Cryptanalysis and improvement of quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol with a quantum one-time pad

Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Citation:
Chinese Physics B, 2016, 25 (8), pp. 080308 - 080308
Issue Date:
2016-08
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The security of quantum broadcast communication (QBC) and authentication protocol based on Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) state and quantum one-time pad is analyzed. It is shown that there are some security issues in this protocol. Firstly, an external eavesdropper can take the intercept–measure–resend attack strategy to eavesdrop on 0.369 bit of every bit of the identity string of each receiver without being detected. Meanwhile, 0.524 bit of every bit of the secret message can be eavesdropped on without being detected. Secondly, an inner receiver can take the intercept–measure–resend attack strategy to eavesdrop on half of the identity string of the other's definitely without being checked. In addition, an alternative attack called the CNOT-operation attack is discussed. As for the multi-party QBC protocol, the attack efficiency increases with the increase of the number of users. Finally, the QBC protocol is improved to a secure one.
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