Optimal remedies for patent infringement

Hylton, KN; Zhang, M

Optimal remedies for patent infringement

Hylton, KN Zhang, M

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, 52 pp. 44 - 57
Issue Date:: 2017-10-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hylton, KN	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1070-8614	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-10-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, 52 pp. 44 - 57	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0144-8188	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127571
dc.description.abstract	© 2017 Elsevier Inc. This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced. When the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	International Review of Law and Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.001	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Optimal remedies for patent infringement	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	52	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	52	en_US

Abstract:

© 2017 Elsevier Inc. This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced. When the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127571