Revising horn theories
- Publication Type:
- Conference Proceeding
- IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011, pp. 839 - 844
- Issue Date:
This paper investigates belief revision where the underlying logic is that governing Horn clauses. It proves to be the case that classical (AGM) belief revision doesn't immediately generalise to the Horn case. In particular, a standard construction based on a total preorder over possible worlds may violate the accepted (AGM) postulates. Conversely, Horn revision functions in the obvious extension to the AGM approach are not captured by total preorders over possible worlds. We address these difficulties by first restricting the semantic construction to "well behaved" orderings; and second, by augmenting the revision postulates by an additional postulate. This additional postulate is redundant in the AGM approach but not in the Horn case. In a representation result we show that these two approaches coincide. Arguably this work is interesting for several reasons. It extends AGM revision to inferentially-weaker Horn theories; hence it sheds light on the theoretical underpinnings of belief change, as well as generalising the AGM paradigm. Thus, this work is relevant to revision in areas that employ Horn clauses, such as deductive databases and logic programming, as well as areas in which inference is weaker than classical logic, such as in description logic.
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