http://hdl.handle.net/10453/35192 2026-04-09T09:06:28Z http://hdl.handle.net/10453/185586 Title: CEO performance targets: The impact of Big 4 accounting firms versus other compensation consultants Authors: Bachmann, RL; Rasool, S; Spiropoulos, H Abstract: Using a sample of ASX 500 firms over the 2005–2019 period, we document substantial variation in the use of performance targets within Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts, contrasting firms advised by Big 4 accounting entities with other compensation consulting firms. Firms that engage a Big 4 accounting firm are more likely to implement explicit non-financial performance targets within the short-term incentive plan, effectively minimising opportunities for post hoc justification. They also favour the incorporation of relative performance targets that mitigate pay for luck in the long-term incentive plan. Firms that engage a Big 4 accounting firm demonstrate a similar pay-for-performance relation to firms that do not engage a compensation consultant, while firms engaging non-Big 4 consultants exhibit a lower pay-for-performance relation. Our findings suggest that Big 4 accounting firms provide compensation recommendations that encourage the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. JEL Classification: J33, M12, M52, L25. 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10453/185547 Title: Evaluating the sustainability of early-stage production system design: A case study of algal biodiesel production. Authors: Qiao, C; Brown, P; Bajada, C; Labeeuw, L; Liang, Y; Ghannam, S; Pham, H; Wright, A; Ralph, P Editors: Clarke, T 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10453/182752 Title: Market Reactions When Zero-Leverage Firms Obtain Bank Finance Authors: Ferguson, A; Grosse, M Abstract: Prior studies of bank loan announcements depict significant capital market reactions. More recent evidence however, fails to identify such reactions (Fields et al. 2006, Maskara & Mullineaux 2011). In this study, we consider market reactions to loan initiations where the borrower has no prior record of bank lending. Zero-leverage firms are firms that have zero outstanding short-term or long-term debt in their capital structure (Strebulaev & Yang 2013). Using a unique hand collected sample of bank loan announcements for Australian Mining Development Stage entities, we find that both initial bank loans and subsequent bank loans attract significant market reactions. Further, we produce evidence consistent with announcements of such loans reducing information asymmetry which we proxy for with bid-ask spreads and trading volume. Our final analysis examines evidence of bank specialisation. We find that borrowers from the industry leader in terms of loan origination (Macquarie Bank) in this sector exhibit stronger abnormal returns. 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10453/182406 Title: Show me your hand: An examination of voting methods at annual general meetings Authors: Bugeja, M; da Silva Rosa, R; Shan, Y; Yermack, D Abstract: Until 2022 Australian companies' legislation required that resolutions at annual general meetings be decided using a show of hands of those present at the meeting unless the meeting chair called a poll vote. The use of show of hands voting has been criticised as it ignores a shareholder's ownership stake and does not count the votes of shareholders that vote prior to the meeting. Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence that resolutions have been passed by a show of hands when votes cast prior to the meeting suggested that the resolution may have failed. This study investigates the extent of inappropriate passing of meeting resolutions, along with the determinants and consequences of the voting method employed. Consistent with the anecdotal evidence we report that some firms appear to have inappropriately passed resolutions using a show of hands vote. We document firms are more likely to vote by poll when they are larger, have lower stock returns, have greater board gender diversity and lower shareholder concentration. Importantly we find that the method of voting matters to shareholders and that a move away from voting by a show of hands encourages greater shareholder voting participation and dissent at the annual general meeting. Interestingly, firms are more likely to withdraw resolutions with higher dissent prior to the AGM when show of hands voting is discouraged. 2024-12-01T00:00:00Z