当代中国“国进民退”现象研究――兼论中国政治改革的困境 = A study on the phenomenon of the advance of SOEs and the retreat of private enterprises in contemporary China, with a discussion on the predicament of political reform
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近几年来，在中国经济领域里发生的“国进民退”这一新现象一直是个热门话题，见仁见智、莫衷一是。本论文在力所能及的范围内广泛收集资料，包括各种数据和作者自身深度访谈所得到的第一手材料，综合运用新制度经济学、产权理论、公共选择理论、政府干预理论、政府缺陷理论等理论分析框架，采用规范分析、定量分析和定性分析相结合的方法，系统研究“国进民退”这一现象的来龙去脉、前因后果。并且，透过“国进民退”这一现象探讨产权归属、国家干预、政府垄断对中国经济增长的得失利弊。本论文还对山西煤改事件与山东日照钢铁两个典型案例进行深入分析，旨在深化论文主题。 本文的研究表明，中国在本来以“市场化”为主导思想的改革开放进程中发生国进民退这一怪现象，其内在原因在于政治权力对经济的粗暴干预，在于执政党为了维护和加强统治地位而控制经济命脉。这种政治干预所形成的国进民退，严重违反市场经济的基本原理和公平原则，对中国经济和社会造成了严重破坏。本文从政治和经济紧密相连的角度，进一步探讨中国经济体制改革和政治体制改革的双重困境。本文指出，中国的政治垄断和经济垄断两者之间存在着相互依存、相辅而行的关系；经济利益格局的弊端，根源在于政治权力格局的弊端，政治垄断成为中国建设市场经济的根本障碍。因而，遏止国进民退现象的最佳方案是进行必要的政治改革，通过打破政治权力垄断格局来来打破国企的垄断地位，斩断通过国企攫取改革经济成果的特殊利益集团的利益链，让更多的民营企业做大做强，让市场经济在正常的轨道上运行和发展。 The advance of state-owned-enterprises and the retreat of private enterprises has become a hot topic for controversies in China in recent years. This thesis is a systematic investigation on the phenomenon of the advance of SOEs and the retreat of private enterprises in China. Based on the rich sources of data including a variety of statistics and the data generated by intensive interviews, the thesis explores the causes and consequences of the advance of SOEs and the retreat of private enterprises, borrowing analytical frameworks from the theories of new institutionalism, property right, public choice, government intervention and government failure. In particular, the thesis provides an in-depth analysis on the gain of loss caused by the government intervention and monopoly. To shed new light on the theme the thesis also carries out case studies on the annexation of private coal mines by SOEs in Shanxi Province and the annexation of private-owned Rizhao Steal by the state-owned Shangdong Steal in Shangdong Province. The thesis demonstrates that the principal cause of the strange phenomenon of the advance of SOEs and the retreat of private enterprises in China in the process of reform and opening guided by the principle of marketisation lies in the heavy-handed intervention by the party-state, which exercises control on national economy to strengthen its monopoly on political power; that the heavy-handed political intervention runs against to the fundamental principles of justice and market economy and is destructive for the economy and society. From the perspective of the close relationship between politics and economy, the thesis goes a step further to explore the double predicaments of economic and political reforms in China. It is pointed out in the thesis that the economic monopoly and political monopoly in China are complementary to each other and the maladies in the economic structure are imbedded in the political power structure of hierarchies. As political monopoly is the root cause of economic monopoly, the best way to remedy the advance of SOEs and the retreat of private enterprises in China is a genuine political reform to break the double monopolies in politics and economy, block the special interest group from taking predatory advantages and promote the normal operation and development of market economy.
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