Revisiting key-swapping collusion attack on distributed sensor networks

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dc.contributor.author Tran, TD
dc.contributor.author Agbinya, JI
dc.date.accessioned 2012-02-02T11:06:12Z
dc.date.issued 2010
dc.identifier.citation Proceedings - 4th International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications, SENSORCOMM 2010, 2010, pp. 381 - 388
dc.identifier.isbn 9780769540962
dc.identifier.other E1 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10453/16077
dc.description.abstract Recent study has demonstrated that quite a few well-know pairwise key establishment schemes are susceptible to key-swapping collusion attack aiming to subvert crucial applications that require cooperative efforts, e.g., data fusion algorithms, routing protocols, etc. Previous works against this attack have shown their own limitations. To overcome these limitations, we propose a new countermeasure in this paper. Our approach makes good use of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives and a hidden one-way hash chain to avoid unreasonable assumptions and/or costly methods, and guarantee network scalability. The intensive security analysis reveals that the countermeasure eliminates the possibility of the attack under normal conditions with only a tiny increase in under the worst case. This susceptibility can be eliminated by some additional mechanisms. Lastly, performance overheads are well justified by theoretical analyses and simulation to be suitable for current sensor node generations. © 2010 IEEE.
dc.relation.isbasedon 10.1109/SENSORCOMM.2010.63
dc.subject Collusion attacks, Countermeasures, Distributed sensor networks, Key establishment, Key-swapping, Security, Distributed sensor networks, security, collusion attacks, key establishment, key-swapping, countermeasures
dc.subject Collusion attacks; Countermeasures; Distributed sensor networks; Key establishment; Key-swapping; Security; Distributed sensor networks; security; collusion attacks; key establishment; key-swapping; countermeasures
dc.title Revisiting key-swapping collusion attack on distributed sensor networks
dc.type Conference Proceeding
dc.parent Proceedings - 4th International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications, SENSORCOMM 2010
dc.journal.number en_US
dc.publocation USA en_US
dc.identifier.startpage 381 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 388 en_US
dc.cauo.name FEIT.Faculty of Engineering & Information Technology en_US
dc.conference Verified OK en_US
dc.for 030107 Sensor Technology (Chemical Aspects)
dc.personcode 10742878 en_US
dc.personcode 030858 en_US
dc.percentage 100 en_US
dc.classification.name Sensor Technology (Chemical aspects) en_US
dc.classification.type FOR-08 en_US
dc.edition en_US
dc.custom International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications en_US
dc.date.activity 20100718 en_US
dc.location.activity Venice/Mestre, Italy en_US
dc.description.keywords Distributed sensor networks; security; collusion attacks; key establishment; key-swapping; countermeasures en_US
dc.description.keywords Collusion attacks
dc.description.keywords Countermeasures
dc.description.keywords Distributed sensor networks
dc.description.keywords Key establishment
dc.description.keywords Key-swapping
dc.description.keywords Security
dc.staffid en_US
dc.staffid 030858 en_US
pubs.embargo.period Not known
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group /University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Computing and Communications


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