

Chapter 2

Exploring the need for an Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework in development assistance that contributes to peaceful and sustainable post-conflict societies

Prakash Paudel

PhD Candidate, Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney, Australia.

Email: prakash.paudel@student.uts.edu.au

Dr. Keren Winterford

Research Director, Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney, Australia.

Email: keren.winterford@uts.edu.au

Dr. Yvette Selim

Senior Research Associate, Institute for Public Policy and Governance, University of Technology Sydney, Australia.

Email: Yvette.Selim@uts.edu.au

Over the last three decades, studies on conflict sensitivity largely focused on organizational, institutional, technical, and capacity barriers by ignoring the political barriers. Likewise, existing conflict sensitivity approaches, such as ‘Do No Harm’, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment’ have failed to dig beneath the post-conflict contexts and see the underlying fragilities that can potentially lead to reoccurrence of conflict. These fragilities are diverse, dynamic, and constantly emerging. Bad governance, Climate change impact, stalled transitional justice or food insecurity provide some examples, which continue to fuel nonviolent conflicts and disrupt the path to sustainable peace. As a result, the successful application of conflict sensitivity by development donors in post-conflict development has brought mixed result. In this context, this study proposes Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework-ICSF is informed by political settlement framework to critique, interrogate, and reconceptualize conflict sensitivity in post-conflict development. Such politically informed conflict sensitive approach understands as well as analyses how donors should understand the formal political system as well as informal unarticulated political processes that determine the political and economic behaviors of a post-conflict state. Finally, ICSF advocates for inclusive structures, resources distribution and decision-making, which are crucial to peacebuilding, legitimacy, and development in post-conflict.

Conflict sensitivity, post-conflict, fragilities, development, sustainable peace, political settlement.

2-1 Introduction

Until mid 1990s development assistance used to be taken as politically neutral and independent of context. However, during the devastating genocide in Rwanda in 1994 aid money was exploited by rebel groups to launch attacks on refugee camps and against the government to consolidate

rebel's power (Brown et al. 2009; Haider 2014). Uvin (1998) further argues that development assistance in Rwanda did not fully understand the historical, political, social, and economic context of the crisis and exacerbated social tensions that undermined the effectiveness of the assistance. Consequently, it was realised that aid influences the social, political, ethnic forces, and power dynamics in the local level (Paffenholz 2005; Brown et al. 2009; Haider 2014; OECD 2001; Uvin 1998; Goldwyn and Chigas 2013). In response to the realization that humanitarian aid can inadvertently cause harm in conflict, the concept of conflict sensitivity emerged in 1999 through the project 'Do No Harm' by Mary B. Anderson.

The notion of conflict sensitivity suggests that development assistance is political, and it interacts with underlying conflict risks in both conflict and post-conflict context. Conflict sensitivity can be described as “the ability of your organisation to understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts” (The Resource Pack 2004, p. 2). According to this report, (The Resource Pack, 2004) context refers to all aspects of conflict including socio-economic and political tensions, root causes and structural factors which might lead to conflict.

Advocates of conflict sensitivity contend that development assistance can be a tool to peacebuilding. It is because conflict sensitive development assistance seeks to minimize the negative impacts by helping to find out the conflict triggers in such volatile contexts. For example, development assistance can address rural poverty, social injustice, unequal distribution of resources, or unemployment by including marginalised communities, such as women, minority groups in the development process (Assa 2017; Haider 2014). Such peacebuilding efforts of development assistance identifies and supports the structures that help to strengthen fragile peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (Ghali 1992).

Similarly, several conflict sensitivity approaches were developed to guide this peacebuilding potentiality of development assistance into practice. For example, Do No Harm (DNH) by Anderson (1999); Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) by Bush (1998), Conflict Impact Assessment Systems (CIAS) by Reychler (1999) and Aid for Peace (AFP) by Paffenholz and Reycheler (2001), were developed to analyse the relationship between development assistance and conflict or fragile contexts (Brown et al. 2009). These four seminal works brought a sea

change in development assistance in the context of conflict and post-conflict fragility because they started to look beyond the stated project purpose and looked at a projects' impact on conflict and peacebuilding.

Despite the rapid proliferation of conflict sensitivity tools and approaches through donor-led development programme, donors' development and humanitarian interventions continue to fuel the post-conflict contexts. It is because the existing conflict sensitivity tools and approaches were more focused on conflict context, thus are failed to incorporate the post-conflict problems as conflict risks. These approaches also failed to recognise post conflict reality that more than half of the civil conflicts are the result of post-conflict relapses (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008; World Bank 2011). In this context, this article draws on shortcoming of these approaches to study these post-conflict context, and proposes a new holistic approach that addresses the post-conflict fragilities/realities. Thus, the importance of exploring the post-conflict fragilities including their interactions which shapes the post-conflict socio-political landscapes has been highlighted in this article.

In this context, this research paper, firstly, analyses the complexity as well as the dynamicity of post-conflict context which present challenge for peacebuilding and international development. Secondly, it reviews weaknesses of the existing conflict sensitivity approaches which presents challenges in mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in post-conflict. In response to these shortcomings, the paper finally proposes an Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework (ICSF), which studies the dynamics of post-conflict fragilities from political settlement perspective. Such an integrated framework in my research helps to critique, interrogate, and conceptualize conflict sensitivity in post-conflict development.

2-2 Post-conflict context

Post-conflict is described as a discrete period that marks the end of conflict history and paves the path for socio-economic development (Shneiderman and Snellinger 2014; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008). Literature have defined post-conflict in three different stages: emergency, recovery, and development. There is a predominance of military and political interventions in emergency stage of post-conflict, such as Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), whereas recovery

stage of post-conflict focuses on establishment of basic social welfare infrastructures (JICA 2006). Similarly, development stage of post-conflict concentrates on socio-economic development in a way to prevent conflict recurrence and cultivate sustainability (JICA 2006). It is also considered that there is no risk of violence in post conflict as conflict is resolved with the peace agreement (Barbolet et al. 2005).

However, it is very difficult to define post-conflict as an end date of conflict because there are less evident conflict/conflict fragilities (Baker 2009). Such fragilities keep evolving in the dynamic socio-political post-conflict context. That is why more than half of the civil conflicts are the result of post-conflict relapses (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008; World Bank 2011). From the observation of literature, it is evident that peace in post-conflict is typically fragile and post-conflict encompasses the inherent challenge of addressing those conflict-fragilities to limit the possibility for conflict recurrence. Thus, post-conflict is one of the most difficult time frames to understand as well as operate for both domestic and international actors (Krampe 2017).

2-2-1 Actors in post-conflict

Domestic actors, who are elites from different spheres of post-conflict society, are key players of post-conflict development and peacebuilding. For example, political elites are involved in institution making, political decision-making and its implementation (Grimm and Weiffen 2018) and economic elites provide economic resources necessary for a transition economy (Pugh 2011). Similarly, security elites possess power to control over state security forces and non-state security, such as rebel groups, criminal networks, whereas failure of control over these security forces easily leads to post-conflict relapses (Winters 2011). In such post-conflict power dynamics, civil society elite's role is to challenge political elites from committing any misdeeds (Eyal et al. 1998). Thus, post-conflict characterizes power struggle among various categories of elites.

In addition to the domestic actors, the United Nations' Peacebuilding Commission also acknowledges the increasingly active role of international actors including foreign aid donors and international NGOs in state-building and peace-building in post-conflict transition (Shneiderman and Snellinger 2014; Grimm and Weiffen 2018). Such external actors' involvement in post-conflict naturally leads to the interaction of external actors and domestic elites. In this interaction such international involvement, with the gradual progress in post-conflict democratization, is

often not well received by the domestic elites. As international actors want to drive the post-conflict development with their finance and human resources, popular slogans of ‘local ownership’ become a highly contested issue (Grimm and Weiffen 2018). Similarly, the role of NGOs also becomes ambiguous in post-conflict contexts as these non-state actors are accountable to the donors instead of to the local community (Dietrich 2013). Thus, it has become increasingly important to investigate in how external actors engage in the activities, such as political power sharing arrangement among ethno-national groups, democratic capacity building of political actors, inducing democratic institutions and proportional representation (Schneckener 2002). It is even more important to explore how such post-conflict dynamics has been addressed by the existing conflict sensitivity approaches to contribute to peacebuilding.

2-2-2 Assessment of conflict sensitivity approaches

Development of conflict sensitivity approaches, such as DNH, PCIA brought positive awareness among international development agencies to mainstream conflict sensitivity while working in conflict and other fragile contexts. For example, OECD/DAC in its Policy Guidelines ‘Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation-1997’ for the first time emphasized the importance of doing peace and conflict impact assessment in such contexts (Leonhardt 2002). Similarly, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Department for International Development (DFID) developed ‘The Conflict Analysis Framework’; Peace Building Tool (PBT); and Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) respectively (Haider 2014).

Although existing conflict sensitivity approaches including donors’ tools helped to widen the scope of peace as long-term peace through the development programs, they face several inherent weaknesses. Firstly, these approaches have primarily focused on organizational/institutional barriers to apply tools in practice with less focus on political barriers. It means donors while mainstreaming conflict sensitivity within their organization and whole program cycle has primarily focused on institutional capacity, commitment, and incentives (Haider 2014). While doing this, these approaches on the one hand have ignored the asymmetrical power relationships as the underlying cause of the social tensions and the ways how development assistance can be best utilised to support the inclusive political settlement. These existing conflict sensitivity

approaches have also failed to explore how political elites ignore the existence of conflict with the fear of losing their privileged status. In the same context, Barbolet et al. (2005) also has emphasized the need of engaging political leaders and governments in the application of conflict sensitivity as they are powerful actors to conflict. Such need is even higher when development donors operate in conflict-affected contexts to understand the distribution of power/benefits; the grievances of marginalised groups and support the progressive political settlements (Carothers and De Gramont 2013).

Secondly, these conflict sensitive approaches do not emphasize on the importance of consulting local organisations while formulating and implementing the conflict sensitive policies (Ahmed 2011). It is because such local partners have more knowledge about the culturally sensitive development practices and local capacities for peace by doing justice to the local customs, needs, and practices (Haider 2017). For example, DNH focuses on externally imposed-universal connectors to build trust and inter-group relationships at the local level while forgetting the potential role of existing local connectors which is more effective to solve the local grievances.

Conflict sensitive approaches are not informed by theory to lead investigative inquiry. For example, PCIA assesses possible development impact in political stability, economic opportunities, social order, however it does not help in doing analytical investigation (Jütersonke et al. 2010). These approaches are described more as guidelines rather than informed by any systematic theoretical propositions.

Thirdly, these approaches are silent about the unspoken political structures and processes, such as informal elite networks or traditional elite institutions that significantly impact the outcome of development projects. Because of the prevalence of such institutions at the local level, even the inclusive development policy interventions help perpetuates the historical marginalisation and contributes to the conflict triggers.

Fourthly, conflict sensitive approaches by their very nature have largely focused on conflict context where conflict causes are more explicit. In contrast, these approaches are less focused on peacebuilding processes in post-conflict (Ahmed 2015). They do the conflict analysis in the conflict or conflict-prone context through the study of actors, context, causes and dynamics (Haider 2017; Bush 1998), whereas conflict causes, and actors are not always explicit in the


context of post-conflict. Similarly, conflict fragilities in post-conflict are different than in the conflict situation, which have not been incorporated by these existing conflict sensitivity approaches. It is because of the absence of study of underlying conflict dynamics, donors need to address the different types of conflict risks in post-conflict in a holistic way.

2-3- Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework

After a careful consideration of conflict sensitivity literature, I identified the need for a politically informed holistic conflict sensitivity approach. So, I am proposing the Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework-ICSF, which is informed by the Political Settlement Framework (PSF). PSF illustrates the pattern of distribution of organisational power and benefits, decision-making between dominant elites, and the principles that govern these processes (Khan 2010; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Di John and Putzel 2009; Pospisil and Rocha Menocal 2017; Menocal 2017; Simangan and Bose 2021). Such political settlement perspective to the post-conflict

fragilities through Integrated Conflict Sensitive Framework helps to address the inherent weaknesses in the existing conflict sensitivity approaches discussed. above. Figure 1:

Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework - ICSF



The application of the ICSF serves three basic purposes. Firstly, it helps to explore the donor's practice related to post-conflict risks, such as social exclusion, weak governance, unjustified transitional justice, and climate change-conflict in holistic way (as shown in the top of the figure). Secondly, the framework helps to unravel the interaction of these fragilities, indicated by arrows in the figure, where addressing one risk unintentionally may cause to escalate other risks that hampers the overall positive peace and sustainable development in post-conflict. Thirdly, the ICSF, through the political settlement mapping¹ allows to dig beneath the post-conflict fragilities to explore how powerful actors through the powerful institutions exert their influence that only worsens the peace in post-conflict. In addition, the framework helps to analyse how socio-political, economic, and ecological processes and outcomes can be shaped by elites in order to fulfill their personal purpose. Thus, the integrated framework allows external actors to maximize windows of opportunities for addressing fragilities and strengthening resilience in post-conflict. In rest of this chapter the framework is explained more in detail.

2-3-1 Post-conflict fragilities and political settlement

Conflict fragilities in post-conflict are very diverse. Legacies of recent violence, under-development, socio-economic inequalities, weak governmental institutions, food and health insecurity, and fragile peace best characterize a post-conflict society (United Nations 2009; Greeley 2007; JICA 2006; Brown, Langer, and Stewart 2011). Similarly, a post-conflict context can include traumatization of civilians; internally displaced people; ex-combatants; disaffected youths as conflict victims; and underrepresentation of ethnically diverse groups (Gullette and Rosenberg 2015). These experiences can be a source conflict recurrence if individual or groups' needs, and priorities are not addressed in post-conflict (Modvig et al. 2000; AusAid 2011; Lambourne 2008).

Similarly, extensive literature have also identified that unequal natural resource governance and climate related environmental impact which is adding additional security risks in post-conflict (Rüttinger et al. 2015; Krampe 2014; Van Houten 2007). Climate and environmental risks are caused by resource competition and livelihood insecurity, which is further compounded by climate

¹ The concept of political settlement mapping is borrowed from Parks and Cole (2010) to inform Integrated Conflict Sensitive Framework (ICSF).

change. In this context, post-conflict state-building should be conflict sensitive to address those underlying post-conflict fragilities and support sustainable peace and development.

All these above-mentioned fragilities in post-conflict in this chapter are categorized in five main types of risks. These fragilities are informed by the various literature, which can be a threat to peace and sustainability in post-conflict contexts. Because of presence of these underlying fragilities, there is a greater need to combine development needs in post-conflict with peace and conflict analysis. I introduce these five types of post-conflict fragilities next.

2-3-1-1 Socio-economic-political exclusions

Historical deep-seated marginalisation and exclusion is recognised as one of the main causes of conflict (Brown, Langer, and Stewart 2008) as a result horizontal inequalities best characterizes post-conflict societies. Post-conflict typically encompasses marginalised groups in terms of ethnic, social, religious or gender. These groups often lack access to formal institutions and decision-making (Laws 2012). Literature has suggested that such historical marginalisation further gets compounded when they are disproportionately victimised by the ongoing crisis, such as climate change, Covid-19 in developing world context including in post-conflict societies (Morrissey 2020; Detges et al. 2020). So, there is a strong need for development actors to be as inclusive as possible to include gender, ethnicities, religious groups, geographical regions, conflict victims, and climate change victims while working in post-conflict.

Though the existing approaches to conflict sensitivity have established the issue of social exclusion as one of the driving factors of conflict, they have not explored how social exclusion has its roots in power relationship between elites and non-elites. Similarly, compounded networks of formal and informal institutions especially in the local level and their role in perpetuating exclusive behaviors is under investigated. Conflict sensitive approaches remain silent about the ways international development work in post-conflict can influence inclusive decision-making processes and outcome in the name of democratisation of post-war country.

If we dig beneath to the problem of exclusion, violation of power sharing arrangements and precipitating exclusionary behaviours by the dominant elites are the most dominant causal factor of conflict occurrences in post-conflict and greatest obstacle for sustainable peace (Call 2012; Bogati et al. 2017; Drucza 2017; Brinkerhoff 2005; Brown et al. 2009; Walter 2004). To

understand such power dynamics, donors should be able to analyse how formal as well as informal institutions and policy formulations are captured to serve the elite interests (Castillejo 2014) through economic resources sharing and rent redistribution (Stewart 2011). It is equally important to analyse local informal power structures and dynamics that may perpetuate locally marginalized groups, such as minorities and women (Haider 2017). Failure to understand such power dynamics eventually exacerbates “tensions between elites and between elite interests and the wider society, which lead to ‘the wrong peace’ (Khan 2010). For example, political leadership’s inability to include the minority groups in the political settlement after conflict relapsed into the conflict recurrence in post-conflict in Sri Lanka, South Sudan.

Such identification of power arrangements helps donors to promote inclusive political settlement and address the historical legacies of exclusive practices and facilitate sustainable exit from the violence (Castillejo 2014; World Bank 2011; Call 2012; Lindemann 2008). Thus, Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework (ICSF) helps donors and implementing partners to design the inclusive development policies that can promote resilient and peaceful societies in a way to help avoiding the possibility of recurrence of violence in post-conflict. To work in this direction, it utilises the power of local formal/informal institutions to bring local solutions to the problem of exclusion in post-conflict.

2-3-1-2 Stagnant transitional justice

Stalled transitional justice processes in post-conflict may encourage conflict victims to revert to conflict. The transitional justice process may reproduce the existing tensions by representing the conflict victims’ diverse experiences in single narrative; through the struggle over controlling resources among various groups of victims, ex-combatants, perpetrators; by challenging the power and vested interests (Haider 2017). It is because such transitional justice processes are also heavily influenced by asymmetrical power relationships, which reproduces existing inequalities by denying justice to the oppressed groups or communities, such as women, marginalized ethnic groups. Moreover, politicians are often involved in ignoring directives given by judiciary and human rights commissions related to human rights violations and victims’ rights to serve the interests in power. If development assistance can’t ensure distributive justice, promote re-integration and reconciliation of ex-soldiers, displaced populations, strengthen good governance

through the development policy and project, it may contribute to the conflict recurrence in post-conflict (De Greiff 2009).

However, none of the conflict sensitivity approaches including donors' tools have considered justice to conflict victims or ex-combatants needs as a part of their peacebuilding strategy. Similarly, these approaches have failed to establish that development assistance should strengthen local organisations' institutional capacity to attain equal resources distribution and find the local solutions to the war-time injustices. Dominant interest of political parties/elites behind stalling the justice process is also underexplored in the existing approaches. Thus, the study of the existing conflict sensitivity approaches has found that there is a need of an integrated conflict sensitivity approach which supports transitional justice process in post-conflict that can contribute to the harmony and reconciliation in post-conflict.

In this context, the ICSF advocates that development assistance in post-conflict should be transitional justice sensitive by promoting inclusiveness and local participation. According to this framework, it is imperative for donors to accommodate the priorities of each category of conflict victims including demobilised soldiers, and returnees through inter-group projects in order to reintegrate them into the community that can promote justice, reconciliation and social trust (AusAid 2011; JICA 2002; United Nations 2009). Such type of projects may encourage beneficiaries to discuss the issues that divide them and how it can benefit to each group of people equally. If development projects can promote these transitional justice values, it improves the economic capacity of the beneficiaries and in overall creates the enabling environment for developmental activities (Haider 2017).

Moreover, the ICSF framework also believes that donors can involve in supporting post-conflict governments and powerful political leaders to recognize the individuals or groups' victimization through more inclusive political settlement (Haider 2017). Inclusive settlement is equally important to include gender and victims from marginalized communities in the narratives and decision-making forums (Haider 2017).

2-3-1-3 Weak governance

Weak governance refers to the situation, where governmental institutions are not strong enough for equitable service delivery and distribution of resources and fail to maintain rule of law and

control corruption (Goldfinch, DeRouen Jr, and Pospieszna 2013). Since weak governance heightens conflict, inclusive and effective governance is a precondition to maintain positive peace in post-conflict. For example, when governmental institutions fail to deliver the public goods, such as safe water and sanitation equally to its citizen, the resulted dissatisfaction encourages people to take part in violence (Addison and Murshed 2005; Brown, Langer, and Stewart 2011; Krampe and Gignoux 2018).

Similarly, local governance often consists of traditional and local system of service delivery, competing traditional elites and local civil society organizations which remain outside the formal institutions in post-conflict. If donors fail to recognize these non-state forms of organizations in post-conflict assistance, it will help the post-conflict society backslide from peace to violence (Richmond 2010; Goldfinch and DeRouen Jr 2014; Brinkerhoff 2005). For example, post-conflict Afghanistan witnessed the competition between formal and informal governance systems run by regional warlords and local commanders leading it to the heightened conflict.

In this context, the ICSF argues that development assistance needs to promote inclusive governance by establishing relationship between formal and informal at the local level. For example, leaving some decision-making roles to local elites and landlords while limiting their rights on control over local resources (Wilder and Lister 2007) helps to bridge such gaps. Similarly, creating or supporting new formal or informal institutions, such as women and youths' committees with adequate resources and capacities also contribute to reshape the power relations within communities (Mosello and Ruttinger 2019). Such conflict sensitive approach "would involve building on a detailed understanding of existing indigenous governance norms and approaches to ensure that new approaches and interventions actually serve to consolidate peace, and do not entrench existing inequitable or unjust power structures" Barbolet et al. (2005, 13).

Similarly, donors' role is paramount for development of local organizations to strengthen positive peace and 'conflict-sensitive democratization' in post-conflict. So, donors should provide funding to the Grass Root Organisations (GROs) to build their capacity for dispute resolution mechanisms, enhance their transparency, legitimacy, and accountability to the grassroots people (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Goldfinch and DeRouen Jr 2014; Goldfinch, DeRouen Jr, and Pospieszna 2013). It is because weak political and accountability institutions are unable to provide the durable and peaceful solutions to the causes of conflict, outbreaks instead intensify the incentives for violence

(Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg 2012). While building their capacity it is equally important to get local actors involved in institutional models, which captures the local realities instead of imposing the so called ‘best governance practices’ from elsewhere (AusAid 2011).

In this way, ICSF takes these good governance agendas described above as an organizing principle to enhance government legitimacy, support state-building and peacebuilding by donors in in post-conflict. To work in this direction, donors need to understand and positively influence the overarching political settlement to address these sub-national socio-political realities thorough inclusive governance.

2-3-1-4 Climate change-conflict

Climate change is increasingly being taken as a security threat in post-conflict. It exacerbates the chances of conflict reoccurrence in post-conflict resulting from local natural resources competition (Abrahams 2020; Krampe 2017), livelihood insecurity (AusAid 2011). Climate change adaptation policies in post-conflict often create unintended negative effects, such as unsustainable resource sharing (Lukas Ruttinger 2015). Such policies in some contexts are used to consolidate elite power bases that perpetuates unjust social practices. So, there is a greater need to address such conflict risks in order enhance effectiveness of development assistance in post-conflict.

Literature on climate security has found that climatic change driven impacts on natural resource exacerbates the other drivers of conflict, such as political marginalisation, poverty and weak governmental institutions which breeds inter-group violence (Koubi 2019; Malamud 2018; Krampe and Sherman 2020; Mosello and Ruttinger 2019; Detges et al. 2020). For example, climate change impacts more disproportionately to the poor and other marginalised groups, who have less resilience for the natural shocks and less support from their governments. Post-conflict context becomes more fragile when victims of climate change are excluded from processes of resolving resource conflicts and underrepresented in national political processes (Detges et al. 2020).

Though greater need of environmental peacebuilding in post-conflict has been increasingly emphasized in the academic literatures very recently, development donors have failed to incorporate climate security threat in their conflict sensitivity tools and approaches. Some donors,

such as EU, UNDP have developed tools, such as Climate Risk Assessment, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) Guidelines but they are not systematic framework informed by theory. More importantly, interaction of power dynamics with climate change that exacerbates the conflict risks in post-conflict has largely been ignored by the contemporary conflict sensitivity approaches. Thus, the Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework (ICSF) takes this climate-conflict dynamics into consideration in order to contribute to the positive peace and development in post-conflict context.

Moreover, the ICSF argues that climate change resilient programs can also be used by political elites to strengthen unjust political settlement and weaken the legitimacy of governmental institutions. Resources allocated to climate change adaptation programs is often used by the powerful groups for political purpose to strengthen patronage networks and consolidate power bases (Reiling and Brady 2015). For example, competition for natural resources at the local level in Somalia was driven by the competition among national elites to control those resources (Webersik 2008). Similarly, these elites capitalize on climate change effects to exploit social vulnerabilities, resources competition, deteriorating livelihoods for political purpose (Krampe and Sherman 2020; van Baalen and Mobjörk 2016). For example, they can instigate inter-group violence in way to get continuous support from the other groups, who are largely dependent on those elites (Kahl 1998). On the other hand, such resources can be used to support the formal networks by ignoring the informal organisations, such as customary rights, thus such marginalisation may fuel grievances at the local level.

Development assistance in post-conflict should be concerned about sustainable utilization of resources, their equitable distribution to empower the marginalised groups and avert uncontrolled exploitation and injustices in a way to facilitate coordination among the people and different interest groups (JICA 2002; Krampe 2017; Ratner et al. 2017; Jensen and Lonergan 2012; Rüttinger et al. 2015; Krampe and Sherman 2020). Similarly, Detges et al. (2020) argues that peacebuilding in post-conflict need to be climate sensitive to ensure climate change impacts do not inadvertently increase the risk of conflict. In this context, the ICSF contributes to the climate change sensitive development assistance by positively addresses the unequal power balance in the local level to find out the sustainable solutions to these problems. Thus, the framework supports “the ecological foundations for socially, economically and politically resilient peace” Krampe (2017, p. 1).

2-3-1-5 Food and health insecurity

Political power struggles, weak governance, climate change has posed additional threat in food security and sustaining peace in post-conflict. It is highly important to focus on unequal power relations between elites and non-elites that impacts access and distribution of water and land that leads to the food insecurity to the extremely vulnerable populations (Nyborg et al. 2012). State institutions' delivery capacity as well as local coping capacity to deal with livelihood insecurity gets collapsed during the conflict which becomes fertile ground for politicization of resources and persistent social tensions in post-conflict (Upreti, Sharma, and Paudel 2014). Such resource competition is also caused due to the historical practices denying rights to the socially and economically marginalised communities who are denied from basic livelihood needs. Food insecurity in post-conflict is not taken as one of the imminent causes that may easily lead to conflict recurrence, thus is not addressed by the political leadership and post-conflict government before the conflict escalates.

Strong health care system that ensures life-saving cares to all including different types of marginalised and vulnerable groups in post-conflict, is essential to sustain peace after the conflict. In order to strengthen health care systems and deliver equitable health care by prioritizing gender and disability inclusion in such context, institutions in both national and municipal level need to be strengthened that can promote inclusive service delivery (DFAT 2022). Addressing such health inequities is particularly more important in post-conflict because such unequal access remained there in pre-conflict and is exacerbated when there is conflict (Pavignani 2005). In this context, development partners should invest in strengthening government's accountability to its citizens and manage social protection programs that ultimately contributes to the statebuilding and widen the prospects for peace (Kruk et al. 2010). If these factors are considered by the development partners while investing in post-conflict, it may reduce the likelihood of recurrence of conflict (Ohiorhenuan 2008). Thus, the Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework (ICSF) takes these factors into considerations while working conflict sensitively in post-conflict societies.

2-3-2 Interactions of post-conflict fragilities

Interaction between social, political, and ecological processes decisively shape the post-conflict landscape. For example, climate change adaptation policies might help to address the existing climate vulnerabilities, but it might help to weaken the government legitimacy and exclude the marginalised groups at the same time. Similarly, targeted development programs to address the historical exclusion may not be equally inclusive to climate impact victims or conflict victims or ex-combatants. So, exploring complex interactions between socio-economic, political, and environmental realities of post-conflict go beyond the principles set by the existing conflict sensitivity approaches including donor's tools. Considering half of the civil war are from post-conflict relapses, such incompetence within conflict sensitivity approaches may inadvertently lead to more fragility and conflict risks in post-conflict.

In this way, through the analysis of these five types of post-conflict fragilities, ICSF highlights that these fragilities are rooted in asymmetrical power relationships which need to be understood and addressed. Moreover, such understanding of the power dynamics at the local level need to inform the intervention that can work towards correcting the power imbalances and unequal political settlement that govern the context in which development actors operate. Such need is even higher when development donors operate in conflict-affected contexts to understand the distribution of power/benefits; the grievances of marginalised groups and support the progressive political settlements (Carothers and De Gramont 2013). Even though political elites in post-conflict are powerful actors, existing conflict sensitivity approaches overlook the role of those actors in the application of conflict sensitivity in post-conflict. In this context, the ICSF proposes political settlement mapping and socio-political-ecological analysis as two-steps process:

2-4 Political settlement mapping

Political settlement mapping comprises three key elements: actors, interests, and institutions. It means powerful elites proactively exert their power and influence in a way to shape and influence the formal institutions and policies to proliferate their interests (Parks and Cole 2010). In addition to the formal institutions, those political elites in most post-conflict contexts maintain strong relationships through informal patron-client networks based on communal or ethnic loyalties (Khan 2010). In this context, dominant elites maintain informal network's power and legitimacy by transferring state patronage and benefits, such as employment, contracts to their clients and

other influential people—businessman, local leaders, state officials (Simangan and Bose 2021).

The ICSF argues that it is essential to study about political settlement to create conditions for change in post-conflict. It is because political settlement in post-conflict often comprises weak, or newly formed formal institutions that involve some degree of elite predation, such as control over resources, corruption, exclusion of political opponents (Parks and Cole 2010; Douma 2006; Lindemann 2008). Similarly, even the democratic institutions are shaped in a way to serve the interests of the ruling elites (Parks and Cole 2010), which further weakens the state legitimacy and increases the chance of conflict recurrence in post-conflict (AusAid 2011; Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg 2012). In this context, political settlement mapping provides an accurate way of understanding performance of institutions and policies in post-conflict “that [can] promote or frustrate the achievement of sustainable growth, political stability and socially inclusive development” (Laws 2012, p. 1).

The PSF “implies that international [development] actors recognise that they have a degree of influence in shaping the direction and balance of power in elite politics that in turn shapes development, security, and governance institutions” (Parks and Cole 2010, p. 1). Because distributing development aid through elite controlled institutions only benefit those elites and their followers (Parks and Cole 2010). So, seemingly successful international development projects later become dysfunctional as they get captured by powerful elites and exacerbate tensions between elites and wider society (Parks and Cole 2010).

The political settlement mapping of actors, institution, and interests provides detailed assessment of dominant forces, alternatives to the dominant coalition, shared interest among coalition, excluded groups, institutions and potential coalition that supports inclusion (Parks and Cole 2010; Laws 2012). Such analysis significantly helps donors in post-conflict to identify and include the historically marginalised communities in the development process. Similarly, development donors become well aware about the necessity of supporting growth supporting institutions and creating new conditions that supports inclusive development and positive peace (Parks and Cole 2010; Leftwich 2007). Promoting such inclusive peace and development outcome ultimately create the foundation for resilient and peaceful societies (Rocha Menocal 2015; Adhikari et al. 2014).

2-5 Political-economic-ecological analysis

When development actors understand the power dynamics through the political settlement mapping, it is equally important to look at both: process and outcome of the inclusive social policies. Process includes how decisions are made, such as policy, social relations, norms, and values, whereas outcomes involve employment and other economic opportunities, social and cultural participation, political rights, voice, and representations. It is because inclusive process does not ensure excluded group's rights and entitlement (outcome) because elites' control over these processes through clientelism in order to serve the interest of elites (Castillejo 2014). This is particularly important to the post-conflict, where social fragmentation caused by horizontal inequalities was the cause of the conflict and that is also significantly posing threat to the sustainable peace in post-conflict (Castillejo 2014). Proper understanding of the dynamics of political settlement helps to influence the political processes, creating and sustaining in order to support pro-poor welfare policies and good governance in developing or conflict/post-conflict states (Khan 2010; Laws 2012; Di John and Putzel 2009). Thus, such comprehensive understanding of the political context helps donors to intervene in formal institutions, or informal norms that can support inclusive structures, resources distribution and decision-making, which are crucial to peacebuilding, legitimacy, and development in post-conflict.

2-6 Other factors to consider

In addition to being informed by political settlement, the Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework also investigates if the development donors are involved in mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in realistic way through long-term financing; coordinated efforts; and capacity building of local organisations. It is because most of the conflict affected contexts are characterized by ethnic and religious disparities and strongly rooted in local traditions, which needs long-term investment commitment from donors to bring desired social change (Ahmed 2011). Similarly, fragmented aid engagement of aid organisations in post-conflict is a major problem in identifying and strengthening capacity of traditional local institutions, which have the potential to contribute to sustainable peace (Barakat and Chard 2002).

Moreover, greater coordination among development, peacebuilding and humanitarian actors is deemed essential to minimize the potential backlash though spillover effects in fragile post-conflict contexts (Haider 2017). The ICSF also enquires if donors are incentivising local

organisations to grow ownership to conflict sensitivity rather than creating a burden imposed by external actors. In order to foster inter-group relationships and trust-building, incentivizing and strengthening local groups and institutions is recognized as more effective rather than externally determined institutions (Haider 2017). Such incentives also help to discover and utilize the existing peace promoting connectors.

2-7 Conclusion

Despite the rapid proliferation of conflict sensitivity tools and approaches over the last three decades, a key question remains largely unanswered: Why do international development actors and institutions fail to integrate conflict sensitivity approach when a post-conflict country progresses from recovery and reconstruction to the long-term development stage? Conflict sensitivity approaches tend to fail to dig beneath the post-conflict contexts and see the underlying and interconnected fragilities that can potentially lead to reoccurrence of conflict. These risks are diverse, dynamic, and constantly emerging and have an important influence on positive peace. Climate change, stalled transitional justice, or weak governance provide some examples, which continue to fuel nonviolent conflicts and disrupt the path to sustainable peace.

Some existing conflict sensitivity approach and some of the donors' tools talk about need of understanding political processes and power dynamics. For example, PCIA has incorporated project's impact on formal and informal political structures and processes. Similarly, donors, such as DFID, UNDP has developed guidelines for political economy analysis and political settlement analysis to understand the socio-economic context in post-conflict. However, such tools have failed to establish existing political settlement as foundational causes of post-conflict fragilities (as described in 2.3.2). Moreover, conflict sensitivity approaches and tools have not been able to do the comprehensive mapping of political settlement, political processes, and outcomes. As a result, they have also failed to provide policy recommendations on how development assistance can influence political settlement to enhance positive development outcomes in post-conflict.

In this context, Integrated Conflict Sensitivity Framework (ICSF) takes account of this complex interaction of this social, political, and ecological processes to address the root causes of conflict and limit the possibility of conflict resurgence in post-conflict. The five types of fragilities, since they are interconnected, need to be addressed in a holistic way. A development program with the

stated objective of supporting gender inclusion must include women combatants or women who are conflict victims in various ways. In addition, as this chapter explored various types of post-conflict fragilities and found the asymmetrical power relationships as underlying causes of the problems, it needs to be addressed in order to support for the positive peace. Political elites are identified as most powerful actors who exploit the formal as well as informal institutions to fulfill their personal as well as political motives, which makes the post-conflict context more vulnerable and peace more fragile.

Thus, informing conflict sensitivity approach by the political settlement framework is deemed essential to create the change without exacerbating the conflict risks. It gives donors understanding about how institutions and policies perform, which also determines the security, development, and peace in post-conflict. Moreover, integrated conflict sensitivity framework helps donors to form the meaningful collaboration with growth supporting institutions which can only challenge the unequal power relationships, which is identified as underlying cause of all types of fragilities in post-conflict.

References

- Abrahams, Daniel. 2020. "Land is now the biggest gun: climate change and conflict in Karamoja, Uganda." *Climate and development*:1-13. doi: 10.1080/17565529.2020.1862740.
- Addison, Tony, and S. Mansoob Murshed. 2005. "Post-conflict reconstruction in Africa: some analytical issues." In *Post-conflict economies in Africa*, 3-17. Springer.
- Adhikari, Tej Prasad, Fatik Bahadur Thapa, Sonam Tamrakar, Prakash Buda Magar, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, and Babken Babajanian. 2014. "How does social protection contribute to social inclusion in Nepal." *Evidence from the Child Grant in the Karnali Region*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Ahmed, Zahid S. 2011. "Peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA): Lessons from Pakistan." *Peace and Conflict Review* 5 (2):12-27.
- Ahmed, Zahid Shahab. 2015. "Development and Conflict Sensitivity: A Case Study of the Application of PCIA in Pakistan." *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 3.
- Assa, Jacob. 2017. "Integrating peacebuilding and sustainable development policies in least developed countries." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 12 (1):103-107.
- AusAid. 2011. Framework for working in fragile and conflict-affected states: Guidance for staff. Canberra.
- Baker, Bruce. 2009. *Security in post-conflict Africa: the role of nonstate policing*: CRC Press.
- Barakat, S., and M. Chard. 2002. "Theories, rhetoric and practice: Recovering the capacities of war-torn societies." *Third World Quarterly* 23 (5):817-835. doi: 10.1080/0143659022000028639.
- Barbolet, Adam, Rachel Goldwyn, Hesta Groenewald, and Andrew Sherriff. 2005. *The utility and dilemmas of conflict sensitivity*: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management Berlin.
- Bogati, Subindra, Fletcher D. Cox, Sachchi Karki, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2017. "Nepal: identity politics in a turbulent transition." In *Peacebuilding in Deeply Divided Societies*, 175-213. Springer.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 2005. "Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes." *Public administration and development* 25 (1):3-14. doi: 10.1002/pad.352.
- Brown, Graham, Arnim Langer, and Frances Stewart. 2008.
- Brown, Graham, Arnim Langer, and Frances Stewart. 2011. "A typology of post-conflict environments." *CRPD Working Paper* 1:1-22.

- Brown, Sarah, Rachel Goldwyn, Hesta Groenewald, and Joan McGregor. 2009. "Conflict sensitivity consortium benchmarking paper." *Working Draft, March*.
- Bush, Kenneth. 1998. "A measure of peace: peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) of development projects in conflict zones." *D-322-Bush_Kenneth-283*.
- Call, Charles T. 2012. *Why peace fails: the causes and prevention of civil war recurrence*: Georgetown University Press.
- Carothers, Thomas, and Diane De Gramont. 2013. *Development aid confronts politics: The almost revolution*: Brookings Institution Press.
- Castillejo, Clare. 2014. "Promoting inclusion in political settlements: a priority for international actors." *Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Oslo*.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2008. "Post-Conflict Risks." *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (4):461-478. doi: 10.1177/0022343308091356.
- De Greiff, Pablo. 2009. "Articulating the Links Between Transitional Justice and Development: Justice and Social Integration." In *Transitional justice and development: making connections*, edited by Pablo De Greiff and Roger Duthie. New York: Social Science Research Council.
- Detges, Adrien, Daniel Klingensfeld, Christian König, Benjamin Pohl, Lukas Rüttinger, Jacob Schewe, Barbora Sedova, and Janani Vivekananda. 2020. 10 Insights on Climate Impacts and Peace. adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH.
- DFAT. 2022. "Health Security in Timor-Leste." <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/development-assistance/health-security-in-timor-leste>.
- Di John, Jonathan, and James Putzel. 2009. "Political settlements: Issues paper."
- Dietrich, Simone. 2013. "Bypass or engage? Explaining donor delivery tactics in foreign aid allocation." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (4):698-712.
- Douma, Pyt. 2006. "Poverty, relative deprivation and political exclusion as drivers of violent conflict in Sub Saharan Africa." *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs* 2 (2):59-69.
- Druza, Kristie. 2017. "Social inclusion in the post-conflict state of Nepal: Donor practice and the political settlement." *Global social policy* 17 (1):62-88.
- Edwards, Michael, and David Hulme. 1996. "Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on nongovernmental organizations." *World development* 24 (6):961-973.
- Eyal, Gil, Iván Szelenyi, Iván Szelenyi, and Eleanor R. Townsley. 1998. *Making capitalism without capitalists: Class formation and elite struggles in post-communist Central Europe*: Verso.
- Ghali, Bhutros Bhutros. 1992. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. In *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*.
- Goldfinch, Shaun, and Karl DeRouen Jr. 2014. "IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL? POST-CONFLICT STATEBUILDING, PEACEBUILDING, AND THE GOOD GOVERNANCE AGENDA IN TIMOR-LESTE." *Public administration and development* 34 (2):96-108. doi: 10.1002/pad.1679.
- Goldfinch, Shaun, Karl DeRouen Jr, and Paulina Pospieszna. 2013. "Flying blind? Evidence for good governance public management reform agendas, implementation and outcomes in low income countries." *Public Administration and Development* 33 (1):50-61.
- Goldwyn, Rachel, and Diana Chigas. 2013. "Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity: Methodological challenges and practical solutions." Access: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/CCRV/CCVRI-Monitoring-and-evaluating-conflict-sensitivity-challenges-and-solutions.pdf>.
- Greeley, M. 2007. *Aid that works: successful development in fragile states*: World Bank Publications.
- Grimm, Sonja, and Brigitte Weiffen. 2018. Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratisation: mapping interactions and their impact. Taylor & Francis.
- Gullette, David, and Dorothy Rosenberg. 2015. "Not just another box to tick: Conflict-sensitivity methods and the role of research in development programming." *Development Policy Review* 33 (6):703-723.
- Haider, Huma. 2014. "Conflict Sensitivity: Topic Guide." *Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham*.
- Haider, Huma. 2017. "Breaking the cycle of violence: applying conflict sensitivity to transitional justice." *Conflict, Security & Development* 17 (4):333-360. doi: 10.1080/14678802.2017.1337420.
- Jensen, David, and Stephen C. Loneragan. 2012. *Assessing and restoring natural resources in post-conflict peacebuilding*. Abingdon, Oxon :: Earthscan.
- JICA. 2002. Research Study on PEACEBUILDING.
- JICA. 2006. Handbook for Transition Assistance.

- Jones, Bruce, Molly Elgin-Cossart, and Jane Esberg. 2012. "Pathways out of fragility: the case for a research agenda on inclusive political settlements in fragile states." *Center on International Cooperation*. New York: New York University.
- Jütersonke, Oliver C., Moncef Kartas, Isabel Dauner, and Christoph Spurk. 2010. *Peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA): Madagascar*: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva.
- Kahl, Colin H. 1998. "Population growth, environmental degradation, and state-sponsored violence: The case of Kenya, 1991-93." *International Security* 23 (2):80-119.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2010.
- Koubi, Vally. 2019. "Climate Change and Conflict." *Annual review of political science* 22 (1):343-360. doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070830.
- Krampe, Florian. 2014. "Climate Change Mitigation and Political Legitimacy in Post-Conflict Settings." ISA's 55th Annual Convention Spaces and Places Geopolitics in an Era of Globalization March 26th-29th, 2014, Toronto, Canada, 26th-29th, 2014.
- Krampe, Florian. 2017. "Toward Sustainable Peace: A New Research Agenda for Post-Conflict Natural Resource Management." *Global Environmental Politics* 17 (4):1-8. doi: 10.1162/GLEP_a_00431.
- Krampe, Florian, and Suzanne Gignoux. 2018. "Water Service Provision and Peacebuilding in East Timor: Exploring the Socioecological Determinants for Sustaining Peace." *Journal of intervention and statebuilding* 12 (2):185-207. doi: 10.1080/17502977.2018.1466945.
- Krampe, Florian, and Jake Sherman. 2020. The Peacebuilding Commission and Climate-Related Security Risks: A More Favourable Political Environment.
- Kruk, Margaret E., Lynn P. Freedman, Grace A. Anglin, and Ronald J. Waldman. 2010. "Rebuilding health systems to improve health and promote statebuilding in post-conflict countries: A theoretical framework and research agenda." *Social Science & Medicine* 70 (1):89-97. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.09.042>.
- Lambourne, Wendy. 2008. "Towards sustainable peace and development in Sierra Leone: Civil society and the peacebuilding commission." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 4 (2):47-59.
- Laws, Edward. 2012. "Political settlements, elite pacts, and governments of national unity: A conceptual study." *Background paper* 10.
- Leftwich, Adrian. 2007. "Drivers of Change: Refining the analytical framework to understand the politics of the places we work: Notes of guidance for DFID offices." *Department of Politics, University of York*.
- Leonhardt, Manuela. 2002. "Providing aid agencies with tools for conflict-sensitive practice: Lessons learned from Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 1 (1):39-56.
- Lindemann, Stefan. 2008. *Do inclusive elite bargains matter?: A research framework for understanding the causes of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa*: Crisis States Programme.
- Lukas Ruttinger, Dan Smith, Gerald Stang, Dennis Tanzaler, Janani Vivekananda. 2015. A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks.
- Malamud, Marina. 2018. "The Environment as a Factor in Small Wars." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 29 (2):245-268.
- Menocal, Rocha. 2017. "Political Settlements and the Politics of Transformation: Where Do 'Inclusive Institutions' Come From?" *Journal of international development* 29 (5):559-575. doi: 10.1002/jid.3284.
- Modvig, Jens, J. Pagaduan-Lopez, Jessica Rodenburg, C. M. D. Salud, R. V. Cabigon, and Carlo Irwin A. Pabelo. 2000. "Torture and trauma in post-conflict East Timor." *The Lancet* 356 (9243):1763.
- Morrissey, Annabel. 2020. COVID-19 and Conflict Sensitivity.
- Mosello, Beatrice, and Lukas Ruttinger. 2019. Linking adaptation and peacebuilding: Lesson learned and the way forward.
- North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. *Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*: Cambridge University Press.
- Nyborg, Ingrid, Bahadar Nawab, Kashif Khan, and Jawad Ali. 2012. Rural development in Swat, Pakistan : understanding food and livelihood security in post conflict contexts. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås.
- OECD. 2001. *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.
- Ohiorhenuan, John FE. 2008. *Post-conflict economic recovery: enabling local ingenuity*: United Nations Development library.
- Paffenholz, Thania. 2005. "Peace and conflict sensitivity in international cooperation: an introductory overview." *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 4 (2005):63-82.
- Parks, Thomas, and William Cole. 2010. "Political settlements: Implications for international development policy and practice." *Occasional paper* 2.

- Pavignani, Enrico. 2005. "Health service delivery in post-conflict states." Third Meeting of the High Level Forum on Health MDGs.
- Pospisil, Jan, and Alina Rocha Menocal. 2017. "Why political settlements matter: Navigating inclusion in processes of institutional transformation." *Journal of International Development* 29 (5):551-558.
- Pugh, Michael. 2011. "Local agency and political economies of peacebuilding." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11 (2):308-320.
- Ratner, Blake D., Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Jon Hellin, Everisto Mapedza, Jon Unruh, Wouter Veening, Eric Haglund, Candace May, and Carl Bruch. 2017. "Addressing conflict through collective action in natural resource management." *International journal of the commons* 11 (2):877-906. doi: 10.18352/ijc.768.
- Reiling, Kirby, and Cynthia Brady. 2015. Climate Change and Conflict: An Annex to the USAID Climate-Resilient Development Framework.
- Richmond, Oliver. 2010. "A genealogy of peace and conflict theory." In *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: Critical Development and Approaches* edited by Oliver Richmond, 14-38. London: Palgrave.
- Rocha Menocal, Alina. 2015. "Inclusive political settlements: evidence, gaps, and challenges of institutional transformation." *Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, University of Birmingham*.
- Rüttinger, Lukas, Daniel F. E. Smith, Gerald Stang, Dennis Tänzler, and Janani Vivekananda. 2015. *A new climate for peace: Taking action on climate and fragility risks: An Independent Report Commissioned by the G7 Members*: Adelphi.
- Schneckener, Ulrich. 2002. "Making power-sharing work: Lessons from successes and failures in ethnic conflict regulation." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2):203-228.
- Shneiderman, Sara, and Amanda Snellinger. 2014. "Framing the issues: the politics of "post-conflict"." *Cultural Anthropology Online* 24.
- Simangan, Dahlia, and Srinjoy Bose. 2021. "Oiling the Rigs of State-building: A Political Settlements Analysis of Petroleum Revenue Management in Timor-Leste." *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 9.
- Stewart, Frances. 2011. Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict: A review of CRISE findings. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- The Resource Pack. 2004. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. United Nations. 2009. United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration Geneva.
- Upreti, BR, SR Sharma, and SB Paudel. 2014. "Food security in post conflict Nepal: Challenges and opportunities." *Kathmandu University and Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), Kathmandu*.
- Uvin, Peter. 1998. *Aiding violence: The development enterprise in Rwanda*: Kumarian Press.
- van Baalen, Sebastian, and Malin Mobjörk. 2016. "A coming anarchy." *Pathways from climate change to violent conflict in East Africa. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) & The Swedish Institute of International Affairs*.
- Van Houten, Pieter. 2007. "The World Bank's (post-) conflict agenda: the challenge of integrating development and security." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20 (4):639-657.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2004. "Does conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war." *Journal of peace research* 41 (3):371-388.
- Webersik, Christian. 2008. "Wars Over Resources?: Evidence from Somalia." *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 50 (3):46-58.
- Wilder, Andrew, and Sarah Lister. 2007. "State-building at the subnational level in Afghanistan: a missed opportunity." *Building State and Security in Afghanistan*:85-101.
- Winters, Jeffrey A. 2011. *Oligarchy*: Cambridge University Press.
- World Bank. 2011. *World development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development*: The World Bank.