Strategic Transparency and Electoral Pressure

Moretti, L; Suzuki, T

Strategic Transparency and Electoral Pressure

Moretti, L Suzuki, T

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, 18 (4), pp. 624 - 641
Issue Date:: 2016-08-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Moretti, L	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Suzuki, T https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1804-7416	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:04:46Z
dc.date.issued	2016-08-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, 18 (4), pp. 624 - 641	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1097-3923	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/77680
dc.description.abstract	© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that, when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. It is also shown that electoral pressure can have a nonmonotonic effect on transparency, but a higher electoral pressure always increases the informativeness of signaling and the voter's utility.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Public Economic Theory	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/jpet.12164	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Strategic Transparency and Electoral Pressure	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	4	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	18	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	4	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	18	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that, when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. It is also shown that electoral pressure can have a nonmonotonic effect on transparency, but a higher electoral pressure always increases the informativeness of signaling and the voter's utility.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/77680