Core deviation minimizing auctions

Hafalir, IE; Yektaş, H

Core deviation minimizing auctions

Hafalir, IE

Yektaş, H

Permalink

Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44 (2), pp. 367 - 376
Issue Date:: 2015-05-26

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	10.1007%2Fs00182-014-0433-y.pdf	Published Version	512.54 kB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hafalir, IE https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6731-2848	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Yektaş, H	en_US
dc.date.issued	2015-05-26	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44 (2), pp. 367 - 376	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0020-7276	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/119362
dc.description.abstract	© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In a stylized environment with complementary products, we study a class of dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms and focus on the objective of minimizing the expected surplus from core deviations. For this class of mechanisms, we formulate the core deviation minimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and numerically solve it for some interesting special cases. We then compare the core deviation surplus in the optimal auction (CDMA) to that in Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism (VCG) and core-selecting auctions (CSAs). We find that the expected surplus from core deviations can be significantly smaller in CDMA than that in both VCG and CSAs.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Game Theory	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s00182-014-0433-y	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Core deviation minimizing auctions	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	44	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	0102 Applied Mathematics	en_US
utslib.for	0104 Statistics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	44	en_US

Abstract:

© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In a stylized environment with complementary products, we study a class of dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms and focus on the objective of minimizing the expected surplus from core deviations. For this class of mechanisms, we formulate the core deviation minimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and numerically solve it for some interesting special cases. We then compare the core deviation surplus in the optimal auction (CDMA) to that in Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism (VCG) and core-selecting auctions (CSAs). We find that the expected surplus from core deviations can be significantly smaller in CDMA than that in both VCG and CSAs.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/119362