Optimal remedies for patent infringement

Publisher:
Elsevier
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Citation:
International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, 52 pp. 44 - 57
Issue Date:
2017-07-24
Metrics:
Full metadata record
Files in This Item:
Filename Description Size
1-s2.0-S0144818817300200-main.pdfPublished Version741.4 kB
Adobe PDF
This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced. When the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: