Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game

Goeree, JK; Louis, P; Zhang, J

Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game

Goeree, JK

Louis, P Zhang, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Journal, 2018, 128 (611), pp. 1509 - 1530
Issue Date:: 2018-06-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Goeree, JK https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9876-3425	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Louis, P	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3274-5245	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:18:20Z
dc.date.issued	2018-06-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Journal, 2018, 128 (611), pp. 1509 - 1530	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0013-0133	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/67967
dc.description.abstract	© 2017 Royal Economic Society Previous experiments based on the 11–20 game have produced evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11–20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline-treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best predictive performance is achieved by models that incorporate ‘common knowledge of noise’. A model of noisy introspection, which does so, predicts behaviour remarkably well.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP150104491
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Journal	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/ecoj.12479	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	611	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	128	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	611	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	128	en_US

Abstract:

© 2017 Royal Economic Society Previous experiments based on the 11–20 game have produced evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11–20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline-treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best predictive performance is achieved by models that incorporate ‘common knowledge of noise’. A model of noisy introspection, which does so, predicts behaviour remarkably well.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/67967