suggest that many Iraqis are becoming aware of the gender and youth inequalities developing unevenly in many of the governorates, the growth of vulnerable and impoverished citizens living in marginalised communities who are provided with uneven levels of assistance; As a result there appears to be among ordinary Iraqis no trust of the State's political institutions and a loss of trust between social and ethnic and religious groups.

### ***8.4.1 Implications for Social Policy in Iraq***

What is evident from all this is an apparent social capital paradox in Iraq. Social capital is strong at the *micro*-level but it cannot be mobilised at the *macro*-level. This leaves planners and policy-makers with real social policy challenges. The study has shown that Iraq's strong and vibrant pool of social capital assets has never diminished among the four living generations of individual Iraqis. But it is only over the past decade that Iraqi civil society has begun to re-emerge while at the State level the institutional framework has weakened. The bureaucratic institutions appear no longer able to deliver even-handedly and effectively, the social programs which many disadvantaged elements of Iraqi communities require, while the political and governance institutions appear unable to be deflected from their priority attention to their positions in the political conflict and trying to build up the effectiveness of their public security forces.

Because of this there is a clear need for Iraqi policy makers and planners at both the State and the governorate levels to develop primarily "bottom-up strategies" that will encourage the emerging civil society institutions, particularly the secular community aid organisations to become effective local community service delivery operators - as the study shows that some NGO's are clearly already doing. This could perhaps best be achieved by stimulating the emerging NGO's to establish themselves more widely at the governorate and district levels and take charge of service delivery operations directly to needy communities while simultaneously running their own programs to rebuild trust and mutual support within and between those communities. Such an approach would provide better and more effective opportunities for civil society institutions to become trusted facilitators in mobilising the community-level social capital assets of Iraqis.

Because of the lack of trust the Iraqi State appears no longer to be able to plan any more "top-down" direct-aid, State-run programs beyond the current monthly food ration distribution system that, as described in Chapter 2, has developed from the old UN Oil-for-Food program.

But there is room for optimism that -

- With the help of the social capital experiences and considerable abilities of Iraqis, the NGO sector of Iraqi civil society in partnership with the State can grow and expand

its current range of direct civil aid to the needy and disadvantaged, towards improvements in civil reconstruction of community social and physical and services infrastructure, hand-in-hand with UN agencies and international aid groups.

- In the meantime, civil service leaderships in the Ministries and the governorates should avoid any temptations to over-regulate Iraq's developing civil society. Rather they should focus on identifying opportunities to encourage the developing civil society to mobilise and harness the potential social capital stocks in their local communities. Such mobilisation efforts could help rebuild social and institutional trust in the State institutions and between the various social, ethnic and religious groups. A ripple effect might well help reduce political divisiveness to within manageable limits.
- Civil service planners and policymakers would also do well to recognise and support the core social capital competence, expertise and effectiveness of Iraqi women in building community links and mobilising on a bottom-up basis the social capital of Iraqi communities.

These are some of the immediate social policy implications to come from the study.

The study did not stop at merely producing answers to the research questions. The study generated a comprehensive volume of empirical data not only about the social networks of Iraq and the specific range of benefits they produce - but also on related characteristics of Iraqi's social capital behaviours. These include:

### **8.5 The Social Capital transaction as a core process in Iraq**

The study also produced a heavy yield of empirical data about the core 'process' at work in generating social capital within a society like Iraq. That social capital comes from the study to be a process resulting in a free exchange of benefits by Iraqis between each other within their social networks. They do this by their own choice and they do it in their home and leisure situations and in their work and other settings. This activity the study has labelled as social capital benefits exchanges or more simply as social capital transactions.

The study has shown that these transactions result from fundamental social behaviours that in their many forms – and outcomes - at the heart of all social activity in a society like Iraq. It has been pointed out that in Iraq, the volume of such social capital

transactions is very substantial – perhaps as many as millions of transactions a day among the 33 million people of Iraq.

Thus we see the term social capital in this context can be used not just as a theoretical concept but also as a ‘descriptor’ of the aggregate of all these very real, observable and even potentially measurable benefits which are actually exchanged in these social network transactions.

The literature has also documented some confusion about the term ‘social network’. In Iraq the results show that a social network is a distinct, natural, even primal social grouping small and large, made up of individuals linked by an identifiable personal relationship with each other. As a result of their relationship, they are willingly ready to support and assist each other within their network on a reciprocal basis as needs arise to meet each other’s needs or to help achieve each other’s immediate goals. The study has identified family and personal social networks which function separately from each other, but an individual Iraqi’s multiple membership of different networks means that benefits in one social network can be readily accessed and transferred to another network.

All this suggests that Iraqis’ social capital behaviour is the most frequent, the most fundamental and most important daily behaviour in which they engage whether in their homes, or at work or with their friends and neighbours. We therefore argue that social capital transaction activity represents the core element of Iraqis’ daily social behaviour. Because of its societal effects it merits special research attention now and in the future, perhaps as a new perspective in the study of a society at the national-State level.

### ***8.5.1 Accessing and Mobilising the social capital of Iraqi communities***

Some clear insights did also emerge from the study as to how the social capital of a community could be mobilised - particularly in terms of the potential assets of practical and even material support benefit.

It became clear that firstly social network members in times of need could access the benefits within their network on both an *immediate* basis and also on a *latent* basis, as



was shown by the Sabian participant to who able to reach out after 37 years to a Shi'ite schoolboy friend on behalf of his Sabian relatives.

One socially-active participant was able to go a step further and show how when she perceived a community need, she was, as a trusted facilitator, able to *mobilise* the social capital benefits available in her networks – provided her members gave their blessing to her project. They then joined her in her project. This pointed to a useful approach for NGO and even State planners to consider when exploring ways to engaging Iraqi communities to participate in social and physical improvement programs and, in tandem, enhance individual-community-governance linkages.

## **8.6 What is the Social Capital of Iraq?**

There is evident confusion in the literature about what comprises a community's social capital. Adler & Kwon (2002) in their Table 2 list 23 different definitions. But there does appear to be general agreement that social capital is a valuable but intangible social resource available to communities which are themselves embedded in a broader institutional environment. The resource is seen as a pool of assets which can be mobilised and appropriated for other social purposes. Grooteart and van Basstelaer (2001) portray social capital as an accumulated stock of assets from which a stream of benefits flows, not just a set of social organisations or social values.

There are differences about its source, its potential benefits, its structural and cognitive dimensions, and its limits and its measurement. But, in the spirit proposed by Woolcock (2001) that any definition should focus on what social capital is rather than what it does, we argue that from the results of this study of the Social Capital of Iraq, this functional descriptor can be applied:

**Iraq's social capital** comprises the willingness of ordinary Iraqis, coming together as members of social networks, to give freely their combined assets of information, practical skills, time, expertise and material assets, plus their emotional support, to be jointly held within their network. This social capital comprises both benefits and willingness to give them; it is always immediately available to network members in times of need. It is also latently available to them and also to their wider community for endeavours to which they agree and can work together under the skilled leadership of approved community facilitators. It is a valuable immediate and latent resource for individual Iraqis in

their daily lives and a potentially valuable resource for the communities in which these social networks function. It can be seen as both a social lubricant within Iraqi society and a social glue in binding together the institutions which underpin Iraq's civil society.

This descriptor locates the source of Iraq's social capital firmly within the country's complex of social networks and from within those networks the willingness of individual members to exchange a range of benefits. While the proposition is not explicit about the underlying social process at work in coming together and interacting with each other, it does seek to identify the benefits. Furthermore it specifies that there are limits to accessing social capital, by way of individual social network member's approval of the purpose of mobilising the resource. It also recognises the limits to the role of outsiders in providing skilled leadership through a trusted facilitator.

Finally it seeks to avoid confusion over the egocentric elements of the definitions listed by Adler & Kwon (2002) by locating individual Iraqis not as "focal actors" but firmly as members of social networks.

The proposition also underlines the *potential* nature of social capital as a resource and it also highlights how members of social networks can appropriate some elements of the resource for the *immediate* needs of other members of their network through transactions in their everyday lives.

We believe this proposition, in this form, is empirically verifiable and therefore points the way towards a possible solution to the problems of proper measurement as described by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001) and Stone (2001) and the problems for researchers focussing on seeking empirical values for social capital, such as van der Eijk et al (2005).

Social policy recognition of the potential of social capital and a focus on developing ways of enhancing the mobilising of Iraq's social capital appears to be a prerequisite to assist in re-establishing social cohesion in Iraq and relieve the stresses and strains on the social fabric of Iraqi society.

## **8.7 The need for further research**

As noted, this study can only be regarded as a start on providing what now emerges as a complex picture of all the elements and characteristics of the Social Capital of Iraq and to point to how it can best be mobilised to enhance social cohesion within Iraqi society.

There are problems of representativeness in this study because of the absence of comprehensive demographics data on the 33 million or so Iraqis living in this nation-state, as it is currently constituted. As noted, because of the sampling approach required by the continuing sectarian and now widening conflict, the results may be weighted in favour of the better-educated and employed sector of the population who live in major urban centres in the capital, Baghdad and in the governorates.

It is to be hoped that despite its limitations as to its scope of coverage and also as a qualitative study it can nevertheless be regarded as a study conducted to consistent and rigorous scholarly standards and yielding meaningful results that conventional positivist methods could not have provided.

The study does point to needs also for further specific research on the extent and the identity of the constrained social networks in which Iraqis also produce social capital benefits. These networks clearly provide linkages into the institutions of Iraqi civil society and the State governance sector. At best the results of this study show only insightful glimpses into the types of benefits exchanged in such constrained social network interactions with individual officials in the institutions of the civil society and the governance institutions. Any prospective findings about the activity within these constrained networks can at best be hypotheses which must await further testing.

To be socially useful, the study should also have ideally included data-gathering from Iraqi and foreign social activists on the types of challenges they face in Iraq. As suggested by Mubareka et al (2005), the challenges would relate to security, governance, liaison and other operational problems in the work of developing and implementing post-conflict community rebuilding and reconstruction work. Good data-gathering on these challenges would realise the potential of the research to provide even better early policy guidance on how best to enhance the delivery of humanitarian socio-

economic assistance and social aid projects. But in the security circumstances prevailing in Iraq across the period of this study, this approach did not prove feasible.

At the institutional level there is a need for more detailed analysis of the formal and informal groups now at work within Iraq's civil society. From a social capital perspective it was instructive that the US Civil Aid Program (CAP) reported community-building activities between 2006 and 2012 as part of the US Army occupation's work in Iraq. The details reported vary. The CAP and associated private US agencies claim to have either formed or been involved with forming between 900 and 1300 local community associations in grass-roots initiatives and to have trained up to 17,300 members of Iraqi associations in all governorates, to have completed 391 local improvement projects, formed 80 community action groups and helped them establish links with elected members of local councils. (USAID 2013, CHF International 2008). They also claimed to have helped 2,717 young Iraqi men and women get started in apprenticeships.

These US agencies provided no clear picture of the process they adopted in this attempt to build up the civil society of Iraq and how enduring their efforts have been. These reports suggest that both the US-led occupation forces and their civil aid groups made continuous use of local English-speaking Iraqis as translators. These translators may have been the first point of contact in finding trusted facilitators within communities in seeking to mobilise local communities' stocks of social capital.

A need can also be seen for follow-up research into how effective the current civil-aid and community rebuilding activities of both the UN in-country agencies under the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq and international private aid agencies have been in rebuilding the potential social capital resources of the communities into which they have reached, then mobilising it for future projects. It would be particularly useful for a detailed study of how effective the US Aid work during the recent military occupation of Iraq. A fresh study of how Iraqis appear to be coming together to as active volunteer practitioners in the new Iraqi NGOs would be useful; how they have utilised their social network memberships and their social capital transaction experience to improve,

particularly, the lives of stricken Iraqi women and children and displaced families in their communities.

This in turn suggests that an interesting area for further exploratory research might be how the family-ingrained norms and resulting social network exchange behaviours, which are part of all Iraqi individuals' makeup, might have some influence when Iraqis find work when they work in the bureaucracy. Their set of social network exchange behaviours might beneficially influence their civil service decision-making through the deliberate formation of temporary project-oriented constrained social networks to facilitate both their chain-of-command decision-making and their State resource distribution work.

The scope of such follow-up research may, however, be too much for even a small group of Iraqi scholars ever to complete.

## **8.8 Measuring the social capital of Iraq**

As previously discussed, the social capital literature shows a growing push to research and establish rigorous measures of social capital activities and assets (Stone 2001, Woolcock 2001, Grootaert and von Bastelaer 2001). But developing acceptable measures remains fraught with problems.

This investigation of the process of generating and maintaining the stock of Social Capital in Iraq over three or more generations of living Iraqis is at best only a preliminary study. But it has produced a clearer picture of social capital activity from a transactional perspective at the micro-level. It has also produced some insights into how Iraqis' social capital transactions behaviour intersects with the work of organisations and institutions in Iraqi civil society and how it may directly intersect with the institutions and agencies of the State.

In doing so the study suggests that:

- Better identification is required of the behavioural elements underpinning the process of formation of social networks; the ways that the members of social networks interact

within the network and by common membership, with other networks; the tangible and intangible benefits they generate; their conversion into social capital resources; the harnessing of these benefits immediately by social network members and their appropriation by others for initiatives to improve the wider community.

- This identification would assist in better measurement of all elements contributing to the social capital of given society including quantitative measurement of greater acceptability.
- Better measurement would then assist in resolving much of the confusion surrounding imprecise theoretical propositions about social capital as both a theoretical construct and a descriptor of a set of social phenomenon.
- This would also pave the way for better identification and measurement of all the elements that can be said to comprise a community.

While this study's approach of qualitative data-gathering in groups lacks any claims to representativeness it did make a start on overcoming the problems Stone (2001) has described with developing meaningful quantitative social capital research instruments such as surveys. A qualitative approach permitted participants to provide their own recollections, often prompted by each other's experiences. It leads to the recommendation that further qualitative interviews about actual social capital transaction experiences would be necessary before moving to any quantitative research study.

Interestingly Putnam in his most recent studies Putnam (2007) has also highlighted difficulties in relying on census data to quantify his attempts to use "community" as his unit of analysis for his most recent social capital research. Census statisticians were not concerned with what he considered a crucial issue – that it is *who* is living in a community (a compositional effect), and who they are living *around* (a contextual effect) is what matters They only provided community-type data on the basis of data collection units. That can be a problem in the search for representativeness of quantitative data.

In the area of putting a value financial or social on social capital activity, it was of special interest to note the release in 2014 of an Australian study of the contribution to

the economy of the island-bound community of some 514,000 residents of the Australian state of Tasmania by the state's 134,000 volunteers involved in beneficial social capital-linked community enhancement work. The study suggested their unpaid efforts saved the taxpayers of that State almost \$Aus 638 million in 2013 (mmclink report 2014).

## **8.9 The status of the stocks of social capital in present-day Iraq**

This study began with an assumption, based on the researcher's own uncomfortable personal experiences in the early days of the effects of the 2003 international invasion of Iraq, and then through the subsequent eruption of sectarian killings and conflict. That assumption was that the stock of Iraq's social capital may have been irretrievably damaged through being destroyed, blocked or otherwise seriously affected.

One decade later, at the conclusion of this research study, that initial belief is clearly unfounded.

The evidence from this study has found that life for up to five million or more of the 33 million Iraqis has become problematical through dislocation, deprivation and marginalisation. But a decade after the change of governance in Iraq, at the *micro* level of daily life, something like 25 million untouched ordinary Iraqis continue to engage robustly in millions of social capital transactions every day within their social networks, particularly their family networks and their personal friends and neighbours networks. The ebb and flow of violence in the political and social conflict has only barely touched the lives of these many ordinary Iraqis.

It is as if ordinary Iraqis do not let their help for each other be seriously blocked or be markedly affected by the continuing political and sectarian conflicts across the country. Iraq's social networks merely adjust for it.

In these continuing transactions, Iraq's pool of social capital is regularly replenished. It also appears to have special qualities not found in nation-states with more stable societies, thanks mainly to the robustness of the family networks which underpin so much of the Iraqi social capital activity.

At the *micro*-level members of the myriads of social networks busy in Iraq are immediately accessing on the social capital resources of their networks for transaction benefits to assist others in immediate need.

But there clearly continues to be sets of major problems for Iraq at the *meso* or regional and at the *macro* national level that severely inhibit the mobilising of the social capital of Iraq's many communities. Difficulties and hindrances among and between the institutions of the civil society and of the State appear to create barriers to the effective accessing and mobilising of these pools of social capital for the betterment of the socio-economic lives of vulnerable ordinary Iraqis in these communities. The key to reducing if not eliminating these barriers appears to rely on deliberate and active co-operation between the emerging institutions of Iraqi civil society and the bureaucratic and political leadership of the State.

Finally, on the basis of what the study has found, there is, again, room for optimism that

- Because of the resilient reciprocity of ordinary citizens, social capital of Iraq can continue to cope with the current social welfare and personal security burdens placed on it.
- Once the current pressures of the continuing sectarian and political conflict and the challenge to the State's authority can be resolved and oil production can be increased, a modern and inclusive Iraqi government can focus on devising and delivering a more comprehensive social welfare safety net. This will relieve the drawdown burden on the country's social capital assets and therefore the burden on the individual citizens of Iraq.

Overall there is a vibrant level of continuing social capital transaction activity among the millions of individual Iraqis pursuing their ordinary daily lives, no matter in what social settings and intrusive contexts. This basic level of social capital activity appears to be incapable of suppression whether by conflict or any attempts at State suppression.

The vibrancy of Iraqi social capital behaviour therefore looks set to maintain its *macro*-role in the nation-state of Iraq as both a social lubricant within Iraqi society and a social glue that binds the evolving institutions which underpin Iraq's civil society.



## **Appendix 1**

### **Ethics approval**



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TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY

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UTS CRICOS PROVIDER CODE 00099F

11 March 2010

Professor Jenny Onyx  
School of Management  
CM05D.04.14  
UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, SYDNEY

Dear Jenny,

**UTS HREC 2010-451– ONYX, Professor Jenny, DALTON, Dr Bronwen (for ARIF, Ms Ban, PhD student) – “SOCIAL CAPITAL IN IRAQ: Its dimensions and effects in rebuilding communities”**

Thank you for your response to my email dated 07/03/11. Your response satisfactorily addresses the concerns and questions raised by the Committee, and I am pleased to inform you that ethics clearance is now granted.

Your clearance number is UTS HREC REF NO. 2010-451A

Please note that the ethical conduct of research is an on-going process. The *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans* requires us to obtain a report about the progress of the research, and in particular about any changes to the research which may have ethical implications. This report form must be completed at least annually, and at the end of the project (if it takes more than a year). The Ethics Secretariat will contact you when it is time to complete your first report.

I also refer you to the AVCC guidelines relating to the storage of data, which require that data be kept for a minimum of 5 years after publication of research. However, in NSW, longer retention requirements are required for research on human subjects with potential long-term effects, research with long-term environmental effects, or research considered of national or international significance, importance, or controversy. If the data from this research project falls into one of these categories, contact University Records for advice on long-term retention.

If you have any queries about your ethics clearance, or require any amendments to your research in the future, please do not hesitate to contact the Ethics Secretariat at the Research and Innovation Office, on 02 9514 9772.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Marion Haas  
Chairperson  
UTS Human Research Ethics Committee

## **Appendix 2**

### **Focus Groups – Participant Backgrounds**

**A. Focus Group – Shia Males – Thursday 12/05/2011 In Emerton at 07:00-09:00 pm**

Participants: six (6) males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>A1</b>	<b>A2</b>	<b>A3</b>	<b>A4</b>	<b>A5</b>	<b>A6</b>
<b>Age</b>	56	53	42	43	48	47
<b>status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Academic	Academic	Student	worker	Academic	Worker
<b>Marital status</b>	Grandfather	Grandfather	Father	Father	Father	Father
<b>Diaspora</b>	Chairman of Komail Association	Head of Extended Family	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 6 Children 1 Brother	Wife 5 children	Wife 4 Children	Wife 5 Children	Wife 3 Children 1 Brother	Wife 5 Children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	2 Brothers 2 Sisters Mother father 1 Uncle 12 Cousins	4 Brothers 2 Sisters 1 Uncle 2 Aunts 13 Cousins	2 Brothers 1 Sister Mother Father 3 Aunts 1 Uncle 14 Cousins	1 Brother 3 Sisters 7 Aunts 3 Uncles 43 Cousins	2 Brothers 2 Sisters Mother 3 Uncles 2 Aunts 26 Cousins	2 Sisters 3 Aunts 9 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Thi Qar	Thi Qar	Missan	Thi Qar	Basra	Waset
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1995	2002	1999	2000	1995	1998

**B. Focus Group — Shia Women – Saturday 21/05/2011 in Liverpool at 01:30-02:30 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>B1</b>	<b>B2</b>	<b>B3</b>	<b>B4</b>
<b>Age</b>	53	23	65	45
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Technician	Technician	Age Pension	Home duties
<b>Marital status</b>	Grandmother	Mother	Grandmother	Mother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	—	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Husband 3 Children 2 Brothers Father Stepmother	Husband 1 Children	Husband 3 children	Husband 2 Children

<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Sister	3 Brothers 4 Sisters Father Mother 5 Uncles 6 Aunts 34 Cousin	3 Children 1 Brother 1 Sister	3 Brother 4 Sisters 2 Uncles 2 Aunts 23 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Thi Qar	Thi Qar
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1996	1996	2010	1997

C. Focus Group –**Sabian Mandaean Males** – Tuesday 24/05/2011 in Fairfield at 07:00 – 08:00 PM

Participants: Four (4) Males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>C1</b>	<b>C2</b>	<b>C3</b>	<b>C4</b>
<b>Age</b>	61	51	54	52
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Jeweler	Trader	Self-employed	Security Officer
<b>Marital status</b>	Grandfather	Father	Father	Father
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	—————	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 3 Children	Wife 3 Children 1 Brother	Wife 4 Children	Wife 3 children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Sister 3 Brother 1 Uncle 1 Aunt 6 Cousins	1 Uncle 2 Aunts 7 Cousins	1 Uncle 2 Aunts 7 Cousins	2 Brother 1 Sister 1 Uncle 5 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Missan	Baghdad	Thi Qar	Thi Qar
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	2008	2004	2005	2003

D. Focus Group –**Sabian Mandaean Women** – Saturday 28/05/2011 in Cabravale at

10:00 AM – 11:00 AM

Participants: Five (5) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>D1</b>	<b>D2</b>	<b>D3</b>	<b>D4</b>	<b>D5</b>
<b>Age</b>	59	58	47	54	57
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Home duties	Home duties	Home duties	Home duties	Home duties

<b>Marital status</b>	Grandmother	Grandmother	Mother	Mother	Grandmother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Husband 3 Children 1 Sisters 1 Uncle 1 Aunt 4 Cousins	Husband 3 Children	Husband 3 Children 2 Sisters	Husband 3 children	Husband 4 Children 1 Sister
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	Mother 1 Sister 1 Brother 1 Uncle 1 Aunt 5 Cousins	1 Brother 3 Sisters	1 Sister	_____	3 Brothers 1 Uncle 1 Aunt 6 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Basra	Baghdad	Thi Qar
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1998	2000	2009	2006	2004

**E. Focus Group – Chaldean Christian Men – Saturday 11/06/2011 in Fairfield at 04:00 – 04:45 PM**

Participants: Five (5) males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>E1</b>	<b>E2</b>	<b>E3</b>	<b>E4</b>	<b>E5</b>
<b>Age</b>	49	51	56	52	42
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Engineer	Mechanic	Coffee Shop owner	Taxi Driver	Security Guard
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Father	Grandfather	Father	Father
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	_____	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 4 Children 1 Brother 1 Sister 5 Cousins	Wife 3 Children 1 Sister Mother	Wife 3 Children 1 Brother 3 Cousins	Wife 4 Children 1 Brother 1 Sister 1 Uncle 6 Cousins	Wife 3 children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	Mother 1 Sister 1 Brother 1 Uncle 1 Aunt 3 Cousins	1 Aunt 2 Cousins	1 Uncle 1 Aunt 4 Cousins	1 Brother 1 Sister 2 Uncles 1 Aunt 7 Cousins	2 Brothers 2 Sisters 1 Uncle 2 Aunts 8 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad

<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1995	1994	1994	1991	2005
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**F. Focus Group – Chaldean Christian Women – Sunday 12/06/2011 In Bonnyrigg at 04:00 – 05:00 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>F1</b>	<b>F2</b>	<b>F3</b>	<b>F4</b>
<b>Age</b>	52	46	43	60
<b>Status</b>	Divorce	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Retired	Social Worker	Home Duties	Retired
<b>Marital status</b>	Mother	Mother	Mother	Grandmother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	3 Children 2 Sisters 1 Brother	Husband 2 Children 1 Sister Father	Husband 4 Children 2 Brothers Mother Father 2 Aunts 6 Cousins	Husband 4 Children 3 Brothers 2 Sisters Mother 1 Uncle 2 Aunts 11 Cousins
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	3 Cousins	2 Cousins	1 Uncle 2 Cousins	————
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1987	1981	1996	1989

**G. Focus Group – Armenian Christians Men – Saturday 18/06/2011 in Fairfield at 07:00 – 08:00 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>G1</b>	<b>G2</b>	<b>G3</b>	<b>G4</b>
<b>Age</b>	56	67	62	72
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Divorce	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Engineer	Academic	Real-estate agent	Retired
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Grandfather	Grandfather	Grandfather
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	————	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	2 Children	Wife 3 Children 1 Brother	2 Children 2 Brothers 3 Cousins	Wife 4 children

		2 Sisters Mother		
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Sister 1 Aunt 2 Cousins	2 Cousins	1 Uncle 2 Cousins	2 Brothers 1 Sister 1 Uncle 5 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Mosul	Baghdad	Baghdad
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1982	1964	1965	1974

**H. Focus Group –Armenian Christians Women – Sunday 19/06/2011 in Fairfield at 04:00 – 05:00 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Women

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>H1</b>	<b>H2</b>	<b>H3</b>	<b>H4</b>
<b>Age</b>	56	49	58	60
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Nurse	Home Duties	Retired	Engineer
<b>Marital status</b>	Grandmother	Mother	Grandmother	Grandmother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Husband 3 Children 2 Sisters	Husband 3 Children 1 Brother Mother	Husband 4 Children 1 Sister	Husband 3 Children 4 Cousins
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Aunt 1 Cousin	1 Cousin	2 Cousins	1 Uncle 2 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1998	1989	1990	1986

**I .Focus Group –Kurdish Men– Saturday 25/06/2011 in Fairfield 07:00 – 08:00 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>I 1</b>	<b>I 2</b>	<b>I 3</b>	<b>I4</b>
<b>Age</b>	50	48	47	76
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Self-employment	unemployment	Render	Retired
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Father	Father	Grandfather
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member



<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 6 Children 1 Brother	Wife 4 Children Mother 1 Cousin	Wife 5 Children	Wife 4 children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	3 Brothers 2 Sisters 4 Aunts 7 Uncles 76 Cousins Father	2 Brothers 3 Sisters 2 Aunts 3 Uncles 24 Cousins Father Mother	1 Bother 2 Sisters 3 Aunts 4 Uncles 42 Cousins Mother	2 Sisters 16 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Suleimaniya	Suleimaniya	Erbil	Kirkuk
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	2001	1998	2003	1999

**J .Focus Group –Kurdish Women – Sunday 26/06/2011 in Fairfield at 4:00 – 5:00 PM**

Participants: Three (3) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>J1</b>	<b>J2</b>	<b>J3</b>
<b>Age</b>	62	48	51
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Home duties	Home duties	Artist
<b>Marital status</b>	Grandmother	Mother	Mother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Husband 4 Children	Husband 5 Children	Husband 4 Children 1 sister
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	2 Brothers 4 Sisters 2 Aunts 4 Uncles 54 Cousins Father	3 Brothers 3 Sisters 3 Aunts 6 Uncles 37 Cousins Father Mother	2 Sisters 6 Aunts 6 Uncles 58 Cousins Father Mother
<b>Where</b>	Erbil	Erbil	Baghdad
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1999	1998	1996

**K .Focus Group – Assyrian Christians Men – Saturday 02/07/2011 in Fairfield  
07:00 – 08:00 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>K1</b>	<b>K2</b>	<b>K3</b>	<b>K4</b>
<b>Age</b>	53	61	76	54
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Taxi driver	Engineer	Retired	Retired
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Grandfather	Grandfather	Grandfather
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 3 Children 2 Brothers 4 Sisters 5 Cousins Mother Father	Wife 4 Children 1 Sister Father	Wife 3 Children 1 Brother 4 Cousins	Wife 5 children 1 Bother 2 Sisters 1 Uncle 1 Aunt Father Mother 6 Cousins
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Aunt 1 Uncle 6 Cousins	1 Sister 7 Cousins	1 Sister 3 Cousins	1 Aunt 9 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Mosul
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	2004	2007	2007	2006

**L .Focus Group – Assyrian Women – Sunday 03/07/2011 in Bonnyrigg 04:00 – 04:45 PM**

Participants: Three (3) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>L1</b>	<b>L2</b>	<b>L3</b>
<b>Age</b>	52	47	55
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Teacher	Engineer	Home duties
<b>Marital status</b>	Mother	Mother	Mother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	4 Children 1 Sister 1 Brother	Husband 4 Children 1 Sister Father Mother	Husband 3 Children 2 brothers 2 Aunts 6 Cousins

<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Brother 2 Sisters Father 12 Cousins	5 Cousins	1 Uncle 2 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	2007	1994	1996

**M .Focus Group –Turkoman Men–** Saturday 09/07/2011 in Fairfield 07:00 – 08:00 PM

Participants: Four (4) Males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>M1</b>	<b>M2</b>	<b>M3</b>	<b>M4</b>
<b>Age</b>	45	44	48	52
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Painter	Worker	Self-employment	Artist
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Father	Father	Father
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 2 Children	Wife 4 Children	Wife 4 Children 1 Brother 1 Sister 2 Cousins	Wife 3 children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Brother 3 Sisters 7 Aunts 5 Uncles 35 Cousins Mother father	4 Brothers 2 Sisters 5 Aunts 5 Uncles 29 Cousins Father Mother	3 Brothers 2 Sisters Father Mother 6 Aunts 5 Uncles 17 Cousins	1 Brother 2 Sisters 3 Aunts 5 Uncles 20 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Kirkuk	Kirkuk	Mosul
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	2007	1995	1994	2004

**N .Focus Group – Turkoman Women –** Sunday 10/07/2011 in Bonnyrigg 04:00 – 04:45 PM

Participants: Three (3) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>N1</b>	<b>N2</b>	<b>N3</b>
<b>Age</b>	39	37	49
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Home duties	Home duties	Teacher
<b>Marital status</b>	Mother	Mother	Mother

<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Husband 3 Children 1 Sister	Husband 4 Children	Husband 3 Children 1 Sister
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Brother 3 Sisters 7 Aunts 4 Uncles Father 46 Cousins	2 Brothers 1 Sister 4 Aunts 3 Uncles Father Mother 16 Cousins	2 Sisters 1 Brother 2 Aunts 3 Uncles 13 Cousins Mother
<b>Where</b>	Kirkuk	Erbil	Kirkuk
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	2008	2005	1997

**O .Focus Group –Sunni Men– Saturday 16/07/2011 in Fairfield 07:00 – 08:00 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Males

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>O1</b>	<b>O2</b>	<b>O3</b>	<b>o4</b>
<b>Age</b>	45	49	56	51
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Self-employment	Self-employment	Technician	Technician
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Father	Father	Father
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 5 Children 3 Brothers 1 Sister 1 Cousin	Wife 3 Children	Wife 3 Children	Wife 2 children 2 Brothers 1 Uncle 4 Cousins
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	Mother Father 2 Brothers 1 Sister 2 Aunts 3 Uncles 13 Cousins	Mother 2 Brothers 4 Sisters 4 Aunts 3 Uncles 23 Cousins	3 Brothers 4 Sisters 1 Uncle 2 Aunts 28 Cousins	4 Uncles 3 Aunts 22 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Diyala	Mosul
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1995	1998	1997	1999

**P .Focus Group – Sunni Women – Sunday 17/07/2011 in Bonnyrigg 04:00 – 04:45 PM**

Participants: Four (4) Females

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>P1</b>	<b>P2</b>	<b>P3</b>	<b>P4</b>
<b>Age</b>	42	38	40	42
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Manager	Technician	Accountant	Home Duties
<b>Marital status</b>	Mother	Mother	Mother	Mother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Husband 4 Children	Husband 3 Children	Husband 5 Children	Husband 3 Children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	Mother Father 2 Sisters 1 Brother 3 Uncles 4 Aunts 18 Cousins	Mother Father 2 Sisters 4 Brothers 4 Uncles 2 Aunts 33 Cousins	Mother Father 3 Sisters 4 Brothers 8 Uncles 5 Aunts 56 Cousins	Mother Father 2 Sisters 3 Brothers 4 Uncles 6 Aunts 34 Cousins
<b>Where</b>	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1998	2008	1999	2002

**Q .Focus Group –Yazidian Men and Women – Saturday 03/08/2011 in Fairfield 07:00 – 08:00 PM**

Participants: tow (2)

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Q1</b>	<b>Q2</b>
<b>Age</b>	38	34
<b>Status</b>	Married	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Labour	Labour
<b>Marital status</b>	Father	Mother
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 3 Children	Husband 3 Children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	3 Sisters 4 Aunts 6 Uncles 27 Cousins Father Mother	2 Brothers 1 Sister 3 Aunts 3 Uncles Father Mother 13 Cousins

<b>Where</b>	Mosul	Mosul
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1999	2001

**R .Focus Group –Shabak Men– Saturday 19/08/2011 in Fairfield 07:00 – 08:00 PM**  
Participants: one (1) Male

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>R1</b>
<b>Age</b>	49
<b>Status</b>	Married
<b>Occupation</b>	Carpenter
<b>Marital status</b>	Father
<b>Diaspora</b>	Association Member
<b>Family in Australia</b>	Wife 3 Children
<b>Family in Iraq</b>	1 Brother 2 Sisters 3Aunts 5 Uncles 18 Cousins Father Mother
<b>Where</b>	Mosul
<b>Arrival date to Australia</b>	1999

## **Appendix 3**

### **Focus Groups – *Diaspora* - Scripts**

OPENING SCRIPT & PROBE QUESTIONS  
*Groups of 5-7. Allow two hours total per group)*

*Background*

1. Separate groups in each *diaspora* ethno-religious extended family network between
  - Men – all ages
  - Single women & married womenbecause of different perceptions of social benefits
2. Distribute personal questionnaire as participants come into the gathered. Ask them to complete. Pick them up after the session if not handed in.
3. Topics to be explored
  - Within immediate family network the extended family network:
    - Social capital benefits received
    - Social capital benefits contributed
    - Experiences within immediate family networks on requests for social capital benefits, and with characteristics of power, reciprocity, trust & norms
    - Experience within extended family network on requests for social capital benefits, and with characteristics of power, reciprocity, trust & norms
  - Memberships of other social networks – particularly
    - Neighbourhood networks and
    - Local Religious (church/mosque) networks
  - Experiences in social capital transactions within these other networks

*See over for*

1. Personal Questionnaire- SOME INITIAL QUESTIONS
2. “SCRIPT” for each group session
3. Preliminary listing of examples of social capital benefits/ingredients



## SOME INITIAL QUESTIONS

I would very much appreciate your answers to some initial questions about your family here and your other family members in Iraq before we start talking. Please note that we do not want your names.

1. What is your age? .....

2. Are you married  engaged  or single

3. Who is here with you?

**In Australia?** *(please tick)*

Husband/Wife

Children

Mother

Father

Brothers

Sisters

Uncles

Aunts

Cousins

**Who is in Iraq?** *(please tick)*

Husband/Wife

Children

Mother

Father

Brothers

Sisters

Uncles

Aunts

Cousins

4. In what province or provinces do your relatives live in Iraq?  
.....

5. How often do you speak with your family in Iraq?

Once a day  Once a week  Once a month  Other *(please specify)*

6. How do you mainly talk to them *(Please tick)*

Mobile Phone/Landline  Computer phone  Computer video call

Email

## FOCUS GROUPS – OPENING SCRIPT

Thank you for coming to participate in my research on the social networks of Iraq. I think you have all received my Research Information Sheet in Arabic. If you would like an English version please ask me. Thank you also for completed the personal questionnaire I have handed out. Your answers will remain completely confidential.

Does anyone have any questions? No? OK

NOW TO START OFF I would like you to begin by telling me in your own words what are the specific benefits you most remember gaining in your early life in your immediate (*aylia*) and your wider family (*amoma*) when you were in Iraq.

The sorts of benefits I'm interest in are the special benefits apart from food, shelter and clothing which you have received in, say, *Survival, Social support, Life enhancement situations* (see separate listing)

Let us begin with your immediate family. Besides the food, the clothing and the shelter you obtained from your family while growing up in Iraq, what other benefits do you remember?

### *Follow up prompts*

- Thank you for that. Now what specific benefits do you get now from your family life in Australia?
- Do you recall any other benefits you obtained in Iraq which gave you either emotional support or special instrumental help in your day-day lives or when you were trying to improve your life or build up your self-esteem?
- Now I'd like to hear from you about how you got along with your parents and your brothers and sisters as well as from your uncles and aunts and cousins in your *amoma* when you were in Iraq and particularly what they expected from you in return for the benefits you gained?
- How often were you asked to give help to other members of your *aylia* and *amoma*. What sort of help and who asked you?
- Next, please tell me about your links with your neighbours in your community. What sort of help did they give you in what sort of situations – and how ready were they to help you?
- Finally, please tell me about your links with your church/mosque (*as appropriate*). Besides the special benefit of communing with God/Allah, what other benefits and help have you received from going to the services you attend? And what have you been asked for in return?

## PRELIMINARY DETAILED LISTING OF SOME SOCIAL CAPITAL BENEFITS

*In Survival, Social support and Life enhancement situations*

### ***Types of Benefits***

Emotional benefits - support in

- times of worry & stress,
- sickness,
- loss in the family and of friends,
- joining a community organisation
- support in helping build up self-esteem.

Instrumental benefits – help with things like

- exchanging recipes
- help with preparing for feasts
- transport,
- getting into a good school,
- completing homework and assignments
- undertaking special education projects
- being taken to a good doctor or a good hospital
- finding a good job,
- locating & being introduced to a interesting possible marriage partner
- finding a good skilled person to fix a car, fix a computer, fix something in the house
- sorting out marriage problems
- finding good places for reliable shopping especially for household good and supplies, another car, a new TV etc.
- escaping from dangerous civil political and security threats.

Information benefits –

- Getting good information about dealing with government services – drivers licences, ID cards, passports, special grants.
- Referrals to good lawyers for legal advice in disputes
- Referrals to good clerics for sound religious advice on special matters (births, deaths & marriages etc.).
- Getting good information about new mobile phones, new computers and other new technology.
- Good expert advice on childcare, health, fitness and good living

## **Appendix 4**

### **Research Information Sheet**



Postgraduate Research, School of Management  
Faculty of Business

**RESEARCH PROJECT:** Social Capital in modern, conflicted Iraq: Its characteristics, dynamics and potential effects in re-building communities

Greetings

I am an Iraqi social science researcher from Baghdad. I am at the University of Technology in Sydney NSW Australia on a special research project for my PhD thesis.

I seek your participation in my research because whether you are in Australia or Iraq, you have all had experiences with at least one of the important social networks in Iraq – your extended family. There are also secular and religious and political networks of which you may be a member

Your experience could provide me with valuable information for my research, so your assistance would be greatly appreciated. My research will establish how the various social networks of Iraq can interact to exchange important benefits for their members – or in times of social conflict hinder such exchanges. It is important, I think you will agree, to understand how these benefits, which make up the Social Capital of Iraq, can best be accessed to help rebuild our disrupted civil society in the years ahead.

I do not plan to take up any more than one hour of your time. I will be asking you questions in Arabic. There is no real risk to you in participating, because my research has been carefully designed. Your responses to my questions will be completely anonymous. You will not have to identify yourself and individual responses will not be identified in my final research report. Only collective results will be reported.

You are under no obligation to participate and if at any time you wish to change your mind and withdraw, please let me know. You will not have to say why.

If you have any questions or concerns about my research, please feel free to contact me or my research supervisor, Professor. Jenny Onyx , in Sydney. Her phone number is +61 2 9514 3633. Her email address is [Jennifer.onyx@uts.edu.au](mailto:Jennifer.onyx@uts.edu.au). In Iraq my local contact is Mr. Muthanna Kamil Salih. His phone number is 00119647813532007. His email address is [muthanna.salih@yahoo.com](mailto:muthanna.salih@yahoo.com).

Please note that my research study has been approved by the University of Technology, Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee. It has the reference number 2010-451A. If you have any complaints or reservations about any aspect of your participation in this research which you cannot resolve with me or Professor Onyx, you may contact the Committee through the Research Ethics Officer (*phone: +61 2 9514 9772 email : [Research.Ethics@uts.edu.au](mailto:Research.Ethics@uts.edu.au)*). Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated fully and you will be informed of the outcome.

Yours sincerely  
Ban Arif

*Telephone: 0405 506 630*  
*Email: [ban.arif@student.uts.edu.au](mailto:ban.arif@student.uts.edu.au)*

## **Appendix 5**

### **Participant Consent Form**



**UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY**  
**Management Discipline Group**  
**UTS Business School**  
**City Campus**  
**PO Box 123 Broadway**  
**NSW 2007 Australia**  
**Tel: +61 (02) 9514 3633**  
**Fax: +61 (02) 9514 3602**  
**WWW.uts.edu.au**

**RESEARCH CONSENT FORM**

I \_\_\_\_\_ agree to participate in the research project on **The Social Capital of Iraq, (UTS HREC approval reference number 2010-451A)** being conducted by Ms Ban Arif of Canley Vale NSW mobile 0405 506 630 who is a PhD research candidate of the University of Technology, Sydney.

I understand that the purpose of this study is to gain first-hand data on the benefits which we Iraqis have gained from each other in our family and other social networks in our daily lives when we lived in Iraq.

I understand that I have been asked to participate in this research because I am an Iraqi-born Australian resident and that my participation in this research will involve up to two hours of my time. My identity will be kept secret.

I am aware that I can contact Ms Ban’s supervisor, Professor Jenny Onyx, if I have any concerns about the research. I also understand that I am free to withdraw my participation from this research project at any time I wish, without consequences, and without giving a reason.

I agree that Ms Ban has answered all my questions fully and clearly.  
 I agree that the research data gathered from this project may be published in a form that does not identify me in any way.

\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature of participant)

\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature (researcher or delegate)

**NOTE:**

This study has been approved by the University of Technology, Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints or reservations about any aspect of your participation in this research which you cannot resolve with the researcher, you may contact the Ethics Committee through the Research Ethics Officer (ph: +61 2 9514 9772 [Research.Ethics@uts.edu.au](mailto:Research.Ethics@uts.edu.au)) and quote the UTS HREC reference number. Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated fully and you will be informed of the outcome.

## **Appendix 6**

### **Tele-Interviews - Iraq - Backgrounds**



<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>status</b>	<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Background</b>
<b>A</b>	55	Married	Veterinary	Father	Shia Male
<b>B</b>	46	Married	Teacher	Mother	Shia Female
<b>C</b>	19	Single	Student	-	Shia Male
<b>D</b>	22	Single	Student	-	Shia female
<b>E</b>	67	Married	Retired	Father	Sunni Male
<b>F</b>	53	Married	Veterinary	Mother	Sunni Female
<b>G</b>	26	Single	Agriculture engineer	-	Sunni Male
<b>H</b>	22	Single	Student	-	Sunni Female
<b>I</b>	38	Married	Dentist	Father	Kurdish Male
<b>J</b>	43	Married	Programmer	Mother	Kurdish Female
<b>K</b>	20	Single	Student	-	Kurdish Male
<b>L</b>	19	Single	Student	-	Kurdish Female
<b>M</b>	63	Married	Engineer	Father	Christian Male
<b>N</b>	47	Married	Teacher	Mother	Christian Female
<b>O</b>	19	Single	Student	-	Christian Male
<b>P</b>	23	Single	Student	-	Christian Female

## **Appendix 7**

### **Tele-Interviews – in Iraq - Script**

## INTERVIEWS – OPENING SCRIPT

*Note:* Interview conducted on .....2012 by .....

With.....

Living in ... ..

Identifier code:

---

Thank you for permitting me to interview you for my research on the social networks of Iraq. I believe you have received my Research Information Sheet and I am thankful for your signed consent. Let me re-assure you that your answers will remain completely confidential.

1. First of all do you have any questions about my research project and your participation?

2. Now, I wish to start by asking you some personal questions about your background as an Iraqi:

Age:

Marital Status:

Profession or Position:

*If married:* Your spouse's profession or Job position

Your religious and ethnic affiliation?

*If married:* Is your spouse's religious/ethnic affiliation the same as yours?

Which district of Baghdad do you reside in?

Where were you born?

In what district/area do you work?

3. Next I would like to know something of your family network.

How many brothers and sisters do you have?

Are your mother and father still alive?

Roughly how big are your extended family uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, nieces?

Who is the head of your extended family?

What is the name of the clan your family is in?

Who is your clan leader and where does he live?

Have you ever met him?

Which tribe is your family from?

Do you know who your tribal leader is and where does he live?

Have you ever met him?

Now I want to ask you about the benefits you receive or give in your social networks.

By “benefits” I mean help and assistance in all sorts of ways - information (even just about recipes or good shops to go to or jobs that are available or good contacts at government ministries and agencies) or emotional support directly or at weddings and funerals and/or other times of stress) or direct physical, tangible support including your time, expertise, contacts and even cash help. They can be small benefits or large benefits.

So, can you tell me of any benefits you have received and which you gave also give from your family network when you or your relatives needed help and assistance? Both small and large benefits?

Now from your clan, do you recall any benefits you have received or provided to your clan?

And do you recall any benefits you have received from your tribe or provided to your tribal leaders?

\*\* If you come from a mixed extended family, have you had any problems associating with relatives from the other religious or ethnic affiliation?

4. Next, I am sure you have your own other social networks which comprise people you value and respect and freely associate with and I would like to ask you in some details about these.

Your network of Neighbours you see frequently

*How often are you in contact with them?*

*What do you value about them?*

*What benefits have you gained from to contributed to them*

*What sort of people are they?*

*Age, education, work, religious/ethnic affiliation?*

Your network of Friends?

*How and when do you meet them*

*What do you value about them*

*What benefits have you gained from them*

*What sort of people are they?*

*Age, education ,work, religious/ethnic affiliation?*

Your colleagues at your work?

*What sort of people are they?*

*Age, education ,work, religious/ethnic affiliation?*

*What do you value about them*

*What benefits have you gained from them*

Any Groups at your mosque/church?

*How and when do you meet them?*

*What do you value about them?*

*What benefits have you gained from them?*

*What sort of people are they?*

*Age, education ,work, religious/ethnic affiliation?*

*Any other groups you belong to?*

*They could be from school, business, professional, academic, political groups or community groups or other non-government organisations*

*How and when do you meet them?*

*What do you value about them?*

*What benefits have you gained from or given to them*

*What sort of people are they?*

*Age, education ,work, religious/ethnic affiliation?*

*Do you or they appear to have any problems freely participating in that group?*

### **Conclusion**

Thank you for your very good co-operation. Your information will be very helpful to our research. Again, I will keep your identity very confidential. No one else will know.

Now, finally, is there anything else you would like to add to what you have already told me.

## **Appendix 8**

### **Script for Special Interviews**

## **SPECIAL INTERVIEW- NGO TRANSCRIPT**

Special Participant No \_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ by Skype in \_\_\_\_\_ (*location in Iraq*).

Thank you for permitting me to interview you for my research on the social networks of Iraq. I believe you have received my Research Information Sheet and I am thankful for your signed consent form.

Let me re-assure you that your answers will remain completely confidential.

1. First of all do you have any questions about my research project and your participation?

2. Now. I wish to start by asking you some personal questions about your background as an Iraqi:

***Personal:***

Sex:

Age:

No. of children:

Education:

Profession:

Husband's profession:

Ethno-religious affiliation

Self

Husband

City and District where you live:

District in which you work

Size of extended family

Who are your own Clan & tribe leader,

Do you have your own network of neighbours:

Own network of friends?

Own network at your workplace

Any other network memberships?

3. Your NGO

Thank you. Next I am particularly interested in your work as an NGO. May I start by asking some questions about your group?

Name of the ***NGO***:

Registered with Ministry?

No. of volunteers in your office are:

No. of paid staff:

What sort of groups of Iraqis does your group aim to help?

Does your NGO produce any pamphlets or other written material and does it have a website?

#### **4. Benefits you provide**

Next I would like to concentrate on the benefits you and your work brings to your communities.

What general and specific benefits does it seek to provide to them – emotional or informational or instrumental?

From where do you get the resources you need to distribute to your - money &/or goods &/or services

How do you recruit other volunteers?

Is it difficult to recruit volunteers?

Where is its Head office & what other field offices does your NGO have?

How are decisions made on which help programs your office will concentrate their efforts on? Who is involved?

How does your office make contact with people it wants to help? (targets) directly, by approaches to heads of local families or their wives, by other indirect means such as *mukhtars* or elected members of provincial councils or local imams and sheikhs?

Is it easy to gain the trust of your targets and the other people?

Just how does your office deliver benefits to targets?

What hindrances does your office encounter in delivery of these benefits from provincial and central government officials – or other local ethno-religious groups?

What local assistance does your office rely on in delivering the benefits?



Do you encounter any resistance or hindrance from the other groups of people associated with your target people (family or clan or tribal groups, business groups or other ethno-religious groups in your area? Are they or you generally suspicious of ethno-religious strangers they/you do not know?

What part does your targets' associated groups play also in helping or hindering your programs?

Does your generally gain respect and thanks for the work it does? Do you as an Iraqi woman also gain respect and thanks for your efforts?

**5. Any special campaigns? Your Petition campaign:**

Have you been involved in any special campaigns of your own?

*(If yes)* Please tell me about that success and what it achieved, starting with how you found out about the problem and who you approached to help you with it?

What other groups of people did you approach to help in getting signatures on the petition?

What was the reaction of the local officials to whom you presented the petition? How easy was it to get an appointment to see them? Was that done over the phone or by letter? Did they keep a watchful eye on you afterwards?

What other documents or letters did you have to prepare to go with the petition itself?

How long did it take to get a result?

What other actions or activities or programs have you helped with on behalf of your group?

Do you know of other NGO's in Iraq – and what are their names?

Do you work with any of them on your and their campaigns?

How often do you have contact with these other NGO's in Baghdad?  
What happens at these contact sessions?

Have you added any of the volunteers or staff of these other NGO's to your own personal social network of friends?

**6. Benefits:**

Obviously your target groups of people gain benefits from your NGO's work.

What benefits and thanks do you and your fellow volunteers get in return, besides, say, a sense of helping out in your community?

**7. Participation problems?**

Finally please discuss what participation problems and frustrations do you encounter in your NGO work from any group – your targets, your family, your friends, other volunteers, other NGO groups, provincial and central government officials, local religious groups, local political party people, the local media?

How do you try to overcome these problems?

*Conclusion-* anything else you would like to tell me about your NGO work – and the place of NGO's generally in present-day Iraq?

## **Appendix 9**

### **Benefits exchanged in Family networks**

***Family benefit***

<b><i>From Women</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID code</b>
- Used cash gifts from my wedding to buy my parents a car.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>F1</b>
- My mother wouldn't let my brother go fighting in the Iraq-Iran War. She secretly built a bunker and kept him there. She did not tell us about this till the war was over.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>N3</b>
- When I graduated I got a job at the Ministry of Higher Education. My parents insisted I save my money and they supported me at home. When I married they made my husband get a house near them and they visited me often.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>P1</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Father sent cash until we reached Australia.	<b>Armenian,</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>G3</b>
As the eldest, helped father make sweets during school. Then I supported rest of family when I got job. Now I send money for our parents.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>M4</b>
-- Father helped me when I went to prison in 1991 then family paid to excuse me from compulsory service. Parents looked after my wife and children when I escaped to Australia.	<b>Shabak</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>R1</b>

**Husbands, wives, married siblings, uncles, aunts and cousins'** support was recalled often in a variety of benefits and of social contexts. The examples below are grouped by different benefits:

**Marriage benefits**

<b><i>From Women</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Supported brothers and sisters in finding spouses and getting married.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>B1</b>

- I helped all my brothers get married and helped their wives during childbirth or when they got sick.	<b>Sabean</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>D1</b>
- My sister sold all her gold to raise money for me to pay legal costs of my divorce.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>L2</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Mother and my sister gave me all their gold when I married. Later I brought my mother to Australia.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>I2</b>
- My brothers helped me with \$30,000 towards my divorce.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>G3</b>
- I was responsible for my sister and my brothers. I helped them in their marriages.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>O3</b>
- We three brothers came to Sydney. I helped one brother marry the daughter of my friend.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>O4</b>

#### **Family support and enhancement benefits**

<b><i>From Women</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- My big brother encouraged my artistic work and always brought back oil colors for me when he went to the city. Because of him I became a professional artist.	<b>Yazidian</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>Q2</b>
Every Eid, our father and brothers prepare a tent for 200 relatives for feasting and accommodation. My father says it's important.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>P3</b>
- During sanctions husband sent food from our supermarket every day when uncle's wife fell sick.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>P2</b>
- We relatives gave monthly cash to a cousin and her 4 children when her husband was murdered in sectarian strife in 2005.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>P3</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Always helped children with homework and they did well and gained good jobs.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>G2</b>
- Brother had a "problem" so his brothers sold their car and the wives sold gold for money support.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>A1</b>

- Provided money support from Australia to my brothers in Iraq.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>C4</b>
- Came to Australia. Worked hard. With savings helped brother get to Turkey, then Sydney. Now he works in our shop.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>I1</b>
- My sister visits my disabled widowed aunt every day. My parents assisted with money from time to time.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>K2</b>
- We took in my sister and her family during the sectarian killings. She left our house for Syria. Later she sold it and paid us.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>K3</b>
- When Aunt's husband died, my father arranged the funeral and my sister went and stayed with our aunt.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>M3</b>
- Brother went to Libya. While away I looked after his family. Gave them money. Took children to school.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>O2</b>
- My uncle always rewarded me for good school results with a gold coin to encourage hard study.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>O2</b>
- My father took over his family when my uncle died. Supported them. They married and appreciate my father deeply.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>O3</b>
- Relative an air force pilot. Visited us often. Helped my brother get frequent leave during his compulsory Army service.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>O4</b>
- I went back to Iraq 2004 and married in our traditional way. My new wife stayed with my parents till her visa came and then she rejoined me in Australia.	<b>Yazidian</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>Q1</b>

### **Health benefits**

<b><i>From Women</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Wives of brothers cared for me after a car crash while I was pregnant.	<b>Sabean</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>D1</b>
-We paid all expenses when my brother needed appendectomy.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>B4</b>

- Our family is strong and we siblings help each other. I sent money to my brother for an eye operation and I paid for my sister to go on the Haj. They helped us with our house deposit in Sydney.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>N2</b>
- I went to live in Jordan with my husband and our two sons. When one of them fell sick my family members gave me emotional support and my brother sent \$3000. He recovered. We came to Australia and I helped them when they needed it.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>P4</b>
-Nephew needed operation. Gave him \$250.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>B1</b>
- Fled to Turkey when I was pregnant. Dr said abort, but cousin stayed with me 5 months. We named baby after cousin.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>J3</b>
-I stayed with my uncle while our house was rebuilt. My sister stayed with a sick cousin in hospital till she was better.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>J3</b>
-My baby needed blood. Hospital did not have correct blood group. My brother-in-law did and donated his blood.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>L1</b>
- My barren sister came to look after my sick daughter. Years later my daughter went back from Sydney to Baghdad to live with my sister.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>L3</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Wife and I changed house roles whenever we each got sick.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>G2</b>
- My sister's husband suffered renal failure. All of us, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts and cousins donated money for his hospital costs.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>A6</b>
- One prisoner was a doctor and he said eat a lot of garlic so my parents used to bring a 10kg bag of garlic and we shared it.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>A5</b>
- Always visited sick cousins and stayed to provide care if needed.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>A1</b>

- Aunt gave live-in care for my sick mother and did all the domestic work.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>C2</b>
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### **Work benefits**

<i>From women</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Relative in Transport Ministry gave my son a driver's job. In 2003, he drove the relative and family to Mosul and stayed with them until the regime changed.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>L2</b>
- When we had to flee, cousin in Turkey arranged job in local restaurant.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>N1</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Sister's husband gave me a job during tough times of sanctions. I then helped my parents.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>E2</b>
- After graduating as Engineer, uncle obtained a job for me through (Sunni) friends in Minister's office.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>G1</b>
- After my son graduated, relatives with contacts in Ministry of Agriculture got him a professional post.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>K3</b>
- Came to Perth in 1995. Brother opened mixed business. We helped with capital and he gave work to our cousin and my daughter's husband.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>O1</b>

### **Personal Security benefits**

<i>From Women</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
-Sent money to help my two brothers separately to take refuge in Syria.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>D2</b>
My husband was kidnapped by Kurds during fighting. My husband's mother came and paid \$50,000 for his release.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>H1</b>
- We received a threat letter in Kirkuk to get out or be killed. Police did nothing. After more threats my husband took us to another province and my brother sold our house for us. Then we went to Turkey.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>N1</b>



-Relatives raised \$6000 for ransom for my kidnapped son.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>D4</b>
- Brother-in-law arranged release of my husband after paying \$50,000 ransom to Kurdish captors.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>H1</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- I helped my sister in Syria to be able to reach Australia.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>C3</b>
- Brother helped me escape to Turkey after I deserted. Gave me all his money. I repaid him from Australia.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>I1</b>
- My brother hid me in his house after I deserted from the Iraqi Army.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>E4</b>
- My brother bribed <i>Mukhabarat</i> gaoler with \$3000 to let me escape. Then he hid me till I fled.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>E5</b>
- As then a senior officer in the Iraqi Army I was able to arrange through Army contacts to transfer my wife's relative's son from front-line service.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>G4</b>
- Kurds captured young cousin. We raised \$28,000 ransom. But Kurds delivered only his body. They had killed him.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>K4</b>
- In 2003 grandfather insisted we move from Baghdad to Erbil and stay with him till regime fell.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>M1</b>
- Sister's Shia husband killed in sectarian conflict. Me and my brothers sent money from Australia for her and her 3 children.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>M2</b>
- Fled to Turkey, joined sister and family and we helped each other. I came to Australia. She went to Denmark.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>M4</b>
- My uncle was a senior Army officer. He would visit my unit when I did compulsory army service, arrange 3-4 days leave for me and ensure no risky duties were assigned.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>O1</b>
- Fled Iraq. A cousin in Turkey gave me free board for 3 years till I came to Australia.	<b>Yazidi</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>Q1</b>
- Father helped me when I went to prison in 1991 then family paid to excuse me from compulsory service. Parents looked after my wife and children when I escaped to Australia.	<b>Shabak</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>R1</b>

### General Material and Practical benefits

<i>From Women</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- My husband rebuilt my brother's house at no cost when my brother was short of money. My husband also rented a shop for my brother to open a computer repair business.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>N2</b>
- My husband did not have a job. I was a teacher. We had a little girl. We were able to rent a house in the same street as my sister. She looked after our little girl while I went to work until my husband found a job.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>N2</b>
- Younger brother injured others in car smash. Cousins paid for repairs to their car. Also gave him another car.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>H2</b>
- Sister's husband intervened when my husband went broke in 1980. We had to move to Erbil. I lived with my sister until her husband helped him to rebuild his business in Erbil.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>J1</b>
- Uncle's clothes shop went bad in 1990's. Our family only bought from his shop. His business survived and flourished.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>P1</b>
- Grandmother gave her cousin her late husband's shop to get started. He did well and invited grandmother to live with him.	<b>Yazidi</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>Q2</b>
- Filled in for 3 months for sick husband at his weekly mosque support meeting.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>B1</b>
<b><i>From men</i></b>			
- Sister working at Oil Ministry got us extra fuel coupons during sanction scarcity.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>K1</b>
- Money support to brothers in Iraq during sanctions.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>A4</b>
- Cousins rented and rebuilt gold shop for my father.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>C3</b>
- I had to flee. Gave brother my share of house. When he sold it, he paid me my share.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>E1</b>

- My sister and husband got an Iraqi community letter in Sydney to support my refugee application to Australia.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>E4</b>
- Received refugee visa. My uncle paid airfare to come to Australia.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>I3</b>
- Came to Australia in 1994. After 2003 went back to try to establish a mini-refinery project in north Iraq. Brothers and sisters sold property and raised \$4 million towards costs. Project did not proceed. We gave that up. I turned to other projects with them.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>M4</b>
- I went back to Iraq after change of government. My cousin worked with the new government. He helped me to get land and a \$30,000 grant to build a new house because I had been a political prisoner.	<b>Shabak</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>R1</b>
- Through close links with long-time Shi'ite friend from schooldays in Missan province who had become a leading officer in the local Al Mehdi Army, we secured release of Mehdi Army captives in Baghdad at height of sectarian terror.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>C1</b>

### **Emotional support benefits**

<b><i>From Women</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
-I continue to call my family and old ( <b>Sunni</b> ) neighbors in Iraq twice a week on the Internet or mobile.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>B2</b>
-Always contact my family in Iraq, by telephone and internet.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>D3</b>
-My cousin and I helped each other a lot. On children's birthdays we would bake cakes together and I would decorate them.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>N1</b>
- Very close to my aunt. She defended me as I grew up. I tried to get her to Australia but couldn't. Keep close to her.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>P4</b>

- Sister drove me to visit my <b>(Sunni)</b> friends. They became her friends and now they support each other.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>N3</b>
- Value family, Shia, Sunni neighbours and Sunni, Shia, Christian and Kurdish friends for their assistance when I need it.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>P2</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
None reported			

## **Appendix 10**

### **Benefits gained from Clan and Tribe Networks**

### ***BENEFITS FROM OTHER SOCIAL NETWORKS***

The participants' recollections produced a smaller number of anecdotes of social benefits given or received from two networks to which they felt closely attached.

Noticeably the recollections came only from the men. These were:

#### **Clan network**

<b><i>From Men</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Always visit sick relatives in clan and offer help.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>A5</b>
- Contributed blood money to clan of murdered man ( <b>Shia</b> ) to free clan member who killed policeman.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>A1</b>
- Two clans ( <b>Shia</b> ) strongly connected became scourge of other people of Basra province.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>A3</b>
- We Sabian men would estimate the longevity of our elders and pool funds for their funerals.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>C4</b>
- We Yazidis join in our many feasts so we maintain our ethnic identity and so that our children can make friends within our own community.	<b>Yazidi</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>Q1</b>

#### **Tribe network**

<b><i>From Men</i></b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Great credit to the tribes for diminishing the sectarian conflicts when they withdrew their members from militias.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>A1</b>
- Local Ba'athist leader met elders, sheiks to gain tribal support. But only temporary.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>A2</b>

## **Appendix 11**

### **Benefits gained from Neighbour Networks**

The participants' recollections gave greater weight to benefits from a number of other previously unidentified social networks which they clearly considered to be important to them. These were their **neighbour networks** and their **friends' networks**. The benefits transacted within these networks included:

### **Neighbour networks**

<i>From Women</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Always visited Sunni and Shia neighbours on feast days etc.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>B1</b>
- Family always helped our next-door neighbour	<b>Shia</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>B4</b>
- Took (Shia) neighbour with cancer into own house and paid for operation.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>B3</b>
- Helped neighbour's children with meals before school.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>B3</b>
- (Shia) Muslim Iraqi family from Perth stayed with us in Sydney.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>D1</b>
- Though neighbours are Muslim, this does not affect us. We do not react among each other on the basis of different religion. My neighbours are like my family.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>D4</b>
- Though Muslim, shared celebrations with neighbours no matter their religion.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>D2</b>
- Our elderly mother returned from Germany to Baghdad. She wanted to resume living among her Shi'ite neighbours and friends. They now look after her.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>D1</b>
- During air raids, neighbouring elders' stories in shelters quelled our fears.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>F3</b>
- Neighbour school friend helped me with maths and I helped her with Arabic.	<b>Kuradish</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>J2</b>
- As children we went to neighbour's house to watch TV and my mother made sweets for our neighbours.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>J1</b>
- Took turns with neighbour to drive 8-y-o sons to school each day to save on petrol during sanctions shortages.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>L1</b>



- During war rocket damaged Sunni neighbours house. My husband helped them repair the damage.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>L3</b>
- Husband a baker had to close shop during sectarian strife. Neighbours got him to bake at our house and helped him.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>N2</b>
- During sanctions we used to share our rations with very poor ( <b>Turkoman</b> ) neighbours. She helped me with housework.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>N1</b>
- Close to Shia neighbour in Diyala. We stored their furniture when they left for a while due to Sunni gang threat.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>P2</b>
- We always ask our neighbours if they need any help, we help each other.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>P3</b>
- Neighbour's aunt came to look after us when we were little after she took my sick mother to hospital.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>P4</b>
- Neighbour, a policeman, helped my husband in a faulty truck sale dispute. Confronted, seller agreed to replace truck.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>J2</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Ba'ath Party officers wanted to arrest my neighbour's husband She screamed. I intervened to vouch for him. They took me away instead.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>A4</b>
- A Ba'ath Party security unit supported by Iraqi army forces came to destroy our local houses for participating in the 1991 uprising. My Sunni neighbour was able to save our house.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>A5</b>
- In 1986 I fled to Greece. Neighbours looked after my land. In 2004 they sold it, located me and paid me.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>E3</b>
- When we travelled outside Baghdad, we always left a key with ( <b>Sunni</b> ) neighbour who looked after our aunt and fed our birds.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>K2</b>
- Our Shia neighbours under threat from Sunni militia. We helped them buy a car to relocate in southern Iraq.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>K2</b>

- Sunni neighbour's mother disabled with fractured hip in car accident. My mother went to her daily. Taught the daughter how to care for her mother.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>K4</b>
- Our children in Australia arranged a visa for us to join them. We gave our kitchen tools to our Sunni neighbours and our furniture to our relatives.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>K3</b>
- Sunni neighbour's house bombed in air raid. They stayed with us till they found another house.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>K4</b>
- I was a taxi driver. Each day I gave a lift to Shia neighbours to their bus depot. We were closer to them than to our relatives.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>K1</b>
- Neighbours warned me the <i>Mukhabarat</i> coming for me. Escaped to sister in another province and avoided arrest.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>M2</b>
- Neighbour's 9-year-old son kidnapped. My family raised ransom of \$13,000. Kidnappers accepted and released the boy.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>M3</b>
- Joined other neighbours to help support a family when the husband called up to fight in Iraq-Iran war.	<b>Sunni</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>O1</b>
- Shia neighbour executed for political activity. All we neighbours joined to support his bereaved family.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>I3</b>
- Helped neighbour with shelter and money. After 2003 he became a high Government official and helped us.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>I3</b>
- Mother close to neighbours. We stayed close, helping each other after growing up.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>I1</b>
- Visiting rural brother had row with local shopkeeper. My neighbours intervened. Shopkeeper backed down.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>I4</b>
- Neighbours in another party alerted me when Iraqi Army about to attack my militia group. Heavy losses but I escaped.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>I3</b>

## **Appendix 12**

### **Benefit gained from Friend Networks**

### Friend's networks

<i>From Women</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
-My open family had close Muslim friends and also used to go to different Christian churches.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>F4</b>
- Wanted to return to Iraq as missed my friends.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>F2</b>
- Friends met in afternoons to exchange ideas and experiences, such as events, clothes, ornaments, recipes.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>F2</b>
- Sunni friend's husband in Foreign Ministry arranged job for my husband.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>H3</b>
- At school, we used to go to home of friend for help from willing mother who was a maths teacher.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>H1</b>
- At school three of us walked home together to protect us from bullies.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>H3</b>
- In Greece became friends with other poor Iraqi refugee families to provide mutual support. One son married my daughter.	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>H4</b>
- A friend and her husband persuaded my husband to return to me after a serious dispute. Avoided divorce.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>J2</b>
- I met my future husband as the brother of a girlfriend. They hosted our secret romance. We wed with families' consent.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>J3</b>
- I fled to Syria after my husband. With other woman we helped a mother with sick kids at river crossing.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>J1</b>
- I did private tutoring in science. Friends and cousins brought children to me for tutoring.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>L1</b>
- My best friend, a Sunni, worked with me in Ministry. While one of us was away the other looked after her work duties.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>L2</b>
- Very close with girls at Ministry job. We went to the Director General when one had a problem to intercede for her.	<b>Suuni</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>P1</b>

- Two Shia friends rescued my brother from drowning in Iraq-Iran War. We sheltered one friend and his family when they fled.	<b>Yazidi</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>Q2</b>
<b><i>From Men</i></b>			
- Through close links with long-time Shi'ite friend from schooldays in Misan province who had become a leading officer in the local Al Mehdi Army, we secured release of Mehdi Army captives in Baghdad at height of sectarian terror.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>C1</b>
- Friend helped me when I lost all my money and he offered me to work with him. I got back all the money.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>A6</b>
- <i>Gahwa</i> friends helped find work for each other (in Iraq).	<b>Armenian</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>G1</b>
- <i>Ghawa</i> friends group helped me find extra work (in Sydney).	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>E5</b>
- Forced to move to Thi Qar. Shia Arab friend of my friend helped me find a house and work, meet our neighbours and settled in.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>I4</b>
- Loaned a Shia friend money in 1993 to help build his house. I gave him his last payment. Years later met him in Syria. He gave me and my new bride his house for our honeymoon.	<b>Assyrian</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>K1</b>
- Stayed friends with rest of our boy soccer team. Later helped each other find jobs.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>E2</b>
- I made friends while on pilgrimages to Najaf. We kept in contact and we helped each other find jobs.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>A1</b>
- I gave shelter to a friend who deserted during war. Later I married his cousin. My brother married his sister.	<b>Kurdish</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>I2</b>
- Cousin arrested. Sunni friend had a relative in the <i>Mukhabarat</i> . My family raised funds for bribes arranged through my friend. Our cousin was released after 4 years.	<b>Turkoman</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>M2</b>

<p>- During my military signals service in 1989 I served in a remote Anbar post and became trusted friends with the other 3 Arab soldiers at the post. We arranged that two of us would take a week off at a time. The Army never knew.</p>	<p><b>Turkoman</b></p>	<p><b>45</b></p>	<p><b>M1</b></p>
<p>- As a student, our landlord ordered 4 of us out of our rooms. The father of an Arab Shia classmate offered us a cheap flat to go to.</p>	<p><b>Turkoman</b></p>	<p><b>52</b></p>	<p><b>M4</b></p>
<p>- Iraqi friend in Sydney became gambling addict. I gave him funds to go to Baghdad, marry and stay 6 months away from poker machines.</p>	<p><b>Sunni</b></p>	<p><b>51</b></p>	<p><b>O4</b></p>

## **Appendix 13**

### **Benefit gained from Local Worship Networks**

### Local Worship networks

<i>From Women</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
- Our "Manda" (Sabian house of worship) is my source of entertainment and support.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>D2</b>
- I am a Sabian Mandaean. When I arrived in Australia, local Sabian Mandaean families helped me, by showing me around and teaching me things.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>D5</b>
- The Mandaean women's association takes care of the activities of women. We gain benefits also make us enjoy life by putting less pressure on us.	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>D4</b>
- Raised cash to assist church friends to pay costs for brother with kidney failure, however he died. Church itself did not help.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>F1</b>
- Church important to meet new friends, relieve my daily pressures.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>F3</b>
- Going to church relieves my stresses, makes me happy.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>F4</b>
<i>From Men</i>			
- In our local Church group we raise funds to use to bring sick Iraqis to Sydney for treatment. We pay for their ticket, their hospital costs and the flight back to Iraq.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>E3</b>
- Our local Shia association helps our children learn 'social cohesion'.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>A3</b>
- Our local Shia association activities provides marriage opportunities for our children.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>A6</b>
- Our local Shia group activities help members learn our religious culture.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>A6</b>
- Our local Shia group activities take our minds off our worries and lift the personal pressures on us.	<b>Shia</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>A6</b>
- As a computer repairer fellow churchgoers ask me if I can repair their computers. I advise them to bring their computers to my shop.	<b>Chaldean</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>E1</b>



### **Business networks**

Only one participant recollected a benefit from his business activities. This was

<i>From Men</i>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>ID Code</b>
Good relations with suppliers meant ready credit for jewellery shop	<b>Sabian</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>C1</b>

## **Appendix 14**

### **Record of Interview - Tele-Interviews with participants in Iraq**

**Interview A:** *Male married Shia professional, aged 55, living and working. His wife is also Shia. They have 2 children. He has an extended family of some 350 relatives including his 4 brothers and 7 sisters and their families. Knows the head of his clan and has met his tribe's leader.*

### **Benefits from Family network**

He became a *wasta* intercessor when a brother got into trouble with the local police in Wasit province for selling phone cards from a temporary shop without a licence. A friend who had a contact in the Prime Minister's liaison office in the province arranged for the contact to secure the brother's release with a warning.

### **Benefits recalled**

#### **His family network**

*“My brother had a temporary shop in the middle of the other shops in Wasit province selling phone cards of Asian service providers. My brother didn't register his business and was informed many times that he had to register the business at the government departments or else the shop will be legally closed. One day in May this year 2012 while he was working in his shop, a group of national security patrollers saw his shop not registered yet and told him to close it now or there will be consequences. He closed his shop but after an hour he opened it again. The national security patrol saw the shop opened and assumed that he was playing with them and took him to the national security office and handcuffed him in the office. He gave me a call and told me what happened to him and asked me for help I remembered that one of my friends had a relationship with Al Jaafari office in Wasit who is the former prime minister and I asked him to use them to free my brother. He went to the manger of the office and told them to free my brother they called the national security office and pleaded them to free my brother. They agreed to let him free but said if he opens any shop without registration he will be thrown in jail.”*

#### **Clan network**

His clan and another bigger clan had serious problems over a piece of his clan's land and the big clan began to fence it. Gunshots were fired. A well-known provincial

identity intervened with the heads of both clans. The confrontation stopped. The clans met formally with the identity, agreed on the return of the land. The identity took the gun for safe-keeping.

*“There was a big problem in Wasit province in Al Dujaili between my clan the Al Dufliah and another clan called Aal Chulebah. The fight started when a big family from the Aal Chulebah clan took a piece of land which belonged to a small family from the Al Dufliah clan. The big family which took the land said that they owned that land and started putting a fence around it. The fight between the two clans started verbally and then the fight ended when the clans started making threats on that day. After a few weeks one of the children from the small family from the Al Dufliah clan got a real gun and started shooting the people on the land that was stolen. No one was injured or killed but the family from the Al Chulebah clan got scared and told everyone what happened. Both clans got scared and prepared themselves in case of anything. Later a very well known person came and talked with both the clans and told them there’s no need for all this drama and calmed down the head leaders. They had a meeting at the house of an important man known to both clans. He told each other that there was no need for fighting and they agreed that this won’t happen again. After ten days he talked with both families together and they agreed that the big family would return the land they took. He also took the gun that was used to shoot at them for a few months just for safety”.*

### **Neighbours network**

He reported a network of five neighbours whom he values as close friends. They comprise Iraqi men, mostly well-educated, who are Sunni, Shia and Sabian Mandeian, and are working. They are between 35 and 60. He sees them almost every day. They provide aid and assistance to each other especially in the most critical times. These could be damage to a neighbour’s house, a fire or any other incident.

### **Friends network**

He reported a network of 13 good male friends aged between 28 and 64 and a mix of religious and ethnic backgrounds. They help each other with moral and financial support and mediate to resolve problems that any of them may have.

### **Work network**

At his professional work he is a member of a network of around 20 men and women people and close to 3 of them .They enjoy each other's company and work well together.

***Interview B:** Female married Shia professional (teacher), aged 46 living and working Baghdad. Her husband is also Shia, they have 3 children. Her extended family comprises around 70 relatives.*

### **Benefits from family network**

A relative spotted her waiting in a huge queue at her district Registry office as she waited to obtain a new Iraqi civil ID and citizenship certificate. She did not know he worked there. He took over and arranged her documents for her within 30 minutes. He saved her hours of queuing and 3 months of waiting for her documents to be prepared.

### ***Benefits recalled***

#### **Her family network**

*“One day in 2010 I needed to get a new Iraqi civil ID and citizenship certificate so I went to the proper Registry in Baghdad. When I arrived I saw around 3,000 people waiting in line. I joined the line and I asked one of the people ahead of me how long it should take for me to get my documents. He told me that it takes at least 2 or 3 months. While I was waiting one of my relatives saw me and came to me. He told me to follow him to his room since he works at the Registry. We chatted and told him I needed to get some documents. He instantly called one of the clerks to go and get the documents. Within half an hour I got them and was done.”*

#### **Clan network**

Her husband spotted in a shop three rugs stolen from her clothesline after she cleaned them. The shop owner identified the seller. She and her husband went to their clan leader. He in turn made contact with the thief's clan leader. At a special meeting

arranged by the clan leaders, the return of the rugs was arranged with a compensation payment and the thief required to live in another city.

*“In the year 2001 in March I decided to wash three of our rugs I washed them and hanged them around the house to dry throughout the night .The next morning they were stolen, My husband told me to tell the neighbours that we lost them but also say that we don’t really care about the problem because they were old and cheap, after 2 days My husband started going to a market that sold old rugs that were used, about two weeks later My husband saw my three rugs for sale with a man, My husband told him that these are my rugs and they were stolen the man told him he bought them from a man he told My husband his name and where he lives we instantly knew him and that he lived only three houses away from my house, My husband later went to the leader of our clan and told him what happened he sent a person that was very well known by our clan and the clan that the thief was from, he went to the head leader of thief’s clan and told them of the situation and gave them a period of time to investigate and see for themselves what was happening, later the thief’s clan sent a messenger telling us that they want to have a meeting with our clan to solve this problem, later on they came to our leader’s house everyone from the other clan was there except for the thief they told us that he was guilty and that they came to solve this problem, My husband told them that there are some things that they must do, the things were they had to give back all three rugs, pay me 2 million Dinars, and that the thief and his family had to go to another place, and they did all that.”*

### **Neighbours network**

She reported a network of 10 neighbours who were between 24 and 70 years old. They included Shia, Sunni, Sabeen, Faili Kurd and Christian women. She sat with them on her return from work at the same time every day. She valued their close relationship.

#### *Benefits:*

*“We provide each other with moral and financial support when needed. We mediate to resolve problems that someone may have, mainly we enjoy the close social relationship between us. During the festive season of Eid, we always like*

*people to visit us. During the last Eid most of my girl friends visited me at home and brought with them cakes and sweets. I was very that my friends and neighbours were all gathered at my house”.*

### **Friends network**

She separately reported a network of 6 good friends of between 35 and 55 years old, mostly well-educated and most of them working. They were from Shia, Sunni and Faili Kurd backgrounds. They often met together at her place or went shopping together and kept each other informed of new products and best prices.

### **Work network**

At the school where she teaches, she has 14 colleagues with whom she is close. These are mostly women, some men, ranging in age from 28 to 60 and from a variety of religious backgrounds. They often cover up for each other by combining classes in the one room when one of them needs to take some unofficial time off.

**Interview C:** *Male single Shia student, aged 19, living and studying in Baghdad. Lives with parents a brother and three sisters and has an extended family network comprises around 80 relatives. Knows his clan and clan leaders but not which tribe he is in.*

### **Benefits from Family network**

He recalls he obtains social benefits “maybe”. Some of his relatives visit his family and he has fun with their children who are his age.

### **Neighbours network**

He reported a network of 7 neighbours with whom he is in contact almost every day. They comprise mainly students aged 18 to 24. They are a mix of Sunnis and Shias. Some of them are working. They help each other particularly in finding short-term work for their financial benefit.

### **Friends network**

He reported a network of 10 good friends aged between 18 and 21. They are Shias, Sunnis, Christians and Faili Kurds. Most of them are students. Some of them work. They meet at coffee shops or sometimes they walk around various sections of Baghdad. He enjoys their company when he goes swimming or plays soccer. He spends most of his time with his friends.

**Interview D:** *Shia single female, Student aged 22. Lives with parents and 2 brothers. Thinks her extended family numbers around 36 but is not sure. Does not even know the head of her extended family, let alone her clan and tribe leaders. Does know the name of her tribe.*

### **Benefits from family network**

She recalls how her aunt helped her mother to find a job for her to work at a hospital. Her dad helps her grandfather financially because he is old and now cannot work.

### **Neighbours network**

Only 1 neighbourhood friend – a Shia fellow student aged 22. She states: “I do not have other friends in our street as I am a student and I have to work hard to finish my university, but still I need my friend to talk many things over with her. We meet about four times a week.”

### **Friends network**

She reports two close friends at University. One is Shia, the other a Sunni. They are also 22. They meet at the library during breaks and lunch together away from ‘the annoying people.’ They help each other out especially during exam period.

**Interview E:** *Male married Sunni, aged 76, retired, living in Baghdad. His wife is also Sunni. They have 3 adult children with families. His extended family network comprises around 90 relatives. He himself has 3 brothers and 3 sisters. He identified the head of his extended family, his clan and the head of his clan, whom he has met. He knows the name of his tribe but not the identity of its leader.*



### **Benefits from family network**

He needed help harvesting a good crop of wheat. A relative renting a harvester machine harvested his crop for no charge. Afterwards he invited the relative's family for a thank-you feast which they all enjoyed.

### ***Benefits recalled***

#### **His family network**

*"In the year 2009 I had a piece of land which I used to grow wheat when it came time to harvest them I thought of how I was going to harvest all of it as I didn't have any machine to help. After sometime I found out that my relative was renting a machine to help him harvest his wheat I went to him and asked him if I could borrow his machine to harvest my wheat and pay him an amount of money. He said he will harvest my wheat for free after he harvests his. Later on he harvested my wheat and when he was done I told him that he and his brothers and father are invited for dinner at my house as thanks for all your help. So he went home and got his brothers and father and brought them to our house and we had a great time eating and talking together".*

### **Clan network**

In 2006 when the sectarian conflict got serious in the Al Dora and Al Baya districts of Baghdad, clan leaders were asked to intervene because the conflict stopped the men getting to their jobs and work in each other's areas. The head leaders from both clans met and agreed that they would protect the Shia workers coming into Sunni neighbourhoods and vice versa. That fixed the problem.

*"I have many relatives in the Al Dorah area of Baghdad. In 2006, there was a sectarian conflict in that area Al Dorah, many innocent people were killed, a number of employed people called for help from their clans and tribes to protect them. Employed people from Al Dorah and in particular Sunni Muslims were afraid to continue their work in the area of Baya, while employed people from Al Baya especially Shi'ite were afraid to continue their work in Al Dorah area. This problem didn't end until the head leaders from both clans had a meeting*

*and they both agreed that if either people from both cities went to their city they would protect and help them”.*

### **Neighbours network**

He reported a network of six neighbours of mixed religious and ethnic backgrounds who see each other almost every day. They help each other on special occasions arranging wedding parties or funerals.

### **Friends network**

He meets with his network of 15 very close friends of mixed religious and ethnic backgrounds at local coffee shops for a game of backgammon or dominoes and they freely discuss and reassure each other about all the difficult changes in their country.

**Interview F:** *Sunni married female aged 53. Works as client liaison in her Shia husband's veterinary practice in Baghdad. They have three children and an extended family of around 160 relatives. She knows the name of her clan leader and her tribe leader.*

### **Benefits from family social network**

Her brother gave her the money she needed to top up her savings to buy a car. Her sister stayed with her in hospital when she fell sick, then came home with her to cook and look after her children.

### **Benefits recalled**

#### **Her family network**

*“I remember when I want to buy a car and I didn't have the full amount to buy a car my brother helped me and gave me the rest of the money, and also I remember when I get sick and I went to the hospital, my sister stayed with me until I felt better and then she came with me to my home and took care for me and look after to my children for two weeks”.*

**Clan network**

Her daughter lent some money to a work colleague. He would not pay back the loan. She and her family went to their clan leader. He went to the borrower's family and requested repayment. They agreed to repay in instalments.

*“My daughter leant some money to a colleague that works with her but there was nothing to prove that she had given him money. Later she asked for her money back but he denied that he had taken any money from her so he didn't return her funds. At that time I went with my daughter and my husband to the head of our clan and the head leader went to my colleague's family and told them your son must return the money. They agreed and they returned it back by instalments”.*

**Neighbours network**

She reported a network of between 40 and 60 female neighbours with whom she was close. They were 40 to 60 years old. Some of them worked. Most of them were fully involved with home duties. They included Shia, Sunni, Sabeen, Christian and Kurdish women. She valued their close relationship. She recalled how they visited and consoled her when her brother died and helped her to recover from the grief.

**Friends network**

She reported a wide network of friends age between 30 and 60 both working and homemakers. They met on various occasions in shops and restaurants or at each other's houses. They supported each other emotionally and sometimes financially. To her, her friends are like her family.

**Work network**

At her workplace she has a network of around 14 colleagues with whom she is close. They are mostly women but include a few men. Two of them are also close friends of other friends. Their ages range between 28 and 60. When a new vet arrived in Baghdad, they all found them a house and arranged for their professional association to help with the rent. Then they made special efforts to help the new family settle in.

*“One day, a vet doctor and his family arrived to Baghdad and they had no place to stay. Each one of us helped this family by providing assistant in finding them a house to say in and rent it for them through the Veterinary Medical Association which I’m a member of. I remember my husband and I bought this family a small present (a set of plates) to welcome them and other friends have brought them house products that helps them to settle in”.*

**Interview G:** *Male single Agricultural engineer, Sunni, aged 26, living and working in Baghdad. Lives with his parents, 2 brothers and 2 sisters. His extended family numbers around 85. Knows his clan and clan leader but only his tribe.*

#### **Benefits from Family network**

He could not readily identify any particular benefits.

#### **Neighbours network**

He reported a network of five close friends of his age in his neighbourhood whom he values as close friends.

#### **Friends network**

He reported a network of another 8 very close friends between 24 and 30. They are of Shia, Sunni, Christian and Kurdish backgrounds. They meet sometimes in each other’s houses, sometimes in coffee shops or somewhere in the Baghdad markets. They enjoy the social relationship, being together, thinking about business.

#### **Work network**

Likewise at his job, he has a network of 4 people, 2 Sunnis the others a Shia and a Christian. He enjoys the social relationship and helping each other at work.

**Interview H:** *Sunni single female. Aged 22. University student. Lives in Baghdad with her parents and a brother and a sister. Has an extended family network of some 70 relatives. Knows her clan and her tribe, but not the names of their leaders.*

### **Benefits from Family network**

Her Aunt's daughter has a car and takes her shopping and sometimes to university. Another cousin, an engineer and a computer specialist, always helps her by repairing her laptop for free.

### **Neighbours**

She reported regular contacts with 2 neighbourhood friends, a student and an older neighbour who worked at home. She saw them about 3 times a week and regarded them as close friends. She highlighted how important her friends and neighbours were to her as after the onset of the sectarian violence people have become afraid of strangers.

### **Friends**

She reports she has around 7 close friends at University. They are fellow students who are Sunni, Shia and Christian. They helped each other a lot with study and stayed in touch from home through mobiles and on their computers. She recalls how one of her girl friends fell in love with another student but her friends found out that he only wanted to use her to do his homework and to get money from her. They spoke to her about this incompatible relationship, told her about him and counselled her.

*“We help each other a lot when it comes to study after we leave university and go home. We stay in touch through mobiles and sometimes we use Messenger. Often we need a long time to discuss our problems that relates to uni. These discussions may involve things relating to the subjects that we are currently doing and how hard they are or problems that involves other students that we know at uni. One of my girl friends fell in love with a student at uni, however we found out that he doesn't love her and he only wants to use her. At the beginning he asked her to do his homework soon after he started asking her for money by saying that he and his family are currently going through financial hardship and he needs this money for urgent matters. We as friends spoke about this incompatible relationship and we started advising our girl friend about what is currently going on. We also encouraged her to refuse the things that the guy is asking her to do and he should be honest and decent in this relation or she should leave him forever”.*

**Interview I:** *Male married Kurdish professional (dentist), aged 32, living and working in Baghdad. He is Sunni. His wife is a Sunni Arab. They have four children. His Extended family network comprises around 95 relatives including 3 brothers and 6 sisters and their widowed mother. He knows his clan and tribe.*

### **Benefits from family network**

He helped the grandson of a relative plan and raise funds for a proper funeral for his relative, a well known poet and writer who died in 2011. His family and he helped the grandson raise funds from among other relatives to pay the high costs. They decorated the funeral venue, issued formal invitations and he and the grandson spoke in the poet's honour.

### ***Benefits recalled***

#### **His family network**

*“One of my relatives from Baghdad province who was a very well known poet and writer passed away in April 2011, his grandson who is also a very well known poet wanted to make a big funeral for his grandfather who died, he asked me and my family to help him design and plan the funeral we found out that the cost were too high at about 2,000,000 Dinars so we decided to gather money from our relatives. After we collected the money we made posters and letters to invite the guest, and at the funeral I made a personal speech for him, and our relative who thought of the funeral in the first place also made a personal speech”.*

### **Clan network**

The landlord wanted him to move out quickly because he did not have a proper rental contract. His brother went to their clan leader on his behalf. His clan leader went to the landlord's clan leader. The landlord backed down and accepted six months notice.

*“In 2006 I rented a house in the same area that my brothers lived in. the rent was 500,000 Dinars per month for 4 years, but I didn't have a legal contract*

*with the owner I only had a piece of paper which said that I had to pay 500,000 per month to the owner for rent.*

*In less than a month the owner came to me and informed me that I had to leave the house because his brother who lived in Baghdad was coming to live here because sectarian conflict, I told him that I have nowhere else to go he said it didn't matter to him I told him to at least let me stay for a couple of months until I could find a house to live in he said no also said that if I don't leave within three days he will bring a group of people with guns and kick me and my family out of his house. So I went to my big brother who lived in the same area and told him of the situation, he took me to the head leader of our clan and told him what happened. He went to the owner and the head leader of his clan and talked with them about the situation. When the owner saw that the head leaders of the clans were getting involved in the situation he agreed to let me stay for 6 months and then leave”.*

### **Neighbours network**

He has a network of two neighbours whom he sees every day and he values as close and useful friends. When he has to travel he relies on them to provide protection to his family members whenever he is away from home or experiences a misadventure.

### **Friends network**

He meets with many of his network of 20 good friends of mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds at coffee shops and sometimes at each other's houses. Their closeness helps relieve the work pressures on him and has various benefits to his family members socially and psychologically.

### **Work network**

He also appreciates the closeness of his work of around 7 people, also from mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds. They bring him and his family the same sorts of benefits as his friends network.

**Interview J:** *Faili Kurd married, female IT programmer aged 43, living and working in Baghdad. Her husband is also a Faili Kurd engineer. They have 4 children. She has an extended family network of 43 including 4 brothers and 5 sisters. She knows her clan and the name of the clan head. She knows the name of her tribe.*

#### **Benefits from family network**

She recalls how relatives helped each other in engagements and marriage and when women were giving birth to a new born baby, and sometimes there was financial assistance.

#### **Neighbours network**

In her network of 5 neighbours with whom she was close she always provided advice to them and their families about their new computers or programs or repairing and installing computer programs.

#### **Friends network**

She recalls travelling north to Duhuk during school holidays and staying at the house of one of her husband's friends. That friend had three sisters with whom she formed a special friendship during an enjoyable stay and she still keeps in touch with them.

#### **Work network**

At her workplace she has a network of 4 other women she regards as close. Their ages range between 35 to 45. They are all well-educated and from a variety of religious backgrounds. They support and help each other with their work.

**Interview K:** *Male single Agricultural engineer, Kurd, aged 20, University student living in Baghdad. Lives with his parents and 2 brothers and 2 sisters. His extended family it's about 90 relatives. Knows only the name of his clan but not his tribe.*



### **Benefits from Family network**

Did not recall any particular benefits from his family.

### **Neighbourhood network**

His network of 4 close friends in his neighbourhood are all students aged 20-24.

Some of them work. They are either Sunni, Shia or Kurdish. He sees them almost every day. During the holidays, he spends the days with them, playing computer games and sometimes sleeping over.

### **Friends network**

He reports a network of 9 other close friends, between 19 and 23. Some of them work but most are students. They are of Shia, Sunni, Kurdish and Arab background. He meets them sometimes at the coffee shop. One of his friends taught him to drive. Another friend's father gave him a job in the family's big trading shop. It was a very important experience for him.

**Interview L:** *Faili Kurd single female, 19, High school student. Lives with family in Baghdad -2 brothers and 2 sisters. She has an extended family of about 6 relatives. Knows only the name of her tribe.*

### **Benefits from Family network**

She does not readily recall any specific benefits

### **Neighbours**

She has two close friends among her neighbours, both students also aged 19, one an Arab Shia and the other a Faili Kurd. They are always helping each other like friends.

### **Friends**

Outside the neighbourhood she has another 5 friends who are between 18 and 20. They are fellow students. They are Arab and Kurdish Shia and Sunni. They meet at school and always help each other.

**Interview M:** *Male married Christian, aged 63. Engineer originally from Mosul, but lives and works in Baghdad. His wife is also a Christian. They have 5 children and an extended family network of 120 relatives including 12 brothers and sisters. Knows his clan and the name of its head.*

### **Benefits from family network**

His very bright son in Year 10 at high school was having problems with his French teacher. He invited a friend who is also a teacher and the French teacher to dinner at his place. They talked about his son and he persuaded the French teacher to help him. The teacher agreed and the son's marks improved. He is now one of the smartest students at his school.

### ***Benefits recalled***

#### **His family network**

*“My son is in year 10 and has very high marks in all his classes. One day he came to me and told me that he has a problem and needed help in French to get a few more higher marks. He also said that his French teacher hates him and doesn't like him as a student, so I invited the French teacher and my friend who is also the teacher friend to my house for dinner. When they came the teacher knew me and my son and said that my son is a good student I told him if my son was good in French he said that my son is very good, I asked him if he could help my son get a bit better at French he said okay. I later gave him a small gift to show my thanks. And a few weeks later my son came home happy because he got higher marks in French and is now one of the smartest students at his school”.*

#### **Neighbours network**

He has a network of 12 neighbours from Sunni, Shia and Christian backgrounds. He sees them almost every day and values them as close friends.

#### **Friends network**

He reported a network of 13 good friends who are of Shia, Sunni, Sabean, Christian, Kurdish and Faili Kurd backgrounds. They meet sometimes in each others' houses,

sometimes in coffee shops or restaurants. They help each other. One of them is a mechanic and charges him reasonably for car repairs. Another friend is ready to loan him money when he needs it to win a private contract.

### **Work network**

In his professional work he is a member of a work network of around 20 people, both men and women, between 27 and 65. He is close to 3 of them. He said he was able to make friends readily regardless of their ethnic or religious background.

**Interview N:** *Christian married female, aged 47, teacher living and working Baghdad. Her husband, also a Christian, is an engineer. They have 3 children and an extended family network of around 80 relatives.*

### **Benefits from family network**

When a friend's brother's business had to close, she called on her friends who worked in government departments about a job for him. After three weeks she was told of a job awaiting him in a college canteen.

### ***Benefits recalled***

#### **Her family network**

*“My cousin worked in a shop but it closed because the rent of the shop was too high. His brother told me of his situation because his brother really needed help, so I called my friends who worked in government departments and asked them if they knew of any government jobs. After three weeks one of them called me and told me that there was a place in the canteen of their college and the job was his”.*

### **Clan network**

She recalls how the head of her clan came to her house and helped solve a family problem. He also helped a Christian family from Basra to resettle in their neighbourhood.

### **Neighbours network**

She recalls how her network of 7 neighbours with whom she is close, stepped in to help her organise a christening party, although some of them were Muslims.

*“When preparing for a Christening party, my Christian friends helped me to organise and prepare the food and supervise the invited children so they would not get involved in playing dangerous games. My other friends who are Muslims and the rest of my Christian friends we share other interests and responsibilities. My friends and I reinforce and build our children’s relationships; we encourage that by organising time for them to stay over at each other houses to study or even play. I strongly believe that teenagers must always stay under the parents supervision in order for us to monitor them and avoid the chances of them getting involved in drugs issues or gaining money in unethical ways in the future. My Muslim and Christian friends all believe and work towards raising their children with good principles”.*

### **Friends network**

From among her group of 10 good friends all Sunni or Shia or Christian, she reports she loves seeing their children in her classes and feels honored that she is their teacher.

### **Work network**

She is close to her 7 colleagues at her school workplace. They are between 25 and 50, all well-educated and some from Sunni, Shia and Christian backgrounds. She also gets on well with their local educational supervisor at the Ministry of Education and the school principal relies on her every time that supervisor comes on an official visit.

**Interview O:** *Male single Christian aged 19, University student, lives with his parents, 3 brothers and 1 sister. His extended family network comprises around 75 relatives. He knows his clan and has met the clan leader.*

### **Benefits from family network**

He draws from his family financial and moral benefits. He loves all his relatives and has strong relationships with them. They help each other.

### **Clan benefits**

He says he is proud to belong to a clan and adds: “I feel strong because I have a clan”

### **Neighbours Network**

He reports he has regular contacts with 10 of his neighbours almost every day. They are between 17 and 23. They are all students. Some of them also work. They are either Sunni or Shia Arabs. He regards them as close friends. They talk about sport, especially soccer and about issues in their lives from which they suffer, such as not having continuous access to electricity.

### **Friends network**

He says he regularly sees a group of 12 friends outside his family. They are between 17 and 23. Most of them are students and well educated. Some of them work. They are either Christians or Arab Muslims. They meet at coffee shops and visit each other. He likes to get out and play computer games with them. He also has his own Facebook page that he uses to create new friendships.

**Interview P:** *Christian single female, aged 23. University student. Lives in Baghdad with her parents and one brother. She does not know how big her extended family is and knows only the name of her clan.*

### **Benefits from Family network**

She could not immediately recall any specific benefits.

### **Neighbours**

She has only one friend she regards as close in her neighbourhood – another Christian student aged 23. She sees her friend every day. They gain social and emotional moral benefits from each other.

### **Friends**

From her network of 5 friends at University, all her age and either Christians and Muslim Arabs. They gain social and emotional benefits from each other.

## **Appendix 15**

### **Record of Interview – Special Interviews**

## **SPECIAL INTERVIEW 1 – Volunteer Mosque Teacher**

**SI 1 Participant** Sunni female widow 38 with 4 children. Husband murdered by Shi'ite Al Mehdi Army militia in 2005. High school teacher.

*She described how as a devout Muslim, she wanted her children to have the benefit of religious instruction. After consulting friends who attended the same mosque, she approached the wife of the Imam of the mosque. She became a volunteer teacher and her children attended the religious classes for their age group. She teaches at the mosque in the school holidays for three days each week. There was a strong bond between the female teachers and they helped each other.*

**Comment:** An example of cross-linkage between the religious establishment and the local community using volunteers who became a special type of what I call a **Worship** social network exchanging benefits from the local religious leader, his wife and each other.

## **SPECIAL INTERVIEW 2 - Volunteer**

**SI 2 Participant:** Sunni male, married age 45 married with 3 children, technical graduate, computer expert.

*He described how he helped with teaching on a variety of lessons throughout the year at both the mosque and at the homes of local mosque worshippers. This is where I teach and sometimes he also studied at them. Men teach boys and the women teach the girls. There is a relationship of respect and veneration for and between the teachers and strong cohesion with the students. They also share in wedding celebrations and in the sad moments provide material assistance and moral support to each other at all times, not just in the holy month of Ramadan.*

**Comment:** A further example from a devout Muslim man of a cross-linkage between the religious establishment and the local community using volunteers who are in a

**Worship** social network. This network provides emotional support and benefits from the local religious leadership.

### **SPECIAL INTERVIEW 3 – NGO with own community restoration project**

**SI 3 Participant:** Widow, 44, high school teacher and NGO volunteer in a provincial city of Iraq. Sunni. Late husband was Shia. Has networks of 12 neighbours and 30 friends. Also has own networks at her school and among other volunteers at a local NGO-type community organization where she freely gives her time and effort.

*She described how on her own initiative but drawing on her experience as an NGO volunteer, she planned a project to mobilise government agencies to start priority renovation work on the older schools in the capital city of her province.*

*She put together a small project team from her own friends and work networks and her NGO volunteer network to get inspection parties to survey the work required on the local schools. They documented their work along with photos. Then she and her small team arranged meetings with local officials to ensure acceptance. Then the document went as a Formal Request to the Municipal Council. In parallel she and her team organised and arranged signatures from friends, neighbours, workplaces and women's network groups on a petition. They presented their report and signatures. Then they kept at their contact work up the bureaucratic decision-chain to the Ministry of Education. Her and her group's plan was funded at the provincial level and work has begun on the first renovation work. Her group supervises progress closely.*

**Comment:** This interview began as an exploration of the role of social networks in NGO-community level activity. It not only confirmed anecdotal evidence but became an illuminating story of a self-help community activity by a small group with NGO experience and strong networks of not only friends but also volunteers in an example of Bridging and Cross-linking social capital being stimulated with good effect for a local community's benefit.

### **SPECIAL INTERVIEW 4 – Regional Community Aid Organisation networks**

**SI 4 Participant:** Sunni woman with Shia husband aged 52, no children. Volunteer with a Regional NGO. Graduate High school teacher with an extended family of 83



relatives. Knows her clan and tribe. Has a network of 10 neighbours, 9 friends and workplace network of 8 close colleagues.

*She reports: A volunteer with a registered NGO with paid office staff of 6 and 16 volunteers based in Baghdad and with offices in various districts of the city. This NGO is one of the biggest non-profit social and community organisations in Baghdad. It provides aid to families of the missing persons and displaced victims of the sectarian conflict. It also offers literacy classes to older illiterate people. Another service is to provide special medical services through mobile clinics and help in opening community health centres. Funds and aid supplies come from government agencies and international aid groups as well as donations from individuals and companies. The NGO also provides information material to stimulate and accept encouragement for a more active role for women in Iraqi society and care for the natural environment, plus a better understanding of the need for security and social solidarity and human rights.*

*Leadership and volunteers work closely with local mukhtars (appointed mayors) who know the people of a district and with local imams and sheikhs from the mosques and in Baghdad the elected members of local councils. No officials or other people have tried to hinder the work of this NGO. Its mobile medical clinics are manned by teams of 4-5 doctors for free examinations of local needy people and inoculations of children. These are valued at all levels of the region.*

*She also said: "We find it easy to gain the trust of people in a local community because it is clear to them we are helping them. Having found out about us they keep on coming back or tell their friends. We gain recognition through word of mouth and needy people come to us and we gain their thanks and respect."*

*Her NGO from time to time engaged in public campaigns to stimulate more State action on issues such as local unemployment. The volunteers worked with unemployed University graduates and friends, families, acquaintances, neighbours and local businesses and other social organizations to obtain signatures for campaign petitions. This campaign is continuing. It has strong support from many unemployed graduates. The leadership and volunteers not only add to their own friends networks but also develop close horizontal links with local municipal officials, local intelligentsia and*

*high officials of institutions and ministries. They also liaise closely with the leadership and volunteers of other civic organisations with headquarters in Baghdad and will join sometimes in coordinated campaigns.*

*Volunteers all gain a great sense of satisfaction and achievement in helping as much as they can to build better lives for the needy and the distressed people. They also gain satisfaction from the thanks they receive from the people they help. But they always know there is much more to do.*

**Comment:** This interview not only confirmed how Iraqi NGO leadership and volunteers locate and help the local needy, they also appear to be developing webs of special social networks which cross-links with regional officials and with local businesses and with other similar community aid organisations. In parallel they are establishing social networks with decision-makers in regional institutions of the State. These types of ‘institutional’ social networks generate mutual benefits for the community organisation and the cross-linked institutions, stimulating Bridging Cross-linking and Vertical Linking social capital for the benefit of the needy in their communities.

## **SPECIAL INTERVIEW 5 – National Community Aid Organisation**

**SI 5 Participant:** Shia woman in a central province, married 65, with three children. Retired lecturer at the governorate University with a PhD in ancient Iraqi history. Married to retired lecturer and painter. Neighbour network of 7 and Friends network of around 40. These include networks of artists, academics, politicians and a work network of 15 at the University where she still does some work.

*She reports: Volunteer with 7 others in the province office with 3 paid staff of a major national community aid group which concentrates on a number of direct programs. One, with Ministry of Education help, runs literacy programs and talented children programs for needy children. The other uses dialogue workshops to stimulate awareness of the rights of ethnic and religious groups in the community plus special sensitivity workshops to heighten awareness of human rights issues and gender violence among police and other investigators. As a national body this NGO also coordinates*

*closely with 10 other Iraqi community service organizations with whom it liaises closely.*

*Its leadership and volunteers have developed extensive social networks with officials in government agencies, UN agencies, foreign embassies in Baghdad and international aid groups. It also works with business and other community leaders to build up donations. She reports that among the Association's formal membership are "some former members of Iraqi parliament in addition to the academics very well known to a lot of government departments. The members of the Association have extensive relationships with figures influential in the country, so we do not have a problem in making appointments with officials, often through telephone, and always we see an interest to read our petitions". Through these networks, she reports "we create our distinctive activities and meet the slices of society in need of our activities."*

**Comment:** This interview casts additional light on the existence of special 'institutional social networks' which are outside the natural social networks Iraqis form in that they are somewhat more formal and certainly more goal-oriented. Yet they function on a similar freely-developed personal relationship basis and can generate social capital outcomes for all parties. The links within these social networks can be either horizontal or vertical or both, leading to the distinction between social capital outcomes that are not only bonding and/or bridging but can also be horizontal cross-linking and/or vertical linking types of social capital.

#### **SPECIAL INTERVIEW 6 – Shia religious worker in Sydney**

**SI 6 Participant:** Shia-born male aged 46 married with 5 children. Computer technician and Shi'ite cleric qualified to lead Friday prayers in Shia *Husseinyats* (prayer centres). Comes from an Iraqi religious family, studied at a Shi'ite Hawza (Islamic seminary) and is qualified to lead prayers. Came to Australia in 1999 and remains an active Shia volunteer with his brother with several of the Shia religious associations with their own *hussseinyats* across Sydney.

*He described how a practising Shi'ite individual becomes a member of a special social network developed around the prayer centre and a wider network of adherents within the Shia religious establishment. This local network provides reciprocal benefits for the individual and the religious institution. For the local prayer centre there are benefits from the larger size of its congregation and the donations and waqf (endowments) that can flow, prestige within the national Shia religious establishment and if big enough funds from the Shia Endowment distributed by the Waqf office of the State. There can also be material benefits for the practicing Shia adherent because the prayer centre at the local level is where local Shi'ites can also meet and socialize and help in becoming teachers or help in distributing aid to the poor and needy. These other local Shi'ites will include owners of shops and commercial businesses, others are employees in the municipal or provincial departments or the State ministries. They will also be labourers or wage-earners or unemployed. They can all benefit from each other. There are also the politicians and the merchants who can show their honesty and sincerity and create an image of simplicity and working hard to be close to the people. Besides the Friday prayer sermons adherents can also join in the monthly discussions about what the State is doing about meeting the needs of the people and combating terrorism. There are also from time to time special courses which adherents can attend to develop themselves and their knowledge and understanding of the jurisprudence of Islam which deals with the code of conduct set down in the Koran and the specific observance of rituals, morals and social legislation in Islam. At times of elections, the prayer centre also serves as an alternative to the old traditional but no longer convenient salon meetings with the tribal or clan chief and his retinue to discuss parties and policies. A most important thing for the Shia religious establishment in Iraq is to provide adherents with the clan sense of belonging. The centres of the senior leadership of the religious establishments are located in the big cities and not in the villages or in the rural areas. This is because of the population density near the holy Shrines such as the Mausoleum of Imam Ali in Najaf province and the Mausoleum of Imam Al-Hussain in Karbalaa province. If the strength of the religious identity is stronger than that of the clan, this makes the chief of the clan or tribe in the smaller centres open to accepting the building of a Hussainiyah or small Mosque to satisfy the sons of the clan and relieve them from other ties to power for the clan or tribe.*

*On religion in politics, he notes: In Iraq there are big political institutions led by Shi'ite men of religion. They all demand benefits from the State for their own people and for the poor and needy to enhance the place of Islam in the lives of all people.*

*These big religious- political institutions affect the decision making of the State. In this atmosphere deals are carried out by agreements to accept certain positions in government or supporting a particular political bloc in return for certain benefits to a second party such as government positions to members of the parties to the deal. It also extends big government contracts in such fields as importing the subsidised rations shift card or purchasing arms for the Army or contracts for developing the oil resources and rebuilding the electricity generation.*

**Comment:** This interview casts additional light on the location of what we have named **Worship** networks. Worship networks exist within a larger web of mosque-based social relationships linked by their religious adherence which can become social networks involved in mutual benefits exchanges – or Bridging social capital transactions – between adherents, as well as mutual-benefits exchanges between the Shia clergy and their adherents based on social networks formed by adherents with other adherents as agents of the clergy.

## **Appendix 16**

### **Social Contexts Stresses Narratives**

## **Ba'athist Stress narratives**

### ***A.5 Shia Man***

I was with a group of politic prisoners in Abu Ghraib jail in Baghdad at Saddam Hussein regime, and the health situation was very bad. One of the prisoners was a doctor and he advised to eat a lot of garlic so I called my parents. When they visited me once a month my parents would bring a 10kg box of garlic which I shared with my friends.

*Benefits from a **Family** network bridged to a **Friends** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

### ***A.5 Shia Man***

After the uprising in 1991 a security force supported by the Iraqi army forces came to destroy the houses of people who participated in the uprising. One of these was our house. Our neighbour was the son of one of a famous tribe sheikh that supported the Ba'ath party. Our neighbour stood up for us and didn't let the forces destroy our house because he was our neighbour more than 50 years and we always help each other.

*Benefits from a **Neighbour** network. **Emotional support** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

### ***E.5 Chaldean Christian Man***

In 1998 a member of the Ba'ath party on our area was murdered. Many security units came to the area and seized some men suspected of the murder. I was one of the people they rounded up. They took us to a prison to investigate us. The son of the member who died had seen who the murderer was and said that it was none of the men they had captured. But the *Mukhabarat* still kept us in prison, they then decided to send us to another jail in Babylon. One of us asked a jailer what it was like in the other jail, the guard replied that it is where people would be killed because they were against the government. I was able to tell my brother about what they were going to do with us. He

made arrangements and he gave one of the guards \$3000 to let me escape. So I escaped and my brother kept me hidden in his house. Later I went to North Iraq and from there, later, I came to Australia so that I could be safe.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

### ***E.3 Chaldean Man***

I once owned a piece of land during the war between Iraq and Iran. In 1986 I left Iraq to go to Greece and eight years later I came to Australia. I thought the piece of land was gone, either stolen or sold, so I decided to forget about it. But in 2004, I found out through a surprise phone call that my neighbours near my land had taken care of the land all these years because I had a great relationship with them. When they got my phone number from one of my relatives in 2004 they called me and told me that the piece of land that I had was still mine and that they took great care of it during those years and let no one steal or sell it. I gave them permission to sell it and when they sold it they sent the money to me.

*Benefits from a **Neighbours** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***R.1 Shabak Man***

My family always helps me in many situations and mainly my dad helped me. I was a prisoner in March 1991 and when I served my sentence I was forced to report for army national service. My family paid a lot of money to stop the government from taking me. They purchased a waiver. My parents also helped me escape from Iraq and get to Australia and they let my wife and children stay and live with them and helped them all the time, until I could bring them to me.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***I.2 Kurdish Man***

One of my friends escaped from military service during the war between Iraq and Iran. I told him to live with me in the countryside. He stayed with me for four years. The



relationship between my family and his family became very strong and so my brother married his sister then I married his cousin and we became a new family.

*Benefits from a **Friends** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***K.1 Assyrian Man***

In the early 2000's it was very difficult to get oil or gas only in the black market and it was very expensive. My sister was working in the Oil Ministry so she was able to get coupons. This made it easier for the rest of the family to get oil.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** benefits recalled. **Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

### ***L.1 Assyrian Woman***

I used to live in Baghdad and I had a son about eight years old at that time. He was in year three at school. My neighbour also had a boy in the same year at the same school. In the sanctions conflict times we agreed to share taking the kids together to school in each other's cars. She was worried that something might happen to her child but petrol for cars was very hard to get and was expensive, so we took turns taking the kids to school.

*Benefits from a **Neighbours** network. **Emotional support** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***M.1 Turkoman Man***

During my compulsory military service in 1989 I used to work with three other soldiers on maintaining communication equipment in the outlying areas of Al Anbar province. We grew to trust each other and we made our own private arrangement to let one of us take leave away for one week in rotation while the other two covered for him.

*Benefits from a **Friends** network. **Emotional support** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***M.2 Turkoman Man***

My relationship with my neighbours is strong and because of that they helped me from being arrested. One of my neighbours came to me and whispered that that the security forces were coming to my house that night to arrest me because they think that I'm

helping a political party working against the government. I immediately ran away to my sister's house in another province to avoid the arrest.

*Benefits from a Neighbour and a Family network. Emotional support and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding and Bridging social capital generated.*

### ***N.1 Turkoman Woman***

During the economic sanctions we received things such as sugar, tea, and more and we shared. We always gave some of our share to our neighbour because she was very kind and poor. In return for her always helping me in my house and because my husband worked as a tradesman and had a good income, we share the rations.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Material benefits recalled. Bonding social capital generated.*

### ***O.1 Sunni Man***

My uncle helped me a lot when I was a soldier doing my compulsory service. My uncle was a senior officer in the former Iraqi army and had many friends and relations. He always spent time with me when he came to the headquarters of the unit that I served in. He asked the officers to let me leave for three or four days and always to be careful that they did not to put me at risk.

*Benefits from a Family and a Work network. Emotional support and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding and Bridging social capital generated.*

### ***O.2 Sunni Man***

One of my neighbors was a trader who was executed on a political charge. The conditions at that time were very bad, so I and the rest of our neighbors helped his family. Here in Australia we miss this social networking.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding social capital generated.*

### ***P.2 Sunni Woman***

In the economic sanctions things were not good. My father had a supermarket but my uncle's family life wasn't good and his wife was sick, so my father was sending them food every day.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

## **Saddam Wars narratives**

### ***E.4 Chaldean Christian Man***

I ran away from the Iraqi army during the invasion of Kuwait. I was very afraid that the Iraqi army might find me and the punishment would be to execute me. My brother helped me by taking me to another province, he then hid me in his house until the war ended and continued to help me. I was able to resume a normal life after the (Ba'athist) government issued an amnesty for deserters from the army.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***G.4 Armenian Man***

I was a commander in the Iraqi army. I had a strong network of Army friends who were all commanders. One day a relative to my wife came and asked me to help her son who was a soldier during the war between Iraq and Iran. She asked me to move her son from the front to the city because it was safer. So what I did was to call my friends to let them know. First they got him a permit to leave the front for ten days. After 1 month passed we got him moved to Baghdad because we had to exchange the services between us.

*Benefits from a **Work** and **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

### ***H.1 Armenian Christians Woman***

During the war between the government and the Kurdish opposition in northern Iraq, the Kurds kidnapped my husband, and demanded a ransom for his release.

I called my husband's mother and told her what had happened. My husband's mother paid fifty thousand dollars to the Kurds, so they freed my husband.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***J.1 Kurdish Man***

When I escaped from the military service I decided to go to Turkey. My brother helped me driving me the borders and he gave me all his money. When I came to Australia I worked and I sent to him a good amount of money to repay him.

*Benefits from a Family network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding social capital generated.*

### ***J.3 Kurdish Woman***

In Turkey I got pregnant with my final child. The doctor told me that I had to release this child because I was sick; if I refused to abort I would have to sleep on the bed straight on my back for 5 months. I told one of my cousins who was also in Turkey and she came and stayed with me until I was to deliver the child. She did all my home duties and after I delivered I named my child my cousin name. I will never forget her ever again.

*Benefits from a Family network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding social capital generated.*

### ***K.4 Assyrian Man***

In the 1990's one of my cousins was kidnapped by Kurdish forces and he was only 17 years old and they asked for \$40,000 US dollars if we wanted my cousin to be released. This was a big amount for my uncle, so me and my dad collected donations from our relatives and made \$28000 US dollars and the rest of the money my uncle paid. The money was paid to the Kurdish forces (\$40000 US dollars) but they gave us only his body they already killed him so that our family and uncle's family decided to leave Iraq without coming back.

*Benefits from a Family network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding social capital generated.*

### ***Q.1 Yazidi Man***

When I left Iraq, I lived with my cousin in Turkey for three years for free until I was able to travel to Australia. I was working but my cousin refused to take any rent money from me.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### **Q.2 Yazidi Woman**

My brother was a soldier during the war between Iran and Iraq. He told us that he was about to drown in a river until two of his good friends came and rescued him from drowning. When the war was over one of his friends that saved his life came to our house with his family and stayed with us for three days before they left Iraq.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### **K.4 Assyrian Christians Man**

During the war between Iraq and Iran, Iran was destroying many homes in air raids. One of the bombs hit close to my area and destroyed some houses. One of them was a neighbour's house. Our neighbour was away at the time. When they came back a few days later they saw their house destroyed and they had no place to stay. My wife and I told them to live with us and gave them a room. They stayed with us for one month and we didn't let them pay any money for food and water. They rented a house until they could rebuild their old house.

*Benefits from a **Neighbour** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### **L.3 Assyrian Woman**

During the war between Iraq and Iran a rocket fell next to my neighbour's house on the street and their house was damaged and all their windows were broken and it was winter. My husband helped first to fix their windows then rebuild their house.

*Benefits from a **Neighbour** network. **Emotional support** and **Material and Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### **M.2 Turkoman Man**

In 1988 my uncle came to our house and told us that the security forces had arrested his son because they claimed he joined the Al Da'awa Islamic Party. That meant his life

was in serious danger and his family's as well. I asked my friends to find a way to save my cousin's life. One of my friends said one of his relatives worked for the *Mukhabarat* so I explained my cousin's situation and I gave him many expensive gifts and money. I remember my uncle sold his house and my dad borrowed money from his friends and gave it to me to continue trying to save my cousin. The regime did not execute him but after 4 years of arrest they released him.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** benefits recalled.*

***Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

### ***N.3 Turkoman Woman***

In the 1980's my mum would not let my brother to go to front and fight with the Iraqi army against Iran because she was very worried he might be killed. So, unknown to us she arranged a secret bunker and hid him there and she would feed him and prepare his needs. None of us knew what she was doing until the war finished.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** and **Practical** benefits recalled. Extreme example of **Bonding** social capital generated.*

### ***O.1 Sunni Man***

In the 1980's I had a neighbour who was a soldier, when he went to the front, I with my family visit with his family, and we would always ask about and help them with their needs.

*Benefits from a **Neighbour** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

## **Post-2003 Sectarian conflict narratives**

### ***C.1 Sabian Mandaean Male***

I'm from the Misan province. The majority in the province are Shi'ite Muslims, and we had a strong relationship with them in particular, because we believe that the majority of southern Iraq was Sabian, but when Islam came they converted to Islam and later became Shi'ites. We believed this because they do not belong to the culture of the Bedouin.

In the years 2005 and 2006, many of the Sabian families asked us to help them. For example, my wife's cousin asked for help because her son had been kidnapped by a group of the Al Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr, so I went with my cousin to the local Office of the Martyr Sadr and told them what had happened. One of their leaders was an old school friend and we had been close. He told us that they would contact their headquarters in Baghdad and follow up with them. Later they released my wife's cousin's son. I also sought his help after the brother of a friend was kidnapped and he too was later released. My old school friend now a militia leader remembered our school friendship.

*Benefits for a Family network from a Friends and an interlinked Institutional Liaison network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding and Bridging and social capital generated.*

#### ***D.1 Sabean Woman***

We were always very close to our neighbours but after the sectarian killings began in 2004, we took my mother from the Shi'ite area of Al Bayaa to Germany to live with my brother. But she could not settle down in the strange environment of Germany. Shortly after, despite the dangers, she returned to Al Bayaa and the neighbours were overjoyed to see her. Now my Shi'ite neighbours help my mum in many ways such as taking her shopping, help clean the house, prepare food and take care of her when she is sick or injured. My mother is very happy.

*Benefits from a Neighbours Family network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Strong Bonding social capital generated.*

#### ***D.2 Sabean Mandaean Woma***

I arrived in Australia in 2000. One of my brothers had three children. He worked for the Ministry of Trade, his situation was difficult and terrorists fought him in Baghdad, so he was forced to sell his home and take refuge in Thi Qar province. He was certified as a displaced person. Then he left Iraq and went to Syria, and applied to register as a refugee. His eldest daughter stopped going to school because his financial situation was poor. When I learned of this, I began helping him financially, as well as trying to get him to Australia as a refugee. As well as my second brother also living in Thi Qar

prepared to leave Iraq to Syria if my other brother came to Australia. I am sending my brother in the Syrian Arab Republic \$US150 every month and the same amount from my sister plus he receives \$US250 from the United Nations. There has been some help from my cousins from time to time.

*Benefits from a **Family** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

#### ***D.4 Sabean Mandaean Woman***

My son was kidnapped by a terrorist gang in 2004. I paid \$6000 US dollars for him to be freed, I did not have the full amount, but my relatives donated the money to me. Later on we found out that one of my neighbours was a former Ba'athist in the Al Bayaa area in Baghdad and that he was in the kidnapping gang. The police caught them.

*Benefits from a **Family** network – and negative benefit from a **Neighbour** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated.*

#### ***I.4 Kurdish Man***

In 1974 the Iraqi government forced me to move from Kirkuk to the south of Iraq. I did not speak Arabic at that time and I was lost and didn't know what to do or where to go. It was worse as I could not communicate with others. My friend back in Kirkuk told me about a good friend who lived in my new city. I then asked people where to find him and they led me right to his shop. He quickly closed his shop and took me to his house and as soon as I told him what happened to me and my family he let me stay at his house for three days and rented me a house to live in and helped me meet the neighbourhood and helped me get a good job. I stayed with him for three years and when I got enough money I travelled back to the north to Kirkuk. I never forgot that man even if I'm Kurdish and he is an Arab.

*Benefits from a **Friends** network. **Emotional support** and **Material** and **Practical** benefits recalled. **Bonding** and **Bridging** social capital generated.*

#### ***I.3 Kurdish Man***

We used to help our neighbour with money problems and we stayed with them when one of them was sick because their father and elder brother used to live with other



fighters in the mountains against the Iraqi government. After Saddam Hussein's government changed our neighbour's father and son became important officials in the new government and helped us. Till now if we need anything from a government department in Iraq my family still in Iraq asks them to help.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Practical benefits recalled.*

**Bonding, Bridging and Vertical** social capital generated.

### ***K.2 Assyrian Man***

In the time of conflict a gang charged into my Shia Muslim neighbour's house and they stole their possessions and before they left they broke all the windows and kicked in the doors. They also broke the TV and warned them that they had to leave this neighbourhood forever or be killed. Our neighbours then decided to relocate to a southern province. I and my wife gave them money to help them buy a car and carry them and their possessions. This was because they were polite and helpful to us before.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding social capital generated.*

### ***R.1 Shabak Man***

The relationship between my family and relatives is strong especially between my cousins. Two years ago I went to Iraq to get money because I had been a political prisoner and the new government was granting land or money to people like me. One of my cousins has a good job in a ministry and he helped me to get a grant of a piece of land and \$30,000 to build on this land so I thanked my cousins for all the help they gave me.

*Benefits from a Family network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding and Bridging social capital generated.*

### ***M.2 Turkoman Man***

I'm a Shia Turkoman. My sister's husband was killed in the sectarian conflict so me and her mother my siblings decided to help her financially because she had to care alone for her three children and she cannot work. Now I send her money every month.

*Benefits from a Family network. Emotional support and Material benefits recalled.*

**Bonding** social capital generated.

### ***M.3 Turkoman Man***

My neighbours were threatened and their 9-year-old son was kidnapped after he left school. The kidnappers demanded \$30,000 US dollars. Me and my extended family helped by giving them what we could. We raised only \$13,500 US dollars but the kidnappers accepted this amount and then they let my neighbours son go.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Material benefits recalled.*

**Bonding** social capital generated.

### ***N.2 Turkoman Woman***

My husband had a bakery but during the conflict he had to close it because it became too dangerous. Our neighbour suggested to him to bring his tools and material to his house and work from here. They helped my husband a lot and my husband started to bake his breads and sell the house. Naturally we gave bread to our neighbour for free because they helped us.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Material and Practical benefits recalled. Bonding* social capital generated.

### ***P.3 Sunni Woman***

My aunt's daughter and her husband were killed during the sectarian violence, in the year 2005, and she has 4 daughters, my sister and I and some relatives decided to give her a monthly amount to help them.

*Benefits from a Family network. Emotional support and Material benefits recalled.*

**Bonding** social capital generated.

### ***P.2 Sunni Woman***

When I used to live in Diyalla province my neighbor was a Shia Muslim., our relationship was very strong. She is like my sister, we always help each other. During the sectarian violence gangs came from outside the country to attack the Shia families in our mainly Sunni area. One day these gangs came and threatened my neighbour. They ordered her to leave within two days or be killed. My neighbour and her family decided to leave quickly, so my husband and I helped them by taking all their belongings to our house. After they resettled they came back and collected the belongings from us.

*Benefits from a Neighbour network. Emotional support and Practical benefits recalled. **Bonding** social capital generated*

## **Appendix 17**

### **The Main Social Networks of Iraq**

## Family and Individual networks (*micro level*)

**FAMILY networks**  
**CLAN networks**  
**NEIGHBOUR networks**  
**FRIENDS networks**  
**WORK networks**  
**WORSHIP networks**  
**VOLUNTARY networks**

*Special characteristics:* The data from the study clearly shows that:

- Every Iraqi is a member of a social network. Most Iraqis are members of **multiple** social networks. This facilitates Bridging social capital transactions.
- Membership of a social network involves a high level of **trust** between members as a basis for the relationship between them. But there is **no trust of strangers**. It can also be inferred that there is little if any trust of politicians, the security services and the State.
- There is **no sectarian divide** between Iraqis at this *micro*-level of daily activity. It exists only at the *macro*-level or national level.
- The exchange of social capital benefits is **unrestrained** at this ‘individual’ level. But **constraints** creep in when the State intrudes into daily life, requiring a more demanding level of **practical and material benefits** from a social network.

### *Notes in Individual networks*

**FAMILY networks** –These comprise **immediate family networks** nested within their **extended family networks**, all the uncles, aunts, spouses and cousins linked together by blood ties. They are the core social networks of Iraqi civil society and the most important networks in the civil society of Iraq. Though they are born into these networks most embrace their fellow members freely, based on mutual respect and trust and are generally highly supportive of each other. Each extended family network can have more than 100 members, mainly linked in intimate or private relationships.

**CLAN networks** - Family networks are in turn linked to the even more extended **Clan networks**. There are about 2,000 clans in Iraq. Every adult Iraqi knows his/her clan (and his/her tribe). Extended family networks can move to other clans if dissatisfied with leadership. Clans are linked to the main 150 **tribes of Iraq**. Tribes, once dominant in

the civil society of the old Iraq still have a special role in property governance in the rural regions. Clan networks have a special role in inter-family dispute resolution.

**NEIGHBOUR networks** – the social networks of neighbours in an urban residential setting or in a village in a rural setting. They are informal but important to each other. Members do not have any blood ties or secular links and different religious affiliations. These are networks generally composed of private relationships.

**FRIENDS networks** - Iraqis all freely form their own networks of friends who come together regularly in close private relationships mainly in recreational settings. Friend's networks can start in school and change over time. But members support each other closely.

**WORK networks** – In their workplace, Iraqis freely form their own private-relationship networks through which they support each other independently of – and sometimes in conflict with - the networks of fellow employees with whom they are required to work within their employing organisation. Sometimes these work networks will operate in conflict with the rules and procedures laid down by the organisations management.

**WORSHIP networks** – The devout adherents of the various religions of Iraq, who attend the mosques or churches or *husseinayat* prayer centres and associated social activities arranged by their local clerics in their local district or village, can also, as volunteers, freely join the worship social networks, which assist in religious teaching and traditional social welfare activities.

**COMMUNITY Networks** – This listing of individual social networks is not exhaustive. Just as with the identified Worship networks, some Iraqis may undertake volunteer work with private non-for-profit community support organisations and similarly form social networks among fellow volunteers and paid staff of these organisations.

**District-region institutional networks**  
**(meso level)**

**Education networks**  
**Health networks**  
**Police networks**  
**Justice networks**  
**Public service networks**  
**Local business networks**  
**Community assistance networks**  
**Local Religious establishment networks**

***Special characteristics:***

Since 2003, Iraq has been administratively divided into provinces, now called governorates and then into districts. Within the governorate districts are rural towns and villages and in the major towns sometimes municipalities with elected councils and *malhalla* or districts with an appointed *mukhtar* (mayor). At this *meso* level of the civil society, the data from this study identifies the following social networks connected with both private organisations and public institutions. Both administrative staff and volunteers of these public and private organisations form social networks which interact with the Iraqis living in these local and regional communities to win support and help. The staff here inevitably also form social networks with their supervisors and decision-makers up the chain to the central leadership of the State Ministries in Baghdad to monitor decisions on developments important to them.

*Notes in District Institutional networks*

**Education networks** – social capital-relevant social networks can be found at the district public and high schools located across most population centres and also in the Universities and private schools and colleges of the education sector. At a horizontal cross-linking level, teachers and officers reach out into the community from whom they draw their students. The leaders and some teachers are also involved with vertical-linking social networks with their supervising officers in the two education Ministries.

**Health networks** – Each community has access to State hospitals for free medical care. There are also some private hospitals and private specialist clinics. Hospitals are large and complex organisations. Within them are both formal and informal social networks of students, treating medical practitioners, ancillary students, qualified health staff and

administration officers as well as professional health organisations. Some of these become involved in health awareness programs which horizontally cross-link with their local communities. There are also vertical-linking social networks with the Health Ministry.

**Police networks** – Police centres are established in most districts of the major cities and in the bigger rural townships to record citizens complaints and investigate them, or send files up to investigating judges in criminal and security cases. While there is in the police force a formal chain of command, there are also both horizontal cross-cutting social networks through links with local communities, and vertical linked social networks to share intelligence information or request resources and become involved in special, usually terrorist-related, enforcement campaigns.

**Justice networks** – In most districts and in the major cities there is a system of criminal, civil and personal status courts with associated social networks of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and court administrators. The cross-cutting social networks usually link court administrators with lawyers and in the personal status courts link court administrators and judges with individual Iraqi couples wishing to have their religious marriages certified for the civil registries. There are also social networks vertically linking judges and court administrators with their supervisors in the Justice Ministry and the Union of Lawyers. In parallel, both informal Clan leader networks and *sulha sheikhs* are called on to conduct informally dispute resolution proceedings under customary tribal law. Their judgments are happily accepted and confirmed by most judges in the civil courts.

**Public service networks** – Each major city and sometimes districts have their own Central Registry for recording births, deaths and marriages and issuing ID cards and Certificates of Nationality as well as taking applications for Passports. They are always busy. Similar if usually separate offices exist for other public services related to electricity supply and water and sewage. The Ministry of the Interior also operates throughout Iraq its own formal network of monthly food ration distributions to registered Iraqi families and associated family ration registrations.



**Local business networks** – Family businesses appear to dominate the commerce, trading, manufacturing and retail life of the economy of Iraq. These businesses operate in shopping centres in every city and town across the country. Small business owners form their own social networks based mainly on social and sometimes private relationships and exchanging mainly information benefits about business concerns. The State is only indirectly involved, merely requiring registration by the local Chamber of Commerce established in each major city. To service the business community and individual Iraqis some Iraqi State and private banks have retail branches in the major cities. But most Iraqis appear not to trust them completely and hoard their wealth assets.

**Community assistance networks** – As noted, there are a growing number of both formal formally registered Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and informal community and civil society groups operating at district levels in Iraq. These groups promote and provide social welfare aid to the needy, children and women, as well as public education programs on civil and human rights for minorities. Through social networks of volunteers, staff and office-holders they engage in horizontal cross-cutting social capital transactions to identify clients and supporters and in vertical linking transactions with Ministry and State decision-makers.

**Local Religious establishment networks** – Through their local mosques and prayer centres and in the case of Christians their parish churches, the religious establishments of Iraq not only develop local Worship social networks of volunteers as previously described above. The Shia Muslim prayer centre and their clerics also offer adherents bridging social capital opportunities to meet and mutually benefit from others in their community who may be merchants, businessmen, municipal and ministry officers and even politicians. The Sunni mosques offer similar opportunities as well as memberships of their local youth and other civil society groups.

**National institutional Decision-maker networks**  
(macro level)

The main (but not necessarily exhaustive) identifiable elements of the groups and institutions at work at the National interface with the State in Iraq include:

- Government and the Legislature**
- The Kurdish Regional Governments**
- The Bureaucracy**
- The Political Establishments**
- The Religious Establishments -**
- The National NGOs**
- The Tribes**
- The larger Business and Financial Establishments**
- The UN International Agencies**

*Special characteristics*

There is little transparency in what happens at the national level. Organisations compete for the considerable benefits which the State distributes to the civil society and lobbying about the government's own search for civil stability and social cohesion to avoid the rendering and even the repair of the stressed social fabric of Iraq's civil society. But there is sufficient evidence in the empirical data from this research to show that social networks are at the heart of all the national activity.

However, the characteristics of what can be called the **Decision-maker** social networks involved appear to be very different from the free and unconstrained benefits exchange activity of the social networks of ordinary Iraqi citizens. These decision-maker networks are clearly based on constrained social relationships involving a basic degree of personal trust and the benefits exchange are mainly informational. This is because their purpose is not support each other but to achieve mutually-acceptable compromise 'deals' at the interface of the State and the civil society.

*Notes on National District Institutional decision-maker networks*

**Government and The Legislature** – The elected unicameral Council of Representatives may nominally be the constitutional source of ultimate power in Iraq. But the reality is power resides with the Prime Minister who selects the government Ministers. Nevertheless, continuous social network activity among the Council members can be seen at work among all the elements of the legislature on a horizontal bridging and cross-cutting social capital basis as well as vertical linking basis and

likewise between Ministers and their Ministries with the Prime Minister's office coordinating all this activity.

**The Kurdish Regional Governments** – A special feature of Iraqi civil society is the autonomy guaranteed in the Constitution to the Kurdish regions to govern their own affairs through their elected local government and their own matching institutions with the central government in Baghdad. The types of social networks at the community, district and regional level appear to be similar to the rest of Iraq – and Kurds freely settle in the major southern cities of Iraq.

**The Bureaucracy** – The Directors-General of the Ministries are likewise heavily engaged through their horizontal and vertical social networks in developing and negotiating policy program proposals with their Ministers and supervising the administration of current programs through their provincial and district offices.

**The Religious Establishments** – The three main religious establishments of Iraq have formal links with the Religious Endowments (*waqf*) office of the Prime Minister. In addition, Christians and other ethno-religious groups have a constitutionally-guaranteed number of seats in the legislature. But they have different and complicated vertical linking social network links directly and indirectly with the State and its government in pressing their claims for other State-controlled resources besides the *waqf*. Within the Shia Muslim establishment, the volunteers and officers of the *marjari* organisations of the Grand Ayatollahs have their own close horizontal cross-cutting social network links with operatives in the Shia political parties and close vertical links directly into bureaucratic agencies of the government as well as with the offices of government Ministers – of whom so many are Shia adherents themselves. By contrast the Sunni religious establishments are in a state of conflict with the Shia-dominated government over domestic grievances including discriminatory treatment of the Sunni minority. So they tend to deal more informally through the elected Sunni members of the national and governorate legislatures and the Sunni Ministers of the Government through their own vertical-linked social networks.

**The Political Alliances** - The political alliance of the parties from all the ethno-religious groups in the national legislature and the governorate and municipal councils have their own well-developed social networks both utilising both horizontal cross links with their party support groups and vertical links to leaders in the alliances.

**The National NGOs** – The newly-emerging national NGO groups are recognised by the State and likewise have from their experiences with their individual social networks, now developed their own social networks with cross-links to supporters, donors and other regional NGO's, and well-developed vertical links with the political and State institutions for whom they often undertake special community programs.

**The Tribes** – Tribal leaders still maintain their dispute resolution roles through their social networks with clan leaders particularly in the rural areas. Shia tribal leaders appear content to pursue any State matters to their political parties. Sunni tribal leaders who are not overtly supporting insurgent and terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, are being courted by the State directly and through Sunni political party leader social networks to have Sunni tribe members participate in such anti-terrorist militias as the *sahwa* (Awakening) units, tasked with targeting the Islamists in Al Qaeda.

**The larger Business and Financial Establishments** – Besides the State trading concerns and oil production companies, Iraqi industrial, commercial, transport and large security companies and other businesses are generally family-based and quite familiar with the process of developing and using social networks to influence regulators and bankers. These establishments conclude contracts either with municipal or governorate authorities or overseas buyers and suppliers. The Central Bank of Iraq regulates 7 State banks, 23 private banks, 9 Islamic banks, 16 foreign banks, 5 financial institutions including the fledgling Stock Exchange of Iraq, another 33 financial companies, including the popular money transfer companies and 10 financial investment companies. Other large foreign international companies and financial institutions, including foreign oil companies have or are already learning the Iraqi social-network way of conducting businesses through horizontal cross-cutting and vertical links.

**The UN International Agencies** – Using their highly-developed techniques of international diplomacy, the United Nations family of agencies play a major and still ongoing role in developing the governance of the State and the reconstruction of the community infrastructure and institutions of Iraqi civil society. The first UN agencies began operating in Iraq in 1955. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) began work in 2003 to coordinate the activities of some 20 different UN agencies operating in every governorate in Iraq with support programs in humanitarian and development aid, national reconciliation programs including human rights training, political and constitutional affairs and electoral assistance. UNAMI has a staff of some 450 international and 630 Iraqi employees and has a budget of more than \$170 million a year. It clearly has become expert both in developing and using existing individual and institutional social networks in its work.

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