Democratic theory and constitutional design: Hearing persistent electoral minorities
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2017, 24 (4), pp. 341 - 389
- Issue Date:
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© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017. Questions of constitutional design, that is, of structuring the political relationship between dominant and non-dominant communities, are recurrent across the globe. While the particular issues faced by each state are distinct, at their root lies a common problem: how should legal and political institutions and processes be designed to provide minority groups or peoples with the capacity to have their interests heard in the processes of government? In this article, I explore how democratic theory conceives of, and answers, this fundamental question.
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