TY  - JOUR
AB  - © 2019 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press. We study how agents adapt their behaviour to variations of incentives in dynamic contests. We investigate a real dynamic contest with large stakes: professional tennis matches. Situations in which balls bounce very close to the court's lines are used as the setting of a quasi-experiment providing random variations in winning probability. We find evidence of a momentum effect for men whereby winning a point has a positive causal impact on the probability to win the next one. This behaviour is compatible with a reaction to the asymmetry of incentives between leaders and followers. We do not find momentum for women.
AU  - Gauriot, R
AU  - Page, L
DA  - 2019/11/01
DO  - 10.1093/ej/uez040
EP  - 3136
JO  - Economic Journal
PY  - 2019/11/01
SP  - 3107
TI  - Does Success Breed Success? a Quasi-Experiment on Strategic Momentum in Dynamic Contests
VL  - 129
Y1  - 2019/11/01
Y2  - 2026/05/25
ER  -