

Empire and War:
Turkish and Indian Experiences and Remembrance
of the First World War

Burcu Çevik-Compiègne

A thesis submitted in the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

2016

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

University of Technology Sydney

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

I certify that the work in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree except as fully acknowledged within the text.

I also certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

Signature of Student:

Date:

PUBLICATIONS FROM THIS THESIS

Cevik-Compiegne, B. 2015, 'From Gallipoli (1915) to the War of Independence (1919-1922): Modernisation of Turkish Womanhood', *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 102-15.

Acknowledgements

This thesis has been completed with the support of the UTS International Research Scholarship and UTS Presidents Scholarship. I am also indebted to the Indian Ocean and South Asia Research Network for their support. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor A/Prof Devleena Ghosh for her mentoring and intellectual guidance throughout my candidature. Her friendly approach and kindness made a huge difference for me in settling in this new country as well as in managing my research project. I would also like to acknowledge a number of other scholars at UTS, starting with my second supervisor Prof Heather Goodall for her encouragement and enthusiasm about my research. I also appreciated the insightful and pertinent comments of Dr Christina Ho and Prof Hilary Yerbury at different stages of my candidature assessments. I also would like to acknowledge A/Prof Matthew Graves from Aix-Marseille University for offering me his supervision during my Masters Research Degree and for having faith in my work.

There is one person without whom none of this would be possible. I owe my deepest gratitude to my husband Irwin Compiègne for always putting my achievement before his and adapting to all the challenges along the way. I would not be able to complete this thesis on time if it was not for his dedication to our son Samuel who was born and grew with this thesis. I also acknowledge my mother Emine Kanburoğlu for helping me during my fieldwork in Turkey and in the UK, and both of my parents for fulfilling my never-ending demands for books.

I am also thankful to Sevil Sadıkoğlu from Marmara University, Istanbul for transliterating the Ottoman language documents, and Lorraine Shannon for copy editing my thesis. Their competences and meticulous work made this thesis richer and more readable.

I was lucky to have an excellent support network among the fellow PhD students at UTS. I would like to acknowledge Dr Jesica Kinya Mwithia, Katharine Sands, Dr Mehal Krayem, Dr Emma Cannen, Chrisanthi Giotis, Nandita Das, Dr Judith Betts and Zeynep Polat for their kindness and friendship.

Last but not least, I am thankful to my respondents who shared their thoughts and sometimes very personal memories with me. I have been very anxious to give them a voice and not to cause any offence through my critical engagement with their comments. I cannot possibly list all the people who helped me organise my fieldwork but I certainly have to mention Vandana Ram, Muzaffer Orel, Aytuner Akbaş, Victoria Harbutt and Ajmer Singh for their invaluable support.

To Irwin and Samuel

Table of contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VII
TABLE OF FIGURES	VIII
ABSTRACT	X
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>PART I – IDEAS</u>	<u>10</u>
CHAPTER 1 - EMERGENCE OF PAN-ISLAM	10
CHAPTER 2 - ENTERING THE WAR	29
CHAPTER 3 – GLOBAL JIHAD AND THE ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENT	45
<u>PART II - SUBALTERN</u>	<u>67</u>
CHAPTER 4 – PRE-NATIONAL ARMIES	67
CHAPTER 5 – BODIES AND MINDS: ESCAPING THE WAR	89
CHAPTER 6 - TRANS-CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS	111
CHAPTER 7 - WOMEN AND WAR:	142
'HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE IDEAS SUGGESTED BY THE ABOVE TWO WORDS!'	142
<u>PART III – REMEMBERING</u>	<u>162</u>
CHAPTER 8 - WRITING GALLIPOLI	162
CHAPTER 9 - POSTCOLONIAL SITES OF MEMORY	190
CHAPTER 10 - FROM NATIONAL TO TRANSNATIONAL: ANZAC DAY	230
CHAPTER 11 - MULTICULTURAL ANZAC DAY	252
<u>CONCLUSION</u>	<u>272</u>
BIBLIOGRAPHY	276

Table of Figures

Figure 1 - An Ottoman soldier in rags, apparently a common sight (Imperial War Museum).....	104
Figure 2 - Frostbitten Gurkha soldiers in Gallipoli (Australian War Memorial)....	108
Figure 3 - Sikh troops guarding Ottoman prisoners, Sannaiyat 1917 (Imperial War Museum).....	121
Figure 4 - An Australian and an Indian soldier, Gallipoli 1915 (Australian War Memorial).....	134
Figure 5 - An Indian Kut prisoner who was released during an exchange of prisoners (Imperial War Museum)	137
Figure 6 - A headstone that belongs to a Muslim mule driver, Anzac Beach Cemetery, Gallipoli. All three mule drivers died in 1918. This might explain the exceptional treatment that they received (author's own).....	195
Figure 7 - Local labourers clearing the ground for a cemetery, Gallipoli (Imperial War Museum).....	202
Figure 8 - Çanakkale Martyrs Memorial (authors own).....	205
Figure 9 - 57th Regiment Cemetery (author's own).....	209
Figure 10 - Kesikdere Cemetery showing name, age and circumscription of the soldiers (author's own)	210
Figure 11 - New Zealand National Memorial and Atatürk Memorial at Chunuk Bair (author's own).....	212
Figure 12 - India Gate with King George's canopy at the background, and a close caption of Kipling's dedication (author's own).....	221
Figure 13 - Amar Jawan Jyoti (author's own).....	225
Figure 14 - Atatürk Memorial next to Anzac Memorial, Hyde Park, Sydney (author's own)	243

Figure 15 - Aubrun War Memorial and Wall of Friendship, Sydney (author's own)

..... 245

Abstract

Although the 1914-18 war is commonly known as the First World War, historiographically it has been conceived as a European War. Non-Europeans appeared to have been sucked into the war, the Ottoman Empire because of its geographic location and India because of its colonial submission to the British. However there has emerged in various disciplines together with trans-disciplinary studies an interest in what made the war truly global. In the last few decades, several works highlighted the military, political and social experiences of the war at micro, macro and subaltern levels in non-Western countries. This study goes one step further and explores non-European experiences of the war and its memorialisation from a transnational perspective. Focusing on colonial and post-independence India and the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, this study not only draws parallels between these two contexts but also examines the connections between them. A wide range of published and non-published sources is used in order to highlight the impact of the war on the emerging nationalisms, everyday politics and identities not only of the elites but also of subaltern people previously marginalised in history writing. Memorialisation process of the war in India and in Turkey are observed alongside commemorative practices in Australia to shed light on the transnational nature of remembrance. Interviews conducted with people from Turkish or Indian/Sikh backgrounds who participated in the Australian commemorations are particularly informative about how memories are constructed socially, how they travel across borders and are re-constructed within different social frameworks. This research contributes to the transnational understanding of the issues of imperialism, nationalism and class and gender underlying the First World War as well as its remembrance in non-Western countries.

Introduction

Background

I grew up in Izmir, or Smyrna, a two thousand year-old city where only a few buildings were older than a hundred years. Like many of my compatriots, I lamented the senseless destruction of the city's heritage by past and present generations. Old postcards, mostly from the late-Ottoman period and early years of the republic, picturing my neighbourhood Karşıyaka, or Cordelio, with pristine waters, mansions along the seacoast and people dressed in European style clothes 'that long ago' were regularly emphasised to my generation to signify the world we had lost. I was born in the early 1980s and was educated in the Kemalist public school system in the 1990s so Esra Özyürek's (2006) observation about the 'nostalgia for the modern' certainly resonates with my experience. According to Özyürek:

In the new international order of which Turkey was a part in the 1990s, the basic reference points of nationalist and Kemalist ideology – the boundaries of the national economy, state, and East and West – were changing. Thus nostalgia for the first ten years of the republic became meaningful at a time when its foundational principles came under threat. [...] Nostalgic discourse defined the foundational years as the childhood of the nation, when everything was pure and citizens were gathered around the authority of their father. Recognizing it as such, nostalgic citizens knew that the foundational era was irretrievably gone, similar to childhood. Kemalism was no longer all powerful and hegemonic, but rather a fragile ideology in need of citizens' protection. (p.16)

However, that nostalgia for the modernity of the past is not solely limited to earlier periods or topographies of the republic. Kemalists usually believe that national independence after the First World War created a total breach with the

dark ages of the Ottoman Empire, supposedly dominated by religious fanaticism, ignorance and decay. On the other hand, the bricolage of the old postcard version of the cityscape, its Westernised lifestyle, in fact the entire culture of the city is usually credited to its former non-Muslim, mainly Greek inhabitants who were massacred or evicted in the aftermath of the First World War. Paradoxically however, while imagining the utopian modernity achieved by the Greek inhabitants of the city in the pre-republican, or Ottoman past, Izmir's population also very enthusiastically participates in the annual celebrations of the 'liberation of Izmir' from those same Greeks on 9 September 1922 by the national forces led by Mustafa Kemal. In this stronghold of Kemalism, which prides itself on its image as 'Izmir the infidel,' I was educated to become a standard bearer of secularism above all else and to repudiate the Islamisation of Turkish politics and society. Growing up with these inherent contradictions in the identity of the people of my city, my neighbourhood and, indeed, in myself, I developed a powerful interest in understanding how the past was represented in multiple and contradictory forms in the present.

Collective/Cultural/Communicative Memory

The de-problematised blending of elements from imperial and national pasts is not specific to the identity of Izmir. Every city and country that tries to create a national narrative from imperial, diverse and disparate histories faces these contradictions and inconsistencies. The transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey and the formation of the Indian nation-state are pertinent examples for understanding the conflation of modernity with Westernisation in these emerging nation-states. As these nations grew more assertive on the world stage, they reverted to the past rather than the future to identify indigenous models of modernity. This nostalgia has been defined as a "structure of feeling" by Raymond Williams (1977), an experience of the present. In fact, the feeling of nostalgia has more to do with present experience than the past. My reflections concerning memory in this study are informed by Maurice Halbwachs' notion of the past as something that is reconstructed in the present. The influence of the past in shaping

our present is not a one-way process; our present also constantly renovates and transforms our past. In other words, our memories make us who we are but, simultaneously, we also determine our remembrance of things past.

In his seminal work on collective memory, Maurice Halbwachs (1925) argues that memory is not a passive storage of the past but an active process of reconstruction within social frameworks. Memories are neither discrete nor unique; they are doubly constructed by our past and present social lives (Farrugia 2007,p.133). Since our social frameworks are subject to change, so are our memories. This concept of memory as a social phenomenon is crucial in unpacking the narratives of the past within their social context. However, Halbwachs' study of collective memory is based on individual memories that were framed and communicated socially. It is not particularly relevant to the study of 'mnemonic institutions' such as monuments, museums, archives, and commemorative practices that have been set up deliberately to memorialise certain sections and interpretations of the past. Therefore, Jan Assmann (2008) refers to Halbwachs' concept as 'communicative memory' and introduces another type of collective memory, which he identifies as 'cultural memory.' The main difference between these two forms of collective memory, according to Jan Assmann, is the institutional and formalised nature of cultural memory, which involves a large degree of ritualisation. Unlike communicative memory, which has a limited life, cultural memory reaches back to a more distant past and is more akin to historical consciousness (p.112-3). Jay Winter proposes a similar distinction between memory and remembrance, questioning the validity of the term 'collective memory.' Winter argues that, "states do not remember, individuals do, in association with other people." In fact, this collective action is not the recalling of memories, but the purposeful act of remembrance (Winter 2006, pp.4-5).

Both Pierre Nora's work on *Lieux de mémoire* [*Realms of Memory*] and Eric Hobsbawm's *The Invention of Tradition* focus on the sites of cultural memory that are produced and reinforced by the state. These sites are designed to have national significance and bind the disparate people of a nation by means of shared memories and a shared identity. There are many examples of these: symbols, civic celebrations, myths and places chosen for their potential to illustrate the national

struggles for independence in Turkey and India. However, unlike the *lieux de mémoire* in Nora's edited volumes and their significance in national imaginations, this study examines the contested, fluid and transnational character of these national symbols and narratives. It demonstrates through an analysis of the First World War and its remembrance from a comparative and transnational perspective that imperial pasts are constantly re-made and transformed in a postcolonial era; that they exist in multiple overlapping and contradictory forms in the present.

Focus of the study

The First World War is largely marginal in both the commemorative calendar and the historiography in Turkey and India despite the human and material cost of the war to the Ottoman Empire and India. Inserting the war in these national histories has been problematic, not only because of the imperial nature of the war but also because of its outcomes. Although India was on the winning side, she did not achieve greater autonomy within the British Empire as a reward for her sacrifice. Britain in fact, tightened her grip on her Indian possessions after the war. India's place in the British Empire was different from that of the Turks' in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire experienced considerable European domination although Turks assumed political and military leadership during its last years. The status of the Ottoman Empire is usually described as 'semi-colonised'; however this stratification of colonial subjugation is not relevant when comparing the responses to European hegemony in the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire.

A major work on the social and cultural history of the war in the Ottoman Empire is yet to be written although the military, political and intellectual histories of the war in the Ottoman Empire have been given some scholarly attention (e.g. Rogan 2015; Uyar 2015; Zürcher 2010; Köroğlu 2004). However, an emerging interest in colonial troops in general and Indian soldiers in particular has already yielded a number of important works (e.g. Kant 2014; Singh 2014; Das (ed) 2011(b); Roy et al. (eds.) 2011, Liebau et al. (eds) 2010). This recent scholarship

provides important insights into the cultural and social ramifications of the war in non-European communities and the imperial and racial ideologies that underlay the encounters between the colonised and the colonisers.

The difference of interest between the scholars of the Ottoman Empire and South Asia can be at least partly ascribed to the legacy of the Subaltern Studies scholars who pioneered the bottom-up histories of postcolonial India since the 1970s. Ranajit Guha identified two questions that illustrated the challenge made by the Subaltern Studies group to the bourgeois-nationalist elitism of Indian historiography.

1. What was there in our colonial past and our engagement with nationalism to land us in our current predicament – that is, the aggravating and seemingly insoluble difficulties of the nation-state?
 2. How are the unbearable difficulties of our current condition compatible with and explained by what happened during colonial rule and our predecessors' engagement with the politics and culture of that period?
- (1997, p.xi)

These are the very questions that motivated my study of the First World War. There is an important benefit to examining subaltern histories transnationally. The problematics of subalternity and the transition from empires to nation-states are not specific to any one country. Dropping the national or geographic demarcations can allow a broader understanding of the issues underlying postcolonial histories.

This study focuses on the First World War as a period of shifting boundaries: not only the physical boundaries of empires and states, but also the political paradigms of imperialism and nationalism; the changing relationships between imperial rulers and nationalist leaders; and between the elites and ordinary people. I trace the legacy of the First World War in Indian and Turkish nationalisms and the racial, religious and class discourses within those nationalisms from wartime to the remembrance of the war in the present. In recent years, commemorations of the First World War have proliferated. In fact, the Indian diasporas in various countries lobbied for the Indian Government, which had followed a policy of active forgetting to acknowledge the impact of the

First World War. Turkey was also propelled into a 'memory boom' in the last few decades, with the increasing frequency of Anzac Day commemorations at Gallipoli, which became a major battlefield tourism attraction and a site where competing national and transnational understandings of the war began to be reinscribed. The processes of memorialisation of the war can also be better understood when examined transnationally. Anzac Day and the Australian construction of Gallipoli offers a third perspective on the study of the remembrance of the war in nation-states which were contained within empires. In addition, Indian/Sikh and Turkish participation in the Australian commemorations gives a unique insight into the hybridity of the 'national' and other collective remembrances of the war.

Methods

There is now a vast literature on the First World War. This study relies on a range of published sources, including published official documents and reports, contemporary sources, academic works, fiction, non-fiction and popular history as a source of information and material for critical analysis. In addition, several archives across Turkey, the UK, France and Australia were consulted, specifically focusing on the experience of Indian soldiers in France and in the Ottoman Empire, Indian-Turkish connections before, during and after the war, along with the construction of sites of commemoration and commemorative events in general.

The fieldwork conducted in Sydney consisted of 18 interviews and participant observation in a number of commemorative events and meetings related to those events. I spoke to Sydneysiders with a Turkish, Indian or Sikh background who participate in either Anzac Day marches or other First World War related commemorative activities. I asked them about their backgrounds, reflections about the war and its memorialisation as well as their participation in the commemorations. I analysed these interviews to elucidate the processes of memorialisation, intergenerational communicative memories of my interlocutors, the remaking of these memories in migrant communities and their engagement with the Australian commemorative tradition.

Outline

This thesis is organised into three thematic parts. The chapters in Part I outline the framing of the struggle between East and West, colonised and coloniser, within the emerging Indian and Turkish nationalisms and pan-Islam. They discuss, in a more or less chronological order, how these ideas were transformed, consolidated or abandoned as the relationship between the belligerent countries and the dynamics within their political leadership changed during the war. The first chapter focuses on the pre-war period and describes the context in which national or alternative identities were articulated by intellectual elites and political leaders in India and the Ottoman Empire. The chapter is dedicated mainly to pan-Islam, not because of its prevalence as an ideal, but because its efficiency as a policy in the pre-war period and its spectacular decline during and after the war deserves attention. This chapter also highlights the anti-colonial nature of pan-Islamic bonds between India and the Ottoman Empire and examines how Islam was used as political leverage in both countries by indigenous political classes as well as European powers.

Chapter 2 discusses the responses of nationalists and other political leaders to the outbreak of the war and the strategies that informed their participation in or support for it. The Ottoman entry into the war as an ally of Germany, often assessed in Turkish historiography as controversial, had in fact a large base of support within the Ottoman leadership and intellectual circles. This chapter also examines the process of decision-making in terms of alliances and strategies such as jihad and assesses the echoes of these decisions in India and the Indian leaders' responses to war.

There were significant revolutionary activities in a range of places across Asia, Europe and America, in contrast to the predominantly supportive attitudes of Indian elites. Chapter 3 provides an overview of these activities focusing on Afghanistan, Berlin and Istanbul and analyses the scope and limits of these revolutionary ideas in recruiting Indian soldiers from the front and prison camps. The chapter then discusses mainstream Indian politics and the way in which Indian elites became more assertive about their aims for independence within a

short period of time after the war. The strengths and weaknesses of the non-cooperation and Khilafat movements in the aftermath of the war are examined in terms of their long-term consequences regarding Hindu-Muslim relations.

Part II focuses on subaltern experiences of the war, with particular emphasis on soldiers and women. Chapter 4 outlines the parallels and distinctions between the experience of soldiers in the pre-national armies of the Ottoman Empire and India. How responsive were they to the ideas of nationalism? What were they fighting for? While Chapter 4 focuses essentially on the motivations of the soldiers who fought for the Ottoman or the British empires, Chapter 5 investigates their physical and psychological suffering as a result of their involvements in the war. Although the scope of this study does not allow a deeper analysis of the phenomenon of shell-shock among the soldiers, it discusses the ideological considerations that affected the treatment of war trauma among these subalterns of the imperial armies. This chapter offers an alternative view of soldiers' experience of war by exploring experiences such as war trauma and desertion that challenged the narratives of national masculinities and warrior identities.

The war provided unique possibilities for intercultural encounters among the soldiers of the colonial/imperial armies and between the soldiers and local people. Chapter 6 examines the nature of these relationships, the degree of understanding that was established between these people from different parts of the world and the strategies of communication that were deployed in order to build those relationships.

Chapter 7 focuses on the experience of Turkish and Indian women from a variety of social backgrounds and the shaping of their participation in nationalist movements or the war effort by gender as well as their social situation. The examples suggest that, although the war provided opportunities for women in India and the Ottoman Empire to extend their domain from the domestic to the public, these were not radical changes. These contestations fit rather within the process of modernisation that had started much earlier and gained impetus during the war.

The final section of this study relates to the remembering of the war in the nations that provided colonial armies. How were the pre-war and wartime considerations negotiated in the nationalist remembrance of the past? Chapter 8 examines the representations of World War I and the ensuing War of Independence in Turkish literature. Turkish writers actively participated in the shaping of the national identity and some influential writers have had an enduring influence on the understanding of the war. Chapter 9 analyses the construction of the imperial monuments to war dead and the long-term consequences of the initial meaning of these edifices on several subsequent overwritings by national agencies. The examples of the Imperial War Graves Commission's work on Indian and Australian soldiers' graves, the India Gate and the Turkish monuments at Gallipoli are particularly scrutinised in order to highlight the layers of overwriting through many years. The last two chapters are concerned with the commemorative practices relating to World War I and how they evolved as the perceptions of the past changed over time. Turkish and Indian participation in that uniquely Australian rite of Anzac Day displays, in particular, the processes through which the past is a palimpsest, constantly re-inscribed and re-made in the present.

PART I – IDEAS

Chapter 1 - Emergence of Pan-Islam

The period leading up to the First World War was characterised in the Ottoman Empire by rapid change brought about by reforms that aimed to contain the repercussions of the rise in European imperialisms and nationalism. The consequences of these imperialist and nationalist projects were tangible especially, on the one hand, in the increasing economic dependence on European creditors, and on the other, due to the territorial loss in the Balkans and Northern Africa. The Ottoman Government, more generally referred to as the Sublime Porte, sought to reverse these detrimental effects by a vast project of modernisation and diplomatic alliances starting with the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876), which literally means reformation period. Although the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) seemed to bring about an abrupt end to this period of reform by reinforcing a pan-Islamic policy, all Ottoman rulers and administrations, in fact, adopted policies of Westernisation, Ottomanism, pan-Islam and later pan-Turkism simultaneously. What seemed to be a radical change was often merely a change in emphasis, either mandated by the context or dependent on the personal inclinations of the decision makers. Pan-Islam increasingly gained importance after the loss of European territories and the massive shift of the geo-political heartland of the Empire towards the East.

Pan-Islam had been a constant of the Ottoman strategy in dealing with European hegemony for a long time. Pan-Islam is a term that is used retrospectively, referring to either an imagined unity of purpose among Islamic societies or an endeavour to achieve political unity for the Muslim states. Islamic unity or solidarity was indeed at the heart of the Ottoman relations with Indian Muslim leaders in the pre-war period. Although the level and the context of colonial submission differed in these two countries, the responses to Western domination were similar. In the early 20th century, both the Ottoman Empire and Indian Muslim leaders avoided antagonising Britain as well as other European

powers. However, their resentment and urge to build alliances in order to counterbalance European power materialised in pan-Islamic solidarity. Before looking at pan-Islamic propaganda during the war and its consequences in the next chapters, it is necessary to examine the pre-war conceptualisation of pan-Islam in India and the Ottoman Empire and the pan-Islamic networks between the two countries.

Firstly, pan-Islam needs to be placed within the broader state policy of the Ottoman Empire from the 19th century to the end of the First World War. From Tanzimat [Reformation] onwards, several strategies were deployed by the Ottoman state in order to find the cement that would keep the vast territory of the Empire and its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural people together, in the face of nationalist movements from within and military and diplomatic pressures from outside, particularly in the European and North African territories. The first and most persistent of these strategies was modernisation, starting with the administrative reorganisation and improvement of the Empire's infrastructure. The frenetic efforts of the state to introduce change in order to preserve the actual status quo can be aptly rendered by the famous dictum in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's *The Leopard*: "Everything must change so that everything can stay the same."¹ This statement, which combines a conservative mindset, with a seemingly contradictory radical attitude, summarises in a nutshell, the Ottoman dilemma during the period in question. Indeed, Ottoman rulers and elites simultaneously adopted and resisted modernity as defined in Western terms.

Partha Chatterjee's (1993) analysis of anti-colonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa is pertinent in explaining how this attraction and resistance operated in the definition of Ottoman identity and the limits to an acceptable level and domain of modernity. Although physical reality forced the Ottoman leaders and intellectuals to acknowledge the superiority of Europe in the material domain, they claimed sovereignty in the spiritual domain. Chatterjee identified two phases of social reforms in Indian history, shifting from reliance on colonial authorities to reform traditional institutions, to resistance to their interventions in the spiritual

¹ I owe acknowledgement to Prof. Robert Ilbert for the application of the dictum to the Ottoman context during his lectures at Aix-Marseille University.

domain. Chatterjee thus identified the second phase as a period of nationalism in which the spiritual domain was equated with national culture (p.6). However, in the Ottoman context, these two phases were intertwined rather than subsequent and the boundaries between the separate domains were often volatile. Moreover, the resistance to Western infiltrations started long before the idea of a separate Turkish nation was formulated and the most radical changes in traditional institutions were implemented *after* the foundation of the Turkish nation-state. While Turkish nationalism started emerging in the very last decades of the Empire, alternative supra-national identities were not abandoned so easily.

Since the aim was to save the Empire, at first *Osmanlılık* or Ottomanism was prioritised as a means of reconciling all subjects regardless of religion or ethnicity. It is significant that the territories under immediate threat were the European ones. Therefore, the focus was not initially on the Turkish-speaking Muslim population, nor was Asia Minor perceived as the stronghold of the Empire until all territories in Europe were lost during the Balkan Wars. The Ottoman state was not an outsider encroaching on European territory as it was commonly represented in 19th century Europe. It was, in fact, a constituent part of Europe or as Goffman put it “[17th century Europe] was an Ottoman Europe almost as much as it was a Venetian or Habsburg one” (cited in Bryce 2013, p.109). Yet, while the pragmatic diplomatic, political and economic interaction undeniably placed the Ottoman Empire in Europe in a secular sense, there was a binary narrative in Europe, mostly based on religious difference that treated the Ottoman Empire as an outsider (p.109). As the imperial ventures of the Western European states radically and irreversibly changed the power structures and the West acquired cognitive control of the East, the Ottoman Empire became a threat to the self-definition of the West as the Orient within (p.112). Anachronistic tropes of Orientalism not only denied contemporaneity to the Ottoman Empire, but also legitimacy as a European state in an *anachoristic* sense. In other words, the Ottoman Empire was treated as being out of time as well as out of place. Thus, the metaphor ‘sick man of Europe’ connoted the anomalous presence of the Ottoman state in Europe as much as the Ottoman Empire’s weakness. A solution was sought

by dissecting the sick man into discursively controllable pieces that consisted of Balkan and Arab nation-states and colonies.

Foundations of pan-Islam in the Ottoman Empire

Although Europe defined civilisation mostly in secular terms, by the end of the 19th century they still believed Islam to be intrinsically backward or uncivilised. In contrast, the Ottoman elite viewed civilisation as universal although they shared the historicist view of the linearity of progress towards civilisation and the pre-eminence of Europe in that linearity. Tanzimat reformers relied on a synthesis of Islamic universalism inherited from the medieval philosopher Ibn-Khaldun with the universalism of the Enlightenment to justify their modernisation project. This, they believed, would bring them to the highest level of civilisation without compromising their Islamic tradition (Aydın 2007, pp.21-4). The Ottoman elite also identified with both the so-called Caucasian white race and the Abrahamic people (including Christians) who had found a true belief in one God and, therefore, they shared the European sense of superiority. For this reason, they also believed that if they were able to rise to the level of material prosperity of Europe they would automatically obtain acceptance among the European countries.

However, the Ottoman bureaucratic elite and intellectuals became more and more aware of the implications of the anti-Islamist writings of such acclaimed European intellectuals such as William Draper and Ernest Renan. In his 1883 lecture, *L'Islamisme et la science*, Renan attacked precisely the notion that the Muslim and Christian worlds belonged historically to the same larger civilisation and the Muslim states could reach the same level of progress through reforms (Aydın 2007, p.48). Renan, as a staunch secularist, had been condemned for his statements about Christianity being an obstacle to scientific progress, and his prediction that rationalist civilisation in all likelihood would overcome the burden of religious faith in the future. Although Renan viewed all religions as a source of backwardness, he argued that, contrary to a Christian, a Muslim could not but be a fanatic (Renan 1883, p.3). While admitting the cultural and scientific superiority of

the Muslim world during the middle ages, he attributed this to the non-Arab and non-Muslim people of the region (pp.15-6, 18). As a philologist, Renan believed that, based on the development of their languages, Aryan people had the intellectual ability to adapt and change which was lacking in the Semitic and Turkic people (Guida 2011, p.60). Therefore, European superiority, according to Renan, did not derive from Christianity but from the ability of Aryan people, unlike Muslim people, to think beyond religious dogmas.

These sorts of claims to European racial superiority as well as the 'incurable backwardness' of Arab and Turkish people provided the justification for the colonial intervention in Tunis (1881) and Egypt (1882) by France and England respectively. Towards the end of the 19th century, it seemed obvious to most politicians and intellectuals that the divide between East and West was not just about the level of material prosperity, but it was also along religious lines and Pan-Islam consequently came to the fore as an anti-Western response. Halil Halid's (1907) refutation of European superiority in *The Crescent versus the Cross* is largely based on this binary of the material and the spiritual. Halid perceived European colonisation as not just an encroachment on the sovereignty of Muslim states but as a threat to the very existence of their culture. In fact, Halid's primary line of criticism was the immoral and uncivilised nature of the so-called civilising mission of Europe that represented Muslim people as needing European tutelage to exist. He was particularly critical of the French occupation of Muslim lands, which aimed according to Halid, to destroy Muslim society through displacement or assimilation. He qualified British occupation as somewhat milder, adding that, considering the sheer numbers of Muslims under British rule, such a policy would be impossible to implement. Therefore, he did not give much credit to British goodwill either (pp.218-23).

It is notable that his writings tended to emphasise the defensive quality of pan-Islam. In his chapter, "The Pan-Islamic Peril," Halid defined pan-Islam as a shared understanding among Muslims "with a view to upholding what vestige of independence the Islamic world still possesses" (p.208). He argued that even if Muslims conducted a combined action against Europe in defence of their independence, pan-Islam still could not be justly called a "peril" and there was only

one peril in the world, namely “[European] encroachment upon the rights of the Muslim world” (p.212). This was the language that was commonly used by Ottoman pan-Islamists in response to European hegemony. It was not usually the language of a theological defence of Islam against Christian proselytising, but rather the secular language of the Enlightenment, emphasising the “natural rights” of Muslim people (Aydın 2007, p.67). The stated aim and the language of pan-Islam were in fact not religious but political and for this reason even the most pragmatic secularists embraced it to a certain degree.

The nature of the intended union between Muslim states and people was not, however, entirely clear. Allegiance to the institution of the Caliphate, and therefore to the person of the Ottoman Sultan would be a necessary prerequisite, although, the ultimate objective was not to form a political entity encompassing all Muslim states. The Ottoman leaders did not consider the pan-Islamic union to be an alternative international alliance replacing existing or coveted alliances with European states. In fact, throughout the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and the subsequent Young-Turk Government, the anti-Western element in pan-Islam was toned down in order to avoid antagonising Europe where the pragmatic interests of the Ottoman Empire resided. Pan-Islam was conceived as a spiritual alliance that sought to balance the asymmetrical diplomatic and economic alliances with Western powers.

The Young Turks’ policy on pan-Islam and the Indian responses

However, in Turkish historiography, pan-Islam, much like pan-Turkism, was treated until recently as the foolish dream of the incompetent Young Turk leaders to expand the territory of the Empire in Asia. This was seen as the main reason for the Turks to rush into involvement in the First World War. These claims were retrospectively made in order to discredit the Committee of Union and Progress leaders as well as to discredit the Young Turk heritage of Turkish nationalism (for a detailed assessment of Turkish historiography, see Aksakal 2008). In fact, the Young Turks were very reluctant to support pan-Islam when they seized power in 1908. They had maintained their distance from pan-Islam for

several reasons. Firstly, they had a predilection for the secular policy of Ottomanism and they also wanted to break away from pan-Islam, which was strongly identified with the rule of the deposed Abdulhamid II.

Ironically, pan-Islam developed to its full potential during the CUP rule thanks to the alleviation of censorship. Print media flourished and many pan-Islamist publications amongst others saw the light of day (Köroğlu 2010, p.91). Both Abdulhamid and the CUP were very careful not to offend the Empire's European allies with an aggressive pan-Islamic policy. After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, Britain started following Ottoman newspapers very closely as some of these were circulated in India and the extent of Indian Muslims' concerns with the day-to-day events in the Ottoman Empire was noteworthy (Özcan 1997, pp.64-78). As a result, some of the Ottoman newspapers became a source of diplomatic tension between the Ottoman Government, known as the Sublime Porte, and Britain with resulting pressure being put on the editors of the newspapers. A pertinent example of this is *Paik-i-Islam*, an Urdu and Turkish language newspaper, issued in Istanbul and distributed in both countries. The publication was stopped by the Porte, upon British request, due to its allegedly inciting Indian Muslims against British rule. The Sultan issued regular warnings to the press about their tone and eventually prohibited the use of the term *Ittihad-i Islam* (Islamic unity or pan-Islam) altogether (Özcan 1993, pp.113-5). The Sultan's response was highly symptomatic of the asymmetry of the relations with Britain, as the British Government refused to address any complaints about anti-Ottoman papers published in Britain. In the meantime, the handling of this particular request clearly indicated the greater strategic importance of diplomatic relations with Europe rather than pan-Islamic alliances.

During the more lenient regime of the CUP, several pan-Islamist and other publications emerged while some pan-Islamist writers returned from exile. Most of the pan-Islamic writing was published in newspapers and there was a constant dialogue between rival or opposing views. In such a climate, ideas started to gain clearer contours and divisions were also crystallised. The CUP did not actively support these pan-Islamic writers until the invasion of Libya by Italy (1911) and the diplomatic crisis during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). In fact, shortly after the

Young Turk coup of 1913, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Greece annexed Crete while European powers refused to intervene although they were bound to do so by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The policy of the CUP from then on, turned towards an assertive pan-Islam particularly in foreign affairs, combined with Turkish nationalism at home. In addition, the popular uprising in 1908, led by Islamist leaders to overturn the CUP and restore the powers of the Sultan was still fresh in memories. The Young Turks needed to muster whatever support they could from the Islamists therefore they started engaging in pan-Islam propaganda (Özcan 1997, pp.132-3). From 1913, the CUP directly funded *Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i Islamiye* [the Benevolent Islamic Society], which was a political organisation under the guise of a charity and its fortnightly *Jihan-i Islam* was published in Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Urdu (Landau 1990, pp.92-93).

The CUP retained its secular approach to pan-Islam as is well illustrated in the writings of Ismail Naci (using the pen-name Habil Adem), a CUP member, working in the intelligence agency, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* [Special Organisation], and a journalist. Ismail Naci suggested that the Ottoman state should turn away from its Eurocentric policy and focus on Asia. He argued that an international pan-Islamic solidarity would strengthen the nationalist struggles of subordinated Muslim people. He thought pan-Islam would give Indian Muslims the power to resist colonial domination and he envisioned Afghanistan as “something like the industrial and neutral Belgium of Asia” (Aydın 2007, pp.104-6). This new geopolitical configuration would be beneficial to the Ottoman Empire not only because it would extend its zone of influence but also because the Ottoman Empire needed viable alliances in order to defend its own interests. Although Ottoman pan-Islamists believed in the reunifying force of the institution of the Caliphate, most of them did not conceive pan-Islam as a hegemonic attempt to bring other Muslims under Ottoman rule. Rather, Pan-Islam was born out of the realisation of the interdependence between Muslim societies around the world. Celal Nuri argued in his *İttihad-i Islam* that the Ottoman faith was tightly linked to that of other Muslim societies and, therefore, the realities of those societies had to be fully understood. Consequently, he thought that such an understanding should inform Ottoman policy about pan-Islam, while keeping the potential benefits and setbacks

in sight (p.101). Pan-Islam was weighed with its pros and cons in the same way as any other policy.

Although, on the one hand, the Young Turks clearly saw the Ottoman sultan as an obstacle to their constitutional regime and went so far as to dispose Abdulhamid II in 1909 through an act of parliament and replace him with the more co-operative Mehmet V (commonly known as Mehmet Reşad), on the other hand, they widely supported the influence of the institution of the Caliphate to gain support from Muslims inside and outside of the Empire. The Young Turk revolution was enthusiastically received all over the Muslim world until the deposition of the Sultan-Caliph. In India, the regime was accused of replacing the Caliph with a man “who is a mere puppet in the hands of Young Turks” (cited in Özcan 1997, p. 129). The reaction was so extreme that the British officials even predicted that pan-Islamism was dead and had little chance of coming back to life again (p.130). The CUP was certainly receptive to these reactions and sought to calm the anxieties of Muslims by securing a *fatwa* from the *Sheikh-ul-Islam*, the religious authority, enjoining the act of parliament that deposed the Sultan-Caliph Abdulhamid II (Sadiq 1983, p.21). They also sent emissaries and received visitors from other Muslim countries in order to reassure them about the continuity of the Caliphate.

The visits, on separate occasions, of Abdul Bari, the chief figure of Firangi Mahal, one of the oldest and most important madrasas of India, and Mushir Husain Kidwai to Istanbul between 1910 and 1911 were certainly the most effective in dissipating any doubts about the Young Turk regime in India. Both of them returned satisfied with their encounters with the Young Turks and the religious authorities. On Abdul Bari’s return to India, Mushir Husain Kidwai introduced him to the Ali brothers, the outspoken emerging Muslim leaders, who became his collaborators and religious disciples. In 1913, Abdul Bari initiated the association called *Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba* with the apparently religious motivation of the safekeeping of the holy places of Islam (Minault 1982, p.34-5). Although the religious feeling behind the Anjuman was certainly sincere, the proposals that were made in order to achieve that protection were unavoidably political. The Anjuman allocated at least one third of its funds to the uplifting of the Ottoman

Empire to the level of “effective Muslim sovereignty” in order to be able to defend the holy places (Qureshi 1999, p.60). For this purpose the Anjuman proposed building dreadnoughts or planes to be offered to the Ottoman Empire (Minault 1982, p.36). The Anjuman clearly overestimated its financial potential, and even if they had reached their objective, they were mistaken in believing that Britain would authorise them to make such donations of a military nature in the name of religion. Around the time when the Ali brothers were confidently writing about these possibilities to Talat Bey (then Ottoman Home Secretary and a part of the CUP triumvirate along with Enver Bey and Cemal Bey), the Islamic Society of Madras had seen a similar request turned down (Özcan 1997, p.161).

This lack of foresight was, however, not entirely due to the naivety of the Anjuman’s leaders. Britain had consistently encouraged pan-Islam in the past. By using the spiritual leadership of the Ottoman Caliph in order to gain Muslim support against the Russian threat, Britain inadvertently prepared the terrain for the pan-Islamic movement in India (Qureshi 1999, p.20-1). As early as 1789, Britain procured a letter from Selim III, addressed to Tipu Sultan of Mysore who was then seeking help from the French against the British invasion, urging him to keep away from the French who had become enemies of Islam through their incursion in Egypt (p.18). Especially following the Crimean War, the British used the leadership of the Caliph, more or less convincingly, in order to keep Russian expansion in Asia under check with the support of Central Asian, Afghan and Indian Muslims (p.20). Through the Capitulations, a number of fiscal and other concessions made to European countries since the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire recognised France as the protector of Catholics and Russia of the Slavic Orthodox people under Ottoman rule. Ottoman Sultans similarly obtained acknowledgement from the European states of their spiritual leadership of all Muslims through a certain number of treaties since the 18th century, although they were not able to implement their rights. In the second decade of the 20th century, when the political tide turned and pan-Islam became a potentially subversive force, the British started monitoring pan-Islamic activities in India very closely.

Indian Red Crescent Mission

When the Balkan Wars started, Shaukat Ali initiated and both Ali brothers coordinated a medical mission to Turkey. Dr Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari who was a qualified surgeon and former resident doctor at Charing Cross Hospital in London led the mission. This Indian mission received encouragement from the Government of India because of its humanitarian cause and the Viceroy himself saw the team off in Bombay. However, the mission's activities during their eight months stay in Turkey were by no means limited to humanitarian work. In fact, even before their departure, the political tone was set by the fact that Dr Ansari personally took charge of recruiting staff from Aligarh College, the new hub of anti-Western thinking among Muslims. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (1961) relates his first encounter with Dr Ansari thus:

I expressed my joy and admiration for him for having undertaken the responsibility of leading the Medical Mission. He told me that he had come to Aligarh to find some young men to go with him to help him in the discharge of his duties. I said, "I am not a doctor." He replied, "You can do managerial work as well as some nursing." (p.21)

Seven students were thus recruited from Aligarh and instructed in first aid by Dr Ansari during the trip. The number of members increased from 22 to 28 people, including seven doctors and 21 male nurses and administrators who arrived in Istanbul in January 1913 (Qureshi 1999 p.58²⁹³).

Within a few days of their arrival, the Aligarh students were received by Enver Bey at his house in Pera and during the time they spent in Istanbul, the mission was in frequent contact with Enver Bey and other prominent CUP leaders, such as Talat Bey and several commanders. The mission was also introduced to the Sultan who awarded them medals before they left Istanbul at the end of June 1913. Shortly after the mission had set out to the village of Ömerli behind the frontline in Çatalca, the news of the assassination of the commander-in-chief, ordered by Enver Bey, arrived. This resulted in the fall of the government. According to Khaliquzzaman, the mission showed their support to the newly appointed commander-in-chief Ahmet Izzet Pasha (p.22-3). The members of the mission

freely engaged with the leaders and intellectuals in Istanbul, including the principal actors in the events. Their encounters and interests certainly went beyond the purpose of their medical mission.

The mission was soon divided in two, the second party heading to Çanakkale to set up a new ward. Both hospitals were wound up in April and June 1913, after which all members of the mission stayed in Istanbul and established contacts with the local elite. During this time, Dr Ansari, joined by Zafar Ali Khan, the owner of the *Zamindar*, initiated a project to provide a colony in Cilicia for destitute Turkish-Muslim refugees from the Balkans. Four of the members stayed two more months and visited a few places in the country. Another member from Aligarh, Abdurahman Peshawari, decided to stay in Turkey indefinitely. He became a protégé of the naval officer Rauf Bey and pursued a military career. He earned a Medal of Independence (a military honour of the highest order) for his service during the War of Independence. He became a Turkish citizen and Turkish ambassador in Kabul in 1921-1922 (Wasti 2009, p.399). Mirza Abdul Qayyum who had joined the team later, also stayed in Turkey and died while fighting for the Ottoman Army during the First World War (Özcan 1997, p.151¹⁹). Others returned to India and pursued their pan-Islamic activities more intensely.

Indian aid to the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars was not limited to this mission. In fact, this team was the best known of three Indian medical teams, all of them entirely funded by Indian subscribers (Özaydın 2003, pp.14-15). The British Red Crescent Society, organised by Ameer Ali, sent one of the teams. Although being the main benefactor of the British Red Crescent mission, Muhammad Ali's newspaper *Comrade* transmitted Dr Ansari's accusations based on the high mortality rate of the patients of that team, qualifying them as "inferior bonesetters." Muhammad Ali went on to write a letter to the Viceroy, complaining that the mission had misused their money by distributing Bibles and an anti-Turkish pamphlet among the Turkish Muslims in the relief camps (Özcan 1997, p.152). It is not entirely clear whether the allegations originated from rivalry between the doctors or were deliberately targeted at Ameer Ali's credibility.

Not only was the medical mission entirely funded by subscriptions in India, but large amounts of money were also donated to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. A full list of donations from India amounting to an impressive total of 157,044 liras is available in the archives of the Turkish Red Crescent Society. This estimate is considered conservative since Indian Muslims from all around the world also donated large sums. For instance, the money sent from Britain is believed to have been donated by Indian Muslims there and would bring the total to over 185,000 liras (Tepekaya and Kaplan 2003, p.159). Indian Muslims from other parts of the British Empire also responded to the call of fund-raisers; Afghans and Indian Muslims from as far as Western Australia (p.160) and from Sydney (KA 19/165) also contributed a relatively smaller amount.

The geographical span of the mobilisation for aid to the Ottoman Empire was just one aspect of the success of print media in reaching and involving the masses in their campaign. Three newspapers, particularly, but not exclusively, relayed news from the Ottoman Empire and raised funds: Muhammad Ali's *Comrade* from Delhi, Zafar Ali Khan's *Zamindar* from Lahore and Abdul Kalam Azad's *Al Hilal* from Calcutta. An eyewitness described the extent of the interest:

The masses seemed so anxious to have an account of the war that the journalists thought it necessary to start fresh papers as the demands suddenly became too numerous. People living in far distant villages and obscure places nevertheless went to the nearest town every other day to get the Turkish news. (cited in Özcan 1997 p.148)

Indian Muslims were so receptive to the events taking place in the Ottoman Empire that CUP leaders such as Enver Bey, Talat Bey and Mahmut Şevket Pasha (the newly appointed Prime Minister after the storming of the Porte by Enver's supporters) became heroes whose pictures were displayed in almost every Muslim household or shop according to Malik Lal Khan, former secretary of the Punjab Khilafat Committee (Qureshi 1999, p.60). Naeem Qureshi who conducted the interview with Malik Lal Khan states that Qureshi also remembers seeing such portraits in homes and shops as late as in the 1940s (p.60³⁰²).

In Turkey, the service of the medical mission was also remembered through three commemorative plaques in Ömerli, at the village mosque, the village fountain and near the source of water, all bearing the inscription 'A fraternal souvenir from the All India Red Crescent Medical Mission which came from India during the Balkan Wars to help their Ottoman brothers, 1913' (Wasti 2009, p.400). It is unclear whether the mission offered the plaques to the Turkish or whether they were locally commissioned. In either case, they are likely to be the only tributes to the Indians as allies of the Ottoman Empire or the Turks. The only other memorial, which refers to Indians, is a very poor depiction of a Sikh soldier during the First World War at Gallipoli, placing Indians among the Allied troops.

Pan-Islam in retrospect

During his speech at the Aligarh College, shortly after his return to India, Dr Ansari aptly reported that the biggest achievement of the medical mission was the consolidation of the ties between Turkey and India (Bamford 1974, p.113). The networks of Indian and Turkish (and Egyptian) leaders and writers created at that time proved to be long lasting. However, having been blamed for the Ottoman failure in the First World War, Enver and Talat Beys went into exile in Central Asia and Germany respectively, and Indian pan-Islamists thus lost their closest contacts in leading positions. They were not able to build such relations with the emerging leaders of the Turkish Republic. Dr Ansari invited Rauf [Orbay], in 1933 and Halide Edip in 1937 to India in order to give lectures in Jamia Millia Islamia. Both were contacts made during the mission, and both of them were also in exile in the 1930s, on account of their various disagreements with Mustafa Kemal. Halide Edip, in the account of her trip, *Inside India*, refers to her meeting with Khaliquzzaman and Abdurrahman Siddiqi during her visit ([Adivar] 1938, pp.163, 205-210). She also mentions that there was a portrait of Abdurrahman Peshawari whom she knew well in the hall in Aligarh College where she gave her lecture. She remembers that every lecturer saluted the portrait reverentially:

This extreme sensibility to Abdur Rahman Qureshi² is also symptomatic of the urge to *Independence*.³ The passionate admiration for him is not at all a sign of Indian sympathy for Turkey; nor is it even for his bravery in the Great War. It is for his having taken sides with a people who were fighting against forces which threatened their independence. (pp.130-1)

This is probably a valid analysis made in and about the context of the 1930s when the claims for independence were explicit. Halide Edip also discusses the retrospective comments of Dr Ansari about the past significance of pan-Islam for Indians.

Dr Ansari qualified the medical mission as a “weak and faltering expression” of the pan-Islamic sentiment which was not “inspired by interest, policy or worldly wisdom; it [had] no definite practical end in view” in the preface to the *Conflict of East and West*, the collection of lectures of Halide Edip in India (Adivar 2009, p.16). Ansari continues: “Pan-Islamism in India was not in the main political. With the vast majority of Indian Moslems its appeal was purely religious” (p.17). However, Halide Edip somehow interpreted these statements as confirming her belief that:

Pan-Islamism for the Indian Muslem was a sort of sublimation or compensation for the loss of a thing without which his self-respect is not complete. If he himself had lost his political rights, he at least consoled himself with the fact that there was an Independent Muslem Nation which also had the costly privilege of maintaining the Khilafat, the institution which, in his mind, was a necessity for the self-respect of the Islamic world. (Adivar 1938, pp.321-2)

Halide Edip’s understanding seems to contradict the essence of Ansari’s statement. However, neither Halide Edip nor Ansari considered that both a feeling of solidarity on the grounds of a shared religion and a yearning for independence

² Halide Edip refers to Abdurrahman Peshawari as Abdurrahman Qureshi for reasons that are not entirely clear. Zafer Hasan Aybek (another Indian pan-Islamist who became a Turkish citizen) reported that Abdurrahman Peshawari identified with the independent Afghanistan rather than with the British ruled India (Wasti 2009, p.405⁷¹). He might have preferred not to use Peshawari as it revealed his Indian origin.

³ Halide Edip’s emphasis.

were political sentiments. Ansari qualifies pan-Islam as non-political because of its lack of practical objective in terms of a political project, such as an independent Indian state. He depicts pan-Islam as a religious and even as a reactionary movement (Adivar 2009, pp.19-20) whereas Halide Edip adopts a milder and more sympathetic vocabulary (sublimation, compensation, loss, consolation, self-respect, etc.), also placing pan-Islam unmistakably, in the domain of spiritual.

The ever-changing vocabulary of the pan-Islamists makes it difficult for historians to interpret the movement either as political or religious. Different texts by the same author, or sometimes even different parts of the same text, may come to completely opposite conclusions. Jacob Landau cites Zafar Ali Khan's article "Indian Muslims and Pan-Islamism," which appeared in *Comrade* on 14 June 1913, where Khan describes pan-Islam as:

... synonymous with a gigantic union of the Moslems of the world, having for its cherished object the extermination of Christianity as a living political force ... The brotherhood of Islam, or Pan-Islamism if you will, transcends all considerations of race and colour and is of an extra-territorial type in which all the Muslim populations of the world merge their geographical identity and become one nation. (cited in Landau 1990, p.191)

Landau uses this article to illustrate that, in pan-Islamic circles, political activism became more forceful from 1913 onwards. This contradicts Sadiq's (1979) interpretation of the same text, that Zafar Ali Khan "emphasized the non-political nature of pan-Islamism and defined it as a fraternity which organized the Muslims of the world in one nation" (p.206⁵⁴). In fact, most of the intellectuals who were influential in shaping pan-Islam did not see any contradiction in using religious and secular arguments simultaneously or alternately. For instance, Jamal ad-Din-al-Afghani who is considered to be the inspiration for both Turkish and Indian pan-Islamists, promoted what may seem today like a mishmash of ideas about unity, ranging from pan-Islam to ethnic or regional alliances, all however, with a consistent anti-imperialist agenda (see Keddie 1969, p.22-5).

No matter how much contemporaries claimed, or to a degree, believed that pan-Islam was purely religious, it was obviously not religious in a traditional

sense. Keddie argues that “the political activism of Pan-Islam and its stress on man, not God, also distinguish it from classical Islam and show Pan-Islam to be a step *between* traditional Islam and modern nationalism” (p.21¹⁰). In pan-Islamic unity as conceptualised by Indians, religious considerations may have been more prominent. This is partly due to the fact that a significant proportion of the Indian pan-Islamists were affiliated to a religious institution and Islam was a constituent element of their thinking. In fact, one of the achievements of pan-Islamic activity in India in the years leading up to the First World War, was bringing the *ulama* and the Western educated Indian Muslims together in a political awakening (Qureshi 1999, p.61; Minault 1982, p.37). Therefore, in India, the politicisation of the religious circles paved the way for a pan-Islamic movement, whereas in the Ottoman Empire, pan-Islam instead meant the integration of religion in the essentially secular political projects.

On the other hand, denying the political nature of pan-Islam was also strategic. Freedom was usually coupled with religion in the Indian people’s dealings with the British. In the early 20th century, religion was the principal domain of sovereignty left to Indians. Pan-Islam blurred the distinction between Islam and politics, and Indian Muslims used religious discourse more and more subversively. This strategy, whether conscious or not, was effective. The British were well aware of the fact that pan-Islamism undermined their authority; however, they were reluctant to take punitive action, apart from censorship and, later, internments which only occurred after the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war. Until the First World War, British policy consisted of the monitoring of pan-Islamic activity as much as possible through the control of incoming and outgoing information.

The visit of the delegation of the Turkish Red Crescent Society to India in 1914 before the outbreak of the war was closely examined and described in Bamford’s intelligence report as “visits to India of suspicious Turks” (1925, p.115). The delegation’s declared purpose was to thank Indian Muslims for their contribution during the Balkan Wars. Although, Bamford says, “they were careful to avoid politics themselves, their presence gave occasion to inflammatory speeches.” Bamford concludes that “they conveyed the impression that their visit

to India had been undertaken with the expressed intention of cementing the relationship between the pan-Islamic Party in India and the Young Turk Party in Constantinople” (p.116). They were reported to have met the Ali brothers and Dr Ansari as well as their Turkish contacts and the Turkish Consul-General in Bombay who was no other than Halil Halid, former lecturer at Cambridge and the author of *The Crescent versus Cross*. He had become so popular among Indian Muslims that when he was recalled to Istanbul, hundreds of Muslims protested to Muhammad Ali and the latter consequently wrote to Talat Bey to request that, if at all possible, Halil Halid should be sent back to India (Özcan 1997, p.172).

At this stage, the suspicions of the British about the political agenda of the visit were well founded. Especially when the European war appeared imminent, the Ottoman emissaries’ purpose became quite clear. After the return of the Red Crescent delegation to Istanbul, a pamphlet was circulated on their behalf, more or less openly inviting the Indian Muslims to join forces with the Ottoman Empire so that:

God forbid, if transgression on the honour and integrity of the Imperial Government occurs ... [by] any European Power, no effort whether material, moral, financial or physical will be spared ... in resisting and repelling it, and in guarding the sacred places of Islam, so that the integrity of ... the only kingdom of Islam, and the honour and respect of all Mohammedans on the face of the earth, and brethren in faith should be guarded. (cited in Özcan 1997, p.171)

Around the same time (in September 1914), a group of ‘suspicious’ Turkish visitors came to the notice of the British authorities in Peshawar. One of them turned out to be Hacı Sami Bey, the lesser known of the Kuşçubaşı brothers who were both very daring agents of the *Teskilat-i Mahsusa*, the intelligence office of the CUP. The details of their mission in India are not known but Bamford was probably right in guessing that they were supposed to “stir up Indian Muslims” (1925, p.116)

Rauf [Orbay] Bey also mentioned in his memoirs that Enver Bey asked him in August 1914, if he would go to Afghanistan “at the head of a delegation to

promote closer relations with this highly strategically placed country and to advise on modernization of the Afghan army.” It was understood that the plan was arming and raising the frontier tribes against the British. However, the mission had to be aborted as Rauf Bey had difficulties reaching Afghanistan due to the outbreak of the war (Wasti 2006, p.712). At this stage, at least for the Ottoman leaders, pan-Islam was far from being just a sentimental alliance with no practical ends. As we shall see, Indian responses were also guided by practicalities more than sentiments.

From the 19th century until the outbreak of the First World War, the pan-Islamic movement emerged, not out of religious revivalism so much as out of the need to counterbalance hegemonic European power. It was a discursive means to oppose the Orientalism that was directed against Muslim people. This was the reason why pan-Islam was so appealing to Muslims across the borders. The loss of identity through ‘excessive Westernization,’ as some of the contemporaneous authors put it, was a common concern among the colonised or semi-colonised people. The intellectuals of the time perceived the epistemic aggression of the West in terms of a religious crusade against the Muslims. This understanding generated a religious conservatism that Ansari depicted as reactionary. In the 1910s, intensified European encroachments on Ottoman lands brought Muslim intellectuals together and consolidated pan-Islamic networks. On the eve of the First World War, pan-Islam was not just a way of protecting the spiritual domain of the Muslims, but it had come to be thought of as a viable alliance and a major means of pressure against the Western powers.

Chapter 2 - Entering the war

At the outbreak of the Great War, the Ottoman Empire decided to throw in its lot with Germany. German influence over the Ottoman Empire was increasing; the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Express is one example. However, the decision to side with Germany was not taken lightly. The official history, which is one of the main influences in constructing the cultural memory of the war, conveniently put the ruling CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) triumvirate on the spot for having made the wrong decision because of their pro-German, pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist policies. Since these representations of the Ottoman-German alliance and the Young Turk's responsibility in the defeat is so crucial to understanding the remembrance of the war in Turkey, it is important to outline the reasons behind the Ottoman decision to join the war against the Allies.

Shortly after the entry of the Ottoman Empire to the war, jihad was declared against the enemies of the Caliph. The renowned Dutch orientalist, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's essay, "Holy War Made in Germany" (1915), had an enduring influence on the interpretation of pan-Islamic propaganda and the declaration of jihad as a German scheme (see for instance, Landau 1990, p.94-103; McMeekin 2010, p.85-99; Hagen 2004). However, the failure of the scheme was attributed either to the fact that the sultan-caliph was not acknowledged universally as the supreme leader in the Muslim world, or to the technicalities of the theological validity of the declaration of jihad. As Sean McMeekin put it rather sarcastically in his chapter title, "Death to Infidels Everywhere! (Unless they be Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Americans or – possibly – Italians)," the jihad declaration was discredited by Orientalists at the time and by historians later, on the grounds that the Ottoman Empire was also the ally of a non-Muslim power (2010, p.123). To what extent were these considerations influential in determining the responses of Indian Muslims? Why did global jihad fail to emerge?

Turco-German Alliance

Turkish historiography and collective memory holds that the Ottoman Empire was dragged into the war as a result of the short-sightedness and incompetence of Enver Pasha, the War Minister and a powerful man in the triumvirate who, in his irredentist ambitions, expansionist dreams and blind admiration for Germany, threw the country to its predictable doom (Aksakal 2004, p.507-9). However, neither the claim that the Ottoman involvement in the war was due to misjudgement by a single man nor that the German alliance was a hasty and ill-considered option stand up to scrutiny.

Faith in international law had been shaken in the Ottoman Empire after the conclusion of the Balkan Wars as it became clear that the European powers would not comply with their obligations under the Treaty of Berlin (1878). A certain Ferhad Bey voiced an argument that was already widespread in the press and among the politicians at the time. In his speech in the Chamber of Deputies in July 1914, he said that:

It does not matter how many books we write on international law or however many human rights laws we implement. In order to get states to respect these we must still possess additional means, means of coercion. Every state has adopted this position and for that reason builds up its [military] strength. [A state] will use all of its defensive or offensive strength in order to defend and protect its rights. We are a state too, and we therefore cannot escape this truth. (in Aksakal 2004 p.516)

Since it was clear that the Ottoman Empire could be saved only through a military victory and that it could not defeat its European opponents without allies, the Porte approached all the Great Powers in an attempt to break its diplomatic isolation. An alliance with a Great Power would provide the safety and stability that was so clearly needed.

However, the other two members of the triumvirate, Talat, the Home Secretary, and Cemal, the Navy Minister, returned empty-handed from their negotiations with Russia and France. After Talat's failure to sign a treaty with Russia in May and Cemal's failure on the French side in July 1914, Germany seemed to be the only option left for the Porte. Britain did not even appear to be a

prospective ally, considering its cautious policy vis-à-vis other Great Powers, particularly Russia (Heller 1983, p.134). In June 1913, Britain had declined the Ottoman Empire's offer for an Anglo-Ottoman alliance or the inclusion of the Empire in the Triple Entente. Mallet, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, as well as the British Foreign Office believed that an Anglo-Turkish alliance would arouse the suspicions of Britain's allies and the Ottoman Empire's inclusion in the Triple Entente would similarly affect relations with Germany, Austria and Italy (see Mallet cited in Ahmad 1966, p.322). Britain had nothing better to offer than to advise the Ottoman Empire to remain neutral. However, the Porte was not willing to remain neutral in the coming war, unless they obtained a number of real and long-term guarantees from all the Entente Powers.

During the July crisis, Mallet was on leave and he returned to Istanbul on 16 August, almost a week after the two German warships, *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been allowed into the Dardanelles. Britain interpreted this event as unmistakable proof that the Ottoman Empire would not stay neutral but support Germany (Heller 1983, pp.136-7). Mallet however, still believed that there was hope. On the day of his arrival in Istanbul, he met with the Grand Vizier, Said Halim, and the Navy Minister, Cemal. The latter assured him that:

were France and Britain to guarantee his country against Russia, German influence would immediately collapse. He also asked for a defence treaty with each of the Entente Powers, the abolition of the Capitulations, the immediate delivery of the seized Ottoman ships, renunciation of any interference in internal affairs and the return of Western Thrace in the event of Bulgaria joining the enemy camp. (p.138)

Britain found these demands unreasonable, or as Mallet put it, akin to "terms imposed by a victorious enemy" (p.138) and therefore offered only limited assurance on the integrity of Ottoman territory against Russia and conceded nothing on the other points.

Germany, on the other hand, agreed to make significant concessions on each of these points. Said Halim, in spite of his sincere commitment to Ottoman neutrality, had nevertheless been compelled to sign a secret alliance treaty with

Germany on 2 August. However, the Porte delayed its intervention in the war until November with excuses that it had not concluded an agreement with Bulgaria, lack of military preparedness and the poor condition of the defences of the Dardanelles (Trumpener 1968, p.35). During the three months after the signing of the treaty, Enver, the notably pro-German War Minister, managed to gain considerable support in the cabinet, including from Talat and Cemal, the other two members of the ruling triumvirate. On 25 October, relying on the support of this central committee, he decided to go behind Said Halim's back and authorised manoeuvres of the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea and "an attack on the Russian fleet if a suitable opportunity presented itself" (p.54). However, Souchon, the German admiral commanding the operation, launched an attack on the coastal installations of Russia, instead of waiting for the "opportunity" by which Enver meant, a confrontation on the high seas where it could be alleged that the Russian fleet had provoked the attack (p.55).

A few days later, two of the most influential leaders of the anti-interventionist faction of the CUP, namely, Said Halim and the Finance Minister Cavid and three other ministers announced their resignation but had a change of heart later that day, possibly realising that their presence in the cabinet was a bigger threat to the Germans than their resignation (56). It seems that the discord within the cabinet benefited the Ottoman interests. Enver and the war party repeatedly put forward their supposedly weak position in the cabinet in order to press for more concessions from Germany throughout the war. After the Ottoman declaration of war, the Porte asked for the terms of the treaty to be extended over a longer period and assurance of German protection against France and Britain in addition to Russia (Aksakal 2008, p.184). After the initial rejection, Berlin however came around as the German ambassador Wangenheim reported:

In order to appease the grand vizier [Said Halim], Cavid and their backers, Enver and his friends had expressed the wish to expand the alliance and improve the credit agreement. They had counted on a favourable response from Berlin. The fact that we have not given them a [positive] decision as of yet has increased the tensions here by the day. I am unable to meet with the grand vizier personally. (in Aksakal 2008, p. 185)

Thanks to their ability to convince the Central Powers that the non-interventionist party in the cabinet needed to be satisfied for the political stability of the Empire, Ottoman leaders managed to renegotiate the terms of the treaty towards the permanent abrogation of the Capitulations, the commercial, fiscal and diplomatic privileges granted to European powers since the 16th century, which were held responsible for the subjugation of the Empire (Trumpener 1968, p.108). Thus, the Ottoman leaders showed political astuteness by exploiting the division that they purposefully maintained in the cabinet to the Empire's best advantage.

It is also important to note that, the disagreement within the cabinet was mainly about the timing of the intervention rather than about the decision to participate in the war or the appropriateness of Germany as ally. The Ottoman leaders and intellectuals believed that the European Powers stood deliberately in the way of Ottoman progress. Britain's policy, in particular, was perceived as being antagonistic as Cami, a politician and a Turkish nationalist claimed:

Yes, in order to be friends with Britain we must recognize that the Red Sea is a British sea. And we must also cede [to the British, the region stretching from] Egypt to Syria, [and from] Iraq to India, and permit the British sphere of influence in Iran to extend westward, that is, to the port of Alexandretta. And we must be satisfied with an Anatolian principedom based in Konya. [Once we do all that] we can begin to speak of a friendly British policy towards us. (in Aksakal 2008, p.34)

Germany, on the other hand was not suspected of having any such designs in the Middle East. Moreover, Germany and the Ottoman Empire felt similarly threatened by the Russian and Balkan-Slavic world. Among the Turkish intellectuals the declaration of war was received with approval. As Yusuf Akçura, one of the major ideologues of Turkish nationalism, said shortly after the declaration of war:

The policy pursued by the Ottoman state today is historically flawless ... I do not know of any war which Muslims, or Ottomans, have fought with greater justification than this one. [...] We are only defending ourselves against an active policy of imprisonment and oppression ... (in Aksakal 2004, p.534)

At least in the cabinet and among politicians and intellectuals, the war was considered both unavoidable and the beginning of liberation for the Empire.

By the time the war broke out, it had become clear to the Ottoman leaders that siding with Germany and the Triple Alliance was their only option, not only because Germany was willing to comply with the Ottoman Empire's demands but also the Triple Entente powers showed no inclination to do so. Therefore, the decision to side with Germany cannot be assigned to any pro-German sentiment among the leaders. In fact, apart from a few individuals such as Enver, the bulk of the post-Balkan War generation of the Young Turks were pro-Entente (Ahmad 1966, p.324). The decision was not due to blind faith in German superiority either. As Feroz Ahmad framed it: "The German alliance was a gamble and the outcome of the war proved that they had backed the wrong horse. But events had shown that they had had no other horse to back" (p.325).

Because of the outcome of the war, most Ottoman leaders denied responsibility for the German alliance in the aftermath of the war, while the new cabinet tried to show their resolution was bona fide by punishing the responsible party in order to obtain more favourable peace terms (Aksakal 2008, p.188). Among other things, the wartime leaders were accused of "entering the war without reason" and "rejecting the honourable and salutary offers by the Entente governments following mobilization and prior to the declaration of war, and allowing the Empire to be drawn into war without obtaining any kind of guarantee from Germany and without securing an advantage" (p.189). The prominent leaders had fled the Empire after the armistice and the remaining cabinet members responded to the accusation by singling out those who were conspicuous by their absence. Later, the death of Enver in 1922, while fighting against the Red Army on the side of the Central Asian Muslim and Turkic peoples, contributed further to the mainstream narrative of the Ottoman involvement in the First World War as being the result of an over-ambitious dictator's dream to build a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic empire (see Yilmaz 2007). Thus, Enver and the other prominent leaders were accused not only for their pro-German policy but also for their pan-policies (Aydın 2007, p.94). These pan-policies were discredited during and in the

aftermath of the war, to such an extent that they were not sustainable in the post-war period, and even staunch supporters of these causes had to abandon them.

Ottoman – German Jihad

Baron Max von Oppenheim who was the mastermind of German jihad strategy believed Islam to be Germany's "sharpest weapon against the British," as he wrote to the Kaiser in a top secret report dated October 1914, "Fomenting rebellion in the Islamic territories of our enemies" (Schwanitz 2008, p.189). Oppenheim had spent several years in Egypt as a diplomat, and therefore claimed expertise on the Middle East and the Muslim world. He advised Wilhelm II that the spread of Islam in Africa was not a threat to the German possessions and pan-Islam could be instrumentalised to Germany's advantage (Hagen 2004, p.149). The First World War promised to be the ideal terrain for Oppenheim to prove his theory.

Oppenheim expected his plan to achieve nothing less than "set[ting] the entire Muhammadan world aflame in a wild uprising" (p.149). This plan particularly focused on cutting Britain's connection with India by seizing control of the Suez Canal, and on encouraging Muslim rebellions in India and a German sponsored Afghan invasion from the northwest. The first step to this programme would be the declaration of jihad against the Allied powers by the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire. An intelligence and propaganda institution would be set up in Berlin, working in close collaboration with a sister institution in Istanbul which would be controlled and supervised by some "'tactful and qualified' Germans, who were to keep up the pretence to be only friendly advisers to the Turks" (Lüdke 2005, p.116). According to Oppenheim's plan, Germany was not only to provide direction but also the money and the material that was necessary for the effective functioning of intelligence and propaganda work. More importantly, no expense was to be spared in order to ensure Ottoman military victories, which Oppenheim believed to be indispensable for the success of German propaganda (p.115-6). Finally, Muslim troops in the Allied forces would be encouraged to desert and the

Muslim deserters and prisoners of war would be persuaded to join the Ottoman army.

The first challenge that Oppenheim's plan faced was funding. The *Nachrichtenselle für den Orient* (hereafter NfO), the intelligence agency for the East, was founded in September 1914, and was initially financed by Oppenheim personally and remained underfunded throughout the war (p.118). The Foreign Office's parsimonious treatment of the organisation may be, at least partly, assigned to a lack of faith in Oppenheim's plan among the German leaders and Orientalists from the beginning (p.117). However, some of the renowned Orientalists such as Carl Heinrich Becker and Martin Hartmann who previously denied the very existence of pan-Islamism in the Muslim world, joined NfO after the breakout of the war (p.116³). They were, in particular, the targets of criticism from the Dutch Orientalist, Snouck Hurgronje, whose arguments against jihad were twofold. Firstly, he contested the validity of jihad and the legitimacy of the Caliph on theological and historical bases. Secondly, he pointed to the hypocrisy of those Orientalists who supported jihad, largely by quoting from their pre-war writings. Hurgronje finally warned against the dangers of "reviving the dying mediaeval fanaticism of the Mohammedan world" (Hurgronje 1915 p.77).

If we leave aside the customary condescension towards the Oriental mind that supposedly tended to resist rational thinking and was therefore susceptible to fanaticism and backwardness, the critics of jihad were not so misguided in their contestation of the Caliph's authority or their prediction of jihad's potential to kindle religious hatred. The place of the institution of the Caliphate in Islam in the 20th century was difficult to define theologically and to justify historically. As Hurgronje (1915) points out, by the time the Mongols took Baghdad in 1258, wiping out the Abbaside family who were the last holders of the title, the institution had long lost its function and power. Egyptians then kept the tradition alive by appointing one of the survivors as Caliph (pp.16-9). When the Ottoman Empire conquered the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina as well as Egypt in 1517, the title of Caliph was not their major concern. It was not until the 19th century that the Ottomans reinvented the tradition of the Caliphate by introducing new rituals and artefacts, especially Caliph Omar's sword, in the accession to the throne

ceremonies (Landau 1990, p.11). The legitimacy of the claim was drawn from the conquest of Egypt retrospectively, and the narrative was constructed as if Ottoman Sultans had held the title ever since.

The reason why such an invention of tradition was necessary at the time is related to the fact that antagonism with the West was becoming more and more translated into an Islamic revivalism and pan-Islamic aspirations. But most importantly, the promotion of the Caliphate was a response to the European powers' right to intervene in matters that concerned Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Sultans sought to counterbalance that right which was conferred on the European powers through the Capitulations, by imposing themselves as the religious leaders of all Muslims living under foreign rule. It has to be underlined that the aim of the operation was not to impose the Caliph's authority over Muslims around the world but to convince Western powers that the Muslims under their rule owed allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan.

Hurgronje (1915) made the point by saying that the Caliph was not the all-powerful head of Muslims around the world and his authority was limited to his empire (p.22). However, he shared the short-sightedness of his colleagues in his perception of pan-Islam. In fact, whether Muslim people under British rule would respond to the call of jihad or not, did not depend on their attitude towards the Caliph. In other words, whether the Caliph had legitimate authority was not a determining factor for the effectiveness of the call for jihad. Pan-Islam was, above all else, an anti-colonial movement, which was religious in its rhetoric and secular in its purpose. The motives to join a jihad would necessarily be political rather than religious.

Ottoman leaders were quite realistic about the potential of pan-Islam as a foreign policy and refrained from engaging in over-ambitious plans by stirring trouble in Muslim colonies. They were reluctant to play the pan-Islamic card against the British Empire as they knew that jihad may not be as powerful a weapon as the British thought it to be. In Kemal Karpat's (2001) words "[Ottoman leaders] knew that the threat of jihad was more effective than the call itself" (p.234). Upon the declaration of jihad, the deposed sultan Abdulhamid II was also

reported to have said: “not jihad itself but its name was a weapon in our hands” (Özcan 1997, p.180¹⁵³). According to Morgenthau, the American ambassador in Istanbul, Wangenheim had a similar conception of jihad as a political threat that could force Britain to peace, rather than being a powerful military weapon with a large recruitment potential (Schwanitz 2008, p.195).

The understanding of jihad was very different among the Germans and the British on the one hand, and the Ottomans on the other. As Aksakal (2011) commented, in Ottoman understanding, “the meaning of jihad went beyond any one legal-doctrinal definition and signified a generic call for marshalling all-out effort in the face of great challenges” (p.188). Challenges could vary from expeditions to suppression of rebellions (even if the rebels were also Muslims) and even economic crisis could fall into the category of jihad. The typical absence of doctrinal considerations about the declaration of jihad in the Ottoman Empire indicates, on the one hand, the secularisation of the term and on the other, the consequent politicisation of its use (p.188). Even the War of Independence was declared a jihad led by Mustafa Kemal who ultimately put an end to the Caliphate (p.189). Therefore, it was not surprising that the Ottoman Empire would declare jihad on the Allied powers with or without German plans. The purpose of their jihad however, was quite different to that of Germany.

The tone was set from the very beginning. After the reading of the fatwa, which declared jihad on 14 November 1914 at the Fatih Mosque, Istanbul, a procession moved to the German Embassy accompanied by a curious staging of the procession of the prophet Muhammad on horseback, accompanied by his wife and her servant (Hagen 2004, p.145). The crowd was welcomed by ambassador Wangenheim from the balcony of the embassy, and after a Turkish employee of the embassy delivered a speech, several of the 14 North African prisoners of war from the French army said the few lines in Turkish that they had learned by heart, probably without understanding a word (McMeekin 2010, p.126). Then, the crowd proceeded through Pera (the European quarter of Istanbul), looting and burning Christian-owned businesses along their way (p.127). As Wangenheim and the Austrian ambassador Pallavicini feared, the anti-Christian violence would ultimately target the Christian minorities of the empire and this would embarrass

Germany vis-à-vis neutral powers (Trumpener 1968, p118; McMeekin 2010, p.125). As they predicted, Asia Minor would see its Christian population drop from 20% in 1912 to only 2% in 1924 as a result of a combination of Muslim immigration, non-Muslim deportation and massacres and finally a compulsory population exchange with Greece in 1923 (Aksakal 2011, p. 195).

Despite the warnings of their diplomats Germany did not put the Armenian question on the table, as there were other ongoing negotiations that concerned Germany more directly, such as the permanent abrogation of the Capitulations and the question of a common peace policy. After the sudden death of Wangenheim in October 1915, his successor, Wolff-Metternich paid the price of taking the Armenian question to heart by being recalled to Berlin after less than a year's service (Trumpener 1968, p.128). His withdrawal had been explicitly requested by Enver and Talat on the grounds of his hostility towards the CUP regime, although, in fact, Enver had previously complained that it was impossible to deal with the new ambassador because "he would not talk about anything but the Armenian persecutions" (pp.126-127). German policy tended to avoid friction with the Ottoman leaders on what were considered to be side issues, while on the field, the attitude of German officials and officers ranged from active contribution, tacit compliance and different forms of resistance (see Dadrian 1996; Kaiser 1999).

Enver and Talat, largely supported by other Turkish leaders, sought not only to eliminate the threat of Armenian collaboration with the Allied powers but also to solve the national identity crisis for the long term with a plan of demographic engineering. Enver's infamous 24 April 1915 decree aiming to reduce the Armenian population to less than 10% in designated areas, for 'security purposes', was issued just a day before the Allied landing on Gallipoli,⁴ followed by Talat's relocation order of 30 May (McMeekin 2010, p.251). It is beyond the scope of this research to cover many of the questions concerning the implementation of the Armenian policy. However, the result of these policies in the Ottoman Empire

⁴ Turco-Armenian tensions crystallise around the remembrance of Gallipoli because of the simultaneity of the landings at Gallipoli and the beginning of the Armenian deportations. This question is developed in Chapter 10.

in terms of the Turkification of Asia Minor by elimination of Christian population at all costs is undeniable.

The Indian home front

Although the call for jihad did not immediately cause any uprising, the perceived threat of insurrections was sufficiently strong among the British for them to remain on guard at least until well into 1916. John Buchan's bestseller *Greenmantle* reflected in 1916, the lingering fear of a Islamic conspiracy orchestrated by Germany, with particular concern over British India: "There is a dry wind blowing through the East, and the parched grasses wait the spark. And that wind is blowing towards the Indian border" (p.2/100). The implausible plot of the novel takes the main character Richard Hannay through Germany to Istanbul and to Anatolia on a secret mission to foil the mysterious, ultimate German hat-trick. "The East is waiting for a revelation. It has been promised one. Some star – man, prophecy or trinket – is coming out of the West. The Germans know, and that is the card with which they are going to astonish the world," says Sir Walter, the Foreign Office official who sends Hannay off on his mission (p.3/100). The German plan turns out to be the revelation of 'Greenmantle,' a fake prophet who could finally ignite the global jihad. Thus, Buchan implicitly admits that it would take a miracle to make a global jihad work. However, since Western nations thought it would be easy to deceive ignorant hordes of Muslims by conjuring up a prophet, the jihad conspiracy did not seem at all impossible to them.

British authorities were well aware of the pan-Islamic support for the Ottoman cause in India. Some Indian Muslims mistrusted British policy on the Ottoman Empire and thought that Britain was complicit in the loss of the Ottoman territories. Maulana Mohamed Ali wrote in his memoirs that, in a meeting during his visit to England in 1913:

I pointed out that the Turks had almost lost the Balkan War before it had been declared, for it was not fought on the battlefields of the Balkan, but in the editorial sanctums, and on the public platforms, in the pulpits, in the clubs, and the drawing rooms of Western Europe. (in Iqbal 1979, p.133)

Indian pan-Islamists' standpoint was clear and Muslim loyalty seemed to depend on Ottoman neutrality. When Britain joined the war against Germany, although the vast majority of Indian Muslims offered their support to Britain, a part of the Muslims represented by the *Comrade*, *Al-Hilal*, the *Zamindar* and the *Wakil* made no secret of their pro-German stance (Özcan 1997, p.175). Certain issues covered in these papers were stopped and censorship was also imposed on Reuters in order to keep Indian Muslims in uncertainty as to whether the Ottoman Empire would join the war (p.174). The Viceroy Hardinge advised Britain that "because the Muslims were kept entirely uninformed [...] the sudden announcement of war with Turkey without previous warning or preliminary education of Muslim public opinion, would cause intense surprise and have a disturbing effect upon the Muslims" (p.176).

In the meantime, Hardinge tried to rally Muslim notables in order to discredit a possible call for jihad even before the Ottoman Empire joined the war (p. 177). After the Ottoman declaration of war and jihad, the Indian Government gave assurances to Indian Muslims that the Holy Places of Islam in Hijaz and in Mesopotamia would be immune from Allied attack, in order to assuage some of the anxieties that would arise from a war against the Ottoman Empire (p.179). Hardinge also managed to persuade several of the ulema to sign a fatwa declaring that the war was a political war and thus Indian Muslims were exempt from responding to the Caliph's call, although, the fatwa lost much of its credibility when Moulvi Abdul Haq who drafted it, admitted that it was instigated by the government (Bamford 1925, p.120). Although others including Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal refused to sign the fatwa, they still pleaded their half-hearted loyalty to the British (Minault 1982a, p.38). As Mohamed Ali said: "There is not a Musalman who in heart does not pray for the victory of the Caliph and the defeat and the destruction of his enemies, including Britain" (Özcan p.181). Vocal supporters of the Ottoman Empire such as the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad and Zafar Ali Khan were interned during the war under the Defence of India Act (1915) in order to keep pan-Islamic activity in check (Sadiq 1983, p.50).

There was also an additional category of Indian Muslim elite who was genuinely loyal to the British notwithstanding their pan-Islamic sympathies. The

most emblematic figures of this group were Syed Ameer Ali and the Aga Khan, both based in London. The Aga Khan was the hereditary leader of the Ismaili branch of Shia Muslims and the elected permanent president of the All-India Muslim League from 1908. By the time the First World War started, the Aga Khan had lost much of his credibility and eventually his position as the permanent president of the League since his moderation and his suggestion that the Ottoman Empire should peacefully retire from its European territories during the Balkan Wars did not resonate with the pan-Islamic spirit of the League (Minault 1982a, p.49). Although the Aga Khan actively campaigned against the global jihad, and even took the initiative of going to Egypt to preach loyalty to the Indian Muslim troops, the British mistrust of the Indian Muslims was so powerful that the Aga Khan as well as Syed Ameer Ali were kept under surveillance during the war (Ansari 2008, p.35).

The rulers of princely states invited their subjects to remain loyal to the British, while they also made extravagant offers to prove their sincerity. Most notably, the Nizam of Hyderabad not only contributed two regiments, but also covered their costs and the Viceroy commended this demonstration of “intense patriotism and devotion” (in Natesan 1915, p.110). The meaning of patriotism here is identical to loyalty to the colonial rulers. Many of the Indian nationalists also acted in agreement with that definition. A letter signed by Gandhi, Sarojini Naidu as well as dozens of other names was sent to Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, offering their services to the government. “It was thought desirable by many of us that during the crisis that has overtaken the Empire [...], those Indians who are residing in the United Kingdom and who can at all do so should place themselves unconditionally at the disposal of the authorities” (p.117). However, behind this manifest and unconditional loyalty of the educated classes, there was a large measure of expectation that this loyalty would be rewarded with self-government.

In an article entitled “India’s Loyalty and England’s Duty,” Annie Besant argued that:

India has dropped every question which has arisen between herself and Britain on domestic matters [...] When the Empire is attacked, every other

issue fades into insignificance; the one duty is that which calls every good patriot to the work of defence [...]

It is through England's help and by England's friendly guidance that India hopes to step out into the circle of Free Nations, and it is as one of the self-governing units of the British Empire that she hopes to accomplish her own glorious destiny. For the inspiration that England has brought her by the gift of education; for the glory with which England will crown her by the gift of self-government; by her gratitude for the one, and her hope for the other, India is willing to shed her blood to save the Empire. (p.267)

Bal Gangadhar Tilak who cofounded the Home Rule League with Besant in April 1916 also believed that loyalty and cooperation was the proper route to self-government. On a recruitment rally in Poona, he said: "If you want Home Rule be prepared to defend your home. You cannot say the ruling will be done by you and the fighting for you. Had it not been for my age, I would have been the first to volunteer" (in Omissi 1997, p.161).

A more or less calculated pledge of loyalty was also the most common response among the non-Muslim leaders. In the case of a British victory, Indians could be rewarded with self-government for their loyalty. In case of a German victory, Britain would certainly lose its grip on India. Indians had nothing to win and everything to lose by engaging in jihad. The Mutiny of 1857 was a constant reminder of the consequences of a failed rebellion. The loyalist strategy turned out to be a costly gamble that eventually failed, causing a great deal of embarrassment to the nationalist leaders who grew more and more assertive in their claim for self government in the 1920s.

Far from submitting to German hegemony by signing a treaty of alliance, the Ottoman Empire endeavoured to place itself as a fully-fledged partner of Germany in the war. The Ottoman Empire did not throw itself hastily into the war, and on the 'wrong side,' just because of the whims of Enver Pasha, who is singled out in the official Turkish history as the person primarily responsible for the Ottoman decision. In fact, there was a widespread expectation of a great European

war in which Germany was the consensual prospective ally both in the Turkish cabinet and media since the war in Tripoli (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) (Aksakal 2004). Germany equally regarded the assistance of the Ottoman Empire as not only desirable but rather essential for their war effort (Trumpener 1968, p.21). Other than the fact that the Ottoman front would divert important resources of the Allies away from the Western Front, Germany also strongly believed that the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph had the potential to destabilise the imperial possessions of Britain and France. Although Ottoman leaders were sceptical about the German plan of Egyptians and Indian Muslims rising against British rule, they also had high expectations from jihad in terms of consolidating the loyalty of the Muslims within the Empire and eradicating the non-Muslim threat from within. Outside the borders of the Empire, jihad had a very limited appeal, for reasons that were internal to each of the countries targeted by the German-Ottoman propaganda. However, Indian Muslims' sympathy and concern for the Ottoman Empire was tangible although ineffective as far as the war effort was concerned.

Chapter 3 – Global Jihad and the anti-colonial movement

Although the Muslims of India did not collectively and openly rise against British rule, the war had a far-reaching impact not only for the Muslims but also for British India as a whole. In fact, seditious activities during the war, including the support given to the German intelligence services, were not undertaken exclusively by Muslims. The activities of the Indian revolutionaries were not supported by a massive movement during the war and had limited impact on the soldiers of the Indian army. However, many of the returned soldiers who were discharged from the army following the war became involved in anti-colonial mass movements, mainly in the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements. These movements were born out of disillusionment with British post-war policy in India and the treatment of the defeated Ottoman Empire by Britain. This chapter discusses the revolutionary activities supporting the Ottoman Empire during the war and the role of pan-Islam in the mass movements in India in the aftermath of the war.

Political agitation across the borders

Only a very small number of Indian Muslims actively supported the jihad. Aybek reported in his memoirs that a group of some 700 Indian Muslim pilgrims at Mecca were persuaded to join the Ottoman forces by members of the *Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba* (Özcan 1997, p.180¹⁵³). In February 1915, a number of students from Lahore, 15 according to the *Sedition Committee Report* (1918), crossed the Afghan borders to ultimately join the Turkish forces (p.175). These runaway students became followers of Obeidullah Sindhi who arrived in Kabul in October 1915. Obeidullah, a Sikh convert who had become a moulvi at Deoband, one of the most prestigious madrasas in India, was sent to Afghanistan by Mahmud-ul Hasan, the head of the Deoband school, who also carried the title of *Sheik-ul Hind*, the Sheik of India. Mahmud-ul Hasan himself, in the meantime, decided to go to Hijaz with the intention of proceeding to Istanbul and working his way to the tribal areas of India from there (Qureshi 1999, p.79). Most of the students from Lahore,

however, remained in Afghanistan and only one of them, Zafer Hasan [Aybek] is known to have finally gone to Turkey in 1924 to join the Turkish armed forces thanks to his contacts with Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (The Intelligence Organization of the CUP) agents in Afghanistan (Wasti 2006, p.719²⁸). He was accompanied by Obeidullah Sindhi.

At the breakout of the war, Mahendra Pratap, a Hindu prince, had joined Indian revolutionaries such as Har Dayal and Virendranath Chattopadhyaya in Berlin. They were working with the NfO, the German intelligence office for the East. Mahendra Pratap reported to the German Foreign Office that if Afghans were persuaded to invade India, a revolution would break out against the British (Sareen 1979, p.172). He proceeded to Kabul as the nominal leader of the German mission to join the Afghan Army in order to pre-empt the predictable Hindu concern over a Muslim invasion (p.173). Barakatullah, an Islamic scholar and a Ghadarite also followed the mission to Afghanistan. In October, Barakatullah and Mahendra Pratap arrived in Kabul with the German-Ottoman mission and combined their efforts with Obeidullah and the students.

In December, Mahendra Pratap announced to the befuddled German and Turkish members of the mission the establishment of the Provisional Government of India, with himself as the President, Barakatullah as the Prime Minister and Obeidullah as the Minister of Home and Foreign Affairs (Stewart 2014, p.98). Mahendra Pratap, was described as an eccentric character in the *Sedition Report* (1918, p.177), and the Provisional Government was not lacking in ambition to liberate India from the British. Baraktullah's proposition was to establish a pan-Islamic society centred around the Sultan of Turkey, the Shah of Iran and the Amir of Afghanistan, because he said, "this is the only way of inflicting an effective blow to the infidels in India" (in Ramnath 2011, p.188). The Provisional Government set up a plan to raise an army, called the "Army of God" with headquarters in Medina and Mahmud-ul Hasan as the commander-in-chief and coordinate a rebellion from within India. In order to encourage Amir Habibullah to invade India, they also promised that he would be declared the king of India (Stewart 2014, p.98).

If the jihad propaganda had failed in 1915, it was not likely to succeed any time thereafter. In early 1916, after the withdrawal in defeat of the Allied troops from Gallipoli, a very large number of British troops were captured when they surrendered in Kut-al-Amara in Mesopotamia. The two Allied military disasters that were only a few months apart provided the Ottoman Empire and Germany with precious propaganda material and affected the morale of the British. Having in mind the possible consequences of an early evacuation of Gallipoli, Viceroy Hardinge had advised London that the capture of Baghdad would not compensate for the defeat at Gallipoli as far as British prestige was concerned. Persia and Afghanistan could then be expected to throw in their lot with Germany and the tribal attacks on the frontier could also compromise internal security in India. Hardinge further suggested that in the event of the evacuation of Gallipoli, British military positions in Mesopotamia and in India should be strengthened (NA CAB/37/137/16). A few days after the final evacuation, Hardinge also wrote to Lt-Gen. William Birdwood who was the commander of the ANZAC troops at Gallipoli, to share his concern about the outcome of the 'big German conspiracy' and his suspicion that arms may have been landed at different places in India in preparation of an outbreak of local rebellions all around India. He was referring to what came to be known as the failed Christmas Day Plot (AWM 3DRL 3376, Series 2, Folder 1).

In fact, at that stage, all German attempts to ship arms to India had been prevented by the British intelligence services (Sareen 1979, p.138). The German mission in Afghanistan also seemed to be reaching a dead-end by the end of 1915. However, quite unexpectedly, Amir Habibullah decided to make a proposal for an agreement. In the meantime, the Amir did not fail to reassure Hardinge who possessed up-to-date information about what was going on in Kabul (Stewart 2014, p.100). By the time the final draft of the treaty was signed on 24 January 1916, it had become clear that Habibullah was testing Germany with extravagant demands in terms of money, troops and arms that could be provided only if Germany had already won the war (McMeekin 2010, p.229). Habibullah did not want to fall out of favour with Germany when the latter seemed to have a chance of winning the war (Stewart 2014, p.100). He was making sure that he would not

have to cede his neutrality with Britain but he could still be considered an ally of Germany if Britain lost the war.

The last blow to Afghanistan-based seditious movements came when Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant General of Punjab discovered the Provisional Government's plan to raise the 'Army of God' to liberate India, known as the Silk Letter Plot. Silk letters were designed to be sewn inside clothes for discretion. They were cryptic communications from Obeidullah and Mahmud-ul Hasan to their supporters in India, detailing the organisation of the 'Army of God,' including the names of the generals, and urging the recipients to raise funds and organise an armed rebellion from within, in support of the invasion from the north-west. The declaration of jihad known as Galibnama obtained from Galib Pasha, the Governor of Hijaz, was also included in order to be spread throughout India. (*Sedition Committee Report 1918*, pp.176-9). O'Dwyer (1988) appeared to have been informed about the silk letters by the father of two of the runaway students in Kabul, who happened to be "a fine Mohammedan soldier – a Khan who was a friend of mine" (p.178). Zafer Hasan Aybek's memoirs suggest that the two brothers were allowed to return to India unharmed and both the father and the sons were awarded agricultural lands and the envoy who revealed the silk letters was appointed to the Railway Police (Wasti 2006, p.714). The affair ended with the arrest of about 12 sympathisers in India and Mahmud-ul Hasan and Galib Pasha were also captured by the Sheriff of Mecca and handed over to the British authorities (O'Dwyer 1988, p.181). The event revealed how difficult it was for revolutionaries to build a reliable network, or even trust a close circle of collaborators.

Despite the pan-Islamic bias, the Provisional Government did not envision India as a Muslim kingdom. The declaration that they issued to be distributed in India called upon "children of India, Hindus, Muhammadans, Jains, Parsis and native Christians" to draw the British out of India. Hindu-Muslim cooperation was also a theme that was emphasised in the propaganda literature targeting Indian soldiers (Ramnath 2011, p.188). In fact, many of the Indian collaborators with the Germans were not Muslims. A number of Indian revolutionaries from diverse backgrounds were drawn to Berlin upon the breakout of hostilities. They founded

the Indian Independence Committee (IIC or the Berlin Committee hereafter) under the auspices of the NfO and worked in the Indian branch of the organisation throughout the war. They were particularly active in propaganda intended for Indian soldiers, either at the front or in prisoner camps, and they also worked towards the establishment of an army to support future rebellions in India.

In fact, before the Ottoman Empire entered the war, the Ghadar Party, a diasporic revolutionary movement based in the US, had already appealed to its members to return to India to organise an armed rebellion with the promise of:

Salary: death

Reward: martyrdom

Pension: freedom

Field of battle: Hindustan. (in Ramnath 2011, p.1)

Actually, over 4000 Ghadarites managed to reach India and about 2000 were assembled in readiness for the fight (Bose 1978 p.111). Barakatullah wrote from the US to Har Dayal, one of the central figures of Ghadar and a member of the Berlin Committee, to request German financial help (Sareen 1979, p.121). However, an effective coordination between German authorities and Ghadar was not achieved and the plan for revolution in February 1915 did not materialise (p.122-3).

The diversity among the networks and collaborators with German intelligence meant that the propaganda material was neither necessarily produced by nor was destined for Muslims. Copies of a pamphlet that were thrown at the Allied trenches at Gallipoli are also an example of the convergent anti-British motives of pan-Islam and the Indian independence movements. The pamphlet was addressed to “Hindus and Mohammedans,” urging them to join the Turkish forces and referring to the recent Indian mutinies with much hyperbole. “In Ceylon and Singapore, the Sikhs, Mohammendans and Punjabi, joining forces have slain all the English and seized all the forts.” There was only a brief reference to jihad in the pamphlet placing it rather as a detail. The pamphlet also showed a photograph of Indian men who were stated to be deserters from the Suez Canal, now serving as the Sultan’s bodyguards, to reassure potential deserters of the good treatment that

they would receive (NA PRO 30-57-69(63), p.15). It is important to note that the pamphlet was written in Hindi, which was neither the language nor script of the Muslim soldiers. It is unlikely that this was a blunder and it is reasonable to assume that the message was not specifically intended for Muslim soldiers.

According to a more extensive version of this letter which was dropped on the Indian trenches at Gallipoli on 26 June at 6 am, as recorded by a French medical officer, it also included the sentence “We have done our duty in giving you this advice for the sake of Muhammadan solidarity,” although the addressee is clearly the “Hindu, Mussulman and Sikh soldiers of India” (*Uncensored Letters* 1916, p.144-6). In this version, in order to encourage Indian soldiers to mutiny or, as a second choice, to desert, the overriding argument was the necessity to overthrow the tyrannical British rule and that the English were contemptuous of the Indians. The propaganda literature typically blended pan-Islamic and nationalist elements, which reflected the composition of the Berlin Committee and its collaborators. However, the balance between the pan-Islamic and nationalist bias was fragile and bound to be disturbed. It was Har Dayal’s stay in Istanbul in 1915 that would bring some of these tensions to the surface.

Har Dayal intended to take over the *Jehan-i Islam*, an Istanbul-based pan-Islamic weekly in Arab, Turkish and Urdu, and to transform it into an Indian nationalist magazine. Moreover, he proposed that the Istanbul office of the Berlin Committee be called ‘Bureau du Parti National Hindou’ (Ramnath 2011, p. 177). In his proposal, he defined the program of the office as “I. Propaganda for emancipation of India, II. Propaganda for the establishment of relations between Turkey and India after the war, III. Propaganda for pan-Orientalism” (in Keleşyılmaz 1999, appendix 3). Har Dayal’s intention to steer the propaganda effort away from pan-Islam, in favour of Indian nationalism as well as pan-Asianism was not welcomed by Turkish, German or even Indian partners. Har Dayal reacted so strongly to this rejection that Chattopadhyaya had to explain that the Hindus were not hostile to the Muslims, although tensions had become apparent (Khan 2011, p.83).

Har Dayal (1920) denounced the incessant disputes of his Indian fellows in Berlin and Istanbul in *Forty-Four Months in Germany and Turkey* (p.45, 68). This text reads as a pathetic apology offered to the British by a repentant revolutionary who wanted to be allowed to return to India without harm. Other than omitting the fact that his colleagues assigned much of the dispute to his own egotistic behaviour, Har Dayal was quite accurate about conflicts impeding the work (Ramnath 2011, p.177). Incidentally, Har Dayal was finally granted permission to return to India in 1938, a few months before he died, but he did not make it. Although the Government of India took a long time to allow his return, they were far quicker in translating and distributing copies of his infamous book in India as propaganda material (Zachariah 2013, p.9-10).

Mutineers, revolutionary fighters and half-hearted jihadis

The primary targets of the Ghadarite propaganda were the Indian troops who were trained and armed. The Ghadar Party believed that freedom could not be obtained through constitutional reforms but only through fighting; therefore enlisting Indian soldiers to the cause was an essential part of their propaganda effort. Three mutinies that occurred in the Indian Army during the war were linked more or less strongly to Ghadar and/or pan-Islamist propaganda. The most significant of these was the mutiny of the 5th Light Infantry Battalion in Singapore. In February 1915, the Muslim soldiers of the 5th seized control of the barracks and parts of the city for several days after liberating the German POWs. As a result of the mutiny, 12 British officers and 15 civilians were killed and 212 mutineers were tried and sentenced, including 47 death sentences (Sareen 1995, p.16). Although the British authorities downplayed the external causes of the mutiny by arguing that it had been a local and isolated event, the influence of pan-Islam and the Ghadar movement as well as the German military POWs who were in contact with the Indian guards unmistakably revealed the global nature of the mutiny (Streets-Salter 2013, p.547).

The Singapore mutiny had antecedents in the region. In December 1914, the 130th Baluchis' plan to mutiny in Rangoon had been nipped in the bud (Sareen

1995, p.11). The Malay State Guides, which consisted of Sikhs, Pathans and Punjabi Muslims, refused to go to East Africa, arguing that they had not been recruited to serve overseas. Before they were sent back to Malaya however, a corporal of the regiment sent a letter to the Turkish Consul in Rangoon, expressing their pro-Turkish feelings and requesting a warship to support their mutiny (Streets-Salter 2013, p.548). It turned out that the Malaya State Guides and the 5th Light Infantry not only had contact with each other but also socialised with a number of local civilians who had affinities, although probably not any formal affiliation with the Ghadar Party. Both regiments also guarded the German POWs. Most of these prisoners were civilians; however, a small number of military prisoners from a German cruiser, *Emden*, were among them and it was formally reported that these military POWs influenced the soldiers (p.557). The *Emden* prisoners were the only ones to take flight when the mutineers liberated them.

Although pan-Islamists, Ghadarites and even the German POWs were keen to take credit for provoking the mutiny, the facts are that they had no power to initiate the mutiny and had little accurate information about the events even long after they took place (Singh 2014, p.133-4). Although they did not play any active role in organising the mutiny, their propaganda had reached the mutineers through a combination of local and global channels and undeniably influenced their reactions to the prospect of serving overseas (Streets-Salter 2013, pp.560-1). In the case of the 5th Light Infantry, there were only rumours that they would be eventually committed to the battlefields of Europe. They were, in fact, destined to be shipped to Hong Kong. The Malaya State Guides' refusal to go to East Africa or the 5th Light Infantry's unwillingness to serve in Europe may be explained by a variety of reasons, mainly by the fact that they had not signed up for overseas service. The 130th Baluchis in Rangoon and 15th Lancers in Basra, on the other hand, clearly protested against being sent to Mesopotamia to fight their co-religionists, although the mutineers of the 15th Lancers claimed that they would fight the Turk or the Arabs anywhere else other than in Arabia or close to the holy places of Baghdad and Kerbela (Omissi 1994, p.140). This proposition indicates a fear of profaning sacred ground rather than a feeling of solidarity with their co-religionists.

Although insufficient in number and intensity, the cases of mutiny and desertions among the soldiers of the colonial armies pointed to potential support for the Ottoman Empire. Following the logic that the soldiers who refused to fight for the British and the French might be convinced to fight against them, the Berlin Committee proposed to raise an Indian legion, formed by the Indian deserters and prisoners of war both in Germany and in the Ottoman Empire. Har Dayal and a few other members of the Committee went to the Ottoman Empire to organise the volunteer corps. They were followed by recruits from German camps, who were supposed to form the nucleus of the legion (Sareen 1979, p.166-8). The numbers of the POWs recruited in German camps are unknown. However, the Indian recruits from the German camps could probably be counted in the hundreds. A letter to Enver from the Young Hindustan Association, founded by Har Dayal and presided over by Abdul Hafiz, pointed to the fact that in January 1916 there were large numbers of Indian volunteers awaiting deployment in the Yıldız Barracks in Istanbul (in Keleşyılmaz 1999, appendix 7). According to Turkish documents, a further 200 Muslim prisoners left Germany on 8 February 1916 and were expected to reach Istanbul on 17 February (ATASE BDH-1901-88-35). Other groups of prisoners kept coming from Germany and some were used in combat on various fronts. Many of these volunteers deserted back to the British lines in Mesopotamia, disappointed by their treatment in the Ottoman army; British and Indian Kut prisoners also encountered others while serving in the Ottoman army (Jones 2011, p.176). The recruitment base of the volunteer forces was not limited to Muslim POWs either, and several non-Muslim Indian POWs were also sent to Istanbul from Germany (Keleşyılmaz 1999, p.132). Renowned Ghadar activists such as Amba Parishad were also known to have volunteered to fight with the Ottomans through other networks (Ramnath 2011, p.183).

At least 3000 North Africans were similarly recruited in the German POW camp in Wünsdorf. They were first sent to Baghdad and then to the Caucasian front (Rogan 2015, p.270). Although there are no accounts left by any of the Indian volunteers, a North African prisoner recruited to the Ottoman army left a statement that gives an insight into what their experience may have been. Ahmed bin Hüseyin, described as an 'elderly farmer' by the Ottoman official who took his

statement, was recruited in Marrakech and was captured by the Germans on the Western front. He said that he was treated well by the Germans during his six months of captivity. Then, a Turkish officer, Hikmet Efendi came to ask for volunteers and 12 of the prisoners, including Ahmed, responded. They stayed in Istanbul for three months under the supervision of a Turkish sergeant although they were free to go about in the city by themselves. They were subsequently deployed against the Sheriff of Mecca's forces in Jeddah. However, when Ahmed returned to Istanbul he was put in a jail for reasons that he was apparently unaware of. His statement was taken 16 days after he was jailed (in Tetik et al. 2009, pp.93-4).

The large numbers of North African POW-volunteers were attributed to the efficient propaganda work of Salih al-Tunisi, a Tunisian born Islamic scholar of Algerian background. Salih al-Tunisi had left Tunis following the French occupation in 1881 and he had an eventful career as the confidant and advisor of Enver and an agent of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Not only did he coordinate the propaganda work in the Wünsdorf camp, but he also undertook the risky venture of going to the trenches personally in order to persuade North African soldiers to desert (Heine 1982, pp.89-91). Salih al-Tunisi was so convinced about the anti-colonialist commitment of Germany that, in a letter to the Kaiser in 1916, he suggested that Germany should liberate all its colonies to give an example to the other colonial powers and to enhance their prestige in the colonised countries (p.93). It is doubtful however, that the Islamist and anti-colonialist propaganda was internalised by all the POW-volunteers. It is interesting to note that Ahmed bin Huseyin did not mention his motivations, anti-colonial or otherwise; he simply said that others did not enlist because they were afraid (in Tetik et al. 2009, p.94). Thus, he implied that volunteering was the brave and honourable thing to do, regardless of an ideological commitment to either side.

There were probably numerous reasons for the POWs to enlist as volunteers, other than a genuine willingness to fight against the enemies of the Caliph and their colonial rulers. No matter how favourable the conditions were in the Wünsdorf camp, there were captivity-related anxieties and depression among the prisoners. Sound recordings in the German archives reveal that several

prisoners were desperate to return home. One predicted that he would die, were he to stay another two years in captivity (in Kant 2014, p.168, see also Scheffner 2007). Deserters were particularly distressed about their captivity as they feared that the Germans would hand them over to the British after the war. Fighting for the Ottoman Empire was their safest option (Ahuja 2011, p.46).

The POW camps in Germany were not the only recruitment pool for the legion. After the fall of Kut-al-Amara, the Ottoman Army took about 10,000 Indian soldiers prisoner, half of whom were Muslims (Keleşyılmaz 1999, p.132). Chattopadhyaya, and a few other members of the Committee, proceeded to Konya to inspect the prisoner camp where there was a high concentration of Indian POWs. They decided to separate Muslims from Hindus for propaganda purposes; however, they found it impossible to accomplish the task of raising a legion and gave up the mission, because of lack of support from the Turkish officials and the Indian Muslims (Sareen 1979, p.168). They also had serious doubts about the willingness of the German and the Ottoman Governments to provide the necessary support for the scheme. The Committee finally reported to the German foreign office that “it was no use wasting so much money on mere propaganda unless there was a serious desire on the part of the German and Turkish governments to carry out the plan of a volunteer legion” (p.169).

Even if the Berlin Committee had succeeded in forming a legion, they would have been faced with another important flaw in their scheme, namely the mechanics of sending an entire corps across Persia to the Indian border. Niedermayer, the head of the German mission in Afghanistan, also suggested that 1000 Turkish/Muslim troops fighting alongside the Afghans would convince the Amir to break his neutrality. However, the composition of the troops, Indians or Turks, was not important. In any case, the fate of the Ottoman Empire did not depend on a mission that was very unlikely to reach India anyway (Stewart 2014, p.95). Moreover, the Ottoman authorities, Germany and the Indian Independence Committee never reached an agreement on whether the legion would be sent to India or how it would be used otherwise (Sareen 1979, p.168).

Before the abandonment of the scheme in early 1917, an international committee of the Red Cross Society arrived in Istanbul from Geneva in order to inspect the prisoner camps. They reported that Eskisehir and Konya where most of the Indian officers were sent, seemed to have the best conditions:

Hindu and Muslim officers wander around the city without like tourists without any surveillance [...] The houses are well furnished and well located. They use one room as a prayer room where they gather to read Koran. The Hindus in Konya are staying in "hans" and are quite happy about their sort. They belong to Brahmanic castes and are extremely religious. The commandant told us that they had just had three days of celebrations where they donated money to the poor. (Boissier and Vischer 1917, p.14)

Recruitment of these officers to the service of the Sultan was strongly desirable. Colonial soldiers' engagement on the Ottoman side was valued as an ideological victory. The *Harp Mecmuası*, a semi-official propaganda organ of the Ottoman Government, publicised a picture of a small group of Turkic soldiers with the caption: "Of the prisoners from the Russian front: Our Muslim brothers who volunteered in our army to participate in jihad" (1916, vol.15, p.240). This propaganda was intended to reassure its readers that there was a fifth column in the army of the enemy which was being effectively exploited rather than highlighting the military contribution of a handful of POWs. For this reason, the Sultan-Caliph received 70 Indian Muslim officers (this was probably the total number of Muslim officers from Kut) in order to return them their swords as a gesture in August 1916. Although a local paper in Iraq reported that all 70 officers agreed to serve the Caliph in return, and the British official history claimed that those who refused to serve the Caliph were arrested, neither of these suggestions has been verified (Rogan 2015, pp.270-1, 434³⁸). The Ottoman officials' good treatment of the Indian officers may not have been entirely disinterested, although the Ottoman hopes of recruitment should not be overstated. After all, British officers also received similar treatment according to their ranks and the Red Cross Committee report suggested that the Indian officers, whether Muslim or not, were still well treated long after it became obvious that they would not serve the Ottoman Empire.

The experience of the Indian soldiers however, contrasted with that of the officers. They were kept under similar conditions to the Ottoman soldiers who were almost always undernourished, underdressed and exposed to contagious diseases. Indian prisoners were also used in railroad construction work (KA 771/187, 283, 297, 412). Although there were large numbers of Indian soldiers who applied for residency in Turkey after the war, it is likely they were officers. At least one of the Indian Muslims from Konya who presented himself as a deserter, applied for Turkish citizenship in November 1918 and his wish was granted in July 1919 (BCA 272-00-00-11-13-48-3). He was certainly not the only one to settle permanently in Turkey. On 4 April 1923, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to grant stipends according to the ranks of the increasing numbers of 'refugees' who applied for citizenship, particularly among the Indian Muslims (BCA 130-18-01-01-6-49-6). A British Criminal Investigation Department report stated that there were also a large number of Indians, some of them civilians, who had engaged in the Turkish national army against the occupation forces after the war (IOR/L/PS/11/179, P7828 A/1920). Among the eight names that were cited, were Mirza Abdul Qayyum and Abdul Rahman Peshawari of the Red Crescent Mission of 1913.

'Turkish war after the war,' the Khilafat and non-cooperation

The First World War was a major failure for the Ottoman Empire from all points of view. The Ottoman leaders thought that the war was the only option to save their territories, and during the war, they worked towards Turkification of an Anatolian homeland by all possible means, with the idea of preserving at least a predominantly Turkish territory based in Asia Minor. However, the methods of building that Turkish homeland further exacerbated the already deep-rooted anti-Turkish sentiment among their opponents who, as victors, had no intention of negotiating; instead they sought to simply impose peace terms. The Ottoman leaders' last hope of preserving anything remotely resembling an Empire was shattered with the signing of the Sevres Treaty in 1920. The terms of the treaty were not surprising given the fact that the intentions of the Allies had been made

clear through the treaties signed with individual Central Powers as well as among themselves. The territory that was projected as the Turkish homeland would be partitioned among the Armenians, Greeks and Kurds and the remaining areas would be placed under the Allied countries' mandate, leaving only a small part of Central Anatolia to the Turks (Rogan 2015, pp.390-3). The signature of this treaty marked the end of the war for the Ottoman Empire and virtually the end of the Empire itself. However, the Turkish war was far from over.

A surprisingly well-organised Turkish national resistance movement, with the explicit goal of preserving Asia Minor emerged in anticipation of the peace terms, and in reaction to the Allied sanctioned Greek occupation of Izmir in May 1919. In the meantime, the treatment of the Ottoman Empire kindled a major political movement called the Khilafat movement in India. The declared aim of the movement was nothing less than *status quo ante bellum* for the Ottoman Empire, which was framed as a purely religious claim by the Khilafat leaders. Although this principal goal was so ambitious that it was doomed to failure, the movement achieved a short-lived Hindu-Muslim cooperation and showed the potential of a religiously oriented movement to mobilise the masses.

Muslim leaders had voiced their concerns over the fate of the Ottoman Empire after the defeat of the Central Powers, from a variety of public platforms, including media and by pleading with government officials. However, the methods of contestation shifted from petitions to a popular mass movement, which culminated into the All-India Khilafat Day on 17 October 1919. This day of public meetings and prayers was observed mainly in urban centres all across India by both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Gandhi was among the leaders who addressed the public (Minault 1982, p.76) and supported the movement from its initial stages. As early as 1918, he had pleaded with the Viceroy for the release of the Ali brothers. He explained his interest in Muslim-Hindu cooperation to Mohamed Ali: "... my interest in your release is quite selfish. We have a common goal and I want to utilize your services to the uttermost, in order to reach that goal. In the proper solution of the Mahomedan question lies the realization of Swarajya" (p.68). The Muslim leaders accepted Gandhi's invitation to join the protest movement against

the Rowlatt Bills (1919), which extended the wartime security measures into the post-war period.

The Rowlatt Bills were indeed a massive blow to the belief that the wartime sacrifices of India would be rewarded with greater autonomy. The educated classes who had made that calculation were bitterly disappointed. However, Gandhi's satyagraha, or civil disobedience movement based on the principle of non-violence, had a much broader base. His call for a nationwide strike in April 1919 was observed by large numbers of people and was very encouraging for the Hindu-Muslim entente. However, the heavy-handed repression of the peaceful demonstration in Amritsar, known as the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, and the subsequent imposition of martial law in the Punjab, successfully suppressed the movement for a while (p.70). Nevertheless, the impressive demonstrations elsewhere, pointed to the potential of Hindu-Muslim cooperation.

As the base of the movement broadened, the need for a body to coordinate the movement emerged. In November, the Muslim League decided to assign the role of a Central Khilafat Committee to the Bombay Khilafat Committee (Qureshi 1999, p.121). Seth Chotani, a wealthy Muslim merchant and businessman, was the head of the Bombay Committee, hence the organisation would not lack for resources. In fact, Seth Chotani was not the only wealthy supporter of the Khilafat movement. While most people were affected by the disastrous effects of the war economy, the war was profitable for some businessmen who were willing to sponsor the Khilafat movement rather than surrender a part of their wealth to the British (Wolpert, 1978, p.131).

For a time, the Khilafat movement also enjoyed the Nizam of Hyderabad's sponsorship. While the Nizam made huge contributions to the British war effort, he also simultaneously fostered relationships with leading pan-Islamists such as Zafar Ali Khan and Shaukat Ali, in order to bolster his leadership of the Indian Muslims, gain popular support and also thwart the powers of the Resident in his state. The Nizam's interests seemed to converge with that of the Khilafatists until 1920 when the growing popular basis of the movement became a potential threat to his own authority. The Nizam was eventually compelled to collaborate with the

British in quelling the protest movement (Pernau-Reifeld 1999, pp.2747-9). However, in its first stages, the Khilafat movement had a strong appeal to large sections of Indian society, from princes to rich merchants, from educated urban classes to poorer and illiterate masses, and perhaps more importantly from Muslims to Hindus. This level of mobilisation pointed to the possibility of a strong backlash following the announcement of the terms of the treaty with the Ottoman Empire.

In the meantime, different modes of protest were being tested; the most significant of these was probably *hijrat*. The Indian context had not generally been propitious for a jihad. However, there was another possibility according to the Islamic tenets, namely *hijrat*, that is, leaving the land that was hostile to Muslims. The Ali brothers explained this, in a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford in April 1919:

When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives, *Jihad* or *Hijrat*. That is to say, he must either make use of every force God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return[ing] to it when it is once more safe for Islam ... In view of our weak condition, migration is the only alternative for us ... (in Qureshi 1999, p.180)

The suggestion that India was *daru'l harb* was a theologically sound argument since any country under non-Muslim rule would be defined as *daru'l harb*. However, there was disagreement among the *ulama*, Islamic scholars as to whether it was incumbent on the Indian Muslims to perform *hijrat* to *daru'l Islam*, following the example of the prophet Mohamed who left Mecca for Medina. Most of the *ulama* refused to endorse the proclamation of *hijrat*. Among the prominent non-religious Muslim leaders too, Hasrat Mohani, Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and many others were opposed to *hijrat* (pp. 196-7).

However, the outspoken partisans of *hijrat*, mainly the Ali brothers and Zafar Ali Khan, managed to get Abul Kalam Azad's fatwa, enjoining *hijrat* to Afghanistan. Additionally, a misinterpretation of an extremely brief message from

Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, the founder of the Anjuman, led to the belief that he also supported the scheme (pp.184-9). This religious sanction gave impetus to the movement, to which the Amir of Afghanistan also declared his support. Although the hijrat movement was largely an offshoot of the Khilafat movement, the Central Khilafat Committee and Jamiyat-ul Ulama refused to patronise the movement. However, the support of the Amir and Azad's fatwa were sufficient to encourage the pro-hijrat leaders to launch a campaign to mobilise the masses. The group of leaders who initiated the scheme did not have any control over the developments that followed. Rumours and misinformation about the conditions awaiting prospective migrants and the sinister future of Muslims in India certainly influenced the decision of thousands of people. In addition, profiteers and speculators encouraged people to sell all their possessions at incredibly low rates before they left for supposedly better futures (pp.194-200). As a result, an unprecedented number of Indian Muslims decided to undertake the exodus. As their numbers reached 40,000 in August 1920, causing a major refugee crisis in Afghanistan, the Amir had to suspend the scheme until this first wave was absorbed. However, more migrants arrived in Afghanistan independently without informing the authorities of their intentions (p.214-5). The result was disastrous for those who undertook hijrat. Many became destitute and tried to return to India and an uncertain but significant proportion of them died on their way back to India or in Afghan refugee camps (p.231).

Thus hijrat squandered important resources and the mobilisation potential of the Khilafat movement. However, this was a loss that Khilafat leaders were apparently able to overlook. This disaster, which is barely remembered today, at the time caused neither consternation nor imperilled the credibility of the Khilafat leaders. The noncommittal stance of Shaukat Ali and Azad who had issued the fatwa later provided them with a shield as a disclaimer. In fact, although Azad did enjoin hijrat, he had always emphasised that it was not mandatory for Indians to perform it. Shaukat Ali later changed his mind about the mandatory nature of hijrat, announcing that it was an alternative only if the non-cooperation movement were to fail (Minault 1982a, p.106). The important question that hijrat did raise, however, concerned its impact on Hindu-Muslim unity. Indeed, the whole purpose

of hijrat was supposed to be taking refuge in daru'l Islam until the *muhajirin* (those who undertake hijrat) would be strong enough to conquer daru'l harb through jihad. Gandhi was opposed to the hijrat campaign, because he did not think it would put pressure on the government but also the threat of a Muslim invasion from the northwest cast doubt on a commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity (Qureshi 1999, pp.197-8). The pro-hijrat leaders of the Khilafat thus opted for the preservation of the Hindu-Muslim unity of action through non-cooperation, which was flourishing in August 1920 when the Treaty of Sevres was finally signed.

The Khilafat movement actually became the driving force of the non-cooperation movement. Gandhi's non-cooperation program only passed through the Indian National Congress thanks to enthusiastic Muslim campaigning and votes (Minault 1982a, pp.114-5). This program required the involvement of all classes of society to by-pass government institutions and replace them with national ones, especially schools, law enforcement bodies and courts. It also encouraged indigenous agricultural and industrial initiatives to support the boycott of foreign products. The movement would then move into its second phase whereby army, police and taxes would be boycotted (p.112). The year of 1921 was the apogee of the non-cooperation movement with massive Muslim and Hindu support. However, the movement and especially the Hindu-Muslim understanding based on non-violence started to rapidly fall apart.

The Ali brothers talked about taking the sword against the British, even if hypothetically, and openly invited the Muslim sepoys to mutiny (Bamford 1925, pp.28, 173). While rumours of their pending arrest were in the air, the All-India Khilafat Conference held in Karachi in July 1921, and led by Mohamed Ali passed a resolution congratulating "Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Government of Angora on their brilliant victories and heroic efforts for the preservation of the Islamic Empire." The resolution went on to remind everyone of the fatwa of the ulama that forbade Muslims from serving in the British army and ended on an openly defiant tone:

This meeting further declares that in case the British Government directly or indirectly, secretly or openly, resumes hostilities against the Government of Angora, the Indian Muslims will be compelled in co-operation with the

Congress to resort to civil disobedience and at the next session of the Congress at Ahmedabad to declare India's independence and the establishment of an Indian Republic. (p.171)

Not only this particular resolution but also the general tone of the conference cost the Ali brothers and five of their collaborators yet another prison term. The imprisonment of the brothers was hugely detrimental to the movement. Latent ideological, religious and personal rivalries surfaced as opposing factions started competing to fill the vacuum in the leadership (Minault 1982a, p. 168).

Another development that marked the decline of the non-cooperation and Khilafat movement was the escalation of violence. This was also ascribed to the inflammatory speeches of Khilafat leaders in general, and the Ali brothers in particular. In fact, the lifeblood of the movement in rural areas was provided by various local movements, which had their own causes against different colonial policies, some of them long-standing. All these movements rallied under the banner of the Khilafat movement but the Khilafat leaders' words had little to no effect on the angry insurgents. The most significant and the deadliest of the outbreaks of violence, known as the Moplah rebellion (1921), was carried out by the impoverished Muslim peasantry in Malabar district, against their Hindu landlords in reaction to imminent famine and the failure of agrarian reform (p.148). The Khilafat movement provided the riots with not only religious symbols but also organisational bases. The Khilafat volunteer groups which were designed to maintain order, attracted large numbers of demobilised soldiers who were the first to engage in altercations with the police which triggered the ensuing riot (p.146). Similarly, in the Chauri Chaura incident (1922) which led Gandhi to suspend the civil disobedience movement, the demonstrators were led by non-cooperation volunteers. Ironically, the *raison d'être* of these volunteers was to police the violent urges of the mobs. These outbreaks of violence could have been interpreted as signs of the readiness of the people to engage in a popular anti-colonial struggle. But Gandhi saw these local insurgencies rather disdainfully as "mobocracy" of the darshan-seeking crowds" (Amin 2000, pp.181-2). These significant events indicated the inability of the non-cooperation and Khilafat leaders to control the mobs as they wished. They were certainly detrimental to

Hindu-Muslim unity as they were regarded as an aspect of inter-communal violence along with the belief that the masses were unready for democracy - as the condescending discourse of the leaders suggested.

In 1922, the Turkish nationalists divested the Caliph of his temporal powers. When they abolished the institution altogether in 1924, the Khilafat movement had already undergone its political death. However, the Muslim leaders were not indifferent to the fate of the symbol that they held so dear. The first reaction came from the Aga Khan who wrote a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Pasha, urging the government to restore the Caliphate. Although the Aga Khan had been campaigning for lenient treatment towards the Ottoman Empire since the end of the war, his well-known loyalty to the British was enough to raise suspicion. The Turkish leaders were convinced that he was conspiring with the British against the Turkish nationalist cause (Özcan 1997, pp.200-1). The Nizam of Hyderabad made an attempt to resuscitate the Caliphate by arranging a marriage between his son and the daughter of the deposed Caliph, with none other than Shaukat Ali acting as go-between (Pernau-Reifeld 1999, p.2749). The Nizam additionally granted a generous allowance to the deposed Caliph Abdulmedjid (O'Dwyer 1988, p.136), hoping that this pan-Islamic connection would bring legitimacy to his claim for Muslim leadership in India. However, the children of that marriage never held the title of nizam, let alone the title of caliph, as Nizam Osman Ali was deposed after the independence of India. Khilafat leaders also approached Mustafa Kemal with several suggestions ranging from declaring himself Caliph to investing the Turkish Parliament with the powers of the Caliph (Özcan 1997, p.203).

These suggestions indicate that, although the rhetoric of the Khilafat movement was strictly related to the fate of the Caliphate and the Turks, the movement itself had become more and more disconnected from political events in Turkey. The vocabulary and symbolism of the Khilafat movement had a strong appeal for the masses and its religious tone gave it a relative immunity. The British policy towards religious movements was non-intervention. However, as religion and politics were undeniably entangled, this immunity was compromised; more or less all major Khilafat leaders were interned at some point and Muslims comprised

75 to 80 per cent of all political prisoners (Qureshi 1999, p.317). However, Islamic solidarity was not merely a practical cover for the political activity of the Muslims. The concern of the Muslim leaders about the fate of the Ottoman Empire was sincere. On the other hand, the Khilafat movement's purpose and scope was much larger than the defence of the Caliphate. Popular mobilisation was driven by long-standing economic, social and political issues. Harsher economic conditions brought about by the war amplified the discontent, shifted the previously stable power relations and thus provided a catalyst for anti-colonial movements. The Khilafat movement was not the only movement to start as a religious movement but its focus broadened significantly and became an aggregation of various local protests. The Akali movement of the Sikhs, and Tana Bhagat of the Oraons were also similar to the Khilafat movement from this perspective. In fact, in this phase of emerging anti-colonial movements and in the absence of a blanket Indian national identity, religion was the main element of collective identities, and the masses mobilised around religious symbols.

During the First World War revolutionaries from diverse backgrounds moved across borders, institutional affiliations and informal networks, trying to find common ground between pan-Islamic, nationalist and other anti-colonial movements, although not always successfully. Large but insufficient numbers of revolutionaries, coupled with a lack of resources and lack of mass support, all contributed to the failure of plans to start a revolution (Bose 1978, p.112-4). However, the anti-colonial zeal of some of the Indian revolutionaries overran Indian borders as they committed to the more mature nationalist movement of the Turks. In the aftermath of the war, concerns over the plight of the Ottoman Empire were fused and confused with India's own anti-colonial struggle and the cause of the Caliphate became a powerful symbol of antagonism to the British rulers, regardless of the causes of that antagonism. The causes of the Khilafat movement went so much deeper than the trigger that gave its name to the movement that by the time the Caliphate was abolished, the Indian Muslim leaders were totally at a loss regarding the recent transition from the Ottoman Empire to a Turkish Republic. Mutual understanding between the Ottoman and Indian Muslim leaders

based on pan-Islam had been replaced by Turkish leaders' distrust of Indian Muslim leaders whose interventions seemed reactionary and at the service of the British Empire. The Khilafat movement collapsed because of its internal weaknesses, rather than the abolition of Caliphate. However, the movement had a long-term legacy; the relationship between the nationalist leaders and imperial authority permanently changed, and the capacity of Hindus and Muslims to cooperate was curtailed. In retrospect, these nationalist elites were able to overwrite their history of more or less zealous loyalty to the British Empire during the war as a strategic error that was undone in the process of the anti-colonial struggle. Soldiers on the other hand, having been pawns in this political game, became irrelevant. Since their fighting did not help to obtain Home Rule as expected, they appeared to have fought imperial wars for Britain overseas while the real battle was supposedly fought by the leaders of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements.

PART II - SUBALTERNS

Chapter 4 – Pre-national armies

Historiography of the First World War has recently moved towards a social and cultural approach, bringing to light the experience of common people. In the last years, there has been a growing interest in the colonial soldiers' experience of the war. Both Indian⁵ and Turkish soldiers were marginalised in the history writing process for several reasons. The major reason was the supposed irrelevance of these subaltern people to the big picture that was filled mainly by political leaders and commanders. The subaltern studies group endeavoured to write histories based on criticism of the elitist historiography of Indian nationalism. According to Ranajit Guha (1988), different categories of this elitist historiography treated the history of Indian nationalism either as "the sum of the activities and ideas by which the Indian elite responded to the institutions, opportunities, resources, etc. generated by colonialism," or as "primarily an idealist venture in which the indigenous elite led the people from subjugation to freedom" (pp.37-8). Santanu Das (2011c) argues that Indian soldiers and labourers were doubly marginalised in the history writing process "coming largely from the wrong class and falling on the wrong side of the political line in post-independence India"(p.8).

There is a newly discovered interest in the experiences of these mostly rural and illiterate people, which has often been frustrated by the scarcity of written or oral sources. Nevertheless, an important amount of material has now been recovered. In this chapter the soldiers' letters captured by the censors or kept

⁵ Although 'Indian' may not now be the appropriate denominator for the soldiers of the Indian army, I will use this term when I am referring to these soldiers in general, regardless of the variety of ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds among the soldiers of the Indian army.

by their families and interviews with the ex-soldiers that were published after the war are particularly useful to make the soldiers' voices heard. In addition, the officers' diaries and other writings of the time shed light on some aspects of their experience. Indian soldiers on the Western Front used to write up to 10-20,000 letters per week and only a fraction of these were captured and translated by the censors (Omissi 1999, p.7). These are the scripts that are kept in the archives today and this chapter focuses mainly on the sample of these letters that were published in David Omissi's *Indian Voices of the Great War* (1999). As for the Indian soldiers on other fronts and Turkish soldiers, censorship was sporadic, disorganised or even completely non-existent at times. As a result, the collection of the Boulogne censors' records is quite exceptional. Although there were particularities attached to the experience on the Western Front, there are nevertheless fragments that are applicable to the experience of the soldiers in other places or even in other armies. However, these letters are examined, bearing in mind the layers of filters that operated during the writing and censorship processes.

Similarly, the interviews that were conducted with Turkish ex-soldiers contain multiple layers of filtering. The interviews were conducted by Ruşen Eşref in 1918 and were published in the special Gallipoli commemorative edition of the *Yeni Mecmua*, a magazine that was edited by renowned Turkish nationalists of the time, although the magazine's content was more eclectic. The interviews mostly took place in the military barracks where the soldiers seemed to perceive the interviewer as a figure of authority and they were not given any information about the purpose of the interview. Another important source is the journalist Cahit Önder's (1981) book, *Yaşayan Çanakkaleli Muharıpler* [*Surviving Veterans from Çanakkale*], which is a compilation of photos and scripts of the interviews that he conducted with ex-soldiers living in the district of Çanakkale in the early 1980s. These interview scripts are a rare resource that have been largely unexploited by researchers, mainly because the book is fairly unknown and is difficult to find on the market.⁶ Although over 60 years had elapsed between the war and the

⁶ I owe my deepest gratitude to Ahmet Kaşıkçı who generously offered me his own copy.

interviews this does not mean that the memories of the interviewees were unreliable. However, it has to be remembered that those memories were processed over decades. Although none of the narratives gave the impression of being rehearsed several times or being polished by experienced story-tellers, the emotions that were conveyed and the fragments that were remembered were the result of a long selection and rationalisation process that helped these men to integrate their experience into a logical sequence of events that formed their life stories.

These limitations to the resources notwithstanding, there are still multiple avenues through which the voices of these subalterns can be heard and brought back to life. Using a rather small sample and acknowledging other sources that were unearthed in previous research, this chapter examines the Indian and Ottoman soldiers' experience in concert to give an insight into the ways in which soldiers from similar backgrounds assessed their experience in a variety of situations.

Recruitment

Both the Ottoman and Indian armies were pre-national and multi-ethnic institutions but neither of them did justice to the diversity of the population of the two countries. Recruitment pools were defined and limited geographically, racially and socially in both cases. In India, the martial races theory, a policy which limited recruitment of combatant soldiers to supposedly inherently warlike castes in specific regions, meant that the contribution of manpower was very uneven across the subcontinent. In the Ottoman Empire, although some of the exemptions from military service and conscription were repealed, ethnic or religious groups were disproportionately represented in the combatant and non-combatant units due to assumptions about the unreliability of non-Turkish recruits for political reasons. Although the martial races theory seemed to emphasise pseudo-scientific classifications rather than the political context, anxiety over loyalty was the very reason why a theory of martial races was ever elaborated in the first place. The sepoy mutiny of 1857 was a crucial turning point in the development and the

acceptance of the 'martial races theory' in the Indian army. Although the mutineers had many grievances, the solutions that were devised by the British implied that they defined the problem in racial terms. Major changes to the composition of the troops were implemented in order to find a balance between different groups. The preoccupation at first was the prevention of a future mutiny by exploiting the existing hostilities between certain peoples through the time honoured "divide and rule" policy (Omissi 1994, pp.9-10). However, from the 1880s, as the Russian expansion in Asia became a threat to British India, the extraction of the best "fighting material" among the so-called martial races became a strategy directed towards an external enemy (p.12).

By the end of the 19th century, the prejudices that made up the martial races theory were fully developed into a recruiting doctrine. This new system of recruitment not only identified the suitable sub-castes but also limited the geographic location from which they were to be drawn (Tan 2005, pp.64-5). The martial races theory held that the soldierly qualities of these men would only reveal themselves so long as they were led by British officers. However, the shortcomings of these British officers and other military factors were hardly taken into consideration when assessing the performance of the units (Stanley 2015, p.27). While the Ottoman and British Indian recruitment systems differed greatly in the sense that the Indian army was a mercenary army whereas the Ottoman army consisted of conscripts, they faced similar challenges in filling their ranks. The underlying racial stereotypes, internalised to various degrees by these so-called martial people, had a long-lasting impact on their relations to the military.

The overwhelming majority of the Indian troops who were sent to Europe and Mesopotamia were recruited in the Punjab, the North-Western Province and Nepal and consisted largely of Gurkhas, Sikhs, Muslims (including Punjabi Muslims, Pathans and Baluchis), Hindu Jats, Hindu Rajputs and Dogras. The wartime requirements exploited these recruitment pools to near exhaustion but until 1917, the British obstinately preserved this inadequate policy. Although in 1917, recruitment of new classes and from new districts was initiated, the burden still heavily fell on the Punjab and surrounding regions.

The Ottoman Empire had a conscription system which also had major shortcomings. Firstly, the Empire did not have a reliable census, necessary for any conscription system, to indicate the number and location of available men. Secondly, military service was extremely unpopular because of abuses in terms of length of service and payments. Many Turkish veterans said that they were kept under arms for a period over 10 years from the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) to the end of the War of Independence (1919-1922) (see Önder 1981). Moreover, in a state of constant warfare, military service meant active service, usually in appalling conditions. It was very common to hide from the recruiting agents who would be most unlikely to have accurate information about the dwellers of each town and every household (Zürcher 2010, p.160). Arabs, Kurds and nomadic tribal people could also easily escape conscription.

Another limitation of the potential military manpower lay in the numerous exemptions given on personal, professional or collective bases. The most significant collective exemptions concerned the inhabitants of Istanbul and the non-Muslim population. While the capital with its population of over a million did not contribute a single soldier, non-Muslim men anywhere in the Empire had to pay an exemption tax. The exemption tax was available to Muslims as well but at a much higher rate. In addition, exemption from military service did not rule out conscription in time of war. Take the example of Halil Koç from Çanakkale, who was one of the lucky few who were able to pay the tax, but he was conscripted anyway just seven months later, during mobilisation (in Önder 1981, p.88).

Many of the exemptions were revoked in 1909 not only in order to fill the ranks but also in a final attempt to bring all the ethnic groups together under Ottomanism. Greek and Armenian community leaders were involved in the decision-making process and although the Greeks were initially reluctant, an agreement was eventually reached. The British military attaché reported that numbers of Greeks and Armenians signed up as volunteers in some places (Ahmad 2014, p.13). However, it is important to remember that there was not a single and united Armenian or Greek community in the Ottoman Empire, and the responses to conscription diverged significantly among different communities and significant resistance to conscription and high rates of desertion were noted in some areas. In

Zeytun, which was defined as the cradle of Armenian resistance, a substantial number of draft dodgers took refuge in the mountains. By February 1915, after the defeat in Sarıkamış against the Russians, and in anticipation of an Allied landing in the region of Cilicia, the presence of thousands of armed Armenian men in the region became a serious threat to the Ottoman forces. While Cemal Pasha sent a disproportionately large contingent to Zeytun, showing his determination to wipe out the draft dodgers, he also approached Talat Pasha in order to deport the local Armenian population. Thus, months before 24 April 1915, which is considered to be the beginning of the Armenian genocide, draft dodgers served as a pretext to initiate mass deportations in Cilicia (Dündar 2010, pp.72-4).

Despite the hostilities between the Armenian and Greek communities and the Bulgarians there were high rates of desertion among the Armenian and Greek soldiers to the Bulgarian army during the Balkan War. Moreover, the increasing deterioration in the relationship between the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Armenian and Greek leaders also put Armenian and Greek soldiers on the spot. There were still provisions for exemptions and, even during the war, Christians could buy their way out of conscription but now they had to pay the high rate that was applied to Muslims. Many poorer Christians were unable to pay the fee and they were typically — but not necessarily — enlisted in labour battalions since they could not rise above a certain rank in the armed forces (Zürcher 2010, pp.171-2). However, a number of Armenians bore arms until February 1915 on the Caucasian front and until Spring 1916 in Sinai.

When the genocide of Armenians started in April 1915, conscription turned out to be an efficient disguise for the elimination of the male population, although the mode and intensity of killing differed according to place and time. In some places, they escaped massacres thanks to either specific arrangements or to the resistance of local administrators. In 1919, a representative of the British High Commission reported from Aftonkarahisar that only 177 Armenian men returned from military service out of 1,300 conscripts. The balance, based on the local Armenian community registers, was assumed to be lost, either killed or displaced. (NA FO 383-535/3875, pp.208-11). Although the returned soldiers represented a

very small proportion of the conscripts, the British report nonetheless, strongly suggests that some Armenians continued to serve in the Ottoman army until the end of the war. On the other hand, even the skilled civilian Armenian labourers working on the strategically important Baghdad railway construction were deported or killed despite the protestations of the railway company (see Kaiser 1999). As the labour battalions were mostly made up of Armenians, the lack of manpower forced the authorities to use prisoners of war, particularly on railway and road construction work. Many Indian prisoners, among others, thus replaced Armenians in the labour force.

Non-Muslims were not the only ones who were kept in separate corps. Although Arabs, Kurds and other Muslims were also drafted into the armed forces, they were enlisted in separate regiments. This was partly due to the fact that regiments had their own recruiting areas. The 72nd and 77th regiments of the 19th Division at Gallipoli consisted of Syrian Arabs and their Turkish commanders regarded them as a liability as it was reported that they panicked and deserted during the first days of fighting at Anzac. Lt-Col Mehmet Şefik who was commanding the 27th regiment of the 19th Division held that, had the division been populated with Turkish soldiers rather than Arabs, Australian troops would have been obliged to withdraw to their boats by the night of 25 April (Broadbent 2015, pp.109-10). The Turkish officers' comments reflected the general conviction that Kurdish and Arab troops were not good fighters but their assessment of the performance of Arab troops was probably unfair as it overlooked extenuating circumstances such as language barriers, difficult terrain and darkness in addition to the general confusion of the officers (pp.110-1). This was, however, used as an additional reason to keep them in separate regiments.

In the Indian army also, there was a class company or class regiment system, which required that the casualties in a company be replaced by new recruits from the same class and same region. These reserves were largely exhausted in the first years of the war and the system had to be revised. Until 1917, each class was recruited in a separate depot. Those who wished to enlist were expected to go to the depot of their class at their own cost, rather than enlisting at the closest one. The cost and inconvenience was a deterrent for

potential recruits. (Tan 2000, p.379). From February 1917, a more efficient system of recruitment was employed, whereby civilian administration as well as non-officials and the military, cooperated in finding available men and local depots were established to receive and train men from all suitable classes (O'Dwyer 1988, p.219). In the Punjab, the Provincial Recruitment Board divided the quota among the districts and made a chain of officials accountable for the recruitment objectives. This system entailed a lot of pressure on eligible men from the lower echelon of Indian officials. Local leaders such as *zaildars* would exercise their authority over the villagers to coerce eligible men to enlist, as they were anxious to preserve their privileges and to gain rewards (Tan 2005, pp. 117-9).

The British authorities went to even greater lengths to fill the labour corps. The labourers and porters were drawn from a variety of backgrounds including, but not limited to, the martial races. There was a strong resemblance between the nature of the service in the Labour Corps overseas and indentured coolie labour. However, while the treatment of indentured labourers was overseen, there was no such provision to protect the rights of the coolies in the army. In fact, the Indian Army Act (1911) even had provisions about corporal punishment of the 'menial' category of native follower, or in other words an un-enrolled private servant (Singha 2007, pp.420-1). However, summary corporal punishment was also applied to other categories of followers such as porters and syces (Singha 2010, p.76). Moreover, the principle of entirely voluntary enlistment was disregarded to a large extent, especially when recruiting from jails (Singha 2007, p.428). About 16,000 prisoners were sent to Mesopotamia between October 1916 and July 1919 to serve in the labour corps (p.413). Hundreds of juveniles were also sent from Lahore and Bombay (p.428). The jail porters and labourers were certainly not the only ones who were submitted to a certain measure of coercion (see Mahinder Singh's father's story in Chapter 11). There appeared also to be a great deal of misinformation about the legal terms of their service, as many of the recruits were given to understand that their sentences would be remitted upon enlistment. In fact, their sentences were only suspended until the end of their service and they were expected to serve under prison-like conditions (p.435).

Motivations for enlistment and fighting

Other than coercion and misinformation, there were also significant incentives offered to the 'martial races' to support the war effort. In impoverished provinces such as the Punjab, regular wages received from the army was a relief for poor families. Families of the soldiers who were at the front wrote several letters to them that were captured by the censors. These reveal the extent to which these families relied on these payments and how anxious they became when there was a delay in receipt. "You must indeed make endeavours for money to reach your home, as the need for it is very great. It is famine time, rain did not fall on the proper season, and no crops were sown" was written to a certain Pathan in France (Omissi 1999, p.151). This great need was certainly one of the important factors that pushed young men to enlist. Another letter was received by a Jat, "There has been no rain and there is severe scarcity. Prices are very high; grass is very dear. Recruiting is going on with a great rush. Birma has enlisted for the second time and Hukma has been caught" (p.136). Even bad news from the front, combined with the dissuasive letters from the soldiers, did not deter the numbers of men flocking to the colours when the alternative was battling with drought and famine.

Moreover, the so-called martial races had internalised British military doctrine and they displayed the stereotypical behaviour expected of them. Sikhs and Rajputs, especially, referred extensively to their fighting spirit as part of their identity. Some of the Sikh participants in this research mentioned their martial culture and although they mostly tied this quality to a more distant history, going back to the origins of Sikhism, one man in particular (Kuldip Singh) also referred to it as a source of their prestige during the British Raj since fighting qualities were valued by the British. In fact, securing a favoured position within the Empire was probably one of the reasons that motivated these groups to support the war effort (Jarboe 2013, p.89).

Sepoys also put a great deal of emphasis on their collective or individual endeavour to win *izzat*, an informal code of honour or reputation, in return for their service or even death on the battlefield. A Jat wrote, "Before this war no one thought anything of our clan. But now it is definitely recognized as very warlike"

(Omissi 1994, p.82). Sepoys achieved a sense of accomplishment through their reputation as good warriors for their caste. A Sikh signaller wrote to a relative, "It was my very good fortune to be engaged in this war. We shall never get such another chance to exalt the name of race, country, ancestors, parents, village and brothers, and to prove our loyalty to the Government" (Omissi 1999, p.142). There was a shared understanding of *izzat* coupled with a sense of loyalty and duty. A Sikh jemadar wrote, "We soldiers have been fed with money which we have now to earn, with our lives if necessary. Therefore may none of us die of disease. We must all die some day. It is best that we should die in this great war" (p.182). Death on the battlefield was a part of the contract that had to be honoured.

A measure of personal gratification was complemented by loyalty to caste, family, local community, government and the King. Other than the prospect of dying on the battlefield and becoming a martyr or breaking the chain of reincarnation, the possibility of earning pensions, winning medals and other rewards, especially land was a strong motivation. Accordingly, the military authorities paid attention to such rewards. The Order of British India, the Indian Order of Merit, the Victoria Cross and the Military Cross were available to the Indians and were valued among the sepoys and the officers. However, land was the reward that was particularly sought (Ellinwood 1978, p.204). Balbir who participated in this research told me that his father was disappointed that he did not get any land for his service in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. He and his friends planned to protest by returning their medals and to ask for land instead. The medals were not only a source of pride but also a valuable and stable source of income, as there was revenue attached to each medal. Nevertheless, in peasant communities the ownership of land was a major signifier of social status and therefore valued at a very high level.

There was a greater degree of ambivalence regarding rewards among the Ottoman soldiers. Hüseyin Sürek who received a German medal in Palestine claimed to have said, "Sir, I would rather have 5 liras. I don't have a copper. What do I do with this medal?' They said "This is more valuable"" (in Önder 1981, p.111). However, he regretted that later the British took his medal away from him when he was a prisoner of war and never returned it. He wished he could have shown it

off to the people in his village on his return so that they would have appreciated his sacrifice. Aytuner Akbaş's grandfather was notified that he had earned a military medal but he did not value this distinction highly enough to travel for several hours from his village to collect it. This attitude was very common among soldiers and many medals were left unclaimed.

Soldiers in the Ottoman army, being conscripts, were not in a position to expect any other rewards or compensation. Even the nominal monthly allowance was in fact very irregularly paid, if at all (Zürcher 2010, p.178). The service was perceived as an obligation towards the state and, resentments notwithstanding, compensation was not expected. In the early 1980s, most of the surviving veterans claimed not having received any pensions after the war (see Önder 1981). In fact, many of them either did not know that they were eligible for pensions or found the application process too complicated and opaque. The peasants were unfamiliar with the concept of wages or pensions and felt awkward about receiving money beyond the term of their service. A veteran from Eceabat (in Gallipoli peninsula) said, "I am not receiving a pension. My son is looking after me. He gives me bread. He gives me money. Why would I go begging from the government? I have 50 acres of land" (in Önder 1981, p.104). Thus, an old peasant would typically rely on traditional social structures for subsistence. Many of them considered pensions beneath them and took pride in having self-sufficient families rather than depending on the government's money.

On the other hand, some of the illiterate or semi-literate veterans who actually wanted pensions were likely to find the rules abstruse. One such veteran complained that those who were not in need received money but he did not get anything (p.147). Another applied but only got a few gifts because he had not been wounded. He said with bitter irony, "There was a stream called Kara Yorgi at Alçı Tepe (in Gallipoli). The kafirs used to rain down shrapnel balls on us there. I had no luck. Not one of them hit me, unfortunately" (p.103). Yet others who in fact did get wounded, also failed in their applications (p.142). Overall, most of them could not comprehend how the applications were assessed and what their rights were.

Turkish nationalist mythology holds that Turkish soldiers were willing to die in battle and become martyrs to save their homeland. In fact, both Indian and Turkish soldiers had very ambivalent attitudes about death on the battlefield. A large number of letters written by Indian soldiers from France referred to death as unavoidable and therefore the prospect was met with resignation. "If God spares me, we shall meet again. If not, well, we are given life only to reach death in the end" wrote Lal Khan (Omissi 1999, p.128). Some sepoy soldiers considered duty on the frontline as a death sentence. A Jat bugler, Mausam Ram, wrote from Kitchener's Hospital in Brighton, "If I stay a long time [in the hospital], then it will only be for two months. But even so I must go back to the firing line. What is that but to die?" (p.49). This realisation about the nature of war came to most of the sepoy soldiers after they saw action for the first time, whereas the rural Ottoman men knew all too well that once they were drafted, there was little hope of ever coming back. There were different responses among the soldiers to this feeling of imminent and unavoidable death, one of them being resignation. This was often misrepresented in nationalist and militaristic discourses as altruistic self-sacrifice.

This acceptance of death often became an advantage during battle. Corporal Mehmet was asked in an interview in 1918, whether soldiers panicked during the attacks. He replied, "No sir, even if panic comes, it does not last long. Because there is no hope [of surviving]" (in Ruşen Eşref 2006, p.335). However, arguably, the lack of hope and absence of panic was a death sentence in itself. Halil Koç's father used to go and visit him at Anzac and even fired at the enemy on one occasion. "My father used to say: 'These boys, they have no hope. They will die here.' [I wondered] how can anyone have hope under fire?" (in Önder 1981, p.87). The feeling that emerges from the popular Turkish war songs of the time also reinforces the idea that most soldiers were doomed, melancholy and hopeless. One of the Çanakkale songs which is still popular today goes: "They shot me down in Çanakkale, They buried me before I was dead, Woe to my youth." There were other songs from Gallipoli and other fronts, all sharing the same grim outlook (Compare this with the reserve officers' song, Ch.8, p.166).

Officers often misunderstood this state of mind when observing the soldiers' apparently uncaring attitude to death. A Turkish reserve officer argued:

“These soldiers, rather than being brave, they were uninterested and ignorant about death. They considered death as simple and as natural as living. As to the concept of danger, it had no place in their consciousness” (Aydemir 1959, p.111). These officers often questioned, usually condescendingly, soldiers’ mental faculties and their ability to comprehend danger. There were also attempts to explain their behaviour in racial terms. Tonguç explains the ‘simple and lazy soldiers’’ unsuspected display of courage during the fighting as: “This characteristic has nothing to do with the worries about paradise or hell. It is solely the result of a tradition, a genealogical inheritance [...], an inherent warlike quality” (1999, p.137). In the Indian army also, soldiers’ behaviour was almost exclusively explained through a set of racial stereotypes. This is why it was important to the individual soldiers to uphold the prestige of their class, in the military sense of the term, so as not to bring shame upon their entire community.

Fighting for their homeland was also thought to have given strength to the Turkish troops. However, the notion of a national homeland in the pre-national army of the Ottoman Empire requires qualification. It is highly doubtful that Arab soldiers in Gallipoli or Turkish soldiers in Sinai for instance, had a sense of defending their homeland. However, there were also large numbers of local recruits at most of the fronts. The 27th Regiment at Gallipoli mostly consisted of local conscripts and NCOs. The region of Gallipoli was ethnically diverse and so was the composition of the regiment, with a large proportion of Turkish and some Jewish soldiers in the fighting troops and non-Muslims mainly making up the labour and fighting service support units (Uyar 2015, p.61). Their attachment to the land may have positively affected their performance as they probably felt more strongly about the invasion. Ali Balkan’s resentment at what Allies had left behind after the evacuation is obvious in his account:

What things they had done on the seashore! They had built houses, rooms and filled them with food and drink. They had planted vines. You, wicked

*gavur*⁷! Did you think this was your homeland? How dare you plant vines!
Did you think you would stay? (in Önder 1981, p.140)

Many soldiers were desperate to find someone from their home region, when they were serving far from home, especially in time of need. When Mehmet Özsoy was wounded in Aleppo, he looked for someone from Çanakkale in the barracks but they all seemed to be from the South Eastern Anatolia. “I was looking at people in the crowd. I spotted two. The way they spoke resembled ours. I managed to get closer to them: ‘—Where are you from?—I’m from Aydın.’ Finally I had found a fellow countryman! And yet, what does Aydın have to do with Bozcaada?”⁸ (p.133). For destitute soldiers, a fellow countrymen’s help was the closest thing to a support system that was available. After the war when the prisoners of war were brought back to the Selimiye Barracks in Istanbul, those who were able to pay their passage home were free to leave. Many received help from their countrymen to pay their long journeys back home rather than waiting for the authorities to arrange their transfer (pp.122, 129).

The concept of a national homeland as well as its defence was anachronistic for the lower ranks of the Ottomans. Officers on the other hand were far more indoctrinated into nationalism. They were often shocked at the lack of commitment to and awareness of the nation among ordinary soldiers. Turkish literature abounds with accounts of the reserve officers from Istanbul, influenced by the ideology of Turkism, traveling to remote corners of Anatolia during the war, only to discover that there was no feeling of nationhood among the Turks (see Chapter 8).

Officers

⁷ *Gavur* is usually translated as infidel. However, I prefer to keep the original word, as the translation does not capture all the non-religious connotations involving cruelty and mistrust.

⁸ Bozcaada, also known as Tenedos, is an island off the coast of Gallipoli. Aydın is a Western Anatolian city about 500km away.

There were no strong feelings of national unity among the fighting rural classes of the Indian army either. While the middle class aspired to self-determination and racial equality with the British, they considered themselves quite separate from the lower classes. A Punjabi newspaper argued that:

It must be remembered that Indians are divided into two distinct classes — the educated and the illiterate. To pit the latter against German soldiers who are fighting with a spirit of patriotism is ridiculous. What Government should do is to enlist the services of educated Indians. Such men have a conception of the meaning of patriotism and would thus be fit to meet Germans in the battlefield. (in Jarboe 2013, p.94)

Urban middle classes seemed to be among the most enthusiastic supporters of the war, but the services that they offered had to be in accordance with their social status. Yet, there was no opportunity for them to become officers in the Indian army. Therefore, during the war, the Indianisation of the army, or rather its officer corps, became a bone of contention between the British authorities and the Indian nationalists.

Training in the Royal Military College at Sandhurst was a prerequisite for getting a King's Commission in the Indian army. Indian officers could only acquire the Viceroy's Commission which meant that they were subordinate to all King's Commissioned ranks. This highlighted the fact that the British military refused to serve under Indian authority and was symptomatic of the racist ideology that informed colonial rule. There was a long-standing resentment among educated Indians over this racial discrimination and the war provided the expedient circumstances to press their demands. It was more and more difficult for the British authorities to justify the exclusion of Indians from the higher ranks when there was a shortage of officers. One of the concessions that nationalist leaders such as Tilak and Gandhi expected to obtain by supporting the war effort was the repeal of these discriminatory measures (Deshpande 2006, p.193). At first, in 1917, they obtained the somewhat tokenistic concession of 10 vacancies per annum for Indian cadets at Sandhurst. It was a gesture aimed at rewarding the loyalty of families who made significant contributions to the war effort. Apart from

a few aristocrats who were not interested in a military career, a few VCOs and NCOs close to the end of their careers were also granted a King's Commission (Omissi 1997, p.162).

Other than encouraging further commitments from these influential families to the war effort, these commissions were also expected to provide incentives for joining the army. Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, said "eleven representatives of leading martial tribes have received commissions in the King's Indian forces within the last few months, but the number to be granted will naturally depend in a great measure on the response to the call for recruits" (Cohen 2006, p.174). Promotions were usually given after long service and rarely on the grounds of merit. Thus, the NCO and officer corps consisted of mainly elderly men who had served for a long time, with or without distinction. However, during the war, the casualties from all ranks had to be replaced quickly and there was hope of climbing the hierarchy more quickly and even having a King's Commission.

However, even acquiring a King's Commission did not assure equal treatment. Thakur Amar Singh, a Rajput aristocrat who was a KCO, kept diaries during the war, detailing among other things, his experience of "slurs" or "slights" ranging from "the refusal of the English soldiers to salute him to being teased for not eating beef to being 'very rudely' asked to leave the room when important military details were discussed" (Das 2011(a), p.76). He also believed that Indians were criticised according to a double standard, which favoured the British:

[...] whenever we fail in the slightest degree anywhere people raise a hue and cry whereas if the British troops fail under the same circumstances no one mentions it. [...] Plainly if there is a success it is due to the British element but if there is a reverse then it is all put down to the Indian troops. I do not know what is expected of the Indians. (p.76-7)

This may have been true for the high command but the regimental officers tended to be defensive about their men's performance, partly because their prestige also lay in the performance of their troops.

Although sepoys were usually eager to get promotion, they were not trained for military leadership. When given a chance to prove their ability to command, they often failed and this reinforced the rationale behind British rule in India. General Wilcocks, the commander of the Indian corps in France, explained the poor performance of the Indian officers in France thus:

Immediately you touch upon this point you strike the bedrock of the reason we own India. [...] It is the presence and natural instincts of the white man which the Indian officer can never replace. The Indian has not the instincts which make leaders in modern war. There is in fact no solution; the European and the Indian are built on different lines, the one to command men, the other to wait for guidance before he issues commands. (in Omissi 1997, p.161)

This was the underlying prejudice that the Indian nationalists faced in their campaign for the Indianisation of the officer corps, though they themselves harboured prejudices against the poorer classes that made up the troops. In 1921, the legislative assembly adopted a resolution about the Indianisation of the Indian army. Although the Government of India did not reject the resolution, they struggled for several years to make a decision about how to implement the change. A major concern was the fear of losing the Empire in India as well as racial prejudices about whether Indians had military leadership capabilities. Kitchener had predicted earlier, in 1908, that "Sooner or later the preponderating influence in the Army would be Indian instead of British. When this point was reached, our position in India would be one of sufferance, terminable at any moment when the people so desired it" (p.160). Therefore, the Government of India did its best to delay Indianisation and pushed very unconvincing measures through hoping to assuage nationalist anger without making any real concessions.

In the Ottoman army as well, it was quite hard to move between the categories of conscripted troops, NCO and officer corps. The lack of promotional prospects did not encourage conscripts and NCOs to commit to a military career. However, during the mobilisation period, the military school-trained NCOs were granted a wholesale commissioning (Uyar 2015, p.22). This measure, which aimed to fill the officer ranks, caused a shortage of NCOs who were equally indispensable.

Some of the experienced soldiers served as NCOs during the war, although they were never officially promoted and they did not have any of the privileges of the position (see Önder 1981, pp.67, 90, 124). In spite of the wholesale promotion of the military school trained NCOs, when the Ottoman army reached sufficient strength to be mobilised with over a million men, the number of trained officers fell severely short. As a result, reserve officers emerged as a new category of conscripts. These were university students or graduates who were to be trained for a short period at a Reserve Officer Training Camp in Istanbul, which was hurriedly set up in August 1914 (Uyar 2015, p.29).

These 'reserve officer candidates' were sent to their units after six to eight months of military drilling to serve as NCOs for a probation period of six months. After probation, their performance was assessed and, if successful, they became 'deputy officers.' This complicated system was constructed mainly as a consequence of the resentments and doubts of the career officers towards the reserve officers in their profession. The experienced NCOs who were raised from the ranks earlier were not given a chance to get a commission and were equally resentful. Therefore, the reserve officers had the hard and unrewarding task of proving themselves worthy to a prejudiced higher and resentful lower hierarchy while they were also trying to learn on the job (pp.30-3).

These highly educated conscripts wrote and were written about and many of their war diaries have been published. The writers of the time, from the same social class, were sympathetic to these conscripts, previously exempt from military service and in no way destined for a military career. Burhan Cahit described the training camp as a devouring machine:

The drill, the rest, the manoeuvres, the marching, everything is hasty. As if to feed a hungry giant, the youngsters who come over here are very quickly regarded as lumps of flesh. Within a few days, they are marked with an 'A' on their arms and thrown into the mouth of that unknown giant. (in Arıkan 2011, p.224)

Their unpopularity was probably one of the reasons that prompted so much writing destined to redeem their image. A fictitious character, Semih writes to his

fiancée from Gallipoli in a short story published in the special edition of *Yeni Mecmua*, commemorating the third anniversary of Gallipoli.

Do you remember how sad I was when the first graduates were being rounded up? [...] while you were laughing out loud at my being drilled, I used to say: "Is that me who has become a soldier? Woe to those units that I am going to command!" My beautiful fiancée, it did not turn out that way. Many reserve officers who grew up on custard and were pampered like myself have now become the most considerate and self-sacrificing heroes on the fields of bravery. (p.234)

This astonishment at the good performance of the reserve officers was meant to challenge their stereotypical representation as city grown weaklings, incapable of the masculine task of military leadership.

There were large numbers of students, especially those involved in nationalist associations, who were enthusiastic about doing their bit. The experience of the war caused many of them to reassess their political views. Some of them turned away from their previous persuasions completely. Osman Fahri, a poet and a staunch nationalist, almost entirely forgotten today, willingly joined the training camp. However, his poems show a dramatic shift from the enthusiasm of a young patriot to the severe trauma of a radical pacifist and anti-conscriptionist. By 1916, his poetry described war and victory as being meaningless and soldiers as prisoners. He said that death on the battlefield was not martyrdom but misfortune; people should rise up to overthrow their oppressors. He continued: "Be your own master and do not put your right to live in someone else's hands" (in Kerman 1988, p.94). However, as the war dragged on, this revolutionary outcry turned into utter disgust and loss of faith in humanity. Although Osman Fahri survived the war, he did not survive without shell-shock. There was no possible way of aligning his nationalist pre-war self with the radical change that he went through during the war. Alienated from his pre-war identity, he never returned to Istanbul. He died a 'madman,' committing suicide in 1920.

Another reserve officer, Tevfik Rıza, left four diaries and hundreds of letters written to his wife, all in French since they had both grown up in Beirut, had been

educated in French schools and Tevfik Rıza himself had graduated as an engineer in France. It also provided some privacy for intimate correspondence since not all the censors could read French (Doğruöz in Tevfik Rıza 2012, pp.1-8). Tevfik did not provide much detail about warfare or his role in it in his diaries, firstly because he expected them to be ultimately read by his wife, and secondly because he was simply not interested in the war. Much of what he wrote was about his sense of not belonging. He did not seem to have fully grasped that conscription was a surrender of fundamental rights until he realised that he could not just walk away. He resented his captivity even more acutely after his daughter was born. After struggling for a long time to get leave, he wrote: "I would like to take everything essential with me, because I have no intention of ever coming back here after my leave" (2012, p.277/63-4). Tevfik was probably not planning desertion but might have thought that there was some way out of a situation that he loathed.

Tevfik Rıza was not ready to die on the battlefield. "I am not capable of such devotion anymore. I cannot make a good military man, I am not willing to die in battle. I am of another kind" (p.223/30). After politely declining a highly strategic role, he wrote:

No, I will not go. They will say that I am running away from danger. Let them talk as they wish. I will not go. I do not have the feelings of patriotism that I had two months ago. I do not want to expose myself to a probable death. Here, I am relatively safe. (p.208/83-4)

The major reasons affecting Tevfik's patriotism was his experience in the army. He had a very low opinion of most of the career officers. After describing an argument between German and Turkish officers which he helped to interpret, he wrote: "How all these things put me off military life[!] Now I hate this oppressive despotism, this institution of ignorant people" (p.230/56). He sometimes felt he was on the wrong side of the war. "I may die because of their projectiles; well, I love those people [the French] all the same" (p.208/86). However, he was ultimately disappointed with the French as well, after they and the British bombarded the coastal village of Maydos (Eceabat), causing the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Tevfik's letters and diary entries become sporadic and quite far apart after his visit to Istanbul to see his newborn daughter. Tevfik died far

from his loved ones and completely despondent in 1916, in Switzerland where he was receiving treatment for the lung disease that he had contracted in the war (p.3). Tevfik's diaries provide a sharp contrast to other published diaries with his confession of vulnerability and inadequacy in the face of nationalist and gender expectations.

The famous poet Ahmet Haşim was also drafted as a reserve officer and sent to Gallipoli. However, he never wrote about his experience and according to his friends, did not talk much about it either. After his death, Nurullah Ataç, a renowned author and friend, reacted to rumours about Ahmet Haşim's heroism and exploits in Gallipoli in a newspaper article, saying:

It is true that Ahmet Haşim was in Gallipoli but he never said that he sank a ship or anything of that sort. The only story he kept telling was about an Indian enchanter who used to incant a spell over watermelon rind and hold it to the moonlight and turn it into a translucent food. That was all he talked about (in Ayvazoğlu 1999, para.7).

Yakup Kadri, another of his friends, would protest about Ahmet Haşim's total silence except for mention of a few bizarre events. Ahmet Haşim would retort: "Are you expecting hymns of heroism from me? You can hear those from the poets who were invited to Gallipoli as honoured guests once everything was over.⁹ Now, it is only me, the reserve officer Haşim Efendi talking to you" (para.8). A plausible explanation for this laconic attitude might be resentment at being sent to the battlefield while other poets and writers who did not fight there composed nationalist hymns of heroism. Ahmet Haşim may have also been reacting to a possible war trauma that he preferred not to share with his close social circle since they did not share his experience.

The subalterns filling the ranks of the pre-national armies of India and the Ottoman Empire, and to a certain extent the conscripted reserve officers in the Ottoman army were foundations onto which nationalist ideals were projected during the First World War. Since the Turkish nation-state was formed shortly

⁹ For details about the trip of the poets to Gallipoli, see Ch.8, pp.165.

after the war, the First World War (or at least parts of it, such as the Gallipoli Campaign) came to represent part of the national struggle of the Turks. However, the accounts of the subalterns themselves and the accounts about them strongly challenge that view. The nationalist elites were also caught up in the war in a way that they had not anticipated and their pre-war commitment to nationalist ideologies were tested. War experience was transformative in many cases. However, this traumatic transformation was destructive as it disrupted the sense of continuity in personal narratives. In India, where independence was obtained much later, the war did not seem to have any obvious connections with nationalism, although at the time it was instrumental in the political battles that nationalists were fighting. There was a deep divide between the social classes about their perception of homeland and war. Moreover, the experience of Imperial rule and oppression differed among the diverse groups that made the ranks of these armies and those that were excluded from the combat units, if not from the armies. There is no possible way of describing a monolithic subaltern experience of the war as there were different forms and levels of subalternity among these colonial or pre-national soldiers and civilians.

Chapter 5 – Bodies and Minds: escaping the war

Altruistic bravery was established as the only acceptable conduct in war, by the patriotic or martial ideals of manhood. This expectation certainly constrained an array of other emotions and behaviours. The truth was, many soldiers, including those among the volunteers, were trapped in their situation as soldiers and there was no easy way out. Exposure to violence and the constant risk of death caused war trauma which manifested itself in various forms among large numbers of soldiers. By war trauma or war neurosis, I am not referring to a single condition, but a variety of mental illnesses with a vast range of symptoms caused by the experience of being under fire. We do not know much about the trauma that continued throughout the lives of those Ottoman and Indian soldiers who suffered psychological injury, but we do have some information about the cases that were referred to psychiatric experts and those who were court martialed. The cases that are discussed in this chapter show that the treatment of war trauma was not only tinged with incomprehension and blame but also with ideological concerns. Now that war neurosis, which was once stigmatised as 'psychic desertion' or simply the proof of inherent weakness of the mentally ill, is regarded and treated with sympathy, it is perhaps timely to address the stigma around malingering and desertion too. This chapter, therefore, places malingering and desertion within the range of 'normal' behaviour. Once the masculine and martial ideal of patriotism is discarded as a guideline, we gain a clearer understanding of the soldiers who chose that path. In fact, we will see that malingering or desertions were not easy ways out. They required either careful planning, a large amount of risk taking and conscious decision making or an underlying war trauma to embark on such actions. Conditions such as homesickness, privation, danger, exposure to sickness that produced mental illness also often induced desertion or malingering, which provides a reason to look at these phenomena together.

Soldiers' Letters

Letters were an important means of communication and any long-term interruption in the exchange of information was a great cause of distress both for the soldiers and their families. Although Indian soldiers were mostly illiterate they exchanged tens of thousands of letters weekly, with their correspondents, not only in India but also in other regiments of the army. It can be safely assumed that similar numbers of letters were written proportionate to the numbers of troops, in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli, where the censorship efforts were basic or non-existent at times (Stanley 2015, p.54). Among Turkish soldiers and officers, on the other hand, there were different habits of communication. Generally, compared to the numbers of soldiers, few letters were exchanged. One reason for this may have been that Indian soldiers were given incentives to communicate with their families in order to keep morale high both at home and at the battle front (p.55). The soldiers in the Ottoman army and Ottoman prisoner camps did not even have paper at their disposal if they wanted to write (IWM Doc.16030, p.3).

Postal services were very poor in general in the Ottoman Empire. Many letters did not reach their destination. Parents of a Turkish POW in a camp in Baghdad wrote to him:

Son, you say you are hurt that we are not sending you any letters whereas we have been in fact, sending you two or at least one letter per month. You say that it is a wonder that you have not got any letters in three years and you are sorry that you are not getting any answers, and you use such sad expressions as if you did not have anyone in this world. What to do, son! We wish we were birds to carry our letters ourselves. (in Yarar and Delialioğlu 1999, p.161)

The original letter is kept in the Turkish archives, so presumably their son did not get this letter either. The Red Cross Committee which inspected the POW camps in India also pointed out that most of the Ottoman officers “seem[ed] deeply grieved at having had absolutely no news of their families, in some cases for two years” (1918, p.40). Additionally, Armenian prisoners from Mardin had no news of their families and feared that they might have been killed by the Turks (p.24). In the meantime, the numbers of letters received in each camp differed greatly. For instance, the Turkish POWs of Bellary Camp (where the above complaints were

made) received only 70 letters in 18 months, whereas, in Thayetmyo Camp in Burma, the prisoners received 2-3,000 letters monthly (pp.40, 51), that is 18 times more than the Bellary camp prisoners received proportional to their numbers. The difference is simply too big to be explained by the letter-writing habits of the soldiers or the proportion of officers and privates in each camp. A more likely cause of the problem is the postal censorship arrangements. In the absence of official translators, some camps passed the letters uncensored while others withheld them.

When the Ottoman army was demobilised, Ibrahim Yılmaz ran into his father in Istanbul who did not believe his eyes, because he thought that Ibrahim was dead (in Önder 1981, p.69). Even if Turkish soldiers were not habituated to letter writing, their families expected to receive a sign that they were alive. Since the purpose of the letters was not to give an account of events or share thoughts and emotions, the contents were often disappointingly dry, consisting basically of a list of people to whom the sender sent greetings or questions about their health. This was enough to let people know that the sender was alive. These kinds of letters often caused some frustration in the recipients. Zamindar Nehal Singh was writing to Dafadar Sri Ram in France: “All you say is ‘Ram, Ram, we are quite well and happy!’ My friend, what can be gathered from such words? [...] There is no pleasure in hearing what you say, or in having your letter read” (in Omissi 1999, p.183).

Letter writing and reading was often a collective activity. In some letters the sender referred to the scribe: “Mollah Durmuş came from India where he was a prisoner. He wrote this very letter. He says hello” (in Yarar and Delialioğlu 1999, p.161). Sometimes people would go to the scribe together, who would be mentioned in the letter: “while this letter is being written Mehmet Ağa’s son Idris, Ali’s son Rifat, Lame Hasan’s son Hadji Ömer Ağa, are present here and say hello” (p.99). In fact, orally transmitted messages served the same purpose. Hans Kannengiesser (1927), a German officer at Gallipoli, observed that:

the connection of the soldier with his home was not, as is usually the case, by exchange of letters through the post, but more often one of the older men decided to visit the troops in the field. He travelled around in his

neighbourhood to collect messages from parents or other relatives. Then sought the troops in the field. After many months he found them and was able to exchange letters and news with the soldiers from his neighbourhood. Finally, after further months he arrived back home, eagerly awaited by everybody. (p.157)

This may not always have been practical or possible. However, the Gallipoli veterans who were locals to the area suggested that they had visitors from home even at the firing line. Otherwise, soldiers on sick leave and those who had chance encounters would also work as messengers.

A father who sent a letter to the Red Crescent Society, signed as Shepherd Hüseyin of Tepecik, Seferihisar, Izmir, had heard from the only returning soldier of his village that his son was a servant to a rich Russian (an officer?) in a POW camp. He volunteered to go and bring his son back if the government did not have money. His questions were: "Is there any road that leads there? Is it possible to go? How much does it cost?" (in Yarar and Delialioğlu 1999, p.113). POWs and their families were especially distressed about not being able to get any news from each other. Hundreds of letters reached the Ottoman Red Crescent Society inquiring about missing relatives. They were mostly peasant families looking for private soldiers. Some of the men were found in prisoner of war camps. Some letters seeking information about Indian soldiers also reached the Ottoman Red Crescent through the International Red Cross Society. One such inquiry was about a Service and Transport Corps soldier Nagendranath Ghose, taken prisoner in Kut. The letter said that his wife was extremely anxious about him and wanted to know his whereabouts (KA 642/191). This is one of the rare cases of an Indian woman of a presumably modest background initiating an inquiry about her husband.

Muslim sepoys, desertion and disloyalty

Desertion was another risky way out. Most of the time, sepoys deserted in pairs or in groups, sometimes as large as 23 as in the case of the men from the 58th Rifles who deserted in March 1915 in France. Among these men were Jemadar Mir Mast and Sepoy Azam Khan who were due to receive the Indian Distinguished

Medal for their bravery under fire (Jarboe 2013, p.128). In fact, having been under quasi-constant fire for several months with very little time recuperating, the 58th Rifles had suffered a terrible death toll. Their situation was comparable to the 129th Baluchis who were reported to be at breaking point by the censor who was reading their letters (p.130). It is worth noting that the 129th Baluchis were also the unit that sustained the highest number of cases of mental illness. It seems that the conditions that produced mental illness and those that pushed soldiers to desertion were very similar. However, the jihad propaganda, which openly invited the Muslim soldiers of the colonial armies to join the Germans and the Turks, also accounted for the higher rates of desertion among the Muslims, particularly among the trans-border Pathans, who were a martial race from Afghanistan. The advantage for the latter was that they could escape British authority when they reached home and this immunity contributed to their larger numbers among the deserters.

Paul Walter, who later interviewed the men of the 58th Rifles, recorded their many grievances apart from their objection to fighting the allies of the Caliph. Jemadar Mir Mast said that they were aware of the German-Ottoman alliances and knew that the Germans treated the Indian prisoners well. They complained about the number of casualties and sickness and their low income. Mir Mast asked that they should be given arms and be sent to Afghanistan to fight against the British (p.137). In fact, desertion was not just a means to escape the horrific battle conditions, but also a way of engaging in a more meaningful fight for their own battles for independence. Mir Mast and other prisoners were indeed sent to Afghanistan along with the German mission to Kabul and they remained there after the mission left (Stewart 2014, p.120).

Although he may not have had an articulate political opinion, Mir Mast and his fellows had an understanding that they should be fighting against the British, not for them. Mir Mast's trajectory contrasted with that of his brother Mir Dast, a recipient of the Victoria Cross. Although Mir Dast chose to serve the British Indian Government faithfully, the two brothers were not so different. Mir Mast also fought with distinction on the Western front and was still willing to fight when he deserted. They certainly must have shared a sense of honour drawn from fighting

in the battlefield. Mir Dast additionally valued being “faithful and eat the salt of the Government with loyalty” (in Omissi 1999, p.94). This is where the two brothers’ paths diverged, as Mir Mast’s loyalties laid elsewhere.

While some of the sepoys deserted to the Germans who appeared to be sympathetic to their anti-colonial cause, large numbers of Armenian and Greek conscripts deserted the Ottoman army to join the Allied forces that they hoped would support their national cause. As early as 26 April, a group of 80 Greek and Armenian soldiers deserted to the French lines (Rogan 2015, p.152). Larger numbers still joined the Russian army to form the Armenian Volunteer Regiments. However, deserters did not always have political motivations. In many cases, soldiers ran away out of despair and a strong desire to return home. Several of the deserters were caught on their way to India. The British authorities also inclined towards this hypothesis (Jarboe 2013, p.126).

In August 1916, 11 Pathans, nine of whom belonged to the 58th Rifles and a mysterious 12th person who was an Afghan were captured in Shiraz by the British authorities. Although the Pathans claimed to have been taken prisoner by the Germans, the authorities were persuaded that they were deserters, now working in the service of the Germans. The Afghan named Abdul Manun appeared to be a civilian, a fruit seller according to his statement, although many inconsistencies in his story led the intelligence office to think that he too was a German agent (IOR/L/PS/11/129, P7828A/1920). We will never find out whether Abdul Manun told the truth, however unbelievable it seemed, or what parts of his account were not genuine. It is possible that he also was a deserter. The labour corps units were sometimes formed so hastily that the records of the recruits were not kept consistently (Singha 2007, p.434). If Abdul Manun was one of those followers, he may have been able to desert without leaving any trace in the British records although this possibility was not discussed in the proceedings.

There were large numbers of deserters on the Suez Canal. Among the Muslims were four men of the 69th Punjabis who apparently deserted to visit Mecca — and probably return to India afterwards — rather than to join the Turks. They were captured and three of them were executed while one was sentenced to

penal servitude for life (Stanley 2015, p.56). The 69th and 89th Punjabis which contained a large number of Muslim troops (four and three companies respectively) were later committed to Gallipoli, only to be withdrawn two weeks later. Although this decision seemed to be predictable at first sight, given the high command's suspicions about Muslim soldiers' loyalties, there were some inconsistencies in the treatment of these two units. First of all, these troops had served well against the Ottoman forces whenever they had a chance; on their way to Egypt, in Egypt and then at Gallipoli before they were assigned temporarily to labour (Talbot 1937, p.64; Stanley 2015, p.62; AWM 1DRL/0221, Cox diary, p.17). The 89th Punjabis lost 10 men at Gallipoli, mostly in a local offensive before they were withdrawn (Stanley 2015, p.124). After fighting in France, these troops were sent to Mesopotamia to fight against the Ottoman army anyway. The 69th and the 89th ultimately fought with distinction against the Ottoman army in Mesopotamia. Naik Shahmad Khan of the 89th even won a Victoria Cross near Sannaiyat in April 1916 (Chhina 2013, p.235). It was also quite curious that other Muslim troops in Gallipoli were not singled out in the same way. About 50% of the drivers and gunners of the 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade and 75% of the supply and transport units consisted of Muslims who were never suspected of disloyalty (Stanley 2015, p.73). There were also Muslims in the ambulance corps who served with distinction, three among them were recommended for rewards by Major Rothney Battye (NA WO 95-4272, Appendix II, pp.3-5).

Two Gurkha prisoners' testimonies give us an idea about the rumours that were circulating among the soldiers about the sudden dismissal of the Punjabis. Amersingh stated that:

[These] two Muslim regiments as soon as they arrived in Çanakkale, rebelled saying, "we cannot fight here. Because our sovereign is here." Investigations were carried out. But the Muslims said "We cannot engage in war here, send us back to France." Later they were sent (in Tetik and Demirtaş 2009, vol. I, p.47)

Gulbahadur [Gurung], another man of the 6th Gurkhas gave a similar account although the location and the outcome were different:

We heard that we were going to fight against the Turks only on the ship after our departure from Port Said. It was all the same with us; however, [we had thought] that we were going to France. But when the Indian troops landing on an island near Çanakkale learned that they were to fight against the Turks they revolted and relinquished fighting. The English executed their leaders by shooting, and sent all the Muslim soldiers to France. (p.52)

Had these serious incidents occurred, it is reasonable to assume that there would be at least some trace of them in the archives or in the personal diaries of the officers. It would also be illogical to allow these troops to land in Gallipoli totally armed and participate in an operation following their landing. Moreover, the inconsistencies between the two statements indicate that these rumours, which seemed very plausible, did not in fact have any foundation. Peter Stanley argues that the reason behind the treatment of these battalions at Gallipoli was probably that Ian Hamilton who was an admirer of Gurkhas wanted to replace Punjabi regiments with Gurkhas and if that was indeed his intention, his plan worked. "Hamilton used or allowed the suspicion of Muslim troops reliability to obtain a brigade that by the end of May had become three-quarters Gurkha" (2015, p.123). Indeed, Hamilton had hoped to have a Gurkha brigade all along. He had written to Kitchener in March saying that he was very anxious to have a Gurkha brigade for the Gallipoli campaign as he thought they would be the most suitable for the hilly topography of the peninsula (Chhina 2013, p.242).

It is possible that the Muslim soldiers would have preferred not to fight against the Ottoman Empire. However few of them would run the risk of the death penalty out of loyalty to the Caliph. Two Sudanese Muslim soldiers who deserted the French army in Gallipoli said that lots of their comrades wanted to escape if they had a chance. But the treatment they received from their superiors seemed to be more of a problem than their religious sympathies. Both of them complained about the cruelty of the French officers and one of them, Mohammad Kamara, said he wanted to live in Turkey thereafter (Tetik and Demirtaş 2009, pp.22-29). During the siege of Kut-al-Amara as well, only a few Muslims refused to attack. Three Pathans from the 28th Punjabis were made to dig their graves and lie in them before being executed. These sorts of measures deterred soldiers from mutiny or

desertion for a while (Gardner 2014, p.106). However, as the conditions of the siege worsened and the Indian soldiers struggled against starvation as they refused to eat horsemeat, no matter how severe the punishments, a total number of 147 soldiers deserted to the Ottoman army and a smaller number were killed while attempting to do so (p.139).

On the Western Front, Mesopotamia or Gallipoli, disinclination to fight against fellow Muslims was not the main driver of desertion, though it may have been an additional source of grief. Muslim soldiers both in the French and the British army were fighting far from home. If they deserted, their chances of safely returning home depended on finding friendly capturers across the lines. Prisoners' statements strongly suggest that the Turkish officers tried to retrieve information about the morale of the Muslim soldiers and whether they were aware of whom they were fighting against. They certainly hoped that some of those 'helpless Indian Muslims' could be deterred from fighting against the Ottoman army if they were properly informed. Leaflets in Urdu and Arabic, specifically targeting the Muslim soldiers, were dropped at Moudros and Limnos where the troops due for Gallipoli were camping (Albayrak et al. 2005, pp.194-6). The impact of these leaflets in terms of numbers of deserters or mutiny was negligible, although we have no indication of the psychological impact that these may have had.

War trauma, sickness, malingering and desertion

There were many different responses among soldiers to the death and suffering surrounding them. Some men became completely desensitised. Hans Kannengiesser (1927) interpreted this coping mechanism as something inherent and culturally specific to the Turks:

The Turk is unbelievably insensitive to the corpses and their stench. I remember, for instance, two soldiers, who on the extreme right flank of the front line had laid three corpses one on another as cover from the sea. They sat on these and ate their bread and olives. (p.173)

After prolonged exposure, some men acquired a capacity to shut their senses to such horrors as stench, the noise of shells and the sight of dead bodies. On the

other hand, coping mechanisms often failed many others who were exposed to violence, pain, captivity and all manner of privations. There are no exact numbers or types of mental illnesses, there being a dearth of psychiatric experts or policies about treating or handling the cases. Moreover, the experts themselves usually classified war neurosis within the realm of forensic medicine, with an inclination to treat trauma, hysteria and malingering as conscious or unconscious selfishness. Therefore, the patients were perceived as “psychic deserters” rather than psychologically injured (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, p.45).

In the Kitchener Indian Hospital in Brighton, there was a ‘lunatic asylum’ which took patients from all Indian hospitals in England and those transferred from France (IOR/L/MIL/17/5/2016, p.18). The 29 cases admitted to the hospital between January and November 1915 were classified into three categories: Traumatic (mental illness supposedly caused by a physical injury, especially to the head), acute mental disease and those of obvious low mentality. “‘Idiot’ and the case of Chronic Delusional Insanity would come under the third group, being the cases of very low mental calibre, who would have been thrown off their balance by any slight mental strain” (p.35). It was a common understanding among European and European-trained neuro-psychiatrists that war trauma was not the cause of the cases of mental illness that they examined but a trigger revealing a pre-existing latent condition (Yanıkdağ 2013, p.182).

Among the Indian soldiers admitted to Kitchener Hospital with mental disease, there were six cases from 129th Baluchis, the highest number from any one unit (IOR/L/MIL/17/5/2016, p.34). Regardless of the fact that this was one of the first Indian regiments to see repeated action on the Western Front, the health professionals were suspicious of the numbers:

In the case of the Mahsuds (129th Baluchis), it was difficult at times to separate the true signs of organic disease from the functional and feigned. The first of them had undoubted hysterical fits in addition to his mental disturbance, the other men of the 129th Baluchis in the ward copied these with more or less accuracy. (p.35)

Since hysteria was believed to be an unconscious imitation or simulation of the symptoms of disease, malingering or conscious simulation was almost impossible to distinguish from genuine hysteria, hence the reluctance of the experts to recognise the 'accurate' symptoms as being authentic. Of course, sepoys were aware that feigning illness was one way out of the battlefield. Isar Singh, a Sikh soldier, wrote to a friend: "So far as is in your power, do not come here. If you come, get yourself written down ill of something in Marseille, and say you are weak. You will do better to get the Doctor to write down that sickness you have in the head. Sick men do not come to the war" (in Omissi 1999, p.59).

In the Kitchener Hospital two cases were court martialed for malingering (although it is not specified which illness was allegedly simulated), but they were acquitted because "to convict in cases of this sort, however strong the evidence, is in practice, almost impossible" (IOR/L/MIL/17/5/2016, p.8). The psychiatrists who provided expertise in those court cases believed that it would take some level of insanity to simulate mental illness, therefore, ability to simulate mental illness had to be considered as a sign of genuine mental weakness (Yanıkdağ 2013, p.190). Military authorities were far from being sympathetic to soldiers suffering from war trauma, because it challenged the unity of the army which was based on the expectation that every man should want to die for his country. It seemed unfair that some men should go through the ordeal of the war until they died, while some escaped enemy fire because of what appeared to be a selfish desire to survive. However, when war trauma manifested itself as "combat madness" which led to the senseless killing of the enemy with a suicidal zeal, it was considered to be the ultimate form of bravery (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, p.42).

When these outbursts of violence were directed to the 'wrong side,' they were almost sure to be 'dealt with' through summary execution. Dafadar Ali Mardan wrote from Egypt:

[...] a Gurkha went mad and wounded three Indian officers. He ran into the trenches and began firing indiscriminately. [...] He fired at us three or four times but missed and wounded other men at a distance. [...] I fired again and dropped him wounded. We then jumped in and seized him and he died almost at once. (in Omissi 1999, p.178)

It is impossible to know how many such cases there were. One similar case occurred among Ottoman soldiers at Gallipoli. This soldier was captured after killing the master gun-smith and his helpers in their sleep, because he had dreamt that one of the companions of the prophet told him that gun manufacturers were prolonging the war and causing the bloodshed (Yanıkdağ 2013, p.182). He was diagnosed with “religious fanaticism,” which fell under the category of “ignoble degenerates”(p.183).

Treatment of Ottoman and Indian patients seemed to be very different. For Indian soldiers “the chief treatment adopted was exercise, fresh air, and plenty of light food” while the Ottoman soldiers were treated with electrotherapy, “strict isolation, restricted diet, injection of pain-causing drugs and long cold baths” (IOR/L/MIL/17/5/2016, p.35; Yanıkdağ 2013, p.188). This difference, however, was because the aims were different rather than there being different approaches to psychiatric treatment. In fact, brutal methods, akin to torture, were also used on European soldiers with the same objective: unmasking the malingerers and curing the “weak” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, pp.47-9). Indian psychiatric patients were sent to India as soon as possible and therefore the aim was to manage their symptoms and prevent violent behaviour while they were at the hospital. On the other hand, the Turkish neuro-psychiatrists were determined to cure their patients not only because they were needed at the front but also to prove that the Turks were not a degenerate race. Harsh methods were used as “counter-suggestion” in order to persuade the patient to behave normally, when all other simple counter-suggestions such as the question, “are you not ashamed?” failed to cure them (Yanıkdağ 2013, p.188).

This underlying concern about eugenics was a determining factor in the attitudes to war and war trauma. In 1915, Mazhar Osman, one of the leading psychiatric experts in the Ottoman Empire, responded to the question “are the Turks degenerate?” with a qualified yes. However, he argued that the degeneration of the Turks had some positive outcomes such as the “physical beautification” through the elimination of Central Asian features and that there was still hope for the Turks to preserve their moral virtues such as courage and war-like qualities (pp.213-4). The psychiatrists were also anxious about the destructive potential of

war in evolutionary terms. However, they suggested a paradoxical measure to prevent national degeneration by excluding the mentally weak and physically unbalanced from combat units or from military service altogether. The wiping out of the physically and mentally strong as predicted led to growing anxieties during the interwar period about the increased proportion and reproductive proclivities of those who were considered to be degenerates (pp.219-32).

In fact, various forms of war related neuroses and depression were widespread in all the belligerent armies. After the war, most men assumed their normal lives but we know very little about how they coped with their memories. How did they manage the memories of killing, suffering and violence in their civilian lives? Many years later, some would refer to seemingly random flashes of memory that were full of significance. Hüseyin Koç for instance was haunted by this image: “we put on the bayonets in Muş. I looked towards the sun. Bayonets were shining bright. I can still see that before my eyes. It never leaves me, never!” (in Önder 1981, p.68). Sometimes the images would be more explicitly related to death. Mehmet Özsoy said “Many soldiers died in Arabia. [...] These flash by before me and make me cry. Maybe their bodies were never buried ... They remained on the sand of the desert ...” (p.134). The letters written by the sepoy also suggest that they were deeply affected by their experience but unfortunately we have no testimonies about their post-war experience.

There is no reliable statistical data of this widespread depression and psychotic breakdown, not only because of the insufficient number of neuro-psychiatric experts but also the general uneasy attitude towards mental illness and war neurosis at the time. Although there was some research on war trauma available before the First World War, the earlier theories were largely ignored or modified by the psychiatric experts, because of the pressure to make these conditions compatible with patriotic ideals (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, p.44). As eager participants in the nation-building process, psychiatric experts were also ideologically biased towards underestimating the scale of war neurosis among soldiers. On the other hand, the same ideological bias provided a clearer picture about the scale of venereal diseases among the Ottoman troops and population. This is explained by the fact that European scientists argued that the general

paresis caused by syphilis would affect only brain workers and more intelligent white men. The Turkish neuro-psychiatrists took it upon themselves to prove the superiority of the Turkish race, though European experts were not so easily convinced.

Mazhar Osman and a number of other doctors engaged in a battle against their European counterparts who practised in Istanbul and who pretended that they had not seen a single case of general paresis among soldiers. When this obviously dubious information was disseminated, it was taken as evidence that non-Europeans were not civilised or intelligent. Then it became urgent to prove that there were ample numbers of cases among the Eastern soldiers to salvage national pride as well as ethical probity. A certain professor Müller visited the Şişli La Paix hospital upon Mazhar Osman's invitation to see for himself the general paresis and tabes cases which constituted 11 per cent of all the hospitalised patients (Yanıkdağ 2013, p.157). He further mentioned the cases among the colonial soldiers fighting for France and England. This was a nationalist and anti-colonialist battle as much as a scientific and professional one, based on providing evidence that the Eastern soldiers were civilised and intelligent enough to suffer the degenerative effects of syphilis. However, his counterpart maintained that there was no general paresis among the Ottoman soldiers. How these men contracted the disease was not a major concern in the debate in the case of the Turkish soldiers whereas, in the case of the sepoys, the presence of venereal diseases caused more embarrassment as it indicated interracial sex. The reports from the Indian hospitals in Britain are either silent or say very little about the prevalence of venereal diseases among the Indian soldiers. There is only a passing mention of venereal diseases in Pavilion and York Hospitals and the cases are described as few and "old standing" (IOR/Mss Eur F143/81, p.27). In fact, the rate of venereal diseases increased substantially during the war and was high in colonial troops as well (Levine 1998, p.117).

Apart from syphilis; malaria, tuberculosis, typhus and dysentery were the major causes of death not only in the Ottoman army but also among the civilian population. The mobility of millions of refugees, deportees, soldiers and deserters, most of whom had no access to health care and basic sanitation, created favourable

breeding grounds for pandemics. In fact, in the Ottoman army, far more men died of diseases than of combat wounds. According to the statistics of the Ministry of War, among those who were admitted to hospitals, over 460,000 men died of diseases against a much smaller number of nearly 70,000 men who died of wounds ([Yalman] 1930, p.253). Once the numbers of those who were killed in action or died before being referred to hospital are added to the casualties mentioned above, the death rate of the Ottoman army was a shockingly high 37 per cent (Zürcher 2010, p.186). The Ottoman soldiers were more likely to die from diseases or other causes than soldiers in other armies but they also had far more opportunities for deserting. The number of deserters was estimated to be half a million by the end of the war, far higher than any other belligerent army ([Yalman] 1930, p.262).

The poor conditions pushed many soldiers to run away. Soldiers' accounts invariably mention hunger, unsuitable and insufficient clothing, especially the absence of shoes and long marches under harsh conditions. Aytuner Akbaş shared with me the story of his grandfather who had to dig a shelter in the snow and eat the calluses off his feet to survive on his way back from Russia. The soldiers had to eat the leather of their shoes, barley for the horses and eventually the horses themselves (Önder 1981, pp.69, 87, 98). Osman Kaçmaz and Osman Yılmaz described how soldiers kept talking about the food their mothers used to cook (pp.79, 97). Mehmet Şanlı said that his unit was reduced from 350 to only 18 because of famine during the winter of 1915 in Mesopotamia (p.25). These are not the reminiscences of a few sporadic shortages since Ottoman soldiers were generally undernourished at all times due to lack of supplies and poor transportation. Even at Gallipoli where the Turkish soldiers were relatively well-fed, the food supplies that the Australians had left behind inspired envy. "All the meat in the world, all of it, in cans! Ready to eat! Piles of it, like mountains! It was checked, they had put no poison in them ... Meat, meat, meat ... We used to have horse beans, chickpeas and once a week, rice pilaf. That's it!" (p.140).

The inefficiency of the transportation network also meant that soldiers (and prisoners of war) had to walk long distances, sometimes in very harsh weather conditions. Liman von Sanders wrote about the Ottoman soldiers who had no other choice but to strip off the clothes of British and Indian dead to replace their

used up and unsuitable uniforms (Özdemir 2008 p.39). Falih Rifki Atay, a Turkish author who served as a reserve officer described in his memoirs that Ottoman soldiers would seize the opportunity even in the heat of battle to get dead British soldiers' boots and uniforms. After the Ottoman troops captured a British trench they would come back unrecognisable, dressed as they were in random uniforms looted from the British (Zürcher 2010, p.179).




Figure 1 - An Ottoman soldier in rags, apparently a common sight (Imperial War Museum)

The accounts of several British prisoners of war suggest that the Ottoman soldiers stole not only from the dead. Frederick William Nelson, a British private, captured at Gallipoli told that during their transfer to Istanbul:

In turn each one [of our guards] would drop to the rear of the party and relieve one of our group of his boots and any other property which happened to attract his attention. The only things I could lose were my boots and I lost them at about 11pm. (IWM Doc.16030, pp.1-2)

A British subaltern in the Indian army, taken prisoner at Kut-al-Amara also noticed:

the Turks were only too anxious to buy, when they could not steal any clothing, boots, or equipment, their own clothing and equipment being at a very low ebb after months of service in Mesopotamia, to say nothing of the long march down from Asia Minor. Many had no boots, and were just wearing sandals of goat-skin. (Bishop 1920, p.16%)

These poor conditions were a major reason behind the high rate of desertion among the Ottoman troops. Turkish veterans did not mention desertion directly but referred to it implicitly. Several of them mentioned the precautions taken against desertion, such as being locked up in the train wagons and guarded by armed men during the marches, although they do not refer to any inclination to desert among the soldiers. Only a Gallipoli veteran, Mustafa Yıldırım, who later settled in Australia, admitted to having deserted after a month of heavy fighting. He said he simply wandered off and kept walking for a month until he reached home in Central Anatolia. He said some women made fun of him for having escaped but there were no other consequences of his action (Fewster and Başarın 2003, p.100). In spite of the provision of the death penalty for desertion, most of the deserters were sent back to their units if captured.

A reserve officer and nationalist, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir also wrote about the attitude of the soldiers to desertion as:

the notion of distance and time is blurry in [the simple soldier's] mind. He is under the impression that beyond that mountain ahead, the road will take him to his village. And sometimes he hits the road and becomes an outlaw [...] The reason why he suddenly leaves one day has nothing to do with fear of death nor with lack of endurance. Thus, if he ever gets caught and comes back to the front, he fulfils his tasks as hardily as ever, as if nothing had happened. (1959, p.119-20)

Aydemir was also astonished by a sergeant who much later told him that he had escaped from his prisoner camp in Malaya hoping to get to his village and that he still believed he would have made it, had he not got caught (p.119). According to Aydemir, it was melancholy and homesickness that made soldiers leave. It was not a lack of understanding but a lack of choice that caused soldiers sometimes to walk

for months. Mustafa Konar said that he was given three months of sick leave but by the time he reached his village in Çanakkale district on foot, he had only 18 days left (in Önder 1981, p.13). The army did not give much consideration to how soldiers would arrive at their destination without access to transportation.

The numbers of deserters had reached such high proportions by the end of the war that the deserters became the most important reserve of manpower. However, there was no incentive for those men to return to service and it would have been difficult to lure them with false promises. Although some of the gangs of deserters had reached the size of battalions and they looted the regular troops, the Ottoman army did not have any means to engage in an effective guerrilla style fighting against these groups. On 20 July 1918, a general amnesty was issued for all deserters. The Government's tone was, however, far from conciliatory. After the first proclamation inducing the deserters to join their former units failed, it was followed by one that demonstrated a misplaced authoritarianism directed at a group out of its control:

Deserters! You were asked to take the road that leads to God. If you had encountered on this road not military service, but even the hell itself you should not have thought of deserting. You ought to have been patient and remained at the front, even if you were deliberately being cut to pieces. Privation and pain should not have influenced your actions. But you thought only of your good pleasure and put butter on your enemies' bread.
(in [Yalman] 1930, p.264)

This passage shows that the authorities had clearly identified the causes of desertions as "privations and pain" and bad treatment as implied in "deliberately being cut to pieces." However, the Government reserved to itself the right to dispose of the lives of its people. This attitude was precisely captured in the celebrated words of Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli, "I am not ordering you to fight, I am ordering you to die." These words are celebrated to this day, out of a misguided belief that soldiers were willing to become martyrs and national heroes. When the range of attitudes among soldiers to the war and the prospect of death and suffering are taken into account, the words sound cynical and atrocious rather than moving.

In fact, other soldiers belonging to different armies on different fronts were also literally 'ordered to die,' in hopeless offensives that defied all logic and consideration for human life. Thus, an Indian rifleman Amar Singh Rawat described the battlefield as:

when the leaves fall off a tree and not a space is left bare on the ground, so here the earth is covered with dead men and there is no space to put one's foot. [...] When we reached their trenches we used bayonet and the kukri, and blood was shed so freely that we could not recognize each other's faces; the whole ground was covered in blood [...] I think the Germans have been shaken and that the war will end soon, because the whole world is being destroyed, no men are being left, some hundreds of thousands, nay millions; the whole world is being finished. (in Omissi 1999, p.45-6)

There were other sepoys who believed that the war would go on until no one was left. "It looks as if not a single man can remain alive on either side—then (when none is left) there will be peace" (in Omissi 1999, p.59).

Although Indian soldiers served under better conditions and ran a much smaller risk of dying from diseases, famine or lack of suitable clothing, they also suffered similar hardships at times. On the Western Front as well as at Gallipoli, frostbite was a major concern. The officers of the 4th Gurkhas who arrived at Gallipoli in August after having fought at Neuve Chapelle, Ypres and Festubert, found the conditions at Gallipoli very challenging. The Turkish trenches overlooked theirs giving them no respite from enemy fire (Stanley 2015, pp.238-9). Especially in the Anzac sector, a huge number of soldiers were packed into a small area, with no adequate water supply. Adding to these conditions, the heat of August created ideal conditions for contagious diseases. No wonder that soon after their arrival on the peninsula, all British officers and men of the 4th Gurkhas suffered from mild dysentery and more sick men than wounded were being evacuated every day (p.239).

As the weather got colder, the morale of the troops was affected. Hundreds of frostbite casualties were reported by the end of November. Three quarters of one Gurkha battalion, including 11 officers suffered frostbite in one night (p.270).

The 4th Gurkhas were better off thanks to the experience of their officers on the Western front; they had been provided with sufficient extra clothing (p.271). In the report on the York and Pavilion Hospitals, the cold weather-related casualties were treated as an outcome of “natural selection in the form of trial by climate” which eliminated the “unfit” (IOR/Mss Eur F143/81, p.18). They were seen as signs of inherent weakness and posted under ‘debility’ in the report. Yet, experience showed that the soldiers’ ability to resist cold depended on external conditions and had nothing to do with any inherent capacity.




Figure 2 - Frostbitten Gurkha soldiers in Gallipoli (Australian War Memorial)

In the cold winter nights at Gallipoli, those who did not have adequate clothing had to walk about in the open to keep themselves warm and thus risk getting shot. Under these conditions, Rothney Battye, in charge of the 108th Indian Field Ambulance, recorded a few allegedly self-inflicted hand injuries and officers reported additional cases (pp.265-7, 271). In fact hand wounds by enemy bullets were very common but it was considered incriminating to have hand wounds. Amersingh of the 6th Gurkhas surrendered to the Ottoman army in Gallipoli because he said:

When I was first wounded my company commander, who did not believe that I was shot with a Turkish bullet, threatened me saying that he would put me in a cannon and shoot me off. I was afraid. I hid myself for a day. The

next day I surrendered to the Turks. (in Tetik and Demirtaş 2009, vol. I, p.48)

According to Amersingh's account, the order for withdrawal of the Allied troops from Gallipoli had been received before this incident occurred. It seems unlikely that he would have inflicted wounds on himself when he knew he would be evacuated soon.

A self-inflicted wound was a sure way out of the battlefield although it involved several risks, including permanent damage, loss of a hand due to infection and ultimately court martial. On the Western Front as well, within the first few months, 1848 Indians were admitted to hospital with hand wounds. General Willcocks ordered five of the sepoys shot for cowardice as a warning and as a consequence the number of cases dropped (Jarboe 2013, p.116). However, an analysis of 1000 instances of wounds, written by Colonel Bruce Seton in order to investigate the prevalence of self-infliction among Indian troops concluded that:

Analysis of the first thousand cases of wounds that have passed through Kitchener Hospital, shows that there is no evidence of self-infliction of wounds which could be supported by statistical examination. [...] it would appear to be fairer to the Indian Army to seek some other explanation, before suggesting, as is very commonly done, that there is strong suspicion attaching to any individual with a wound in his hand, especially in a left hand. (IOR/L/MIL/17/5/2402, p.8)

In any case, Indian soldiers, and they were certainly not the exception, did sustain self-inflicted wounds at moments of despair. Many men who were reluctant to injure themselves sought other methods that would discharge them from battlefield. One letter sent from India to a sowar (a man of the cavalry), Mohammad Rafi Khan, obviously responded to his inquiry about ways of causing symptoms temporarily. His correspondent consulted several people and wrote a thorough list of tricks that would indicate various symptoms of illnesses (in Omissi 1999, p.67).

The Indian and Turkish soldiers often praised by their commanders for their unquestioning loyalty and altruism and later remembered for their equally stereotypical bravery were in fact complex figures who had range of responses to the adverse circumstances of war. A close examination of the evidence places them as actors in their own stories, as they demonstrated their agency in every possible way. Dido Sotiriou's novel character Manolis' statement on desertion is very pertinent: "The gallows, the neck-irons, the torture – nothing could stem the tide of desertion. It was a kind of war against the war. Men wanted to break away from the herd as it rushed headlong toward disaster, wanted to take responsibility for themselves" (1991, p.110). From recruitment to desertion, the soldiers displayed several forms of resistance, adjustment and resilience, which were often misinterpreted. Although the soldiers were typically portrayed in the accounts of health professionals and officers as being driven by mysterious forces to malingering, desert or employ other ruses and as being unable to assess the risks and possibilities, they were obviously very much aware of their options. Their ability to endure hardship or their willingness to take tremendous risks depended very much on their individual situation. The experience of the soldiers of different origins and cultures, serving under different banners, converged significantly as they came to share their underlying human condition and marginalisation by overarching power relations.

Chapter 6 - Trans-cultural encounters

The movements of millions of soldiers and displacement of even larger numbers of civilians during the First World War led to an unprecedented intensity of intercultural encounters. Many of the soldiers came into contact with some of the other cultures for the first time. How did they process this exposure and built their knowledge about other peoples? More or less intimate relationships were established between individuals who would not have met under normal circumstances. How did they familiarise themselves with new languages and cultures and what impact did this have on their sense of self? Colonial soldiers often interacted directly with both 'enemies' and allies, by-passing the mediation of their colonial rulers. To what extent did this new framework challenge contemporary racial attitudes? This chapter offers some reflections on these questions. This discussion on the nature of the encounters and relationships between these soldiers and the people they encountered in a range of circumstances and spaces focuses on the experiences of the soldiers of the Indian and Ottoman armies.

Indian and Turkish soldiers' encounters

Based on their interviews, Turkish soldiers at Gallipoli and Mesopotamia were often aware that they were fighting against Indians. They seemed to sympathise with the Indian soldiers as they believed that the British had manipulated them into fighting the Turks. Mehmet Kurtul said:

On [the Eastern] side of Suez, we encountered the soldiers that the English had rounded up in India. What an army the English had brought from India!... A mercenary army... They deceived them saying "you are going against the Germans." But they were marching them against us. (in Önder 1981, p.95)

Osman Ertaş who fought the Indians in Jaffa believed that the English did not value Indian soldiers as much as their own. "On the English side there were Indian

soldiers. Do you think they would have any pity for the Indians? They would have pity, if they were their own [British] soldiers. Savagely, there was assault, assault, assault ... They fell in piles, both Indians and ours.” (p.38) However, compared to themselves, Turkish soldiers found the Indians quite well looked after. “Indians are massive guys. They were well looked after. They are good fighters. The soldier of the *gavur* is fed fat cheese, chicken, pastrami. We used to eat boiled wheat in ammunition boxes. There was nothing else. What to do?” (p.122).

Sisir Prasad Sarbadhikari, a medical orderly, taken prisoner at Kut, also had conversations with wounded Turks, which seemed to support the idea that the Turkish soldiers sympathised with their Indian counterparts whom they thought had been forced into a war which was not their business.

We used to talk about our country, about our joys and sorrows ... One thing, they used to reiterate. What is your gain in this war? Why are we cutting each other’s throats? You live in Hindustan, we live in Turkey, we don’t know each other, we don’t have any quarrel between us ... (in Das 2011(a), p.81)

Sarbadhikari seemed to reciprocate this Turkish sympathy since he believed that the Germans were also exploiting the Turks.

There was one more thing noticeable amongst them—that was a common hatred of the Germans ... The main cause for discontent was that whatever was good in this country, the Germans would have it first. The eggs would first go to the German hospitals and leftovers—if any—would then go to the Turks. The same happened with everything. We used to think that the same thing happens in our country but our only solace is that we are at least a subjugated nation, whereas Germany and Turkey are friends! (p.81)

It is interesting to note that, decades later, the shared memory of Australians and Turks would be constructed upon the foundation of a sense of colonial victimhood, while Indian and Turkish memories completely diverged.

Turkish soldiers, however, had a confused and unclear understanding of the origins of the colonial soldiers with whom they came in contact. Mustafa Aksoy was told that they were Arabs and the English had brought them to Gallipoli

without their knowledge (p.76). Ali Balkan also said that most of the soldiers in the British army were Arabs and that they were paid to fight (p.140). Arab was a term that was used indistinctly for all people with darker skin in colloquial Turkish language, so the confusion was understandable. However, those who encountered Indian soldiers more closely and identified them as Indians were not very clear about the cultural difference within them either. “Those Indians, they are big, very big men. Half of them are Muslim, the other half are fire worshippers” (p.39). This was probably a common mistake among Turkish soldiers whose cultural references included only Abrahamic religions. Those who saw the cremation of the bodies of Hindu and Sikh soldiers may have concluded that these soldiers worshipped fire. However, the term consistently used by the Ottoman officers to refer to non-Muslim Indians was ‘*Mecusi*’ which translates as Mazdean. The common misconception of the Mazdean religion, also known as Zoroastrianism, as a form of fire worshipping, explains this analogy, despite the information that was available about Indians, especially to Ottoman officers who were highly literate.

Accommodating religious diversity

Given the fact that the Ottoman military staff had little understanding of their practices, non-Muslim Indian prisoners could only expect limited and selective sensitivity. Although the officers and soldiers were allowed to practise their religion, if any of the practices seemed inconvenient, the military authorities did not hesitate to intervene. For instance, the Sikhs who were held prisoner in Aleppo were not served beef but other religious practices were not sacrosanct. Competent prisoners were appointed for tending and butchering of the sheep and goats in keeping with their religion. However, it was ordered that:

For these graziers, it is against the tradition by their religion and sect to force them to cut their moustache and beard. To avoid the matter reaching an unseemly stage, from now on moustaches and beards will be cut in order to protect everyone’s health and this will be explained in an appropriate way to them, or failing that, to the more cooperative ones, and they should be persuaded to cut their moustache and beard willingly. (KA 771/45)

Given the high rates of contagious diseases among the POWs in the Ottoman camps, the facial hair of the butchers was probably not the greatest worry in terms of hygiene. However justifiable this order may have been in terms of health and hygiene, it must have caused considerable distress among the Sikh prisoners who were accustomed to the extreme caution of the British in their dealings with religious matters. This was a situation where the British had no power to make sure that everyone's religious obligations were respected while fighting in foreign lands.

The German attitude to religious matters, however, was comparable to the British ones. Non-European prisoners were concentrated in Wünsdorf camp, also known as Halbmondlager (Crescent Moon Camp). They were supplied with food in compliance with their traditions and given freedom to practise their religions. Thus, the first mosque on German soil was built on the grounds of the Wünsdorf camp. This favourable treatment was not totally disinterested. Germany hoped to recruit revolutionary fighters from among these prisoners and succeeded in sending thousands of North Africans and hundreds of Indians to the Ottoman Empire for revolutionary purposes (Rogan 2015, p.270; see also Ch.3, p.57-61). The Indian Independence Committee, working closely with the NfO (Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient/Intelligence Bureau for the East), crafted propaganda material for the prisoners. However, even after hopes for an anti-colonial revolution dissipated and the exemption of the Wünsdorf POWs from compulsory labour was revoked, German officials still gave consideration to their religious and cultural sensitivities as well as the social status of the POWs (Ahuja 2011, p.34).

British policy on religious sensitivities was also extended to their Muslim POWs. However, since British ideas about the religious practices of Ottoman soldiers were not always accurate, their 'religious freedom' package was not necessarily appropriate. The assumption that prayers and other rituals would be observed was so strong that some Turkish prisoners took it as coercion. There is a dramatic irony in the statement of Osman Ertaş who was a POW in Egypt that "The

Gavur [the British] favoured those who prayed. Keep collapsing¹⁰ all day, they won't bother you. They won't put you to work. But if you don't ... As long as you collapse [you will be fine]... They like Muslims that much!" After Ramadan those who observed the fast were separated from those who did not. "They were going to punish those who did not fast. They were taking those who did not fast to work at the quay in groups of ten." According to Osman Ertaş, the British decided to let this pass as many of the POWs protested at this treatment (in Önder 1981, p.41-2). It is highly probable that this treatment was not intended as punishment but the commanders did not anticipate that those who did not worship also expected to participate in the religious festivities. The British commanders may have also expected every Muslim to be equally pious. The fact that this was not the case disturbed their preconceived ideas and they attempted to divide their concept of 'Muslim' into subcategories that would be understandable.

The International Red Cross Committee, which inspected the POW camps of both sides also often mentioned, with an element of surprise, the lack of interest in religious services among the Turkish prisoners. Thormeyer who visited the British camps in India and Burma reported that "the camp authorities have allotted them a building to serve as mosque, and imams come to hold services. There is little religious keenness, and many of the men are indifferent" (1918, p.17). At the camp in Bellary (Bombay Presidency) prisoners even preferred to convert the building into a café-restaurant (p.40). The reports however, do not give any information about the behaviour of the Arab POWs and there is also no indication that any arrangements were made for the Armenian and other non-Muslim Ottoman POWs. The British authorities were complimented on the "care lavished on their [prisoners'] welfare, the constant desire to improve their lot, and the absence of useless annoyances are the factors in a treatment which conforms with the principles of humanity and civilisation that honour to the British race" (p.17). The Turkish prisoners on the other hand, although appreciated for behaving well in general, came across as being irritating, as they did not seem to be thankful for the resources that were by implication, wasted on them. This was particularly

¹⁰ A humorous and irreverent way of referring to the act of prostration.

apparent in the report on the Citadel camp in Cairo, which sheltered women and children of the families of the Ottoman prisoners in other camps.

Oriental women and 'unpatriotic effeminate' in POW camps

The Head Matron of the Cairo Citadel Camp, Miss Lewis, was commended by the committee for possessing the patience, tact and kindness required for the "often very ungrateful task" of managing the camp (*Turkish Prisoners in Egypt*, 1917, p.32). Not only did women not wish the imam to hold weekly religious services as initially planned by the administration of the camp, they did not show any interest in intellectual diversions either. "They pass their days in talking and smoking" (p.36). According to the report, in spite of all the efforts of the head nurse and the donations of British ladies to set up a dressmaking class, they were not interested in work either, as they apparently had plenty of money (pp.36-7). Some of the women asked to see their husbands more often or begged to be repatriated. However, the Ottoman Government was not responsive to the repatriation proposals of the British authorities, who desired, according to the report, "to be freed from the maintenance and surveillance of these people, whom it took under its care merely for reasons of humanity" (p.38). Furthermore, a certain Mme S. seemed to have complained to her husband Dr Süleyman Bey about the food, although the prisoners were provided with unlimited and good quality food. Upon the investigation of the committee, it turned out that "she only found the cheese too salt and olives monotonous. Mme S., who purchased coffee, biscuits, fruit and bonbons at the canteen, would not touch ordinary bread because it was not good enough for her" (p.39).

The report clearly depicted women in the camp, especially those who belonged to the upper class (wives of officers), as being capricious, ungrateful and unreasonable. The British authorities seemed to have considered this camp as particularly burdensome although it accommodated only 229 women and 207 children at the time of the visit of the committee (p.32). The number was insignificant compared to the other camps that each contained thousands of prisoners. As well as the cost, the uneasiness about the Cairo Citadel, probably also

originated from the fact that this camp (and its setting) recalled the luxurious laziness of harem life as imagined by Europeans. It was described as 'the curious Jewel-Palace' which resonated with that trope: uneducated and overly sexual Eastern women languishing and smoking all day, waiting and demanding their husbands' conjugal visits. There were indeed 12 rooms that were reserved for this purpose in the camp and women requested to see their husbands at least once a month (p.37). As a result of this sexual activity, it was necessary to establish a maternity ward where "there were 5 births during the last three months of 1915. Two more occurred upon the day we inspected the camp" (p.36). This orientalist female sexuality and the supposed out of control reproduction that it entailed, and the very presence of these women for that matter, was anomalous in the discourses of prisoner of war camps which were supposed to be exclusively masculine spaces.

However, women were not the only perceived challenge to the masculine military order of the prisoner camps. In spite of heavy penalties, there was homosexual activity among the soldiers and a very many homoerotic relationships between men who otherwise identified as heterosexual (see Das 2005, pp. 109-172). In some of the POW camps where inter-cultural encounters were more regular, some self-proclaimed ambassadors of national masculinity attempted policing homoerotic behaviour. One such prisoner was the Head Clerk Ragıp Bey who was held in the Krasnoyarsk Camp in Russia which housed German and Turkish officers. Ragıp Bey was very much concerned about "an increasing number of mischievous and fickle-tempered Turks" who imitated the European habit of bathing naked "without using the waist cloth." Furthermore:

Any Turkish officer who fancied some young and 'moustache-less' [handsome] foreign officer immediately picked him as his [German] teacher and thus became acquainted by their 'cursed ideas'... This kind of behaviour did not bother Europeans, for they did not put much value in such matters. In fact, [they] apparently did not understand honour in terms of sexual honour. (in Yanıkdağ 2013, p.65)

In this narrative, Ragıp Bey considered homoerotic tendencies as not only unmanly but essentially un-Turkish, although he identified the party that 'mischievously' initiated the undesirable behaviour, as Turkish.

The entertainment that fellow officers organised was not to Ragıp Bey's taste either. "The first clownery, something called cabaret, was produced by Gabaracı Halil in which some Turkish officers played like girls." As if this was not bad enough, some Turkish officers performed the belly-dance, while others in the audience got drunk and joined in (p.66). While his fellow officers were having so much fun, perhaps Ragıp Bey's serious anxieties were related to his conservative religious concept of masculinity as well as national identity. Ragıp Bey was also a very pious man who condemned homosexuality on the basis of religious morals and his concern over national identity was probably exacerbated by captivity in foreign lands with foreign inmates. Consequently he reacted strongly to the homoerotic behaviour of his colleagues. Other accounts of these sorts of light-hearted entertainment praised the performers' talents. Ahmet Ercan, a private who was held POW in Egypt said:

Sometimes, there was entertainment at night in our camp. Someone produced a women's garment, who knows where they found it. A friend would play the tomtom on a pumpkin, another would hold his nose to make the sound of a clarinet and the one wearing the dress would dance in the middle. Such talents there were among us! Our soldiers built theatres, sculptures in adobe. What artists! (in Önder 1981, p.129)

Although Ragıp Bey was an officer from an educated and urban middle-class background, while the private Ahmet Ercan was uneducated and came from rural Anatolia, these divergent attitudes cannot be explained simply by background and education. These differing responses were present in all classes. The theatre stage and the sculptures that Ahmet Ercan praised were later destroyed by a pious inmate, during an excess of religious zeal or possibly a episode of mental disturbance (p.129). Therefore, there were ambassadors of patriotic masculinity among the privates too.

Language and communication

Former Turkish POWs generally referred to their experience of captivity as being behind barbed wire, which betrays a certain claustrophobia, although they usually depicted their treatment in captivity in positive terms. The conditions in the POW camps were usually a huge improvement on the privations that the soldiers of the Ottoman army had undergone. Ahmet Ercan described how he and other POWs were cleaned in barrels filled with medicated water and given new clothes and were well looked after. He said they did not work much apart from daily chores (pp.128-9). Osman Ertaş had similar reminiscences and he added that when they wore the clothes that were given to POWs, “We looked like gentlemen” (p.40). Osman’s experience in captivity was to improve even more as he was assigned to the service of an English Major who apparently took particular care of him. “He liked me so much, he kept bringing me nuts and chocolate. He said ‘Eat!’ I became so chubby [...] We parted with the Major in Selimiye [Istanbul], both of us crying. He liked me very much. He wanted to take me to England on a merchant ship. It didn’t work out” (p.41).

Ali Demirel’s account also suggests that the POWs were not the only ones to be weighed down by solitude and trauma. Soon after Ali arrived at his POW camp in Egypt a limping English Captain asked if there was anyone from the 27th Regiment, which was at Gallipoli. Ali was worried but he came forward. The Captain was apparently very happy to have found him. He was wounded at Anzac and according to Ali he was traumatised. He provided Ali with a separate tent to share with two fellow prisoners of his choosing and further helped him by giving him money and packs of cigarette to sell. “He used to hang out in my tent all the time. He liked my company [...] He never talked much, the English Captain. He did not let me go until there were only a thousand men left behind the barbed wire” (p.23).

The privileged and apparently platonic relationship that this Captain maintained with Ali is quite difficult to explain. It seems as if Ali’s presence was somehow reassuring for the Captain simply because he had been at Gallipoli where the Captain had been crippled not only physically but also emotionally. His

permanent injury apparently confined him to service in the camp where he also may have felt entrapped. Since the Captain was so laconic, Ali did not know much about him. He referred to him as the nameless 'English Captain' or the 'lame *gavur*.' Ali offered him a chest and a pair of shoes that he proudly made entirely by hand, which the Captain got marked 'Made by the POWs.' So Ali also possibly remained nameless in the Captain's story. But the two men certainly communicated non-verbally and comforted each other on an emotional level.

The language barrier between captors and prisoners was not always insurmountable and was not the biggest obstacle to their communication. Many soldiers, including those who were illiterate were multilingual or had been exposed to a diversity of languages. This enabled them at times to exchange meaningful words with their supposed enemies. Ibrahim Arıkan spoke Greek and was obviously touched by his conversation with an old man whom he encountered when he escaped from his POW camp in Athens:

- Where are you from?
- Constantinople, I said, thinking that they wouldn't know any other place.
- Isn't it such a shame? the old man said.
- What is such a shame?
- You are also some mother's lamb ... You are hiding here thus, in this foreign land. Wouldn't it be better if there were no wars? (p.114)

Picking up a new language was not an unusual experience for most of them.

Mustafa Gürer said that after three years in captivity in Mesopotamia and India, he was able to speak a little English and a few words of Hindi (p.17). Mehmet Kurtul who was captured by the Indians, apparently learned the basics of an Indian language so he could ask for water and answer simple questions (p.96). Osman Ertaş who was already able to speak a little Kurdish, Pomak, Bulgarian and Serbian claimed that the English Major taught him English in ten days (p.40-1). Apparently, before his captivity, he already knew a few words, as he described this basic conversation with the Indian soldier who mistook him for a German. "He said – Fuckin' German! – No. Muslim. Soldier Muslim. Finish German" (p.39).

Production Note: This figure is not included in this digital copy due to copyright restrictions.

Figure 3 - Sikh troops guarding Ottoman prisoners, Sannaiyat 1917 (Imperial War Museum)

Usually, the conversations remained basic and this is also one of the reasons why prisoners acquired a satisfactory level very fast. In France, Indian troops were often in contact with the local people. When the soldiers were behind the lines they were often billeted in French farms. Although a large proportion of the troops in France were committed to Mesopotamia by 1916, a number of troops stayed on until the end of the war. After two years spent in France, a sowar reported that “all of us can now talk French” (Omissi 2007, p.384). Massia Bibikoff, a French-trained Russian artist, who had authorisation from the General Staff to draw sketches of the Indian soldiers in their camp in Marseille wrote that, “They [sepoys] like to be with our peasants and talk to them by signs, and I have seen a child teaching them French on the Berlitz method. As he peeled a potato he said, ‘knife, potato,’ and the others set themselves to repeat the two words” (1915, p.10). Bibikoff also observed that around the stalls of the country farm sellers “most laughable explanations in Franco-Anglo-Indian are to be heard” (p.55).

Indian troops and French women

French people and the Indian soldiers had both the desire to communicate and frequent opportunities to interact following the arrival of the first troops in

Marseille in September 1914. Two of the major local newspapers in Marseille, *le Petit Provençal* and *le Petit Marseillais* reported the enthusiastic reception of the Indian troops, invariably referred to as 'Hindu troops,' by local French people. This event was also very accurately described in Mulk Raj Anand's 1939 novel, *Across the Black Waters*, while *Le Petit Provençal* reported the arrival of the first Indian troops in Marseille:

[As they marched through Marseille], they were acclaimed enthusiastically by the people. People threw them flowers, offered them fruits and tobacco. Women pinned flowers on the tunics and turbans of the Sikhs, who were of gigantic stature, a head taller than the spectators, and the little Gurkhas, Punjabis and Baluchis. They were given little tricolour [French] flags that they attached on their rifles. They warmly responded "Vive la France!" while the crowd switched between "Vivent les Anglais! Vivent les Hindous!" and *la Marseillaise* [the French anthem], was very well performed by the Hindu military band with their strange instruments. ("Les Troupes hindoues à Marseille" 1914)

French people were quite curious about these Indian troops. Several postcard series featuring Indian troops were printed for the benefit of the wounded French soldiers and were sold as souvenirs of the Indian troops' stay in Marseille. In the first three months of the Indian presence in Marseille, there were regular news items about these troops in the local papers. However, the newspaper coverage of them faded rapidly as their presence ceased being a novelty.

However, the interest of the local people endured for much longer. In April 1915, Marie, an adolescent French girl, was writing to her brother at the front about her exciting encounter with an Indian soldier while she was walking in Parc Borély with her father and little sister.

We start a conversation with a few of them to enlighten ourselves about various things that we wonder about them. But we especially talk with one of them who is particularly affable. (Just a little note here: when I say conversation with a Hindu, I mean a few words or syllables that are hard to understand. Because, as you can imagine, their English and mine did not match very well.) Anyway, after a little while, I see my Hindu trying to

remove the ring he is wearing. Then, when he finally managed to take it off his finger, he offered it to me very gracefully. My word! I don't want to take it at first but he insists, saying: "Souvenir, souvenir." So Dad wanted to pay him for the ring but he keeps repeating maybe the only word he knows in French: "Souvenir, souvenir." So I walk away proudly with my ring, and babbling thanks, as you can picture. (ADBR 216 - J/29)

Marie then returned with a piece of paper, asking the sepoy to write his name down for her. After a little resistance and a failed attempt in communication, he finally wrote his name, which the Indian cook of a restaurant in the city transliterated later for Marie. It turned out that the young man's name was Ajav, written in Urdu characters, which suggests that Marie's 'Hindu' was in fact a Muslim.

As Marie was writing to her brother about a scene which also included her father and sister she may have been concealing her romantic interest in this soldier although her enduring excitement ten days after the encounter, and to a certain measure her awakening sexuality, is palpable in her letter which practically consists of this story. Marie and Ajav's story is one that ended before it even started, much like Marie and Lalu's love story to be in Mulk Raj Anand's novel, *Across the Black Waters* (2008) Lalu, a Sikh soldier of the imaginary 69th Rifles, becomes the favourite companion of a little boy on the farm where his company is billeted. This grants him access to the family home, and consequently proximity to the teenage sister of the little boy, Marie. The mutual attraction between Lalu and Marie, evident in their body language, is constantly disrupted by Lalu's self-consciousness because he feels the constant gaze of other sepoys and Tommies when he is with Marie. His friend Subah even harasses Marie openly. Finally, the tragedy of the death of a dear friend of Lalu affects his emotional and mental ability to pursue a love interest. Anand did not envisage a love affair between a sepoy and a French girl as being in the realm of possibilities. There were several obstacles to romantic relationships between the sepoys and French women developing fully although opportunities for sexual intercourse were frequent and there was certainly emotional attachment in some cases.

The drafting of men in large numbers left a disproportionate number of women in French civilian life and colonial troops would typically interact with women, children and the elderly (Stovall 1998, p.747). Notwithstanding the myth that France had a laidback policy towards interracial sex or according to a British bureaucrat “the French allow[ed] their African troops the same privileges as Europeans: [he] is as good as a Frenchman,” there was considerable amount of anxiety about white women’s prestige, and French authorities tried to prevent interracial relationships (Kant 2014, p.46; Stovall 1998, pp.761-2). The measures were certainly not as drastic as in England, where convalescent Indian soldiers were initially kept in confinement almost as if they were prisoners. Because of the resentment that this treatment caused they were allowed a limited time free from strict surveillance from 1915 (Omissi 2007, p.380). In both Britain and France, the allegedly loose morals of lower class white women was perceived as a potential threat that could undermine colonial rule. French and British authorities similarly censored any correspondence that would tarnish the reputation of white women, a notion which was based on bourgeois morality (see Levine 1998 and Stovall 2003). However, it was not practically possible to segregate colonial soldiers from the local population in France and there were certainly many opportunities for Indian soldiers to have intercourse with sex workers or other women in France. There were explicit or coded references in many soldiers’ letters about their sexual experience with European (mainly French) women, such as “contrary to custom in our country they do not put their legs over the shoulders when they go with a man” (in Singh 2014, p.114).

Although most of the time contact between Indian soldiers and French women must have been occasional and discontinuous, there were several attempts to keep in touch. The censors reported that, after having spent the winter in a French neighbourhood, some of the Indian cavalymen received letters “of a violently amatory nature” from French women (Omissi 2007, p.388). Risaldar Mokand Singh wrote back to France from India, “I generally hear from Paulette; but I cannot make out why Louise is so quiet” (in Omissi 1999, p.273). Several other men had or pretended to have more than one French girlfriend. A sepoy sought advice: “Do you think that I should bring them with me? Would there be

any harm? Of course people would laugh, but ‘can en fait rien’ [sic. ‘ça ne fait rien’ or ‘that doesn’t change anything’] [...] Both of them are quite willing to come” (in Singh 2014, p.114). There were also several, obviously insincere promises given to friends to bring them or send them one or more French women.

Some French women, however, were willing to make the journey if the opportunity presented itself. Massia Bibikoff, who went to the camp Borély several times to draw sketches, had eyes only for Maharajah Sher Singh from the first moment she saw him. As she described it: “But he turned towards me—and it was like a gleam of sunlight. Never in my life had I seen a handsomer man. He realised the dreams of beauty in which I loved to wrap the heroes and princes of the Arabian Nights” (1915, p.85). Bibikoff also praised the physical beauty of some of the sepoy, and as she was drawing sketches, it was perfectly justified to gaze for lengthy periods of time at these bodies which were eroticised to a certain extent in her writing. However, her attraction to the Maharajah was more than physical. His title clearly impressed her and activated her imagination about “sparkling” or “scintillating jewels” (p.85). With the help of an interpreter the Maharajah told her:

[...] After the war, if he is still alive, he will come and see you—and where do you live?’ (I wrote down my name and address at Paris and Marseilles and he handed this to the Maharajah.) “He will come and see you in Paris, and from there His Highness will take you with him to India; you will be lodged in his palace, where you will be received as queens and heaped with pearls and diamonds!” Oh, if only his words could come to pass! Then my wildest dreams would come true! (pp.116-9)

It would be interesting to know how middle or lower class women imagined the lives of ordinary sepoy but there are not many female voices that can answer this question. However, in Chandradhar Sharma Guleri’s short story, *Usne Kaha Tha* [*She Said It*] (1915), a sepoy tells his friends: “At that foreign woman’s house – velvety soft grass. There is an abundance of fruits and milk there. No matter how much I try, she never asks for money. She says–You are a king who has come to save my country. [...] Till date I could not make her understand that the Sikh community does not smoke and whenever she tried to light a cigarette for me, I would avert my face and she thought that the king was feeling insulted and would

not fight for my country” (para.2). It is hard to imagine to what extent French women were able to tell a sepoy apart from a Maharajah and the harsh rural life in Punjab from fairy tales. Pokhar Das, a Punjabi Hindu wrote from France that these verses were in everyone’s lips:

When Lahore and Meerut left, rumour fell upon Rouen.
Rumour will be rife again when the Cavalry Corps depart.
Weep, weep ye lovers.
One has dubbed himself ‘Prince,’
Another has covered himself with medals,¹¹
And another has felt the slipper applied.
Weep, weep ye lovers. (in Omissi 1999, p.147)

Several soldiers’ letters suggest that a number of marriages were contracted between French women and Indian soldiers and as late as the 1970s, one of the Sikh ex-soldiers suggested that some of these French women came to the Punjab (Pradhan 1978, p.223). If any French woman actually followed their Indian lovers or husbands, they would probably have encountered difficulties being accepted by their in-laws and the community in general. The responses that the sepoys received from their families in India were not generally encouraging. Inayat Ali Khan replied with a letter defending his fiancée:

Whatever you wrote about Bernadette is entirely false. She is an unmarried girl and surrounded by modesty and moreover, I rely on her, and she has given me her youthful promise that she will never look at another man.
Further my actual seal remains imprinted on her. (in Singh 2014, p.115)

A non-Muslim sepoy received an incendiary letter from his parents in response to his desire to convert to Islam or Christianity to be able to get married. In fact, although Muslim soldiers were allowed to marry French women, Hindus were not, as they would lose caste (Omissi 2007, p.388).

Have you no shame? Do you think I brought you up so that you might marry a Christian wife? Could a man be so perverted to lose his religion for the sake of a woman? [...] And if you reject my advice, take care how you bring

¹¹ According to David Omissi, medals refer to “the small charms” commonly use in Roman Catholic countries and frequently used as love tokens.

such a woman in my house, for she will be beaten on the head with a shovel a thousand times. (in Singh 2014, p.115)

Despite the objections of families and peers, at least one Indian Muslim, Lance Dafadar Mohamed Khan married a French woman. Contrary to Inayat Khan above, Mohamed Khan was not defensive about his wife but rather about himself. He even made up a story that the girl had gone behind his back, writing to the King and that he had no choice but to convert to Christianity and marry her on the orders of the King, and against his wishes. The reason behind their precipitous marriage in April was in fact that the woman was pregnant. It may be true that Mohamed Khan did not wish to marry her and father the child whom he later called the 'daughter of a Kaffir,' but it was also true that he did have intercourse with her (see letters in Omissi 1999, pp.279, 298, 313, 322; in Singh 2014, p.118). On the other hand, for one Parsi soldier who wrote to a friend in India, having a child with a European woman was more than desirable. "It is impossible to describe the beauty of the children (whom personally I love the best). I wish only that I had such a child. After looking at the two pictures of their children which I enclose, can you not see that it becomes difficult for us to return?" (in Omissi 1999, p.29).

The sepoys had conflicting opinions about French women and society in general, ranging from moral condemnation to sublimation. However, most of them were situated in the middle ground whereby they were critical of some aspects of the French way of life as they observed or experienced it, while they were appreciative of others. The most notable example of the latter was the relative equality in boys and girls education. Some sepoys thought that Indians should follow the same path and educate their daughters as well as their sons and they recommended change around themselves.

I know well that a woman in our country is of no more value than a pair of shoes and this is the reason why the people of India are low in the scale. [...] In Europe everyone—man and woman, boy and girl—is educated. The men are at the war and the women are doing the work. They write to their husbands and get their answers. You ought to educate your girls as well as your boys and our posterity will be the better for it. (in Omissi 1999, pp.257-8)

Colonial savages and saviours

In their letters, sepoys usually described French women in relation to themselves as either shameless and available sexual partners, weeping sweethearts, or benevolent substitute mothers. A type of woman who fell outside these categories apparently escaped the sepoys' attention. Repulsion at the colonial soldiers, although not specifically at Indians, was the main response recorded among the women by Lucie Cousturier. "What is to become of us?" moaned the farmers' wives ... We will not dare let our young daughters walk the paths among those savages. We will not dare go out alone ourselves to cut the grass or gather wood ... 'Just think of it! If we were to be taken by these gorillas!'" (in Das, 2011(b), p.19). Although fear of the colonial troops may have dissipated in these communities after prolonged contact, representations of the Indian troops remained ambivalent.

An article in *Le Petit Marseillais* detailing the characteristics of the different classes of the Indian army, described the Pathans thus:

Recruited from among the independent tribes between the North-Western frontier of India and Afghanistan, the Pathans are a savage and unruly race. [...] The Pathan has no fear in action, is easy to feed, but never touches alcohol or pork meat. However, even if his cannibalistic instinct prevails, it is possible that he will stray from that custom for the benefit of the Germans. Much less disciplined than the Gurkha, he possesses nevertheless, all the qualities of a first class combatant; extraordinary courage, splendid aim and a rare endurance. At the moment of an offensive, he is hard to keep on a leash. ("Les Troupes hindoues" 1914)

Written with the confidence that came from the position of France as an ally of the British and therefore of the Indians, the description nevertheless contained an element of fear. Massia Bibikoff's narrative also matched fearsome and animal-like characteristics in the Gurkhas.

His eyes blinked like a wild animal's and seemed to avoid meeting one's look. "Poor Boches!" I remarked to the Colonel. And, sooth to say, they are

wonderful fighters. They are said to see clearly at night, and their great art is to glide across the hollows of their mountain valleys and slopes of the Himalaya so as to surprise their enemy and cut out his tongue. Such at least would be their natural tactics, only disciplined and tempered by British civilisation. (1915, p.5)

Apart from the non-human frame of reference, the most common comparison was with African soldiers in the French army. In fact, the description of the features of the Indian soldiers shifted constantly between the non-human and African. Massia Bibikoff continued by wondering: "Did the rain and cold make them shiver in silence as our Africans so often do?" A few lines below, Bibikoff switches back to comparison to animals: "Today they take pleasure in it [the war], and having got used to the Flemish climate, they creep at night through the mud towards the enemy's patrols like dripping tigers" (p.6).

Le Petit Provençal anticipated the arrival of the Indian troops, expecting "these Asians" to "engage in combat side-by-side, with the same impetuosity as our Africans." It is noteworthy that Indian troops were not imagined as fighting side-by-side with the French troops on an equal footing. The article continued: "Some of the races which form the elements of these troops share the rock solid ardour and daring of our turcos and our Senegalese" ("Les Troupes de l'Inde en route" 1914). The article further mentioned the obedience of the Indians to the military order of the English just as the Senegalese obeyed the French, although they kept, according to the same article, some of their unspecified peculiar customs. After this reassuring note however, the article ended with the words attributed to Lady Dufferin, the wife of the former Viceroy, describing the Indian soldiers as 'demons.' "Soon these demons will charge against the Germans with a frenetic ardour." It is noteworthy that the Indian troops are defined in relation to the Africans, Germans and even to some extent to the English but anxiety about the presence of these troops on French soil is deliberately circumvented by representing them as powerful 'instruments of combat' under the strict control of their European masters.

In Germany, where there was no confidence in the discipline of the colonial troops, anxieties were running high. Even distinguished scholars such as Max Weber, shared their indignation that “Germany continues to struggle for its existence against an army of Negroes, Gurkhas and sundry other barbarians from all nooks and corners of the world, who wait in the wings to turn our country into a desert” (in Ahuja 2011, p.28). The deployment of colonial troops against Germany was commonly deplored as a breach of “racial etiquette” (p.27). Germany, therefore, expected racial loyalty to be maintained among the European nations that transcended whatever quarrel caused them to be opposed. The upkeep of this racial order was held to be the uttermost moral obligation and the use of colonial troops was perceived as a transgression of this unwritten code of conduct. The justifications for the use of non-white troops against the Germans were formulated within the same racist ideological framework that was quasi-consensual in Britain as well as in France.

Le Petit Provençal reported a declaration by an unnamed representative of London:

Our enemy is outraged that we are deploying black troops against them. They should save their sincere indignation for the acts that deserve it. The soldiers that we are putting in the lines are trained and disciplined, and as much under the authority of their officers as the “civilised” German troops. Their fathers possessed an ancient civilisation while the ancestors of our current enemies used to run half-naked in the forests and long periods of struggle taught them the way wars should be fought. (“L’armée anglaise” 1914)

The commonplace intra-European racism that placed Germans in the line of Asian Hun people was one thing but placing them behind the Indians on the civilisational ladder was akin to denying Germans the status of civilisation at all. Operating within the same ideological framework, the declaration went on to classify different colonial people and accused the Germans of deploying ferocious tribes in Eastern Africa.

There was an understanding so far, that a quarrel between Europeans in Africa should be resolved among the whites, and the indigenous people

should be kept out of it. Rather than exciting native passions in a continent where the number of blacks exceed that of whites in a proportion of twenty to one, we deliberately refrained from using our splendid Indian troops against the Boers. The Zulus themselves, while they were fighting against us, declined the help of the inferior tribes, because they could be controlled neither during the battle nor after. It was at the discretion of the Germans to prove themselves inferior to that proud and valiant people and to call out for the help of the savages whose only notion of war is to slaughter everyone.

Far from being unexceptional in its style or its content, this statement encapsulates many of the contradictions and inconsistencies of the racist discourse on colonial people. After claiming that Indian troops were under the strict authority of their British officers and were far more civilised than the Germans, it was affirmed that Britain refrained from using them in colonial wars where they would be liable to take over the whites and commit savagery. How Indian troops would achieve this in South Africa where Indians were a minority is another question. There was also a consensus that the European way of making war was more virtuous and civilised than that of the colonised people's, although it also involved, in some instances, the indiscriminate killing of the enemy by the thousands. The range of firearms placed a comfortable physical and emotional distance between the killer and the killed and thus became a source of complacency seen as civilisational superiority of European warfare. Bayonet charges, which were very close to the 'uncivilised' methods of killing employed by 'savages,' were however rarely mentioned in this discourse.

While both parties accused the other of committing the crime of breaking the code of white supremacy by deploying savages against each other, it was the colonial troops who suffered the consequences of this diabolic image. It transpired that, out of fear of getting slaughtered, German troops did not capture many South Asian prisoners, but simply killed them in anticipated self-defence (Ahuja 2011, p.22). Talbot Mundy captures this fear and prejudice in the story narrated by Hira Singh: "I have fought in a trench beside Englishmen who spoke of me as a savage; and I have seen wounded Germans writhe and scream because their officers had

told them we Sikhs would eat them alive. Yes, sahib; not once but many times” (1917, p.8%). Ironically, it was the German authorities who undertook a plan to redeem the image of these troops because they hoped to recruit some of them to fight against the Allies, and they therefore needed the Indians alive (Ahuja 2011, p.22-3).

The German captors’ interest in these soldiers did not end with the recruitment of jihadists and revolutionaries. The POWs were a subject of scholarly curiosity for the German and Austrian anthropologists who focused on racial studies of European and non-European peoples. These specialists compared the POW camps, which had become laboratories at their disposal, to the 19th century exhibitions of ‘exotics’ (Evans 2010, p.199). Notwithstanding the ethical issue of consent by these captive ‘participants’ who were not always so eager to cooperate (p.216), data from these anthropological studies, particularly thousands of sound recordings, give us invaluable insight into the experience of war and captivity for the Indian soldiers. In the meantime, the investigations undertaken by the German scientific community of the time point towards the collapse of pre-war distinctions between exotic and non-exotic subjects, as European prisoners were also similarly measured, examined and questioned as a means of defining the enemy as the racial other (p.225).

Oriental mates

While the enemy in all its diversity was conflated into an all-encompassing racial other in German anthropology, an undifferentiated Oriental otherness became more and more problematic in a war where, on the one hand, the Ottoman Empire was an ally of Germany, and on the other hand, Indians, Gurkhas, Senegalese and Algerians to name a few fought alongside the Allies. This confusion is best illustrated in the Australian official war correspondent Charles Bean’s account of an incident which involved a group of Turkish soldiers, allegedly pretending to be Indians, asking for an audience with senior Australian officers. The group of six somehow succeeded in capturing a Corporal, a Lieutenant and a Captain singlehandedly, although the Colonel managed to escape. Charles Bean

noted “How easy it would be for any Oriental to dress up as an Indian and come along the beach—not one of our men would have distinguished him” (in Rogan 2015, pp.156-7). This incident occurred at the beginning of the campaign, and one may wonder whether at any point during the eight months of the campaign, Indians and Turks (or possibly Arabs) ceased to be Orientals with interchangeable faces and identities for the Australian troops.

Australian and Indian troops in Gallipoli fought side-by-side and interacted freely all through the campaign. There was “tremendous camaraderie between them,” apparently to the surprise of the British officers of the Indian army, “as they [the Australians] don’t care much for the native in their own country” (in Stanley, 2015, p.258). A group of Gurkhas returning to India from Gallipoli were seen to have been missing uniform buttons. They explained that they had given them as souvenirs to Australians (p.260). The diaries of Lieutenant Charles Stinson of the Anzac Signal Squadron and Private Septimus Elmore of 2nd Division field ambulance both contain names written in English, Gurmukhi and Urdu by the Indian soldiers themselves (AWM PR84/066 and Stanley 2015, p.260). Harold Arthur Browett, an Australian Private of the 3rd field ambulance wrote a letter of appreciation to Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for India, about the work of Indian ambulance corps at Gallipoli:

I feel it my duty, only as a private, to write and tell you of the splendid assistance your ambulance men gave our Medical Corps on more than one occasion. All Australians are fascinated by the cool work done by the Battery which aided us so much, and stirred us to feeling which words cannot convey. (IOR/L/MIL/7/18921, p.10)

There were also other men who were appreciated individually. When Naik Mohamed Din was in hospital, his officer George Aylmer received a message from the commanding officer of an Australian unit saying that he hoped that Mohamed Din would return to his unit where he was an honorary member of its corporals’ mess (Stanley 2015, p.258).

Production Note: This figure is not included in this digital copy due to copyright restrictions.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

C01544

Figure 4 - An Australian and an Indian soldier, Gallipoli 1915 (Australian War Memorial)

According to Ellinwood (1978), in the letters and interviews that were studied, Indian soldiers were particularly fond of Australians for treating them as equals (p.197). More significantly, the Australians were even seen to obey Indian NCOs' orders (Stanley 2015, pp.172-3). The reason why Australians, coming from a society where racism was institutionalised, would behave so well and treat Indians with respect had perhaps something to do with the fact that they respected them as good fighters, possibly better than themselves as they were better trained, more experienced and overall older than the Australians (pp.172, 258). At least at Gallipoli, the white troops did not receive more favourable treatment and this may have also worked as a leveller, as Indians and Australians were doing the same job, under the same conditions. Australians were often dependent on Indians for vital supplies such as water. In their accounts, Australians typically described the Indians as providers and themselves the beneficiaries of their kindness. An additional explanation can also be offered in the remainder of Browett's letter of appreciation.

There was a fine exhibition of true Empire spirit around the camp fire– we would collect sticks for a fire, and they would make chupatee cakes, and I

can tell you that in that valley of death, those cakes with jam between went well. (IOR/L/MIL/7/18921, p.10)

Not only did Australians share their experience with Indians at Gallipoli, but they, or at least some of them accepted Indians as fully-fledged members of the Empire, sharing their ideals and spirit. Many of the narratives praised the Indians' loyalty, implying loyalty to the Empire. This was probably the major factor that differentiated the treatment of Indians and Aboriginal Australians who were hardly considered to be loyal members of the Empire.

This harmonious co-existence did not, however, wipe out all racial prejudice. Some rumours about the Indian soldiers' habit of beheading their enemies and other 'uncivilised' methods also found currency in Gallipoli. Although most men were aware that there were distinctions among the Indian soldiers, with Gurkhas and Sikhs being especially distinguished, there was general confusion about their customs and religion. John Hargraves' verses dedicated to them stand as a perfect example of the misrepresentations associated with the Indian soldiers:

By the blessings of Allah he's more than one wife; -

"Jhill-o! Johnnie, Jhill-o!"

He's forbidden the wine which encourages strife,

But you don't like the look of his dangerous knife; -

"Jhill-o! Johnnie, Jhill-o!"

The picturesque whallah is dusky and spare;

"Jhill-o! Johnnie, Jhill-o!"

A turban he wears with magnificent air,

But he chucks down his pack when it's time for his prayer; -

"Jhill-o! Johnnie, Jhill-o!"

When his moment arrives he'll be dropped in a hole; -

"Jhill-o! Johnnie, Jhill-o!"

'Tis Kismet', he says, and beyond his control;

But the dear little houris will comfort his soul; -

"Jhill-o! Johnnie, Jhill-o!" (in Stanley 2015, p.261)

It seems that the various stereotypes about Muslims, Gurkhas and Sikhs were conflated into one stereotypical 'Indian Johnnie' in these verses, which are likely to have been representative of Australian perceptions of the Indian soldiers.

Stories about the Gurkhas and others hunting their enemies down to bring their heads back were very common. As one of these stories goes, an Indian mule driver noticed the flash of a Turkish sniper's rifle, so he handed his mule to a passing Australian, and shortly after, he returned with the head of the sniper and the Australian identity discs that the Turk had collected as trophies (p.258). The 'savagery' in these unsubstantiated stories actually brought the Indians closer to the Turks who were allegedly displaying the same behaviour. Representations of the Turks were at least as ambivalent, all the more so because Australians and Turks were either on opposite sides of the firing line or they experienced the necessarily asymmetrical relationship of captor-captive.

Maleficent captors

Conditions of captivity in the Ottoman Empire were described, almost invariably, as being appalling by European and dominion military of all ranks. Undeniably, there was truth in these claims, as illustrated by the high death rate among the POWs. However, the privations and hardship that were suffered by the prisoners of the Ottoman Empire were more often assigned to the inherent cruelty and sadistic behaviour of the Turks than the stark lack of resources, combined with the normalisation of brutality in war. The prisoners of Kut contributed the largest number of memoirs of captivity largely because Kut contained a huge numbers of prisoners who received particularly horrific treatment. Although the figures vary, of about 3,000 British prisoners more than half perished, and about a third of more than 10,000 Indian prisoners met the same fate (The War Office 1922, p.330) mostly due to long marches in horrific conditions, often compared to the Armenian death marches, and diseases. Indian soldiers in particular, who refused to eat horsemeat during the long siege, were especially weakened, although they were not the only ones to succumb in hundreds in the first weeks of captivity.

The prisoners were separated into groups, not according to their race but their rank, although there was apparently a disparity between Muslim and non-Muslim Indian ranks, as non-Muslims were left behind in the Ras-el-Ain railway construction site (Jones 2011, p.185). There is however no evidence to suggest that Muslim soldiers received any privileges vis-à-vis the British other ranks during the marches except the right to distribute food and milk on occasion (p.187). Although there were allegations that Indians were better treated (Rogan 2015, p.270), the report of the Red Cross Committee suggests that, once they reached their destination, both Indian and British officers received favourable treatment and did not complain about the material aspect of their captivity. Other ranks were subject to the same diet and material conditions as the Turkish soldiers, and the report suggested, “the latter content[ed] themselves with very little, accepted the harshest deprivations and were accustomed to rudimentary nutrition” (Boissier and Vischer 1917, p.13-4). Notwithstanding the preposterous assumption that the Turkish soldiers were accepting of these conditions, the report is clear about the disparity between officers and other ranks, regardless of their race.




Figure 5 - An Indian Kut prisoner who was released during an exchange of prisoners (Imperial War Museum)

The British officers seemed to have resented their equal treatment with the Indian officers and tried to restore the colonial order under Ottoman captivity. Major Sandes wrote that as they reached the barracks:

Our first business was naturally to get separate accommodation for the Indian officers [...] We explained to the Turkish bimbashi (major) who was in charge of us that we were not accustomed to live with our Indian officers—much as we liked them personally—since their habits were different from our own, and because they had certain prejudices and established customs about the preparation and eating food. We also explained that Indian officers, in spite of the badges of rank on their shoulders, were always inferior rank to British officers and were under their orders. The bimbashi listened politely to this explanation, and then, with a knowing smile, he said, “Ah! You do not like them. Is it not so?” (1919, pp.285-6)

However ‘natural’ his sense of entitlement seemed to Sandes, he was obviously missing the point that technically the Indian officers were not under the orders of the British officers anymore. The erasing of customary hierarchies certainly caused some distress among the British officers. However, these distinctions were not totally suppressed by the Ottoman authorities and they were even exploited at times. For instance, in POW exchanges, the Ottoman authorities would insist that they wanted “real Turks” and would send “only Indians” in return for Arabs (Zürcher 2010, p.173-4). The Ottomans clearly knew something about racial hierarchies too.

The earlier disparity between Muslim and non-Muslim Indians vanished as the plan for the formation of an Indian legion fell through. There is ample evidence that important numbers of Indian prisoners of all classes were later sent to railway construction sites from their prisoner camps (KA 771/187, 283, 297, 412), as well as their English and dominion counterparts. An English private, Frederick William Nelson who was captured at Gallipoli and was also transferred to the railway construction site across the Taurus Mountains, had an interesting way of phrasing his experience of forced labour. “Having dumped us at Bilemedik the Turkish Government washed their hands of us as far as food etc. was concerned and we had to earn our living or starve. The guards of course remained” (IWM Doc.16030, p.9). Nelson also mentions a Greek whom he worked with, presumably a conscript in the Labour Corps.

Having been marched across the desert in similar conditions to the Armenians and reduced to forced labour like the Greeks, it was no wonder the prisoners of war were able to identify with the destitute ethnic minorities more than the Turks although most Turks were as lacking in privileges as themselves. In Bishop's memoirs (1920), there are clear distinctions about the ethnicity of almost every local person he encountered. Although Turkish officers and Arabs usually came across as villains in his narrative, he seemed to sympathize with some of the civilian or deserter Turks as well as Armenian and Greek officers. Indians who crossed Mesopotamia or stayed there to work also encountered many Armenians who had escaped massacres. An orphaned Armenian boy of about ten was cared for by some Indian POWs (Jones 2011, p.188). The memoirs of a medical orderly, Sisir Prasad Sarbadhikari reveal that another Armenian orphan was adopted by a North Indian sweeper, was taken to India after the war, and renamed Babulal (Das 2011a, p.80).

Several Armenians also worked in the British POW camps as doctors or interpreters. Some of them had lost their homes and families and hated the Turks. Ömer Üner recounted that an Armenian from Gallipoli was serving as an interpreter in his POW camp and he kept insulting them. One day he was cornered and beaten by a group of prisoners after which he stopped harassing them (in Önder 1981, p.122). Apart from such isolated incidents, there is no evidence that Armenians who were at the service of the British tried to take advantage of their position of power. However, after the war, the Turkish Government was informed of serious allegations about the deliberate blinding of thousands of Turkish POWs. These allegations were based on two documents; the first accusing the British, the second specifically accusing Armenian doctors in the camps. Following the proposal of two MPs, the Ankara Government passed a resolution in order to take legal action regarding the deliberate blinding of 15,000 Turkish prisoners who were allegedly blinded in creosol baths on their arrival at the prison camps (Taşkıran 2001, pp.215-6). The second allegation was based on the memoirs of a former POW who was held in Heliopolis camp in Egypt. He accused the Armenian doctors of purposefully applying wrong medication to the eyes of patients suffering from conjunctivitis (pp.218-20).

This conspiracy thesis was further taken up from the late 1990s by Turkish journalists and amateur historians who merged the two allegations into one, whereby the English were complicit in the blinding operation which was conducted by the Armenian doctors. In the absence of any evidence, the journalist-historians accepted the presence of the Armenian doctors, named in the Red Cross Committee reports as proof that the allegations were well founded (Yanıkdağ 2013, pp.161-3). In fact, conjunctivitis as well as trachoma were common among the POWs. Moreover, some of the POWs may have contracted a nutrition-related eye disease because of vitamin A deficiency. This is a viable possibility given the 'non-European' diet that was offered to the Turkish POWs (p.160). The same diet was also responsible for pellagra disease among the POWs. It was known that vitamin A deficiency caused eye-disease and although pellagra was not at the time linked to niacin, it was known to be also a nutrition-related disease. However, the European doctors never considered diversifying the non-European diet. Yanıkdağ argues that:

The camp doctors and officials intended no direct or intentional harm to the prisoners; however, their Orientalist, racial and even racist attitudes were so ingrained, so beyond question in their minds, that when what 'Turks' said as patients or what they reported about their diets at home contradicted these mindsets, Turks could only be lying 'non-Europeans' who knew less about themselves than the European doctors did. (p.161)

Interesting enough, Ahmet Gündoğdu, who lost his sight in a POW camp in Egypt seemed to be aware of the argument of nutrition-related disease, yet he still did not dismiss the idea of conspiracy. He said that although he had an eye disease because of the food in the camp, he lost his sight because of a cream that the Armenian doctors applied to his eyes (in Önder 1981, p.16).

In fact, the Orientalist and racial assumptions of the camp officials about the prisoners were not limited to nutritional and medical issues. The attitude of the camp officials to the religious observances of the Muslims was also informed by their knowledge of Orientals as discussed in the first section of this chapter. Another relatively less harmful example of this was to be observed in Egyptian camps where the prisoners were provided with 'Turkish slippers.' These slippers

were, however, the object of one of the few complaints of the Turkish POWs in Ras-el-Tin camp, who found them very uncomfortable and requested “laced shoes such as they wear at home” (*Turkish Prisoners in Egypt* 1917, pp.43, 47). Obviously, the Turkish prisoners did not regard the slippers that were offered to them as traditional or familiar in any way. Yet, even the Red Cross Committee report persisted in referring to them as ‘Turkish slippers,’ suggesting that the Turkish people themselves were not a reliable source of information about their own culture.

Whether intercultural encounters would challenge the preconceived ideas and racial attitudes depended very much on the type of relationship that was established between the parties. In general, the relationships that were characterised by asymmetry, either real or perceived, did not foster deeper understanding of the cultural ‘other,’ and in some cases even consolidated misconceptions despite the empirical evidence as in the case of Orientalist medicine. While basic hierarchies between coloniser and the colonised, Oriental and Western, master and subaltern were constantly challenged, this fluidity was due to the out-of-ordinary circumstances of war rather than a long-term change of mindset. Nevertheless, intimate bonds were built between individual soldiers and civilians and between soldiers of ally or enemy armies were established on more than one occasion. These exchanges often led to a perceptible or even profound transformation on an individual level, not only in racial attitudes but also in cultural identities. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that these large-scale individual transformations altered social structures in the long run.

Chapter 7 - Women and war:

'How different are the ideas suggested by the above two words!'

In the aftermath of the war, there was a tangible concern around the definition of Turkish national identity and there were very specific expectations from women in terms of nation building. The representation of women's war experience was crucial to defining their so-called national character. Although the modernisation of the nation, starting with women, seemed to be the main driver, the role model for Turkish women as patriot warrior had remained largely embodied in the unsophisticated, uneducated and supposedly backward rural Anatolian woman who was considered to be the purest incarnation of Turkish women's national character. This complicated the idea of modernisation. Women's condition was perceived as a barometer for civilisation in India as well. In both contexts, although modernisation of women's lives was a part of the nationalist project, there was resistance to the idea of modernity being defined as strictly Western.

Similar to Spivak's assessment of Indian women's position, Deniz Kandiyoti argued in the late 1980s, that the "position of women in the Ottoman polity was constituted as an ideological terrain" upon which the project of modernisation was negotiated (Spivak 1993, p.102; Sirman 1988, n.p.). Forced to admit the material superiority of the West because of their colonial subjugation, Indian and Ottoman/Turkish nationalisms sought to protect their moral and spiritual values as constituting the realm of Eastern superiority. The binary opposition of material and moral found its equivalents in world and home, public and private and man and woman (Chatterjee 1993, pp.120-1; Findley 1998, p.23). While the discourse on modernity focused mainly on Westernisation of the first element in each category, the latter was jealously protected as the signifier of national identity. While discussing the limits and the scope of the liberating effects of the wartime experience for Turkish and Indian women, this chapter also addresses the seeming

juxtaposition of the modernity of urban women and the backwardness of peasant women.

“An army of mothers and sisters” and labourers

In the Ottoman Empire, nursing had, for a long time, been a male-only profession. In the 20th century women started being introduced to the profession in order to provide care for female patients. After the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the shortage of medical staff and the increasing contact with Western nurses and nursing education institutions brought change in the practice of female nursing (Bahçecik and Alpar 2009, p.699; Özeydin 2006, pp.163-4). Women became particularly active in relief work during the Balkan Wars. There was an influx of Muslim refugees in Istanbul at the time and they needed food, clothing and health services. Several women’s organisations and particularly the Women’s Branch of the Red Crescent Society took care of the fund raising and relief work. The Red Crescent Society also offered nursing classes for women over a period of five months and after practical training a final examination was taken in order to obtain a diploma. From November 1914 to April 1915 alone, 300 women took the classes and 120 of them passed the exam (Tepekaya and Kaplan 2003, p.165). Apart from the Red Crescent society certain hospitals also provided training for prospective nurses.

Making the nursing profession available to women was certainly a necessity in the context of the war but it was also perfectly in line with the idea of modernisation in the Tanzimat period.¹² The Ottoman elite often described their society as ‘backward,’ and women’s condition was also pointed to as an element of backwardness. It was argued that women should have access to education and knowledge in order to be able to give appropriate education to their children. Kandiyoti identifies the agenda of this male-sponsored reformation of women as ultimately liberating the younger generation of men from the oppressive

¹² Tanzimat literally means reformation. This period started in the 1839 with the introduction of European-inspired laws and was interrupted with the reign of the unpopular Abdulhamid II (1876-1908).

patriarchal Ottoman family (Tekeli 2005, p.253). Therefore, women's modernisation was not aimed at their liberation but simply towards access to education in order for them to perform their traditional duties in a way that met these new expectations within modern family structures. The nuclear family became the new norm, both establishing every head of the household as a figure of authority and preventing the moral decay that was associated with the collapse of the traditional family structures. During the war period, family ceased to be a private affair and was regulated by diverse public agencies in order to ensure that women would not escape their reproductive duties (Toprak 1992, p.226). The example of the Islamic Society for Working Women (hereafter ISWW) illustrates how this policy was implemented.

The ISWW provided work for thousands of Muslim women in factories as well as in offices or other establishments depending on their skills. The aim of this society was not only to organise and promote work for women but also to the activity of women official sanction (Ahmad 1988, p.280). However, the ISWW adopted the principle of compulsory marriage by the age of 20 for their female workers. The society took care of finding appropriate prospective grooms, or gave approval if the young women designated their future husbands. The carrot was a 20% increase in wages for marriage and an additional 20% for each child, the stick being a 15% cut and subsequent dismissal from ISWW (Toprak 1992, p.225). Therefore, women's work outside the home was accepted and even encouraged as an aspect of modernity as long as their activity did not threaten the modern yet still patriarchal family structure. The nursing education programme also fulfilled this requirement and was therefore met with support from the government and army as well as enthusiasm from the media.

Some of the women who worked in the Women's Branch of the Red Crescent Society also shared this ideal and described nursing education as a moral obligation for all women. Fatma Aliye, one of the prominent women writers of the time and a founding member of the Women's Branch said:

Women have practiced the art of nursing from time immemorial knowingly or unknowingly. Nursing has always, everywhere and in every household been a duty of women. In fact, nursing which is an important and difficult

task is now bound by modern scientific principles. Caring for a patient while ignoring these principles may cause more damage than benefit. Since all women are endowed with qualities required for nursing and they are also morally responsible for this task they have to learn these principles. (in Sarı and Özeydin 1992, p.16)

Therefore, women were considered to be inherently inclined to patient care but this natural disposition was no longer sufficient. They were also held morally responsible for developing their nursing skills further with formal education. This project of modernisation did not necessarily empower women and even women's ability to perform their traditional duties was questioned. Fatma Aliye continued:

Women suffered so many privations for so long, being taken for a flower or a doll, so that let alone being able to bandage a wound, she could not even stand seeing a little blood on a small cut and would pass out. In this situation, our ladies who go to bandage wounds are the heroes of our time. Holding an arm that is to be cut off, cleaning the wounds of a disintegrated hand and carrying out this duty with courage and calm, yes it qualifies as heroic. (in Tepekaya and Kaplan 2003, p.166)

Of course, the author, the subject and the addressee were all women who belonged to an urban upper class and mostly a bureaucratic elite. All women who were involved in the Red Crescent Society as well as most of those who took nursing classes came from the same urban elite. The condition of women described in their writings and their grievances are specific to their social status as much as to their gender. These women had access to more than basic education and a good number of them studied further and excelled in a field, mostly in foreign languages and literature. Some of the women of this social background complained about the idleness of their daily lives and about not being able to put their knowledge to good use. During the Gallipoli campaign when hospitals were full and an increasing number of nurses were needed, the Women's Branch prepared publicity to encourage women to sign up to take classes in their spare time (in Sarı and Özeydin 1992, p.13). This notion of spare time and the desire to make a contribution to society gave impetus to some of these women to become active in public life and the war provided them with the opportunity. However, these

activities did not defy the established gender order. They defined themselves as an 'army of sisters and mothers' and even the official papers of the RCS defined them in relation to a male in their family (sister of X, daughter of Y, wife of Z, etc.).

Not all women who were involved in these activities, however, were content with the description of their role as auxiliaries to men. Fatma Züleyha who attended the classes in 1915 translated a nursing handbook from French because, she said, while she was studying there were no sources available in Turkish. She took special pride in translating this book that had been written in English by a woman (Miss Oxford) and also translated into French by another woman. In the preface of her publication she emphasised the role of nurses beyond its supposedly secondary nature. "Without a scientifically trained nurse, a doctor will not get any results. Nursing is the acting hand of medicine [...] The reason for the success of the surgical projects in Germany is the excellence of the nurses" (in Sarı and Özeydin 1992, p.15). Clearly, Fatma Züleyha saw in the nursing profession something more than an extension of women's traditional duty and she meant to make a difference both as a nurse and as a translator.

There were also women from backgrounds other than this urban elite who were taken on in different circumstances. One of the reports of the RCS, covering the period from 1912 to 1915 states that about 40 destitute Armenian women who immigrated to Kayseri were given room and boarding by the RCS and at the same time were offered nursing classes in an attempt to rehabilitate them. At the end of the mission in Kayseri, those who wished to go to Istanbul with the commission were also paid for their journey (in Sarı and Özeydin 1992, p.11). In Istanbul, it was possible for them to continue working as nurses. The same report represents RCS as the provider and these Armenian women as the beneficiaries of a charitable act but in doing so, it fails to acknowledge the output of these nurses in the war effort. Nevertheless, it provides insight into how nursing education and practice may have significantly improved the condition of some poorer women. We do not know for sure what the social background of these Armenian women might have been. We can only speculate that some of the stability that they lost because of the war may have been restored thanks to this new profession that was available to women, also because of the war. A much more likely outcome for dispossessed

Armenian women was assimilation into Turkish, Arab or Kurdish families through forced marriage or prostitution (see Üngör 2012).

Some women chose to join field hospitals and it seems that they even had a say in which front they would like to go to. In July 1915, a certain Fatma Servet who was working in Taksim Hospital in Istanbul obtained approval to join the war in Gallipoli as a wage-earning nurse (KA 221/43). Kerime Salahor, Safiye Hüseyin Elbi, Munire Ismail and Nesime Ahmed Dölen also volunteered to go to Gallipoli (Bahçecik and Alpar 2009, p.700). This list may not be exhaustive and we do not know exactly how many women served as nurses in this campaign and what their experience was like. Safiye Hüseyin Elbi who pursued her nursing career after the war, probably gave the most detailed account about her war experience in an interview in the mid-1930s. She had served as the head-nurse of the hospital ship *Reşit Paşa* at Gallipoli.

Yes, I participated in the war and I stayed in Çanakkale for a while. They said: "it's risky ... Whatever ship it may be ... Whether they are Red Crescent or Red Cross ships, the English are bombarding them." I didn't care. When the war broke out, I had volunteered as a nurse. I was going there as a volunteer too. I should say it from the start, I never feared death in my entire life. [...] You see these fingers? I closed the eyes of I don't how many young men with these fingers, never to be opened again. How many ... [...] Despite all the danger, we never had time to be scared. Because the patients were waiting for us. There were hundreds of them waiting to be operated or bandaged. We didn't have time to worry about ourselves. [...] Once we were under heavy shelling. [...] When we got back to Istanbul, we found that everyone thought that our ship had been sunk. My relatives had been mourning for me. I came back to Istanbul, as if I was coming back from the beyond. (in Beyhan and Eryüksel 2008, pp.41-2)

Safiye Hüseyin Elbi wove the narrative of her war experience into two distinct threads: altruism and a strong sense of responsibility on the one hand, and compassion and grief for those who suffered or died, regardless of their origins on the other. She recounted the story of a dying English soldier, how he kept

repeating 'I'm dying' followed by the name of his fiancée and how Elbi comforted him.

Not for even a moment did I consider him as an enemy soldier, and I comforted him in his mother tongue: "You shall not die at all, you shall live ... These horrific days will soon be over. You will recover and go to your country and back to your fiancée ..." [...] We consoled all the hopeless dying patients like that. As we repeated that they would live, sometimes we managed to persuade them. Although they were convinced that they would live, they still died. (p.43)

There is not a single suggestion in Elbi's narrative about the heroism of the soldiers or a single word that glorifies the war. She did not commend herself for being selfless either, but simply explained her lack of fear in rationalistic terms. Although grief over the human tragedy of war was tangible in her narrative, so was her satisfaction at playing an active role and being useful.

Elbi described her saddest memory as the loss of one of her colleagues, an Austrian nurse from the German Red Cross in an Allied bombing. At least one other female nurse named Erika died in service due to (perhaps the same) Allied bombing of the hospital behind the frontline, in the village of Yalova in Eceabat (Esenkaya 2011, p.59). She may not have received any posthumous honours but a number of other women who volunteered to work in the hospitals in Istanbul were rewarded with medals (Tepekaya and Kaplan 2003, p.164; Esenkaya 2011, p.59). Despite official recognition and public encouragement at the time, the contribution of the nurses was soon to be forgotten.¹³

Nursing was not the only way for women to join the war. Some women from diverse backgrounds were engaged in the labour battalions. Formation of

¹³ By contrast, male nurses' experience was always disregarded. Male nurses served in much larger numbers throughout the war and although they were advantaged by lower eligibility requirements, they were sent to the most dangerous posts. Undoubtedly, service in the ambulance corps was considered less honorable than bearing arms. Although nursing used to be a male only profession this was due to sexual segregation and nursing was considered to be a feminine job. Once women were introduced to the profession, the number of male nurses plummeted and in the Turkish Republic nursing became a female-only profession until 2007.

these women's battalions in 1918 was a necessity. Although many of the exemptions from military service had been revoked and the age of conscription had been extended to 15-55 by 1916, high death tolls and desertion meant that the Army had to make the best of whatever workforce was available (Zürcher 1996, p.242). In February 1918, a call for enrollment was launched for robust women between 18-30 years of age, with good morals and character (to be certified by the local authorities) and without infant children. Single women were to stay in the barracks at all times whereas married women were allowed to spend four nights a week at their home, provided that they lived close enough to return to work at a given time in the morning. Women in these battalions were to serve either as administrative clerks or labourers but after a while, all positions including the command and the administration of the battalion were left to women (Toprak 1992, pp.226-7). This decision seems to have been taken with a view to "protecting the honour" of these women by reducing their hierarchical subordination to men.

The war opened up new possibilities to women and therefore could be acknowledged as a time of progress for them. However the narrative of the War of Independence and the foundation of the Republic has been largely based on association with the late Ottoman Period and wartime Istanbul was particularly associated with moral decay, corruption and sexual promiscuity (Neumann 2006, pp.321-5). This representation was in stark contrast to the image of the new nation-state leaders posing as enlightened rescuers of Turkish women from the shackles of ignorance and subservience. Although the new regime shared the same ideal for women's modernisation with the Young Turk Government of the Ottoman Empire, the leaders of the Republic rejected their heritage and continuity with the late Ottoman period. The achievements of the Turkish nurses along with other professional women during the war were thus buried in the pre-history of the Republic.

Resistance and political activism

Both in India and in the Ottoman Empire, women typically contributed in the war effort through fund raising and organising humanitarian work, or through

their labour, depending on their social background. A renowned Turkish nationalist poet Mehmet Emin Yurdakul composed a poem during the Balkan Wars, about women working as seamstresses in workshops, comparing their needles to glittering swords. The poem equated women's service to men with their service to the country (see the poem 'Ey İğnem, Dik!' [Sew, o my needle] in Tansel 1989, p.156-64). In fact, the role that women played in time of war and its aftermath was by no means limited to assistance given to soldiers' relief work. In India, women readily participated in the non-cooperation movement. However, women's ability to fully participate in this political movement was mainly due to its non-violent nature, which was considered to be particularly suitable for women (Jayawardena 1986, p.97). In the Ottoman Empire, some urban women from the upper classes were also engaged in active resistance to the Allied occupation in the aftermath of the war.

Halide Edip was a prolific writer and a respected intellectual in nationalist circles. In March 1915, during the naval battle of Gallipoli, she attended secret meetings with other intellectuals, in order to prepare to coordinate a national resistance movement in case Istanbul fell (Köroğlu 2010, pp.184-190) and she appeared to bring together a certain number of prominent nationalists and emerged as a de facto leader by the end of the war. After the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces in 1918, Halide Edip organised several protest rallies, the best known of which took place on 19 May 1919 when she truly became a public figure by addressing a crowd of several thousand people. She had by then become a seasoned orator but it was significant that this was the first time a woman had delivered a speech on a public platform in a society where sexual segregation had only just started to dissipate. Many other women joined in the resistance against foreign occupation and organised similar events throughout Anatolia (Tekeli 2005, p.259). In 1920, other large demonstrations followed and hosted women speakers such as Nakiye [Elgün] and Saime [Asker], the latter being one of many resistance women to be arrested (Criss 1999, p.119).

In fact, women had practiced political activism within women's branches of various organisations during the Balkan Wars. Admiral de Robeck reported from Istanbul in 1920, that all these women's organisations had political purposes

beneath the guise of charity and in fact, they played an important role in the coordination of the underground resistance movement against the Allied occupation and in support of the Turkish nationalist movement. The scope of their activities during this time extended beyond the borders according to de Robeck, as they were connected to several intelligence agencies across Europe (p.119).

As early as during the Balkan Wars, women from the Ottoman National Defence Organisation had reached out to Indian women for support. Although there is no evidence that links the two events, almost simultaneously, some Muslim women from Calcutta organised a meeting in support of their Ottoman co-religionists and sent a resolution to the government (Özcan 1997, p.148⁶). Pan-Islamic solidarity was the main feature of Ottoman-Indian Muslim relations at the time and this was not particularly an original initiative. It is interesting, however, to note that this pan-Islamic solidarity signified not only an anti-colonial struggle but also a fight to acquire a public voice for women in the face of the Islamic practice of gender segregation. Halide Edip reports that during her visit to India in 1936, letters she received from young Muslims (girls probably) all begged her to speak against purdah during her lectures ([Adivar] 1938, p.52). However, as an observer Halide Edip was able to notice the range and nuances in the attitudes to purdah among women and approached the topic sensibly.

An interesting comparison can be made between the Turkish and Indian Muslim women's wartime activities, because the wartime political activities of Muslims in India were tightly linked to the events in Turkey. India saw an unprecedented mobilisation of its Muslim population in support of the Ottoman Empire, which culminated in the Khilafat movement following the defeat of the Central Powers. This period of turmoil was also an opportune moment for women to be involved in activities of public significance. Although they claimed the motivation of their activities were purely religious, in this particular context religion and politics were inseparable. Thus, similar to the Turkish nurses, Indian Muslim women were able to extend their domestic responsibilities—in this case, the safekeeping of religious integrity—into the public sphere.

Another similarity lies in the fact that these women were also related to prominent male leaders of the time. They conducted their activities in parallel to that of their husbands. The Khilafat leader Mohamed Ali, nevertheless, accurately ascribed his wife's political engagement to her own ambitions and capabilities:

[...] when she began to accompany me she disdained to be a useless appendage and being a far better book-keeper than myself and certainly as good an organizer at least in her own circle of women, she started a lively enough propaganda among Indian women and collected for the Khilafat Fund such large sums that they soon invited her to travel on their behalf. [...] on the 14th September, 1921, I was arrested at the railway station of Waltair [...] but it has been a source of consolation to me, not unmixed with some amusement, that my wife is still travelling—at public expense [...] Mahatma Gandhi had insisted more than once on her addressing a few words to gatherings of ladies and had assured her at the end of her speeches that she was a better speaker than myself, and since my arrest it is not unoften that large male audiences have had their enthusiasm whipped up by the stirring address of a veiled Muslim woman who had never dreamt some years ago of addressing even an audience of women outside of the *harem* or *zenana*. (1979, pp.150-1)

The first Muslim woman who is reported to have addressed a mixed political gathering was Mohamed Ali's mother, Bi Amman, who spoke behind her veil at the annual meeting of the Muslim League in 1917, on behalf of her son who was in prison. In 1921, she spoke, this time lifting her veil and introducing herself as a mother figure to all present (Minault 1982, pp.252-4). It was not only Muslims but also Hindu women such as Sarojini Naidu who used the symbolism of the self-sacrificing mother, thus merging their political activities with the traditional responsibilities of women in order to obtain social sanction for their political engagement. The limits of the socially acceptable shifted quickly and by Indian independence in 1947 women had taken up active roles in politics, although they were typically involved in women's organisations instead of taking part in the existing male-dominated parties (Forbes 1982, p.236).

Many nationalist leaders including Sarojini Naidu supported the imperial war, as she believed at that time, that Indian independence could be achieved under the benevolent guidance of the British. She wrote a war lyric entitled “The Gift of India,” for the Report of the Hyderabad Ladies’ War relief Association in December 1915 (Das 2010(a), p.356):

Is there aught you need that my hands withhold,
Rich gifts of raiment or grain or gold?
Lo! I have flung to the East and West,
Priceless treasures torn of my breast,
And yielded the sons of my stricken womb
To the drum beats of duty, the sabres of doom.

Gathered like pearls in their alien graves,
Silent they sleep by the Persian waves.
Scattered like shells on Egyptian sands
They lie with pale brows and brave, broken hands.
They are strewn like blossoms mown down by chance
On the blood-brown meadows of Flanders and France.

Can ye measure the grief of the tears I weep
Or compass the woe of the watch I keep?
Or the pride that thrills thro’ my heart’s despair
And the hope that comforts the anguish of prayer?
And the far sad glorious vision I see
Of the torn red banners of Victory?

When the terror and tumult of hate shall cease
And life be refashioned on anvils of peace,
And your love shall offer memorial thanks
To the comrades who fought in your dauntless ranks,
And you honour the deeds of the deathless ones,
Remember the blood of thy martyred sons! (in Das 2010(a), p.356)

Written in a very conventional style, Naidu's poem also appears to be conformist in its message. Sublimation of death on the battlefield through the use of late Victorian aesthetics and tropes of selfless motherhood contribute to the glorification of India's sacrifice. However, one of Naidu's speeches suggested a different reading of the poem that emphasised the nationalist agenda. During a protest against the ban on the right of Indians to carry arms, in 1916:

Have we not, the women of India, sent our sons and brothers to shed their blood on the battlefields of Flanders, France, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, when the hour comes, for thanks, shall we not say to them for whom they fought ... *remember the blood of martyred sons*, and remember the armies of India and restore India her lost manhood. (in Das 2010(b), pp.306-7)

This second reading, not only confirms the nationalist motives of the support offered to the Empire by Indian educated classes, but also highlights how this burgeoning national consciousness was informed by the perception of colonial rule as a form of emasculation. The internalised sense of inferiority was put forward here not only in racial terms but also in gender terms. Indian educated classes saw the war as an opportunity to prove that Indian men were 'man enough' to fight the wars of their colonial rulers. Nationalist women also joined in in the construction of nation in masculine terms.

Undoubtedly, the war affected Indian and Turkish women to very different degrees. In Turkey the experience of armed conflict within their territory disturbed Turkish women's sense of normality to a greater extent. As discussed above, this opened up hitherto unseen possibilities to Turkish women who were, unlike their Indian counterparts, resolutely against sexual segregation at this point in time. Women were granted political rights soon after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. However, validating those rights in a male-dominated and authoritarian regime was another battle. Nezihe Muhiddin and her collaborators founded the first political party of the Republic, the People's Party of Women, which was denied the right to run for the presidential campaign in 1927. The party was not even recognised as such and the leaders were advised to create an association instead (Tekeli 2005, pp.259-260).

Women who participated in the creation of the Republic in so many ways were also removed from the political scene during the early Republic. Halide Edip had joined the resistance in Ankara and served with the armed forces throughout the War of Independence having initially the rank of Sergeant and then Sergeant-Major. Although she did not actually bear arms but worked as a translator, she is sometimes referred to inaccurately as a woman fighter. After independence however, like many others who actively took part in the liberation, she was disappointed with Mustafa Kemal's authoritarian approach to leadership. Halide Edip chose to leave Turkey in a self-imposed exile because she was unwilling to submit to the absolute authority of Mustafa Kemal who consequently labeled her a 'traitor.' She went back to Turkey shortly after the death of Ataturk and was elected to the parliament in the 1950s. In spite of her falling out with Ataturk, whose judgment is hardly ever questioned, she has been remembered respectfully and represented as the archetype of modern republican women.

Women: From an element of backwardness to the symbol of modernity

The concept of modernity that Halide Edip supported and expanded in her writings was a very complex one. During the war, she developed a strong mistrust of the Western world and rejected almost everything associated with it. Therefore, in her search for an indigenous model of modernity, she turned to rural Turkish women. Some other nationalists of the time were even more radical in their opposition to non-Turkish elements of identity. Nationalists such as Ziya Gökalp and Fatma Aliye, to name a few, blamed women's conditions on Persian or Arab influence. According to this idea, sexual segregation, polygamy and woman's confinement in household had nothing to do with either Turkish tradition or Islam ([Yalman] 1930, p.234). Thus, the emerging Turkish nationalism found both its oriental 'Other' and its authentic 'Self.'

As discussed earlier, the Ottoman elite had internalised European representations of their Empire as backward and thus, they had also internalised the system of values through which they were judged. It is therefore, not surprising that they viewed their own subjects through with the same lenses as

they were gazed upon by Europe. As Ussama Makdisi (2002) commented, “Ottoman reform created a notion of the pre-modern within the empire in a manner akin to the way European colonial administrators represented their colonial subjects” (p.770). Ottoman Orientalism in this sense, was not new and concerned not only the Arabs but also the Turks of Anatolia. The major shift that occurred during the war was the identification of the Ottoman Muslim elite as Turkish, as opposed to Ottoman, which now connoted corruption and decay. Thus, Anatolian women were idealised as being authentic, simple, upright, hardworking, morally pure and self-reliant both by Halide Edip who promoted a local Islamic mysticism and those including Mustafa Kemal who looked back to a mythical past where Turkish society was seen as egalitarian.

Turkish nationalists were not the only ones to search for the ideal of modern womanhood in the past, thus circumventing the issue of the protection of an indigenous identity. A British sponsored reformist movement in 19th century India also looked back for social progress. Pioneers of social reform such as Rammohan Roy advocated women’s rights on the grounds of his interpretation of Vedic texts, as part of his larger aspiration to purify Hinduism from obscurantist practices which did not have any foundation in the earlier texts. Muslim reformers, such as Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh Muslim College, also argued against polygamy based on their reading of the Koran. However, during this period, the debate on women’s rights centred on sati or widow burning among the Hindus and polygamy among the Muslims, which were both issues that concerned mainly upper class and upper caste women. However, although the driving force of the reforms was improving conditions of upper class women’s confinement to domesticity, some of the issues that concerned lower caste and lower class women, such as child marriage or widow remarriage were also taken into consideration (Jayawardena 1986, pp.78-87). The following generation of woman reformers who were products of this upper-class male-sponsored modernisation also used religious and traditional texts as a source of empowerment. A pamphlet about women in war, signed by ‘a Hindu woman’ made references to woman fighters in the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* as well as historical examples of Indian woman fighters such as Rani of Jhansi. The text then continued, stating:

Curiously enough women seem to have changed their role, or rather forced to change it. [...] Though nowadays it is a common cry in the West that their women are being dewomanised–i.e., losing their womanly qualities of gentleness, modesty, etc. by their inordinate desire to compete with men in public offices–with all this we have not yet heard that a single woman, not even Mrs. Pankhurst, has offered to go to the front. Public opinion would regard the idea of women as fighters in the ranks as outrageous. (in Natesan 1915, p.244)

The author looks back to a mythical indigenous past, rather than to the contemporary West for an ideal of Indian womanhood and finds warrior role models, diametrically opposed to the domestic ideal promoted by reformists past and present.

Celebration of the Anatolian female heroes who bore arms in provincial towns and villages also contributed to the myth of Turkish women as fierce fighters. Recently, a Turkish historian brought to light accounts of a few Anzac soldiers who told stories about women snipers some of whose bodies were reportedly taken at Gallipoli (Tunçoku 2002). Although no official documents support these statements of either the anonymous or identified Anzac soldiers and Tunçoku himself could not affirm the veracity of these accounts, the article certainly propagated a strong belief in the existence of women fighters at Gallipoli. In the last few years, there has been an increasing number of Internet articles and pages dedicated to the celebration of these female heroes. An example is the story of Sergeant Halime who enlisted disguised in men's clothes (she was in fact, probably transgender as she wore men's clothes and shaved her entire life). Another is the story of Corporal Nezahat who supposedly fought at Gallipoli as a child-warrior at the age of eight alongside her father Col. Hafiz Halid Bey. Tens of other stories have been circulated and kindled a nationalistic zeal in a receptive public.

The depiction of Turkish peasant women as carriers of ammunition and other supplies is also very common in the national celebration of women's contribution to the war effort. Given that these women usually appear with a baby

in their arms and in traditional civilian clothes, their affiliation with any army troops is doubtful. However, it was not uncommon for civilians to spontaneously contribute to the war effort, particularly during the War of Independence after the First World War and the number of women labourers was not strictly limited to those who were recruited through official channels. However inaccurate, the presence of a baby in these representations is highly significant. Many of the stories that accompany these images (either in monuments, paintings or other media) relate the event of the death of the baby and the patriotic and dignified response of the mother. The message is that the sacredness of the nation prevails even over the sacredness of motherhood. In a country where the perceived constant threat of internal and external enemies translated into a readiness to fight and the militarisation of the entire society, this message remains relevant today. The mother who willingly offers the life of her child for the greater good of the country still stands as a role model for Turkish women.

This myth of the strong and self-reliant Turkish woman emphasises manly characteristics and purposefully desexualises and militarises women's identity. Although the suppression of femininity was certainly desired in order to decrease the discomfort of men in their social encounters with women, there was more at stake. Since the early Republic, Turkish girls have been drilled to march in step usually three abreast, maneuver and stand to attention as part of their basic physical education as a means of maintaining their readiness to fight in case of invasion. The underlying anxiety clearly relates to rape in war. It was common knowledge that a great many women had been traumatised by rape and Halide Edip related this in her novels and short stories. The fantasy of Turkish women as fierce fighters operates as a coping mechanism, both acknowledging men's inability to protect them and the denying that the rape actually took place.

In fact, not only in the disputed areas, or places under occupation after the war, but also in other parts of present-day Turkey, rape has been an everyday experience or a ubiquitous threat for many women. Mehmet Yavaş, a Gallipoli veteran said that when he came back from the war, he discovered that his wife had been kidnapped and he never saw her again (in Önder 1981, p.57). In the Ottoman Army there was an extremely high rate of desertion. It was very common for these

deserters to form armed gangs and take refuge in the mountains or other hideouts. They lived by carrying out raids and extortion and represented a danger particularly for women. Even after the war, some of them were not able to resume normal lives and some gangs survived for a surprisingly long time. Rape by these gangs—let alone by the enemy—must have been so widespread that ‘being taken to the mountain’ became a synonym for ‘being raped’ in the Turkish language. Urban women also suffered sexual exploitation. The number of prostitutes increased dramatically and segregated Muslim prostitution quarters were authorised for the first time during the war. Some 746 women in Istanbul only were reported to have gone back to regular activity after the war ([Yalman] 1930, p.244).

In India as well, considering that the men who enlisted in the Army were mostly from rural and modest backgrounds, their absence or loss must have had a considerable impact on their wives. Many of the soldiers were married and with children when they were sent overseas. Although there were strong incentives for them to enlist (see Chapter 4), it is probably that some women thought that the promise of a regular income was not worthwhile considering the risks. A Punjabi folksong recorded the pessimistic tone that was possibly common among the soldiers’ wives: “Write my name among the widows” (in Stanley 2015, p.291). In Amritsar district, a recruiting officer noted that women would trail recruiting parties for several miles, looking for opportunities to lure the men back (Tan 2005, p.108, 108³³). Another Punjabi folksong gives an insight into the emotional experience of these women:

My husband, and his two brothers
All have gone to laam [l’arme]
Hearing the news of the war
Leaves of trees got burnt.
[...]
Without you I feel lonely here.
Come and take me away to Basra.
I will spin the wheel all night.
[...]
War destroys towns and ports, it destroys huts

I shed tears, come and speak to me
All birds, all smiles have vanished
And the boats sunk
Graves devour our flesh and blood.
[...]
Trees by the roadside
Wicked Germany, stop the war
There are widows in every household.
[...]
Germany is on the offensive
The English wouldn't be able to do anything
May God forgive me.
[...]
Mothers' sons have gone to the laam in the foreign lands
May Allah end the laam, my children
May the Five Souls of the Prophet's family guard you
May Allah bring you back home safe. (in Das 2011(c), p.10; in Chandan
2005, para.II)

Apart from the emotional aspect of separation and loss in this lamentation, the material consequences of widowhood can be traced in a letter that was sent to the authorities by a Punjabi widow whose husband had enlisted in the Australian Imperial Forces. Completely dispossessed and abandoned by her in-laws after the death of her husband, she was making a case for her rights to a pension and her late husband's heritage (NAA B2455, Sarn Sigh's records, see Chapter 10).

The war's impact on women depended as much on their social background as their gender. While an urban elite seized the war as an opportunity to become active in public, professional and political life through charities, nursing and political activism, poorer urban women who already worked outside the home before the breakout of the war had increasing difficulty looking after their families. Although the absence of men provided them with some opportunities, the war

economy destroyed almost all hope of earning a decent living. Women in rural areas and disputed areas of the Ottoman territory were also more vulnerable to rape and killings. The type of activities they were involved in remained the same but their workload was greater due to the absence of men. Some of them spontaneously fought against the enemy or contributed to the war effort in whatever ways they could. But, as discussed above, their image as warriors was out of proportion and was created to fulfill different agendas. Although gender roles were challenged to a certain extent, the evolution of women's condition was fundamentally in line with the pre-war Young Turk policies. The war perhaps gave added impetus to the process of modernisation for women both in the Ottoman Empire and in India, a process which concerned and was led mainly by an urban population. The war also challenged the conceptualisation of modernity. In Turkey, while the intended outward image remained Western, an idealised image of rural Anatolian women was posed as the spiritual model for all modern Turkish women. Turkish nurses' story was written out of history in the process, because it did not fit the narrative that the liberation of women was achieved under Ataturk's reforms in a complete rupture from Ottoman social policy.

PART III – REMEMBERING

Chapter 8 - Writing Gallipoli

The First World War, described as the “great imaginative event” in European cultural history by Samuel Hynes, has been a common theme in European literature since the outbreak of the war (Strohmeier 2006, p.297). In India and in Turkey on the other hand, the impact of the war on art and literary production was quite limited. In India, although a small number of diaries and memoirs were published privately, and two novels about Indian soldiers’ experience were written, these did not have any major impact on the ways in which the First World War has been remembered in India. While these two novels, namely, Mulk Raj Anand’s *Across the Black Waters* (2008, first published in 1939) and Talbot Mundy’s *Hira Singh* (1918) as well as Chandradhar Sharma ‘Guleri’s short story “She Said It” (2014, first published in 1915) are mentioned elsewhere, because of their minimal influence in shaping the cultural memory of the war in India, they are not discussed in this chapter. Fiction, non-fiction and poetry written in Turkish in or about the period on the other hand, played a major role in constructing cultural memories of the war. In Turkish literature of the early republican era, the First World War was not a stand-alone theme. However, Gallipoli, or Çanakkale as the Turks refer to the campaign, more than any other episode of the war was treated in conjunction with the War of Independence (1919-1922) that followed the First World War. In the last few decades Gallipoli featured in an ever-increasing number of fiction and non-fiction work largely surpassing interest in the War of Independence, which had previously been the main focus of war literature.

Before this recent development, it was necessary to look back to publications during wartime or its immediate aftermath to find examples of work

dedicated exclusively to the campaign. These earlier works, now serve not only as a source of inspiration or influence for fictional work, but they are also sometimes used as references in non-fiction. In particular soldiers' letters that were published in magazines and newspapers during the war, are now being republished in books and magazines, and are reproduced on countless websites without reference to the original publication. Although some of these letters were probably fictitious propaganda pieces, they are now presented as documentary evidence of historical facts. Thus, whether the public is aware of these earlier works or not and no matter how problematic their current use is, they still largely shape the historical memory of Gallipoli in Turkey today. The writing and re-writing of Gallipoli is traced in this chapter as it reveals much about the changing place that has been given to that event in different nationalist narratives of Turkey's foundation and the persistent versions of Turkish national identity. The discussion focuses on the enduring influence of a rather small sample of memoirs, pieces of fiction and poetry as well as two main wartime magazines: *Harp Mecmuası* [War Magazine]¹⁴ and the special Gallipoli edition of *Yeni Mecmua* [New Magazine]¹⁵, which was prepared for the occasion of the third anniversary of the naval victory of Gallipoli on 18 March 1918, but was issued somewhat later, probably in May 1918 (Albayrak 2006, p.9). These are chosen either for their prominence, representativeness or on the contrary, their originality.

Wartime literature

The victory of the naval battle of Gallipoli on 18 March 1915 was the first victory that broke the long chain of defeats in the late Ottoman period. Ömer Seyfettin, a Balkan War veteran and a Turkish nationalist writer, in his short story "After Gallipoli" ["Çanakkale'den Sonra"], metonymically describes the morale boost that Gallipoli gave to the nation through the main character's coming back to life after a long depression (2005, pp.159-66, originally published in 1917). The

¹⁴ In this research I used the re-edited version, see Seven et al. (eds) 2014. The magazine was originally published from December 1915 to June 1918.

¹⁵ I used the re-edited version of the special edition, see Albayrak and Özyurt (eds.) 2006.

victory in Gallipoli after the Balkan defeat also gave rise to a revanchist triumphalism. Although the Balkan Wars were not lost to the same forces, the victory against the Allied forces restored the pride of the Ottoman army for a short time. Moreover, particularly Britain and Russia were considered to be complicit in the previous defeats. In the opening comments of the first issue of *Harp Mecmuası*, Aġaoġlu Ahmet says, “[after the Balkan Wars] when we were reading the joyful descriptions of our expulsion from Europe in foreign newspapers, our head in our hands, a secret wound would bleed in our hearts. [...] Now we hold our head up” (2014, p.6). To cite another example among many others, Raif Necdet used the metaphor of “stain” repeatedly to describe the feeling of shame and humiliation that was brought about by the Balkan Wars. Gallipoli on the other hand, was the victory that wiped out all the stain (2006, p.102-4).

The victory provided valuable material for official propaganda. Enver, the War Minister and the acting commander-in-chief (the official commander-in-chief was the Sultan, but only in name), assigned a group of officers to write an official history of the campaign in 1915 but only a draft volume about the naval battle was published for internal use in 1916 but the work ceased in 1916, in all likelihood because of the aggravation of the war situation (Uyar 2014, p.1). In the meantime, General Headquarters organised a trip to the Gallipoli battlefields in July 1915 for a group of intellectuals who responded to Enver’s invitation. The group of 17, mostly consisting of prominent writers but also including two famous painters and a musician, was encouraged to produce pieces of art that would make truthful depictions of the essence of the soldier and the capabilities of the people. It was explicitly demanded that praise to public figures be avoided (Koroġlu 2004, p.198-9).

This effort, however, did not yield the results that the War Office had expected. Lacking an incentive to publish, the writers produced a negligible amount of poetry, short stories and articles (p.200). Therefore, a campaign was launched to encourage more publications although it was extremely inefficient. The authors were commissioned to write books and upon completion of their work, they were rewarded with large sums of cash. However, there were not enough buyers in the market so the War Office purchased the entire lot to be

distributed to the army (p.210). Yusuf Ziya [Ortaç] referred to this system in his memoirs many years later, identifying himself as a war profiteer for having earned enough money to buy a four-bedroom house in those years, upon delivery of a book of poetry that he hated writing (Strohmeier 2006, p.303).

Harp Mecmuası, a fortnightly magazine of official propaganda started only in December 1915. The total of 27 issues brought together a large number of mostly photographs, but also included several articles and poems written by prominent authors of the time, whether they were close to the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) circles or not. The magazine mainly treated the heroism and achievements of soldiers and officers. It is difficult to assess the impact of the magazine during the war but there is no doubt that some of the lines that were published in the magazine have become monuments to Gallipoli in themselves.

Among the most cited verses: “With the Turks blood was kneaded this clay, My mother bore me for this day” which were reported to be the lyrics of a song that was composed by six reserve officers on the night before they died (Süleyman Nazif 2014, p.35). This idea was later taken up in one of Mehmet Emin [Yurdakul]’s poems where a mother calls upon her son, “Go my child, I have given birth to you for today” (in Strohmeier 2006, p.305). In the early 1980s, Mustafa Aksoy, a Gallipoli veteran, also said that before an offensive, the captain of his unit told them “your mothers bore you for this day” (in Önder 1981, p.77). In an interview in 1918, Corporal Mustafa from a different unit reported that his captain also used the same words to encourage them before the attack (in Ruşen Eşref 2006, p.329). It is not clear whether these verses were from a popular song in the trenches that has since been forgotten, or whether they were in fact Süleyman Nazif’s creation, presented as an authentic war song. Either way, they certainly resonated with a particular idea of Gallipoli and blood sacrifice at the time as they still do today judging by the number of times they are quoted in Turkish websites dedicated to Gallipoli.

Another well known example of this blood and soil pathos is certainly an extract from Mehmet Akif [Ersoy]’s 1924 poem, *Asım*, which was written in a much more pompous style.

If I could set up the Ka'ba at the head of your pit
And carve on it the inspiration that stirs my spirit;
If I could seize the firmament with all the stars within,
And then lay it as a pall over your still bleeding coffin;
If I could hitch spring clouds as ceiling for your open tomb,
Hang the Pleiades' seven lamps in your mausoleum,
As you lie drenched in your own blood under the chandelier;
If I could drag the moonlight out of night into your bier
To stand by you as custodian until Doomsday;
If I could fill your chandelier with dawn's eternal ray,
And wrap your wound at dusk with the sunset's silken glory
I still cannot say I have done something for your memory. (Translated by
Talat Sait Halman in Strohmeier 2006, p.301)

Mehmet Akif was a prominent pan-Islamist and a well-known poet during the war. He was an active member of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (the Intelligence Service of the CUP) and he was sent to Berlin and Arabia on missions accompanied by the notorious secret agents Eşref Kuşçubaşı and Sheik Salih al-Tunisi (Köroğlu 2004, pp.310, 314). He certainly remains a much-acclaimed poet by the Islamists in Turkey because of his emphasis on religion as a structural element of Turkish identity. He was also the author of the national anthem, "The March of Independence," which is regarded by the secularist faction as one of the sacred symbols of the Turkish Republic, along with the flag and Atatürk. Therefore, he is immune from overt secularist attacks despite his Islamic persuasion. Some of the lines above are inscribed on an evocatively book-shaped stone near the Monument to the Martyrs in Seddülbahir in Gallipoli, not only celebrating the ideology of martyrdom but also pointing at the continuity between the renowned poet and the rampant Islamist tendencies of the current parliamentary majority.

The interpretation of war in religious terms was very common in the writings of the war period. The archenemies that emerge from the essays in *Harp Mecmuası* and *Yeni Mecmua* are mainly Britain and Russia and Britain particularly was represented as the enemy of Islam. In one article, the defeat of the British Empire is celebrated as the salvation of the Muslim world:

It had become a sacred duty for us to confront the Entente powers who have been keeping ninety-eight per cent of the Islamic world under oppression and control, have caused the decline of all Muslim governments and mean to destroy the last two Muslim states. [...] Henceforth, a greater and longer era is opening up not only for Turkey but also for the entire Muslim world. The name of the Turk restored the prestige of Islam. (Ağaoğlu Ahmet 2014, p.9)

Although the politics of the war was not explained exclusively in Islamic terms, according to several pieces of writing, Islam was under attack and the soldiers were defending the capital of Islam under the banner of the Caliph, with the outcome being beneficial to all colonised Muslim people.

In fiction, the victory was often attributed to some sort of divine intervention. In another short story by Ömer Seyfettin, which took place in Gallipoli, entitled “Good News,” a mysterious object is seen falling from the sky, radiating colourful lights and leaving behind a mass of smoke, which takes the shape of a transparent ribbon. The soldiers who are present clearly identify the shape of the ribbon as a verse from the Koran “fethûn karîb”¹⁶ [conquest/victory is near] written in an intricate Arabic script in the sky (2005, pp.154-8). Another example of a miracle in fiction was “Işıldak’s Dream”¹⁷ from Halide Edip [Adıvar]. The moment officer Işıldak is shot, he hears the voice of Süleyman Pasha who is a recurrent figure in literature pertaining to Gallipoli, since he was the first Turkish commander (and heir to the throne) to have crossed the Dardanelles and conquered European territory in the 14th century. The sepulchre of Süleyman Pasha was in Gallipoli and was visited by many of the officers and visitors. The voice of Süleyman Pasha enquires if the enemy is walking over his sepulchre. In his dream, Işıldak begs God for an audience with Süleyman Pasha and he reassures

¹⁶ The verse goes as: “And there is one more thing that you will like, the help from God and a conquest soon. Tell the good news to the believers.” Hence the title of the short story.

¹⁷ Işıldak is a very unusual name for a person, male or female. It means “gleamy, twinkling or searchlight” and its use seems to be metaphorical. It is also important to note that this short story was published in December 1914, before the Allied attack on the Dardanelles. It was in a way, Halide Edip’s wishful thinking.

him that the Turks did not let the enemy walk over his grave. Süleyman Pasha strokes Işıldak's wound with his holy hands and the next day Işıldak returns to his duty and explains that the touch of Süleyman Pasha healed his wound (Enginün 1987, pp.124-5). These stories are fictional precursors of miracles that are told today as true stories, comprising the mystic version of Gallipoli, which is discredited and even ridiculed in the secularist media, but persists on various websites and some battlefield tours.

During the war, spirituality was also considered as a rational explanation of the outcome of the battle. The binary division between the East, the spiritual, and the West, the technical, also informed the analysis of the victory. Mehmet Zekeriyya, in his article entitled "The Psychology of the Battle of Gallipoli," argues that in modern warfare courage and heroism became secondary to technical means and fortifications totally lost their relevance (2006, p.289). However, he explains, although the Turkish army was technically inferior, they won the battle because of their spiritual superiority. According to Mehmet Zekeriyya, the biggest weakness of the British and the French forces was the presence of the 'primitive African people' among their troops. He was probably unaware of the fact that there was a large number of Senegalese Muslims among those 'primitive people.' He compares the armies of the French and the British to the passengers of a boat who came together circumstantially and could not be expected to have a unity of purpose. He says that:

The Turkish army, on the other hand, [...] was harmonious and was composed of people who were tied together through national and religious feelings. [...] One of the factors that created the spirituality of the Turkish army was religion. Religion is the most important element that gives higher ideals to the people. No matter what we say, Turks are religious and a little mystical. [...] Gallipoli proved that spirituality is still effective in modern warfare. In the meantime, this war showed us that the Turk possessed ideals. (pp.292-3)

Although the definition of spiritual is not entirely clear here, we understand that a national feeling of Turkishness and religion are the main components of this spirituality. Although this statement about the ethnic and religious unity of the

Ottoman army is highly questionable, it clearly shows the imbrication of Turkish ethnicity and Sunni Islam in national identity as defined by the nationalists of the time.

The nationalist ideology that is outlined above is usually referred to as Turkism [Türkçülük]. It had been posed as a powerful alternative to Ottomanism before the war by drawing the focus of collective identity away from a multiethnic civil union to a culturally and ethnically exclusive Turkishness which was believed to be deeply rooted in the pre-Ottoman history and shared with Turkic peoples of Central Asia. The Turkish Hearth [Türk Ocağı] which was founded in 1912 by the main ideologues of Turkism, namely Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and Mehmet Emin [Yurdakul], Ağaoğlu Ahmet and Ahmet Ferit among others, became particularly active after the Balkan Wars. It gathered a considerable amount of support particularly among Turkish students (membership to the organisation was reserved to the Turks) with 1,600 of its 1,800 members in Istanbul being students in 1914. The Turkish Hearth worked as a pressure group on the government's educational and cultural policies and it even led a boycott on non-Muslim businesses with considerable success (Landau 2004, p.34). Many of the reserve officers who interrupted their studies to join the war were largely influenced by the idea of Turkism and by extension, pan-Turkism that sought to reunite the Turks across Asia.

Faik Tonguç, one of the reserve officers whose memoirs were published recently, wrote that in his student years, he was a member of the Society of the Turkish Hearth, which he described as a student association. He remembered meeting the leaders of the movement in weekly seminars that were organised to enlighten the youth. Tonguç also referred to the student associations founded by Albanians, Kurds and Arabs respectively prior to the Turkish Hearth. The constant tensions with those groups sometimes resulted in fights even inside the classrooms (1999, p.18-9). When he joined the army Tonguç was burning with desire to fight the Russians and reach Turan.¹⁸ Although he may have thought he

¹⁸ Turan is an Asian region but usually used in reference to the 'Turanian race,' or Uralo-Altaic people comprised of, not only Turks and other Turkic peoples but also Hungarians, Fins, and even Koreans and the Japanese according to some racist ideologies

was ready to fight for those higher ideals, Tonguç seemed completely unprepared for his encounter with Asia Minor. He was greatly disillusioned by the Caucasian campaign that ended in the tragedy of Sarıkamış where tens of thousands of troops died of exposure, an indication of their blatant inability to reach Turan. But more importantly, the poverty and general decay that he observed in Anatolia seemed to be a total shock. Further into his narration, he no longer seemed to be so preoccupied with Turan.

Even if pan-Turanism was still topical for Ziya Gökalp at the end of the war as illustrated in his poem “Çanakkale,” the experience of war and the encounter with Anatolian people alienated many intellectuals of Istanbul from the idea. Ziya Gökalp’s poem reads:

Turan is not a dream anymore,
It is fulfilled today...
Turks will know only one language,
It is a celebration day

Çanakkale, to four states,
You brought victory
To a hundred nations slave to the Tsar
You brought independence

Thanks to you who knows
How many nations will be liberated
Neither in Africa nor in Asia
Will there be any colony left. (2006, p. 94)

However, Halide Edip for instance, had distanced herself from pan-Turanism in her article “Let us mind our own house: Field of activity of Turkism” (Köroğlu 2004, p.237). It seemed to be a swift turnabout following her 1910 novel *The New Turan* which had been inspirational for many a pan-Turanist. Halide Edip argued in a caustic style that the Turks of Asia were clear-sighted enough not to give any

similar to Aryanism. Many of the Turkish nationalists were also influenced by pan-Turanism.

credibility to the “little set of talkative theoreticians” when they saw the sad reality that was called Turkey behind them (in Köroğlu 2004, p.238). Paradoxically, Ziya Gökalp was one of the few who somewhat agreed with Halide Edip on this point when the bulk of the leaders of the Turkish Hearth virulently opposed her (pp.244-7). Ziya Gökalp agreed that priority should be given to the homeland but added that it was important to establish friendly Turkish neighbours around that homeland, thus finding a justification for pan-Turanism in terms of realpolitik (p.246).

In Kemalist Turkey, Halide Edip’s focus on the Anatolian heartland, now defined by its new frontiers, prevailed. Pan-Turanism was perceived as a liability that could affect relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was not a viable political project for the Turkic peoples living under Soviet rule either. The death of Enver Pasha in 1922 while fighting against the Russians alongside the Turkic peoples of the Central Asia closely linked pan-Turanism to the Committee of Union and Progress leadership and added to its dismissal. Therefore in 1923, Ziya Gökalp wrote his major work, *Principles of Turkism*, aligning his ideas with that of the official nationalism. In this work, he defined three phases of Turkism where the first phase was Turkey-ism, which was the present phase, and two subsequent pan-phases, pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism, were projected into an undetermined and distant future (Landau 2004, pp.36-7). The ideology of Ziya Gökalp has not disappeared and the Nationalist Movement Party with its iconography of ancient Turkish mythology, its pan-Turkist aspirations and its youth organisation Hearth of Ideal, modelled after the Turkish Hearth, are largely indebted to him and other ideologues of pan-Turanism. Since almost all major political parties in Turkey currently share the aggressively nationalist ethos of the Nationalist Movement Party, the main distinction of this party seems to be, other than its particular iconography, its emphasis on ethnicity and religion as inseparable parts of Turkish identity.

Revisiting Gallipoli in the age of the Republic

Republican period writers focused on Anatolian Turks, acquiescing to the official line of nationalism that broke both with the Ottoman past and the pan-Turanic future. They typically celebrated the new regime for having significantly improved the lives of peasants, while lamenting the deplorable condition of the same under Ottoman rule. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1959), before starting his account of the Anatolian soldiers during the war, reassures the reader that “these observations and analysis are of course, solely related to the late Ottoman period, that is to say imperial Turkey. These observations naturally have nothing in common, no similarities what so ever with our present Republican generation and our Turkish Republic” (pp.109-10). Şevket Süreyya Aydemir treated the war as a social experiment where the Istanbul elite encountered the Anatolian Turks for the first time and was utterly shocked at the discrepancy between the Turkey of their imagination and the reality. Aydemir who joined the army as a reserve officer thought that Turkish peasants were religious but he was soon to realise that none of the soldiers under his command had any basic notion of religion. When he asked them their nationality they were confused too. He decided to hand them the answer: “Aren’t we Turks?”

This was the Turkish army and we were fighting for Turkey. After an adventure that lasted for centuries [i.e. the Ottoman Empire], only this Turkishness could be our last harbour. And yet, when I asked “Aren’t we Turks?” they answered “God forbid!” as they thought that it meant *kızılbaş*.¹⁹ They did not know what *kızılbaş* was but apparently they assumed that it was a bad thing. (p.113)

Aydemir said that he thought, “Perhaps we are fooling ourselves. Perhaps we would like [to] see Turan ahead of us while in fact we do not even have a united Turkey behind us ... And perhaps the first task before Turan is to build Turkey ...” (p.116). Aydemir claimed that the First World War was almost an auspicious event that occasioned the encounter of the Anatolian peasants and the educated young reserve officers. But the event that truly united the nation was the War of Independence where they actually fought side-by-side (p.110).

¹⁹ A local Shia sect consisting of ethnic Turks. They were severely persecuted on multiple occasions throughout Ottoman history.

Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu conveys a similar image of the Anatolian Turks in a much more pessimistic note in his 1932 novel *Yaban*. Contrary to Aydemir, Yakup Kadri does not describe the War of Independence as a unifying event. The main character, Ahmet Celal is the son of a pasha from Istanbul. After losing his arm in Çanakkale, he joins his orderly's village in order to get away from Istanbul under Allied occupation and to revitalise himself in the authentic Turkish countryside. The difference between Ahmet Celal and the villagers however, seems unbridgeable and the events of the War of Independence uncoil before the total indifference of the peasants who are only resentful about their men being forced into the army yet again. Ahmet Celal even speculates that the villagers must be thinking that he lost his mind for being so euphoric about the victories of the Turkish army. He sometimes hosts in his house Turkish army officers on passage and believes that these are not the same lot as in the First World War.

During the World War they all used to complain about one thing or another. They used to criticise government policies. They all used to look weary. Now they do not even argue. They say, "we are going to win, by all means." However, it is unbelievable that I am living among those who do not want the war ... Aren't these villages, these hotbeds of sickness, poverty and hopelessness, the only resource of this nation? (Karaosmanoğlu 1983, p.76)

Thus, having contrasted the resolve of the officers with the carelessness of the villagers, who are considered to represent the most authentic incarnation of Turkishness, the character plunges into depression. He tries to persuade himself of the resourcefulness of the peasants but his positive views about them fit into only a few paragraphs where he is describing their work in preparation for winter and the sacrifices of the peasants who are transporting munitions to the front (pp.87-8, 97). In contrast, the feeling of alienation and the description of the ugliness and coarseness of the inhospitable landscape and people sprawl over the entire narrative. The villagers refer to any stranger as *yaban*, which the narrator defines as the Turkish equivalent of the word *barbarian* in ancient Greek (p.35). It refers to a stranger and has a connotation of 'wild' or 'uncivilised.' After more than two years of co-habitation, which ends in tragedy, the villagers are no less *yaban* to Ahmet Celal than he to them.

The same feeling emerges also from the memoirs of Faik Tonguç who expresses his surprise every time he arrives in a major Anatolian city that the town has nothing of the charm and prosperity that he had imagined or read about in books. For instance, when he arrives at Kayseri, he finds that the city looks like a medieval ruin and he claims that only the Christian neighbourhoods appear well maintained like in other cities he has seen (1999, p.23). That there was a stark contrast between the prosperity of the Christian population and the poverty of the Turks was a common assessment among the young Turkish nationalists. It was this feeling that had prompted the boycott of non-Muslim businesses in Istanbul in 1913. Osman Fahri, half brother of one of the most productive poets of war propaganda, Cenab Şehabettin, also wrote in a letter from a provincial town that the poverty of the Turks was stark. However, he mentioned: “the Greeks are working, the Greeks are earning, the Greeks have no worries, they are confident, they are happy... And in their eyes their dogs have more value than us.” Then, referring to the Greek owner of the only restaurant where he eats in town: “I am disgusted by the insulting indifference of Hiristo. This is as indigestible as his food. Now I am looking for a house in the Muslim area. Having homemade food is both economical and free from hatred” (in Kerman 1988, p.11).

Although the English and Russians were designated as the arch-enemies in most published material of the time, hatred was much more deeply rooted against the non-Muslim and non-Turkish population. Ömer Seyfettin, in his short story, “A Kid Named Aleko,” tells the story of the betrayal of a Greek priest in Gallipoli who mistakes a Turkish boy for a Greek and sends him as a go-between to the British trenches. However, Ali takes a detour and transmits the message to the Turkish commanders instead and then joins the British. He is given a bomb to blow up the Turkish headquarters but he decides to use the bomb against the British, exploding the quarters of the British commander at the cost of his own life (2005, pp.129-53). The story juxtaposes the incorruptible patriotism and sense of self-sacrifice of Turkish people that can be seen even in a child, with the backstabbing of the Greeks who readily collaborate with the enemy. This story was written before the Greek invasion that followed the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which implicitly gave carte blanche to the Greek army to invade parts of current Turkey. The violence of

the Greek occupation forces against the Turkish civilian population exacerbated the hatred against the Greeks to a point that even revenge against Greeks, satisfied during the War of Independence was not enough and a compulsory population exchange agreement was sealed in Lausanne Treaty (1923) between the two governments. The subsequent dislocation and dispossession of hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Anatolia, and Muslims from Greece left painful scars in the memories of both populations. Greek author Dido Sotiriou's *Farewell Anatolia* (1991)²⁰ is still widely read in Turkey after becoming a bestseller in the 1980s. Yaşar Kemal's four-volume novel *An Island Story* [*Bir Ada Hikayesi*] (1998, 2002, 2002, 2012) recounts the story from a Turkish point of view. In the trilogy, the Turkish migrants from Greece and various other places settle on an island in the Marmara Sea, whose Greek population had been totally evacuated. Haunted by the memories of its original owners, the island seems to reject its new inhabitants, who are each trying to learn how to live with their demons and as a community. Both Yaşar Kemal's volumes and Dido Sotiriou's novel challenge Turkish and Greek nationalist narratives and both authors are criticised, or even condemned in the nationalist circles of their respective countries.

After the defeat in the First World War and the Allied and Greek occupation that followed the war, the victory of Gallipoli was put in perspective. The War of Independence emerged as the ultimate struggle of the Turkish people and Gallipoli was often represented as a prelude to that mobilisation. Even Fazıl Hüsni Dağlarca who dedicated an entire book of poetry to Gallipoli in 1965, *Epopee of Çanakkale*, wrote "Çanakkale, the preamble of New Turkey." Halide Edip's *Ateşten Gömlek* [*The Shirt of Flame*] (2007, first published in 1923) and Yakup Kadri's *Yaban* (1983, first published in 1932) are a few well-known examples of those post-war novels in which Gallipoli appears as a backstory for the main characters while the actual story takes place during the War of Independence. Particularly after *Nutuk*, [*The Speech*] of Mustafa Kemal, delivered to parliament over several days in 1927, the official account set the War of Independence as the beginning of Turkish history, led by the Messianic figure Mustafa Kemal himself, and rejecting the Ottoman

²⁰ First published in Greek, in 1962; then in Turkish in 1982, *Benden Selam Söyle Anadolu'ya*; and finally in English in 1991.

heritage altogether. The First World War was the immediate pre-history of the Republic and only Gallipoli was given special meaning mostly because of Mustafa Kemal's own achievement in the campaign.

Yakup Kadri's and Şevket Süreyya's depiction of the peasants prior to the foundation of the Republic, as an ignorant horde, far from constituting a nation, is consistent with this narrative. The purpose is to explain the particularly unfavourable circumstances in which Mustafa Kemal, the *One Man* [*Tek Adam*] as the biography of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir qualified him, succeeded in building the nation. In *Yaban*, the main character says:

If we manage to win the war, all that we are going to liberate is this desolate land and these high hills. Where is the nation? There is not any yet and it will have to be built out of these Sergeant Bekirs, these chieftain Salihs [...]. Who could I support but Kemal Pasha? Because, He is the leader of those who will sacrifice themselves to achieve this mammoth task. (1983, p.153)

Every time there is a reference to Kemal Pasha, the capital H, for he, implies the deification of the figure. In one instance, this deification is more than implied. "I am drawn to the front like a Kaaba to circumambulate His tent" (p.141). The peasants are represented both as the custodians of the national essence and an obstacle in the way of the nation's coming to life. The intellectual characters are waiting for a Messiah to lead them to their destiny while the peasants themselves are devoid of agency in the national story. Both Yakup Kadri and Şevket Süreyya invite the Istanbul elite to take responsibility for the past failure in providing basic education and other services to the Turkish peasants, both of them confident that the paternalistic hand of the new state had reached these people by the time they were writing in the 1930s and 1950s (Aydemir 1959, pp.116-7; Karaosmanoğlu 1983, p.181).

From this perspective, the First World War was retrospectively assessed as the time when the Ottoman Empire and its people hit rock bottom economically, socially and morally. Kemal Tahir's depiction of Istanbul of 1918 in *The Weary Warrior* [*Yorgun Savaşçı*] (2005, first published in 1965) rather subtly concurs with that assessment (see Neumann 2006 for more examples). The story takes

place between the end of the First World War and the beginning of the War of Independence and is narrated from the point of view of an army captain Cemil who returns to Istanbul after the war. Many issues are discussed in the narrative through Cemil's thoughts and a reasonably theoretical conversation with his acquaintances about political economy. However, the main problem seems to be a moral one that is epitomised by the corruption of bureaucratic and religious institutions. An encounter with a local imam who is obviously introducing war widows and even prepubescent war orphans to prostitution for his personal gain is one of the moments where Cemil finds his apathy no longer bearable. He joins the rebel forces of Mustafa Kemal where he is indifferent to the prospect of death, not out of heroism or self-sacrifice but out of weariness. This also reinforces the idea that the Turkish people were left with almost nothing to fight for and it was a miracle that they somehow found the force to pull themselves together to build the country out of nothing.

Contesting Atatürk's place in Gallipoli

Mustafa Kemal in the official narrative appeared to be the omniscient leader and the only person who was appropriate to lead the nation to its destiny. Allegiance to this leader who officially adopted the name Atatürk, father of Turks, became the idea of a shared history itself in Turkish national identity. The dissolution of the connection with the Ottoman past also contributed to the dissolution of family histories. Particularly after the adoption of Latin script in 1926, the 'old script' became akin to something of a religious nature in the collective consciousness and the high rates of illiteracy among the Turkish population during the Ottoman period was assigned to the supposed difficulty of that script. The language also went through a process of being purged of Arabic and Persian words, making the Ottoman administrative and literary language incomprehensible to the new generations. Privately kept documents such as letters and diaries were discarded, as their custodians were not able to understand their content (see Danişman 2003, p.vii). One of the openly claimed objectives of the

recent republication of texts from the period is to build those lost links with the nation's past, with explicit or implicit present preoccupations.

Recent literature often combines oral history with wartime literature particularly focusing on the common soldiers' spirit. In contrast to the republican period, wartime writers had put a lot of emphasis on the spirituality of the soldiers. In particular, soldiers' letters that were published in newspapers and magazines, whether authentic or fictitious, have been unearthed in the past few decades. Common features among the soldiers that emerge from these letters and oral histories are patriotism, bravery and faith, in agreement with the wartime propaganda but in contrast to Republican literature. The assessment of the soldiers as non-religious men in the post-war writings seems to be due to the lack of scriptural knowledge of religion among the Sunni Muslims and the large numbers of non-Sunni Muslims among the ranks. While Sunnis were considered to be ignorant, the Shia Muslims' faith was denigrated. For instance, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir says that those few soldiers who prayed (which indicates Sunni confession) were not able to recite the suras. It is implied that they were ignorant, whereas Alevi, Yezidi and Kızılbaş confessions are qualified as "detritus of beliefs that incite their followers to live in a confused faith mud" (1959, p.115).

Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, an Islamic scholar who volunteered to go to Gallipoli, although he was doubly exempted because of his age and profession, agreed with that assessment (in Koçkuzu 2011, pp.156-61). He reproached the soldiers with not only a lack of faith and worship but also with immoral conduct, involving bad language, drinking, theft and even rape (p.158). Abdullah Fevzi extends his indignation about the lack of faith to officers as well (pp.161-8). The memoirs of Abdullah Fevzi are unique in the sense that they are the only published account of a religious man that has obviously been edited in order to challenge the official narrative of Turkish history; but in doing so, it also conflicts with the mainstream Islamic version of Gallipoli. The memoirs are edited in two volumes, the first volume, *An Islamic Scholar in Gallipoli Campaign*, retraces Abdullah Fevzi's experience of the First World War. The second volume relates how he ended up being accused of treason because of his allegiance to the Ottoman authority and his denial of the legitimacy of the Ankara-based Turkish resistance and how he was

tracked by head-hunters operating a purge in the service of the nationalists during the War of Independence.

Religious leaders invariably appear as enemies of the Ankara Government in the Republican literature. Faik Tonguç also juxtaposes himself as a figure of a secular and unreligious officer with the fanatical Islamic scholar of his unit. He seems amused about the outrage that he causes by his deliberate irreverence to religion amounting to blasphemy in the eyes of the religious man (1999, pp.82-106). Abdullah Fevzi's memoirs validate the stereotypical representation of the religious authorities as a reactionary force, though pacified by the new regime. However, these memoirs are unique because they give a voice to those silenced religious scholars who read the narrative of the foundation of the republic as one of oppression and injustice.

Since the AKP (Justice and Development Party), dreaded by the secularists because of its Islamic outlook, obtained a parliamentary majority for the first time in 2002, criticism directed at Atatürk and the official narrative that emanates from *Nutuk* [*The Speech*] has ceased to be a taboo. Since secularism is equated with the person of Atatürk who supposedly introduced the principle to Turkey, this liberation of discordant voices has alarmed Kemalists about the future of secularism in Turkey. Battlefield tours and the commemoration of Gallipoli at schools were encouraged nationwide by the government while secularist media raised concerns about the Islamic take on Gallipoli which aimed to eclipse Atatürk in the history of the campaign. A multitude of hitherto unknown soldier-heroes were rediscovered in this context often referring back to older sources that emphasised their religious faith.

This contention was obvious in a seminar entitled "Gallipoli: Turkish Perspectives," organised on 24 April 2014 in Sydney by the Bayram Cultural Association, a Turkish association with Gülenist²¹ affiliations. The seminar attended by state dignitaries, diplomats and other officials and a large number of

²¹ Refers to the followers of Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish Islamic scholar, the leader of the grassroots "Hizmet" [Service] movement. Fethullah Gülen is a controversial figure in Turkey and politically stands in a no-man's land since the movement fell out with the AKP leaders in 2014.

guests started with a speech by Mehmet Saral from the association. Mehmet Saral shared a few 'original' Turkish soldiers' letters with the audience emphasising their willingness to die to become martyrs. One of the letters was originally published in the special Gallipoli edition of *Yeni Mecmua*. The letter was in fact part of the short story, "A Drop of Blood and a Drop of Tear," claimed to be authentic by its female author Emine Semih. As the story goes, Sefika and Semih, two young graduates of the Fine Arts Academy were engaged before Semih was conscripted as a reserve officer to be sent to Gallipoli. He dies shortly after sending a letter to his fiancée advising her to marry a ghazi if he dies. She indeed accepts the proposal of a limbless ghazi that she meets while working as a nurse in a hospital in Istanbul (2006, p.232-7). Incidentally, this story also featured in a television series about Gallipoli, *Kıvalı Kuzular* (2006), produced by the national broadcasting company TRT. Mehmet Saral finished his talk with a citation from Fethullah Gülen, "It is not the time of the sword, it is the time of the pen,"²² providing a tacit reminder of the war of pens that has been ongoing in Turkey over the remembrance of Gallipoli.

The second of the three papers of the seminar was presented by academic historian Harvey Broadbent, who focused on the Turkish side of the war from a military perspective. When Harvey Broadbent referred to mistakes that were possibly committed by Mustafa Kemal the disquiet in the room became tangible. Finally, when the historian stated the fact that "Mustafa Kemal did not win the war all by himself," it was the straw that broke the camel's back. A number of people from the audience interrupted the talk with protestations and a few people even yelled "He did!" Volkan Ermis who was present in this event and expressed his disagreement with Broadbent, told me that the only appropriate way of talking about Gallipoli was to start with honouring the Turkish leader. He qualified the covert implication that the outcome of the campaign would have been the same with or without Mustafa Kemal as untruthful and disturbing.

Thus, any narrative that does not refer to Atatürk directly looks suspicious from a point of view that has its origins in Atatürk's own narrative of the campaign

²² There are several versions of this citation such as 'The time of the jihad of the sword is over, now it is the time of the jihad of the word.' Gülen pronounced similar versions on several occasions, in different contexts.

in *The Speech*, while Islamist versions deliberately and equally uncompromisingly diminish Mustafa Kemal's role in the campaign. The one-man version has limited the imaginative potential of writers who welcome the creative possibilities of many different heroes, as do researchers and readers. However, the expectation that any story about Gallipoli should relate to Atatürk in a significant way introduces the question of how to tell other stories. A recent film, *Son Mektup [Last Letter]* (Eren, 2015), is a love story between one of the few Turkish pilots and one of the few Turkish nurses at Gallipoli during the naval battle. The only direct mention of Mustafa Kemal is inserted towards the end of the film in a very artificial way, because the reference is absolutely not essential to the story. It is merely a device to briefly inform the audience that the film does not intend to challenge Atatürk's place in history. On a cinematography website, a critique offers positive comments on the film but ends with a criticism: "On the other hand, the fact that Mustafa Kemal whom we know as the biggest military genius of the Gallipoli Campaign is barely mentioned, apart from in two scenes, can be seen as the only failing of this production" (Kocabaylıoğlu 2015, para.6). The 41 viewers' comments that follow invariably discuss this issue in preference to any other aspects of either the film or the critique. Some of them forgive the filmmaker, Özhan Eren, for not having given a more central role to Mustafa Kemal, some of them condemn him, while others although exasperated by the whole discussion nevertheless participate in it.

The same expectation about the Mustafa Kemal connection is also applied to individual memories. One of the very few published interviews with First World War veterans, which have been extensively quoted from in the previous chapters of this thesis, dates from 1981. As Atatürk's birth date is 1881, the book commemorates the 100th birthday of the leader with the title: *On the centenary of his birth, Atatürk's brothers in arms: Surviving Veterans of Gallipoli*. The work is very valuable as it gives insight into the relationship between individual reminiscences and the social framework in Maurice Halbwachs (1925) terms. While details in the accounts of the old veterans are unclear more than 60 years after the war, they remember anecdotes such as having once caught a glimpse of man which would have been rather anodyne if the man in question were not

Mustafa Kemal in person (see Önder 1981, pp.53, 58, 105, 123). The ex-soldiers who understood that this connection was perhaps the only reason why their stories were valued, tended to repeat them and remember them vividly while some deeply personal aspects of their experience were hardly mentioned and had been gradually forgotten.

During a research trip to Gallipoli, a very helpful local contact also informed me that in the village where Mustafa Kemal was stationed during the war, I could interview the descendants of those who saw him. The memories that had been passed down to them are still valued largely because of their proximity to the leader, no matter how unremarkable this encounter may have been. There are also similar anecdotes about Mustafa Kemal in a more recent work published by the Seddülbahir 1915 Private Museum that brings together the memories of Gallipoli survivors through interviews with their descendants (Uslu 2008, p.71, 95). However, this book was clearly dedicated to the soldiers themselves and there are only very brief references to Atatürk.

National, transnational and local versions of Gallipoli

There are huge numbers of websites and local or nationwide publications that are dedicated to the survivors of Gallipoli, generally referred to as the ghazis of Çanakkale. They mostly emphasise the sacrifices of the soldiers during the war and society's ungrateful forgetfulness of those sacrifices. Yetkin İşçen, an independent researcher starts the preamble in Ahmet Uslu's book with a tone of rebuke to the Turkish nation that appears to be enthusiastic about anything military but easily forgets about the ghazis (2008, p.v). He continues by defining the terms martyr and ghazi, explaining that fighting in defence of the motherland is as sacred as fighting in the service of God. After arguing that it is not an obligation to fight against non-Muslims to deserve these titles, İşçen reminds the readers: "Those terrorists and rebels that our soldiers are fighting in 'the low density war' [against the PKK] that has been going on in the southern frontiers of our country today are also of our own religion" (pp.v-vi). The Gallipoli diary of Major Halis Ataksor has also been edited by his grandson who dedicates the work "in the first

place to my grandfather Halis Bey, then all the martyrs of Gallipoli and all those martyrs who lost their lives while fighting against the separatist terrorist organization” (Ataksor 2008, p.8).

In the last few decades, many Turkish young men who were conscripted for compulsory military service died in operations against the Kurdish organisation, the PKK. This context has contributed to the longevity of the blood and soil pathos in Turkish nationalism, which in all its forms and currents is still very much focused on blood sacrifice to keep the national territory intact. The only appropriate way to refer to the dead is considered to be ‘martyr,’ because of the sanctity of the fight for national territory according to such an ideology. The increasing interest in the individual stories of the soldiers in such mythic wars as Gallipoli is at least partly related to this ongoing glorification of martyrdom in the service of the nation. Most of the fiction that treats Gallipoli is also written in the same edifying tone and has rather poor literary standards. Mehmed Niyazi’s novel, *Çanakkale Mahşeri* [*Doomsday in Gallipoli*] is certainly one of the biggest commercial successes, reprinted over 60 times since the first edition in 1998. Close to the ideology of Turkism, the author willingly combines religious and chauvinistic elements. The back cover promises that “[the heroes of the novel] are people of such a spiritual outlook that they are more legendary than the legends and more real than what is told in history books.” Mustafa Necati Sepetçioğlu’s trilogy *Ve Çanakkale* [*And Gallipoli*] (1989), comprising *Geldiler* [*They Came*], *Gördüler* [*They Saw*], *Döndüler* [*They Left*], written in a very similar style and from a very similar perspective, has also been very successful commercially. The titles of the volumes refer not only to the famous Roman dictum *veni, vidi, vici* but also to Mustafa Kemal’s much acclaimed prophecy about the Allied fleet across the coast of Gallipoli: “They will leave as they came.”

Most of the recent work about Gallipoli could be read as a pastiche of wartime writing. The literary style of Mehmet Akif in particular, although transposed in prose, comes across as a major influence. The popularity of this panegyric war literature suggests that the national feeling that was conveyed in the writings of the pre-republican period still resonates with Turkish readers today. In fact, a powerful anxiety over the integrity of the national territory and the

unity of the nation itself has been acute not only because of the conflict with the PKK but also because of what has been called by historians the Sèvres syndrome, consisting of the fear that there is an international conspiracy at work aiming to weaken or divide Turkey from within (see Akçam 2005; Guida 2008; Göçek 2011). There is a widespread suspicion that the western powers would be threatened by a strong Turkey and therefore they are constantly plotting to drag Turkey down and divide it internally. Although this feeling has its roots in the late Ottoman period, it was embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which sought to divide the current Turkish territory among the Greek, Armenians and themselves at the expense of the Turkish majority after the First World War. The treaty stands as symbol of Turkish struggle to become a nation-state against the will of all other parties involved. The Sèvres syndrome is the idea that this struggle is still pertinent today and other powers secretly conspire in a concerted way in order to dispossess Turkey economically and destabilise it politically. In addition, some treacherous Turks collaborate with these powers for their personal material gain.

In a climate where there are such intense fears about division, any dissension is susceptible to being interpreted as an attempt on the integrity of the nation. In an academic article, studying the misinterpretations and deliberate or unintentional alterations to an authentic letter from Gallipoli, the historian Mustafa Arıkan (2011) established that those sections of the letter, which have gone through deliberate omissions and deformations, are mainly religious or nationalist in nature. The author points out that the letter was written by a reserve officer who was involved in the movement of Turkism and who willingly blended Islam with the national feeling of Turkishness. Although the expression of such feelings were historically relevant when the officer was writing (pp.222-6), the author extends the relevance of those lines to the present and ends his article on a note of warning to those who do not tolerate the blend of Islam and Turkishness. "This is a misguided attitude that will inadvertently serve the purpose of dividing the country and the nation at a time when the identity of this nation and the Turkish affiliation of this land and even the name of the state being Turkey is questioned" (p.236).

This Turkism-inspired nationalism once again turns against ethnic minorities. The handful of Armenians who are left in Turkey have been targeted more and more frequently by nationalist groups. In the last decades, Armenian diasporas are campaigning more actively for the recognition of the Armenian genocide which is generally admitted to have started on 24 April 1915, only hours before the Anzac landing. During the first years of his prime ministership, Erdoğan initiated a policy of openness towards the Kurds and Armenians, which was harshly criticised by the nationalist circles as a sign of weakness and later by other intellectuals for lacking sincerity. Nevertheless, this policy was reflected in some of the new memorials such as the Kesikdere Cemetery built in 2006 at Gallipoli. It includes the names of some Armenian and other non-Muslim soldiers' names on a memorial plaque.

However, the presence of Armenians among the fighting troops is not so easily admitted. Recently published memoirs of Sarkis Torosyan (2012) entitled *Çanakkale'den Filistin Cephesine* [From Gallipoli to the Palestinian Front], traces Torosyan's war experience. He starts off as a brilliant medal-winning Ottoman officer fighting at Gallipoli, while his entire family is being dispersed throughout Cilicia. His account then explains how he turns against the Turks in revenge by joining successively the Arab revolt and the Armenian legion. The book was first published in 1947 in the United States where he immigrated after the war, and was reedited recently. Some historians discredited the memoirs as being erroneous, based on their examination of the supporting documents that seem to be forged. On the other hand, other historians argued that the issue of authenticity of the documents did not prove or disprove the authenticity of the account itself. The book was socially censored with most booksellers refusing to sell it although it is legal. On the other hand, the story has been adapted for the stage by playwright Aytekin Özen and was directed by Nar Taneleri Tiyatrosu.

There are also some recent publications that step beyond the binaries of Islam versus Kemalism and national unity versus separatism. Some of the most interesting narratives of Gallipoli appear in very little known local publications. For instance, Ahmet Kaşıkçı, a retired school teacher and an experienced Gallipoli tour guide, born and raised in Gallipoli published several books dedicated to

Gallipoli. In these books, the campaign always figures as one of the globally significant events that occurred in the region. Kaşıkçı has a holistic view of the history of Çanakkale from the Ancient Era to the present. He praises the uniqueness of the region not only from a historical point of view but also its nature and its culture. One of his books entitled *Çanakkale'ye Can Verenler* (2010), which can be translated either as *Those Who Gave Their Lives To Çanakkale* or alternatively as *Those Who Brought Çanakkale to Life* is an odd collection of short introductions of people who served Çanakkale in one way or another. The list includes names from Homer to our time; writers, navigators, politicians, scientists, businessmen and of course soldiers and commanders. This local perspective places the Gallipoli campaign in the chronology of the long history of the area without diminishing it. On the other hand, it constructs a very unproblematic continuity between the past and the present of the region.

Although aggressively chauvinistic pieces seem to have taken over the publishing and film-making industries, since the Australian and New Zealand commemorations on the peninsula on Anzac Day were invented as a new tradition, a transnational understanding has also gained momentum along with a more widespread ethnocentric one. In juvenile literature, Serpil Ural's (2004) novella *Candles at Dawn* published first in Turkish in 1997 is a clear example of literature that honours the Turkish-Australian friendship that came after the war rather than glorifying the war. Tolga Örnek's 2005 documentary *Gallipoli* narrates the story of the war from not only Turkish but also from British, Australian and New Zealand points of view through its selection of interviews with historians and soldiers' letters. Sinan Çetin's (2012) film, *Children of Gallipoli*, tells the unlikely story of two brothers born of a Turkish father and an Australian mother, fighting on opposite sides of the war. These stories tend to erase differences and fuse the experience of the soldiers on both sides in order to emphasise the human suffering in war.

One of the most interesting examples of those works that promote a transnational understanding of the war experience is the novel by Buket Uzuner (2002), *Uzun Beyaz Bulut, Gelibolu* [*Long White Cloud, Gallipoli*]. The main character in this novel, a New Zealand woman travelling to the peninsula alone in 2000, notices the picture of her great-grandfather on the wall of a local coffee

house. Her claim causes some distress among the local people, as the man is known as a Turkish veteran in the village. His daughter Beyaz who speaks perfect English with a heavy New Zealand accent reveals the secret. Alistair, the young man, traumatised by the violence of the war, gathers enough courage to desert, disguised as a Turkish officer thanks to the clothes of a dead officer. The dead officer's name is Osman, but Alistair does not know that. Behind the Turkish lines, he stumbles into a local young woman who saves him from a certain death and falls passionately in love with him. In order to have him accepted in the community, she fabricates the story that he is indeed a Turkish officer who lost speech because of the trauma of the war. They marry and have three children Uzun [Long], Beyaz [White] and Bulut [Cloud] symbolising his native New Zealand. In the meantime, his Maori girlfriend back in New Zealand has a daughter of whom he remains ignorant. Eighty-five years later his great-grand daughter who is visiting the battlefields in order to discover her own history, returns to New Zealand as a new person.

Uzuner is the only Turkish author so far to have focused on people who usually appear to be peripheral to, if not completely absent from other stories. The story is narrated from the point of view of the female characters not the soldier's; New Zealand is the home country of the main character, not Australia; Maori culture is the reference culture, not Pakeha. While Alistair is stripping the body of the Turkish officer of his uniform the reader understands that this is Osman who was introduced earlier through his correspondence with his mother and this adds a dramatic irony to the story. The bond that is created between the two men is one that neither of them is aware of, and differs significantly from the more common stories of encounters between Turkish and Anzac soldiers. The letters than Osman wrote to his mother resemble the published examples of reserve officers' letters, and consequently the character seems like a figure that the Turkish readers are already very familiar with. However, as soon as he dies and his clothes are taken, he loses his centrality in the story and his fictional role ends abruptly and brutally. He becomes one of the anonymous masses of dead bodies on the peninsula. This is certainly a very subtle and unsettling way of conveying the waste of human life in war. The story of desertion is also related in a very sympathetic way especially

considering its lifelong consequences for the deserter, far from the implication of cowardice or easy choice that are usually associated with desertion.

In the part of his book that is dedicated to Buket Uzuner, Ahmet Kaşıkçı (2010) mentions that the story was so convincing that the visitors he guided on the peninsula started asking about the tomb of Alistair (p.152). It is also noteworthy that many years after Buket Uzuner's novel, Russell Crowe (2014) also took up the idea in his film *The Water Diviner*, imagining a change of identity and a second life for a soldier, an Australian this time, whom everyone believed to be dead. Although the film has a transnational approach and is in fact very sympathetic to the Turks, it challenges the vision of a Turkish-Australian friendship that was born out of the war. Crowe even goes out of his way to depict the main female character, as a hater of Australians although she can apparently tolerate the British. This myth of friendship that was created by the Australian and Turkish memorial diplomacy, and often remains unquestioned, does not enjoy as much space in literature and cinema as in commemorative speeches. Turkish literature and cinema in particular is either utterly hostile to any non-Turkish forces involved in the war or the notion that common understanding might be conveyed through similarities in the human experience of war.

Writing about Gallipoli always has political implications that unavoidably impact the content, the style and the number of works that are published. Reading Gallipoli is more and more akin to reading a political map of modern Turkey. It is a unique topic that provides the means to trace the long-lasting and deeply rooted conflict over national identity from the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey. While two competing versions are clearly identified as Islamist and secularist/Kemalist, in fact many other versions co-exist and possibly enjoy the attention of the same readership. As the old sources are unearthed and presented as authoritative, a synthetic Turkish identity defined simultaneously in ethnic and religious terms is rapidly gaining ground. Although it is surprising how much these old texts are transposable to the present-day context in Turkey, they are also confronted by a new challenge: the transnational understandings of Gallipoli that have rapidly

gained ground in representations. The awkward blend of old and new understandings, however, is not limited to the domain of literature. As we will see in the following chapters, transnational conversation about the meanings of the past has permeated through both the memorial landscape and the commemorative practices.

Chapter 9 - Postcolonial sites of memory

The end of the First World War marked the beginning of a new era in terms of commemoration of dead soldiers through memorials and, wherever possible, individual tombs on the battlefields. Britain in particular reached a level of standardisation of the commemoration given to its individual soldiers. This systematised commemoration emphasised the Empire's righteousness and grandeur rather than the private grief caused by the war.²³ The Imperial War Graves Commission was in charge of the design and building of the military cemeteries and memorials, including those honouring the colonial troops. Notwithstanding the principle of equality, the inherent inequalities between white and colonial people became apparent in the double standard that was applied to colonial troops in accessing the status of imperial monuments. In India and in Turkey there was no public policy on building memorials locally or nationally and only a handful of monuments were built by Indians and Turks themselves. India Gate in Delhi and Gallipoli cemeteries and memorials built by the Imperial War Graves Commission had a perennial influence on how Indians and Turks subsequently shaped their collective remembrance of the past by nationalising reminders of colonial occupation and a humiliating invasion. Three different manifestations of the engagement with an imperial past and participation in an imperialist war can be observed in India, Australia and Turkey at different stages of their nationalisms following the war. Over the years, changing and competing understandings of national histories have been overwritten on these sites. In this sense, Jay Winter's notion of a palimpsest is more appropriate to define these places than Nora's *lieux de mémoire*.

Pierre Nora's encyclopaedic collection of seven edited volumes, indexes the French sites of memory which, according to Nora, replace an organic memory that used to be transmitted and shared in traditional societies, but has been lost in

²³ Local communities also undertook the commemoration of their own loss through memorials, which varied significantly in their form and their message. But the typography of these memorials is not discussed in this research.

modern societies. Nora's project deals with the canonised symbols that epitomise the fragmented and intangible nature of French national memory. Thinking within the national framework brings obvious limitations when applied to post-colonial contexts. Neither in India nor in Turkey were the collective remembrances of the First World War shaped as a result of a process that was internal to the nation. The nation-building processes of these countries, and arguably any other nation-state, involved engagement with non-national elements of the past and inter-national concerns of the present. Jay Winter proposes that in a transnational age, it is important to understand "the multi-layered nature of the narratives that we construct about the past" and reflect on "the incompatible and contradictory stories we tell ourselves and each other about our violent, imperial history" (2009, p.172-3). In addition, I believe that the metaphor of entanglement as well as a palimpsest suits the processes of overwriting the sites of memory, as the layers have not always been segmented chronologically. Gallipoli, particularly, is a case in point for reflecting on the disordered responses that led to the contestation of a site of memory on intra-national and transnational levels.

Dead as imperial monuments

Unlike local monuments dedicated to the Great War, which are now seen in almost every town and neighbourhood of French and British cities, the monuments that dot the theatres of war are not the outcomes of private memories framed socially and expressed collectively. The battlefield monuments are rather the result of a top-down remembrance policy. This policy, as far as the British Empire was concerned, was shaped by the state-sponsored Imperial War Graves Commission. It started with a formal request by Fabian Ware, the commander of the Mobile Unit of the Red Cross Society, to extend his duties to tracing the missing. With the support of the British generals, Ware obtained the approval of the War Office to pursue his work registering graves in 1915. Shortly after, the 'Graves Registration Commission' was attached to the Army (Gibson and Ward 1989, pp.44-5). The following year, Ware extended his activities to the maintenance of graves through the National Committee for the Care of Soldiers' Graves, with the

Prince of Wales as patron. By May 1916, Ware had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and was leading a team of 700 staff (p.46). The Imperial War Graves Commission was finally established in May 1917, with a Royal Charter, to meet the need for “an Imperial organization to care for and maintain in perpetuity the graves of those who have fallen in the War, to acquire land for the purpose of cemeteries and to erect permanent memorials in the cemeteries and elsewhere” (p.47).

An exegesis of the Commission was narrated in Gibson and Ward’s book, *Courage Remembered*, as the inspiring story of one man’s undertaking that changed permanently the way we remember the war dead. Certainly, Fabian Ware and other staff’s work deserve credit. However, between the lines, there is also another story that accounts for the massive financial, organisational and practical support that Fabian Ware received from War Office officials and the Prince of Wales. General Douglas Haig, for instance, reported to the War Office that the work of registering graves had a beneficial effect on the morale of troops and their friends and relatives at home. He further cautioned that, “on the termination of hostilities, the nation will demand an account from the government as to the steps which have been taken to mark and classify the burial places of the dead” (p.45). General Nevil Macready was also conscious of the distress caused by the neglect of the British graves in the Boer War (p.44). The War Office and other authorities responded to these concerns by supporting the graves registration and maintenance work, which was essentially organised so as to avoid a major public outcry that would jeopardise the ongoing war effort. Initially, steps were taken to appease people on whose representation the government’s power was based. However, as the undertaking assumed massive proportions, the individual needs and requirements of the bereaved became increasingly insignificant compared to the larger vision of the IWGC about the monumental enterprise.

Bereaved families were certainly concerned about the treatment of bodies and graves. Many families requested photographs of graves, and the Red Cross, YMCA as well as the War Office took charge of these tasks (Scates 2006, p.15). However, persistent requests for repatriation of bodies were systematically rejected. Several petitions were produced, some with thousands of signatures,

demanding that the policy be revised. Ruth Jervis wrote to IWGC, "Is there no limit to the suffering imposed on us, is it not enough to have our boys dragged from us & butchered [...]. The country took him & the country should bring him back" (Ziino 2007, pp.114-5). The public reason for the rejection of repatriation requests was equality of treatment of the dead, and this same reason was put forward to reject families' requests to customise graves or make any modifications. In fact, the principle of equality was not the only plausible reason behind the IWGC's policy. The Commission in fact, did not want the families of dead soldiers to interfere with their design of the cemeteries. The guidelines about the construction of these sites had been decided as early as 1917, without any formal consultation with the families during the process (p.109). Work started as soon as possible on each site after the war, and was presented as a *fait accompli*.

The principles of the Commission regarding the cemeteries and memorials stated that every man should be remembered by name. If the burial place was identified, the grave would be marked with an individual headstone, otherwise the name would be inscribed on a memorial wall (Gibson and Ward 1989, p.66). Headstones bore inscriptions of the person's rank, initials and surname, decorations if any, the name of the regiment, the date of death and age. An emblem representing the religion of the person was also engraved on the headstone, unless the next of kin requested it be omitted (p.67). The only other choice that was given to families was a space for an inscription of up to 60 letters, and these inscriptions stand out as the most remarkable testimonies in the cemeteries today. Apart from the individual headstones, cemeteries, which contained over 40 burials, were marked with a Cross, and those containing over 400 burials had a Stone of Remembrance with the inscription "Their name liveth forever more" chosen by the British writer and poet Rudyard Kipling (p.53).

Although these principles were simple and clear, there were several adjustments to be made depending on the circumstances on each site. The proceedings in the Commonwealth War Graves Commission archives suggest that the problems were dealt with on an ad hoc basis, and individual solutions were not necessarily considered to apply to similar cases. Some of the questions concerned practical issues such as the maintenance of isolated graves; whether the remains

should be removed, or otherwise, on which memorial the dead should be remembered. The crucial consideration behind every decision was cost. Equality of treatment was the principle that the IWGC apparently held most dear; however, it turned out to be a costly principle and, whenever equality was sacrificed, it was at the expense of the colonial troops. Winston Churchill's letter sent to the Governors of the Crown Colonies in 1921, made it clear that "equality of treatment for the graves of all" was not intended for colonial troops.

The erection of memorials to the memory of the native troops, carriers, etc., depends upon the local conditions. In ordinary circumstances the Commission would not erect individual headstones but a central memorial in some suitable locality to be selected by the Government concerned. (in Barrett 2011, p.302)

Especially in Africa, the treatment of 'white graves' was intrinsically different from 'native graves.' While European soldiers were exhumed and reburied in concentrated cemeteries, large numbers of identified graves belonging to African soldiers were abandoned, or to use the official term, "sent Missing" (p.303). In Sierra Leone, Arthur Browne, the Principle Assistant Secretary of the IWGC, informed Fabian Ware that "I am not including the names of the Carriers, as I do not know how far they are sufficiently civilized to justify the inclusion of their names and that it would greatly increase the cost of the Memorial to include their names" (Barrett 2007, p.470). The Commission accepted this view and applied it with some variation to other memorials.

In Europe there was a greater degree of equality of treatment between colonial soldiers and their British and Dominion counterparts. A memorial that was specifically dedicated to the Indian war dead was built in Neuve Chapelle, France. The Secretary of State for India nominated Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan and Prahbhashankar Pattani to represent Indian Muslims and Hindus respectively (WG 909/9). Other religious groups, such as Sikhs, were also included in the term 'Hindu' in the Commission reports and did not have a separate representative. In a Committee meeting in March 1918, the two Indian representatives set up guidelines for the treatment of the bodies. They both agreed that there should be two separate memorials, possibly within the same compound, one for the Hindu

faith and the other for Muslims (WG 909/9). However, after much debate and consultation, it was decided that there should be just one central monument that would be acceptable to Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Herbert Baker's 1923 design was chosen, representing a column surmounted by a lotus capital, the Imperial crown and the Star of India with two tigers on each side of the column. "God is One, His is the Victory" was inscribed on the memorial in English, Urdu, Hindi and Gurmukhi. The memorial bears the names of over 5,000 Indian soldiers who died in France (Barrett 2007, p.457).

Indian soldiers who died in Europe or in Gallipoli were commemorated in a similar manner to white soldiers. Three of a handful of individual headstones that commemorate Indian soldiers on the Gallipoli peninsula belong to mule drivers who were buried at Anzac Beach Cemetery and Lancashire Landing Cemetery. The Indian non-combatants were therefore individually honoured in Gallipoli, whenever possible.




Figure 6 - A headstone that belongs to a Muslim mule driver, Anzac Beach Cemetery, Gallipoli. All three mule drivers died in 1918. This might explain the exceptional treatment that they received (author's own)

Despite this, the number of Indian graves in the cemeteries of Gallipoli is significantly low. Only 116 unidentified bodies of Indian soldiers were recovered after the war. In the absence of any possibility of identifying their name or religion, they were cremated after consultation with Muslim, Sikh and Dogra officers who

were present on the peninsula in 1920 (WG 909/5). Two identified Hindus buried at isolated graves were also cremated in 1924 and their names were added to the Helles Memorial, bringing the total of identified or partly identified individual Indian graves to a mere 15 (WG 909/5). However, all the 1,500 Indian soldiers who did not have a known burial place at Gallipoli were commemorated individually on the Helles Memorial along with 19,000 British and 250 Australian soldiers who were not commemorated elsewhere (Gibson and Ward 1989, p.164). The absence of any reliable record of the burial or cremation places of those Indian soldiers may be due to the fact that Indian troops handled their own dead and were perhaps not given clear instructions on record-keeping. Nevertheless, every Indian soldier who died at Gallipoli was individually commemorated.

By contrast, the Basra Memorial, which commemorated the largest number of Indian soldiers on any one memorial, did not name their ranks. The IWGC decided to commemorate only the 665 Indian officers by name, while 33,222 other ranks were commemorated solely by number. About 8,000 British men of all ranks were individually named. Thus, under the names of the officers of each regiment, the number of the ranks of the regiment was inscribed, such as “Subhadar Mahanga and 1,770 other Indian soldiers” (Barrett 2011, p.310). The decision was taken “bearing in mind that the memorials themselves will in all probability not be seen by any of the relatives of the rank and file” (Barrett 2007, p.464). Ironically, the Basra Memorial is the only overseas memorial commemorating Indian soldiers that K.C. Kurruvilla, one of the participants in this research project, has ever seen.

In fact, predictions at the time concerning the number of potential visitors were not particularly accurate. Although only wealthy Indians could afford to visit Neuve Chapelle, Basra was en route to Mecca for large numbers of Muslim pilgrims. This was pointed out to the IWGC by Captain Ajab Khan who wrote to the Army Department of the Government of India that “the graves of Indian fallen soldiers in Iraq have not received that generous attention which is bestowed on Indian graves in the European theatres of war” (WG 909/5, 7 Oct 1925). In response, Captain Ajab Khan received a three page long letter expressed in cavalier tones, implying that his judgement was hasty as the work on the graves was still incomplete, due to lack of local stone and other resources. The letter concluded

with a reassurance that the headstones as well as the memorial in Basra would soon be completed thereby negating the grounds for his criticism. The Military Department then sought the IWGC's approval for the response given to Ajab Khan. Arthur Browne, the Principle Assistant Secretary simply reminded the Military Department that, "As you are aware, owing to the imperfection of the records there will be no headstones erected to Indian soldiers in that country [Basra or Iraq]" (WG 909/5). Nevertheless, Browne agreed to the response, emphasising that there had been delays because of the necessity of obtaining materials such as from Delhi. Ironically, the stone from India was destined for the British headstones and for the memorial, which did not list the names of the ranks.

An omission remained in Arthur Browne's amendment to the response given to Ajab Khan, regarding the fact that headstones would not be built, owing to the absence of records. However, there was a simple explanation for this lapse: the general officer commanding-in-chief during the war had ordered the Graves Registration Unit not to register the graves of Indians during the war, although it was not clear whether he had consulted the War Office or the Government of India on that matter (WG 909/5). Hence, the IWGC found hundreds of unregistered graves that would be costly to build and maintain, and since those graves belonged to unidentified soldiers, it was legitimate to ask whether the effort would be worthwhile. It was decided that no exhumation and no cremation would take place in Basra, apart from a few exceptions. A memorial in each cemetery would record the fact that unnamed and unnumbered Indian soldiers were buried in the cemetery. It was decided to harmonise the treatment of Indian graves in the "three Eastern theatres" (Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt) in that graves would not be maintained but replaced by these memorials. The reports of the Committee stated that "a memorial of this sort would be far more appreciated by the Indian than anything we could do in the cemeteries" (WG 909/5, 17 June 1919) and,

I am further of the opinion that the marking by name of individual graves is not considered to be of importance by the Indian, but that a monument to the Indians who have fallen in the campaign would be more in keeping with the religious customs as well as the characteristics of the various classes represented in the Army. (WG 909/5, 8 April 1918)

The absence of any enquiries by Indian families as to the graves of Indian soldiers, up to that point, seemed to validate the opinion that individual burial places did not matter to Indians.

The soundness of this opinion is borne out by the fact that not one enquiry has been received from relatives concerning the graves of Indian soldiers [...]. It would be a myth to suppose that any Indians will make the voyage to Egypt or Palestine for the purpose of visiting the grave of a deceased relative. (WG 909/5)

At least one enquiry was lodged a few years later, regarding Umrao Singh. But the result was 'no trace.' In fact, by 1925 when the enquiry was made, even those Indian soldiers who were on burial lists were considered to be 'missing,' or as with the graves of African native troops, those few identified Indian graves in the Eastern fronts were 'sent Missing.'

It is interesting to note that, while the British authorities justified their treatment of Indian graves based on their understanding of Indian cultures, and on the fact that families were unlikely to visit the cemeteries, Captain Ajab Khan's complaint tells us that he, more accurately, saw the cemeteries not as sites for private mourning but as Imperial monuments.

It will go a good way towards enhancing British prestige and its appreciation of those who gave their lives in its just cause if the Indian graves in those parts of the world were built on a grander scale.

The East, as you know, is very impressionable to such things, and it will be in much the best interest of our Empire if my suggestion is favourably examined. (WG 909/5, 7 October 1925)

Ajab Khan's point was that Indian soldiers were also worthy of Imperial monuments. His concern was not about the grief of the families, but about the offense that the unequal treatment of the Indian dead was likely to cause. After all the expectations about greater autonomy for India and the Indianisation of the army had been frustrated after the war (see Chapters 3 and 4), Ajab Khan still hoped that there would be symbolic recognition for the Indian war effort by honouring them as worthy members of the Empire.

Ironically, those who racially qualified for that honour or because they died in a relatively important theatre of war might not have been so keen to become monuments to the greatness of the Empire. At least some people did not want the bodies to be kept in imperial custody. Viscount Wolmer claimed that the IWGC had “no right to employ, in making those [imperial] memorials, the bodies of other people’s relatives. It is not decent, it is not reasonable, it is not right” (in Ziino 2007, p.116). There was a strong feeling that the remembrance of the deceased was a private affair and there was considerable resentment directed at the government’s authoritarian attitude towards the fate of the bodies. The IWGC tried to persuade people that being buried in such cemeteries promised a “higher ideal than that of private burial at home” (p.116). However, those higher ideals did not appeal to many people, regardless of whether there was a body to dispute. Some requests were received from next of kin for the omission of names from memorials to the missing as well. Gibson and Ward suggested that:

[...] the reason for not wanting a name to be inscribed on a memorial is not clear, but probably political. [...] the Commission decided that a wish by the next of kin could not override its duty under its Charters and that the names would be inscribed; and so they were. (p.83)

Criticism from the families and colonial subjects did not weigh much in the balance compared to the Commission’s ‘duty under its Charters.’ In that scheme, it is questionable whether the purpose was to honour the dead, or have the dead honour the Empire.

The Anzac Estate: ‘one big graveyard’

After the evacuation of Gallipoli, Australians were very concerned about the graves left behind. As early as four months after evacuation, the Australian Government pressed for reassurance from the Ottoman Government regarding the protection of the graves (Ziino 2007, p.63). After the British Government failed to obtain permission to inspect the graves, a papal delegation was finally authorised to visit the peninsula and take pictures of the graves (p.64). Although the delegation was satisfied with the treatment of the graves, the IWGC wanted the

peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire to ensure that the Commission had ownership of the land where the cemeteries were located, “the Turks being reputed as neglectful of graveyards” (Bean 1948, p.9-10). In 1919, the Graves Registration Unit was able to start restoration work with the assistance of the Australian Historical Mission led by C. E. W. Bean. Bean was entrusted with the duty to report on the situation regarding the Australian burials, advise on the prospect of having a permanent Australian memorial on the peninsula, advise on the possibility of planting Australian trees and on the improvements that were needed to facilitate visits by the Australians (p.12).

Bean’s assessment of the graves was ambivalent. Although Bean did not deny that there were cases of desecration, he contradicted a 1918 report claiming that desecration was systematic (p.11). Within five weeks of the survey, the Australian Historical Mission was able to locate 4700 identified graves, which amounted to almost the full number of graves that had been registered (pp.325, 383). Bean insisted that the graves should not be concentrated, but preserved at their current location, arguing that:

the dead, merely by being buried where they fell, or where their comrades had carried them, would commemorate their achievement better than any inscription. Thus, anyone standing by the graves [...] could not fail to grasp something of what these men, and indeed those opposed to them, had done and were. (p.327)

It was quite clear that Bean meant the graves to be testimonies to the achievements of the troops. *Where the Australians Rest*, a booklet that was printed to inform Australian people about the plans, similarly stated that “the graves of the men should be preserved where they fell, whenever possible, so that the site of their graves would mark their heroism” (Department of Defence 1920, p.54). Anzac cemeteries were designed to support a narrative of heroism and achievement and the Australian and New Zealand national memorials also did a great deal to bolster that narrative. Both countries chose the highest points ever reached by their troops on the peninsula as sites for their national memorials with the New Zealand memorial possibly more eloquent in its triumphalism with the inscription, “In honour of the soldiers of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force 8th

August 1915. From the uttermost ends of the Earth.” Both memorials and cemeteries on the peninsula were thus devised as testimonies to the heroic deeds of the Dominion soldiers.

Bean further emphasised the importance of having control over the area that covered the battle zone, insisting it should be considered “one big graveyard.” While putting forward the idea that the land should belong to Australia, Bean had to acknowledge that there was a far greater number of Ottoman dead in the area. However, he argued that the Turks did not care about their graves (p.342-3). Therefore, the rationale behind Australia’s claim on the Anzac sector was based on the absence of Turkish claims, similar to the principle of *terra nullius* in colonialist ideology. Moreover, not only Bean but all those involved in the construction of non-European sites, considered the supposed indifference of Turks and Indians to graves to be a major cultural difference between Eastern people and Europeans. They completely overlooked the fact that the Empire was undertaking a venture of this scale for the very first time in history. It was unreasonable to suggest that this was a traditional way of remembering the war dead and therefore, a characteristic of Western cultures.

In case the Turks considered interfering with the works, Bean also proposed that “after the Australians and British are all buried the Turks should all be buried, but not until the burial of our men is completed, because if the Turks begin work before we are finished they are certain to confuse Australians with Turks” (p.385). It was a strange supposition that the Turks would be less competent in differentiating their uniforms and kits from those of Australians. Ironically, since Bean had declared that European soldiers were “not suited for summer work,” local Greek and Turkish workers, some of whom had fought at Anzac, were hired for the construction work and they did not seem to be particularly confused or ill-informed about identifying their dead (pp.328, 341). Bean was, in fact, very much aware of Turkish monuments and cemeteries that had already been built or were in the process of being built. He even included photographs of a few in his book (p.63). His concerns about the interference of the Turks had in fact more to do with their taking over symbolic control of the area before the demarcation of the Anzac Estate was completed. There is however, no

evidence that the Ottoman Government intended to do any work, matching that of the IWGC on the peninsula.




Figure 7 - Local labourers clearing the ground for a cemetery, Gallipoli (Imperial War Museum)

In 1920, Turkish nationalist forces refused to recognise the Sevres Treaty, which sought to unequivocally grant the Anzac sector to the British Empire. When the Turkish forces pushed back the Greek army in 1922 and breached the neutral zone of the peninsula, Britain and Turkey came perilously close to a new conflict, referred to as the Chanak crisis. The presence of the graves was largely instrumental in the British response to the Chanak crisis, which in fact sought to avoid ceding control of the straits to the new Turkish state. Churchill and Lloyd George began preparing for military action. Churchill stated that:

Not only does the Freedom of the Straits for which such immense sacrifices were made in the war involve vital imperial and world-wide interests, but we cannot forget that there are 20,000 British and Anzac graves in the Gallipoli Peninsula and that it would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire if these were to fall into the ruthless hands of the Kemalists.

(Roessel 1990, p.44)

However, the prospect of further armed conflict immediately prompted heavy criticism. A. A. Milne cynically put it in a newspaper article:

I am told that we are to fight: (1) for England's honour; (2) for the freedom of the Straits; (3) for the sanctity of our graves in Gallipoli ... Graves are sacred only when England occupies the earth in which they were dug. There were airmen who fell within the German boundaries ... Foolishly we allowed the Germans to keep that land. We should be occupying it. (p.45)

The protection of the graves was not a sufficiently strong argument for a military operation against the Turks. However, neither Australia nor Britain relinquished the idea that the land containing imperial remains should belong to the Empire. The Lausanne Treaty in 1923 finally ceded control of the area to the Allies, thus granting that the sanctity of the remains of the war dead were legitimate grounds for ownership of the land. This acknowledgement would shape the Turkish responses to the Commonwealth memorials at Gallipoli. Turkish memorials later built on the peninsula seek to reclaim the land by inscribing a counter-narrative on the landscape.

Earlier Turkish Responses to Memorials and Cemeteries in Gallipoli

During the war, only a few memorials and cemeteries were built in what is now Turkish territory. Surprisingly, one of the few wartime memorials dedicated to Gallipoli, is to be found in the south-eastern Anatolian city of Urfa. A local administrator built the Mustafa Kemal Pasha Memorial Fountain in 1917, in honour of their commander Mustafa Kemal after the men of the town were returned invalided from Gallipoli. The most interesting features of the memorial are the plaques on its four sides, indicating directions: the road to Ankara, the road to Caucasus, the road to India and Mustafa Kemal Pasha Road (Akbiyık 2015, para 6-9). The cover of number 4 of the *Harp Mecmuası* [*War Magazine*] also showed Mustafa Kemal in a cemetery in Kireçtepe, Gallipoli, with a central memorial made of piled up shells.

The Kireçtepe monument and cemetery no longer exist as no efforts were made after the war to consolidate them. Given the political and financial situation in the Ottoman Empire after the war, this abandonment was hardly surprising. The Allied monuments were built on the peninsula while the new Turkish state was

still fighting over large portions of its territories. When the Lausanne Treaty (1923) was finally signed, Turkey had to be rebuilt. Memorials and cemeteries were not a major preoccupation. However, in 1925 after the Allied memorials and cemeteries had been completed, there were a few voices of concern over the absence of a major Turkish memorial on the peninsula. Süleyman Nazif lamented that, “the English spent millions of gold coins and built an enormous monument for their dead at Çanakkale. [...] Yet we see at the present moment for our martyrs nothing but an endless ‘arch of oblivion’. This is a disgrace and abasement for our nation and our history” (in Kreiser 2006, p.189). Necmi Onur (1960) who was involved in the project of constructing the main Turkish memorial in Gallipoli described the role of the director of the War Graves Commission in Gallipoli, and the financial and practical resources that the English Government²⁴ provided him to look after the graves and memorials. Onur then asked: “Where was the memorial for those who gave their lives for this land? This was the very question that the Turks grappled with over years and years” (p.96).

In fact, as early as 1921, the Turkish Parliament had decided to build a perennial memorial at Gallipoli, and in 1927, the Ministry of Defence proposed to procure the material as soon as possible (BA 030-18-01-024-28-015). Impatient to see a national memorial constructed, the National Federation of Students Associations applied to the Prime Ministers office in 1934, for permission to raise funds for this purpose. Their offer was turned down, on the grounds that such an enterprise was not in the association’s purview, and it would be preferable for the Ministry of Defence to accomplish such a task (BA 030-10-0-0-213-446-3). However, no design for the memorial was available until 1944, when the Ministry of Defence organised a competition for a memorial in Gallipoli. The winning project of Doğan Erginbaş and İsmail Utkular was ambitious but the means were meagre. The finances of the project were not decided until 1952 and it was finally paid for entirely via public subscription in 1954 (Onur 1960, p.97). The

²⁴ In fact, the IWGC was financed by all participating governments, and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission is still funded by the UK (78%), Canada (10%), Australia (6%), New Zealand (2%), South Africa (2%) and India (1%), proportionally to the number of graves from each country (see ‘How we are funded’, Commonwealth War Graves Commission website).

construction work started in 1954 but was interrupted soon after, as defects were detected due to the corruption of the builders (p.98). By the time the foundations were completed in 1957, the Committee had run out of money. Necmi Onur who had started working on the project as a clerk during the initial phases of the construction, was now a journalist in one of the major national newspapers, *Milliyet*. He initiated an extremely successful public subscription campaign, using his position in the newspaper (p.100-1; see also news items “Çanakkale Abidesi yardım kampanyası” 1958 and “Son iki gün” 1958). By the time the Martyrs Memorial was completed, it had already become a national icon.



Figure 8 - Çanakkale Martyrs Memorial (authors own)

Doğan Erginbaş (1950) who co-designed the memorial explained that his inspiration was the triumphal arches that were commonly used as war memorials in Europe as these were also reminiscent of some indigenous architectural work. He proposed a 40 metre high memorial as opposed to a few existing two or three-metre high memorials, which he felt were unworthy of the “grand victory and its heroes” (p.34). The size of the memorial was considered important as it had to compete with the Allied memorials. Since the visits of Turkish or non-Turkish groups or individuals were subject to permission from the Turkish authorities, the number of people visiting the battle zones was limited. Most people would see the

memorials from the sea; therefore, visibility from a distance was a major consideration in favour of bigger memorials. However, as the practices of battlefield visits changed, the types of memorials also changed.

In the 1950s, while the memorial was still under construction, and throughout the 1960s, student associations requested free transportation for large numbers of students from Istanbul to Gallipoli for the annual commemorations on 18 March (BA 030-01-0-0-123-790-8, 030-18-01-02-193-18-10/204-22-7). This date marked the naval victory of the Ottomans, which led to plans for an amphibious operation to start on 25 April. Since the war, 18 March had been accepted as the commemorative day for Gallipoli in Turkey, known as Çanakkale Martyrs' Day. Although the day was not nationally remembered at that time, many students and veterans commemorated it on the peninsula. During the same period, several groups of visitors came from France, UK and Australia. In 1973, the National Parks Directory of the Ministry of Forests assumed control of the area covering the battlefields and the memorials, thus heralding a more welcoming setting for visitors with free access to the site.

Gallipoli pilgrimage and Australian-Turkish friendship

In the 1980s, the changing perceptions of Gallipoli in Australia that increasingly emphasised the experience of the soldiers as a heroic tragedy, did not resonate with the rigid and militaristic outlook of Australian commemorations at home. Through negotiations with the Turkish Government, the Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his New Zealand counterpart, David Lange, successfully turned Gallipoli into a new icon for Australians and New Zealanders who were eager to remember the war in its original setting. In 1985, the Australian and New Zealand Governments requested that the place where Anzac troops landed be officially named 'Anzac Cove.' As a gesture in return, the Australian and New Zealand Governments would honour the Turks at home. The Atatürk Memorials in Canberra and Wellington were built as part of this plan (Australian Embassy, Ankara 1985, p.290-1). Finally, in 1990, the first Dawn Service at Gallipoli was organised and attended by the then Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand

as well as by thousands of visitors from these two countries. The Dawn Service was also broadcast live in Australia. The flow of Anzac Day 'pilgrims' has steadily increased since then. While inventing a new tradition for Australians who apparently yearned for commemorations of this sort, Hawke also managed to make Prime Ministers key actors on Anzac Day, whereas in the past they had been eclipsed by the veterans association Returned and Services League (RSL) (see also Chapter 9).

In order to facilitate these commemorations on the territory of a former enemy, a solid myth of friendship had to be constructed. The human experience of war, whereby each side realises the futility of killing at some stage and actually feels sympathy for the enemy was represented as unique and specific to Gallipoli alone. There is no reason to question the authenticity of the numerous accounts of soldiers exchanging cigarettes and food; however, this was one of the curious entertainments for all soldiers wherever their trenches were close enough. In fact, similar stories were told about the Western Front where soldiers were supposedly incapable of killing each other after sharing moments of friendship during the Christmas truce.²⁵ However, the narrative attached to Gallipoli insists that, unlike any other battle, Turkish and Australian soldiers respected each other and actually shared whatever they could but eventually had to fight each other in a war that none of them wanted. There are certainly elements of truth in this story, but the soldiers' feelings of respect and sympathy for each other is overstated. This belief in a friendship forged during the war is cherished by both sides because it constructs both soldiers and the countries as victims of the imperial powers of the time. This sense of common victimhood enables a shared remembrance of the war between the former enemies. Since the agency of both countries is denied in the warfare, their animosity is also cancelled out. The entire responsibility for the horror is left with the British Empire and Germany, while the Australians and Turks take the credit for sacrifice, courage and humanity.

The limits of this narrative of friendship are manifest in two principal ways. Firstly, as this narrative intensified, the symbolic control of the place became

²⁵ A recent French film, *Joyeux Noël* [*Merry Christmas*] (2005), illustrates well the popular representations of the event.

increasingly important, demonstrating that the anxieties of the past, remained very much alive in the present. Secondly, on both sides, the commemorations in one country that honoured the former enemy and supposedly promoted peace, failed to include participants from the other. The Dawn Service at Gallipoli has always been an exclusively Australian and New Zealand event. A third problem has been added to these since 2013, when two Australian State Governments, namely New South Wales and South Australia, decided to pass resolutions in order to acknowledge the Armenian genocide. This last point is developed in the next chapter.

Contesting the 'National Park'

Since the annual pilgrimages of Australians and New Zealanders gathered momentum in 2005, the Turkish authorities have built monuments and cemeteries so intensely that it is difficult to keep up with the most recent changes. As soon as the first Anzac Day service was planned on the peninsula in 1990, the CEO of a major Turkish bank announced that his bank would finance the restoration of the Turkish cemeteries on the peninsula because they could not let foreigners see Turkish cemeteries covered with weeds while theirs were like beautiful gardens (Özata 1990). The weeds were not the only problem. The cemeteries had never been consolidated in the first place and, 75 years later, they had completely disappeared. In the construction of new cemeteries, a sense of urgency prevailed over research and accuracy of detail. The first Turkish cemeteries that were built in the 1990s were 'symbolic' according to the authorities, 'fake' according to sceptical critiques. These cemeteries prompted anger, among other reactions, for damaging or destroying the real traces of the past. One of the major Turkish memorials and cemeteries dedicated to the 57th Regiment, was built in 1992, and the car park near the site was expanded in 2004, burying a part of the original trench work under concrete. A bilingual battlefield guide published in 2006, presented a photograph of the cemetery with the caption, "Symbolic cemetery and real car park" (Göncü and Aldoğan 2006, pp.48-9).

These symbolic or fake cemeteries, depending on one's point of view, are very real for the majority of visitors, no matter the clues that indicate that they do not contain bodies. Some of the recent guides and even official brochures for visitors do indicate whether a cemetery is authentic or symbolic. However, the sites themselves send mixed messages. For instance, the cemetery near the Martyrs Memorial has disproportionately small graves with long lists of names on each headstone; clear evidence that all those listed could not be buried in that spot. However, an ablution and prayer place near the cemetery encourages people to pray at the fake tombs, and many people do so, thus creating an astonishingly absurd view. On a similar note, the 57th Regiment Cemetery that imitates the CWGC cemeteries, has headstones rising slightly above the lawn, although the concrete footpath for visitors differs from the CWGC cemeteries. The purpose of the footpath is to remind the visitor that it is not acceptable in Turkish culture to walk on graves, once again creating the illusion that there are bodies underground.



Figure 9 - 57th Regiment Cemetery (author's own)

More recently, real cemeteries were also transformed and opened to visitors. For instance, in Kesikdere Cemetery, the names of 1115 men who were buried in a mass grave were etched on a horizontal metal plate. The list includes several names that are unmistakably Armenian, Jewish or Greek (Muslim names can be Turkish, Arab or Kurd), showing the ethnic diversity of the troops.

However, cemeteries and memorials that include an exhaustive list of names are rare. These memorials and cemeteries, built in a period where individual links and family connections with that past have largely dissipated, aimed to establish a national story about the past. In fact, on these structures, the names of administrative districts outshine the names of individuals who are largely forgotten. Some of the cemeteries include only the names of districts; others, like Kesikdere, give the names of individual soldiers in alphabetical order according to the district of recruitment. The names of the districts are familiar to visitors, who are happy to see the contribution of their own locality acknowledged. The narrative that these cemeteries construct is one of people from all over Turkey joining a war in defence of the nation.



Figure 10 - Kesikdere Cemetery showing name, age and circumscription of the soldiers (author's own)

Bülent Ecevit, one of the former Prime Ministers of Turkey, consolidated this anachronistic statement in a poem in 1988,²⁶ imagining the posthumous conversation between Turkish and Anzac soldiers.

“Brothers” said Mehmet of Anatolia

²⁶ The entire poem can be read on a wall at the entrance of Kabatepe Museum.

who does not even have a headstone to his name
“I understand your plight, as I also died for hundreds of years
in foreign lands without even knowing why.
I had the pleasure of dying for my own country
For the first time in Çanakkale.”

As argued in Chapter 4 and 8, it is highly doubtful that Gallipoli felt like a homeland to soldiers coming from other provinces, any more than the ‘foreign lands’ in which the Ottoman army had been fighting for centuries. The history of Gallipoli had to be re-inscribed as a national war in defence of the homeland. The Australians fit into this narrative as unwitting accomplices of a supposedly unprovoked foreign invasion.

While constructing a national narrative of war for the consumption of a receptive Turkish audience, the cemeteries and memorials have also been devised as messages to non-Turkish visitors. They assert the legitimacy of Turkish sovereignty against claims over the land because of the presence of the remains of the soldiers. They also qualify the national myths of achievement of Australia and New Zealand. None of the memorials do this more openly than the Atatürk Memorial at Chunuk Bair. The Turkish memorial aggressively encroaches into the space of the New Zealand memorial. Apart from its central oversized Atatürk statue, a number of inscriptions surrounding the Chunuk Bair memorial explain in detail that two days after the New Zealanders captured that hill, Turkish forces under Mustafa Kemal’s command pushed them back. The huge Turkish flag adds the final and not so subtle touch to the Turkish memorial, which unequivocally claims the hill. The site therefore turns the photo sessions of the visitors into awkward moments, where everyone tries to find the right angle to capture their version of the story.



Figure 11 - New Zealand National Memorial and Atatürk Memorial at Chunuk Bair (author's own)

Similar tensions can also be observed around Anzac Day. Although the Australian and New Zealand officials express their gratitude to their Turkish hosts on every occasion, praising the national character of Turks in their speeches, there seems to be some concern that Australian and Turkish crowds might not mix very well. Pre-emptive measures have been taken in order to avoid any uncomfortable clashes between zealous youths of the host and guest countries. These measures have mostly consisted of separating the two crowds as much as possible. This unwritten policy has become increasingly obvious since the numbers of Turkish visitors skyrocketed during the first term of Erdoğan's Prime Ministership from 2002. Since then, a fierce battle for the symbolic control of Gallipoli has been fought between Turkish Islamists and Kemalists, attracting about two million visitors to the peninsula each year. As the numbers of Turkish visitors grew, Anzac Day commemorations, which had gone unnoticed by people living in other parts of Turkey, suddenly became a curiosity. However, Turkish visitors who wanted to be

involved in the Anzac commemorations would be disappointed as it has been made quite impossible for them to join the commemorative site.

A number of security measures that were taken to direct the traffic, also function effectively to keep Turkish visitors out of the ceremonial space. Australians and New Zealanders are requested to access the site by tour buses and all other vehicles are directed elsewhere. Such tours are specifically for 'Anzacs' and do not accept Turkish customers. Turkish visitors can access the memorial park either in their private cars or by Turkish tour buses. The latter are marked differently and have different itineraries so Turkish visitors in these 'other vehicles' are always directed elsewhere. Apart from officials and journalists, the only Turks who are eligible to attend the Dawn Service are those who obtained permission from the authorities and those who managed to sneak in thanks to some insiders' help. Ironically, the orders of service and interpretative programme handed to the participants are printed in both languages.

Since 2005, the Federation of Students Associations, with substantial support from the army, initiated an alternative ceremony to the Dawn Service for Turkish university students. While Australian and New Zealand pilgrims attend a nightlong 'interpretative programme,' waiting for the dawn, Turkish students camp where the 57th Regiment was stationed the night before the landing. After the Dawn Service, the Australians and New Zealanders walk the path towards their national memorials, thus imitating the first Anzacs. On the Turkish camp, students also imitate the Turkish soldiers while they are served crushed wheat soup, which was apparently the last meal served to Turkish soldiers before the landing. The students then start marching supposedly on the same path as the 57th Regiment's soldiers. The two groups' paths cross each other at Chunuk Bair. The Turkish cortege then proceeds to the 57th Regiment Memorial. There may be variations on the Turkish side, as this ceremony has not been undertaken consistently. This re-enactment serves as a mnemonic device, much stronger than the words that are repeated in the commemorations. Participants symbolically assume the role of the soldiers and by acting out they internalise the experience of war as an individual memory. However, it is clear that the connection with the past is made both by

following the footsteps of the soldiers and by opposing and competing with the 'enemy.'

Australia has certainly lost this symbolic battle too. In spite of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey has asserted ownership of the peninsula. By welcoming Australians and New Zealanders, they claimed the position of hosts and disarmed their opponents. In order to emphasise this point, the Turkish Government built a memorial representing a Turkish soldier, carrying a wounded Australian soldier, following the story recounted by Richard Casey, a former Australian Governor General, who had served as a lieutenant at Gallipoli. The famous words attributed to Atatürk are also displayed, in addition to other sites, on a monolith at Anzac Cove. Australian visitors are expected to be, and usually are, humbled by the generosity and hospitality of the Turks who welcomed them to 'this country of ours,' in 'our bosom.'

There has always been a question mark around the intent of these words that were supposedly written by Atatürk as late as 1934. The most logical explanation at the time pointed to Atatürk's intention to calm anxieties about the graves, while the Turkish control of the strait was about to be sealed in the Montreux Treaty (1934). It turns out that, most probably, Atatürk did not write or pronounce these words at all. Turkish writer and researcher Cengiz Özakıncı recently found that the earliest appearance of the speech is in 1953, long after Atatürk's death, in an interview with Şükrü Kaya who was the Minister of Home Affairs in 1934 and who claimed to have delivered the speech to foreign visitors on behalf of Atatürk.²⁷ The speech was then published in a tourist guide in 1969 and discovered there by Alan J. Campbell, an RSL member, during his visit to Gallipoli in 1977. The text then found its way onto the Gallipoli Fountains of Honour in Brisbane the following year and has become a ubiquitous citation on innumerable texts and memorials ever since (Özakıncı 2015, pp.24-5).

²⁷ If Şükrü Kaya was the author of the famous words, it is difficult to imagine what his intention might have been. Enver Pasha's speech at the inauguration of Âbide-i Hürriyet monument in Istanbul in 1909 shows striking similarity to the spirit of Atatürk's so-called address to Allied mothers and may have been the source of confusion or invention: "Muslims and Christians lay side-by-side, a token that they, living or dead, were henceforward fellow patriots who would know no distinction of race or creed." (in Kreiser 2002, p.44)

Writing in a magazine openly hostile to Anzac commemorations, Özakıncı expresses his relief that the Atatürk whom he venerates, never uttered such nonsense that the invaders were equal to Mehmeds. He also refers to the only speech, dated 1931, that Atatürk had given to Şükrü Kaya to read.

Tomorrow, history of civilization will judge better which side's sacrifice was more just and more humane. The monuments of the aggressors, or still untouched traces of those heroes who were defending their homeland, their traces on sacred stone and soil. (p.28)

The last lines of the speech script say that:

While Turkish nation looks at these monuments with respect, remembering the dead on both sides with compassion, the sincere wish that lives in their minds and hearts is for these memorials to dead to be never erected again, on the contrary for the human relations and ties to be promoted among those who built these monuments. (p.29)

Özakıncı emphasises that Atatürk referred to dead soldiers of the Allies as "dead," presumably as opposed to martyrs, which Özakıncı takes as a sign of disrespect, although in the same sentence Atatürk also refers to the "dead on both sides." Özakıncı further misinterprets the peace message in the last lines of the speech to mean that Atatürk "wished that no more memorials should be built in Çanakkale for Anzacs, etc who are qualified as 'dead.'" One point that Özakıncı might be missing is that, indeed, no more memorials were built in Gallipoli for Anzacs since the works of the IWGC were completed in 1925. All the memorials honour the Turks, including the one that represents a wounded Anzac soldier in the arms of a bulky Turkish soldier.

The words wrongly attributed to Atatürk, have been used as the leader's seal of approval for the memorial diplomacy that has been developed with Australia and New Zealand. Since Atatürk's every word was recorded as a guideline for future generations, Kemalists have been compelled to trust their late leader's wisdom on the issue. It will be interesting to see whether Özakıncı's theory will find any acceptance among Kemalists and whether there will be consequences in the diplomatic relations between the countries. In Turkey, some

nationalists, whether Kemalist or Islamist, find it challenging to accommodate a friendly enemy in their narratives and every now and then, there is an upsurge of Sevres Syndrome, which takes its name from the Sevres Treaty in which the partition of the territory of the defeated Ottoman Empire was signed off. The “structure of feeling” that is commonly known as Sevres Syndrome consists in the belief that “the West wants to divide and break up Turkey like they broke up the Ottoman Empire” (Göçek 2011, p.98). By extension, if the Australians are so interested in their ancestors who died in Gallipoli, they must have a hidden agenda of expropriating that piece of land. The Australian incorporation of a defeat into a crucial part of their identity is understandably quite confusing for most Turks, especially nationalists who only consider victories worth remembering.

On the other hand, arguably, the Anzac myth is not as disruptive to the Turkish myth as the Turkish myth to Anzac. After all, the Anzac myth had to be significantly transformed to make room for the enemy, even if the enemy was a respectable one. The Australian experience at Gallipoli was remembered as a battle against an invisible enemy, as vividly illustrated in Peter Weir’s *Gallipoli* and by the IWGC construction of the site. The Turks have forced themselves into that picture with their flags, monuments, fake cemeteries and emotional speeches and have stolen the show from the Australians. Turkish authorities have been frequently accused of ruining the heritage of the site by building not only cemeteries and memorials but also roads and other construction work. Bill Gammage claims that “tourism is destroying Anzac [...] Lausanne does not let anyone build ‘recreation works’ at Anzac, yet more roads mean more users, more crowds, more already impossible demands on transport and parking, food and water, toilets and security. What next – a dual highway?” Gammage proposes instead that the Turkish Government should stop building new memorials and roads and Anzac Day should be commemorated elsewhere (2007, p.139-40).

Gammage thus joins a number of historians, journalists and other researchers who are in favour of a ‘crime scene approach’ to the site, in order to preserve the ‘evidence.’ Whatever truth the original trenches or other traces of the war might still conceal is deemed valuable enough to preserve. Presumably, historians would then examine the evidence and deliver their understanding of

history to people. The suggestion is as unreasonable as it is impossible to achieve. The authenticity attributed to the site has long been thoroughly compromised after successive looting by poor local people, sanitisation by the IWGC and a major memory boom. It is in fact quite difficult to see any value in Gallipoli if not as a site of memory, rather than one of historical or archaeological evidence, as it has retained this character ever since the campaign. Anzac has a very interesting story to tell about how conflicting myths and understandings of the past can coexist, converse and evolve together on a unique site of memory. Gallipoli can never be one exclusive national site since the construction and remembrance of Gallipoli has never been anything other than transnational.

Un-writing imperial and pre-national past

Because of the political climate after the war, as discussed in Chapter 2, Indians probably experienced a greater degree of awkwardness than the Turks about the making of memory of the First World War. Army units seemed to be the only apparent agencies of commemoration of the First World War until very recently. One of the rare early monuments to commemorate the war dead is a pink sandstone obelisk at Patiala, which bears the inscription “In memory of gallant warriors” and lists the names of Patiala’s war dead in Gallipoli (Stanley 2015, pp.296-7). The Maharaja of Patiala was anxious that the larger Ferozepore Sikhs, into which the Patiala double company was integrated, would overshadow the services of his men. Although he was reassured that “he had the honour of being the only [Indian] ruler who had troops in the Dardanelles,” Patiala companies were in fact not remembered separately as the Maharajah wished (Chhina 2013, p.244). By building this memorial in Patiala, the Maharajah ensured that they were remembered separately, though locally.

Again thanks to the donations mainly from the Maharajah of Patiala, a functional memorial was inaugurated in Ferozepore in 1937. This memorial was built as an extension to the Ferozepore Cantonment Hospital, in memory of the Indian officers and other ranks of the 14th Sikhs and Patiala State Infantry who were killed or died of wounds in Gallipoli. The extension of the hospital was to be

used for the wives of Indian soldiers. The memorial was launched by Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Savory who was one of the young officers of the regiment at Gallipoli. Six other survivors of Gallipoli, four subadars, one havildar and one sweeper were still serving in the regiment at the time of the inauguration and were also present at the ceremony along with a large number of other active and retired servicemen (Bamford 1948, p.63-4). After partition, the armed forces underwent major changes. However, although army units experienced the First World War differently, they remained custodians of their institutional memories of the war.

Probably a unique commemoration has been given to Gabar Singh Negi, one of a handful of Victoria Cross recipients in the Indian army. Gabar Singh Negi died in France, aged 21, and his name was inscribed on the Neuve Chapelle Memorial. In Chamba, Uttarakhand near his native village, an annual fair has been organised in his memory. Although the date of the commencement of this tradition is not clear, it seems that the fair has gained momentum since 1971, when the Garhwal Rifles, which was Gabar Singh Negi's unit, started patronising the fair and built a memorial in Chamba in his honour (Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Military Honours, Gabar Singh Negi). The recruitment rally organised by the Garhwal Rifles is apparently one of the major attractions of the fair. On an Indian travel forum, the celebrations are described thus:

Every year, on 21 April people from far and near gather to pay their tribute to Gabbar Singh Negi, who brought glory and fame to the place by winning the Victoria Cross during the First World War. This time was no different. The Garhwal Rifles Regimental Band made the atmosphere emotional by beating retreat. With misty eyes, people remembered the great son of the soil, Gabbar Singh Negi. The Commandant of the Garhwal Rifles Regimental Centre, Brig. Gurdeep Dabar was specially here and paid floral tribute to this brave soldier. It was a memorable sight to watch the procession of the Manjood villagers, where Negi was born, to the sound of the traditional drum. (Dhol) (Gusain 2003, para.2)

The Army and the recruitment rally appear to occupy an important role in the event, and the Chairman of the Nagar Panchayat in 2003, was reported to have explained the aim of the fair as, "We want people to be inspired by the heroism of

Gabbar Singh Negi and continue the martial tradition of Uttarakhand” (para.3). There is certainly a convergence of interest between the army unit and the local community in remembering the war.

None of the commemorations or memorials other than the All-India War Memorial, more commonly known as India Gate, intended to communicate an understanding of the war at a national level. Designed by Edwin Lutyens, the architect of New Delhi and the IWGC, the foundations of the arch were laid in 1921. The Government of India built the memorial, with contributions from the IWGC. There were initially plans to build a memorial in Attock, to the missing officers and men of the Indian army who fell on or beyond the north-western frontier from 1914 to 1921. However, the idea was dropped due, on the one hand, to concerns over the accessibility of the area and, on the other, to the instability of the region. The IWGC then approached the Viceroy, Irwin, proposing to contribute funds to the Delhi memorial, provided that the names of the missing were inscribed on the memorial. The Viceroy and the IWGC jointly decided that all officers and other ranks who died during the Great War on or across the Indian north-western frontier would be commemorated by name on the memorial. The Government of India also undertook the building of a few cemeteries on the frontier without consulting the IWGC. The latter believed that these cemeteries could not be maintained and therefore, all those who died in the operations on or beyond the frontier, including those who were in known graves, should be considered ‘missing,’ and individually commemorated on the memorial arch (WG 127/5/4, pt1).

By the time the list of names was completed, the question remained concerning the dedication of the memorial. Initially, the proposed inscription contained no reference to the soldiers who had died in other theatres of war.

To the glory of God and in memory of thirteen thousand five hundred and twenty-seven officers and men of the British and Indian armies who fell in India and on the frontiers in the Great War 1914-1918 and the Third Afghan War 1919.

However, before finalising the text, the IWGC decided to consult Rudyard Kipling. An amended text omitting “of the British and Indian armies” was sent to Kipling, advising him that “we do not want to distinguish between British and Indian or between death in battle, death at home, nor can we properly say or imply that the graves are not known, because in nearly all cases they are.” Although Kipling respected the instructions, he came up with a significantly different dedication, which gave a new meaning to the memorial.

To the dead of the Indian armies who fell and are honoured in France and Flanders, Mesopotamia and Persia, East Africa, Gallipoli and elsewhere in the near and the far east and in sacred memory also of those whose names are here recorded and who fell in India on the North West Frontier and during the Third Afghan War. (WG 127/5/4, pt.1)

Those who died elsewhere had never been mentioned in the project of the memorial and although this dedication was significantly different from the intent of the memorial, Kipling’s proposal was accepted.





Figure 12 - India Gate with King George's canopy at the background, and a close caption of Kipling's dedication (author's own)

Fabian Ware's inaugural speech in 1931 also emphasised India's contribution to the Empire's war and stated that:

We are here to recall four years in a fading past, four unforgettable years, during which nations and people and races in every part of the world who owed allegiance to the King Emperor became, as never before, one - one in a common impulse to the throne and one in defence unto death of the rights they had won under the protection of that sovereignty. (WG 1/1/167)

The idea of honouring India's dead in defence of their own homeland was somewhat lost in the dedication of the memorial as well as in the proposed understanding of it. Although those Indian soldiers who died on the frontier, also did so in the interest of the Empire, the narrative of the war being India's war, fought on the borders of its own territory, became secondary to the narrative of Indians "standing shoulder to shoulder with the other nations of the Empire on the side of justice and freedom" (WG 1/1/167).

As contestable as this imperial interpretation may have been, the first attempts to nationalise the memorial after India's independence in 1947, did not target its imperial content, but its reference to undivided India. The first alteration

to the memorial was made in January 1949. Graffiti of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), a Hindu nationalist organisation, was painted on the foundation stone near the Urdu inscription, giving the date and particulars of the foundation. At the same time, the Urdu inscription itself was eliminated by the stonemasons who intended to replace it with a Hindi inscription (WG 127/5/4, Pt.2, 22 Jan 1949). Accommodating the history of an undivided India was also challenging for Pakistan. Commodore M. M. Hussain, the Head of the Military Mission at the High Commission for Pakistan in London approached the CWGC in 1966, requesting that the Neuve Chapelle Indian Memorial be called the “Indo-Pakistan” Memorial. The CWGC was against retrospective designations, therefore, a compromise was made by simply dropping the word ‘Indian’ (Barrett 2007, pp.459-61).

As far as India Gate is concerned, consultation with the CWGC was, to say the least, sporadic. The Indian Government took it upon itself to make several changes without informing the Commission. The question was: why would they? The memorial was theirs. The graffiti and alterations of 1949 was reported to the head office of the CWGC by their Delhi representative, advising that, “In view of these developments I feel the time has come to make it clear to those concerned that certain parts of this Delhi Memorial are the property of the Commission and cannot be interfered with in any way” (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 22 Jan 1949). The parts concerned were precisely the inscriptions on the memorial and the flanking fountains. The Commission had undertaken the funding and the execution of these parts; however, there was a question mark around the continuing responsibilities of the Commission for the maintenance and formal ownership of these parts. On this matter, the legal assistant of the Commission responded that “on the view that the whole structure of the memorial was and is the Indian government’s responsibility, we are perhaps not on very firm ground to raise a protest at an alteration which in itself does not so far as I can judge threaten the commemorative character of the memorial.” The policy of the Commission henceforth was clear: that the memorial was the property of India. In the meantime, the Commission reserved to itself the right to scrutinise the modifications planned by the government. “We are entitled to know that nothing is

in contemplation which might affect the names or general commemorative inscriptions which are the essence of the Memorial from the Commission's point of view" (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 16 Feb 1949). The Commission was satisfied with the reassurances that the commemorative character of the memorial was not altered by the changes.

The idea that the imperial content of the memorial somewhat contradicted its national character came to the fore in the 1960s and the response of the CWGC was significantly different. In 1961, the Indian Government approached the CWGC regarding their plans to amend the inscriptions on the memorial in order to include the Second World War and Jammu and Kashmir operations, as well as the addition of five rolls of honour for Burma, the Far East, Middle East, Europe and Jammu and Kashmir operations. D. R. Mital, Under Secretary to the Government of India enquired:

Since the proposal involves changes in the All-India War Memorial Archway (popularly known as India Gate) commemorating those who went from India and fell in defence of Empire from 1914-21, I am to enquire whether the Commonwealth War Graves Commission have any objection to the proposed scheme to convert India Gate into the National War Memorial as proposed above. (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 18 Aug 1961)

Although, from the CWGC's point of view, there was no doubt about the Indian ownership and therefore the national nature of the memorial, it was equally clear from the Indian Government's perspective that this memorial, which was dedicated to the 'defence of Empire,' did not constitute a national memorial. The addition that was suggested to make it national was essentially the war against Pakistan. The sense of nationhood, at least from the government's point of view, was drawn from the hostilities with Pakistan, at least as much as the anti-colonial struggle.

The Commission argued that the Second World War dead were individually commemorated in the campaign areas where they died. Reminding the Indian authorities of the reassurances that had been given in 1949, that the content and

meaning of the inscriptions would not be altered, the Commission's letter continued:

The amendment of the existing inscription on the Delhi Arch to include the War of 1939-1945 would undoubtedly amount to a radical alteration of their content and meaning; still more would the addition of reference on the Memorial to the Jammu and Kashmir operations. The Commission would be most reluctant to accept the former. As to the latter, the Commission's constitutional position, as laid down in its Charters, with India and Pakistan as two of its participating Governments, would make it impossible for the Commission to agree to the amendment of the inscription in this way. (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 29 Dec 1961)

The Commission suggested that the memorial should remain as "essentially a First World War Memorial," thus circumventing the issue of national or imperial interests, and that India should have a separate national memorial, like the London Cenotaph for instance.

The Indian Government did not protest this suggestion, but did not give up on their intention. However, an addition to the memorial would be built 11 years later, in 1972, immediately after the India-Pakistan War of 1971, over the independence of Bangladesh. Although it is not clear from the phrasing used in the official correspondence about this new addition, it seems that the idea of placing a perpetual flame at the centre of the memorial arch emerged in 1961, in the year when the Indian Government's proposal to nationalise the memorial was turned down. In January 1972, the Delhi representative of the CWGC noticed a news item, which reported that a perpetual flame would be placed under the arch of India Gate. So far, the Commission had apparently been under the impression that the flame would be placed under the canopy, which used to shelter King George V's statue, near India Gate. The flame was to be lit by the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi on Republic Day, in other words, less than a week after the newspaper article was noticed (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 18 Jan 1972). Upon his visit to India Gate the next day, the Delhi representative, Foster, reported that the memorial was being built in the middle of the gateway, with a base made of bricks and cement, a pedestal over the base and a rifle with a helmet on the top. Flames on four corners

of the memorial would be fed from gas cylinders located in the room inside one of the pillars (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 19 Jan 1972).

Everything about the description of the memorial pointed to its being permanent. Even the name 'Perpetual Flame' should have said something about the permanence of the new memorial. Yet, the Adjutant General Sibal who was in charge of communicating with the CWGC, held that the memorial was only temporary and no inscriptions were intended. Adjutant General Sibal explained his failure to communicate with Foster, whom he apparently knew personally, by the fact that he thought Foster had left Delhi (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 20 Jan 1972). Foster would not have been qualified to discuss such a significant modification anyway, and as the Indian Government was aware following the correspondence in 1961, the appropriate procedure was to contact the head office of the CWGC through the High Commission for India in London. It is quite clear that the Indian Government purposefully avoided consulting the CWGC in case there were objections to their plan.



Figure 13 - Amar Jawan Jyoti (author's own)

Indira Gandhi lit the flame as planned on Republic Day 1972, and the *India News* reported: “Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi pays homage at the solemn ceremony at India Gate to honour the memory of the nation’s unknown martyrs who campaigned for Indian independence.” The caption also adds that there was “A spectacle on the Bangladesh freedom movement, presented as part of the parade” (WG 127/5/4 Pt.2, 12 Feb 1972). Thus, the anti-colonial struggle of India and the India-Pakistan rivalry were fused in the celebration of the new memorial. Although Sibal still reassured the Commission that the memorial would be permanently removed on 31 January, the Commission was more realistic in not expecting its removal. They were simply hoping that there would be no further inscriptions apart from “Amar Jawan” [immortal warrior] which remains the only inscription on the memorial.

The CWGC was obviously wrong in believing that inscriptions alone gave meaning to the site. Although it is not explicit who the Amar Jawan Jyoti memorial commemorates, it is common knowledge among Indians that it commemorates the freedom fighters. Since this more recent addition is not perceived as a separate memorial, but as an integral part of the India Gate memorial arch, the entire structure has now also become a commemoration of Indian freedom fighters. One has to look upwards to see the inscription that explains the intent of the memorial according to Rudyard Kipling, although this was not the IWGC’s original intent either. Moreover, nothing on the memorial, not even the dedication of Kipling, explains whose names are listed on the honour roll. Jay Winter’s concept of a palimpsest is very useful here, to understand the layers of re-writing on the memorial, from the honour roll to imperial dedication and to the Amar Jawan Jyoti. The memorial remains a contested place which is still subject to re-writing.

A more recent challenge to India Gate has evolved as the site has also become a place where protesters express their discontent with the government or more generally with the political class. After the anti-corruption protest led by Anna Hazare in 2011, anti-rape protests gathered at India Gate in December 2012, following the particularly brutal gang-rape of a female student in New Delhi. Despite police violence in attempting to disperse the crowd, protesters gathered over and over again, occupying the site for several days. *The Times of India*

reported that: “A month before the Republic turns up at India Gate, with all its pomp and glory, people incensed by its attempt to silence their voice marched all over the place, making a bonfire of the wooden barricades that keep them off Rajpath [the parade ground leading to India Gate]” (Times News Network 2012, para.1). These unprescribed uses of India Gate show that the memorial has also become the symbol of betrayed promises for social justice and gender equality of the freedom fighters and an independent India.

The current Indian Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, stated its intention to build a national war memorial around King George V’s canopy and a national war museum at the adjoining Princess Park, both dedicated to the post-independence war dead. A *Daily Pioneer* columnist stated “Nothing can be more ironical than the fact that more than six-and-a-half decades after independence from British colonial rule, India still honours its war heroes – soldiers who have sacrificed their lives in defence of their motherland – by placing wreaths at a memorial that was added on to a relic of the British Raj” (Gupta 2014, para.1). Another newspaper article commented that the “Amar Jawan Jyoti was built [later] under the arch of India Gate in 1972 as a tribute to the almost 4,000 soldiers killed in the 1971 war” but that the soldiers who died in other operations were not honoured anywhere (Pandit 2014, para.5). There is certainly increasing awareness about the history of India Gate and Amar Jawan Jyoti, although there are conflicting interpretations of the latter, and increasing discontent about the perceived inadequacy of this memorial as a national memorial.

When the memorial and the museum are built, India Gate will certainly look like part of a much bigger commemorative complex. How these new constructions will relate to each other is not clear, as no design has yet been finalised by the government. Whatever the design may be, it is quite obvious that India has been propelled into a new era of commemoration as Indian diplomatic institutions are constantly solicited by Indian diasporas keen on participating in commemorations of the First World War in their home countries. Indian Government representatives and other dignitaries have also participated in a number of centenary commemorations organised by foreign diplomatic institutions in India. It is interesting however that the response of the government to the centenary

commemorations is further eschewing the First World War by diverting attention towards other wars.

India Gate is not the only memorial to the war built by the British in India. There are many other local memorials and some of these have been more effectively re-inscribed by Indian authorities after independence. One of the most remarkable examples of these local memorials is located in Chennai, presumably built before the war but later dedicated to all those from the Madras Presidency who died in the First World War (Mohan 2014, para.2). References to the Second World War were also added to the memorial after 1945. Unlike India Gate and several Commonwealth war graves across India, the Victory War Memorial was not built or maintained by the CWGC (former IWGC) and the Indian army seems to have assumed the maintenance of the memorial since independence. Several additions to the inscriptions on the memorial have been gradually made. The memorial now commemorates all wars in which the Indian army has participated since the First World War, including all post-independence conflicts. The dedication of the memorial now reads: “To the memory of all those from the Madras Presidency who lost their lives in the service of **the nation** and *post independence martyrs*.” “The nation” was clearly inscribed later, replacing another word, presumably “Empire” which had been deleted. Some older photos of the memorial do not include the last section, “and post independence martyrs,” which seems to have been added recently. Although the word Empire has been deleted, the inscription is still problematic as it remembers the anachronistic contribution of the “Madras Presidency” to the nation.

The cases of India and Turkey show that remembrances of the past are almost always about the present, especially if the commemorations proliferate after so many years. Transforming pre-national histories into national sites of memory has never been a straightforward process. These sites of memory have been overwritten several times according to changes in current preoccupations; they have been amended, altered and contested. While India and Turkey were plunged into their post-war battles over independence and political stability respectively, they saw little benefit in commemorating the First World War. Subsequently, they have had to grapple with the meanings of the past that were

handed down to them, and transform imperial sites of memory erected in their territories into national icons. Maintaining memorials to the glory of the British Empire in territories of what have become independent nation-states is a delicate diplomatic practice. Eventually, Australia also joined hands with Turkey in overwriting an imperial past that had become cumbersome in their own national mythologies. The story of friendship that was born out of that joint effort, rather than the war, also brings about its own diplomatic intricacies. The sites that are discussed in this chapter are in a constant process of being remade and it seems that the process will be complete only when the sites become irrelevant to the national projects. As long as the sites preserve their relevance, they can be expected to go through amendments.

Chapter 10 - From national to transnational: Anzac Day

Anyone who takes an Australian citizenship test may have to answer the question: “What do we remember on Anzac Day?” There is not a simple answer to this question but the multiple-choice suggests that the correct answer is “the landing of the Australian and New Zealand Corps at Gallipoli, Turkey.”²⁸ Although the word may sound like an unintelligible collection of sounds to most people outside of Australia (or New Zealand), all Australians know what Anzac and Gallipoli stand for, and citizens-to-be are expected to know the implications of these two key words that are an intrinsic part of any conventional definition of coming into being of Australian national identity. Anzac was originally the acronym for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. It was lexicalised as a word in its own right and is now interpreted as a tradition or a legend or more controversially a myth. Still very much associated with Gallipoli, the mythical birthplace of Anzac, Anzac Day now officially commemorates all Australians who served and died in wars, conflicts and peacekeeping operations as well as celebrating Australian national identity. Such a restricted vision of nationhood that celebrates the military achievements, or indeed failure, of a predominantly white, male group of people alienated and still alienates a large sector of the population. I argue that, paradoxically, certain immigrant groups find in these commemorations an opportunity to become or show that they are a part of the Australian “national community.”

Sydneysiders of Turkish or Indian backgrounds, who regularly march on Anzac Day, contribute multiple and quite original answers to the question of what people remember on Anzac Day. Eighteen people whose interviews were recorded

²⁸ Other options are: “A/ The first free settlers arriving from Britain, B/ The First Fleet’s landing at Sydney Cove.” There are a few different versions of this question one of them: “What is the significance of Anzac Day? A/Anzac Day is a solemn day when we remember the arrival of the First Fleet from Great Britain in 1788, B/ Anzac Day is named after the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, which landed in Greece during the World War I, C/ Anzac Day is a solemn day when we remember the sacrifice of all Australian who served and died in wars, conflicts and peacekeeping operations.” The correct answer is C.

for the purpose of this research belonged to different age and social categories. All but one of them marched on Anzac Day at least once, under the Turkish, Indian or Sikh banner. The exception was Nuran, an Armenian from Turkey, with whom I discussed Armenian commemorations that coincide with Anzac Day. Some of the other respondents also participated in other commemorative events related to Gallipoli, and others are involved in organising such events. Their ethnic and religious backgrounds are diverse, as are their stories of immigration to Australia. They are all settled in Sydney, with the exception of Balkar who divides his time between India and Australia, and K.C. who happened to be on holiday in Australia in April 2014, when he was invited to march with the Indian 29th Brigade. They do not have much in common apart from their shared interest in remembering the war in the peculiar context of Anzac Day marches (not necessarily the dawn service), and their identification with the non-Australian elements of the Gallipoli campaign. I was also a participant observer in several meetings of the National Sikh Council of Australia, the Turkish Chapter of the RSL Auburn sub-branch, the Atatürk Cultural Centre as well as many commemorative events pertaining to Gallipoli campaign other than Anzac Day.

The revival of Anzac Day since the mid-1980s and 1990s has been scrutinised by many historians, specifically from the Anglo-Australian perspective. But what were the responses of those who are least expected to identify with the original Anzacs? Why do Sikhs, Turks and Indians want to be a part of Anzac Day? How do they relate to the story of Anzac? How does the Anzac myth fit into their narratives of self and community? This study includes the point of view of a small number of individuals who have participated in Anzac commemorations and does not attempt to make larger claims about those who do not participate; neither does it claim that the findings are representative of these communities at large. However, their accounts are not merely personal ones. They are shaped socially within diasporic communities that endeavour to bridge the divide between their original and adopted countries. The findings from the interviews not only provide new insight into the phenomena of the revival of Anzac commemorations, but they also point to the larger issues that have been discussed in previous chapters about the ways in which the experiences of the First World War are remembered in India

and in Turkey. In this chapter, the reinvention of Anzac Day is discussed, not as a purely Australian phenomenon, but as one which also has multicultural and transnational input from immigrant communities.

The fall and rise of Anzac Day in Australia

The Anniversary of the landing of Australian troops at Gallipoli at dawn on 25 April 1915 had already become a day of commemoration by 1916. However, by the time the date was adopted as a national holiday in 1927, it had gone through a process of standardisation, shifting from locally organised and mostly civilian and religious commemorations towards Returned Servicemen's League (RSL) regulated military parades (Thomson 1994, pp.130-1). Today, the RSL still hosts Anzac Day commemorations and has the power to decide who will or will not march in the parade. A typical Anzac Day starts with a Dawn Service around 5am held at the local RSL branches, and the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. An examination of the orders of service that are published annually reveals that all these services follow the same programme year after year, incorporating very little change.²⁹ There is no space for individual tributes or any improvisation on the part of the speakers. This immutability, rather than the actual religious content of the ceremony, gives the dawn service a canonical quality. After the Dawn Service, there is a military parade where servicepersons and ex-servicepersons march with their units. Following the parade, a National Service is held in Canberra only and this is usually a shorter version of the Dawn Service, the only difference being that a political figure delivers an address at the beginning. One of the principles of the RSL has been keeping the 'politics' out of Anzac Day and by this token, the

²⁹ One of the major changes that was brought about concerns the national anthem. In 1984, PM Bob Hawke requested the order of the ceremonial to be reprinted, removing 'God Save the Queen' from the programme. Prior to 1984, the programmes included "Playing of the National Anthem [God Save the Queen] and 'Advance Australia Fair'. Played as a hymn. (Those present in uniform are not required to salute.)" Bob Hawke demanded that 'Advance Australia Fair' should be played as the National Anthem and those in uniform should salute" (AWM Anzac Day Souvenirs Collection, 5/9/1). It is interesting to note that this was the first time a PM intervened in the programme. Retrospectively, this intervention signals Bob Hawke's intention to be involved in the reshaping of Anzac Day. It also clearly indicates his intention to break from the imperial tradition and reinvent Anzac as a national celebration.

organisation is able to claim both a higher moral ground and greater permanence than any political party or representative. Nevertheless, the RSL has imposed a conformity on Anzac Day, which has been anything but apolitical.

From the beginning, many ex-servicemen, especially those of a left-wing orientation, who did not identify with the conservatism of the RSL chose not to join the league or Anzac Day celebrations, seeing them as a glorification of war (Thomson 1994, p.214). Until the 1980s, the gap between the participants and outsiders seemed to widen, as new generations were growing particularly irreverent towards Anzac. In the late 1950s, a university student described Anzac Day as a “yearly pageant of national necrophilia, which joins Australians in a day of morbid joy and unity” and participants as those who believed that “trained assassins are Australia’s foremost export” (in Donaldson and Lake 2010, p.80). In the 1960s, with the outbreak of the Vietnam War and the introduction of conscription, criticism of Anzac Day became even more widespread and virulent. Since the 1950s, many observers had predicted that the tradition would die with the generation of original Anzacs (Holbrook 2014, pp.117-8). However, Anzac Day became a place of contestation throughout the 1980s and was taken up particularly by Aboriginal servicemen who insisted on marching separately, rather than with their units, and by feminist groups opposing rape in war, who were discredited as ‘lesbians’ wanting to destroy Anzac Day by the then president of the RSL of the State of Victoria, Bruce Ruxton (McKenna 2010, p.118).

However, instead of destroying Anzac Day, the feminist protestors inadvertently brought the dying tradition back to life. The women’s protest prompted not only misogynistic comments and insults from onlookers, but also stimulated sympathy for the old veterans whose dignity was felt to be violated (Twomey 2013, pp.99-101). As Christina Twomey argued, “Anzac Day began to be recast not as the resort of the war-monger, but the domain of men whose honour and integrity had been exposed to unjustified criticism and doubt” (p.102). However, women’s protests were an indicator of the ongoing transformation of Anzac Day as well as the changing perceptions of the war and its subsequent commemoration. Perceptions of the war as a horrific rather than an epic event was

well under way when the Women against Rape in War collective emphasised the horrors of war.

Many historians consider Bill Gammage's *The Broken Years* (1974), Patsy Adam-Smith's *The Anzacs* (1974) and Peter Weir's film *Gallipoli* (1981) as the turning point in the representations of the original Anzacs (Donaldson and Lake 2010, p.90; Inglis 2008, pp.415-6; Holbrook 2014, pp.135-6). Until then, the view of the Australian official war correspondent and the writer of the official history of the First World War, Charles Bean, had dominated the narrative. The legend goes that the young Australians who landed at Gallipoli, on 25 April 1915 at 5am, proved their manhood through bravery and blood sacrifice thus heralding the coming of age of the Australian nation. Australia was born out of this "baptism of fire." Although this story is a permanent part of the Anzac liturgy, reiterated every year, the Anzac legend was also reinvented as a story of death and horror whereby a flock of youthful and naïve Australians were dragged into certain death by an incompetent and uncaring British command. More than epic-heroic, the essence of the story became tragic, or rather a hybrid genre which accommodates contradictory elements of both with astonishing ease. This change occurred simultaneously with a sense of Australian nationhood shifting from the Empire to an indigenous identity forged by the Australian landscape.

Other than making the Anzac story more attractive to younger Australians, this representation of the Anzac soldier as benign and non-aggressive enabled former enemies to construct a shared memory of an oxymoronic friendly warfare between Turkish and Anzac soldiers. This new narrative pattern made it possible for Australian diplomacy to approach the former enemy for commemorations on Turkish soil. These large-scale commemorations could only be negotiated and organised at a government level and the RSL, whose primary focus was on servicemen, ex-servicemen and their direct descendants, lost its control over the make-up of participants, the nature of the remembrance and the mode of commemoration on Anzac Day. The overseas commemorations became so popular that a number of other war sites had to be negotiated to receive the flood of Australian 'pilgrims,' although, Gallipoli is still the favourite destination for this new memorial tourism. The attendance at Anzac Day in Australia has also

exploded since the early 1990s, the figures that were given for attendance at the centenary commemorations in Canberra alone was 150,000 people (Reinfrank and Thorpe 2015, para.1).

Since the 1990s, Anzac Day in Australia has also become somewhat more inclusive now embracing all those who served and died in all conflicts and peacekeeping operations in the Australian, Commonwealth or Allied forces. In an attempt to include more diversity, a few memorials were built to honour nurses and Aboriginal soldiers. However, the meaning of Anzac Day is still very contested. Gallipoli as the myth of origin of the Australian nation is still problematic regardless of recent efforts to acknowledge the ethnic diversity of servicemen and servicewomen. This originary myth elides Australia's colonial past and downplays the significance of any non-military aspect of Australia's history. Why should warfare be treated as the single crucial experience that encompasses any nation's history or 'spirit'? Yet, the untested presumption that World War I was the most important influence in shaping today's Australia, and that the war was the uttermost cause of human suffering in history justifies generous funding for the elaboration of war-related teaching material, school trips, exhibitions, broadcasts and other projects, which further enhance that presumption (Lake 2010; Stanley 2012).

Although Anzac myths have always been a bone of contention, dissident voices have been suppressed by its aura of sacredness. Notwithstanding criticism in academic circles, and a few odd editorials, the Anzac myth usually receives an uncritical reception so that it appears to be a consensual narrative of Australian nationhood. Many immigrant communities identify with the narrative. The RSL now authorises ex-servicepersons and descendants of the veterans of allied forces to march on Anzac parades and even allows these groups to have their own sub-branches. However, despite its new multicultural outlook, Anzac Day still remains centred on the military heritage of Australia and its allies. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost all respondents in this research had family links to a veteran and/or they served personally in the armed forces. This military identity is a key element that drives most of them to join the marches. However, all my

respondents are now civilians and their desire to be part of Anzac Day has much more to do with their civilian lives in Australia than their military pasts.

Early responses of South Asians in Australia to the war

South Asians, mainly Sikh, Hindu, and Afghan immigration to Australia, started in the colonial period. After the adoption of the White Australia policy in 1901, South Asians remained as one of the biggest non-European communities in Australia after the Chinese. Although people from non-European descent were subjected to discriminatory laws and treatment, during the First World War, the situation of the Sikhs improved to a certain degree. There were not only many long newspaper articles praising the warrior qualities of Sikhs and Gurkhas (for example see “The Indian Army in France” 1915), but also news reports about Sikhs in Australia. *The Daily News* (W.A.) reported:

An unusual recruit for the Australian Imperial Expeditionary force was found in a wiry-built, brown-skinned man, who made his application in full khaki kit, forage cap and leather puttees. On his tunic dangled the South Africa and Tirah campaign medals. “I’m a Sikh,” he exclaimed proudly ... Here I have been hawking, but I am a Sikh, and when I put on my uniform I forget I have been a trader and become a soldier. We Punjabis make good fighters. (“A Sikh in Australia” 1915)

We do not know the name of this man, but he was probably one of at least 12 South Asian immigrants who served in the AIF³⁰ (see First World War Embarkation Rolls, AWM; NAA B2455). At the beginning of the war, some Sikhs were more ambitious about the contribution they could make. In November 1914, the *Geraldton Guardian* transmitted a message from a certain Rur Singh who wanted to raise a Sikh regiment in Australia:

³⁰ There is no practical way to search for the AIF recruits from different backgrounds. Through the search of common South Asian names in the records, I was able to identify nine men carrying the name ‘Singh,’ and three South Asian men with the name ‘Khan.’ Other names that I tried did not give any results.

However, there are many less common names that I had to overlook for the sake of economy.

Any Sikh (Indian soldier) in W.A. willing to volunteer for the war in Europe is requested to communicate with Rur Singh, Geraldton, before the beginning of March next. If necessary, financial assistance will be given to any applicant. Maharajah of the Sikhs is now with his army in Europe and his subjects in Australia are invited to show their loyalty and allegiance by answering the appeal. ("The Proposed Australian Sikh Regiment" 1914)

Considering that there were merely a few thousand South Asians in Australia at the time (3698 "Hindoos" according to 1911 census (Bilimoria 1996, p.11)), forming a regiment was an unrealistic project and did not succeed. However, their relatively small number was not the only problem. Several men who enlisted were rejected after their medical examination. Although the medical reports did not give a specific reason why Juwan Singh for instance was considered to be "unlikely to become an efficient soldier," or in what way Nundah Singh presented an "unsuitable physique," these were possibly coded ways of saying what Linna Singh's medical report said clearly: "not of substantially European descent" (NAA B2455).

For Sikhs, other than their definition of themselves as martial people, their past experience in the army must have influenced their decision to enlist. About half of those South Asian men who enlisted in the Australian forces had already served in the Indian Army. Gurbachan Singh's brother already seemed to have a connection with the AIF, as his address was given as "Indarar Singh, c/o Captain W. Gee, No 2 AIF Camp, Goulburn, NSW" (NAA B2455). Another man, also named Gurbachan Singh, had served in the Boer War with non-combatant troops, as Indians were not eligible to fight ("A Fighting Sikh" 1918). They were all over 30 years of age, four of them over 40, and typically working as farmers, labourers or hawkers. South Asian men of this profile did not necessarily intend to settle in Australia permanently. They were not allowed to bring their families and were encouraged to either intermarry and assimilate into Australian society or leave (Bilimoria p.12).

Davy Singh and Fatte Allie Khan both lived with their Australian wives, whereas Sarn Singh's wife, Partab Kaur, remained in Punjab. Sarn Singh never

returned to Australia or India. He was killed in action in Belgium a little more than a year after he joined the AIF. He had apparently had the opportunity to buy land and save some money in a bank before enlisting. He had anticipated his possible death and left a will in due form, witnessed by a solicitor and a law clerk, before he embarked for overseas. He asked a friend in Australia to liquidate his estate and send all his assets to his brother. However, shortly after his death, his wife complained that her in-laws were not willing to support her anymore and she was anxious to get his money and pension. Sarn Singh's father also lodged a similar inquiry, and even the Viceroy requested information about the case.³¹ The officer in charge requested that all the money should be sent to his wife and also referred the case to the Deputy Commissioner of Pensions. It is not clear whether Partab Kaur received any payments but she did receive Sarn Singh's British War Medal and Victory Medal in 1922 and signed with her fingerprint on the receipt. The booklet *Where the Australians Rest* was also posted to her (NAA B2455, see chapter 9 about the booklet).

Apart from Sarn Singh and Sailani Nain Singh, who was also killed in action in Belgium, all these men returned to Australia with medals, some with wounds and diseases and at least one, Davy Singh, with serious psychological damage that was diagnosed as neurasthenia. Why was it so important for these men to serve Australia? It is not clear whether they enlisted out of loyalty to Australia or to the Empire or even their Indian comrades who were also fighting on various fronts. In a war where India and Australia were both fighting for King and country, enlisting with the AIF might have been merely practical. The income that was attached to military service that greatly weighed in the balance in Punjab was probably not as attractive in Australia. The social distinction that came from martial identity must have been a strong motivation for these men to enlist. However, their response to the war was unlikely to have been representative of all South Asians in Australia. There was possibly a diversity of responses that, unfortunately, escaped the

³¹ Sarn Singh's records do not include the letter from the Viceroy, but a reference to it. Since Sarn Singh's father was apparently a local dignitary, he may have been able to solicit the Viceroy's attention to the case of his son.

record. There was nonetheless, one significant event that displayed opposition to the imperial loyalty of the men who enlisted.

On new year's day 1915, two South Asian Muslim men, carrying guns and a Turkish flag attacked a train with over a thousand picnickers en route to Silverton and killed four people and wounded several more. Local and national newspapers covered the attack as "War in Broken Hill." After the shooting, the two attackers were chased by the police and military men. Several armed civilians also joined the shoot-out, as the *Barrier Miner* reported, in "a desperate determination to leave no work for the hangman" ("To-day's tragedy" 1915). Eventually, both men were shot dead. There was some doubt about the origins of the two men who "wore the dress of their people, with turbans on their head." Although there was a possibility that they might be Afghans, they were mostly referred to as Turks in the media even after their identities had been revealed.

Police soon discovered two suicide notes written by the two men, Mulla Abdullah and Gool Mahommed. Gool Mahommed presented himself as an Afridi who had served in the army of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid and he claimed he had taken action for the sake of his faith and loyalty to the Sultan. Mulla Abdullah's reasons were of a different nature. He had apparently been persecuted by a sanitary inspector for slaughtering sheep without permission. He said he took arms for his faith and obedience to the Sultan but also, because of his grudge, he wished to kill the inspector first ("The New Year's Tragedy: The 'Confessions'" 1915). Mullah Abdullah also stated that, "no man interfered with us except [the sanitary inspector] in the Court, and we had no enemies, except that one day, a long time ago, I put on a turban and some larrikin children threw stones. I did not like it, and that was why I put on the turban to-day. I didn't wear one since the day the larrikins threw stones" ("Broken Hill Sensation: Turk's confession" 1915).

Apparently, both men had come to Australia for the camel trade but the business did not turn out as planned and they were unemployed for a while until Gool Mahommed was hired as an ice-cream seller (Seyit 2013, para.1-2). There was an additional source of grievance suggested by the *Clarence and Richmond*

Examiner, in an article entitled “Broken Hill ‘Turks.’” The article started with the statement that the so-called Turks were in fact Afghans and continued:

It is quite conceivable that the ‘Turkish’ attack on the picnic train was the sequel to an attack on the Afghan camp by some of the disorderly elements that throng the Barrier. Such an attack is hard to explain in any other way. The burning of the German Club – a somewhat unpretentious building in Delamore street – can only be ascribed to a drunken freak. A Broken Hill mob is very courageous when it is full of liquor. [...] When the recent tragedy is sifted, it will probably be found that innocent picnickers lost their lives through the disorderly elements temporarily cutting loose, attacking the Afghans, and the Amir’s subjects taking revenge by firing at a picnic train. The tragedy has really no war significance. (1915)

This hypothesis has some value, in so far as the letters insist on the fact that they had not consulted or told anyone about their plans, possibly in an attempt to protect their comrades in the camp from retaliation. For the same reason, they may have avoided mentioning the racial hatred experienced by the South Asians in Broken Hill. However, the incident did cause further distress to the cameleers and other South Asian men, as an angry mob proceeded to their camp and attacked it after burning down the said German club. A few days later, 12 men (four Germans, seven Austrians and one Turk) were arrested in relation to the shooting incident and were transferred to Adelaide in spite of the claims of Mulla Abdullah and Gool Mahommed that they had acted alone (“Aliens from Broken Hill” 1915).

The attack certainly had its roots in local issues. But the reasons given in the suicide notes should not be dismissed altogether. The tragedy did have some significance related to the war. We know that South Asians in Australia, mainly in Sydney and Perth, had previously contributed to the Ottoman Red Crescent funds during the Balkan Wars, out of pan-Islamic solidarity (see Chapter 1, p.31). There is good reason to believe that they would be concerned about the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war against the allies. The possibility of these men taking up arms in defence of their Caliph was perhaps no more unlikely than the other 12 South Asian men enlisting in the service of Australia and by extension, the Empire.

Although the local circumstances were probably more important triggers for this event, the trope of the unspeakable Turk demonstrating his fanaticism was more expedient in terms of war propaganda in Australia (see “The Unspeakable Turk” 1915; “Sensational outrage ... Kaiser’s murderous friends” 1915). Similar discourses circulated in the Ottoman Empire where the incident was reported as Turks ambushing a military convoy and killing hundreds of Australian soldiers (Seyit 2013, para.7). Today, the event has a particular resonance for Turkish immigrants in Australia; on the other hand, I have found no evidence that it has any significance for South Asian Muslims. In fact, South Asian Muslims, whether from Pakistan, India or elsewhere, generally stay aloof from Anzac Day. One Turkish-Australian man refused to participate in this research saying that he did not want to get into ‘politics.’ He explained that the Australian Government had paid two Afghan men to launch an attack under the Turkish banner in order to propagate hatred against the Turks and to find more recruits to send to Gallipoli. Although the Gallipoli landing had not been planned when the attacks took place, I have heard this conspiracy theory on a few other occasions.

Transnational politics of Anzac Day

Immigration from Turkey to Australia started in 1968 with the Assisted Migration Scheme, signed a year earlier. However, there had been a Turkish Cypriot community in Australia since the 1950s. Notwithstanding their relatively recent history of immigration to Australia, Turkish people have been marching in Anzac parades in Sydney since the 1970s, although this was not authorised until 1998. Kemal Döver was the first person to organise the unauthorised Turkish contingent in 1972 and a few consecutive years thereafter. He was a former Turkish wrestling champion who arrived in Sydney with the first chartered flight from Ankara. A small group of about 10 Turkish immigrants marched with him with a banner “Turkish-Australian friendship will never die.” When some people said that the Turkish were not welcome, Döver wittily responded that the Anzacs were not invited to Gallipoli either, but they came all the same (Fewster et al. 2003, p.17). This group stopped marching a few years later for unknown reasons and a

Turkish contingent again took part in the march in Sydney only in 1998 after the Turkish Sub-branch of the RSL was founded.

It is clear that individual Turkish immigrants as well as Turkish ambassadors and consuls were active agents in opening up transnational spaces in commemorative practices in Australia. Baha Vefa Karatay, the first Turkish ambassador to Canberra, during his short term in office from March 1967 to November 1968, initiated not only the Assisted Migration Scheme but also a commemorative project. In 1968, Australian newspapers reported that

The recent Turkish Ambassador to Australia, His Excellency M. Baha Vefa Karatay, has sought the Returned Services League's assistance to prepare a personal type history of the Gallipoli campaign. M. Karatay points out that the number of Gallipoli veterans decreased each year and his aim is to collect as many personal impressions and experiences possible from Australians, New Zealanders and Turks. ("Gallipoli Veterans Can Help Ambassador" 1968)

Karatay's initiative was certainly noteworthy at a time when personal accounts were given little public importance, and individual memories were not a focus of war studies. Karatay called for witnesses and also managed to organise a reunion of veterans, where he asked them about their experience in Gallipoli and their encounters with Turks. According to Aytuner Akbaş, who was the head of the Turkish sub-branch of the RSL from 2005 to 2010, this was a turning point, not only in terms of the remembrance of the Turkish 'enemy' in Australia, but also in the way in which Gallipoli was remembered in Turkey. Karatay appeared on Turkish national television and published a book about Gallipoli in the mid-1980s. There followed an upsurge of publications about Gallipoli in Turkey. This change in representations of the war on the one hand, and the increasing interest of people on the other, prepared the ground for the transnational revival of Anzac.



Figure 14 - Atatürk Memorial next to Anzac Memorial, Hyde Park, Sydney (author's own)

The then Consul General in Sydney, Ferit Ergin, was also involved in the negotiations with the RSL for a Turkish sub-branch. Turkish consuls have subsequently been involved, in one way or another, in all the commemorative projects initiated by this sub-branch, which later underwent structural change in 2011 and became a chapter in the Auburn RSL sub-branch. Among the commemorative projects honouring the Turks that were completed recently are the Atatürk Memorial in Hyde Park and the Australian-Turkish Memorial Wall in Auburn Memorial Park, both unveiled in February 2015. The Atatürk Memorial, which was co-funded by the NSW and the Turkish Governments, prompted an immediate reaction from the Armenian National Committee of Australia: “To erect memorials to Atatürk and to pay tribute to his legacy is to honour his legacy of rape, murder, dictatorship, ethnic cleansing and genocide” (2015). Ironically, according to Aytuner Akbaş, the idea of erecting this memorial emerged in response to a memorial to the victims of the Armenian Genocide which was erected in the gardens of the NSW Parliament in 1999.

Tensions around the recognition/denial of the Armenian genocide are central to the Turkish commemorations of Anzac Day. Muzaffer Orel, one of the founding members of the Turkish sub-branch and the former coordinator of the chapter, confided to me that one of the reasons they wanted to become a part of

the RSL was because of the League's lobbying potential against those who were pressing for the recognition of the Armenian genocide. However, they were soon to discover that, by its constitution, the RSL could not be and would not be involved in activities of an overt political nature.

Past and present consuls, representing the official stance of the Turkish Government, also attempted to influence Australian opinion, particularly around Gallipoli commemorations. In 2012, during the Turkish commemoration of Gallipoli on 18 March, the then consul, Gülseren Çelik inserted this in her speech about the meaning of the day:

We also remember with profound sorrow the former Consul General of the Republic of Turkey to Sydney Mr. Şarık Arıyak and his security officer Attaché Mr. Sever who were killed 31 years ago on 17 December 1980 by an Armenian terrorist organization just because they were Turkish and representing Turkey. This was only one of the 200 attacks perpetrated by Armenian terrorist groups in 21 countries and 4 continents between 1973-1984, killing 58 Turkish citizens, including 34 diplomats. We pay our respect to all who lost their lives in these attacks. (para.7)

On 18 March 2015, the Consulate and the RSL Turkish chapter organised a conference in NSW Parliament House. On all seats a book was placed, written by a Turkish academic, Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, contesting the validity of the genocide claims from the point of view of international law (see Palabıyık 2015).

Furthermore, the Turkish consul at the time also resolved the controversy over the design of the Auburn memorial by exploiting the Armenian issue. The Australian-Turkish Friendship Wall was a part of the plan to remove the RSL's Auburn memorial to its current location opposite to the Auburn RSL building. As the RSL had liquidated its estate in Auburn, the memorial had to be moved to Auburn Council property. As an addition to the existing memorial, a wall with commemorative plaques was built behind it, in honour of the Turks. However, as the memorial was being built, Muzaffer Orel who found the addition disproportionate in size to the old memorial and was further offended by the wall's location in the background, decided to register his disagreement. He felt that his

concerns were being dismissed by both the RSL and the Council and so decided to garner more support by involving Turkish associations. Almost all of the associations who responded to Orel's call for a meeting, signed a petition requesting the alteration or cancellation of the plans. The representatives of the associations appeared to agree that the memorial in its current form did not honour Australian-Turkish friendship but was culturally insensitive and an insult to the Turks. However, they changed their views after a meeting set up by the Consul General, Şeyda Hanbay Arca. It is reported that the Consul General invited the associations to choose their battles, arguing that the Turkish community should appreciate an Australian initiative (neither the Turkish Government nor the associations had contributed to the funding) to honour their friendship otherwise Armenians would gain more ground. After considering the consul's proposition, the battles were indeed chosen; the petition was withdrawn. It is also important to note that many Turkish people genuinely appreciated the memorial and were both surprised and outraged at the protest.



Figure 15 - Aubrun War Memorial and Wall of Friendship, Sydney (author's own)



Since the concerns over Armenian-Turkish tensions are so central to the Turkish commemorative agenda, it is not surprising that most Turkish participants in Anzac Day have very strong opinions on the issue. Those who strongly oppose the recognition of the Armenian genocide are more likely to participate in the marches. I asked whether Nuran, who is a Sydney-based Armenian from Istanbul, whether he thought that Armenian people should have more space in the Anzac Day ceremonies. He said that he considered Anzac Day to be a glorification of war and that he was not interested in being a part of a celebration of a war, which had dispersed or killed so many members of his family. He believed that Anzac Day represented the very ideology that should be avoided in order to enable understanding and reconciliation between Turks and Armenians. Nuran was born and raised in Istanbul and in his experience, prejudices collapse when people mingle socially and bond with each other. He regretted, however, that Armenians are too few in number to make a change through social interaction in Turkey. I did not bring up the issue deliberately during any other interview, except with Volkan Ermis, who is an active member of the Talat Pasha Committee, which was founded for the sole purpose of ensuring that the genocide was not officially recognised. Volkan is also one of the regular participants in and an occasional organiser of 18 March commemorations. When I asked him about the reasons for the close connection between Gallipoli and the Armenian genocide, he argued that this connection existed only in Australia, where the Armenian diaspora regarded the Turkish-Australian friendship based on Gallipoli as an obstacle to their own

agendas. He believed that the Armenian community were focused on enabling resolutions about Armenian genocide to be passed in Parliament and, to this end, were trying to weaken the spirit of Gallipoli.

Anzac Day has clearly become a battleground for recognition versus denial of the Armenian genocide. Thus, whenever the treatment of Armenians and other minorities during the First World War is discussed, not only in Australia but also often in Turkey, Turkish leaders or commentators vehemently refute the allegations, pointing to Australians as witnesses to the good national character of the Turks. Thus, Anzac narratives of Turks being fair and compassionate fighters became incontrovertible proof against accusations of genocide. However, this narrative of friendship is constantly tested as it depends on Australian acquiescence to the official Turkish line on the Armenian genocide. Yet the camp in support of the recognition of the genocide is gaining ground in Australia as demonstrated in 2013, when two state governments, namely, New South Wales and South Australia, decided to pass resolutions acknowledging the Armenian genocide. The Turkish consul threatened NSW MPs that they would not be granted visas to Turkey for the Anzac Day commemorations and added, "We expect Australians to show the same kind of respect that we have shown to their history and their ancestry" (Davidson 2013, para.4).

The consul's reaction is not surprising as the Turkish Government's position on the issue is unequivocal. What is more interesting is the overwhelming support from Turkish immigrants, some second generation, for the state politics of Turkey. Peter Stanley argues that, "the controversy obliges Australians to take sides. [...] Turkey's extraordinary response to the NSW parliamentarians will oblige Australians to choose between being a friend of Turkey or being a friend of the truth" (2013, para.10-1). However, in this particular case, Australian MPs were compelled to take sides for reasons that were different to those cited by Stanley. The Reverend Fred Nile, the leader of the Christian Democrat Party, who had proposed the motion had previously denounced the Islamisation of Australia and pointed out that "we should reflect that life of Christians can be fragile in any country dominated by Muslims" (Davidson 2013, para.14-5). It is possible that Turks may have been offended not simply on behalf of the Turkish state but also

because of the discourse on the ‘inherent barbarity’ of Muslims. Ironically, none of the participants in this research identified Islamophobia as a major concern; in fact some took issue with the Islamism of one sector of the Turkish community in Sydney.

As an extension of the current domestic political battles in Turkey between secular Kemalists and Islamists, there are competing Turkish communities in Sydney courting state institutions and consulate support for their separate and yet not so different agendas. The associations representing the Islamic branch have carried out a very successful image management campaign and received acceptance as the moderate face of Islam in Australia since they had access to much better funding and superior organisational skills. Through their very popular inter-communal events, such as open days at the Gallipoli Mosque, inter-faith iftar dinners during Ramadan, Turkey study tours, Anatolian festival and public lectures, they established themselves as the representatives of the Turkish community in the eyes of state institutions. Their success is demonstrated by their ability to gain grants from institutions such as Multicultural Affairs NSW, the Community Relations Commission, and so on. However, their strong emphasis on Islam in Turkish identity and their affiliation with the controversial figure, Fethullah Gülen, alienates a significant section of the Turkish community. On the other hand, the Islamists do not identify with the veneration of Atatürk and Kemalist state politics, which have been repressive towards Islamists in the past.

Since the Islamist branch of Turkish politics has been enjoying an uninterrupted majority in the Turkish National Assembly since 2002, the Kemalist Turks in Sydney consider the success of the Islamist associations as part of a Turkish state-sponsored conspiracy to take over diasporas. This contention was particularly clear in 2014 when the freshly appointed Turkish consul was invited to the last minute organisation of the 18 March commemorations in Auburn. It was the first public appearance of the new consul and her political affinities were a subject of speculation among the guests even before she arrived. The audience listened carefully to her welcome speech and the expected reference to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk finally came towards the end. After the consul general, Aytuner Akbaş gave a lecture about the Turkish perspectives of the campaign from a

military history point of view, followed by Muammer Toprakçı who made a presentation about the naval campaign of Gallipoli. Towards the end of his lecture, Toprakçı became carried away by his concerns over the future of the army in Turkey. The Turkish Government, over the last few years, had wiped out the Kemalist military leadership, for allegedly plotting a coup d'état. While Toprakçı was sharing his thoughts and concerns over this political purge within the Turkish army, the consul general unexpectedly interrupted Toprakçı's speech, asking for permission to leave as it was "getting late." Before she even left the room, a few people, exclaimed: "Traitor! Traitors are among us!" referring to the consul.

Barely more than a month later, on the 24 April, the Bayram Cultural Association held a seminar in Sofitel, in the Sydney CBD, largely attended by Australians of non-Turkish background as well as an impressive list of dignitaries. The event was funded by the NSW Government as well as by the Turkish consulate. The financial means poured into this event contrasted with the modesty of the Kemalist commemoration of 18 March and the contrast regarding the content of the two events was equally as stark. The Kemalists found the general absence of reference to Atatürk suspicious enough, but one of the speakers' open criticism of his military astuteness prompted several people to protest in the audience, including the organisers of the 18 March event (see Chapter 8). The next day, at the meeting place of the Turkish contingent at the Anzac Day march, several people who had been at the seminar qualified it as a "scandal" or a "disgrace." I have heard many times complaints about "how divided we are," both on that occasion and others, as well as during several of the interviews. However, the division between the Kemalists and Islamists is so deep and seems so unbridgeable that the "we" does not even include the non-Kemalist Turks. The Kemalists yearn for unity among themselves so that they could be empowered to stand up to the more influential Islamist camp. I did not have the opportunity to observe how Islamists perceived this polarisation.

In a 2014 meeting to brainstorm projects for the centenary of Gallipoli, organised by the Atatürk Cultural Centre and attended by representatives of a number of other Turkish associations and individuals, indignant comments were made about the seminar of the Bayram Cultural Association, as well as some recent

Turkish movies about Gallipoli. They were seen as “biased,” or in other words, they did not pay respect to Atatürk. The aim was to counter these narratives and educate people on the “true history.” The proposals did not lack ambition but they all faced the same obstacle: who would organise them and who would fund them. It was pointed out that all government funds were already committed to specific projects and it was clear to the participants of the meeting that nothing should be expected of the consulate as they had already chosen sides.

Since the 1960s, when the mass migration of Turkish workers to industrialised countries started, the Turkish state had indicated its policy to police and structure the political activities of its citizens overseas. Through its diplomatic institutions, the Turkish state tended to gear the political activities of its citizens towards defending the interests of Turkey (Şenay 2013, pp.78-9). But the process went both ways; those who were engaged in political activities in alignment with Turkish state politics turned to diplomatic institutions for support. Since 2002, with the historical reversal of power in Turkey, the Kemalists have been anxious about the dissolution of that close relationship, in addition to their concern over the general state of affairs in Turkey. While the consulate remains swift in mobilising its citizens in anti-Armenian protests, they do not seem to be as responsive to specifically Kemalist agendas, such as restraining Islamist voices.

In contrast, the Indian Government does not appear to maintain any control or influence over its former citizens. An important distinction between the two countries is their policy regarding dual citizenship. India does not allow dual citizenship, and its nationals have to give up their Indian citizenship if they are naturalised in any other country. Turkey, however, devised a multiple citizenship policy, allowing an unlimited number of citizenships, as a means to enable its citizens to lobby for the interest of Turkey more effectively in their country of residence (p.79). Recently, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia in November 2014, and particularly his Sydney speech, which gathered 16,000 enthusiastic people, indicates the increasing interest of the Indian Government in the potential contribution of Indian-Australians to the future of the two countries as business partners. However, the nature of the sustained political allegiance to Turkey that is expected of Turkish born Australians (or even second

generation Turkish immigrants) is very different from the economic resources that Indian born Australians represent for India, thanks to the very high proportion of highly educated professionals in the community. The relationship that the immigrant communities maintain with their countries of origin determines the way in which they engage with the national/ist traditions of their country of adoption.

Chapter 11 - Multicultural Anzac Day

Indians and Sikhs in the parade

Although the enlistment of a dozen South Asian men in the AIF went almost unnoticed, India's impressive contribution to the war effort had some positive outcomes for South Asian immigrants in Australia. In order to reward the contribution of India, in 1920, Indian dependents were allowed to enter Australia. In 1925, they obtained electoral franchise and in 1926 rights for pensions (de Lepervenche 1984, pp.59-61). However important these rights were, the numbers of South Asian people living in Australia did not increase significantly until the end of the White Australia policy in the 1970s. Since then, the profile of the immigrants has also changed. While earlier immigrants were mostly indentured or free labourers or traders, recent migrants were skilled professionals who mostly settled in urban Australia. The respondents of this research belong to the second category.

Among South Asian immigrants, the first community eager to participate in Anzac Day was the Woolgoolga Sikhs, one of the oldest Sikh communities in Australia. Although the Dawn Services are open to all, in some places such as Woolgoolga, the RSL apparently asked Sikh people to leave during the services unless they removed their turbans. Finally, it had a change of heart in 1993 allowing Sikhs to attend the services with their turbans on. In 2005, *The Sydney Morning Herald* reported that Jorahvar Singh who grew up in Woolgoolga, described his first Anzac Day as: "It was a beautiful day. Growing up here as a Sikh, [Anzac Day] was always seen as not for anyone else but the white Australian people. We want our children to just feel part of the community" (Lewis 2005, para.6-9). The Sikh community in Sydney was given permission to march in 2007.

Sikh people who march in Sydney come mostly from India, Malaysia, Singapore, Fiji and the UK. Although most Sikhs from India are still connected to the Punjab and interested in Indian politics, some of the participants have never lived in India and do not identify as Indian. Some of them belong to families who migrated to other countries before partition, and do not easily relate to post-

independence and post-partition India. Some of my interviewees immigrated to different countries before finally settling in Australia. Depending on their migration history, they identify either as Sikh or both Sikh and Punjabi/Indian. A shared language and religion is at the core of the Sikh identity in Sydney, rather than an attachment to a common homeland. This is the publicly stated reason why the Sikh community wants to march as a separate and distinct group on Anzac Day.

In order to be able to march as Sikhs, as opposed to Indians, the National Sikh Council of Australia, which coordinates the Sikh contingent, had to argue their case with the RSL, since the latter insisted that only Commonwealth and Allied countries could be represented. Since there was no Sikh country, they were asked to march as Indians. Finally, the RSL conceded that since Gurkhas did not originate from a specific country either and were allowed to march, Sikhs should also be able to do so. In spite of this concession, an issue remains concerning the Sikh contingent marching separately on Anzac Day since a different group representing India has also joined the parade since 2013. This group marches under the banner of the 29th Indian Brigade, which served in Gallipoli, and is composed of ex-officers of the Indian armed forces from diverse backgrounds. This Indian contingent is smaller in number since their social network includes only ex-officers, although Joe Matthews who coordinates the group, would like to reach out to ex-NCOs and privates through other channels. Regardless of size, Indians are not necessarily preferred over the Sikhs. The South Australia RSL rejected the application of another group of Indian ex-officers to march in 2015 in Adelaide, on the pretext that “the only ex-military personnel that could participate in Anzac Day march were those who served in a conflict as an ally of Australia” (Venkataramakrishnan 2014). This is fairly unconvincing given that Indian soldiers fought as part of the British colonial troops in the First and Second World Wars. Other equally invalid reasons mentioned were those of crowd management and the strain of long queues on the elderly veterans. In fact, Commonwealth and Allied contingents march at the very end when all active and retired Australian servicepersons have finished marching.

Since many of the members of the National Sikh Council of Australia are not Indian born, the commemorative projects of the Council, such as the photographic

exhibition on Sikhs in Gallipoli, or the brochures handed out to the public during Anzac Day marches have a unique Sikh perspective and references to the Indian Army are rare, if not non-existent. In 2015, the Council funded, via its diasporic networks rather than contacts with India, a Sikh military band from Malaysia, which was a spectacular addition to its usual contingent on Anzac Day. More surprisingly, the ex-military personnel of the Indian armed forces who march under the banner of the Indian 29th Brigade do not claim to represent India or Indians either.

Joe Matthews, who is the coordinator of the Indian contingent and a retired officer of the Indian armed forces, discovered Anzac Day in New Zealand where he and his family lived before settling in Australia. He attended the Dawn Service regularly in Auckland. When he moved to Australia, he figured that unlike in New Zealand, there was a march after the Dawn Service and he wanted to be a part of it. The RSL allowed him to join some Australian contingents for a few years until he decided to organise an Indian armed forces contingent. When Joe started attending the Dawn Service in New Zealand, he had not even been aware of the Indian presence at Gallipoli. He said that he was attracted to the services because of “the common bond across all military-trained people.” He believed that those serving or those who had served in any army around the world gathered to honour the Anzacs on Anzac Day because of that bond. In answer to a question about strategies to increase the numbers of participants in the Indian contingent, he replied that numbers had to be limited because too big a crowd would defeat their purpose of honouring the Anzacs. This attitude is in sharp contrast to the Turkish and, to an extent, Sikh objectives of attracting as many participants as possible in order to give their communities maximum visibility.

Eligibility and code of conduct

The main difference between the Sikh and Turkish strategies, however, is the eligibility criteria for participation. RSL policy on Commonwealth and Allied contingents indicates that only ex-servicemen and direct descendants of war veterans (no more than one person per veteran) can march. The RSL delegates the responsibility of verifying eligibility to the coordinators of each group. Since

Turkey has been an ally since the Korean War, Turkish veterans are allowed to march. A minimum of six months of service is required; therefore, any Turkish male who undertook compulsory military service as a resident of Turkey becomes automatically eligible. (There are special arrangements for Turkish citizens residing overseas with most Turkish immigrants serving only a month.) There is also a dress code and other regulations about flags and banners. Although it is not compulsory to wear uniforms, the participants are requested to wear clothes that “reflect the occasion.” The Sikh Council asks its participants to wear black or navy blue suits, with white shirts and dark ties and dark turbans for men. Each contingent is allowed to display only one national flag. Sikhs choose not to display any national flags, respect the dress code and take their participation very seriously, rehearsing prior to the actual march.

The Turkish contingent has a very different attitude. The Auburn RSL’s Turkish chapter issues an announcement every year distributed through the email list of the Turkish Consulate, requesting participants to wear dark suits and ties for men and appropriate clothing for women. The announcement also states that, “since the banner and the flag that will be carried during the march are provided, no extra visual material is needed” (Turkish Consulate General in Sydney 2015, email, 16 April). The phrasing for these requirements is fluid, especially regarding the presence of flags or banners, and eligibility criteria is not even mentioned. As a result, many turn up wearing whatever they see fit; several women in 2015 were dressed in red and white (the colours of the Turkish national flag) and young men wore football jerseys of the Turkish national team or Tee-shirts depicting the Turkish flag. Several actual flags were also displayed. This made quite a contrast to the usual contingents of men, the very few women in uniform or in suits marching in step, three or four abreast. The Turkish contingent looked quite disorderly; In addition to all the colours and flags, marchers took selfies, cheered, waved and blew kisses to the onlookers.

Since the Turkish contingent does not adhere to any eligibility criteria, it contains a higher proportion of women and several children. As military professions are generally dominated by men there are very few women represented in most other contingents. The large number of participants is another

logical outcome of the disregard of RSL policy. Although every year, there is speculation that the participants in the Turkish contingent will number in the hundreds, the actual numbers are usually closer to 50 and, even on the centenary of Anzac Day, there were only a little more than 50 participants. There is certainly a discrepancy between the level of interest and eagerness to commemorate Gallipoli among the Turks in Sydney and the number of actual participants on Anzac Day marches. This may be because of the day's strong emphasis on the military narrative and particularly on the Australian story. The participants consider, however, that the Turkish community needs more representation in the marches. Murat who marches every year told me that he takes his teenage son along to remind him that there are 60,000 Turks in Sydney. Every person marching counts because only about 60 people turn up to represent the community. Murat considers his participation in the march every year as his duty as a Turkish citizen, agreeing with Aytuner that all overseas Turks should act as ambassadors. Murat also brings Turkish delicacies to work on Turkish national holidays to familiarise his colleagues with Turkish culture (culture here refers to national holidays and their significance more than the delicacies offered on the occasion). Although the RSL's point of view is that participants represent veterans, not communities at the marches, the Turkish chapters consider that the impact of the war on Turkish people was such that every family gave a victim to the war and all Turks are descendants of veterans.

Ebru Güngören, who marched for the first time in 2015, thought that more people should participate in the marches so that they would be even more cheerful. It was clear that Ebru, who has lived in Sydney for five years, did not know about the limits on participation, nor had she been informed that a solemn attitude is expected of those who march. Ebru is definitely eligible to participate since her great grandfather was a Gallipoli veteran. She said she was proud to be there and see how much Australians appreciated the Turkish side of the story and the Turkish leader, Atatürk. Although she spotted a few disapproving looks, she did not connect them to the 'cheerfulness' of the contingent, which might appear inappropriate to some Australians. On the contrary, Ebru was shocked when she was invited for drinks by her colleagues who were celebrating the day in a pub.

She found the proposition that they should drink and have fun utterly disrespectful to the spirit of the day. Ebru clearly draws a line between the exhilarating, patriotic cheerfulness of Turks and the drunken, larrikin cheerfulness of her Australian colleagues. Most of the nuances are lost in translation on both sides.

Representing the community

While Turks mostly see Anzac Day as a multicultural civic celebration, Sikhs and Indians clearly define it as a military and mainly Australian event where they are accommodated as guests. I asked Aytuner Akbaş about the reasons for the different attitudes of Sikhs and Indians to the Turks regarding the instructions of the RSL about the attire and conduct expected at the marches. He replied: "Our privilege! That's the reason." He claimed that there was ample evidence to show that the original Anzacs respected the Turks and had been treated well by them so that the present generation could not deny this. "They cannot discriminate against us. My grandfather and his six brothers went to war, they can't make a fuss about whether my grandfather was in Gallipoli, or whether it was my uncle, or was he in Gallipoli or Sarıkamış. If we weren't, they couldn't be!" The last sentence really struck me. It is clear that Aytuner believed that the destinies of the two nations did not simply emerge but also merged at Gallipoli. Aytuner realises that the privileged status of Turkish immigrants was a hard-earned one. He remembers that representations of Turks in the newspapers of the 1970s and 1980s were not flattering. He once wrote a very long letter, albeit in Turkish, to an English language newspaper, to correct their derogatory text about Turkish soldiers. He also advised his children on how to respond if anyone harassed them about their grandparents killing the Anzacs.

Many Turkish migrants were genuinely concerned about Australian kids attacking their children at school, or people harassing them at work because of the past enmity between the two countries. A *Sydney Morning Herald* article mentioned the story of a Turkish woman, Nazmiye Iyidilli, who was approached by an angry foreman, a co-worker: "Your granddad. He killed my granddad. At Gallipoli." She responded by asking him what his grandfather was doing thousands of miles from his own country (Huxley 2005, para.1). I have heard so many versions of this

story from different people that I concluded that, although some people may have experienced something similar, many more probably internalised it as their direct experience or that of a person close to them. Gallipoli, a possible source of conflict with the host country, was an additional source of anxiety for Turkish immigrants who were already destabilised by the process of migration. In reality, many of them faced indifference rather than outright hostility. Şevket Tokdoğan remembers meeting Australian Gallipoli veterans in the 1970s and introducing himself as the son of a Turkish Gallipoli veteran. He says that they could not have cared less.

Within 40 years of Turkish immigration in Australia, Anzac Day was transformed into a site where Turkish people could establish their prestige, or privilege in Aytuner Akbaş's words. Yet, Aytuner thinks that the community is not dedicated enough to realise even more ambitious projects. One thing that upsets him is the fact that the Turkish contingent still marches at the very end. He brought this grievance to the RSL's attention, saying "if we are perpetuating our forefather's friendship together, it doesn't make any sense for us to march behind you. We should march arm-in-arm to show that our friendship means something." He says that he had sympathetic responses but little practical help as the procedure for change in the RSL is very long and complicated. Aytuner continues to believe that the common heritage of Gallipoli could be of even more benefit if there were greater dynamism within the Turkish community. While Anzac Day participation has proved effective in gaining acceptance in Australian society, many immigrant families developed other strategies to integrate into Australia.

Metin Bozdaş, who arrived in Sydney in 1973 as a ten year-old and the eldest of four siblings, remembers that he did not feel any connection to Anzac Day at all when he was at school. There was not even a mention of the Turks as far as he could remember. His grandfather had fought in the First World War and the War of Independence, and his great grandfather had died at Gallipoli. However, none of these family connections seemed relevant at that time. Metin compares his experience at school with that of his daughter who talked about her great grandfather to her classmates around the time of Anzac Day. Metin says that a child who is a descendant of a Turkish soldier who fought at Gallipoli is rare and

therefore valued as “some sort of flavour of the month.” Although Metin was born in Turkey and actually knew his grandfather, he was not singled out at school. He assigns this difference to the fact that the study of war at school is now undertaken from a multicultural point of view. Metin’s father did not draw any attention to his own father’s and grandfather’s involvement at Gallipoli. He adds that his father worked hard not only to provide for the family but also to give them exposure to Australian role models. They moved to Cabramatta when Metin was a teenager and they happened to live on the same street as Gough Whitlam. Thanks to that contact, they were able to attend several local community events where they met other political leaders such as Paul Keating and Bob Hawke.

These encounters were very inspirational for Metin and his siblings and gave them confidence about their future in Australia. Metin and his two brothers became lawyers and their sister a doctor. Metin was not interested in Anzac Day at all until 2005 when, in his own words, he experienced an “identity crisis” after a holiday in Turkey. Up to that point, he saw Turkey as a holiday destination and considered himself Australian. A twelve-hour conversation about Gallipoli with an Australian passenger on his flight from Istanbul to Singapore had a long-lasting impact in his life. He started questioning his identity and reading Turkish history. After struggling with his dual identities, he decided to explore his Turkish side. He believes that without the Gallipoli connection between Turkey and Australia, he would feel “a hundred per cent Australian.” “I would have lost my ties with Turkey. Anzac delays that.” In Metin’s case, the Anzac myth problematized his becoming “a hundred per cent Australian” rather than helping him connect with Australian society. Metin considered the prospect of a total breach with his former homeland as an unavoidable, and even desirable outcome of immigration and the Anzac story complicated this separation. When Metin decided to embrace his Turkish identity, he became involved in the RSL, and even briefly coordinated the Turkish Chapter. Later he abandoned those activities altogether, dedicating himself entirely to his work. He believes that succeeding in business was a greater service to his community than his involvement in Anzac Day and that, at this point in his life, he feels more useful simply doing his job.

Participation in Anzac Day is thus often seen as service to the community. Kuldip Singh served in the Indian army and was involved in operations against China and Pakistan. He was also a successful boxer who represented India in the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. When he was visiting his relatives in Australia, he ran into a recruitment rally for the Australian Army where the recruiting agents were very interested in his profile. They offered him Australian citizenship if he served in the army. Kuldip found himself in Vietnam within a few months, only to return some weeks later at the end of the war. Kuldip participated in Anzac Day marches with his Australian army unit but when the Sikhs were finally granted permission to march as a group, he did not hesitate to start marching with them. I asked him why he preferred to march with the Sikhs, assuming that he identified more strongly with his community than his former army unit. He answered that he did so because he thought everyone should know that the fathers and grandfathers of Sikhs had fought side-by-side with Australians at Gallipoli. Indeed, Kuldip's great-uncle, who was like a grandfather to him, had fought in Gallipoli. Kuldip's decision to march with the Sikhs may certainly be because of his wish to highlight the legitimacy of his community as an immigrant group in Australia. However, he prioritised his forefathers' vague connection to Australian history rather than his own service in the Australian army. The symbolic significance of Gallipoli necessitates a demonstration that the Sikh-Australian alliance goes back to a mythical past and continues today.

The majority of the participants in this research said that the reason they marched was to promote a better understanding of Sikh people in Australia. They felt that Australians did not know about their culture and religion. Many of the Sikhs who participated in Anzac Day were concerned that people of their community would be mistaken for radical Islamists and persecuted unjustly. Balbir referred to violent acts meant to target Muslim people that were misdirected at Sikhs. Harmohan Singh personally experienced an assault. He said that the images of Osama bin Laden wearing a turban that had appeared on television and in newspapers, were terrible for Sikh men. One day, when he was going to the train station in Marrickville after work, Harmohan overheard some 11 or 12 year-old boys and an adult male talking about him, saying "look, he's a terrorist!" He

pretended not to hear it and moved on. While he was waiting for his train, one of the boys came and pulled his turban off. Jaskiran Kaur's house was stoned and her father was attacked for the same reason. Considering many of these people had immigrated to Australia, sometimes leaving stable jobs and comfortable lifestyles behind, in order to provide a safer environment for their families and themselves, these attacks were shocking for Sikh communities.

Harmohan came to Australia from India with his family in 1991 because of the widespread violence against Sikhs since Operation Blue Star (3-8 June 1984) and the ensuing assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards (31 October 1984). Harmohan, a highly qualified engineer and deputy manager of a big company in India, had to significantly downgrade his lifestyle; he was an unemployed TAFE student for a while. But he never regretted coming to Australia since he felt it offered security for his children. After the incident in Marrickville, he decided to "mingle with the mainstream Australian society." His engagement with Australians was driven as much by his desire to understand, as to be understood. Harmohan became a member of the Labor Party and was candidate for Castle Hill in local as well as in federal elections in 2004. He is the chairperson of the Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin and is actively involved in social work. His interest in Anzac Day fits perfectly into the range of his activities. He says that Sikhs were not accepted by the RSL for a long time. Since 2004, he personally undertook the initiative of attending the Dawn Service in Castle Hill and laying a wreath at the memorial in the name of the Sikh community and engaged in conversation with local leaders and people at the ceremony. When the Sikh Council obtained permission to march on Anzac Day, he started marching with them. He says that there is much more awareness about Sikh culture in Australian society now. Anzac Day is just one of the factors that contributed towards this awareness, the other being the increasing numbers of Sikhs holding offices in public and private sectors.

Although the post-9/11 incidents linger in a corner of their mind, Sikh participants of this research describe their experience in Australia in very favourable terms. While most of them think that they are better off in Australia economically and socially, Kuldip and Balkar Singh also feel more welcome in

Australian society than in India. Kuldip said, “we fought for the independence of India. Sikhs earned the independence and look at us now ... Second class citizens in our own country.” This refers to the sweeping victory of Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the last elections. The BJP’s affiliation with Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist movement, is a cause for concern for minorities. Balkar remembers Operation Blue Star clearly. He was in Amritsar and serving in the army. He remembers fearing for his own life and that he might be ordered to fire on his own people. The situation has improved since then but the feeling remains that Indian democracy has failed the Sikhs. Kuldip thinks that the British valued the Sikhs as a martial race but they lost their prestige in independent India. Anzac Day gives them an opportunity to re-establish their prestige and martial qualities in Australia.

Jaskiran who joined the march for the first time this year said that she felt proud of her Sikh heritage and that the martial blood also ran through the veins of Sikh women. She was wearing her great grandfather’s medal, a man of the 29th Punjabis who fought in East Africa and in Palestine. I asked Jaskiran, why she rather than her father marched on behalf of his grandfather. She said that it was her father’s way of showing that he was proud of her and that she was as capable as a boy of carrying the torch. Although Jaskiran has a promising career as a city planner, she actually wants a military career. What attracts her to military life is not so much the physical courage in battle as the discipline and dedication that shapes every aspect of the life of a military person. She believes that Sikh women in particular, and women in general, are not given enough opportunity to prove their worth in the armed forces. She believes, however, that she would be much better off in the Australian armed forces if she decides to change career.

Sikhs are not the only Indians who feel more valued in Australia. Many of the ex-officers of the Indian armed forces chose to export their qualifications overseas. K.C. Kurruvilla retired from the Indian Air Force as a Commodore with extensive experience over many years in strategic posts, including two overseas missions in Iraq and Iran. K. C. wanted to continue working but had no offers from Indian companies or public service departments whereas several interviews in London were all successful. Eventually, he managed to find employment in India.

During his stay in Sydney, he met several ex-officers and was pleasantly surprised to see a number of them working in government agencies. He deplored the fact that not only did the Indian Government not value military service, but they also did not provide opportunities for ex-service people to transfer their qualifications to other sectors.

Trans-generational memory and Anzac interference

Religion is a structural element of the Sikh identity, although their individual attitudes to the precepts of Sikhism may diverge. The gurudwara is not just a place of worship but also a cultural and social hub. It has a fundamental role in the transmission of cultural memory. Priests acknowledge and honour individual or collective acts of bravery and resistance in religious services. However, as Jagjit Singh pointed out, these events and the people who are honoured go back to the beginnings of Sikhism and stop suddenly around colonial times; for example there is little reference to anything after the Anglo-Sikh Wars. The First World War and arguably more traumatic events such as Partition, Operation Blue Star and the violence that ensued are also avoided. It may be that harking back to a remote past and stories of origins might be less problematic than dealing with recent events that directly affected the lives of many people in the congregation. Official memory, delivered top-down, may dictate collective memories about the Mughal period for instance, but is harder to control and prescribe a simple and consensual narrative when it comes to events that were personally experienced or observed.

However, the reason why the First World War is elided over is because it is less relevant. As Jagjit put it, they were fighting for King and country, not to preserve their religious identity. The First World War was not fought for Sikh honour. Therefore, the memory of Gallipoli is not fostered in the same way as other remote, past events and many Sikh people are still neither aware of nor interested in that part of history. Meanwhile, the fact that there is no officially sanctioned version of Gallipoli, enables Sikh remembrance to be shaped locally. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in spite of the absence of commemoration of the

First World War in India, Indian and Sikh diasporas around the world have been involved in the commemorations of their adoptive countries. In 2014 and in 2015, European delegations of the Global Organization of People of Indian Origins gathered together in France, at the Neuve Chapelle Memorial in honour of the Indian dead, and planned to organise a series of events to celebrate 100 years of the Indian corps in France. They announced that, “the celebration will include seminars, exhibitions depicting sacrifices of Indian nationals for peace and freedom of Europe” (MINDFRA 2014). The GOPIO wanted to commemorate the war in the context of Europe, to focus on the common bonds between India and Europe; similarly, the Sikh communities in Australia remember their history as connected to the Anzac myth. The idea of Gallipoli in the Sikh community carries the legacy of the Anzac myth as well as the Sikh heritage.

The Sikh memory of Gallipoli and the Anzac myth share a representation of British troops as the privileged ones who held the safest positions, at least from Kuldip’s point of view. He has never been to Gallipoli and is keen to know about the landscape and cemeteries on the peninsula. Kuldip asked me whether it was true that the Turkish positions were on the top of the hills, whereas the Sikh trenches were a little down the slope, further down came the Australians and the British were actually on the beach. This configuration clearly implies that Sikhs were purposefully sacrificed on the front line, even more than the Australians, while the British provided the safest positions for their own men. This dominant view about the British contempt for colonial or dominion soldiers was propagated through the last scene of Peter Weir’s film *Gallipoli*, which counter-factually pictures Australian units being massacred during the August offensive under the orders of the uncaring British commanders while freshly-arrived British reinforcements are calmly sipping their tea on the beach (see Pugsley 2004 for a discussion about the historical inaccuracy of that last scene). Kuldip is also unhappy because he thought that the Sikh cemetery in Gallipoli was in a state of neglect whereas the British cemetery was tended properly. In fact, there is no cemetery in Gallipoli designated specifically for Sikhs or any particular group. There are 31 cemeteries of various sizes built by the IWGC, containing bodies from various nationalities, all now looked after by the Commonwealth War Graves

Commission under the same conditions. Both Kuldip's suggestions place Sikhs in this story not only as heroes and victims but also locate them above the Australians in their degree of sacrifice.

The current interest in Sikh family histories is another consequence of living in Australia. The emphasis on blood lineage motivates many Sikhs to enquire of their elders about the relevance of their family history to the Australian national myth. Many people undertake archival research to reconstitute that part of their family history if the oral sources fall short, as they often do. Although Balbir was aware of his father's experiences and had a few pictures of him in uniform as well as most of his military records, he decided to find out more at the archives in London. He was disappointed to find nothing there, but happy to share his stories and the documents that he keeps meticulously. I asked him about the reactions of people to the fact that his father was at Gallipoli especially when he first arrived in Australia 30 years ago. He replied that he did not tell anyone about his father until he brought his papers from India. According to Balbir, without these documents, people would not have believed him or valued his story. He also felt that he could not introduce the topic of his father out of context. The general indifference that Şevket Tokdoğan experienced when he talked to Australian Gallipoli veterans in the 1970s was not specifically reserved for former enemies.

It seems important for Sikhs to establish links between the Australian past and their community or family. Jagjit wants to research his family's contribution to the First World War when he has time. Unfortunately, the family records do not go back sufficiently far and there are fewer people every year to recall stories which Sikhs feel are relevant to their place in Australia. In the past, they were not curious about such times nor would they remember stories they had been told. Mahinder Singh remembers his father talking about being in a non-combatant corps in Basra during the First World War. Mahinder now regrets that he did not ask any questions or request more information from him although we can deduce some things from the facts he does know. He remembers his father saying that he was conscripted although there was no conscription at the time. When I explored further, it became clear that his father was adamant that he did not have a choice in the matter. Mahinder's father and a whole group of men from his village were

rounded up and shipped overseas without any training. He was discharged after the war and was not given a pension for his service. A few years later, in the early 1920s, he migrated to Malaya and lived there quite happily as he was able to provide for his family. This fragment of information provides insight into the experience of “voluntary enlistment” for some of the recruits press-ganged into service in the villages of the Punjab as well as other places.

Harbant Singh never met his grandfather who was in the cavalry in the First World War but thinks that he might have been at Gallipoli or in the Middle East. He says that his grandmother did not say much “at that time” about his grandfather’s war experience. This was the only fact he knew about his grandfather; that he was in the cavalry: “I saw the horse’s leather equipment that used to sit in our house [...] When they came on holiday from the army they brought their horses with them and kept them at home ... I don’t know any other stories, only that my grandfather ... his equipment was lying in the house.” I tried to understand the significance of this story for Harbant’s grandmother. Why would she choose to tell this story over any other? Was it because she was annoyed about the horse? Or maybe she told other stories that Harbant did not remember; but why did he remember this one? The answer might have been the leather equipment. This was not a story about Harbant’s grandfather but a story of the leather equipment in the house. The presence of that curious object needed to be explained more than an absent grandfather’s war experience in a village that lost, according to Harbant, so many men in both the First and the Second World Wars. In a later conversation, Harbant confirmed that he had asked about the equipment and this was how he learned about his grandfather’s stint in the cavalry.

Balbir on the other hand, grew up listening to his father’s war memories. He says that all families in his father’s native village sent someone to the war. But after partition, they moved across the border to India and whenever his father met another war veteran, they would be extremely happy to share each other’s stories. Balbir’s father continued serving in the army until the 1930s and his war experience and military career were presumably important parts of his identity. Photographs of him in uniform and his unit hung on their living room wall. Balbir as a young student also enjoyed joining his father’s fellow veterans in their daily

meetings in the town where he used to go to school. He remembers his father as having good memories about the war. There are three stories that he recalls particularly well.

In chronological order, the first and, apparently the most important one for Balbir, is the story of how his father set out for war in Europe by ship. Since he was under-age and did not have his parent's agreement, his uncle came to talk to his commander and forced him to disembark. Two days later, the ship was attacked and sunk, and all on board perished. The second story is about Gallipoli where he was a signaller and charged with establishing contact between Australian troops and the British command. His mission appeared to be dangerous as many of his predecessors had died on the job. He took the initiative and successfully took messages through a different route but was shot in the leg. He waited an entire night for the rescue team, and just when he was sure he was about to die, he was finally evacuated. He received the British War Victory Medal and Distinguished Service Medal for this particular action. Although Balbir says that his grandfather was wounded at Gallipoli and evacuated to France, his military records show that he was wounded in Mesopotamia much later in October 1918. The third story takes place in Mesopotamia. The troops were marching somewhere and they were starving as they had not received any supplies for several days. They saw an onion field and started to eat all the onions. The British commanders had to pay the farmer for the loss of their crop. They could not believe that the soldiers had eaten so many raw onions. This led the soldiers to demonstrate their onion-eating capabilities to the amusement of the British officers.

Balbir becomes emotional only when he is telling the first story. His father used to laugh when he told the other stories but the first one was serious. The story was recounted over and over again by his father and uncle and it always saddened everyone. Balbir emphasises that it was pure luck that his uncle made his father disembark otherwise he would have been dead and Balbir and his brothers and sisters would not have been born. In fact, Balbir's father could have died in any of these stories and the outcome would have been the same. The first story was probably more meaningful for Balbir's father because of the notion of fate. In the other two stories, death was a strong possibility, but there was hope for

survival. In the story of the boat that sank, his agency was totally absent. It was pure happenstance that saved him. This story was not one about war or fear of death, but about the unpredictability of life in general.

Although the story of the boat has a particular resonance for Balbir, he is well aware that Gallipoli is the most relevant part of his father's experience today. This is perhaps the reason why he inadvertently attributes his father's injury to that campaign. His father told him that he received treatment for his injury in France, although Balbir does not recall any stories about the stay in France in particular. In general, none of the place names had any particular resonance to people in India, as these were just details that were easily forgotten both by the narrator and those who listened. Some of the details in the stories allow us to place them. The long march in an arid, semi-desert area must be somewhere in Mesopotamia. But some stories could have taken place anywhere. They are attributed to Gallipoli since that location is the major memorial site for Australians and it is also the campaign where Sikhs and Anzacs fought side-by-side. Many Sikh websites and online articles focus on the Sikh contribution in Gallipoli, thus establishing the community's links with Australia's national myth.

Having familiarised themselves with the Anzac commemorations, several Indians and Sikhs have become critical of themselves and their people for having forgotten the war so easily. Jagjit wonders why Indian sacrifices are not remembered in India and in diasporas in the same way as Australian sacrifices are.

We fought for the same King and the country. How come some people are more appreciated than others? Australians, New Zealanders and even the British appreciated those who passed away on their behalf. But it was never even mentioned in India for as long as I can remember [...] I reckon that it's quite sad that we sacrificed nearly a hundred thousand Sikhs and we don't even know who they are. That's really bad on our side [...] I became more and more curious.

Jagjit thinks that the death of so many Sikhs is worth remembering, all the more so because they were not even fighting for their religion. He assumes that the

Australian way of remembering is the correct way and judges the Sikhs as morally lacking for forgetting. When he learned of the Sikh experience in Gallipoli after settling in Australia, Jagjit decided go to the Kranji Memorial on his last visit to Singapore where he was born and raised. I asked him whether he had previously been familiar with this memorial. He smiled and said “No, I wasn’t, actually.” He was disappointed to find out that his relatives were not even aware of the monument. The perception of the Anzac commemorations as timeless, continuous and natural to Australians leaves many people, including Sikhs, with a feeling of guilt because of their lack of commemorative practices. As a result they have become more and more involved in Australian commemorations.

Ebru also appreciates being able to represent her great grandfather on Anzac Day and does not think he is commemorated adequately in Turkey. Ebru has also been invited to contribute to a commemorative project that honours both Turkish and Australian soldiers who fought in Gallipoli and whose descendants currently live in Sydney (Johnnies and Mehmet's Digital Memorial website forthcoming). Ebru thinks that her great grandfather Kazım Kocabağ deserves to be remembered nationally rather than just at the Maltepe council in Istanbul. Ebru has vague childhood memories of her great grandmother but her main source of information is a newspaper clipping from *Milliyet* dated 18 March 1984. The article published on the occasion of the Çanakkale Martyrs’ Day features an interview with Behice Nine, Ebru’s great grandmother. Kazım who is represented as “one of the thousands of unnamed Mehmet's of Gallipoli” apparently captured the journalist’s attention because he figured in one of the iconic photographs of Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli. The journalist says that they received a letter from a certain Musa Kocabağ saying:

Every year at the commemorations of the victory of Çanakkale, we see our father on TV behind the great leader Atatürk. However, only we know the identity of the unknown soldier in this picture which has become a part of our patrimony. That unknown soldier is my father Kazım Kocabağ. He has long deceased but my mother is still alive. If you visit her, you will see that she keeps his photo like a sacred relic. (in Soysal 1984, pp.1, 7)

It is noteworthy that Kazım's son, Ebru's great uncle, initiated the remembrance of his father through this newspaper article which remains the most detailed account of Kazım, although some of Ebru's relatives have recently conducted further research to find out more about their great grandfather. We know from the article that he lost one eye in the battle and was treated in Germany. His eye never recovered and he was consequently discharged from the army. This saddened him greatly as he wanted to pursue a military career. In addition to this information, Ebru also says that he lost his eye in an act of bravery, in order to save his commander Mustafa Kemal's life. Ebru also knows that he was a learned man and a social worker, mainly involved in education.

Metin's grandfather and Şevket's father also knew Mustafa Kemal very well, as they worked in the President's Guard after the war. Şevket possesses a collection of memorabilia including photos of his father standing beside Atatürk. Şevket knows more about his father's post-war activities with Atatürk than about his war experience. His trans-generational memories become clearer and more numerous according to their connection to Atatürk. Since Turkish people's memories are constructed within a politics of identity in the context of a national history shaped by the deeds of one man, stories not tied into this narrative became irrelevant. In other words, the state politics of remembrance acted as social frameworks that determined the content of those memories. Similarly, in India, post-independence politics of remembrance as well as the narratives of the past conveyed in Gurdwaras shape the relevance of individual memories to society at large. Every memory goes through this double filter. Firstly, the narrator shares only those stories that are supposedly interesting to the listeners; and secondly, the following generations forget the stories that they consider unimportant. The war experiences of previous generations are now suddenly significant for Sikhs and Turks in Australia and around the world as they move across borders or their home countries discover a newfound interest in that past. Since these are second-hand memories, the recovery process is very complicated and there are many frustrations and much guilt about forgetting attached to it.

While the Anzac myth is still under scrutiny as to whether it unites or divides Australians, there are many Australians who are situated outside the discussion. The recent memorial frenzy in Australia certainly influences the ways in which people from diverse backgrounds remember their past and recover parts of their memory from the natural process of forgetting. Finding a shared history of Gallipoli with other Australians is certainly an important element in creating a sense of Australianness. Sikhs and Turks, as migrants, have often lost contact with their elders who traditionally assumed the role of transmission of memories. Consequently they use formal history to tie their past to their present. Having a shared history with Australia provides Sikh, Indian and Turkish people with a sense of continuity between their past and present in Australia. Being a part of the Gallipoli story, which has such a powerful appeal to the Australian imagination, reinforces people's sense of belonging to Australia without conflicting with their cultural identity. Although Anzac Day celebrates a white Australia and excludes people on racial, political and ideological lines, paradoxically, the Sikh and Turkish people consider it a platform whereby they can improve the standing of their communities. The contingents representing various Commonwealth and Allied countries that participate in the marches hardly ever engage with each other. The Lemnos³² Association of NSW kindly invited the National Sikh Council of Australia to join them in the wreath laying ceremony in Martin Place, on 25 April 2015. But these are rare occurrences. Anzac Day seems more often to be the grounds for competition between communities for the favours or sympathy of "mainstream" Australia. Sikhs, Turks as well as many other immigrant groups marching in the parade endeavour to fit into the existing framework of remembrance rather than changing or challenging it, although their inclusion itself is a challenge to a well-established, conservative and notoriously militarist tradition.

³² Lemnos is a Greek Island across the Turkish coast en route to Gallipoli from Alexandria. Many Indian troops were stationed there during the campaign.

Conclusion

In its centenary years, it is appropriate to remember that the First World War was actually a global war. European-based centre-periphery approaches are neither satisfactory nor appropriate for the assessment of non-European experiences of the war. This study of the First World War from Indian and Turkish perspectives demonstrates that there were complex networks that defied the exclusivity of the metropole-colony or coloniser-colonised relationship. The connections between Indians and the Ottomans certainly demonstrates that the interactions between intellectuals, political leaders and subalterns on a periphery to periphery level were just as important in shaping responses to the war. There was certainly a feeling of shared struggles and common destinies between these two countries. However, this feeling of solidarity began to dissipate after the war when the Ottoman Empire transitioned from a multi-cultural empire, seeking pan-Islamic unity and the independence of Asia, to a somewhat homogenised Turkish nation-state centred on its homeland while India was beginning to formulate its nationalist agenda.

The histories of both countries were written by bourgeois elites who claimed to be the driving force of independence although in India the poorer classes and lower castes were part of the mass movement against colonial rule and other oppressive structures of power. In Turkey, the bourgeois elites argued at length that pre-republican rural Turks were unconscious of their own identity until the paternalistic Turkish state taught them who they were. Yet, in spite of that early and still influential republican literature, the Turkish peasantry is anachronistically praised for their self-sacrifice for their nation during the First World War. These contradictory suggestions in the national myth of peasant/civilian soldiers inform current Turkish remembrance of the First World War as the precursor of the national war of independence not only against European powers who sought to destroy the Turkish homeland but also against the out-dated and corrupt Ottoman rule. In fact, Turkish and Indian soldiers were

not martial, inherently altruistic and courageous, nor were they devoid of agency in a war mostly beyond their comprehension. A hundred years after the war, when popular and scholarly interest has turned towards an understanding of the war in terms of its human cost, panegyrics to the bravery of the military recruits remain strikingly persistent. Bravery and sacrifice are still assessed as collective virtues while cowardice and self-centredness are considered individual failings. I have considered these states of human existence as responses to precise circumstances rather than as immutable characteristics. Many examples cited in this study demonstrate that, although disadvantaged by their subaltern status, in many cases soldiers and ordinary people demonstrated their willingness to take control of their destinies, as well as resignation and desperation in other situations.

In the Wünsdorf prisoner camp in Germany, a sepoy predicted that “when the war is over, many stories will be printed” (in Lange 2011, p.149). Many stories were indeed printed, but his story had to wait for almost a hundred years to be told. Soldiers’ and peasants’ experiences were not only marginal in the study of the First World War but also in its remembrances. For a long time, armed forces were the principle agency that promoted the remembrance of past wars in India, including the two world wars. The Indian Government recently declared its intention to play a more active role in the commemorations of Indian war dead. However, these celebrations of blood sacrifice for the nation will not include the First World War; a war that belongs to a past which does not bend to a nationalist logic. In Turkey, on the other hand, there is an increasing interest in soldiers’ experiences. However, this resurgence has been motivated by precise political agendas and fails to offer a sincere acknowledgement of the suffering caused by the war, not only to soldiers but also to civilians, both Turkish and non-Turkish. In fact, the sympathetic image of the poor peasant-soldier, validated through supposedly impartial Australian accounts, serve as a shield against the accusations of genocide committed against non-Turkish, mainly Christian people of Asia Minor.

This friendship of convenience between Turkey and Australia also helps to resolve some of Australia’s issues with its imperial past. The narrative of the common suffering of Turkish and Australian people under the crushing power of European empires places Ottoman Turks as well as White Australians as victims of

imperialism, concealing any blame for their own colonial oppression of others. The other side of this coin is a not so friendly rivalry for the symbolic control of Gallipoli, where this friendship was supposedly forged. The chauvinistic, aggressive and condescending discourse that is inscribed on the peninsula by Australians and Turks during different periods is constantly contradicted by the diplomatic language of the shared values of bravery, endurance and sacrifice.

However, this transnational arena is not the only place where interpretations of the war are contested. An Islamic, as opposed to secular, version of the war as the defence of the faith against non-Muslim powers, inspired by the jihad propaganda writing of wartime, further complicates the efforts of reunifying the representations of the First World War in Turkey. The place of religion in the ideal of national character is still problematic in Turkey as well as in India, both of which embraced secularism only after going through different levels of religious purges in the process of becoming nation-states. It is telling that consecutive Indian Governments made more determined efforts to eradicate Pakistani/Muslim traces from India Gate than imperial ones.

It is understandable that states should promote the remembrance of the war for its potential to fit with nationalist agendas, or to support a preconceived message. What is more interesting are people's responses to and critical engagement with these top-down memorial policies. State sponsored remembrances of the war have always been challenged, whether at the earlier stages of memorialisation, the construction of battlefield sites or the several layers of post-independence overwritings of earlier monuments. The resistance of some British citizens to the project of transforming the war dead into imperial monuments, the Australian insistence on control over their national sites and Indian expectations of being honoured on equal terms with white soldiers of the empire testify to the ability of states to dominate the multiple narratives of the past as often being exaggerated. In fact, this thesis demonstrates that, in many instances, far from controlling the discourses of remembrance, states often merely responded to bottom-up pressure. The increasing demands of diasporas for funding for their memorial projects, Turkish students' and newspapers' calls for public subscription before the state even had a serious plan to construct a

memorial, changes in the representations of warfare from glorious patriotism to human tragedy are examples that obliged several governments to engage with remembrance of the war and review their memorial policies.

The involvement of Sydneysiders from Turkish, Indian and Sikh backgrounds in Anzac Day and other war commemorations show the complex relationship between the influence of state policies and the cultural memory of the war at large in re-shaping understandings of the past in immigrant communities. Many of the Gallipoli veterans processed and transmitted their fading memories within a particular social framework to their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren who retrieved them after the process of immigration when they became more relevant to their new identities. People from these communities wished to carve themselves a niche within the Anzac myth rather than challenging the national narrative of their host country. Their shared history with Australia reassures them of their place in their new home and emphasises the continuity between their past and present identities. However, this new multicultural outlook of Anzac Day brought about by Australia's overseas memorial diplomacy on the one hand and the active engagement of diverse communities in Australia on the other, inadvertently challenges the exclusive nature of nationalist myths and is therefore both contested and supported depending on the point of view. There are a large number of works that offer rich analyses of the significance of Anzac Day in various national imaginaries. This case study of Turkish, Indian and Sikh perspectives argues that the nation as the sole analytical framework is insufficient to portray the complexities of memorialisation of the war. There is fertile ground for further research about the interplay of immigrant communities and their engagement with the national myths of their home and host countries.

Bibliography

Archive sources

Archives départementales des Bouches du Rhône (ADBR)

216 – J/29 Famille Martin-Laval

87 Fi 1 L'armée anglaise à Marseille – 1914-1919. Tome 88: Base-Remount du camp de la Valentine, septembre 1914- septembre 1915.

Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi (ATASE)

BDH-1901-88-35

Australian War Memorial (AWM)

1DRL/0221 Private Record of Cox, Sir Herbert Vaughan

PR84/066 Private Record of Stinson, Charles G J

3DRL 3376 Private Record of Lord William Riddell Birdwood.

Anzac Day Souvenirs collection

Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri (BCA)

130-18-01-01-6-49-6 İngiliz ve Fransız ordusunda görevli iken Türkiye'ye iltica eden müslümanlar ve Hintlilere rütbelerine göre tahsisat verilmesi.

272-0-0-11-13-48-3 Aslen Hindistanlı olup, İngiliz ordusundan firar edip Osmanlıya iltica eden Mahmut oğlu Abdullah'ın Konya'da tabiiyete kabul edildiği.

30-18-1-1-24-28-15 Çanakkale'deki şehitlik abidesinin emaneten yaptırılması.

30-10-0-0-213-446-3 Çanakkale şehitleri için Abide yaptırmak üzere Milli Türk Talebe Birliği'nin para toplamasına müsaade edilemeyeceği.

30-1-0-0-123-790-8 İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği Başkanı Samet
Güldoğan'ın Çanakkale'nin kurtuluş yıldönümüne katılmak için kendilerine
vapur tahsis edilmesi talebi.

30-18-1-2-193-18-10 Çanakkale şehitliği'nde yapılacak 51. zafer yılı törenlerine
katılacak dernek ve kuruluşların Denizcilik Bankası'nın tahsis edeceği
gemilerden yararlanması.

30-18-1-2-204-22-7 Çanakkale Zaferi'nin kutlama törenine katılacakları
İstanbul'dan Çanakkale'ye götürmek üzere, Denizcilik Bankası'nca bir
geminin tahsisi.

India Office Records and Library, British Library (IOR)

L/MIL/17/5/2016 A Report on Kitchener Indian hospital, Brighton.

Mss Eur F143/81 Copies of reports and returns for the Pavilion and York Place
Hospitals, Brighton, and the Indian Section of the Royal Victoria Hospital,
Netley.

L/MIL/17/5/2402 An analysis of 1000 wounds and injuries received in action,
with special reference to the theory of the prevalence of self-infliction.

L/MIL/7/18921 Appreciation of assistance rendered to Australian Medical Corps
by Indian ambulance men in Gallipoli.

L/PS/11/129, P7828A/1920 Political and Secret Annual Files

Imperial War Museum, London (IWM)

Doc.16030 Papers of Frederick William Nelson

Kızılay Arşivi (KA)

19/165 Afgan-Hindistan müslümanlarından toplanıp Sidney Şehbenderliği
vasıtasıyla gönderilen yardım hk.

221/43 Hastabakici Fatma Hanimin Gelibolu'ya istihdam edilmesi.

642/191 Hint tutsak Nagendranath Ghose hakkında bilgi talebi

771 Hintli savař esirleri

National Archives, Australia (NAA)

B2455 First Australian Imperial Force Personnel Dossiers, 1914-1920

National Archives, UK (NAUK)

CAB/37/137/16 Views of the Viceroy of India on the proposed evacuation of Gallipoli.

WO 95-4272 War Office: First World War and Army of Occupation War Diaries. Part III Gallipoli, Dardanelles. General Headquarters.

FO 383-535/3875 Foreign Office: Prisoners of War and Aliens Department: General Correspondence from 1906.

PRO 30-57-69(63) India and miscellaneous: correspondence: Lord Crewe and others.

Commonwealth War Graves Commission (WG)

909/5 Indian Graves in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor

909/9 Indian Graves Committee

127/5/4 Pt.1 Delhi War Memorial, from 1928 to 1935

127/5/4 Pt.2 Delhi War Memorial, from Jan 1936

1/1/167 Delhi (India Gate) War Memorial- Speech delivered by Fabian Ware, 12 Feb 1931

Published archive material and official documents

Albayrak, M., akıcı, M., Uzundağ, R., Kahrıman, S. & Karaca, Y. (eds) 2005, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde anakkale Muharebeleri*, vol. I, Bařbakanlık Devlet Arřivleri

Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara.

Albayrak, M. & Özyurt, A. (eds) 2006, *Yeni Mecmua, Çanakkale Özel Sayısı*, Yeditepe, İstanbul.

Australian Department of Defence 1920, *Where the Australians rest: A description of many of the cemeteries overseas in which Australians, including those whose names can never be known, are buried*, Government Printer, Melbourne.

Australian Embassy Ankara 1985, 'Anzac Day 1985: naming of Anzac Cove', *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 290-2.

Bamford, P.C. 1925, *Histories of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements*, Government of India Press, Delhi.

Boissier, A. & Vischer, A. 1917, *Documents publiés à l'occasion de la Guerre Européenne (1914-1917) : Rapport de MM. Alfred Boissier et Dr Adolphe Vischer sur leur inspection des camps de prisonnier en Turquie, Octobre 1916 à Janvier 1917*, Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, Genève.

The Delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross 1917, *Turkish Prisoners in Egypt*, Red Cross Society, London.

Omissi, D. 1999, *Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers' Letters, 1914-18*, Macmillan, London.

The Red Cross Committee 1918, *Reports on British Prison-Camps in India and Burma, visited by the International Red Cross Committee in February, March and April, 1917*, Red Cross Society, New York.

Sareen, T.R. 1995, *Secret Documents on Singapore Mutiny, 1915*, vol. 1 & 2, Mouto Publishing House, New Delhi.

The Sedition Committee Report 1918, Superintendent Government Printing, India, Calcutta.

Seven, Y., Alici, A. & Arvas, M.Ü. (eds) 2014, *Harp Mecmuası*, Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara.

Tetik, A., Demirtaş, Y.S. & Demirtaş, S. (eds) 2009, *Prisoners of war at the Çanakkale Battles: testimonies and letters*, vol. I, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara.

The War Office 1922, *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

Yarar, H. & Delialioğlu, M. (eds) 1999, *Cepheden Mektuplar*, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, Ankara.

Other Published Sources

'A Fighting Sikh' 1918, *The Daily News*, 26 January, p. 9.

'A Sikh in Australia' 1915, *Daily News*, 25 January, p. 9.

'Aliens from Broken Hill' 1915, *Chronicle*, 9 January, p. 46.

'Broken Hill "Turks"' 1915, *Clarence and Richmond Examiner*, 7 January, p. 5.

'Broken Hill Sensation: Turk's confession' 1915, *The Muswellbrook Chronicle*, 9 January, p. 2.

'Çanakkale Abidesi yardım kampanyası' 1958, *Milliyet*, 18 January, p. 1.

'Gallipoli Veterans Can Help Ambassador' 1968, *Victor Harbour Times*, 17 May, p. 1.

'L'armée anglaise: Toutes les troupes de l'empire britannique ' 1914, *Le Petit Provençal*, 21 October, p. 2.

'Les Troupes de l'Inde en route' 1914, *Le Petit Provençal*, 2 september, p. 2.

'Les Troupes hindoues' 1914, *Le Petit Marseillais*, 7 October.

'Les Troupes hindoues à Marseille' 1914, *Le Petit Provençal*, 7 October, p. 4.

'Sensational outrage: Excursion train fired on: Kaiser's murderous friends' 1915, *Daily Standard*, 2 January, p. 5.

'Son iki gün: Şehitler Abidesine yardım kampanyası sona eriyor' 1958, *Milliyet*, 17 March, p. 1.

'The Unspeakable Turk: Broken Hill Sensation' 1915, *The Dubbo Liberal and Macquarie Advocate*, 5 January, p. 2.

'To-day's tragedy' 1915, *Barrier Miner*, 1 January, p. 2.

'The Indian Army in France' 1915, *Daily Advertiser (NSW)*, 12 January, p. 4.

'The New Year's Tragedy: The "Confessions"' 1915, *Barrier Miner*, 31 January, p.3.

'The Proposed Australian Sikh Regiment' 1914, *Geraldton Guardian*, 28 November, p. 3.

Abdullah Fevzi Efendi 2011, *Bir Müderrisin Sürgün Yılları*, edited by A.O. Koçkuzu, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul.

Abdullah Fevzi Efendi 2011, *Çanakkale Cephesinde Bir Müderris*, edited by A.O. Koçkuzu, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul.

[Adıvar], H.E. 1938, *Inside India*, Macmillan, New York.

Adıvar, H.E. 2009, *East Faces West: Impressions of a Turkish Writer in India*, re-edited by M. Hasan, AAKAR, New Delhi.

— 2007, *Ateşten Gömlek*, Can, İstanbul.

Ağaçolu Ahmet 2014, 'Harp Mecmuası Niçin Çıkıyor', in Y. Seven, A. Alıcı & M.Ü. Arvas (eds), *Harp Mecmuası*, vol. 1, Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, pp. 1-6.

— 2014, 'Türkiye'nin ve İslam Aleminin Kurtuluşu', in Y. Seven, A. Alıcı & M.Ü. Arvas (eds), *Harp Mecmuası*, vol. 1, Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, pp. 7-9.

Ahmad, F. 1966, 'Great Britain's relations with the Young Turks, 1908-1914', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 302-29.

— 1988, 'War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908-18', *Review*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 265-86.

— 2014, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman nationalities : Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and Arabs, 1908-1918*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City.

Ahuja, R. 2011, 'Lost Engagements? Traces of South Asian Soldiers in German Captivity, 1915-1918', in F. Roy, H. Liebau & R. Ahuja (eds), *When the War Began We Heard of Several Kings': South Asian Prisoners in World War I Germany*, Social Science Press, New Delhi, pp. 17-52.

Akbiyık, A. 2015, *Abuzer Akbiyık Kişisel Web Sitesi*, viewed 10 September 2015, <http://www.abuzerakbiyik.com.tr/page_detail.php?page_id=170>.

Akçam, T. 2005, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* Zed Books, London.

Aksakal, M. 2004, 'Not 'by those old books of international law, but only by war': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 507-44.

— 2008, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* Cambridge University Press, New York.

— 2011, 'Holy War Made in Germany'? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad', *War in*

History, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 184-99.

- Amin, S. 2000, 'Remembering Chauri Chaura: Notes from Historical Fieldwork', in R. Guha (ed.), *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 179-239.
- Anand, M.R. 2008, *Across the Black Waters*, Orient Paperbacks, Delhi.
- Anon. 1916, *Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles: Written to his English wife by a French medical officer of le Corps Expeditionnaire D'Orient*, William Heinemann, London.
- Ansari, H. 2008, 'Making Transnational Connections: Muslim Networks in Early Twentieth Century Britain', in N. Clayer & E. Germain (eds), *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 31-63.
- Arıkan, M. 2011, 'Bir Çanakkale Şehidi ve Mektubunun Başına Gelenler', *Akademik Bakış*, vol. 5, no. 9, pp. 231-43.
- Armenian National Committee of Australia 2015, *Armenian community outraged it was not consulted on Hyde Park plaque of genocidal dictator*, media release, 8 March, ANC, Sydney, viewed 1 October 2015, <<http://www.anc.org.au/news/Media-Releases/Armenian-community-outraged-it-was-not-consulted-on-Hyde-Park-plaque-of-Genocidal-dictator>>.
- Assmann, J. 2008, 'Communicative and Cultural Memory', in A. Erll & A. Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 109-18.
- Ataksor, H. 2008, *Çanakkale Raporu: Binbaşı Halis Bey'in Savaş Notları*, edited by S.S.H. Ataksor, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Australian War Memorial, *First World War Embarkation Rolls*, Australian War Memorial, viewed 25 September 2015, <https://www.awm.gov.au/people/roll-search/nominal_rolls/first_world_war_embarkation/?preferred_name=&service_number=&roll_title=&op=Search>.
- Aydemir, S.S. 1959, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, Öz Yayınları, Ankara.
- Aydın, C. 2007, *The politics of anti-Westernism in Asia : visions of world order in pan-Islamic and pan-Asian thought*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Ayvazoğlu, B. 1999, 'Edebiyatın Çanakkale'si', *Aksiyon*, 20 March.
- Bahçecik, N. & Alpar, S.E. 2009, 'Nursing Education in Turkey: From past to present', *Nursing Education Today*, vol. 29, pp. 698-703.

- Barrett, M. 2007, 'Subalterns at War: First World War Colonial forces and the Politics of the imperial War Graves Commission', *Interventions*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 451-74.
- 2011, 'Death and the afterlife: Britain's colonies and dominions', in S. Das (ed.), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, pp. 301-19.
- Bean, C.E.W. (ed.) 1916, *The Anzac Book: Written and illustrated in Gallipoli by the men of Anzac*, Cassell and Company, Melbourne.
- 1948, *Gallipoli Mission*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
- Beyhan, M.A. & Eryüksel, A. 2008, 'Osmanlı'nın son döneminde sağlık hizmetleri', in N. Özçelik, M.A. Beyhan, A. Eryüksel & F. Akben (eds), *Sağlık Ordusu*, Ajansfa, Istanbul, pp. 11-44.
- Bilimoria, P. 1996, *The Hindus and Sikhs in Australia*, Australian Govt. Pub. Service, Canberra.
- Bishop, H.C.W. 1920, *A Kut Prisoner*, electronic book, John Lane, London.
- Bose, A.C. 1978, 'Indian Revolutionaries during the First World War: A Study of their Aims and Weaknesses', in D.C. Ellinwood & S.D. Pradhan (eds), *India and World War I*, Manohar, New Delhi, pp. 109-25.
- Broadbent, H. 2015, *Gallipoli: The Turkish Defence*, Miengunyah Press, Melbourne.
- Bryce, D. 2013, 'The Absence of Ottoman, Islamic Europe in Edward W. Said's *Orientalism*', *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 99-121.
- Buchan, J. 1916, *Greenmantle*, electronic book, Hodder & Stoughton, London.
- Çelik, G. 2012, *On the occasion of the Turkish Martyr's Commemoration Day*, speech, 18 March, Turkish Consulate General, Sydney, viewed 1 October 2015, <<http://www.sidney.bk.mfa.gov.tr/ShowSpeech.aspx?ID=2240>>.
- Chandan, A. 2005, *How they suffered: World War One & Its Impact on Punjabis* viewed 5 September 2015, <<http://www.apnaorg.com/articles/amarjit/wwi/>>.
- Chatterjee, P. 1993, *Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Chhina, R. 2013, 'Their mercenary calling: The Indian army on Gallipoli, 1915', in A. Ekins (ed.), *Gallipoli: A ridge too far*, Exisle, Wollombi.

- Cohen, S.P. 2006, 'The Military Enters Indian Thought', in K. Roy (ed.), *War and Society in Colonial India, 1807-1945*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 163-89.
- Commonwealth War Graves Commission n.d., *Commonwealth War Graves Commission*, viewed 1 September 2015, <<http://www.cwgc.org/>>.
- Criss, N.B. 1999, *Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923*, Brill, Leiden.
- Dadrian, V.N. 1996, *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A review of the historical evidence of German Complicity*, Blue Crane Books, Watertown, Massachusetts.
- Danişman, H.B. (ed.) 2003, *Gallipoli 1915: Bloody Ridge (Lone Pine) Diary of Lt. Mehmed Fasih, 5th Imperial Ottoman Army*, Denizler Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Das, S. (ed.) 2011(b), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- 2005, *Touch and Intimacy in First World War Literature*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- 2010(a), 'Ardour and Anxiety: Politics and Literature in the Indian Homefront', in H. Liebau & K. Bromber (eds), *World in World Wars: Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia*, Brill, Leiden, pp. 341-67.
- 2010(b), 'India, empire and First World War writing', in R. Chaudhuri & E. Boehmer (eds), *The Indian postcolonial: a critical reader*, 1st edn, Routledge, New York, pp. xviii, 366 p.
- 2011(a), 'Indians at home, Mesopotamia and France, 1914-1918', in S. Das (ed.), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 70-89.
- 2011c, 'The Singing Subaltern', *Parallax*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 4-18.
- Davidson, H. 2013, 'Gallipoli service: O'Farell attacks Turkish threat to bar NSW MPs', *The Guardian*, 22 August.
- Dayal, H. 1920, *Forty-Four Months in Germany and Turkey*, P. S. King & Son, London.
- De Lepervanche, M.M. 1984, *Indians in a white Australia : an account of race, class and Indian immigration to eastern Australia*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
- Department of Veterans Affairs 2015, *Gallipoli and the Anzacs*, viewed 15 September 2015, <<http://www.gallipoli.gov.au/north-beach-commemorative-site/>>.

- Deshpande, A. 2006, 'Contested Identities and Military Indianization in Colonial India (1900-39)', in K. Roy (ed.), *War and Society in Colonial India, 1807-1945*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 190-224.
- Donaldson, C. & Lake, M. 2010, 'Whatever happened to the anti-war movement', in M. Lake & H. Reynolds (eds), *What's Wrong with Anzac: The Militarisation of Australian History*, UNSW Press, Sydney, pp. 71-93.
- Dündar, F. 2010, *Crime of numbers: the role of statistics in the Armenian question (1878-1918)*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J.
- Ellinwood, D.C. 1978, 'The Indian soldier, the Indian army and Change, 1914-1918', in D.C. Ellinwood & S.D. Pradhan (eds), *India and World War I*, Manohar, New Delhi, pp. 177-211.
- Emine Semih 2006, 'Bir Damla Kan ve Bir Damla Gözyaşı', in M. Albayrak & A. Özyurt (eds), *Yeni Mecmua, Çanakkale Özel Sayısı, 18 Mart 1918*, Yeditepe, İstanbul, pp. 232-7.
- Enginün, I. 1987, 'Çanakkale Zaferinin Edebiyata Aksi', *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 2, pp. 111-29.
- Erginbaş, D. 1950, 'Anıt-Kabirler ve Zafer-Asker Anıtları', İ.T.U., İstanbul.
- Esenkaya, A. 2011, 'Çanakkale Muharebelerinde Cephe ve Cephe Dışında Sağlık Hizmetleri', *Çanakkale Araştırmaları Türk Yılığ*, vol. 10-11, pp. 25-70.
- Evans, A.D. 2010, 'Anthropology at War: Racial Studies of POWs during World War I', in H.G. Penny & M. Bunzl (eds), *Wordly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire*, Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 198-229.
- Farrugia, F. 2007, 'Syndrome narratif et reconstruction du passé dans *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* et dans *La mémoire collective*', in B. Péquignot (ed.), *Maurice Halbwachs: le temps, la mémoire et l'émotion*, L'Harmattan, Paris, pp. 119-46.
- Fassin, D. & Rechtman, R. 2009, *The Empire of Trauma: an inquiry into the condition of victimhood*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Fewster, K., Başarın, V. & Başarın, H.H. 2003, *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW.
- Findley, C.V. 1998, 'An Ottoman Occidental in Europe: Ahmed Midhat Meets Madame Gülnar, 1889', *The American History Review*, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 15-49.
- Forbes, G.H. 1982, 'From Purdah to Politics: The Social Feminism of the All-India

- Women's Organizations', in H. Papanek & G. Minault (eds), *Separate Worlds: studies of purdah in South Asia*, Chanakya Publications, Delhi, pp. 219-44.
- Gardner, N. 2014, *The Siege of Kut-al-Amara: At war in Mesopotamia, 1915-1916*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
- Gibson, E. & Ward, K. 1989, *Courage Remembered: The story behind the construction and maintenance of the Commonwealth's Military Cemeteries and Memorials of the Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945*, McClelland & Stewart, Toronto.
- Göçek, F.M. 2011, *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*, I.B. Tauris, London.
- Gökalp, Z. 2006, 'Çanakkale', in M. Albayrak & A. Özyurt (eds), *Yeni Mecmua, Çanakkale Özel Sayısı, 18 Mart 1918*, Yeditepe, İstanbul, pp. 93-4.
- Guha, R. 1988, 'On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India', in R. Guha & G.C. Spivak (eds), *Selected Subaltern Studies*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 37-44.
- (ed.) 1997, *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Guida, M. 2008, 'The Sevres Syndrome and "Komplo" Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press', *Turkish Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 37-52.
- 2011, 'Al-Afghani and Namik Kemal's Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought', *Turkish Journal of Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 57-70.
- Gupta, K. 2014, 'Modi promises India its national war memorial', *Daily Pioneer*, 2 February.
- Gusain, R. 2003, *Annual fair recalls memories of VC winner Gabbar Singh*, viewed 20 september 2015, <<http://www.indiamike.com/india/india-travel-news-and-commentary-f80/annual-fair-recalls-memories-of-vc-winner-gabbar-singh-t1734/>>.
- Hagen, G. 2004, 'German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental Studies', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 145-62.
- Halbwachs, M. 1925, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* Félix Alcan, Paris.
- Halid, H. 1907, *The Crescent versus Cross*, Luzac, London.
- Heine, P. 1982, 'Sâlih ash-Sharîf at-Tûnisî, a North African nationalist in Berlin during the first world war', *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la*

Méditerranée, vol. 33, pp. 89-95.

- Heller, J. 1983, *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914* Frank Cass, London.
- Holbrook, C. 2014, *Anzac: the Unauthorised Biography*, UNSW Press, Sydney.
- Hurgronje, S.C. 1915, *The Holy War 'Made in Germany'*, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York.
- Huxley, J. 2005, 'Old foes, new friends', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 April.
- Inglis, K.S. & Brazier, J. 2008, *Sacred places : war memorials in the Australian landscape*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria.
- Iqbal, A. (ed.) 1979, *My Life: A Fragment, an autobiographical sketch of Malauna Mohamed Ali*, Seema Publications, Delhi.
- Jarboe, A.T. 2013, 'Soldiers of Empire: Indian Sepoys in and beyond the Imperial Metropole during the First World War', Northeastern University.
- Jayawardena, K. 1986, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, Zed Books, London.
- Jones, H. 2011, 'Imperial captivities: colonial prisoners of war in Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918', in S. Das (ed.), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 175-93.
- Kaiser, H. 1999, 'The Baghdad Railway and the Armenian Genocide: A case study of German resistance and complicity', in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Remembrance and Denial: The case of the Armenian genocide* Wayne University Press, Detroit, pp. 67-112.
- Kannengiesser, H. 1927, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, Hutchinson, London.
- Kant, V. 2014, *India and the First World War : 'if I die here, who will remember me?'*, Roli Books, New Delhi.
- Karaosmanoglu, Y.K. 1983, *Yaban*, İletişim, İstanbul.
- Karpat, K.H. 2001, *The politicization of Islam: reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the late Ottoman state*, Oxford University Press, <<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utslibrary/Doc?id=10269057>>.
- Kaşıkcı, A. 2010, *Çanakkale'ye Can Verenler*, Yıldızlar Yayıncılık, Ankara.
- Keddie, N.R. 1969, 'Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism', *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 17-28.

- Keleşyılmaz, V. 1999, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Hindistan Misyonu (1914-1918)*, AKDITYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara.
- Kemal, Y. 1998, *Bir Ada Hikayesi - 1, Fırat Suyu Kan Akıyor Baksana*, Yapı Kredi, İstanbul.
- 2002, *Bir Ada Hikayesi - 2, Karıncanın Su İçtiği*, Yapı Kredi, İstanbul.
- 2002, *Bir Ada Hikayesi - 3, Tanyeri Horozları*, Yapı Kredi, İstanbul.
- 2012, *Bir Ada Hikayesi - 4, Çıplak Deniz, Çıplak Ada*, Yapı Kredi, İstanbul.
- Kerman, Z. 1988, *Osman Fahri: Hayatı ve Şiirleri*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara.
- Khaliquzzaman, C. 1961, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Longmans, Lahore.
- Khan, N.-A.I. 2011, *Egyptian-Indian nationalist collaboration and the British Empire*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Kocabaylıoğlu, D. 2015, *Beyazperde Eleştirisi, Son Mektup*, viewed 17 April 2015, <<http://www.beyazperde.com/filmler/film-230843/>>.
- Köroğlu, E. 2004, *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 1914-1918: Propagandanan Milli Kimlik İnşasına*, 2nd edition edn, İletişim, İstanbul.
- Kreiser, K. 2002, 'Public Monuments in Kemalist and Post-Kemalist Turkey', *TUBA*, vol. 26, no. II, pp. 43-60.
- 2006, 'War Memorials and Cemeteries in Turkey', in O. Farschid, M. Kropp & S. Dahne (eds), *The First World War as remembered in the countries of the eastern Mediterranean*, Orient-Institut, Beirut, pp. 183-202.
- Lake, M. 2010, 'How do school children learn about the spirit of Anzac?', in M. Lake & H. Reynolds (eds), *What's Wrong with Anzac: The Militarisation of Australian History*, UNSW Press, Sydney, pp. 135-56.
- Landau, J.M. 1990, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- 2004, *Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History*, Hurst & Co, London.
- Lange, B. 2011, 'South Asian Prisoners and German Academics: Anthropological, Linguistic and Musicological Field Studies in Prison Camps', in F. Roy, H. Liebau & R. Ahuja (eds), *When the War Began We Heard of Several Kings': South Asian Prisoners in World War I Germany*, Social Science Press, New Delhi, pp. 149-84.

- Levine, P. 1998, 'Battle Colors: Race, Sex and Colonial Soldierly in World War I', *Journal of Women's History*, vol. 9, no. 4 Winter, pp. 104-30.
- Lewis, D. 2005, 'Bad blood set aside as Sikhs join parade', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 April.
- Liebau, H., Bromber, K., Lange, K., Hamzah, D. & Ahuja, R. (eds) 2010, *World in World Wars: Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia*, Brill, Leiden.
- Lüdke, T. 2005, *Jihad made in Germany Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War*, LIT Münster.
- Makdisi, U. 2002, 'Ottoman Orientalism', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 768-96.
- McKenna, M. 2010, 'Anzac Day: How did it become Australia's national day?', in M. Lake & H. Reynolds (eds), *What's Wrong with Anzac: The Militarisation of Australian History*, UNSW Press, Sydney, pp. 110-34.
- McMeekin, S. 2010, *The Berlin-Baghdad express : the Ottoman Empire and Germany's bid for world power*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Mehmet Zekeriyya 2006, 'Canakkale Savaşı'nın Psikolojisi', in M. Albayrak & A. Özyurt (eds), *Yeni Mecmua, Çanakkale Özel Sayısı, 18 Mart 1918*, Yeditepe, İstanbul, pp. 289-93.
- Minault, G. 1982a, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Religious Mobilization in India*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- 1982b, 'Purdah Politics: The Role of Muslim Women in Indian Nationalism, 1911-1924', in H. Papanek & G. Minault (eds), *Separate Worlds: studies of purdah in South Asia*, Chanakya Publishers, Delhi, pp. 245-61.
- MINDFRA Interculturel 2014, *Centenary Commemoration of Indian soldiers' arrival in France organised by GOPIO*, 26 August, MINDFRA Interculturel, Paris, viewed 10 September 2015, <<http://interculturel.mindfra.com/157/>>.
- Mundy, T. 1918, *Hira Singh: When India came to fight in Flanders*, electronic book, Cassell, London.
- Natesan, G.A. (ed.) 1915, *All about the War: the Indian review war book*, Natesan, Madras.

- Neumann, C.K. 2006, 'The First World War as a Time of Moral Failure: Its Reflection in Turkish Novels ', in O. Farschid, M. Kropp & S. Dahne (eds), *The First World War as remembered in the countries of the eastern Mediterranean*, Orient-Institut, Beirut, pp. 321-8.
- Niyazi, M. 1998, *Çanakkale Mahşeri*, Ötüken, İstanbul.
- O'Dwyer, M. 1988, *India as I knew it, 1885-1925*, Mittal, Delhi.
- Omissi, D. 1994, *Sepoy and the Raj: Indian Army 1860-1940* Macmillan Press, Basingstoke.
- 2007, 'Europe Through Indian Eyes: Indian Soldiers Encounter England and France, 1914-1918', *English Historical Review*, vol. CXXII, no. 496, pp. 371-96.
- Önder, C. 1981, *Doğumunun Yüzüncü Yılında Atatürk'ün Silah Arkadaşları: Yaşayan Çanakkaleli Muharıpler*, Akgün Form Ofset, Çan, Çanakkale.
- Onur, N. 1960, *Çanakkale Savaşları ve Şehitler Abidesi*, Gün Matbaası, İstanbul.
- Özakıncı, C. 2015, '1915 Çanakkale Savaşı anıtlarına kazınan 'Conilerle Mehmetçikler arasında fark yoktur' sözleri Atatürk'e ait değil', *Bütün Dünya*, no. 3, pp. 23-9.
- Özata, Ş. 1990, '"Çanakkale'de üç amcam şehit oldu"', *Türkiye*, 18 February, p. 11.
- Özaydın, Z. 2003, 'The Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society's Aid to the Ottoman State During the Balkan War in 1912', *Journal of the International Society for the History of Islamic Medicine*, vol. 2, pp. 12-8.
- 2006, 'Upper Social Strata Women in Nursing in Turkey', *Nursing History Review*, vol. 14, pp. 161-74.
- Özcan, A. 1993, 'The Press and Anglo-Ottoman Relations, 1876-1909', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 111-7.
- 1997, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*, Brill, Leiden, New York, Köln.
- Özdemir, H. 2008, *The Ottoman army, 1914-1918 disease & death on the battlefield*, University of Utah Press, <<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utslibrary/Doc?id=10509238>>.
- Özyürek, E. 2006, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* Duke University Press, Durham.

- Palabiyık, M.S. 2015, *Understanding the Turkish-Armenian Controversy over 1915*, Beta, Istanbul.
- Pandit, R. 2014, 'National War Memorial finalized at India Gate complex', *Times of India*, 21 August.
- Pernau-Reifeld, M. 1999, 'Reaping the Whirlwind: Nizam and the Khilafat Movement', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 34, no. 38, pp. 2745-51.
- Pradhan, S.D. 1978, 'The Sikh Soldier in the First World War', in D.C. Ellinwood & S.D. Pradhan (eds), *India and World War I*, Manohar, New Delhi, pp. 213-25.
- Pugsley, C. 2004, 'Stories of Anzac ', in J. Macleod (ed.), *Gallipoli: Making History*, Frank Cass, London, pp. 44-58.
- Qureshi, M.N. 1999, *Pan-Islam in British Indian politics : a study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924*, Brill, Leiden, Boston.
- Raif Necdet 2006, 'Vatana Hitap', in M. Albayrak & A. Özyurt (eds), *Yeni Mecmua, Çanakkale Özel Sayısı, 18 Mart 1918*, Yeditepe, İstanbul, pp. 102-4.
- Ramnath, M. 2011, *Haj to Utopia : how the Ghadar movement charted global radicalism and attempted to overthrow the British empire*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Reinfrank, A. & Thorpe, C. 2015, 'Anzac Day 2015: Record crowd of 120,000 attend dawn service, 31,000 attend National service and march in Canberra', *ABC News*, 26 April.
- Renan, E. 1883, *L'Islamisme et la science: Conférence faite à la Sorbonne, le 29 Mars 1883*, Calmann Lévy, Paris.
- Roessel, D. 1990, 'Live Orientals and Dead Greeks: Foster's Response to the Chanak Crisis', *Twentieth Century Literature*, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 43-60.
- Rogan, E.L. 2015, *The fall of the Ottomans : the Great War in the Middle East*, Basic Books, New York.
- Roy, F., Liebau, H. & Ahuja, R. (eds) 2011, *When the War Began We Heard of Several Kings': South Asian Prisoners in World War I Germany*, Social Science Press, New Delhi.
- Ruşen Eşref 2006, 'Röportajlar', in M. Albayrak & A. Özyurt (eds), *Yeni Mecmua, Çanakkale Özel Sayısı, 18 Mart 1918*, Yeditepe, İstanbul, pp. 324-77.
- Sadiq, M. 1979, 'The Ideological Legacy of the Young Turks', *International Studies*, vol. 18, no. 177, pp. 177-207.

- 1983, *The Turkish Revolution and the Indian Freedom Movement*, Macmillan India Limited, Delhi.
- Sandes, E.W.C. 1919, *In Kut and Captivity with the Sixth Indian Division*, John Murray, London.
- Sareen, T.R. 1979, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad, 1905-1921*, Sterling, New Delhi.
- Scates, B. 2006, *Return to Gallipoli : walking the battlefields of the Great War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Schwanitz, W.G. 2008, 'The Bellicose Birth of Euro-Islam in Berlin', in A. Al-Hamarneh & J. Thielmann (eds), *Islam and Muslims in Germany*, Brill, Leiden, pp. 183-212.
- Şenay, B. 2013, *Beyond Turkey's Borders: Long-Distance Kemalism, State Politics and the Turkish Diaspora*, I. B. Tauris, London.
- Sepetçioğlu, M.N. 1989, *Ve Çanakkale*, İrfan Yayıncılık, İstanbul.
- Seyfettin, Ö. 2005, *Bütün Eserleri*, vol. 10, Bilgi, Ankara.
- Seyit, K. 2013, *Battle of Broken Hearts: a history of Australia's Muslim Cameleers*, viewed 25 September 2015, <<http://www.battleofbrokenhearts.org.au/index.php/the-battle-of-broken-hill-new-year-s-day-1915>>.
- Sharma 'Guleri', C. 2014, *Usne kaha tha [She said it]*, viewed 10 September 2015, <<http://www.writersasylum.in/2014/01/translations/she-said-it-usne-kaha-tha-by-chandradhar-sharma-guleri-a-translation/>>.
- Singh, G. 2014, *The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy*, Bloomsbury, London.
- Singha, R. 2007 April, 'Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq: The Jail Porter and Labor Corps, 1916-1920', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 412-45.
- 2010, 'Front Lines and Status Lines: Sepoy and 'Menial' in the Great War 1916-1920', in H. Leibau & K. Bromber (eds), *World in World Wars: Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia*, Brill, Leiden, pp. 55-106.
- Sirman, N. 1988, 'Turkish Feminism: A short History', *Women Living Under Muslim Laws*, vol. December 1988-May 1989, p. n.p.
- Sotiriou, D. 1991, *Farewell Anatolia*, Kedros Publishers, Athens.

- Soysal, N. 1984, 'Kazım Kocabağ'ı her yıl TV'de Çanakkale Zaferi'ni anma törenlerinde izliyoruz', *Milliyet*, 18 March, pp. 1, 7.
- Spivak, G.C. 1993, 'Can Subaltern Speak?', in P. Williams & L. Chrisman (eds), *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, UK, pp. 66-111.
- Stanley, P. 2012, 'Monumental mistake: Is war the most important thing in Australian history?', in C. Stockings (ed.), *Anzac's Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History*, UNSW Press, Sydney, pp. 260-86.
- 2013, 'Australia's misplaced friendship with Turkey', *Eureka Street*, 25 August.
- 2015, *Die in Battle, Do not Despair: the Indians on Gallipoli, 1915*.
- Stewart, J. 2014, *The Kaiser's Mission to Kabul: A secret expedition to Afghanistan in World War I*, I.B. Tauris, London.
- Stovall, T. 1998, 'The Color Line behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France during the Great War', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 103, no. 3, pp. 737-69.
- 2003, 'Love, Labor, and Race: Colonial Men and White Women in France during the Great War', in T. Stovall & G. Van Den Abbeele (eds), *French Civilization and Its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race*, Lexington Books, Lanham, pp. 297-321.
- Streets-Salter, H. 2013, 'The Local Was Global: The Singapore Mutiny of 1915', *Journal of World History*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 539-76.
- Strohmeier, M. 2006, 'Monumentalism versus Realism: Aspects of the First World War in Turkish Literature', in O. Farschid, M. Kropp & S. Dahne (eds), *The First World War as remembered in the countries of the eastern Mediterranean*, Orient-Institut, Beirut, pp. 297-319.
- Süleyman Nazif 2014, 'Çimentepe'de', in Y. Seven, A. Alıcı & M.Ü. Arvas (eds), *Harp Mecmuası*, vol. 3, Başbakanlık Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, pp. 34-6.
- Tahir, K. 2005, *Yorgun Savaşçı, İthaki*, İstanbul.
- Talbot, F.E.G. 1937, *The 14th King George's Own Sikhs : the 1st Battalion (K.G.O) (Ferozepore Sikhs), the 11th Sikh Regiment 1846-1933*, Royal United Service Institution.
- Tan, T.Y. 2000, 'An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 64, pp. 371-410.
- 2005, *The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial*

- Punjab, 1849-1947*, Sage, New Delhi.
- Tansel, F.A. 1989, *Mehmet Emin Yurdakul'un Eserleri*, vol. 1, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara.
- Taşkıran, C. 2001, *Ana ben ölmedim: I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Esirleri*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Tekeli, S. 2005, 'Les femmes : le genre mal-aimé de la République', in S. Vaner (ed.), *La Turquie*, Fayard/CERI, Paris, pp. 251-81.
- Tepekaya, M. & Kaplan, L. 2003, 'Hilal-i Ahmer Kadınlar Cemiyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri ', *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, vol. 10, pp. 147-201.
- Tevfik Rıza Bey 2012, *Çanakkale Günlükleri*, edited by V.T. Doğruöz et al., Kırklareli Üniversitesi, Kırklareli.
- Thomson, A. 1994, *Anzac memories living with the legend*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
- Times News Network 2012, 'Delhi gang rape: India Gate turns into a battleground', *The Times of India*, 24 December.
- Tonguç, F. 1999, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Bir Yedek Subayın Anıları*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Toprak, Z. 1992, 'II. Mesrutiyet Doneminde Devlet, Aile ve Feminizm', in H.D. Yıldız (ed.), *Sosyo-Kültürel Degisme Surecinde Türk Ailesi*, T.C. Basbakanlık Aile Araştırma Kurumu, Ankara.
- Torosyan, S. 2012, *Canakkale'den Filistin Cephesine*, İletişim, İstanbul.
- Trumpener, U. 1968, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Tuncoku, M. 2002, *Canakkale 1915: Buzdagının Altı*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara.
- Twomey, C. 2013, 'Trauma and the reinvigoration of Anzac: An argument ', *History Australia*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 85-108.
- Üngör, U.Ü. 2012, 'Orphans, Converts, and Prostitutes: Social Consequences of War and Persecution in the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1923', *War in History*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 173-92.
- Ural, S. 2004, *Candles at dawn*, Limitlight Press, Balmain, N.S.W.
- Uslu, A. 2008, *Çanakkale Gazileri*, Seddülbahir 1915 Özel Müzesi Yayınları, Çanakkale.

- Uyar, M. 2014, 'Gallipoli's Place in Turkish History ', in D. Horner (ed.), *Gallipoli 100: Lest We Forget*, Faircount Media, Sydney, pp. 256-8.
- 2015, *The Ottoman defence against the Anzac landing, 25 April 1915*, Army History Unit, Canberra.
- Uzuner, B. 2002, *Uzun Beyaz Bulut, Gelibolu*, Everest, Istanbul.
- Venkataramakrishnan, R. 2014, 'Indians kept out of Australia's WWI centenary despite sending 16,000 troops to Gallipoli alone', *Scroll.in*, 1 September
- Wasti, S.T. 2006, 'The Political Aspirations of Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Nexus', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 709-22.
- 2009, 'The Indian Red Crescent Mission to the Balkan Wars', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 393-406.
- Williams, R. 1977, *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Winter, J. 2006, *Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in Twentieth Century*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- 2009, 'In Conclusion: Palimpsests', in I. Sengupta (ed.), *Memory, History, and Colonialism: Engaging with Pierre Nora in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts*, German Historical Institute London, London, pp. 167-73.
- Wolpert, S.A. 1978, 'Congress Leadership in Transition: Jinnah to Gandhi, 1914-1920', in D.C. Ellinwood & S.D. Pradhan (eds), *India and World War I*, Manohar, New Delhi, pp. 127-40.
- [Yalman], A.E. 1930, *Turkey in the World War*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Yanıkdağ, Y. 2013, *Healing the Nation: Prisoners of War, Medicine and Nationalism in Turkey, 1914-1939*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
- Yılmaz, S. 2007, 'In Pursuit of Elusive Glory: Enver Pasha's Role in the Pan-Islamic and the Basmachi Movement ', in B. Tezcan & K.K. Barbir (eds), *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp. 185-202.
- Zachariah, B. 2013, 'A long, strange trip: the lives in exile of Har Dayal', *South Asian History and Culture*, 21 August 2013, <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19472498.2013.82684>>.
- Ziino, B. 2007, *A Distant Grief: Australians, War Graves and the Great War*, Western Australia Press, Crawley.

Zürcher, E.J. 2010, *The young Turk legacy and nation building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, I. B. Tauris London.

Interviews and personal communications

Aytuner Akbaş. Sydney, Australia. April 2015.

Balbir Singh. Sydney, Australia. May 2014.

Balkar Singh. Sydney, Australia. June 2014.

Ebru Güngören. Sydney, Australia. September 2015.

Harbant Singh. Sydney, Australia. May 2014.

Harmohan Singh. Sydney, Australia. March 2015.

Jagjit Singh. Sydney, Australia. May 2014.

Jaskiran Kaur. Sydney, Australia. July 2015.

Joseph Matthews. Sydney, Australia. May 2014.

K. C. Kuruvilla. Sydney, Australia. April 2014.

Kuldip Singh. Sydney, Australia. June 2014.

Mahinder Singh. Sydney, Australia. May 2015.

Metin Bozdaş. Sydney, Australia. April 2015.

Murat Zafer. Sydney, Australia. May 2015.

Muzaffer Orel. Sydney, Australia. April-December 2014.

Nuran Zorlu. Sydney, Australia. August 2015.

Şevket Tokdoğan. Sydney, Australia. April 2015.

Volkan Ermiş. Sydney, Australia. May 2014.

Films and Series

Carion, C. 2005, *Joyeux Noël*, France. Distributed by UGC.

Çetin, S. 2012, *Çanakkale Çocukları*, Turkey. Distributed by Plato Film Production.

Crowe, R. 2014, *The Water Diviner*, Australia. Distributed by Universal Studios, Entertainment One.

Davut, T. 2006, *Kınalı Kuzular*, Turkey. Distributed by TRT.

Eren, O. 2015, *Son Mektup*, Turkey. Distributed by Sepya Filmcilik.

Örnek, T. 2005, *Gallipoli*, Turkey. Distributed by Doğus Group.

Scheffner, P. 2007, *Halfmoon Files*, Germany. Distributed by Pong.