Matching and bargaining models of markets: Approximating small markets by large markets

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Show simple item record Wooders, J 2012-02-02T11:02:21Z 1998
dc.identifier.citation Economic Theory, 1998, 11 (1), pp. 215 - 224
dc.identifier.issn 0938-2259
dc.identifier.other C1UNSUBMIT en_US
dc.description.abstract We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.
dc.language eng
dc.subject NA, C73, C78, Economic Theory
dc.subject NA; C73; C78; Economic Theory
dc.title Matching and bargaining models of markets: Approximating small markets by large markets
dc.type Journal Article
dc.description.version Published
dc.description.version Published
dc.parent Economic Theory
dc.journal.volume 1
dc.journal.volume 11
dc.journal.number 1 en_US
dc.publocation New York en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 215 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 224 en_US BUS.Centre for the Study of Choice en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 1401 Economic Theory
dc.personcode 112051 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US Economic Theory en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom en_US en_US
dc.location.activity en_US
dc.description.keywords NA en_US
dc.description.keywords Chinese medicine pattern identification acupuncture hepatitis C virus
dc.staffid en_US
dc.staffid 112051 en_US
pubs.embargo.period Not known
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Strength - Study of Choice

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