Money, Political Ambition and the Career Decisions of Politicians.

Keane, M; Merlo, A

Money, Political Ambition and the Career Decisions of Politicians.

Keane, M Merlo, A

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Publisher:: American Economic Association
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 2010, 2 (3), pp. 186 - 215
Issue Date:: 2010-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Keane, M	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Merlo, A	en_US
dc.date.issued	2010-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 2010, 2 (3), pp. 186 - 215	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1945-7669	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15756
dc.description.abstract	We assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the US Congress. These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, non-pecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that the effect of most policies varies considerably across different types of politicians. For example, a reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by "skilled" politicians, Democrats, and politicians who were relatively young when first elected, but not by politicians who most value legislative accomplishments ("achievers"). (JEL D72)	en_US
dc.publisher	American Economic Association	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	American Economic Journal. Microeconomics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1257/mic.2.3.186	en_US
dc.title	Money, Political Ambition and the Career Decisions of Politicians.	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.for	140213 Public Economics- Public Choice	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.volume	2	en_US

Abstract:

We assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the US Congress. These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, non-pecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that the effect of most policies varies considerably across different types of politicians. For example, a reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by "skilled" politicians, Democrats, and politicians who were relatively young when first elected, but not by politicians who most value legislative accomplishments ("achievers"). (JEL D72)

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15756