TY - JOUR AB - © 2019, © 2019 Griffith University. This article will argue that emotional thinking and decision-making does not lead to an abandonment of objectivity when we drill down and consider what precisely we mean by both emotion and objectivity in law. In doing this I do not necessarily wish either to accept or to challenge the importance that objectivity occupies in our legal thinking, but merely to reconsider its definition and hope for a more nuanced conversation around its significance, purpose and function. I will argue that if we accept a meaning of emotion that connects it to rationality, and if we accept a meaning of objectivity which connects it to our agency, then emotion and objectivity are not opposites, but rather, two mutually reliant and essential parts of legal thinking and legal decision making. AU - Grossi, R DA - 2019/01/01 DO - 10.1080/10383441.2019.1627042 JO - Griffith Law Review PY - 2019/01/01 TI - Law, emotion and the objectivity debate Y1 - 2019/01/01 Y2 - 2024/03/28 ER -