A game theoretical partially cooperative model of international fishing with time delay

Engel, A; Szidarovszky, F; Chiarella, C

A game theoretical partially cooperative model of international fishing with time delay

Engel, A Szidarovszky, F Chiarella, C

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 2003, 18 (3), pp. 549 - 560
Issue Date:: 2003-10-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Engel, A	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Szidarovszky, F	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Chiarella, C	en_US
dc.date.issued	2003-10-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 2003, 18 (3), pp. 549 - 560	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0960-0779	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/3473
dc.description.abstract	A common generalization of the oligopoly model of international fishing of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi [Seoul J. Econom. 11 (1998) 321] and the grand coalition model of international fishing of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi [Seoul J. Econom. 13 (2000) 471] is introduced to consider the case of partial cooperation among the fishing countries. Then, the assumption that there is a time lag in obtaining and implementing information on the fish stock is added. Similarly to the study of Engel et al. [Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Tucson, Arizona, October 7-10, 2001, 2001, p. 2658] continuously distributed time lags are considered. The local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium is analyzed, and in the case of loss of stability the possibility of the birth of limit cycles is explored. © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Chaos, Solitons and Fractals	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/S0960-0779(02)00676-8	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Mathematical Physics	en_US
dc.title	A game theoretical partially cooperative model of international fishing with time delay	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	18	en_US
utslib.for	0105 Mathematical Physics	en_US
utslib.for	0103 Numerical and Computational Mathematics	en_US
utslib.for	0102 Applied Mathematics	en_US
utslib.for	01 Mathematical Sciences	en_US
utslib.for	08 Information and Computing Sciences	en_US
utslib.for	09 Engineering	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	18	en_US

Abstract:

A common generalization of the oligopoly model of international fishing of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi [Seoul J. Econom. 11 (1998) 321] and the grand coalition model of international fishing of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi [Seoul J. Econom. 13 (2000) 471] is introduced to consider the case of partial cooperation among the fishing countries. Then, the assumption that there is a time lag in obtaining and implementing information on the fish stock is added. Similarly to the study of Engel et al. [Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Tucson, Arizona, October 7-10, 2001, 2001, p. 2658] continuously distributed time lags are considered. The local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium is analyzed, and in the case of loss of stability the possibility of the birth of limit cycles is explored. © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/3473