We do not care about our reputation in towns where we are only passing through. But when we have to stay some time we do care. How much time does it take?

*Blaise Pascal, Pensées*

**what is a geophilosophy?**

There are many kinds of geophilosopher: Pascal might be one of them. He knows that specific places matter to how we care about ourselves, known others and unknown others. He also knows that social relationships are not mechanical. One does not immediately belong to a place, any more than one immediately knows the difference between good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsehood. Rather, one is always entangled in proximities that *anticipate* a geography of the known, but which nevertheless require some effort to become so: “Others are too near, too far, too high, or too low. In painting the rules of perspective decide it, but how will it be decided when it comes to truth and morality?” (Pascal 6). If geophilosophy has a starting point, it is perhaps this thinking through of lived cultural formations, hesitation around the near and the far, mindfulness of what counts as familiar and what becomes constructed as strange. A geophilosophy is a territory in thought that virtually extends a possible culture, or a culture to come.

Unlike other philosophical forms, then, a geophilosophy is not a special brand of philosophy such as logical positivism or phenomenology. For our purposes in collecting the articles for this themed edition, geophilosophy has been a placeholder for things we cannot yet do, things we hope to do, things that we have failed to do so far. It signals our optimism that philosophy does not need to be practised as placeless and timeless, as without a people, even if some of the alternatives we provide here are as flawed as the models they seek to replace. More than most other disciplines, European philosophy constantly strives to overcome its situatedness in particular times and places. In this context, geophilosophy could be a way of *not doing* philosophy while practising located, embodied thinking. As Doreen Massey notes, there is both a theoretical and methodological importance to linking critical concepts with particular ways of living in relation to specific spaces, places, and trajectories, whether real or imagined (264–65). The Hegelian, Marxist and Bergsonian biases towards *temporal* concepts as social glue (becoming, labour, reproduction, the *élan vital* and so on) has meant that definitions of time and history still remain nodal points for major philosophical debates, often at the expense of careful attention to space. This has made it easier to take spatial extension as a neutral starting point for social
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research, rather than being an independent object of such research (267–68).

What has been dubbed the “spatial turn” should not be confused with the reduction of complex and open-ended human realities to Cartesian geometries. In thinking through alternative approaches to the “geo” we have taken as our inspiration the collaborative works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Although they remain attached to the specificity of philosophy as distinct from non-philosophy (see Laurie), their writings nevertheless open up new possibilities for what philosophy could look like and where philosophy might take place. In so doing, Deleuze and Guattari devise a geography of concepts, suggesting that: “The concept is not object but territory. It does not have an Object but a territory. For that very reason it has a past form, a present form and, perhaps, a form to come” (What is Philosophy? 101). Recognising the utility of this situated model of knowledge, we begin from the position that knowledges are generated by located cultural formations embedded in particular historical trajectories.

Deleuze and Guattari explain the situated and relational production of knowledge through stating: “thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and earth” (85). Although Deleuze and Guattari’s “territory” and “earth” are promising concepts, we find particular utility in the notion of concepts as involving different kinds of neighbourhoods, populated with diverse communities. Such neighbourhoods could involve subtle proximities of concepts and concept-making activities. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “The concept’s only rule is its internal or external neighbourhood […] hence the importance in philosophy of the questions ‘what to put in a concept?’ and ‘what to put with it?’” (90). As we show, while Deleuze and Guattari construct a conceptual neighbourhood where one is more likely to meet German idealist Immanuel Kant than black feminist poet Audre Lorde, there are many others places for Deleuze-Guattarian scholars to wander.

This themed edition of Angelaki encourages relocations to and within the neighbourhood of masculinity studies. Rather than looking primarily for new thoughts about masculinity we have also been looking to masculinities as sites in which thought is created. We have considered what it might mean to over-populate this neighbourhood, forcing open its borders into new territories. There have always been dangers present in the institutionalisation of “masculinity studies” as a semi-gated community. In particular, a certain triumphalism vis-à-vis feminist philosophy haunts much masculinities research (see Gardiner). For example, one discussion of the “originality” of the “hegemonic masculinity” concept confidently asserts that

Patriarchy is therefore not a simple question of men dominating women, as some feminists have assumed, but it is a complex structure of gender relations in which the interrelation between different forms of masculinity and femininity plays a central role. (Demetriou 343)

It is not clear whether, for example, Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan and Juliet Mitchell are allowed to be “some feminists” here. Indeed, we remain unsure who the feminists in question are. What is for certain is that the idea of masculinity studies often requires feminism to become a motley, even mediocre, assortment of “some feminists” rather than a challenging intellectual movement and organisational practice that has recognised that patriarchy is not a “simple question.” Indeed, feminism began such discussions and in so doing created space for debates at the centre of contemporary masculinity studies.

Any atomisation of masculinity studies as distinct from gender studies, feminist
inquiry or queer studies must be understood as provisional and hazardous rather than as the result of absolute differences in the phenomena being investigated or expertise required. There is no relationship between men and masculinity so robust that these terms could be developed or criticised without simultaneously developing and criticising “woman” and “femininity.” The task of working out masculinity involves, as its critical horizon, the production of ideas, experiences and narratives for which new languages will eventually be necessary and different questions asked, including those that abandon the frame of “masculinity studies” altogether. As R.W. Connell reminds us, the “idea that masculinity itself might change is particularly upsetting to gender conservatives” (134; emphasis in original). We might add that masculinity studies is as much at risk as any other social institution of attaching itself to one “version” of masculinity and the conceptual apparatus through which this version of masculinity is produced.

The expansion of geophilosophy towards masculinity does contain the risk of a violent reterritorialisation, through the containment of gender studies as merely a subset of something called “Deleuzianism” or “Deleuzoguattarian thought.” Philosophy itself remains a predominantly white masculine culture: a geosophy of masculinity needs to treat with caution the translation of “philosophy” as a form of cultural and intellectual capital into gender scholarship. There is always a risk that philosophical experimentation will itself become an intellectual doxa, replete with its own identity-based investments in philosophical institutions and canons (see Miller 190; Laurie 10–11).

Nevertheless, our geosophy remains optimistic. We hope that masculinity studies and Continental philosophy can discover shared objects of interest, even if careful negotiation – bickering, even – is required. One outcome could be a community invested in both philosophical innovations within masculinity studies and in a thorough gender critique of philosophy itself. Our provisional name for such a community has been “geosophy,” but we hope to inspire others.

At present, the neighbourhoods of philosophy and masculinity studies rarely speak to each other, and both watch closely when the other takes shortcuts across its own turf. The act of bringing these fields together is, after Eve Sedgwick, a reparative rather than paranoid project. It brings a gendered and sexed body to Continental philosophy, and finds pleasure in the resulting discomforts. At the same time, a geosophy of masculinity brings a thirst for creativity, ambivalence and neologism to masculinity studies, a field still dominated by social scientific vocabularies. For these purposes, we have collected works that explore the ways in which lived cultures of masculinity might be read as offering means for understanding men and masculinities articulated across different political formations and aesthetic practices. As such, we have encouraged a focus on the methodological consequences of poststructuralist approaches to masculinities, especially perspectives on the strengths and limitations of structuralist, poststructuralist and psychoanalytic thinking within the empirical social sciences.

Readers will notice that, although cited throughout this collection, Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative works are rarely discussed at length. There is already a significant extant body of scholarship on Deleuze and gender, beginning with an early critique by Alice Jardine of fraternity in A Thousand Plateaus, as well as Buchanan and Colebrook’s compelling edited collection on Deleuze and feminism. Relatively less has been written about masculinity in Deleuze and Guattari, although one of their most influential publications, Anti-Oedipus, takes the Freudian account of masculinity and masculine identification as its organising theme. For this reason, we want to
briefly reconsider Deleuze and Guattari’s polemic against Sigmund Freud, as this provides a useful starting point to frame the contributions in this special issue.

the “anti” in oedipus

Anti-Oedipus is ostensibly an extended treatment of the Oedipal theme in Freudian, post-Lacanian and Marxist-Freudian scholarship. In the “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” Freud wanted to say that the penis – which in Lacan more elegantly becomes the phallus, or master signifier – disturbs the famously “polymorphous, perverse” situation of early infancy. The little boy takes pride in his penis, it’s something he knows he wants, but he becomes aware that it could be lost. In particular, he recognises his Father as possessing both a penis and the power of castration. Correspondingly, the girl wonders why she doesn’t have one, and blames her mother for this perceived lack. These formative experiences shape young children’s broad relationships to power, loss, and vulnerability. In this way the Oedipal complex is born. The child internalises the prohibition and becomes a subject in relation to desiring their parent and fearing castration or experiencing genital envy, while various objects in his or her surrounds come to mediate the fear of castration and the repressed desire to take the Father’s place.

The analysis of formative gender relations as a function of masculine imperatives (the capacity to castrate) and feminine impediments (always-already castrated) is best captured, as Luce Irigaray observes tersely, in Freud’s own statement “THE LITTLE GIRL IS THEREFORE A LITTLE MAN” (Irigaray 25). What girls and young women really want is what men already have. The problem posed by “masculinity” is therefore that of granting universal access to what everyone already wants. In this context, we should remind ourselves of a long-enduring regime of second-order pathologies attributed to women based on the psychoanalytic privilege of masculine currencies: woman as envious, woman as working against herself, woman as successful only by proxy to masculine values (52, 57–58).

Anti-Oedipus attacked a series of moving targets in Freudian and post-Freudian accounts of masculinity and femininity. Psychoanalysis was already an extremely broad church by the 1960s in France, and the “Oedipal” theme had entirely different meanings for Marxist cultural theorists such as Roland Barthes and Herbert Marcuse than it had for more methodical clinicians like Melanie Klein. Nevertheless, what Deleuze and Guattari sought to dismantle across all versions of Oedipal theory is the formulation of desire as a closed economy of individual desires restricted either to the bourgeois family (Freud) or to a symbolic structure with triangulated “familial” coordinates (Lacan’s structural Oedipus). Deleuze and Guattari refuse to see identification with patriarchal signifiers or the predominance of castration anxiety as inevitable, natural and desirable stages in the child’s psychic development. This does not mean that psychoanalysis is incorrect when it identifies Oedipal complexes; rather, the problem resides in the Freudian order of explanation. For psychoanalysis, society and culture respond to and attempt to resolve conflicts internal to the unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari do not argue that phallicism is unimportant, only that it is contingent on collective assemblages of desiring-production, rather than necessitated by the individual psyche:

We do not deny that there is an Oedipal sexuality, an Oedipal heterosexuality, and homosexuality, an Oedipal castration, as well as complete objects, global
images, and specific logos. We deny that these are productions of the unconscious. (Anti-Oedipus 82)

*Anti-Oedipus* criticises the notion that prohibitions are constitutive of desire, and repositions “transgression” as secondary to more immanent proliferations of desire outside the Oedipal frame. In this context, “masculinity” can be understood as a side-effect of identificatory structures that certainly *bully* the unconscious but are not endogenous to it. The problem of masculinity is historical and may one day be overcome: the challenge is not simply to produce better masculinities or more sanguine gender identifications but to produce social relationships outside the identity-based circumscriptions of “male” and “female” altogether.

The relationship between gender, identity and desire therefore acquires new valences in *Anti-Oedipus*. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire invests directly in the social field, in politics, history, and mythology, and also in events, affects and “partial objects” – an ear, a tune, fractured memories (see *Anti-Oedipus* 67). This does not just mean there are always plural desires. Rather, desire is the bringing-together of a multiplicity that precedes moments of subjectification: “in the unconscious there are only populations, groups, and machines” (311). Desire belongs to a crowd before it belongs to an entity – one can only ever *join in* somewhere in the bustle of a population. It is equally important that fluid groups are no better than static ones, for it is “possible that one group or individual’s line of flight may not work to benefit that of another group or individual; it may on the contrary block it, plug it, throw it even deeper into rigid segmentarity” (226). Depending on its mode of solidarity, the same group can accommodate quite contradictory trajectories and political persuasions. Deleuze and Guattari describe “an energy of filiation” that “does not as yet comprise any distinction of persons, nor even a distinction of sexes, but only prepersonal variations in intensity, taking on the same twinness or bisexuality in differing degrees” (171, 172).

Although Deleuze and Guattari recognise that highly structured “Oedipal” group formations do exist – there are many ways to invest in signifiers of masculinity – these are always grafted over or extracted from more porous aggregations of desire. We can go even further: Oedipal structures of identification are not always the enemy. As Dorothea Olkowski has observed, sometimes the most pernicious microfascisms feed on communication breakdown and political confusion, as when the Ku Klux Klan affectively disrupted an organised citizens’ commemoration of Martin Luther King Jr. In such cases, it can be useful to move away from the critique of social identifications – how such-and-such a group is represented to itself and to others – towards a heightened sensitivity to the “re-organisation of functions” and “re-grouping of forces” transposed from homes to workplaces to schools and other social settings (see *A Thousand Plateaus* 353).

Deleuze and Guattari’s discourse on desire is ambivalent rather than didactic. So, what exactly is the “anti” doing in *Anti-Oedipus*? There are at least two ways to read this polemic. If the “anti” means rejecting social formations organised around the Oedipal triangle then this also means distancing gender politics from any identity categories dependent upon the sign of the Father. But as Jacques Lacan and Judith Butler (*Gender Trouble*) have famously shown (albeit in different ways), the patriarchal signifier is ubiquitous. Thus, a rejection of “Oedipus” would require an abandonment of gender nomenclature and gendered social relations *tout court*. Many contemporary artistic practices point in this direction: in the present collection, Hélène Frichot, Gregory Minissale and Travers Scott each explore moments of failure and
lines of flight within gendered social relations, where the signifying circuits of man/woman and masculinity/femininity no longer retain traction.

The “anti” in Anti-Oedipus could also mean abandoning the Oedipal method of interpretation. Even in cases where Oedipal dynamisms appear to be clearly at play, anti-Oedipal thinking would refuse to indict new phenomena as simple recurrences of old patterns. Every repetition contains a difference: even the most entrenched masculine archetypes contain slippages and lines of flight. We are thus reluctant to characterise geophilosophies of masculinity as triumphant correctives to bad identity politics. It can be helpful to explore the capabilities of binaries within extended signifying systems rather than simply negating binary or identitarian thinking, as some shorthand iterations of poststructuralist critique would have us do (on this point, see Morris). Geophilosophies of masculinity can produce what Deleuze and Guattari call a “double-pinched” movement (A Thousand Plateaus 65). On the one hand, these articles retrieve objects and events – like Daniel Marshall’s irreverent “A Beginner’s Guide to Melbourne” – that suggest pathways towards new relationships outside the spectres of masculinity-as-usual. On the other hand, these geophilosophies re-examine those ordinary moments of masculine self-definition that could be imagined otherwise: the carbon fibres of Oscar Pistorius or the wildly successful Ringu horror film franchise.

Are these geographies Deleuzoguattarian? Probably not. Sometimes the most interesting problems are those where the “proper” approach becomes undecidable. The contributions do, however, extend the mixed valences of Anti-Oedipus, moving from critical accounts of “masculinity” as a theoretical construct to open-ended portraits of characters that we rarely meet in the neighbourhood of masculinity studies.

approaching and producing masculinity

We have chosen articles that employ a diversity of styles, some bleeding into the styles of artists being written about, others cultivating the ecstasies of abstraction found in Guattari’s own essays. Partly for this reason, we want to close by mapping the different approaches to masculinity taken throughout this collection.

Our first piece is Tim Laurie’s “Masculinity Studies and the Jargon of Strategy,” which begins with the premise that within the discipline of sociology, masculinity has acquired a certain anticipatory causality or quasi-causality. We are always-already primed to guess how and where signifiers of sexual difference will appear. The faultlines of gender differentiation involve supple inflections of sensory-motor orientation – what we look for, listen for, expect to find familiar. The world of masculinities is thus always tethered to the world of speech about masculinity. This speech, in turn, is constantly organised around the expectation that men will form homosocial bonds, and that these bonds are practised in and through “strategies” for personal gain. Laurie argues that we must be careful not to simply replace the doxa of biological essentialism with a parallel formulation, that of the innate disposition of men to strategise in relation to other men. Laurie turns to Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense to rethink the problems of tautology and sense-making that animate the dominant sociological discourse on hegemonic masculinity.

Themes of recognition, orientation and (un)familiarity are also central to “Beating Space and Time.” Daniel Marshall focuses on historical queer cultural geographies of masculinities in two places, and across different archival media. The
first case is beats in inner city Melbourne, which witnessed various entanglements of desire, fear, confusion, disappointment and hope during and after Gay Liberation in Australia. The second site is literary – Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice*, a canonical twentieth-century imbrication of male homosexuality and geography, but one rarely examined for the specificity of its psychogeography. In reading these two spaces through a queer lens, Marshall provides adventurous insights into the connections between space, sexuality, and the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Taking up the work of Eve Sedgwick, Marshall argues that we can use a Nietzschean *overcoming* as a philosophical resource for the production of cultural geographies of homosexual masculinities, especially when those masculinities are experienced as precarious, tentative, or otherwise incompletable. Following Ahmed’s work on wilfullness, Marshall reads gay archives in a deliberately anachronistic mode, drawing together past and present in a compelling portrayal of modern urban spaces as inevitably but uncertainly queer.

Maintaining the engagement with Continental philosophy established in the first two articles, but turning to face aesthetic problems, Hélène Frichot argues that filmic visions offer a glimpse into the biotechnological “pluriverse” that is created within artist Matthew Barney’s *Cremaster Cycle*. The cycle is a *magnum opus* combining film, drawings, photography, damaging soundscapes, and a mixed media of sculptural props. At the centre is the cremaster, a muscle that controls the movement of the testes in relation to the male body. Barney presents extended and agonising scenes of striving and failing, a hyperbolic dramatisation of testes in their contractions and relaxations. The cycle begins with androgynous_birthings and finishes with an austere meditation on death. Frichot argues that masculinity comes to be reformulated through Barney’s feats of aesthetic labour, which traverse the incompossible worlds found at each level of the building. The differences between man and woman, up and down, beginning and end, are each challenged through Barney’s strivings towards posthuman moments – but also, just as importantly, towards moments beyond the *man*-form of the human. In this way, Frichot argues that Barney weaves a geophilosophical construction of concepts around the fraught relationship between organism and environment. By placing the man-machine under extreme duress, and by speeding up his circuits of production–consumption–production, Barney is able to throw up new visions of future organisms and environments.

In “The Invisible Within: Dispersing Masculinity in Art,” Greg Minissale extends the focus on aesthetics by reviewing feminist and queer artists’ image-making practices. Many artistic movements – and not least of all, abstract expressionism – are haunted by the perceived potency of their masculine figureheads, whether artists or art critics. Nevertheless, artists that refuse the masculine heroism associated with idolised figures like Jackson Pollock can still find new techniques for occupying these artistic legacies, often injecting them with humour, irony or confusion. Minissale argues that Deleuzoguattarian concepts such as becoming-woman and becoming-imperceptible can help us to understand heterogenetic artistic practices, and that feminist and queer image makers are themselves developing concepts to articulate their cautious relationships with masculine archetypes in visual art cultures. In particular, the works of many feminist, queer and trans- artists have creatively distorted, camouflaged, recoded or made invisible the human body, while also trying to retain the specificity of gendered bodily experience. Many such artworks show that masculinity is not a naturally occurring substance monopolised by heterosexual men. Like any malleable material, masculinity and femininity can be manipulated, refigured or dispersed,
attracting new meanings while glimmering with sensibilities of the old. To this extent, such image-making practices are less concerned with transgressing social taboos than with reorienting audiences’ own viewing habits, and thus prompting wider questions around the curation and retention of masculinised artistic canons.

Travers Scott continues the focus on philosophy and aesthetics and turns our attention to film and novels. In “Productive Possessions: Masculinity, Reproduction and Territorializations in Techno-Horror,” Scott amends Foucault’s conception of the convulsive, possessed body as a site of struggle by extending it with Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of territorialisation. Scott reads techno-horror popular cultural texts as productions of masculinity yoked to the problem of “reproduction,” which continues to enliven popular debates around the specificity of sexual difference. In all such cases, as in the films and novels of techno-horror, Scott argues that the important questions to ask are not “What is represented?” or even “What is meant?” Rather, passing by way of Deleuze and Guattari’s discourse on territorialisations, the more urgent questions become “What is happening?” and “Who (or what) is becoming?” Of course, the unfolding of reproductive masculinity in many contemporary horror narratives could be interpreted as expressions of a predictably masculine fantasy of an all-male society. Nevertheless, Scott suggests that the concept of territory pushes us to consider more complicated processes of becoming. Masculinities are constantly struggling with reproductive redundancies and with being reproduced in new ways. Key themes that Scott extracts from his materials thus include generation, nurturance, and cultivation, albeit couched within the gendered territorialisations of heterosexual reproduction.

Each example considered thus far in the collection involves a careful modification to the concept of “masculinity,” in so far as it remains dependent on specific times, places, and modes of representation to acquire its various meanings. These concerns are tethered together in Janell Watson’s “Multiple Mutating Masculinities: Of Maps and Men,” which examines the gendered aesthetics of everyday life. Watson argues that the field of masculinity studies has come to recognise the complexity of its object, by theorising and demonstrating masculinity’s cultural variability, historical specificity, multidimensionality, and multiplicity. Concepts like hegemonic masculinity, hybrid masculinity, mosaic masculinities, personalised masculinities, sensual masculinity, and inclusive masculinity all attest to that fact that masculinity is not one pole of a binary but a shifting assemblage with changing extremities. In order to theorise this complexity, Watson follows the lead of the Australian gender theorist Clifton Evers, who after Deleuze and Guattari describes masculinity in terms of assemblages. An assemblage is a metastable formation which includes material, social, cultural, and embodied components (see Deleuze and Guattari, “What is an Assemblage?”). Using the notion of assemblage to produce a global account of how masculinities are made and re-made, Watson argues that the contemporary transnational political economies favour softer masculinities, and that a post-patriarchal egalitarian society requires political approaches that do not simply demonise machismo but pay attention to new kinds of gendered power relations.

Building the focus on ordinary and everyday life, Glen Fuller’s “In the Garage: Assemblage, Opportunity and Techno-Aesthetics” examines the garage as central to two masculinist myths that circulate in contemporary popular culture. The first involves a nostalgic rearticulation of the garage as a staging ground for disaffected male youth working on modified cars. The second myth belongs to the high-tech venture-capital world of the two-guys-in-a-garage start-up myth of Silicon Valley entrepreneurial culture. In both cases, the space of the garage exists as an
actual, embodied space and also as part of a broader apparatus for the valorisation of certain kinds of gendered social capital. Fuller argues that certain relations of knowledge and practice are articulated together through the mythological work of the “garage,” but of interest here is the way masculinity is valorised in differential economies of respect and economies of innovation, particularly in the way the garage is understood as a space of opportunity. Working in parallel to Watson’s discussion of “assemblages,” Fuller explores what he calls the garage-assemblage. The garage-assemblage is both a shared fantasy among men and a specific material and embodied practice, one he considers in relation to the “Men’s Shed” movement. Fuller argues that the provisional and transitory space of the garage functions to inculcate tendencies towards “masculinised” trajectories of action. Firstly, there is a reproduction of patterned gender roles; secondly, this patterning produces a particular disposition towards technical objects in an associated milieu or space; thirdly, these dispositions are mediated through competitive homosocial economies of cultural value (“respect,” “innovation,” and ways of being a man). In bringing these dimensions together, Fuller argues for the importance of these gendered techno-aesthetics in shaping young men’s perceptions of opportunity and individual teleology.

This collection is brought to a close with Anna Hickey-Moody’s essay on “Carbon Fibre Masculinity.” Building on her earlier work on disability (Unimaginable Bodies), Hickey-Moody examines carbon fibre as a prosthetic form of masculinity, and in so doing she advances three main arguments. Firstly, Hickey-Moody contends that carbon fibre can be a site in which disability is overcome, an act of overcoming that is affected through masculinised technology. Secondly, she shows that carbon fibre can be a homosocial surface; that is, carbon fibre becomes both a surface extension of the self and a third-party mediator in homosocial relationships, a surface that facilitates intimacy between men in ways that devalue femininity in both male and female bodies. She examines surfaces as material extensions of subjectivity, and carbon fibre surfaces as vectors of the cultural economies of masculine competition. Thirdly, Hickey-Moody gives an account of Oscar Pistorius as an example of the masculinisation of carbon fibre, and the associated binding of a psychic attitude of misogyny and power to a form of violent and competitive masculine subjectivity. She unpacks the affects, economies and surfaces of “carbon fibre masculinity” and discusses Pistorius’ use of carbon fibre, homosociality and misogyny as forms of protest masculinity through which he unconsciously attempted to recuperate his gendered identity from emasculating discourses of disability.

While each of the papers in this collection advances a respectively different line of investigation, these inquiries are launched with similar intellectual resources and they build a new relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy. This relationship is characterised by Deleuze and Guattari as:

> the constitutive relationship of philosophy with non-philosophy. Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes a new people and a new earth. The philosopher must become nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy. (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 109)

We hope that these articles offer new ways to be philosophical and non-philosophical, to stave off dogmatic “images” of thought (Patton 18). We have endeavoured throughout to find connections between thinking gendered bodies “outside” the
conceptual limits of masculinity, and to this end Deleuze and Guattari have been our interlocutors. Geophilosophy of masculinity is not necessarily revolutionary: there are no grandiose injunctions or obliterations in the articles that follow. But by creating some proximity to the most sensitive and perhaps fickle problems in the study of masculinity we hope to have approached "something deeper that’s always taken for granted, a system of co-ordinates, dynamics, orientations: what it means to think and to ‘orient oneself in thought’" (Deleuze qtd in Patton 18). An even more modest proposal, however, is simply to invite you to unmake masculinity alongside us – even if, as it turns out, this unmaking doesn’t always hold.

note

1 This theme is found throughout “Conclusion: From Parody to Politics” in Butler (Gender Trouble 181–90).

bibliography


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