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Social Transformation and Migration

National and Local Experiences in South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Australia

Edited by

Stephen Castles
Research Chair in Sociology, University of Sydney, Australia

Derya Ozkul
University of Sydney, Australia

Magdalena Arias Cubas
University of Sydney, Australia
Contents

List of Figures and Maps viii
List of Tables ix
Preface x
Notes on Contributors xii

Introduction 1

1 International Human Mobility: Key Issues and Challenges to Social Theory 3
Stephen Castles

Part I Methodological Challenges 15

2 Towards a Multi-scalar Methodology: The Challenges of Studying Social Transformation and International Migration 17
Rebecca Williamson

3 The Virtues and Challenges of Comparative Analyses of Immigration, Migrant Settlement and Transnationalism 33
Kevin M. Dunn and Alanna Kamp

4 The Temporalities of International Migration: Implications for Ethnographic Research 45
Shanthi Robertson

Part II Case-study Insights: South Korea 61

5 The Political Economy of Immigration in South Korea 63
Dong-Hoon Seol

6 An Overview of International Migration to South Korea 81
Hye-Kyung Lee

7 From Salt Fields to ‘Multicultural Village Special Zone’: The Transformation of a Migrant City in South Korea 97
Chulhyo Kim
Part III  Case-study Insights: Turkey  113

8  Migration Realities and State Responses: Rethinking International Migration Policies in Turkey
   Ahmet İçdüygu and Damla B. Aksel  115

9  Turkey’s Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers
   Mine Eder  133

10  Migration Flows in Turkey’s Neoliberal Era: The Case of Kumkapi, Istanbul
    Derya Ozkul  151

Part IV  Case-study Insights: Mexico  167

11  From Casa Blanca to Tulsa: A Social Transformation Analysis of Mexican Migration in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization
    Magdalena Arias Cubas  169

12  The Return of Migrants in the USA to Mexico: Impacts and Challenges for Zacatecas
    Rodolfo García Zamora, Alondra Ambriz Nava and Patricia Herrera Castro  185

13  Unravelling Highly Skilled Migration from Mexico in the Context of Neoliberal Globalization
    Raúl Delgado Wise  201

Part V  Case-study Insights: Australia  219

14  ‘In the beginning all is chaos . . .’: Roaming the Dystopic Realm in Australian Multiculturalism
    Andrew Jakubowicz  221

15  Multiculturalism at the Margins of Global Sydney: Cacophonous Diversity in Fairfield, Australia
    Elsa Koleth  237

16  The Political Economy of the Social Transformation of Australian Suburbs
    Jock Collins  255

17  Law as an Agent of Social Transformation: Trends in the Legal Regulation of Migration
    Mary Crock and the IMPALA Consortium  269
18 Generations and Change: Affinities Old and New
Ellie Vasta

Conclusion

19 International Migration in an Era of Neoliberal Social Transformation
Magdalena Arias Cubas, Derya Ozkul and Stephen Castles

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables
Index
List of Figures and Maps

Figures

6.1 Number of migrant workers in South Korea, 1991–2012 83
6.2 Inflows of marriage migrants by sex to South Korea, 1990–2012 87
6.3 Inflows of female marriage migrants to South Korea, 1990–2012 88
7.1 Share of employees by industry in Ansan, 1976–2011 101
8.1 Selected milestones in Turkish immigration and emigration policy since the early twentieth century 117
12.1 Return migrants to Zacatecas, Oaxaca and Michoacán, 1995–2010 189
13.1 Growth of Mexican highly skilled migration (Bachelor's, Master's, Professional and PhD degrees) to the USA 1990–2011 202
13.2 Highly skilled immigrants in the USA by country of origin 207
13.3 Monthly income (in Mexican pesos) of the population with a Mexican postgraduate education and of Mexican origin resident in Mexico and the USA, 2010 208
13.4 Relative weight of the population of Mexican origin with a postgraduate education in sciences and engineering resident in the USA compared with that resident in Mexico, 2010–11 209
17.1 Count of entry tracks in family and economic categories, 1999 and 2008 273

Maps

Country Case Studies: Australia, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey 2
South Korea: fieldwork site 61
Turkey: fieldwork site 113
Mexico: fieldwork site 167
Australia: fieldwork site 219
## List of Tables

3.1 Cultural retention and belonging: Hong Kong-Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane, 2005–06 (%) 38

3.2 Cultural identification: Hong Kong-Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane, 2005–06 (%) 39

3.3 Transnational links: communication and cultural consumption among Hong Kong-Chinese in Australia and Canada 40

3.4 Support for, and concern with, diversity, Vancouver \((n = 1,479)\) and Sydney \((n = 1,845)\) (%) 41

5.1 Foreign immigrants in South Korea, 2012 65

5.2 Correlation coefficients between the number of foreign immigrants and the explanatory variables 75

7.1 The foreign population of Ansan, 2013 100

9.1 Brief overview of legal changes regarding the treatment of immigrants 144

12.1 Zacatecas: migratory indicators for 2000 and 2010 (percentage of households) 188

12.2 The repatriation of Mexican migrants who are minors from the USA by state of origin, age group, classification of arrival and sex, 2012 194

12.3 Students, teachers and Bachelor’s degree programmes in bilingual primary education in the states of Michoacán, Oaxaca and Zacatecas, 2011–12 school year 195

Appendix Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 314
Preface

This book is based on the work of the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project, carried out by researchers at the University of Sydney from 2009 to 2014, together with partner researchers in four case-study countries: Republic of Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Australia. In addition to the editors of this book, the Sydney research team consists of Elsa Koleth, Chulhyo Kim and Rebecca Williamson. We are obliged to them for all their work and support.

The Sydney University team is grateful to its research partners in each country for their enthusiastic participation. Our own local and national studies would have been impossible without the advice and generous support of these colleagues. More specifically, most of the papers that led to chapters in this book were presented at the STIM International Workshop at the University of Sydney in August 2013. Nearly all those who presented papers in the workshop appear as authors of this book, so we will not name them specifically here.

In addition, we would like to thank the following colleagues for advice, comments and assistance: Hein de Haas (University of Oxford), Kemal Kirişçi (Boğaziçi University, Istanbul), Stuart Rosewarne (University of Sydney), Ellie Vasta (Macquarie University, Sydney) and Montserrat García Guerrero (Autonomous University of Zacatecas).

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More information on the project and photographs of the fieldwork sites can be found on the following websites:

Notes on Contributors

Damla B. Aksel is a PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul. Her research focuses on international migration and her thesis examines the Turkish state’s policies on extraterritorial citizens.

Alondra Ambriz Nava is currently a Master’s student in Population Studies at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF). Her thesis focuses on the topic of return migration and health in Zacatecas. She is an Academic Fellow in the Academic Unit in Development Studies at Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, and a member of the NDP-Migration and the International Network on Migration and Development. Alondra has also participated in the preparation of legislative proposals for the establishment of a programme to fight hunger in Zacatecas.

Magdalena Arias Cubas is a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney. Her doctoral research analyzes the impact of international migration on the well-being of Mexico’s indigenous population. Magdalena holds a First-Class BA in Economics and Social Sciences in Political Economy. In addition to her studies, she has worked as a tutor and lecturer for the Department of Political Economy. She is also a researcher in the Social Transformation and International Migration in the Twenty-First Century (STIM) Project.

Stephen Castles is Research Professor of Sociology at the University of Sydney and a Research Associate of the International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford. Until August 2009 he was Professor of Migration and Refugee Studies at the University of Oxford. He is a sociologist and political economist, and works on international migration dynamics, global governance, migration and development, and regional migration trends in Asia and Europe. His recent books include: The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World (Fifth Edition), with Hein de Haas and Mark Miller, Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014.

Jock Collins is Professor of Social Economics in the Management Discipline Group at the UTS Business School, Sydney, Australia. He is the co-director of the Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Research Centre at UTS. His research interests centre on an interdisciplinary study of immigration and cultural diversity in the economy and society. His recent research has been on Australian immigration, ethnic crime, immigrant and indigenous entrepreneurship, immigrant youth, ethnic precincts and tourism, multiculturalism,
the Cronulla Beach Riots, global teachers, immigrants and the built environment and immigrants in regional and rural Australia and the social use of ethnic heritage and the built environment.

Mary Crock is Professor of Public Law at the University of Sydney. She is an Accredited Specialist in Immigration Law and author of many books, articles and reports on immigration and refugee law. Mary leads the Australian team on the International Migration Policy and Law Assessment (IMPALA) Database Project, which was initiated by Professor Michael Hiscox, who has dual appointments at Harvard University and the University of Sydney.

Raúl Delgado Wise is Professor and former Director of the Doctoral Program in Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas. He is the President and founder of the International Network on Migration and Development, Co-Director of the Critical Development Studies Network and Director of the journal Migración y Desarrollo. He is also a coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Development and Human Rights and a member of the advisory board of the UNESCO-MOST committee in Mexico. Through a 35-year trajectory, he has published/edited 21 books and written more than 150 essays, including book chapters and refereed articles.

Kevin M. Dunn is Professor of Human Geography and Urban Studies and Dean of the School of Social Sciences and Psychology, University of Western Sydney. His areas of research include immigration and settlement, Islam in Australia, the geographies of racism and local government and multiculturalism.

Mine Eder is Professor of Political Science at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. She has twice been a Visiting Professor at Yale University, in 2006 and 2009. Publishing extensively, her work focuses on the political economy of Turkey’s welfare regime, the informal economy, labour movements, migrant workers and, more recently, urban transformation in Istanbul. She has co-edited a book entitled The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East (2005) and her articles have appeared in Critical Sociology, Middle East Law and Governance and Middle Eastern Studies. Her recent research is concerned with precarious work among female migrant workers in Istanbul, Turkey.

Rodolfo García Zamora is the Director of the PhD Program in Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas. He has conducted research on the links between government policies and migration, on the ‘3×1’ remittance-matching programme in Zacatecas, and on patterns of remittances sent home by Mexican migrant communities in the USA. In addition to his academic background, García Zamora has been active in various civil society initiatives on migration issues. He has worked extensively with key
players in migrant organizations and sits on the Board of MacArthur grantees *Sin Fronteras* and the Institute for Migration Research and Dissemination (INEDIM).

**Patricia Herrera Castro** is an Academic Fellow in the Academic Unit in Development Studies of the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas. She has participated in research projects on migration and development, and state budget expenditures. She is also a member of the NDP-Migration and the International Network on Migration and Development.

**Ahmet İçduyu** is Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Migration Research Center at Koç University, Istanbul. He holds a PhD in Demography from the Australian National University. He held visiting fellowships at Stockholm University, the University of Warwick, the University of Manchester and the European University Institute. In addition to his numerous articles in journals such as *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Citizenship Studies* and the *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, his co-edited books include *Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism* (2011) and *Countries of Migrants, Cities of Migrants: Italy, Spain, Turkey* (2013).

**Andrew Jakubowicz** is Professor of Sociology and Co-Director of the Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Research Centre at the University of Technology, Sydney. He has published widely on the media and racism, new media discourses in academia, multiculturalism, asylum issues, cultural diversity and social policy. His current research focuses on cyber-racism and community resilience. He is the co-editor (with Chris Ho) of *Australian Multiculturalism: Theory Policy and Practice* (2013). He advises on multicultural documentary, and is theme writer for the award-winning multi-season television project *Once Upon a Time in – Cabramatta* (2012), *Punchbowl* (2014) and *Carlton* (2015).

**Alanna Kamp** has been part of the teaching and research team in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology at the University of Western Sydney since 2008. Alanna’s areas of research include the historical geographies of Chinese-Australian experiences, attitudes to immigration and experiences of other non-white settlements throughout Australia’s history and contemporary times.

**Chulhyo Kim** is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Sydney. His research interests include the nexus of social transformation, international migration, immigration policy and the human rights movement. He holds an MA in the Theory and Practice of Human Rights from the University of Essex and a BA in Sociology from Seoul National University. He has extensive work experience with international and local NGOs and
intergovernmental organizations in the field of international migration and human rights. He taught sociology, migration and human rights at the University of Sydney and at South Korean universities. His recent publications include a co-authored chapter, ‘Irregular migration: causes, patterns and strategies’, in *Global Perspectives on Migration and Development* (2012).

**Elsa Koleth** is a Doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney. Her doctoral research is on temporary migration and its implications for multiculturalism and belonging. She is also a researcher on the STIM project at the University of Sydney. Elsa has previously worked as a researcher in the Australian Parliament and the New South Wales State Parliament.

**Hye-Kyung Lee** is a Professor in the Department of Public Policy, Pai Chai University, South Korea. Since she received her PhD in Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1988, she has published extensively on the issues of migration, gender and work. She was the coordinator of the Korea Migration Research Network from 2000 to 2003. She has been an advisory committee member for the Korean National Statistical Office, the Ministry of Gender Equality, the Ministry of Labour and the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. During 2009–2010, she was the president of the Korea International Migration Studies Association.

**Derya Ozkul** is a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney. Her research explores the effects of immigration countries’ changing immigration and diversity policies on Alevi Turks from Turkey. In addition to her studies and work for the STIM project, Derya has taught courses on Sociology of Terror, Human Rights and Social Protest in the Department of Sociology. Previously, she worked in the Migration Research Centre at Koç University, Istanbul. She holds a BA in Political Science from Bogazici University and an MSc in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics.

**Shanthi Robertson** is Research Fellow at the Institute for Culture and Society at the University of Western Sydney. Her research works at the intersection of politics and sociology, and centres on transnational migration, citizenship and urban transformation in the Asia-Pacific region. Her work has been published in several international journals, including *Ethnic and Racial Studies, Population, Space and Place, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Journal of Intercultural Studies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* and *Ethnicities*. Her first book, *Transnational Student-Migrants and the State: The Education–Migration Nexus*, was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2013.

**Dong-Hoon Seol** is Professor of Sociology at Chonbuk National University. Currently, he is the editor of the *Korean Journal of Sociology* (Hanguk Sahoehak),

**Ellie Vasta** is Associate Professor in Sociology at Macquarie University. She was a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford (2003–9). Her work has been published in the *Australian Feminist Review*, *Ethnicities*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Die Erde* and the *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 34:2 (2013). Her current projects include an edited book, *Reinventing Home in the 21st Century* (with Justine Lloyd) and an ARC-funded project, Affinities in Multicultural Australia (with Lucy Taksa and Fei Guo).

**Rebecca Williamson** is a Doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney. Her research interests include migration and transnationalism, multiculturalism, citizenship and belonging, and critical urban studies. Her thesis examines the spatial management of multiculturalism, drawing on ethnographic research into migrant place-making practices in Sydney. She is a researcher for the STIM project at the University of Sydney. She has previously worked in research administration and social research in the public sector, and received her Master’s in Social Anthropology from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Introduction
1

International Human Mobility: Key Issues and Challenges to Social Theory

Stephen Castles

Introduction

This book presents some of the key ideas and findings of the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project, based at the University of Sydney from 2009 to 2015.¹ The project’s main research question is:

- In what ways are human mobility and broader processes of social transformation interrelated in the context of neoliberal globalization?

Research on this issue could have been sited in many parts of the world, for few places today remain unaffected by the massive transformations that have taken place since the 1970s. We only had the resources for research in a limited number of places, so we carried out national case studies in four countries where the changes have been particularly significant – Australia, the Republic of Korea (generally referred to in this book as South Korea), Mexico and Turkey. Our aim is to explore the links between global, national and local dimensions of transformation and human mobility. Moreover – since global and national transformations are perceived and experienced locally by the people affected – we chose one neighbourhood or village in each case-study country for intensive research. For the purposes of our study, it was not necessary to examine origin and destination countries linked in migration systems or corridors. Instead, we sought to understand the social effects of globalization in nations, metropoles, neighbourhoods and villages. Our work can make no claim to representativity, but it does reveal important processes at all these levels.

The book starts by discussing the theory and methodology developed in the project. This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of the theory. The first section on methodological challenges start with an account
The STIM project is theoretically driven but empirical in approach. The project’s conceptual framework is based on the idea that it is important to distinguish between social change and the more fundamental process of social transformation, and that the latter generally has important consequences for the forms and volume of human mobility. In the chapters that follow, the STIM and partner researchers present their own perspectives on the theory and methodology needed to understand the nexus between social transformation and international migration in widely differing contexts.

Social change is a constant but mostly gradual process in the majority of societies. Most social theory is concerned with social change – or often more specifically with the relationship between social change and social order (see Portes, 2010). In contrast, our working definition of social transformation is:

[a] shift in social relationships so profound that it affects virtually all forms of social interaction, and all individuals and communities simultaneously. It is a ‘step change’ that goes beyond the normal processes of change that are always at work.

The driving factor in such a change may appear to be technology, economics or military power. But characteristic of such epochal shifts is that simultaneous transformations occur in culture, social relationships, social institutions (such as the family), personal and community identities, ideologies and politics. For example, the introduction of new technologies based on steam power was widely seen as the basis for Britain’s industrial revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the emergence of market liberalism was equally important. Today, new technologies in transport, communication and control are often perceived as the initial basis for globalization.
(later reinforced by the end of the Cold War), but the rise of neoliberal ideology is also crucial.

**Polanyi’s ‘Great Transformation’ as a starting point**

A useful point of departure for a theory of social transformation is Karl Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (2001, first published in 1944). Central to Polanyi’s work is the need to understand the economic, social and political causes that led to the crisis in European society which, in turn, gave rise to the First World War, the economic meltdown of the 1930s, the emergence of fascism and then the Second World War. Through a multi-disciplinary analysis, *The Great Transformation* traces the roots of these cataclysms to the ‘utopian endeavour of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system’ (Polanyi, 2001: 31). According to Polanyi, the market liberalism of the nineteenth century ignored the *embeddedness* of the economy in society (i.e. its role in achieving social goals laid down by politics, religion, ethics and social custom). The liberal attempt to *disembed* the market was a ‘stark utopia’ leading to a *double movement* – a protective counter-movement to re-subordinate the economy to society. However, in the crises of the first half of the twentieth century, the counter-movement led inexorably to fascism and world war (Block and Polanyi, 2003; Polanyi, 2001).3

Much post-Polanyian work seeks to identify ‘the second great transformation’ (e.g. Burawoy, 2000; Munck, 2002). However, a longer historical view would throw doubt on the idea of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century industrialization as ‘the first great transformation’. History has seen a number of fundamental transformations. Many early sociological works – like those of Spencer (1851) and Durkheim (1902) – developed evolutionary (and often teleological) models moving from simplicity to complexity, from simple to segmented societies, from mechanical to organic solidarity and so on. Marxist historiography is based on the idea of stages of societal development: from slave-holder societies to feudalism, to capitalism, to socialism and finally to communism. This, too, seems determinist and teleological. However, Marx also provides a detailed historical account of pre-industrial capital accumulation, covering the English enclosures from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the destruction of the Scottish peasantry and the importance of the exploitation of overseas colonies (Marx, 1976: 873–940).

The key point is that there has been a succession of ‘great transformations’, of which the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism were the more recent. This, in turn, was the precondition for Polanyi’s ‘great transformation’, which has been followed most recently by the great transformation embodied in neoliberal globalization. Such transformations do not mean complete breaks in development tendencies. For instance, the rise of the world market is already discussed in Marx and Engels’ (1848) *Communist Manifesto*. One can see historical continuity through the emergence of
imperialism, as chronicled by Hobson (1902) and Lenin (1968, first published in 1917), to the development of today’s globalized economy.

Polanyi’s analysis of the ‘great transformation’ of European society in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries is valuable for several reasons. It provides an insightful critique of the key principles of market liberalism – one of which is that the economy is self-regulating and should be seen as quite separate from the rest of society. It reveals the destructiveness of purely economic approaches that, if taken to a logical conclusion, could mean the impoverishment and eventual destruction of nature, the labour force and, indeed, of society as a whole. It shows how counter-movements inevitably developed and examines the destructive forms that these sometimes took. From our current perspective, Polanyi’s theory also had severe limitations, for it focused on the industrial countries of Europe and North America and failed to analyze the significance for capitalism of the subordination of the rest of the world. Yet it does provide a conceptual model for a contemporary critique of neoliberalism.

Reworking social transformation theory to analyze neoliberal globalization

The closely linked processes of accelerated economic globalization since the 1970s and the reshaping of political and military power relationships since the end of the Cold War represent a contemporary step change – a new ‘great transformation’. These fundamental economic and political shifts are closely interwoven with a transformation of social relationships. At the structural level, social transformation in high-income countries can be seen in the closure of older industries, the growth of the services sector (involving both highly qualified professionals and lesser-skilled ancillary staff), the restructuring of labour forces, the erosion of welfare states, the fragmentation of communities and the reshaping of social identities. In low-income countries, forms of social transformation include the intensification and mechanization of agriculture, the destruction of rural livelihoods, the erosion of local social orders and the formation of shanty towns within new mega-cities (Davis, 2006). Characteristic of this new phase is that the main engine of transformation is, as Karl Polanyi Levitt has argued, the shift to the ‘financialization’ of economic and social relationships. Dominance in manufacturing has ceased to be the main source of power in the world economy; instead, financial control and the ability to capture the main profits in global value chains has come to signify real power (Polanyi Levitt, 2013).

However, it must be remembered that money was only one of the three ‘fictitious commodities’ identified by Polanyi (2001: 175) – the other two were labour and land. A new phase in the commodification of labour through the promotion of a global labour market – based not only on human capital (the possession of educational and vocational credentials) but also on race, ethnicity, gender, national origins and legal status – reflects the engagement
of policies and practices that are the hallmarks of neoliberalism (Castles, 2011a; Munck et al., 2011). This global labour market is a crucial context for the analysis of international migration (Phillips, 2011). As for land, Polanyi’s approach is still highly relevant, as our case studies illustrate. In Mexico, the destruction of peasant agriculture through free trade and multinational agribusiness is a key example of commodification that is at the root of much emigration. In Turkey, gentrification and the displacement of marginalized ethnic minorities by international developers are other forms of commodification. In addition, Polanyi’s notion of the commodification of land can be extended to the broader issue of the destruction of the natural environment by excessive use of fossil fuels – now widely recognized as a major threat to human society.

The last three decades have witnessed a period of profound social, political and economic re-organization in almost all parts of the world, including the four countries we selected for the STIM project fieldwork. However, it is important to realize that this neoliberal transformation has taken highly diverse forms in different places – as we explore for the four case-study areas in later sections of this book. Yet almost everywhere, neoliberalism has emerged as the ideology and theory of political and economic practices behind the market-driven reforms that have characterized this transformation. Neoliberalism has almost universally entailed a withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision and the emergence of associated patterns of deregulation, privatization and marketization (Cahill, 2010; Harvey, 2005) – a process that has been as geographically uneven as it has been far-reaching. As noted by Harvey (2005: 3), ‘[A]lmost all states . . . have embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and practices accordingly.’

Just as nineteenth-century liberals portrayed economic affairs as separate from the rest of society, proponents of neoliberalism have promoted globalization as a predominantly economic phenomenon. The emergence of a new economy was depicted as the result of growing foreign direct investment, the deregulation of cross-border flows of capital, technology and services, and the creation of a global production system (Petras and Veltmayer, 2000: 2). According to neoliberal ideology, the superior efficiency of this new economic world was guaranteed by the rationality of decision-making in multinational corporations (MNCs) and by the ‘invisible hand’ of global financial and commodity markets. The basic premise of globalization was ‘the leadership of civilization by economics’ (Saul, 2006: xi). This ideology was summed up in the ‘Washington Consensus’ on the importance of market liberalization, privatization and deregulation (Stiglitz, 2002: 67).

But the neoliberal attempt to disembed economic globalization from its societal context was, in fact, deeply political because it made global economic integration appear as an inevitable and desirable form of modernization – one
which, according to dominant ideas, could only be resisted by backward peoples or fundamentalist leaders. Clearly, globalization was not just about economics: it was also a political process, conceived in ideological terms (Petras and Veltmayer, 2000: 2). The globalization paradigm emerged in the context of the political strategies of the Reagan–Thatcher era, which were designed to roll back welfare states and the relatively high wage levels of the postwar boom period in Western Europe and North America. The consequences for both high- and low-income countries are outlined above. This economic transformation has been justified by the ideology of the ‘level playing field’ and enforced – especially in low-income countries – through the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Many critical social scientists now believe that Polanyi’s work on the European ‘great transformation’ can bring light to the analysis of current transformations caused by neoliberal globalization. As Stiglitz (2001: vii) has argued, ‘[B]ecause the transformation of European civilization is analogous to the transformations confronting developing countries around the world today, it often seems as if Polanyi is speaking directly to present day issues.’ Yet, as Munck (2006: 180) argues, there is a need to ‘scale up’ Polanyi’s theory – that is, to examine new trends in capital mobility and trade, and the impact of these on inequality between and within nations – in order to properly address the social and political transformations being brought about by contemporary globalization processes.

Polanyi (2001: 3–4) argued that society would inevitably protect itself against the perils of the free market by seeking to re-embed the market into society. The importance of restoring the economy to social control is a key concern arising from recognition of the negative social impact of economic restructuring under the ideology of laissez-faire. As Stiglitz (2001: xi–xii) argues:

Rapid transformation destroys old coping mechanisms, old safety nets, while it creates a new set of demands, before new coping mechanisms are developed. This lesson from the nineteenth century has, unfortunately, all too often been forgotten by the advocates of the Washington consensus, the modern day version of the liberal orthodoxy [emphasis in original].

For Munck (2004: 251) the ‘Polanyian Problem’ thus consists of ‘how the tendency towards the creation of a global free market economy can be reconciled with a degree of stability and cohesion in society’. Gray (1998: 17) argues that the free market and democracy cannot coexist since the social costs of the former are such that it ‘cannot for long be legitimate in any democracy’. It is here that Polanyi’s (2001: 79) principle of the ‘double movement’ – the emergence of protective counter-movements that blunt the destructive impact of the commodification of labour, land and money – becomes particularly relevant. Munck (2004: 256) claims that Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ provides a basic theorizing of the concept of counter-hegemony: ‘Polanyi directs us
away from class essentialism and towards an understanding that counter-hegemony will be a broad social and political spectrum seeking to represent the general interest of humanity.’ Thus, ‘[W]e need to consider his [Polanyi’s] incipient theorizing of a concept of counter-hegemony in a way that complements rather than contradicts Gramsci’s’ (Munck, 2004: 253).

Activism against neoliberal globalization is considered by many to be a form of contemporary counter-movement against hegemony. The World Social Forum provides one of the most salient examples of this form of resistance, organized around an agenda of counter-hegemonic globalization and decentralized forms of international solidarity-building. But there are many examples of grass-roots-level resistance, such as a spate of protests in China against the dispossession of peasant farmers or the resistance by poor people against their forced displacement for dam, airport or luxury-housing projects. There is an implicit similarity between Polanyi’s idea of the ‘double movement’ and de Sousa Santos’ idea of ‘insurgent cosmopolitanism’, which ‘refers to the aspiration by oppressed groups to organize their resistance on the same scale and through the same type of coalitions used by the oppressors to victimize them, that is, the global scale and local/global coalitions’ (de Sousa Santos, 2006: 398).

The idea of the ‘double movement’ can be seen through the modern lens of the concept of agency. Social transformation processes are mediated by local historical and cultural patterns, through which people develop varying forms of agency and resistance. These can take the shape not only of religious or nationalist movements but also of individual or family-level livelihood strategies, including rural–urban or international migration. The recent upsurge in international migration, especially between poorer and richer economies, can best be understood through examination of these complementary changes and their complex linkages. Here, too, we can examine agency – for instance, in movements demanding human rights and social inclusion for migrants, which have emerged in many places (Castles, 2011b).

Social transformation and international migration

A theory of global change in which the economy is seen as disembedded from society, and where the political and social consequences of economic activities are treated as inevitable ‘externalities’ (as economists put it), leads also to a disembedded understanding of migration. In a narrow economistic view, this means seeking the determinants of migration in a range of individual rational choices based on economic interests. The essential link to massive changes in global economic and political power relationships and the resulting social transformation processes is absent. The failure of policy-makers and analysts to see international migration as a dynamic social process leads both to policy failure and to a wide range of political and social problems, often resulting in the systematic violation of the human rights of vulnerable populations. Human mobility should be understood as an essential component of change, shaped not just by economic factors but importantly also by
complex historical, cultural and social factors. This understanding is vital to achieving sustainable forms of migration, which recognize the aspirations and human rights of all involved.

If migration is conceptualized as an integral element of contemporary social transformation processes, then it becomes clear that global cities are crucial units in these interlocked processes. Most international migrants do end up in big cities or their industrial peripheries. Our case studies from Turkey, South Korea and Australia all show the impact of immigration on cityscapes and forms of place-making – as well as the impacts on immigrants of struggles over ownership of the city. The Mexican case study shows how rural areas, too, are transformed – often forcing people to migrate to cities, both in the home country and across international borders. Many crucial issues in cities are affected by immigration. These include urban and social planning processes, aspirations for active citizenship by migrants and local communities, and transnational and translocal home- and place-making strategies. This will be discussed in more detail in several of the case-study chapters.

Theoretical and methodological principles

The STIM project has developed its central and subsidiary research questions from the theoretical ideas – outlined in the preceding sections of this chapter – on the relationship between social transformation and international migration, and has sought to answer these questions through transnational research. The researchers have developed a methodology that links its theory with complex empirical realities at different socio-spatial scales: the global, the national and the local. We have also had to adopt appropriate methods for carrying out the empirical work in very different social and cultural contexts. Concentrating on specific countries, in fact, contradicts the principle of transnational research – that is, research that goes across borders rather than seeing each country as a closed-off unit. We sought to deal with this contradiction in two ways: first, by using a comparative case-study approach and, second, by carrying out local studies in each country. Collaboration with leading migration researchers in each country has allowed a richness of historical, cultural and locality-specific understanding that could never have been achieved by a research team based in a single place.

Here we summarize the theoretical principles derived from our discussion, above, of social transformation and migration, while specifying the methodological consequences:

1. Migration is not a result of social transformation, nor a cause of it, but an integral part of transformation processes.

The key theoretical principle that has informed the project is the idea that human mobility cannot be separated from changes in societies and their
political, economic, social and cultural institutions and practices. This approach forms the basis for the STIM project’s methodological principle of examining migration as a key aspect of globalization.

2 It is misguided to try to separate migration studies from broader social theory.

One of the central problems of migration studies has been its (at least partial) exclusion from mainstream social science and the tendency for it to be perceived as a mainly descriptive and administrative field. This derives from the ways in which political elites have (often over long periods) constructed national models for managing migration and ethno-cultural diversity, with social science often an integral part of this process of construction. Such models range, in the case of our fieldwork countries, from the official Australian acceptance of multiculturalism as a necessary aspect of a nation built through immigration, to the South Korean principle of maintaining cultural homogeneity as an essential basis for social solidarity. Methodological nationalism is, hence, a key problem of migration studies (see Amelina et al., 2012). Migration research is often rather atheoretical and short-term in its approaches, frequently taking the form of research commissioned by governments to resolve specific dilemmas through administrative means. This, in turn, reinforces the academic marginalization of migration: critical social scientists often look down on migration studies just because of its closeness to government agendas. Yet, in an epoch of global integration, mainstream social theory cannot afford to ignore the growth of human mobility. Here the methodological consequence is to work to re-embed migration studies in social theory.

3 Migratory processes are shaped both by macro-social structures and by the actions and perceptions of affected populations, both migrants and non-migrants.

National models for managing migration and ethno-cultural diversity often fail to achieve their objectives or have unintended consequences because they are based on reductionist views of human behaviour that emphasize individual economic incentives and formal rules. In reality, people confronted by social changes can and do react in varying and often unpredictable ways, ranging from compliance, through informal subversion, to open resistance. This leads to the methodological principle that it is always essential to look at both structure and agency, as well as at the relationships between them.

4 Global forces are mediated through national cultural patterns and historical experience.

The global forces that lead to economic and cultural integration are often hard to perceive, because national responses, processes of change and forms of resistance vary considerably. Despite globalization, transnationalism and decentralization, the nation-state remains a key political and, often, also cultural unit. This is the basis of the methodological principle that understanding globalization requires national studies and cross-national analysis.
5 The effects of global changes are always experienced locally.

Globalization changes people’s lives in complex ways. The need to emigrate (e.g. in the Mexican case and formerly in Turkey and South Korea) or the influx of new immigrant groups (in Australia, South Korea and Turkey today, and potentially also in Mexico in the near future) means that migration and growing ethnic diversity are often the visible face of change. Migrants are active participants in processes of economic transformation and local place-making. In localities strongly affected by migration – such as our four local case-study areas of Ansan in South Korea; Kumkapi (Istanbul) in Turkey; Casa Blanca (Zacatecas Province) in Mexico and Fairfield (Sydney) in Australia – both positive and negative experiences of social transformation are often strongly linked to perceptions of migration and migrants. Hence our methodological principle of engaging with the experiences and perceptions of both migrants and non-migrants at the local level.

6 There is no single correct way of analyzing globalization. Global, national and local dimensions are connected in complex and non-linear ways.

This principle sums up the previous ones: to understand the sociological significance of globalization requires research at multiple socio-spatial levels, including analysis of the linkages and contradictions between the levels. This is reflected in the methodological principle of multi-scalar research.

Methodology has not been discussed in detail in this chapter, as this is examined in the chapters by Rebecca Williamson, by Kevin Dunn and Alanna Kamp, and by Shanthi Robertson. The ways in which theoretical and methodological principles have been operationalized – in research methods and procedures for studying the relationships between social transformations – are addressed in virtually all the case-study accounts in this book.

Notes

1 Stephen Castles thanks the co-editors of this book, Magdalena Arias Cubas and Derya Ozkul, for their comments on this text. He also thanks Ellie Vasta and Stuart Rosewarne for their critiques and suggestions.

2 It is worth noting that the Sydney-based researchers had close personal and family links to the case-study countries and spoke the relevant languages.

3 The work of Polanyi is discussed in more detail in Castles et al. (2011).

4 This section also draws extensively on the STIM project’s jointly authored Working Paper No. 1 (Castles et al., 2011).

5 Here we use the terms ‘high-income’ and ‘low-income countries’. Some analysts prefer the terms ‘northern’ and ‘southern’, while others use ‘developed’ and ‘less-developed’. None of these terms is entirely satisfactory, since they suggest binary divisions which are rather simplistic. We prefer to use the World Bank classification based on income levels, while being aware that this, too, is unsatisfactory, as it does not take account of inequality levels.
References


Part I

Methodological Challenges
Towards a Multi-scalar Methodology: The Challenges of Studying Social Transformation and International Migration

Rebecca Williamson

Introduction

Reconceptualizing the dynamics of international migration from the perspective of social transformation is a challenging methodological project. This is not only because the processes involved are extremely complex but also because they have been dominated by macro-level or quantitative analysis, which provides limited scope for understanding the nuanced relationship between migration trends and the changing realities of everyday life. This chapter focuses on the possibilities inherent in a multi-scalar approach to migration that is sensitive to the interconnectedness and complexity of migration processes enacted across multiple sites and scales, and involving multiple agents. Such a perspective explores migration across different socio-spatial levels, and seeks to problematize conceptual frameworks that theorize migration as the outcome of global forces and their local effects. It also challenges the tendency to reify another scalar construction – the nation-state – by identifying issues of methodological nationalism prevalent in migration research. Contemporary scholars of migration have argued that approaches to migration based only on the analysis of ‘push and pull’ factors, or which regard migrants narrowly as rational economic actors (using a neoclassical lens), are ill-equipped to deal with the complex spatialities and temporalities of contemporary migration processes, which are increasingly temporary, non-linear and multi-sited and which may implicate new forms of transnational and multiple belonging (Castles et al., 2013; Collins, 2013; Vasta, 2013). The chapter reflects on the challenge of conceptualizing and applying a multi-scalar research approach in the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project, conducted in
2010–14 and based at the University of Sydney. This interdisciplinary, collaborative research project aims to re-embed migration research in social theory, and examines the link between migration and social transformations in the era of neoliberal globalization in case-study localities in four countries: Mexico, South Korea, Turkey and Australia.

The following discussion outlines the STIM project and its aims before providing some background information about the case-study locality which informs this chapter. I then outline how the idea of multi-scalarity has been employed in the field of migration studies both methodologically and analytically – particularly in relation to the challenge of methodological nationalism – and how geographical notions of scale might be relevant to a conceptualization of the dynamics of human mobility. I then turn to a discussion of how one might ‘operationalize’ multi-scalar methods, using the example of the research methods employed in the STIM project, before sketching briefly some of the analytical insights that can be gleaned from one of our fieldwork sites. Drawing on this empirical work, I reflect on the potentialities and limitations of a multi-scalar approach for migration research.

The STIM project

The multi-disciplinary STIM project examines international migration in the twenty-first century, drawing on theories of social transformation and exploring how political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of change in society are interwoven with human mobility. Of particular interest is Karl Polanyi’s (2001) thesis of the ‘great transformation’ of European societies linked to the market liberalism of the nineteenth century, and its role in the subsequent upheavals of the early twentieth century. Transformation in this context is framed as a structural change – a significant ‘step-change’ – that goes beyond the everyday, incremental processes of change, which constitute the dynamics of any society (Castles, 2010). The project reflects on Polanyi’s observations of the social consequences of attempts to dis-embed the economy through the myth of a self-regulating market – that is, the counter-movements that sought to redress this imbalance in both progressive and reactionary ways. The project is premised on the idea that a similar step-change has occurred in global society through processes of neoliberal globalization, and that migration needs to be understood as part and parcel of this transformation. This approach takes a holistic perspective that views migration, the global political economy, civil society, social movements and micro-level cultural and social changes as mutually constituted and thus part of the dynamics of social transformation (Castles, 2010; Castles et al., 2011). In so doing, it starts with a challenge to the sedentary logics that frame migration as abnormal or problematic. The starting point was a locality in each country that magnified certain transformational
aspects of migration: in Australia, the locality of study was Fairfield (Sydney); in South Korea it was Ansan; in Turkey, Fatih (Istanbul) and, in Mexico, Casa Blanca (Zacatecas). We sought to better understand how these localities were embedded within processes of neoliberal globalization and international migration unfolding across macro, meso and micro levels or scales.

Several methodological challenges – such as issues of representativeness and comparability across different cultural contexts, and the ongoing challenge of remaining reflexive about our positionality in the context of northern-centric migration scholarship – became apparent during the formulation of the project. Another methodological issue was that of studying migration across multiple socio-spatial levels or scales. The project was based on the assumption that migration is shaped and given meaning at different ‘levels’, which can be clustered around processes at the ‘macro level’ (for example, the deregulation of global labour markets), at the ‘meso level’ (for example, national migration and migrant incorporation policies) and at the ‘micro level’ (for example, migrants’ subjectivities and the impact of migration on individual bodies or on local communities). The project explores how these ‘levels’ are interwoven in each of the four case-study countries. One dilemma was to develop a conceptual approach that provided more analytical depth than studying migration across ‘levels’, a concept which involves a taken-for-granted assumption about how the local, the national and the global are hierarchically ordered. Instead, the aim was to make clear how migration involves relations of power between levels of governance whose fields of influence can be variable and contested.

Bringing in the idea of scale, or a multi-scalar approach, allows for a more flexible conceptualization of the way in which migration is reinforced, contested and made meaningful at various levels of power and in different sites. Scale can be used in two ways. Firstly, scale refers to the everyday spatial categories we use to order and understand our world (Moore, 2008; Soja, 2005), from the body to households, neighbourhoods, cities and so on. Secondly, scale can be used in a more reflexive mode to understand how social constructions of scale are ‘themselves implicated in the constitution of social, economic and political processes’ (Leitner, 1997: 125; Marston, 2000). Others have defined scale simply as the ‘spatial reach of actions’ (Xiang, 2013: 284) or, from the perspective of geography, as a ‘crystallization’ or ‘real abstraction’ of historically and geographically specific social relations’ (Brenner, 2011: 31). Taking a multi-scalar perspective adopts this analytical lens, which problematizes what we mean by the local, the national and the global and asks how migration itself shapes the constitution of these scales in complex ways. But it also offers a methodological dimension – a multi-scalar approach can also frame the way in which we empirically examine migratory systems, as discussed below.

The empirical examples in this chapter are drawn from case-study research in Fairfield, Sydney. Fairfield City² is one of the most socio-culturally diverse
local government areas in Australia. According to figures from the 2011 Census, of a total population of 198,381 residents, 50 per cent are migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds from the postwar migrations of Southern and Eastern Europeans, through ‘waves’ of Lebanese, South American and Vietnamese (forced) migration during the 1970s, to increasing Asian migration in the 1980s and diversifying streams of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and, more recently, Africa. Since the Second World War, overseas migration to Fairfield has been facilitated by a range of factors, including the presence of several migrant hostels and affordable housing, systems of chain migration and a national immigration policy that welcomes workers from an increasingly diverse range of countries. Initially connected to the then-booming peri-urban manufacturing industries that provided a steady source of factory and agricultural work, the area functioned as a key ‘gateway suburb’ for new migrants in Sydney. Migrants were more likely to settle in surrounding areas that were familiar to them, and concentrations of migrant groups have created a networked landscape of migrant services, ethnic businesses, cultural institutions and community organizations that continue to attract migrants today. The decline of the manufacturing industry and other sources of employment during the late 1980s heightened unemployment and precarity in the area, as it has in many of the middle-ring suburbs of Sydney (Randolph and Holloway, 2005). It is characterized by profound socio-economic disadvantage; however, this is only one side of a complex story of regeneration, decline and upward social mobility across generations (Gapps, 2010). Fairfield remains prominent in the public imaginary – for better or for worse – as a site of the lived reality of migration, multiculturalism and, more recently, a re-branded global cosmopolitanism (see Koleth in this volume). While we can only briefly touch on it here, the area is situated within the complex social and economic geographies of the global city of Sydney, as well as being connected into regional and global processes of migration, macro-level economic transformation and historical and contemporary crises.

Multi-scalar approaches to migration

That migration is a multi-sited and socially constructed phenomenon is now widely accepted in migration literature. The social significance of human mobility and the actors and institutions involved in it are multiple and contingent, and migrant agency is not only shaped in relation to structural elements operating at the local, national and global levels but also co-produces these structural conditions. The emergence of a multi-scalar approach in migration studies can be traced to several strands of theory. Without attempting an exhaustive review, I briefly outline three genealogies of thought that have integrated scalar thinking into contemporary migration research, drawing on critical globalization theory, sociological and anthropological studies
of migration and political geography. I then discuss how this thinking is manifest in methodological approaches to migration.

Theories of globalization were instrumental in the conceptualization of migration as an international or global phenomenon but, in so doing, they tended to over-estimate the extent to which globalization – as the connectedness and global flow of goods, ideas, capital and people – encompassed the whole globe. ‘Second-wave’ critical globalization theorists were more likely to temper this vision by highlighting the unevenness of these processes (see, for example, Appadurai, 1996; Castells, 1999; Held et al., 1999; Robertson, 2005; Smith, 2001). The latter body of work was better able to demonstrate how global flows were selectively spread and sought to deconstruct the reification of the concepts of ‘global’ and ‘local’ in the social sciences, to highlight the power relations inherent in the employment of such terms. Thus, critical globalization theories grounded the global and globalized the local – for example, through concepts such as ‘glocalization’ (Robertson, 2005), ‘translocality’ (Smith, 2011), a ‘global sense of place’ (Massey, 1994) and studies of global cities (Sassen, 2001). These critical discourses sought to reterritorialize social life and identity – to reinstate people as ‘socially and spatially situated subjects’ (Smith, 2005: 236) – in a world characterized by the ‘space of flows’ in a way that avoided the trap of framing the global as naturally more abstract, powerful and somehow ‘wider’ than other scales, or rendering the local as fixed, contained, small-scale and the primary site of human agency and resistance (Massey, 2004); in other words, creating what Michael Burawoy has referred to as ‘powerless places and placeless power’ (2000: 2). In any case, such an approach contributed towards a more nuanced theorization of migration as embedded in and produced through a range of mutually constituted scales, including local, national, regional and global structural conditions and agencies.

A second theoretical thread that highlights notions of scale is the studies that critique the relationship between migration and the scale of the nation-state. Methodological nationalism refers to a bias towards privileging the nation-state as the ‘natural’ container of society, and the most appropriate analytical lens for studying migration (Castles, 2007; Glick Schiller, 2009; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). Nation-centric studies, data and policy dominate migration research – a function of national funding structures and disciplinary boundaries and, more generally, the influence of the modern history of nation-state-building on the social sciences (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). In line with nation-building imperatives, methodological nationalism reinforces notions of an assumed homogeneous national community tied to a bounded state territory. This can foster exclusionist notions of national belonging that work to ‘Other’ migrant or minority groups (Glick Schiller, 2009; Papastergiadis, 2005). Studying migration as an abstracted flow across national borders tends to dis-embed migrants from their intricate webs of connection across multiple spaces, times and territories. Responses
to this dilemma in migration studies have been articulated successfully through the field of transnational studies – for example, through the concept of ‘transnational social fields’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004), which take migrants’ multi-layered and multi-sited transnational networks as the lens through which to study migration. Constructing migration as a national phenomenon can serve particular interests and justify certain modes of governance for both progressive and conservative ends – for example, the increasing rhetoric in many Western countries around the heightened securitization of territorial borders in which migrant subjects are aggregated to represent a threatening ‘wave’ of human movement. And, while the shifting scales at which human mobility is given meaning in an age of globalization have profound implications for belonging, citizenship and governance, it is worth noting that the nation-state undoubtedly remains a powerful scalar lens through which migrant bodies are regulated.

A third, related stream that has contributed to a multi-scalar analysis of migration draws on political geographical thinking around scale and emphasizes the profoundly political nature of scale and its relationship to economic relations. Here, scale refers to a process of spatially fixing and representing a set of political, economic and social relations in a hierarchy (Harvey, 2006; Herod and Wright, 2002). By ordering socio-political relations, concepts of scale allow the building of ‘geographical totalities’ such as the ‘national state’ and ‘the global’ (Marston, 2000: 220), which have immense discursive and material power. Concepts like ‘interscalar processes’ (Brenner, 2001) and ‘scale-jumping’ (Smith, 1993) help us to examine how scale is also negotiated, dynamic and relational. The notion of ‘scaling’ (Çağlar and Glick Schiller, 2011) has also been used to study the process through which various socio-spatial constructions – the city, the region, the nation-state, the world region and so forth – are positioned as a result of processes of capitalist restructuring and changing relationships of power between different political entities (Çağlar and Glick Schiller, 2011; Salzbrunn, 2011). These studies show how migrants can act as ‘scale-makers’ and contribute to the global repositioning of cities – for example, through their participation in the labour force, as agents of gentrification and urban rebranding (Çağlar, 2007), as facilitators and contesters of privatization and neoliberal agendas and as mediators in transnational associations (Brettell, 2011). This, in turn, shapes the conditions for migrant incorporation. Rather than taking the nation-state as the overriding spatial frame, these studies posit a more relational idea of place and the role of the migrant subject within it, and engage with a range of scales that shape migration and its role in social transformation. Moreover, they expand the scope for agency and highlight important gaps for political mobilization. Such an approach also resonates with Polanyi’s notion of ‘double movement’ to the extent that scale is mobilized for the purposes of both empowerment and containment (Smith, 2000: 726), providing context- and scale-specific opportunities for both inclusion and exclusion.
Multi-scalar methodologies

The literature outlined above points mainly to the theoretical and analytical relevance of a multi-scalar approach to migration and its construction at different scales. But how does this translate into an applicable set of research methods? How can scalar relations and the way in which they structure migration be traced in the study of everyday life? Methodological approaches that investigate the interconnectedness of social phenomena – including migration processes – in a globalized world are diverse. Multi-sited ethnography (Hage, 2005; Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995), global ethnography (Burawoy, 2000), macro-ethnography (Appadurai, 1996) and ethnography across multiple scales based on ‘empirically grounded abstractions’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003) represent just a few that can be applied to a more socially embedded study of migration. More recently, Xiang (2013) has proposed a multi-scalar ethnographic approach to migration. Going beyond multi-sited ethnography, this approach identifies a descriptive and analytical approach to identifying the multiple sites at which migration is enacted (Xiang, 2013: 284, 285). He proposes the concepts of ‘taxonomical scale’ and ‘emergent scale’ to point to the fixed (structural) and emergent (agentive) nature of scalar relations. While ‘taxonomical scale’ refers to the way in which hierarchies of bounded spaces (local, regional, national, global) are deployed to regulate migration, ‘emergent scale’ refers to the strategies through which dominant scalar relations may be subverted or transformed through collective mobilization and individual agency. Xiang (2013: 285) contends that ‘every site, event and actor is simultaneously located at a particular taxonomical scale and an emergent one’. Like the critical geographical approaches outlined above, such an approach enables an examination of the gaps in existing systems and the potential for social transformation. As a methodological approach, Xiang (2013: 282) proposes multi-scalar ethnography as a way of locating multiple sites analytically and suggests following migratory processes across multiple levels of governance.

The STIM project draws on elements of these approaches. The project also goes beyond a multi-sited ethnography to the extent that it focuses on different localities that have been transformed through global economic changes and migration, and is not an exercise in tracing transnational connections or networks or a specific ethnic group across multiple sites in a single social field (Fitzgerald, 2010; Hage, 2005). Additionally, time and resource constraints limited the possibility for long-term place-based ethnographies. The STIM project’s engagement with the multi-scalar approach was to use this tool, like Xiang (2013), to help to structure an existing methodological framework, to assist in the analysis of the connections between actors operating around micro, meso and macro scales, and to provide a critical lens for doing so. However, what seems to be missing from the methodological
and theoretical approaches outlined above are any explicit discussion of research methods. In other words, a question that arose during our study was how one ‘operationalizes’ a multi-scalar approach beyond engaging it as an analytical tool in the post-data-collection stage. The following section is intended to provide an exploratory discussion of and reflection on how a multi-scalar lens can be applied to the formulation of research methods, and how this is integrally connected to both the theoretical and the methodological aspects of the work.

Multi-scalar methods?

The STIM project engaged a mixed-methods approach using quantitative and qualitative sources, including national- and local-level statistics, in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant observation, photography and the analysis of local, national and regional/supranational policies. Using mixed methods provides a richness of data and offers one way in which to capture the gamut of scalar relations – and their various forms of articulation – which shape contemporary experiences and historical patterns of migration in each country.

Quantitative and qualitative sources

In each case study there was an attempt to draw on statistical data that corresponded to different levels of governance. To focus on the Australian case study, the availability of local-area data was particularly useful for capturing more-nuanced geographical variances in population compositions and socio-spatial patterns of migrant settlement. Such data can be compared to other local government jurisdictions in Sydney as well as to aggregated statistics for the Greater Metropolitan Area, the state of New South Wales and national-level data. At a broader level of analysis, this can be made meaningful in relation to international data on human mobility. However, there are obvious limitations: many of the data generated on migration flows are produced by national governments and inevitably take the nation-state as the primary spatial and scalar unit. As Stephen Castles argues in his introductory chapter to this volume, this can result in studies engaging only in cross-national comparisons and limits the scales at which comparative analysis can take place. It can also reinforce methodological nationalism to the extent that other forms of migration, such as the internal movements of migrants and diversified migration trajectories (such as transnational practices), are seldom captured statistically, if at all. The STIM research aimed to engage statistical information across the case-study localities (for example, measures of the proportion of migrant groups in each case-study locality) and to embed such analysis in relation to other scalar measures and information relevant to that case-study country (for example, embedding changing inflows of migrants into these localities based on shifts in national migration
policy). Any comparison between case-study countries thus involves this contextualization of data rather than any direct comparison.

Secondly, demographic information and migration statistics were combined with a review of local, state and national government documentation, literature from local NGOs and ethnic community groups and academic studies of the areas. This provided us with a detailed picture of how migration and social transformation have occurred in these specific localities, and the different scales at which migration is given meaning – from official government discourse to the narratives and evidence provided by migrant support workers at the ‘coal face’. Thus, data on migration and social change were gathered from sources produced at different scales of governance. Examining the discursive connections and points of disjuncture between a sample of sources, such as documented local histories, NGO reports, local-government economic development plans or city-level strategic planning, allowed a cross-section of perspectives that gave flesh to the multi-scaled statistical analyses of the localities. To give an example most relevant to the Australian context, we analyzed national and state-level documentation to understand how migration and migrant incorporation – through discursive and programmatic aspects of multiculturalism – were officially constructed, to then better grasp the points of overlap or disconnect with the lived realities of multiculturalism and social transformation associated with migration through the anecdotal and descriptive sources generated by community organizations or local government representatives, and through interviews with local residents.

Scaling participation
In order to reframe migration as part and parcel of processes of social transformation, it was important to ensure that multiple social actors operating at different scales of the migration process were targeted in the recruitment processes. Rather than confining the sample to a single migrant group, transnational network or specific micro-space in the locality, interviews were conducted with three groups of participants: local informants (migrant and non-migrant local residents), local key informants (decision-makers, community leaders, support workers and local officials) and national key informants (decision-makers, experts and officials working in migration-related areas). The majority of the latter participants involved in managing migration or migrant incorporation were directly recruited in relation to their specific role at a national or local level, while individual residents were recruited based on their residence in the locality through referral from gatekeepers or using snowballing techniques. While the sample size was relatively small, and the lines between participant categories were frequently blurred, the approach meant that multiple experiences and opinions were gathered from differently located and differently scaled social actors. The voices of recent migrants and refugees, established migrants, non-migrant residents, business owners, community workers, community leaders, local public servants,
local and state politicians and others were included, and their perspectives highlighted the multiple and entangled scales that shape everyday perceptions and experiences of migration. As Xiang (2013: 284) explains, this can work to illustrate how ‘smooth flows at one scale (e.g. international) can be disruptive at another (e.g. family or community). At the same time smooth transnational flows may not be possible without the deep disruptions in family or the tight encapsulations of individual life.’

**Participant observation and visual data**

The project also fleshed out these narratives through participant observation and the use of visual data (particularly photography) in case-study locales. Participant observation – a fundamental tool of the ethnographic method – involves the negotiation of both the ‘insider’ and the ‘outsider’ status of the researcher. This dance of positionality is even more complicated in the context of migration and diaspora research, where concepts of home, belonging and identity may be subject to greater flux and contestation (Ozkul, 2014). Full immersion of the STIM project’s researchers into the communities of the case-study localities was limited by the time-frame of the study. However, participant observation in everyday life and community events, and the making of a visual record of it, provided a more-nuanced picture of how processes associated with social change and migration were daily negotiated. For example, in Fairfield we were able to observe patterns of intercultural exchange and encounter practised in public spaces like cafés or in community-group settings. We were also able to observe local streetscapes that instantiate histories of migration through a variety of ethnic-specific businesses and that also signal the presence of emerging or newly arrived migrant groups. The potential of photography and participatory photography as a method for migration research is significant as it provides an avenue for studying participants’ perceptual observations, which may be harder to access through more conventional techniques such as interviews (Lombard, 2012). Participatory photography evolved organically through the project’s fieldwork in Ansan, South Korea, and was a technique used to better capture local perceptions of transformation, and to invert the traditional relations of power between the researcher and the participant. Overall, the inclusion of mundane sites in our research through participant observation and photography (ranging, for example, from local community centres to the offices of different levels of government) demonstrated the multi-sited and multi-scalar nature of studying migration and social transformation beyond the formal interview setting.

**Extending multi-scalar research as an analytical tool**

While scales are, in reality, as Anderson and Taylor (2005: 463) note, often entangled, co-constitutive and nested in one another, integrating a multi-scalar approach into the formulation of research methods might provide a
way of making clearer the interscalar relations from the start of the research. Using a range of methods to elicit data from multiple sites and differently located actors, a multi-scalar approach enables us to ‘locate multiple sites analytically’ and to better capture the multi-dimensionality of contemporary migration trends. As well as engaging with scale as a kind of ‘holding shelf for multi-sited material in a way that will lead to broad insights’ (Xiang, 2013: 282–4), the usefulness of the multi-scalar analytical and methodological lens might be extended by critically assessing how particular research methods might elicit certain representations of scale and interscalar relations.

At the analytical stage, there are several useful ways in which to think about scale. One way, as discussed above, is to analyze instances where scales are transformed, or where conventional interscalar relations are challenged. To give an example from our case-study locality, the local government in Fairfield had signed up to an initiative of the Refugee Council of Australia which invited local councils to become a ‘Refugee Welcome Zone’ and enact a series of initiatives to raise awareness about asylum-seekers and refugees. This local-level initiative responded to the demography of the suburb with high numbers of migrants from refugee backgrounds, and was one way for local-level officials and non-governmental organizations to mobilize against, or at least provide an alternative to, the dominant national-level political narrative that has sought to criminalize asylum-seekers who arrive by boat. The latter discourse frames this kind of mobility in relation to disorderly global and regional flows, with social impacts that are scaled around the nation-state and its territorial borders. From this perspective, the discourse seeks to disassociate these kinds of migrants from the local scale – despite a long history, particularly in localities like Fairfield, of refugees successfully integrating into society and becoming an integral part of the everyday cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism with which the locals identified the locality. The disjuncture in the narratives of some local residents illustrated the complex and often contradictory scaling of the place of refugees and migrants in Australian society: while some wholeheartedly welcomed them into the community, others supported detention policies while maintaining positive views or having interpersonal relations with neighbours or friends who had also arrived as ‘unauthorized maritime arrivals’ in the past. Another example of the scalar repositioning of the locality was demonstrated through initiatives instituted by the local high school which, in response to high intakes of refugee children, developed an innovative community centre bringing together the parents of refugee children and the school community. The principal was invited to present in Geneva to the United Nations, for which the programme received accolades for demonstrating best practice in relation to the provision of social services to refugee communities. This grassroots response to structural and social changes emerging from migration flows into Fairfield, and its ‘scaling up’ to an international forum, effectively involved a repositioning and rescaling of this locality vis-à-vis national discussions regarding Australia’s response to refugees.
Another possible approach takes the concept of scale beyond an abstract analytical lens and explores how participants themselves articulate scalar relations. This provides a means to interrogate participants’ subjective sense of their own positionality and agency in relation to processes of social transformation and migration. As Xiang (2013: 285) argues, ‘The perspectival scales of both the actors and the ethnographers are of great importance.’ Such an analysis draws on the ‘spatial rationales’ which people use to understand their world. In the STIM project, a series of questions in the interview schedule with local residents explored participants’ perceptions of how their locality was connected to national life and international influences. This allowed us to explore the ways in which these residents conceived of the impacts of migration, drawing on dominant scalar frames such as the local, the national and the global. The questions were interpreted in different ways and drew a wide variety of responses, but were useful for exploring how the interplay between migration, social transformation and neoliberal globalization was given meaning in everyday life. For example, the global scale and its impact at the local level could be framed in relation to international conflicts and their impact on the flow of refugees settling in the Fairfield area, or ongoing translocal networks that engaged in fundraising practices to assist friends and family still affected by war. Other participants perceived the local material presence of migrant cultures and their locally celebrated festivities as embodying the ‘global in the local’ – from the annual food festival to the scent of a neighbour’s cooking over the garden fence. While these responses signal the ‘messiness’ of scale and its everyday social construction, at the analytical stage this may widen our purview and allow us to understand the different ways in which migration and social change are given meaning, and how a politics of scale works on the ground. Reflecting on this research method, there is room to experiment with the languages of scale and transnational connectivity in a way that better taps into participants’ articulations of interscalar relations and highlights ‘emergent scales’ or new forms of (migrant) agency.

Conclusion: a middle-range framework?

Xiang (2013: 290) defines scale as ‘abstraction aimed at capturing actors’ strategies and international dynamics of social change’. He proposes that a multi-scalar ethnographic approach allows researchers to examine how transnational migration is constituted through different scales and why some mobility is more consequential than others. In this chapter I have discussed how a multi-scalar approach might be extended further into methodological considerations and the formulation of research methods as well as the analysis stage of research. The STIM project’s use of mixed methods, which tapped into variously positioned social actors and the different scales at which migration is given meaning – from everyday encounters on the
suburban street to government offices – is one way of attempting to capture and tease out through the research process the multiple scales that constitute contemporary migration and social transformation. This approach also resonates with the project’s interest in re-embedding migration within processes of social transformation to the extent that it provides a lens through which to analyze the multiple dimensions and politics of scale involved in migratory experiences. A multi-scalar approach – from methodology to analysis – attempts to unsettle ontological assumptions about the different scales at which migration and processes of transformation are meaningful. This works to challenge tendencies towards methodological nationalism and, in doing so, questions fixed analytical frames that prioritize national territory and belonging over other scales of belonging. Such an approach therefore elucidates how scalar concepts work by examining how migration is variously aligned with definitions of national belonging, economic growth, global integration or local place-identities, for example, which operate to embed or dis-embed migration and migrants-as-subjects from society. Indeed, as Carruthers (2013: 224) has argued in relation to the Australian context, ‘New multicultural subjects have become all but unrecognizable as targets of classical multicultural policy. The lithe and multi-scalar nature of their identifications provokes us to change our very understanding of what it means to “assimilate”.’

Rethinking migratory processes as intimately connected with and produced through economic, political and social factors operating at multiple levels – and integrating this into all stages of the research process – is one possible way to reconfigure the political and academic models of migration ‘away from singular national identities and jealously guarded borders to a much more open model that corresponds with our increasingly integrated region and more mobile world’ (Castles et al., 2013: 119). This reflection on the methodological dimensions of a multi-scalar approach aims to raise questions about future methodologies which better capture the complexity of contemporary migration in the age of neoliberal globalization.

Notes
1 See the case-study chapters in this volume for more details on the rationale behind these locality choices.
2 Fairfield City refers to the local government area (LGA) that is comprised of 16 suburbs. Fairfield is one suburb within the LGA and functions as its administrative centre.
3 This is reflected in low average household incomes and the designation of Fairfield as having the highest level of disadvantaged inhabitants in Sydney and the third highest in New South Wales, according to the SEIFA Index of Disadvantage.
4 For example, we asked ‘In your opinion, has the area become more closely connected to national life?’ and ‘Have foreign cultural influences/foreign companies become more important in recent years?’.
References


Brenner, N. (2011) ‘The urban question and the scale question: some conceptual clarifi-


3
The Virtues and Challenges of Comparative Analyses of Immigration, Migrant Settlement and Transnationalism

Kevin M. Dunn and Alanna Kamp

Introduction

In this chapter we examine some of the insights that can be gained from comparative analyses of immigration, migrant settlement and transnationalism. There has been a series of calls for comparative approaches to migration research across the social sciences and humanities (for example, Campbell, 1995; Green, 1994; Vertovec, 1999). Drawing upon this literature, in the first section of this chapter we outline the primary benefits of comparative analyses. These include insights into the structural conditions of immigrant experiences and subjectivities, and the culturally varied responses to, and legacies of, international migration. In this way we highlight how comparative analyses can offer a bulwark against generalizations regarding the modes, frequency and pressures of migratory movement as well as the communications between migrant groups and their ‘home’. In the second section of this chapter, we utilize data obtained in two Australian research projects – the Transnationalism and Citizenship Project and the Challenging Racism Project – to compare immigrant groups across two Australian cities (Brisbane and Sydney) with their Canadian counterparts. Comparative approaches to migration research eschew both erroneous generalization and naïve particularism. In order to present a balanced appraisal of comparative analyses of immigration and transnationalism, we also chart some of the challenges of this approach. These include issues such as finding appropriate analogues and securing matching indicators.
Comparative approaches to migration research: the benefits

The comparative possibilities of migration and migration research are clear. As highlighted by the migration historian Nancy Green, the migrant is an embodiment of a set of comparisons ‘between past and present, between one world and another, between two languages, and two sets of cultural norms’ (Green, 1994: 3). Migration research is, therefore, inherently comparative, as it must take into account these shifts in time, place and culture when examining migration processes or migrant experience. The comparative nature of migration research is also evident when demographic variables such as age, sex and country of birth are used which reveal differences in the migrant experience. The very act of ‘analyzing and representing activities and relations among people from one culture for audiences in another’ is a comparative project (Foner, 2005: 2). It has been asserted that ‘virtually all migration research is comparative’ (Foner, 2005: 1). However, very rarely have migration researchers acknowledged the comparative basis of their projects, nor do they engage with the challenges it poses. In this chapter we focus on research and researchers who have taken a more openly comparative approach, especially across space. We begin by outlining the benefits of comparative analyses as advocated in such migration research.

The more strident approaches used by migration researchers to compare migrant experiences and migration processes usually involve comparisons between the same ‘national’ migrant group (that is, groups identified by their nation of origin; see Green, 1994: 13) across cities, regions, countries or historical contexts, or between different national groups in the same locations. Green (1994) categorized these approaches under three models: linear, convergent and divergent. The linear approach (which follows an immigrant from place of origin to place of settlement) compares experiences before and after migration and, in so doing, provides insights into change and/or continuity over time and place (Green, 1994). The convergent model takes the place of settlement as the constant variable and examines the settlement experiences of different migrant groups within the same place. An example of this type of comparison is Yeoh and Willis’ (2005) examination of Singaporean and British expatriates in China, or Voigt-Graf’s (2005) work on three Indian groups (Punjabis, Kannadigas and Indo-Fijians) in Australia. These types of comparison assume that national/cultural origins are the primary factor shaping settlement experiences alongside timing, economic opportunity and political factors (Green, 1994). The divergent model, on the other hand, compares the same national groups across different locations. In this way the place of origin is a constant, while the place of settlement is a point of difference. Examples of this type of comparison include Nancy Foner’s body of research on West Indians in the United States, Britain and Canada – see Foner (1998, 2009), Campbell (1995) and McRaid’s (1999) historical comparative studies of Irish migrants in the United States,

The utility of comparative approaches to migration studies has been discussed in scholarship across various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Green (1994), for example, pointed to the utility of comparative approaches in migration histories. Similarly, Campbell (1995), also a migration historian, specifically detailed the benefits of comparing Irish migrant experiences across the globe. Foner (2005, 2009), a sociologist, detailed several benefits of comparative research to advocate greater use of the approach in migration studies, while Dunn (2008), a geographer, detailed the utility of using comparative analyses in studies of transnationalism (see also Vertovec, 1999; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004: 1191–2). The benefits outlined by these researchers were all grounded in the defining characteristic of comparative approaches – that is, their focus on similarities and differences between migration processes and migrant experiences. In the broadest sense, by comparing migrant groups – looking at the similarities and the differences, and coming to understand not only ‘what is unique to a specific situation’ but also ‘what is more general to the migration experience’ (Foner, 2005: 3; as also argued by Fredrickson, 1997; Green, 1994) – the tendency to essentialize migrant experience is assuaged. As Foner (2005: 3) argued, the majority of migration scholarship ‘narrowly’ examines single migrant groups, single locations or single time periods and often suggests that migrant experiences are universal or, in contrast, completely unique to the migrant group, location or time period under investigation (see also Fredrickson, 1997). The ‘broader view’ provided by comparative analyses allows us to attain a deeper and more complex understanding of the migration experience (Green, 1994: 16; as also argued by Foner, 2007; Vertovec, 1999; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004: 1191) and may help to break down generalizations about given groups. This, in turn, provides less insular/generalized reports on the cultural, political and economic fabric of a nation and places migrant experiences and the migration process in an international perspective. This provides a basis for better policy practice and benchmarks for improved integration and community relations (Dunn, 2008: 3).

Comparative research not only highlights similarities and differences in the migrant experience, but forces us to account for them – that is, we must question why there are shared or unique characteristics within and across groups (Foner, 2007; Vertovec, 1999). In answering these questions, the influence of both cultural and structural (political, economic, social) factors on the fortunes of immigrants and their descendants are brought into view (Dunn, 2008; Foner, 2005, 2007). This, according to Dunn (2008: 3), ‘is a fundamental advantage of comparative analyses’, and hints at yet another benefit of comparative research – a better understanding of the importance of spatial variation and place in the migration process and settlement experience (as noted by Dunn, 2008; Foner, 2007). For example, cross-national comparisons
of the same migrant group (divergent comparisons) can highlight how different cultural/ethnic identities develop and are maintained depending on the contexts/places in which migrants move. This is highlighted in Foner’s (1998) comparative exploration of gender issues in West Indian migrant populations in the United States and Britain. In this study, she found that West Indian women’s ethnic and racial identities developed in diverse ways depending on the social/cultural setting of the national and urban context of settlement. This advantage is also evident in convergent analyses where different migrant groups in the same location are compared, as was seen in the aforementioned study by Yeoh and Willis (2005) on Singaporean and British expatriates in China. Through their comparative analysis, Yeoh and Willis (2005: 281) found that, as ‘embodied beings, bearers of nationality, culture, ethnicity, gender and class’ with different cultural imaginings of and historical linkages to China, expatriates from Singapore and Britain had different cultural experiences across six cities of settlement in China.

In terms of structural factors, comparisons can uncover the way in which contexts of reception (including social, economic and political structures and institutions in a given location) and immigration policies shape flows and adaptations in new countries of settlement (as argued by Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004: 1191–2 and seen in Foner’s 2007 article on Eastern European Jewish migrants). These structural (and cultural) processes and the ways in which they impact unevenly across the planet (Dunn, 2008: 3) or across different groups are generally not evident in single case studies (Foner, 2005: 3). Comparative approaches therefore force us to rethink, re-theorize and re-evaluate previous conclusions and assumptions of migration processes by ‘bring[ing] fresh perspectives to old problems’ (Foner, 2007: 3; see also Foner, 2005; Green, 1994).

Comparative analyses in action: divergent comparisons within Australia and between Australia and Canada

By examining data from real-life contexts of migrant settlement and experience, the benefits of comparative approaches become even more apparent. We therefore draw upon information obtained from various research projects to compare the experiences of Hong Kong transnationals across two countries (in Sydney, Australia, and Vancouver, Canada) and across two cities in one country (the Australian cities of Brisbane and Sydney). We also draw upon attitudinal data from research projects conducted in Australia and Canada to indicate that comparative analyses can be used to examine similarities and differences in the attitudes towards migration and cultural diversity in different places. The analysis demonstrates structures and similarity, as well as nuanced particularities.

The data on Hong Kong transnationals in Sydney and Brisbane, upon which we draw in this chapter, were obtained from the Transnationalism
Kevin M. Dunn and Alanna Kamp

and Citizenship Project, which commenced in 2003 and was based at the University of Sydney (led by Christine Inglis). In addition to Hong Kong immigrants, the project gathered information about immigrants originally from China, Turkey and Greece, and explored participants’ involvement in transnational practices and continued linkages with their homeland (in the form of social, cultural, political, economic and religious connections). The project also examined the links between transnationalism, the migrant’s sense of identity and experiences of citizenship and exclusion. Data for the Transnationalism and Citizenship Project were collected from 1,198 Turkish, Greek and Chinese ‘transnationals’ in Sydney and Brisbane using a telephone survey. The project also involved the conduct of in-depth interviews with 131 individuals from three communities (Turkish people from Turkey and Chinese people from Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China), as well as a series of interviews with community leaders. The findings of this research were part of an international comparative project involving Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany (ABS, 2011).

The Australian attitudinal data, which we draw upon in this chapter, were obtained from the nation-wide telephone survey conducted as part of the Challenging Racism: The Anti-Racism Research Project based at the University of Western Sydney. The telephone surveys, conducted in all states and territories in Australia, were carried out over a six-year period between 2001 and 2007. The survey was principally concerned with collecting data regarding attitudes to cultural diversity, racism and so-called ‘out groups’, with an additional survey being conducted on experiences of racism, including the forms of racist experience and the contexts and responses to those experiences (Challenging Racism 2011). The surveys generated 12,512 valid responses, of which 2 per cent were from the Australian Capital Territory, 34 per cent from New South Wales, 20 per cent from Queensland, 1 per cent from the Northern Territory, 8 per cent from Perth (Western Australia), 8 per cent from South Australia, 26 per cent from Victoria and 2 per cent from Tasmania. This closely approximated the relative population sizes of the states and territories. For our comparative purposes, in this chapter we only draw upon survey data obtained from Sydney respondents (n = 1,845).

The Canadian (specifically Vancouver) data used in this chapter were drawn from the Vancouver Center for Excellence-funded telephone survey of 2,000 residents. The centre’s work was part of the Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Project, and the results below are drawn specifically from the 1,479 respondents who were immigrants. Within that, we also distill the sub-sample of 185 immigrants who were Chinese. The survey included questions about immigrant experiences, migrants’ transnational connections and sense of belonging, and attitudes towards diversity (see Hiebert and Ley, 2003). The Vancouver survey used a cluster design, focusing the sample frame on five areas of differing socio-economic status, but all with recent or longstanding histories of immigrant settlement. These
datasets allow us a comparative insight into three very important aspects of immigration and the migrant experience: international communications, the immigrant sense of subjectivity and the extent of the immigrant welcome and/or racism.

Transnationalism and belonging: Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane compared

To explore the relationship between locality and practices of transnationalism, we can use a divergent comparison in which the places (cities) being compared are within the one national context. In this instance, the comparison is between Chinese migrants from Hong Kong in two of Australia’s major cities – Sydney and Brisbane – where their presence has become increasingly visible since the mid-1980s. The Sydney Chinese community in general is longer-established, more developed and more diverse than that in Brisbane. These contextual factors help to explain the variations in the data in Table 3.1 where, in Sydney (in contrast to Brisbane), there was less perceived need for cultural retention (for example, the Chinese language), a heightened wish that children be accepted as Australian and a smaller proportion feeling their own sense of belonging in Australia. Dunn and Ip (2008) speculated that, in Sydney, where there is a longer-established Chinese cultural infrastructure, the perceived threat of language loss and ‘cultural fading’ is less keenly felt than in Brisbane.

Table 3.1 also shows that Sydney-based respondents were more likely to agree that it was important to them that their children be fully accepted as Australian. Migrant anxieties about belonging have been linked to discourses of exclusion which make it difficult for non-privileged groups to openly claim citizenship. If you are constantly told that you are ‘not Australian’ or asked ‘where you come from’ or you experience racism, then it is made

Table 3.1 Cultural retention and belonging: Hong Kong-Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane, 2005–06 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sydney</th>
<th>Brisbane</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is important that my children know the Chinese language</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to continue practicing my cultural heritage</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that my children¹ be fully accepted as Australian</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel I belong in Australia</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹If no children, then ‘If you did have children, would it be important to you?’

Source: Telephone survey, 2005–06, conducted by the Hunter Valley Research Foundation, for the Australian Transnational Project. Response options were: Agree strongly, Agree, Neutral, Disagree or Disagree strongly (Not applicable).
more difficult to self-declare as Australian, Canadian or English (Hage, 1998). Dunn and Ip (2008) pointed to the data on experiences of racism, and how there were higher rates of cultural exclusion in Sydney (media stereotyping and experiences of racism) compared to Brisbane (Forrest and Dunn, 2006).

Chinese immigrant survey respondents in both cities were given the option of identifying as Australian, Chinese, Hong Kong-Chinese or Chinese-Australian. The most popular response was the hyphenated identity of Hong Kong-Chinese-Australian or Chinese-Australian (Table 3.2). The main variation between the two cities was across those who identified as simply Australian and those who selected a hyphenated identity which included Australian. Dunn and Ip (2008) pointed to how there were more respondents with Australian self-identification among Sydney respondents, but the proportion who expressed belonging in Australia was smaller. They concluded that ‘While the respondents had stronger levels of actual citizenship, and stronger levels of self-identification, the degree to which they could say they felt they belonged was retarded compared to those in Brisbane’ (Dunn and Ip, 2008: 95). The levels of racism and exclusion do vary from one city to another, even within the same nation, and this can impact upon migrant belonging.

### Transnational links: Sydney and Vancouver compared

The comparison of Hong Kong-Chinese immigrants in Sydney and Brisbane indicated differences in experiences of cultural retention, feelings of belonging and cultural identification across the two Australian cities. However, a divergent comparison of Hong Kong immigrants across two national contexts (Australia and Canada) highlights some similarities in migrant experience, particularly in regard to communications with ‘home’. For example, in the data from both Vancouver and Sydney, we can see the demise of the letter as a dominant mode of transnational communication,
Social Transformation and Migration

Table 3.3 Transnational links: communication and cultural consumption among Hong Kong-Chinese in Australia and Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia Monthly</th>
<th>% Monthly</th>
<th>Canada Monthly</th>
<th>% Monthly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese radio/TV</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese newspapers/magazines</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1How often in 2004 did you keep in touch with family overseas using the telephone?
2How often in 2004 did you keep in touch with family overseas using email?
3How often in 2004 did you keep in touch with family overseas using letters or cards?
4How often in 2004 did you or anyone in your household listen to the radio or watch television programmes that were in Chinese/read Chinese language newspapers/magazines? Canadian question wording: Does anyone in your household watch or listen to Hong Kong TV/radio?

and the emergence of email in both places (Table 3.3). The telephone is still a key form of everyday transnational communication, certainly for Hong Kong transnationals in Australia and in Canada. If the same questions were asked in 2014, we would expect that short message service (SMS) texting and social media (for example, Facebook) would be other emerging modes of transnational communication. The figures for Australia and Canada do not vary much, despite the different settings. The small differences could be attributed to the slight variations in question-wording and response options. The same similarities pertain to the consumption of transnational media (Table 3.3). The similarities in these two countries, for an immigrant group with the same origin, demonstrate a global phenomenon or, at least, a trend within Western immigrant reception countries. This is an example of a divergent comparison that reveals a global trend. This comparison, when placed alongside the comparison of Brisbane's and Sydney's Hong Kong-Chinese immigrants, highlights the key benefit of comparative approaches – the ability to identify the diversity of experience within a single ‘national group’ as well as an identification of common experiences and a global phenomenon.

Immigrants welcome: comparing attitudes to immigration in Vancouver and Sydney

Comparative analyses can also be used to examine the ways in which attitudes towards migrants and migration are shaped in different place-based settings. For example, the Sydney and Vancouver projects indicated that, in both cities, there was broad support, reaching close to consensus, for cultural
diversity among respondents (Table 3.4). It was a little stronger in Vancouver (92 per cent) than in Sydney (84 per cent) – an indication, perhaps, that the different debates in the two countries may have generated different public attitudes. There are also likely to be ‘city effects’ as linked to the geographies of immigrant settlement and the residential patterns of ethnic minorities and majorities. More-stark levels of concentration in Vancouver may have fired assimilationist fears, whereas greater diversity in Sydney might generate less anxiety about cultural maintenance.

There was, however, also close-to-majority (50/50) support for assimilationist thinking, with 46 per cent of Sydney respondents agreeing that Australia is weakened by the different ethnic groups ‘sticking to their old ways’; in Vancouver, 61 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘Canadians should all be part of a common culture’. So most respondents agreed with the principle of distinct cultural expression, which is a key element of multiculturalism; yet a majority also agreed that diversity, or the lack of a common culture, undermined nationhood. The co-existence of multicultural thinking with assimilationist thinking has been discussed in previous research (Dunn et al., 2004). However, this international comparison of opinions in two immigrant settlement cities shows that this is a global issue – a global problem with the project of multiculturalism. The project has not yet been developed, disseminated or championed well enough to challenge older fears of diversity and assumptions that harmony can only be developed in circumstances of cultural uniformity. Moreover, this reveals that the politics around diversity and immigration is less a product of local ethnic relations and more an outcome of global challenges. It undermines the naïve particularism that would too easily blame migration tensions on a racialized immigrant minority or on a demonized racist majority.

**Table 3.4** Support for, and concern with, diversity, Vancouver \((n = 1,479)\) and Sydney \((n = 1,845)\) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro cultural diversity(^1)</th>
<th>Accept cultural variety(^2)</th>
<th>Diversity weakens nation(^3)</th>
<th>Desire a common culture(^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Disagree</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Disagree</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question wording:* \(^1\) It is a good thing for a society to be made up of people from different cultures; \(^2\) It is important to accept a wide variety of cultures in Canada; \(^3\) Australia is weakened by different ethnicities sticking to their old ways; \(^4\) Canadians should all be part of a common culture.
The challenges of comparative research

According to Dunn (2008: 3), ‘[t]he most obvious angst in comparative analyses has concerned the match between analogues’. For example, questions arise as to how and why we choose to compare one migrant group with another: How can we possibly compare migrant groups with completely different histories and contexts of origin (in convergent comparisons), or migrant groups who have settled on opposite sides of the world in places with vastly different social, economic and political contexts (in divergent comparisons)? How do we ensure that the ‘match’ produces a meaningful comparison? Is there a criterion that must be met? In her appraisal of the comparative method in migration studies, Green (1994) also drew attention to this challenge. While she advocated the use of comparative methods, she also called for the acknowledgement of the constructed nature of comparative analyses and subsequent impacts on the results. Comparative analyses are constructed not only in terms of the ‘type’ of analysis conducted (linear, convergent or divergent), but of the level and unit of analysis chosen by the researcher. As Green (1994: 15) points out, comparing West Indians in New York to African Americans in New York (convergent model) will yield different results to comparing West Indians in New York with West Indians in London (divergent model). Similarly, a comparison of Italian and Jewish women in New York would elucidate very different findings to an examination of the broader experiences of Italians and Jews in the same city. In the former, the subjects’ gendered identities are a point of similarity between the two groups being compared (Green, 1994). According to Green (1994: 6), ‘[t]he comparative project thus implies a triple choice: that of subject, that of unit, and that of the pertinent level of analysis’ and thus, as argued by Dunn (2008: 3), ‘[c]are ought to be taken in the selection of cases’.

Due to the constructed nature of comparisons, critics of this type of research most often highlight ‘the lack of objective standards of comparability, or to contrasts in data or indicators used’ (Dunn, 2008: 3). Dunn suggested that using very similar methodologies in each place or social field and collecting similar data is one way to overcome this challenge. Obviously, however, this is not always possible or desirable as ‘[m]ethodologies and approaches need to be tailored to suit a given research site or the migrant place or transnational field’ (Dunn, 2008: 4). The comparison of Hong Kong transnational experiences in Sydney and Vancouver, and in Sydney and Brisbane, and the comparison of attitudes to immigration among a broader population in Sydney and Vancouver, which we have presented in this chapter, highlight this challenge. For example, in the conduct of the joint Australian/Canadian projects, researchers were wary of the way in which survey questions were worded in the Sydney and Vancouver studies. It was decided that the operationalization of the same indicators (recognition of racism, concern about cultural diversity, etc.) required wordings
that were comprehensible to the local setting and vernacular (Dunn, 2008; Hiebert and Ley, 2003). Thus it was essential to tailor the wording of the survey questions in each city (see Table 3.4). In the globally remarkable STIM project, as reported in the chapters written by Chulhyo Kim, Derya Ozkul, Magdalena Arias Cubas and Elsa Koleth, there was an attempt to ask the same questions in very different social and cultural contexts. But the translation of field prompts into Turkish, Korean and Spanish was not always easy, as some concepts do not exist in certain languages, such that the researchers had to find circumlocutions and provide explanations for the questions asked of participants.

Measuring the effects of place on the migrant experience, as well as the global consistencies, sometimes necessitates a research trade-off between the impulse for methodological harmony (of cases, data and field protocols) and the need for a locally sensitive method that unearths the most valid sense of place. None of this undermines the analytical potential of comparative migration research and the protection it affords against ill-founded generalization and naïve particularism. Comparative research on immigration is expensive, and it requires robust and trusting international collaborations. Nonetheless, the additional effort and reflection are well worthwhile. Migration studies, and the policy recommendations that flow from them, would benefit from more comparative research. Such work needs to be very open about trade-offs between the similarity of data-collection protocols and the local particularity of those efforts.

References


The Temporalities of International Migration: Implications for Ethnographic Research

Shanthi Robertson

Introduction

Transformations in both time and space are central to theoretical understandings of modernity and globalization (see, for example, Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Harvey, 1999; Urry, 2000). This chapter is specifically concerned with understandings of time in terms of the empirical study of contemporary international migration processes and, in particular, in terms of ethnographic methodological approaches. I argue that, in the context of a complex and globalized modernity, temporalities of migration are increasingly recognized as heterogeneous and dynamic. While circular, temporary and staggered mobilities have always been a part of global migration circuits, modern transportation and communications technologies have facilitated increasing temporal heterogeneity, and new modes of temporariness are becoming institutionalized in new ways (Rajkumar et al., 2012). In particular, although Western Europe has an extensive history of guestworker-type temporary migration (see, for example, Castles et al., 1984), traditional ‘settler’ receiving societies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand have only recently begun to shift from the policies of permanent settlement that dominated postwar mass immigration schemes to more-temporary or ‘staggered’ migration programmes.

Traditional understandings of international migration, particularly in settler societies, were often predicated on a linear temporal journey from alien to citizen, and from arrival to assimilation (Meeus, 2012). International migration is now acknowledged to have very varied tempos and rhythms, and is often distinctly non-linear and open-ended, involving diversion, repetition and simultaneity (Allon et al., 2008; Collins, 2012; Griffiths et al., 2013; Lewis and Neal, 2005). Alongside this exists a blurring of the boundaries between categories of migrants such as temporary/permanent,
legal/illegal, skilled/unskilled and sojourner/settler. This has led to ‘mottled profiles’ (Yeoh and Lin, 2013: 39) or ‘mutant mobilities’ (Allon et al., 2008: 74) – that is, migration intentions and migrant identities that are heterogeneous and temporally fluid. These contemporary temporalities of international migration are largely driven by neoliberal forces. On the one hand, immigration in receiving countries has, in many contexts, become a ‘just-in-time’ process that seeks to import flexible, transient and expendable labour (Aneesh, 2001; Neilson, 2009). On the other hand, sending countries seek to circularize flows not only of people, but also of money, ideas and political energy (Gamlen, 2008).

In this chapter, I argue that traditional ethnographic methods of interviewing and participant observation, which often occur at fixed sites, at fixed moments and over fixed durations, often fail to engage with the complex questions emerging around international migration and time. Although ideas that methodology is ‘multi-sited’ or ‘de-nationalized’ have been explored in the international migration field (Amelina and Faist, 2012; Fitzgerald, 2006; Marcus, 1995), this chapter asks, in addition, how we ‘do’ ethnographic migration research that captures multiplicity in both the temporal and the spatial dimensions. I first establish some of the key ideas in contemporary theoretical and empirical discussions of migration and time. I also engage with some current debates around methodology in the field, and position the discussion of the temporalities of international migration within these debates. Next, I develop a conceptual framework of ‘time track’ (a temporal path of social behaviour) and ‘timescale’ (various scales of social and political temporal ordering), before identifying two keys areas of methodological concern around migration and temporality within this framework: time as a ‘boundary category’ in identifying and categorizing research subjects, and time as a form of discipline and control in the governance and regulation of migration. I then turn to a discussion of research practices within ethnography that may begin to address some of these issues, including how traditional ethnographic techniques can be reframed in a temporal approach, and how self-documentation and virtual or digital methods may also be employed. The chapter concludes with some overall remarks about the methodological challenges of ‘breaking in’ to the temporal dimension in ethnographies of international migration.

Unpacking time, migration and methodology in the contemporary context

Scholarly understandings of migration are changing, and temporality is key to these changes. Rather than models of one-way mobility, settlement and integration, the study of international migration increasingly acknowledges the transnationality and temporariness of diverse kinds of migrant subjects, from the elite knowledge-workers who circulate through global
cities, to the low-skilled contract labourers who flow back and forth from the global South to the global North. These heterogeneous and multi-directional flows of migrants are embedded within new modes for states’ management of migration and new forms of migrant agency and subjectivities (Castles, 2002; Goldring and Landolt, 2011; Ong, 2006).

Although the broader social analysis of time has a history dating back to theorists like Durkheim (1915, 1964[1895]) and Mead (1932), there is only a fairly limited range of recent work that offers a thorough conceptual analysis of contemporary migration and time. In general, the spatial has been utilized in far greater depth than the temporal as a framing concept for understanding processes of globalization, including migration (May and Thrift, 2001). There is, however, an emerging literature that acknowledges that migration is as much concerned with time as with space, and that all migration processes clearly have complex temporal dimensions. Most notably, Cwerner (2001) develops a detailed sociological framework of the ‘times of migration’ and Griffiths et al. (2013) offer a comprehensive theoretical review of migration, time and temporalities. Empirically, there is a range of work, including the time politics of asylum regimes (Cwerner, 2004), how travelling subjects take and make time (Elrsrud, 1998), links between temporal order and the re-socialization of migrants in host societies (Golden, 2002) and the temporalities of displacement (Worby, 2010). Previous work on lifecourse theory in migration studies (see, for example, Bailey, 2009; Kobayashi and Preston, 2007), with its emphasis on temporal contingencies, stages, transitions and sequencing, also heavily informs this discussion of migration and time.

There are also various existing arguments for the value of ethnography and of mixed or multiple methods in capturing the new spatio-temporal formations of contemporary international migration (see, for example, Findlay and Li, 1999; Fitzgerald, 2006; McHugh, 2000). Debates, in particular, around multi-sited ethnography and mobile methods (Fitzgerald, 2006; Marcus, 1995; Smith, 2001) come in the wake of critiques of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Basch et al., 1994; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002, 2003) and in the context of the ‘transnational turn’ and the ‘mobilities turn’ that have radically altered methodological and ontological approaches in terms of a reconfiguration of space. Researchers have sought to be more mobile in their research practices and engage with virtual spaces in their attempts to capture migrants’ lives through and across time and space. A strong argument has been made that ethnographic approaches can, in particular, be a highly valuable way to describe and explain ‘the play of migration and mobility in spatiotemporal reorderings and transformations’ (McHugh, 2000: 83) and to develop ‘the articulation of macro structures with members’ lived experience, micro-interactions, and a deep appreciation of members’ meanings’ (Fitzgerald, 2006: 11).

However, much of this methodological discussion still focuses primarily on the spatial and scalar transformations of method, rather than on the
temporal. By and large, as Meeus (2012) has argued, critiques of methodological nationalism imply, but do not explicitly theorize, temporality. There are thus few direct connections between the international migration literature on methodological innovation and that on migration and time, with the exception of King et al. (2006: 259), who argue for a ‘deeper ethnography of migrant decision-making’ to illuminate the complexity of both long- and short-term outcomes. The implications of new conceptualizations of and approaches to time and migration to methodology, particularly ethnography, thus remain largely unexplored. As Findlay and Li (1999: 52) state, ‘Contemporary social theory seems to require greater methodological diversity in order to uncover the multiple meanings of “events” such as migration.’ However, the problem remains, methodologically, of seeing migration as an ‘event’ – as a single act of mobility in time, rather than as a complex and possibly fragmented process across time.

This chapter is thus an attempt to unpack some key issues around time and ethnographic methods in the study of international migration. It comes from a position of seeking to break down embedded assumptions about the temporal linearity of migration, just as previous critique has sought to break from the spatial boundaries of the nation-state. It is based on the idea that migration trajectories are temporal as well as spatial, that arrivals, departures, journeys and transits can be understood as temporal events and processes as well as spatial crossings, and that there are intersections and disconnections between the different aspects of time in migration trajectories. I add primarily to the agenda-setting work of Cwerner (2001), Griffiths et al. (2013) and King et al. (2006) on migration and temporality by looking specifically at some ways in which the temporal can be brought into ethnographic research practices.

**Conceptualizing heterogeneous migrant temporalities: time tracks and timescales**

A variety of terms have been used to describe the different facets of time in relation to migration, including temporal horizons, temporal dimensions, timescale, timescape and so on. Here I draw on and refine some of these concepts in order to develop some useful conceptual possibilities for ‘grounding’ an ethnographic understanding of complex and ‘unfixed’ migration processes. Firstly, I borrow from Lyman and Scott (1989) the general concept of the ‘time track’ to describe the journeys of migrants across time and space. The time track implies movement over time but not always forward movement. A migration time track is embedded within biographical time, but its beginning and ending cannot simply be defined through mobility ‘events’. Rather, migration is a ‘flow’, involving a series of decisions, actions and occurrences that lead to mobility and a cascading sequence of consequences that occur afterwards. Time tracks include physical border-crossings, and crossings and transitions that are non-corporeal ‘status passages’
Borders occurring with the time track can demarcate ‘then’ and ‘now’ as much as ‘here’ and ‘there’, and can take the shape of actual physical borders, ‘paper borders’ (Rajkumar et al., 2012) or imagined borders of identity and belonging. A migration time track can be circular, can stop and restart at different life stages and can encompass dynamic senses of beginnings and endings, disruptions, withdrawals, accelerations and decelerations. The term itself seeks to resonate less with linearity and forward trajectory and more with the possibility of winding, staggered or circuitous journeys. The second key concept I employ here is that of the ‘timescale’ to describe different levels of temporal orderings and events. Here I rely mostly on Meeus’ (2012) conceptualization of the timescale operating in migration processes at three levels: a macro timescale of global political economy, particularly around spatially unequal processes of capital accumulation (including financial but also cultural and social capital); a meso timescale of migration regimes (including national and supranational systems of governance and also brokers, agents, recruiters and other facilitators of mobility); and the individual-level – micro – timescale of biography. This micro timescale is akin to the concept of the lifecourse, as ‘the series of stages and transitions in life which are culturally and institutionally framed from birth to death’ (Heinz and Krüger, 2001: 33).

The time track is structured by and embedded within all three of these timescales in different ways. Take, for example, the migrants described in Barber’s (2000) and Parreñas’ (2010) ethnographies of women’s labour migration from the Philippines. The women’s migration is deeply embedded in the timescale of the Philippines as nation-state, both in the context of post-colonial economic and political restructuring and the temporal narratives of the state that position migrants as central to national imaginaries of the future (Rodriguez, 2002). Secondly, at the meso level, the time tracks of these migrants are heavily structured by the timescales of different governance systems in host states. In Asian and Middle Eastern destinations, the pattern is sequential short-term contracts, whereas in Canada, longer-term trajectories are more possible if migrants are able to meet particular criteria over time. The time tracks of these migrants consist of events that influence decisions and unevenly spaced moments of departure, arrival, transit and return. Although futures are often imagined as linear pathways to economic and social stability through migration, ultimately these futures are constantly ‘reworked’ through changing social and economic conditions, and the influences of other actors. Parreñas (2010) also notes both how a migration time track can interrupt or suspend the individual biographical timescale, structuring periods of migration as ‘outside’ of migrants’ ‘actual’ lives at home and how patterns of life and work in the host country can enable forms of segregation that are temporal as well as spatial. These examples illustrate how concepts of time track and timescale can be used to illuminate the temporal in ethnographic studies of migration.
Time and the construction of research subjects

It is often increasingly difficult to distinguish when migration begins – its temporal edges are not always easy to define (King et al., 2006). The temporal categories of temporary and permanent, as well as the category of ‘migrant’ itself, are destabilized, particularly when the complexities of actual and expected durations, temporal limitations of legal statuses and varied cultural and social understandings of time and mobility are taken into consideration. Working from a time-track framework of international migration, which engages with this temporal complexity, problematizes the standard means through which the ‘subjects’ of migration ethnographies are defined and categorized.

I use here some examples in the Australian context to illustrate this. Historically a ‘settler-nation’, Australia now allows the entrance of thousands of overseas temporary workers on student, graduate and working-holiday visas. Many reside and work in Australia for extended durations of several years, and their journeys can variously end in permanent settlement, return, circularity or on-migration to a third country. However, immigration systems and social-policy frameworks overwhelmingly position these groups as transient consumers of education or tourism rather than as migrants (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014; Robertson, 2011, 2013). As a result, the staggered trajectories of young people entering Australia on temporary visas remain unrecognized in Australian migration ethnographies, which tend to focus instead on traditional ‘settler-migrant’ pathways, both humanitarian and skilled.

These examples illustrate that the official status and the cultural status of some mobile groups can cast them outside the identity of ‘migrant’. However, this does not and, in fact, should not, preclude them from being included in ethnographies of migration, particularly when a ‘sojourner’ or ‘visitor’ status may be part of a longer-term migration time track involving sustained patterns of work and residence, or when transient subjects form communities that are ‘permanently transient’ and thus have an ongoing collective impact on the host society. Quantitatively determined cut-offs of duration, which determine who ‘counts’ as a migrant, or a reliance on official statistics, which may define mobile actors in limited ways, do not reflect the complexity of time tracks as lived experiences that disturb settler/sojourner and temporary/permanent binaries within institutional timescales. The time-track and timescale frameworks go some way to recognizing the problems, as identified by Griffiths et al. (2013) and Favell (2005), of relying on official data and statistics as framing points for research, particularly ethnographic research.

A temporal time-track framework – which sees migration as multidirectional rather than unidirectional and as an uneven and temporally contingent process subject to accelerations, suspensions and disruptions – also
has the capacity to bring other immobile actors into the field of ethnographic migration research. Seeing migration time tracks as always potentially incomplete temporal processes means the ‘failed’ migrants, the returned migrants, the ‘almost’ migrants, the potential migrants and the immobile home communities and families can all come into the research field in a meaningful way. This goes some way to answering calls to incorporate other actors besides the classically defined ‘migrant-as-mobile-body’ into migration research (Carling, 2002; Fischer et al., 1997).

Temporality may also be embedded within time tracks and timescales as a form of identity. McHugh (2000) notes how individuals who, ostensibly, have similar trajectories of physical mobility can have differing ‘place attachments’ and temporal identities – such as being rooted, being suspended or being footloose. My own research into student-migrants in Australia has similarly found various and dynamic subjective senses of precarity, rootedness, pendularity, suspension and nomadism across student-migrant time tracks (Robertson, 2013; Robertson and Runganaikaloo, 2013). These are related, sometimes in complementary and sometimes in contradictory ways, with official statuses of belonging and with actual lived durations in particular places. The constraints of institutional timescales are sometimes reworked or resisted by migrants as they tried to reconcile these with their own imaginaries for their journeys. I suggest that ethnographers, therefore, also need to look at the way in which time tracks and timescales operate in migrant subjectivities, and particularly at how temporal identities transform across the time track, and relationships to different places function at different times.

Bringing in macro and meso timescales

The individual, or micro, biographical timescale, rather than the meso or the macro, is often the implicit focus of ethnographic research in terms of lifecourse or biography (King et al., 2006). While the various constraints of ‘structure’ or ‘governmentality’ on mobile bodies have been well explored in previous research, here I seek to specifically explore the temporal dimensions of particular structural forms in relation to ethnographic analysis.

There are many examples of what Cwerner (2001) refers to as a heteronomous time – temporal orderings at the level of the meso or institutional timescale that function explicitly as a disciplinary practice. States alter both time and space to create ‘interstitial zones’ in the processing of asylum-seekers (Mountz, 2010), with temporary, liminal statuses intimately affecting everyday lives (Mountz et al., 2002). Recent policies in Australia have tried to explicitly ensure that onshore claims of asylum are processed as slowly as offshore claims – a temporal tactic purported to discourage arrivals of asylum-seekers by boat. Skilled migrants are also affected, with states increasingly using periods of temporariness as a ‘testing ground’ (Rajkumar et al., 2012) during which migrants must perform or accumulate desirable attributes...
that can grant them extended, repeat or permanent stays (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014; Goldring and Landolt, 2011; Robertson and Runganaikaloo, 2013). The micro temporalities of family and social life are intimately affected by macro and meso timescales. For example, romantic relationships are accelerated to obtain spouse or partner visas, having children is delayed until permanent status is achieved or planning return is dependent on macro political or economic circumstances in the home country. In this way, timescales and time tracks intersect, often around unpredictability, precarity and uncertain futures.

Within heteronomous time, time often functions as a border, and this border is made tangible in various ways: through temporal eligibility criteria (such as being a certain age or having a certain duration of study or work experience to qualify for migration), through temporal limitations to duration of stay, through ‘processing times’ for visas and any changes to rights or status, through durations of work or residence needed to acquire new memberships like permanent residency or citizenship and through temporal limitations on work rights. There is a ‘paradox of pace’ at the heart of the timescale of immigration borders. While, on the one hand, immigration systems are largely pervaded by a ‘slowness’ in terms of ever-growing ‘queues’ and ever-more-complex ‘red tape’, on the other, they simultaneously display a rapidity in policy change that can leave migrants ‘stuck’ or ‘suspended’ in time, or even instantaneously rendered illegal. However, meso timescales of governance and regulation do not always uniformly constrain migrants but, rather, privilege some at the expense of others. Processing times or pathways to permanence may be accelerated for elite skilled or business migrants – seen to be the most desirable under neoliberal immigration regimes – while unskilled labour is kept temporary and precarious (Anderson, 2010; Rajkumar et al., 2012; Yeoh and Lin, 2013). Overall, the meso timescale of governance is also greatly influenced by macro global and national timescales – election cycles, economic cycles of recession and recovery or labour supply and demand, periods of hyper-securitization like the War on Terror era and demographic temporalities such as ageing populations.

The challenge for ethnography, then, is to find ways in which to understand how the more macro and meso timescales influence and intersect with the micro politics of the everyday for migrants and communities. Significant, here, is the fact that migrants from the same ethnic or national group may be impacted differently by timescales. Examples of this could include those who migrated before or after key policy changes or political events, or migrants with different kinds of temporal status. There can be, for example, disjunctures, distance and even animosity between those considered to be long-term or established and those who are perceived to be short-term (see, for example, Han and Han, 2010; Singh and Cabraal, 2010; Yeoh and Lin, 2013). This therefore has bearing not only on individual experience, but also on the constructions and performance of the community.
Practising ethnography under a temporal frame

What, then, do these emerging temporalities mean to the practice of ethnographic research? Firstly, how can staggered and non-linear time tracks of migration be adequately captured when ethnographic methods of interviewing and observation usually occur at fixed points in time or over fixed durations? And, secondly, how can the intersection of time tracks and timescales be analyzed in ethnographic research? In the following sections, I firstly look at how a more explicit awareness of temporalities – particularly time tracks and timescales – can be brought into traditional ethnographic techniques such as interviewing and observations. I then look at alternative methods, in particular at engagement with visual and textual self-documentation – including virtual or digital forms – and how this can work within ethnographic studies to foreground the complex temporalities of migrant experiences.

Capturing time tracks and timescales through traditional ethnographic methods

Traditional ethnographic approaches such as in-depth interviews and observations have great potential to uncover how time functions in migrants’ daily lives. However, when and how migrants are interviewed or observed becomes crucial in a temporally engaged approach. Rather than a single interview or a single period of observation, revisiting participants at significant moments or events in their migration time track – arrival, departure, re-entry, obtaining a visa or significant symbolic milestones – may be appropriate. Alternatively, groups who are at different ‘points’ on a similar time track could be comparatively interviewed or observed. For example, an ethnography of circular migration might seek to capture how the expectations and future imaginaries of migrants differ between those who are setting out on their first ‘cycle’ and those who have already experienced several reiterations of migration and return. Observation can also take place at sites connected to significant moments and events (e.g. arrival, departure, return, deciding and preparing, ceremonies of belonging and transition), particularly those that often remain hidden in traditional ethnographies. The sites chosen for observation must also take into account the ‘temporal diversity’ of migrant communities, by exploring whether there might be temporally fluid groups that interact in different spaces to established or long-term communities.

How interviews are conducted may also need to be rethought under a temporal framework that makes time tracks and timescales central to any analysis. In particular, the temporal linearity of the structure of the traditional interview, particularly when narratives of migration ‘begin’ and ‘end’, may need to be reframed. A temporally engaged approach needs to acknowledge the blurriness of beginnings and endings, gather data that speak to
the openness and contingencies of migrant futures and acknowledge that plans may encompass conflicting ‘ideal futures’, ‘possible futures’ and ‘likely futures’. The creation of ‘cognitive maps’ or ‘participatory mapping’ through sketches, GIS technology and cartography has been used to enhance ethnographic methodologies in a number of studies exploring culture, identity and space (Brennan-Horley et al., 2010; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003; Matthews et al., 2005). I suggest that ethnographers and participants could similarly construct ‘cognitive timelines’ as a means to visually create a sense of the time track, including its diversions, cycles and interruptions. A number of existing digital mapping and timeline technologies could be adapted for this purpose.

Following on from the calls of Mountz (2010) for ethnography to move ‘inside’ the state, I also argue that ethnographers who take time seriously need to turn their attention to the institutions of the governance of migration (including governments, recruiters, brokers, agents, smugglers, employers, etc.), to the practices of actors within these institutions and to the interactions of migrants with them. Institutional timelines, temporal constraints and temporal discourses frame and intersect with the lived experience of migration in complex ways. How migrant practices and subjectivities internalize, resist or negotiate these framings of timescale become quite key to empirical understandings. This is particularly significant for ethnographies that make time central, in that the embeddedness of migrant time tracks within meso and macro timescales can be illuminated at multiple levels through ethnographies of the state. In a similar way, ethnographies can engage with other non-state ‘middle men’ – such as brokers and recruiters – across the immigration system to illuminate more thoroughly the complex scales of temporal ordering in contemporary international migration. In particular, I would argue that ‘moments’ of interaction between the state or the facilitators of migration and the migrant are under-researched in current migration ethnographies. Immigration interviews, citizenship tests, interactions with border-control officers, acts of migrant-labour recruitment that could occur in offices, online or on street corners, interactions with smugglers and brokers in the decision-making process, interactions with the settlement system and so on are all significant events on a migration time track that are embedded within and are constitutive of various timescales. The ethnographic observation of these processes may shed particular light on the temporalities of migration, particularly on how these diverse interactions at different ‘points’ in the time track shape or constrain migrant practices and subjectivities.

Engaging with the textual, the visual and the virtual through ethnographic self-documentation

Ethnographers have recently been called to work beyond oral data and to explore participant self-documentation through both existing texts and
the production of new texts, often taking the form of diaries and journals (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Visual methods have also foregrounded the value of collaboratively or participant-produced video and photography to ethnographic research (Banks, 2001; Emmison and Smith, 2000; Pink, 2001, 2004). Here, I look at how existing textual and visual artifacts, as well as textual and visual materials produced through research itself, can be productive to migration ethnographies that engage with temporality.

Firstly, there is a mass of data that migrants already collect and produce over the course of their migration journeys that may be highly relevant to ethnographers. For example, the ‘paper trail’ created by migrants’ interactions with migration regimes and systems could provide useful data points for highlighting timescales of governance in visa and work-permit applications, residency documents, employment contracts, job applications and so on, and could reveal the intricacies of the entanglement of lives with regulation and provide documentary evidence of key moments and processes. Secondly, there are also the personal records of the migrants themselves – diaries, journals, photo albums, calendars, letters, emails and text messages, blogs and social media posts – that could tell the temporal story of migration time tracks. The use of home-produced visual documentation, such as home videos and photo albums, has previously been utilized as ethnographic data (see, for example, Koltky, 1993; Kotkin, 1978). In more-contemporary contexts, the rise of web cameras, smartphone technology, online communities and social media is likely to have greatly increased the amount of visual and digital self-documentation that migrants produce, archive and share through ‘technologies of the self’ (Fitzgerald, 2000; Schwarz, 2009). Social media and blog formats may be of particular value to temporally engaged research as they often exist as linear constructions of personal experience, posted in ‘real-time’ and archived and displayed chronologically. They can therefore expose both daily practices and rhythms and key moments and milestones across a migration time track. Secondly, online communication between migrants in different places or between migrants and their friends and families can transcend the temporal ‘lags’ between here and there, synchronizing different places through what Cwerner (2001) refers to as ‘asynchronous times’. Thus, both the content of these media and their temporal form can be useful in understanding how migration shapes and is shaped by constructions of time. They simultaneously create historic trails of the past, synchronize different time zones in the present and express imaginaries of the future.

There is also the possibility of producing materials throughout the research process, either individually or collaboratively, using specific prompts or materials provided by the researcher. These can include traditional modes of self-documentation such as journals as well as mixed and multi-media approaches like web or video logging or mixed media ‘cultural probes’ (Robertson, 2008). Participant self-documentation can serve a number of
important purposes in research into migration temporalities. It can allow participants to record responses to events immediately without the element of retrospective reflection inherent to interviews, it can record a volume of detailed and complex data over time that an interview or observation setting could not capture and it can give the researcher glimpses into the private worlds of the participants, including their timelines, tempos and rhythms, without having to physically intrude into these environments. They can thus capture migrants both in many different physical spaces and when they are ‘on the move’.

Conclusions

This chapter has engaged with some key conceptual and methodological issues around ethnographic research and the temporalities of international migration, seeking to suggest some ways in which ethnographic methods can ‘break in’ to the temporal dimension. I have outlined some of the complex temporal characteristics of contemporary migration and positioned these within broader theories of migration and time as well as within debates on the methodological challenges to contemporary international migration research. I have suggested the frameworks of time track and timescale as ways to get a grip on some of the complex relationships between time and migration in the contemporary world and, through these frameworks, discussed two key areas of methodological concern to research on temporality and migration: the role of time in defining research subjects, and the issue of thoroughly capturing meso and macro timescales and their intersections with individual lives. Following Mills’ (2000) suggestion that a blending of methods may be the best way to capture temporality, I have also suggested some means of moving away from methodological statism and fixedness in terms of research practice. These include restructuring traditional ethnographic techniques such as interviewing and participant observation and engaging with self-documentation data in various textual, visual and digital forms.

It is clear that ethnography is well-placed to find new ways to engage with and analyze increasing spatio-temporal complexity in international migration, the ‘quantum haze’ of human mobility’ (McHugh, 2000: 72). Ethnography, with its focus on depth and meaning-making, can shed light on the stickiness and fuzziness around temporariness, permanence, transience, precarity, flexibility and alienation across migrant practices and subjectivities. Yet it is also abundantly clear that, as with any method, ethnography has its limits. Meeus (2012) and Hage (2005) have pointed out that research methods will always have spatial limits, and that there will always be potential conflicts between the mobility of the researched and that of the researcher. Likewise, there will always be potential temporal conflicts between the ‘times of the researcher’ and the ‘times of migrants’. In some
ways, ethnographers can only ever hope to capture ‘snapshots and slices’ of complex migration systems (McHugh, 2000: 72). Yet, bringing a temporal dimension to how we define, choose and approach these ‘snapshots and slices’ can mean more-nuanced understandings – both of migrant experiences and of the overall nature of migration as a complex bundle of interlocking political and social processes. Ethnographic approaches which take seriously the idea of time tracks and timescales as temporalities constitutive of these processes have the potential to bring new methodological and conceptual innovations to the field.

References


Part II

Case-study Insights: South Korea
The Political Economy of Immigration in South Korea

Dong-Hoon Seol

Introduction

At the end of 2012, there were 1,445,000 foreigners from 199 different countries staying in South Korea (hereafter Korea). There are many different types of stayers in Korea – less- and highly skilled migrant workers, international marriage migrants, overseas ethnic-Korean visa-holders and permanent residents (see Seol, 2014). The number of immigrants by visa status in Korea is determined by demand in the host country’s labour and marriage markets, by Korean citizens’ attitude towards immigration and by the Korean government’s policy on immigration.

In particular, we can differentiate between the visa statuses of immigrants – for example, the Korean government operates a selective immigration scheme that receives less-skilled migrant workers by opening its door to just a few countries, while closing the opportunity to others. As can be found with any less-skilled migrant-worker programme in a demand-driven market, the host-society government’s migration policy has a strong impact. Therefore, it is important to look at the sub-groups of immigrants in order to determine a country’s regulations.

However, the complex phenomenon of immigration cannot be explained by variables related to the Korean government’s policy alone, because Korea has a free market economy and political liberalism. Korea adopts a laissez-faire approach to the market that leaves the choice to individuals and to families, with the exception of specific areas which could adversely impact on the indigenous labour market and civil society. For example, it is entirely up to a Korean citizen and her or his family to choose the origin of her or his marriage partner. If she/he is to receive assistance from international matchmaking agencies, then the agencies’ international network will play a role in the choice of spouse. In this case, the individual’s or the family’s preferences, as well as the agency’s network, will have an influence on or determine the chosen spouse’s country of origin.
Political and socio-economic variables explain the differentials in the number of immigrants from each country of origin (see Freeman and Kessler, 2008; Zolberg, 1999). This chapter first explains why the immigrants chose to move to Korea, and which countries they are mainly coming from, and then determines what political and socio-economic variables exist to explain the differentials.

**Korea’s immigration programmes**

For this chapter, I selected the two largest and most typical and foreign immigrant groups for analysis: migrant workers and settled immigrants. Migrant workers can be broken down into two main categories – less-skilled and highly skilled workers – and settled immigrants into three – marriage migrants, overseas ethnic-Korean visa-holders and permanent residents. Table 5.1 shows the details of the major immigrant groups by country of origin.

**Migrant workers: the less-skilled**

The majority of immigrants in Korea are less-skilled migrant workers. At the end of 2012, their number totalled 595,423. They can be divided into three categories of migrant workers with legal status: non-professionals and industrial trainees, ethnic-Korean migrant workers and undocumented migrant workers. In 2012, as Table 5.1 shows, the number of non-professionals and industrial trainees totalled 184,229, and that of ethnic-Korean migrant workers with a Visit and Employment (H-2) visa was 233,340. The number of undocumented migrant workers was 177,854, or 6,375 fewer than the non-professionals and industrial trainees.

**Non-professionals and industrial trainees**

The official programme for less-skilled migrant workers is the Employment Permit Program (EPP) for foreigners. It has been governed by the Act on Foreign Workers’ Employment since 2004. Migrant workers come to Korea on a Non-Professional Employment (E-9) visa under the EPP. The Korean government selected its neighbouring developing countries as sources of migrant workers. By May of 2014, Korea had built Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with 15 countries. Each year, when deciding on the quota for additional migrant workers, the Korean government takes economic conditions, the labour market and the number of undocumented migrants into consideration. This decision is based on major factors such as the preferences of employers with prior experience of hiring migrant workers, the transparency of each country’s labour-sending processes, the percentage of workplace abandonment by the country of origin, the potential for migrant workers to voluntarily return to the home country and the government’s diplomatic obligations, including international economic cooperation and so on (see Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2014).
Table 5.1  Foreign immigrants in South Korea, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Migrant workers</th>
<th>Settled immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,062,424</td>
<td>641,892</td>
<td>595,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>543,329</td>
<td>306,611</td>
<td>297,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>110,086</td>
<td>69,675</td>
<td>68,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>64,185</td>
<td>17,095</td>
<td>3,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>36,540</td>
<td>26,507</td>
<td>23,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>35,489</td>
<td>32,249</td>
<td>31,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>32,826</td>
<td>27,442</td>
<td>27,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>30,385</td>
<td>29,639</td>
<td>29,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>23,776</td>
<td>19,139</td>
<td>19,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>21,796</td>
<td>2,793</td>
<td>1,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>21,545</td>
<td>21,320</td>
<td>21,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>142,467</td>
<td>89,422</td>
<td>72,411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Total foreign immigrants = (2) + (8); (2) Migrant workers = (3) + (7); (3) Less-skilled migrant workers = (4) + (5) + (6); (4) Non-professionals and industrial trainees; (5) Ethnic-Korean migrant workers; (6) Undocumented migrant workers; (7) Highly skilled migrant workers; (8) Settled immigrants = (9) + (10) + (11); (9) Marriage migrants; (10) Overseas Ethnic-Korean (F-4) visa-holders; (11) Permanent residents.

Source: Compiled from Korea Immigration Service (2013).
Ethnic-Korean migrant workers

The Visit and Employment (H-2) visa is only issued to overseas ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship who are seeking less-skilled jobs in Korea. Ethnic Koreans from China and countries of the former USSR usually obtain this H-2 visa rather than the Overseas Ethnic Korean (F-4) visa, due to restrictions in the less-skilled labour sector. Migrant workers with an H-2 visa are free to seek employment in any sector except entertainment, which requires reporting to the government. While the Korean government each year determines the annual quota for less-skilled migrant workers, the quota of migrant workers with an H-2 visa is determined separately from that of non-professionals and industrial trainees. The quota for the issue of H-2 visas is determined by the annual upper limit, although the government also takes into account the needs of the labour market by adjusting the monthly issuing of visas. The Korean government does not set quotas for the different origin countries when issuing H-2 visas – residents with this visa mainly originate from the five countries of China, Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (see Kwak and Seol, 2010; Seol and Skrentny, 2009). In 2012, there were 233,340 residents with an H-2 visa, 222,534 of whom – an absolute majority of 94 per cent – were from China.

Undocumented migrant workers

The Korean government refers to undocumented migrant workers as ‘illegal stayers’ and has cracked down strongly on them, as well as establishing tougher sanctions on business owners and employment brokers. However, the number of undocumented migrant workers is still not decreasing.

Migrant workers: the highly skilled

Highly skilled migrant workers are those with professional knowledge, technology and skills who reside in Korea. They must possess qualifications in the field of application or must have special skills/abilities. Highly skilled migrant workers are exempt from restrictive measures such as visa quotas, visa extension or visa renewal, and are not obliged to wait for employment until the labour market needs can no longer be met by indigenous workers. Korea has tried to attract highly skilled migrant workers, yet the results are not overwhelmingly positive. By 2012, their number was 46,469; only 7 per cent of all migrant workers. Among them, those with global talents were in a relative minority, while foreign language instructors, technicians with the designated activities visa and entertainers continued to be in the majority. Foreign language instructors were mostly from English-speaking countries, China and Japan, where language demands are high; the designated activities visa-holders were mostly from China and other South-East Asian countries; and most entertainers were from the Philippines.
Settled immigrants

Marriage migrants

The Korean government does not control international marriage in itself. Although Kim (2008: 65) argues that foreign brides are ‘imported’ to overcome the crisis in reproduction caused by low fertility rates, the argument is only supported by a few local governments in rural areas, which partially funded the travel costs incurred by international marriages in their region. The central government neither encouraged nor suppressed international marriage. However, since the increase in marriage immigrants from the early 2000s, in 2004 the government established integration policies to incorporate immigrants into Korean society. At the same time, it introduced policies to regulate international matchmaking agencies’ illegal activities, measures which included the implementation of mandatory registration for international matchmaking agencies, followed by the adaptation of visa policy restricting the issue of the F-6 visa when Korean citizens whose incomes are below the minimum standard of living apply to invite their spouses from overseas.

Overseas ethnic-Korean visa-holders

The Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Ethnic Koreans, promulgated on 2 September 1999 as Law No. 6015, legislated that ethnic Koreans should have socio-economically equal rights to Korean citizens. The Overseas Ethnic Korean (F-4) visa is issued to ethnic Koreans who have acquired foreign citizenship, or ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship whose parent or grandparent has Korean citizenship. Overseas Ethnic Koreans from developed nations, such as the United States, have to prove that only one of their parents or grandparents was a Korean citizen. However, for those from China or countries of the former Soviet Union to receive an F-4 visa, they have to have a Bachelor’s degree or higher, be a corporate representative or executive, or an entrepreneur with more than US$100,000 in sales. This kind of institutional discrimination among ethnic Koreans is regarded as hierarchical nationhood (see Seol and Seo, 2014; Seol and Skrentny, 2009). Although almost all ethnic Koreans from developed countries would see their application for an F-4 visa approved, the chances of ethnic Koreans from China and the former USSR receiving an F-4 visa are slim to non-existent. As a result, ethnic Koreans from China and the former Soviet Union could only apply for an H-2 visa instead of an F-4 visa. Until the mid-2000s, the pathway for H-2 visa-holders to exchange it for an F-4 visa was blocked. In 2008, the Korean government opened the way to those who worked in manufacturing, agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing industries outside Seoul for more than two years. Since the policy change, ethnic Koreans with an F-4 visa totalled 187,894, where ethnic-Korean Chinese (Joseonjok) became the majority in 2012, followed by those from the United States and other advanced countries.
Permanent residents

The Permanent Resident (F-5) visa was created in April 2002. The Korean government issues the F-5 to foreigners when their permanent stay is deemed beneficial to the country. Permanent residents can stay for as long as the Permanent Resident status is maintained. In the early 2000s, the majority of permanent residents were Taiwanese citizens, the descendants of pre-1945 immigrants. Later, the number of international marriages increased, and it was made possible for marriage migrants to obtain a Permanent Resident visa after two years in the host country. Chinese, Japanese and other South-East Asian citizens joined them. The F-5 policy changed drastically in 2008. The Korean government enlarged the channels to getting a Permanent Resident visa for foreign investors and employers hiring more than five Korean-citizen workers and for ethnic Koreans with an H-2 visa. H-2 visa-holders who had worked in manufacturing, agriculture and stockbreeding, and fishing industries outside Seoul for more than four years, and who had obtained an official licence related to the industry or whose annual income was above the average income per capita, were eligible to apply for a Permanent Resident visa. As a result, by 2012 the number of permanent residents had increased to 84,140 people from various origin countries.

The causes of immigration to Korea

What can explain the differences in the number of immigrants from the 29 sending countries? This chapter looks at the key explanatory variables. Theoretical explanations for the causes of international migration can be found in the neoclassical economic approach represented by push–pull theories, and historical–structural approaches such as world systems theory. Each approach emphasizes the developmental gap between sending and receiving countries and the formation of social linkages between the respective countries (Castles et al., 2013; Massey, 1999; Massey et al., 1993; Seol, 1999). However, the relative importance of the two approaches varies according to the origin country of the immigrants.

Research model

I selected key variables presented by both the neoclassical economic approach (see Borjas, 1989; Leblang et al., 2014; Lee, 1966; Lewer and Van den Berg, 2008) and the historical–structural approach (see Sassen, 1988) and constructed a comprehensive model: a correlation analysis between explanatory variables and the number of immigrants. The sending country’s income level, income distribution, economic growth and employment, and the spatial difference with and cultural distance between Korea and the origin countries are derived from the neoclassical economic approach (push–pull theories and cost–benefit analysis). On the other hand, foreign investment,
international trade, tourism and ethnic-Korean variables are drawn from the historical–structural approach. The variables are related closely, so it is difficult to ensure statistical independence. This chapter focuses not on building a causal model with the net effect of each variable based on the multivariate analysis, but on finding the key variables that mean the correlation coefficient is statistically significant.

The neoclassical economic approach

Push–pull theories incorporate the origin country’s lower income, poorer employment opportunities and ease of departure – the push factors – and the receiving country’s high employment opportunities and ease of entry – the pull factors; the distance between the countries is an intermediary factor. Economic cost–benefit analysis employs a similar logic in determining the appropriate variables (see Sjaastad, 1962), according to which logic international migration occurs if the benefits to the immigrant – whether an individual or a family – outweigh the costs. These variables include the migrant(s) income level, income distribution, economic growth, employment opportunity and spatial and cultural distance.

Income level

The most important variable in push–pull theories and cost–benefit analysis is the income gap between the origin country and Korea. I adopted the GDP per capita PPP as an indicator of income level. The income gap between Korea and the sending country has a positive value, and the greater the value the more attractive it will be for an immigrant to live or work in Korea – in other words, if a citizen of a developing country can be predicted to have a higher income when working in Korea instead of their home country, then the prospect is more enticing. Furthermore, the governments of sending countries have implemented policies that encourage – or at least do not hinder – their citizens’ migration to Korea in the hope that the move will result in the sending home of remittances.

However, there is a limitation to measuring an income gap in this way. When viewed at the individual level, the fact that the possibility of migration is based on the level of income disparity also implies that migration will still occur when the value of the GDP per capita is negative. Additionally, if an individual’s labour carries a higher value in Korea than in his or her home country – for example, if an American with a Bachelor’s degree were to become an English-language instructor in Korea, then his or her labour would be valued much higher in Korea than in the United States. In this case, the GDP per capita between the United States and Korea will have a negative value; yet the expected income is much higher, so the person is more likely to migrate to Korea.

A positive correlation coefficient of income disparity indicates that the differences in expected income are great; however, when the correlation
Social Transformation and Migration

coefficient is negative, individual labour is understood to be more highly valued in Korea than in the country of origin.

Income distribution
The relationship between income distribution in the country of origin and international migration is not linear. Immigrants are required to meet significant costs in the migration process, so an income level sufficient to cover all the initial expenses is required before departure. These financial restraints result in middle–lower- or middle-income groups and families being able to afford international migration more than the lowest income groups. Considering this point, I have chosen the *distribution of family income* and the *share of the population below the poverty line* as the two variables, which reflect different aspects. The former is measured by the Gini coefficient, and represents the inequality of family income distribution; the latter indicates the share of the poorest population. The destitute poor benefit the most from international migration in terms of income disparity, but the financial constraints caused by the migration process make it impossible for them to pursue their goal (see Abramitzky et al., 2013).

Economic growth
For low-income families and groups in the country of origin, the higher the income level, the more likely they are to choose international migration. Thus it is important to measure the *GDP real growth rate*. In developing countries that have achieved some measure of economic growth, in particular, there would be more people who can afford to migrate, increasing the size of international migration flows. Of course, economic growth would hinder migration when the income disparity between the origin and the destination countries decreases so far as to be almost negligible, given the financial constraints of migration. In the early stages of economic development, the benefits that sending countries can expect to receive are still high, and more people will be able to afford migration costs due to this income growth, leading to an increase in international migration. So, income growth and immigration levels have a bell-shaped relationship. As far as the non-linear relationship between income growth and immigration is concerned, economic growth has a positive effect on international migration but only under specific conditions.

Employment opportunity
International migration is a phenomenon that occurs when people move from a surplus-labour society to one with a labour deficit. The origin country’s *labour force, labour force participation rate* and *unemployment rate* reflect the country’s labour-market situation and the employment opportunities for the country’s citizens (see Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1970). However, in the relationship between international migration and employment
opportunity, the domestic and foreign employment opportunities are not always evaluated equally, and the effect of employment opportunities is often interpreted in contradictory ways.

A labour force or economically active population is those people of ‘production age’, in other words those in the 15–64 age bracket, not including the economically inactive population such as housewives and students. In general, the greater the number of people who make up a country’s labour force, the more likely it is that many of them will seek employment overseas. However, if the country experiences rapid economic growth and needs a substantial labour force, labour shortages could occur. Therefore, the labour force is considered to be just one of many indicators representing employment opportunities, and it must be open to other interpretations.

Apart from the labour force itself, the labour force participation rate can also represent the share of the labour force in the total ‘production-age’ population. The higher the labour force participation rate, the better the employment opportunities in the origin countries. If the origin countries have many employment opportunities, this can deter international migration; however, at the same time, this would remove the financial constraints of international migration and, as a result, promote overseas employment, as more migrants would be able to afford the costs involved. The possibility of the latter is higher than the former. When considering the advantages of international migration, domestic employment opportunities are relatively less valued.

The actual number of people employed among the economically active population is called the employment rate; by the same token, the share of the economically active population who are unemployed is called the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is a function of labour supply and employment capability. The unemployment rate in the country indicates whether or not the labour force is excessive, and affects international migration in two ways: when the unemployment rate of the origin country is high, individuals seek employment both domestically and globally, thus increasing the volume of migration. However, the higher the unemployment rate is, the higher the ratio of the population living below the poverty line will be, which exacerbates the financial constraints of migration, and inhibits the volume of international migration.

Spatial distance

Push–pull theories hypothesize that, if the spatial distance between the two countries is relatively small, then a larger scale of international migration will be observed. I have calculated the spatial difference between each sending country’s capital city and metropolis according to the airfare from these cities to Korea. Airfares are determined on the basis of both geographic distance and economic factors, such as the number of passengers, and are the strongest determining factor in the early stages of international migration.
It is therefore a more suitable indicator than geographical distance in the case of the relative proximity of the two countries involved. The closer the sending country is to Korea, in other words, the cheaper the airfare becomes, and international migration will be easier for the people.

**Cultural distance**

Sending-country citizens’ attitude towards the Korean culture can be defined as the *cultural distance*. A common religion between the sending and the receiving country is usually used as an indicator of cultural closeness or cultural distance. Korea's religious pluralism has adopted Christianity, Buddhism, and other religions, and there is a high ratio of atheists, so religion cannot be used as an appropriate indicator of cultural distance here. I have instead incorporated the so-called Korean wave, the popularity of Korean culture as an alternative indicator of cultural distance, using the number of views by each country on K-pop singer Psy's *Gentleman* music video on YouTube. Though there are other factors that can limit the measurement, such as Internet accessibility, I had no choice but to use these data to analyze all 29 countries. In China, it is impossible for general users to access YouTube; the actual measure of 5,644 was replaced by an estimated value of 3,538,725.4 The shorter the cultural distance, in other words, the more popular the Korean wave is in the country of origin, and the greater the possibility of international migration to Korea. Cultural distance not only expresses the degree of desire to live in Korea but also the degree of pressure, so the ease of departure can be considered as an indicator.

**The historical–structural approach**

World systems theory emphasizes the social linkages between sending and receiving countries. Important variables include foreign investment, international trade, tourism and overseas ethnic Koreans. I now look at each of these in turn.

**Foreign investment**

The FDI of Korean enterprises can be categorized into two types: market development strategy, which seeks to penetrate the barriers of the consumer market, and labour-costs reduction strategy, which seeks to employ cheap labour. The two types of foreign investment have an effect on the formation of socio-economic links between Korea and the countries invested in. The scale of FDI measured by the investment of Korean capital in the targeted country can be used as an appropriate indicator of sending countries and of Korea’s socio-economic linkage structure (see Leblang, 2010).

**International trade**

Commodity exchange constructs a bridge between two societies (see Bo and Jacks, 2012; Hatton and Williamson, 2007; Mundell, 1957). Foreign
investment and international trade are closely related. However, this is not always true in the case of international trade without capital mobility. Exports from Korea to foreign markets, the import of foreign goods into Korea and international trade – the sum of the two values – were set as indicators. The greater the amount of international trade between the origin country and Korea, the stronger the socio-economic linkages between the two countries, which ultimately raise the likelihood of migration to Korea.

Tourism

Person-to-person exchanges between the two societies can directly form socio-economic linkages and also represent existing linkages. Human interactions can be linked to economic factors such as foreign investment and international trade, and they can also include basic human interactions such as tourism. Tourism has broadened the interface of the interaction between the two societies, and created social linkages. For example, Thailand is one of the most preferred countries for Korean newlyweds to go on honeymoon, and this has made the relationship between the two societies closer.

Overseas ethnic Koreans

World systems theory emphasizes that relations between former colonizers and colonies, the experiences of colonialism and a foreign military presence in a country can all act as catalysts for international migration. Sassen (1988) has appropriately pointed out that Korea is one of the top ten countries sending migrants to the United States due to the presence in Korea of US forces. Nonetheless, the influx of foreigners in Korea cannot be explained by these variables. It is, however, important to note that, as a result of the colonial experience between 1910 and 1945, ethnic-Korean descendants have come to Korea from China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and other countries. Neither can we ignore the emergence of a ‘new Korean diaspora’ in the aftermath of WWII, particularly from the 1960s onwards. The descendants of these migrants have also come to Korea from the United States, Canada and Japan, among other countries. The Korean government developed immigration programmes which targeted ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship. It is also important to note that social linkages with ethnic Koreans in advanced countries such as the United States, Japan and Germany can stimulate immigration to Korea. The existence of ethnic Koreans who settled overseas signifies the social linkages between them and Korean society. The linkages can also be used for their return migration but can boost the immigration of their fellow citizens of non-Korean ethnicity by providing prospective immigrants with information regarding the migration process that can lower migration costs – help with accommodation, the search for employment, and working and living in Korea.


**Model for analysis**

The ten theoretical concepts derived from both the *neoclassical economic approach* and the *historical–structural approach* were measured using 15 variables, presented in the Appendix. The values of these variables were collected from a variety of sources, set out beneath the Appendix. This research model does not require the statistical independence of the independent variables, thus the data presented are non-standardized.

**Analysis and findings**

To explain the differentials in the number of immigrants from the 29 origin countries, a correlation analysis was undertaken. Table 5.2 shows that both the neoclassical economic and the historical–structural variables are correlated with the distribution of immigrants’ origin countries.

In particular, the historical–structural variables – including FDI, trade, tourism and ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship – are strongly correlated with the number of immigrants by origin country for all the sub-groups, with just one exception: migrant workers through the EPP for foreigners. The EPP's quota per country is based on the Korean employers’ preference and diplomatic–political considerations. The effects of the historical–structural variables are statistically insignificant.

Among the neoclassical economic variables, there are three which show consistent effects across all immigrant groups’ origin countries. Only one is statistically significant; the others are all insignificant.

The more severe the income inequality becomes – that is to say, the greater the Gini coefficient of family income value – the greater the number of immigrants from that country in Korea. This shows that migrants choose to move when they see better prospects compared to those in their origin countries in terms of income and other life opportunities. This fact is common to all groups of immigrants.

The other two variables – ‘percentage of the population below the poverty line’ and ‘unemployment rate’ – have no influence on immigrants’ distribution by origin country. The poorest of the poor – those whose income is below the poverty line – and the unemployed do not usually come to Korea as migrant workers or settled immigrants because they cannot afford the migration costs. Most immigrants to Korea are those in the middle–lower- or middle-income socio-economic class, rather than those in the lowest class in the origin country.

The effects of the remaining variables in the neoclassical economic approach are quite dissimilar. First, the origin country's ‘GDP per capita’ is strongly correlated to the distribution of non-professionals and industrial trainees. Countries with lower levels of per capita income have a greater number of less-skilled legal migrant workers in Korea. Less-skilled migrant
### Table 5.2: Correlation coefficients between the number of foreign immigrants and the explanatory variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Migrant workers</th>
<th>Settled immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)</td>
<td>(8) (9) (10) (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neoclassical economic variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita PPP (US$)</td>
<td>-0.097 -0.182 -0.209 -0.489** -0.091 -0.221 0.396* 0.015 -0.138 0.106 0.009</td>
<td>0.349* 0.322* 0.351* 0.289*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of family income (Gini coefficient)</td>
<td>0.378* 0.395* 0.385* 0.246* 0.307† 0.455** 0.376*</td>
<td>0.349* 0.322* 0.351* 0.289*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below poverty line (%)</td>
<td>-0.127 -0.109 -0.106 -0.077 -0.087 -0.110 -0.123 -0.146 -0.130 -0.129 -0.167</td>
<td>0.146 -0.130 -0.129 -0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP real growth rate (%)</td>
<td>0.218 0.270† 0.281† 0.336* 0.196 0.306† -0.070 0.146 0.188 0.112 0.127</td>
<td>0.146 0.188 0.112 0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force (millions)</td>
<td>0.820*** 0.805*** 0.796*** -0.062 0.833*** 0.751*** 0.565* 0.823*** 0.690*** 0.814*** 0.800***</td>
<td>0.194 0.278† 0.154 0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation rate (%)</td>
<td>0.232 0.259† 0.263† 0.407* 0.171 0.257† 0.039 0.194 0.278† 0.154 0.125</td>
<td>0.194 0.278† 0.154 0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>-0.066 -0.059 -0.059 -0.011 -0.040 -0.111 -0.036 -0.072 -0.107 -0.043 -0.072</td>
<td>0.020 -0.382* -0.109 -0.322*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air fare (KRW)</td>
<td>-0.320* -0.369* -0.387* -0.496** -0.257† -0.433** 0.140 -0.250† -0.382* -0.109 -0.322*</td>
<td>0.224 0.117 0.338* 0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean wave (YouTube view count)</td>
<td>0.140 0.072 0.029 -0.101 0.031 0.097 0.800***</td>
<td>0.778*** 0.601*** 0.864*** 0.624***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Historical-structural variables |                       |                    |
| FDI (millions US$) | 0.719*** 0.661*** 0.627*** -0.037 0.646*** 0.613*** 0.949*** 0.778*** 0.601*** 0.864*** 0.624*** | 0.778*** 0.601*** 0.864*** 0.624*** |
| Trade (export + import; thousands US$) | 0.842*** 0.791*** 0.771*** -0.104 0.815*** 0.737*** 0.742*** 0.892*** 0.749*** 0.891*** 0.848*** | 0.892*** 0.749*** 0.891*** 0.848*** |
| Export (thousands US$) | 0.911*** 0.867*** 0.848*** -0.051 0.879*** 0.817*** 0.767*** 0.949*** 0.803*** 0.948*** 0.894*** | 0.949*** 0.803*** 0.948*** 0.894*** |
| Import (thousands US$) | 0.702*** 0.643*** 0.623*** -0.169 0.682*** 0.587*** 0.667*** 0.765*** 0.634*** 0.762*** 0.740*** | 0.765*** 0.634*** 0.762*** 0.740*** |
| Korean visitors (person) | 0.847*** 0.815*** 0.803*** -0.041 0.824*** 0.796*** 0.597*** 0.871*** 0.791*** 0.822*** 0.855*** | 0.871*** 0.791*** 0.822*** 0.855*** |
| Overseas ethnic Koreans (person) | 0.862*** 0.812*** 0.787*** -0.128 0.841*** 0.739*** 0.840*** 0.911*** 0.705*** 0.965*** 0.823*** | 0.911*** 0.705*** 0.965*** 0.823*** |

(1) Total foreign immigrants = (2) + (8); (2) Migrant workers = (3) + (7); (3) Less-skilled migrant workers = (4) + (5) + (6); (4) Non-professionals and industrial trainees; (5) Ethnic-Korean migrant workers; (6) Undocumented migrant workers; (7) Highly skilled migrant workers; (8) Settled immigrants = (9) + (10) + (11); (9) Marriage migrants; (10) Overseas ethnic Korean (F-4) visa-holders; (11) Permanent residents.


† <0.10 * <0.05 ** <0.01 *** <0.001, N = 29.
workers tend to be recruited from countries that can benefit from remittances sent home from overseas host countries. The pattern is reversed for highly skilled migrant workers. Countries with a higher per capita income have a greater number of immigrants in Korea. Those with advanced technological skills, professional knowledge and/or linguistic ability tend to be from economically advanced countries.

Second, the correlation between the ‘GDP real growth rate’ and the number of migrant workers is statistically significant. The distribution of migrant workers by their country of origin is significantly correlated with the origin country’s economic growth rate for non-professionals and industrial trainees, and undocumented and less-skilled migrant workers. The higher the economic growth of the origin country, the more likely migrant workers are to come to Korea. Individuals from countries with a higher economic growth are more likely to be able to afford the migration costs and more easily come to Korea. However, the tendency does not apply to the distribution of H-2-visa migrant workers by country of origin. They are recruited based on the Visit and Employment Program for ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship, so economic growth in the origin country is not significantly correlated. The economic growth rate is also not correlated with the distribution of highly skilled workers and settled immigrants in Korea.

Third, the ‘labour force’ by sending country has no influence on non-professionals’ and industrial trainees’ distribution by country of origin, yet it exerts a positive impact on other immigrant groups’ distribution. Sending countries with a relatively large labour force – such as China and Indonesia – make up the majority among the total population of immigrants in Korea. In other words, the larger the home country’s labour force, the greater the number of immigrants in Korea. However, such a principle does not apply to the EPP for foreigners. The Chinese government did not comply with the MOU conditions proposed by Korea. As a result, the Korean government postponed the MOU with China, and in the early 2000s relocated the quota of migrant workers originally assigned to China to other countries. In other words, the EPP is a government-led migration workers recruitment programme.

Fourth, the correlations between the sending countries’ ‘labour force participation rate’ and the number of immigrants in Korea show a pattern similar to the correlations between the ‘GDP real growth rate in the origin country’ and the number of immigrants in Korea. Non-professionals and industrial trainees, undocumented migrant workers, less-skilled migrant workers, total migrant workers and international marriage immigrants’ distribution by country of origin all have a statistically significant correlation with the economic growth rate of the origin country. The higher the labour force participation rate of the origin country, the greater the number of migrant workers and international marriage migrants who fall into the category. Considering that most people who choose to leave their country of origin are not from the lowest-income families, we can infer that a society
with a high labour force participation rate will have a greater likelihood of outward-bound migration.

Fifth, the spatial distances between the sending countries and Korea, in most cases, affect the number of immigrants. However, there are two exceptions – highly skilled migrant workers and ethnic Koreans with F-4 visas – where the correlation coefficients between spatial distance and number of immigrants are statistically insignificant.

Sixth, the cultural distance between the sending countries and Korea is, interestingly, only statistically significant in the two groups whose spatial distance is statistically insignificant. The more popular the Korean wave is in the sending countries, the more immigrants there are from those countries in the two categories. This implies that the Korean wave affects the selection process and results in the choice of Korea as their migration destination. The effect of the Korean wave narrowing the cultural distance between the countries is a major reason why ethnic Koreans choose long-term residence with an F-4 visa as a type of return migration to Korea.

Conclusion

Korea receives many types of immigrants. It is very important to analyze the influence of their distribution by country of origin for both academia and policy-makers. This chapter fills the vacancy, and provides implications for the fields of research.

The main findings of this contribution can be summarized through this parable: social linkages were constructed between the sending countries and Korea to act as a highway for an influx of migrants, and the migrants arrive in Korea riding different kinds of vehicles which represent the various visas. There are cases where the distribution of the country of origin is totally dependent on the policies of host society governments concerning non-professionals and industrial trainees, and there are cases of other types of migrant workers and settled immigrants being dependent on the market mechanisms or social relations within civil societies. The various outcomes imply the importance of understanding the historical–structural factor first in order to consider individual factors afterwards. The neoclassical economic approach and the historical–structural approach are not to be understood separately; rather the two approaches must be used as a comprehensive model and be combined when explaining and understanding social phenomena.

Notes

1 Other immigrant groups such as foreign students, investors and asylum-seekers are not included in the analysis. Naturalized citizens are also not included due to the non-availability of relevant data. The Korean government does not release the stock number of naturalized citizens by country of origin.

3 These were China, Vietnam, the United States, the Philippines, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Cambodia, Japan, Sri Lanka, Canada, Mongolia, Nepal, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Russia, Pakistan, Australia, the United Kingdom, India, New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Germany, Timor-Leste, France, Iran and Laos.

4 KOFICE measured the Korean wave index and placed China between Japan and Taiwan; therefore the median value between Japan and Taiwan was assigned (KOFICE, 2011: 7).

References


Introduction

South Korea has undergone extremely rapid transformation in many areas – demographic, economic, political, social and cultural – during the past six decades. Its Gross National Product (GNP) per person increased from US$79 in 1960 to US$22,582 in 2012. The total fertility rate dropped from 6.0 in 1960 to 2.06 or around the replacement level in 1983, then reached its lowest level of 1.23 in 2010, rising slightly to 1.24 in 2011. Meanwhile, the proportion of the Korean population aged 65 years and over has increased considerably from 3.3 per cent in 1960 to 11.3 per cent in 2010. Statistics Korea (KNSO, 2011) predicts that the population proportion of people of economically productive age (15–64 years) will begin to decline from 2018 due to an ageing population and low fertility.

The past six decades can be divided into two stages; the early stage (1960s–1980s) has been called ‘condensed modernity’ and the second stage (1990s–present) can be viewed as ‘a second modernity’ (Chang, 2010). The first stage is characterized by a ‘developmental’ period as its first priority was economic development orchestrated by an authoritarian government while sacrificing many political, social and cultural objectives. The explosive civil movement of 1987 became a stepping-stone enabling Korea to jump to the second stage. Thus, the second stage can be characterized as a ‘democratization’ period, though its progress was not entirely smooth due to a global economic crisis followed by economic fluctuations.

In between these two stages, South Korea also experienced a shift from being a migrant-sending country to a migrant-receiving one. The total number of migrant residents was fewer than 200,000 in 1993, but rose to over 1,400,000 in 2012 (Ministry of Justice, 1991–2012) with 589,000 (42 per cent) being migrant workers and 221,000 marriage migrants (16 per cent) or foreign spouses who married locals (MOPAS, 2012). Labour and marriage migrants are the two most significant migrant groupings in South Korea.
Among migrant residents in 2012 (1,409,577), about 90 per cent were Asians and the remaining 10 per cent were non-Asians, including Americans. If we look at ethnicity or nationality in more detail, the largest group is Korean-Chinese (40 per cent), followed by Chinese (15 per cent), Vietnamese (12 per cent), Americans (5 per cent), Filipinos (4 per cent) and Japanese (3 per cent) (MOPAS, 2012).

It is now more than two decades since South Korea began to attract labour and marriage migrants, and there have been important policy shifts since the 2000s. The Employment Permit System (EPS) (2004) and its co-ethnic (or Joseonjok) version, the Working Visit System (WVS) (2007), are current major foreign-worker policies, while the so-called ‘multicultural policy’ is a social-integration policy for certain migrants, especially for marriage migrants. In South Korea, issues and policies towards migrant groupings differ depending on their status (migrant workers vs marriage migrants) and their ethnicity (foreigners vs co-ethnic foreigners). Focusing primarily on the second stage of Korean social transformation, this paper reviews the trends and patterns of labour and marriage migration to South Korea and related policy shifts. It then explores the peculiarity of international migration to South Korea and its implications.

Trends and patterns of labour migration

Labour migration to Korea began with visiting Korean-Chinese in the late 1980s. Korean-Chinese refers to ethnic Koreans and their succeeding generations who have resided in China since migrating there from the nineteenth century onwards. Some voluntarily crossed the Duman River in response to famine and natural disasters after the mid-nineteenth century, while others, sometimes involuntarily, migrated to the Manju area during the Japanese colonization period (1910–45). After Korea was liberated in 1945 and when the Communist Party took over in China in 1949, ethnic Koreans could not return to their home country due to severed diplomatic relations between South Korea and Communist China. Instead, they settled in the northeastern part of China, predominantly in Yanbin, a Korean self-governing autonomous area, maintaining their own language and culture under China’s favourable minority policy (Lee, 2005: 351; 2006: 502–3). Nowadays, about two million Korean-Chinese are one of 55 minority ethnic groups in China.

While China opened its doors to capitalist investment, the Korean-Chinese areas have not experienced the rapid economic development that other regions in China have. This is mainly because the Korean-Chinese communities are concentrated in marginal areas of the country. Instead, since the late 1980s, it has primarily been by visiting relatives back in South Korea that Korean-Chinese have found economic opportunities. Their visits were made possible due to political changes in the post-Cold War era, with a normalizing of political relations between China and South Korea.
While the influx of Korean-Chinese continued steadily, from the early 1990s other migrant groups also began to enter Korea. Initially these were mainly nationals of Bangladesh and the Philippines (Lee, 1994). Several factors inspired the migration, such as the end of large construction projects in the Middle East, which led migrant workers to seek alternative destinations for employment, and the ‘Japan Rush’ phenomenon, which was caused by a desire to migrate particularly to Japan as a result of the high value of its local currency (Lee, 1994: 98–9; 1997: 509–10; 2014: 291). These labour migrations were led by the economic needs of the workers.

However, the South Korean government was caught unprepared for the policy implications which come with a large influx of migrants into the country. Indeed, the debate started ‘after the fact’ as to how these new groups should be treated in society. Initially this debate began within the industries which employed these groups and then spread to the academic world and finally to policy-makers. In November 1991, the government introduced the ‘Overseas Investment Enterprise Trainee System’; in November 1993, this was changed to the ‘Industrial Trainee System’ (ITS).

As Figure 6.1 illustrates, there were 44,000 migrant workers in South Korea by 1992, increasing to nearly 700,000 by 2009, fluctuating thereafter due to the global economic downturn. Since the influx of migrant workers into South Korea began with visiting Korean-Chinese, they comprised over 60 per cent of all migrant workers in 1992. As the South Korean government began to formulate and apply the ITS during the early 1990s, the nationalities of migrants began to diversify and also included many South-East Asian migrant workers.

Figure 6.1 Number of migrant workers in South Korea, 1991–2012
The ITS certainly helped to reduce the shortage of labour for small and medium enterprises involved in dirty, dangerous and demanding (3D) jobs. However, it has been evaluated as a total failure because the system resulted in several problems, such as low wages, exploitation and the abuse of human rights. The most serious problem was that it resulted in a pool of undocumented migrants. Because trainees were not regular labourers by definition, their training allowances were set very low, even far below those of undocumented migrants. As a result, trainees tended to run away and become undocumented workers. The share of undocumented migrant workers reached its peak at 80 per cent in the early 2000s.

Therefore, a desire for a policy shift developed not only in civil society, through migrant-support NGO-led social movements, but also at a governmental level (Lee, 2008a). However, when the Asian financial crisis hit the region in 1997, attempts at change miscarried. In the early 2000s, when South Korea had overcome the economic crisis, two significant shifts in foreign-worker policies occurred. One shift was to the EPS and the other was to the WVS. The target group of the former was generally Asian migrant workers, while that of the latter was co-ethnic migrant workers or Korean-Chinese. In the beginning, the EPS operated alongside the ITS from August 2004. Finally, foreign-worker policy became unified into the EPS from January 2007.

Policy shift towards the EPS

There are several internal and international factors which have influenced changes in immigration policy in Korea – such as judicial decisions, NGO-led social movements and international pressure to protect the human rights of migrants. In Lee (2008a, 2008b), however, I demonstrated how the changes in Korean foreign-worker policy since 2004 can be explained through the prism of ‘professional competition among ministries’ and ‘the perspective of the government’. I highlighted the competition between the various ministries, notably those representing economic interests and those representing labour rights. The significance of the political perspective of the administration was also noted, with major developments towards expansion and inclusion having occurred under President Moo-Hyun Roh (2003–08) and his left-wing government.¹ Both President Myeong-Bak Lee’s (2008–13) and the current President Geun-Hye Park’s (2013–present) administrations are from the political right. While the former left-wing government emphasized ‘human rights’ and ‘nationhood’ in its foreign-worker policies, the right-wing administrations tend to emphasize economic interests.

The latter right-wing administration justifies this protectionist approach as a result of the recent global economic downturn. Due to fears of rising domestic unemployment, the administration has reduced the quota of and benefits for migrant workers. Under the Lee administration, for example, the migrant workers’ quota was reduced to 34,000 (17,000 EPS and 17,000 WVS)

¹0.1057/9781137474957 - Social Transformation and Migration, Edited by Stephen Castles, Derya Ozkul and Magdalena Cubas
In 2009, the quota remained the same at 34,000, but all for EPS foreign workers and none for WVS co-ethnic (H-2) workers. This meant that the government did not issue any new H-2 (WVS) visas, instead wanting to keep the number of co-ethnic workers who already resided in Korea under the ceiling of 303,000. The quota for EPS rose to 57,000 in 2012 and 62,000 in 2013. In addition, the original EPS required employers to provide foreign workers with room and board and to guarantee their departure and wages. From 2008, these requirements went from mandatory to optional, in order to reduce employers’ costs. The maximum period of work for foreign workers expanded from three years to nearly five years (four years and ten months). From July 2012, the EPS has changed to allow, via ‘re-employment permits’, some foreign manual workers who have not left their designated workplaces to be re-employed by the same employers three months after leaving Korea.

This change aimed to help small-sized manufacturing and farming industries to retain semi-skilled migrant workers while preventing these latter from changing their workplace or from becoming undocumented migrants after the expiry of their visas. This reminds us of the fact that the EPS was devised when its predecessor, the ITS, led to a significant increase in undocumented migrants. In this sense, the EPS has also not effectively addressed the issue of undocumented migrants. From the beginning, the Korean EPS has had a pro-employer flavour, which has been further enriched due to the economic downturn. Therefore, it has not improved the human-rights conditions of foreign workers as much as was originally intended.

Since the current manual migrant-worker policy does not allow migrants to bring their families to Korea, it will face more serious criticism of the resulting family dissolution than the original EPS. Therefore, the most serious challenge will be whether the government can prevent the permanent stay of manual migrant workers in Korea, and how long it can maintain the restrictive rules preventing family reunification in the future.

Co-ethnic issues in Korean foreign-worker policy: the Working Visit System

When the Korean government had to decide what kind of labour-migration policy was suitable for the nation-state, it chose to discard the co-ethnic preference system in the early 1990s – it only revived it, under the name of the WVS, in 2007.

During the early 1990s, Japan and Korea experienced a similar situation in relation to co-ethnic return migration. The contrasting outcome between Japan and Korea is stark. There were various reasons behind this policy difference such as geo-political factors, the Cold War legacy, a concern for the national security of Korea and the overriding consideration of employers’ preferences for South-East Asian workers in order to maintain the wages and privileges of foreign workers at a low level. However, the point should not be missed that
Korea’s level of liberal democracy at that time was very low in terms of concerns for human rights (Lee, 2010a: 572–3; Seol and Skrentny, 2004).

When the Korean government decided to choose the WVS for co-ethnic migrants in 2007, it was not a voluntary decision but, rather, a compromise. The story actually goes back to 1997, when the Asian financial crisis hit Korea as well as the wider region. During the crisis (1997–98), then-President Dae-Joong Kim and his administration wanted to attract overseas Korean investment in the same way that overseas Chinese contributed to China’s development. Hence, they proposed the Act on Immigration and the Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (OKA) in 1998. The law permitted overseas Koreans free access to Korea and longer stays, and granted privileges not accorded to other foreign nationals, including the buying and selling of land and other assets.

When this law was initially prepared, it included all overseas Koreans. However, the definition of ‘overseas Korean’ (Dongpo) was changed in order to exclude those now disenfranchised, such as Korean-Chinese and Korean-Russians. Specifically, the definition of Dongpo changed from ‘Koreans by racial extraction’ to ‘a person who had lost their Korean nationality’. Thereby, ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union were excluded from the category, the reason being that many could not officially confirm their Korean nationality before they obtained a foreign nationality because they had emigrated during the period of Japanese colonization (1910–45), before the foundation of the Republic of Korea in 1948. The official reason for this exclusion was that the earlier definition angered the Chinese government, which was concerned that the OKA would agitate Chinese citizens who were of Korean racial extraction. In reality, however, it was due to a feared loss of labour-market control and national security concerns (Lee, 2010a). As a result, there was anger amongst Korean-Chinese. Three Korean-Chinese people, with the help of migrant-support NGOs, petitioned the Constitutional Court to review the enacting legislation. The Constitutional Court ruled, in November 2001, that the altered definition did not agree with the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Therefore, the Court ordered that the law be revised by the end of 2003 (Lee, 2010a).

The law was thus revised on 1 February 2004 to include Korean-Chinese and Korean-Russians. However, since the Immigration Control Law prohibits a person who acquires an overseas Korean stay visa (F-4) to take up employment as a manual worker, it remains difficult for ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union to obtain such F-4 visas in practice (Lee C., 2005: 522; Lee, 2010a; Seol and Skrentny, 2009).

Meanwhile, by way of compromise, the Employment Management System (EMS) became effective in December 2002, and its successor, the WVS, became effective from March 2007. Both are a kind of ‘work permit system’. While the EMS only allowed entry and employment for people who have relatives in the Republic of Korea, the WVS expands entry to those who have
no relatives there. In addition, the WVS allows for free movement between China and Korea for a period of up to five years (termed a ‘plural visa’). In 2008 another global economic crisis hit Korea and, since then, the WVS has undergone several restrictions, including a reduction in its quota.

Trends and patterns of marriage migration to South Korea

Like other migration to Korea, marriage migration was also led by Korean-Chinese after 1992, when Korea re-established an official relationship with China. Figure 6.2 shows the trends of marriage migration to Korea. It also illustrates two peaks: the first peak concerned Korean-Chinese women, while the second involved mainly South-East Asian women.

The stagnation from 1996–2002 illustrated in Figure 6.2 reflects (i) the IMF crisis in Korea between 1997 and 1998, (ii) a change in the international marriage process, making it more complex than before between Korea and China from 1996–2003 and (iii) a significant change in the ‘Nationality Law’ in 1998, which abolished automatic citizenship for women resulting from marriage as foreign brides (Lee, 2008b: 112; 2014: 299).

The second peak after 2002 can be explained by the flourishing of commercial international marriage agencies. From August 1999, marriage agencies did not need to have licences from local governments and became free businesses. This allowed an increase in the number of such agencies as well as in the number of mediated marriages. As a result the nationalities of the foreign brides who entered South Korea began to diversify further to include Vietnamese, Thai and Mongolian women (Figure 6.3).

![Figure 6.2 Inflows of marriage migrants by sex to South Korea, 1990–2012](image)


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Hye-Kyung Lee
Though marriage migration can be found the world over, it is now more prevalent in Asia than in the West. This is, in part, the result of a number of social and cultural factors. In the West, arranged marriages in general disappeared about two or three centuries ago or during the course of industrialization. In the East, arranged marriages were a common practice until recently, or one generation ago, depending on the country’s industrialization period, typically initiated by individuals (Lee, 2010b). However, there are also a number of other factors, in both receiving and sending countries, driving this regional trend.

One of the primary driving forces has been the inability, in receiving countries, of some local men to marry local women. This is due to a number of interwoven reasons, such as the higher level of education of women in recent times and the greater employment opportunities available to them, which can result in a postponement of marriage or in spinsterhood. Coupled with this, there is a traditional preference for male offspring, with the use of ultrasound to detect a foetus’ sex early with a view to aborting female foetuses, producing an imbalance in the sexes, particularly among those born in the 1980s and 1990s in South Korea. Exacerbating this is the strong ideology of ‘patriarchy’, coupled with an asymmetrical preference of marriage partner by gender (for example, a preference for ‘marrying up’ for women and for ‘marrying down’ for men). This has caused a marriage squeeze: women from the upper socio-economic classes give up on marriage to concentrate on their careers instead, while men from the lower socio-economic classes still demand women who are only available from poorer countries (Bélanger et al., 2010; Jones and Shen, 2008; Lee, 2010b).
Another important engine for the phenomenon has been the explosively growing care needs for elderly parents. Unlike the West, where the ‘socialization of care work’ has increased, South Korea has not attained this welfare stage yet due to its short history of dominance as a capitalist economy. Such care was traditionally performed by daughters-in-law in Korea and remains a perceived role for them. Regardless of whether this is a cultural tradition or the ‘traditionalization of modernity’ (Ochiai, 2013), this belief is strong in contemporary Korea. Since the current life expectancy has increased by nearly 30 years in the last six decades, however, it is really impossible to put such a care burden on the shoulders of daughters-in-law. Therefore, few Korean women are willing to shoulder this task. The consequence is that many men see women from poorer countries as better potential carers for their elderly parent(s). Just as the ‘global care drain’ is an important factor leading to the migration of nannies and domestic workers (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Sassen, 2002), it also leads to the migration of those potential wives and mothers who fulfil the required role.

Commercial matchmaking industries played a significant role in the development of the trend, particularly in its early stages and even before official government policy had recognized a need for marriage migrants. However, as ethnic communities and transnational networks have become more established, chain-migration patterns have started to become more significant. Governments themselves, in receiving countries, have also played an important role in the creation of marriage migration. Their primary concern has been the falling birth rate amongst the local population and the rural exodus. Policy has sought to alleviate the potentially disastrous effects of depopulation by drawing on women from other Asian nations. In addition, they tend to utilize their labour as care-providers. This is because the speed of the ageing process is too fast for the government to handle, in a country where social welfare is still at an embryonic stage.

At the same time, government policy has had an arguably unexpected effect for another reason. Immigration policies in the developed Asian countries in general, and in South Korea in particular, have been very restrictive for foreign workers, particularly those with low skills, and marriage migration is by far the easiest and cheapest – and often the only – means available for women who wish to migrate to these countries (Lee, 2008a, 2010b). Immigration policy changes regarding low-skilled migrant workers, students or entertainment workers also affect marriage migration. For example, the Korean government’s announcement of the WVS, aimed at easing entry and employment for Korean-Chinese workers in 2004, resulted in a significant decrease in the influx of Korean-Chinese marriage migrants. On the other hand, the limitations imposed on unskilled migrants and those involved in the entertainment industry accelerated an increase in the number of marriage migrants (Lee, 2008b: 112; 2014: 299).
It is noteworthy that an immigration policy in one country also affects migration streams in other countries. An example could be found when Taiwan decided to reduce the number of foreign brides in 2004, which resulted in an increase in flows to Korea instead – when faced with barriers in certain areas, agencies seek to meet the available demand with supply as well as they can. Similarly a converse relationship applies, as was illustrated when Vietnam attempted to restrict its women’s marriage to foreign men. The consequence was that agencies shifted sources of supply to Cambodia and Mongolia.

Supply itself has been partly driven by the growth of traditional inter-regional migration patterns to encompass the intra-region. For example, the Philippines, due to its long colonial history, has been a long-standing female marriage-migrant sending country to Europe and the United States, but has, more recently, begun sending migrants to the newly developed countries closer to home. In the meantime, a second supply engine has been the change in policy of ‘closed-door’ countries such as China and Vietnam, which were, until recently, behind the ‘iron curtain’. These latter nations now have more liberal policies for the travel of their citizens to neighbouring capitalist countries, and there has been a marked increase in migration since their policy shift.

Besides macro-policy issues, there are a number of micro push factors in migrant-sending countries. There is a wish to escape a rural life or to start a new life, a perceived lack of a future, the desire for an opportunity for work outside the home or the need to earn an income and to help the birth family by sending remittances (Bélanger et al., 2010). Combined with this, there is an emerging marriage-migration culture which can impose pressures on women to seek marriage migration.

**Policy shift**

Although marriage migration has occurred since the early 1990s, neither the central nor the local governments paid much attention to the issue. It was only after the dawn of the new millennium that the Korean government began to prepare a pilot integration policy for marriage migrants. In February 2005, some congressmen – mostly representing rural constituencies – submitted a law to the National Assembly proposing the regulation of marriage agencies, which asked the Ministry of Health and Welfare to examine the situation of foreign wives. This proposal led to the first nationwide survey on foreign wives’ lives in Korea (Seol et al., 2005). The survey results were shocking, showing that over 50 per cent of such families were living below the poverty line.

Meanwhile, a governmental committee had prepared a social-integration policy for migrants under the direction of then-President Moo-Hyun Roh in 2005. The results were announced on 26 April 2006 as the ‘Female Marriage
Migrant Family Social Integration and Support Policy’. Since then, the Ministry of Gender Equality (and the Family) has been the leading and major coordinating governmental department in supporting marriage migrants and their families. The Korean government has promoted its own particular vision of a ‘multicultural society’ (Kim, 2008; Lee, 2008b, 2014). The implementation of ‘assimilation’ programmes – such as language programmes – has begun.

Korean experiences show that changes in the perspectives of the administration and in immigration policy are very closely linked. However, it is interesting to note that the so-called ‘multicultural policies’ towards marriage migrants have become embedded, regardless of whether the political perspective is left- or right-wing in Korea. This is because all governments, regardless of their political perspective, perceive the issue of international marriage and the resulting families as a ‘population’ policy to alleviate the seriously low fertility rate and the increasingly ageing population.

In addition, regardless of their political perspective, all governments share a similar ideology geared towards a ‘patriarchal family’. Therefore, both governments place emphasis on ‘family values’, highlighting foreign brides’ roles as ‘wives’ and ‘daughters-in-law’ instead of viewing them as ‘independent human beings’. Thus, the policies for multicultural families display something of a contrast between state policy towards Korean women and foreign brides (Lee, 2014).

Conclusion

Thus far, I have reviewed the trends and patterns of labour and marriage migration to South Korea and the important policy changes over the past 25 years. The period of the early 1990s (commencing 1987) was a watershed, being the country’s second social transformation, not only towards political liberalization but also towards a migration transition to a labour-receiving country. Since then, there has been a shift from an authoritarian state to a liberal democracy and, alongside this, a shift from right-of-centre politics to left-centred politics and, more recently, back to a right-wing ideology. Since then, ‘democratization’ has been important but ‘development’ is still a critical driving force for the country. The strains and struggles between development and democratization have further accelerated some social transformations, but also slowed down others, including those related to international migration and its policies.

Regarding labour migration, the country has always viewed matters through a ‘developmental’ lens, although an important ‘democratization’ flavour was added during the left-wing governments’ times in office – for example, the policy shift to the EPS in 2004 and to the WVS in 2007. Like other migrant-receiving countries, South Korea has struggled to reduce the number of undocumented migrants, to prevent low-skilled migrants staying
Social Transformation and Migration

permanently and, instead, to attract high-skilled professionals. Regarding its efforts in these three areas, it seems they have not been that successful. The EPS has become somewhat inefficient due to changes in governmental perspective as well as global and local economic downturns. For example, the recent ‘Reemployment Permit’ may shake the roots of the system itself, breaking the ‘rule of rotation’ principle. Thus, it will be difficult for the government to prevent family reunification and subsequent applications for Korean citizenship in the near future.

Regarding co-ethnic return migration, the role of Korean-Chinese should be emphasized in both labour and marriage migration. Providing a stepping-stone for the migration transition, they have acted as a kind of buffer. Without them, it would have been more difficult for Koreans – people of a relatively homogeneous country – to become familiar with working and living together with people from other countries. Korean-Chinese return migration raises several issues in Korean society. First, it discloses a ‘classism’ where Korean people tend to have contempt for Korean-Chinese as poorer relatives. Both governmental policies and media coverage also fluctuate between such ‘classism’ and emotional ‘nationhood’ depending on economic cycles. Second, co-ethnic issues have also become significant in the area of ‘brain gain’. As most countries around the world compete to attract global talent in order to cope with rapid economic and social change, Korea is no exception. It has overhauled its immigration policy in order to attract highly skilled professionals to Korea. However, the proportion of such workers has remained small as they prefer to migrate to more-advanced countries in the Americas or Europe. Realizing that this is due to ‘hierarchical citizenship’, as Castles (2005) notes, the Korean government has begun to appreciate the significance of the Korean diaspora for recruiting global talent – an important reason for allowing ‘dual citizenship’ from 2011 for people who are mostly the product of the Korean diaspora.

However, Koreans seem to have ambivalent feelings towards returnees, not only those who are poor, such as the Korean-Chinese, but also those from more affluent nations. One example was when the nominee for the ministerial post of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP), Jeong-Hoon Kim, withdrew his nomination in early 2013. He was a 52-year-old Korean-American technology entrepreneur who had recently regained his Korean citizenship. Although it is not a legal requirement for government officials to do so, he decided to surrender his American citizenship in order to publicly express the depth of his commitment to the assigned role. However, due to rumours and suspicions regarding his past activities in the US (particularly his experience as a US naval officer and his alleged connections to the US Central Intelligence Agency) and to speculation about the real-estate assets held by his family, his nomination became untenable (Korea Times, 3 April 2013). This event raises public debate on the meaning of ‘dual citizenship or identity’ in contemporary Korea. Co-ethnic issues,
therefore, demonstrate how questions surrounding ‘multiple citizenship’ and the proper relationship between the nation and the state – as raised by Brubaker (1992) – concerning ‘who is what’, have been brought into public and political debate.

The Korean case also shows that marriage migration can be understood and analyzed through its inter-relationship with labour migration. Marriage migration is not a new phenomenon but, in Asia, a very specific marriage-migration pattern has emerged. The phenomenon is the result of complicated and inter-related factors in the region. The economic boom of the 1980s resulted in a demand for low-skilled labour which could not be met internally, and thus general intra-regional migration began. Initially this migration was predominantly male and temporary, as regional receiving countries restricted long-term access and migration. Indeed this remains true to this day. A growing migration culture amongst women in sending countries, partly resulting from rapid socio-economic restructuring processes in countries like China and Vietnam, alongside very few avenues for labour migration, facilitates marriage migration. Marriage migration is, in many cases, the easiest and cheapest route of access for low-skilled migrant women to these more developed East-Asian countries.

Additional cultural and social factors, such as the perseverance for social acceptance of arranged marriages, strong marriage pressure and a sense of responsibility for one’s parents, have tended to promote a growing trend in the region. Additionally, with growing divorce rates in the region, this avenue tends to become a remarriage option for local men as well as for foreign women. Since the stigma of divorce is still more severe for women than for men, many women wish to reset their lives through marriage migration. A simplistic dichotomy of victim and agent should be avoided, as the grassroots strategy of participants in the marriage-migration phenomenon has been to adjust to whatever regulatory obstacles are put in their path and to overcome them.

Marriage migration can also be seen as a form of strategy by the state to handle its population problem. In the beginning, some local governments used the strategy to handle their de-population problem as well as to invite foreign brides for their older bachelors. Since the early 2000s, when South Korea faced, for the first time, a fear of losing competitiveness due to its low fertility and fast-ageing population, the central government itself has encouraged marriage migration, allowing reproduction citizenship for foreign wives. The government has also tried to put a care burden on the migrant women, idealizing ‘patriarchalism’ and ‘familialism’.

Unlike in the West, where marriage migration has been treated as a secondary form of migration, subordinate to, and less relevant than, labour migration, it and its effects are more significant in Asia. In South Korea, it has contributed to the speeding up of integration policies, beyond the first stage of border control. This is why there is a rapid growth in social-integration
policies in Korea, where only 3 per cent of the population are migrants. It has raised a hegemonic discourse on the meaning of a ‘multicultural society’ in a previously nominally homogeneous Korean society. However, Korea has been plagued by a lack of overall direction and philosophy. Therefore, there has been strong criticism from academics, civil society and even marriage migrants themselves.

In sum, the Korean experiences in labour and marriage migration, as well as co-ethnic return migration, will serve to raise interest in which factors either facilitate or impede these migration trends and related policy measures, and in what has led to differences between South Korea and other countries (including in the West) facing similar global trends and pressures. It will further contribute to the areas of transnational nation-building, transnational ethnic identity and transnational householding, as these areas will no doubt be of growing importance in the future.

Notes

1 For convenience, administrations from the conservative party are referred to as right-wing and those from the liberal party as left-wing. Since we have a strong legacy of anti-Communist ideology due to the Korean War, the Cold War and the on-going threat from North Korea, use of the term ‘left wing’ needs to be cautious.

2 The WVS allows for migrant workers to change their employer, unlike the EPS.

3 For detailed information on the policy, see Lee (2008b: 117–18).

4 The MSIP is a newly created ministry under the current administration, which manages the government’s restructuring plan for the creation of new jobs through the combination of science and information communications technology.

References


From Salt Fields to ‘Multicultural Village Special Zone’: The Transformation of a Migrant City in South Korea

Chulhyo Kim

Introduction

On a summer night in 2012, the ‘Meeting Plaza’ in the centre of the South Korean ‘urban village’ of Wongok-dong (part of the city of Ansan) was full of people dancing an old-fashioned jitterbug or performing a Yangko dance (a north-eastern Chinese group dance) to loud music. Passers-by stopped and watched the unusual scene with curiosity; others walked straight on by, as this is a daily occurrence. Police officers at the ‘multicultural police station’ next to the square often receive complaints about the noise from residents living nearby, but they cannot stop the music. ‘Multicultural Street’, next to the square, was alive with street-vendors selling raw meat and fish, tropical fruits and different types of bread, display stands advertising brand new smartphones and exhausted workers coming back late from their hard jobs. The next morning, shop-owners were busy cleaning up the empty bottles and sunflower-seed shells that were left in the square the previous night. Soon after, the square was again filled with people saying prayers to celebrate the end of Ramadan. Across the road from this solemn ceremony, another group of devout people gathered in a small church, praying for ‘Gospels for Muslims’.

This cosmopolitan scene is now part of everyday life in Wongok-dong, a working-class area of Ansan. However, only 15 years ago, this scene could not even have been imagined by the local people. Until the 1970s, the Ansan area consisted only of a few villages subsisting on small-scale fishery and agriculture. Most of its land was mud flats, small rice fields, low hills and salt fields. In a period of less than 40 years, this area has undergone a breathtakingly rapid transformation. The mud flats and salt fields were reclaimed and made into an industrial complex. The rice fields were rapidly transformed...
into residential or commercial areas. The small villages with a combined population of 16,000 residents in 1976 were filled with new internal migrants from all over the country and merged to become a city of more than 760,000 people by 2013. The central government of South Korea designated this area as a ‘national industrial complex’ in 1976, which brought about the first industrial and urban transformation. Soon after, the city experienced the second transformation in its demography and culture. The residents were rapidly replaced by international migrants, first from Asian countries and, later, from all over the world. The government then designated the Wongok-dong area a ‘multicultural village special zone’ in 2008.

What happened in Ansan over the last 40 years? What were the causes of these transformations? How have the transformations changed the lives of local people? These are the key questions that this chapter seeks to understand. It answers these questions by contextualizing the transformations in Ansan within the framework of the broader transformations of the South Korean economy and society – the first transformations under authoritarian developmental regimes and the second during an era of neo-liberal globalization. In analyzing the transformations, the international migration perspective is our particular focus in this chapter. Thus, we seek to understand the multi-scalar dimensions of social transformations at global, national and local levels, paying particular attention to the relation between structural changes and the responses of local agencies. The analysis is based on ethnographic research conducted in Ansan in 2012 as a part of the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project.

Ansan: industrial city of migrants

Ansan is located on the south-western outskirts of the Seoul metropolitan region, near the Western Sea. The city is 31 kilometres away from central Seoul, but is connected by metro – an hour’s trip. Ansan is known as the first South Korean city established by urban planning (G. H. Chung, 2005). The city is roughly divided into five areas: an industrial complex in the south-west, the first new towns in the north and south-east, the second new town in the central south, old rural areas on the eastern outskirts of the city and an island area in the Western Sea.

The industrial complex was built in the late 1970s and is known as the Banwol National Industrial Complex. It consists of small- and medium-sized companies with fewer than 100 employees in each. These companies are mostly subcontractors producing parts or materials for end products as ordered by big companies or chaebols (conglomerates in South Korea). The economy of this industrial complex greatly relies on the business strategies or performance of the big companies. This industrial complex mostly consists of manufacturers of polluting industries such as chemicals, leather, dyeing and plating (G. H. Chung, 2005). The first new town area, known
as Banwol New Town, was built from the late 1970s through to the 1980s. Accommodation here is mostly in ‘multiple-household houses’ or ‘honeycomb houses’, which are small two- or three-storey buildings with between four and twelve units each comprising a small main room, a toilet and a kitchen. This typical working-class residential area was built to provide housing for workers at the nearby Banwol National Industrial Complex. This area has a high rate of inhabitants who have low or no income and who rely on government livelihood subsidy programmes (Ansan City History Compilation Committee, 2011).

The second new town area, known as Gojan New Town, was built in the early 2000s. This area is made up of newly built high-rise apartment complexes, mostly middle-class accommodation with three or more spacious rooms. Many residents in this area are professionals who own their own apartment and commute to work in Seoul on the metro. In the old rural areas, there are small fruit and vegetable farms. The farms supply fruit and vegetables to the Seoul metropolitan region. The island area, Daebu-do, is a tourist spot for the residents of Seoul and the capital region. The island is, in fact, linked to the mainland by the 12.7-km Shihwa breakwater, built as a national construction project in 1994. The original purpose of the breakwater was to transform the bay into a freshwater lake and eventually to reclaim the land. However, the project failed and ended up causing serious environmental destruction. The gates of the breakwater are now open, and the lake is maintained as a saltwater one.

Ansan is an industrial city. An official estimate shows that almost half (48.4 per cent) of the city's gross regional domestic product is created through manufacturing – the main source of income for the city; more than four in ten residents of working age (42.3 per cent) were employed in this sector in 2011 (Ansan City Hall, 2014; Gyeonggi-do Office, 2014). The other businesses are mostly in the service sector – wholesale, retail, real estate, leasing and education services, mostly for the consumption of local residents rather than for incomes from outside the city.

Ansan is also a city of migrants. Native Ansan residents who lived there before the urbanization and industrialization represent less than 1.4 per cent of the total population, according to researchers' estimates (G. H. Chung, 2005). All other residents are either internal or international migrants. The internal migrants and their second generation make up approximately 92 per cent of the total population. One in ten Ansan residents is an international migrant who does not hold South Korean citizenship, according to official statistics for 2013 (Ansan City Hall, 2014). Wongok-dong, an old working-class residential district, shows a particularly high foreign population density, in fact the highest in the country: more than half of the total number of residents (Ansan City Hall, 2014). It is often estimated that there are as many irregular migrants as registered ones in Wongok-dong (see Table 7.1). The majority of the migrants are from
Social Transformation and Migration

Asian countries such as China, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, though there are migrants from all over the world. More than 70 per cent of the international migrants hold temporary low-skilled work visas or low-skilled ‘overseas Korean’ visas. The second most popular visa category is the marriage-migration visa.

Rapid industrialization under authoritarian developmental regimes

Until 1976, there were only a few fishing and farming villages – small rice paddies and vegetable fields – in the area which is now Ansan. The bay in front of the area was mostly mud flats, some parts of which were reclaimed, while others were developed as salt fields. Some villages had as few as 100 residents, while others had about 500–800 (Ansan City History Compilation Committee, 2011).

On 21 July 1976, authoritarian ruler Park Chung Hee ordered his cabinet to identify a potential site for the establishment of a new industrial city. Two months later, the Banwol area, which consisted of several fishing and farming villages, was designated as the site. After a further six months, the construction of Banwol National Industrial Complex and Banwol industrial city was launched, with its ten-year plan (Ansan City History Compilation Committee, 2011). The area was rapidly industrialized and urbanized. By 1986, more than 1,000 factories had moved into the industrial complex. The major industry of Ansan rapidly shifted from agriculture to manufacturing. The jobs of Ansan residents changed exponentially (Figure 7.1). In 1986, the area was officially upgraded to become known as Ansan City.

The transformation of Ansan took place over a mere ten years, a typical example of South Korea’s ‘compressed modernization’ (Chang, 2010). The oppressive government aggressively pushed forward with its rapid industrialization project by mobilizing abundant human resources. The strategy of the ‘developmental state’ (Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999) focused on facilitating the capitalist accumulation of local bourgeoisies and chaebols (Kim and Park, 2011; Kuznets, 2006). This rapid capitalist accumulation was

Table 7.1 The foreign population of Ansan, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Registered foreigners</th>
<th>Undocumented foreigners</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>% foreign population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wongok-dong</td>
<td>20,410</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>53,666</td>
<td>54.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansan</td>
<td>49,249</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>762,915</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>985,923</td>
<td>183,106</td>
<td>50,219,669</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ansan City Hall (2014); Korea Immigration Service (2014); Statistics Korea (2014).
achieved at the cost of fair wage levels for hard-working workers and fair profit levels for small enterprises.

The industrialization of Ansan aimed at relocation away from the polluting industries of the capital city, Seoul (Park and Markusen, 1999). The early stage of South Korea’s industrialization in the 1960s was concentrated in Seoul, which had the highest level of infrastructure and the largest working population in the country. Based upon the achievement of its initial capitalist accumulation, the South Korean government shifted its industrialization strategy from a light industry-oriented one (textile and clothing) to a heavy industry-oriented one (manufacturing and chemicals) in the early 1970s. As the industrialization had been intensified, the pollution in Seoul far exceeded a tolerable level. While capital-intensive industries (car manufacturing, steel, oil-refining, shipping) were built on the southern coast of the country, small- and medium-sized or unlicensed factories, which were mostly the subcontractors of bigger companies, had to remain close to Seoul in order to access the market, the workforce and resources. The new industrial complex was designed for ‘the agglomeration of small and medium-sized enterprises’ (J. H. Chung, 2005).

The South Korean government also sought to relocate working-class people in overpopulated Seoul by building the first new town in Ansan. The rapid industrialization in Seoul required a huge workforce from all over the country. Farmers gave up their land and moved to urban and industrial areas. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the numbers of manufacturing workers increased more than sevenfold, while those of agricultural workers decreased by half (Koo, 2001). Seoul rapidly became crowded by internal migrants from all over the country. A survey shows that the majority of those in Ansan are from Seoul and neighbouring cities in the capital region (Park and Oh, 2008). However, in our interviews, Ansan residents and local

![Figure 7.1](https://example.com/figure7.1.png)

**Figure 7.1** Share of employees by industry in Ansan, 1976–2011

government officials revealed that many residents had originally come from poorer rural areas in the south- or central-west before they moved to the capital region and then to Ansan.

Ansan rapidly became a city of migrants. During the first ten years of industrialization, the population increased more than tenfold from 16,000 in 1976 to 162,569 in 1987, due to ever-greater numbers of internal-migrant arrivals. In 1981, 29.5 per cent of the total population had arrived that year, and the share peaked at 48.1 per cent in 1986. Ansan’s population also showed high mobility in terms of out-migration. The share of those who left Ansan was approximately 16 per cent until 1985; it jumped to 26.8 per cent in 1986 and went on to reach even higher levels. Ansan is often called a city of ‘wanderers’ rather than ‘settlers’. This demographic character influenced the local culture of Ansan. As a local business person in Wongok-dong commented, ‘Individual workers come to make money and work hard. Once they achieve their goals, they just leave. The spirit of community cannot be built.’

The urban planning of Ansan was set up only two months after the order came from the dictator in 1976. There is no record of the government’s effort to reflect the opinions of local residents, employers and workers (e.g. public hearings). The government undertook the development project by forcefully expropriating land from the residents. It designated several districts as an estate for thus-displaced persons and parcelled out housing sites. However, the compensation that local residents received for their displacement was not enough to enable them to build a house on the new estate. Many had to sell their designated lots to property speculators at low prices and thus fell into poverty. Only a few managed to sustain their wealth through the property rental market. Out of the 16,000 original residents of the area, 12,710 people were displaced in this way (G. H. Chung, 2005). The rural communities completely collapsed.

The urban structure of Ansan’s new town was an imitation of the Australian capital city of Canberra: concentric hexagonal streets emanating from two radii. Under the slogan of ‘factories in parks’, the city has clear divisions between its industrial area, its residential area and its commercial area. The residential area was again divided into a working-class area and a middle-class area. Although the local residents are proud of the fact that Ansan was the first planned city in South Korea and an imitation of Canberra, this urban structure was far from ideal for the lives of Ansan’s majority population: low-income working-class people who mostly relied on public transport. The wheel-and-spoke pattern of road structure caused more complicated routes for public transport, and the division of the districts caused longer commuting or shopping travel times. The division of the city into a working- and a middle-class residential area resulted in personal, economic and cultural segregation, as revealed by residents of the area.

Ansan’s experience of rapid industrialization and urbanization was a typical reflection of South Korea’s rapid economic growth under authoritarian
developmental regimes. The purpose of the development was the ‘dumping’ (J. H. Chung, 2005) of any industrial and demographic troubles away from Seoul. The urban planning was carried out by the central government without going through the democratic process of gaining the residents’ consensus. The city enjoyed the increased economic achievement gained through industrialization. However, Ansan began to experience economic disparities between its residents, and its economy was highly dependent on large enterprises based outside the city.

**Neoliberal transformations and the hollowing out of industries**

As originally designed by the authoritarian developmental regimes, the Banwol National Industrial Complex of Ansan is an agglomeration of polluting and small- and medium-sized manufacturers. Ansan’s major industry was a ‘low value-added, declining and 3D (dirty, difficult and dangerous)’ one (J. H. Chung, 2005). The operational strategy of these companies was ‘fundamentally Fordist in nature’ and relied on ‘displaced, deskilled, and marginalized workers’ (Park and Markusen, 1999). This industrial character was the source of rapid economic growth in the 1980s, but later became a significant challenge to Ansan’s economy under the pressing neoliberal transformation of the national and global economy.

In the late 1980s, South Korean society experienced a dramatic political transition from long-standing authoritarianism to a democracy. The massive democratization movement in June 1987 achieved a certain level of institutional democracy and civil and political rights. The Grand Struggles of Workers, which exploded onto the scene immediately afterwards, also led to a certain improvement in working conditions, wages and union rights (Koo, 2001). The developmental state model of capitalist accumulation strategy, which had relied on political repression and the exploitation of workers, could no longer be sustained.

Throughout the 1990s, a neoliberal state model – where governance and social relations are dominated by market economy dogmas – rapidly replaced the old development mode (Ji, 2011). The liberal government’s globalization project hastily opened its economy to the international market by preferring the high-technology manufacturing of chaebols over agriculture and small enterprises. The project was accompanied by a rapid flexibilization of the labour market, including the legalization of redundancy, subcontracted and temporary work, and limited union rights. Political liberalization and democracy were ‘hijacked by neoliberalism’ (Lim and Jang, 2006). On top of the endogenous drive towards neoliberalization, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis became a watershed for a fundamental shift of the South Korean economy. The restructuring programme that was imposed by the International Monetary Fund accelerated the privatization of core
businesses, the dependence of financial and stock markets on foreign investors and the flexibilization of the labour market.

A consequence of the neoliberalization of the South Korean economy was the widening disparity between big businesses and small and medium enterprises. While chaebols rapidly grew into transnational corporations, the small and medium enterprises, which were mostly subcontractors supplying materials and parts to the big companies, became even smaller and poorer. This disparity was mainly due to an asymmetric and ‘exploitative subcontract system’ (Chung, 2007; Saesayon, 2009). The big companies gained profits by making use of the subcontractors’ high dependence on them. They shifted the burden of the increased import prices of raw materials, the increased wages and the high bank interest rates onto their subcontractors; thus, the small and medium enterprises were faced with acute price competition in order to maintain or win the subcontracts vital for their survival.

For these small and medium enterprises, the most common business strategy for reducing production costs was to continue paying the low wages and providing the poor working conditions of the old developmental-state labour system. The improvement in workers’ income levels achieved by the struggles of the late 1980s and early 1990s did not reach the workers of the small and medium enterprises, where trade unions were rarely organized. The wage gap rapidly increased: that between the big companies and small and medium enterprises remained at approximately 10 per cent until 1987 but increased to 35 per cent in 1996 (Jeong et al., 2005). South Korean workers began to avoid working for small and medium manufacturing companies, leading to severe labour shortages – the rate for companies with between ten and 29 employees peaked at 17.9 per cent in 1991, three times higher than for companies with 300+ employees (6.4 per cent). There were consistently between two and six vacancies in the small and medium companies at any one time (Statistics Korea, 2014).

The neoliberal transformations of the 1990s brought about an acute crisis in Ansan’s economy – the city’s economic growth had slowed since the late 1980s, from 17.3 per cent in 1986 to 2.17 per cent in 2003 (Ansan City Hall, 2014). Although the number of employees at the industrial complex remained at roughly the same level, the number of companies doubled over the same period (G. H. Chung, 2005). This meant that the small and medium enterprises in Ansan became even smaller and poorer during the economic restructuring process.

Manufacturing was no longer the major industry in Ansan. The share of manufacturing jobs in the employment sector of Ansan gradually decreased, to be replaced in size by the service sector in the 2000s (see Figure 7.1). This change in the city’s main industry was accelerated by the construction of the second new town, Gojan New Town. Contrary to its original plan, this area was developed as a middle-class residential area (Ansan City History Compilation Committee, 2011). Most of its residents have no connection
with the industrial complex; many are suburban commuters who work in Seoul. The development of this area removed an environmental buffer zone between the industrial and the residential areas, and led to increased air pollution and stench. Consequently, the new Ansan residents began to complain about the industrial zone, and the polluting industry and small and medium businesses – once the founders and breadwinners of Ansan – became unwanted problems (Ansan City History Compilation Committee, 2011).

Many small and medium enterprises in Ansan, under the pressure of price competition, sought to reduce their production costs in three main ways. First, they shifted their production offshore, seeking lower labour costs. According to a survey, approximately 30 per cent of the member companies of Ansan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry had relocated their factories to China and other countries by 2003 (J. H. Chung, 2005). Second, for those small- and medium-sized companies that could not afford to relocate downsized even further, one common strategy was to divide a factory site and share it with other companies. Some manufacturers even gave up their businesses and converted to leasing out their old factory buildings – they found this more profitable than manufacturing (J. H. Chung, 2005). The third option was to maintain low labour costs by hiring new low-wage workers from overseas – small companies which could not afford to relocate or whose premises were not large enough to lease out had no other choice than to continue in this way if they were to survive.

The arrivals of new migrants: changing landscapes and social relations

After this rapid economic growth and democratization, South Korea became one of the major destinations for labour migration in the region. In addition to the increased wages, more relaxed political relations with its neighbouring socialist countries and a decreased labour demand from the Gulf countries, the labour shortages at the 3D industries of small and medium enterprises turned South Korea into a destination country in the international division of labour (Seol, 1999).

When the South Korean government loosened its visa control during the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, irregular migrant workers began to appear. Seeing the number of irregular migrants gradually growing, small and medium enterprises asked the government to officialize labour migration. In 1991, the government introduced a pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme – the Industrial Trainee System (Lee, 1997). The intention of this programme was to utilize the cheap workforce and maintain low labour costs by suppressing the mobility of migrant workers in the labour market and the possibility of their settlement. This programme turned out to be a failure. It produced a large number of irregular migrant workers.
workers. In 2004, the South Korean government introduced a new version of the temporary labour migration scheme, the Employment Permit System, which guaranteed the minimum wage for migrant workers but still limited employment rights (Castles et al., 2012).

Ansan is one of the cities heavily affected by the increase in international migrants. During the period of hollowing-out at the industrial complex, the city experienced the stagnation of its population growth, which recovered when new migrants from overseas countries began to arrive in 2000. The old working-class residential area, Wongok-dong, experienced the most dramatic demographic changes. During the earlier period of industrialization, Wongok-dong developed as a major residential area for workers at the Banwol Industrial Complex. With small apartments and entertainment businesses, the district became a major commercial area in Ansan. Its population grew to 34,000 by the late 1980s. However, the neoliberal restructuring and hollowing out of the Banwol Industrial Complex throughout the 1990s wiped out this area. Workers rapidly left both the factories and the residential area: the population of Wongok-dong had dropped to as low as 19,844 by 1995. This decrease in population immediately had a deleterious effect on Wongok-dong’s businesses, particularly in the entertainment and rental market, as confirmed by both a local businessman and a migrant business owner.

Soon after, the factories and residential area were quickly filled by international migrant workers: the estimated figure of both regular and irregular international migrants in Wongok-dong grew to 18,000 by 2002 (Park and Chung, 2005). Within a short period of just seven years, the population returned to its previous level but, this time, half of its residents were replaced by international migrants. The majority of migrants were temporary low-skilled work visa-holders. They were also predominantly single male workers, who were either unmarried or who had left their family back in the home country: young single male workers made up between 58.0 and 83.3 per cent of all migrants in the period 1997–2011 (Gyeonggi-do Office, 2014). This was a direct result of the central government’s labour migration policy – the non-settlement of low-skilled migrants.

In fact, Ansan had already experienced this high density of single male workers during the initial stage of industrialization in the early 1980s. However, the single internal migrant workers formed families, and Ansan became a city of young working-class families. For example, 29.3 per cent of the total population of Wongok-dong were children under the age of 14, and another 42.1 per cent were parents aged between 25 and 44 in 1989 (Ansan City Hall, 2014). Throughout the 1990s, these families gradually left Wongok-dong. The children, in particular, disappeared, as the dramatic shrink in the numbers of pupils at a local school exemplifies – the students of Wongok Elementary School decreased from 4,228 in 1991 to 499 in 2010 (Ansan City History Compilation Committee, 2011).
The central government’s policy on international labour migration brought about significant changes in the characteristics of the local population, not only in terms of their ethnicity but also of their households and ages. ‘Temporariness’ became the most notable feature of the local population in Ansan.

The demographic changes transformed the landscape and economy in Wongok-dong and Ansan. Ethnic grocery stores and restaurants began to increase from the early 2000s. The main street of Wongok-dong, now called ‘Damunhwa Gil’ (Multicultural Street), was filled with ethnic restaurants of various origin countries. Other new businesses also appeared in order to meet the demand of migrant workers – for example, international call shops, video rental shops and travel agencies. The housing market was also revitalized. The increased demand for migrant-worker accommodation raised rental prices. Home-owners, many of whom had lived in the area since the early stages of its urbanization, renovated their houses by dividing rooms into smaller ones in order to accommodate more migrant workers, as both a former member of the Wongok-dong Residents’ Committee and a local business person informed us.

Low-skilled temporary migrant workers were intrinsically vulnerable in labour relations. Under the earlier pseudo-temporary labour migration scheme, the workers were not permitted to change jobs after they were designated to a certain workplace. The employers hired them basically with the intention of sustaining the old labour system of poor working conditions and low wages. Hazardous working conditions, degrading treatment and beatings, the illegal confiscation of passports and delayed wages were common practices in such workplaces (Seol et al., 2002). Female workers often faced sexual abuse. Corruption in the recruiting process imposed extremely high placement fees on migrant workers, which they could not pay back within the permitted three years of temporary migration. Many voluntarily became irregular workers by breaking away from their designated workplaces to seek higher wages or by overstaying after their visas expired.

Many irregular migrant workers gathered in Wongok-dong, seeking job opportunities or assistance with solving their problems. The ethnic shops and restaurants became centres for the exchange of information and for building migrant networks and communities. Local business people generally welcomed them because the migrants revitalized business. As business-owners described to us, they often opposed the crack-down campaigns of central government because the campaigns involving the search, arrest and deportation of irregular migrants had a negative impact on their businesses. NGOs and religious groups made contributions to the migrant communities. One church-based NGO, the Ansan Migrant Centre, became known nationwide for its services to and advocacy for migrant workers and their children. Many small churches and missionaries were established, aiming to convert the migrant workers from a non-Christian background. Mosques were also
established: one for South Asians and another specifically for Indonesians. The NGOs and religious organizations formed an important part of civil society in Ansan, sometimes cooperating and at other times competing with each other.

The government of Ansan City was also active in providing services to migrants. It initiated the introduction of local legislation on migrant rights and services for migrants. The Ansan Ordinance on the Promotion of the Human Rights of Foreign Residents was the first law of this kind. This ordinance is unique in that it protects and provides services to irregular migrants, and thus conflicts with the migration policy of the central government. The local government acquired the central government’s support by designating Wongok-dong area as a ‘multicultural village special zone’ in 2008, aiming at the gentrification of its streets and the promotion of local business. It set up a local government office specializing in providing services to migrant workers. The local government policies were, however, not always welcomed by local residents or civil society. Some residents complained about ‘reverse discrimination’ against Korean residents, and some NGOs criticized government projects which contributed to the commercialization of the district and the breaking-up of its multi-ethnic communities.

Wongok-dong district has recently experienced even more changes. It is rapidly changing from a residential to a commercial area for migrant workers from all over the country. The shops and restaurants have increased and expanded. The international call shops and video rental shops have all disappeared, but smartphone shops are flourishing, with low prices and home-language services for migrant workers. The signs all changed from being names of small local shops to the brands of transnational telecommunication companies. Migrant workers are moving out to suburban areas, seeking lower rental prices. Instead, Wongok-dong has become a commercial area which is extremely crowded with migrant workers visiting for shopping and entertainment on weekends.

Wongok-dong used to be considered as a ‘mixed minority enclave’ (Seol, 2011) due to the multi-ethnic composition of the residents. However, it is rapidly changing into a single ethnic concentration: the share of Chinese passport-holders among total foreigners increased from 33.6 per cent in 1999 to 71.0 per cent in 2011 (Ansan City Hall, 2014). This is partly because of the general increase in the numbers of Chinese migrants with Korean ethnicity throughout the country, following the central government’s preferential migration policy (Lee, 2010). It is also possible because Chinese workers succeeded in accumulating considerable wealth in South Korean society. Although the main street of Wongok-dong maintains its multi-ethnic features, a new Chinese area has been growing fast and is now bigger than the main street. The rapid growth of a single ethnic group led to some tension between them and other ethnic groups. Korean local residents and non-Chinese migrants often pointed to the increase of Chinese migrants as
the most visible change in Wongok-dong over the past several years. They also expressed their concerns about their economic and cultural domination over other ethnic groups or complained about cultural differences.

The media often describe Wongok-dong as a negative example of international migration: the concentration of ‘illegal migrants’, foreign criminal organizations, bad behaviour such as rubbish-dumping or urination and defecation in public places and prostitution. Local residents are ambivalent about the stigmatization: although they complain that the reports are unfair, they also quote the same reports when they complain about the newcomers. The media also often criminalize irregular migrants and blame them for crimes without any evidence. However, migrants, employers and migrant-rights advocates often claim the opposite: that irregular migrants tend to conform better than others because of their vulnerable status. Influenced by the media, local residents who live in other parts of Ansan, especially in the recently built middle-class area, as one resident of the latter told us, often consider Wongok-dong as a very different space from the rest of Ansan. Wongok-dong is gradually becoming isolated from, and excluded and unwanted by, the rest of the city.

One social worker told us that Ansan people often say: ‘Ansan is such a city that you keep saying “Ansanda” (“I won’t live here any longer” in Korean) but you cannot get out of it.’ They also often say ‘No character is the character of Ansan’ or Ansan people have more sense of belonging to their hometown than to Ansan, as a member of Ansan City Council stated. International migrants, however, express rather different emotions. They often say that they feel at home in Ansan, because it was the first place in which they lived in South Korea or the place which sheltered them during their hardest time. More importantly, in the migrant-dominant district, they do not have to worry about racial discrimination or degrading treatment.

Conclusion

The short history of Ansan’s transformation over the last 40 years is a symbolic example of South Korea’s rapid social transformation. At the same time, it also reveals that there has been a darker side to this stunning growth in the South Korean economy both during the past authoritarian developmental regimes and the present neoliberal state. The case of Ansan also shows how the social transformations at the local level can be interwoven with transformations at the national and global levels, how the structural changes affect the lives of local people and how the local agencies organize counter-movements.

The transformations were dramatic: from several villages of salt fields, small farms and fishing boats, to an agglomeration of small and medium factories in polluting industrial sectors and again to an enclave of temporary migrant workers and other migrants from all over the world. The first
transformation – the area’s industrialization and urbanization in the 1980s – was driven by a national project enacted by the authoritarian developmental regimes. The city was rapidly filled by internal migrant workers from all over the country. The project was about relocating or ‘dumping’ unwanted industries and working-class people away from Seoul and into a regional city. The unwanted industries created only low added-value at the cost of pollution and the exploitation of low-wage workers. From the 1990s onwards, the South Korean economy went through the rapid transformation of neoliberal globalization. This was first initiated by endogenous actors, but later accelerated by international forces. While the chaebols based on high technology took this opportunity to grow into transnational corporations, the small and medium enterprises of these unwanted industries were driven either to closure or to offshoring.

In the 2000s, the unwanted industries and the working-class residential area of Ansan were revitalized by newly arrived international migrants. The new migrant workers led the second transformation of the city towards a cosmopolitan landscape and multicultural relationships. They also actively participated in the movement to build a multi-ethnic community with the support of local NGOs and religious groups. The local government initiated a new project – the ‘multicultural village special zone’ – and sometimes conflicted with or over-ruled central government policies. The district has also been stigmatized as a dangerous and dirty place, while being rapidly commercialized and dominated by one ethnic group: it again became the space of the unwanted. Nevertheless, Ansan still provides hope and is the second hometown for its migrants.

Notes

1 In order to strengthen the ties between the Korean diaspora and the migrants’ home country, the South Korean government introduced a preferential visa system for former South Korean citizens or their descendants – the ‘Overseas Korean (F-4) Visa’. However, ‘overseas Koreans’ in developing countries are not entitled to apply for this visa unless they can prove that they will not engage in low-skilled manual waged work. This is to control the numbers of Chinese low-skilled workers with Korean ethnicity who form the majority of migrants in South Korea. The government also introduced the ‘Work and Visit (H-2) Visa’, which allows the Korean diaspora from China and the former Soviet Union to engage in low-skilled manual work only, with some restrictions of movement. More than 20 per cent of migrants in Ansan are H-2 visa-holders.

2 The interviews mentioned in this chapter took place between 15 and 20 October 2012.

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Part III

Case-study Insights: Turkey

Turkey: fieldwork site

istarbul

Kemkapi

Country’s Capital City

State or Province Boundary

Fieldwork Site
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8

Migration Realities and State Responses: Rethinking International Migration Policies in Turkey

Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B. Aksel

Introduction

As noted by Castles (2010), a major obstacle to theory formation in migration studies is the complexity and diversity of migration experiences. This issue is particularly challenging when seeking to grasp different migration patterns and political rationalities without running into methodological nationalism or policy-centred perspectives treating migration ‘as a problem’. We argue that the social transformation perspective provides room for manoeuvring around such challenges, since it conceptualizes migration ‘not merely as a result of social transformation, nor as one of its causes, but as an integral and essential part of social transformation processes’ (Castles, 2010: 1578). Whilst placing social transformation at the focal point, our research emphasizes the role of the nation-state as an agent, by either promoting or limiting international migration. This resonates with Massey’s (1999: 303) argument that migration studies have historically paid relatively little attention to the nation-state ‘as an agent influencing the volume and composition of international migration’. In the last decade, although this picture has changed considerably and nation-states are recognized as important actors on the migratory scene, these efforts focus primarily on migrant-receiving countries. Relatively little work has been done on migrant-sending countries and even less has been written on the state’s role in both emigration and immigration processes. Focusing on the case of Turkey, this chapter links the experiences of migration at the national level to those at the global level.

In the 90-year-old history of modern Turkey, internal and international mobility have been the most crucial vehicles of social transformation and demographic transition. When the Republic was founded in 1923, Turkey was primarily an agrarian society with little geographical mobility (İçduygu, 2012a). For the policy-makers pioneering the Turkish modernization process,
mobility and population management were considered to be among the major objectives for building the nation-state. During this period, while people of Turkish origin and Islamic faith were encouraged to migrate to Turkey, non-Muslims in Turkey were discouraged from remaining. When Westernization defined the main political dimension of the state-centric Turkish modernity, one aspect of its sociological grounding was a top-down vision of urbanism that was viewed as a necessity for making Turkey a civilized and modern nation-state. This contributed to the mobilization of millions of people, first from rural areas to urban areas within Turkey and, later, from Turkey to other countries, thus serving the country’s developmentalism projects.

By 2013, mobility was still considered to be a crucial determinant of national integrity, with, however, different social and political implications. While the founders of the Republic had previously called on Turkish populations living outside the country’s borders to return and participate in its restructuring, the new ideological setting asks them to integrate into their host countries without losing their ties with Turkey. This change in rhetoric reflects two important developments which have marked crucial changes in the Turkish state’s position on international migration over the last few decades. First, the Turkish state has engaged in diaspora politics by dynamically using the transnational spaces built up by the diaspora communities originated from Turkey as diplomatic arenas and its expatriates as political and cultural agents abroad. Second, as Turkey has begun to attract non-Turkish and non-Muslim immigrants for the first time in its recent history, it has increasingly become a transit and destination country for immigration – forcing the state to develop new policies and programmes over issues of immigration. The implementation of such measures implies a cautious transition from long-established policies – which are mostly formulated through the lens of nationalism – to new liberal ones, which are partly affected by Turkey’s engagement with global dynamics and its involvement in EU affairs.

This chapter addresses the role of internal and international migration in the social transformation of Turkey by focusing on four periods which reflect the different political rationalities (Figure. 8.1):

- the uneasy process of nation-building and the nationalist policies of un-mixing, which together created a two-way immigration and emigration circulation cycle in the early Republican era;
- mass emigration, mainly to European countries, intersecting with state-led developmentalist policies, rapid urbanization and internal migration beginning in the 1950s and 1960s;
- the advent of liberalization and globalization after the 1980s, pushing the state to become increasingly responsive to the demands of emigrants abroad, the rising flow of migrants of non-Muslim origin and the emerging identity questions; and
- new administrative and legal mechanisms in between nationalist legacies and global trajectories.
Figure 8.1 Selected milestones in Turkish immigration and emigration policy since the early twentieth century
Social Transformation and Migration (1923 to the 1950s)

The social texture in the early days of the Republic was very much affected by the ethnic and class-based distinctions within Ottoman society during the nineteenth century. As argued by Keyder (1989), the Ottoman Empire joined the European political system and increasingly became embedded in world capitalism from the eighteenth century onwards. Over a period of a century, the shifts in the manufacturing and production processes and the dependency on international markets created a new bourgeois class, which did not exist in earlier epochs. Differing from other countries that had undergone a transition to capitalism, the rising class conflicts in the Turkish geography were marked by religious and ethnic fragmentation between peasants, artisans, bureaucrats – mainly of Muslim background – and a bourgeoisie comprised of non-Muslim populations (Keyder, 1989).

This picture was about to change in the early twentieth century. One of the key factors for this transformation was the emigration and immigration patterns before and after the foundation of the Republic. These migration patterns were triggered by policies aimed at homogenizing the population in the country, which was already affected by waves of nationalism. The homogenization comprised of a dual pattern based on the emigration of non-Muslim populations – mainly Armenians and Greeks – from Anatolia and the immigration of Turkish Muslim populations, especially from the Balkan countries. According to estimates, about 16 million people – 13 million Muslims and 3 million non-Muslims – were living in the region at the start of the First World War (Courbage and Fargues, 1998: 128). The state-led emigration was maintained by agreements of reciprocity with other countries (in 1913 and 1925 with Bulgaria, in 1923 with Greece), forced displacements (as in the case of the 1915 Armenian emigration) and migrations triggered by deterrence policies (including the Wealth Tax of 1942). Among the social engineering initiatives for Turkifying the population living in the Turkish Republic were the administrative and legal arrangements facilitating the immigration and settlement of Turkish populations (Aktar, 2000: 101). These arrangements were put in force primarily in the 1930s. The 1934 Law on Settlement (Çagaptay, 2002; Kirisci, 2003; Yildiz, 2007) established two divergent statuses by (a) facilitating the migration and integration of those of ‘Turkish origin and culture’ either as migrants or as refugees and (b) preventing and impeding the entry as migrants or refugees of those who did not meet this criterion. While these two statuses were in line with what had been the state’s migration policy since the late nineteenth century, they also paved the way for succeeding patterns of migration to and from Turkey. As a result of these patterns of migration, the national bourgeoisie changed hands from non-Muslims to the newly enriched Muslim merchants. This new bourgeoisie...
was also supported by the state elites, who were endeavouring to create a national economy through paternalistic policies (Keyder, 1989: 136–137).

Since its inception, the main political dimension of state-centric Turkish modernity was defined by Westernization. This vision aimed to found a civilized and modern Turkish nation – viewing demographic transition, urbanization and socio-economic development as the proper prescription for the modernization process. From 1923 to the 1950s, Turkish society began shifting from a regime of high levels of mortality and low fertility rates to one of increased fertility rates – a result of pro-natalist state policies. This caused the Turkish population to double from 13 million to more than 27 million (İçduygü, 2004). Although the rural character of Turkey did not change and the rural population hovered at around 18 per cent during this period, urban planning attempts took place in big cities, as well as in emerging small peripheral towns like Tatvan, in Eastern Anatolia. It was within this context that the Kemalist elites attempted to remove the traditional rural image of Turkish society, and replace it with an urban outlook (Bozdoğan, 2001).

These transformations were also coupled with migration policies that were intended to promote the rapid growth of the postwar population and to support the modernization process. Sending Turkish students to European countries (mainly France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and to the United States and Canada in an attempt to create a Turkish intelligentsia was one of these policies. These highly qualified students received a personal farewell note from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which placed an emphasis on their importance or perceived significance in moulding society: ‘I am sending you as a spark, come back as volcanoes!’ Students were expected to receive a ‘Western-style education’ and return to the Republic in order to respond to the need for qualified labour. Many of them did return and participated in the University Reform of 1933, laying the foundations for modern higher education in Turkey (Şarman, 2005).

The migration boom: rapid urbanization and beyond (1950s–1980s)

The post-Second World War period had brought economic vigour, increases in agrarian production and social and physical mobility. These transformations also had implications in Turkey, where traditional values were replaced with a mentality of developmentalism and market freedom (Keyder, 1989: 169–174), not only in cities but in rural areas as well. The rise of the urban industrial job market over family employment reflected the demographic transition in the country, where the motivations shifted from having many children to increasing children’s economic and educational opportunities, especially in urban settings. As a result, the period was marked by an internal
and international migration boom, resulting in rapid urbanization and in Turkey becoming a well-known country of emigration.

Beginning with the 1950s, the nation-building process led by the Turkish state became ingrained at the local level and the links between the rural and the urban, which had weakened during the early years of the Republic, were restructured. The passage to multiparty democracy had a significant role in this transformation, since the centre-right government of the 1950s buttressed the urbanization process. According to Buğra (2008), the rapid urbanization was juxtaposed by policies for making the landless farmers into landowners; therefore, it did not stimulate the dissolution of the peasantry, as experienced in other countries. To the contrary, the lack of formal social-security structures in the city and the continuing linkages between the rural and urban populations provided alternative strategies and opportunities for the new urbanites. The major implications of this early developmental period were the emergence of shantytowns (gecekondu), along with new networks and localisms among the inhabitants in the city. During the period between 1950 and 1960, the population increase in the four major cities was nearly 70 per cent, while one in every ten villagers was migrating to the cities (Keyder, 1989).

In the meantime, liberal policies integrated the Turkish state and society into the global and regional political and economic arenas. In parallel with these newly formed international linkages, Turkey entered into new relations with labour-demanding industrialized countries through labour recruitment agreements, beginning with the 1961 Agreement with Germany. Modern Turkey has witnessed, for the first time, the mass emigration of Turkish and Muslim populations abroad. The main goals during these labour agreements were different to the viewpoint of the labour-requesting vs the labour-requested country (i.e. Turkey). The interests of the European labour-requesting countries were to respond to the postwar labour shortage via short-term migration from less-developed countries, while the interests of the labour-requested countries were to send migrants abroad in order to benefit from the economic (export of surplus labour power and remittances) and social (transfer of knowledge and know-how) capital which emigrants would gain in Europe. For both sides, migration was supposed to be temporary.

According to official records in Turkey, a total of nearly 800,000 workers went to Europe through the Turkish Employment Service between 1961 and 1974. Out of these workers, 649,000 (81 per cent) went to Germany, 56,000 (7 per cent) to France, 37,000 (5 per cent) to Austria and 25,000 (3 per cent) to the Netherlands (Akgündüz, 2006). The overall state policy in Turkey was based on facilitating remittance flows and the easy return of labour migrants during the first decade of migration. Remittances were considered to be a solution to the perennial foreign exchange crises and shortage of foreign funds to pay for imported goods and services (Martin, 1991; Sayan, 1986). However, labour migration triggered numerous unprecedented
social and political consequences, beginning in the 1960s – from the separation of spouses and parents to extensive contacts with other cultures, from the formation of competing social networks and emotional ties, to reintegration problems after returning to Turkey. Large numbers of Turks were exposed to different economic, social and political processes during their stay in Western Europe. The local non-migrant people labelled the returned emigrants as Almancı or Almanyalı ('Turk from Germany') because of their changed attitudes and behaviour. In fact, the returns prompted economic and social transformation in rural areas.

Over time, emigrants began to settle in cities after their return, rather than in their home villages, and some even stayed in the host country. Emigration also contributed to migrants’ quality of life, bringing upward social mobility and increased social standing in Turkey after their return. Perhaps the most important change was related to the evolving status of women during this period which, according to Abadan-Unat (1977), was marked by a certain emancipation and liberation, more or less limited to increased purchasing power. Still, urbanization, the adoption of the nuclear family pattern, women’s entry into the labour market and their encounters with new social rights in the host countries, caused the demise of the institution of extended family and reconfigured traditional family roles.

This pattern continued until the 1973 oil crisis, which triggered economic stagnation and the halt of state-led labour migration in Western Europe. In the 1970s, new geographies, such as Australia, the Middle East and North Africa, became the target of immigrant populations. Subsequent emigration waves to Europe were comprised of family reunifications, family formations, refugee movements and clandestine labour migration (İçduygu and Sert, 2010), which differed significantly from previous flows of emigrants – consisting primarily of young single men and women from rural backgrounds (Abadan-Unat, 2011).

While social and physical mobility swept the country through internal migration and the emigration of ethnic Turks, the emigration of non-Muslim populations led to transformations in the ethnic and religious realm. In the period 1950–1980, the non-Muslim population decreased from 225,000 to fewer than 150,000 (İçduygu, 2008). Events causing violence against the non-Muslim populations in 1955, the 1963–1964 crisis in Cyprus, rising violence against minority populations during the 1960s along with the effects of the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974, pushed non-Muslim and mainly Rûm populations to displacement. In addition, the Jewish populations moved to Israel after the establishment of the Israeli state. Such events reinforced the ethnic and religious homogenization in the country, which had already been maintained in large measure since the population exchanges in the early days of the Republic. This also solidified the ‘minority problem’, which was intertwined with the rising public perception of ‘the others within’ (Yumul, 2005).
The politicization of migration: questions of identity and citizenship (1980s–2000s)

As asserted by İçduygu (2009), the first objections against the settled definitions of citizenship in Turkey happened as a result of international migration, which surfaced in the 1980s. Starting in the 1960s, as noted in the previous section, millions of Turks left their country in search of work, better life conditions or political liberty. Even though a significant number of these emigrants became members of the host societies, both professionally and socially, over the decades, they were not granted political rights through citizenship. Despite efforts in the 1970s to encourage migrants to return to Turkey, most emigrants stayed in their European host countries. This has gradually become an accepted fact for the Turkish state and society, changing their perception of Turks abroad from that of ‘distant workers’ to ‘migrant workers’, ‘Turkish citizens abroad’ and even to ‘minorities in Europe’.

The adoption of neoliberal policies attracted increasing flows of FDI over the 1990s, lessening the role of remittances in the Turkish economy. As the economic expectations from emigrants faded away, the management of social and cultural affairs and the issue of maintaining ties with the now-permanent emigrants abroad gained importance. The identity questions of the 1980s, including binary oppositions such as Turk/Muslims vs foreigners and Turkish emigrants vs non-Turkish emigrants, became important in policy-making. The post-1980 period was characterized by the increasing engagement of the Turkish state with emigrants in host countries, rather than those in Turkey (Ünver, 2013). It is argued in the literature (İçduygu and Keyman, 2000; Mügge, 2012; Sayarı, 1986) that a number of reasons were behind this policy change: the settling of former labour migrants, as elaborated on above, emerging patterns of political migration of different opposition groups (communists, Islamists, Alevi and Kurdish nationalists) fleeing to Europe from the military junta and the rising cultural revivalist movements of Turkish citizens in European countries. In the early 1980s, in particular, the policy of military rule was to reduce political opposition both within the territories of Turkey and abroad (Mügge, 2012). As a result, the state provided legal and official incentives to keep in close contact with, maintain ties to and improve conditions for Turkish emigrants in Europe. In 1981, the state introduced a law that allowed dual citizenship for the first time in Turkey – significantly increasing the number of Turkish citizens who also obtained the citizenship of their host country (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010).

The state considered dual citizenship to be a crucial tool enabling the integration of emigrants into their host societies. However, some of the host nation-states did not allow dual citizenship. As a result of complaints among emigrants, the Turkish state adopted a number of measures in order to provide quasi-citizenship to those who were born in Turkey, but had acquired citizenship in their host countries. The early 1990s were marked
by a number of incentives facilitating emigrants’ political and social engagement with Turkey, such as the Pink Card procedure (replaced by the Blue Card in 2009) granting rights to those who gave up Turkish nationality and the change in the Turkish Party Law allowing the establishment of Turkish party branches outside of Turkey. The state took other legal and administrative measures to facilitate the political and social participation of Turkish emigrants (Şenay, 2013). The emerging problems of citizenship and rising xenophobia in Europe – which had emerged through events such as the Solingen arson attack in Germany in 1993 – are also considered by scholars to be causes of the Turkish state’s adoption of the Pink Card mechanism (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010).

Even though modern Turkey had been affected by immigration waves since the 1920s, they were based on ‘common descent and culture’. The immigrants of the 1980s were, for the first time, ‘foreigners’, who were neither Turkish nor Muslim. Some of the flows to Turkey were related to the overall globalization process, which facilitated and boosted the movement of people, goods, technologies, ideas and finances. In addition, the political turmoil and economic transformations over the previous 30 years in the region obliged people to move to safer, more-developed countries, making Turkey a passageway. In the East, the draconian politics in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq – especially towards minorities – and the insecurity after the Iran–Iraq war and the Gulf crisis, pushed people to enter Turkey to seek asylum. In the West, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist systems in Eastern Europe prompted the citizens of these countries to arrive in Turkey in search of temporary work.

A significant portion of the ‘non-Turk, non-Muslim’ immigration to Turkey since the 1980s has been irregular and such immigrants are defined by Turkish law as ‘illegal’. Until the 1994 Asylum Regulation, a handful of texts laid down clauses and modalities regarding the entry, exit, stay and residence of aliens, without touching on issues of asylum or labour. The 1994 Regulation defined the conditions for applying for asylum in Turkey; however, this still provided only limited opportunities to be legally recognized, due to the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees granted countries the possibility to accept only those who were fleeing events in Europe. Despite criticism, the Turkish state did not lift the limitation and allowed only temporary asylum to non-European asylum-seekers until they had resettled in a third country. Analyzing this from the perspective of the nation-state paradigm and international migration, policies with regard to immigrants in Turkey have been reluctant to recognize the immigration of non co-ethnics and resistant in reforming nation-state-centred migration policies as a response to the rising migration challenges.

As a result of the legal and administrative framework, which was based on an approach of ‘ignorance’, the ‘foreigners’ who entered the country were
entrenched in urban poverty in the peripheral squatter settlements, together with the internal migrants. In their ethnographic analysis of the Sultanbeyli district in Istanbul, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001) argued that migrants were ‘taking turns in poverty’. The first settlers were the early-comers from Anatolia in the 1950s and were followed, in the late 1980s, by internally displaced Kurdish populations and ‘foreign’ immigrants. While the first squatters in the peripheries allowed for the emergence of ‘informal’ and ‘marginal’ economic strategies, subsequent settlements – especially in the marginal spaces within the city centres (as in the case of Tarlabası in Istanbul and Kadifekale in Izmir) – created urban poverty and an underclass incapable of upward social mobility.

**In between nationalist legacies and global trajectories (post-2000s)**

As noted by Fargues (2013: 5), ‘[w]hile the nation state is a community that recognises itself as one people sharing one territory and one narrative, international migrants are perceived as transgressors to the founding principle of the nation: emigrants, because they live outside the territory of which they still share the narrative; immigrants, because they are not yet part of the narrative attached to the territory in which they are newcomers.’ Indeed, one must view the challenges of the new modes of migration transition and its governance in Turkey since the 2000s within this context of the nation-state and the international migration dilemma.

A number of factors were behind this transition from a country of emigration to one of immigration. Globalization clearly is a major external force behind Turkey quickly becoming a ‘migration transition’ country. This broader phenomenon is captured by Castles and Miller (1998) and Stalker (2000). İçduygu and Keyman (2000) demonstrate the impact of globalization in the specific case of Turkey. They also point out the importance of internal developments as factors transforming Turkey into a ‘migration transition’ country. Turkey’s liberal market economy, characterized by informality, is another internal factor that attracts migration into the country. Yet another internal factor has been government policies making entry into Turkey much easier than was the case during the Cold War. As discussed in the following pages, the single-party rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP, or AKP in Turkish), with its partly liberal stands, has been instrumental in the country’s immigration policy reforms since the early 2000s. Lastly, Turkey’s current ambition to become a member of the EU, and the accompanying political liberalization, are altering the state’s traditional conception of national identity. There has been growing pressure to adopt policies that recognize Turkey’s own ethnic and cultural diversity. Inevitably, this is having a bearing on how the Turkish state and society are looking at foreigners and migrants. In turn, government policy is under growing pressure to be
reformed and adapted to the realities of Turkey becoming a ‘migration transition’ country – a transformation from mainly being a country of emigration to being one of immigration.

The early signs of changing policy in the area of immigration are becoming increasingly apparent and the EU has been an important driving force since the early 2000s. For example, Turkey, as part and parcel of pre-accession requirements, has to harmonize its legislation in areas identified in the EU ‘Accession Partnership’ document and, more specifically, in the Action Plan on Asylum and Migration adopted by the government in March 2005. This action plan lays out the tasks and timetable which Turkey intends to follow in order to prepare for the development of a fully-fledged national status-determination system, lifts the geographical limitation of accepting only refugees from European countries and adopts EU directives on asylum and migration in general. However, uncertainty over Turkey’s membership prospects is discouraging officials from advising the government to make these changes too precipitously.

Moreover, there is a deep-seated concern that Turkey may become a ‘buffer zone’ or a kind of ‘dumping ground’ for the EU’s illegal migrants and rejected asylum-seekers. At the south-east periphery of the EU, Turkey functions as a transit zone for thousands of so-called ‘transit migrants’ attempting to enter Europe. The concern over the country becoming a buffer zone has been strongly propounded by Turkish officials during the readmission agreement negotiation process. Considered by the EU as an effective tool for returning irregular migrants to outside its territories, the readmission agreement has occupied a crucial position in the pre-accession process over the last decade. As a result of long negotiations, both sides finally reached an agreement on readmission on 16 December 2013 in Ankara, confirming in tandem the launch of a visa-liberalization dialogue – an incentive demanded by the Turkish side in return. According to a European Commission press release, the readmission of third-country nationals will enter into force three years after the signature. The visa-liberalization dialogue consists of the screening of Turkish legislation and administrative practices based on the Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey, without setting ‘a specific timeline by when the dialogue should be completed’. Hence the liberalization of the visa for Turkish citizens will depend on the fulfilment of the requirements listed on the roadmap, including the implementation ‘in full and effective manner of the RA’, the management of the borders and the visa policy in order to prevent irregular migration and the establishment of migration and asylum systems in line with international standards.

It is estimated that, in the last two decades, more than half a million transit migrants – primarily from Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries – were apprehended in the country trying to make their way to Europe. Another half a million, mostly coming from post-Soviet countries, were apprehended while they were irregularly working in various sectors. In the same period,
there were more than 100,000 asylum-seekers individually arriving in Turkey, in addition to the mass movements of 500,000 Kurds from Iraq during the first Gulf War in 1991, and another half a million Syrians in light of the recent, and ongoing, crisis. In addition, there is a stock of around 250,000 foreigners who have residence permits, most of whom are professionals, students or retired ‘sun’ migrants (İçduygu, 2012b). As a result, the 2000s signify changing migration flows with respect to four different categories of immigration in Turkey: irregular labour migrants, transit migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, and regular migrants. The irregular migrants (labour/shuttle and transit migrants) signified those who either used Turkey as a way to cross into a third country, or who stayed or worked in the country without the necessary permits. The asylum-seekers and refugees were considered in parallel with the irregular migrants, due to their entry into Turkey often being through irregular border-crossing. Regular migrants are comprised of immigrants and their family members who arrived in Turkey for employment, education, settlement or long-term living and recreational purposes.

As in the previous period, the rise in the number of ‘foreign’ migrants during the 2000s has had significant implications for the outlook and expansion of urban areas. Nearly a quarter of Turkey’s urban population is currently living in the three biggest cities – the largest being Istanbul, with more than 15 million inhabitants. International migration to the country is also targeted towards bigger cities, as they provide more economic and social opportunities for immigrants. Two policy responses aimed at reducing the challenges of rising poverty are urban renewal – which aims to transform squatter areas in the city centres and to relocate the inhabitants in new public housing – and the implementation of ‘satellite cities’ to provide temporary residences in less-populous Anatolian cities for asylum-seekers and refugees. Both policies are based on the dislocation of the mainly migrant populations and have been criticized by academia and by civil society for not envisioning social services for the post-displacement period.

Moreover, the Turkish state recently enacted the Law on Work Permits of Foreigners (Law No. 4817), which enabled labour migrants to obtain their documents in Turkey more easily. The enactment of this law, that facilitates foreign nationals’ search for work and employment in Turkey, heralds the state’s more-welcoming attitude towards the migrant labour force. A new Law on Foreigners and International Protection was adopted by parliament in April 2013. Combining the previously planned two separate laws, the Law on Aliens and the Law on Asylum, this law is designed to bring about some landmark reforms in order to provide Turkey with a modern, efficient and fair management system in line with core international and European standards. With the new law, Turkey commits itself to taking the necessary steps towards the integration of immigrants into the country and to treating asylum-seekers and irregular migrants according to international norms. The law officially declares the foundation of the General Directorate of Migration.
Management, established under the Ministry of the Interior, which will be a hub for the implementation and regulation of the entry into, stay in and exit from Turkey of foreign nationals, and for the protection of the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers. Critically thinking, we can argue that the developments brought about by this new law mark genuine progress in the country’s public policy agenda.

The increase in international migration brings to light new social implications, some of which have not been as ostensible in the past in Turkey. One of these implications is the rising tension between the non-migrant majority population and the immigrant minority – as in the case of the Syrian refugee crisis. Since the start of clashes between Syrian government forces and the opposition in early 2011, more than 400,000 Syrian refugees have fled to Turkey. Under the direction of the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), temporary settlements were expanded to comprise 20 camps in ten provinces. However, the majority of the refugees have been living outside the camps since 2012, with crucial numbers of people without any form of registration in Turkey. Although state policies in the early months of the crisis were very generous, the increase in the number of people and the emerging tensions between the migrants and Turkish citizens triggered the publicizing of the migration issue in the country.

The Syrian refugee crisis evokes other questions about the possibility of migrants’ naturalization and citizenship regime. Although Turkey’s migration policies have undergone a remarkable transformation towards liberalization since the early 2000s, there seems to be various paradoxical developments about the direction of these changes. In some policy areas, including that of citizenship, the prospect of Turkey loosening its traditional immigration policies seems less likely. Although the new Settlement Law of November 2006 has made similar changes towards the liberalization of migration policies, it continues to limit formal immigration to Turkey to individuals and groups of ‘Turkish descent and culture’. This approach is very closely related to the traditional conception of ‘Turkishness’ reminiscent of the 1930s. The identifying features of ‘Turkishness’ are not solely related to Turkish ethnicity, but to the ability and willingness of immigrants to adopt the Turkish language and to be a member of the Muslim Sunni ethnic group often closely associated with Ottoman rule in the past. Technically, Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, Tatars and Turks – mostly from the Balkans – who are included in this definition will be able to migrate to Turkey. Minorities claiming a link to Turkey who are not Sunni Muslims – that is, everyone from Armenians and Assyrians to Greeks and Jews, as well as unassimilated Kurds and Alevis – are likely to face difficulties in migrating to Turkey. Such a policy is not in accord with the emerging EU common immigration policy, which increasingly emphasizes civic connections to the host territory and to employment prospects rather than to ethnic or national origin, as grounds for immigration.
Despite the legal and administrative challenges to the naturalization of ‘foreign’ migrants, there have been transformations in the Turkish citizenship regime over the last two decades (İçduygü and Kirişçi, 2009). These seem relatively covert when one examines the enactments within the country, including naturalization through marriage and the granting of citizenship to certain professional groups (including a handful of African footballers playing in Turkish leagues). However, the Turkish state has been overtly producing proactive policies since the 1980s, through adaption of the needs of Turkish emigrants, who have now become settled minority groups in their host countries. As mentioned in the previous section, flexible forms of quasi-citizenship have been introduced under settings where the host countries did not allow for dual citizenship. In 2012, the Turkish state introduced consular voting, which will allow citizens living abroad to participate in future elections. Considering that more than five million Turkish citizens (nearly six per cent of the entire population of Turkey) are living abroad, consular voting is expected to bring new challenges to the Turkish political system.

Over the last few years, policies for preserving ties with emigrant communities abroad have been coupled with the emergence of new membership forms without citizenship. Indeed, the reflections of this newly emerged ideological setting of neo-Ottomanism have become very clear, with the establishment of a new government department – the Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı). The Presidency was set up in 2010 with the objective of maintaining and strengthening the relationship of the Turkish state with Turkish citizens living abroad, with those of Turkish origin living outside Turkish territories and with foreign students in Turkey. This is the first time that emigrants abroad and non-citizen Turkish ethnic communities have been brought together under the same institutional roof (Aksel, 2014).

According to the Presidency, close contact with Turkish citizens living abroad is of the foremost importance and ‘citizens who are dispersed to vast geographies in the world, from Germany to Jordan, the Balkans to Australia, are increasingly becoming more effective and successful in their residence countries in different fields, including economics, science, arts, sports and politics’. Besides this interest, the Presidency projects a discourse which often references the country’s glorified Ottoman past, and its history, people and geography. Together this rhetoric and the promotion of the Turkish language and culture abroad through the establishment of Yunus Emre Cultural Centers reflect the Turkish state’s concern for making use of the neo-Ottoman discourse (Kaya and Tercmen, 2011). Since the early 2000s, various external and internal factors have made Turkey take more systematized steps toward institutionalizing the ‘management of international migration flows and their outcomes’. It seems that a considerable shift has taken place in the last decade towards a proactive policy-making position on emigration and immigration issues. However, with the changing global, regional and
local outlook around Turkey, it is too early to say whether the country is on a smooth path of policy-making on international migration.

Concluding remarks

This chapter has addressed some of the challenges associated with the transformation of the migration paradigm from one based on nationalism and the nation-state to one founded on transnationalism and the globalized world. In so doing, it has linked the national-level experience of migration with the global-level phenomenon of migration, in order to elaborate on the dynamics and mechanisms of international migration in Turkey. More importantly, the chapter argues that, during the last 90 years of the Turkish Republic, internal and international mobility have been the most crucial vehicles of social transformation.

A number of paradigmatic shifts since the early twentieth century have prompted a process of revisionism with regard to Turkey’s international migration policies. For the first half of the twentieth century, nation-building concerns determined the nature of emigration and immigration flows in the country: departures of non-Muslims and arrivals of Turks and Muslims dominated the flows. In the mid-twentieth century, migration policies focused on the economic gains from emigration flows: labour migration to Europe was seen as a tool for reducing unemployment, obtaining remittances and acquiring skills. Starting in the early 1980s, Turkey was faced with flows of immigrants with different national, ethnic and religious backgrounds: regular and irregular labour migrants, transit migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees all arrived in the country. In the 1980s and early 1990s, any noticeable policy concern about emigration and immigration issues was absent from politics. From the mid-1990s until recent times, the Turkish state’s position vis-à-vis the issue of international migration has broken away from the approach of ‘ignorance and neglect’ which dominated the period of the 1980s and early 1990s: both emigration- and immigration-related issues have gained in importance on the public policy-making agenda. Today, in the early twenty-first century, Turkey is confronted with questions concerning the consequences of emigration and immigration, and how the various migration patterns can be managed by policy-makers. It appears that the country’s migration policy-making processes are now caught between ‘the politics of the past’ (nationalist legacies) and ‘the politics of the future’ (globalist trajectories).

Notes

1 According to Ayhan Aktar, the Turkification process was ethnically defined and was based on ensuring the domination of Turkish ethnic identity in every aspect of social life.
2 Law No. 2510 on Settlement (1934), Law No. 5683 on Residence and Travel for Aliens in Turkey (1950), the Passport Law No. 5682 (1950) and Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 (1981).

3 ‘Accession Partnership’ documents lay down the tasks that Turkey has to implement to harmonize its laws and policies with those of the EU *acquis*. There is a whole section relating to issues under immigration. The most recent one is *Accession Partnership Strategy for Turkey*, Council Decision, 18 February 2008.

4 The Action Plan on ‘Asylum and Migration’ was officially adopted by the Turkish government on 25 March 2005.


References


Turkey’s Neoliberal Transformation and Changing Migration Regime: The Case of Female Migrant Workers

Mine Eder

Based on a series of interviews with undocumented, irregular female migrant workers at different sites in Istanbul, this chapter maps out the layers of vulnerability faced by female migrant workers in Turkey. In line with the feminization of global migratory flows, Turkey received increasing numbers of irregular female migrants throughout the 1990s, mostly from the post-Soviet world. These women found jobs in precarious informal labour markets as domestic caregivers, cleaners, shop clerks and sex workers. The neoliberal economic transformation that the country has undergone since the 1980s has added fresh levels of economic fragility, volatility and what I have termed the ‘violence of uncertainty’ for these migrants. Another aspect of this violence of uncertainty is that Turkey, despite certain regularization strategies and the establishment of a new Immigration Office, has begun to securitize its borders, making it harder for these women to move back and forth, and leading to an increased criminalization of their status. The arbitrariness and uncertainty embedded in migrants’ encounters with state officials constitute yet another level of vulnerability, forcing them to live on the edge of constantly changing borders of regularity and irregularity. The ‘wanted, but not welcome status’ of these women in the absence of any integrative measures, and the combined effect of existing legal, economic and cultural pressures in the country, have led to a deep sense of exclusion.

Theoretically, the study of female migrant workers and their ‘integration’ in Turkey offers yet another set of evidence for the argument that globalization and neoliberalization do not translate into increased openness and inclusion and improved gender norms. If anything, growing uncertainties and volatility in the economy, coupled with the securitization of borders, add fresh layers of ‘otherings’ for these women, pushing them to live with the violence of uncertainty in their daily lives.
In what follows, I describe some of our findings, based on hour-long interviews with more than 80 post-Soviet female migrant workers in different settings – predominantly in the deportation centre in Kumkapı but also in private homes where they work as domestic workers, in churches where they often socialize and in shops in a specific district in Istanbul known as Laleli, which specializes in formal and informal trading with the post-Soviet world. In the deportation centre in Kumkapı, these women, aged from 22 to 62, were about to be deported for a variety of reasons – some for visa violations or visa fraud, some for working as sex workers. Almost half of the interviews were done during the summer of 2007. The rest took place every Tuesday throughout the period of our fieldwork – May 2013 to March 2014. In addition to these interviews with migrant women, I also interviewed at different periods nine employment agency staff and/or ‘informal managers’ as well as more than 20 police officers who were mostly working in the Bureau of Foreigners, Borders and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of the Interior. In July and August 2013, we interviewed more than ten police officers in charge of running the deportation centre, including the then head of the centre, as well as those processing asylum applications.

The rising feminization of migratory flows to Turkey, and particularly to Istanbul, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union is quite remarkable. These flows occurred not only in the midst of tumultuous processes of capitalist transition in the former Soviet Republics, but also when Turkey’s neoliberal economic transformation had begun to speed up. Although most of the migration literature on Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region focuses on human trafficking which, indeed, became rampant in the 1990s, the presumed ‘voluntary’ economic migration has largely been neglected. The economic violence that these migrant workers go through is, nonetheless, quite dramatic and should not be underestimated. As such, these migrant workers represent a new form of ‘voluntary servitude’ à la Boetie (1975) in the global economy. Added to these global pressures are the increased volatility, informality and precariousness of the labour markets, which have become even more fragile under the intense commodification pressures on Turkey’s own political economy. The deadly combination of neoliberalization and globalization, I argue, has created a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of ever-lower wages, uncertain labour contracts and informality, and has intensified what I call the ‘violence of uncertainty’ for these migrant women.

In a seemingly paradoxical fashion, the Turkish government, faced with new migratory flows, tended towards increased securitization and futile border controls as well. Although Turkey’s aspirations to become a regional power have, at times, meant deliberate negligence towards increased migration and a softer visa regime, the general trend was towards better registration, codification and control over these flows. For the migrant workers, this meant having to constantly live on the arbitrary borders of regularity and
irregularity, which created intense vulnerability, ambiguity and uncertainty (Calavita, 2005). These two processes, and the encounters of these women in their daily lives, inhabit, as Kemp (2004: 268) aptly puts it:

[a] double moral standard that fuels the phenomenon of labour migrations globally, on the one hand, the increasing demand and recruitment of cheap and docile labour in the guise of migrant men and women that pervades the neoliberal economies, and the other strengthening the social and political barriers aimed at incorporation as legitimate members of the community.

Finally, these women face layers of ‘othering’ mostly manifested through their encounters with police officers and employment agencies and in the workplace. By ‘othering’, I refer to ‘racialization’, defined by Kemp (2004: 269) as:

[a] structuring of social relations through the signification of biological or cultural characteristics in such a way so as to define and construct cultural characteristics as natural and hence immutable.

The arbitrary treatment of various migrant groups and their constant stigmatization because of their gender, national origin and appearance (even hair colour) once again intensify the ‘violence of uncertainty’.

Globalization and the neoliberal race to lower wages in Turkey

The diversity, geographic dispersion and volume of irregular migration into Turkey and Istanbul since the 1990s, whether of asylum-seekers, transit migrants mostly on their way to Europe or migrants who come to Turkey to work temporarily and return home – the so-called transnational, circular, pendulum or return migrants – have been quite remarkable (İçduygu, 2006).

The influx of approximately 1 million Syrian ‘temporary guests’ into the country since 2010 has further complicated this picture. It is now almost a cliché among migration scholars of Turkey to remind everyone that Turkey is not only an emigration country but also a country of immigration. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the declining economic opportunities at home in the post-Soviet era, the initial loosening of border controls and the overall proximity of Turkey, which made the country – and particularly Istanbul – a convenient destination for this type of irregular migration, contributed significantly to this dynamism.

Though it is very difficult to ascertain the number of irregular migrants, we know that 56 per cent of the 336,478 irregular migrants apprehended in the 2001–05 period had migrated to find employment (İçduygu, 2006: 3, 19).
Migrant workers in Turkey are heavily concentrated in domestic service, entertainment, the sex industries, textiles, hospitality and construction. Women heavily outnumber men – except in construction; they are seen as the ideal employee in these sectors, as they are willing to work for much lower wages. İçduygu (2006: 11) provides a broad sectoral breakdown of these irregular and predominantly female migrants. Accordingly, post-Soviet and Bulgarian women were employed in domestic work, Romanians, post-Soviets, Russians and Ukrainians in the sex and entertainment sectors, Moldovan and Romanian women in textiles and Iranian, Iraqi, Moldovan and Romanian women in the construction industry. The new Syrian so-called temporary refugees have since spread all across these sectors, lowering the wages even further.

What is also remarkable about these flows is the growing numbers of women. Among these transnational migrants/visitors, three groups of post-Soviet women have been particularly ‘visible’ since the mid-1990s – the traders in the bustling district of Laleli in Istanbul and, more recently, on the outskirts of Osmanbey (generally middle-aged, middle-class and relatively better educated), the sex workers (generally younger and less-educated women derogatively known as ‘Natashas’) and the domestic workers (mostly Moldovans and Bulgarians but, recently, Uzbeks and Turkmens as well) who are often in-house babysitters or caregivers for the elderly. These groups have little in common and are not particularly sympathetic to each other.

These women’s experiences and encounters with the state are also quite different. Suitcase traders (transnational entrepreneurs in the 1990s) were mostly of regular status, entering and exiting the country with proper visas, though this was clearly not the case in the early 1990s when prostitution was part of the ‘start-up’ capital for these traders (for details, see Yükseker, 2000). The goods they carry back home, however, are often ‘negotiated’ through informal networks. They declare these goods as ‘carry-ons’, but both the volume and the quality of the goods go well beyond the ‘legal’ limits. The number of these shuttle traders (who were, again, predominantly women) has dwindled since the mid-1990s, but some have stayed on as migrant shopkeepers working in the Laleli area since they have language advantages. Domestic migrant workers, on the other hand, usually enter into the country on a one-month visa but overstay their regular visa to find work and are faced with heavy fines and penalties on their departure; still others find themselves in prostitution rings and in a situation of irregularity and criminality (for details, see Erder and Kaşka, 2003, 2012).

Moldova, for instance, one of the poorest countries in the post-Soviet region, became one of the largest migrant-sending countries, particularly in the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis. While some 371,000 Moldovan workers – approximately 25 per cent of the active working population – are said to be working abroad, this estimate does not take into account seasonal and temporary work. The country also ranks among the highest when it
comes to the ratio of remittances to overall GDP. Most of these migrant women have come from rural areas in Moldavia, and these remittances have been instrumental in addressing the skyrocketing poverty in the country. As more and more family members rely on these women’s work abroad, Sassen (2001) has aptly called this phenomenon ‘the feminization of survival’.

Apart from these push factors, post-Soviet migrant women were particularly appealing for the Turkish domestic labour market for three main reasons. One was that the initial migrants were mostly from Moldavia, were all of Gagauz Turkic origin (the only Christian population with Turkic origins) and had a fairly good oral knowledge of Turkish, which was a great advantage for Turkish households. Secondly, they were often more educated than their Turkish counterparts. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, these women were willing to provide in-house care (since they rarely had anywhere else to go), were very flexible over working hours (many reported that they worked very long hours) and were willing to work for at least half the wage of local domestic workers.

From a broader perspective, domestic care for children and the elderly has, from the very start, always been sourced through informal labour networks in Turkey. The absence, or very limited scale, of a welfare state, the utter negligence of state pre-school education (only 7 per cent of pre-kindergarten students attend school) and a lack of state-funded care for the elderly have meant that such issues would have to be solved through extended family networks. The rapid socio-economic transformation of Turkey, particularly since the economic liberalization of the 1980s, ongoing urban migration, the atomization and subsequent evaporation of those family social networks that have long played a crucial role in cushioning poverty, coupled with the rising number of elderly people in the country, have not only created more permanent pockets of poverty in the country but have also led to a burgeoning demand for informal domestic workers (Buğra and Keyder, 2003).

The domestic care problem was initially ‘solved’ through the ‘internal’ Turkish/Kurdish migrant workers moving from rural areas to the big cities. In fact, the gatekeeper’s wife (kapıcının eşği) was often the ‘cleaning lady’ for the households in the apartments. Given the historically low levels of female participation in Turkey, the ‘commodification of care’ has, ironically, not been induced by increasing the work-life pressures of women but more by the availability of cheap labour. This is why domestic care in households where women are ‘housewives’ is also very common (Akalın, 2007). The entry of these new migrants into an already informal market has marked a clear shift from the relatively less-educated, poor rural migrants to the better-educated, foreign migrant women with occupational skills. Still, as elaborated below, the growing competition between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ domestic workers can be seen as a new ‘race to the neoliberal bottom’, driving the wages even lower. Though the wages for foreign migrant workers have increased over time as these workers have learned the language and adapted to the working
conditions in the households, in-house migrant domestic caregivers will still accept work at a lower wage.

Meanwhile, the lure of Laleli district, which has transformed itself into a truly transnational market place since the 1990s, was also significant. With almost all the signs in Russian, this was a district with the highest concentration of hotels, shops that cater to post-Soviet women, cargo companies, so-called ‘tour operators’ who bring these migrants in, transnational entrepreneurs who carry goods and people to and from, and red-light districts in its immediate vicinity. Most post-Soviet migrant women were brought to Laleli hotels where they stayed until they found a job. A lot of voluntary sex workers also admitted that they started their jobs in Laleli hotels, and some were subject to very cruel treatment. Laleli is also the district where most of these migrant workers come not just to find a new job but to buy goods to send home, to contact cargo companies which send these goods back home or to buy tickets to return home. As such, Laleli was mostly an informal transnational market place conducive to these flows. Though the dynamism of the district as a labour market has died down since the 2000s, there are still considerable numbers of migrant women working in Laleli shops and it is still a meeting place for most of these women (Eder et al., 2008).

But perhaps the biggest lure of Turkey’s labour market was its relatively flexible visa regime, particularly towards the post-Soviet Republics. As Kirişçi (2005) explains, Turkey’s visa policy allowed for three modes of entry to the country, the first of which was visa-free entry; the second required nationals to obtain their visa prior to arriving in Turkey. Along with these conventional categories, the third and most interesting practice which Turkey employed was the ‘sticker visa’ (bandrol in Turkish), a visa issued at the border in return for a fee that changed from origin country to origin country. Most of the former Soviet Union countries could enter with this sticker visa. All the shuttle traders and post-Soviet migrants we interviewed unanimously said that easier visa regulations were one of the most important factors in their choice of Turkey for suitcase trading and for working as domestic helpers.6 Turkey also signed bilateral agreements with Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries facilitating regular travel and making other visa arrangements for transit travel (Kirişçi, 2005: 351). In December 2011 and October 2012, the visa requirements for Georgians and for Moldovans, respectively, were also lifted.7 Loose visa policies have clearly affected the number of people travelling from the former Soviet Union countries. When the visa restrictions for Georgians were lifted, for instance, the number of entries from there increased from a mere 180,000 in 2005 to 1.1 million visitors in 2011. As of 11 April 2014, with the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the Electronic Visa Application System, or e-Visa, has replaced sticker visas.

The marriage of a flexible visa regime, more transnational ties with the former Soviet countries and the rising demand for cheap domestic care led to increased migratory flows. However, the migrants faced an increasingly
volatile economy with very few regularization avenues, precarious labour markets and very little access to public services. Easy and regular entry into the country did not translate into the problem-free acquisition of residence or work permits. On the contrary, as the entries became easier, the barriers to the regularization of migrant workers began to increase, starting with legal constraints in 2003 (Erder and Kaşka, 2012), which I explain below.

The neoliberal transformation of Turkey: extensive commodification and privatization

The neoliberal economic transformation the country has undergone since the 1980s has increasingly made these irregular migrants’ lives ever-more-precarious in an already volatile labour market. At first glance, managing the debt burden of the economy, controlling inflation and generating growth after decades of malaise prior to the 1980s appeared to be a major success in Turkey. But the first ten years of limited fiscal spending and wage freezes and the opening up of the economy to global competition meant that the country had become politically unsustainable by the end of the 1980s. When most of the policies of the pre-1980 era returned with a vengeance in the 1990s, unsustainable debt, soaring public-sector borrowing ratios and, of course, high inflation soon followed. The financialization of the global economy, combined with extensive borrowing, caused two financial crises in the 1990s (1994 and 2000/2001), the latter bringing the economy to the brink of total collapse.

The crisis itself became an instrument for a much deeper neoliberal restructuring and began to change the political and economic landscape in Turkey. With a 9 per cent decline in GDP and more than 1 million jobs lost, it was no surprise that the political parties of the coalition government during the financial crisis were literally wiped off the political scene in the 2002 elections. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government came to power on the promise of economic stability. Fully implementing the IMF programme, the AKP brought down inflation to single digits, resolved the debt, lowered interest rates and achieved an average annual GDP growth of 6 per cent during the 2002–07 period.

Despite this ‘seeming success’, the neoliberal transformation of Turkey’s political economy had devastating social and economic consequences. Firstly, agricultural liberalization, the reduction in subsidies and the entry of big agro-businesses into the Turkish market resulted in increased rural poverty and a significant decline in agricultural labour – the ratio of agricultural workers in total employment declined from 40 per cent in 1998 to 25.2 per cent in 2010 and had dropped to 19.6 per cent by January 2014 (TÜİK, 2014). An estimated 3 million agricultural jobs have been lost since the financial crisis of 2001 (TÜİK, 2014). Furthermore, since the corresponding job growth in the urban sectors was insufficient, the pressures of unemployment remained constant and high. This also meant that informal
welfare mechanisms through agricultural policies would no longer be available; this is also visible in the persistently high degree of poverty in agriculture in comparison to other sectors. Clearly, the deepening commodification of Turkey’s agriculture has intensified the uncertainty and vulnerability in the countryside (Keyder and Yenal, 2010).

Secondly, the commodification of land was not limited to the countryside. The prospects of using informal housing as a welfare measure had long dwindled as the urban landscape also rapidly became saturated and commodified. Two major trends accelerated this process and transformed urban land into areas of social and political contestation. One trend was the increasing devolution of power to the municipalities. In 1984, the Motherland Party, which enjoyed the parliamentary majority, passed a construction law enabling the municipalities to prepare and approve urban construction and land development. An influx of foreign capital into the cities also accelerated the appropriation of land. The second trend was the rising power and visibility of the Mass Housing Authority (TOKI). Though the institutional origins of the TOKI go back to 1984, it was the AKP that equipped TOKI with extraordinary powers. Almost all urban state lands were now rendered available to TOKI free of charge for planning and executing housing projects in cooperation with the Privatization Administration. Though some of TOKI’s activities were meant to provide cheap houses for the poor, long-needed in most cities, the lack of transparency – particularly in bidding for TOKI projects – and the continued appropriation of public land for private purposes has significantly accelerated the commodification of urban land, eliminating all prospects for informal housing as an exit from poverty. Whether it is the private developers building new office spaces or shopping malls, the municipalities undertaking giant infrastructure projects, sprawling mass-housing projects or giant gecekondu transformation projects dubbed as ‘urban renewal’, the pathways to social integration and upward social mobility through informal housing have clearly been closed.

The third and final component of Turkey’s neoliberal transformation was the visible privatization of its welfare regime and transition from an informal, but still public, welfare regime, to a minimalist, increasingly privatized welfare provision and social assistance mechanisms (Eder, 2009). While social security reforms increased the age of retirement and eligibility requirements in 2008, the healthcare transformation programme had, since 2003, opened up new avenues for the private healthcare industry to flourish. It was the private healthcare institutions that led the expansion in the healthcare sector in the decade between 2002 and 2012. The number of private hospital beds grew at an annual rate of 23.6 per cent, a figure much higher than the growth rate of hospitals under the auspices of the Minister of Health. Similarly, the number of private hospital visits also grew at the remarkable rate of 63.5 per cent. Though public provision of minimal healthcare insurance for those living below the minimum wage provided some social protection, it also meant...
the indirect channelling of public funds for the private healthcare industry. Thus most of the valuable public funds were being spent on health insurance rather than on increasing the quality and scope of public healthcare.

As agricultural and urban land became intensely commodified, public social protection was increasingly privatized, the eligibility requirements for social protection increased and irregular migrants joined the army of informal ‘native workers’ who now faced an economy where informal welfare mechanisms and possibilities for survival (such as through informal housing in the city) were no longer available. In short, the irregular migrants joined the growing army of the urban and rural poor.

**The ‘violence of uncertainty’, Take 1: informality, precarious work and no protection**

Irregular migrants started to arrive to join the almost half of the working population in the country who were ‘informal’, that is, having no access to social security benefits (TÜİK, 2014). Informality and a lack of social protection had indeed been a perennial feature in Turkey’s political economy from the start. The entry of migrants further complicated this problem and led to a decline in wages across various sectors, including the domestic care industry. The irregular migrants, regardless of whether they were domestic workers or sex workers in the case of women, had no access to free healthcare, even in an emergency. One Uzbek woman, for instance, described how she was reported to the police and sent to Kumkapı (the detention centre) when she could not pay for her heart surgery, even when she still needed post-surgery care. Though there are some organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which help women (albeit in a very limited way) who have been trafficked and forced into prostitution, there are hardly any civil society groups or organizations providing help for self-employed sex workers, or voluntary migrants working in the informal labour market. The healthcare transformation in the country, which aimed to improve access, simply did not extend to irregular migrants.

Typical migrant women planning to come to Istanbul for the first time to work as domestic workers, for instance, operated totally in an informal realm. They started by contacting the so-called tour operators in their own country. There may have been as many as 10–15 tour operators in a given village, all wanting to organize and pool the potential migrants. These tour operators also have direct and indirect ties with semi-formal employment offices in Istanbul, whose job it is to match the families seeking domestic help with these new migrants. For this particular service, the tour operators can charge anything between US$1,000 and US$3,000 depending on the risk. A typical wage for a domestic worker started at about US$400 in the 1990s and increased to US$600–700 – at least four or five times the average salary in the post-Soviet world.
And for this presumed service, employment offices usually charged a fee to the families seeking domestic help – either half or a full month’s salary. Migrants also paid one third to half of their salaries to the office. Some employment offices were located in Laleli, for convenience, because Laleli was often the last stop for the tour operators. Some were placed in cheap hotels/motels in the district until they found a job or some shabby apartments with tens of other migrant workers. Some of these employment offices look like temporary shelters for these workers, but there are also fancy employment offices which are registered, pay some of their taxes and do this networking on the side.

The first time a migrant comes to Istanbul is a moment of intense vulnerability. As has been documented, this is where these women, with their passport confiscated, might also face the risk of being forced to trade in sex (Erder and Kaşka, 2003). Indeed, there seems to be a thin line between those ‘marketed’ for the informal domestic labour market and those marketed for the fashion industry, modelling, shopkeeping in Laleli and, indeed, for prostitution. Tour operators usually arrange the paperwork and are also responsible for the migrant’s safe passage. If there are some issues of irregularity or of complicated visa situations, the price of the travel goes up.

These employment agencies reveal an intense racialization of these women as well; at its worst, the language of slavery is used. ‘I keep telling these women not to come here with golden teeth’, said one agency manager, ‘I end up having to take these women to the dentist because golden teeth shout “I am a foreigner, come and get me”.’ Racialization based on the physical appearance and age is also very common. As explained to us by a member of staff at an employment agency:

We have to find women whom we will be proud to send to ‘good families’. That is why they have to look decent and tidy. But they should not be too old, either, because they will get tired very quickly.

There also appears to be a wage scale based on migrants’ experience, how well they speak Turkish and how ‘presentable’ they are. The Moldovans, for instance, who have been in the domestic care market for almost 20 years, have begun to out-price the ‘newer’ migrants from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and claim that, even though these ‘newer’ migrants may speak some Turkish, they do not know ‘how to manage a house properly’. Uzbeks and Turkmens, new to both the domestic work and the sex work market, agree to work for less money, starting the race to the neoliberal bottom one more time, this time among the foreign migrants themselves.

Meanwhile, under increasing pressure from the labour unions and complaints of ‘foreigners are taking our jobs’, the government introduced new legal measures regarding work permits for foreigners, which appeared to offer a venue for means of regularization. On 6 September 2003, a new law – ‘Working Permits for Foreigners’ – was introduced, which facilitated
obtaining work and residence permits for foreigners and removed domestic work from the informal job list.\textsuperscript{10} This law also increased the fines imposed for those caught in informal employment. Since 2003, however, there has been no significant evidence that work permits among migrant domestic workers have actually increased. The fact that the initiative is totally left up to the employer, and that work permits would mean increased costs and responsibilities for the employer, could explain why regularization has not been meaningful on the ground. Very few of the post-Soviet women actually managed to get work permits and benefit from a one-time amnesty for migrant domestic workers in 2012. Even after the pardon, though the numbers of work permits increased by almost 68 per cent in 2012, the total number of applicants was not impressive.\textsuperscript{11} The application process for getting a work permit still remains cumbersome and costly.

Some female migrant workers, however, had no prospects whatsoever for regularization. The double standards were the most visible in the case of foreign sex workers. Sex workers, voluntary and involuntary, also favoured Turkey due to its flexible visa regime but, although prostitution is acceptable for Turkish citizens, the foreign sex workers are not permitted to work in Turkey according to the 1950 Passport Law Article 8, which states that ‘prostitutes or those who receive income by pushing others into prostitution are subject to deportation’ (Gülçür and Ilkkaracan, 2002: 413).

In short, from labour agencies to uncertain and unreliable working conditions, these women found themselves totally commodified, either as domestic workers, putting in long hours in homes, or as always potentially available sexual objects. They systematically reported underpayment or non-payment by their bosses, arbitrary firings and threats of being denounced to the police, sexual harassment and stigmatization. Finally, they almost unanimously all mentioned housing problems, how it had become impossible to find a place to rent unless there is a Turkish citizen signing a contract, how they are easily evicted when delays in payment occur and how Istanbul, in particular, though a place where all migrants prefer to come because of more job opportunities, has become increasingly expensive and unaffordable.

The ‘violence of uncertainty’ Take 2: deportability and the blurring boundaries of regularity/irregularity

Table 9.1 indicates the signs of securitization in Turkey’s migration management apparent as early as 2003. The change in the Citizenship Law in 2003 made getting citizenship through marriage more difficult by requiring that a couple live together for a minimum of three years before being entitled to claim citizenship. One police officer explained:

They [marriage migrants] were constantly getting married and were having their citizenship right the day after they got married; we would bust
<table>
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<th>Law/Regulations</th>
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| Law on Work Permits for Foreigners, Law Number 4817 | Accepted on 6 March 2003 and went into effect on September 2003 | - Changed the old 1932 law that restricted the number of jobs permitted to foreigners in Turkey and expanded the categories of jobs for which foreigners can be legally employed, including domestic work.  
- Work permits are granted based on business or household initiative. Only employers can apply for foreigner work permit, which can be made even if the migrant has not arrived in Turkey at the time of the application. If fired, migrants’ work permit becomes invalid.  
- Applications are made through the website of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  
- If in Turkey, the migrant has to have a minimum residence permit of six months at the time of the work permit application. |
| Amendment to the Article 5 of the Turkish Citizenship Law | 12 February 2003 | - The right of foreign national couples to have immediate Turkish citizenship at the time of the marriage is abolished so as to eliminate marriage of conveniences. Three years of waiting period is imposed, which includes periodic police visits. Even after the three years, the citizenship petition can be denied based on prior deportations and criminal records. |
| Amendment to the Law of Residence and Travel for Foreigners in Turkey, Law Number 5683 | Accepted on October 2011 and went into effect on 1 February 2012 | - Foreigners with tourist visas can spend 90 days in Turkey in every 180 days without the need for residence permits, but will have to leave the country at the end of 90 days.  
- Foreigners can cut their overstay fines and re-entry ban time by half, by applying to the police. |
| One-time-only amnesty and six-month-long residence permit for irregular migrants who have started to overstay their visas before 28 May 2012 and applied for amnesty before 15 August 2012 | May 2012 | - Foreigners who had overstayed their visas and their residence permits received a one-time amnesty and received a six-month residence permit, provided that they paid for their overstay charges, and residence permit fees. Those who missed this deadline and could not benefit from this regulation were also exempted from re-entry bans, if they agreed to leave by 31 December 2012. |

Source: Compiled from official Gazettes by Mehtap Altinoz and Gül Çatır.
a sex operation and could not do anything against these women because they were Russian but with Turkish citizenship. The law had to change; now we can go and check whether the couple is actually living together or not and really make sure it is not a ‘fake marriage’.

Marriage still enables these migrant women to get work permits, but regular checks by the police make it very difficult for them to actually marry. Meanwhile, even though marriage offers a passage to regularization, it still creates vulnerability for women in the domestic sphere as they are reluctant to report any domestic abuse or violence for fear of losing their regular status.

There were also a number of constantly changing regulations and internal police decrees that defined how the police are expected to ‘manage’ the migrants. One such decree, for instance, was a regulation introduced in 2007, which required tourists coming in from the post-Soviet world to demonstrate proof of sufficient funds at the point of entry. Post-Soviet tourists were asked to show evidence of US$1,000 (the approximate cost of a one-month stay – the duration they were allowed to stay with the sticker visa at the time) at the point of entry. What this practice simply did, however, was to increase the price of the ‘tour operators’, who ‘lent’ these US$1,000 to the prospective migrant workers only to collect them again after the migrant’s successful entry.

Creating new barriers to entry is yet another strategy for managing migration flows, one of the reasons why the then Undersecretariat for Foreigners came up with the ‘equal stay’ requirement, whereby a migrant had to spend the same amount of time outside Turkey as the time they overstayed their visa. This was valid even for those who paid their penalties for overstaying their visa in full. Not surprisingly, in its implementation, the equal stay rule created a perfect opportunity for the police and law enforcement to ‘interpret’ this rule as they saw fit. The shift was the most dramatic among the Bulgarian Turks – who used to be a significant group in the domestic care industry – who could regularly travel back and forth between Bulgaria and Turkey every three months. Between 2001 and 2007, migrants from Bulgaria were allowed to stay in Turkey on visa waivers valid for three months. In 2007, within the context of harmonization with the Schengen regime, the government signed a new visa agreement allowing the Bulgarian Turks to stay for a maximum of 90 days in any six-month period. This was extended to all foreigners entering the country as of 2012. In effect, the Bulgarian Turks became undesirable ‘irregular, foreign migrants’ almost overnight (Kaslı and Parla, 2009).

Finally, Afghans and Iraqi males are groups that are predominantly and systematically deported. The deportation and apprehension of women migrants are also common. The number of foreigners apprehended peaked at 94,000 in 2000, and has hovered around an average of 50,000 migrants every year since then. Migrants are apprehended for prostitution, informal
employment, overstayed visas and/or irregular entry–exit. This number then dropped in 2011 to 42,821.12 Yet, the same year, 26,889 of those apprehended were deported, which suggests that not all apprehended migrants are actually deported. The breakdown by deportation reason also reveals that, as deportation based on visa violations has declined largely thanks to the flexible visa regime, the number of those deported from informal employment increased from 925 in 2001 to 2,634 in 2011. This suggests that there is growing concern over irregular migrants staying in the country and working in the informal labour markets (Toksöz et al., 2012: 47).13 In November 2013, the Social Security Institution issued a decree requiring every employer to insure their domestic care workers and established severe penalties for non-compliance. Given the additional costs and paperwork, however, this only means that, in a sector that is already highly informal, the existing migrant workers will become increasingly irregularized. Furthermore, even if their social security premiums are paid in Turkey, because of the lack of bilateral arrangements with the post-Soviet countries, these women will not be able to receive retirement benefits at home in the country of origin.

Increased passport controls, fingerprinting, documentation and electronization have all been used to address the ‘loopholes’ in the legislation, as one police officer put it, aimed at differentiating between tourists and migrants. But migrant women also developed various survival strategies: they began to tamper with their passports, and to divorce their husbands so they could change their surname and receive new passports, thus gaining re-entry to Turkey without having to wait out the equal stay requirement. They also chose different transportation methods. One Moldovan woman, Tatiana, explained:

Our names can be traced easily through ports and airports, so you leave by plane, return by minibuses, which are harder to trace. It is much easier to get deported at the airport; they put you on the next plane, much harder at the land borders.

In effect, for each strategy that the government has adopted in order to purportedly ‘control’ the flow of migrant workers, these women have developed very effective counter-strategies in order to circumvent these restrictions.

Not surprisingly, there are numerous police harassment stories narrated by post-Soviet domestic workers, shuttle traders and sex workers; their periodic deportations, arbitrary pick-ups from Laleli and passport confiscations are all too common. But mostly the post-Soviets and other domestic workers complained about being treated as ‘Natashas’. They all mention the arbitrary implementation of the law. Tatiana, one of the domestic workers, said:

They want to find out that we have overstayed our visa so they can threaten us. There are even those who just look at you, think that you are
foreign looking (blond, blue eyes) and feel as if they have found a gold mine. In effect, the police are always there to demand their cut.

Another police officer at the Foreigners Bureau responded:

Of course, we don’t pick up the Germans and the English in a bar. We may not be always right. Sometimes those women in these bars have valid visas, but they may still be deported mainly because, thanks to the environment she is in, she is deemed to be there for that job [referring to prostitution].

It is this enormous leverage which the police enjoy in defining who may and who may not be a prostitute which creates a zone of rather arbitrary racialization since these definitions are admittedly based on ‘impressions’. And this is when the social and cultural preferences and perceptions start to constitute a new layer of control over the female migrant workers. Apparently, a similar practice emerges when accepting applications for a residence permit, as advanced by a police officer dealing with applicants:

If a female applicant comes with a boyfriend, forget it, we don’t give them residence even though they may be eligible. You know, we are also responsible for upholding the moral values of this society.

Conclusion

The migration of post-Soviet women looking for employment as domestic workers, shopkeepers or sex workers in Turkey reflects a global trend towards the feminization of international migration. Pushed by the rapid economic transformation of post-Soviet countries, and lured by the rising demand from Turkey and its relatively flexible visa regime, these predominantly female migrant workers found themselves in a highly precarious labour environment. The workers were, in fact, responding to a growing demand in Turkey’s highly neoliberal economy. With the country’s deepening neoliberal restructuring since 2002, which combined the rapid commodification of land, urban and agricultural transformation, and an increasingly privatized welfare state, the labour markets for incoming irregular migrants became ever-more-precarious and uncertain. With Turkey unable to provide sufficient public services and pre-school education for its children, or to regulate its labour markets, foreign migrant domestic care appeared to address the ‘growing care deficit’ in the country, while offering flexible working hours and much lower wages. The same was true for the demand for sex workers, who were mostly fulfilling the sexual fantasies of dark-skinned and/or elderly Turkish men keen to be intimate with a blond and/or young foreigner.
Yet, a double morality was at work here. The exigencies of the neoliberal markets conflicted with the authorities’ desire to control the flow of these women, who operated in a rapidly changing legal environment, living at the continuously fuzzy edges between informality, irregularity and criminality. The slippery ground of both economic and legal fronts has created what I have termed a ‘violence of uncertainty’ for these women. The encounters of these women with employment agencies and police officers alike also reflect this ambiguity. These women create immense opportunities for ‘rent’, yet they also need to be controlled. These difficult encounters manifest a series of ‘otherings’, racializations and continuous commodification, ranging from their golden teeth, their looks and their clothes, to their skin colour. These ‘otherings’ were sometimes based on their nationality (the Russian meaning of Natasha = sex worker), sometimes simply on their language or their distance from ‘Turkishness’. Sometimes, being a Muslim appeared to help, sometimes looks and nationalities overshadowed all other criteria. It is precisely the ambiguities and uncertainties of these ‘otherings’ and the wide scope for unchecked racialization which create such intense vulnerability for these women.

Notes

1 I would like to thank my doctoral student and research assistant, Gül Çatır, for her invaluable help.
2 In this chapter, I define irregular migrants as those seeking employment and a livelihood in the country and those who are not fully registered. They may move in and out of regularity, and gain and lose their regular status. I exclude, therefore, transit migration, regular migration and refugee flows.
3 As of May 2014, the UNHCR had 736,137 Syrian ‘temporary’ refugees in Turkey. According to the geographic limitation clause of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, Turkey grants asylum rights only to refugees from Europe, hence the term ‘temporary’.
4 There is also a significant group of transit migrants, mostly from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, who enter into Turkey with the intention of staying temporarily en route for a developed country. Unlike the migrant workers, this group is predominantly male and also mostly smuggled into the country irregularly.
5 In terms of remittances as a share of GDP, the top recipients were Tajikistan (52 per cent), the Kyrgyz Republic (31 per cent), Nepal and Moldova (both 25 per cent), Armenia and Haiti (both 21 per cent), Liberia (20 per cent) and Kosovo (17 per cent). The world’s 232 million international migrants are expected to remit earnings worth US$550 billion in 2014 and over US$700 billion by 2016 (World Bank, 2013).
6 In the case of the post-Soviets and Bulgarians, ethnicity and language were also additional factors, as the Turkic-origin and Turkish-speaking Gagauz post-Soviets and the Bulgarian Turks were among the first to arrive.
7 Iran, Bulgaria and Georgia were granted a 90-day visa exemption and the Russia Federation, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 30-day visa exemption. Nationals of Moldova and Armenia could obtain a 30-day visa stamp at the port of entry.
8 Turkey experienced jobless growth along with many of the countries around the world.
11 The total number of female applicants for work permits in the domestic care industry, Istanbul (2010–14), was as follows: from Azerbaijan 246, from Armenia 173, from Georgia 3,605, from Kazakhstan 50, from Kirgizstan 98, and from Moldova 1,642 (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, received from the Ministry on 20 February 2014).
12 Of this population, 7,049 were from the post-Soviet Union countries.

References


Country-level studies by the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project include the analysis of a specific locality in each country. In the Turkish case, we chose to look at Kumkapı, an old sub-district of Fatih, Istanbul, which has been exposed to various layers of migration. This chapter lays out the results of our fieldwork, conducted with individuals living in the area and with officials dealing with migration at the local and national levels. While discussing recent international migration flows in Kumkapı, I display the bigger picture of social transformation in Turkey.

Turkey has gone through a series of changes that constitutes a neoliberal transformation: the development of the economy, the rise in the urban middle class and the absence of welfare provisions, such as childcare and care for the elderly, are among the factors that have required the arrival of international migrants. In this chapter, I lay out the daily life of Kumkapı, where the local population of internal migrants and long-standing inhabitants encounters international migrants. Through their experiences of social transformation at the local level, I trace the social transformation taking place at the local and national levels in Turkey.

In the following sections, I first outline migration flows within Turkey in relation to the processes of social transformation. Second, I explain the methodology behind our research and the challenges I have faced during the fieldwork stage of our project. I then depict our research site – Kumkapı – together with its history of migration. Following this, I sketch out the local population’s interactions with and perceptions of international migrants. Lastly, I show changes in Turkish society as seen through the eyes of our local and national respondents.
Migration flows and the social transformation of Turkey

International migration has played an important role in the establishment of Turkey (see İçduygu and Aksel, in this volume). While the ‘ideal’ citizens of Turkey were officially seen as those who were of Turkish ethnic origin – Muslim but Western-oriented – the non-Muslim population gradually decreased through state policies and increasing public hostility (Kirişci, 2008).

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed an industry-led expansion with increasing investments in big cities. Industrial concentration in certain cities such as Istanbul resulted in internal migration from rural communities. The problem was the unequal access to resources between the different regions. At first, internal migrants from Central Anatolia and the Black Sea region left for the cities of Istanbul, Kocaeli, Ankara and Izmir to find work and look for better opportunities (Cerit, 1986). These early internal migrants benefited, firstly, from their hemşehris. Close relationships and ongoing networks with their hometowns were crucial for migrants trying to overcome their difficulties. Secondly, these migrants also benefited from the way in which the state condoned their illegal activities. For instance, migrants could not afford legal types of accommodation but, instead, built gecekondu (shantytowns, literally meaning ‘put up in [one] night’), which were ignored by state officials for a long time (see Karpat, 1976).

The 1990s witnessed growing conflicts over the Kurdish issue. These conflicts eventually led many Kurds in the East to migrate to neighbouring cities or to those in the West. Some of them were forcefully evicted from their towns and placed in certain districts; others arrived due to the lack of employment in their home towns. By the mid-1990s, more than 3,000 villages had been evacuated and 378,335 Kurdish villagers were forced to move (HRW, 2005: 5–6). Others were not forcibly displaced, but suffered from the decline of social and economic activities in their towns. By the time these migrants arrived in Western Turkey, they already were at the bottom of the neighbourhood hierarchy (Keyder, 2005: 126). Many did not have adequate resources and lived as big families in small apartments.

The migration of Kurds happened at a time when the people of rural origin and their shantytowns were already beginning to irritate the urban elite – such settlements were considered detrimental to the city's modern image. When the Kurds arrived, they were immediately accused of disfiguring urban space and causing social disorder (Saraçoğlu, 2010). By then, the cities’ populations had increased tremendously: whereas, in 1965, the population of Istanbul was approximately 2.2 million, by 2012 it had reached nearly 14 million (TÜİK, 2013). Internal migrants had changed not only the city’s physical attributes but also its ‘cultural imaginary’ (Biehl, 2011: 8).

This phase of migration also coincided with the period when Turkey liberalized its economic policy: the country gradually opened itself up to foreign
investments and hence to their cultural influence. Following a Polanyian perspective, Keyder (2005: 130) suggests that, by then, land had become a commodity and Istanbul was ‘progressively evolving in the direction of a truly “global city”’. The previous populist regime, which condoned the illegal settlement of internal migrants, was ceding its place to a utilitarian one: land was now an extremely important form of capital in Istanbul, particularly in places close to the city centre. Urban transformation projects emerged under the neoliberal restructuring of the city (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010).

Those districts close to the centre gradually became the target of global capital. Two factors were important in their commodification: their geographical location in the city and their historical value. Districts such as Sulukule, Fener-Balat, Süleymaniye, Tarlabası and many others were intended to be renewed and prettified, while their inhabitants were pushed out to live in high-rise buildings constructed in more-distant neighbourhoods by TOKI (the Housing Development Administration of Turkey under the Prime Ministry). The idea behind the renewal has been not only to beautify the buildings in order to provide more services to the local population but also to increase their financial value. We should pay attention to the politics behind the word ‘beautiful’ here: urban transformation projects label certain houses as ‘ugly’ and ‘in need of renewal’ not only for their inhabitants but also for the gaze of tourists and investors.

The 1990s also experienced the collapse of communism in Turkey’s Northern neighbours. The majority of post-Soviet countries soon suffered from high levels of unemployment due to the ‘shock therapy’ economic reforms to which they were subjected. Turkey’s relatively liberal visa regime then allowed their citizens to migrate and look for jobs in Turkey. The 1990s also witnessed the arrival of foreigners from these post-Soviet countries to work in the growing textile, automotive, domestic-work and entertainment sectors in Turkey. Erder and Kaşka (2012: 116) suggest that more than 5 million people arrived in 2009, compared to only 4,500 in 1988.

The 2000s were characterized by Turkey’s desire to become a regional power in the Middle East (see Elitok and Straubhaar, 2011). Foreign policy became more involved in global affairs, while the ‘zero problems with neighbouring countries’ policy and attempts to become the role model for other Muslim-dominated countries made Turkey an attractive choice for investment in real estate. At the same time, Turkey lifted the visa requirement for more and more countries, eased the procedures for acquiring a work permit and provided protection for refugees from the conflict zones of Syria. Through the media (for instance TV series and films), Turkey was becoming a regional hub not only in economic but also in cultural and political spheres. Hence a globalized Turkey was also becoming a country of transit and immigration.

In Istanbul, the number of formal work permits increased approximately sevenfold between 2010 and 2013 (correspondence with the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security). However, the real number of migrant workers was estimated to be far higher. Many sectors employed foreigners mostly because they were irregular and more easily exploited (Erder and Kaşka, 2012). Such industries included domestic work (Akalın, 2007), entertainment (Bloch, 2003; Gülçür and İlkkaracan, 2002), construction (Akpınar, 2009) and spare parts in manufacturing and textile (Dedeoğlu, 2011; Yükseker, 2004). Generally migrants from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan worked in construction (Akpınar, 2009), migrants from Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Philippines worked in the domestic sector (Erder and Kaşka, 2012: 126) and Azeri women worked in textiles (Dedeoğlu, 2011).

Furthermore, Turkey's geographical location made it one of the crucial waiting places for those who wanted to transit to Europe. Increasingly, migrants from sub-Saharan countries arrived in Turkey with the intention not only of transiting but also of staying on in Turkey as conditions permitted and their intentions changed (De Clerck, 2013; Fait, 2013). Some were entrepreneurs coming to buy goods; others worked informally in textile workshops and cargo companies, or as street vendors (Saul, 2013). The arrival of African migrants was not accidental: Turkey had also been increasingly more involved in diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with many African countries.²

At present, the majority of regular migrants in Turkey come from China to work for Chinese companies operating in the construction sector (senior official at the Ministry of Labour). For migrants to receive their official work documents, they first need to apply to the Foreign Ministry for their work visa. The Ministry of Labour then issues the work permit and the police give the residence permit. In order to receive a work permit, migrants need to be employed in a position that cannot be filled by a Turkish national. To assess this, the Ministry of Labour goes through the İSKUR (Turkish Labour Agency)'s demands and decides on a case-by-case basis.

In Turkey, migrant workers fill the ‘gaps deserted by natives, either due to the lack of necessary qualifications or due to cultural thresholds’ (Erder and Kaşka, 2012: 125). For instance, the work of female domestic workers who stay in homes overnight and who look after elderly male patients cannot be done by local workers because of cultural codes of honour. Employers also prefer foreign irregular workers in other sectors because they can give them temporary and low-cost jobs. The majority of these diverse migration flows can be documented in Kumkapı, part of the neighbourhood of Fatih.³

Methodology of our research

The original data in this chapter came from semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted at individual, local and national levels. This interviewing technique reflects the basis of our methodology, which seeks to unravel the
entanglements between the local, the national and the global levels (see Burawoy, 2009; Burawoy et al., 2000). In total, we conducted 37 interviews, 19 with inhabitants of Kumkapı, 6 with key local informants and 12 with key national informants. The STIM research has sought to overcome the language barrier when conducting research in various sites by employing researchers from those particular countries. In the Turkish case, Stephen Castles and I conducted the interviews at local and national levels together; originally coming from Turkey, I undertook the interviews at the individual level on my own. This method helped us in approaching the inhabitants of Kumkapı and conducting the interviews in Turkish.

Having said that, one needs to consider the challenges of doing research in a foreign country with native researchers (Ozkul, 2014). Speaking Turkish (the official language of the country) was not always adequate to reach migrants from Eastern Turkey. Women from Eastern Turkey, in particular, spoke no Turkish, only Kurdish, which made it impossible for me to obtain their views. On the other hand, the majority of men from all regions of the country spoke Turkish well and responded to my questions with confidence. Although I could overcome the language barrier with most of the Kurdish men, the gender issue played a major role in the conducting of the interviews. Men’s responses with regard to foreign women were possibly veiled. On the other hand, my gender helped to reach the women. In the summer, Kumkapı’s female inhabitants spend a lot of their time on the street in front of their houses, chatting with their friends, which made it easier for me to approach them. Some of our individual interviews thus turned into group discussions, which also enabled me to see their changing opinions (which were becoming even more rigid) while debating with their friends.

Another major problem in our research was the fear of public expression in Turkey, as many interviewees mentioned in their responses. Among the interviewees at the local and national levels, several did not want to be recorded or cited. Turkey is listed as ‘the world’s biggest prison for journalists, especially those who express views critical of the authorities on the Kurdish issue’ (Reporters without Borders, 2013). The fear of some officials was understandable. However, other officials, who seemed to be on good terms with the government, were generally confident in their responses and did not have a problem with being recorded.

My aim, in the following sections, is primarily to explore the social transformation of Kumkapı in relation to that of Istanbul and Turkey. I first look at Kumkapı as a research site, downsize to the individuals’ points of view and then upscale back to local and national conditions of change.

Kumkapı as the research site

Kumkapı offers a good reflection of Turkey’s internal and international migratory dynamics. Located 2 km. from the old town and 6.5 km from the
city centre (Taksim Square), Kumkapı is one of the oldest districts in Istanbul. In its long history, it has hosted inhabitants of various origins. In the first decades of the Turkish Republic, Armenians, Greeks and Turks populated the neighbourhood. Increasingly non-Muslims immigrated to Kumkapı; with vacant houses, the neighbourhood slowly but surely became a lower-income area. Despite the fact that the population has changed extensively over time, Kumkapı still retains Armenian and Greek monuments and historical buildings from those periods. The architecture of the area, with its rows of terraced houses – although many buildings have been destroyed or transformed by their new inhabitants (Üner, 2006) – is testimony to the Western influence of the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Studying the change in Kumkapı is important, as it also reflects the major processes which have shaped the modern Istanbul.

Internal migration flows
As explained in the first section, Turkey’s development policies after the 1950s led the rural population to migrate to the bigger cities. Istanbul thus attracted migrants from various parts of Anatolia (Keyder, 2010). One major characteristic of Kumkapı was that it was close to the city centre and offered employment opportunities for newly arriving migrants. The 1960s saw the arrival of internal migrants from the Black Sea region who came to Kumkapı primarily to find work. Internal migrants who arrived after the 1950s helped each other and moved to the houses previously occupied by non-Muslims residents. In the 1980s and 1990s, and parallel to Turkey’s internal dynamics, Kumkapı witnessed the arrival of internally displaced Kurds. Those coming from the East were more disadvantaged than the previous internal migrants. They were deprived of their resources, not only economically, but also linguistically and socially. A Kurdish interviewee (male, call-shop owner, early 30s) described the lack of linguistic skills as follows: ‘The most difficult thing is learning a new language. For that you need to be re-born.’ Some of these internally displaced migrants were directed to Kumkapı in the place of previous migrants who had moved to higher-income districts. Often their relatives settled in with them. The main reasons for choosing Kumkapı were the proximity to the city centre and the presence of flexible, unqualified work opportunities.

International migration flows
The 1990s also saw growing international trade in the area with the arrival of textile buyers from post-Soviet countries. Laleli, which is situated close to Kumkapı, became the regional hub for the textile trade (Eder et al. 2003; Yükseker, 2004). Textile items were transported as air-passenger baggage, but generally their magnitude exceeded the limits. In time, there emerged a triangular illegal trade system between workers of transportation companies in Turkey, customs officials and recipients in destination countries, all of...
whom were involved in securing the safe transport of the goods. The trade in Laleli involved shops in the front and transportation companies behind. Unemployed women from post-Soviet countries were the ideal workers as they could both show the products on their bodies and translate from or into Russian. Simultaneously, Kumkapı became the prime housing district for women working in those shops.

The increasing international migration to Turkey had invigorated other sectors as well. The other inhabitants of Kumkapı were those working in the entertainment sector in adjacent neighbourhoods. After the fall of the Soviet Union, rising poverty in the post-Soviet countries pushed women to look for work elsewhere (Yükseker, 2003). This coincided with Turkey’s relatively liberal visa regime and Turkish men’s desire for blonde women. The trafficking of women has become a crucial type of trade in the area (Erder and Kaşka, 2003). Originating from its non-Muslim background, Kumkapı has long been known as the entertainment district of Istanbul with restaurants serving alcohol. As the neighbourhood is also located very close to Aksaray, a district famous for its hotels, bars and entertainment places, Kumkapı gradually attained a bad reputation among families living nearby.

Kumkapı also hosts sex workers in its houses and bars. The general belief is that the majority of the sex workers come from post-Soviet countries but, as a local Turkish hairdresser in his early 30s stated, increasingly sex workers are coming from elsewhere, including from Tunisia, Libya, Tatarstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and various African countries. The same interviewee also informed me about the extent to which nationalities were commoditized differently in the eyes of the local population. Accordingly, African women received around US$50–100, women from post-Soviet countries around US$200–300 and older women as little as US$15–25 per session.

Since the 1980s, Turkey has clearly become a country of transit and immigration (İçduygu and Kirıç, 2009, Kirıç, 2007). Among migrants coming to Turkey with various sorts of social and human capital, Kumkapı hosts those who are at the ‘lowest rank’ of the social hierarchy. This does not necessarily mean that all migrants have little human capital (indeed 50 per cent of the international migrants whom we interviewed stated that they had a tertiary level of education). However, those who stay in Kumkapı usually do not have adequate financial capital or the necessary legal documents. Furthermore, race plays an important role in preventing them from scaling Turkey’s social hierarchy.

Today, the main street of Kumkapı gives a good picture of its inhabitants, ranging from internal migrants from all over Turkey to international migrants from various countries. The growing migration flows come not only from post-Soviet countries, but also from African countries. Like earlier immigrants, their reason for choosing Kumkapı is both its proximity to the city centre, with its informal and irregular employment opportunities, and also – as several African interviewees reported – its proximity to the
police. These migrants suggested that the police allowed them to stay only in Kumkapı while they were waiting for their residency permit. There was no formal policy about this but, in the international migrants’ view, it was easier for the police to control them in Kumkapı, which hosted the Foreigners’ Detention Centre.

Kumkapı’s demographic transformation affects the local population’s perceptions of the newcomers. Their interactions show that the cosmopolitanism at-first-sight in the area is composed of complex relationships, to which I turn in the next section.

Perceptions of the local population

When we started our fieldwork, we were interested in how the local population perceived the changes occurring in Kumkapı. Strikingly, the most important aspect of their responses was the fear of being expelled from their houses through an expected urban transformation project. Many respondents were worried that the new municipality would initiate a renewal project in the area and oblige them to leave their homes. As their perceptions of the neighbourhood worsened, their anger against the authorities grew, as evidenced by this extract from an interview with a Kurdish real-estate agency owner in his 30s:

In the past, this area was much cleaner, more in order. When it passed to the Fatih Municipality, it seems like here is forgotten. I don’t believe that things will ever get better again. We hear things like they are prepared to sacrifice this place. The Municipality has some plans for this area. They say this area needs to be changed. They will make urban transformation here. That is why they think it is better if here is neglected, disordered.

Respondents were also concerned about rising costs of living. The local inhabitants accused international migrants of increasing their rents. Many rooms were now priced in dollars and cost twice the normal price. The perceived reason was ‘because foreigners have more money, because they make illegal things’ (Arab, male, shop-owner, 60s).

International migrants were also accused of changing family and social values. A 58-year-old retired Armenian resident, who had lived in Kumkapı her entire life, complained about the newcomers’ backgrounds and indecent clothing:

All of our neighbours have changed. In the past, [...] these houses were always very clean both from the outside and the inside. There was a big difference. When people went outside, they would take care of what they wore. That was so important. People wore clean and decent clothes. Everyone was cultured. They had education and they knew how to talk,
how to walk. We talked about culture, about politics. […] Now none of this exists.

Cosmopolitanism at-first-sight thus includes complex relationships between groups. Almost all of our interviewees among the local population complained about other ethnic groups. Armenians and Turks humiliated the Kurds who arrived after them, as the same interviewee continued:

There have been a lot of people coming from the East, those who belong to the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party]. These people cannot even speak Turkish! They are like animals! […] They live in houses all together. […] Their men are always after foreign women. They look at them as if they are eating them. They are like animals!

Kurds, on the other hand, had acquired a different perception of the area as it was before they migrated. Many agreed that the earlier flows from the East would not continue and that, if the conditions in the East improved, they would return to their home towns as this Kurdish call-shop owner in his early 30s stated:

Of course, those who migrate to new places learn new things. In the East, we thought that the West was beautiful. We thought it was like heaven. Now that idea, that fantasy is lost. We know that here can be like hell. Here there is only employment. That is it. People are different though. People are aggressive. They are not like us.

What the local population had in common, though, was their disapproval of international migrants and the perception that the latter were in better situations than themselves. Moreover, migrants were often associated with criminal activities:

They live in our country way better than us, because they are in the drug business. [Women] earn 800–1,000 dollars per month. Nobody would give such good money to our women. Our women are all unemployed (Arab, male, shop-owner, 60s).

African migrants, in particular, were accused of making money out of the drug business and such news was transmitted in daily chats, as in the quote below, from a group discussion:

I saw it the other day with my own eyes. One Negro was hiding the pill in his mouth. Another man came towards him. They talked a bit, and he took the pill out of his mouth and sold it to him. There was nothing like this in the past.
Indeed, in my conversations with African migrants, I observed many having a sweet in their mouth that looked like a pill. Some of them were just playing with it and, at times, spitting it out. So the sweet was not valuable, but in the eyes of the local population it was evidence. Another participant – the Turkish hairdresser in his early 30s who worked for sex workers – acknowledged that the drug business was not only composed of Africans but also of local inhabitants and state officials:

The drug exists everywhere on the streets. The sellers are men. They can be Africans or Turkish or Kurdish people. This is a mixed business. But the buyers are our people. [. . .] They usually come to buy individually for themselves. [. . .] There are also hotel and bar owners who come to buy for their customers. [. . .] There are no such things as surprise attacks or anything like that [by the police]. Although everyone knows where they do these sorts of things.

Ignorance about foreigners was reinforced due to the lack of verbal interaction with them. As one Kurdish café worker in his 50s said: ‘We don’t interact with them. We don’t chat with them. We don’t talk. I just sell the böreks [pastries]: they eat here and they go away. [. . .] We don’t know what they are doing really.’ Africans, for example, were labelled as Negroes in almost all interviews. It was also common that ‘Africans’ meant anyone of black colour without the interviewee knowing their geographical origin. One participant struggled to explain their origin: ‘These Negroes. I don’t know which countries they are coming from. There are Somalis, there are Africans.’ Later, when he asked his friend sitting next to him: ‘So what is this Africa?’ his friend responded: ‘There is one Africa, which is the continent; there is another one, which is the country of Africa.’ Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge did not prohibit them from producing claims about foreigners: ‘The Negroes are much more content than they were in Africa. They are used to living together in crowded places anyway’ (Kurdish male, real-estate agency owner, 30s).

For Turkey’s local population, African migrants are so unknown that they are easily labelled as poor and destitute. This is also related to the local population’s collective memory in which Africans were slave-workers in their predecessors’ houses: Africans were employed as forced domestic workers during the Ottoman Empire. Slavery was abolished in the late nineteenth century, but it took decades to put an end to it completely (Olpak, 2013). However, in Kumkapı not all African migrants were unskilled and poor. Many have been involved in the textile trade with Turkey. Some stay for short periods and just order their goods; others do this in order to save money for their next step. Several African businessmen have also started up cargo companies to transport textile goods. Informally, they employ other Africans to work in packaging. However, Yükseker and Brewer (2011) emphasize that
not all Africans came to Turkey with the same intentions. They caution that one should not mix those coming for work reasons (mainly from Western and Central African countries) with those who are coming as asylum-seekers (from mainly Eastern African countries).

The abjection of immigrants was the most striking when people felt anger and disgust towards those of the same ethnic origin as themselves but who arrived at different times. One interviewee of Armenian origin particularly criticized other Armenians:

God shall curse those coming from Armenia! We don’t even understand their Armenian. They are very simple people. They are not cultured people at all. Women wear showing-off type of clothes. They want to show all parts of their body. They cannot have any relationship with us! We would never talk with them. We would never have any conversation with them!

(Armenian, female, retired, 58 years)

The use of public space in Kumkapı was another indication of cosmopolitanism at-first-sight. When walking through the streets of Nişanca, it was easy to discern several cafés populated by Turkish, Kurdish and African men. At first glance, it would be easy to conclude that they all lived in peace. However, many of our interviewees accused the international migrants of doing nothing, just living on benefits provided by the state. In fact, such financial aid has never existed and these migrants do not walk around for pleasure. I turn now to their living conditions and common perceptions about them.

Perceptions of international migrants

International migrants in Kumkapı included, *inter alia*, Moldovans, Romanians, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Azeris, Armenians, Georgians, Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis, Senegalese, Nigerians, Tanzanians and Sudanese. They can be grouped into three main categories: migrants from post-Soviet countries, from the conflict zones of the Middle East and from African countries. However, the individual migrants whom we interviewed did not necessarily feel that they belonged to such regional groups. In fact, there were conflicts among them. One 50-year-old Moldovan woman working in a textile shop stated:

There are now more women coming from Turkmenistan. What kind of relationship can we have with these women!? For example, you are Turkish, right? You might not get along well with Kurds. For us, it is the same thing. The Moldovans get along well with the Moldovans. Everyone is together with his own group.

Migrants from post-Soviet countries have a different status among the residents of Kumkapı, depending on their time of arrival in Turkey. Those who
arrived earlier (Russians, Romanians and Moldovans) have acquired the top position in the social hierarchy among international migrants. They usually receive the highest salary for their work in the textile industry and domestic or care work. Those who arrived later also face differential treatment according to their religion, and their capacity ‘to serve Turks’. Among these, Muslim migrants are given preference, but the ability to speak fluent Turkish, to cook Turkish food and to have ‘Turkish family values’ counts as an advantage too.

Conflicts among international migrants were not only between those coming from other countries, but strikingly with Kurds. The Istanbul–Moscow textile route, which had grown so quickly in the 1990s, slowed down in the following decades. Numerous new factories opened in Russia and Moldova, and the production sites changed. Nowadays, the main Istanbul–Moscow route has increasingly been replaced with one between Istanbul and Baku in Azerbaijan, where a new distribution hub has emerged, leading more women to come from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Ignoring these changes, a 50-year-old Moldovan textile-shop worker complained about the arrival of Kurdish entrepreneurs in Laleli over the last decade. An immigrant herself, she was, interestingly, using the same words as some of my Turkish interviewees:

These Kurds are very dirty people! They are like animals; they are not human beings! This place has worsened so much since they arrived here! [. . .] You know, people who sold their donkeys opened a shop here! [Russian] customers do not come here anymore. In the past, they would choose 100 of an item, for example. The Kurds would then send them defective things. Of course, then, in time, their businesses went down.

Similar complaints were reported among Africans who had stayed long enough to learn the local differences. A Senegalese worker complained about his Kurdish bosses’ working conditions in similar words:

Usually it is the Kurds who manage the shoe workshops. Kurds and Turks are very different to each other. Both groups are racist, but the Kurds are even worse. They are themselves animals! They also behave towards us like animals. Kurds do not have any experience in life. They are inexperienced people! (Senegalese, male, shoe workshop worker, 31)

Another factor arising from our interviews with migrants was that of the many hardships they experienced in Turkey. For instance, none of the African migrants we interviewed in Kumkapı had a work permit. They were either over-stayers or living with their residency permit of six months and working informally. Their employment was only temporary and weekly-paid. The last two decades have seen increasing flexibilization in the Turkish labour market, with employers in the area preferring international migrants
because they are available for flexible periods and lower costs. Such arrange-
ments made it necessary for migrants to be in the area at all times. In order
to find work, they had to be on the streets (in the informal job market) and be present for potential employment opportunities. Those who were
employed to do the ironing in textile shops received around US$75–100 per
week. However, paying for their rent (around US$50 per month) and food,
they barely survived and could not send remittances to their families. One
Senegalese textile workshop employee in his 30s depicted their daily activity
thus: ‘The life here in general is expensive. We cannot really go out and sit
somewhere else. We stand out on streets with our friends. That is free.’

Perceptions of local and national informants

Contrary to our individual interviews in Kumkapı, an official from the Fatih
Municipality, to which Kumkapı belongs, responded to our questions about
immigrants in a very positive way. In his room – decorated with Ottoman
motifs and a map on his wall showing the Ottoman territories – he reminded
us of the tolerant multiculturalism reigning in Ottoman times. According to
him, the relationship with African migrants should be understood from this
perspective:

There are also the Africans. With the Africans, we get along well.
For instance, we established a football team with them at the Fatih
Municipality. We love them. We support them. You know the Ottomans’
relationship with the Africans was quite good. Particularly with Sudan.

The internationalization of Turkey was another theme that emerged in our
interviews. One interviewee from a service-provider NGO informed us that
many of the Senegalese migrants had already been familiar with the country
because Turkey was well known in Senegal. As mentioned before, Turkey’s
relations with numerous African countries have recently intensified. For
instance, the number of staff employed in Turkish consulates in African
countries has increased, and Turkish Airlines has more direct flights to them.
In certain of these countries, the so-called ‘Fethullah Gülen-inspired Turkish
schools’ educate some of the local students and increase Turkey’s attract-
iveness. The positive view of immigration and the internationalization of
Turkey were also apparent in the statements of an official at The Union of
Marmara Municipalities:

Istanbul is, more and more, profiling itself as a global city or a candidate to
be among the most important global cities, a site for global transactions,
finance, business and others, cultural interactions. So this [is] becoming
a site of intense interactions, which also brings here interest, investment
and brings people.
The last theme to emerge was that of the importance of migrants for domestic, child- and elderly-care work. A senior official at the Ministry of Labour admitted that, at present, the Ministry gives work permits to almost whomsoever applies for elderly-care employment. This increased need for domestic or care work is the result of changing demographics and social relations in Turkey – the young population of big cities can no longer take care of the elderly, and the family can no longer take care of their younger generations. The lack of state support in these areas makes it necessary to import workers. In Ottoman times, slaves generally imported from Sudan – ironically mentioned in a positive way in the words of the official at the Fatih Municipality quoted above – carried out such work; evlatlık in the early Republican period, internal migrants since the 1960s onwards and, increasingly, international migrants over the last two decades continued the same mission.

Conclusion

Kumkapı, with its late-night bars, restaurants and hotels, is a site of attraction to many tourists. The majority of the travel blogs describe it as a locus of ‘amazing Turkish hospitality’ and depict the area where the local inhabitants reside as the ‘colourful streets’ of Istanbul. Our research has shown that the cosmopolitanism at-first-sight in Kumkapı is not a peaceful one but that it is composed of layers of silent violence between the various ethnic and religious groups. The old settlers of Kumkapı accuse the recent international migrants of causing all the negative changes in the area. International migrants complain about the racism that they face in their daily lives, in the workplace and on the streets. Furthermore, international migrants use xenophobic language amongst themselves about other ethnic groups. Turkish internal migrants also use racist statements against Kurdish internal migrants. These conflicts can become visible and grow very easily if any physical violence starts between groups.

On the other hand, we should not immediately become pessimistic in the face of discriminatory statements from our interviewees. Approximately one year after our fieldwork in Istanbul, demonstrations started, initially to contest the urban development plan for Taksim's Gezi Park. These protests soon spread to other districts, where people rejected the rapid and authoritarian development plans. In these demonstrations, groups from various geographical, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds came together to oppose the real cause of the disorder: the neoliberal transformation of the economy and society in Turkey under authoritarian rule. Kumkapı, as much as it experiences discrimination between different groups, can also host cooperation and solidarity against the vulnerability of their common social conditions.
Notes

1 In Turkey, *hemşehrî* means coming from the same city. *Hemşhrîcîlîk* connotes favouritism between those coming from the same city to work in each other's business and to maintain social solidarity (see Erder, 1996).

2 Somalia, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania, Congo, Kenya, Cameroon, Tanzania, Sudan and Eritrea are important source countries (Yükseker and Brewer, 2006).

3 Two-thirds of Fatih’s population is composed of internal migrants (Municipal official).

4 At the time of writing, 81 journalists were either fired or forced to leave their jobs.

5 At the time of writing, 1 US$ was equivalent to 2 Turkish Liras.

6 The management of Kumkapı changed from Eminönü to Fatih Municipality in 2009.

7 In local interviews, this word was used as *Zenci* (literally meaning ‘Negro’) in Turkish, though it does not have the same historical and political connotation as the word ‘Negro’ in English. However, in cases when the interviewees used the word in a racist manner, I translated it as ‘Negro’ to convey their statements fully. Where no racist statement was implied or participants used the word *Afrikalî* (literally meaning ‘African’), I translated it as ‘African’.

8 *Evlatlık* were brought into the households as children or teenagers and were employed as unpaid workers to help with the housework. They were generally distant relatives from the villages of families who lived in cities.

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Part IV
Case-study Insights: Mexico

Mexico: fieldwork site

ZACATECAS
Casa Blanca

Fieldwork Site
Country’s Capital City
State or Province Boundary
From Casa Blanca to Tulsa: A Social Transformation Analysis of Mexican Migration in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization

Magdalena Arias Cubas

Introduction

Mexico is well known not only as a country of emigration but, increasingly, also as a country of transit and return migration. Mexicans have travelled north for over a century in what has been described as the ‘largest sustained flow of migrant workers in the contemporary world’ (Massey et al., 1998), while recent decades have seen the growth of transit flows involving mostly Central American migrants on their way to the USA. Recently, too, Mexico has experienced a growing flow of return migration, as thousands of migrants have decided – or have been forced – to return from the USA to Mexico.

Migration is closely related to the social transformation experienced by Mexico and its neighbours over the last decades in the context of neoliberal globalization. This chapter will look at the relationship between migration and major economic, social and political developments, including the implementation of economic and social reforms since the 1980s, the impact on Mexico of economic, political and social changes in the USA and the more recent development of the ‘war on drugs’. I will draw from interviews conducted for the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project in Casa Blanca – an agricultural community located in the central-western state of Zacatecas, approximately 35 km away from the state capital. The three developments mentioned above were chosen due to their significance to the interviewees. In this context, Casa Blanca, like many communities across Zacatecas and Mexico, has experienced all these transformations vis-à-vis the development of significant migration flows to the USA. Importantly, this chapter will point out a paradox of this
case study – while communities like Casa Blanca have witnessed significant social transformation, this transformation has not been entirely ‘progressive’. In other words, I will argue that Casa Blanca provides an example of a community at a crucial crossroad.

A brief history of Zacatecan emigration

Casa Blanca is located in Zacatecas, one of Mexico’s traditional emigration states. Zacatecan emigration has had a traditional rural character and has played a significant role as a subsistence strategy for the local population (Delgado Wise and Moctezuma, 1993). Initial population movements were linked to the dismantling of the local economy through the commodification of land and the establishment of a ‘precarious and exclusionary productive system based on mining, and extensive cattle ranching’ in the late part of the nineteenth century (Delgado Wise et al., 2004). The Mexican revolution and the paralysis of the mining industry in the early twentieth century caused further displacement. This initial process of depopulation was contained following the implementation of the first agrarian law of the country and the consequent process of land redistribution. Yet, this was not sufficient to guarantee the survival of the population, and emigration continued. This was exacerbated by two events: the Cristero War (1926–29) – a church–state conflict that raged across central-western Mexico – and the Bracero Program (1942–64), which mobilized young males to work temporarily in the USA.

Significantly, ‘Go north for opportunity’ was an idea that ‘remained deeply embedded in the Mexican mindset’ even after these events (Alba, 2013). In the case of Zacatecas, ‘the territorial attachment arising from land distribution, the bridges established by the early stages of the migration process and labour demand in the United States’ (Delgado Wise et al., 2004: 162) led to the establishment of a predominantly circular migration pattern based on a system of social networks which has expanded and strengthened since then (Moctezuma, 2003). This period also witnessed the development of an intrinsic and mutually sustaining relationship between peasant production and the production of a migrant workforce. Migrants would originate from rural areas and support peasant production in their communities of origin by either sending remittances or saving enough money for future expenses. As reported by one of our interviewees, a state government official, without migrants and remittances, ‘[R]ural Zacatecas and agriculture would no longer exist.’ The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s witnessed the continuation of circular migration flows and the development of hometown associations (HTAs), which supported this strategy (Delgado Wise et al., 2004).

Casa Blanca provides a clear example of the development of these migration flows. Locals have migrated to the USA since the 1930s. Many of today’s
older male residents migrated through the Bracero Program, as witnessed by this female retiree:

[T]hey were able to earn money and that is how they started to build houses here. After a while, people learned how to make their own way north. They knew how to come and go, they even learned how to cross the line without papers.²

It is crucial to point out that the development of Casa Blanca – and its emigration flows – has historically been linked to agriculture. The community was originally part of a large *hacienda* or estate, which employed locals as *peon* or servants. The hacienda was dismantled after the revolution and some locals benefited from the creation of an *ejido*;³ it was not until the 1970s – and after significant struggle – that the remaining *latifundium* was redistributed among landless community members, according to a female retiree. After the lands were redistributed, emigration slowed down in the late 1970s and the 1980s, when the community witnessed a significant economic renewal, said a local academic. At that time, only small groups of ‘Casablanqueños’ migrated on a circular basis to Tulsa (Oklahoma) – their main destination in the USA. Similarly – and in line with state trends – the vast majority of migrants at the time were young men. The same local academic then told us that an informal community census conducted in Tulsa in 1989 found only 100 migrants from Casa Blanca, of whom only one was a woman.

**Mexican migration amid economic and social reforms**

The community of Casa Blanca witnessed significant transformation resulting from Mexico’s implementation of neoliberal economic and social reforms. Some of the most prominent reforms implemented since the debt crisis of 1982 included the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the deregulation of industry and the elimination of most subsidies, import liberalization and tariff reductions, reforms to land tenure and use, the deregulation of the financial system and the promotion of foreign direct investment (Solomon, 1999). In general, this reform process was conducted with the aim of giving a larger economic role to the private sector while accelerating the integration of Mexico into the US economy and the world economy (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2004; Otero, 2006). The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 was seen as the ‘culmination of the reform process’ which provided ‘an “external lock” on the reform process’ (Griffith-Jones, 1996: 159).

In this context, a changing agricultural industry illustrates the manner in which reforms have brought about a profound transformation. At the national level, reforms to land tenure ended the process of land distribution and opened the door to the privatization of *ejido* land. In addition, unilateral
industry deregulation led to comparative growth in the production of export crops against that of basic crops such as corn and beans; the elimination of most subsidies led to a situation in which Mexican farmers were increasingly exposed to competition from developed countries’ highly subsidized agricultural systems (Améndola et al., 2006). These reforms have had a very unequal impact throughout the country. In general, the northern part benefited from industrialization (e.g. industrial farming and the maquiladora industry), while the poorer south and the rural areas were hit the hardest by the collapse of small-scale agriculture (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2004). As explained by a state government official:

The benefits were shared by a very small portion of large producers, while the majority—that is, small producers—were negatively affected by it. Who produces chilli? Who produces tomato? Who produces carrots? The 10 per cent. And the other 90 per cent? They produce corn and beans and they were ravaged by imports.

In this context one could argue that reforms have led to the commodification of agriculture, to the detriment of small farmers. This is perhaps the most localized expression of social transformation in rural Mexico.

An associated phenomenon has been the inability of policies to create the conditions required by an economically growing active population. A federal government official stated: ‘[T]he levels of unemployment have always remained relatively low . . . there is need to talk about the quality of the existing jobs, for instance whether the wages allow workers to sustain their families with a decent standard of living.’ In this context, millions of Mexicans have migrated to the USA, while others have joined the informal sector. This continues to affect those seeking employment. In 2012, 9.4 per cent of Mexico’s youth (i.e. those aged between 15 and 24) were unemployed, while over 50 per cent of the working youth were employed in the informal sector (OECD, 2014a). A more telling fact is that 21 per cent of Mexican youth are not engaged in education, employment or training (NEET) (OECD, 2014b). In other words, one in five young Mexicans is a so-called ni-ni (ni estudia, ni trabaja – neither works, nor studies). This represents a significant social and human security challenge due to the possibility of individuals turning to criminal organizations for work or attempting to cross an increasingly dangerous border in search of jobs in the USA (Proceso, 2010; Villarreal, 2010).

The experience of Casa Blanca is typical of countless communities across the state and the country. Considering the importance of agriculture for the community, it is no surprise that national reforms had a significant impact. Zacatecas, in general, has witnessed the dismantling of small-scale or peasant farming over the last decades. One male business owner told us that locals often referred to this process as ‘the abandonment of the
The situation of the fields has gone backwards.' Some locals are more vulnerable, as they do not own lands but work informally as farmhands for others. Farmhands reported incomes of approximately US$9 a day when work is available. As explained by the wife of a farmhand, ‘[S]ometimes he works six days a week, then another week he may work for one to three days, there may be entire weeks where there is no work at all.’ Yet, and in line with state trends, agriculture continues to be the largest employer in Casa Blanca. For example, out of the 20 households that were surveyed for the STIM project, 13 depended on agriculture as their main source of income. This points to a significant contradiction regarding the continuous reliance of locals on agriculture in spite of the decline of this industry. As explained by a female shop assistant and a male farmer, respectively, ‘Agriculture is no longer profitable for the majority of small producers’, yet ‘Y]ou either work on the fields or nothing.’

In line with state trends, locals in Casa Blanca are being left without many quality employment alternatives. Aside from a declining and low-tech agricultural sector composed of small farmers and extensive livestock farming, Zacatecas’ economy is characterized by a limited and fluctuating industrial sector, a mining sector that has almost no impact on employment and the regional economy, and a growing services sector driven by micro-enterprises (Castillo Ponce and Larios Candelas, 2008; García Zamora and Sánchez Barbosa, 2006). In the case of Casa Blanca, locals have limited access to jobs outside the community. The closest urban area is approximately one and a half hours away by public transport, which is extremely limited. To illustrate, out of seven households surveyed which did not depend on agriculture for their income, only two were supported by jobs with the municipal government. From the others, three households depended on micro-enterprises and two were formed by retirees who were financially dependent on their children. In most cases, then, the quality of jobs outside agriculture was also low, as the locals were either self-employed (micro-enterprises) or had no access to quality social security (dependent retirees).

Economic and social reforms have also impacted on migration flows. Significantly, these reforms led to the collapse of the subsistence strategy that relied on both peasant production and the production of a migrant workforce. This led to a strong depopulation tendency that extended to an ever-greater area of Zacatecas (Delgado Wise et al., 2004). In the case of Casa Blanca, emigration became widespread when the community was struck by the crisis of 1994 and the disappearance of guaranteed prices for agricultural products (Molina Ramírez, 2001). The growth of emigration to the USA was...
exponential. One sign of this was the decline in school enrolments, as this local academic explained:

From about 1997 to 2005 there were almost no local male students enrolled in high school and perhaps only one or two were enrolled in university. This was a significant change. During my generation, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, you could see a lot of people from Casa Blanca attending high school and training college to become teachers. But then, the generation after us realized that not even those with a degree could earn a decent wage. They stopped studying and invested all their energy and resources in migrating.

Migration appeared as an alluring alternative, as this male farmer explained: ‘[I]n Tulsa, the workload was not as heavy, there was always work, and you got paid better.’ Migrants often found employment in construction or landscaping and earned between US$300 and US$1,200 a week, one male business owner said, significantly more than in Casa Blanca. Yet, according to a local academic and migrant leader, one must be careful not to romanticize this either: a large number of ‘Casablanqueños’ became irregular migrants and many made the decision to emigrate out of desperation.

This growth of emigration in the post-reform period is in line with a national trend of greater emigration in numerical and geographical terms. During the 1990s and 2000s there were many more migrants than before and they came from nearly every region of the country (Alba, 2010). The social and demographic profile of migrants is telling of their experiences within the larger process of neoliberal social transformation. Drawing on data from Mexico’s National Population Council (CONAPO, 2014a) and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2011), one can paint a picture of the ‘stereotypical’ Mexican migrant. What emerges is a portrait of a young migrant, often with low levels of schooling, who has migrated irregularly to the USA. This concurs with anecdotal evidence provided by interviewees in Casa Blanca. Thus, it is important to highlight the dual importance of these migrants in the context of Mexico’s neoliberal social transformation. In the simplest terms, ‘Mexico has been highly dependent on the continuation of emigration – through formal or informal channels – as a “safety valve” for economic and political pressures and, more recently, as a key source of income for remittance recipients’ (Délano, 2009). Similarly, and as will be explained in the next section, Mexico has become a supplier of ‘cheap, largely poorly trained labour’ to its northern neighbour (Delgado Wise and Guarnizo, 2007).

An important issue to highlight is that, in spite of its significance, migration remains a contentious issue in communities such as Casa Blanca. There are very diverse understandings and perceptions of the impacts on migration in the community, and there are also opposite understandings of the
experience of migrating itself. For some locals, such as a female homemaker, ‘migration has not changed the ranch, it has saddened it’, while others, like a male farmer, argued that ‘all changed [for the better] thanks to the boys in the north’. Similarly, this domestic employee saw migration as an opportunity to ‘work and be able to afford a truck and some good clothing’, while others held a more negative view. As recounted by a recently returned, male unemployed migrant, ‘[I]n the North, they use you till they squeeze everything out of you. The old man that is left afterwards is nothing more than industrial waste.’

The impact of a changing USA on its southern neighbour and its migrants

A long history of migration, geographical proximity and economic ties make Mexico, and communities like Casa Blanca, susceptible to changes in the USA (Arias Cubas, 2014). Events such as the restructuring of the US economy and society, changes to the country’s immigration policy and the most recent financial crisis have also had a strong impact on past, current and prospective Mexican migrants, including those from Casa Blanca.

As in the case of Mexico, the US economy has changed significantly over the last four decades. The social, economic and political crisis that resulted from the end of the post-war boom and the emergence of stagflation signalled the start of a neoliberal revolution through strategies of privatization, deregulation and marketization (George, 1999). American firms and corporations also implemented reforms to regain their competitiveness in world trade through focusing on technological innovation strategies designed to improve their external and internal flexibility, by respectively deregulating contractual relations and improving labour productivity levels (Canales, 2000). As a result, the structure of the US labour market slowly changed, with a smaller percentage of the labour force employed in industry, and a growing number in services (World Bank, 2014a, 2014b). An associated phenomenon has also been the polarization of US society due to growing inequality (OECD, 2011).

This restructuring has significantly impacted on the employment prospects of Mexican migrants. This is closely related to strategies designed to increase the internal flexibility of US firms and corporations by improving labour productivity levels. As argued by Marchand (2008: 1378), ‘[O]n the US side the economy has been transformed into a post-industrial, service economy in need of a different kind of precarious or casualized labour force, in addition to the continuing need for agricultural workers.’ In this context, one important factor is not only the quantity of Mexican migration, but also its ‘quality’: a growing supply of Mexican migrants since the early 1980s – many of whom were socially excluded due to their migratory status – increased ‘the volume and flexibility of the labour supply in certain segments
of the job market’ (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, 2007: 668). Mexican-born workers continue to be employed in agriculture, while others work in cleaning and domestic services, construction, manufacturing and transport (CONAPO, 2014b). For instance, male migrants from Casa Blanca work in construction; females work in cleaning and domestic services, as a shop assistant and a farmer recounted, respectively. These segments are characterized by increasingly insecure jobs in industries experiencing productive restructuring (i.e. agriculture and construction) or undergoing global competition and reconfiguration (i.e. cleaning and domestic services, manufacturing and transport) (Delgado Wise and Guarnizo, 2007).

Similarly, US immigration policies have had a significant impact on the processes of social transformation and international migration in Mexico. For instance, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 regularized the migratory status of more than two million Mexicans, encouraging them to increase their length of stay (Ayón, 2006). Across Zacatecas, and other parts of Mexico, this led to the breaking of the traditional pattern of circularity (Alarcón, 2011). This coincided with the beginning of the collapse of peasant production in Zacatecas mentioned above. There was a transition towards permanent migration which included a growing participation of women and families with children. This affected communities in numerous ways. As one local academic said, in the case of Casa Blanca, ‘[E]ntire families moved to the USA, so there are no longer many wives or children left at Casa Blanca who receive remittances on a regular basis.’ The IRCA also represented the beginning of a more restrictive stand on border security that continues to the present day. This has made it more difficult and costly for new migrants to cross the border. One of the consequences of this approach has been a move towards permanent migration, as migrants increasingly seek to avoid the risks of crossing an expensive and dangerous border. One of our interviewees in Casa Blanca – an unemployed male – explained this: ‘[C]oming for a visit means risking not being able to cross the line on the way back. Nowadays there are too many soldiers and security at the border . . . The last thing I heard was that a coyote (guide or smuggler) was charging US$5,000 to get you across the line, but not even that is certain.’

Changes in US immigration policies continue to have a significant impact on migrants. On the one hand, the Obama administration has failed to implement an immigration reform and there has been a significant increase in the level of deportations of Mexican migrants. Locals in Casa Blanca are well aware of this, as a male business owner explained: ‘Obama came to office with the support of the Latino vote. But then he turned a blind eye and deported more people than anyone else.’ Locals, such as this farmer, reported that approximately 18 people had been deported in 2011, but that all of them had tried to go back to the USA. Furthermore, the recent development of anti-immigration laws in Arizona, Alabama and other US states has seen irregular migrants increasingly profiled racially, criminalized and
deprived of basic rights (HRW, 2011). Locals are also aware of this. The same business owner and a female retiree expressed the view of many of our interviewees that: ‘[Migrants] are being treated badly by the new laws . . . nowadays you are detained simply by the colour of your hair’, and ‘[W]e are not wanted there anymore.’ On the other hand, the recent implementation of the ‘Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals’ (DACA) has the potential to allow thousands of young Mexicans to avoid deportation and to apply for temporary work permits (Batalova et al., 2013). This could have a significant impact on the everyday lives of migrants in the USA and their relatives in their communities of origin. It is yet unknown how DACA will affect young migrants from communities such as Casa Blanca.

Finally, one must consider the impact of the most recent financial crisis on migrants and their relatives. The most direct impact, as a male butcher told us, was that ‘[P]eople in the north were left unemployed’. Mexican migrants, including those from Casa Blanca, were negatively affected due to their concentration in industries, such as construction, that were hit strongly by the crisis. In addition, the irregular status of many of them makes them particularly sensitive to economic conditions, since irregular workers are often not entitled to unemployment pay or other social benefits (McCabe and Meissner, 2010). In the face of these challenges, remittances to Mexico and Zacatecas fell by 16 per cent in 2009 and remained almost flat in 2010. Today, remittance flows still remain below pre-crisis levels (BANXICO, 2014; World Bank, 2014c). Data are not available at the community level but one might expect remittance flows to Casa Blanca to follow national and state trends. Locals reported that ‘a lot of money used to come from the US, but it is no longer so’ (male farmer). Furthermore, a local academic explained: ‘[M]any migrants had money saved in Mexico, so when the crisis hit, they asked for those savings to be sent to them.’

The crisis also affected migration flows. Migration from Mexico to the USA slowed down from 2006 onwards and reached a much-publicized net standstill in 2010 (Cave, 2011). This was seen as a result of the financial crisis. However, other possible factors include increased enforcement against irregular migrants, the high risks due to criminal activities on the US–Mexico border and, to a lesser extent, changing demographic and economic conditions in communities of origin (García Zamora, 2012). In Zacatecas, emigration flows have slowed down: between 2005 and 2010 (the most recent data available), only 30,498 people migrated to the USA, a significant reduction from previous periods. Return flows – voluntary and involuntary – have increased (CONAPO, 2014c). As mentioned before, this includes a significant number of involuntary returnees or deportees. In contrast to such trends, locals in Casa Blanca, such as this male farmer, reported that ‘people did not come back’ in spite of the economic crisis. At the same time though, as the academic explained, ‘[M]igrating to the USA does not look like such an attractive option anymore. People over there tell those here “Why do you
even bother coming? There are no jobs here either”. What emerges from this analysis is that the US crisis has had a significant impact on current and prospective migrants and their relatives in Casa Blanca. As explained by a local farmhand, ‘[W]hen work goes down in the north, everything goes down here, even the harvest.’

The war on drugs, violence and migrants

A more recent, and more brutal, transformation affecting Mexico has been the government’s implementation of the so-called ‘war on drugs’. Shortly after assuming office, President Felipe Calderón (2006–12) declared his administration’s commitment to the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime. In particular, Calderón deployed the military in a series of large-scale operations against drug cartels (González, 2009). The strategy was to dismantle large cartels into smaller gangs that could be more easily policed and to regain government control over the large number of territories controlled by drug cartels (Starr, 2012). Instead, powerful and more violent cartels have emerged in the fight for territories and trade routes. Similarly, cartels have diversified their activities to include human trafficking, informal trading, piracy and extortion, as an official at the state’s human-rights commission revealed.

The roots of the war on drugs are multilayered. Among a number of geopolitical factors (Arias Cubas, 2014), it is important to highlight that the parallel process of neoliberal restructuring and persistent low socio-economic opportunities in Mexico has fuelled the ranks of drug cartels. Indeed, the relationship between lack of opportunities and organized crime was highlighted by many of our interviewees, such as this state government official:

Gang members approach a young man and tell him: ‘You get this truck, a gun and a thousand pesos a week, but you are going to have to kill and kidnap.’ This young man stops and looks around and he cannot see anything else. What other alternative does he have?

The relationship between such conditions of hopelessness and extreme life choices in the context of Mexico’s neoliberal restructuring is further explained by Morton (2012: 1641):

Whether it be through the 250,000 soldiers deserting the army since 1995, alienated by low salaries and tempted by the largesse dispensed by the drug lords; or the growing ranks of mass migrants divorced from their means of subsistence in the countryside and subjected to market-dependence, which marks the particular imperative of capitalism and adds to the narco cartels’ business operations; or the uneven development and fragmentation of state space resulting from NAFTA and the globalising contradictions of capital and symbolised by the maquila forms
of ‘in-bond’ assembly production, neoliberalism has contributed to the recent rise of the drugs cartels in Mexico and the ensuing internecine war.

The costs of the war on drugs have been high. Estimates suggest that so far the war has killed or led to the disappearance of 100,000 Mexicans or more. This war has deeply affected the social fabric of Mexican society in what González (2009) calls a ‘psychological leap into a state of generalized fear and a perception of acute vulnerability’. In the case of Zacatecas, a state government official told us that the state has witnessed increasing conflict, as two of Mexico’s largest drug cartels – El Cártel del Golfo and Los Zetas – have battled for disputed territories. There have been large-scale incidents of violence, such as a three-day-long shoot-out that resulted in 46 deaths in 2013, and more common ‘everyday’ acts of violence such as extortion and intimidation (Proceso, 2013a). In Casa Blanca, the impact of the war on drugs has been felt since 2008 when Los Zetas – or ‘the bad guys’ as they are referred to by locals – began to target the community. Their arrival is a story often told by our interviewees, in this case, a female retiree:

They [Los Zetas] first came four years ago on 3 May while there was a big party in La Luz, the neighbouring community. There was a big shooting that night... They kidnapped people; they stole cars, tractors and people’s houses; and they fired shots against houses and gates.

Since then the community has continued to be affected by the presence of Los Zetas. As narrated by a male farmhand, ‘Los Zetas are infiltrating the community, and they are powerful. They can get to your house or your business and easily rob you or ask you for money.’ This has the potential to particularly affect small local businesses. Locals reported that ‘Los Zetas come and collect a lot of money in rents from them. They sometimes come every week. But local businessmen are struggling, because they do not have that much money to pay them’ (female homemaker). In fact this affects all members of the community. The butcher, the farmer and the farmhand all complained that ‘everyone has fear’ and that ‘one cannot go out freely anymore’.

The current climate of crime and violence has had a major impact on migration. Organized crime has taken over territories through which migrants frequently travel, thus making migration an ever-greater risk in the face of systemic kidnapping and extortion. This has created a particularly dangerous condition for thousands of mostly Central American migrants travelling through Mexico on their way to the USA, as a local academic explained. The vulnerability of these migrants is particularly high, as demonstrated by the kidnap and massacre of 72 Central and South American migrants by an armed gang in the state of Tamaulipas, north of Zacatecas, in 2010. However, this is an issue which does not affect Casa Blanca, as Zacatecas is not on the route taken by migrants travelling north to the USA.
Different aspects of the war have affected Casa Blanca. An unknown number of people have been displaced due to crime and violence. In Zacatecas, migrants’ relatives have been targeted by criminal organizations (Dillon, 2009) and locals in Casa Blanca reported that ‘things changed because of the insecurity’. In cases like that of Casa Blanca, displacement has not been evident because it has involved the movement of individuals or families rather than of larger groups (NRC, 2011), as this female homemaker and business owner illustrated in the following quote:

There was this older woman whose children were all in the US. They came for her and took her north with them because of it. Many of the migrants that were already established in the USA took their parents and their children with them.

No formal information about this is available though. As explained by one of our interviewees, an official with the International Organization for Migration (IOM):

No one really knows who is leaving or which places they are abandoning. . . . This is partly because the Mexican government does not recognize the figure of an internally displaced person, and we do not have the correct tools or methodologies to record.

In addition, the current climate of insecurity is affecting those migrants who used to travel back to Mexico as well as those prospective migrants who wish to travel north. First, a tradition of family visiting and holiday-making has been broken by the rise of violence and crime. As a federal government official stated, ‘This concerns particularly those documented migrants who were able to travel back to their communities of origin.’ In Casa Blanca, migrants used to come back to visit their relatives or to attend the patronal feast, but they stopped coming after Los Zetas arrived, as a female farmhand told us that they ‘began silencing them and stealing their trucks’. Second, newer migrants are struggling to migrate north due to the threat of organized crime, according to a federal government official. This situation reflects the existing interconnectedness among the different economic, social and political events affecting migration flows in Mexico. As articulated by one of our male interviewees, a farmer:

First of all, the border has become increasingly difficult to cross for those without papers. Second, many are afraid of the violence and insecurity in Mexico. And finally, there is no longer extra money to travel. . . . Nowadays one has to pay a coyote US$3,700 to cross the line. Plus, one also has to pay US$500 to the bad guys to be let through.
Casa Blanca is now confronted with a reality where the escalation of crime and drug-related violence is affecting migrants and non-migrants alike, albeit in different ways. As argued by a female homemaker and business owner, ‘I do not know when it happened, but suddenly it was here. Kidnappings and murders, they affect everyone.’

Conclusions

Current estimates by a local academic suggest that approximately 3,500 people from Casa Blanca reside in the USA, a massive increase from the levels recorded in the late 1980s. The idea that ‘half of the town is over there’ is commonly recognized by locals. This fact in itself is extremely significant for our understanding of migration as a crucial component of social transformation. Yet, while communities like Casa Blanca have witnessed significant social transformation, this transformation has not been entirely ‘progressive’. Indeed, Casa Blanca provides an example of a community at a crucial crossroad. First, this is a community where migration, an almost institutionalized tradition, remains a contentious issue. There are very diverse understandings and perceptions of the impacts on migration in the community, and there are also opposite understandings of the experience of migrating itself. Second, this crossroad relates to the continuing reliance of the local economy on agriculture, in spite of all the odds against this industry. Third, this crossroad presents the community with an environment where the escalation of crime and drug-related violence is now affecting everyone, migrants and non-migrants included. Finally, this crossroad is related to the impact of what happens in the USA. This involves not only the impact of policies to restrict or control migration, but most significantly also the impact of the neoliberal transformation of the US economy and society on current and prospective migrants and their relatives.

Notes

1 This includes 19 interviews with local informants in the community, 16 interviews with key informants at the state level and 3 at the national level. All the quotes used in this chapter are from interviews held between 21 August and 24 October 2012.

2 In many cases, migrants have travelled first within Mexico before arriving in the USA. Some travelled to neighbouring states to work as agricultural labourers on cotton or tomato farms, while others migrated to urban areas such as Mexico City or Monterrey to work in factories or in construction (local academic).

3 Ejido is a type of communal land holding in which individual members own and farm a specific parcel of land from a communal holding. This type of holding was implemented after the Mexican revolution through a process of land redistribution. Significantly, the right to land use was not the equivalent of ownership, implying that ejido land could not be sold prior to a constitutional reform enacted in 1991 (Améndola et al., 2006).
Some of the characteristic features of employment in the informal sector are layoffs without notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions and the absence of social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health insurance.

At the end of 2012, more than 167,000 people were employed by this sector at the state level (INEGI, 2013). This figure is equivalent to a quarter of the employed population.

It is difficult to quantify the exact number of deaths or disappearances that have taken place since the start of the war on drugs. An estimate of 70,000 deaths was given by Mexico’s Secretariat of the Interior (SEGOB) in early 2013 (Proceso, 2013b). A report by Amnesty International (AI, 2013) suggests that 25,000 people went missing between 2006 and 2012. Drug-related deaths and disappearances have continued since then.

The Mexican government estimates that 150,000 irregular migrants, mostly from Central America, enter the country each year, but NGOs believe the actual number to be much higher (CNDH, 2011).

References


12

The Return of Migrants in the USA to Mexico: Impacts and Challenges for Zacatecas

Rodolfo García Zamora, Alondra Ambriz Nava and Patricia Herrera Castro

Introduction

For over 30 years, international migration has been viewed in Mexico as a unidirectional flow northwards, thus diminishing the importance of migrants who return. However, aspects such as the severe economic crisis in the USA between 2007 and 2013 and its repercussions on unemployment, the long process of militarization of the border since the 1990s, and anti-immigrant legal reforms over the past 15 years have resulted in the return of more than two million Mexican migrants to their homeland in the past five years alone (Gallegos, 2014). This poses new challenges for research and for the design of public policies to address the impacts of that homecoming, in order to help with the reintegration of those migrants and to support their families.

This return migration has had an important effect upon Mexico’s social and economic life. Our chapter examines the principal impacts faced by migrants returning to the state of Zacatecas in terms of their health and education. Thus, through an analysis of the impacts in these areas, it is possible to formulate a proposal for a ‘Support Program for the Comprehensive Reintegration of Migrants and their Families’, to be implemented by both federal and state governments in collaboration with the Federation of Zacatecan Hometown Associations.

Studies on return migration

Studies on the topic of return migration in Mexico are somewhat scarce, compared to the great quantity of work on international migration. The existing literature centres on the return brought about by the economic crisis of 1929–33 and the end of the Bracero Program (1942–65), a programme
created as a way of recruiting guestworkers to meet the labour force needs of the USA brought about by the Second World War. In this way, generally, return migration has been seen as an option for migrants once they have achieved certain goals in the USA, such as obtaining enough capital to open a business in their homeland, as well as an individual decision taken for personal, family or cultural reasons.

Jorge Durand (2005) suggests that return migration calls into question the unidirectional or definitive character of migration, at least in the case of Mexico and the USA, since the decision to return implies a reinitiation of the migratory process, but in reverse. Returning can be distinguished, according to Durand, as having three characteristics: (1) temporary migration, tied to guestworker programmes, in which the labour contract explicitly mandates the obligation to return; (2) the migrant’s own decision to return, made consciously and voluntarily after a long residency (an example being the return of retirees with a pension); and (3) transgenerational return, which constitutes the return not of the migrant, but of his or her descendants (children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren).

According to Salvador Cobo et al. (2008), an analysis of return migration must include the migratory experience in terms of the well-being of the migrant and his or her family, which is tied to the migrant’s work experience in the destination country, migratory legal situation and integration (or not) into the external context. Another dimension has to do with the impacts of the migrant’s return on the economic and social development of the origin and destination countries. Specifically, it is important to consider the dual perspective of the new labour abilities, the return migrant possesses and the skills and savings potential that affect the local development and the structural capacities of the places of origin and return to reincorporate return migrants. These points indicate the necessity of recognizing the diversity of experiences of return migrants as defined by their gender, age, migratory situation, work history, and so on.

Meanwhile, Francis Mestries (2013) suggests considering the objective and subjective factors of return migration. Among the objective factors are those tied to migrants (e.g. age and work history) and environmental factors (e.g. distance between origin and destination, migratory situation, and economic situation at the destination). The subjective factors include human and social capital, community identity (i.e. the sense of belonging and participation in community organizations in the place of origin and destination), the success or failure of achieving the objective of migration (e.g. earning money and purchase of land), factors relating to family and loved ones (e.g. pressure from the spouse, children and parents, nostalgia and the inability to adapt to the place of destination) or, lastly, factors drawing one away from the community of destination and towards places in the country of origin (e.g. previous investments and opportunities of community representation in city government or local councils).
Recent tendencies in return migration at the national level

The five years from 2005 to 2010 have been very important for the migratory phenomenon in Mexico. A new migration pattern has been observed during this period: Mexican migration has departed from its cyclical character to become permanent and there is a greater presence of return migration where migrants and their families return to the communities of origin or to other places which have greater appeal. As we have noted above, the triggering factors for return migration are the growing militarization of the northern border, the increase in anti-immigrant policies in the USA, and the negative effects upon the US labour market brought about by the ongoing economic crisis.

Among the more apparent indicators of the current situation is the reduction in remittances received in Mexico, whose historic heights reached US$26.059 billion in 2007 according to the Bank of Mexico (BANXICO, 2013), and which later fell by 12 per cent in 2008. These figures are also explained by the increase in unemployment among Hispanics who work in the USA which, according to the US Office of Labour Statistics, rose by 8.8 per cent in 2008, 2.3 per cent more than the average national rate (Alarcón et al. 2009). This is partly due to the fact that the sectors most affected by the crisis were those that employ Mexican migrants: manufacturing and construction. Finally, this is also explained by the temporary fall in the number of Mexican migrants in the USA. Between 2006 and 2007, Mexican migration to the USA reached its highest level with 12.5 million migrants. However, due to the economic recession, this was followed by a significant drop between 2007 and 2009, only recovering in 2012 (BBVA, 2012). Data from Mexico’s National Population Council (CONAPO, 2014a) show that between 1995 and 2000, there were 267,150 return migrants at the national level and 1,469,801 migrants to the USA, while the five-year period 2005 to 2010 registered 131,400 return migrants and 990,477 departures. We see, then, a drop as much in the number of departures as in the number of returns nationally.

These figures lend support to the controversy around zero migration, which began when Damien Cave (2011), in a letter published in the New York Times, suggested that the drop in migration could be explained by improving economic and social conditions in Mexico. Authors such as Douglas Massey, Jorge Durand and René Zenteno were proponents of this position, which signalled a decrease in migration due to factors such as a drop in the birth rate, lowered unemployment in Mexico, increased legal migration, democratic progress and less poverty. In contrast to this, elsewhere, we have argued that the number of undocumented migrants and of deported and return migrants reached equilibrium, due mainly to rising unemployment in the USA resulting from the economic crisis (García Zamora, 2012). Similarly, the thesis held by Alejandro Canales (2012) indicates that the impact of the financial crisis is clearly seen not in a massive return of migrants, but rather in a reduction in the flow of Mexicans to the USA. Further, he notes that
return migration did not show a different tendency during the crisis. In an analysis of migration tendencies, one can see null migration not as an end of migration, but rather as a virtual and temporal equilibrium between the return from and the entrance of Mexicans to the USA.

Given the high correlation that exists between migratory flows and the economic cycles of both countries, one can expect a recovery of the migratory flows to the USA once the economy of that country improves. Other factors that could influence the migratory phenomenon and, in particular, return migration are the eventual migratory reforms and security policies that the USA implements along its border with Mexico.

A manifestation of return migration in Zacatecas

The state of Zacatecas has more than 100 years of experience of international migration to the USA. This explains the fact that 1.5 million Zacatecans currently live in Zacatecas while 650,000 live in the USA. In fact, over the past 70 years, international migration and family remittances have been very important in the economic and social life of the state's various regions and social sectors. Therefore, the economic crisis in the USA, and the consequent drop in migration and remittances, had significant repercussions for Zacatecas. In the context of recent Zacatecas–US migration, the return of migrants to their communities has grown significantly, leading to growing economic, social, cultural and community problems regarding their reintegration and reunion with their families. Between 1995 and 2000, Zacatecas received 10,824 return migrants and sent 61,969 migrants to the USA whereas, during the five-year period from 2005 to 2010, return migrants numbered 27,324 compared to 30,498 departures. These figures reflect the national tendency towards less migration to the USA and a rise in the number of return migrants. In Table 12.1, we can see the evolution of the migratory indicators for the state of Zacatecas, which are themselves a reflection of the impacts of the economic crisis and the decrease in the percentage of households that receive remittances.

Table 12.1 Zacatecas: migratory indicators for 2000 and 2010 (percentage of households)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittance recipients</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With emigrants to the USA during the previous 5-year period</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With circular migrants during the previous 5-year period</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With return migrants during the previous 5-year period</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Mexico’s National Population Council (CONAPO, 2014a, 2014b).
Here, it is important to highlight the differences within Zacatecas. The municipalities which had the greatest percentage of households with return migrants in the 2000–05 period were Trinidad García de la Cadena, El Plateado de Joaquín Amaro, Momax, Chalchihuites, Atolinga, Monte Escobedo, Juan Aldama, Huanusco, Juchipila and Jerez. These municipalities have a long tradition of international migration, where the percentage of return migrants has varied between 7.47 per cent and 5.86 per cent. Between 2005 and 2010, the municipalities with the highest number of return migrants were Francisco R. Murguía, Susticacán, Apozol, Sain Alto, Trinidad García de la Cadena, Apulco, Tepechitlán, Rio Grande, Nochistlán and Villa González Ortega, with the percentage ranging between 9.0 and 14.61. It is important to note that the six leading municipalities are those that have experienced higher levels of depopulation, ageing and feminization prior to the crisis in the USA due to their greater degree of international migratory intensity.

On this point, we should also bear in mind that this return is not observed equally across all states in Mexico, but is concentrated in just five – Jalisco, Sonora, Guanajuato, Michoacán and Oaxaca. The importance of the existence or lack of social networks can be shown in the volume of return migrants who come from emerging areas of international migration such as Oaxaca. In the case of traditional areas, the trend is declining, as 2010 figures were approximately a third of those in the year 2000. In the case of Zacatecan migrants, we see that the number of return migrants to their place of birth between 1995 and 2010 fell from 44,340 persons to only 13,192, as shown in Figure 12.1, which compares them with those from Oaxaca and Michoacán, states also known for their high degree of migratory intensity.

![Figure 12.1](image_url)

**Figure 12.1** Return migrants to Zacatecas, Oaxaca and Michoacán, 1995–2010

*Source: Authors’ creation based on data from the Centre on Migration Studies (CEM, 2013a).*
Governmental response to return migrants

At the national level, programmes relating to migration are the responsibility of the Secretary for Foreign Relations (SRE), but the human resources of the SRE have proven to be insufficient, in particular for the great number of people deported to Mexico who arrive without belongings and, in the majority of cases, without identification. This is in addition to the difficult situation of family separation. Added to this is the serious problem of unaccompanied deported minors, in 2010 reaching 67 per cent of deported migrant children, where 24 per cent of these were under the age of 12 years. In this context arises the need to protect the human rights of repatriated migrants and to expand the coverage of measures to address their needs. In the face of this scenario, the Mexican government has been criticized for its limited work in defending the human rights of Mexicans in the USA in general, and those of Mexicans deported or returned from that country. In particular, the government has not met the standards identified by the National Migration Institute (INAMI). According to INAMI, essential elements of public policy must ‘contribute to national development, through an appropriate management of migration based on a legal framework that facilitates migratory flows with respect to human dignity’ and must ‘guarantee the protection and defence of migrants’ human rights, such as their physical well-being and protection of property, independent of their nationality and their status as documented or undocumented in which the three levels of government share responsibility’ (INM, 2011: 18).

Mexican policies regarding migration have traditionally been limited to providing and defending the rights and physical well-being of migrants on national territory. The Paisano Program was ‘created with the aim of guaranteeing a safe, orderly and dignified migratory flow to those Mexicans who enter, transit or depart from Mexico’ (INM, 2011: 19). In this context, Grupo Beta is also charged with assisting those migrants in situations where they may be at risk or abused by authorities, individuals or organized crime, providing direction and information about the dangers along the way. These programmes are designed, primarily, for recurring migrants or those who return as tourists, but not for those who are deported, or who return voluntarily, for economic and family reasons. Therefore, at the moment, there is no programme in Mexico oriented towards supporting return migrants.

In the context of this large number of Mexican return migrants from the USA, the Federal Mexican Congress approved the Migrant Support Fund (FAM) in 2009 with the goal of assisting the economic reintegration of return migrants through self-employment projects. This involves the provision of financial assistance in the form of a grant valued up to MXN$12,500 (approximately US$960). The programme is administered by the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) and is intended to support return migrant workers and families who receive remittances, in order that they might find
a job in the formal labour market or identify self-employment possibilities, improve their human capital and their residence conditions, support the operation of shelters that care for them and, depending on individual cases, assist their return home.

The FAM had a national budget of MXN$300 million in 2012, which was reduced by MXN$100 million in 2013 and will lose another MXN$50 million in 2014. This is occurring at a time when the past five years have seen a considerable number of return migrants, leading to the highest unemployment levels existing in Mexico. Furthermore, the reduced allotment to this fund highlights the absence of state programmes and of a comprehensive national support programme for the reintegration of return migrants and their families that encompasses economic, labour, food, health, education, community reintegration and family reintegration factors.

In theory, the FAM should support return migrants and those who receive remittances, but that support is given without training or adequate follow-up, making this programme, like many others, no more than a hand-out. Thus, there are no real prospects beyond the hope that the supported projects might prosper in the future. The results have not been promising due to the lack of project planning, which should have been accompanied by a serious process that included training and technical support. In addition, there is broad discretion on the part of state and municipal governments to give support to people who are neither migrants nor return migrants, with preference given to members of political parties. This leads to the siphoning of scarce resources to other sectors of the population who already have some form of institutional support via other programmes.

These financial and institutional shortcomings in their operation add weight to the need to design and establish a comprehensive support programme for the reintegration of return migrants and their families. However, designing a programme of this kind requires the political will of the Mexican government and the various political powers in the nation’s Congress to come up with an appropriate budget. Of particular concern is the need for bi-national collaboration in the processes of repatriation, given the complex processes involved and the vulnerability of migrants and their families who require support in areas such as education and health. In the face of the problematic outlined above, questions arise about whether the various areas of government are capable of safeguarding the fundamental rights of the population who are returning to their places of origin. It will be due to the organization by and pressure of the migrants’ home communities, their families and various allies in civil society that any advancement possible towards the design of this kind of programme will be made.

The impacts of return migration on health services
The phenomenon of return migration is putting Mexican migrants in situations of increased vulnerability in terms of access to health services.
In most cases, when those who are now return migrants first departed, they did not enjoy formal employment and thus were not offered social protection and access to health services. This condition of vulnerability continues during their stay in the USA. According to Castañeda and Ojeda (2008), migrants in the USA are 2.5 times less likely to be covered by medical insurance than those born within the country’s borders. Thus, 45 per cent of immigrants who are not US citizens lack medical coverage. This implies that they are not able to freely exercise their right to health care nor take advantage of public health programmes. Instead they take other measures such as self-medication, private expenditure and trips to Mexico for medical attention and medication, and so on. Upon their return to Mexico, their medical needs should be addressed and assistance should be provided in their search for economic and social opportunities that will lead to a successful reintegration.

Once migrants have returned to Mexico, they would ideally be offered institutional support so that their fundamental right to health could be fulfilled. Given that current return migration occurs within an adverse labour scenario which limits their ability to find formal work – and thus access to health services, the Seguro Popular de Salud (Public Health Insurance) programme becomes the only medical alternative offered by the state in contemporary Mexico, which implies that they have sufficient income to pay for access. Even when the cost of this insurance is minimal when compared to private services, its coverage is the bare minimum and may exclude chronic and degenerative illnesses.

Return migration has a significant impact on the emotional health of young children, both of deported migrants and of those who come to Mexico accompanied by their parents. While this age group in general is in an overall good state of health, the change in lifestyle and the lack of opportunities found in Mexico can lead to diagnoses of depression in these young children. The vulnerability of international return migrants of advanced age is also notable because of the lack of social security and access to health services in both countries – those over the age of 65 face high costs when they have chronic degenerative illnesses and complications.

The pressure applied by return migrants on the health system in Mexico calls into question the Seguro Popular strategy, which is purported to offer a universal service to the population, but which is facing an ever-increasing enrolment while having the same physical and economic resources. This weighs heavily on the quality and efficiency of service delivery, as the system copes with infrastructure and human resource deficiencies while attending to the health care needs of communities. If one adds the weight of return migrants to the context, the consequences are manifested mainly in the saturation of services and the insufficient availability of medication.
The limitations of migrant health care policies

Although there exist various policies and responses designed to address migrant health, they are diffused and unconnected. Their common denominator has been the lack of political will and commitment, not only with a specific segment of migrants and their families, but with that which underpins them – their fundamental rights and the constitutional mandate. For instance, the experiences of IMSS Migrante (1990), the Americas Health Initiative (2001), Windows of Health (2003) and Go Healthy, Return Healthy (Vete Sano, Regresa Sano – 2012) were attempts to bring medical attention and preventive services to migrants and their families; however, factors such as administrative problems, and a lack of clarity in insurance funding, among others, have led these strategies to be under-utilized.

The Migrant Health (Salud Migrante) initiative – analyzed, but never implemented, by the National Institute of Public Health – was intended to operate as a bi-national medical insurance with the aim of addressing the problem of delays in seeking medical attention, complications of chronic illnesses, the return or repatriation of seriously ill individuals, and the catastrophic expenses involved. This initiative was made part of the National Health Plan 2007–12 and was intended to coordinate efforts and frame the development of a comprehensive health policy. Nonetheless, this initiative never crystallized and was abandoned, exposing a lack of real commitment to the right to health care of the migrant population and their families.

Another initiative is the Bi-National Health Week (SBS), observed annually in Mexican consulates across the USA and in those states in Mexico which experience the greatest volumes of international migration. The SBS seeks to bring health services to migrants and their families for the duration of their activity in both countries. According to the Outcomes of the Bi-National Health Week 2012, an estimated 4,216 activities benefiting a total of 466,770 people were carried out (Semana Binacional de Salud, 2012). Moreover, campaigns were undertaken to raise awareness among the Latin population on topics such as women’s health, mental health, adolescent health, occupational health, infectious diseases, chronic illnesses and access to/reform of health services. The core limitation of this initiative is that it appears as a short-term promotion with a high degree of propaganda on the part of the Mexican government.

Health initiatives at the state level

The Zacatecan Bi-National Health Initiative (IBIZA) is a successful pilot programme in community health promotion for Zacatecan migrants in California which operates in coordination with different actors in international migration: the state government, the Americas Health Initiative, the University of California-Berkeley and the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of
Southern California. The goal of this initiative is to improve the health and quality of life of the Zacatecan population and their families who live in the USA. To achieve this goal, the coordination, development and implementation of activities are shared under the premises of service provision and the prevention of illness.

Similar to the limitations of the SBS, the IBIZA Program is a pilot programme which has not been institutionally formalized. It does not guarantee bi-national access to health for all Zacatecan migrants and their families. It is more likely to succeed if it is promoted through the large network of Zacatecan clubs in the USA, which exceed some 300 transnational community organizations. Another limitation is that IBIZA does not include return migrants. Rather, IBIZA is a programme which attempts to improve health indicators in destination and origin communities through better personnel training and repeated health checks for those in California, but it is not intended to provide specific attention to return migrants.

The impacts of return migration on educational services

In education, the needs are urgent, as the country is faced with an increase in the number of return migrants and their families. Table 12.2 provides data on the incidents of repatriation of Mexican migrants who are minors for 2012. One significant challenge is the growing number of mostly male, unaccompanied-minor return migrants. In 2007, unaccompanied minors accounted for 49 per cent, a figure which had increased to 67 per cent by 2010. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a significant challenge for the education and health systems in Mexico.

Increasingly, minors need educational programmes that address their needs, so that adapting to the Mexican educational system is not so difficult for them. For this, and in order to offer bilingual services, teacher training is proposed; however, this, too, has not been implemented. It is extremely important that governments become directly involved in the needs of the growing minor return migrant population. States, such as Zacatecas, with a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12.2</th>
<th>The repatriation of Mexican migrants who are minors from the USA by state of origin, age group, classification of arrival and sex, 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total general</td>
<td>1,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12–17 years</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompanied</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccompanied</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–11 years</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Centre on Migration Studies (CEM, 2013b).*
high degree of migratory intensity and high indices of return migrants should respond by providing these changes in educational investment since – as Table 12.3 shows – there is a complete lack of teachers and Bachelor's programmes in bilingual, cross-cultural primary education in the face of a growing population of minor return migrants with transnational educational needs.

In matters of education, the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), a consulting body to the SRE made up of 130 Mexican migrant leaders, has proposed small measures which – while they do not address the entirety of the demand for educational topics – could expand existing programmes and be offered to the rest of the migrant population. Within these initiatives are teacher-exchange programmes, the donation of books to schools, libraries and community centres in the USA, literacy programmes for adults and educational programmes offered through the more than 360 community centres. In addition, there is the IME-Becas joint programme with the University of California that began in 2005 with the goal of supporting, via donations, the community centres and the institutions that offer educational programmes to Mexican students (Délano, 2010).

The outcomes sought via these programmes are the acquisition by students of educational tools that allow them to have a better connection with US institutions. As argued by Délano (2010: 860), ‘[a]lmost all the students enrolled feel motivated by the idea that an education in their own language not only facilitates learning to read and write, but permits them to quickly learn English, and in some cases obtain their diploma (GED) and attend university in the United States’. This impetus in the education of migrants should be seen as advancements in their access to better jobs and an improved quality of life.

The Bi-National Migrant Education Program (PROBEM), implemented by the Secretary for Public Education (SEP) of Mexico and the California Department of Education, has the core objective of supporting children and youth as they pursue their studies, with one part of the school year pursued

### Table 12.3  Students, teachers and Bachelor’s degree programmes in bilingual primary education in the states of Michoacán, Oaxaca and Zacatecas, 2011–12 school year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>1st school enrolment</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Degrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Mexico’s Secretary of Public Education (SEP, 2012, 2013).
in Mexico and the other in the USA. It assures the quality and continuity of their education in order to improve the quality of life of these children and youth. According to Tinajero (2007), PROBEM has four thematic axes: information and distribution, teacher exchange, document transfer and the development of educational material. Only the teacher exchange has received any real direction, while the other three axes have seen little advancement. The most limiting factor faced by the programme implementers is the very small budget of no more than MXN$303,000. Furthermore, the core of the programme and teacher exchanges does not address a more significant educational problem: school dropouts.

The limitations of migrant educational policies

While federal programmes around educational materials for migrants exist, the demand for them is growing and they now need to be extended both geographically and financially. In Zacatecas, the 2012–13 school year had around 8,000 children with bilingual educational needs enrolled in PROBEM. However, as we saw in Table 12.3, there are no teachers capable of meeting these needs. The teachers who face these challenges do not speak English and many of the minors speak little or no Spanish. One of the options that this programme proposes is a diploma in English for the teachers who have to support these students. Thus, one of the greatest problems among the population of child return migrants is their lack of Spanish linguistic ability in a context in which there are no teachers with training at the didactic and pedagogical levels nor with English-speaking capability.

Another central problem among the population of child return migrants is the lack of documentation – including the recognition of birth certificates and the lack of school documents – which restricts a person’s recognition as a Mexican citizen. This is a situation more often confronted by youth who have just finished high school, since their return is not planned and people go back without the necessary documentation. Of the 58 municipalities in Zacatecas, all have at least one ‘bi-national’ student – a total of 9,256 minors. The top five in terms of the number of these students are the municipalities of Fresnillo (1,081), Sombrerete (582), Jerez (525), Guadalupe (519) and Río Grande (471). The efforts made under PROBEM in Zacatecas are limited and have only achieved minimal progress in the face of the larger challenge posed by the plethora of municipalities with return migrant minors.

Proposals

Given that the sources of information are widespread, it is important to undertake municipal censuses of return migrants and their families in order to obtain reliable data on the problematic, impacts and proposals, and from these, to elaborate regional public policies for the same transnational social
actors. It is also vital to bring support for migrant transfer from the border to the area of origin, avoiding, in this way, the risks – such as theft, extortion, kidnapping, assault and murder – that return and deported migrants face.

In particular, support is needed for the reintegration of migrants and their families into their communities of origin through programmes of job creation and timely training, as well as through psychological support and the provision of job training and microcredit financing. It is likewise necessary to develop inter-institutional coordination with migrant clubs and federations and with municipal and state governments in the areas of origin, and with other official institutions in education, health, employment and human security.

With regard to health care, a specific health support programme for return migrants and their families must be established, taking advantage of the wide network of health centres that exist in Zacatecas. It is important for both countries to develop solutions to the health problems of transnational migrants. To that end, the IBIZA pilot programme should be strengthened, expanded and institutionalized between the two countries with an appropriate budget, and should serve as the basis for its development and reproduction in other parts of the country. From a strategic point of view, it is of great importance to advocate the establishment, with the 18 Zacatecan club federations in the USA and the state government of Zacatecas, of a low-cost health, educational and life-insurance policy in the vein of that promoted by other Mexican states such as Oaxaca, in cooperation with credit unions and non-governmental organizations.

On the matter of education, PROBEM must be strengthened and state educational budgets must be increased to permit the comprehensive training of 500 teachers that will allow the needs of return migrant children and youth in Zacatecas to be adequately met. This is an estimated figure drawn from the number of returning students and their dispersion across nine municipalities.

Conclusions

In the face of the growing number of deported and return migrants to Mexico, the Mexican government must exercise a better defence of the human rights of its countrymen and women in the USA in general and, in particular, among return and deported migrants. The Mexican government must establish public policies to support the transit of return and deported migrants from the northern border region to their places of origin, with personalized attention that allows them the basic security to return and prevent any violation of their rights. This could form part of a more comprehensive reintegration support programme for migrants and their families, on the part of the federal government, that takes into consideration economic factors, training, microfinance and access to health and education for the entire family.
With regard to health programmes, it is important to improve the existing initiatives and ensure the access of all migrant families to this service. It is also urgent that health services in Zacatecas adequately extend to reach the areas of greater migratory and return migrant intensity in a way that guarantees access to health services by the migrants, their families and, in particular, all senior return migrants. On the matter of health care, the IBIZA Program is essential as a reference campaign for the entire country in the promotion of a culture of preventive health care among Zacatecan migrants in the USA, where the challenge lies in its propagation across the country through an alliance with the Zacatecan migrant clubs that reach across the USA.

However, there remains much to be done on the matter of return migration. As we have shown, the infrastructure and financing of Seguro Popular are limited and are faced with an additional burden from return migrants who will only add to the deficit of services. For all of these reasons, access and enrolment in the Seguro Popular must be guaranteed, as well as effective coverage, with the availability of medicines, timely examination to prevent further suffering, and psychological support for the reintegration of migrants to their families.

With regard to educational programmes, existing mechanisms must be improved and broadened in scope so that the increasing number of youth with particular needs has access to appropriate services. Regarding the available educational services, it is necessary to formulate a strategy to increase the cadre of bilingual teachers along with the pedagogical, psychological and social training of teachers and staff capable of supporting the 9,500 child return migrants who currently reside in the state.

In the context of Zacatecas, in particular, greater state government coordination is needed with the Federations of Zacatecan Hometown Associations in order to design a state support programme for return migrants and deported migrants that takes into consideration their joint responsibility under the ‘Planned and Assisted Return’ programme of the federal government, the consulates, Mexican border governments, origin-state governments, municipalities, NGOs, international bodies, the Superior Education Institutes (IES), churches and so on. It is increasingly urgent that the three levels of government, migrant organizations, communities of origin, NGOs, educational institutions and international organizations such as UNESCO, IOM, ILO, IDB and others articulate a comprehensive policy to support the reintegration of return migrants and their families.

Note

1 Authors’ calculation based on research in the archives of the Secretary of Public Education (SEP, 2012, 2013) at the state level.
References


Unravelling Highly Skilled Migration from Mexico in the Context of Neoliberal Globalization

Raúl Delgado Wise

Introduction

Mexican migration to the USA has experienced unprecedented growth since the implementation of neoliberal reforms in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) further accentuated the phenomenon to the degree that it turned Mexico into the number one country of emigrants in the world. This seemingly inexhaustible expulsive force brought with it profound qualitative transformations in the migratory phenomena associated with processes of deep social transformation. One of these, which has received relatively little attention in the literature, has to do with highly skilled labour migration which, in the last two decades, has shown a pace of growth greater than that of Mexican migration in general (see Figure 13.1). This makes Mexico the second-ranked country in the world in terms of sending highly skilled migrants to the USA, the first-ranked to the rest of Latin America and the sixth-ranked to the rest of the world.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze this phenomenon from a comprehensive and critical-analytical perspective. We are interested, above all, in uncovering the role played by brain power originating in Mexico – and in general that of the countries of the South – in the process of restructuring of the systems of innovation that were deployed within the framework of neoliberal globalization and at the hand of large multinational corporations. From this analytical perspective, it is possible to deepen our understanding of the nature and characteristics of highly skilled labour migration, in contrast to the dominant perspective that decontextualizes its analysis and restricts it to a supposed transition from brain drain to brain circulation and an eventual brain gain favouring the countries of origin.
Our central hypothesis is that the export of scientific and technological capabilities (brain power) consists of a higher phase in the restructuring strategy promoted by northern governments and large multinational corporations with the aim of lowering their labour costs through the resource of the inexpensive labour force from peripheral or emerging countries and regions. This situation, rather than resulting in positive social transformations in the migrants’ countries of origin, has led to the emergence of new forms of unequal exchange and dependency along the South–North axis.

**Workforce export and the dynamics of Mexico–US integration**

For our purposes, it is important to draw attention to a few essential features of the economic integration process underway between Mexico and the USA which has developed largely over the past three decades. This process, notable for the implementation of neoliberal reforms in the country and the signing and activation of NAFTA, is characterized by a triple movement.

**First movement: the dismantling and reinsertion of the Mexican economy**

An unavoidable feature of the course followed by neoliberalism in Mexico is the accelerated dismantling of the productive, commercial and service apparatus in the country oriented towards the domestic market, which was turned around and reoriented towards the international market. This turn of the rudder made possible, in a relatively short time, the conversion of the Mexican economy into the principal exporter in Latin America and the 12th worldwide. At first glance, this is not only a transformation into a new exporter role but, rather, an unprecedented pursuit of a new exporting dynamic consisting of some 80 per cent manufactured goods – of which almost
40 per cent are classified as embodying technological progress (Delgado Wise and Márquez, 2007).

The latter point has served the interests of the architects of the Washington Consensus in labelling the Mexican case as a paradigmatic ‘success’ story in the implementation of neoliberal reforms and an example of the benefits of ‘free trade’ (Iglesias, 2001). This, however, is nothing more than a distorted reflection of one vision of reality. To reveal the real character of Mexican exports, one must understand that, for the most part, this rests upon two pillars:

- The maquiladora industry, made up of assembly factories associated with a strategy of productive, commercial and services relocation by large multinational corporations, principally of US origin, which seek to take advantage of the low labour costs prevalent in Mexico. This kind of ‘industry’ is characterized by a very high proportion of imported inputs.
- The disguised maquiladora, which refers to export manufacturing plants with productive processes that are relatively more complex than the maquiladora, as is the case in the automotive and electronics sectors, but whose operation is carried out under a system of temporary importation similar to the maquiladora industry.

Both the maquiladora and the disguised maquiladora are characterized by a lack of forward and backward linkages with the rest of the national productive, commercial and service apparatus, for which they shape enclave economies. Similarly, both are subjected to the dynamics of labour uncertainty and feature significant wage differences with regard to US manufacturing: 1/10 in the case of the maquiladora and 1/7 in the disguised maquiladora (Cypher and Delgado Wise, 2011). The high degree of imported components in these activities, which represents between 75 and 80 per cent of the total manufactured exports, means that their contribution to the Mexican economy is essentially reduced to a miniscule salary flow, that is, the value of the workforce incorporated into the exports (Cypher and Delgado Wise, 2011). Therefore, behind the mirage of an advanced platform of manufactured exports, what the country really exports through the products of the maquiladora and the disguised maquiladora is a workforce – even though these Mexican workers never leave the country (Tello, 1986). It is, to put it in more precise terms, a modality of indirect export of the workforce.

If one adds to this indirect export of labour the direct export of the labour produced through migration, the true make-up of Mexican exports and the nature of the export model imposed upon the country reveal their actual significance. In effect, more than an advanced model of manufactured export, in reality, what has been implemented in the country is a cheap labour-force export-led model. Such a development not only represents a step backwards in the export programme of the country, but also implies a frontal attack on the conditions of life and work for the majority of Mexicans (Delgado Wise and Cypher, 2007; Delgado Wise and Márquez, 2007).
Second movement: the creation of a boundless reserve army of labour

The toll of neoliberal restructuring has been detrimental to the majority of the Mexican population: 2.1 million jobs were created in the country between 2000 and 2010, whereas some 9.5 million people were potentially looking for work (OECD/CEPAL, 2011). This resulted in an excessive growth in the reserve army of labour which, in this period, reached a height of 7.5 million workers, of whom 1.5 million were unemployed, 3.9 million fell into the ranks of informal workers and 2.1 million were international migrants. This situation, which represented a stark scenario for the country, was aggravated by the runaway crisis in the USA from 2008 and by the massive deportations by the administration of President Obama which, according to official statistics from the US Department of Homeland Security, amounted to 2 million deportations in the last five years (Golash-Boza, 2013).

Furthermore, as a corollary of the excess labour supply integral to the dynamic of neoliberal restructuring in Mexico, one witnesses the persistence of poor-quality and low-paid jobs. According to data from the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI, 2013), 60 per cent of Mexican workers were in the informal sector in 2012, while 66 per cent of waged and salaried workers saw incomes of less than 1.7 dollars per hour, and 85 per cent worked either more than 40 hours per week or less than 35. One can also add that in the shadow of this attack against the Mexican working class, the ever-more-porous boundaries with organized crime lie at the root of the grim processes of social disintegration. In this regard, it is worth acknowledging, for instance, the large number of organized crime murders in Mexico since 2006 (Molzahn et al., 2012).

Third movement: unleashing forced migration

Under the export model of cheap labour, migration from Mexico to the USA has shown an exponential growth. This growth was made more acute with the arrival of NAFTA. The heights reached by this migratory phenomenon are expressed eloquently in the following: in 2012, the Mexican-origin population residing in the USA was estimated at a little more than 32 million people, between emigrants – documented or not – born in Mexico (12 million) and US citizens of Mexican heritage (20 million). This is the largest diaspora in the world, located in a single country – in this case the largest country of immigrants in the world.

Mexican migration to the USA has also experienced qualitative changes with regard to levels of schooling, ethnic and gender composition, increased duration of migrant flows, and so on. However, the most important characteristic is that this migration takes on, with increasing force, the nature of a forced displacement (Márquez and Delgado Wise, 2011). In this sense, those who join in the migratory streams are, for the most part, people who have
literally been expelled from their territories (i.e., who abandon their places of origin out of necessity, with the hope of attaining some way to live or opportunities for social mobility beyond the country’s borders). The conditions in which these displacements occur carry with them multiple risks and hazards all along the difficult migratory journey – particularly for less-skilled migrants – including the persistent exposure to conditions of labour instability and social exclusion at their destinations. Further, international migrants are being increasingly subjected to policies and practices of criminalization, racial profiling and discrimination, which not only create vulnerable and segregated populations, but also often put the migrants’ very lives at risk. The fact that more than half of Mexican migrants can be categorized as undocumented or irregular (Passel and Cohn, 2011) has significant implications in terms of stigmatization and social vulnerability. The forced returns that are the result of massive deportations and the US economic crisis aggravated the situation described above.

It is important to note that by virtue of the hemispheric extension of the policy of economic integration promoted by the US government, Mexico has become the largest migratory transit corridor in the world. This involves, like the movement of its citizens to the USA, a flow of forced migration, coming particularly from Central America, which is subjected to ever-increasing conditions of vulnerability. In this context, the growing number of victims on Mexican territory represents a very serious and embarrassing episode in the annals of the nation’s history, one that cannot and should not be avoided (Casillas, 2012; Castillo, 2005).

Restructuring of the systems of innovation under the neoliberal aegis

The context in which skilled migration occurs, particularly that originating in peripheral or emerging countries, is notable for a profound restructuring of innovation systems on a global scale, with the USA at the head and having the large multinational corporations acting as core agents. Four overarching aspects are characteristic of this restructuring process:

- Increasing the internationalization and fragmentation of research and development activities. In contrast to the traditional innovation processes ‘behind closed doors’ in research and development departments that suckle at the breast of large corporations, this trend is known as open innovation. This refers to the sharing of knowledge-intensive corporate functions with the growing participation of external partners, such as suppliers, clients, subcontractors, and universities, and results in the creation of ‘ecosystems’ or networks of innovation (OECD, 2008).
- The creation of scientific cities – such as Silicon Valley in the USA and the new Silicon Valleys inaugurated in peripheral or emerging regions,
principally in Asia – where collective synergies are created to accelerate innovation processes (Sturgeon, 2003). At its root, as Saxenian (1996, 2002) noted, this represents a new paradigm, which departs from the old ‘closed’ models of research and development embedded in large corporations and opens the way to a new culture of innovation based on flexibility, decentralization and partnerships, under various modalities, with new and ever more numerous players that interact in local and transnational spaces. Within the latter, innovation platforms that are set up in peripheral countries operate as extensions of the established platforms in the core countries, taking advantage of low salaries, tax exemptions and other kinds of advantage, which lend them a character of scientific maquiladoras (Gallengher and Zarsky, 2007).

• The development of new methods of controlling research agendas (through risk capital, partnerships and subcontracting, among others) and of appropriation of the products of scientific endeavours (through the acquisition of patents) by large multinational corporations, through so-called strategic investment. It is interesting to observe how, while 76 per cent of the patents at universities and about half of the total patents in recent years registered in the USA were attributed to foreign inventors, 93 per cent of those were granted to multinational corporations (Galama and Josek, 2008; National Science Board, 2012; Partnership for a New American Economy, 2012; United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2012).

• An expansion along the South–North axis of the highly skilled workforce, in particular in the areas of science and engineering, and the increasing recruitment – via partnerships, outsourcing and offshoring – of that workforce from peripheral countries (Batelle, 2012). In fact, the evolution of this restructuring dynamic has crystallized in a new geography of innovation and of the scientific and technological research and development associated with it. Since 2011, the USA has been overtaken by China, Japan, South Korea and India as the principal investor in research and development, and it is anticipated that in 2023, China will individually surpass the USA along that line (Batelle, 2012). With regard to scientific-technological capacities (brain power), according to the American Community Survey (US Census Bureau, 2011), one in every three Master’s degrees and one in every two PhDs in science and engineering in the USA were awarded to foreigners – principally from peripheral or emerging countries. In addition, notably in China and the European Union, the ranks of PhD holders in these knowledge fields are growing faster than in the USA (Freeman, 2008; Galama and Josek, 2008).

It is worth emphasizing that this restructuring dynamic has made it possible for large multinational corporations to employ a growing contingent of scientific-technological workers from the South, transferring risks and responsibilities and capitalizing on apparent benefits through an increased
acquisition of patents. Under this new scheme, they have produced an unprecedented commercialization and monopolization of scientific work, with a short-term view that discards any social concern, and where the physical and indirect emigration of highly skilled workers from peripheral or emerging countries plays an increasingly important role.

**Dimensions and characteristics of highly skilled migration from Mexico migration to the USA**

Mexico is the top country in Latin America and sixth overall in the world in terms of the volume of highly skilled migrants it sends to OECD countries (Dumont et al., 2010). The number of Mexican professionals with a Bachelor's, Associate's, Master's or Doctoral degree who reside in the USA grew to 1.1 million, which puts Mexico in the second place among this category of immigrants to the USA (see Figure 13.2). At the postgraduate level, the Mexican contingent – although relatively small compared to China or India – more than doubled in the last decade, reaching, in 2011, a total of 129,027 with a Master's degree and 12,026 with a PhD. This figure is equivalent to 17 per cent of all the postgraduates in the country (Tuirán and Ávila, 2013a). To these numbers, according to data drawn from the American Community Survey, we can add 2.5 million professionals of Mexican origin born in the USA, of whom 328,298 hold a Master's degree and 26,050 have earned a PhD. If we compare these figures with the highly skilled population residing in Mexico, the proportion of Master's degrees and PhDs of Mexican origin in the USA (immigrants and those born there) show – surprisingly and significantly – that they make up 55.2 per cent and 29.7 per cent of the total, respectively.

![Figure 13.2](https://www.palgraveconnect.com/doi/10.1057/9781137474957)  
*Highly skilled immigrants in the USA by country of origin  
Source: SIMDE UAZ. Estimates based on the American Community Survey (US Census Bureau, 2011).
respectively. To these numbers, another 60,000 highly skilled ‘temporary-migrant’ Mexicans can be added (Rodríguez, 2009).

Looking beyond these figures, it is necessary to highlight that only 54.7 per cent of Mexican high-skilled immigrants are employed in professional or managerial activities in the USA (at the postgraduate level the proportion rises significantly to 74.3 per cent) and that their incomes, including those of the professionals of Mexican origin, tend to be lower than the remainder of native-born citizens and immigrants. At the postgraduate level, the income picture for Mexicans and for the population of Mexican origin in the USA follows the same pattern. Nonetheless, it is sufficient to note that in comparing these incomes with those received in Mexico, the situation is even more critical (see Figure 13.3).

To the preceding we can add the low degree of higher-education coverage that characterizes the country (e.g. 30 per cent of those aged between 19 and 23 years) notwithstanding the ostensible increase that postgraduate education has had in the last decade, which underlines not only the limited creation of a highly skilled workforce, but also a growing loss, waste and squandering of talents for national development. The situation takes on particular relevance when one considers the proportion of Mexican postgraduates in computing and systems analysis, sciences, and engineering among those Mexicans resident in the USA (immigrants and those born there) compared with those who reside in Mexico. For each 100 Mexican postgraduates in computing and systems analysis, sciences and engineering residing in Mexico, there are respectively 99, 66 and 47 postgraduate Mexicans residents (immigrants and those of Mexican origin) in the USA (see Figure 13.4).

Figure 13.3 Monthly income (in Mexican pesos) of the population with a Mexican postgraduate education and of Mexican origin resident in Mexico and the USA, 2010 Source: SIMDE UAZ. Estimates based on the American Community Survey (US Census Bureau, 2011).
In contrast to the Mexican migration experience in general, which is almost (98 per cent) completely concentrated in the USA, highly skilled migration, while principally oriented to that country, exhibits a notable geographic diversification towards countries in Europe, Asia and Oceania. The Institute of Mexicans Abroad has promoted the creation of a network of skilled Mexicans abroad, which currently counts 27 chapters and has a presence in 12 countries.

The fallacy of brain circulation

In the academic and political discussion on skilled migration, the concept of ‘brain drain’ has been abandoned, replaced by the notion of ‘brain or talent circulation’ (Meyer, 2011; Saxenian, 2006). From this perspective, the pessimism and concern about South–North skilled emigration has been transformed into a rampant optimism that substitutes the notion of gain for that of loss. This view is based upon the supposition that knowledge is, in itself, beneficial for all and that contact with highly skilled compatriots abroad generates synergies that drive development in the country of origin, regardless of where, how, in what situation and for whom they work. Knowledge, as much as research agendas, is viewed as neutral and, in a similar vein, the question of intellectual property – that is, the appropriation of the products of scientific endeavour – is undervalued or simply ignored. Further, the unbridled euphoria around the ‘circulation of talent’ and the creation of outreach programmes with the ‘skilled diaspora’ arise from the assumption

Figure 13.4 Relative weight of the population of Mexican origin with a postgraduate education in sciences and engineering resident in the USA compared with that resident in Mexico, 2010–11
Source: SIMDE UAZ. Estimates based on INEGI (2010) and American Community Survey (US Census Bureau, 2011).
that innovation creates, through incubation processes, its own ties with the productive, commercial, financial and service sectors in countries of origin.

None of the assumptions upon which the optimism of the supporters and followers of the ‘brain or talent circulation’ concept are grounded fit with the reality of contemporary capitalism. This does not mean, however, that the notion of ‘talent circulation’ should be totally discarded. On the contrary, to explicitly identify its suppositions and to seek the mechanism by which it could be attained, particularly for the benefit of the country of origin’s development, constitutes a useful reference point for the design of coherent public policies for innovation systems properly contextualized and tied to the country of origin, with direct pathways towards the productive, commercial and service sectors. A central element in this perspective is the establishment of a national patent system that allows for the appropriation of the fruits of scientific work, accompanied by incentives to drive strategic research lines that address the priorities and possibilities of national development.

In the Mexican case, the following facts and considerations allow for a better appreciation of the dimensions and characteristics of this problem:

• After China, Mexico is the country with the highest growth rate in doctoral programmes in the world: 17.1 per cent between 1998 and 2006 (Cyranoski et al., 2011).

• Postgraduate educational programmes in the country grew in number to 8,522, of which 5,865 were at Master’s level, 1,773 were at ‘Professional degree’ level and 884 were PhDs. These programmes were offered by 1,423 institutions, of which 1,134 are private and 289 are public. Just over half (56 per cent) of the doctoral programmes belong to the National Registry of Quality Postgraduate Studies in CONACYT (the National Council on Science and Technology), in contrast to the Master’s programmes, of which only 16 per cent are qualified at that level and where the greatest number of programmes are offered by private institutions (Sánchez Soler et al., 2012). This highlights the important role that public education still has at the upper level of education in the country, notwithstanding the growing trend towards privatization.

• The membership growth of the National System of Researchers (the programme that includes active researchers with a PhD in Mexico who work in universities or research centres) from 12,086 in 2006 to 18,554 in 2012, which also includes 700 members residing abroad, in no way compensates for the exodus of highly skilled emigrants from the country, given that, in 2012, the number who returned amounted to no more than 93 individuals (Sánchez Soler et al., 2012).

• In 2010, Mexico was awarded 14,576 patents, of which 93.5 per cent belonged to foreign applicants (Villa Rivera, 2012). Similarly, the country is situated among those most dependent upon foreign technology in the world (Red de Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología -Iberoamericana e Interamericana, 2011).
• In contrast to the previous accounting, which itself alludes to the practical non-existence of a National System of Innovation, it is worth noting that Mexico is the top country in Latin America in terms of the outward migration of inventors (Miguélez and Carsten, 2013).

Clearly then, the Mexican case not only fulfils the assumptions of the so-called circulation of talents, but also gained enormous wealth from the investment in higher education – particularly at the postgraduate level, implemented since the 1990s (Gandini and Lozano, 2012). In effect, without taking into account issues of quality – above all at the Master's level where, as we have seen, there has been a private institution boom in programme offerings – it is certain that the growth of Mexican postgraduate programmes had no direct correlation with transformations in the labour market, due to the structural limitations derived from the cheap labour-force export-led model prevalent in the country. In this context, the ties – limited as they are – between scientific-technological development and the domestic economy tend to become even more dislocated and blurry, severely restricting the national demand for a highly skilled workforce. This situation translates into an excess supply of professionals and scientific and technological personnel, leading to a significant waste of talent (brain waste) and a growing increase in highly skilled emigration (brain power) to the USA and other destinations. If one considers, moreover, that salary incomes and labour opportunities for this segment of the population – although relatively lower than those of citizens and other groups of immigrants – tend to be greater in the USA (and other countries) than in Mexico, it is easy to see that the exodus of Mexican talent will continue to grow.

To this we can add the rising proportion of Mexican migrants who undertake their postgraduate studies in the institutions of the country’s northern neighbour (approximately 50 per cent of the postgraduates residing in the USA) and who, for the most part, were financed with public and/or private Mexican funding (Tuirán and Ávila, 2013b). This segment of the population, like those who received training in Mexico and reside abroad, is unable to find favourable conditions in terms of salaries and/or professional development, or to find a way to return or form ties from abroad with initiatives and projects that would contribute to national development. It is not unusual, in that sense, that barely 5.6 per cent of the total number of returnees between 2005 and 2010 corresponded to highly skilled migrants (Tuirán and Ávila, 2013b).

Conclusions: the emergence of a new mode of dependency and its challenges

The restructuring of innovation systems in the framework of neoliberal globalization constitutes a privileged vantage point for the analysis and understanding of the significance and implications of highly skilled migration,
as much for the countries of origin and destination as for the key subjects involved: multinational corporations, universities, research centres and the migrants themselves. From this perspective, it is evident that notions of brain drain, brain circulation and brain gain as supposedly explanatory analytical categories for the phenomenon are unworkable and superficial.

Returning to the use of the notion of labour-force export to characterize the export-led model implemented in Mexico, it remains clear that the dynamics of the restructuring of innovation systems referred to previously are etched into this dynamic. In fact, it takes the form of an advanced or superior stage of that process that operates on two fronts: the direct export via migration of the highly skilled labour force and the indirect export via the implementation of scientific maquiladoras. The latter aspect is still relatively recent in the Mexican case. In this regard, Gallagher and Zarsky (2007) revealed that foreign direct investment in information technologies to the so-called Mexican Silicon Valley did not create a hotbed of innovation capable of generating multiplying effects on the Mexican economy and operated, rather, under the mode of an enclave economy.3

In a deeper sense, it is necessary to caution that the export of the labour force represents a new mode of unequal exchange on the North–South axis (and, in our case, between Mexico and the USA). Understanding this is crucial to revealing the processes of surplus transfer implied in the strategic and structural framework woven around the global commodity chains that are at the foundation of the asymmetric reinsertion and subordination of the Mexican economy to that of the USA. It is important to keep in mind that most of the debate on unequal exchange was, and remains limited to, an analysis of the international division of labour that places the periphery in the role of source for raw materials and the developed countries as the providers of industrialized products. And, although this division remains for a significant number of peripheral countries, it has stopped being exclusively a feature of North–South relations. Some recently industrialized peripheral countries – principally in Asia – ever-more-frequently play the role of providers of industrialized goods. Even more important is the fact that to this classic mode of unequal exchange, a new factor has been added, under the aegis of the neoliberal globalization which is progressively taking centre stage: the export, direct and indirect, of the labour force.

To enter into the analysis of this modality, with its dual fronts, it is important to note that the use of mechanisms of unequal exchange is more disadvantageous to the periphery than that implied in the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. On the one hand, the indirect export of the labour force, associated with the participation of peripheral nations in adding value to global commodity chains, carries with it a net transfer of profits abroad. This represents an extreme form of unequal exchange, which implies a transfer of practically the total economic surplus generated by the labour force employed in the maquiladoras or assembly plants.
This mechanism, which reasserts the logic of the export enclave, inhibits any economic growth and development derived from the exportation process which, under the guise of manufactured exports, the peripheral nation performs. In fact, its key contribution to the process of national accumulation is limited to a meagre income flow – taking advantage of the enormous wage differentials between countries, in our case between Mexico and the USA – and, in the best of cases, to a small multiplier effect by way of consumption. Furthermore, the installation and operation of assembly plants in peripheral countries are accompanied by subsidies and extended tax exemptions – the weight of which is endured by the social capital of the country in question – as well as collateral damages like the narrowing, differentiation and increased precariousness of the labour markets and environmental degradation (Cypher and Delgado Wise, 2011). Another aspect of the indirect export of the labour force, which has begun to gather momentum in the context of peripheral or emerging countries, is the creation of joint scientific-technological complexes, linked to the restructuring of innovation systems in some of the more developed countries, with the USA in the lead role. By way of these complexes, which function under subcontracting arrangements, associations or other forms of partnership, intangible benefits are transferred abroad that have a value and a strategic significance beyond the net profits accruing from the maquila and assembly plants. We refer to the transfer of development and progress capabilities, which take the form of competitive advantages and competences to generate extraordinary profits.

On the other hand, the direct export of the labour force via labour migration implies a transfer of the anticipated future benefits that arise from the costs of training and the social reproduction of the workforce that emigrates. These costs – as the case of Mexico has shown – are not compensated for by the flow of remittances (Delgado Wise et al., 2009). In demographic terms, this implies a transfer of the demographic dividend of peripheral countries located in an advanced state of demographic transition – that is, of the population of productive age that supports the population of pre-working age and seniors. In a more profound sense, this transfer implies the loss of the most important resource for capital accumulation in the country of origin – its labour force. Furthermore, the export of the highly skilled labour force exacerbates the problem, seriously reducing the country of origin’s capacity to innovate for its own benefit and drive technology-intensive development projects.

To analyze these new modes of unequal exchange presents the theoretical, methodological and empirical challenges which require changes to the perception and characterization of the categories typically used to interpret contemporary capitalism. Nonetheless, without disregarding the significant contributions of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to advance our understanding of this phenomenon (above all in regard to the central role played by scientific and technological
progress), it is important to bring to bear Marxist theories of unequal exchange in its dual aspects: in a strict and broad sense, they provide a solid and fertile basis upon which to advance the conceptualization of the emergent modes of unequal exchange implied in the export of the labour force. On the one hand, unequal exchange in the strictest sense places income differentials derived from barriers to population mobility (i.e. the differentials in the rates of surplus value) at the centre of the analysis, and on the other, unequal exchange in the wider sense adds to those differentials emanating from the diverse organic compositions of capital (i.e. the differentials in scientific and technological progress of the countries involved). We take into consideration that the internationalization of capital in the framework of neoliberal globalization seeks incessantly to lower labour costs – including those relating to the highly skilled labour force – and to maximize the transfer of surpluses between peripheral and developed countries, precisely in the taking advantage and deepening of wage differentials.

This leads us to conclude that the export of the highly skilled labour force originating in peripheral or emerging countries, far from constituting an option in which everyone wins – as the currently-in-vogue notion of talent circulation posits – represents a new mode of dependency that is particularly devastating and predatory. Based on this scenario, the great challenge for Mexico consists in countering the dynamics that separate highly skilled migrants and professionals of Mexican origin who reside in the USA and other parts of the world from the processes of national development, in order to build an alternative project capable of taking on the prevailing systemic order for the benefit of the working classes.

Notes

1 A previous version of this chapter was published in 2013 as Working Paper No. 1 in the International Development Series of St Mary’s University, Canada.

2 At the heart of the restructuring plan of large multinational corporations under the neoliberal aegis is the displacement of parts of the productive and commercial processes, and of services, towards peripheral countries and regions in function of the enormous income differences on a global scale, that is, the global labour arbitrage. See, for example, Foster et al. (2011) and Delgado Wise (2013).

3 For some authors, the Guadalajara region, in Mexico’s Western-Pacific area, constitutes the country’s Silicon Valley due to the presence of 12 manufacturers of original equipment, 16 providers of electronic manufacturing services, dozens of design centres and more than 700 companies that manufacture electronics (Manterola, 2008).

References


Part V

Case-study Insights: Australia

Australia: fieldwork site

Fieldwork Site

Country’s Capital City

State or Province Boundary
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In the beginning . . .

While there has been considerable conversation about the status of cultural diversity (or multicultural) policy in Australia, some issues appear unchangeably resistant to policy. The Coalition (conservative) national government elected in September 2013 had, while in opposition from 2007, been identified with a rejection of multiculturalism. Prior to its election, however, the new Prime Minister Tony Abbott was reported to have become a convert to multiculturalism, arguing that migrants ‘come here to join us, not to change us’ (Abbott, 2013; Baker, 2013).

After the election, the multiculturalism portfolio was downgraded and redefined solely as a welfare concern; nevertheless, it survived what might have been annihilation (for instance, the fate of Australia’s foreign aid agency, AusAid). Of course, the policy challenges remained, as they have throughout many transformations of the policy rhetoric. Two of these challenges involve the tensions around communal dislocation and conflict on the one hand, and the representation of difference in narratives of the nation on the other. The social realities and their cultural reflections are intimately interrelated, with each having an unpredictable but serious impact on the other.

The first element was momentarily profiled by former Immigration Department head Andrew Metcalfe; he flagged that poorly integrated refugee settlement might generate the same sorts of violence in Australian cities as had characterized London and other English cities in the northern summer of 2011 (Keane, 2011). Social dislocation and conflict shades the darker side of Australia as a society of immigration, with governments anxious to ensure social cohesion and harmony. Where dislocation is most apparent, as where ethnic neighbourhoods grow to carry urban crime overtones, the policy responses can be confused.
The second element focuses on how culturally diverse communities in stress are represented in the media and, in particular, how they can be re-interpreted as communities seeking to build their own resilience despite wider societal condemnation. In this chapter, I focus on the particular example of the Vietnamese Australian community of Cabramatta, a Western Sydney neighbourhood renowned by 1990 as a centre for drug abuse, violence and lawlessness. A turning point emerges a decade later when community activists declare their Australianness and demand that they be properly policed, with community safety as valued as elsewhere in Anglo-Australian Sydney (Sham-Ho, 2002). The Vietnamese story – from arrival to present – tracks in time the initiation, development, crisis and re-invigoration of Australian multiculturalism more widely.

What is Australian multiculturalism?

Amidst international condemnation of multiculturalism and the collapse of the idea as the basis for public policy in Western Europe (Jakubowicz, 2013), the then Immigration Minister Chris Bowen announced, in 2011, that Australia was re-affirming the policy; in so doing he asserted an Australian exceptionalism (Bowen, 2011). What was he talking about when he described Australia as multicultural? Multicultural Australia or Australian multiculturalism has been the focus of debate, denigration and celebration since its entry into the political lexicon in August 1973 (Grassby, 1973). As a conceptual package, it contains three important components.

Firstly, as an adjective, it is a ‘description’ of this Antipodean late-modern former colonial-settler society that has drawn in hundreds of different national-origin and ethnic groups to a unique and constantly changing constellation of cultural collisions and synergies. Secondly, as a noun, it is the label adopted by governments of all political persuasions since the mid-1970s to capture the set of public policies used to manage the intake, settlement and long-term aftermath of these slivers of globalized people-movements. Thirdly, in its application as ‘everyday multiculturalism’, it refers to a supposed popular cosmopolitanism that allows for both the appreciation of and the interactions between these multitudes of ethno-cultural and religious communities and quasi-communities in Australia’s cities and towns. Multiculturalism draws attention to the synergies that emerge from cultural interactions and the new forms of cultural ‘getting-by’ that are created through the many everyday contacts and collaborations between members of different cultural communities. Yet, almost in contradiction, multiculturalism can also refer in everyday practice to the attempts by cultural groups to prevent the erosion of their traditional cultural mores, and the institutional steps they take to hold back interaction, integration or even assimilation into dominant group mores, which they fear may be at the cost of their own cultural values and practices.
Australian multiculturalism has also been affected by global and local debates over the impact of Muslim settlers on previously non-Muslim societies. For many of those opposed to Muslim settlement, multiculturalism can be seen as a cloak that disguises the erosion of dominant Anglo-Christian values, especially through the undermining of key symbols of that culture. Multiculturalism can be associated with the arrival of Muslims, the first of whom came in a significant way in the 1970s after the signing of the Australia–Turkey Migration Agreement. Turks were then followed by those who came from Lebanon, other Middle-Eastern countries (especially Iraq and Iran) and then African (Somalia and Sudan) and Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, etc.).

The entry of new immigrants into already settled and growing economies has always triggered a degree of friction, tensions occasioned by newcomers seeking to find place and space in a pre-existing and often somewhat chaotic social hierarchy. Multiculturalism as public policy in Australia reflects the contemporary approach by the state to managing these tensions and minimizing conflicts that, to some extent, are inevitable. The inevitability of tension and conflict was first elaborated in the US context by Robert Park in Chicago (Park and Burgess, 1925). Park identified five stages of settlement, beginning with first contact, then the potential for conflict, then accommodation, then specialization and, ultimately, in his term, ‘assimilation’. This dynamic would be fraught with the everyday realities of cultural misunderstandings, the seeking out of opportunities and the discovery of social power. Often the most important skill that an immigrant could bring would be the capacity to mobilize bonds of kinship or shared ethnic background and to seek out economic opportunities in the less well-ordered corners of the social realm. Thus, immigrants may be viewed warily by the wider social order, exactly because they begin their social journey from outside the moral order and economy of the established hierarchy.

At the heart of the Australian debate about multiculturalism lie inevitable questions of whether the new immigrants are integrating into Australian society and, consequently, whether earlier inequalities are sustained and reproduced through the generations or disappear as the immigrant becomes more economically and socially embedded in his/her new world. While integration itself is a controversial concept, given its implication of adaptation of the immigrant into that pre-existing order (Abbott’s ‘Join us, not change us’ mantra), it is, even so, rather more useful than the ideologically laden ‘assimilation’, suggesting, as this does, a one-way process of re-formulating the self in reflection of a unitary presentation of the receiving society. While integration allows for interaction, mutual recognition and responsiveness, it also still carries a strong sense of the need for continuity in social institutions, tempered by a concern for the social inclusion of immigrants.

What exactly, then, would count as effective versus ineffective integration? In Australia, the logic of integration since the end of White Australia in
the early 1970s has passed through a number of phases. Integration requires
the provision of the possibility for participation by newcomers in the social,
political and economic opportunities of the society they are joining. It also,
reciprocally, looks for the re-alignment by the newcomers, to a greater or
lesser extent, of their own values and practices to fit more comfortably with
the wider social mores they encounter.

While participation (Arnstein, 1969) was a popular term across the world
in the 1970s, energizing urban activism, gender and youth politics, ethnic
participation had a particular pull in an Australian context where assimila-
tion had been so much part of the rhetoric of migration settlement (Ethnic
Affairs Commission of New South Wales, 1978). Participation framed the
possibility of agency and acting on the broader social institutions to make
them more responsive to cultural difference and more aware of cultural
needs. It also suggested that the transformation of those institutions would
be placed on the wider policy agenda, to incorporate a range of cultural
sensibilities and sensitivities outside what had been taken for granted in an
earlier, more monocultural, era. Participation, though, did not presuppose
any particular outcomes – people can participate but still not achieve their
goals through this process. Participation shaped the underlying message of
the first period of multiculturalism. The door was open to diversity but solely
on terms that the majority could and would accept (Galbally, 1978).

The first crisis in the implementation of multiculturalism arose through
three co-temporal events: (1) The election of the Australian Labour Party
(ALP) government in 1983 brought with it more of a social justice agenda to
replace the integrationist priority of Fraser's conservative coalition. (2) The
Liberal Party moved in opposition strongly to the Right, influenced by the
Christian and neoliberal agendas of conservatives in the USA and the UK – in
the process rejecting multiculturalism as a core policy position. (3) Historian
Prof. Geoffrey Blainey reset the discursive parameters around immigration
and settlement by proposing, in effect, that racism among the Australian
poor and working class was so entrenched that alien immigrants such as
the Indo-Chinese or Muslim Lebanese should not be accepted and settled
(Blainey, 1984).

Blainey's framing of settlement as a problem of incommensurable values
came to dominate both conservative policy and wider popular sentiment.
By the end of the 1980s, the competing discourses had hardened. On the
one hand, conservatives tended to argue that migration and settlement were
only effective when assimilationist intent powered the policies of the day,
whatever public label they were given (e.g. multiculturalism). On the other
hand, the language of social justice and equity drove much of the more pro-
gressive policy programme, with multiculturalism used not simply to carry
an idea of reduced barriers to participation but also to propose a re-allocation
of resources to ensure a more equitable array of outcomes within a pluralist
framework of values. In the latter case, the differences amongst values and
practices were seen as a positive basis for synergistic productivity, as long as an allegiance to the national good was one of the agreed parameters.

It is generally recognized that the apogée of multiculturalism as a serious underpinning to broad social policy was achieved in 1989, through the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989). Two political influences focused governmental attention. The extremely energetic and well-organized backlash from ethnic groups that greeted the Hawke government’s 1986 budget, in which drastic funding cuts had been made across all services for migrants and the multicultural sector, caught the government off guard. There was also considerable disarray among the conservative political forces between pro- and anti-multiculturalists, thus opening up a way of intensifying a reformist multicultural platform.

Many of the proposals from the *National Agenda*, such as that for a Multiculturalism Act similar to that in Canada, found initial interest but then faded as political leadership changed and the impossibility of bi-partisan support became more apparent. By the mid-1990s, the earlier tensions within the Coalition had been resolved, with victory going to the conservatives under John Howard. They were poised to take office, with a policy hit list that would target most of the agencies of multiculturalism already in place, and it was clear that there was little interest in creating any more.

The social unrest over immigration that had focused on Indo-Chinese settlers in the mid-1980s had, by the mid-1990s, moved on to include Arabs/Muslims/Lebanese. Where the previous concern had foregrounded introduced cultural tensions, the new concern was amplified by political and loyalty worries about Arab Muslims, tied to the invasion of Iraq and the intensification of armed crime in the Arab neighbourhoods of Sydney. Again, conservatives built their rhetoric around the criminality and destructiveness of the immigrant cultures (as expressed by young men), while progressives framed the supposedly threatening young men as the victims of racism, the outcome of unemployment and the intimidated targets of police harassment.

The most important reagent in the chemistry of intercommunal tensions, Pauline Hanson, touched all the buttons that underlay the fears of ‘traditional’ Australians when faced with rapid social transformation (Castles et al., 2013). Hanson’s articulation of the issues (most famously put as ‘I have merely inflamed what you condone’, addressed to Prime Minister John Howard) drew out the fear of chaos and disorder and the demand that the state perform its duty as the agency of control on behalf of the traditional nation. As her influence grew in the late 1990s, including through the creation of the One Nation Party, she re-asserted a popular desire for a national narrative of assimilation. In so doing, she was acting in the tradition of a stream of Australian nationalist politicians who, since the creation of the Federation in 1901, had seen the racialized parameters of Australian nationhood as the primary purpose of the national state.
Hanson’s ascendancy took place in an environment of very heightened racialized sensibilities. Factors contributing to her influence included widespread anxiety about the collapse of the ‘Asian dragon’ economies, the rising militarization by Indonesia of East Timor, an ‘out of control’ Indo-Chinese gang war and heroin epidemic in South-Western Sydney, and the rapid spread of firearms and gang wars among ‘people of Middle Eastern appearance’ in neighbouring areas. In each of these cases, the national state was presented as incapable of securing core values. In response, the Howard government moved on three fronts – it initiated research into Australians’ attitudes to cultural diversity, promoted an inquiry into core values of citizenship and became the ‘deputy sheriff’ to US President Bush in supporting the independence of East Timor.

Policy thinking about multiculturalism: cultural diversity or harmony?

One of the first acts of the incoming Coalition government in 1996 was to commission a study of Australian attitudes to cultural diversity, as a basis for the development of a public policy in the broad area of multiculturalism. This project, undertaken by Eureka Research, still stands as the most recent systematic research for the national government to be used to fashion policy in the area. Howard had led the fight inside the Liberal Party against multiculturalism and, by 1989, had managed to have it dropped from the Coalition policy platform, to which it was returned by the brief reign of John Hewson. In 1995, the Howard-led Coalition in opposition had also (with the help of the libertarian elements among independents in the Senate) blocked attempts to include criminal sanctions in the revised Racial Vilification section of the Racial Discrimination Act, foreshadowing only a commitment to ‘education’ as a pathway to the resolution of intercultural conflict, should the Coalition be elected. The 1996 election saw Howard in the Lodge, one of the few remaining then-liberal Liberals, Phillip Ruddock, as Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Minister and Pauline Hanson running a fierce anti-immigrant and anti-Aboriginal line. The headlines were full of stories about gang wars among the Vietnamese in Cabramatta, giving Hanson a field day in her campaign to ‘send them home’ or, as the by-now assassinated Cabramatta MP John Newman had said earlier on, ‘back to the jungle’.

It was in this climate that the Howard government contracted Eureka Research to undertake the study as the basis of what was initially planned to be an ‘anti-racism’ campaign. Announcing the programme, Ruddock said, ‘Australia has been fortunate to be comparatively free of the more virulent forms of racism. . . . We cannot afford to be complacent. . . . Increasing community awareness through community education is our best viable long-term approach’ (Eureka Research, 1998a: 1). With that statement, Ruddock pre-empted the findings of the research and guaranteed that whichever
anti-racism strategy might emerge would not step outside the confines of his ‘education’ template. However, the research was only released under Freedom of Information to me in 2011, having been locked away and refused release for 13 years.

The majority of the interviewees and focus groups could find only one significant perspective about which those who were in favour of multiculturalism could agree with those who were not – that ‘the people of Australia should strive for community harmony’. Fear of chaos, disunity and conflict drove the broad debate on cultural diversity and, as many of the new communities in the public mind were riven by conflict, crime, violence and disorder, their failure to achieve ‘harmony’ was laid at their own doorstep. These two closely related elements – fear of disorder and desire for harmony – underpin government thinking about the policy associated with immigrant settlement.

**Eureka’s research**

The broad aim of the research was ‘to explore and understand the subtleties and nature of racism in the Australia of the late 1990s with a view to mounting an effective mass media and/or education anti-racism campaign’. The campaign would have to fit in with the Coalition’s vision of Australia ‘as a country whose people are united by the common cause of commitment to Australia’. The first student of this vision, Hanson quickly dubbed her movement ‘One Nation’ (redolent, in the memories of some who had arrived as refugees from Europe after 1945, of the ‘One Nation, One People, One Leader’ rhetoric of the Nazi Party in Germany). Eureka’s research would seek to discover whether there were, indeed, core common Australian values that could serve as the ‘central unifying message’ promoting tolerance and diminishing racist attitudes and behaviour.

The research set out to identify which values Australians actually shared, what they knew and understood about these values, and what was their awareness of the benefits of shared values. It also examined what people thought might be the personal and social costs of racism, what people thought racism was and how it was manifested. If government were to undertake a campaign against racism, what would this mean and what should it contain? Specifically, what should such a campaign be called? What definition of racism would work for different people? The qualitative research undertaken through some 30 focus groups would determine perceptions of the likely causes of contemporary racism, its focus and how effective different messages might potentially be in reducing racist sentiments, and thereby racist behaviour (or the reverse – reducing the behaviour and thus modifying the sentiments). The focus groups comprised about one-third ‘positives’ (those who displayed ‘short social distance’ from other groups) and the remainder ‘negatives’ (‘long social distance’). Two reports emerged from the process, one dealing with the results of the qualitative exploration and
the other detailing the results of the quantitative dimensions of prejudice (Eureka Research, 1998a, 1998b).

**Qualitative report**

The first qualitative report concluded that there was ‘a clear need for an anti-racism campaign’ (Eureka Research, 1998a: 59). Moreover, the research uncovered a crisis in what it meant to be ‘an Australian’. The researchers argued that the crisis, stirred and debated in the context of Hansonism, actually provided a rare opportunity to re-affirm Australian core values through defining them – that is, through asserting that being Australian meant accepting diversity, and that such values were, in fact, held by all Australians, whatever their national origin (the Australian Citizenship Council was then commissioned to carry out national consultations to determine what these core values might be).

The study had determined that if Australians in general could be assured that core values of acceptance existed and that they were widely shared, the insecurity (which was widespread in Anglo and non-Anglo groups and often reflected concerns they had about each other) might be ameliorated and a stronger sense of Australia as a non-racist and diverse community ‘of which we can all be proud’ might be fashioned, ‘to the benefit of harmonious community relations for decades to come’. Thus, the underlying issue became ‘How do we strategize to reduce anxiety about difference?’.

The need for an anti-racism campaign did not imply that a campaign should carry such a label, which the consultants argued would be counter-productive. Respondents were deeply antagonistic to any suggestion that their fears were anything but natural and, in particular, that their emotions implied that they were racists. Rather, they took it as natural that people would prefer their own cultural group and would defend the space of the group, be it physical, psychological, economic or geographic, against the inroads of those perceived as aliens.

**Quantitative report**

How, then, might an anti-racism strategy be made to work? That was the underlying question posed for the second stage of the study, a survey-based approach that was designed ‘to provide strategic directions for the campaign, to assist campaign development and to act as a “benchmark” of community attitudes prior to the launch of the anti-racism campaign’ (Eureka, 1998b: 24). The survey took place early in May 1998. Pauline Hanson’s maiden Federal Parliamentary speech in September 1996 (Hanson, 1996) had set the agenda for a more hostile orientation towards immigration, and Asian migrants in particular. By May 1998, Hanson's One Nation Party had been established and was pushing for the victory that would give her 11 seats in Queensland’s state parliament, and fuel Howard’s recognition that he could no longer condone what she inflamed.
The survey findings related to the climate of racism – its form, prevalence and intensity – and to both the profile of those the most likely to hold more-racist views and community reactions to possible campaign themes. The statement on which there was the highest level of agreement (90 per cent) was the decidedly circular definition of an Australian as ‘anyone committed to Australia’; the most hostile value was associated with ‘I hate . . . when migrants all live together and form ethnic ghettos’ (55 per cent).

Indicative of the times before the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, while Muslims may well have been seen to have ‘strange ways’ (30 per cent), a more significant fear was of Asian migrants who were thought to take Australian jobs (30 per cent) and were heavily into crime and drugs (40 per cent). Almost a third picked out Asians and Vietnamese as failing to live in harmony with the wider society, while only 3 per cent identified Muslims (and the Greeks and Italians captured 4 per cent together). Two in five respondents could see ‘why some people are racist towards [migrants and Aboriginals]’ (Eureka Research, 1998b: 24). Moreover, seven in ten agreed that racism was often the result of fears of losing out to competing ‘races’ (e.g. jobs and housing). In summary, after Aborigines, Indo-Chinese were the bêtes noires (perhaps jaunes) of the racists.

What do people believe ‘racism’ to be? As it turns out, racism can be either something negative or a prejudice that permeates social life (most immigrants, Aboriginals and ‘positive’ non-immigrants think about it in this way) or an extreme action involving violence (the definition more likely for those with the most stereotyped and negative views of other groups). The researchers concluded that about 15 per cent of the community hold on to hard-core prejudiced values; they tended to be older and non-metropolitan, to have lower educational attainments, not to be in the workforce, to have a low income and to be living in more rural states with higher indigenous populations. They hold on to this extreme definition as a protection from allegations of racism against them: ‘If racism is violence, I am not violent; therefore I am not a racist’, the logic apparently flowed.

When the various responses were combined into a ‘racism index’, with an extreme statement about racism as the boundary marker, about 42 per cent were deemed to be fairly tolerant, with 33 per cent as fence-sitters (equal numbers of racist and non-racist views) and 25 per cent supporting four or more racist views. Any anti-racism campaign would need to be subtle and comprehensive, and the three population segments present very different challenges – those who are generally racist are likely to resist any action, those who hold some racist views and some anti-racist can be swayed but not fully won over, and those who generally hold to anti-racist views require positive reinforcement.

Three criteria were identified for a potentially successful campaign: In what ways were the values recognizably Australian? To what extent were they widely shared? Did they make Australia a better place? The values that
passed the test were ‘helping one another in crisis’, ‘a fair go’ and ‘a desire for community harmony’. These were communal bonding ideas based on reciprocity and the recognition of common membership of a wider society. Values that failed to ignite sufficient support included ‘equality’, ‘acceptance of others’ and ‘tolerance’.

The Eureka report then argued that the only theme that might work in a campaign would need to capture the ‘desire for harmony’. This theme, rather than targeting racism as a problem, appears to reflect a wide societal reaction to fears of the social order becoming fragmented by the rapidly changing diversity of the country, economic crises and the stirring of political agitators. The most highly shared statement, affirmed by nearly all respondents in the survey, was that ‘people in Australia should strive for community harmony’ (Eureka Research, 1998b: 45–51). Thus, criticism of others who, by retaining their own cultural values and staying within their own communities, were not clearly ‘striving for community harmony’ would not be self-construed as racism; the others would be blamed for their reluctance to conform.

Campaign

From the outset, then, the advice to the government was against the use of ‘anti-racism’ as a vehicle. Rather, messages should stress the fact of harmony, the value of harmony and the importance of protecting harmony. Furthermore, harmony would be best protected by two parallel approaches – one would show how harmonious Australia was in reality and how precious that harmony was, while the other would demonstrate the role of diverse communities in Australian life and their commitment to Australia (especially in times of disaster and danger).

This campaign would then promote and reinforce those (a small minority) who held non-racist attitudes, while reducing the ambivalence of fence-sitters (the majority), thus reducing their possible racist behaviour. Moreover, given that fence-sitters see or identify so little racism in their daily lives, they would react negatively to any campaign that spoke of widespread racism. Its credibility would soon be undermined. Interestingly, Eureka specifically recommended that the term ‘cultural diversity’ not be mobilized in the campaign, as it attracted criticisms from all sides for emphasizing differences rather than commonalities.

Implications for contemporary Australia

While some circumstances have clearly changed, the persistence of deeper cultural attributes over the period from 1998 suggests that the Eureka approach may still provide insights today. What can we discern from the research and from how its results were interpreted and applied? From the outset, the Howard government accepted the main thrust of the Eureka
proposals, in particular that racism or anti-racism should not be mentioned. Additionally, the government suppressed the report, so that its evidence-base for what became the policy of ‘Living in Harmony’ – that would run for well over a decade (Australian Government, 2009) – could not be examined, tested or challenged.

Since the suppression of the report, the only government research into the extent or intensity of racism in Australia has been carried out by the Human Rights Commission as a prelude to its ‘Racism, It Stops With Me’ campaign of 2012 (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012). After 1998, no attempt was made to use the research to provide a benchmark against which changes in attitudes and behaviour as a result of ‘Living in Harmony’ could be assessed. A review of ‘Living in Harmony’ and of the Harmony Day funding scheme a decade later (Australian Government, 2009) was unable to ascertain whether any changes had been affected in the range and quality of the attitudes of Australians as a consequence of the decade-long programme. However, the ALP government, under Parliamentary Secretary Laurie Ferguson, changed the title of the programme from ‘Living in Harmony’ to ‘Diverse Australia’ in 2008, exactly the framing of the title that Eureka Research had warned against so strongly in 1998. In 2011, it was changed once more to ‘Diversity and Social Cohesion’, re-integrating the Diverse Australia with the National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security. The latter programme had been almost totally focused on the counter-radicalization of Muslim youth, with the surveillance and identification of potential ‘home-grown’ terrorists as its mainstay.

In a reaction to the suppression of the Eureka report and the prevention of key social data from reaching the public and the taxpayers who had funded it (University of New South Wales and later University of Western Sydney), social geographer Kevin Dunn, with colleagues at Macquarie and Melbourne Universities, initiated the Challenging Racism Project in 2000. In introducing some of the project findings, Dunn argued that ‘Australians are in large part secure with cultural difference. However, there are still pockets of the country that hold on to “old-fashioned” racist views’ (Dunn et al., 2004). Dunn suggested that, overall, this figure was about 15 per cent of the total population (similar to the Eureka finding). Dunn also found that the majority of Australians believed that most Australians (but usually not themselves) held racist attitudes.

As indicated, the focus of Living in Harmony funding under the Coalition, after 2005 and the Cronulla riots, turned to the ‘counter-radicalization’ of young Muslim men. As part of its anti-racism commitment after 2011, the Labor government announced a series of anti-racism partnerships, and funded specific projects to use sport as a framework for including youth from diverse backgrounds in mainstream activities. The October 2011 Attorney General Department’s Resilient Communities programme almost fully focused on the re-integration of young Muslims, including youth leadership training.
The Eureka research does raise some valuable questions about the characteristics of an anti-racism campaign and the multiple faces it would need to present to the many constituencies it would need to win over. The hard kernel of emotion about race relations remains locked into a ‘desire for harmony’, complemented by a denial of personal responsibility for racism and an edge of intercommunal intolerance and distrust. This is a wider cultural problem than can probably be addressed through education and information per se.

In September 2011, in the wake of the London riots and while referring back to earlier race-inflected riots in Paris, then Immigration Department head Andrew Metcalfe warned that the overwhelmed regime for the processing of asylum-seekers could well produce significant local social conflict and tensions. He was soon relieved of his position by the ALP government and then later terminated altogether by the incoming Coalition. The questions of social cohesion and social justice would not so easily be moved sideways, as the case of the Vietnamese communities outlined below would show.

Chaos and culture: ‘Once Upon a Time in Cabramatta’

If Australians were wary of chaos, and more welcoming of harmony, then they had a bi-modal set of concerns – both too much and too little community worried them as signs of chaos and disharmony. The literature on social capital, initiated by the work of Robert Putnam, points to a balancing between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ capital as the recipe for wide social trust and community harmony (Putnam, 2007).

Lack of social capital would be exemplified by those isolated and fragmented refugee individuals, perhaps arriving in small family groups, traumatized by their life histories and circumstances of arrival, who were prey to exploitation as victims of, or recruitment into, extralegal and criminal activities. In contrast, critics would also problematize larger established networks, claiming that they would act as ‘ghettoizing’ frameworks, with too much bonding capital that prevented any bridging and therefore blocked integration into wider societal norms and practices. Such neighbourhoods reinforced communal practices that were viewed negatively in the wider society by the dominant culture’s ideological gatekeepers.

It is not often that an opportunity arises to take sociological research on social transformation and render it accessible to a wider audience, one that lives outside the worlds of academe or government policy. Recently, I have become closely involved with the development and production of multicultural documentaries, both for broadcast and as online interactives. Specific projects include Liberal Rules (2009), the historical documentary and associated multimedia website Immigration Nation (2010), and the Once Upon a Time . . . project, commencing with Cabramatta (2012), to be followed by...
Here I want to address the issues raised by the Cabramatta episodes and their implications.

Cabramatta, a suburb in the Fairfield local government area in the southwest of Sydney, is close to the former Villawood migrant hostel. Villawood was the first staging place for many Vietnamese, and Cabramatta was their first home – amidst the earlier generations of Italians, Yugoslavs and Russians. Prior to the Vietnam War, there were almost no Vietnamese in Australia. Following the defeat of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, many hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese fled as refugees to the USA and to its ally, Australia. Through an extraordinary story of international political negotiation, the incoming Liberal Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, agreed to take 100,000 Vietnamese refugees over a decade, firstly from camps, and then through an orderly departure programme.

Fortuitously, the Vietnamese arrival, the end of White Australia and the adoption of multiculturalism all occurred in tandem. So when refugees first arrived in 1976, there was no multiculturalism and hardly any migrant services, let alone services for Asians. There was still the major legacy of racism associated with White Australia, which greeted the arrival of Vietnamese refugees fractured, bashed about, alienated, frightened, hopeful and mainly lacking skills or language. The documentary was designed to explore the dynamics of that social transformation, not only for the Vietnamese but also for the wider Australian society, two generations later.

In 1976, there were fewer than 2,500 Vietnamese in Australia. By 1986, the number had grown to 83,000, swelled by the intake through the ‘orderly departure’ programme negotiated among nations as part of a regional solution to the refugee crisis. By 1996 and the election of the Howard government, the numbers sat at 151,000, though the inflow would soon be effectively terminated by the new order.

SBS (an Australian broadcasting network) decided to merge two genres, crime and social documentary. Aware that public interest in on-screen crime stories leads the programming of most broadcasters, SBS shaped a brief that used crime and populism as tools to bring audiences to engage with more serious questions. The first series, ‘Once Upon a Time in Cabramatta’, was broadcast in early 2012. It drew on the arrival in Australia of Vietnamese refugees in the immediate wake of the end of White Australia, and in parallel to the development of multiculturalism. By the late 1990s, Cabramatta had become known as a drug haven and the site of murder, assault, extortion and heroin overdoses, all associated with the local Vietnamese community, triad crime gangs and brutal martial arts images.

The three-part series asked ‘How did this place turn into the drug capital of Sydney, and how come today it is renowned as a generally peaceful tourist destination full of restaurants, shopping and cultural events?’ Working from an original paper of mine (Jakubowicz, 2004), the underlying theme was...
adopted: ‘When immigrants first arrive, all is chaos and, in chaos, the first thing to get organized is crime.’

### Crime, integration and social transformation

Given that crime and criminality exist and gain rapid public notoriety, recognizing that the majority of victims are within communities, the producers sought out families where drugs and crime had come close to the heart. Interviewing, in Vietnamese and in English, ex-criminals, drug addicts and their parents, local police, politicians and academics, the documentary rooted the wider social reality through the pain and tensions within families. It also looked to the Vietnamese to tell their own stories and provide their own interpretations. The focus was put on a Vietnamese Australian local politician, who had pressed for inquiries into the quality of policing in Cabramatta. How could an Australian community – and the Vietnamese would assert that this is what they were – be thus abandoned by its police and scapegoated by its politicians? Rather than the Vietnamese as the problem, which typified most mainstream media accounts of the time, the emphasis was placed on the failure of the state to protect them from the depredations of the criminal gangs. However, it also showed how the gangs evolved and the role which they played in ‘assimilating’ immigrant youth into the broader Australian social milieu.

A wider community project was initiated in which local people offered their own narratives of life and how things had changed. The programmes were available online for replay, and out-takes of interviews were available online. Over 800,000 viewers watched the opening night. While SBS remains a minority-audience broadcaster, normally drawing about 5 per cent of total audience figures, for this series and those from the same ‘multicultural documentaries’ stable, the register stood above 10 per cent.

A long curve of settlement, survival and adaptation has made today’s Vietnamese a ‘model minority’ in the eyes of many Australians. Their story carries important lessons about how public policy, political leadership and community values can either contribute to the building of a creative multicultural society or push a society into becoming a maelstrom torn apart by hatred, fear and self-defeat.

The Vietnamese were the first significant intake of non-Europeans to be admitted in over three generations, a period dominated by the defensive barrier of White Australia. With no pre-existing community institutions, framework of settlement or migrant resource centres (which stuttered into life from 1979), settlement carried with it a series of challenges for all sides – the initial shock of first contact, early points of conflict over access to scarce resources (housing, employment, etc.), the realization among the newcomers that their cultural knowledge would not be enough to ensure their security, the competition for places in the local hierarchy, and the making of a
community out of the early shambles. Often the first aspect noticed is the most readily imported – extralegal modes of survival, disorganized crime. Then the organization of the extralegal world surges ahead, as struggles within the legal world become bogged down in bureaucracies, economic deprivation, racism and exploitation.

References


Multiculturalism at the Margins of Global Sydney: Cacophonous Diversity in Fairfield, Australia

Elsa Koleth

Introduction

Australia’s transformation from a colonial settler state into a globalized, multicultural immigrant nation has been catalyzed since the 1970s by the confluence of processes of globalization, the changing nature of international migration to Australia and increasing diversity. The uneven material and symbolic processes that have transformed Sydney into a global city in this period have fundamentally shaped the City of Fairfield, located in South-Western Sydney, through various socio-spatial and cultural impacts.

Between January and July 2013, the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project conducted in-depth interviews with 18 key informants and 20 local residents from across the City of Fairfield. Key informants included elected office-holders and local government officers, officials at local institutions such as schools, the police, public libraries, community centres and organizations, and the local community arts sector. The residents interviewed included a mix of migrant settlers, people of second-, third- or 1.5-generation migrant background, and the descendants of colonial settlers. They ranged in age from mid-20s to 80 years. Their ethno-cultural backgrounds included the major ethnic-ancestry groups represented in the area – Vietnamese, Anglo-Australian, Assyrian/Chaldean, Italian, Lebanese and Serbian (Profile id., 2012: 12).

Drawing on the views and experiences of people who live and work in Fairfield, this chapter argues that the local multicultural that has evolved in Fairfield is characterized by a cacophonous diversity – that is, an environment where Anglo-Australian hegemony has been displaced to accommodate a multiplicity of cultural presences and voices engaged in negotiation, dialogue and exchange. The local multiculture of Fairfield is emblematic of the enduring ambivalences and potentialities of globalized, multicultural Australia.
Fairfield: an introduction

The City of Fairfield is a Local Government Area (LGA) located in Sydney’s south-west, roughly 32 km from Sydney’s Central Business District, and consists of 27 suburbs. At the end of June 2012, Fairfield had an estimated population of 198,381 people (Profile id., 2012: 3, 7–8).

The area that today comprises Fairfield was originally inhabited by the Cabrogal clan of the Dharug nation, and indigenous people continued to have a presence in the area after European colonization (Gapps, 2010: 20–8). Since colonization, Fairfield has been a ‘settlement city’ for successive waves of new migrants, the majority of whom, until the 1940s, were British (Gapps, 2010: 375). Migrant hostels established in Fairfield after the Second World War drew British and European migrants under the postwar intakes, Latin Americans in the 1970s and Indo-Chinese refugees from the mid-1970s (Gapps, 2010: 317–89, 411–28). The 1980s and 1990s brought significant immigration from Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, and there has been further immigration from Iraq in recent years (Gapps, 2010: 418; Profile id., 2012: 17).

Within the LGA, the suburb of Fairfield offers affordable housing and social support for recent migrants, while more-settled migrants and the children of migrants move into more-affluent outer suburbs or other parts of Sydney. In reflection of these patterns of internal social and spatial mobility, ‘the most affluent suburb of the LGA’ was described by one local government officer as ‘definitely second generation . . . and very Anglo and European’.

Fairfield today has a very high concentration of migrants and residents of migrant background, and a high level of ethno-cultural diversity compared with greater Sydney and Australia as a whole (Profile id., 2012). With 133 of the 230 different nationality groups in Australia being represented in the area, Fairfield City Council has declared that ‘Fairfield could be considered the multicultural capital of Australia’ (Fairfield City Council, 2011: 10).

Rather than being archetypal, Fairfield is exceptional in its embodiment of what multiculturalism could look like in Australia. Indeed, the multicultural reality of the area was commemorated in Fairfield long before the concept of multiculturalism had gained public purchase in Australia, for example, through the formation of the Fairfield Multicultural Society by ethnic community groups in 1962 (Gapps, 2010: 378–82). However, Australia’s journey to becoming a globalized, multicultural, immigrant nation more broadly has been contested and fraught with enduring symbolic ambivalence and material inequality.

Social transformation: immigration, multiculturalism and ‘global Sydney’

The 1970s heralded a period of significant social transformation as Australia sought to become a globalized nation. National efforts to integrate into
the emerging global economy triggered significant economic restructuring, which resulted in Australia shifting from a manufacturing economy to a services-based one by the 1990s (Murphy and Watson, 1995: 338). The attendant decline in manufacturing employment and the needs of the new service-driven economy (Fagan, 2000: 144–61) provided the impetus for major changes in Australia’s immigration and integration policies.

In reflection of the needs of a globalizing nation, the dismantling of the White Australia Policy (achieved partly through the introduction of a ‘colour-blind’ immigration policy), and the formal introduction of multiculturalism in the 1970s, coincided with the introduction of a points-tested, ‘human-capital’-based approach to migrant selection (Jupp, 2007: 82–3; Tavan, 2005: 161–200). The human-capital approach was expanded in ensuing decades to reduce intakes of migrants who could become welfare dependent and to strongly favour skilled migrants who could contribute to the economy (Jupp, 2007: 142–7). Australian multicultural policy originated in the 1970s as a framework for responding to the integration and settlement needs of migrants. However, the economic rationalism underpinning public policy from the 1980s precipitated a shift towards ‘productive diversity’, or a focus on the economic value of diversity in promoting Australia’s economic growth and engagement in the global market (Murphy et al., 2003: 483–6).

Processes of global and national transformation centrally shaped Sydney’s emergence as a global city (Burnley, 1998: 50). As Australia’s financial and business-services sectors expanded, Sydney usurped Melbourne as the business capital of Australia, and became the prime settlement destination for international migrants, drawing the majority of Asian and Middle Eastern migrants following the dismantling of the White Australia Policy (Burnley, 2000: 244; Forrest et al., 2003: 503; Murphy and Watson, 1997: 51). By the end of the twentieth century, international migration had led to a ‘massive change in Sydney’s population’, notably through the growth of ‘multicultural Sydney’ (Connell, 2000: 12). As a result, by 1991 almost 50 per cent of the city’s population was of first- or second-generation migrant background, from a mainly non-English-speaking country (Murphy and Watson, 1997: 6). In particular, Sydney’s role as the prime destination for Asian migrants who engaged in professional and highly skilled occupations in advanced industrial sectors, and had diasporic connections with regional business circuits, was touted by governments as one of the chief ‘multicultural advantages’ of global Sydney (Burnley, 1998: 59–67; Murphy and Wu, 2000: 76–82; Murphy et al., 2003: 487).

Through the fire: the making of multicultural Fairfield

Fairfield’s attempts to navigate the vicissitudes of Australia’s societal transformations in the late-twentieth century exposed the contradictions inherent in neoliberal visions of growth, prosperity and diversity in the global city.
Despite achieving high levels of national prosperity by the end of the twentieth century, global Sydney was increasingly marked by socio-spatial cleavages of income and complex labour-market segmentation according to gender, age, skills, ethnicity and location (Collins and Poynting, 2000: 55; Connell and Thom, 2000: 342; Raskall, 2002: 281). The loss of manufacturing jobs disproportionately impacted upon areas where residents did not have the requisite skills for the new economy, while the benefits of prosperity became concentrated in the wealthiest suburbs of the city (Raskall, 2002: 291–8). The western and south-western suburbs of Sydney, which housed the highest concentrations of migrants of Non-English-Speaking Background (NESB), suffered the highest unemployment rates in Sydney in the 1980s and 1990s (Collins and Poynting, 2000: 97; Fagan and Dowling, 2005: 75–9). For example, in December 1992, Fairfield's unemployment rate rose to 20 per cent and, by 1998, the suburb housed the lowest proportion of information workers in the city (Fagan, 2000: 165). Western Sydney also suffered locational disadvantage related to access to work, availability of transport and social infrastructure, including education, training, childcare and affordable healthcare and housing (Fagan and Dowling, 2005: 80).

The growth of global Sydney largely reflected the interests of the beneficiaries of structural economic change, while the ‘vast, messy, socially heterogeneous mass of the metropolis’ remained at the margins (Murphy and Watson, 1997: 37). Indeed, globalization discourses were said to have been ideologically mobilized by governments to justify the socially uneven effects of restructuring as necessary local adjustments to new global contexts (Fagan, 2000: 166).

The experiences of Vietnamese migrants in Fairfield were emblematic of Sydney’s emergent socio-spatial polarities. Following major intakes of Indo-Chinese refugees from the mid-1970s, the Vietnamese population of Fairfield grew by 450 per cent in the 1980s (Hanna et al., 1995: 17). By the 1990s, the Vietnamese became one of the most residually concentrated communities in Sydney, spatially and symbolically transforming suburbs like Cabramatta in the process (Dunn, 1998: 520–1; Forrest et al., 2003: 507). A former manager of a community organization there recalled:

There were real problems in Cabramatta in the 1970s, with having a lot of Asian people move in, they were quite different looking and ate different food [. . .] people who moved in there during or just after the Second World War, moved out because they were fundamentally – racist really – they didn’t like the influx of Asian people in the area . . .

Vietnamese migrants ‘were especially ill-equipped to cope with the new period of global restructuring they arrived into’, with the majority lacking the skills, qualifications and English-language ability to compete in the labour market (Forrest et al., 2003: 507). Fragmentation in the manufacturing sector (for example, in the clothing industry), and the increased sub-contracting
of casual, non-unionized labour from the secondary labour market (Fagan, 2000: 149), meant that many migrants were forced to find work in sweatshops or outwork arrangements. By the 1990s, high unemployment rates among the Vietnamese population in Fairfield (Murphy and Watson, 1997: 23–4), compounded by intergenerational and other issues, gave rise to youth gangs, crime and a growing drug trade (Dunn, 1998: 515).

Critics of multiculturalism and the perceived ‘Asian-ization’ of Australia attempted to draw links among crime, socio-economic disadvantage and ethnic concentration as evidence of the deleterious impacts of multiculturalism (Dunn, 1998: 506). However, analysis revealed that patterns of migrant settlement in Australia overwhelmingly produced mixed neighbourhoods, rather than segregated ‘ghettos’ or ‘enclaves’ (Burnley, 2000: 268; Forrest et al., 2003: 502–9). Further, there was little evidence to suggest that ethnic concentrations were, in themselves, causally connected with disadvantage or crime (Dunn, 1998: 513–16). Indeed, the varied nature of Asian migration to Australia in this period had also given rise to concentrations of Asian migrant communities in wealthier parts of Sydney (Burnley, 1998: 58). However, racializing discourses about Asian communities in Western Sydney were embedded within a broader stigmatization of the West as the undesirable working-class ‘other’ of the new, cosmopolitan, global Sydney (Dowling and Mee, 2000: 273–9).

The deployment of entrepreneurial multiculturalism to promote Sydney as a global city, alongside debates about the impact of visible, ‘non-Anglo’ migrant settlement on Australia’s urban and cultural landscapes, revealed deep-seated ambivalence about increasing diversity (Dunn, 1998: 512; Murphy et al., 2003: 487). Resurgent critiques of multiculturalism in the 1990s (Dunn, 1998: 523) reflected the legacy of hegemonic racial formations privileging a white and British national identity that have underlined the nation’s formal transition to multiculturalism (Ang, 2003; Hage, 1998).

Entrepreneurial multiculturalism was a key strategy mobilized in the regeneration of Cabramatta in the late 1990s as a tourist attraction in a cosmopolitan marketplace (Collins, 2006: 142–6; Murphy and Watson, 1997: 30; Wirth and Freestone, 2003: 2). However, Hage has critiqued such forms of ‘cosmiculturalism’ for being more concerned with the commodification of cultures for consumption, rather than the lived multiculturalism of ‘inhabitation and cross-cultural interaction’ in localized settings (Hage, 1997: 132).

Cacophonous diversity: the local multiculture of contemporary Fairfield

The landscape of disadvantage

The 2011 Australian Census revealed that Fairfield continues to be positioned at the margins of global Sydney as the most socio-economically disadvantaged LGA in the city (Profile id., 2012: 79–82). A number of participants interviewed for the STIM project reflected on the ways in which
socio-economic disadvantage manifested itself in the area. These included urban decline in the streetscape of Fairfield town centre as a place for cheap products and ‘two-dollar’ shops, the prevalence of informal economies and cash-in-hand work, and high levels of gambling. At a time when the substantial majority of permanent immigrants to Australia are skilled migrants, Fairfield receives a high proportion of settlers through the humanitarian and family reunion entry streams (Glenn, 2011). Refugees, recent migrants and young people were the most vulnerable to deteriorating economic conditions in recent years. For refugees and humanitarian entrants, the challenges of economic adversity were further compounded by the psycho-social effects of trauma and conflict, which precipitated family breakdown, intergenerational struggles and youth disenfranchisement (Gow et al., 2005: 22–37). Many participants were aware that the socio-economic landscape of Fairfield LGA was itself polarized, and that Fairfield’s locational disadvantage was situated within the broader socio-spatial polarization in Sydney, as one Italian-origin male, 55+ and himself a migration consultant, stated:

For me, it’s the same old story – not enough jobs, better transport, better facilities, it’s just not on. It’s been forgotten . . . there’s money for other things everywhere else, but not for here. . .

In 2011, the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, and the standing federal Member of Parliament for the Fairfield area, Chris Bowen, declared that the ‘genius of Australian multiculturalism’ was in part attributable to it being ‘citizenship-based’ (Bowen, 2011). However, our research revealed that the citizenship of many residents of Fairfield has been undermined (Castles, 2001: 98; Sassen, 2003: 46–9) through the interplay of locational disadvantage and racialization, which reflects the material inequality of global Sydney, and the unequal terrain of belonging in multicultural Australia. It is in this crucible of adversity and structural disadvantage that the local multicultural of Fairfield has been forged (Gidley, 2013: 367).

Multicultural community in Fairfield has been shaped by its residents’ capacity for empathy and resourcefulness, their commitment to community and place, and their accommodation of cacophonous diversity. The forms of community-building that have been engendered in the local multicultural of Fairfield manifest possibilities for the inhabitance of alternative globalities (Sassen, 2012: 6–7) that contest the prevailing material and cultural economy of the neoliberal city.

Changing attitudes to difference and the contemporary ‘deserving’ migrant

The responses of several participants suggested that experiences of discrimination and racism were a normalized rite of passage for new migrants attempting to settle in Australia. The persistence of this reality reflects the
fundamental ambivalence towards increasing diversity that has characterized Australia’s path towards multiculturalism. However, many participants also reflected that there was significantly greater tolerance and acceptance of difference today than in the past. Migrant communities garnered greater acceptance with the longevity of their residence and through interaction and participation in the cultural and political life of the local community. As the head of a local community organization observed, ‘ultimately, people have learnt – have had to learn – to accept the different ways of life.’

South-East Asian migrants, who were met with xenophobia in the 1970s, emerged in interviews as a model minority group who were admired for their work ethic and the resultant educational and employment achievements of the second generation. However, the contemporary construction of South-East Asians as a model minority appeared to serve as a counterpoint for the construction of more-recent migrants as ‘unproductive’ and ‘unde-serving’. Ironically, the migrant settlement infrastructure, which has evolved since the 1970s in response to the needs of previous waves of migrant settlers, is today seen by some participants as giving rise to attitudes of laziness, dependency and even ‘ungratefulness’ among more-recent migrants. The contemporary trope of the ‘undeserving’ or ‘uneconomic’ migrant (Jupp, 2007: 151) reproduces neoliberal discourses that rationalize the withdrawal of state welfare and valorize self-reliance and entrepreneurialism (McNay, 2009; Murphy and Watson, 1997: 37, 49).

Empathy as the basis for multicultural community-making

Multiculturalism in Fairfield was made possible through the paradoxical co-existence of the stigmatization of new migrants alongside a shared understanding of the complexities with which the lives of migrants and fellow residents were riven (Hage, 1997: 115). Gow has identified ‘a profound ethical rationale of shared empathy’ as a central feature of multicultural civic solidarity fostered among residents of Fairfield, through the grounded experience of ‘rubbing shoulders’ with diverse others (Gow, 2005: 387). In our research, such expressions of empathy emerged the most strongly from participants of first- or second-generation migrant background. A number of participants expressed solidarity with their fellow migrants, based on an understanding of the displacements, compromises and negotiations inherent in the experience of migration, as demonstrated by a resident and beautician of Assyrian background, in her late 30s:

I was one of them. . . . I know what they’ve come from, I know what I’ve come from. . . . We didn’t have a choice, we had to leave . . . .

And this middle-aged female teacher of Fijian-Indian background:

Because we’ve got all the migrants, we understand each other, and then we’re happy to live with them. That’s what I like about this area. From Fiji
we didn’t come from a war-torn place, we came as skilled migrants. But others, they went through hell to come to Australia, they went from one country to another to another to come here. We just came. Yes we do get along very well.

For one key informant of Anglo-Australian background – a former manager of a local community organization – empathy arose from the experience of working closely with local communities:

I’ve been constantly impressed by people I have known over the period in that job who are refugees who have rebuilt literally from nothing to make really good lives for themselves, and particularly for their children, and the children are Australian.

The ethic of empathy underpinned counter-narratives to tropes of ‘ethnic concentration as pathology’ (Dunn, 1998) or the ‘undeserving migrant’. Several participants, including local service providers, suggested that ethnic concentration facilitated the settlement and integration of new migrants by generating social welfare support, ethno-specific services, advocacy services, social and economic opportunities through a proliferation of ethnic associations, government and voluntary agencies, and local businesses (Dunn, 1998: 517–21; Gow et al., 2005: 21). Some participants, like those in the following two quotes, reflected that social networks generated through community concentration were a crucial support to migrants in coping with racism, histories of conflict and trauma and surviving under straitened economic circumstances:

So it meant that when he [father] got here and copped so much flack for not being white, and for having a really ethnic-sounding name that they couldn’t pronounce and for being Muslim as well, I think they got comfort in numbers when there were other people like him (Lebanese-origin cultural-programme manager, in her late 30s).

[My] parents . . . would drive at night and be collecting rubbish to bring back to our home to refurbish it to make it something new. . . . So it was a very big bartering system in my family and also in my community as well. That was a way for us to kind of stick together and feel like we’re all in the same race, we’re all on the same journey. Not to always compare ourselves with the Joneses (community arts practitioner, Vietnamese background, in her late 20s).

Counter to the ‘spatial cultural silence associated with residential dispersal and assimilation’ (Dunn, 1998: 511), several participants reflected on spatial manifestations of migrant cultures as playing a central role in helping migrants to create a sense of home and belonging in Australia (Burnley, 2000:
Public manifestations of migrant cultures included diverse places of worship, ethnic grocery stores, businesses and clubs, multilingual signage, an outdoor café culture and street parades. Migrant cultures also manifested themselves in private settings (Watson and McGillivray, 1994: 211) – for example, through the construction of outdoor kitchens in residents’ backyards. Through greater understanding of the role of migrant home-making strategies (Hage, 1997: 110), the re-mapping of Fairfield’s cultural landscape and the proliferation of visibly different cultural communities came to be recognized as something positive, as affirmed by this senior local elected office-holder:

The Assyrian community and the Asian community. They’ve really joined in and really become part of the community – the community for us. Good work ethic, they are highly religious, which all forms part of them staying as a strong community. And they do stay together, work together, play together, pray together and it gives them some strength.

Openness, adaptability and resourcefulness

A key theme to emerge from our research was that the local culture of Fairfield was characterized by a remarkable openness to migrants and cultural difference, in contrast with hostility to difference in other parts of Sydney and opposition to particular types of migrants, such as asylum-seekers, at the national level (Gow, 2005: 390). The Fairfield Cultural Plan states that ‘Fairfield is a uniquely vibrant and compassionate community. The City is home to many refugees and asylum-seekers and continues to welcome new migrants’ (Fairfield City Council, 2011: 10).

Interviews with the two local-government officers cited below revealed that acceptance of difference often provided the basis for connection and belonging in the local community.

People like to come here because everyone’s different, there is no norm, and so people are accepted for who they are . . .

The openness of Fairfield was connected with a capacity for adaptability and resilience in the face of change:

We just open our doors to whoever comes! And I think the community is like that as well. . . . I think individuals in Fairfield just go with the flow. Everyone sees Fairfield as our first port of call, the first place of opportunity, and let’s just get on with it.

‘Getting on’ with the task of building multicultural communities consisted of undertaking various transversal negotiations (Wise, 2009: 40) and
innovative strategies to enact and enable localized forms of citizenship (Gow, 2005: 387–9; Isin, 2009: 370–84). Community-building involved a combination of local institutional strategies and quotidian practices and interactions of residents.

As compared with national or state governments, the local government (Fairfield City Council), in concert with local institutions such as schools and non-governmental ethnic, religious and arts organizations, was uniquely placed to reach the community, facilitate participation and recognize, as did the Lebanese-origin community-programme manager quoted earlier: ‘Everybody’s got a story; everybody’s got a reason for being here.’ Key local government initiatives mentioned by participants included community education and training, the sponsorship of interfaith activities, collaboration with the local arts industry in cultural development, and addressing of youth and intergenerational issues.

The majority of participants referred to Fairfield City Council’s support for a wide range of community festivals – such as the Vietnamese Moon Festival, the Assyrian New Year Festival, the Muslim Eid Festival and various Latin American festivals – as a central expression of the local multiculture. Rather than the fetishization of ‘otherness’ that inheres in ‘cosmo-multiculturalism’ (Hage, 1997: 118–33), for the people of Fairfield, community festivals represented an inclusive expression of genuine openness, as part of an ethic of communal solidarity in difference – a sense that, to quote the former manager of a local community organization, ‘We’re all in this together.’

Institutions such as local schools and the local police were instrumental in responding to the particular forms of marginalization engendered by the socio-economic and cultural profile of the local community. For example, in its efforts to become a ‘hub of the community’, the principal of Fairfield High School explained that the school had developed a programme called the ‘Parents’ Café’:

Going through Fairfield, there are a lot of cafés . . . it is an accepted Arabic custom to go to a café. This idea was taken up by a person who works with a range of the community, particularly disengaged kids, their families. The Parents’ Café not only became a meeting point for the parents of migrant and refugee children but also provided a forum in which to hold community information sessions, run accredited skills and training courses and build a community garden.

Individual negotiations undertaken by local residents demonstrated quotidian transversality (Wise, 2009: 40) whereby people built relationships across linguistic and cultural differences, in part through practices of patience, accommodation and empathy. This retired Anglo-Australian woman aged 55+ told us about her neighbours:
I’d say hello to them and they’d start talking to me . . . in their own lingo, and it’s embarrassing you know? You want to be able to understand, and you nod your head and say ‘Yes’ and hope you are saying it in the right place [laughs]. The old lady next door was Yugoslav . . . Every time I went past she’d have a yarn but I never understood a word . . . she used to go for a walk and I think it was just an outlet.

One participant in his 20s, a youth worker of Assyrian background, explained that quotidian interactions at the neighbourhood level could function to mitigate the effects of prejudice and racialized portrayals of communities:

Recently our neighbourhood realized we’re really friendly people. Neighbours realized that we’re not as bad as the media portrayed us, they’re more comfortable. They say they wish more people like you guys would move out here.

A key theme to emerge was that organizations and individuals working in Fairfield had developed a strong sense of resourcefulness in dealing with the exigencies of structural disadvantage. A number of participants cited the strong collaborative ethos and commitment to community and place that had been fostered through practices of ‘making do’ with little as a key strength of the area (Fairfield City Council, 2011: 10). In the context of inadequate government funding for social-service provision to the community, the manager of the Immigrant Women’s Health Service explained, ‘You see areas where the government is not really fulfilling and the NGO is left to secure their needs . . . you have to link and partner with everybody around to service the new needs of these people.’ Resourcefulness and collaboration were also central to the local government’s attempts to address the specific needs of the local population, such as multilingual programme and service provision, as one local government officer explained: ‘It can be [expensive], but we are good at operating on a shoe-string budget! We’ve got the language schools here! We can partner with the universities and get bilingual students.’

For some participants, awareness of socio-spatial disadvantage galvanized their commitment to improving Fairfield. One local community arts practitioner who established a local parkour movement bringing together young people in Fairfield explained:

When you come from a place which doesn’t have opportunity for you, you have to make it. You have to really fight for opportunity. [...] [Have things improved for young people?] They’ve improved because we made them improve. For me, I’m not gonna wait around for people to make change or for Council to say, ‘Yes . . . here’s a park’. . . . We’re not gonna wait for that. We’re gonna make it happen ourselves.
Cacophonous diversity

Our research suggested that the local multiculturalism inhabited by younger participants in particular attested to emergent forms of multicultural belonging that unsettled and contested the prevailing material and symbolic inequities persisting in multicultural Australia. Our research revealed that the local multiculturalism of Fairfield was characterized by a cacophonous diversity reflective of the local demographic reality of Fairfield. Multicultural diversity in Fairfield is ‘cacophonous’ in that it fosters a socio-cultural and spatial environment that fundamentally displaces the Anglo-Australian hegemony, which continues to define Australian society more broadly, and, instead, creates a space that accommodates a multitude of cultural voices and enables agonistic (Amin, 2002: 973) dialogue and exchange.5

At Bossley Park High School. . . . Honestly the mixture of multiculturalism there, there was one kid, I think, who looked Aussie, if you can say that. And they get on famously. Absolutely . . . I wouldn’t say that for every area, but Fairfield is unique in the fact that we’ve had so much over so many years, people are definitely more accepting (head of a local community organization).

Two young residents explained that it was through this cacophonous diversity that they negotiated acceptance and belonging, and engaged in intercultural exchange. The first, a tour guide in his late 20s, of Uruguayan origin, said:

The generation above from me . . . they really suffered migration as kids, really went through the wog [inaudible] and found it very hard. Whereas when I came in . . . it was strange if you were Australian, Anglo-Saxon. Not that you were shunned or anything . . . But predominantly we were all Uruguayans, Lebanese, Chileans, Argos, so obviously it was easier for us.

An Assyrian-origin youth worker in his early 20s confirms this:

By the time I was in High School there were more Assyrians, so Asians and Europeans tend to adapt to our language and try to learn . . . We say things like ‘Bro’ and ‘Yallah’ a lot and they ask why, and we tell them, and then they slowly start doing it, without even realising it. People from Assyrian culture also pick up things from other cultures . . .

At the same time, younger participants were acutely aware of the unequal material, symbolic and affective landscape in which they were imbricated, as Australians of migrant origin from Fairfield. Some participants were highly
critical of hegemonic economic, racial and cultural power structures that prevail in broader Australian society. One participant – a Vietnamese-origin community arts practitioner in her late 20s – reflected on the experience of applying for jobs in the media industry:

I feel like there is a fight. I feel like you have to do 150 per cent more versus someone who comes from the Eastern suburbs . . . They will judge you on your last name, they will judge you on where you come from, they will judge you on how far you [travel to] get to work . . .

Some young people dealt with the stigmatization of Fairfield, and Western Sydney more broadly, by disassociating themselves from the area because, as a community arts practitioner suggested, ‘They don’t want to look like they come from the ghetto.’ Indeed, the prevailing trend for people of second-generation migrant background to leave Fairfield for other parts of Sydney as they sought employment and social mobility was cited by a number of participants as evidence of the successful integration of migrant communities.

However, arguably a more profound indicator of the successful incorporation (Dunn, 1998: 511) of migrant communities is the way in which the local multiculture of Fairfield has enabled residents of migrant background to re-imagine and articulate their identities, claim a localized sense of place, and contest the margins of belonging in Australia more broadly.

Some participants questioned the conditional nature of the tolerance extended to migrants under Australian multiculturalism and the terms of integration imposed on them. Such contestations framed a critique of the persistence of hegemonic racial structures in Australia. One participant of Vietnamese background – a local elected office-holder – challenged the liberal democratic credentials of Australian multiculturalism as a governmental paradigm by making explicit the marginalization of her parents’ generation and the conditionality of their integration experience:

I don’t think they will complain. Even if they have been treated as second-class citizens, which has been the case for the last 20 years. They have not been treated like citizens, they’ve been treated like second-class citizens, they have not complained.

As the child of refugees, one participant of Vietnamese background – a community arts practitioner in her late 20s – described the affective impact of pressures for racial and cultural assimilation in a putatively multicultural Australia of the 1980s and 1990s:

. . . growing up, watching ‘Home and Away’, man I wished I was white. I so wished I was white . . . My God, you become obsessed with being not you. Not embracing your own culture.
One resident of Lebanese background (around 40), who works as a cultural programme manager, expressed her frustration at being racialized as a perennial outsider due to her visible difference from the ‘white’ racial norm that prevails in multicultural Australia:

I was born here, but I obviously don’t look like I was born here. And it’s really stupid, because how many years does Australia have to have had a multicultural community for them to stop asking that question ‘Where are you from?’ . . .? We need to accept that we’re Australian and move on. And Anglo Australians need to accept that Australian is not just white.

For another resident – the Vietnamese-origin community arts practitioner cited above – processes of racialization emerged in her encounter with the orientalization (Saïd, 1978) of ‘third-world’ others in the Australian media as she attempted to apply for roles as an actor:

Even though I was born here, I feel like there’s a ceiling effect . . . I either get cast as a ninja, as a prostitute [laughs and repeats], as a prostitute, Asian grocery store owner, a migrant mum when I’m not even a migrant mum. So a lot of the stereotypes are being thrown back at me . . . why can’t I be the main lead in things? Why do I always have to be . . . the evil character, the comic relief? Whereas the Anglos I feel get to get those top roles [. . .] I know some actors in the area, the amount of casting they get for drug lords and gangsters, they feel that that’s who they are. And they feel those are the only roles they’ll ever get in Australia.

Moving beyond the obsequiousness and passivity implicit in the ‘model minority’ paradigm, this participant suggested that, as migrant communities grow and mature, they are better able to contest the political boundaries of their belonging in Australia and actively exercise their citizenship:

There’s more people power now. When there are issues in the media there are agencies that are quick to respond and refute it. . . . Rather than saying, ‘I’m sorry, I’m sorry for my community’, it’s more like, ‘No, no, no! Get your facts straight cos we’re not like that’. . . . And if there’s problems we’ll fix it but we need to lobby to the government for the relevant departments to give us funding and the right support to make it happen. But don’t start pointing fingers at us saying ‘You’re a problem, you’re a problem, get out of the country’. Cos we’re not, we’re here to stay.

For her, confronting and challenging assimilationist expectations or negotiating over shared cultural and physical spaces was central to fostering a local
multiculture built on an agonistic democratic politics (Amin, 2002: 973; Sandercock, 2006: 47–9):

A lot of times it might cause disharmony but from that it will actually engage the community to negotiate. . . . How they want to be perceived, how they embrace their culture, how they actually offer what they have, their experiences, to mainstream Australia as well . . . that causes dialogue, creative dialogue, community dialogue, which is always constantly needed to bring vibrancy to the community, to make the community grow. There’s always gonna be the hard stuff. If a community comes in and it’s nice, no dramas, everyone’s settling in, everyone’s eating the same food, it’s boring! You can do that in the Eastern suburbs. You come out here to find vibrancy, to find different stories, different people.

One key informant – a creative producer at a local youth theatre – explained that the local multiculture of Fairfield had fostered ‘a new acceptance of being able to have a multiple identity. . . ’ – a ‘fluidity’ and pluralism which were celebrated in local community initiatives and, in so doing, facilitated the subversion of hegemonic cultural narratives of belonging. For our Vietnamese-origin community arts practitioner, her sense of home and place was grounded in the perception that Fairfield enabled her to inhabit and express her hybrid identity:

. . . we’re living in a place that recognizes that we can be both Australian and Vietnamese. . . . People might come here and go, it’s a bit ghetto, it’s not very classy. But it’s the make-up of who we are. We didn’t come from a classy – we come from war-torn Vietnam so that’s our identity . . .

Conclusion

There is much to be drawn from the experiences of communities in the Fairfield area regarding the challenges and potentialities for the flourishing of a dynamic pluralism in Australia. As against the enduring material inequality and Anglo-Australian hegemony that often characterizes broader articulations of Australian identity, the views and experiences of several participants revealed the capacities for empathy, adaptability, negotiation, contestation and transformative change that inhered in the inhabited local multiculture of Fairfield. Pointing to the cultural relevance of Fairfield’s evolution to multicultural Australia more broadly, one older (55+) retired Anglo-Australian participant and long-term resident of Cabramatta took an expansive view of Australia’s capacity for accommodating dynamic cultural transformation: ‘I think with our Australian culture, you don’t have to lose it to gain more. It’s one of those things that is infinite.’
The assemblages of collaborative and agonistic engagement between individuals and organizations in Fairfield signal possibilities for a politics of ‘presence’ through which actors who are rendered at the political and economic margins of the global city can engage in transformative citizenship practices (Isin, 2009; Sassen, 2003: 61–2). Explicating the material and symbolic contexts in which such local multicultures arise is central to conceptualizing how ecologies of change across the global and the local will continue to shape the possibilities for alternative visions of globality and belonging in the global city (Varsanyi, 2006: 240).

Notes

1 The concept of ‘multiculture’ refers to a local context characterized by a proliferation of multiple intersecting and dynamic cultures in one setting (Gidley, 2013: 367). For further discussion of ‘cacophonous diversity’, see the relevant subheading in this chapter.

2 Key informants’ analysis of settlement patterns of migrant communities in Fairfield.

3 See the chapter by Andrew Jakubowicz in this volume in relation to Vietnamese Australians.

4 ‘Parkour’ is a physical activity involving negotiation of the urban environment by running, jumping and climbing (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014).

5 The term ‘agonistic’ refers to a political culture ‘that values participatory and open-ended engagement’ based on the ‘vibrant clash’ of positions in a democratic context (Amin, 2002: 973).

References


The Political Economy of the Social Transformation of Australian Suburbs

Jock Collins

Introduction

Australia has been a major immigration nation for six and a half decades. Census data for 2011 shows that one in four Australians is a first-generation immigrant (born in another country) while almost one in two is either first- or second-generation (born in Australia with one or both parents born in another country). Most immigrants have settled in large Australian cities (Hugo, 2011): 61 per cent of the population of Sydney and Perth and 58 per cent of the Melbourne population are first- or second-generation immigrants. The composition of the Australian immigration intake has varied considerably over the postwar period, with predominantly British, Irish and European immigrants arriving in the first decades and immigrants from Britain, New Zealand and Asian countries dominating intakes over the past 20 or 30 years.

One consequence of immigration has been the social transformation of the suburbs of Australian cities. Most immigrants in Melbourne and Sydney settled in the western and south-western suburbs though, in recent decades, professional and business immigrants have settled in wealthier areas of the city, like Sydney’s north shore. However, Australian suburbs are not ethnic ghettos dominated by one immigrant group. Rather they are cosmopolitan places and spaces, with immigrants from a large number of different ethnic, national, religious and linguistic backgrounds living side by side. Moreover, many immigrants have a high degree of residential mobility over time, moving from suburb to suburb. At the same time, many Anglo-Celtic third- or later-generation Australians have moved out of Australian capital cities on retirement and the suburbs have changed composition and character over time. Newly settled immigrants establish restaurants, erect new places of worship, locate ethnic community organizations and establish clubs for recreation and sport in their new neighbourhoods as the transformation of the social environment of the suburbs leads to a transformation of the built environment.
When immigrant entrepreneurs cluster together in a street, suburb or area, an ethnic enclave (Portes, 1981: 290–1) or ethnic precinct may emerge. The emergence of ethnic precincts in the city is a long-established feature of many immigrant cities in North America, Europe and Australia, with Chinatowns an almost universal form of this ethnicized place in contemporary Western cities (Anderson, 1990, 1991; Fitzgerald, 1997; Fong, 1994; Kinkead, 1993; Lin, 1998; Zhou, 1992). Other ethnic precincts such as ‘Little Italy’ (Conforti, 1996), ‘Little India’ (Chang, 2000; McEvoy, 2003), ‘Little Bavaria’ (Frenkel and Walton, 2000), ‘Little Sweden’ (Schnell, 2003) and ‘Finnabouts’ (Timothy, 2002) have emerged across many continents. A key feature of these precincts is the provision of ethnic food and restaurants (Gabaccia, 1998; Warde, 1997; Warde and Martens, 2000), while most ethnic precincts are also sites where ethnic community organizations are located and their activities – including festivals – are staged.

Sydney is Australia’s largest city with the country’s largest immigrant population. Sydney’s downtown has a prominent and long-established Chinatown, Australia’s oldest ethnic precinct. In many other suburbs of Western and South-Western Sydney, the suburban streetscape has taken on the ethnic character of a particular immigrant group, despite the fact that all these suburbs have a cosmopolitan population comprised of first- and second-generation immigrants from different national and ethnic backgrounds and of people of an Anglo-Celtic background. Some of these emerge as clearly defined and identified ethnic precincts such as Chinatown and Leichhardt’s Little Italy. In other suburbs clearly visible ethnic characters and streetscapes emerged, such as Petersham (Portuguese), Marrickville (once Greek, now Vietnamese) and Ashfield (Chinese) in Sydney’s inner-south-western suburban ring. In the mid-south-western suburban ring, ethnic precincts include Auburn (Turkish), Lakemba and Punchbowl (Middle Eastern) and Bankstown (Asian and Middle Eastern). Cabramatta, in the Fairfield municipality, is even further from the city centre and has become an Asiatown (Collins and Castillo, 1998).

A key feature of all these ethnic neighbourhoods is the clustering of immigrant entrepreneurs in the shopping centres of each suburb (Collins, 2003). In Chinatown, 89 per cent of all enterprises in 2007 were owned by Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs. In the same year, in Leichhardt’s Little Italy, 91 per cent of all enterprises were Italian-owned, often by second-generation Italians. In Cabramatta, 80 per cent of all enterprises were owned by Vietnamese immigrants and a further 10 per cent by Chinese. In Auburn, 205 enterprises (78 per cent) were owned by Turkish immigrant entrepreneurs (Collins and Kunz, 2009). The social transformation of Australian suburbs is thus shaped by changing patterns of immigrant settlement and, more importantly, of clustering of immigrant entrepreneurs.

Despite this changing ethnic tableau in cosmopolitan cities, some suburbs have emerged as ethnic precincts, identified with one ethnic group in
particular, while others have developed a pan-ethnic character. Other sub-
urbs do not wear the badge of their ethnicity despite their large immigrant 
population. This contribution to the volume is interested in exploring this 
phenomenon – the ethnic identity and ethnic façade of the different sub-
urbs and the political economy of ethnic precincts. A number of questions 
emerge: What are the characteristics of ethnic precincts? What role do immi-
grant entrepreneurs play in the development of ethnic precincts? This chap-
ter draws on fieldwork conducted in Sydney and Perth to attempt to answer 
these questions. It looks at the long-established Chinatown in Sydney, the 
failure to establish a Chinatown in Perth and the emergence of a Little Korea 
or Koreatown in Sydney.

Ethnic precincts

Sydney's Chinatown

Sydney’s Chinatown has existed in the downtown area of the city since the 
1860s. In the 1940s, Chinatown moved to Campbell and Dixon Streets, where 
it is still located today (Collins and Castillo, 1998: 278–89; Fitzgerald, 1997). 
Following Federation in 1901, the White Australia policy saw reductions in 
the Chinese population in Australia. Since its repeal in the early 1970s by the 
Whitlam labour government, Australia’s Chinese population has increased, 
particularly in the last two decades. In 1996, 2.8 per cent of the Australian pop-
ulation was born in China; by 2011, this had grown to 6.5 per cent. In 2009–10, 
China was the largest county source of Australian immigrants. At the 2011 
census, 6 per cent of the Australian population was born in China, while many 
other ethnic Chinese immigrants were born in countries such as Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Singapore. In the decade to 2011, the Chinese-born were one of 
the fastest-growing immigrant communities in Australia, growing by 176,200, 
second only to the Indian-born (200,000). In 2011, 336,410 Australians spoke 
Mandarin at home and 61,673 spoke Cantonese (DIAC, 2013).

The character of the Australian Chinese immigrant population reflects the 
changing political economy of Australian immigration. Most are university 
graduates – who enter under the skilled component of the permanent immi-
gration programme – or temporary immigrants. In 2012, 122,520 Chinese-
born were temporary immigrants (DIAC 2013: 128), and are one of the largest 
groups in Australia on temporary student visas. Many Chinese international 
students live in the Sydney central business district (the City), or in sub-
urban areas with high Chinese immigrant concentration: Hurstville, where 
50 per cent of the population speaks a Chinese language, one of the high-
est suburban concentrations of any non-English language group in Australia 
(Moreton, 2013), Strathfield and Chatswood, among others.

Accompanying this increase in the Chinese population, there has been 
a growth of Chinese immigrant entrepreneurship in Australia. In Sydney, 
for example, the number of Chinese restaurants grew from 171 in 1969–70
to 558 in 2011. This is important for an understanding of Chinatowns in Australia because it is the clustering of Chinese restaurants and other retail and professional services in the historic downtown Chinatown precinct, rather than contemporary suburb-resident Chinese populations, that is the most critical to the emergence of an ethnic precinct like Chinatown. In 2007, 89 per cent of the businesses in Chinatown were Chinese-owned (Collins and Kunz, 2009). Changes in the regional and class background of Sydney’s Chinese immigrants alter the nature of the restaurants in Chinatown. Many suburban Chinese travel to Chinatown to socialize, purchase Chinese food and access Chinese medical, dental and legal professionals. While the social landscape of suburbs like Hurstville, Chatswood, Ashfield and Strathfield has been transformed by new Chinese immigrant settlers and the streetscape transformed with Chinese restaurants and retail outlets and their Chinese-language characters and iconography, they have not been formally identified as Chinatowns.

This reflects the crucial involvement of local and state governments in shaping the emergence and development of Chinatowns. The Sydney City Council has played a key role in the planning and funding of a number of makeovers of Chinatown over the years – including the redevelopment of Dixon Street in 1972 – by introducing porticos, lanterns and rubbish bins with ‘traditional’ Chinese symbols, by the development of a pedestrian thoroughfare in Dixon Street, the erection of Chinese dragons and the planting of Chinese trees along the streetscape in the 1980s, and by linking Chinatown to the new Darling Harbour development via Chinese Gardens in the 1990s (Fitzgerald, 1997). The Sydney City Council recently produced a new Local Area Plan for Chinatown after consultation with Chinese residents, chambers of commerce and local businesses. The Chinatown Public Domain Plan was launched in 2010. The first stage of works, which was completed in early 2012, included a AUD5 million makeover of three laneways in Haymarket – Little Hay Street, Factory Street and Kimber Lane – with widened footpaths and new trees, street furniture, lighting and paving.

But is Chinatown really an authentic representation of Chinese-ness (Meethan, 2001)? Anderson (1990: 150) argues that Sydney’s Chinatown has been revitalized in ways that reflect white Australia’s image of Chinese-ness: ‘Making the area more “Chinese” . . . [meant] making the area appear more consistent with the architectural motifs and symbols of ancient China.’ Bryman (2004: 52) also notes that the theming of ethnic precincts often depicts a sanitized history, one that removes any reference to hardship and conflict in order to promote consumption. It could be argued, then, that attempts by the Sydney City Council to create a Chinatown in an image that would attract tourists could have resulted in façades, monuments and facelifts reflecting stereotypical images of a homogeneous ‘Chinese-ness that exists only in the “white gaze”’, an argument also made about Chinatowns in New York (Lin, 1998: 173) and Vancouver (Anderson, 1991). On the other
hand, Chinatowns across the world are all very similar in terms of ethnic iconography – welcome gates, lions, dragons, lanterns, Chinese-language signage and vegetation – so that there is a universality to the ethnic theming of Chinatowns. But consultation with the Chinese community in Sydney is selective: there are over 100 different ethnic Chinese community organizations in Sydney, often with different clan and regional backgrounds. Only a few of the leaders of these associations were drawn into the Sydney City Council’s consultation process for the makeover of the Chinatown precinct.

As Meethan (2001: 27) has put it, symbols ‘are multivocal, that is, they have the capacity to carry a range of different, if not ambiguous and contradictory meanings’. One example of this relates to our fieldwork conducted in Chinatown with Chinese, other Asian and non-Asian informants in 2008, which supports Meethan’s argument; we found that non-Asian informants liked the façade and iconography of the streetscape of Chinatown, which they considered tasteful and authentic. On the other hand, Chinese informants were more critical while other Asian informants were largely indifferent (Collins and Kunz, 2009: 51).

The public spaces of Chinatown also attempt to demonstrate ethnic authenticity through the Chinese festivals and spectacles that are staged there (Zukin, 1995: 3–11). Chinatown is the site where all major festivals on the Chinese calendar are celebrated, of which the New Year celebrations are the largest outside China. Each year a programme of activities, including Dragon boat races, Chinese opera and theatre, dragon dance and drums, are organized by the Sydney City Council in consultation with the Chinatown community. The celebrations in Chinatown attract some 150,000 international tourists from China and other Asian countries, as well as Sydneysiders from all ethnic backgrounds.

Perth’s Northbridge: a failed Chinatown

One problem with designating places and spaces as ethnic precincts is that patterns of immigrant settlement change over time. In Australia, most suburbs have very diverse and changing populations of immigrants and non-immigrants, with no one group the majority. Similarly immigrant enterprises located on the streets of Australian suburbs and downtown areas also change over time. Identification of such a suburb or downtown area with only one ethnic group is often opposed by other immigrant groups who live, or own businesses, in the area. This is seen clearly in the case of Northbridge, an ethnic neighbourhood and restaurant precinct in the heart of Perth, the capital city of Western Australia. Northbridge provides another example of the social transformation of suburban neighbourhoods because of immigration, and the key role of immigrant entrepreneurs, regimes of regulation in ethnic place-making (Hoffman et al., 2003), the contradictions inherent in the commodification of ethnicity and the emergence of ethnic precincts in cosmopolitan neighbourhoods (Jordan and Collins, 2012).
From the 1890s, Chinese immigrants in Northbridge began establishing their own businesses in the area, including laundries, market gardens and furniture factories (King, 1998; Peters, 2007). Because of the ‘White Australia’ policy introduced in 1901, the Chinese population fell considerably, both in Perth and in other Australian cities (Choi, 1975: 27). Northbridge became their central meeting place, with the Chung Wah Association, established in Northbridge in 1909, active in promoting the rights of local Chinese residents and entrepreneurs (King, 1998). With the concentration of Chinese businesses and social activities, Northbridge soon gained the reputation of being Perth’s Chinatown (Peters, 2007: 1).

However, reflecting Australia’s changing population intakes, Greek and Italian immigrants began to settle in Northbridge in the 1950s and 1960s and South-East Asian and South Asian immigrants in the 1970s. Immigrants’ small businesses were established by these new settlers, which changed the landscape of the suburb. Greek and Italian shops were established and joined by Vietnamese and Chinese restaurants, Asian butchers and a number of professional services targeting an Asian clientele as the immigrant population of the neighbourhood was transformed. The growth of Vietnamese shops and restaurants along the north of William Street prompted the new nickname for that area – ’Little Saigon’ (Peters, 2007).

Today, Northbridge’s population continues to evolve. A real-estate boom in Perth was driven by the mining peak of the last decade. The proximity of Northbridge to the city led to a significant increase in housing costs and a gentrification of properties, as the class character of the suburb was again transformed. Wealthy urban professionals displaced many of the earlier immigrants, with around 64 per cent of Northbridge residents being born in Australia or the United Kingdom. Today the largest non-Anglo-Celtic immigrant groups have come from Malaysia (8 per cent of the immigrant population), followed by Indonesia (7.5 per cent), Hong Kong (7 per cent), Thailand and Vietnam (both 6.5 per cent). Only 3 per cent of immigrants were born in Italy, while none of Northbridge’s residents were born in Greece (ABS, 2007). As the residential population of Northbridge has changed, many immigrant entrepreneurs have re-branded their products to appeal to the new professional middle class. For example, several of the original immigrant grocery stores now market themselves as gourmet food stores, selling high-quality products and a wider range of European, Asian and Middle Eastern foods. With its diverse restaurants and food stores, Northbridge has become one of the most popular sites in Perth, for locals and tourists alike, in which to experience a range of ethnic cuisines.

Northbridge hosts several annual festivals, some of them reflecting the area’s ethnic history. Chinese and Vietnamese New Year celebrations, the Greek Glendi festival and a world-music festival are all held there each year. The annual Northbridge Festival highlights contemporary arts and acknowledges the area’s ethnic diversity, with history tours pointing out important
sites in its immigrant heritage. Northbridge is also a key site for events during the Perth International Arts Festival and annual gay and lesbian Pride Parade.

By the early 1980s, with the increasing number of Asian immigrants settling in the area, a small group of Malaysian Chinese businesspeople began to plan a Chinatown for Northbridge. The plan aimed to ‘retain and enhance the character and ethos of the Orient within a totally planned modern environment’, complete with Chinese arches, awnings and iconography (Chinatown, 1982: 1). In promoting the concept, the developers made explicit reference to using the development as a leverage point for securing permanent residency visas for foreign nationals who would be employed in the proposed Chinatown.

The developers purchased land on Northbridge’s southern edge and constructed Chinese arches leading into two parallel laneways. The original plan was to purchase surrounding properties to also include over 30 specialist Asian food stalls, a Chinese theatre, a 49-bed hotel, entertainment facilities and professional offices (Chinatown, 1982: 1). The plan failed due to poor positioning (the Chinese arches mark the entry to two short and narrow laneways tangential to the main streetscape of Northbridge), the reluctance of property owners to sell to the developers and the blowout in Australian interest rates in the late 1980s.

The arches – located on Roe Street – are of limited use in attracting visitors, as very few pedestrians walk along this street, an area dominated by large industrial and commercial buildings and virtually devoid of retail premises. Today the shops along Chinatown’s two laneways include a handful of Chinese restaurants, a hairdresser and a Chinese tea house. A number of the shops remain vacant.

Twenty years later a second attempt to create a formal Chinatown in Northbridge began to gather momentum. This attempt was spearheaded by Town of Vincent Mayor Nick Catania, who wanted to develop a ‘readily identifiable and popular precinct’ that ‘for want of a more appropriate name might be called “China Town”’. He suggested that a formally defined and marketed Chinatown was appropriate for any city wanting to be taken seriously on the global stage, with ‘almost every major city in the world [boasting] a colourful and culturally diverse “China Town”’ (Town of Vincent, 2006: 1). However, local government consultation with business owners and residents in upper William Street revealed that the proposal had limited support. Many of the businesses in Northbridge were owned by non-Chinese entrepreneurs, including Vietnamese, Thai and Japanese. Even some ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs felt little connection with China, having been born in South-East Asia. The proposal was also opposed by some members of Perth’s key Chinese organization, the Chung Wah Association, who felt that establishing a formal Chinatown would alienate members of the non-Chinese community. These concerns reflect a common academic critique of
A Little Korea for Sydney?

The Korean community in Australia is the sixth-largest outside the Republic of Korea (City of Sydney and Sydney Korean Women’s Association, 2011: 6). At the end of June 2011, 97,600 South Korean-born people were living in Australia – a 62 per cent increase in five years (DIAC, 2012). In the past two decades, the Korean immigrant population has increased in number and changed in terms of social class. Attempts to align Australian immigration policy to a changing, globalized national and international economy saw an increasing emphasis on skilled and professional migration and a dramatic rise in temporary immigration, particularly of those on an international student or a working holiday visa (Collins, 2011).

Sydney is the key centre of Korean immigrant settlement in Australia. Most (75 per cent) of these Korean immigrants who arrived in the last year or so entered under the skilled immigrant category. Moreover, one in four Korean-born immigrants is a professional, indicating the changing class character of new Korean immigrant arrivals. Koreans have the highest rate of entrepreneurship of any immigrant group in Australia – at least twice the Australian average. Many Korean immigrant entrepreneurs who own restaurants or other cafés or food-retailing businesses have located their companies in the downtown area of the City of Sydney and in key suburbs of Korean settlement such as Eastwood, Campsie and Strathfield.

The changing class character of Korean immigration to urban Sydney has led to changing patterns of Korean immigrant settlement in the suburbs and, in turn, to changing clusters of Korean immigrant entrepreneurship in Sydney. Before the turn of the century, Korean immigrant settlement in Sydney was smaller in size, less professional and less highly skilled. The immigrants concentrated around Campsie, an inner-south-western suburb where rents were relatively low. Korean settlement transformed Campsie, which informally became Sydney’s Little Korea, largely because of the clustering
of Korean restaurants and small businesses along Beamish Street (Collins and Castillo, 1998: 350–3). The Korean immigrant intake who arrived more recently under the permanent programme were wealthier than earlier arrivals and settled not in Campsie but in more expensive suburbs such as Eastwood and Strathfield. School choice was an important part in these changing settlement patterns: the schools in the Eastwood and Strathfield areas had a very good reputation among the Korean immigrant community, and after-school coaching run by Korean immigrant entrepreneurs was also available. Temporary Korean immigrants, particularly international students and those on working holiday visas, settled in downtown central business district (CBD) areas and in cheaper suburbs.

Contemporary Korean immigrant entrepreneurship reflects these changing class and settlement patterns, as seen in the location of Korean-owned restaurants and retail food outlets, which have clustered in the downtown CBD and the suburbs of Strathfield, Eastwood and Campsie. Recent fieldwork (Collins and Shin, 2012) highlights some of the relationships between changing patterns of Korean immigrant settlement, Korean immigrant entrepreneurship and the social transformation of the Sydney CBD and suburbs.

While Korean-owned restaurants are spread fairly widely in the CBD, they are clustered in particular around the section of the city bordered by Bathurst, Castlereagh, Liverpool and George Streets. Many Korean, Japanese and Chinese restaurants and other food outlets owned by Korean immigrant entrepreneurs are located in the CBD to take advantage of the large passing parade of customers (who may be workers in the city, tourists or shoppers) and Korean immigrants (particularly those on temporary student and working holiday visas) living in new apartment blocks erected in the city over the past decade. Other clusters of Korean businesses in Sydney were in the suburbs of Strathfield, Eastwood and Campsie, areas of concentration of Korean and other Asian immigrant settlement. There are 49 restaurants and food outlets owned by Korean immigrant entrepreneurs in Strathfield and 33 in Eastwood.

A survey of 65 Korean immigrant entrepreneurs in Sydney revealed that they were not only involved in restaurants selling Korean food, but that they also owned Japanese restaurants (including Sushi ones), Chinese restaurants, cafés and take-away food shops. About half of the Korean immigrant restaurant owners in Sydney surveyed (42) ran Korean restaurants – split evenly between 21 Korean BBQ and 21 Korean restaurants; nine out of those surveyed were involved in Japanese restaurants (16 per cent of the sample) and six ran sushi restaurants (13 per cent); another seven owned cafés, four owned Chinese restaurants and two owned take-away general food shops (Collins and Shin, 2012). Koreans often debate whether the origins of sushi are Korean or Japanese.

Nevertheless, the issue of authenticity in Korean-owned restaurants seems less important than that of the business opportunity. The Korean immigrant
entrepreneurs who now own restaurants or food-retailing businesses had tried their hand at a wide variety of business types before opening their current restaurant. Most commonly, these prior businesses were also in the food and beverage industry, a logical pathway to owning a restaurant. However, the most compelling factor was the great diversity of business pathways to setting up a restaurant or café. Nine had a cleaning business, a key area of business concentration for Korean entrepreneurs in Australia. The breadth of other prior businesses is remarkable: news agencies, tiling and construction, advertising, tourism, surveillance and even butchery. This demonstrates the innovation inherent in the Korean immigrant entrepreneur experience in Australia: try a business but, at the same time, keep your eyes open for other business opportunities.

Most of the Korean immigrant entrepreneurs surveyed did not decide to come to Australia to set up a business; most chose Australia for family reasons and Sydney because they had Korean social networks (family or friends) already living there. The majority of the Korean immigrant entrepreneurs surveyed (57 per cent) did not have a family business background. For these Korean immigrants, the decision to migrate to Australia was not just one of moving to a new country, but one of moving into entrepreneurship for the first time. For 40 of the Korean immigrant entrepreneurs surveyed (62 per cent) their current business was not their first in Australia, although for 25 (38 per cent) of them it was. Once again, this is consistent with the literature, which shows that entrepreneurs will tend to have a number of businesses in their working life. Closing down a business to open another should not be seen as entrepreneurial failure, but rather as part of entrepreneurial development, adaptation and change.

Establishing a business also requires a decision about the business location. For restaurants, sushi bars or cafés and take-away food bars, this decision is critical: it is important to find a location where there is a good demand for eating out and for eating Korean/Japanese/Chinese food. Many of the businesses were located in the key hubs of Korean restaurant and business clusters and Korean immigrant settlements in Sydney – Strathfield, Eastwood and Campsie – or in the downtown Sydney CBD. The most common answers about restaurant location decisions related to the large volume of customer traffic, particularly the large number of Korean and Chinese residents/customers. High business density and a large volume of passing public traffic were the key reasons for locating in the CBD.

Customer demand is a key aspect of any successful business. Korean and Chinese immigrants formed the largest cohort of the customer base of these Korean restaurants: in half of the restaurants Koreans were 50 per cent or more of the customers, while in one in four of the restaurants more than half were Chinese. These restaurants tended to be located in Strathfield, Eastwood and Campsie. In the restaurants located in the CBD, non-Chinese or non-Korean customers were more common.
These suburban concentrations of Korean immigrants and clusters of Korean immigrant entrepreneurs, particularly those engaged with restaurants and food outlets, have not yet led to the formal emergence of a ‘Little Korea’ in Sydney, either in Eastwood or in Strathfield. A decision to actively brand Eastwood or Strathfield as Little Korea or Koreatown and to give them a Korean makeover and promote the area is a matter for the local regulators: the Strathfield Council and the Ryde Council, in the case of Eastwood. Many Chinese and other immigrant entrepreneurs with businesses in these areas are opposed to the Korean precinct because it denies their own ethnic presence in the area.

Conclusion

Australia’s sustained, large and diverse immigration programme has led to the transformation of the nation into one of the most cosmopolitan of all contemporary societies, particularly in the cities where the most immigrants have settled. This has led to the social transformation of the suburbs of Australian cities. Immigrant settlement transforms the neighbourhoods into which immigrants decide to locate. In Australia, most immigrants settle in the large cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide. An Australian immigration programme that has drawn migrants from all corners of the globe has ensured that the suburbs where they settle are populated by immigrants from very diverse cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds who live alongside the non-immigrant community. Cosmopolitan neighbourhoods rather than ethnic ghettos are the consequence. The built environment of these Australian suburbs and downtown areas changes with successive waves of immigrant settlement. This is most evident in the restaurants and shops established by immigrant entrepreneurs and in the places of worship (churches, mosques, temples, synagogues) and leisure facilities built by these immigrant communities.

When clusters of immigrant enterprises from one community emerge in the form of restaurants, shops and professional services, the suburb or downtown precinct takes on the character of this immigrant group. The ethnic iconography of the shops and restaurants, and the sounds and smells that they generate, transform these Australian places and spaces. In some instances, an ethnic precinct may develop.

This chapter has looked at the way in which Chinese and Korean immigration has changed the ethnic diversity and cultural landscape of some urban neighbourhoods of Australia, leading, in some instances, to the emergence of ethnic precincts. The aim was to develop an understanding of the political economy of ethnic precincts in Australia – of the way in which people, places and spaces are transformed, mediated by economic, social, cultural and political processes and relationships.

Concentrations of immigrant settlement and entrepreneurs in particular suburbs or neighbourhoods provide the potential for an ethnic precinct
to emerge. The key difference between ethnic precincts and other ethnic
neighbourhoods in the city is that local and state governments have taken
a decision to label and market the ethnic precinct. This is evident in the
history of Sydney’s Chinatown. Local government plays the central role in
formalizing a neighbourhood into an ethnic precinct and in designing and
funding its ethnic makeover. This requires decisions about the appropriate
ethnic iconography to be installed, which often incurs the contradictions of
authenticity and legitimacy: what to install, who to consult (Collins, 2007)?
The Sydney City Council has consulted with Sydney’s Chinese commu-
nity over the redevelopment of Chinatown at different stages over the past
decades but, with over 100 Chinese community, regional and clan organiza-
tions located in the Chinatown region, it has had to be selective in decid-
ing which representatives should be members of the Chinatown Cultural
Advisory Committee. Local government also promotes the ethnic precinct
as a place for ethnic festivals. All this leads to a commodification, a brand-
ing and a marketing of ethnicity to local, national and international tour-
ists. The Chinese New Year in Sydney’s Chinatown is the biggest Chinese
New Year parade outside Asia: a wide range of events such as Chinese opera,
Dragon boat races, special banquets, art exhibitions, film screenings and his-
tory tours are organized, attracting some 150,000 tourists from China and
other Asian countries over a six-week period in 2013.

On the other hand, suburbs with a much higher concentration of Chinese
immigrant settlement, such as the Sydney suburb of Hurstville, where half of
the population speaks a Chinese language at home, have not been formally
identified and promoted as Chinatowns. The problem with identifying a
neighbourhood with one immigrant or ethnic group is that this will exclude
all the others who live there and/or have businesses there, which is what
happened in the failed attempt to get Perth’s Northbridge identified as a
Chinatown. Other immigrant communities and entrepreneurs were opposed
to the area being identified only in terms of its Chinese culture. It is also
what has prevented Strathfield or Eastwood from becoming identified as sub-
urban Little Koreas, despite the fact that this is where Korean business has
clustered in recent years. This has reduced the claims of Campsie as Sydney’s
Little Korea, which itself has always been informally rather than formally
established. The large population of Chinese and other immigrants who
live in these suburbs and the Chinese and other immigrant entrepreneurs
who have restaurants, shops and businesses in them are opposed to such a
development. Despite this, many Australian suburbs and neighbourhoods
develop the character of an informal ethnic precinct, or what Li (1998) calls
an ‘ethnoburb’, a suburb where the concentration of immigrant residents
and business gives the neighbourhood the look, sound, taste and smell of a
particular ethnic group. Clearly, the politics of place and community and the
competitive nature of business enterprises are key components of the politi-
cal economy of ethnic precincts in Australia.
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Controlling immigration: the rise of regulation and the liberal paradox

The movement of people around the globe is at once an inevitable concomitant of scientific and social development and a site of tremendous contest. The technological advances that feed globalization have facilitated exponential growth in both regular and irregular migration, as people cross borders in search of economic opportunity or security. The overall percentage of people on the move may have remained relatively stable, but the sheer numbers are astonishing. For example, in 2013 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014) recorded over 51 million refugees and ‘persons of concern’ displaced by war or other catastrophes. The phenomenon of modern migration has fostered a process of internationalization within and between states. Within states, it has fuelled endless debates about the burdens attending immigration in any form. Do migrants make jobs or take jobs? Do they offer protection against an ageing population or do they put strains on scarce public resources in areas such as education, health and housing? Do they enrich societies with their diverse cultures or do they cause harm by congregating in ghettos that spawn crime and social unrest? Migration also affects relations between states – and not just because crossing borders obviously implicates (at least) two countries.

In this chapter, we examine trends in the way in which nations have regulated the entry and stay of non-citizens as a vehicle for exploring the sites of contest that migrants have opened both within and between states. We look at how domestic legal systems have dealt with the issue of which migrants to admit and which to exclude. Our central argument is that states’ responses to these questions have directly contributed to their economic and social transformation.
In 2004, Hollifield observed:

Since the end of the Second World War, international economic forces (trade, investment and migration) have pushed states towards openness while the international state system and powerful (domestic) political forces push them towards greater closure. (2004: 885)

Our study reveals that this conflict is more complicated than a simple push–pull between international forces for openness and domestic forces for closure. Hollifield’s ‘liberal paradox’ does not entirely explain the scope and variety of states’ responses to different types of migration. We argue that states have become increasingly torn between the need to attract and admit (skilled) migrants and the political imperative to control and restrict immigration within societies resistant to admitting strangers. In the field of skilled migration, states are competing with each other to attract talented workers. Developed states actively, but selectively, encourage immigration. Migrants with skills, youth and other attributes needed to enhance the economic and cultural bases of their society are highly sought after (Shachar, 2006). States also work actively to deflect, deter and deny irregular migrants (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011).

We argue that the tension of this ‘liberal paradox’ is manifest in increasingly – but variably selective – migration regulation. Viewed this way, migration regulation can be seen as a process that shapes and reflects other social and economic processes. The twin imperatives of control and opportunity manifest in what we describe as ‘selective openness’. We argue that migration laws and policies across a range of developed states have become increasingly nuanced and complex over time. If migrants have played a significant role in transforming the culture of states, they have also driven states to think more carefully about the micro- and macro-economic effects of (foreign) human capital in society.

In this chapter we use data collected from the first pilot phase of the International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Database Project to interrogate regulatory responses to migration in nine developed states between 1999 and 2008. The IMPALA Database provides empirical evidence on the nature, origins and effects of immigration policies and laws (Gest et al., 2014). As we explain in the second section, it works by cataloguing answers to common questions about laws and policies that describe how individual states regulate immigration and citizenship.

In the third section we use empirical data derived from the IMPALA Database to make preliminary observations about two broad trends in the regulation of migration in these nine countries. The first is the explosion in the complexity of migration policies and laws. The fact that immigration rules are codified in increasing detail does not in itself tell us much about the effect of the changes observed, so we take a closer look at the
codification that has occurred. Using changes in the regulation of economic migration, we identify a second trend that suggests growing sophistication in the understanding of labour economics and regulatory theory. We find both greater openness (for highly skilled migrants) and greater restriction (in the specificity of indicators of economic desirability). We argue that the IMPALA data support the notion that states have become increasingly conflicted in the laws and policies they adopt to regulate the admission and stay of non-nationals. Using Australia as a case study, the IMPALA data suggest that migration laws and policies have been used to achieve increasingly specific socio-economic objectives.

**A new approach to analyzing and comparing migration law**

In the IMPALA Database, the task of describing immigration systems is undertaken by dividing migration laws and policies into broad categories. The pilot phase of the project focused on what we consider the most important areas of immigration entry and settlement across the pilot countries. The categories chosen were economic migration, family reunification, asylum and refugee migration, students and other temporary migration, and citizenship (loss and acquisition). When complete, the database will also include material on legal frameworks (including appeal structures), ‘threshold’ requirements such as health and character rules, irregular migration and enforcement (including change or adjustment of status) and bi-lateral agreements.

In constructing the IMPALA Database we devised aggregated descriptors of what we observed to be the common ways in which migrants are admitted in all countries. We refer to these as ‘tracks’ of entry. An entry track represents a group of migrants who are subject to similar requirements (in terms of admissibility criteria and the conditions on which a permit is granted). The use of entry tracks allows clear and effective comparison across countries of the nature of the country’s selection policy for immigrants. The methodology highlights how countries use the characteristics of the applicant or requirements such as sponsorship as determinants for entry.

The database consists of questions that are predominantly susceptible to binomial (Yes/No) answers, together with data fields that record the detailed authority for the answer in law and policy, with a dedicated space for comments. For each entry track and each year, coders identify the laws and policies in effect by examining national legislation, policy documents published by government authorities, case law (where relevant) and secondary source material such as textbooks and reports. These materials tell the story of how many and what type of migrants can be admitted into a country (lawfully) each year, the conditions under which immigrants live and work, and their legal rights. This positive image also allows for the construction of the legal gaps for irregular migrants who enter and live outside the law. The objective
has been to construct questions that capture the distinct features of particular entry tracks (or citizenship modes) within any given category. It is a unique feature of the database that each answer to each question will be accompanied by a pinpoint reference to the relevant law or authoritative source.

The questions interrogate immigration laws and policies that have been reduced into written form as legislation, circulars or other published records. The database does not attempt to record state practice or de facto policies. The distinction is an important one. While we acknowledge that the written record often does not reflect what happens on the ground, published material is, nevertheless, the most accurate and enduring reflection of a state’s point-of-time commitment in specified areas.

In their raw form, the IMPALA data can be aggregated for any number of purposes. The use of common entry tracks across time and across countries facilitates the extraction of comparable information on hundreds of features of law and policy. The pinpoint specification of legal and policy sources facilitates the easy comparison of systems of law and policy that would otherwise intimidate the most devoted comparative researcher. As we demonstrate in the following section, it also allows for the development of systematic measures of the stringency or restrictiveness of laws governing immigration and citizenship across states and time.

Policy patterns: identifying trends in the regulation of migration

Increased codification and complexity

The first and most obvious observation that can be made about the approaches taken to immigration control in the IMPALA pilot states is that laws and policies have become very complex. This is reflected in the number of visa/entry permits issued by the subject states, the number of entry tracks identified and the number of questions that have been required in order to capture a sense of how the systems operate.

Figure 17.1 sets out the number of family and economic entry tracks across the pilot countries for each of two years – 1999 and 2008. The track count shows a marked increase over this ten-year period, suggesting a general move towards greater regulation. Within each broad grouping, however, it will be seen that there is considerable divergence between states in the way that the categories are broken down into entry tracks.

Australia, Switzerland and Germany emerge as the states with the most complex regulatory systems in the area of economic migration. That complexity increased between 1999 and 2008, most markedly in Australia and Germany. In other key European countries, however, there has not been anything like the explosion in regulation that occurred between 1999 and 2008. The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Spain all had relatively small
entry-track counts, and those counts remained similarly small across the
decade under study. In contrast, the pattern is almost directly inversed in
the area of family migration. For sheer complexity of family migration cat-
egories, European countries stand ahead of the new-world settler countries,
with far more highly regulated systems of family migration, particularly by
2008. Australia’s large number of economic entry tracks dwarfs its family
migration tracks. The latter actually bucked the trend by shrinking between

Over time and with closer analysis, we anticipate that more nuances in
these general trends will become apparent. For example, in Australia the
number of visas has fluctuated over the years, with periodic attempts to sim-
plify the system resulting in the conflation of visa classes and subclasses. By
2012, there were 43 entry tracks, compared to 64 in 2008. This is part of the
pattern of expansion and contraction – of explosion in regulation and then
rationalization. These sorts of modification are almost invariably done in the
name of economic efficiency. They are designed to make it easier for busi-
ness and for highly skilled migrants to navigate the legal maze and to make
it easier for the ‘right’ (most qualified) migrants to enter. In spite of such
movements, the historical drive towards more complexity in the regulation
of immigration appears to be inexorable.
We note the creation of specific and targeted tracks of entry, and the breaking down of ‘meta’ categories of entry (such as ‘business’) into greater numbers of subcategories. The creation of targeted tracks of entry reflects a process of differentiation. Targeted tracks are those open only to entrants with certain qualifications (usually qualifications or skills in short supply in the receiving country). Some give preference to entrants who are prepared to fill gaps in the labour market, including in particular geographical areas.

While all countries distinguish sponsored workers, independent migrants and investors, Australia and the US have created separate entry tracks for a wide variety of entrants. These range from the rarified ‘distinguished talent’ migrants through religious workers and professional sportspeople, to entertainers or artist groups. Such targeted entry tracks are a measure of economic sophistication. They also model the use of migration policy as a development tool. Australia provides good examples of economic migration used to this end in entry tracks that encourage migration to regional areas of the country. The Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme was established before 1999. From 2000 onwards, other visa classes have been created for investors and skilled people needed in regional areas. Using a migrant’s willingness to work, invest and/or settle in a particular region is an example of immigration used as a tool for targeted economic growth.

Quantifying and assessing skills: economic sophistication in migration policy

If we take economic migration as a case study, it will be seen that the proliferation in entry tracks has followed increasing specificity in the types of migrants considered desirable. It is our observation that the procedures by which migrants are selected have become increasingly sophisticated and nuanced in the way in which distinctions are made between migrants. The data provide tangible measures of how the lifting (or increasing) of restrictions on migration works to transform a destination country. These data are consistent with Czaika and de Haas’ observations about the links between migration and geopolitical and economic transformations (Czaika and de Haas, 2014). As we will explain, migration regulation not only reflects economic shifts, but can also be used as an agent of change in a country’s economy.

The IMPALA pilot is described in full in a forthcoming article (Beine et al., 2015). For the present purposes it suffices to note that coders in each team identified the key economic migration tracks for 1999 and 2008. Taking one highly skilled and at least one lesser-skilled track for each country and for each year, these tracks were coded against binary indicator questions which operate as measures of economic sophistication. Most indicators speak to characteristics that are either acquired by the application of effort (such as education and record of employment) or are inherent in the entrant (age, the possession of talents or other personal attributes of economic value). All operate to measure worth in the potential migrant.
Mary Crock and the IMPALA Consortium

The pilot coding by no means provides a comprehensive picture of economic migration in these countries or in those years. However, it reveals the criteria that each country used to select key groups of economic migrants. The trends suggest that the pilot states are placing increasing value on economic migrants who are young and educated, with proven records of achievement in work or business and fluency in the relevant community languages.

For three of the countries – Australia, Germany and the US – there appears to have been a tightening of entry criteria for economic migrants between 1999 and 2008. The same is not true of the European countries, however. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the entry criteria for economic migrants appear to have been relaxed. As we have suggested elsewhere (Gest et al., 2014), the change reflects the introduction of a European-wide policy to improve the attractiveness of EU countries to skilled migrants through the establishment of a unified EU Blue Card working-visa system. The continuing stringency of policies in the settler states of Australia and the US probably reflects the popularity of those countries as destinations for skilled migrants, creating greater scope for selectivity.

In the Australian context, the move to more economically nuanced selection criteria is apparent in the tendency to draw on macro- and micro-economic data to set quotas and even specify occupations for visa categories. From 2000, Australia’s selection mechanisms have involved the use of ‘Skilled Occupations Lists’, first for permanent and later for permanent and temporary economic visas. Separate lists were created for occupations in demand both generally and in specific geographic areas. The increasing economic sophistication is also seen in the thought given to the process of assessing skills and other attributes. By 2008, most economic migrants to Australia were being required to undergo an assessment of their qualifications and suitability as migrants before applying for a visa. This dramatically reduced the labour-market barriers facing migrants with foreign qualifications (Chapman and Iredale, 1990). Rather than having a single (government) authority responsible for the recognition of relevant qualifications and experience, this task was assigned to peak industry bodies and other private agencies. This exemplifies another trend in public administration: the privatization or outsourcing of government functions and of placing non-government bodies in statutory schemes of regulation (Cane and McDonald, 2013; Creyke and McMillan, 2012). The system was designed to ensure that migrants were completely ‘job ready’ at point-of-visa grant.

In 2012, the government went even further to transform the visa application process into one that involves entrants lodging an ‘Expression of Interest’, including full documentation of their credentials. It is a system that empowers the government to pick and choose between applicants while reducing quite dramatically their ability to challenge visa refusals (Bowen, 2011). Interestingly, this was initially a New Zealand innovation, which has since also been picked up by Canada.
Another example of the increased economic sophistication of selection methods in the area of economic migration is the use of ‘points testing’ to weigh various qualifications and eligibility factors. Points tests were first used for this purpose in Canada in the 1970s and were first introduced into Australian law and policy in 1979 (Crock, 2002; Yale-Loehr and Hoashi-Erhardt, 2002). Points tests have taken many forms over the years, but all involve the allocation of marks against nominated characteristics such as age, qualifications, language skills, occupational skills, experience and financial worth. These tests allow a receiving state to be highly selective (and flexible) about the configuration of skills and experiences considered desirable for different migrants at different points in time. Of the pilot states, only Australia was using points tests in the selected key skilled and lesser-skilled tracks for 1999. By 2008, the Netherlands and the UK had also adopted a points test for some of their economic entry tracks. Shortage lists, which were used by Australia, the UK and the US for at least some of the pilot coded tracks in 1999, were picked up between 1999 and 2008 by Spain.

In our pilot study we have not attempted to draw conclusions about percentages of entry tracks in which points testing or shortage lists were used. Further analysis of more complete coding data will reveal more about the prevalence of these indicators. For the present purposes, the data collected support the argument that targeted entry tracks demonstrate the divergent imperatives of the regulatory schemes in settler states. Immigration is at once encouraged and desired, and at the same time closely constrained. This is a manifestation of Hollifield’s liberal paradox, which is at its most acute in a country like Australia, where demand for entry is high and the state can afford to be selective.

Responsiveness to transnational and international law: family migration

Another factor shaping migration laws across the pilot IMPALA countries has been the growing significance of international law, particularly norms of international human rights law. One category where the influence of such laws is particularly acute is family migration. Family unity is a fundamental principle of international human rights law. A person’s right to family life and to have the integrity of his or her family protected is enshrined in the key human rights treaties, including in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 23), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 10[1]) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 18). Of particular relevance to migration is the fact that Art. 44 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families contains specific protections for the unity of the families of migrant workers. The right to family unity also features prominently in supranational European law: Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights protects a right to respect for private and family life.

In this area, the IMPALA data reveal a tendency for human rights law to encourage greater generosity by states in terms of who is to be admitted and on what terms migrants are allowed to enter. The changes also suggest that openness in this area has been used increasingly as a tool to distinguish and attract certain desirable classes of economic migrants. In considering the transformative effect of migration, this trend is of particular interest because it suggests an understanding that prosperity requires policies displaying emotional intelligence as well as economic wisdom.

The pilot IMPALA data reveal the most variation between the states in their treatment of family migration. Germany stands out as the country with the most tracks in this area. Luxembourg showed the most substantial increase in the density of regulation between 1999 and 2008. The number of tracks in Australia and the US are relatively modest in comparison, and they remained more stable over the ten-year pilot. In Australia, entry tracks such as child, carer and partner remained the main vehicles for this migration category.

Again, the number of entry tracks is only one measure of the nature of the trends that have occurred. Attention also needs to be given to the content of the laws and policies regulating admissions in each track. The Australian case is instructive in this regard. While the Australian family tracks have remained in similar form, their substantive requirements have undergone change and development. An excellent illustration of the stability of tracks and the dynamism of their content is eligibility for the partner visas between heterosexual and same-sex couples and between persons in de jure marriages and those in de facto relationships. This can be explored through the lens of international human rights law governing family life and reunification.

There are two ways in which the IMPALA Database can test states’ responsiveness to international norms of family reunification. The first is through capturing dedicated entry tracks for family members: the ‘family’ category of the database. These are tracks where a person’s eligibility is defined primarily by his or her relationship to a resident or citizen of the receiving country. The second is by capturing whether permits in other categories (economic, student and humanitarian) allow for accompanying family. These are referred to as ‘secondary applicant’ provisions. By capturing both modes of entry across each year, the IMPALA Database will allow users to compare regulatory approaches to family unity across the spectrum of migration law. The IMPALA Database is not yet complete to the stage where overall conclusions can be drawn on eligibility for accompanying family. Even so, it does seem that states are becoming more willing to allow family members (including partners of the same or opposite sex) to migrate with economic migrants.

It is clear from the preliminary results that states have tended to expand eligibility over time for partners other than spouses. However, this is not a universal trend: the US stands out as the state that was and remains the most
restrictive to those seeking entry as partners. The US does not recognize any forms of *de facto* or registered partnerships for the purposes of partner visas or accompanying family. Only ‘marriage’ is recognized. However, the term ‘marriage’ is not defined in federal immigration law. Instead, the legislation defers to state law. Now that the Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) has been struck down by the Supreme Court,7 US states have been freed to recognize same-sex marriages. Where such marriages are recognized by state law, they meet the required definition of marriage in the federal immigration statute. The US has recently seen the first group of successful same-sex partner applications accepted.8 This example highlights the difficulty of capturing nuanced practices by reference only to immigration law and policy at a federal level. Even so, the difficulties can be mitigated by matching answers with full citations and comments.

The fact that some countries (including Australia) do not recognize registered partnerships complicates the data collection. However, it is interesting to note the Australian policy response to people seeking entry as same-sex partners. In 1999, same-sex partners were excluded because they could not meet the definition of a spouse or a *de facto* partner, both of which were drafted to exclude same-sex partners. Rather, entry was facilitated through the ‘interdependency’ track. By 2008, same-sex partners were still ineligible to gain a partner visa as a ‘spouse’, but the definition of *de facto* had been changed to include same-sex partners. The previous vehicle for same-sex partner entry, the interdependency visa, had been abolished. The ebb and flow of these visa classes and the varied uses to which they have been put is an interesting case study of the very dynamic nature of migration regulation and the way that it responds to changing social mores and demands for migration.

While the count of Australian partner entry tracks has been largely stable and has even trended downwards, there are some exceptions. Areas where Australian family entry tracks have been expanded over time are in the category of ‘Contributory’ versions of parent and aged-parent visas. ‘Contributory’ visas are those that are subject to dramatically higher fees and other imposts than earlier visas involving the same classes of migrant. The modification reflects change in the principles underlying family migration policy and reveals the tension between imperatives (including international human rights law) towards family reunification and economic pressures (including the perception or reality of migrants as an economic burden on a receiving state). These visas reflect another trend which we hypothesize is increasing and which will be an area for further study: the intersection between family and economic categories of migration.

The intersection between family and economic considerations is also evident in the treatment of accompanying family eligibility for economic entry tracks. The IMPALA survey captures one aspect of states’ responses to this issue by asking whether the applicant must meet a minimum income level for the purpose of bringing accompanying family. Once again, there are
insufficient data to draw full conclusions. However it is interesting to note that no Australian economic entry track coded thus far demands that an applicant have a minimum income level for the purpose of bringing accompanying family. On the other hand, every French economic entry track coded so far which allows accompanying family requires it. It will be valuable to do further investigation into the use of sponsorship, assurance of support and minimum income-level requirements across the family category.

Regulatory trends in the management of migration: back to the future?

In this chapter we have explored some broad trends in the regulation of migration. We acknowledge that we have used a preliminary dataset and therefore that we present only preliminary results. For those of us steeped in the regulatory traditions of our own states, the preliminary data confirm trends that we have witnessed and experienced. In the two broad categories of economic and family migration, there has been a consistent local trend towards greater complexity and density in regulation. Australia stands out as a country that has shifted dramatically from a system of administrative discretion to a system of highly codified and sophisticated selectivity. It is also a country that has become increasingly mindful of the economic and social impact of migration, becoming more selective in its admission of skilled migrants while acknowledging the centrality of the family in the settlement process.

What the IMPALA Database demonstrates is that these local trends are also transnational trends. Broad categories of entry have been differentiated by the pilot states into more and more distinct tracks of entry. Within these tracks the criteria for admission (and exclusion) have been articulated with increasing precision by reference to various standards. We observe interesting movements across states in the laws and policies developed. As explored elsewhere (Crock and Ghezelbash, 2013; Ghezelbash, 2015), the convergence of policies may reflect a growing tendency for states to learn from each other and to actively engage in the transfer of laws and policies.

Comparing sample entry tracks in the economic category, we argue that there is evidence that the pilot states have become more sophisticated in their use of economic theory and modeling. Migration policies have become smarter and more targeted to specific economic outcomes. In some states this is apparent in policies that articulate with greater clarity the age, education, skills and track record of desired migrants. In others it is seen in the introduction of positive inducements for migrants who might be characterized as more highly skilled. The data suggest both a trend towards more articulated regulation and moves to facilitate (or open the country to) skilled migration.

In the family category, similar conflicting patterns emerged. Another force for openness in the states’ policies is the growth in norms of international and transnational human rights law, and we used the family category to
interrogate the data for evidence of the influence on the pilot states of norms of international and transnational human rights law. Here again we identified indicators suggestive of a growing openness in the pilot states. This was seen most particularly in the treatment of same-sex and *de facto* partners. Once again the trend towards more generous policies was counterbalanced by a trend towards more specific regulations.

The overall picture does indeed bear out a ‘liberal paradox’ – albeit complicated and nuanced. We do not claim to identify the domestic causes of the policies described. Yet the character and nature of the changes speak of the problems or opportunities (perceived or actual) that they are designed to address. Variations in policies across the pilot states between 1999 and 2008 reveal both increased openness and generosity and increased restrictiveness. The desire in states to use migrants to enhance economic performance is apparent in laws and policies that give preference to individuals with attributes that states see as desirable.

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Notes

1. Mary Crock and the IMPALA research team: Michael Hiscox, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University. Michel Beine, Professor of International Economics, University of Luxembourg. Brian Burgoon, Professor of International and Comparative Political Economy, University of Amsterdam. Justin Gest, Assistant
The countries are Australia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the USA. These countries have been identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as ‘recipient’ countries for immigrants. When completed, the IMPALA Database will include laws and policies from 26 OECD countries across 60 years.

See http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/impala/home.

The difference between written laws and policies, on the one hand, and practice, on the other, is fertile ground for academic research but well beyond the scope of the IMPALA Database project.

For migration purposes, these are the ‘relevant assessing authorities’ specified under regulation 2.26B of the Migration Regulations 1994.


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Generations and Change: Affinities Old and New

Ellie Vasta

Despite many decades of large-scale immigration in advanced industrial societies, public debate about ethnic and religious diversity has recently become increasingly focused on issues of social cohesion, cultural values and national security, especially in the wake of incidents of international terrorism (Kymlicka, 2007). Such anxieties exist in Europe, where it is alleged that different or inferior values may threaten national identity and have a damaging effect on social cohesion, leading to violence and a loss of freedom and national and personal security (Entzinger, 2003; Vasta, 2008). At the heart of the debate is not simply the idea that too much immigration is a problem, but that state policies have failed due to a misplaced tolerance for cultural difference on the part of the receiving society (Koopmans, 2006).

In the UK, it has been argued that the recognition of different values and the loss of common values challenge Western democracies and that the promotion of cultural diversity will only exacerbate the problem (Goodhart, 2004). After 9/11, in Britain, three successive British prime ministers (Blair, Brown and Cameron) have publicly noted the importance of British values, implying that some ethnic minorities’ values are inferior to British ones. In Britain, in the past ten years, there has been a move towards an assimilationist policy based on ‘integration and social cohesion’ (Vasta, 2010). Recently, both the British Prime Minister Cameron and the German Chancellor Merkel have declared that multiculturalism has failed in their respective countries.

In Australia, there have been similar debates around the consequences of diversity, especially for social cohesion, citizenship and national identity. Australian multiculturalism has also been criticized and has undergone transformation since the mid-1990s, despite its centrality in social policy from the early 1970s. For many, multiculturalism remains highly contested, ambivalent and unsettling (Markus, 2011; Markus et al., 2009) or elicits contradictory reactions (Goot and Watson, 2001). Nevertheless, Chisari (2013) shows that Australia has been having a ‘values debate’ for
the past 30 years. As early as 1981, then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser talked about the ‘shared fundamental values’ within the framework of multiculturalism – ‘Multiculturalism is about diversity, not division – it is about interaction not isolation’ (Fraser, 1981, cited in Chisari, 2013: 10). The *Fitzgerald Report* (Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies, 1988: 2) attacked the policy of multiculturalism, defining Australian citizenship and national identity through a core set of national values (Chisari, 2013: 12). It stated that Australia would not allow ‘the unacceptable and repugnant’ to be transplanted into Australia and that Australians expected a commitment to ‘basic institutions and principles’.

The Howard government continued in a similar vein. Howard insisted that Australian migrants were privileged and were obliged to ‘endorse and imbibe and embrace the values of our society’ (Chisari, 2013: 26; see also Vasta, 2004). Kevin Andrews (2007), Minister for Immigration and Citizenship in 2007, echoed previous assimilationist discourses that migrants had to ‘become like the mainstream’. One of the most controversial aspects of the new Citizenship Act 2007 was the introduction of a Citizenship Test, which questioned new migrants on their knowledge of Australian history and culture. The booklet *Life in Australia*, provided by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIC, 2007) for people applying for visas to live in Australia, begins with an ‘Australian Value Statement’.1 However, Jakubowicz (2009: 30) points out that ‘[t]he supporting documents make no mention of multiculturalism as an Australian value or even a momentary dimension of Australian policy’. Similarly, in her analysis of the Citizenship Test, Tilbury reveals how the test focuses on homogeneity, mainly targeting Muslims ‘who are seen to have values diametrically opposite to those of “Australia”’ (Tilbury, 2007: 10). A review by the Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee of the Citizenship Test found that the test was ‘flawed, intimidating and to some discriminatory’. In response the Rudd Labor government in late 2007 (soon after being elected) pledged to change the contents of the test (Klapdor et al., 2009: 19).

These moves followed years of debate about multiculturalism and ‘Australian values’ – which included questioning the commitment and loyalty of Australians of immigrant background, particularly in the context of concerns about terrorism and the integration of Muslim Australians (Fozdar and Spittles, 2010; Klapdor et al., 2009). It was not until February 2011 that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) government announced its new multicultural policy. Its four principles focused on (1) cultural diversity for national unity, community harmony and democratic values, (2) a just, inclusive and socially cohesive society, (3) the economic benefits of a multicultural nation and (4) promoting understanding and acceptance while responding to expressions of intolerance and discrimination (DIC, 2011: 5). In a public speech, then Prime Minister Gillard (2011) listed a number of Australian ‘shared values’, among them ‘multiculturalism’, referring to it as ‘a proud
history of overcoming difference, of finding common ground’. This definition of multiculturalism is a little misleading because Australian multiculturalism has never set out to ‘overcome difference’. It has been more concerned with recognizing difference. Nevertheless, concerns about ‘social cohesion’ and ‘shared values’ remain and reflect a move away from ‘civic’ multiculturalism to ‘cultural’ assimilationism (Harris, 2013: 33). In some quarters, ethnic and cultural differences are still seen as problems that need to be overcome.

It is this concern about values – about Australian and British values, about migrant values, about implied superior and inferior values – that has led me to question the values that guide our lives, those that are different and those that are shared. Despite proclamations about shared values, in reality we know very little, in any systematic way, about the values that are important to Australia’s ethnic groups, including those of Anglo-Australians. It is these concerns about values that underpin our project on _The Affinities in Multicultural Australia_. We have two working hypotheses: the first is concerned with people’s views about whether affinities can outweigh differences, while providing the basis for forms of connectivity and sense of belonging; the second is that while ethnic and cultural differences are intimately tied, there are other social divisions which might create greater differences, such as conflicts between generations, between religious and secular Australians and between differing levels of education and class position.

In this chapter, I specifically concentrate on the results of a small pilot study. I report important values nominated by our respondents and how they might reveal similarities and differences in the ways in which they are practiced across ethnic groups, with a specific focus on the generational differences reported by young people of migrant background ranging between 19 and 28 years of age. Using two of the interviews with these young people as case studies, I discuss two main themes that have emerged. Firstly, about _constructing Australian values_; young people frequently assert their Australianness by constructing and claiming certain values and identities as Australian values, however different they may be from the mainstream. Secondly, while many younger ethnic-minority Australians claim to have a strong respect for their parents’ cultural values, the difference is considered not as a conflictual problem but as an issue of generational differences and social change.

The project

The pilot phase of this project was completed in Sydney in late 2012. I conducted 51 pilot interviews with Australians of various backgrounds: Chinese, several of whom were of Shanghainese origin), Ghanaian, Indian, Italian, Lebanese, Sudanese and Anglo-Australian. Ten of the 51 interviews were conducted with respondents aged 19 to 28. In this pilot project we asked
respondents to talk about the values or the ideas that guide their lives, to
discuss those they think are significant to them and their ethnic communi-
ties, and to consider similarities and differences in values with other ethnic
groups.

Some conceptual considerations

Theories of affinity, alliance and solidarity, especially within modern urban
contexts, have a lineage that goes back to the roots of sociological theory. But
some of the earlier essays, such as the work of Wirth and Simmel, provide a
legacy based on the assumption that diversity might undermine affinity and
community. Taken to its extreme today, we have the Samuel Huntington
(2002) thesis about the clash of civilizations between Western democratic
and Islamic religious values. Hence there is a strong drive in many Western
countries of immigration for social cohesion and a move towards assimila-
tionism. This drive has paved the way for the social-cohesion framework of
which Harris (2013: 32–7) provides a systematic critique through the follow-
ing three points (see also Vasta, 2010). The first relates to Putnam’s (2000,
2007) notion of social capital, which relies on ideas of homogeneity and
shared values based on voluntarism and community as the focus of building
social cohesion rather than attributing this role to the state and its social
policies. Here the responsibility to integrate remains with the migrants. A
second notion of social cohesion is concerned with the assumption that
communities are at their most cohesive when people share a sense of place.
Geographers, instead of conceiving the relation between space and ethnic-
ity simply in terms of territory and exclusion, emphasize the connectivity
and relational character of space, shaped by the practices in which people
engage (Amin, 2002; Massey, 2005). Thirdly, ‘the privileging of achievement
of consensus over disagreement and debate’, or ensuring respect for dissent
in a healthy democracy, means that the ‘idealisation of consensus serves to
problematis...
are very remote’ (2000: 79). Furthermore, he rejects the idea of civic nationalism based on a common set of political institutions, for this would ignore any common history, language and culture (Miller, 2000: 131). ‘National identity’, according to Miller, ‘provides both the moral and the juridical boundaries of citizenship by tying the geographic base of the nation to the territorial base of the effective state’ (Miller, cited in Williams, 2007: 239). This means that where there are different cultural histories that come from various geographical locations within a nation, this position leans towards the need for an assimilative state. Iris Young (1990) reminds us that even mild forms of assimilation can have oppressive outcomes.

An alternative theoretical approach that engages directly with the growth of cultural diversity suggests that affinities and solidarity emerge from the national identity of a multicultural political community; solidarity is not a given but is nurtured and constantly recreated (Parekh, 2008). For Parekh, common belonging requires the expansion of identities as well as a convergence of the identities of the various parties that are central to our national identity (Parekh, 2008). In a similar vein, Modood argues that ‘a sense of belonging to one’s country is necessary to make a success of a multicultural society’, where strong multicultural identities and strong national identities are required, as they are interlinked. Thus, multicultural citizenship requires an emotional pull, a sense of belonging (Modood, 2007: 148–50). This second approach provides an expanded notion of national identity that nonetheless requires a common sense of belonging to the nation, an expansion of identities that are flexible and open to change.

A more contentious theory, the polity approach, while sympathetic to diversity and multiculturalism, deviates insofar as it distinguishes between what Mason calls a ‘sense of belonging together’ and a ‘sense of belonging to a polity’ (2000: 127). In this approach, the citizens of a state might, in principle, have a sense of belonging to a polity without having a sense of belonging together, to a typically perceived homogenous national culture. In other words, we can belong to ‘communities of shared fate’ where connection to one another ‘is not necessarily a shared identity, a shared sense of membership, or a shared commitment to common values, but a system of social interdependence . . .’ (Williams, 2007: 243). This suggests that we look for ‘points of connection’ (rather than just similarities per se) that allow people to coexist ‘well enough’.

**Constructing Australian values**

The young people interviewed for this project were much more confident about constructing their own Australian values and identities than their predecessors, in earlier migration phases, had seemed to be. This was definitely the case with those who were schooled in Australia compared with those who arrived as young adults. The second generation whom we interviewed
were able to engage with this process in a much more assured and assertive way, finding a space to analyze Australian myths and legends – of which one such myth is *Australian mateship*.

**Australian mateship**

The everyday experiences and lives of young Australians of ethnic background result in a varied and complex set of identities, some of which may, at times, come into conflict with each other. These young people draw upon their cultural heritage and their daily lives to assert their identity and sense of belonging. Interestingly, Australian mateship was highlighted as a value that needs to be deconstructed.

Mateship is considered to be one of Australia’s most important values. It is commonly linked to an Australian national identity that includes a ‘matter-of-fact egalitarianism’, ‘a tolerant ideal of “a fair go” for all’ and with a ‘masculine emphasis on mateship’ (ACPEA, 1982: 5), and it conjures up the ANZAC legend based on images of war and the disastrous Gallipoli landing in 1915.² Because the characteristics of ‘Australian mateship’ are traits generally attributed to Anglo-Australian males, it works as an exclusionary notion for indigenous Australians, women and migrants. One young Anglo-Australian woman says:

> The mateship thing, I think it’s definitely true . . . It’s definitely a boy/boy thing . . . But where that idea came from bothers me, too. When we were fighting a war, we stuck by each other. Well, any country, their men would do that! It’s not an Australian thing, and it drives me insane. It’s like saying the Germans or the Chinese wouldn’t stick by each other. Of course they would!

Like most nations, Australia has its own constructed legends to which it clings. Danni,³ one of the pilot project’s Christian Lebanese interviewers, stated, ‘All nations have an imagined sense of self [and] all national myths are manufactured.’ He and Sara, a Christian Lebanese respondent, discussed the meaning of Australian mateship. Sara suggests that the ANZAC legend has always been manufactured and ‘that’s the one that’s the common thing we see through, all the main Australian myths and legends’. Between them, they list the national characteristics that have emerged from the ANZAC legend:

- **loyalty to other people**, that is, family and community: this is a major Lebanese value that helped Sara to explain how solidarity works within families and communities;
- a healthy **disrespect for authority**: this is entangled with the Ned Kelly symbolism about the folk hero who resists the Anglo-Australian ruling class;
- **larrakinism**: the state of being a mischievous or playful person;
• a sense of being the underdog: Sara claims that even when people have the resources and skills to be ahead in any international contest such as the Olympics, Australians still see themselves as the underdog; and

• hardworking, the battler: Sara says, ‘Australians see themselves as battlers even if they have a mac-mansion in the suburbs and they’re extremely middle class.’

Nevertheless, among Australians of immigrant background, ‘mateship’ has become a contested value – it is not uniquely Australian. Arjan, a young Indian-Australian man, says:

I think mateship’s very important. I don’t think that’s unique to Australia. I think Australia thinks it is, but it’s not. I’ve seen it in different cultures. It might be expressed in a different way, and I think in other ways it’s expressed more openly and more to a grand extent. I think they’re important values. A fair go, mateship, they’re all important values, but I don’t like them being [thought of] as unique to Australia. I don’t think they are, and I think that’s just something that’s used in the media to try and differentiate people from other people.

Thus, mateship can work as a distancing mechanism. The idea of the superior, unique value sends out a message of inferiority to those (women, migrants) who have not had that experience. It represents a hierarchized value, creating a sense of superiority against the values of other cultural groups. This is part of the assimilationism that is inherent in the Australian Value Statement (AVS). As noted earlier, the AVS and the Citizenship Test do more than just inform people about Australian values. In the wake of the anti-Muslim sentiments that emerged after 9/11, Western democracies felt compelled to showcase their values as superior to those of many other cultures (Morgan and Poynting, 2012). This generated unequal power relations in the process of cultural production and solidarity. ‘[T]he strength of the ethical claim may be precisely its ability to divide the world into good and bad and to challenge notions of coexistence that appear unworkable’ (Bhattacharyya, 2009: 3). Hence, the idea of superior and unique values undermines the strong bonding that Sennett (1999) talks about, for it creates an apparent distance that does not exist.

Arjan is reframing mateship as an Australian value about friendship that is universal. He is well aware that Anglo-Australian cultural traditions dominate in the media. As a result, Australians of immigrant background, particularly younger people, often highlight ‘respect for diversity’ as an important value that is sometimes lacking in our understanding of multicultural Australia. The comments on mateship and on what constitutes Australianness resonate with Harris’ research with young people, where she found that ‘Most of the young people associated Australianness with very limited and clichéd
characteristics and activities [demonstrating the] narrow stereotypes about what it means to be Australian’ (Harris, 2013: 120).

**Constructing Australian identities**

In the following example, Tomaso, a young Italian Australian man, reveals where persons of immigrant background are narrowly stereotyped and marginalized within the framing of a multicultural Australian identity:

> Just to give an example, well I’m a multi . . . I’m a representative of multicultural Australia right? And there was a period where I worked for a theatre company in [...] that did original work. Original Australian work. But this original Australian work was written by Italian Australians. Performed in English; performed in Italian; across different styles; all wholly original work. By people who were born here. Studied here; practiced here and so on. And yet this was multicultural theatre. Not Australian theatre, not mainstream theatre [but] multicultural theatre that got multicultural funding, okay? And so that, to me, was an infuriating example of those politics . . . it’s marginalised because you are different, and so for them those same people to go ‘Yeah, but you are Australian’ – you can’t have both. You can’t say to someone, ‘You are Australian, but you are multicultural Australian’. Are you Australian or are you not? The problem is that all this kind of language comes out of this Australian context that still has as its fundamental core identity in an English-speaking one, an Anglo-Australian one. And the rest, it is trying to accommodate.

Nevertheless, in a similar portrayal to the results of Hussain and Bagguley (2005: 415), who report that second-generation British Pakistanis draw upon citizenship rights to assert their identity and sense of belonging, Arjan exemplifies in the next quote how many younger and second-generation Australians assert their sense of belonging and Australianness by constructing and claiming certain Australian values and identities, however different from the mainstream, as their own. Arjan continues:

> So, Australian values – it’s the same values I’ve described before about myself and my community, because I’m an Australian. So, I actually get a bit annoyed . . . [with] an ex-Australian football player who does these commercials for lamb where he talks about how you have to eat lamb on Australia Day, and he really annoys me because I’m an Australian and I’m vegetarian . . . I’ll tell you how I would like to define [Australian values]. I’d like them to be defined by being a multicultural society of, you know, people being vegetarian or going to a temple or going to a mosque or going to the beach or going for a walk . . . that’s the sort of Australian values that I hold.
There is an expansion of national identities, particularly among the young. After a century of continuing immigration, Australia now has a multiethnic and multicultural heritage which will not be ignored by its young. Economic, political, religious, linguistic, geographical and other factors play an important role in the complexities of today’s national identities. As noted in earlier research, there are variations in models of belonging and national identity (Harris, 2013; Vasta, 2013). While many may not necessarily be attached to a traditional national identity as put forward by liberal nationalists, they do contribute to the common good. Both Harris’ and Vasta’s research reveal the complexity of belonging, and showed that people construct a sense of identity and belonging which is multiple and varied depending on circumstances and context. Immigrants and younger generations have intricate as well as subtle ways of defining both integration and belonging. They can be bound to the rest by a common sense of belonging, where they share common interests as well as rights and obligations, thus corresponding with the approaches discussed above on multicultural national identities and the communities of shared fate. They can also maintain transnational identities, multiple geographical sites that they call home, multiple belongings and engagement without any sense of confusion or divided loyalties (Vasta, 2013).

Generations and change

Generations and policy changes

One interesting issue that has emerged from the pilot interviews is the difference in the construction of identities and Australianness between the second generations of the postwar years of the 1950s to 1970s and the more-recent second generations. Returning to some of my earlier work among second-generation Italians, many of whom grew up during the assimilation-policy period of Australian postwar migration, we had this kind of angst, as demonstrated in the following excerpts from Lombardo 1985 (cited in Vasta, 1992: 164):

I had never realised that I was classified as different because I didn’t know that blonde hair and blue eyes was seen as normal . . . As I noticed these differences, and I was hurt, I tried to change myself to be accepted. The first thing I learnt was no salami sandwiches for lunch, and instead I wanted to order a meat pie or a vegemite sandwich . . .

[. . .]

My Italianness stood out in me as if I was wearing a constant sign . . . I even started believing the images they [Australians] had of my culture, and if they made fun of it, I’d find myself laughing with them rather than defending myself . . . Walking down the street, I tried to avoid relatives and family friends so as not to be stopped and kissed and hugged . . .
Some of this angst remains but, with the move to multiculturalism, for many young Australians of immigrant background one’s family and community culture became something to be proud of. Those from European cultural backgrounds and, later, from Asian backgrounds found their cultural traditions were no longer denigrated – as they had been during the assimilation period. Nevertheless, examples abound of how attitudes towards Italians have changed – particularly with Italian cuisine and fashion – making Italian-Australians rather fashionable!

This does not mean that racism has disappeared, as experienced by many Muslim and African migrants. Danni and Sara talk about malicious and non-malicious racism, which can be ‘a playful acknowledgement of difference’, for example, joking with friends of English origin or from other ethnic groups about the cultural stereotypes of each other’s ethnic communities. In direct contrast to the Italian youth of the 1960s and 1970s, who wanted to hide from their Italianness, Danni reveals how the Arabic ‘other’ has been constructed as exotic:

I’ve been really lucky because I don’t feel like I’ve ever been exposed to any kind of malicious racism. It could be just because I’ve always been surrounded by children of immigrants but I’ve also been surrounded . . . at university . . . a lot of my friends are Anglo and I’ve never . . . Yeah. I’ve played it up because I feel they get off on the exoticism of my background. Yeah, but I remember, I was on the phone to my Dad and I always make a point to speak in Arabic whenever I’m on the phone to my Dad. When it’s just the two of us, I speak to him in English, but I know that everyone around me gets off on hearing me talk in Arabic and after I put the phone down . . .

Finally, although this exoticism works for Danni, it is clearly a gendered exoticism, as Sara found it distinctly uncomfortable:

That’s what’s always made me uncomfortable about Uni because it always did feel like, you know, it was exotic, like, you’re different . . . in the inner west at Uni it was . . . I don’t know, I kind of wasn’t as comfortable with that aspect of it.

**Generational changes**

According to scholars such as Giddens (1990, 1991) and Beck (1999), modernity has moved into a new phase. Increasingly, the simple modernity of industrial societies has been replaced by a ‘reflexive modernity’ of the postindustrial age. This has led to greater uncertainty and loss of control, creating what Giddens calls ‘manufactured uncertainty’. According to Beck (1999), this uncertainty characterizes European societies as ‘risk societies’ (Arts and Halman, 2004: 31). He further claims that contemporary solidarity
is seen as a break with the past, in that the rise of the welfare state and individualization, and the decline of traditional institutions, have undermined traditional solidarities. First-generation migrants often experience extraordinary levels of uncertainty and contend with numerous types of risk – this is an enduring feature of the migration process. First-generation migrants tend to maintain the values and traditions they have grown up with. However, Inglehart and Baker (2000: 19) found that, despite major economic changes, there is a simultaneous ‘massive cultural change’ and a ‘persistence of distinctive cultural traditions’.

Analyzing the *World Values Survey* (1990–2012), Inglehart suggests that ‘age and economic circumstances (rising economic and physical security) bring about changes to value orientations between generations due to different experiences in their formative years’ (Inglehart, 2000: 221). Referring to advanced industrial societies, Inglehart indicates that, generally, there is more certainty for younger generations, particularly as economic and physical security rises. In the following quote, Arjan highlights this very point by referring to generational differences in relation to a sense of security, belonging and change:

I think the main difference is probably the emphasis on culture, so the emphasis on maintaining your culture, on keeping it strong. The group I come from, there’s a strong emphasis on that . . . ‘This is how you’re supposed to be’, because they want to protect it, and they want to make sure it survives, and they want to make sure that what they know stays around, as opposed to something different coming in. And they don’t know how they’ll cope or how they’ll adapt . . . whereas I think in the Australian culture, broadly speaking, there’s less emphasis on that because everybody is secure in who they are and what they’re doing, and the people around them, much more than, I think, people from my ethnic background.

Arjan makes two main points here. Firstly, those born and bred in Australia have a certain sense of security inherent in that status. First-generation immigrants migrate precisely to gain a sense of economic and physical security, and to provide their children with a sense of security and belonging. Inglehart’s research supports Arjan’s claim: ‘If one grows up with a feeling that survival can be taken for granted, instead of the feeling that survival is uncertain, it influences almost every aspect of one’s worldview’ (Inglehart, 2000: 223). Secondly, Arjan points to a difference between the generations in his community. While his parents aim to preserve their cultural traditions, Arjan comfortably navigates his way between his cultural heritage and traditions and his Australian identity and sense of belonging.

For Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001), people are constantly exposed to risk and uncertainty. Elias (1982) rejects Beck’s dualism, arguing that people come together by processes of mutual dependence, thus forming new
configurations of social formation (see also Furlong and Cartmel, 2010). For the young, the idea of finding common ground and developing solidarity focuses on how social relationships can be based on cooperation and negotiation, rather than on assimilation, in order to contribute to the common good (Parekh, 2008). In other words, their identity is concerned with the capacity of people to find ways of living together – despite people's differences – that are mutually beneficial.

Conclusion

There is a dominant ideology about what constitutes Australian values and this ideology is emphasized during periods of national insecurity. In many countries of immigration, there is a lingering concern that migrants are not integrating; this, in turn, is said to create a barrier to a sense of belonging. In Australia, hierarchized and unchanging values, such as mateship, remain a part of the national imaginary yet generate distance and discrimination. Nevertheless, young Australians of immigrant background differentiate between myths and reality, and take a constructive role as agents of change.

That differences between generations are greater than those between ethnic groups requires systematic research. This small study indicates that the strength of differences between generations varies according to a number of characteristics of both the immigrant groups and the economic and policy context in which they have settled. For example, migrants who have come from traditional villages find that their children very quickly take on values of the dominant society. Though this might create some conflict between the generations, we found that, compared with earlier generations of youth during the assimilation policy phase, the current younger generation has a more constructive way of navigating the differences between themselves and their parents in a non-conflictual way. We found this as much with people of refugee background from Lebanon and Sudan as with young Indian-Australians.

The official recognition of cultural diversity has made a significant difference to the way in which young people manage cultural and generational differences. But this does not mean that all young people are able to navigate between their parents' cultural expectations and their own. There is a strong possibility that class position, location, sense of place and gender may make a difference to an individual's sense of agency when confronting and dealing with the cultural traditions of family, community, youth and the broader society.

Finally, this pilot project has provided some insight into how racism plays out in different places and social spaces. Racism has been deconstructed into malicious and non-malicious, where the latter can range from joking around with cultural or ethnic stereotypes to the more challenging issues raised by gendered exoticism. There is a sense that where young people have a strong appreciation of ethnic diversity and community, they are able to manage
and negotiate their way around various forms of racism. Strength of community, class location, time and the extent of community development all contribute to how young people deal with racism.

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Notes

1 Includes freedom and dignity of the individual, commitment to the rule of law, equality between men and women and English language.
2 ANZAC stands for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. The legend has emerged around the comradeship that developed, in the face of adversity, among these soldiers of the First World War.
3 All names have been changed.

References


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Conclusion
Migration has been a fact of human life throughout history, yet recent decades have seen the development of new types of migration flow across the globe amid a broader process of neoliberal globalization. In the first chapter of this book, Stephen Castles argued that Karl Polanyi’s study of the ‘Great Transformation’ of European societies, resulting from the ideological dominance of nineteenth-century market liberalism, provided a way of understanding the crises of modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Attention was also drawn to the way in which influential social scientists have updated and broadened Polanyi’s approach to provide a conceptual framework for understanding twenty-first-century neoliberalism and its impact on societies around the world. In this book, most of the authors apply a social transformation analysis in order to understand processes of international migration.

While the percentage of the world’s population who are international migrants (currently about 3.1 per cent) has remained almost static over the last half-century, there has been a growth in the absolute number of people moving and a diversification in the places from and to which people move and the ways in which they travel. At the same time, the growth of temporary and circular migration is leading to new types of incorporation in destination societies and to new forms of personal and collective identity. While not exhaustive in its scope, this book provides an initial analysis of the migration experiences of South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Australia in this era of neoliberal globalization. In each context, contributors to this book have highlighted the manner in which social transformation and migration have been experienced at the national and local levels over the last four decades. Central to these analyses has been the manner in which migration flows have emerged, not as a result or a cause of change but as an integral
part of social transformation processes taking place under the neoliberal model of globalization.

The neoliberal transformation: national experiences

In order to critically engage with migration today, it is crucial to look briefly at the specific contexts in which this transformation has taken place. As argued by Brenner and Theodore (2002: 349):

[I]n contrast to neo-liberal ideology, in which market forces are assumed to operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are unleashed, we emphasize the contextual embeddedness of neo-liberal restructuring projects insofar as they have been produced within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles.

Thus the neoliberal transformation has taken on very different forms in our case-study areas.

In the case of South Korea, neoliberalism must be seen as a new type of transformation following major earlier changes since the late nineteenth century. First came Japan’s military occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945. This led to the forced international migration of Koreans to Japan and to parts of China occupied by Japan. The next major shift was brought about by the Second World War, the division of Korea and the devastating Korean War (which became a proxy war in the East–West conflict), all of which left the country in ruins and the population impoverished. There followed a phase of rapid industrialization and urbanization under a military development dictatorship from 1961 to the 1980s. The focus was on protecting nascent Korean industries and keeping wage costs down to promote exports. During this period, student and labour movements emerged which were able to push the country towards democratization from the late 1980s. Neoliberal economic approaches were embraced by the newly elected government, and became dominant through what Koreans call the ‘IMF Crisis’ of 1997–99. The financial crisis allowed international capital to impose its principles of de-regulation and opening to global investment, leading to the collapse of many of the chaebols – the great, often family-owned, conglomerates which had emerged under the dictatorship – and the multinational control of others, such as Samsung and Hyundai. One consequence of this was the decline of secure employment for both manual workers and white-collar staff, leading to unemployment and insecurity.

In Turkey, major changes occurred with the establishment of the Republic following the decay of the multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire. The newly founded Republic of Turkey, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, promoted a Western-style modernization under authoritarian rules, a homogenized
Turkish Muslim population and state-led economic developmentalism. Turkey later followed a policy of import-substitution industrialization between the 1950s and late 1970s. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed a manufacturing-industry-led expansion, with increasing investments in big cities. The concentration of jobs in Istanbul and other cities stimulated internal migration from rural communities, especially of ethnic minorities like Kurds. In the late 1970s, Kurds started to protest against the suppression of their cultural identity and the unequal provision of services by the state. Turkey could not afford the effects of increasing oil prices, and growing conflicts between left- and right-wing groups were followed by a military coup d’etat in 1980. Neoliberal restructuring of the economy became significant after the coup and the return to parliamentary politics in 1983. The 1980 coup had repressed left-wing groups and paralyzed political life. From early in the decade, the Turkish economy – with the support of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – rapidly opened up to international markets, but without having an adequate institutional infrastructure (see Öniş, 2004). After a phase of economic crises in 1994 and 2000–01, the policies throughout the 2000s aimed to increase competition between private firms, and to provide even greater incentives for privatization. The result of neoliberalism for the Turkish economy and society has been the raising of individualism and income inequality. These conditions have also played a role in increasing the violence between ethnicized and sectarianized groups, and the police atrocities in response to protests by civilians from 2013 to the present day.

As for Mexico, the country has arguably experienced two cycles of economic liberalization. The first cycle involved the privatization of the lands belonging to both the Catholic Church and indigenous communities over the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The cycle ended with the protective countermovement represented by the revolution of 1910 (Otero, 2006). The second cycle began following the debt crisis of 1982. This marked the beginning of the country’s radical reorientation of its development strategy away from a model of import-substitution industrialization and towards a neoliberal agenda of export-led industrialization and trade liberalization. In this context, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 represented the peak of the transition period. As elsewhere, the aim of this shift was to give a greater economic role to the private sector while accelerating integration into the USA and the world economy. It is difficult to fully grasp the scope of these reforms without understanding Mexico’s political system. Throughout the twentieth century, Mexican politics were dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). During the rule of the PRI, many workers and peasants became organized into unions and ‘corporatist’ syndicates, yet those who expressed their concerns outside these official channels – for example, guerrilla movements, indigenous groups or labour insurgencies – were severely repressed. While the country witnessed
a ‘highly institutionalized transition to democracy based on successive electoral reforms’ from the 1970s onwards (González, 2011: 69), it was not until the year 2000 that an ‘opposition’ party won a presidential election. As with Turkey, the legacy of neoliberalism for the Mexican economy and society has been profound and still continues, with rising income inequality and increasing violence, as witnessed most brutally under the current war on drugs (see Arias Cubas in Chapter 11). Similarly, the ‘reform’ process is not yet finished, with recent proposals to further liberalize labour relations and privatize the electricity and petrochemical industries.

Finally, in the case of Australia, the neoliberal phase followed a nationwide period of development in the manufacturing industry after 1945, which went hand-in-hand with a government-led policy of population-building through the permanent immigration – until the 1970s – of mainly manual workers and their families. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) government of the early 1970s emphasized its improved welfare and free education for all, leading to growth in tertiary education and increased upward social mobility for children of working-class families. Neoliberalism came to the fore from the late 1980s, with ALP Federal Treasurer and, later, Prime Minister Paul Keating’s policy of opening the economy to global trade and investment. The result was a rapid decline in manufacturing and a fast growth in services, especially in the fields of finance, health and education. Service employment began to dominate the labour market, leading to a new demand for professional, technological and management skills. Since neoliberalism has also meant a squeeze on educational funding, leading to increasing resource inequality between government and private schools as well as constant increases in university fees, the demand for highly skilled personnel has been partly met through a reoriented immigration policy concentrating on economic criteria and temporary entry. At the same time, resources, especially mining, although employing relatively few workers, began to provide the largest share of Australian exports.

Parallel trends in diverse contexts

While the experiences of neoliberal social transformation in each country have been heterogeneous, some common trends can be identified. First, there was nothing ‘natural’ about this transformation. Instead, the transformations brought about by neoliberalism are the result of ‘social engineering and unyielding political will’ (Gray, 1998: 17). This is clearly exemplified in the cases of South Korea, Turkey and Mexico, where processes of economic and social change were initiated by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments during or after a period of economic or social crisis. In South Korea, the prioritization of manufacturing under the military dictatorship caused rapid economic growth, but at a high cost in social dislocation and political repression. This paved the way for the rise of the democracy movement and
the subsequent internationalization of the economy from the late 1990s. The transformation of Turkey’s economy and society started with the coup d’état in 1980 through state-of-emergency measures. Neoliberal policies were implemented by subsequent governments. In Mexico, most of the reforms mentioned above, including the implementation of NAFTA, occurred under the semi-authoritarian rule of the PRI before the country’s ‘democratic’ transition. Of our case-study countries, only Australia was and remained a stable democracy, yet here, too, the crisis in national manufacturing led to radical economic shifts, which increased social inequality and the insecurity of the working population.

Second, this transformation highlights the interconnectedness of the social, the economic and the political. It is not possible to point to a period in time and single out one ‘economic’ event as isolated from its ‘social’ and ‘political’ context and repercussions. An example of this is the manner in which Australia’s society has changed in step with an evolving economy that has moved away from manufacturing, and a political system that has favoured – quite selectively – new types of migrants while aggressively deterring others. In South Korea the links between political and economic liberalization were very strong, while the subsequent polarization of the labour market between high- and low-skilled occupations was a key factor in the emergence of a migrant-labour recruitment system for ‘3-D jobs’ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning). On the other hand, in Turkey, neoliberal economic policies such as the restructuring of the social security system have given rise to increasing numbers of charitable organizations, and to a growing stress on the importance of protection of the family and of religion as buffer zones against neoliberalism’s destructive force (see Coşar and Gamze, 2012).

Third, this transformation has neither been linear nor finite. In all the countries studied, the process of social transformation and the development of new forms of migration have occurred along a continuum of time and space. Whether it is through the decay of industries such as agriculture or manufacturing, or through the changing nature of towns and cities resulting from the inflow and outflow of internal or international migrants, the evolving nature of this transformation process is evident in each of the four case studies.

Fourth, this transformation has often not been peaceful, and its benefits and costs have been unequally distributed across economic, geographic and social spaces. In South Korea, the high social costs of economic transformation were borne by the working population through low wages, poor living conditions and enormous work stress. The situation has improved for some groups since democratization, but social exclusion has become a fact of life for many: the unemployed, the elderly and, indeed, anyone considered unproductive. In Turkey, most of the economic incentives were given for private investment in the bigger cities of the western part of the country. Similarly, the provision of state services has been uneven between rural and urban areas. Such
policies have resulted in internal migration, while the eastern and south-eastern regions, which are populated predominantly by Kurds, have been denied investment in industry and infrastructure, and remain under-developed. Such processes resulted in increasingly ethnicized identities and social conflicts between groups (see Ozkul in Chapter 10).

Mexico has also witnessed increasing inequality in economic, geographic and social terms. Income inequality increased significantly between 1982 and 1994, when the bulk of reforms were implemented amid two of Mexico’s worst economic crises. Adding to this, there are significant inequalities across regions within the country, with the northern part of Mexico benefiting from industrialization, while the poorer south and rural areas throughout the country were hit hardest by the collapse of small-scale agriculture. One problem associated with these patterns of inequality has been the inability of policies to create the quantity and quality of jobs required by a growing labour force. In response, many Mexicans have either emigrated or joined the informal sector. This is an issue that, after three decades of reforms, continues to affect those seeking employment.

In Australia, the neoliberal transformation has taken place in a series of gradual steps, and has not led to significant social unrest. Nonetheless, the continual growth in inequality has provoked protest movements. The rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in the 1990s represented a right-wing populist backlash, in which minorities like indigenous people, refugees and economic migrants were blamed for threats to the livelihoods and security of the working and lower-middle classes. On the left, the growth of the Green Party since the early 2000s indicates a protest against the pro-development and anti-welfare policies (as well as the corruption) of both the ALP and the Liberal–National coalition.

**International migration**

Our case studies show how important it is to go beyond traditional categories of countries of origin and destination to engage deeply with the complexity of migration flows. Since the 1980s, for instance, we observe the transformation of Turkey from an emigration country to one of immigration, with the arrival of migrants from increasingly diverse countries (see İçduyuğ and Kirişçi, 2009). Immigrants arrive either in transit to European or other countries, or to work and seek refuge in Turkey. On the other hand, emigration still exists, but the types of emigrants have changed. At present, students depart for higher education and highly skilled workers emigrate either to work in highly qualified jobs, or to have a better lifestyle abroad. Students generally choose the USA, Canada, Australia and the European countries, whereas investors and highly skilled workers depart to even-more-diverse regions, including the Middle Eastern and post-Soviet countries. All these changes have occurred simultaneously, bringing new cultures into Turkish society.
South Korea, too, is experiencing changes that may have a fundamental effect on social relations, culture and society. Although the government seeks to keep immigration temporary and to prevent settlement, the economic and cultural openings brought about by neoliberalism and immigration are having unforeseeable and potentially uncontrollable consequences. Certain sectors of the economy – especially small and medium-sized enterprises – have become dependent on migrant labour. Employers seek to retain good workers, and permissible lengths of stay have gradually been extended. Marriage migration inevitably brings cultural change – official policies for ‘multicultural families’ are really about ensuring that immigrant mothers bring up their children as ‘good Koreans’. Yet it is hard to see how the principle of cultural homogeneity can be sustained under such conditions. The collapse of the fertility rate that has accompanied industrialization makes it seem likely that migration will grow and become more permanent in character in the future.

In the case of Mexico, although the country is best known as an exporter of cheap labour to the USA, other dimensions of the migratory phenomenon must be taken into consideration. Highly skilled migration from Mexico to the USA has grown significantly in the last two decades, leading to a new mode of dependency in the context of the Mexico–US asymmetric regional integration process (see Delgado Wise in Chapter 13). In more recent years, Mexico has also witnessed growth in the numbers primarily of Mexican migrants and US-born Mexican-Americans who are returning – voluntarily or involuntarily – to Mexico (see García Zamora in Chapter 12). This has accelerated with the US economic crisis and harsher immigration policies. Finally, the country is still battling with the issue of transit migration. While this is not a recent phenomenon, increasing violence against thousands of mostly Central American migrants travelling through Mexico has brought the issue to public attention. These trends all represent big challenges for the Mexican government and for civil society at the national, state and local levels. They also highlight the need for regional approaches to ensure that migrants’ rights are protected.

Australia sees itself as a country of immigration, yet its government policies have shifted away from population-building and towards economic criteria – admitting those with skills, where possible on a temporary basis, reaping economic benefits from international students and keeping out the low-skilled and people in need of protection. Yet, as an increasingly knowledge-based economy, Australia actually needs lower-skilled workers to fulfil the demand for employees in child care, catering and other services. And it is hard to see how the current exclusion of asylum-seekers and their public demonization can be sustained in view of the often-repeated official rhetoric of human rights and fairness.

Contributions to this volume draw attention to the need to understand the manner in which migration is embedded in historical and geographical contexts.
Korea has a history of emigration that goes back to the nineteenth century, while forced labour migration to Japan and Japanese-occupied China became important in the lead up to the Second World War. Then, in the period of impoverishment after the Korean War, many Koreans moved overseas to seek work in North America, Europe, Oceania and – in the late 1970s – the Gulf oil countries. Industrialization and neoliberalization led to organized labour recruitment and other forms of immigration from the 1990s, but emigration for the purposes of study and work remains important. Both emigration and immigration have significant social and cultural consequences.

The early roots of Mexican migration to the USA can be traced back to the movements of people, or, to be more precise, to the movement of borders which were redrawn following the US conquest and partition of Mexico during the mid-nineteenth century. Later on, during the Second World War, the ‘Bracero Program’ (1942–64) mobilized 4.5 million young males to work temporarily in US agriculture and railroad-track maintenance. Migration flows continued after the end of this programme, but patterns shifted significantly from the 1970s onwards: the magnitude of migration flows intensified sharply, while Mexican migration also came not just from a few states, but from all over the country. Over the last couple of years, Mexican migrants in the USA have been confronted with high levels of unemployment and increasing anti-immigration sentiments linked to the financial crisis. Migration from Mexico to the USA slowed down from 2006 onwards and reached a much-publicized net standstill in 2010 (Cave, 2011). Yet emigration has not stopped and the migrant population – both first-generation migrants and their descendants – remains very large. This fact, in itself, is extremely important for our understanding of migration as a crucial component of social transformation.

In the case of Turkey, we can witness the historical and contemporary impact of various forms of international immigration in the process of nation-building. Non-Muslims living in the territories of today’s Turkey were replaced with Muslim Turks living in the Balkan Peninsula through population exchange agreements. These flows reinforced the homogenization of the new country as Turkish and Muslim, a process that adversely affected the ethnic and religious minorities (see İçduygu and Aksel in Chapter 8). These flows were followed in the 1950s by the emigration of Turkish nationals to Europe and Australia to find work and acquire technical knowledge, or to seek for political refuge from the authoritarian Turkish governments. Recently, due to economic developments and increasing investments by Turkish entrepreneurs in the Middle Eastern and post-Soviet countries, Turkish citizens have also started to migrate to these countries as workers.

Australia has been an immigration country ever since British colonization started in 1789. The first major inflows of non-European workers (mainly Chinese) occurred following the discovery of gold in the 1850s – leading to a hostile backlash by workers of British, Irish and other European origins. The
White Australia Policy, introduced at the time of Federation in 1901, was to stay in force until the 1960s. But it was the experience of the Second World War that led to an acceleration of government-organized labour recruitment and population-building. The aim was to bring in immigrants from the UK to keep Australia ‘white and British’. Paradoxically, the result was to create one of the world’s most ethnically diverse and multicultural societies. With the opening up to Asia, the White Australia Policy became politically and economically untenable, and Australia’s immigration policy has become increasingly complex and contradictory (see Jakubowicz in Chapter 14).

Local experiences of transformation and migration

Such historical and geographical singularities are highly significant when analyzing the real life implications of social transformation and international migration. In addition, our case studies point to the transformative impact of migration on private and public spaces. In the case studies of South Korea, Turkey and Australia, we can witness the impact of migration flows on the process of urban place-making and restructuring at the local level. In South Korea, the city of Ansan, where the Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) researchers carried out fieldwork, has been totally transformed, first through internal and then through international migration (see Kim in Chapter 7). Migrant concentrations – marked often by ethnic businesses and social meeting-places – are visible in Seoul, too, while even rural areas have been strongly affected by marriage migration (see Lee in Chapter 6).

Local case studies in Turkey demonstrate that the use of urban space has changed dramatically through migration. While a large proportion of Istanbul’s residents were non-Muslims up until the 1950s, the city subsequently hosted increasing numbers of generally Muslim internal migrants from other parts of the country. Our study in Kumkapı, a neighbourhood in Istanbul, gives an overview of changing migration flows and the tensions between migrants who arrived in different periods. Migrants’ use of urban space has changed the traditionally accepted codes of behaviour, and has given rise to plurality in modes of living. On the other hand, the rapid appreciation of land values in central Istanbul gave rise to brutal urban-transformation projects, forcing migrants out of the neighbourhoods where they had found shelter, work and – often – a sense of community.

Chinatowns in Australia were first established in the mid-nineteenth century, but declined in the long period of ‘White Australia’. Since the 1950s, certain neighbourhoods of big cities have become places of migrant concentration – first of Europeans and, more recently, of Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean and other Asian groups. Some of the older European ethnic precincts no longer house many immigrants, but have become gentrified centres of overseas cuisine and products (see Collins in Chapter 16).
In the case study of Mexico, however, the impact of migration is more apparent in the transformation of rural spaces and small communities. This includes not only private and public spaces – houses, plazas, churches, agricultural fields and so on – but also the manner in which families and communities have been affected by emigration and the parallel development of migrant hometown associations (HTAs). A culture of emigration was apparent in the community of Casa Blanca, from where generations of young men and women had left for work in the USA. While this has changed in recent years, the historical contribution of migration and large family networks across borders remains both important and contentious – since some argue that the possibility of migrating to the USA has actually reduced the initiative to bring about economic and political change in Mexico. Of course it is probable that migration from Casa Blanca (along with that from other Mexican villages) has been an important factor of transformation of communities in the USA – just as we have seen in South Korea, Turkey or Australia.

Contributions in this volume also indicate the need to understand the manner in which both migrants and existing populations – as individuals, families and communities – have responded to, adapted to or challenged this transformation process. This agency is most evident at the local level, whether through the reclaiming of public spaces, the provision of services or the input into policy developments. For instance, the case study of Fairfield, in Sydney, Australia, shows the residents’ remarkable openness to migrants and cultural difference. Institutions such as local schools and non-governmental ethnic, religious and arts organizations are instrumental in fostering these practices (see Koleth in Chapter 15). Conversely, the case study of Kumkapı, in Istanbul, Turkey, demonstrates that, due to their vulnerable conditions in neoliberal globalization, non-migrants can respond to migrants in a hostile way and blame them for causing negative changes in their areas. The lack of local institutions dealing with particular forms of marginalization aggravates racism at the local level (see Ozkul in Chapter 10).

Another significant finding of the case studies is the importance of crime (or often, more accurately, of perceptions of crime) in relation to migration. In Kumkapı, Istanbul, some locals accuse international immigrants of criminal or anti-social behaviour such as drug-dealing and prostitution. Such beliefs can result in the defamation of immigrants. Nonetheless, it is important to see that activities associated with crime play an important role in the local economies. In Casa Blanca, the relationship between migration and crime is most clearly exemplified by the current war on drugs. As reported by the locals, migration has become an ever-more-dangerous and costly adventure due to the presence of drug cartels along migration routes (see Arias Cubas in Chapter 11). Youth gangs and drug-dealing have also been important issues in some immigration areas in Australia (see Jakubowicz and Koleth in Chapters 14 and 15 respectively). The issue is less obvious in South Korea, although the currently emerging anti-immigrant groups do make claims about criminality.
While this volume aims to make a contribution to the development of an understanding and analysis of international migration as an integral component of social transformation, it is important to highlight that this remains a work-in-progress. A significant objective has been to achieve collaboration between scholars from different countries. International migration, perhaps more than any other area of study, requires the overcoming of national barriers in order to gain a more critical understanding of the issues affecting migrants, the processes fuelling migration and the associated challenges. In this context, collaboration between international scholars has the potential to move academic debates on international migration beyond the dominant focus on security, control, integration and remittances. Considering this, one of the main limitations of this volume is its lack of analysis of the experiences of African countries – many of which have been deeply affected by neoliberal globalization. An exploration of African social transformation and migration processes could significantly enhance this area of study.

This volume also shows us the need to rethink the ways in which neoliberal globalization changes relationships between states and individuals. The traditional understanding of this relationship was dependent upon a balance between individuals’ duties towards their state and states’ obligation to protect the freedom of individuals living on their territories and to provide them with a minimum level of socio-economic and cultural well-being in return. In the current era of social transformation, we are observing that this balance has deteriorated. Increasingly, duties of states have been replaced by a growing emphasis on the duties of individuals. How this imbalanced relationship will affect the meaning of national citizenship and belonging is yet to be seen.

The conclusions we present here – and indeed this book as a whole – should be seen as just one contribution to our understanding of the relationship between social transformation and human mobility. Our comparative case-study approach has made it possible to compare experiences, perceptions, identities and relationships across very different contexts. The similarities in many of our findings show the value of transnational research. But it is hard to go beyond the qualitative level (such as pointing to the existence of new forms of identity and interaction) and to establish the relative frequency and importance of such patterns. Quantitative research is still held back by the dominance of nation-state-based frameworks for statistical data and, indeed, for much social-science research. In an era of globalization and human mobility, transnational research across the social sciences is essential if we are to understand contemporary trends and to speculate on their possible future consequences.

References


### Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical concepts</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neoclassical economic approach</strong></td>
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<td>Income level</td>
<td>GDP per capita PPP (US$)</td>
<td>16,558.6</td>
<td>16,556.2</td>
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<td>50,700</td>
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<td>Income distribution</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>Economic growth</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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<td>Employment opportunity</td>
<td>Labour force (million)</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>798.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>46.0</td>
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<td><strong>Spatial distance</strong></td>
<td>Air fare (KRW)</td>
<td>958,572.4</td>
<td>472,242.4</td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>1,732,700</td>
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<td><strong>Cultural distance</strong></td>
<td>Korean wave (YouTube view count)</td>
<td>2,738,210.0</td>
<td>4,239,806.9</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>21,158,241</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Historical–structural approach</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign investment</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment (million US$)</td>
<td>5,277.8</td>
<td>10,902.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44,518</td>
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<td>International trade</td>
<td>Trade (export + import; thousand US$)</td>
<td>23,469,756.0</td>
<td>45,066,435.1</td>
<td>20,783</td>
<td>215,107,159</td>
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<td>Export (thousand US$)</td>
<td>12,434,738.6</td>
<td>26,594,877.4</td>
<td>9,907</td>
<td>134,322,564</td>
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<td>Import (thousand US$)</td>
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<td>19,561,931.4</td>
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<td>80,784,595</td>
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<td>1,248,298.8</td>
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<td>5,921,284</td>
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<td>388,509.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,830,929</td>
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Notes: * Data from the CIA's (2013) *World Factbook 2013*; † Data from Korean Air's website, www.koreanair.com; ‡ Data from Yonhap News Agency blog, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/medialabs/special/ps/index_en.html; § Data from Korean Eximbank (2013); ¶ Data from Korea International Trade Association (2013); †† Statistics from Korea Tourism Association (2011); †‡ Statistics from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2012). Statistical significance: † <0.10 * <0.05 ** <0.01 *** <0.001, N = 29.
Abbott, T., 221, 223
agency, 9, 11, 20, 22, 23, 28, 47, 224, 294, 310
airfare costs, and migration, 71–2
Anderson, K., 258
Andrews, K., 284
Ansan Migrant Centre, 107
Ansan (Gyeonggi-do, South Korea), 19, 98–100, 102–4
industrial complex, 98–101, 103–5:
employees by industry, 101
migrant population of, 99–100, 102, 106–8
new-town areas, 98–9, 104–5
transformation of, 97–8, 100–2,
109–10, 309
urban planning, 102–5
Wongok-dong district, 97–9, 106–9
anti-globalization activism, 9
Asian financial crisis (1997–98), 86, 103
assimilation, 29, 223, 286, 287
Australia, 41, 224, 234, 249, 284, 289
Canada, 41
South Korea, 91
United Kingdom, 283
asylum policy seekers
Australia, 27, 51, 232, 245, 307
Turkey, 123, 125–7, 161
Atatürk, K., 119, 302
Australia, 219, 237, 255
attitudes to immigration, 40–1
Challenging Racism Project, 33, 37, 231
Chinese migrants, 38–40, 257
Citizenship Test, 284, 289
globalized nation, 238–9
historical context of migration, 308–9
Korean migrants, 262
migration policy, 239, 307
patterns of migrant settlement, 241
racism, 224, 242, 244, 292, 294–5
regulation of migration, 272–7, 279
suburbs, transformation of, 255, 265
temporary migrants, 50

Transnationalism and Citizenship Project, 33, 36–7
Vietnamese immigrants, 233–5
see also Cabramatta; ethnic precincts;
Eureka's racism research; Fairfield;
multiculturalism; values and identity, Australian
Australian Citizenship Council (ACC), 228
Australian Labour Party (ALP), 224, 284, 304

Baker, W. E., 293
Beck, U., 292–3
Bhattacharyya, G., 289
Blainey, G., 224
borders
securitization of, 22, 133, 134, 176, 185
temporary of migration, 48–9, 52
Bowen, C., 222, 242
brain circulation, fallacy of, 209–11
Brenner, N., 302
Brewer, K. T., 160–1
Brisbane, Chinese-Australians in, 38–9
Bryman, A., 258
Buğra, A., 120
Bulgaria, 145
Burawoy, M., 21

Cabramatta (Sydney), Vietnamese Australian community, 222, 226, 232–5, 240, 241, 256
cacophonous diversity, Fairfield (New South Wales Australia), 237, 248–51
Calderón, F., 178
Cameron, D., 283
Campbell, M., 35
Canada, 276
attitudes towards immigration, 40–1
Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Project, 37–8
transnational links of Hong-Kong Chinese, 39–40

Note: bold entries refer to figures and tables.

315
Carruthers, A., 29
Casa Blanca (Zacatecas, Mexico), 
19, 167, 169–71, 173, 174, 177, 310
agriculture, 171–3, 181
depopulation, 173
diverse views on emigration, 174–5, 181
drug-related violence, 179–81
drug-related violence, 179–81
history of migration flows, 170–1
social transformation, 181
United States, migration to, 170–1, 173–4, 181
Castles, S., 29, 115
Catania, N., 261, 262
Cave, D., 187
chaebols (South Korea), 98, 100, 103, 104, 110, 302
Challenging Racism Project (Australia), 33, 37, 231
China
ethnic Koreans, 66, 67, 82, 86, 87
migration to Australia, 257
migration to Turkey, 154
resistance in, 9
Chinatowns, 256, 309
failed Chinatown in Perth, 259–62
Sydney, 257–9, 266
cities
ethnic precincts, 256
migration, 10
see also individual cities
Cobo, S., 186
colonialism, and migration, 73
comparative analysis, and migration research, 33
attitudes to immigration in Australia and Canada, 40–1
benefits of, 34–6
challenges of, 42–3
Chinese-Australians in Sydney and Brisbane, 38–9
constructed nature of, 42
convergent approach, 34
criticism of, 42
defining characteristic of, 35
divergent approach, 34–5
Hong-Kong Chinese in Australia and Canada, 39–40
linear approach, 34
Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Project (Canada), 37–8
Transnationalism and Citizenship Project (Australia), 33, 36–7
utility of, 35
Convention of the Rights of the Child, 276
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 123
counter-hegemony, 8–9
counter-movements, 5, 6, 8–9, 18
insurgent cosmopolitanism, 9
crime, and migration, 159–60, 178–81, 226, 234, 310
cultural distance, and migration, 72, 77
Cwerner, S. B., 47, 51, 55
Defence of Marriage Act (USA), 278
Delgado Wise, R., 170
departures
from Turkey, 134, 145–7
from United States, 176, 204
De Sousa Santos, B., 9
diasporas
and migration to South Korea, 73, 92, 110n
Turkey, 116, 122–3
see also Federation of Zacatecan Hometown Associations
dual citizenship
South Korea, 92–3
Turkey, 122–3
Dunn, K. M., 35, 39, 42, 231, 244
Durand, J., 186, 187
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 213–14
economic growth, and migration to South Korea, 70, 76
empathy, and multicultural community, 243–5
employment opportunity, and migration to South Korea, 70–1, 76–7
Engels, F., 5
entrepreneurial multiculturalism
Australia, 241, 256–66
ethnic precincts, 256
environment, destruction of, 7
ethnic precincts, 256, 265–6, 309
entrepreneurial
multiculturalism, 256
Perth (Australia), failed
Chinatown, 259–62
Sydney, 256–7: Chinatown, 257–9;
‘Little Korea’, 262–5
ethnographic migration research, see
temporalities of migration
Eureka’s racism research in Australia,
226–7
aims of, 227
community harmony, 230
contemporary implications of, 230–2
criteria for anti-racism
campaign, 229–30
qualitative report, 228
quantitative report, 228–30
suppression of, 231
European Convention on Human
Rights, 276–7
European Union, and Turkey, 125
Fairfield Multicultural Society, 238
Fairfield (Sydney, Australia), 19, 20, 27,
29n, 219, 237, 240, 242, 243,
248–52, 310
adaptability, 245–6
changing attitudes towards
difference, 242–3
community festivals, 246
diversity in, 19–20, 238
empathy and multicultural
community, 243–5
Fairfield Cultural Plan, 245
features and characteristics of, 238
individual interactions, 246–7
local initiatives, 27, 246, 247
openness to migrants, 245
resourcefulness, 247
social and spatial mobility, 238
socio-economic disadvantage,
29n, 241–2
spatial manifestations of migrant
culture, 244–5
Vietnamese migrants in, 240–1
see also Cabramatta; Sydney
family migration, regulation of, 276–80
Fargues, P., 124
Federation of Zacatecan Hometown
Associations, 185, 198
female migrant workers in Turkey, 133,
147–8
barriers faced by, 139, 145
commodification of, 143
criminalization of, 133
deporation of, 134, 145–7
domestic workers, 136–8
housing problems, 143
informality, 141, 146
lack of access to social
protection, 141
Laleli district of Istanbul, 134, 136,
138
marriage, 143–5
otherings, 133, 135, 148
police harassment, 146–7
racialization of, 142, 148
sex workers, 136, 143, 157
survival strategies, 146
tour operators and employment
offices, 141–2
violence of uncertainty, 133, 135,
148
visa regime, 138
vulnerability of, 133, 142
wages, 141, 142
work performed by, 133, 136
work permits, 142–3
feminization of international
migration, 134, 147
Ferguson, L., 231
financialization, and social
transformation, 6
Findlay, A. M., 48
Foner, N., 34–6
foreign direct investment (FDI), and
migration to South Korea, 72
France, 272–3
Fraser, M., 233, 284
Gallagher, K., 212
Germany, 120, 272, 275, 277
Giddens, A., 292
Gillard, J., 284–5
globalization, see neoliberal
transformation and globalization
glocalization, 21
González, F., 179
Gow, G., 243
Gray, J., 8, 304
Green, N., 34, 35, 42
Hage, G., 56, 241
Hanson, P., 225–8, 306
Harris, A., 285, 286, 289–90
Harvey, D., 7
Hewson, J., 226
high-income countries, 12n
impact of globalization, 6
highly skilled labour migration from Mexican-US economic integration, 202–5
neoliberal transformation, 203–4
new mode of dependency, 214
restructuring of global innovation systems, 201, 202, 205–7, 211–14
transfer of demographic dividend, 213
unequal exchange, 212–14
to United States, 207–9
Hollifield, J., 270
Howard, J., 225, 226, 230, 284
Human Rights Commission (Australia), 231
human rights law, and regulation of family migration, 276–7, 279–80
Huntington, S., 286
İçduygu, A., 124
identity, see values and identity, Australian
income distribution, and migration to South Korea, 70, 74
income gaps, and migration to South Korea, 69–70, 74–6
Inglehart, R., 293
innovation systems, global restructuring of, 205–7
appropriation of products of innovation, 206
control of research agendas, 206
creation of scientific cities, 205–6
highly skilled migration, 211–14: labour-force export, 212
indirect export of workforce, 212–13
internationalization of research and development, 205
multinational corporations, 206–7
new geography of innovation, 206
transfer of demographic dividend, 213
transfer of economic surplus, 212–13
unequal exchange, 212–14
Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), 195
insurgent cosmopolitanism, 9
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 276
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 276
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 276
international human rights law, and regulation of family migration, 276–7, 279–80
International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Database Project, 270–1
analyzing and comparing migration law, 271–2
see also regulation of migration
International Monetary Fund, 8, 103, 139, 303
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 141, 180
international trade, and migration to South Korea, 72–3
Işık, O., 124
Istanbul, 142, 152
Laleli district, 134, 136, 138, 156–7
see also female migrant workers in Turkey; Kumkapı
Jakubowicz, A., 284
Jang, J.-H., 103
Justice and Development Party (JDP, Turkey), 124, 139
Keating, P., 304
Kemp, A., 135
Keyder, Ç., 118, 153
Keyman, F., 124
Kim, D.-J., 86
Kim, H. M., 67
Kim, J.-H., 92
King, R., 48
Kirişi, K., 138
Index

Korea, Republic of, see South Korea
Kumkapı (Istanbul, Turkey), 12, 113, 156–7, 160, 164, 309, 310
African migrants, 157–61, 163
categories of international migrants, 161
changes in family and social values, 158–9
characteristics of, 155–6
detention and deportation centre, 134, 151, 158
employment conditions for migrants, 162–3
fear of expulsion, 158
international migration flows, 156–8
Kurds, 156, 159, 162
methodology of research on, 154–5
perceptions of migrants, 158–64
status of migrants, 157, 161–2
Kurds, 124, 126, 152, 156, 159, 162, 303

labour market
impact of globalization, 6–7
migration, 7, 70–1, 76–7

labour migration
South Korea, 65, 83, 91–2, 105:
Employment Management System (EMS), 86; Employment Permit Program (EPP), 64; Employment Permit System (EPS), 82, 84–5, 92, 106; ethnic Koreans, 66, 82, 85–6, 92; highly skilled, 66; Industrial Trainee System, 83–4, 105–6; less-skilled, 63–6; non-professionals and industrial trainees, 64; trends and patterns in labour migration, 82–4; undocumented migrants, 66, 84, 85; Working Visit System (WVS), 82, 85–7
Turkey, 120–1, 153–4: labour recruitment agreements, 120; social and political consequences, 121
see also female migrant workers in Turkey; highly skilled labour migration from Mexico
Liberal Party (Australia), 224
life course theory, 47
Li, F. L. N., 48
Lim, H.-C., 103
Li, W., 266
low-income countries, 12n
impact of globalization, 6, 8
Luxembourg, 272–3, 275, 277
McHugh, K. E., 47, 51, 57
Marchand, M., 175
market liberalism
critique of key principles, 5, 6
democracy, 8
social transformation, 5
Markusen, A. R., 103
marriage migration
prevalence in Asia, 88
regulation of, 277–8
South Korea, 63, 67, 68, 93–4: factors encouraging, 88–9, 93; female migrants, 88; integration policy, 90–1, 93–4; migrants by sex, 87; policy changes, 90–1; trends and patterns in, 87–90
Turkey, 143–5
Marxism, and social transformation, 5
Marx, K., 5
Mason, A., 287
Massey, D. S., 115, 169, 187
mateship, as Australian value, 288–90
Meethan, K., 259
Meeus, B., 48, 49, 56
Merkel, A., 283
Mestries, F., 186
Metcalfe, A., 221, 232
methodological nationalism, 11, 17, 24, 29
meaning of, 21
migration studies, 21–2
methodology, 10
agency and structure, 11
globalization and national studies, 11
local level studies, 12
methodological challenges, 19
migration as key aspect of globalization, 11
multi-scalar research, 12
re-embedding migration studies in social theory, 11
see also comparative analysis;
multi-scalar methodology;
theoretical principles
Index

Mexico, 167, 169
agriculture, impact of reforms, 7, 171–3
drug-related violence, 178–81
educational initiatives for migrants, 195–6: limitations of, 196
emigration as ‘safety valve’, 174
growth in emigration, 174
health care policies for migrants, 193, 198: initiatives at state level, 193–4
historical context of migration, 308
neoliberal transformation, 171, 172, 178–9, 203–4, 212–13, 303–6
Paisano Program, 190
political system, 303–4
postgraduate education, 210, 211
remittances from migrants, 174, 177, 187
rural transformation, 310
social and demographic profile of emigrants from, 174
transit migrants, 205
United States, migration to:
access to health care, 192
as cheap labour, 174–6
at circular migration, 170–1
decline in, 177, 187
deportations from, 176, 204
economic integration, 202–5
as forced displacement, 204–5
growth in, 173–4, 201, 204
impact of changing immigration policies, 176–7; impact of economic restructuring, 175–6; impact of financial crisis, 177–8, 187–8; move to permanent emigration, 176; repatriation of minors, 190, 194; return migration, 188–9; unemployment, 187; zero migration, 187–8
young people not in education, employment or training, 172
see also Casa Blanca; highly skilled labour migration from Mexico; return migration; Zacatecas

migration
causes of (to South Korea): correlation analysis, 74, 75–7; historical-structural approach, 72–4; neoclassical economic approach, 69–72, 74
challenges in theory formation, 115
changing understandings of, 46–7
complexity of migration flows, 306–7
disembodied understanding of, 9
global labour market, 7
growth in, 269
historical and geographical contexts of, 307–9
inter-state relations, 269
local experiences of, 309–10
methodological nationalism, 21–2
multi-level approach to, 17, 19–22
national debates over, 269
shaped by structure and agency, 11
social theory, 11
social transformation, 9–10, 115, 301: as integral part of, 10–11, 301–2, 311
stages of settlement, 223
transformation of urban and rural space, 309–10
transnational studies, 22
see also comparative analysis; multi-scalar methodology; regulation of migration; temporality of migration
Miller, D., 286–7
Modood, T., 287
Moldova, 136–7
Morton, A., 178–9
Motherland Party (Turkey), 140
multiculturalism
Australia, 221–2: attitudes towards, 40–1; competing discourses over, 224–5; components of, 222; criticism of, 241, 283; empathy, 243–5; Fitzgerald Report, 284; integration, 223–4; Living in Harmony policy, 231; managing tensions and conflict, 223; Muslims, 223, 225; National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, 225; nature of, 222–6; participation, 224; Pauline
Hanson’s influence, 225–6; policy principles, 284; representation of communities, 222; social dislocation and conflict, 221; values and identity, 283–95

Canada, attitudes towards, 40–1 contested nature of, 283 criticism of, 283 South Korea, 82, 91, 94, 97, 98, 107, 110 United Kingdom, 283 see also Cabramatta; Eureka’s racism research; Fairfield

multinational corporations, restructuring of global innovation systems, 206–7

multi-scalar methodology, and migration research, 12, 17, 19, 23–4 critical globalization theory, 21 defining scale, 19, 28 extending multi-scalar research as analytical tool, 27–8 mixed methods, 24, 28–9 multi-scalar ethnography, 23 operationalization of, 18, 24 participant observation, 26 participant’s articulation of scalar relations, 28 political geography, 22 quantitative and qualitative sources, 24–5 recruitment of participants at multiple levels, 25–6 relationship between nation-state and migration, 21–2 scalar repositioning of the locality, 27 usefulness of approach, 26–7 visual methods, 26

Munck, R., 8–9

national identity, 283, 286–7 see also values and identity, Australian nationalism, see methodological nationalism

National Migration Institute (INAMI), 190

nation-state international migrants, 124 mediation of global forces, 11

methodological nationalism, 21–2 role of, 115

neoliberal transformation and globalization, 6–8 anti-globalization activism, 9 Australia, 238–9, 304–6 commodification of labour, 6–7 commodification of land, 7 critical globalization theory, 21 as deliberate policy, 304–5 driving factors of, 4–5 evolving nature of, 305 impacts of, 6 interconnectedness of social, economic and political factors, 305

Mexico, 171, 172, 178–9, 203–4, 212–13, 303–6 negative social impact of, 8 as political process, 7–8 race to the bottom, 134, 137 restructuring of global innovation systems, 205–7: highly skilled migration, 211–14 social transformation, 6–9

South Korea, 103–4, 302, 304–5 state-individual relationship, 311 temporalities of migration, 46 Turkey, 133, 134, 139–41, 151–3, 164, 174, 302–3, 305–6 unequal distribution of costs and benefits, 305–6 see also social transformation


One Nation Party (Australia), 225, 227, 228, 306 Ottoman Empire, 118

Park, C. H., 100 Park, R., 223 Park, S. O., 103 participant observation, 26 participant self-documentation, 54–6

Perth (Australia), failed Chinatown in, 259–62
Philippines, 49, 90
photography
in migration research, 26
participant self-documentation, 55
Pınarcıoğlu, M., 124
Polanyi, K.
counter-movements, 18
double movement, 8–9, 22
fictitious commodities, 6
‘great transformation’ thesis, 5, 6, 18, 301
re-embedding market in society, 8
Polanyi Levitt, K., 6
political geography, and multi-scalar approaches to migration, 22
Putnam, R., 232, 286

race to the bottom, and Turkey, 134, 137
racialization
definition of, 135
Fairfield (New South Wales, Australia), 249–50
female migrant workers in Turkey, 142, 148
racism
Australia, 224, 242, 244, 292, 294–5: Challenging Racism Project, 33, 37, 231
Turkey, 164
see also Eureka’s racism research; racialization
Refugee Council of Australia, 27
refugees, 269
Australia, 242
Turkey, 126, 127
regulation of migration, 269
analyzing and comparing migration law, 271–2
conflicting aims of nation states, 270
economic migration, sophistication of selection methods, 274–6, 279
entry tracks, 272–3, 274
family migration, 276–80
IMPALA Database, 270–1
increased codification and complexity, 272–4, 279
international human rights law, 276–7, 279–80
selective openness, 270
shaping of social and economic processes, 270
social transformation, 269
trends in, 270–1, 279–80
remittances from labour migrants
Mexican migrants, 174, 177: reduction in, 187
Moldova, 137
Turkey, 120
Reporters without Borders, 155
research and development, internationalization of, 205
Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis Project
(Canada), 37–8
resistance, 9
return migration
characteristics of, 186
Mexico, 185: economic reintegration, 190–1; factors encouraging, 185, 187; governmental response to, 190–1; human rights protection, 190; impact on educational services, 194–6; impact on health services, 192–3; literature on, 185–6; Migrant Support Fund (FAM), 190–1; need for comprehensive support programme, 191; proposals for support programme, 196–8; recent trends in, 187–8; Zacatecas, 188–9
Turkey, 121
Ruddock, P., 226
Sassen, S., 137
Saul, J. R., 7
Saxenian, A. L., 206
securitization of migration, 22, 52, 133, 134, 143
see also borders
settler societies, 45
social capital, 232, 286
social change, distinction from social transformation, 4
social cohesion, 283, 286
social theory, and migration studies, 11
social transformation
counter-movements, 5, 6, 8–9
definition of, 4
distinction from social change, 4
driving factors of, 4–5
evolutionary models, 5
financialization, 6
high-income countries, 6
international migration, 9–10
local experience of, 3, 309–10
low-income countries, 6
market liberalism, 5
Marxist approach to, 5
migration, 115, 301: as integral part of, 10–11, 301–2, 311
Polanyi’s ‘great transformation’, 6, 301
responses to, 310
state-individual relationship, 311
see also neoliberal transformation and globalization
Social Transformation and International Migration in the 21st Century (STIM) Project, 17–20
conceptual framework, 4
main research question, 3
theoretical principles, 10–12
Solingen arson attack (1993), 123
South Korea, 61
causes of migration to, 68:
correlation analysis, 74, 75–7; historical-structural approach, 72–3; neoclassical economic approach, 69–72; research model, 68–9
democratization, 103
disparity between big and small business, 104
dual citizenship, 92–3
historical context of migration, 308
immigration policy, changes in, 84–5
impact of migration, 307
industrialization, 101:
Ansan, 100–1
laissez-faire approach, 63
as migrant-receiving country, 81–2
multiculturalism, 82, 91, 94, 97, 98, 107, 110
neoliberal transformation, 103–4, 302
number of foreigners living in, 63
pressure on wages and working conditions, 104
settled immigrants, 65, 81–2:
etnicity of, 82; marriage migrants, 67; overseas ethnic Koreans, 67; permanent residents, 68
transformation of, 81, 91
see also Ansan; labour migration; marriage migration
Spain, 272–3
Stiglitz, J., 8
structural adjustment programmes, 8
see also International Monetary Fund
Switzerland, 272
Sydney
ambivalence about diversity, 241
attitudes to immigration, 40–1
Chinese-Australians in, 38–9
emergence as global city, 239
ethnic precincts, 256–7:
Chinatown, 257–9, 266; Little Korea, 262–5
labour market segmentation, 240
as migrant destination, 239
patterns of migrant settlement, 241
socio-spatial cleavages, 240, 242
transnational links of Hong-Kong Chinese, 39–40
see also Cabramatta; Fairfield
Syrian refugees, 127, 135
Taiwan, 90
Taylor, A., 26
temporalities of migration, 45–6, 48
changing understandings of migration, 46–7
conceptualizing heterogeneous migrant temporalities, 48–9
construction of research subjects, 50–1
emerging literature on temporal dimensions of migration, 47
ethnographic migration research, 46, 47, 53: methodological challenges, 56–7; participant self-documentation, 54–6
heteronomous time, 51–2
identity, 51
methodological discussions, 47–8
neoliberal forces, 46
staggered migration programmes, 45
temporalities of migration – continued
temporary migration, 45
time as a border, 52
timescales, 49, 53–4: macro and meso, 51–2; micro, 52
time tracks, 48–51, 53–4
women’s labour migration from the Philippines, 49
Theodore, N., 302
theoretical principles, 10–12
challenges in theory formation, 115
local experience of global changes, 12
migration and structure and agency, 11
migration an integral part of social transformation, 10–11
multi-level approach to globalization, 12
national mediation of global forces, 11
re-embedding migration studies in social theory, 11
Tilbury, F., 284
timescales, see temporalities of migration
time tracks, see temporalities of migration
tourism, and migration to South Korea, 73
trafficking, human, 134
transit migrants
  Mexico, 205
  Turkey, 125, 126, 148n, 153, 154
translocality, 21
Transnationalism and Citizenship Project (Australia), 33, 36–7
transnational research, 10, 22
Tulsa (Oklahoma), Mexican migrants, 171, 174
Turkey, 113, 129, 152–3
agriculture, 139–40
citizenship, 122–3: dual citizenship, 122;
naturalization, 127–8
commodification of land, 7, 140, 153
deportations, 145–7
diaspora politics, 116, 122–3, 128
EU accession negotiations, 125
historical context of migration, 308
immigration of Turkish Muslims, 118
internal migrants, 152, 156
irregular migrants, 126, 135–6, 154
limits on formal immigration, 127
marriage migration, 143–5
migrant workers, 153–4: domestic care work, 137–8, 164
migration policy: 1923–1950s, 118–19; 1950s–1980s, 119–21, 152, 156; 1980s–2000s, 122–4; milestones in, 117;
post-2000 period, 124–9, 135, 138, 144, 145–7, 153–4
neo-Ottomanism, 128
non-Muslim emigration, 118, 121
non-Turk, non-Muslim immigration, 123–4
Pink Card procedure, 123
population management, 116
refugees, 126, 127, 135
remittances from labour migrants, 120
return migrants, 121
state-led labour migration, 120–1
as transit and destination country, 116
transition to country of immigration, 124–5, 135, 153
transit migrants, 125, 126, 148n, 153, 154
urbanization, 120, 126, 140, 153
see also female migrant workers in Turkey; Kumkapi; Kurds
undocumented migrants
  Mexico, 176, 177, 205
  South Korea, 66, 84, 85
Turkey, 123
see also female migrant workers in Turkey
unequal exchange, 212–14
United Kingdom, 276, 283
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 269
United States
  Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 177
Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986), 176
regulation of migration, 274, 275, 277–8
see also highly skilled labour migration from Mexico; Mexico

values and identity, Australian, 294–5
Australian Value Statement, 284, 289
conceptual considerations, 286–7:
national identity, 286–7;
polity approach, 287;
social cohesion, 286
construction of, 287–8, 290–1
debate over, 283–5
dominant ideology, 294
generational changes, 292–4
mateship, 288–90
racism, 292, 294–5
research project, 285–6
second-generation migrants, 291–2
Vancouver, 39–41
Vancouver Center for Excellence, 37
Vietnam, 90
voluntary servitude, 134

Washington Consensus, 7, 203
Willis, K., 34, 36
World Bank, 8, 303
World Social Forum, 9

world systems theory, 73
World Values Survey, 293

Xiang, B., 23, 26–8
Yeoh, B. S. A., 34, 36
Young, I., 287
Yükseler, D., 160–1
Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, 128

Zacatecas (Mexico)
agriculture, impact of reforms, 172–3
depopulation, 173
drug-related violence, impact of, 179, 180
health care initiatives for migrants, 193–4, 198
history of migration flows, 170–1
lack of employment options, 173
return migration, 185, 188–9: impact on educational services, 194–5, 196; need for support programme, 198
United States: decline in migration to, 177; migration indicators, 188
see also Casa Blanca
Zarsky, L., 212
Zenteno, R., 187