Governmentality — a term coined by Michel Foucault (1979, 1991) to describe a rethinking of the notion of government — has become a key concept in the humanities and social sciences since the 1990s. Defined as ‘the conduct of conduct’, that is, any more or less calculated means of directing how we behave and act, the concept of governmentality has generated a proliferating body of work on the ‘how’ of governing: how we govern; how we are governed; and the relation between the government of the state, the government of others and the government of ourselves (Dean 1999: 2). What might be called ‘governmentality studies’ thus signifies an interdisciplinary approach to examining how the government of human conduct is thought about and acted upon by authorities and individuals, by invoking particular forms of ‘truth’ and using specific means and resources (ibid.: 1–3).

The attraction of governmentality studies for western academics stems from the apparent need to explain the politics of the present, given the rise of neoliberalism, the decline of the welfare state ideal, the emergence of movements for indigenous rights in postcolonial settings, the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, and growing

As a natural extension of this interest, the concept of governmentality has been used to analyze contemporary Chinese society and politics. Beginning with Michael Dutton’s pioneering monograph of policing and punishment in China (1992), the field of China studies can now claim book-length governmentality studies of the socialist work unit (Bray 2005), policing (Dutton 2005), population policies (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005), and prostitution controls (Jeffreys 2004). It can also claim a special issue of *Economy and Society*, a social science journal that is widely recognized for its
publication of Foucaultian analyses (Jeffreys and Sigley 2006). The issue includes articles on China and changing conceptions of governance, community, consumer-citizens, new professionals, and the role of the media in enforcing ethical behaviours (Anagnost 2006; Bray 2006; Hoffman 2006; Jeffreys 2006; Sigley 2006a). Additionally, a growing number of China scholars have used the concept of governmentality as a framing device for discussions of the relationship between government and the everyday management of citizenship, desire, and identity, for example, through an examination of the politics of commercial television programming, gift-giving, healthy living, human reproduction, labour recruitment, and leisure (Anagnost 2004; Farquhar 2002, 2005; Festa 2006; Greenhalgh 2003, 2005; Keane 1999, 2001; Kohrman 2004; Lee 2006; Powell and Cook 2000; Sigley 1996, 2004; Yan 2003; Yang 1989).

This book contributes to the growing body of research on governmentality and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) embarked on a programme of ‘reform and openness’ in the late 1970s, Chinese society has undergone a series of dramatic, and some would say traumatic, transformations in almost all realms of social, cultural, economic, and political life. The PRC’s shift away from the centralized planned economy of the Maoist period (1949–76) was confirmed when the CCP declared, at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, that its mission was henceforth to develop a ‘socialist market economy’ (shehuizhuyi shichang jingji).

China’s transition from ‘socialist plan’ to ‘market socialism’ has been accompanied by significant shifts in how the practice and objects of government are understood and acted upon. It has led to the abandonment of the affective mass-line politics that
characterized the Maoist era in favour of a reconfigured version of ‘scientific social engineering and socialist planning’ combined with neo-liberal strategies of ‘governing from a distance’ through the development of new technologies of the self. The next section of this chapter therefore outlines some of the organizing concerns of governmentality studies and shows how they can be extended to include a consideration of governmental rationalities in non-western and non-liberal contexts. We then highlight changes in the nature of governmental thinking in reform-era China, especially the shift from a concept of government to one of governance. In conclusion, we summarize the contributions to this volume. These contributions show that China’s adoption of market-based economic reforms has resulted in the emergence of a hybrid socialist-neoliberal (or perhaps ‘neoleninist’) form of political rationality, one that is both authoritarian in a familiar political and technocratic sense and yet also seeks to govern certain subjects through their own autonomy.

**Positioning governmentality: from Paris to Beijing**

Michel Foucault (1979: 5–21) contends that all modern forms of political thought and action are grounded in a particular way of thinking about the kinds of problems that can and should be addressed by various authorities, which he calls ‘governmentality’. Since the overthrow of absolutist monarchies in the eighteenth century, he explains, governmentality has become the common ground of all modern political rationalities insofar as they similarly construe the tasks of authorities in terms of the calculated supervision, administration, and optimization, of the forces of society, rather than in terms of the maintenance of power *per se*. That is to say, they all construe the ultimate
aim of ‘government’ in terms of improving the condition of a population, via the
effective management of the processes that regulate its wealth, health, longevity, its
capacity to engage in labour, to reproduce and wage war, etc. Moreover, the means that
authorities use to achieve these goals are all in some sense immanent to the population
itself. The concept of governmentality thus refers to ‘the ensemble formed by the
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow
the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target
population’ (ibid.: 20).

Foucault’s method of examining government rationalities reconfigures conventional
understandings of the nexus between government and power by decentring ‘the problem
of the State’ — the tendency to reduce the operation of political power to the actions of
a state, understood as a relatively coherent and calculating political subject. Rather than
defining political rule in terms of a state that extends its sway throughout society by
means of an apparatus of control, the concept of governmentality draws attention to the
diversity of forces and knowledges involved in efforts to regulate the lives of
individuals, and the conditions within particular national territories, in pursuit of various
goals. In doing so, it intimates that power relations refer to the state not because they
derive from ‘the State’, but rather because they have been ‘progressively elaborated,
rationalized and centralized, in the form of, and under the auspices of, state institutions’
(Foucault 1982: 793).

This undermining of the importance traditionally ascribed to the problem of the state
flows from Foucault’s demonstration that the historically constituted matrix of
government has entailed the establishment and development of forms of power that are *not* exercised through simple prohibitions or controls (Rose and Miller 1992: 175). On the contrary, the government of society has been achieved via the administering and fostering of life itself, that is, through the establishment and deployment of forms of power (collectively known as ‘biopower’) that directly and materially penetrate the body. This background helps to explain the importance assumed by ‘sex’, for example, as a political issue. As a means of access to the life of the body and the life of the species, ‘the problem of sex’ is located at the junction of questions pertaining to the discipline of the body and the management of populations. It therefore constitutes a crucial target of a power or biopolitics that is organized around the management of the life of the individual and society as a whole (Foucault 1978: 145–7).

Once the productive nature of this form of power is acknowledged, the concern of those who want political change to limit the reach of the state appears somewhat misdirected. Contrary to the popular construction of the modern state as an entity which was developed above individuals, by ignoring or denying their ‘true’ nature, the main impetus of Foucault’s work has been to expose the ways in which the personal and subjective capacities of individual and groups— their choices, desires, skills and lifestyles — have been both shaped by and incorporated into the scope and aspirations of public powers. Concomitantly, although Foucault contends that power is an omnipresent dimension in human relations, he demonstrates that the operation of power in modern societies is an endless and open strategic game, not a fixed and closed regime. This recognition implies that statist-based analyses are not so much unwarranted as over-valued. A far more important focus for political analysis and action
is the non-reducible relationship between government and the manifold technologies through which we have been historically constituted and, in turn, come to constitute ourselves (Burchell 1993: 268).

The Foucaultian concept of governmentality also decentres the founding tenets of classic liberal philosophy by intimating that a political vocabulary structured by divisions such as state/society, public/private, government/market, and sovereignty/autonomy, is unable to adequately capture the diverse ways in which political rule is exercised today. Liberalism is usually portrayed as a political doctrine that is concerned with the maximization of individual liberty and with the defense of that liberty against the state. It is marked as a political philosophy by the assumption that civil society — a community of autonomous individuals who tend to be presented as given — places ‘natural’ limits on the legitimate exercise of power by political authorities. Yet liberalism simultaneously posits that one of the obligations and tasks of the state is to foster the interests and self-organizing capacities of the very citizens that are supposed to provide a counterweight and limit to its power (Hindess 1999). Within the discourse of liberal politics, therefore, power is confronted by a community of individuals ‘equipped with rights that must not be interdicted by government’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 179–80). At the same time, government is charged with the task of addressing a realm of processes which it is by virtue of the inviolability of those rights theoretically disbarred from acting upon. This contradictory framing of the role of government underpins the traditional concern of political scientists with the question of the state viewed as an exploitative and dominating force or else as a privileged and essentially neutral entity fulfilling necessary socio-economic functions. It also fuels the
conventional framing of policy failures and successes in terms of unjustified/unjust versus justified/just governmental interventions.

Governmentality scholars question the founding tenets of classic liberal philosophy by suggesting that liberalism is better understood as referring to a mode of government, not simply a doctrine of limited government (e.g. Burchell et al. 1991; Minson 1993; Rose 1989). They contend that the elaboration of liberal doctrines of freedom, which demanded the constitutional and legal delimitation of the powers of political authorities, went hand in hand with projects designed to make liberalism operable by creating the subjective conditions in which realms designated ‘private’, and therefore beyond the reach of political power, could learn to govern themselves. In making this claim, governmentality scholars do not redefine liberalism as an ideology disguising the state annexation of freedom. Their aim is to show that the celebrated sphere of individual liberty, whether defined in terms of the autonomous individual, civil society, or the private domain, should be understood, not as reflective of the natural liberty of the individual, but rather as a governmental product — an effect of multiple interventions concerned to promote a specific form of life. In advanced liberal democracies this involves “making up” citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 174).

Until recently, the predominant association of governmentality studies with advanced liberal democracies has precluded a consideration of non-liberal forms of governmentality in both western and non-western contexts. Yet the period that Foucault (1979, 1991) attributes to the growth and expansion of governmentality is largely
coextensive with the processes of colonial expansion and administration, hence the
government of subjects at home and abroad was and continues to be intertwined.
Moreover, the focus on advanced liberal democracies overlooks the possibility of non-
liberal forms of governmentality, in this instance a socialist arts of government or
Chinese governmentality, which governs not through familiar tactics of ‘freedom and
liberty’, but rather through a distinct planning and administrative rationality, and which
is nonetheless a product of the same processes that Foucault partly outlines in the
governmentality lecture (ibid.).

Mitchell Dean (2002) extends the original focus of governmentality studies by
demonstrating that liberal government consists of both facilitative and authoritarian
dimensions. The facilitative side can be summed up with reference to the idea that
liberal government rests on the notion of free individuals pursuing their own interests.
The authoritarian dimension involves acknowledging that liberal government requires
the establishment of ‘specific norms of individual and collective life’, which constitute
the desirable forms that freedom and autonomy take. These ‘norms’ in turn become
obligatory and are enforceable (Dean 2002: 40). On the one hand, there is the explicit
political dimension of liberal rationalities that are concerned with guaranteeing
individual liberty; and, on the other hand, what Dean refers to as a ‘liberal police’ — the
knowledges and technologies on which understandings of individual and collective
norms, and the means of ensuring their realization, are founded (ibid.: 41).

Barry Hindess (2001) further contends that authoritarian measures are not just auxiliary
measures within liberal rationalities; they are actually constitutive of them. Hindess
(2001: 101) notes that the subjects of liberal political reason are differentiated in ways that allow for the ‘illiberal rule’, or ‘government through unfreedom’, of certain groups. First, some populations are viewed as incapable of acquiring the desired attributes of autonomy and self-government and should be subject to extermination, enslavement or, we might add, a process of ‘softening the pillow’. Second, some populations are deemed capable of realizing the desired capacities, but only after undergoing an extensive period of training and discipline (e.g. individuals or communities that are the target of colonial administration or characterized by ‘welfare dependency’). Finally, there are those subpopulations in relatively ‘civilized’ societies who are viewed as lacking the capacity for autonomous conduct due to external factors such as ill health, poverty, or lack of education, as opposed to innate characteristics such as those ‘determined’ by race or gender. Hindess does not consider the ‘liberal government of unfreedom’ an anomaly or hypocritical denial of liberal principles. He argues instead that ‘freedom’ and ‘unfreedom’ are joined at the hip. In some circumstances, the resort to authoritarian rule is both a result of the commitment to liberty and an understanding of the liberal commitment to that understanding. Liberal rationalities not only require certain kinds of subject but also deploy a range of tactics, including ‘illiberal’ measures, in order to produce and sustain them (ibid.: 94).

Such analyses can be used to consider how governmentality is played out in non-western and non-liberal contexts — for example, China. In a chapter on ‘authoritarian governmentality’, Dean (1999: 147) notes that liberal and authoritarian forms of rule are typically distinguished on the grounds that the former governs through freedom, whereas the latter does not accept a conception of limited government characterized by
a rule of law that secures the rights of individual citizens. Dean (1999: 147) questions this distinction by suggesting that liberal government stands among the conditions of possibility of present-day forms of authoritarian governmentality, partly because ‘liberalism is itself interlaced with forms of despotism for those who are deemed not (or not yet) to possess the attributes required of the autonomous and responsible subject’.

Historically, the list of those considered not to possess such attributes has included indigenous peoples, women, homosexuals, and the delinquent (ibid. 134). This distinction is further problematized, we might add, in the context of present-day China where one-party rule increasingly is achieved through recourse to a rule of law and associated conceptions of citizenship, as well as through governmental interventions that seek to govern certain subjects from a distance, by relying on their individual choices, aspirations or capacities.

Barry Hindess (1996) also implies that governmentality studies can be extended to a consideration of ‘China’ when he argues that there is neither a distinctly socialist nor liberal technology of government. As Hindess notes, the difference between liberal and socialist political traditions is often presented as clear-cut: liberal-democratic ‘governments’ recognize the natural liberty of the individual and aim to defend it against external obstacles, whereas socialist and communist ‘regimes’ undermine that liberty in the name of collective interests and priorities. However, both political traditions adhere to the view that government should work through, and consequently must aim to realize, a community of persons who for the most part can be left to regulate their own behaviour. Additionally, both traditions have relied on the more or less successful workings of the diverse governmental devices that comprise the so-
called liberal mode of government or governmentality. Hindess (1996: 77) therefore concludes that what these apparently competing rationalities of government have in common may be far ‘more significant than the obvious doctrinal points on which they differ’.

China’s ‘socialist arts of government’ clearly shares a close genealogy with its western ‘liberal’ siblings in terms of a concern with the biopolitical management of life, but Chinese governmentality differs from liberal western variants in its perception of the limits regarding what can be known about the object to be governed (Sigley 2009). Liberal reasoning is ‘sceptical’ about the possibility of knowing the object to be governed in detail and thereby employs an array of indirect methods of shaping human conduct. In contrast, China’s socialist governmentality, especially as it developed during the Maoist period, claimed that through the science of Marxism–Leninism it was possible not only to ‘know’ the object to be governed, but also to predict the precise outcome of any possible intervention. This totalizing assumption facilitated the implementation of more direct and coercive interventions during the Maoist period, for example, against certain aspects of the natural world and those designated as counter-revolutionaries, in order to assure the life of socialism and the revolutionary people (see Michael Dutton; Lisa Hoffman, in this volume).

The revolutionary and scientistic hubris of Chinese socialism has given way somewhat in the post-1978 era of ‘reform and openness’ to calculations and strategies which call for governing through market mechanisms and autonomy. As China began to integrate more closely with the global order, beginning in the 1970s with admission into the
United Nations, and especially after the adoption of market-based economic reforms in 1978 and the subsequent repudiation of Maoist mass-mobilization politics, the PRC Government began to adopt different international accounting practices, forms of economic and social measurement, and so on. The social sciences, which were kept under tight political and ideological control during the Maoist period, underwent a significant revival in the 1980s as the central government called for the input of expertise into its ambitious plan for ‘social engineering’ (shehui gongcheng) and the ‘construction of socialist material and spiritual civilization’ (jianshe shehui zhuyi wuzhi yu jingshen wenming). Working with key global governing institutions that have become synonymous with a global neoliberalism, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the PRC Government has launched its own programmes of economic rationalization and marketization in the fields of employment, education, environment sustainability, health, and so forth (see Feng Xu; Russell Harwood; Lisa Hoffman; and Elaine Jeffreys and Huang Yingying, in this volume).

However, these new calculations and strategies have not completely supplanted the teleological ethos and imperatives of ‘scientific socialism’. In fact, the 1980s were witness to the reinvigoration of a planning mentality, most spectacularly in the field of population planning (Sigley 2004: 457–82); and, sometimes almost verging on ‘scientism’, a wave of technocratic reasoning drawing upon, *inter alia*, systems theory, futurism, and corporate managerialism (Greenhalgh 2005: 253–76). Instead, these new calculations and strategies have become an integral part of the new technoscientific-administrative Party-state — a mixture of conventional Chinese socialist technologies of government such as the ‘mass line’ and seemingly neoliberal strategies designed to
govern through the desires of individuals conceived of as consumers, property-owners, job seekers, and citizens (not as workers for the revolution). It is this combination of market autonomy and technoscientific administrative regulation that characterizes the ‘socialist market economy’ and Deng Xiaoping’s notion of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi).

**Governing the socialist market economy: from ‘government’ to ‘governance’**

China’s official endorsement of a programme of ‘reform and openness’ at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978 is rightly regarded as a major historical watershed of world significance. The year 1992 is also acknowledged as historically significant, but generally for the final downfall of the Soviet Union. The ‘end of history’ thesis that triumphantly accompanied the collapse of state socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has tended to overshadow two important events that took place in China in the same year. These events arguably have had just as far-reaching regional and global implications.

In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping came out of semi-retirement to embark on a ‘southern tour’ of China’s Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which were established in the late 1970s as export processing zones, and to the then somewhat stagnant metropolis of Shanghai. The purpose of Deng’s journey was to re-kick-start the reform process following the ‘loss of direction’ that had accompanied the violent crushing of student and worker demonstrations in June 1989. In the accompanying lectures to this tour, Deng called for greater boldness from Party and government in
implementing reform and opening up. They should not, he instructed, ‘act like women with bound feet’. Socialism, Deng continued, is not to be judged according to whether it is based on the plan or the market but on whether or not it expands and develops the productive forces and raises the standard of living. On the relationship between reform, opening up to the outside world, and changing practices of management and government, he said:

… if we want socialism to achieve superiority over capitalism, we should not hesitate to draw on the achievements of all cultures and to learn from other countries, including the developed capitalist countries, all advanced methods of operation and techniques of management that reflect the laws governing modern socialized production (Deng Xiaoping 1994: 361–2).

Close on the heels of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’ came the convening of the Fourteenth Party Congress of the CCP in October 1992. In his report to the Congress, Party General-Secretary Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) capitalized on the momentum created by Deng, to declare that the object of economic reform was henceforth to construct a ‘socialist market economy’ (Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 1996: 1–47). The use of the term ‘socialist market economy’ in this instance — its first use in an official document — represented a significant conceptual shift for a Party and government that had long upheld the superiority of socialist planning. It unleashed a flurry of intellectual activity across China as people began to discuss the implications for all manner of activity, including the practice of government.
Although governmental reform had been ongoing in China throughout the 1980s, Jiang Zemin’s endorsement of a market-based model for socialist economic development in 1992 created an unprecedented focus for rethinking the very ‘function of government’ (zhengfu zhineng). Wu Jinglian (2002: 308), a prominent economist and formative figure in conceiving the socialist market economy, notes that reform of the system of government (zhengfu tizhi gaige) had previously remained limited in scope due to a lack of consensus as to where China’s reforms were heading. Wu does not suggest that the concept of a socialist market economy made the task of reforming the governmental system any easier, but he does imply that it facilitated a major reconceptualization of state-society relations and the role of government. From about this time, official and scholarly texts begin to engage in a wide-ranging discussion centred on ‘the transformation in government function’ (zhengfu zhineng zhuanbian) and the discourse of governance (zhili) begins to appear in associated policy statements (Yu Keping 2002: 194).

Attempts to rethink the role of government in the context of the socialist market economy were accompanied by a developing critique of the system of socialist planning and associated forms of government. One of the hallmarks of Maoist-era socialist planning was a system of quotas, rewards and punishments, and over-reliance on administrative commands. Commencing in the 1980s, critics of this system argued that administrative intervention was heavy-handed and had a detrimental effect on ‘relations between the Party and the masses’ (dangqun guanxi). As they argued, the target subject of the planned economy was viewed as a passive, dehumanized object of instrumental reasoning, whereas the market — through the mechanism of competition and individual
autonomy and initiative — would generate an environment conducive to forging superior citizens and enterprises. They further argued that the market had the capacity to link China to the rest of the world insofar as the competition between individuals, communities and enterprises at a national level is played out globally as a struggle between competing nation-states and transnational enterprises. In contrast, the socialist plan was a relatively self-sufficient entity, especially during much of the Maoist period when China was more isolated.

Attempts to rethink the function of government in the context of the socialist market economy were therefore also accompanied by the redeployment of a ‘social Darwinian’ view of the world in terms of competing nation-states. Jiang Zeming’s report to the Fourteenth Party Congress on the nature of the socialist market economy is prefaced by a description of an increasingly competitive world in which the economy and science and technology are the foundations of ‘overall national strength’ (zonghe guoli), which, in turn, form the basis of competition between nations (Zhonggong zhongyang 1996: 1–47). The report notes that nations around the globe and especially in China’s immediate region are forging ahead (i.e., the ‘four little dragons’ of Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea). The report also notes the significance of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order. In doing so, it suggests that fast economic growth, not simply economic growth, is required because those nations that fall behind will be at the beck and call of other more powerful nations (shou zhi yu ren) (ibid.). It further suggests that the era of the planned economy and the form of socialism it embodied is over. China has to embrace global capital and develop strategies for
producing both docile labourers and active entrepreneurial citizens if it wants to be an important part of the new global order.

As with general discussions about the shortcomings of government vis-à-vis the socialist plan, Chinese Marxist philosophers, once they neutralized the problem of any contradiction between ‘socialism’ and ‘markets’, generally agreed that the market was conducive to creating superior subjectivities. Lu Jianjie (1995: 22) states that: ‘A socialist enterprise must establish its own subjectivity. Under the planned economy, it is not an independent economic and decision-making subject, but an affiliate of the state … its subjectivity is very weak’. In contrast, ‘[the] socialist market economy demands that the subjectivity of the enterprise be re-made and its tremendous potential be released’, and that which applies to enterprises is equally applicable for individuals. Lu concludes that not only does the market create superior subjects, but it is also only through autonomy or ‘egoism’ (ziwozhuyi) that a ‘true’ subject can come into being. In his words:

‘Egoism’ is the focus of the individuality of the market subject. Ego designates the market subject. It may be the individual’s ego, or the ego of the socialist collectively-owned enterprise and socialist state-owned enterprise with independent interest. Egoism means that the market subject seeks its own interests. Under the guidance of egoism, the market economic subject becomes pioneering, innovative, economical, adventurous, and outward-going. Only by acquiring these characteristics can the market economic subject realize its egoist goals and be a subject in the true sense (Lu Jianjie: 23–4).
Yet textbooks explaining the contemporary workings of government to Party and government officials stress that the establishment of a socialist market economy does not signal a retreat of the state: it requires a powerful (qiang you li) government that simply intervenes in different ways (Li Shouchu 1997: 96; Zhang Kangzhi 1996: 19). As they argue, the role of government in China must change to suit contemporary circumstances because the Maoist-era reliance on administrative commands to allocate resources and set tasks stifled the development of the productive forces and overlooked the potential utility of economic levers such as prices and taxation in shaping and guiding development. Centralized planning compartmentalized the economy and society into distinct areas, hampering flows of information and people, stifling competition, and ultimately making it difficult for Chinese enterprises to integrate with the global economy. Centralized planning also hampered the development of a spirit of innovation among enterprises and individuals, being based on a misconceived notion of ‘egalitarianism’ (pingjunzhuyi). The textbooks consequently uphold the competitive mechanisms inherent in the market for weeding out inferior economic practices, creating greater economic efficiency and allowing subjects to become entrepreneurs of themselves and their own destinies (e.g. Li Shouchu 1997: 91–6). However, they conclude that the shift of the Chinese state towards more indirect methods of intervention does not mean that its governmental role is diminished. To cite Zhang Kangzhi (1996: 19): ‘Any attempt to weaken government power and function is very dangerous. In the process of establishing a socialist market economy the function of government must be strengthened [not weakened]’, even though ‘the kind of
strengthening that takes place must accord with and satisfy the demands of the market economy’.

The development of the socialist market economy in 1990s China has thus encouraged a new form of authoritarianism for the market, one that has many similarities with the notion of ‘good governance’ as it circulates within advanced liberal societies and global institutions. The development of neoliberal rationalities in China and those abroad are related in at least four ways. First, the term ‘governance’, like the term ‘civil society’, came into widespread use in western scholarly and government writings of the late 1980s and early 1990s through the policy texts of global governing institutions such as the World Bank and within the non-government organization (NGO) sector, and was taken up in China round the same time (see Howell 2004; Yu Keping 2002). Second, the rebirth of China’s social sciences has received a sizeable injection from students and researchers that have studied in universities overseas. The fields of economics, demography and sociology, to name but a few, have become conduits for new approaches to government as they diversify and strengthen connections with the international academic community (see David Bray; Feng Xu, in this volume). Third, by 1992, agencies such as the United Nations Development Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, had all been working in China on various development programmes for more than a decade. Despite the apparent ideological differences between these institutions and that of the Chinese Party-state, the scope for cooperation and the transfer of technologies of government was considerable insofar as they shared a common discourse of developmentalism (see Feng Xu; Lisa Hoffman, in this volume). Finally, the NGO sector has been steadily expanding in China and many of the larger
foreign NGOs have contributed, albeit with some limitations, to a changing mindset about questions of government (see, for example, Milwertz 2002).

Yu Keping (2002), Director of the China Centre for Comparative Politics and Economics, and one of the key scholars responsible for introducing and translating foreign scholarship on governance into Chinese, specifically cites the World Bank’s Annual Report of 1992 — ‘Governance and Development’ — as a major catalyst for discussions on governance in China. In the mid-1990s, he argues, some Chinese economists began to take an interest in corporate governance and political scientists began to consider what good governance might mean in the Chinese context (Yu 2002: 194). Yu further suggests that concepts of ‘government’ and ‘governance’ should be distinguished. Government (zhengfu) refers to the Party-state apparatus whereas governance (zhili) refers to the relationships between the government, corporations and communities. He concludes that the most notable difference between the way ‘government’ and ‘governance’ are understood is in the operation of power. In Yu’s words:

Power of government operates always from top-down to bottom-up primarily through orders, statutes, bureaucracy and coercion while power of governance operates mutually, interacting both from top-down to bottom-up and from bottom-up to top-down, primarily through collaboration, coordination, negotiation, social networking, neighbourhood, identity or consensus (Yu Keping 2002: 195).
As the preceding examples suggest, neoliberal strategies based on collaboration, coordination, negotiation, social networking, neighbourhood, and identity or consensus, are now viewed as crucial to, but not outside of or separate from, the operation of (socialist) government in China.

The incorporation of neoliberal strategies into the operation of government in the PRC is captured in changes to the Chinese terminology used to describe socialist planning. The conclusion of the Fifth Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress of the CCP in 2002 was followed by a report that outlines the nature and objectives of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–10). This document is significant insofar as when referring to ‘the plan’ it dropped the Chinese term ‘jihua’ in favour of ‘guihua’ (Sigley 2006b). Jihua was the term used to describe socialist planning in China following its inauguration in the 1950s. Guihua can also be rendered as ‘plan’, but unlike jihua, which implies detailed planning and intervention, guihua connotes regularization and overall supervision. The term guihua is thus much closer to the way in which government has come to be understood in the socialist market economy, while allowing a continued managerial and guiding role for the Party and government.

The incorporation of neoliberal strategies into the operation of government in China is also captured in the official perception of the Party as moving away from being a ‘revolutionary party’ (gemingdang) towards occupying the position of a ‘ruling party’ (zhizhengdang). In a volume dedicated to introducing the concept of ‘service orientated government’ (fuwuxing zhengfu), a concept forwarded at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, Wang Jiangyu (2005) argues that the strategies and institutions formed during...
the course of the Chinese revolution and in the early decades of the People’s Republic have out-lived their purpose. The CCP no longer requires the maintenance of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ through mass mobilization against ‘class enemies’. Nor does society need to be on an almost constant war footing through intense policing and state controls over all aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life (see Michael Dutton, in this volume). Wang concludes that the influence of the revolutionary period lingers in terms of an over-reliance on administrative commands and paternalism, even though society has become far more plural, fluid, and dynamic. Consequently, the Party must alter the way it governs in order to better manage that reality (Wang 2005).

The President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao administration’s current overarching policy goal is to build an all-round well off (xiaokang) and harmonious society (hexie shehui) by the year 2020. There is no exact English-language translation for the classical Chinese term xiaokang, which evokes modest prosperity. However, it was used by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to describe China’s modernization and was revitalized by Jiang Zemin in a report that he delivered to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP in 2002, entitled ‘Build a Well-off Society in an All-round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. In this report, Jiang stated: ‘We need to concentrate on building a xiaokang society of a higher standard in an all-round way’, which means an estimated per-capita gross domestic product of more than 2,000 US dollars by the year 2020 (‘All about “xiaokang”’ 2002). The CCP’s vision of xiaokang socialism now evokes continued economic growth to provide prosperity, but it also sees the need for that prosperity to be broadly distributed and for
economic growth to be balanced with social equality and environmental protection (see Feng Xu; Lisa Hoffman, in this volume). Thus the goal of realizing an harmonious society, which was proposed by Hu Jintao at the 2005 National People’s Congress, stresses societal balance not solely economic growth and has been accompanied by a new stress on people-centred governance (weimin zhizheng).

The crucial point to note is that within all this discussion on the changing function of government in China, the continued importance and necessity of the CCP is not in question. The CCP is the ‘ruling party’ and the one and only possible party that can wear this mantle, hence its cohort of 70 million cadres must be continuously strengthened, disciplined and trained. That task entails strengthening the Party ranks through the injection of new blood and new social forces, such as young professionals and entrepreneurs; disciplining errant and potentially errant members though auditing procedures, improved governmental transparency and ongoing campaigns against corruption; and training officials as professionals to better meet the new challenges of governing China in the twenty-first century (see Brodsgaard and Zheng 2006; Goodman 2008; Shambaugh 2008). Hence to describe Chinese government as either ‘socialist’ or ‘neoliberal’ is misleading. As the chapters in this collection demonstrate, government in contemporary China is a unique and innovative mix of technologies and rationalities, old and new, sometimes united to achieve common ends and at other moments in apparent states of contradiction and antagonism.

China’s governmentalities: governing change, changing government
Chinese discussions on the role of government in the socialist market economy constitute a general critique of the Maoist system and a response to the challenges of governing in the contemporary context. The term ‘socialist market economy’ may seem to be a peculiarly Chinese Marxist notion with only domestic significance (i.e., as a ‘market’ internal to China), but it links the PRC with the rest of the world in ways that were inconceivable under the ideological auspices of the ‘socialist planned economy’. On the domestic front, the market is seen as competitive environment that forges superior enterprises and citizens through a process of ‘survival of the fittest’ (you sheng lie tai). On the global front, the same form of competition is being played out amongst larger collectives, most notably nation-states, as well as transnational corporations and institutions. Questions of government, especially the links between the ‘quality’ (suzhi) of individual subjects and ‘overall national strength’ (zonghe guoli), feature prominently in this reimagining of ‘glocal China’, as the contributions to China’s Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government show.

Commentators often criticize China of the Maoist period and the associated system of centralized planning for stifling individual and economic creativity by blindly copying the ‘scientific socialist practices’ of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Ogdan 1989: 38: Wang 2005). In Chapter 2, ‘Passionately Governmental: Maoism and the Structured Intensities of Revolutionary Government’, Michael Dutton suggests instead that the early CCP put in place a planned economic structure, while simultaneously politicizing virtually every aspect of everyday life in a manner unique to China. This politicization was achieved through an endless series of mass-line campaigns, which mobilized Party-led ‘popular indignation’ based on a question that Mao Zedong claimed was
fundamental to the success of the revolution — ‘Who are our enemies and who are our friends?’ This fuelling of popular sentiment took place in the damwei or socialist work unit, an institution that was meant to overcome the alienation of labour by merging life and work and to which an estimated 90 per cent of the urban population of China belonged by 1957 (Bray 2005). Work units provided all manner of welfare and services — hospitals, schools, housing, policing, shops and entertainment — to the committed revolutionary worker. Moreover, with the curtailment of the monetary economy and the geographical ‘fixing’ of labour to suit the requirements of centralized planning, they ultimately offered the only means of access to resources and rewards in China’s cities.

Mass-line politics and the Maoist system of allocation coalesced to promote affective relations between PRC citizens and new types of comradely political subjectivity that were built upon an intensification of the friend/enemy divide. As people began to ask their friends, their neighbours, and even themselves, whether they were friends or enemies of the revolution, political stance became the determining feature of everyday life. Individuals and groups defined themselves by engaging in self-criticism (ziwo piping) and struggling against selfishness and revisionism (dousi pixie). People, streets, places, and even consumer goods, were named after revolutionary goals and achievements. Dutton therefore concludes that Maoism was a mentality of revolutionary government that defined life itself. Indeed, as most famously expressed during the Cultural Revolution period (1966–76), it was meant to touch people to their ‘very souls’ (Chang 1978).
The PRC’s post-1978 shift to a socialist market economy required the repudiation of mass-mobilization politics and literally meant overturning the Maoist system of allocation and creating both a labour market and a new type of worker-citizen from scratch. In Chapter 3, ‘Governing China’s Peasant Migrants: Building Xiaokang Socialism and Harmonious Society’, Feng Xu notes that an estimated 130 million people to date have migrated from poor, rural areas to developing urban centres to look for work. These people were defined as peasants during the Maoist era because they engaged in agricultural labour and were tied to their rural place of birth by the system of centralized planning. Permitted some mobility in the early 1980s, peasant migrants initially were viewed as an instrumental aid to economic growth, that is, as a cheap and abundant source of labour to fuel the development of export-orientated coastal areas. However, they were neither expected to remain in urban areas nor to become permanent urban residents and their mobility continued to be constrained by the legacies of the Maoist era. They were subject to heavy-handed policing and administrative procedures and denied access to the housing, education and health-care benefits that were once distributed to urban residents through the work unit system. They were also stigmatized as ‘uncouth’, second class citizens and a source of petty crime (Solinger 1999).

The Hu–Wen administration’s acceptance of internal migration as an integral component of national development in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–10) thus signifies a major shift in government thinking (‘Diyipian’ 2006). The incorporation of peasant migrants into China’s developmental goal of building a prosperous and harmonious society has entailed the adoption of neo-liberal strategies of governing from a distance through the development of new technologies of the self. These strategies are
designed to turn ‘low quality’ migrants into active and productive citizens by providing a network of social services and information and trainings about labour rights and responsibilities. This shift corresponds to domestic imperatives and the ‘good governance’ strategies of the World Bank and the United Nations. The work of China’s sociologists, demographers and statisticians, and that of international organizations, suggests that without improved labour trainings and social services, urban-based rural migrants may become an unacceptable social risk in the future. While akin to a revolution vis-à-vis the governance of internal migrants, Feng concludes that the adoption of ‘neoliberal’ approaches functions in circular fashion not only to calm labour unrest and promote social stability, but also to bolster one-party rule by suggesting that the CCP is still the chief defender of (rural) migrants’ interests and without the CCP there will be no future harmony and prosperity.

The Hu–Wen administration has further signalled its commitment to transforming the citizenship capacities of rural and ethnic minorities by providing free compulsory nine-year education throughout rural China by 2010 (Quanguo nongcun yiwu jiaoyu jingfei baozhang n.d.). In Chapter 4, ‘Negotiating Modernity at China’s Periphery: Development and Policy Interventions in Nujiang Prefecture’, Russell Harwood examines the effects of implementing recent education policy changes and other large-scale government development interventions in the Gongshan Dulong-Nu Nationality Autonomous County — a poor rural county, with a large ethnic minority population, in Yunnan Province. Ethnic minorities have been explicit targets of national integration policies ever since the CCP came to political power in 1949. In theory, this meant equal access to improved standards of living both during the Maoist period and in the reform
era. In practice, ethnic minorities in peripheral rural areas have tended to experience standards of living that are considerably lower than the majority Han population (Mackerras 2003: 56–76).

While representing a radical and more inclusive shift in reform-era education policies, the provision of compulsory education to support the relatively new phenomenon of outward migration for work has coded new choices and forms of individual conduct onto remote and poverty stricken areas of China. As Harwood concludes, compulsory education is valued because only those citizens with the appropriate level of education and skills are considered eligible for labour export programmes and hence access to off-farm work and upward economic mobility. Yet the dreams and aspirations to a better life that inspire individual students to become willing subjects of those same education regimes and national developmental goals are often frustrated and destroyed by the harsh realities of both poverty at home and urban-based factory work.

The changing demographics of China’s cities and labour force have also obliged the PRC Government to rethink its strategies of urban governance. In Chapter 5, ‘Building “Community”: New Strategies of Governance in Urban China’, David Bray explains that economic reform not only resulted in a dramatic decline in the state-sector, but also led to the emergence of a more mobile, heterogeneous and economically independent urban population, as long-term urban residents moved to take up work outside of their work unit and rural migrants moved into the cities to find work in the developing construction and hospitality industries. The launch of a nation-wide campaign to ‘build communities’ in 2000 was intended to counter the disruptive effects of these changes by
establishing the residential ‘community’, instead of the former socialist work unit, as the new basic unit of urban governance.

China’s new urban ‘communities’ are premised on a mixture of neoliberal and socialist rationalities in that they aim to develop more localized, economically efficient and autonomous forms of government, whilst simultaneously bolstering CCP support. Residential communities encourage and provide opportunities for urban residents to become involved in local concerns as ethical and caring members of a ‘community’. At the same time, they are still conceived of as administrative entities governed by professional ‘socialist’ cadres with some level of political, managerial and technical training. Indeed, a primary goal of ‘community governance’ is to bolster CCP support at the grass-root level by looking after residents with urgent economic needs and lifting the moral and educational standards of members of the community who are deemed to be problematic or of ‘low quality’, such as migrant labourers and the unemployed. Hence, as Bray concludes, the work of local community activists simultaneously compensates for government shortfalls in the realm of welfare and services, and trains other members of the population in the arts of governing the ‘modern communal citizen’.

Residential communities and the subject formation of urban residents and visitors are being further shaped by concepts of environmental sustainability and ‘green’ practices in order to better secure China’s future. In Chapter 6, ‘Governmental Rationalities of Environmental City-Building in Contemporary China’, Lisa Hoffman explains how the localization of environmental strategies in the form of sustainable city-building is
helping to create new kinds of city spaces and subjectivity in the PRC today. For example, Dalian — once famous as a centre of industry (and pollution) — is now a model of sustainability and investment for other Chinese cities flowing from its success in achieving international and domestic environmental awards. In the mid-1990s, the Mayor of Dalian enacted a locally developed greening strategy based on Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Guan Yu’s ‘garden city’ model. This strategy dramatically altered the social and spatial organization of the city by relocating industry and hence industrial workers from the city centre in order to create an urban landscape that embraced modern offices, entertainment facilities and a ‘green’ aesthetic, i.e., plazas with grass lawns and floral plantings, commercial spaces and pedestrian shopping promenades.

While initially criticized for displacing the kinds of enterprises and workers that were the bulwark of the Maoist period, Dalian’s ‘greening’ strategy ultimately was praised not only for its promotion of environmentally-friendly practices, but also for making the city an attractive site for investment and tourism, and a better place to live. Thus, as Hoffman concludes, the place-making practices that emerge from sustainable development strategies also shape the subject formation of urban residents and visitors. Citizens in reform-era China increasingly are valued, and conversely, ‘not-valued’, according to their capacity to appreciate and engage with the marketized strategies of green city-building and protecting ‘the environment’.

At an even broader level, Chinese citizens are being brought into the terrain of reform-era governance through the embedding of religion into the PRC Government’s vision of China’s development for the twenty-first century. As Susette Cooke explains in Chapter
Religious Work: Governing Religion in Reform-Era China, religion has been an aspect of CCP governance ever since the founding of the PRC in 1949, influenced by the historical legacy of state-religion relations in China but crafted through Marxist ideology which treated it as a social phenomenon destined for inevitable withering-away on the road towards socialism. However, like many social and cultural phenomena released from the political constraints of the Maoist era, religion emerged with unexpected vitality amidst the economic development and social diversification generated by the post-1978 reform and opening up policies. China’s governmental authorities have subsequently re-tooled religious policy, and the specifics of religious work, to take more tolerant account of rapidly growing numbers of religious believers without relinquishing Party-state oversight of religious practice, or the CCP’s ideological commitment to atheism.

At the highest levels of political doctrine, where Hu Jintao’s concept of ‘building a socialist harmonious society’ currently contextualizes the acceptable modes of social activity, religion now finds itself admitted to active contribution to the new national project under the guiding principle of ‘mutual adaptation of religion and socialist society’ (yu shenhuiyue shehui xiang shiyin). Within this social-management environment, the Party-state claims ‘legitimate management’ of any religious development that affects the public interest, starting at the fundamental level of defining which spiritual activities belong in the territory of officially-recognized ‘religion’, and which of these religious activities are deemed ‘normal’ by official state interpretation. As Cooke concludes, through its framework of regulatory mechanisms inside religious institutions — state oversight of institutional religious life extending to administration,
doctrine and ritual, publications, education, and the appointment of personnel — the PRC Government is able to reach into religion’s heart.

The recent provision of sexual health trainings to China’s citizens offers a final example of new governmental efforts to assure the life of the population by shaping the conduct of individuals and certain targeted subpopulations. As Elaine Jeffreys and Huang Yingying note in Chapter 8, ‘Governing Sexual Health in the People’s Republic of China’, sexual health is a recent and controversial issue in the PRC. Shortly after its accession to national political power in 1949, the CCP set about eradicating active venereal disease and the prostitution industry, claiming to have realized these ‘world-firsts’ by the mid 1960s. However, coincident with China’s post-1978 adoption of a market-based economy, prostitution and sexually transmissible infections (STIs) have resurfaced and spread rapidly. The rate of domestically generated HIV infections has also burgeoned since the nation’s first reported case in 1985 and cases linked to sexual transmission outstripped those related to intravenous drug use for the first time in 2005. Acknowledging the potential for an epidemic, China’s State Council issued a circular in 1998 stating that the unchecked spread of STIs-HIV poses a serious public health problem which could threaten national socio-economic development. A 2001 UNAIDS report on China’s AIDS situation more dramatically described it as a ‘titanic peril’, claiming that the country is poised ‘on the verge of a catastrophe that could result in unimaginable human suffering, economic loss and social devastation’ (UNAIDS 2002).

Municipal health authorities have responded to domestic and international concerns about China’s escalating rate of STIs and HIV/AIDS by introducing large-scale, low
literacy campaigns aimed at popularizing sexual health education among the general population, and especially amongst subpopulations designated as ‘at-risk’. CCP-affiliated or mass-line organizations such as the All-China Women’s Federation, the All-China Youth Federation and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, now conduct face-to-face education campaigns that target urban-based students, rural women, and male migrant construction workers, as part of ‘World AIDS Day’ activities. Corporate entities such as Futures Group Europe and Horizon Market Research, as part of the China–UK HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project, are turning condoms into an ordinary commodity to be consumed by China’s huge youth market. In addition, the PRC’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, with the assistance of UNAIDS, has published and disseminated a number of comic books that encourage peer-sharing of knowledge about STIs and HIV/AIDS among members of China’s illegal commercial sex industry (Zhongguo jibing yufang kongzhi zhongxin n.d.; Zhongguo xingbing aizibing fangzhi xiehui n.d.).

The devolving of responsibility for the promotion and enactment of sexual health to individuals and multi-partnership organizations challenges the widespread view that power remains concentrated in an ideologically rigid and unchanging Party-state. As Jeffreys and Huang conclude, sexual health in China is now governed through cooperation with international organizations, the involvement of diverse state and non-state organizations, and the cultivation by individuals themselves of the capacity to regulate their own health and behaviours. This shift away from the centrality of state control towards less direct techniques of governing suggests that the act of managing social change is changing the operation of government in present-day China.
Taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume contribute to a broader understanding of the significant shifts that have taken place in China’s contemporary rationalities of government. They also contribute to emerging studies of governmentality in non-western and non-liberal settings by showing how neoliberal discourses on governance, development, education, the environment, community, religion, and sexual health have been raised in other contexts. In doing so, *China’s Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government* opens discussions of governmentality to ‘other worlds’ and the glocal politics of the present.

**Notes**

1. During the Maoist era, ‘the mass line’ defined the relationship between ‘the leaders’ and ‘the led’ in terms of ‘from the masses to the masses’ and was upheld as the organizing principle of socialist government. It combined two basic but far-reaching strategies. On the one hand, local cadres were required to develop a close and responsive relationship with ‘the masses’, and also to use their knowledge of Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism–Leninism to adapt general policy to localized circumstances. On the other hand, ‘the mass line’ was used to mobilize the population for revolutionary struggle in the form of mass-mobilization campaigns, whilst simultaneously overcoming resource problems and countering any tendency towards bureaucratism and centralism within the vanguard Party. For a discussion of the PRC’s first nationwide campaign — the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries (1950–53) — see Michael Dutton, in this volume. The Great Leap Forward (1958–61)
and the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76) offer two additional and extreme examples of mass-line or campaign-style politics in action. Indeed, the PRC’s post-1978 adoption of market-based economic reforms and repudiation of late-Maoist politics is generally attributed to the catastrophic failure and chaotic nature of both of these two campaigns. Although the era of mass-mobilization campaigns in China has now ended, ‘the mass line’ is still evoked in different and delimited ways to elicit public support for governmental objectives, for example, in assisting the police to fight crime.

2. ‘Softening the pillow’ was a phrase used by white Australian officials during the first half of the twentieth century to refer to what they regarded as the inevitable demise of the indigenous Australian population and their perceived duty to make this demise as humane as possible.

3. Following the crushing of student and worker demonstrations in June 1989, conservative ‘leftists’ within the CCP reasserted some authority over the affairs of state. Although the reform process did not come to a complete and grinding halt, the combination of domestic disquiet as China experienced the largest ‘rectification campaign’ since the Cultural Revolution, and the international opprobrium and ostracism that accompanied the crackdown, meant that the overall process was considerably stalled. This was accompanied by a largely non-public debate between conservatives and reformists (whilst recognizing that these labels are somewhat arbitrary) over the fundamental differences between ‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism’. Under these conditions, it was not possible for reformists to clearly and decisively restart the
reform process. Deng Xiaoping’s very public and high profile entrance onto the scene in 1992 (the ‘southern tour’) was a massive state-media event and Deng’s insistence that ‘reform and openness’ must not only continue, but also deepen and quicken, put an end to what remained as ‘leftist’ influence.

References


