Routledge Handbook of Sports Event Management

Edited by Milena M. Parent and Jean-Loup Chappellet
From the Olympic Games to community-level competitions, sports events can be complex and pose a particular set of managerial challenges. The Routledge Handbook of Sports Event Management surveys the management of sports events around the world of every size and scale, from small to mega events, including one-off and recurring events, and single-sport and multi-sport events.

The book adopts a unique stakeholder perspective, structured around the groups and individuals who have an interest in and co-create sports events, including organizing committees, promoters, sport organizations, spectators, community groups, sponsors, host governments, the media and NGOs. Each chapter addresses a specific stakeholder and defines that stakeholder and its relationships with sports events, describes the managerial requirements for a successful event, assesses current research and directions for future research, and outlines the normative dimensions of stakeholder engagement (such as sustainability and legacy).

No other book takes such a broad view of sports event management, surveying key theory, current research, best practice, and moral and ethical considerations in one volume. With contributions from leading sport and event scholars from around the world, the Routledge Handbook of Sports Event Management is essential reading for any advanced student, researcher or professional with an interest in sport management, sport development, sport policy or events.

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ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPORTS EVENT MANAGEMENT

Edited by Milena M. Parent and Jean-Loup Chappelet
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Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the context of sport event security and of the various types of security agencies (local, national, international, public, and private organizations), and other related stakeholders involved in the planning and hosting of sport events. Following this overview, research associated with risk, sport event security, and safety is presented. The chapter concludes by providing suggestions for further reading and future research directions.

The organization and delivery of sport events now requires an increasingly systematic approach to governance, including planning and managing for every kind of possible risk. This process of risk management incorporates the use of security measures to ensure that event venues, spectators, athletes, and officials are kept safe. In this chapter, security is defined as a range of measures adopted by event stakeholders to maintain order, enforce relevant legislation, prevent and detect crime, and ensure a feeling of safety. The definition of risk management used is, "risk management is a proactive process that involves assessing all possible risks to the events and its stakeholders by strategically anticipating, preventing, minimizing, and planning responses to mitigate those identified risks" (Leopkey and Parent 2009: 187).

Security at sport events is affected by a range of factors, from local contextual and historical aspects (e.g., spectator related tension) to larger geopolitical influences (e.g., political or religious motivation). The reaction to the rising awareness and categorisation of such risks, either real or perceived, has been an increase in strengthening events' preventive infrastructure, especially since 11 September 2001 (9/11) (Boyle and Huggerty 2011). Evidence of the increase have been seen at a range of large and smaller sport events, such as the Olympic Games, Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) events, especially those involving countries with terrorist connections; cricket games involving Pakistan; and domestic events such as United States (US) college football games, to name just a few.
This contemporary focus on public safety, security, and risk mitigation has contributed to a range of improvements in event technology, staff training, and operational procedures and practices. Correspondingly, the resources allocated to security at sport events have also significantly escalated. Security expenditure was $180 million for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, while security costs topped an estimated $1.9 billion at the London 2012 Olympic Games.

Safety and security issues are of a primary concern for a range of event stakeholders, specifically key decision-makers, governments, media, and the public. These security stakeholders have different control powers, interests, needs, and agendas, although each anticipates specific benefits for their contribution to the organisation and aising of sport events (Parent 2008).

Terrorism (e.g., the 2013 Boston Marathon, the 1996 Atlanta Centennial Olympic Park bombing, and the Olympic Games terrorist attack in Munich 1972) is generally regarded as the most serious security issue, especially from the perspective of the Western media (Atkinson and Young 2012). However, such acts of terrorism have been infrequent, when compared to other security issues. Essentially, the main security risks differ, depending on the site, type, and context of the sport event; however, generally the majority of risks are associated with illegal crowd behaviour (e.g., public intoxication, spectator aggression), local crime (e.g., ticket scalping), political activism (e.g., 'anti-event' protests, strikes), and terrorism (e.g., bombs or shootings).

Sports event stakeholders have developed sophisticated bid documentation and operation manuals to contract these risks and dictate low security is to be managed. For example, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has introduced a Candidate Procedure and Questionnaire. Essentially, this document functions as an evaluation process by which the IOC's Evaluation Commission assesses each applicant city on a number of decision-making criteria, each of which is essentially an implicit indicator of risk. Additionally, often in agreeing to host events, local, regional, and/or federal governments have been required to introduce specific event-related legislation, by-laws, and other legal mechanisms to protect venues and limit risk. However, many of these legal arrangements have been questioned in terms of implications of citizen/human rights (Taylor and Tochey 2011).

The implementation of policies and practices in relation to sport event security typically involves an exercise of power by one or more of the event stakeholders. While the mechanisms developed to cope with perceived security risks have led to the development of greater community resilience (Boyle and Higgeney 2009), it has also been suggested that sport events have been used as a 'laboratory' for introducing new security systems, allowing heightened security ritualisation processes to expand beyond the boundaries of the event for which they were originally conceived (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010). Additionally, Rick (2011a) has questioned the use of power, under the guise of risk management, by event owners/organisers, which can control and influence the host city's security and surveillance strategies, as well as its urban design.

Overview of the stakeholder group

Sport event security, especially, but not exclusively, at the mega event level, has become increasingly multifaceted, multi-layered, pre-emptive, pervasive, technologically dependent, politically responsive, complicated, commodified, and costly. Such demands can strain the resources of event organisers. These security transformations have also impacted all levels of sport events and have meant that the number, variety, and power of sport event stakeholders involved in security aspects have increased concurrently.

Sport event security stakeholders now come from the public, private, and voluntary sectors at local, national, and international levels. These stakeholders can include international and national intelligence services, homeland security departments, event-dedicated intelligence agencies, immigration agencies, police forces, military personnel, and security contractors hired by the event. Understandably, this mixture can result in vastly different and even conflicting interests, approaches, and agendas with various other event stakeholders, including the event organisers.

Generally, the security services and police tend to focus their attention on categories such as threats from crime, disorder, and international terrorists, whereas the event organisations committees tend to be more interested in a wider portfolio of security issues affecting the organisation and operation of the event, such as hooliganism. As a result, from an operational perspective:

The process of coordination and management of SMEs engages multiple and heterogeneous stakeholders coming from the private and public spheres. As a result, these mechanisms cannot be conceptualised, exclusively, according to a vertical, hierarchical, linear and state-centred vision. On the contrary, they should be comprehended following a more horizontal and fluid configuration, linking together private and public forces and overlapping the clear distinction between public and private spheres... they should not be restricted to a territorial conception... security consists of dynamic, extensive operations... developed through an inter-institutional, supranational, horizontal and diverse networks within governments, outside governments and within the grey areas between, beyond the national territory transcending the borders of the host country.

(Masnou-Cardona and Dervis 2013: 125)

Essentially, a sport event security stakeholder is any organisation or person who has something to gain or lose through a security-based relationship with the event. Thus, sports events need to adapt to and influence the changing expectations, motivations, and perceptions of their stakeholders.

Stakeholders have legitimate interests in an organisation or event, and the interests of all stakeholders are often interrelated to the organisation or event. The application of stakeholder theory to sport organisations has revealed that there can be complex networks of contiguity stakeholders and an even more consolidated framework of those whose associations are more distant but nevertheless need to be considered (Sweaney and Casterline 2007). All sports events, no matter how big or small, can be advantaged or constrained by their stakeholders' varied agendas, including those agendas related specifically to security.

Eisenhauer (2013) suggested four global influences on current security management processes at sports events: a general increase in counter-terrorisation and commodification; globalisation; technological expansion; and militarisation. The current crucial place of security as an integral part of the planning and staging of sport events both reflects and influences the increasing importance, especially in Western institutions and societies, of the implementation of formal risk management controls, practices, and requirements, as well as the ongoing fear of major security problems, such as terrorism.

While risk management practice itself is becoming more rigid and insomnoric (cultural and geopolitical differences notwithstanding), it still requires choices of 'which risks to discount, which to monitor, and which risks to mitigate and protect against' (Jennings and Lodge 2009: 8). While safety and security have always been a key function of stadium and arena management, with venue managers needing to keep their venues safe and secure within a broad risk management perspective (Sweeney 2005: 22), since the 9/11 attacks, the threat of terrorism has brought risk and security management to the forefront of sport event planning, especially for mega and major events.
The response of sport stakeholders has resulted in increased security measures (for both safety and anti-terrorist requirements), not only in the event venues, but also within the surrounding event precinct and host cities. This has at times been enacted through a technologically-driven social control agenda that has been criticised for the potential to subjugate individuals’ rights (Taylor and Toohey 2011). Such an approach becomes increasingly problematic when these measures are aimed at particular social groups in an effort to restrict an event’s space and can inhibit spectators’ enjoyment for the majority. For example, previously acceptable and seemingly innocuous practices, such as beating drums, waving flags, and even the ‘Mexican Wave’ have been forbidden in some venues, under the guise of providing a safe spectator environment.

In addition to these changes, Clavel (2013) cautions that preventative and intrusive high tech surveillance and securitisation is dominating contemporary sport event security discourse and practice. Spaaij (2013) suggests that this panoptised approach is a result of the growing emphasis on authorities’ role of predictive, anticipatory and preventative action, to control all possible sources of danger before they might occur. Further, he suggests that this pre-emptive discourse of risk management means that any level of risk, however slight, is deemed unacceptable and is monitored. This has meant there has been increasing cooperation around sports events between security agencies and nations, which may not have collaborated previously or may even been opponents (Clavel 2013).

Thus, sport event security has been affected by events and stakeholders outside of sport, resulting in increased surveillance and other deterrent measures. However, sports events have not only been a passive recipient in this connection. Clavel (2013) notes that SMEs have affected the upwards re-calibration of everyday security processes and have become laboratories for the testing of security measures, especially those using the latest technologies. Additionally, the introduction of ongoing and improved international security collaborations between the events’ security stakeholders, including governments, nationally and internationally, has improved.

The scale, location, and format of a sport event influences its stakeholders’ approach to risk and security. For example, multi-sport events, such as the Olympic Games, are mostly concentrated in precincts in a single city or region, thus concentrating risk to a relatively condensed geographical area. However, football, rugby, and cricket world cups are usually spread over a larger area and may even be co-hosted by more than one country. They may also occur over a significantly longer period of time, leading to more potential trouble spots; however, this also means a corresponding diffusion of risks (Jennings and Lodge 2009).

Additionally, the types of security threats and thus stakeholder responses differ between different forms of sports events, especially SMEs. While the Olympic Games have been associated with geopolitical conflicts (such as between North and South Korea in 1988) and/or terrorism (Munich 1972),

international football tournaments tend to be associated with public disorder, violence and organised hooliganism, with large crowds of national (and sometimes local) supporters who gather for specific matches during concentrated periods of competition. This contrasts with the Olympics where . . . spectators . . . tend to comprise diverse/ transnational audiences that do not divide their support across different teams that symbolise historical lines of national conflict. Olympics, Football World Cups and European Championships therefore each encounter the problem of creating a platform for rival, nationalist and anti-capitalist demonstrations, and associated disorder or rioting- but the ways in which they are likely to be realised vary quite significantly. (Jennings and Lodge 2009: 10)
Also increasingly, the CCTV cameras remain after the event concludes, leading to increased and ongoing surveillance of the general public, and potentially intruding on individuals’ civil liberties. Thus, temporary event security measures may become permanent as surveillance mechanisms are used for general public surveillance. This will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Intelligence and security data is increasingly being shared by event security stakeholders on a transnational basis for international events. For example, the 2006 World Cup, Germany built on bilateral agreements it had in place with 36 other nations. These mechanisms have already been utilised in previous European football tournaments, as well as for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games (Jennings and Lodge 2009). Furthermore, existing international forces such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Interpol (which signed an agreement on 9 May 2010 to share data and co-operate) may be involved (Clavel 2013). Additionally, specific international security agencies have been created for SMEs. For example, each Olympic Games since Atlanta 1996, has created an Olympic Intelligence Centre (OIC) to assimilate information and risk assessments for intelligence of Olympic interest through cooperation and information-sharing protocols involving over one hundred countries and international organisations (Jennings and Lodge 2009: 13).

On a domestic basis this security cooperation also occurs. For the 2012 London Olympic Games, existing intelligence agencies (such as the Joint Intelligence Committee, M15, M16, Government Communications Headquarters GCHQ and the Defence Intelligence Staff) intersect with a number of Olympic specific coordinating organisations in particular the Cabinet-level Olympic Security Committee and the Metropolitan Police’s Olympic Security Directorate (OSD). An Intelligence Unit has been established within the OSD to gather and share information between security stakeholders for London 2012. (Jennings and Lodge 2009: 13)

While there is a legitimate and important place for risk management and technology in sport event management, organisations also need to understand the range of emotional responses to these solutions. As Durucic (2007) argues, too much reliance on technical solutions can actually heighten the sense of risk. He also notes that perceptions of risks are as important – if not more so – than the actuality of the risks we face, as perceptions often determine behaviour. Thus . . . irrespective of the basis for such fears in scientific fact, their effects are real in social consequence, leaving governments with little choice but to take such concerns on board and to regulate accordingly. (Duranici 2007: 76)

The role of the stakeholder

As previously discussed, hosting a sports event requires significant risk assessment, security investment and the projection of resilient security strategies. This investment is generally proportional to the scale of the event, with local community events at one end of the spectrum and the events that attract an international audience, either as spectators or via media channels, at the other end. The many faceted community and commercial drivers that underpin sport events obviously impact on stakeholders’ desire to maintain control over key security and surveillance activities.

Irrespective of event size or scope, nearly all post-9/11 security budgets have escalated in response to contemporary perceptions of threats of terrorism. Although there is a low risk of an actual terrorism incident occurring during an event, there appears to be heightened public demand for all possible contingencies to be covered. While tens of thousands of sports events run each year without incident, it only takes one high profile situation, such as the Boston Marathon bombings on 15 April 2013, which killed three people and injured 264 others, to increase public demand for the ‘better’ security and safety. In carrying out an assessment of the risk of terrorism in the 2020 Olympic Games Applicant Cities, the 2020 Evaluation Commission noted, ‘any city in the world can be subject to a terrorist attack either by local or international terrorist groups’ (International Olympic Committee 2012b: 3).

Significant resources are invested in a range of security strategies for sport events. These may be activated by the event owners, host cities, and/or nations. Security strategies in public spaces encompass an extensive range of public order, risk, safety, and stakeholder brand protection and commercial interests associated with an event. As extracted below, the case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC), hosted by South Africa, is a demonstration of the scale of security and safety planning and the range of stakeholders required to host a modern large scale event.

The FIFA World Cup – South Africa 2010

South African Police Service had a budget of about R1.3 billion (equivalent to USD 146 million) to address safety and security at the FWC. This is similar to the 2006 Sydney Olympics budget (USD 179.6 million), but only about one-eighth of the security budget of the 2014 Athens Olympics and 2006 Turin Olympic Winter Games, and less than five per cent of the security expenditure at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Approximately R440 million was allocated for deployment of 41,000–44,000 police officers. Some R865 million was spent on procuring special security equipment, such as crowd management equipment and associated body armour.

The City of Cape Town safety and security plan above accounted for an additional seven fire engines; seven law enforcement vehicles; seven traffic motorcycles; 124 fire fighters; 35 traffic officers; 21 disaster-management officers and 180 law enforcement officers. More than 446 jobs were created and approximately 2,340 people were trained in crowd management and the overall safety and security plan involved 3,600 existing police officers throughout the Western Cape Province. Some 1,200 new South African Police Service members were trained in basic policing, firearm usage, and first level crowd management.

There was a 24-hour Provincial Joint Operations Centre in each province where tournament matches were played. In the Western Cape, they were based at what was called the Police 'War Room', in Cape Town's CBD and coordinated with the Venue Operations Centres (VOC) and mobile command centres that were set up at the Green Point stadium and at each site along the event footprint across the province, including all public viewing areas sites. The VOC had representatives from Law Enforcement, Emergency Services, South African Police Services, South African Health Military Services, Traffic Services, Media Police Services, Fire and Rescue, Disaster and Risk Management Services, Event Management, Event Security Services, and other related agencies.

The Deputy National Police Commissioner remarked, 'a World Cup is a dream for every police chief – I can ask for anything, and I get it!' (Extract from Durrani 2013:145).
As can be ascertained from the FIFA World Cup example, event safety and security involves a complex array of stakeholders. With respect to the Olympic Games, Gligorov and Gold (2013) reported that the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games operations required interaction with over 150 different agencies, including all spatial domains of government and national and international sponsors and partners. They also noted that the LOCOG had virtually no pre-existing knowledge and expertise on which to draw in matters concerning security, transport, international relations, national coordination, emergency services and city logistics (Gligorov and Gold 2013:17).

Table 19.1 outlines key event stakeholders and some of the more common security-related interventions that they typically pursue. These stakeholders will also interact and respond to the local community, athletes, performers, event attendees, and associated sport organisations that are involved with the event. The security-related expectations of each stakeholder and that of the event organiser toward each stakeholder will vary depending on their relationship. Stakeholder expectations can be communicated through consultation, contracts, on-site inductions and performance monitoring, feedback, and evaluation.

The key interventions identified in Table 19.1 are each overviewed below with examples of occurrences.

### Legislation

It has become common practice, and indeed mandated by some event owners, for the hosts of international events, to introduce new legislation as part of the event agreement. Typically, these laws and regulations grant police increased powers of control over public spaces (Gigliottini and Kluever 2011) or the right to introduce what might be considered as intrusive surveillance mechanisms. There are many instances of security-related law reform and government intervention. For example, prior to the Athens Olympics, under international pressure, the Greek Parliament passed a new anti-terrorist law (2002/2002). Post 9/11, there has been a greater mass surveillance and maximum security provisions sanctioned by host city (country) legislative changes. It has been suggested that governments are often manipulated into enacting event-specific legislation as a cost of doing business in exchange for hosting the event (Grady et al. 2010).

Legislation may be specific to a single event. For example, in the lead up to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, the New South Wales Parliament passed three new pieces of legislation: The Homebush Bay Operations Act and Regulation 1999, the Security Industry (Olympic and Paralympic Games) Act 1999, and the Sydney Harbour Ferries Authority Regulation 1999 ("the Olympics Security Legislation"). The premise of this new legislation was to control behaviour within public spaces (Toohey and Taylor 2012). Increased powers were granted to police and other authorities to ensure public order was maintained by directing people to move on when behaviour was deemed to constitute obstruction, harassment, or intimidation of others. The introduction of this legislation was met with some criticism due to the discretionary decision-making power given to the police to control public space and the disregard of civil liberties. Further, there has been much written about the temporary privatisation of public spaces to allow for more intrusive surveillance by contracted security companies during events than would normally be allowed by police (see: Eick and Togner 2008, or Eick 2011a and 2011b for more detailed discussion).

In a study of the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa, Eisenhauer (2013) reported that the Planning Committee was required to incorporate certain legislation and regulation into their safety and security plans, including the 2010 FWC South Africa Special Measures Acts (nrs. 11 and 12 of 2006) and the 2010 FWC By-laws. Similarly, in the candidate documentation for
Table 19.1: Continuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Type</th>
<th>Requirement of Key Personnel</th>
<th>Risk and Safety Management/ Hazzard Plans</th>
<th>Law Enforcement and Media Personnel</th>
<th>State or National Command Determination of National Security Personnel to Work with Public Authorities and the Police Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Recruit and train appointees in event personnel</td>
<td>Safety measures, event day procedures, contingency plans, site plans, and details of security equipment.</td>
<td>Authorized with accreditation and identification</td>
<td>To ensure that TV and media personnel work in accordance with the established accreditation and identification, and not interfere with the safety and security operations of the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating</td>
<td>Set specific requirements and guidelines for risk management.</td>
<td>Personal work - identification and accreditation.</td>
<td>Law enforcement and media personnel, with necessary identification and accreditation, must work to the established procedures and identification.</td>
<td>Fix the required position of officers (CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor/Sport Facility</td>
<td>Security personnel deployment plans</td>
<td>Control and responsibilities</td>
<td>Identification and accreditation, must work to the established procedures and identification.</td>
<td>Fix the required position of officers (CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Personnel</td>
<td>Operations manual including medical plans, planned preventative maintenance schedule, fire risk assessment, and details of security equipment.</td>
<td>Instrumental in the event day procedures, contingency plans, site plans, and details of security equipment.</td>
<td>Security firms/police and emergency services must ensure no interference with the safety and security operations of the event.</td>
<td>Fix the required position of officers (CO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The personnel responsible for the management and coordination of the event, including the development of procedures and plans, must ensure that all personnel work in accordance with the established guidelines and identification. The State or National Command must determine the required position of officers (CO) to ensure smooth coordination and efficient management of the event.
linked to communities and community development goals. Examples were presented of symbolic attempts to foster community development around the sporting events' strategies. Yu et al. (2009) noted that there are often wider social and political implications and complications connected with these event-security-related developments, and Hall (2006) opined that SMFs can be used as a political instrument to conceive or legitimise urban development strategies. Notably, alongside the many positive initiatives and renewal projects associated with event-driven urban planning and development, some projects have been shrivelled in controversy. For example, the Indian city of Delhi hosted the 2010 Commonwealth Games as an opportunity to increase foreign investment levels and become a powerful world player. Delhi underwent significant urban and infrastructure developments, including new sport stadiums, a new link road network, and notably controversial beautification campaigns which involved slum demolitions (Dupont 2011).

In a study of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, Boyle and Hagerty (2011) observed that the city's Project Civil City initiative, promoted urban development in concert with intensified levels of policing and security. However, they suggest that the promises by event organisers that development would bring benefits to the residents of the city were largely unrealised. Similarly, Kasule and Watt (2011:778) noted that measures to reduce youth crime in East London were a major policy objective before the London Olympics, recognising that even two years before the opening ceremonies were scheduled to begin, young people living in transitional housing in East London were encountering the revived spatial practices that also accompanied the Vancouver Olympics, carried out through intensified policing and security regimes. There was intensification of police 'stop and search' powers in relation to young people and related 'clean up the streets' operations in preparation for the worlds intensive glare. Kasule and Watt suggest that the measures acted to stereotype youth as public order risks and that the building of Olympic infrastructure, when coupled with increased policing measures, had a direct impact on some of the youths' everyday lives.

The UN Habitat (2007) reported that one of the main causes of large-scale forced evictions are international mega events, including global conferences and international sports events, such as the Olympic Games. Such evictions are often undertaken with bulldozers, supported by heavy police presence, and the targets are usually the residents of poor informal settlements or slums. The UN Habitat reported that approximately 720,000 people were forcibly evicted in Seoul and Incheon (South Korea) prior to the 1988 Olympic Games; 30,000 forcibly evicted in Atlanta prior to the 1996 Olympic Games; hundreds were forced from their homes in preparation for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games; and 1.7 million people were reportedly evicted in Beijing (China) in the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games (2007: 129).

Technologies for security surveillance

The provision of a safe and secure environment is of high priority for sport event owners, event venues, host cities, and countries. There are pressures on these stakeholders to portray the event as having the latest and most sophisticated security and surveillance measures available. This has triggered significant growth of sport event security budgets and a corresponding expansion of security expertise and technologies. Within his analysis of mega events, Klauseter (2010) has argued that host cities have responded to the demands and expectations of event owners and the public by constructing enclosed and tightly controlled enclaves that are equipped with advanced surveillance technologies and large numbers of security personnel. Further, it has been suggested that mega-events may provide platforms for security companies to introduce and pilot new security technologies that potentially present wider benefit in society (Giulianotti and Klauser 2011).

The examples of technology-related interventions are vast. Prior to 9/11, many technology advances and initiatives were spurred by attempts to quell British soccer hooligan violence, 1990s. This had significant benefit not only for game attendees but globally as the associated security surveillance was transferred to urban centres (Giulianotti and Armstrong 1998) and other sport facilities and events. The Athens 2004 Olympic Games required significant urban development and installation of surveillance systems, which created a sizeable financial burden for Greece. According to Minas Samatas, an expert on the Athens Olympic security operation, the surveillance system cost $300 million, and years after the Olympics, it remained unworkable (cited in Modrus 2011). Science Applications International Corp (SAIC), the contractor hired to deliver a security system used during those Olympic Games, was, in 2013, awarded more than $52 million in damages and fees by an international arbitrator, who ordered Greece to pay for what the company alleged was breach of contract. SAIC was contracted in 2003 to deliver a command, control, communications, coordination, and integration system to prevent a terrorist attack during the Olympics and subsequently to serve as a security system for the Greek law enforcement community. According to SAIC, Greece used the system for two years after the Olympics, but failed to formerly declare ownership of the system or pay SAIC. Interestingly, the lack of any major security breach was more to do with the behind the scenes diplomacy between the Greek government and Muslim, Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli representatives, than the cost of the electronic surveillance system demanded by the US security and compliance lobby (Reje 2013).

However, the legacy was such that the Chinese organisers of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, including the International Olympic Committee, worked from over 70 other countries to work with them to design and implement the massive surveillance systemtermed the 'Golden Shield' (Samatas 2011: 3534). This involved 24/7 monitoring of citizens by CCTV cameras, Olympic radio frequency identification chips (RFID) tickets and second generation national ID cards; phone call monitoring by digital voice recognition systems; and the 'Great Firewall' system of online censorship and filtering. In 2010, for the Commonwealth Games, 2000 CCTV cameras were installed throughout the host city of Delhi (Giulianotti 2013).

In discussing the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, Eck (2011b) noted that a wide array of FIFA-imposed security and surveillance technologies were deployed, including airborne warning and control system planns, security robots, video surveillance cameras, and RFID chips. Over 250,000 personal data files of FIFA employees and another 10 million of those persons applying for tickets were recorded. While most CCTV systems at public viewing areas were dismantled after the World Cup due to legal constraints and costs, some of the CCTV continued to operate post event. As Eisenhauer (2013) observed, the World Cup facilitated an expansion and centralisation of CCTV systems in not only the hosting sports stadias, but also in railway stations and through urban public transport networks. For the London Olympics, anti-terroristic and crowd control measures involved the use of unmanned drones, surface-to-air missile systems, and a thousand armed US diplomatic and FBI agents policing an Olympic zone divided from the rest of the city by an 11-mile, £80 million ID card, number plate and facial recognition CCTV systems, disease tracking surveillance, and checkpoints.
The transfer of security personnel, knowledge, and technological hardware between the host cities of sport events occurs through a range of activities, from ad hoc to systemised processes. Specific policy handbooks and guidelines (such as the 2004 EU handbook on security against terrorist acts at major sport events) standardised procedures from the bidding process to the staging of the event and progress monitoring by the organising bodies vary between each event. In addition, a key role is played simply by the global circulation of public and private stakeholders in security matters, travelling from place to place and from event to event (Bissonhauer 2013).

Security technology is, of course, not just the reserve of global mega-events but is now a mainstay of most professional sport leagues. For example, the US National Football League’s (NFL) facility and event security has been at the forefront of advances. Over 10 years ago (2003), the NFL introduced CCTV facial recognition (the FaceTrac system) for the Super Bowl. In collaboration with law enforcement databases, the FaceTrac system locates faces, allows for searches, comparisons, and rapid identification. In 2012, Yankee Stadium was the first sports facility to earn recognition under the Federal SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies) Act. The Stadium successfully passed security tests conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, granting the Stadium immunity against lawsuits resulting from terrorist attacks (Goss et al. 2003).

Security stakeholder partnerships and privatisation

Sport event security involves the establishment of strategic partnerships between various levels of security providers, event organisers, government, local police, national forces, and international organisations such as INTERPOL. In recent years, there has been a significant shift towards the privatisation of security and the collaboration of institutional corporations for event security. According to Central PMSC (private military and security companies), the private security industry started in the 1970s in Europe and the USA and has experienced an average growth rate of 10 per cent annually. Many security functions previously regarded as the domain of the state have been privatised and outsourced, and it has been argued that these shifts in governance and the resulting proliferation of market opportunities are closely connected to the growth of the private security industry (Eich 2006). This growth has triggered an international civil society campaign seeking to regulate the private security sector run by Central PMSC. The employment of private security contractors can present challenges, as evidenced in the London Olympics case in point below.

A case in point: London 2012 Olympic Games and G4S – the failure of a private security contractor

The London Olympics’ security planning and provision created partnerships between numerous levels of security organisations, including private security agencies, police, the army, the UK Border Agency, and intelligence services. London is now referred to as the most securitised Games to date and has been labelled as ‘lockdown London’ (Milne 2012).

G4S COO had contracted G4S, a private security company, to provide security at the London Olympics. Prior to the Games, the G4S Chief Executive had anticipated that the £204m contract would return a £10m profit to the company. However, two weeks prior to the Olympic opening ceremony, G4S admitted it was unable to provide the promised 10,400 security personnel. To remedy the situation, the government deployed army and police personnel to ensure security during the Games was not compromised. G4S lost £70m on the contract and £2m in associated sponsorship costs; was given a £45m restructuring charge and paid £11m to charities, including the armed forces sports organisations. The contract faltered and resultant bad publicity has had significant ramifications for G4S’s reputation, with the company now in a worse competitive position than it was prior to the event.

In the case of the London Olympics, perceptions of the risk to public order and safety were no doubt influenced by the terrorist bombings in London on 7 July 2005. These attacks occurred within 24 hours of the announcement of the successful London Olympic bid. Coffey et al. (2011) suggested that the timing of the bombings provided a basis for police authorities and risk consultants to increase privatisation. Rojek (2013) argues that in the same way they did in Athens (2004) and Beijing (2008), international security and surveillance corporations lobbying that risk management provision was inadequate, subsequently increasing pressure on the IOC and allied government bodies to escalate security and surveillance budgets.

Global security firms and contractors have an increasing influence on security approaches, technologies, personnel, and policies in selling their services, expertise, and equipment and providing an ever-increasing degree of ‘protection’ from risks. Security companies strategically use large international sport events to showcase their products and services for broader market exposure. Boyle noted that this is particularly evident within the developing world and described this as the ‘mega-event security development (stream)’ (2011: 169), which links governments, sporting bodies, and the security industry.

Recent Olympic Games have epitomised the complexity of relationships between multiple security stakeholders, as evidenced in the case below of the Vancouver Winter Olympic Games.

A case in point: Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games

The Vancouver Winter Olympic Games was Canada’s largest ever security operation, and involved multiple stakeholders (Government of Canada 2010). There were 15,000 security personnel – 6,000 members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 1,700 other police officers, 4,500 Canadian Forces members, and 4,800 private security personnel. 119 different police forces; security background checks on 208,000 applications for Olympic and Paralympic accreditation; and 700 police representatives from 39 countries took part in the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit International Police Visitation Program.

In 2003, the Canadian Government assigned security planning for the Games to the RCMP. The RCMP created the Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU), specifically to manage the Games’ security and establish a network of security-based inter-organisational relationships. The V2010 ISU was responsible for planning and conducting security operations, utilizing law enforcement and the Canadian Forces. The V2010 ISU was composed of representatives from the RCMP and 157 other law enforcement agencies, including the Vancouver Police Department, West Vancouver Police Department, and Canadian Forces. Specialist police units were deployed for tactical and special weapons teams.
Brand and reputation protection

As the commercial aspects of sport events have accelerated so too have brand protection initiatives for both the events and its sponsors. It has been argued that security is now a selling point in terms of world-city place branding (Cooffie and Wood 2016). Security is no longer just concerned with the safety of people; it also encompasses safeguarding event precision to showcase the event and sponsors' brands for commercial gain. The Government of Canada signed a Federal Government with the IOC to protect the Olympic and Paralympic brands which led to the introduction of Bill C-47: The Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act in the House of Commons, and the Act became law on 21 June 2007 to protect the Olympic and Paralympic logos and emblems from unauthorised use (Government of Canada 2010). However, a balance is needed between brand protection and over-securitisation. This was illustrated during the Beijing Olympics when some Olympic sponsors complained that stringent security measures used in the host city transformed the event into the 'no fun Games' (Boyle and Haggerty 2011).

Analysts (e.g. Eick) have suggested that event owners, such as FIFA, implement rules and regulations that unduly exploit the host environment for their own profit and security. Looking at brand and reputation from a different angle, Bolick and Wolfe (2006) were able to demonstrate how the Super Bowl XL employed socially responsible event activities as a way to include local community groups and enhance consumer loyalty.

Media

Event security itself is now a component of the mediated spectacle of sport events with public acceptance or criticisms channelled through various forms mass media — more recently through social media. Intense media attention can actually influence the development and implementation of security measures, and shape public perceptions and expectations (Toovey and Taylor 2008). Highlighting security risks, particularly in relation to terrorist threats and violence, has been a mainstay of media reporting on mega-events such as the World Cup and the Olympics, especially from the perspective of the Western media (Atkinson and Young 2012). Media reports can assist with the legitimisation of security measures.

There was extensive media scrutiny of the massive security presence around the Olympic project and throughout the host city during the London 2012 Olympics. In writing for the Guardian, Graham (2012) noted that the securityisation of the London Olympics involved the deployment of more troops than the war in Afghanistan. The media also criticised the Games' large security budget with respect to the then recent funding cuts to welfare, housing, and legal aid.

Operational risk and safety management

Risk is the possibility of loss resulting from a threat, security incident, or natural disaster. Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function. This very broad categorisation ranges from command, control, and communication, to counter-terrorism intelligence and crisis and disaster management training, through to security design and implementation and is managed through event security management plans.

In their research of two sport event organising committees, Leepkey and Parent (2009) identified 15 risk management issues in large sporting events: financial, organisational, visibility, political, infrastructure, interdependence, sport, legacy, media, participation, human resources, operations, relationships, environment, and threats. The operations category incorporates security, crowd management, safety, health and well-being; and the issue of threats encompasses acts of terrorism.

Hanstad (2012) investigated risk management issues from the perspective of a national category teams before and during the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. The risk strategy categories identified in this study were reduction, avoidance, diffusion, and relationships. As opposed to risk management literature focusing on the host or organising committee's view, Hanstad found that a participating team identified risks as more positive opportunities than negative factors.

Each sport event and its stakeholders aim to work together to mitigate risk through plans, training, and communication. The Australian Grand Prix Corporation which manages the annual Formula 1 Australian Grand Prix lists its safety system elements as:

- leadership and our people;
- risk assessment and management;
- hazards and incidents;
- emergency preparedness;
- running the venue — event operations;
- running the event — event product;
- contractor management;
- design, construction and maintenance;
- working with third parties;
- information and communication;
- records and documentation; and
- monitoring and assurance (WorkSafe Victoria 2006).
Case Study: Beijing 2008 Olympic Games – the largest security budget ever at the Olympics and the role of multiple international stakeholders

The Beijing Games involved the most extensive security operations and largest security budget of any Olympic Games to date. Multiple national and international stakeholders were involved in the planning, implementation, and management of security for the Games. At the national ministerial level, an Olympic Security Command Centre was established. This was co-ordinated by the Ministry of Public Security and relevant national departments, including the national armed forces.

On an international level, experts from over 70 security agencies were consulted. To manage the international co-ordination of the Games, an International Police Liaison Department was established within the Security Command Centre (Yu et al. 2009). BOCOG worked in collaboration with INTERPOL, in the planning and preparation of security. The establishment of strategic relationships between INTERPOL, BOCOG, the Chinese authorities, and law enforcement agencies in other participating countries was a high priority in the lead up to the Games. As stated by Mr. Zhou Yongkang, State Councillor and Minister of Public Security, “The co-operation between all the stakeholders will significantly ensure the security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games” (quoted in INTERPOL Media Release 2007).

Security during the Games involved technical and operational services from an INTERPOL Major Events Support Team. The co-ordination of the Games relied heavily on relationships with international stakeholders.

In 2009, the International Permanence Observatory on Security Measures During Major Events was established. This saw 24 foreign security experts from 10 countries and four international organisations come together to share experiences. This included personnel from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United Nations’ Inter Regional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the European Police Office. Regular security conferences were also organised, which established relationships for future inter-organisational collaborations (www.interpol.int/en).

The securitisation of the Games also relied heavily on relationships with private security and technology companies. Almost 90 per cent of expenditure on security technologies went to foreign companies. GE, IBM, HP; Dell, Panasonic, and Siemens and many others were involved in providing the technology needed for the vast security operations. Security expertise and technologies from a number of foreign transnational companies was employed. These companies greatly benefitted in aftermath of the Games, in terms of further security contracts for large events.

Case Study: English football hooliganism

Soccer/football hooliganism was perceived as a social problem in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. In response, the Thatcher government sought to wage “war” on football hooligans through a variety of approaches. Giulianozi and Klausner (2010) classified these into five domains as:

- legal, through punitive sentencing and new laws, such as the Football Offences Act 1991, and the Football Disorder Act 2000;
- bureaucratic, through more specialised policing frameworks, such as within the National Criminal Intelligence Service, which included a “National Football Intelligence Unit” and other units investigating serious organised crime;
- bio-technological, through new security technologies and architectures to discipline and control behaviour inside stadiums, the strongest illustrations occurred inside stadiums, through all-seeing stands (which served to pacify and to facilitate the monitoring of spectators), and CCTV systems;
- community policy, through the complete absence of public funding for community workers to engage with young spectators – unlike much of mainland Europe; and
- discursive-ideological, through the diffusion, negative labelling of hooligans and other “enemies”.

Venues and facilities

Facility design and management now take into consideration safety and security measures to minimise unacceptable behaviour, such as fan violence. For example, by restricting space around the venue for littering, removing bleecher seating and standing/grass areas to all-seated facilities and introducing systems for designated fan seating and buffer zones. A range of stakeholders are involved in setting facility standards, for example the British Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) developed stadium design standards to set parameters for construction and design of the ground to reduce crowd management issues and the likelihood of a terrorist attack (“Hall 2010: np.”)

Command and control centres allowing police to monitor areas inside and outside the stadium, technological security measures such as CCTV and FareTec – used to identify fans, run database searches, and send images to security personnel – are now commonplace. As are the conduct of risk assessments to determine specific risks, threats and vulnerabilities of respective venues. Assessments of each individual event are typically undertaken (Taylor and Tookey 2011) and these may take into consideration relative intelligence for the event, historical intelligence of the event (i.e. fan rivalries, different sports), capacity of the stadium, and expected attendance (“Hall 2010: np.”). This provides information for the various event stakeholders to have specific security plans. For example, the UK National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) has provided best practice guidelines in the following areas: access control, screening/searches, traffic and parking, CCTV, and managing event staff (National Counterterrorism Security Office 2006).

Security legacy

The escalating attention given to event securitisation has seen a number of security legacies established. Giulianozi and Klausner, (2010: 54) categorise security legacies associated with SMEs into six areas:

1. security technologies that are piloted or implemented for the SMEs – for example, new CCTV or other surveillance systems in major urban centres;
2. new security practices which are deployed during the SME and then extended into other social fields – for example, the widespread use of contracted security officials to police the SME or involvement in partnership relationships with other national police forces or security companies;
3. governmental policies and new legislation which are introduced to enhance SME security resilience and remain in force afterward – for example, new laws that restrict public association or the movement of specific individuals;

4.  

5.  

6.  


4. Externally imposed social transformations that have at least in part a security focus and which take hold before and after the SME — for example, the clearing of specific "underclass" or "unloved" populations from SME spaces;

5. Generalised changes in social and transnational relationships following SME securitisation — for example, different relationships between local communities and police officials following particular incidents or security strategies at the SME; and

6. Urban redevelopment which has connections or consequences for SME securitisation — for example, slum clearance and rebuilding programs that are intended in part to repopulate and commodify specific inner-city localities.

**Case Study: Athens Olympic Games — a failed legacy?**

- The security regime for the Athens Olympic Games left a significant financial burden of $1.5 billion.
- Security spend for the Games was $1.5 billion.
- The major failure of the security operations was the C4I surveillance project. The surveillance system cost $300 million and years after the Olympics it remained unworkable, despite lobbying interventions from the security and surveillance industry. Pressure from this quarter led to the investment of a $300 million "super panopticon" CCTV and information system for the Athens Olympics (2004); (Summar 2007). Graham (2012) estimates that the cost of providing security for each athlete in the Athens Games was €20,000.

**Case Study: Sydney Olympic Games and Intelligent Risks — ongoing legacy for a private company**

- One of the long-term legacies of the Sydney Olympic security operations was the establishment of Australian businesses, Intelligent Risks. The CEO of Intelligent Risks, Neil Ferguson, was the Director of Intelligence for Sydney Olympic and Paralympic Games. Intelligent Risks was created from the expertise that was brought together to manage the Sydney Games Security.
- Intelligent Risks has since provided security advice to a range of SMEs. Most recently their expertise was deployed during the planning of the London Olympics.
- Security companies such as Intelligent Risks are often one of the key stakeholders in the initial design of event venues and the early planning of security operations at international events.

**Summary**

The wide array of actors involved in sport event security presents a complex, dynamic, inter-institutional network of stakeholders with varying interests, expectations, and power (Hoye and Cukkel 2007, Mastrogianakis and Durville 2013). The increase of formal risk management controls, practices, and requirements is clearly evidenced, as is the seemingly constant public amplification of fear of major security problems, especially terrorism. Research on security and sport events (cf. Jennings and Lodge 2009, Taylor and Toohey 2011, Eisenhauer 2013) has related this intensification to the growing commercialisation, commodification, globalisation, technologicalisation, and media attention of selected mega-events (e.g. FIFA World Cup Olympic Games). This in turn has led to an expectation that event organisers should have plans and mechanisms in place to prevent all security risks, no matter how remote or unlikely these are (Clawd 2013, Spaul 2013).

Another key theme in the literature is the debate about the standardisation of security and safety planning, practices, and technologies. The homogenisation of risk management tools, policies, and stadium design (Jennings and Lodge 2009), has been found to alienate spectators and fans because of restrictions placed on attendees (Parram et al. 2008, Taylor and Toohey 2011), facilitate the introduction of intrusive surveillance and control measures (Eisenhauer 2013), and herald the introduction of legislation that grants police and authorities power and control over public spaces (Gigliomotti and Klauser 2011) that extends beyond the boundaries and hosting of the event itself. The event expanding commercialisation of events has created another type of security threat — as related to marketing and branding. The ability of an event host location to provide a secure environment has even in itself become a branding point (Coalfire and Wood 2006).

The mounting level of high-intensity surveillance and large-scale personnel presence (Klauser 2010, Eick 2011b) is fuelled by demands of security lobby groups (Rojek 2013) and has been linked with the shift from government-provided security to the increased use of commercial firms (Eick 2006), especially in developing countries (Boyle and Haggerty 2011). The influence and impact of event security and safety clearly has wider social and political implications (Yu et al. 2009), and the body of research on this aspect of event legacy is proving to yield socio-racial outcomes, Boyle and Haggerty's (20111) study of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics and Kenelly and Wens (2011) analysis of the London Olympics both pointed to unrealised positive community benefits of event hosting as related to event associated security amplifications. Too many times we hear stories of forced evictions and local residents' relocations in the name of event safety and security. Gigliomotti and Klauser's (2010) classification of security legacies into six dimensions provides a useful framework for legacy categorisation.

**Conclusion**

With the escalation of security-related interventions, some of which are incredibly costly, the question is whether the level of investment in security is a true reflection of what is needed in response to an objective security risk assessment. As we have pointed out in previous research (Taylor and Toohey 2011), excessive surveillance and control can negatively impact spectator enjoyment and satisfaction, and can be detrimental if associated with a lack of tolerance, democracy, or respect for human rights. Security needs to be aligned with branding messages for the event, otherwise the event runs the risk of undermining reputational damage.

SMEs may have substantial security legacies for their stakeholders. The special legislation, surveillance interventions, new policing techniques, and associated urban redevelopments may all remain (Gigliomotti and Klauser 2012). The following areas would benefit from future research, especially as much has been written on mega-events but there is far less information about smaller sport events (e.g. local championships).

There is scope for examining how different cultures may impact the expectations and approaches to managing security and safety issues and their importance for the different stakeholder groups. Recently there has been a rise in the number of sport mega-events being hosted in the developing Global South. For example, the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, and the 2016...
Eick, and utly Eick, management', DC Bennett UK. Olympic regards Urban security Routledge. Additional knowledge most effectively transferred between different types of events and stakeholders?

Suggested readings


References

Eick, V. (2011b) 'Lack of legacy? Shadows of surveillance after the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany', Refugee-Cops, volunteers and CCTV at the FIFA Championship in Germany 2006 and beyond', Paper presented at the conference Security and Surveillance at Mega Sport Events, Durham University, Durham, UK.


