A Framework for Confronting Key-swapping Collusion Attack on Random Pairwise Key pre-distribution schemes for distributed sensor networks

Tran, T; Agbinya, JI

A Framework for Confronting Key-swapping Collusion Attack on Random Pairwise Key pre-distribution schemes for distributed sensor networks

Tran, T Agbinya, JI

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Publisher:: IEEE
Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Proceedings of 4th IEEE International Workshop on Wireless and Sensor, 2008, pp. 815 - 820
Issue Date:: 2008-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Tran, T	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Agbinya, JI	en_US
dc.contributor.editor	N/A	en_US
dc.date	2008-09-29	en_US
dc.date.issued	2008-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Proceedings of 4th IEEE International Workshop on Wireless and Sensor, 2008, pp. 815 - 820	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/11035
dc.description.abstract	Random pairwise key pre-distribution schemes have been adopted extensively as a preferred approach to pairwise key agreement problem in distributed sensor networks. However, their practical applicability is threatened by the key-swapping collusion attack whose goal is to ruin critical applications that require collaborative efforts. In this paper, we propose a light-weight framework for thwarting the attack. Our framework is a winning combination of intermittent deployment strategy and one-way hash chain. The framework thereby evades undesirable requirements of functionalities and resources, topological pre-deployment knowledge, or costly location-based detection algorithms, yet maintaining network scalability. Moreover, the in-depth analysis shows in the optimistic situation the framework not only completely defeats the attack but also diminishes usability of non-collusion compromised nodes to attackers. Meanwhile, it still maintains network resilience at a remarkable level in the worst situation. Finally, the performance overheads are analysed to be acceptable for use in the current sensor node generation.	en_US
dc.publisher	IEEE	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Proceedings of 4th IEEE International Workshop on Wireless and Sensor	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE International Workshop on Wireless and Sensor	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/MAHSS.2008.4660126	en_US
dc.rights	© 2008 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.	en_US
dc.title	A Framework for Confronting Key-swapping Collusion Attack on Random Pairwise Key pre-distribution schemes for distributed sensor networks	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.location	IEEE Xplore Online (to appear)	en_US
utslib.location.activity	Atlanta, Georgia, USA	en_US
utslib.for	090303 Biomedical Instrumentation	en_US
utslib.for	090609 Signal Processing	en_US
utslib.for	090699 Electrical and Electronic Engineering not elsewhere classified	en_US
dc.location.activity	Atlanta, Georgia, USA	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.place-of-publication	IEEE Xplore Online (to appear)	en_US
pubs.start-date	2008-09-29	en_US

Abstract:

Random pairwise key pre-distribution schemes have been adopted extensively as a preferred approach to pairwise key agreement problem in distributed sensor networks. However, their practical applicability is threatened by the key-swapping collusion attack whose goal is to ruin critical applications that require collaborative efforts. In this paper, we propose a light-weight framework for thwarting the attack. Our framework is a winning combination of intermittent deployment strategy and one-way hash chain. The framework thereby evades undesirable requirements of functionalities and resources, topological pre-deployment knowledge, or costly location-based detection algorithms, yet maintaining network scalability. Moreover, the in-depth analysis shows in the optimistic situation the framework not only completely defeats the attack but also diminishes usability of non-collusion compromised nodes to attackers. Meanwhile, it still maintains network resilience at a remarkable level in the worst situation. Finally, the performance overheads are analysed to be acceptable for use in the current sensor node generation.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/11035