On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games

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dc.contributor.author Wooders, J
dc.contributor.author Shachat, JM
dc.date.accessioned 2012-02-02T11:02:16Z
dc.date.issued 2001-02
dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 34 (2), pp. 342 - 363
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256
dc.identifier.other C1UNSUBMIT en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15716
dc.description.abstract We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9. © 2001 Academic Press.
dc.language eng
dc.relation.isbasedon 10.1006/game.2000.0808
dc.title On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games
dc.type Journal Article
dc.description.version Published
dc.parent Games and Economic Behavior
dc.journal.volume 2
dc.journal.volume 34
dc.journal.number 2 en_US
dc.publocation San Diego en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 342 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 363 en_US
dc.cauo.name BUS.Centre for the Study of Choice en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 1401 Economic Theory
dc.personcode 112051
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Economic Theory en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US
dc.date.activity en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords Maximin
dc.description.keywords Repeated games
dc.description.keywords Risk attitudes
dc.description.keywords Zero-sum
pubs.embargo.period Not known
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Strength - Study of Choice
utslib.copyright.status Closed Access
utslib.copyright.date 2015-04-15 12:17:09.805752+10
pubs.consider-herdc false
utslib.collection.history Economics (ID: 372)
utslib.collection.history Closed (ID: 3)


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