On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games

Wooders, J; Shachat, JM

On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games

Wooders, J

Shachat, JM

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 34 (2), pp. 342 - 363
Issue Date:: 2001-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Shachat, JM	en_US
dc.date.issued	2001-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 34 (2), pp. 342 - 363	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15716
dc.description.abstract	We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9. © 2001 Academic Press.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1006/game.2000.0808	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	34	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	34	en_US

Abstract:

We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9. © 2001 Academic Press.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15716