Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment

Van Essen, M; Wooders, J

Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment

Van Essen, M Wooders, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 91 pp. 186 - 206
Issue Date:: 2015-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Van Essen, M	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137	en_US
dc.date.issued	2015-05-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 91 pp. 186 - 206	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/122086
dc.description.abstract	© 2015 Elsevier Inc. We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium play, the frequencies of experts exhibit less heterogeneity. We find evidence that the style of online play transfers from the field to the lab.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP140103566
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.014	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	91	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	91	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015 Elsevier Inc. We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players bet and call are closer to equilibrium for experts than novices. And, while the betting and calling frequencies of both types of subjects exhibit too much heterogeneity to be consistent with equilibrium play, the frequencies of experts exhibit less heterogeneity. We find evidence that the style of online play transfers from the field to the lab.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/122086