Organizational ethics, decision making, undecidability
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- Citation:
- Sociological Review, 2007, 55 (2), pp. 393 - 409
- Issue Date:
- 2007-05-01
Closed Access
| Filename | Description | Size | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006011421OKfixed.pdf | 1.18 MB |
Copyright Clearance Process
- Recently Added
- In Progress
- Closed Access
This item is closed access and not available.
In this paper we develop a conceptualisation of organizational decision-making as a practice that is, necessarily, ethical. The paper starts with a discussion of the notion of decision-making as it relates to organizational rationality and the relationship between management and control. Drawing on Derrida's discussions of undecidability and responsibility, we suggest that as well as being able to consider organizational decision-making as an instance of (albeit bounded) rationality or calculability, it can also be regarded as a process of choice amongst heterogenous possibilities. On that basis, we follow Derrida in arguing that for a decision to be considered an instance of responsible action it must be made with neither recourse to knowledge of its outcome nor to the application of pre-ordained rules. Illustrating our argument with a discussion of Eichmann's 'I was just following orders' defence, we suggest that rules for ethical decision making, rather than ensuring ethical outcomes, can work to insulate organizations from moral responsibility. We conclude with a discussion of ethics and democracy in relation to responsible decision making in organizations. © 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: